

# **Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration**

**A PRACTICAL FIELD  
AND CLASSROOM GUIDE**

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration  
A Practical Field and Classroom Guide**

**Authors:**

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AND CLASSROOM GUIDE**



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The Centre also aims at maintaining its competence within specific areas of a peace support operation.

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**Website:** [www.fhs.mil.se](http://www.fhs.mil.se)

Together, GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC and SNDC have produced course outlines and material for DDR-related courses given by NODEFIC, PPC and SNDC. This handbook is another collaborative effort bringing together the DDR-related knowledge and expertise of individuals with practical experience from these organisations.

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## ACRONYMS

Acronyms and abbreviations are used extensively by many of the organisations active in peace operations. Many of these originate within the parent organisations themselves, and do not reflect any single standardised practice. This list contains only those used in the text. A comprehensive list of abbreviations used in the context of peacekeeping can be found in the annex of this book.

<b>A</b>	AA	Assembly Area
	AFV	Armoured Fighting Vehicle
	AI	Amnesty International
	AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
	AU	African Union
<b>C</b>	CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
<b>D</b>	DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
	DRP	Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
<b>E</b>	ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Army, Colombia]
	EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
	ESP	Emergency Stabilisation Phase
<b>F</b>	FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]
<b>G</b>	GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [German Technical Co-operation]
<b>H</b>	HF	High Frequency
	HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
<b>I</b>	ICJ	International Court of Justice
	ICMH	International Centre for Migration and Health
	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
	IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
	ILO	International Labour Organization
	IMF	International Monetary Fund
	IO	International Organisation
	IOM	International Organization for Migration
	IRA	Irish Republican Army (Northern Ireland)
	IRS	Information and Referral System
<b>K</b>	KFOR	Kosovo Force
<b>M</b>	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

<b>N</b>	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
	NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
	NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
	NODEFIC	Norwegian Defence International Centre
<b>O</b>	OAS	Organization of American States
<b>P</b>	PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
	POV	Person-operated Vehicle
	PPC	Pearson Peacekeeping Centre [Centre Pearson pour le maintien de la paix]
	PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
	PVO	Private Voluntary Organisation
<b>Q</b>	QIP	Quick Impact Programme
	QTR	Qualified Technical Representative
<b>R</b>	RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
<b>S</b>	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
	SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
	SNDC	Swedish National Defence College
	SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General (UN)
	SSR	Security Sector Reform
	STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
<b>T</b>	TSN	Transitional Safety Net
<b>U</b>	UN	United Nations
	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
	UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
	UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
	UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
	URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity]
	UVAB	Uganda Veterans Assistance Board
	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
<b>V</b>	VHF	Very High Frequency
<b>W</b>	WFP	World Food Programme
	WHO	World Health Organization

## PREFACE

Programmes for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants have become an integral part of peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction plans. There is hardly any UN peacekeeping mission that is not confronted with aspects of DDR programmes. A number of countries have also implemented demobilisation programmes as part of a national security sector reform or force reduction. DDR programmes constitute a vital link between military and civilian aspects of peace operations. The success of such programmes is essential for sustainable peace and development.

Today a wide range of different organisations are involved in the planning and implementation of specific aspects of DDR programmes. There are military and civilian tasks. In most countries no organisation or mandate covers the entire range from disarmament of soldiers and armed civilians to the reintegration of war-affected groups. And at the same time decision-makers in national demobilisation commissions, foreign ministries and peacekeeping contingents have to ensure consistency in planning, financing and delivery of such programmes.

This book is designed to provide a comprehensive overview of all aspects of DDR operations. It is a training book for upper and middle management staff in specialised organisations that are involved in DDR programmes. This is not an academic book on peacekeeping or on development projects. This book brings together know-how from very different professional fields and explains solutions to common problems in DDR programmes.

The authors of this book all have a long background in DDR operations in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Balkans. They have served both in military as well as civilian capacities, in UN peacekeeping operations and development programmes. As programme managers and trainers they are involved in the planning of specific projects and the preparation of professional staff. This practical field and classroom guide has been developed and tested in numerous staff training courses before, during and after DDR operations.

This has been made possible by the unique partnership between military academies, a peacekeeping training centre and a development organisation. The Swedish National Defence College (SNDC), the Norwegian Defence International Centre (FOKIV), the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) and the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) have established a close network for training and advisory services in the field of DDR programmes. All partners have adopted this manual as a training tool and guideline for project planning.

THE HANDBOOK IS DIVIDED INTO SIX PARTS:

The introduction (chapter 1) gives a brief definition of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and identifies the basic requirements for the successful implementation of DDR programmes. It illustrates, with a focus on peace processes, the general conditions and the conceptual framework within which demobilisation and reintegration programmes take place. It also explains the link between these programmes and development work.

Chapter 2 on disarmament defines the terms, goals and target groups for disarmament projects and lists the essential steps and principles for successful disarmament of regular and irregular armed forces and armed civilians.

Chapter 3 on demobilisation provides an overview of the different target groups and of the necessary prerequisites for demobilisation projects. This chapter details the steps of the demobilisation process. Technical requirements for encampment, registration and discharge are described.

Chapter 4 examines the reintegration component of the overall DDR process, defining the general conditions, aims and target groups. This chapter highlights the necessity of looking at integration projects in terms of three levels – national, regional and local – to ensure success. Here the focus is on development projects, employment creation as well as psycho-social aspects of reintegration.

Chapter 5 summarises the conclusions and points out the need for co-operation on all levels, as well as between military and civilian organisations.

Part 6 of the handbook includes check-lists, guidelines, technical standards, a bibliography and a list of common acronyms.

This book is designed to serve as a neutral standard tool for training and planning. With the publication of this material we would like to encourage other organisations and individuals to make their specific professional knowledge available for DDR programmes. It is our hope that better working relations between military and civilian actors on a national level as well as between peacekeeping forces and development agencies can improve the effectiveness of DDR programmes. Realistic policies and reliable programme delivery will help many war-affected people to find their place in a post-war society and to make a productive contribution to the development of their community.

GTZ NODEFIC PPC SNDC



Soldiers waiting for demobilisation, Cambodia

# 1 INTRODUCTION

## ■ 1.1 DDR AS A PLANNED PROCESS – DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONS

**Demobilisation** can be understood as the opposite of recruiting (mobilising) combatants for an armed group. In the military sense, demobilisation entails either disbanding an armed unit, reducing the number of combatants in an armed group, or it represents an interim stage before reassembling entire armed forces, be they regular or irregular. The technical objectives of demobilisation and disarmament activities generally include improving the quality and efficiency of armed forces. Demobilisation helps to reduce the costs of standing armed forces; fewer personnel must be paid, and funds can be spent more efficiently on equipment and salaries. This encourages the modernisation and disciplining of the military forces. Demobilisation also provides an opportunity to restructure armed forces to make them more efficient. **demobilisation**

**Disarmament** forms an integral part of demobilisation when the aim is to reduce the number of combatants or to disband an armed unit. The weapons used by personnel must be handed over to the authorities, who are responsible for the safe storage, redistribution or even destruction of those arms. **disarmament**

**Reintegration** is defined here as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, often necessitating external assistance. **reintegration**

In this document, the term '**combatant**' should not be understood as solely denoting an individual carrying a gun. All members of an armed group can be part of a target group for demobilisation, including persons working in logistics and administration, as well as individuals – especially women and children – who have been abducted and sexually or otherwise abused and who have subsequently stayed with the group. **combatant**

Demobilisation also occurs for reasons other than pure efficiency. Complete dissolutions of armed groups generally take place when a new government or a dominant regional regime questions the **political legitimacy** of an armed group. This generally follows a military defeat or a military stalemate which has forced the warring factions to the negotiation table. This particularly applies in the case of intra-state wars in which none of the warring factions has left the country. In these cases, the reintegration of ex-combatants from all warring factions is a prerequisite for a sustainable peace. **political legitimacy**

Concern for legitimacy is only one of many political and societal **motivations for demobilisation**. Other concerns include: **motivations for demobilisation**

- loyalty of the armed group to a (political) entity;
- political legitimacy based on popular support;
- accurate minority representation within the armed group;

- human security (large armed forces after a war can be seen as a threat that affects the functioning of society and the economy).

## power sharing

Different circumstances produce a variety of motives and options for demobilisation. In Africa and in Central America, demobilisation took place after the end of civil wars or wars of liberation. In countries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, sustainable peace can only be possible if groups that were formerly enemies agree to **share power**. People from opposing sides must be integrated into a common political system and the various military forces assigned new tasks. Consequently, demobilisation is mainly enacted under a political imperative.

## alternative to disbanding

Traditionally, the **alternative to disbanding** a defeated armed group is to incorporate it, in part, into the victorious armed forces. Such new alliances occur in civil wars with a large number of actors. However, reforms enacted at the end of the war will reduce the now excessively large armed forces. This inevitably leads to political consequences if the demobilised sections of the armed forces feel politically excluded.

## civil-military co-operation

It should be noted that **demobilisation is mostly a civilian process, although the military's input is vital** with reference to decisions of methodology and organisation. Disarmament, on the other hand, is basically a military function, and everything that follows the disarmament process must be organised and implemented by the civilian community. A lack of functional government institutions or bureaucracy leaves room for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to assist with these processes. The military will have input, but the decisions and the implementation of such programmes are the responsibility of a national board created for this purpose.

## time pressure

However, demobilisation can occur at any time, not only during post-conflict situations. Whereas demobilisation following a war takes place under **considerable time pressure**, demobilisation in times of peace can be better planned and even tested. In some countries, demobilisation only takes place once all combatants have been incorporated into one set of armed forces, generally under less time pressure than in immediate post-war situations.

## diffusion of violence

The majority of conflicts around the world today are intra-state or internal conflicts. While wars between states can be terminated relatively quickly by diplomatic solutions and troop withdrawal, the solutions for intra-state conflicts are more complex and protracted processes. After years or decades of civil war, a **diffusion of violence** can be observed through all layers of society, frequently exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

## root causes of conflict

The cessation of hostilities does not mean that the **root causes of the conflict** have been addressed. On the contrary, social inequality is frequently aggravated by war, and those who fought to improve their living conditions rarely find their situation to be better than it was prior to the conflict. Hence, demobilisation by itself does not defuse the actual potential for conflict, as it does not remove the causes of conflicts.



## ESSENTIAL STEPS OF DDR PROGRAMMES

DDR programmes do not commence with disarmament, even though the acronym suggests that the procedural order is indeed first disarmament, then demobilisation and eventually reintegration. Rather, disarmament is an integral symbolic and practical element of the demobilisation process, as the demobilising individuals part with the weapons which formed part of their military way of life and often of their identity as well. Yet it should be noted that disarmament can also take place before, during and after demobilisation. For example, when civilians turn in their weapons, disarmament is not part of a demobilisation process; it can also stand alone. Demobilisation, however, should always include a disarmament phase.

The fundamental **steps of demobilisation** are as follows: (1) planning, (2) encampment, (3) registration, (4) disarmament, (5) pre-discharge orientation and (6) final discharge of the then ex-combatants. It is important to note that the political situation preceding demobilisation affects the chronological sequence of demobilisation and the relevance of the individual steps. These issues will be discussed later on.

The **steps of disarmament** are (1) a weapons survey, (2) weapons collection, (3) weapons storage, (4) weapons destruction and (5) weapons reutilisation.

**Reintegration** initiatives are long-term processes which must take place on three levels: national, regional and local. They include the following components: the formulation of a national policy, support for regional implementation agencies, local level emergency aid, transport to selected settlement regions, discharge payments, reinsertion packages, (re)construction projects and vocational training.

### ■ 1.2 WHEN DOES DDR BEGIN?

DDR is part of the **peace process** and an essential confidence-building measure. It is very important to begin implementing DDR programmes while the peace negotiations are still going on, thus encouraging the further progression of the peace process. Peace negotiations are an essential precursor to the conflict and dispute management mechanisms that should be a part of the envisioned system of governance. This system should provide human security through good governance, and consequently foster sustainable peace and development. The reader should be aware that negotiating peace agreements and prerequisites for DDR programmes are not exclusive measures and may have overlapping timelines. The two support each other by building confidence.

### THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PEACE OPERATIONS

While DDR does not necessitate international involvement, it tends to be a component of UN and/or other multilateral **peace operations**. In this context, it is necessary to understand the legal framework and mandates within which peace operations operate.

Three distinct processes can lead to peace operations: (1) a unilateral decision by a state to commit forces to a peace operation or as part of development assistance; (2) bilateral


treaties that may require states to employ troops and civilian personnel to support peace operations; (3) multilateral agreements through regional organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS), or through resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.

Usually, the recipient state must consent to a peace operation in its territory. Even in cases where it would be legally permitted to intervene without such consent, political and other factors may dissuade or prevent the UN from authorising a peace operation. The **authorisation** for such operations is political and as a result economic interests, political interests and public pressure do affect Security Council decisions on intervention.

The mandate of a UN peace operation is normally stipulated by a UN Security Council resolution. The **mandate** must be clear to the armed groups, the states contributing personnel, and the UN mission personnel. The local population must also be informed about the purpose and objectives of the mission, so that they will be more inclined and better able to support the operation.

Figure 1 gives an overview of the **terminology** used in peace operations, and shows the events required for violent conflicts to recede and allow peace negotiations to take place. Within the set time frame, peace negotiations precede the so-called peace instrument, essentially the peace agreement confirming the conflicting parties' commitment to the cessation of hostilities.

FIGURE 1: CONFLICT AND THE SPECTRUM OF PEACE OPERATIONS



## NEGOTIATING PEACE

During peace negotiations, the first considerations and assessments regarding the introduction of a DDR programme should be the **security concerns of all parties** involved in the conflict. As SALW are cheap, easy to use and easy to transport, disarmament must be identified as a priority in the peace process. The presence of such weapons can lead to a continued state of insecurity, especially among the various armed groups. Two examples that demonstrate the importance of these concerns are the negotiations between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government regarding Northern Ireland, and the talks between Colombian guerrilla groups (i.e. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)) and the Colombian government. In both examples, the turning in of weapons was equated with unconditional surrender, while the possession of these weapons was associated with a certain amount of bargaining power. It should be understood that irregular troops who have fought a government will not be comfortable with the same government reassuming security functions after the demobilisation phase. One way to address this concern is for an international force to enter the country in order to provide security. However, this force can only be effective if both parties accept the peacekeeping role.

security

human security

human rights



Any peace agreement needs to address the issues of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. A DDR programme helps ensure the **human security** of ex-combatants and their communities and provides opportunities for income generation. Without a DDR programme, the peace agreement cannot be sustainable; and without political, social and/or economic security, the peace process itself cannot be sustainable. Ex-combatants must be convinced that there are better options than taking up arms again. To encourage this, any peace negotiation should take into account the combatants' needs, interests and skills, as well as changed and/or changing gender relations. This will provide a better basis for good governance and peaceful mechanisms of dispute management, while supporting the free development of civil society.

At the same time, the civilian population also has the same needs for human security. It is important to remember that **human rights** violations are common in an armed conflict. One of the most common characteristics of intra-state conflicts is that they do not adhere to the conventional rules of warfare. Civilian populations are affected by insecurity, displacement and violence. Civil wars disrupt social cohesion within countries and communities, destroying trust between former neighbours and creating a tear in the social fabric. This undermines interpersonal relations, reducing human security and often encouraging the proliferation of small arms, which provide physical protection by deterring potential aggressors. At the same time, these circumstances discourage economic investment and development. All of these factors highlight the need for measures to counter this lack of security.

Achieving good governance involves examining the political system, as a change in political organisation and representation can foster human security. The opinions of all stakeholders should be considered, and their political, economic, social, cultural, civil

**political change** and physical security concerns addressed. **Political change** in support of a democratic system can be essential to providing a more stable and sustainable environment in a post-conflict society. This is particularly true when repression or marginalisation has strengthened the will of groups to use force to achieve change. Measures taken to increase a population's confidence in the institutions and processes of governance will encourage an environment conducive to sustainable peace and development. With a stable system of governance, long-term investments in the economy are more likely, making sustainable development more probable.

### ■ 1.3 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

**good governance** The characteristics of **good governance** should comply with democratic principles leading to an effective policy enabling every societal actor to exert influence on the state. Good governance is seen as an important precondition for the society to unfold its potential. This is no longer solely the goal of development agencies, but also of the respective states themselves, and is considered an essential element of the global fight against poverty.

The UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) has identified eight essential characteristics of good governance:

**Participation** by both men and women is essential. This can be direct or via legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Note that representative democracy does not guarantee that the interests and needs of the most vulnerable groups are considered and/or met. Informed and organised participation is necessary, as are freedom of association and expression and an organised civil society.

**Rule of law** means adherence to a fair legal framework and impartial law enforcement, with respect for human and minority rights by the police and other security forces, as well as an independent judiciary.

**Transparency** means that people affected by decision-making and the enforcement of these decisions should have access to sufficient and comprehensible information related to decision-making, decisions and implementation.

**Responsiveness** means that institutions and processes work for all stakeholders, take their input into consideration, and act upon it within a reasonable time frame.

**Consensus-oriented governance** necessitates mediation of the distinct interests that exist within a society, to find a common understanding of the entire community's best interest and the most successful way of achieving it.

**Equity and inclusiveness** are meant to ensure that all members of society feel they belong, are included, form a part of the governance process and hence have the chance to change or maintain their way of life.

**Effectiveness and efficiency** mean that the needs of society are met using the available resources as efficiently as possible, taking natural resource issues and environmental protection into consideration.

**Accountability** to stakeholders is vital for all institutions and organisations (both private sector and civil society). Organisations and institutions should be accountable to those persons affected by their actions and decisions. To ensure accountability, it is essential to have decision-making and enforcement, transparency and the application of the rule of law.

Text adapted from: <http://www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm>

### SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Good governance leads to **security sector reform (SSR)**, which includes measures designed to provide impartial and fair lawmaking and enforcement. This is fundamental to the DDR process, as the various armed groups will previously have provided security for their members, whereas now the peace negotiations must produce a security mechanism applicable to the entire population. For this purpose, the security sector encompasses institutions responsible for protecting the state and its citizens from acts of violence and coercion. SSR includes all branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and the security forces, i.e. the police, military, gendarmerie, etc. SSR includes supervision of the code of conduct of the state's security personnel and may involve a re-examination of the legal system, leading, if necessary, to legal reform.

security sector reform

The approach outlined above only addresses the issue of human security (and human rights) from an institutional point of view. However, one of the players in society is the individual; therefore, respect for human rights must exist on an interpersonal level if security is actually to be fostered. For any measure in this field to be successful and sustainable, a comprehensive approach is necessary. An approach such as this needs to examine the role of civil society and provide room for it to participate in addressing human security needs. An informed and organised **civil society** is important in ensuring that all population groups view themselves as stakeholders responsible for sustaining a system of governance. Mutual respect for each other's rights and the protection of minority rights are fundamental to good governance principles. To be sustainable, these principles must be based on local concepts and understanding. In this context and in connection with DDR, **changing social and gender roles** must be considered, to ensure that women who had taken on new responsibilities during an armed conflict, either fighting or simply providing for the family in place of their partner who went to join an armed group, have a voice in shaping their future and are not forced back into pre-conflict roles.

civil society

gender roles

### ■ 1.4 PREREQUISITES FOR DDR

For demobilisation to be successful, the peace process must advance and fulfil certain conditions. At the same time, demobilisation, as part of the larger DDR process, is a **confidence-building measure** that supports the peace process.

confidence-building measure

There are security policy issues that must be taken into account before demobilisation planning can start. Among these issues are the preliminary military and political conditions that need to be fulfilled before DDR programme implementation takes place. Each case must be examined separately, weighing the importance of each condition.

**THE CONDITIONS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:**

consent	The general <b>consent</b> of the state's political representatives or of the warring parties is essential. All parties to the conflict must agree to the demobilisation, even if not all parties are affected by demobilisation in the same way. This presupposes a <b>ceasefire</b> .
ceasefire	
armed forces command	Support from the <b>armed forces command</b> , troop commanders and/or warlords must exist in all regions. During both post-war demobilisation and peacetime demobilisation, this presupposes that military and/or political leaders have control over the combatants.
procedures and timing	The main issues regarding the <b>procedures and timing</b> of the DDR process should be stipulated in the peace accord, and written in a manner that gives sufficient flexibility for the process to go forward regardless of the obstacles that will emerge along the way. The development of the specific details of the plan and benefits to the demobilised ex-combatants should be designated by a commission created as a part of the peace agreement; here all of the parties (donors, UN, international organisations or IOs, NGOs and former combatant groups) should be represented.
donors	<b>Donors</b> should be included in the DDR planning stage while the peace agreement is being prepared, as demobilisation can be accelerated and facilitated by an early provision of funds. On some occasions, donors and interested parties who can move the process along politically can increase co-operation as a 'group of friends,' as was the case in Central America.
target groups	The <b>definition of the groups and contingents</b> to be demobilised should be a part of the peace agreement. A clear differentiation from other government organs (e.g. the police) and other civilians (e.g. returning refugees) is necessary.
supervision	The agreement reached by all factions must be supervised by a commission. <b>Supervision</b> proves particularly essential when delays occur or agreements are not adhered to. The commission should include all parties and have free access to all regions of the country.
neutral international observers	The participation of <b>neutral, international observers</b> is a stabilising factor, especially when demobilisation is an integral component of a peace process. In most cases, international monitors are essential, as mistrust between the former belligerents will be the normal state of affairs, at least early on. Trust must be fostered by the members of the international community.
effectiveness and viability	Apart from security issues, the available resources and the state of the infrastructure are decisive criteria for the <b>effectiveness and viability</b> of demobilisation programmes. To gain acceptance among the combatants and the commanding officers of the parties involved in the demobilisation process, it is important that the time schedule, locations and inputs of the demobilisation programme be described in detail beforehand.

A definite time frame and the clear demarcation of **assembly areas (AAs)** facilitate demobilisation and provide combatants with clear prospects. The AAs should be easily accessible to the armed forces and armed groups, and be monitored by neutral security forces. **assembly areas**

## ■ 1.5 CONDITIONS

The demobilisation process determines the terms and conditions of the **transitional phase** from war to peace. Supply-side problems during this phase can jeopardise the peace process. After a ceasefire, the various armed groups generally do not have sufficient resources of their own to maintain and support all of their combatants; in some cases, their commanders no longer feel responsible for maintaining them. In such situations, national, bilateral and multilateral organisations are needed to support demobilisation by providing expertise, food supplies, health care and logistics. **transitional phase**



Security is one of the most important concerns for ex-combatants during a disarmament and demobilisation programme. Their **physical security** must be ensured during the DDR programme, and afterwards as well. In order to respect the interests of the ex-combatants, demobilisation and disarmament must be accompanied by a plan to create political power sharing by all parties to the conflict. This will lessen their need to revert to violent action for self-protection, as has been observed in the past. In the 1980s, for example, a group of FARC members in Colombia formed the political party Unión Patriótica; soon afterwards, hundreds of their members were assassinated. Consequently, demobilisation talks during the peace negotiations focused on the provision of physical security to those who were willing to lay down their weapons and integrate into political and civilian life. Yet, in El Salvador such assassinations were stopped by the establishment of an ad hoc committee investigating the murders. **physical security**

All combatants or groups must fully **participate in discussions** and negotiations as early as possible in the process, so that their interests are known and respected (i.e. political, social, cultural, economic, ethnic groups including women, war-disabled, etc.). The DDR programme **participation**



## SALW

must be responsive to all interest groups involved in the conflict, in order to minimise discrimination and to reduce the potential for a reversion to violence by any of the groups. While the focus is generally on the disarmament of regular and irregular armed forces, the proliferation of **SALW** among the civilian population also presents an obstacle to the establishment of law and order and hence to (human) security. This proliferation is an immense problem, not only for the country at war, but also for neighbouring states and the region as a whole. Politics and diplomacy may bring about the end of the war, but the proliferation of weapons, often for commercial purposes, may prolong the fighting and create new violence.

## recurring violence

This threat of continued violence can also affect and impede the delivery of humanitarian aid, thereby hindering the return of refugees, displaced persons and ex-combatants to their homes. The threat of **recurring violence**, combined with underdevelopment, lack of reintegration prospects and a greater access to weapons, can lead to higher crime rates and a continued level of violence.

transformation  
processes

In general, with political and economic consolidation after a civil war, new **transformation processes** commence. These changes, caused by structural adjustment programmes, among other factors, often result in the deterioration of the living conditions of the marginalised sections of the population. In this situation, ex-combatants are particularly dependent on government initiatives, as they often lack resources of their own. Against this complex background, demobilisation projects and programmes are important instruments in the consolidation phase and in the preparation of long-term reintegration programmes.

## planning

The **planning** and implementation of DDR programmes pose tremendous logistical and conceptual problems for the state or interim administration. To address these problems, national DDR programmes should include adequate time for planning and preparation. Capacity-building and the organisational development of the main government ministries should be included in the redevelopment of programmes and in budgets. Co-operation should include the provision of consultancy services in connection with the organisation and content-specific design of the responsible institutions.

## emergency aid

In addition to consultancy services, **emergency aid** tasks arise after armed conflicts, and are especially complex when the infrastructure has been destroyed and the population has no possibilities for self-help. The introduction of emergency aid after a ceasefire can help lead towards sustainable peace.

## role and mandate

The complexity of post-conflict situations and the effect of demobilisation on development work have encouraged more development and donor agencies to become involved in DDR programmes. However, each agency will have its own specific **role and mandate**, which may exclude elements of the DDR process, e.g. disarmament and encampment. At the same time, each agency may introduce new perspectives and expertise, such as health care, to the DDR process. Thus, a clear differentiation between military and civilian, or between emergency and development aid tasks, is necessary. Otherwise, the programme risks omitting crucial elements of the DDR process due to lack of commitment or funds from the development or donor agencies. One successful example is Guatemala, where a




joint committee representing all the agencies interested and involved in the demobilisation of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) managed to divide the responsibilities prior to the ceasefire, allowing the encampment and subsequent demobilisation to take place almost without incident.

With regard to the relationship between conditions in the surrounding area and demobilisation programmes, the question must be posed whether a demobilisation programme can promote an end to fighting even against a background of sporadic attacks despite political agreements between the warring parties, or whether DDR activities are in fact endangered by renewed outbursts of **armed violence** and must be halted.

Figure 2 gives an overview of DDR operations and points out the short-term versus long-term nature of the components of disarmament and demobilisation compared to reintegration.

FIGURE 2: DDR TIMELINE



## ■ 1.6 DDR AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION

redistribution of  
funds


The maintenance and housing of armed forces consume a large part of the state budget. The sooner demobilisation takes place, the more quickly funds will be released for the reintegration of the demobilised ex-combatants, post-war recovery and long-term development initiatives. The development process not only benefits from the **redistribution of funds**, but also from the human resources no longer being used by the armed forces. The transition to reintegration and reconstruction projects can be facilitated if this potential is surveyed and effectively utilised.

relief and  
development

Demobilisation and reintegration programmes can affect development co-operation negatively, especially when reintegration measures are perceived to be, or are, unsuccessful. If society excludes ex-combatants economically, politically, socially and culturally, they may then resort to violence and criminal activity as a means of income generation and survival. These methods of income generation create or sustain a climate of physical, economic and social insecurity, which can have an effect on the cultural behaviour of a country's population. Such activities, such as the looting of tools and foodstuffs or demands for ransom, can also have a negative impact on development and humanitarian assistance. This hinders **relief and development** co-operation, which is meant to improve the living conditions of the entire population, including ex-combatants.

In turn, well-planned development co-operation can provide a sound basis for making DDR programmes successful. Including ex-combatants in development projects and engaging them in projects beneficial to the whole of society can facilitate their (re)integration. This can also give ex-combatants a positive view of their own future, one that does not include violence and war. Development co-operation, as part of a DDR programme, provides a chance for ex-combatants to integrate first economically and then socially, politically and culturally, if need be, into civil society. Development co-operation assistance within DDR programmes can range from logistics to consultancy services to local implementing agencies, with regard to emergency aid measures and technical assistance. Further discussion of this will be laid out in the following chapters. Figure 3 generically illustrates the linkages between DDR, development, human security and sustainable peace.

FIGURE 3: DDR, HUMAN SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT



The following chapters will examine the principles and procedures of DDR separately, in order to highlight and recommend certain approaches. The links between the military aspects and short-term humanitarian and long-term development work, and how they can contribute to DDR programmes, will be examined.



Weapons Collection, Cambodia

## 2 DISARMAMENT

### ■ 2.1 DEFINITION

Disarmament is a central objective of demobilisation. It consists of the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants, as well as from the civilian population, in many cases. Disarmament is essential as a **confidence-building measure** aimed at increasing stability in a very tense, uncertain environment with nervous participants and a wary population. All measures must be aimed at the mindset of participants, irrespective of whether these are standing armed forces, guerrilla groups, paramilitary or militia forces or civilians. Therefore, disarmament must include the development of responsible arms management programmes.

### ■ 2.2 OBJECTIVE

Disarmament aims to control the presence of SALW within society. Its goal is to provide an environment that allows for a return to normality and encourages non-violent conflict resolution. While the explicit objective of disarmament is to reduce the number of weapons circulating among a country's population, it also aims at reducing the threat of violence (continuing or otherwise) to **human security**. Overall, it represents a means to achieve further sustainable security and development.

### ■ 2.3 TARGET GROUPS

Disarmament initiatives must be focused on, and aspects of them indeed targeted at, specific groups. What might be appropriate for sophisticated standing armed forces might not be appropriate for guerrilla forces, for example.

A conventional (inter-state) war is usually defined as a conflict between two or more nation-states, where the warring parties are represented by their respective conventional military forces. Intra-state (civil) wars, on the other hand, are often fought between irregular forces and conventional armed forces, or between other irregular forces and/or civilians. Therefore, the target groups for disarmament programmes following in the wake of such conflicts must include not only **statutory forces, militias and irregular armed groups**; they must also include **civilians** who are not members of an armed group, but who have armed themselves with SALW for purposes of self-defence.

### ■ 2.4 CONDITIONS AND DERIVED PRINCIPLES

#### 2.4.1 CONDITIONS

A **peace agreement** is often the vehicle for initiating disarmament, and in it the timing and scope of disarmament will be specified. Disarmament functions as a confidence-building measure. If it is not undertaken quickly, there is the risk that the peace agreement will unravel. However, if insufficient time is allowed to prepare adequately for disarmament, a flawed process could result in new violence. This problem highlights the urgent need for internationally supervised disarmament operations, and makes it essential that at

least the principles, if not the details, of proposed disarmament procedures be spelled out in peace agreements and protocols.

#### national level

Once the scene has been set by agreement at the international level, planning at the **national level** (or at mission headquarters) must settle the continuing conflict by balancing the interests of the warring parties.

#### proportion of forces

Among the procedural aspects to be addressed is the sequence of disarmament, and the extent to which it can be challenged or inspected by the other side. The ratio or **proportion of forces** to be disarmed at each stage of the process must also be dealt with, as well as the disposition of weapons and arrangements for their supervision. This is important to prevent unevenly matched forces from taking advantage of a sudden change in the balance of military power.

#### training and guidance

A lack of specific provisions in a peace agreement regarding disarmament, particularly in relation to the destruction of weapons, tends to leave too much room for interpretation in determining how, or even if, disarmament should be carried out. A lack of rules for disarmament can also result in an inconsistent approach with regard to destruction. Directly related to this problem is the insufficient level of **training and guidance** of forces mandated to carry out disarmament responsibilities. Despite general disarmament obligations as part of the overall demobilisation process, the disarmament of ex-combatants and others has often been one of the least executed parts of peace implementation processes. Substantial completion of the disbandment of former combatants has in many cases not been matched by equivalent disarmament measures.

The principles laid out in the following section are essential for the success of disarmament programmes. It should also be noted that the creation of a solid support base within the local community is a fundamental requirement.



## 2.4.2 PRINCIPLES OF MICRO-DISARMAMENT PROGRAMMES

The following principles were accepted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):

- safety;
- control;
- transparency;
- sustainability;
- replicability;
- legitimacy.

Reference: Hughes-Wilson, John/ Wilkinson, Adrian. *Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes – A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures*. New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2001.

**Safety** is possibly the most important principle. The movement of explosives and ammunition poses a serious threat to human life. The international community must assume a duty of care with regard to the local population, to ensure that a disarmament programme is conducted as safely as possible, and that the risk to human life is kept to a minimum. Any loss of life that results from an internationally mandated or supported programme could be viewed as a direct result of that programme. This will inevitably affect the way the programme is perceived by the local population. The supporting and implementing agencies will lose credibility as a result, and the local community may reduce or withdraw its support – without which the programme cannot succeed. It is therefore essential that safety be the highest priority of any programme. The integration of functional support, in the form of an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) programme and ammunition specialists, significantly increases the level of safety. Any attempt to reduce programme operating costs by failing to use appropriate technical support clearly represents a false economy.

The principle of **control** is directly related to that of safety, which is fundamental to ensuring security, transparency and efficiency. Planning at the mission level must concentrate on fostering conditions of security, in which weapons are no longer seen as the only guarantor of security. The operational aspects of the programme, in terms of weapons collection and destruction, must be conducted in a planned and controlled manner. Control must be exerted to ensure a smooth, progressive and safe collection and destruction plan. Disarmament operations are of necessity logistically complex; therefore, the resources needed to support them must be allocated to ensure maximum effectiveness.

**Transparency** is important in gaining the trust and support of the local population and ex-combatants. The process of collection and destruction should be completely visible to them, within the bounds of operational security. There must be the assurance that the weapons they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or the government. To ensure fairness and justice, all parties to the conflict must be adequately represented in the decision-making process. Such involvement also helps to ensure that all interests and concerns are adequately addressed. Transparency is also essential to ensure verification of the final disposal of the recovered weapons and ammunition.



awareness and information campaigns	<p>The disarmament process must be supported by SALW <b>awareness and information campaigns</b> to promote transparency and to build confidence. Moreover, particularly early on during the emergency stabilisation phase (ESP), disarmament programmes should concentrate on the reinforcement of stability. Confidence-building, especially through awareness campaigns and amnesty provisions, helps to condition expectations of the local population and the demobilising persons. It also encourages individual combatants and civilians to report on arms caches and other attempts to violate agreements. Awareness and information campaigns as a means of encouraging transparency must be a high priority in programme planning and resource allocation. The campaigns must be professionally managed and implemented by members of the local population. Regional forms of communication, with respect to local culture and norms, must be employed in planning and implementing the information campaign. Informing community leaders in the diaspora might also help to raise political support of ethnic groups who are organised inside and outside the country.</p>
sustainability	<p>Programme <b>sustainability</b> is linked to transparency. For operational reasons, it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process somewhere in the community and then expand into other areas. Sufficient financial and logistic resources must be made available to sustain this effort until the whole community has been covered. It will prove difficult to persuade one group to surrender its weapons if group members cannot be convinced that the disarmament programme is sustainable and that the process will be applied throughout the entire community. At any point during the implementation of a disarmament programme, a lack of financial or human resources can cause delays, which can undermine the aim of confidence-building and therefore place the programme at risk. For this reason, disarmament programmes should not be initiated until sufficient resources have been identified.</p> <p>The argument that it is better to remove some weapons from the community than none at all is a spurious one if it leaves one element of the community at a tactical disadvantage to another. Unless a <b>secure environment</b> can be created and maintained, the disarmament operation will fail, as individuals will retain weapons for self-protection.</p>
secure environment	
replicability	<p>The principle of <b>replicability</b> ensures that a similar operational methodology can be used throughout the programme. This confers advantages in terms of training, use of resources, safe collection and destruction, complete visibility of weapons and ammunition accounting, and other easily understood operating procedures. When taken together, and if easily replicable, this also helps to ensure the sustainability of the programme.</p>
legitimacy	<p>The final principle of <b>legitimacy</b> is important for the development of a secure environment providing the necessary resources to support a micro-disarmament programme. The organisation responsible for the programme must operate under a national or international mandate furnished by an appropriate body – for example, the UN Security Council, a regional organisation, or the recognised national government of the country. An unmandated programme is very unlikely to succeed, as it will fail to attract either the necessary resources from the donor community or the support of the community it is trying to disarm.</p>



Factors which may derail or at least influence a **disarmament timetable** are the strength of forces to be disarmed, troop movements (separation, regrouping or massing of troops), selection and development of AAs, ceasefires, formal peace agreements, confidence-building measures, and the electoral process. Each timetable will be different, but must take into account the main factors of the peace agreement and apply them as agreed to by the parties to the conflict. The electoral process should not be implemented until the disarmament and demobilisation process is complete. It is preferable to wait until demobilised soldiers have had the possibility to resettle and are in a position to participate in the electoral process.

disarmament  
timetable

3

4

5

6

■ 2.5 DISARMAMENT PROCEDURES

This section examines the steps of disarmament, taking into account the above principles and recommended measures. The disarmament of combatants and civilians is considered separately.

2.5.1 DISARMING COMBATANTS

The disarming of combatants takes place when they arrive at the **weapons collection points** or at the **AAs**, and is a prerequisite for their discharge. In the case of discharge in times of peace, disarmament takes place when they leave their barracks.



2.5.1.1 CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

After a conflict, the confidence of individual combatants waiting for disarmament and demobilisation can be enhanced by introducing the following measures: buffer zones, secure corridors, mutual observation, communications and dual key procedures (see section 2.5.1.4). All these measures help to ensure the transparency of the process.

**Buffer zones** separating the former warring factions can be observed by United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) or patrolled by UN forces. The presence of liaison officers from each of the factions can increase the assurance that the buffer zone is being respected. When possible, the separation of forces should be adequate to provide a realistic warning.

buffer zones

The **movement of troops** can be accomplished either by using mobile escorts, who can provide secure corridors, or by taking routes which have been reconnoitred and approved by representatives of the warring factions. For the larger camps and weapons cantonment areas, it is essential to have liaison officers from the rival factions, each observing the other's sites. When weapons are destroyed, mutual observation also enhances confidence.



movement of troops

**Communications** are essential if observation and liaison measures are to work. If the factions' means of communication are inadequate, they may rely on UNMOs or UN Force communications. Provision should be made for **translation** where necessary, so that all communications are transparent both to international observers and to the factions involved. Trustworthy individuals must be chosen to ensure correct translation and interpretation, avoiding misunderstandings and misleading information.

communications

translation

### 2.5.1.2 WEAPONS SURVEY

A weapons survey is needed to answer vital planning questions at an early stage. The following questions are just a sample:

- How many weapons are there?
- Who is expected to turn them in?
- What role do SALW play in the region?
- How does the presence of SALW affect social/interpersonal relations?
- How do you know when all SALW have been collected?
- Who controls weapons outside the armed forces (e.g. police, special police or gendarmes)?
- Are there pockets of heavily armed people who might become bandits or pose a security threat?
- Where are the armed units and their heavy weapons stocks?
- What will happen to the latter?

#### inventory

While in some cases an **inventory** of weapons is part of the negotiations, one should not become fixated on the number of weapons, particularly early on, as figures will be vague and highly inaccurate at this stage. It is only much later on in the process that any reliable survey of weapons in society at large will become available.

### 2.5.1.3 WEAPONS COLLECTION

#### EOD and ammunition support

For weapons collection programmes to be successful and efficient, the technical **advice and assistance from EOD and ammunition specialists** mentioned earlier is essential. Weapons collection programmes must minimise the risks posed by the movement, management and storage of arms that are turned in.



For this purpose, the consultation of EOD and technical ammunition experts will help in assessing the technical threats, training local EOD personnel, planning SALW collection, awareness campaign and destruction, developing destruction and render safe systems, and ensuring the safe management of explosives and ammunition. The technical threat assessment is essential, as deaths or injuries due to the neglect of an analysis such as this undermine the purpose of disarmament activities: confidence-building.


#### collection

**Weapons collection** should be organised either in the AAs or in separate reception centres, which are normally manned by mission UNMOs. When the combatant hands in his/her weapon, the following procedures for the collection and registration of proscribed categories of weapons, ammunition and ancillary equipment should apply.

Each weapon should be registered and the **pertinent information** (serial number, type of weapon) recorded. In addition, the personnel at weapons collection points should also record the following: name, unit and military identification number or equivalent of the ex-combatant, and the site where the weapon was handed in. Upon the completion of the disarmament process, the ex-combatant should be given an official receipt and the weapons should be tagged.

**Safety** is essential during weapons collection. The aforementioned technical support encompasses the advice for the design of weapons collection points. Figure 4 provides an example of an optimal layout for weapons collection points. A design such as this would ensure adequate safety provisions.

FIGURE 4: SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF WEAPONS COLLECTION POINTS



In the context of raising support, both within the region and internationally, the public and immediate destruction of weapons and ammunition should be considered. This will be discussed below, and should be addressed early on within the scope of the public information programme.

#### 2.5.1.4 WEAPONS STORAGE

**temporary storage** The inability or lack of proper equipment to destroy weapons may necessitate **temporary storage**. It is possible that the destruction of the weapons might not have been decided yet, or the weapons may be allocated for conversion and/or redistribution to the local military or civilian police. Considerations here include the duration and conditions of storage and, most importantly, the security of the storage. Safety is vital where the storage of ammunition and explosives is concerned.



Instead of being destroyed, weapons may be stored in containers after collection for several reasons, as noted above. **Dual key procedures**, for example, represent a transitional step between surrendering weapons and relinquishing all access to them. The storage containers with the weapons inside are locked and guarded. From an early stage, members of the disarming forces are allowed to keep their weapons to guard the containers. Both UN observers and the onsite faction commander retain a key to the container, and both keys are required to open the container. **Planning should be flexible** and always include a list of 'what ifs' in order to maintain the momentum of the process.

#### 2.5.1.5 WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

**verification** The destruction of SALW must take into consideration many factors, including safety, cost (replicability), effectiveness and the **verification** of destruction.

**methods** **Methods** used for the destruction of SALW cover a range of possibilities, from simply making the weapons non-functional to complete destruction. The most current methods of weapons destruction are shown in Table 1.



**Table 1: Current Destruction Techniques and Technologies**

Technique/ Technology	Explanation	Example country	Advantages	Disadvantages
1. Band saw	The use of industrial band saws to cut SALW into unusable pieces.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Limited training</li> <li>▪ Simple</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Labour-intensive</li> <li>▪ Minimum of 3 cuts per weapon, depending on its type</li> <li>▪ Inefficient</li> </ul>
2. Burning	The destruction of SALW by open burning using kerosene.	Mali, Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cheap and simple</li> <li>▪ Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>▪ Limited training requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Labour-intensive</li> <li>▪ Environmental pollution</li> <li>▪ Not particularly efficient</li> <li>▪ Visual inspection essential, but difficult</li> </ul>
3. Cement	The casting of weapons into cement blocks.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cheap and simple</li> <li>▪ Limited training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Recovery possible, but very labour-intensive to realise</li> <li>▪ Landfill requirements difficult to fulfil</li> <li>▪ Transport requirements to the landfill difficult to fulfil</li> <li>▪ Final accounting difficult</li> </ul>
4. Crushing by armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs)	The use of tanks to run over and crush SALW.	Republic of Serbia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cheap and simple</li> <li>▪ Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>▪ Limited training requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Not particularly efficient</li> <li>▪ Visual inspection essential</li> </ul>
5. Cutting using oxy-acetylene or plasma	The use of high temperature cutting technology to render SALW inoperable.	Albania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Established and proven method</li> <li>▪ Cheap and simple</li> <li>▪ Limited training requirements</li> <li>▪ Equipment available worldwide</li> <li>▪ Maintenance-free</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Labour-intensive (one operative can only process 40 weapons per hour)</li> <li>▪ Risk of small functioning components (bolts, etc.) not being destroyed</li> </ul>
6. Cutting using hydro-abrasive technology	The use of hydro-abrasive cutting technology.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Limited training requirements</li> <li>▪ Technology readily available</li> <li>▪ High production levels possible using automation</li> <li>▪ Environmentally benign</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Medium initial capital costs</li> <li>▪ Equipment requires transport to affected country</li> </ul>
7. Cutting using hydraulic shears	The use of hydraulic cutting and crushing systems.	Australia, Canada, South Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Limited training requirements</li> <li>▪ Technology readily available</li> <li>▪ High production levels possible using automation</li> <li>▪ Environmentally benign</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Medium initial capital costs</li> <li>▪ Equipment requires transport to affected country</li> </ul>

**Table 1: Current Destruction Techniques and Technologies**

Technique/ Technology	Explanation	Example country	Advantages	Disadvantages
8. Deep sea dumping	Dumping of SALW at sea in deep ocean trenches.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Traditional technique</li> <li>Efficient</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Constraints of Oslo convention</li> <li>More environmentally benign than many other techniques</li> </ul>
9. Detonation	The destruction of SALW by detonation using high explosives as a donor charge.	NATO, SFOR, KFOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>Destruction guaranteed if sufficient high explosives used as donor charge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Labour-intensive</li> <li>Environmental pollution</li> <li>Requires highly trained personnel</li> <li>Expensive in terms of high explosives used as donor charge</li> </ul>
10. Dismantling and recycling	The use of industrial processes. Recycling to dismantle and then recover raw materials.	Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Destruction guaranteed</li> <li>Some costs recovered by sale of scrap</li> <li>High maintenance requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High initial capital costs to develop facility</li> <li>Only cost-effective for large quantities of SALW in developed countries</li> </ul>
11. Shredding	The use of industrial metal shredding technology.	Australia, Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highly efficient</li> <li>Limited training requirements</li> <li>Technology readily available</li> <li>High production levels possible using automation</li> <li>Environmentally benign</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High initial capital costs</li> <li>Equipment requires transport to affected country</li> </ul>
12. Safe storage	The storage of recovered weapons in secure accommodation.	Albania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cheap and simple</li> <li>SALW move under direct control of national government or IO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential for proliferation in the future exists if there is a significant political change</li> </ul>
13. Smelting and recycling	The use of industrial smelting facilities to melt weapons, followed by recycling for other purposes.	Argentina, Peru, Serbia and Montenegro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Simple and efficient</li> <li>Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>Limited pre-processing</li> <li>Minimal labour required</li> <li>Destruction guaranteed</li> <li>Some costs recovered by sale of scrap</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires suitable industrial facility</li> </ul>

2.5.1.6 WEAPONS REUTILISATION

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The reutilisation of weapons is a problematic issue in post-conflict peacebuilding as it might hinder compliance by civilians with voluntary disarmament programmes. To avoid complications such as the disappearance of returned weapons or extended storage periods, there must be a timetable for **reutilisation**. The concentration and distribution of SALW must be monitored to ensure that the process is transparent and that ex-combatants are not inadvertently rearmed. Of primary concern here is the implementation and **monitoring** of the process by a neutral **third party** to ensure proper redistribution and continued monitoring after the process is complete.

reutilisation  
third party  
monitoring

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The only legitimate reuse of collected weapons can be in a statutory force that is controlled by a legitimised government. Very often the newly created military force of a country (e.g. Namibia and Afghanistan) is equipped with surplus stocks from a preceding civil war or from other countries.



2.5.2 DISARMING CIVILIANS

When weapons have been distributed by warring factions to the **civilian population** or local militia groups, it is almost impossible to re-collect them. This is one of the reasons that the proliferation of small arms represents a much greater danger than heavy weapons during and after civil wars.

On a social level, arms are often seen as a status symbol and make the owner feel he/she belongs to the community. Security and **cultural issues** are also influential here. All these things combined make it difficult to do away with SALW. Significant **incentives** in the form of development/reconstruction programmes, possibly money, and confidence-building measures must be established to effectively substitute for weapons in these various areas.

cultural issues  
incentives

Despite this, it is assumed that in many regions the possession of weapons is of cultural significance and cannot be stopped. These so-called '**cultural weapons**' are usually not registered or handed back.

'cultural weapons'

A **long-term strategy** must be developed to reduce the number of weapons available to civilians as the security situation in the country or region improves, prior to the establishment or implementation of any tactical plan. The overall strategy must address the issues of **SSR and good governance** (see section 1.3), and it must support civil society. It **must also address gender roles**, which may have changed during the conflict, influencing the post-conflict society and political structures. This creates sustainable security and an environment in which people feel safe. Members of the community should be involved in developing and implementing the strategy, and the following factors taken into consideration in estimating the situation:

long-term strategy  
good governance  
gender roles

1. What is the **political/security situation** in the country? Is it imperative that citizens remain armed for self-protection and personal security? Is crime of great concern to the population as a whole? Are the local police or security forces part of the

security situation



problem? If the answer is yes, then any weapons collection programme, voluntary or forced, is doomed to fail. These problems must be addressed before disarmament can be considered to be a positive and meaningful exercise.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| culture of weapons                     | 2. What is the <b>culture of weapons</b> in the country or region? Is the aim of the exercise only to collect all military-type weapons, such as assault rifles, or are hunting weapons also to be targeted?  |
| local perspective                      | 3. What is the public's perception of the above points? The problem must be articulated and approached from the <b>perspective of the local population</b> , not only from that of the international community.   |
| local culture                          | There must be a grassroots solution, articulated and addressed from the point of view of <b>local customs and culture</b> . The idea of a third party, i.e. peacekeepers, providing long-term security conditions leading to disarmament is unrealistic, and fails to address the real problem. A long-term and self-sustaining approach must be applied to the provision of security. As soon as possible, the government must assume responsibility for the provision of real and <b>sustainable security</b> to the population at large. |
| sustainable security                   | 4. Notwithstanding the above, a broad coalition approach must be taken when setting conditions for any meaningful disarmament exercise. The international community must appreciate the holistic nature of such operations, and address these operations as <b>functions of the overall peace process</b> , not as individual stand-alone exercises.  |
| functions of the overall peace process | International aid in the form of resources and support for SSR, such as assistance in training a national police force, are examples of long-term, sustainable aid which will produce improved security, a higher level of stability, and a population which is prepared to disarm.   |

concerted campaigns	To implement civilian disarmament projects, specific areas where weapons or armed individuals are concentrated should be identified as possible locations for disarmament. <b>Concerted campaigns</b> to collect and destroy weapons, perhaps linked to buy-back programmes or community development initiatives, may be necessary in some areas. Often a reluctance to disarm is related to a prevailing gun culture, which is always difficult to change in the short term. Local leaders will be important in persuading people to give up weapons in this situation.
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Once the strategic plan has been decided upon and the conditions set for disarmament, the points listed below should be considered as aid in developing the mechanics of weapons collection.

### 2.5.2.1 WEAPONS COLLECTION

voluntary surrender and forced collection	The collection of weapons from the civilian population may take place either as <b>voluntary surrender or forced collection</b> by the military, civilian police or other agencies. The preferred method is voluntary surrender, while weapon buy-backs and <b>incentive programmes</b> are also an option. Yet offering cash for weapons may draw more weapons to the region which is targeted by the collection programme and is therefore not advisable. The collection of weapons by force is hard to carry out and tends to be dangerous for everyone involved. It is often difficult to decide who should enforce forced collection, as neither the civilian police nor international forces wish to be seen as the enemy.
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A weapons collection process must be supported by **SALW awareness and information campaigns**. While public information campaigns consist of messages and information delivered via the media (electronic and print) and other channels deemed appropriate, awareness campaigns further aim to influence behaviour and perceptions. They encompass the development of core messages and imaginative delivery mechanisms.

SALW awareness and  
information campaigns 3

Such SALW awareness campaigns help win the confidence and support of the people. Public relations achieve similar goals while maintaining contact with the population. **Confidence in security** is a key issue in disarmament. People will bring in their weapons if they feel they no longer need them. Lastly, all sides must feel involved and informed for disarmament to be successful.

confidence in  
security 6

### 2.5.2.2 INCENTIVE PROGRAMMES

Incentive programmes serve to collect surplus weapons which were not given back during the formal disarmament process. There are four categories that fall under incentive programmes: (1) exchange of weapons for food or goods; (2) weapons in exchange for development; (3) buy-back; and (4) weapons in competition for development.

The idea of **weapons for food/goods** is to not give cash rewards, but to address short-term basic needs (shelter, food, water, etc.). While weapons for food functions as a short-term relief measure, the provision of tools for agriculture or construction can be especially helpful. This approach has a moral and symbolic dimension.

weapons for  
food/goods

The **weapons in exchange for development** approach not only offers incentives to the individuals turning in weapons; it also shifts the focus towards community development needs and can thus support social cohesion.

weapons in exchange  
for development

The exchange of **weapons for cash** can, however, increase the value of arms again after it has just dropped, and draw more weapons to a region. The acceptability of these programmes varies between cultures and countries. The effects of buy-back programmes are short-term and not sustainable. In many situations buying guns contradicts the approaches of other development programmes. However, it can be desirable to link the surrender of at least one gun to the provision of reinsertion packages or payments (see section 3.5.3).

buy-backs

In addition, a new approach is being discussed: **weapons in competition for development**. This approach targets two communities of similar size and divides the funds available for development proportionally between them, according to the percentage of weapons handed in by each community. However, this could spur new conflicts between the targeted communities.

weapons in competi-  
tion for development

Such incentive programmes or amnesty offers can be followed by the **strict enforcement of legislation** pertaining to the possession of and trade in weapons. Enforcement should, however, be preceded by a well-organised campaign informing the people about a specific deadline. If the population is informed and the conduct of security forces sufficient to inspire the community's trust, this combination will increase the legitimacy of the security forces and the likelihood of success.

law enforcement

### 2.5.2.3 WEAPONS REGISTRATION

Legal weapons should be registered according to the national legislation. Weapons registration allows two things to happen: first, people can retain some of their weapons and feel that they are secure; and second, international peacekeeping and national security forces know approximately how many weapons are in a given area. This is particularly useful in **future disarmament campaigns** as a check for success by counting weapons collected in comparison with the **registry**.

campaigns  
registry

The registration process should be jointly run by international and civil agencies, or by local police, and **monitored** by international forces. This will help prevent international forces from becoming known as the 'new enemy' and will also increase the legitimacy of the local forces, as transparency through supervision is possible.

monitoring

Registration is a simple process that requires accurate **information collection** and sufficient personnel. It does not require a large amount of equipment, storage or security.

information  
collection

The problem with weapons registration is similar to those faced by most weapons control techniques – people do not want to come forward. A comprehensive preparation of a society preceding disarmament creates a positive situation that allows registration, perhaps as a first step in the disarmament process, to proceed. **Assurances** must be given by international forces and/or local authorities that security is not a problem and that registering does not mean that weapons will immediately be seized. **Incentives** are often used to encourage registration, ranging from positive measures, such as food and money, to negative ones, such as harsh laws and **forced seizure** of weapons. Registering weapons makes it possible to input serial numbers into an inventory and track their future usage and trade. This helps increase transparency and implements controls.

assurances

incentives


forced seizure

Databases of military and police weapons help track weapons to their place of origin and limit unauthorised transfers. At the same time a comprehensive system of **safe storage**, weapons management and a code of conduct for the existing military and police forces can improve the security situation and legitimise civilian disarmament. One of the best examples for this is the safe storage programme for police and army in Cambodia.

safe storage

### 2.5.3 MINE AND UXO CLEARANCE (DEMINEING)

Demining programmes are costly and time-consuming. Priority is usually given to roads and access routes, infrastructure and population centres; demining of agricultural land will not pay its way in the short term. More commonly, due to insufficient funds, new land is usually opened up for agriculture, rather than formerly mined territory being reclaimed through demining activities.



In many post-conflict regions, arable land has been affected by the war, and explosive artefacts and mines remain a hazard and impediment to **agricultural development**. In the case of Central America, an OAS demining programme involving local organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, was successfully implemented, eradicating the deadly artefacts of war.

Demining programmes should involve both the local **communities as well as those ex-combatants** who were involved in burying mines. After demobilisation, demining programmes can also create short-term employment for ex-combatants. **integrated humanitarian demining**

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In the first phase, all **information** available **should be gathered** from the military as well as from the local population. Both confirmed and suspected mined areas should be mapped and marked. During the same phase, (information) campaigns are important to sensitise the population on mines and how to deal with and report them. **information gathering**

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Disarmament measures in affected countries could be linked to **regional undertakings** in order to prevent a sudden outflow of cheap weapons that could destabilise neighbouring countries. **regional undertakings**

### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

All of the above underlines the importance of measures that can create and sustain security and support good governance. In this context, NGOs and bilateral donors must maintain **neutrality**. Involvement in the disarmament process can only be in support of other neutral organisations such as the UN. Support during disarmament operations **requires civil-military co-operation**. The military personnel who form part of peacekeeping missions may initiate disarmament and take on the role of security provision, while it may be easier for civilian organisations to communicate the programme's purpose and mandate to the local population. In addition, military personnel can provide the necessary expertise on the safe storage and destruction of weapons. The non-military community can contribute by providing the following aspects, creating an early link between technical short-term and long-term measures which impact on human security and aim at conditions that are sustainable without external support: **neutrality**

- logistics;
- information campaign management;
- food/goods/cash incentive programmes for civilians outside the AAs;
- weapons in exchange or in competition for development programmes (needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation);
- technical advice for the conversion and disposal of weapons;
- technical advice, equipment, and training for demining programmes (prioritising regions for development and humanitarian assistance);
- provision of trusted interpreters who have worked in the region.

### ■ 2.6 CONCLUSION

It is obvious that disarmament measures need to be accompanied by other programmes that provide increased security and hence reduce the demand for weapons among the civilian population. Weapons demand for the purpose of self-protection can be addressed through SSR measures. A **comprehensive approach** is therefore needed to work towards sustainable security, peace and development, as laid out in the introduction of this book. **demand reduction**



A female combatant receives her discharge documents, Cambodia

## 3 DEMOBILISATION

### ■ 3.1 DEFINITION

Demobilisation means the formal, usually controlled **discharge** of active combatants from the armed forces or from an armed group. The process of demobilisation comprises different scenarios, from individual combatants flowing through temporary centres, to the massing of troops together in camps designated for this purpose (encampments, AAs or barracks), or to subsequent registration and disarmament.

### ■ 3.2 OBJECTIVE

The purpose of the demobilisation phase is to register, count and monitor the combatants and to prepare them for their discharge with identification documents and, at the same time, to gather necessary information for their integration into the community. It includes medical screening and aid, covers maintenance supplies for the combatants and generally also transport for when they return to their home regions. Demobilisation takes place on a contractual or statutory basis at stipulated places and is implemented within a limited time frame. The objective of demobilisation is to reduce or completely disband armed forces and other armed elements taking part in a conflict.

### ■ 3.3 TARGET GROUPS

Generally, all active members of armed forces or civilian armed groups can be considered as the target group for demobilisation. However, if the armed forces are not completely disbanded, a selection is made, usually equivalent to a negative selection (old combatants, ill or handicapped people). The military authorities – following a political decision – carry out this selection. It can be assumed that in the case of demobilisation, as with recruitment, those to be affected by the programme cannot choose whether they will be excluded or selected. A **catalogue of criteria** is set up for demobilisation.

catalogue of criteria

The target groups include men, women and children who have served in regular or irregular armed forces, not all of whom carry a gun. The target groups for disarmament and demobilisation overlap but are not completely identical. This must be considered to avoid excluding individuals from the demobilisation and reintegration phase of a DDR programme who worked in administration or who were unvoluntarily part of the armed forces.

Whether a combatant really qualifies for the services of the demobilisation programme cannot always be checked. In the case of guerrilla forces, there is generally a lack of personnel records, while in many armed forces a large number of inactive members are often additionally listed on the payroll. The **issuing of identity documents** accompanying registration is an important pull factor for many combatants, as registration in the AAs is the only way of obtaining valid personnel documents. National documents are essential, as they also allow ex-combatants to vote, although the documents used for access to AAs indicate the faction for which the individual fought and may cause discrimination later on. Therefore, discharge documents should not designate the armed group for which the ex-combatant fought.

issuing identity documents

## distinct groups

**Distinct target groups** can be identified and a number of disparate groups selected for, or affected by, demobilisation. Their backgrounds and motives differ greatly, so the assistance they receive should reflect these differences:



## women

- Most demobilised persons have only a low level of formal qualification and few material assets or property, yet their expectations after years of armed conflict tend to be high.
- Many of them have been traumatised by their war experience.
- Combatants with injuries or permanent illnesses (e.g. AIDS) are preferentially discharged.
- Older persons who have spent a large part of their lives as combatants are discharged first.
- **Women**, who are strongly represented in some guerrilla forces (through choice or through abduction), suffer discrimination in many ways when the new armed forces are created. They nearly always belong to the unofficially demobilised group because their status in the war effort is generally unrecognised, allowing them to be excluded from the associated benefits, or their importance and role in the conflict to be down-played. Women's discrimination is also often based on assumptions about their domestic role.

## children and young persons

- **Children and young persons** who were recruited or abducted by armed forces or armed groups during the civil war invariably have no homes to return to when they are discharged at the end of the war. Frequently they are not even included in the demobilisation process if they are still underage. Child soldiers and young persons who have been soldiers a major part of their lives need special attention and rehabilitation programmes.



## mercenaries

- **Mercenaries and combatants of foreign nationality** are excluded from the armed forces after armed conflict and usually formally expelled from the country. This group also falls outside the Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DRP) network in many countries; group members generally have no prospects in their countries of origin. These soldiers may need a special repatriation programme.
- Combatants who have fought in the ranks of the armed forces of occupation or the defeated armed forces are frequently rejected by the community afterwards. In some cases these units leave the country with the armed forces of occupation (e.g. the Koevoet in Namibia).

## dependants

- **Partners, dependants and relatives** who have lived in the direct vicinity of the barracks and camps are also directly affected by demobilisation.



Despite their common war experience, the group of demobilised persons can be highly **heterogeneous**. This becomes particularly obvious during the transition to civilian life. The different needs of the individuals and different groups must be taken into consideration during the demobilisation process.

heterogeneous group

For all those who participate in DDR, political and economic considerations are of great significance. While in the case of discharge in times of peace the lower ranks are more strongly affected by demobilisation, all participants need to establish how they will fit into the refurbished society, with its probable paucity of resources or opportunities for economic sustainability.

■ 3.4 CONDITIONS AND DERIVED PRINCIPLES

Here, the essential principles to be adhered to during demobilisation will be discussed with respect to the phases and steps that form the demobilisation process. As disarmament forms part of demobilisation, these principles are similar to the ones outlined in Chapter 2, and are as follows:

- security;
- control;
- transparency;
- sustainability;
- replicability;
- legitimacy.



During the **peace negotiations**, one of the first confidence-building measures with regard to demobilisation is the disclosure of the numbers and location of troops by all parties. Naturally, all sides are reluctant to share this information, and it is often withheld or distorted for political and security reasons. Typically, more troops are declared than actually exist, although conversely sometimes more exist than are declared. The aim is often to hide forces in reserve until the group is convinced of sufficient security guarantees, or until it is sufficiently committed to the process. Timetables often specify a certain percentage from each force to be demobilised every month or two (as in El Salvador). For reasons of confidence-building, it must be decided upfront **who is to provide security**. This is a similar concern during disarmament procedures. An international force may provide the needed security environment to foster a constructive peace process and support demobilisation efforts. It is very important for the third party or central authority to ensure that the main forces are demobilised at roughly the same rate, to avoid creating an incentive for one side to attack the other.

peace negotiations

security

Secondly, a well-planned and controlled operation increases confidence, security, transparency and efficiency. **Planning** must focus on the provision of security and confidence-building. Engaging the target groups and surrounding communities in the demobilisation process in order to increase **transparency** is essential. It must be clear from the beginning who takes on which tasks and responsibilities, i.e. who will be responsible for planning, funding, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. A related problem can be caused by

planning

transparency

a lengthy delay in the deployment of the peacekeeping force, resulting in unmonitored violations and a general dissipation of the parties' confidence in, and commitment to, the demobilisation process.

**time constraints** Yet the political, economic and security situations after armed conflicts tend to leave **little time for planning and preparation**. Often the Ministry of Defence can no longer feed and pay soldiers. Decisions like the management of the operation and composition of resettlement packages must be quickly taken and require a rapid mobilisation of resources.

**sustainability** Thus, approaching donors to ensure long-term funding of DDR programmes is essential, as a well-planned and operated demobilisation programme will not function without sufficient resources. **Sustainability** of the operation is essential in order to keep the confidence of the target groups. In many past situations, human and financial resources, both of which are necessary to properly implement demobilisation and reintegration programmes, were often not provided in a timely manner. To overcome this problem, the budgets of peace operations sometimes include funding to get these programmes started.

**self-demobilisation** The phenomenon of **self-demobilisation** deserves special attention. Self-demobilisation is defined as when combatants demobilise themselves. In this scenario, armed forces disband in a disorderly fashion after a defeat, and the ex-combatants, with no command structures in place, try to return to their home regions. Many flee to neighbouring countries in fear of pursuit.

**alternatives** In the case of armed groups which survive on organised attacks and road barricades after civil wars, the offer of civilian **alternatives** should lead to combatants abandoning these groups voluntarily. Self-demobilisation differs from desertion in that it takes place in situations in which there is no longer any formal obligation for the combatants to belong to the armed forces or an armed group. Their willingness to slip back into civilian roles depends essentially on the pull factors which the reintegration programmes can create. This group is generally not covered by demobilisation programmes, and it is exactly for this reason that some combatants are encouraged by superiors or other combatants to leave the armed group before gaining access to DDR programmes, as they are seen as competitors for the programmes' benefits.

**vulnerable groups** This affects above all **vulnerable groups** such as women and children, especially girls, because bad publicity is feared if they are found in the ranks of armed forces and armed groups. Therefore, self-demobilisation may be induced by fear of punishment. Others may wish to rejoin their spouses and family as quickly as possible and do not wait for official demobilisation. There are rarely any records about self-demobilisation. A situation such as this is risky if there has been no disarmament. Self-demobilised combatants should however be entitled to subsequent reintegration measures, and documents recognising their duty as soldiers in the armed forces/armed group should be issued if possible.

**government** The **government** must be educated on the protracted nature of the DDR process and prepare itself for a long-term follow-up to disarmament and demobilisation through reintegration measures.




■ 3.5 DEMOBILISATION PROCEDURES

Figure 5 shows the different steps of demobilisation, which include the following six elements:

1. **Planning:** from peace to contingency planning
2. **Encampment:** massing the combatants in AAs (in post-war situations)
3. **Registration:** registering of person-related data and arms
4. **Disarming:** collection and control of weapons (see Chapter 2)
5. **Pre-discharge orientation:** informing combatants about their rights, available services and options.
6. **Discharge:** formal discharge and return transport to combatants' home regions

FIGURE 5: STEPS OF DEMOBILISATION



The following three sections will separately consider the planning phase, the period of encampment and the discharge phase.



### 3.5.1 PLANNING

The length of time needed for demobilisation planning, funding and implementation varies from a few months to two years or more. A demobilisation timetable is generally included in the peace accord, but soon becomes fiction. Serious delays, both at the beginning of and during the process, are common for several reasons. Rates of demobilisation tend to vary greatly, from a few hundred to several thousand caseloads a month, and programmes often stop and then jump ahead frantically to meet deadlines.

#### 3.5.1.1 PHASED DEMOBILISATION

The approach of phased demobilisation is one option to increase efficiency. This process, which includes a pilot test phase, makes it possible to learn from mistakes in the early phases; lessons learned can improve performance later on. This recalls the principle of **replicability**. Owing to logistical constraints (lack of facilities, staff, resources), all combatants nationwide cannot be demobilised at once. A chosen operational methodology makes the whole process of demobilisation more efficient and effective. As with disarmament, clear and replicable procedures reduce personnel training costs, using resources more efficiently and increasing the prospects for the sustainability of the programme.

Demobilisation requires a commitment from all the parties involved and a strict adherence to the timetable. However, this does not always occur. In Sierra Leone, for example, the demobilisation process was planned in April 2000 as a phased process with the simultaneous demobilisation of all distinct groups. Problems arose, however, and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) held back some of its fighters, causing the whole peace process to slow down, and impacting the rate of reintegration in RUF areas.

#### 3.5.1.2 Co-ORDINATION

The planning and implementation of demobilisation programmes calls for a high degree of co-ordination and **flexibility**. It has often proven expedient to entrust a single civilian institution in the country with the programme's co-ordination; this institution should contain **personnel** from both civilian and military backgrounds. In addition, the institution should include individuals who are well-trained and sensitised to the needs and perspectives of vulnerable groups (children, young adults, women and the elderly and disabled). This should be ensured at all levels, with special focus on the local level, in order to have a positive effect.



replicability

flexibility

personnel

Demobilisation must be carried out under considerable time pressure and can often only be realised under conditions of a new beginning. This is why a single line ministry (e.g. ministries of defence or social affairs) is often not appropriate as a **co-ordinating or implementing body** for the DDR process. The planning of a demobilisation process often stretches from the negotiation of a peace plan to contingency planning, a detailed appeal to donors and the maintenance of AAs. These manifold tasks are often handled and co-ordinated by the UN and its agencies.

However, if there is the possibility of creating a national and interministerial commission with the capacities and mandate to bring all relevant actors together in one DDR process, it should be responsible for the overall programme or act as the co-ordination platform for specific programmes from line ministries, IOs or NGOs. This ensures that the DDR process will be considered a **national operation** which is owned by the people. Nevertheless, support by the UN and IOs with experience in this field facilitates the establishment of this organisation and its regional branches.

Co-ordination of the demobilisation plan that involves all groups and donors subsequently improves the **effectiveness** of DDR. The individual measures and inputs of the demobilisation programme (money, tools, services rendered, seeds and food) can be implemented by international NGOs. These inputs should be equal as far as possible in all regions and for all groups. The size and timing of the inputs should also be seen in the light of support to other war-affected groups, to avoid creating a new situation of tension.

### 3.5.1.3 ASSEMBLY AREAS (AAs)

There is also a considerable **need for planning and management** below the level of the national demobilisation organisation, that is, at the regional level. Difficulties at this level and in the individual AAs in particular can lead to unrest and insurrections among combatants. Problems arise, above all, when there is a lack of co-ordination between the national and regional levels. If food supplies are inadequate or combatants' pay does not reach the camps, the demobilisation process is endangered. This reinforces the idea that there should be one national commission with the responsibility squarely in the hands of the national government.



The **dwelling time** in the AAs should be as short as possible and should lead to a direct transition into reintegration. If the capacities of the reintegration programmes are insufficient, the implementation of these measures will be delayed. Until then, the combatants must remain in the camp. Some camps are only dissolved years after demobilisation, since they provide reliable maintenance and take care of the ex-combatants. While this creates additional dependencies and is expensive, it is imperative that ex-combatants participate in a workable reintegration programme. Without one, they will most likely return to lawlessness, banditry and violence. Dealing with this will require more resources than a properly planned and funded reintegration programme.

### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Like the disarmament process, demobilisation requires measures to increase and maintain human security and that aim for good governance. Again, engaging the demobilisation process must be done on neutral grounds and in a manner that does not undermine confidence-building measures.

While demobilisation programmes require military input, they can benefit significantly from humanitarian and development organisations' assistance in the following areas of planning during the demobilisation phase of a DDR programme:

- conducting needs assessments;
- attracting donors for the demobilisation and reintegration process;
- providing organisational consultancy to national and international organisations;
- managing the demobilisation process;
- providing logistics, communications and information;
- organising workshops on the planning of demobilisation with demobilisation experts from other countries;
- planning reconciliation measures.

Such international assistance can also help strengthen the momentum from war to sustainable peace, as it takes the long-term nature of reintegration and the need for its timely preparation into account.

### 3.5.2 ENCAMPMENT

Turning to the implementation of demobilisation plans, encampment is usually the first step, providing the opportunity to regain control over previously dispersed troops and their weapons. The massing of combatants in AAs and camps for the purpose of subsequent demobilisation is practised, above all, when armed forces and armed groups are not accommodated in barracks. There are **three types of encampment areas**:

1. where the members of the armed group that is being demobilised are kept and housed as a cohesive unit;
2. where the men, women and children of the armed group being demobilised are kept in the same camp but are separated within the camp; and
3. where the men, women and children are kept in separate camps.

Which type of camp is most appropriate depends on the conflict and nature of the armed groups. In all cases the distinct needs of men, women and children with regard to health care, sanitation and personal safety must be taken into account. This also includes the need for childcare.

Encampment is the first and also the most **critical phase** of the demobilisation procedure. If encampment fails, not only the demobilisation process is at risk, but the entire peace process as well. The same process must be applied to all combatants to facilitate their transition to civilian life, irrespective of the warring party they belong to and the duration

types of encampment areas

critical phase

of their service. In this phase of the process, the population must be informed of any troop movements to avoid new flows of displaced persons due to a perceived or actual decrease in security.

### 3.5.2.1 LOCATION

The location and **accessibility** of the AAs is stipulated in an agreement with all parties to the war. Enemy forces are in most cases drawn together in separate AAs situated in an area which provides access and safety for the combatants. Generally, the AAs are located in the territory of the country in which the fighting took place, so that the camps are accessible to combatants operating underground without them having to cross borders. For the assembled troops, this also means they can feel comfortable, as they are able to keep strategic areas in case the process fails. AAs for guerrilla forces operating from neighbouring countries can be set up in those countries and disarmament can take place there as well. The establishment and supply of AAs is generally assumed by UN peace troops and/or various UN agencies.

accessibility



Further attention must also be given to the availability of water and general ground conditions. For commonly applied **humanitarian standards** for setting up camps in emergency situations, refer to 6.1.

humanitarian standards

### 3.5.2.2 SUPERVISION


Supervision of the AAs by **international observers** or the UN has proven successful in many countries after civil wars and is an essential tool for transparency. These monitors should also oversee adherence to the ceasefire and the conditions in the AAs. The longer combatants stay in the AAs, the more important it is that they have access to the outside world and their families. In conflict situations, care should be taken to ensure a strict separation of enemy groups. Sometimes it is also necessary to separate different groups within the same demobilising force. Children and young adults should not always stay in contact with their 'comrades in arms'; their reintegration needs may be very different. The same goes for women who, for various reasons, may need to be separated from their armed group. The relationships between men and women may be built upon coercion, discrimination and fear. Many women will live in fear if they remain with their armed group, especially if they were subjected to sexual abuse. However, others may have created lasting bonds from their time in the armed group, and those relationships should not be carelessly destroyed by strictly separating men and women or adults and children.

international observers

Security for **vulnerable groups** is essential, as it provides a base from which the programme can work towards reconciliation and rebuilding social cohesion by coming to terms with changed and changing roles within society. For every demobilisation programme, it will have to be assessed whether such measures of separation are desirable. Other groups, such as returning or withdrawing refugees, displaced persons and the local population, should also be protected against attacks by combatants.

vulnerable groups

FIGURE 6: CAMP LAYOUT – EXAMPLE FROM SIERRA LEONE



### 3.5.2.3 EMERGENCY AID

The AAs must be supplied with sufficient food and drinking water. A lack of **supplies** supplies endangers the discipline of the combatants. It is equally important to ensure sufficient basic health care and sanitary facilities in the AAs, specific to the needs of men and women or boys and girls, to ensure sick combatants are looked after and to prevent epidemics. The camps should provide sufficient shelter and housing for the combatants and the camp staff.

**Logistical aspects and camp management** are often underestimated, but are essential for a timely and effective demobilisation (for details, see 6.1). AAs can be excellent confidence-building measures in the early stages of the process. Many combatants, particularly guerrilla soldiers, will have their families with them. If families are well-treated by AA medical staff, this will have a very positive effect on the attitude of the combatants. However, the AAs should not provide such a high standard of living that combatants are reluctant to leave after discharge.



### 3.5.2.4 REGISTRATION



Independently of supervising the warring parties (number of combatants and arms), the registration of important **person-related data** person-related data is an element of demobilisation programmes which can best be carried out in the AAs. This can be a sensitive issue, as personal and military data can be used against an individual or group. If there is any suspicion that data surveyed during demobilisation may be used for prosecution or discrimination, the registration process could be endangered. In Namibia and in South Africa, laws granting certain groups freedom from prosecution under certain circumstances were promulgated as a supplement to the repatriation and demobilisation agreements. For a list of equipment required for registration purposes, see section 6.2.

Soldiers and members of armed groups generally do not have any **identity documents** identity documents. To address security concerns during disarmament and demobilisation in the AAs, these individuals need to have identity documents that clarify what group they belong to.

**NOTE:** The **discharge documents** discharge documents which the combatants receive in the AAs after demobilisation serve as entitlement to further services in the DDR programme and to participation in national elections later on. They usually do not include the name of the group or faction the individual fought for, in order to avoid discrimination on these grounds. Often, a discharge document also has a high symbolic value for many ex-combatants, particularly for former guerrillas, since it provides some appreciation of their military service and some value of the war's objectives. Since discharge documents are frequently lost, they should be registered so that they can be replaced at any time. It is important to remember that some ex-combatants may be illiterate, so symbols and explanations may be necessary.

### 3.5.2.5 PLANNING FOR REINTEGRATION MEASURES

An important aspect when registering data is the need to plan for ongoing supplies to the AAs and for subsequent reintegration. The lack of person-related data makes targeted group-oriented planning of reintegration measures difficult at the time of demobilisation. Frequently, neither the exact number nor the age and region of origin of the combatants are known. In some cases, the ex-combatants may not want their origins known and may give incorrect information or none at all. A swift transfer of these figures can considerably facilitate preparations by regional and local authorities for the reintegration of ex-combatants. A **database** such as this is, therefore, an indispensable basis for development co-operation institutions participating in the process. The formation and support of formal **organisations of ex-combatants** in veterans' or similar associations generate active involvement of the ex-combatants in the reintegration process, as was seen in El Salvador, Guatemala and Uganda.

organisations of  
ex-combatants

The special needs of groups which have not been taken into consideration by demobilisation must be recorded. On this basis, selective measures can be developed for the needs of vulnerable groups. The earlier this data is surveyed, the more efficiently the programmes for combatants can be planned and used as a basis for **monitoring and evaluation (M&E)** measures that are designed to be carried out parallel to DDR programmes.

monitoring and  
evaluation

### 3.5.2.6 DISARMAMENT – SEE CHAPTER 2

### 3.5.2.7 PRE-DISCHARGE ORIENTATION

Combatants being demobilised need to know about their future prospects and the alternative measures that may be in place to assist them when they leave their armed group. They should be advised on the probable challenges of the transition from military to **civilian life**. The pre-discharge phase provides information to prepare them for civilian life and aims to reduce the likelihood of remobilisation. The more informed they are about planned and existing programmes, the more willing they will be to leave the encampment and utilise the services offered. This phase is strongly linked to the reintegration process, and it is therefore desirable that planning for reintegration be underway when demobilisation takes place.

civilian life

The information to be shared with combatants includes the following:

- economic information (financial planning, education and training);
- accommodation information;
- political and legal information (political and civil rights and responsibilities, political re-education)





- social information (changing gender roles, integration into communities, children's education, stress and trauma management);
- health information (HIV/AIDS awareness, basic health, family planning, immunisation – see 6.3);
- crisis prevention and reconciliation information.

### ECONOMIC INFORMATION

The ex-combatants will need to know about any social and economic adjustments they may have to make, such as returning to school, applying skills to civilian life and acquiring job skills. It is important that a **realistic assessment** be made of their economic and employment situation to limit expectations.

realistic  
assessment

Special attention must be given to the communities that individuals choose to settle in, as the right skills may facilitate **acceptance by the chosen community**. Benefit schemes and eligibility for reintegration and other programmes and services must be explained, as well as how to access them. Men and women should have equal access to all components of the same programmes.

community  
acceptance

Ex-combatants should be given assistance in securing admission into schools for their children or themselves, as well as for **vocational or other skills training** programmes. Only a small number of ex-combatants will have developed skills outside their military career that would allow them to earn a livelihood in civilian life.

skills training

Part of any skills training programme should include **budget training**. Having been kept by the armed forces or an armed group, many ex-combatants will not have had much experience in managing their own finances.

budget training

### ACCOMMODATION

Finding accommodation is one of the major difficulties that all ex-combatants face on being discharged from active duty. Access to assistance programmes dealing with this issue must be facilitated.

### POLITICAL AND LEGAL INFORMATION

People affected by DDR programmes need to know about their **rights and responsibilities** (as men, women, children, disabled persons, widows, civilians, etc.) in accordance with the laws and customs of their country. In many cases it may be necessary to explain the electoral process, especially where political change and transition have happened or are underway. The concepts of civil society and democracy may need to be elaborated depending on the conditions in the country. However, structures and processes should not be forced on the population, including ex-combatants, but rather be developed with their co-operation.

rights and  
responsibilities

Ex-combatants are often subject to pressures from political parties both new and old. With demobilisation possibly part of a larger democratisation process, pre-discharge orientation can be used to provide information on elections, political rights and party programmes that are options for the ex-combatants. The responsibility to make political decisions as a citizen must be explained to reduce the (re)creation of patron-client relationships.



new roles for  
women

### SOCIAL INFORMATION

All ex-combatants returning to civilian life need to be prepared for the social conditions they will be entering, especially with reference to changing gender relations. **Women** may have taken on **new roles** and authority by joining an armed group or by providing for their children themselves, and may not want to give up that newly found self-reliance. They may have learned new skills that do not fit traditional roles. **Men**, in turn, may find it difficult to accept such changes, since these affect their own societal roles and associated tasks. Everyone should be informed about the causes and consequences of such changes.

stress and trauma

Social orientation also includes preparation for integration into communities and potential obstacles to be faced, such as discrimination and stigmatisation. Methods for dealing with difficult reintegration issues should be described. Information on children's education should be shared with adults and children alike. The **stress and trauma of ex-combatants** must be approached carefully, paying attention to traditional forms of psychological healing and reconciliation. Information on how to access counselling services should be given to every ex-combatant.



### HEALTH INFORMATION

The encampment period provides an opportunity to address health issues and provide the target groups and their dependants with **basic knowledge** of preventive measures, including sanitation. Issues to be addressed include HIV/AIDS (see section 6.4), the effects of drugs on the body and on society, culturally appropriate family planning (for both men and women), immunisation, endemic diseases as well as services available to the combatants and their dependants after discharge.

constructive and  
healing dialogue

### CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECONCILIATION

Since demobilisation projects mostly target combatants who have participated in violent conflicts, there is considerable need for crisis prevention measures. This includes training in **non-violent conflict management and transformation**, coming to terms with trauma, and SSR to support official non-violent conflict management mechanisms and structures. This is where development agencies come in, building trust and confidence by supporting measures to increase personal, public and national security, and linking DDR programmes to issues of good governance. Linked to crisis prevention is the need for reconciliation. Preparation for reconciliation measures should begin during the demobilisation phase. Preparing ex-combatants to engage in a **constructive and healing dialogue** benefiting the whole of society can be done during the pre-discharge orientation phase. However, cultural sensitivity is essential and, as stated above, local customs must be respected in order not to suppress indigenous values and identities, which tend to be weakened by armed conflicts.

pilot phase

In Uganda, the **pilot phase** identified counselling and orientation as missing from the programme. These were then included in the later phases of demobilisation and contributed, according to ex-combatants, to their successful social transition.

**NOTE:** All information sessions and workshops should be available to ex-combatants and their dependants when possible. However, care must be taken to provide appropriate schedules.

The pre-discharge information measures need to be available for all groups of combatants. Where possible, there should be **joint sessions** to further mutual understanding, especially for men and women with regard to gender roles that might have changed due to the war. However, the decision to conduct joint or separate sessions must be made on a **case-by-case basis**, taking the actual situation and conditions on the ground into account.

While the focus during demobilisation has so far been on the individuals demobilising, it should be emphasised that **community preparation and participation** are important for the receiving communities as well. Such preparation is an integral part of reconciliation and supports reintegration efforts.

### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

The international community can assist in the process of site selection and operations during the encampment phase by providing support in the following forms:

#### ENCAMPMENT

- consultancy services to national demobilisation institutions in connection with planning and logistics of the encampment;
- management of regional offices or AAs;
- monitoring and evaluating AA conditions (see 6.1).

#### EMERGENCY AID

- supplying the AAs with food and medication as an emergency aid task;
- medical testing and counselling together with voluntary and confidential screening;
- supplies for the combatants' dependants living in the direct vicinity of the AAs or the barracks.

#### REGISTRATION

- arrangement of logistics for the registration of ex-combatants;
- supply of special hardware and software for computerised registration (also for reintegration).

#### PREPARING FOR DISCHARGE AND REINTEGRATION

- assessment of ex-combatants' social profiles and the socio-economic priorities of both men and women to help them fulfil their expectations and support the national organisations in the specific planning of reintegration programmes before discharge;
- build-up of a monitoring and evaluation system to assess the need for reintegration measures at an early stage;



- recruitment of individuals to perform peer education regarding health, which helps reintegration into communities, as the ex-combatants are contributing to improved health conditions;
- support of civic education and information campaigns for combatants, dependants, receiving communities and diaspora communities;
- organisation of workshops and discussion groups for the pre-discharge orientation phase;
- provision of pre-registration for educational, training and employment programmes.

### 3.5.3 DISCHARGE – OR REINSERTION PHASE

Following discharge from the armed forces, combatants can be considered officially demobilised. **Discharge documents** should be provided so that the ex-combatants have identification documents that will entitle them to obtain further services from the reintegration programme, access to other governmental services, and participation in the election process.



discharge  
documents

Discharge is the **transition** from demobilisation to reintegration and is a **critical phase**. It generally includes return transportation to the home region and a package of material support to assist ex-combatants in adjusting to everyday life. In some countries, the demobilisation programme concludes with these services. However, the process of reintegration begins at this point and must be planned beforehand. The chances of reintegration and the effectiveness of reintegration assistance also depend on the transition phase between demobilisation and reintegration.

Directly after demobilisation, the subsistence level of the demobilised persons must be secured by transport and emergency aid (e.g. food, seeds, clothing, tools and cash).

transport



Otherwise, there is the risk that not yet demobilised combatants will avoid demobilisation, while those already demobilised will take up their weapons again. The first year after a civil war is considered to be a critical period, particularly for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

The following issues must be addressed:

**Transport** of the demobilised persons from the AAs or from the barracks should be a part of DDR, so that the ex-combatants may go to the regions which they themselves feel offer the best conditions for reintegration.

The supply of the combatants with the necessities for survival must be ensured. The ex-combatants are prepared for the first phase of reintegration by the provision of **reinsertion packages**. Men and women receive different packages, as their specific needs are different. These packages should enable ex-combatants to take care of their own survival needs and possibly those of their direct family dependants as well. While the objective is to place as low a burden as possible on the scarce resources of the community receiving the ex-combatants, the services and the material value of the reintegration packages should be on a par with the standard of living of the rest of the population. During the planning stage, the entire situation must be studied with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organisations dealing with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The perception of different levels of treatment is a source of possible dissatisfaction and must be addressed accordingly.

reinsertion  
packages

To further the objective of the reinsertion packages, quick impact programmes (QIPs) in the fields of **employment and food security** should be implemented. Labour-intensive programmes, such as building roads and infrastructure, provide ex-combatants with some type of employment during the transitional phase. Assisting in the reconstruction of infrastructure may help social integration into a community, as the ex-combatant is seen to be contributing to potential economic development. The distribution of seeds, agricultural tools and the (temporary) allocation of land can strengthen self-help potential in the agricultural sector. The land issue is highly important and the temporary or permanent allocation of land usually must be accompanied by a reform of land rights. This matter will be discussed in greater detail under section 4.6.3.

employment and  
food security



In areas where the population increases significantly with the return of ex-combatants, there are frequently **bottlenecks in health care**. Strengthening existing healthcare facilities and security systems is particularly important in this phase.

health care

As ex-combatants return from war regions, they should have access to information about retirement and special packages within the scope of the reintegration programme. **Information and referral** should be a continuation of the pre-discharge orientation.

information and  
referral systems

The **planning** of these measures requires considerable know-how and management capacities. For logistical reasons and for the later evaluation of reintegration measures, detailed data on the whereabouts of ex-combatants is necessary. Wherever the infrastructure in the country is sufficient, it is expedient to put certain services, such as transport or the supply of agricultural equipment, out to public tender. Most donors require public tender for procurement in DDR programmes.

planning

### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

In the phase of transition from the AAs and barracks to a civilian life, classic emergency measures are frequently necessary. While the supplies for the AAs are crucial in this phase, it is equally important to provide food, drinking water, seeds and shelter. The range of services during the reinsertion period can encompass the following:

- financing;
- consultancy for planning and implementation;
- support in logistics and transport;
- emergency aid supply (to ex-combatants and receiving communities);
- provision of reinsertion packages;
- creation of orientation systems;
- maintenance of a database for reintegration purposes (e.g. one established during encampment);
- improvements to the receiving community's capacity to absorb the ex-combatants.

### ■ 3.6 CONCLUSION

The two chapters on disarmament and demobilisation have made it clear that the measures taken to ensure a successful DDR programme must have a civilian focus, rather than a military one, as the ultimate aim of reintegration is to prepare ex-combatants for civilian life. At the same time, the many varied tasks taken on by humanitarian and development organisations show the need for **civil-military co-operation**, with a combination of short-term and long-term measures supporting the DDR programme. It is essential that military personnel deal with the demobilisation of military and paramilitary forces. They are likely to have a similar way of thinking and a greater chance of mutual understanding and communication. It is likely that combatants will have more respect for and confidence in other soldiers than in civilians who most probably will not have had comparable life experiences. While civilian experts must create a foundation for confidence-building measures, the security forces must focus on improving the security environment and adhere to the principles of good governance.







Ex-combatant with his family, Cambodia



## 4 REINTEGRATION

### ■ 4.1 DEFINITION

Reintegration is defined here as the process by which ex-combatants acquire **civilian status** and gain access to civilian forms of work and income. Reintegration for ex-combatants, as well as for returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), is particularly difficult in post-war situations. It is only possible to speak of reintegration to a limited extent, as war and violence considerably change the perceptions and abilities of ex-combatants. They cannot and often do not want to revert to their pre-war social roles. In many cases it is a society's social situation and condition that contribute to the causes of war and conflict. War and violence changes the living situations of the civilian population, for better or worse. To return to the social situation and conditions that existed before the war is rarely possible or desirable. Moreover, the demands and expectations of ex-combatants differ from their pre-war opinions.

Reintegration is a social and economic process with an open time frame. It is a part of the general development of the country and represents a national responsibility, possibly necessitating outside help.

### ■ 4.2 OBJECTIVE

The central objective of reintegration programmes is to support ex-combatants in their efforts for **social and economic integration** into civilian society. Whereas disarmament and demobilisation serve primarily to build confidence by disarming and registering combatants, it is assumed that with the help of the services offered by reintegration programmes, ex-combatants will be demobilised and willing to lead a civilian life. Reintegration shifts from a primary focus on the individual and his/her needs and skills, to a focus on this person becoming a responsible member of the community, thereby supporting community development.

By means of selective measures, reintegration programmes for ex-combatants should:

- improve the potential of ex-combatants and their families to earn their livelihood by peaceful means and to participate in economic and social life;
- build the capacities of the absorbing communities to integrate demobilised and other returnees. General social conditions should be improved and macro-economic capacities for the integration of this group created.

Most ex-combatants find their own individual solutions to deal with the challenges of their new situation and to integrate into civilian life. Most see demobilisation as a chance to return to productive employment and to reunite with their families. These ex-combatants are usually not in need of long-term support, but will make use of discharge payments and reinsertion packages. Reintegration programmes are, therefore, targeted at those ex-combatants who have difficulties reintegrating. It is not the objective of reintegration programmes to reach each and every ex-combatant in a country,

**targeted support** regardless of his/her situation. Reintegration programmes offer **targeted support** projects in disadvantaged regions or to groups in need of special support. On a national level, these programmes aim to improve general conditions for reintegration.

### ■ 4.3 TARGET GROUPS AND BENEFICIARIES

**ex-combatants and their families**  
**community**

The group of beneficiaries of reintegration programmes is larger than the actual target group of **ex-combatants**, as their **families and the communities** who take them in must also be able to benefit from reintegration measures. During a reintegration programme, the focus shifts from the individual to the **community** that the ex-combatant wants to or must resettle in.



#### FROM THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE COMMUNITY

This shift of focus from the ex-combatant to the community is important for the success of a reintegration programme. At the beginning, the individual must be shown respect; his/her needs and skills must be assessed based on the opportunities available and on realistic expectations for the future. In order to provide a **realistic assessment** of an ex-combatant's situation, an analysis of the surrounding conditions is also necessary, including an understanding of the needs of the chosen community.

**communal priorities**

For an ex-combatant to have a real chance of integrating into the community, the **prioritised needs of the community** must be known to the institution implementing the reintegration programme and to the ex-combatant participating in the programme. Matching the skills and needs of the individual to those of the receiving community can make the difference between a participant becoming a productive member of a community, and an individual who finds it difficult to make a living and who may revert to (armed) violence and a criminal lifestyle. In addition, the ultimate focus on the community is an important preparation for sensitising communities to receive ex-combatants, hopefully reducing unwarranted prejudices and assisting in coping with trauma. The linkage between assessing individual and communal needs can create short-term employment opportunities on infrastructure and construction projects, which foster the development of the community and, consequently, may facilitate the acceptance of ex-combatants, as they are seen to be contributing positively to the community.


**social and educational profiles**

As already described in the demobilisation chapter (see section 3.3), there are considerable **differences in the social and educational profiles** of ex-combatants. These differences become manifest when individuals experience varying degrees of difficulty during reintegration. This factor must be accorded special consideration in reintegration programmes. The target groups can be differentiated on the basis of age at the time of demobilisation, sex, marital status (and number of dependants to be maintained), formal qualifications (school-leaving certificates, vocational training), work experience, and expectations. These personal data (see section 3.5.2.4) are essential for the planning of targeted reintegration programmes and for supporting individual solutions. Unfortunately, few countries have consolidated data on the social profile of target groups.



Figure 7 shows the shift in benefit focus from the individual ex-combatant to the community he/she is reintegrated into.

FIGURE 7: REINTEGRATION AND THE SHIFTING BENEFIT FOCUS



A number of other **indicators** are useful when seeking to obtain a clear picture of the social **indicators** profile of a target group as a whole: ethnic identity, duration of war experience (in years and as a proportion of a combatant's age), political and social identification with the 'winners' or 'losers', degree of trauma caused by the war (paying particular attention to abductees and the level of both physical and psychological trauma), state of health (physical disabilities, permanent illnesses), town vs. country (settlement in urban or rural regions), return to home region or resettlement in other regions, relations to community (taken in by family, clan or community), and the combatant's own resources. Creating a social profile of the target group can also provide a clearer picture of the beneficiaries of reintegration programmes. As partners and dependants of ex-combatants are also affected by demobilisation (they may indeed be former combatants themselves), there should be a clear idea of the size and the needs of the households that require support from a reintegration programme.

### monitoring systems

In themselves, these patterns result in criteria for surveying the target group and for **monitoring systems**. In addition, a series of social factors exist which characterise the situation and the problems of the target group.

### special needs

Reintegration programmes must also deal with the **special needs** of other target groups that have not been officially demobilised. This group consists of child soldiers, children and young people who have grown up in military camps, plus the elderly, war-disabled who left either the armed forces or armed groups prior to the end of the war, and war-widows.



Whatever the categorisation of the target group, one should not forget that most ex-combatants find **individual ways of improving their life situation**. This will be more difficult for uneducated adolescents who had few opportunities prior to the conflict. They may lack social skills, have little if any family, and can easily resort to aggression and violence to solve their problems. Reintegration programmes, in these cases, are intended to provide support and assistance.

## ■ 4.4 CONDITIONS AND DERIVED PRINCIPLES

As pointed out in the introduction, sustainable peace requires a focus on good governance to provide human security, peaceful conflict management mechanisms and post-war reconciliation. The **political reintegration** of former combatants is essential, as excluding them from political participation can create or renew tensions, motivating new violence. Some of the measures that support the political reintegration of ex-combatants include reforming security forces, developing and strengthening political institutions, government capacities and civil society, as well as enhancing human rights and introducing reconciliation mechanisms. The restoration and development of civil society, the provision of security and non-violent means of conflict management are fundamental requirements that prevent violent and armed conflict and further the sustainability of peacebuilding processes.

### breaks in security

In the wake of a civil war, there are commonly severe problems that affect the system and processes of governance, and consequently human security. **Breaks in security** at the national, public and personal level have a strong impact on prospects for reintegration – as they do for disarmament and development initiatives.



Measures designed to improve the security situation also support reintegration and vice versa. They include the following:

- **National Security** (a competent military that can ensure external security, plus a competent police force and other security institutions providing domestic security);
- **Public Security** (an impartial, competent police force);
- **Personal Security** (of demobilised combatants and their families, and of other groups);
- **Political and Civil Security** (free and fair electoral and judicial systems and strengthened rule of law and legal impartiality, thereby protecting political rights and civil society);

- **Good Governance** (responsiveness and accountability of political and security institutions and officials);
- **Economic Security** (protection of movement, trade and ownership of land – some would add here, the fulfilment of basic material needs).

The post-conflict environment offers **opportunities to reform** the political system, changing features that probably contributed to the outbreak of violent conflict in the first place. The following measures, if aimed towards good governance, can be introduced to support a governance system which is to be participatory, accountable, transparent, responsive, consensus-oriented, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient. Any credible reform programme must be based on the rule of law.

opportunities to reform

All parties must agree to political changes and, above all, to the constitutional and financial arrangements for government. This may entail agreement about the **division of powers** between central and local governments, and autonomy for certain regions or self-government for some groups. Post-conflict states may need outside help to reform civil services and build their capacity to administer effectively. Parties will need to agree on reforms that address the interests of minorities and disadvantaged groups.

division of powers

The principles for reintegration can be derived from the previous ones for disarmament and demobilisation. Reintegration must be **sustainable**, and therefore requires sufficient financial and human resources. Ideally, this means that ex-combatants should re-enter civilian life and not remobilise or resort to violence. In any case, the reintegration programme needs to deliver what it has promised. It is essential that the programme realistically assesses the ex-combatants' future prospects and not leave them with unrealistic expectations.

sustainability

As with disarmament and demobilisation projects, reintegration must be **well planned, well organised and well-co-ordinated**. This is especially true with regard to other humanitarian and development programmes in the country in question. The preparation of a complex and interministerial reintegration strategy takes time. This factor is often underestimated.

planning and co-ordination

While reintegration must be understood as a development process with an open-ended time frame, the latter is essentially determined by the economic situation in the country and by the extent of co-operation with other development programmes. This presupposes long-term planning and flexibility. This **long-term perspective** should also be reflected in the mandate of the institutions involved. At the same time, especially in the case of demobilisation after civil wars, it is necessary for perceptible success to be achieved as quickly as possible and for as many ex-combatants as can be reached by the measures. **Quick impact programmes (QIPs)** are, therefore, generally placed at the start of demobilisation programmes or are already linked to the demobilisation packages that combatants receive on discharge. The term of reintegration programmes depends essentially on two factors: the **efficiency of the programmes**, and the degree of **political will**.

long-term perspective

quick impact programmes

political will

The active and participatory involvement of ex-combatants in the process of demobilisation is important, as it provides them with a sense of ownership and will increase their

**ownership**

confidence in the process. Such active involvement (where possible) of target groups in the planning and implementation of a DDR programme is essential. The sense of **ownership** thus gained is accompanied by an increase in their confidence in the process, making them less likely to resort to armed violence to generate income, as alternatives have been realistically discussed. In Central America, the Fundación concept successfully engages ex-combatants at all levels in the implementation of reintegration programmes.

**other war-affected groups**

Reintegration measures for ex-combatants should be well co-ordinated with other programmes for **other war-affected groups** (IDPs, refugees etc.). For any of these groups, reintegration works more efficiently and effectively if there is a national reintegration policy covering all groups which are in need of support during their reintegration phase. This aspect is also important in emergency situations when donor agencies design programmes for repatriation.



Even though returning refugees and demobilised ex-combatants should not be treated as one group, as their political alliances can differ and tensions be created, **one national policy** should co-ordinate all projects in these fields. Programmes should be linked and benefits should be equal to avoid the outbreak of new conflicts that may turn violent. Over time, reintegration programmes should expand to include other groups. Linkages between other humanitarian or development and reintegration programmes will be facilitated if the latter are included in short-term and long-term government policy and offered by a responsible government ministry.

#### 4.4.1 POLITICAL WILL

**legislators and donors**

The duration of reintegration programmes depends on the political will of the **legislators** and of the **bilateral and multilateral donors**. While demobilisation programmes have a clear time schedule and are generally also monitored by the international community, reintegration programmes often obtain only hesitant commitments from the legislature and political decision-makers, as they tend to be considered too expensive. Therefore, the relevant institutions generally lack personnel resources and responsibilities.

**long-term mandate**

Donors have an important role to play, not just to finance programmes but also to promote the development of institutions that can implement a **mandate for the long-term reintegration** of ex-combatants. Otherwise, the attention paid to the situation of ex-combatants will all too often depend on their ability to draw attention to themselves through demonstrations and violence.

**limited mandate**

In many countries, the law **limits the mandate** of the implementing institutions. This makes reintegration programmes a calculable burden on the national budget. A limited mandate also forces a government to differentiate between targeted reintegration programmes and national development policies. In some countries the areas of responsibility for demobilisation and reintegration are separated. In Mozambique demobilisation was carried out under the supervision of the UN. The mandate for implementing reintegration programmes was only transferred to the Ministry of Labour at a later date.

#### 4.4.2 EX-COMBATANTS AND THE STATE

The **commitment that a government feels** towards demobilised combatants influences the effectiveness and timeliness of reintegration measures. The danger of reversion to war is greater when there is a very close linkage between the state and demobilised combatants who were not transferred to the armed forces of the state. The establishment of ex-combatant organisations can be an extremely effective mechanism for working with government and UN agencies, as was the case in El Salvador and Guatemala.

government  
commitment

After demobilisation, there is still a certain **dependence** on the armed group. Years of dependence on an armed group can manifest themselves in the form of unrealistic expectations. In many cases, the armed group has become a substitute family and support network. This may remain true even after the groups have been officially disbanded.

dependence

In African countries where liberation movements have taken over an intact state and economy, ex-combatants are often maintained by **government pensions** and by **increasing the size of the government**. The way in which ex-combatants and dependants were provided with maintenance in oil-rich Algeria, for example, was unique. When the country became independent in the 1960s, many ex-combatants were given high-ranking posts in government enterprises and received import privileges from which they and their families still profit today. In Zimbabwe and Namibia, many returnees and ex-combatants were placed in newly created positions in the public sector. These measures create employment and contribute to the social recognition of ex-combatants. A reshuffling of the public service sector often takes place parallel to the integration of several armed forces and is a part of national reconciliation. Still, in both the short and the long term, this often represents a burden on the national budget.



Tying ex-combatants to the state by means of new patron-client relations is a political instrument that has negative aspects in terms of development policy. Often those groups without any political lobby – female ex-combatants, elderly ex-combatants, members of particular ethnic groups and war-disabled – are excluded. Elderly ex-combatants, the war-disabled and dependants of combatants killed in action must be covered by **social security systems**. In many countries, the **provision of pensions** for ex-combatants and the war-disabled cannot be implemented either fiscally or politically. Even when pension claims for ex-combatants and their families are stipulated by law, pensions will only be paid years after the completion of the reintegration programmes. In Zimbabwe, a law allocating benefits to ex-combatants was only passed in 1993, in other words, 13 years after demobilisation. In all cases, the feasibility of establishing long-term forms of social security (i.e. pension funds) for certain target groups, in tandem with reintegration programmes, must be examined. In many countries pension funds for military personnel exist (e.g. Cambodia, Angola). In the wake of donor grants, however, national pension funds are often not revitalised after conflict.

social security  
systems



Within the scope of reintegration, **differences in rank, class and gender** also become apparent. Traditional roles may dictate that women be dependent on men and therefore not eligible for social security. High-ranking officers and technical specialists from the

class differences  
and gender roles



armed forces generally have far fewer difficulties finding new tasks. It is by no means rare for them to fall back on their contacts in the armed forces and related fields in the private sector. However, as regards status and political influence, this is the group with the most to lose. Taking this into consideration, the initial focus in El Salvador, for example, was on the 600 or so leaders of the guerrilla movement, with the aim of ensuring that once they were satisfied, their soldiers would be as well. This experience indicates that special focus is warranted for the leaders and superiors of armed groups: when they are satisfactorily reintegrated, they set an example for their followers.

### NEW TASKS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

The conversion of parts of the armed forces into a government development agency may seem an attractive political decision, but in the short term this approach can delay demobilisation. In this case, the armed forces are provided with new tasks and a new image. In the long term, however, this new role can also have counter-productive effects, since it does not promote reintegration into a civilian society. The existing dependence of the combatants on the armed forces and the state is reinforced.

temporary positions

high costs

work experience

The armed forces can, in combination with state-owned development organisations such as the Development Brigades in Namibia, provide valuable **temporary positions** for ex-combatants, allowing them to get some work experience or training before they enter the labour market. However, the **high costs** of training measures outside the existing training institutions are a major drawback, and in many cases the **work experience** does not relate to the market. There is a danger that state-owned employment companies are too centrally organised and do not have the capacity to have an impact at community level. None of the government or army owned development companies have been economically viable.

power sharing

aid conditionality

The provision of support and assistance for sections of the victorious armed forces should be restricted. In most countries, the peace processes after civil wars are based on a form of **power sharing**. This makes it politically difficult to privilege a particular group of demobilised persons. Moreover, **aid conditionality** used by international donors tends to place increasing pressure on the expedient and sustainable implementation of reintegration programmes.

structural  
adjustment

Parallel to demobilisation and reconstruction, many governments have also implemented **structural adjustment** programmes in conjunction with the World Bank, or as preconditions for loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The goal of these programmes is to ensure debt repayment by cutting back social spending and by prioritising structural growth of the private sector. They are frequently counter-productive, as the reduction in social and development programmes make reintegration programmes much more difficult. Such measures can restrict the range of social services available at a time when the return of refugees and ex-combatants increases the demand for such services.

### 4.4.3 REINTEGRATION SCENARIOS

intervention

A very broad spectrum of approaches and measures exist to promote reintegration at different social and economic levels. Both the depth and duration of **intervention** of such



programmes can vary widely. The starting point and the target groups of such programmes depend to a large extent on the political situation in the country and on the political influence of combatants and ex-combatants. Divisions reflect differences between members of the 'winner' and 'loser' armed groups.

Two different contexts can be distinguished with respect to possible reintegration scenarios: reintegration into war-affected societies, and reintegration into stable, largely civilian societies. Both cases will be examined in detail below. In the case of the former, there are three possible different post-war scenarios:

- **Clear winner situation:** A clear winner emerges from an armed conflict. The victorious party must now reduce its forces and often feels an obligation to compensate its ex-combatants for services rendered.
- **Clear loser situation:** One or several armed groups have been defeated militarily or have had to dissolve their armed wing in order to attain their political goals. Ex-combatants must reintegrate as civilians, often without much support and with a negative social image.
- **No clear winner or loser:** A third party like the United Nations brokers a peace treaty. In this case ex-combatants from all parties to the conflict must be reintegrated into civilian life. Only a few are admitted into the newly formed armed forces.



winner

loser

no winner – no loser

Yet, regardless of the above scenarios, all parties to the conflict must be treated with respect and dignity in order to build confidence. For its part, the international community must understand where the real power lies, and accordingly move carefully in an intensely charged environment, with the aim of maintaining and strengthening the **fragile status quo** that exists after an armed conflict.

fragile status quo

#### 4.4.3.1 REINTEGRATION IN WAR-AFFECTED SOCIETIES

The acceptance that a reintegration programme enjoys and the social prejudices that ex-combatants face depend to a large extent on the **political situation** in the country and on the circumstances of the demobilisation. Reintegration programmes must take these conditions into account and must react to them without discriminating against groups of ex-combatants or other social groups, especially those who suffered during the war.

political situation

In many countries, civil wars end without a clear winner/loser situation. Thus, every governmental or non-governmental institution responsible for the reintegration of ex-combatants is obliged to work in a sensitive and difficult political environment. The role that ex-combatants played during the war should not shape the reintegration services they receive in the post-war environment. Ex-combatants from all warring parties typically experience similar difficulties integrating into civilian life – indeed, some of their needs are similar to those of returning refugees or the IDPs. The prevailing **economic conditions** of the society that is obliged to integrate these refugees and IDPs represent an essential factor to be taken into account during reintegration programmes.

economic conditions

## urban areas

Many ex-combatants no longer wish to return either to the conditions in which they lived before the war or to those they experienced during their time as combatants. Returning to their home village or area may, to their minds, have positive connotations; however, to seek work, most ex-combatants will move to **urban areas**.

## gender roles

The limitations of traditional **gender roles** in rural areas also make urban areas more attractive for female ex-combatants, even though they are still confronted with a gender-biased division of labour in cities as well. For their part, men often find it harder to gain employment in cities, especially when they have a rural background or no other skills applicable to an urban environment.

## domestic violence

Women are often reluctant to give up the autonomy they have gained as combatants or sole supporters of their families. Displaced women, for example, have an easier time finding employment in cities as nannies, cleaners or housekeepers than their male partners. **This change in gender roles** with respect to income generation may have a negative effect on interpersonal relations within the family unit, and could foster **domestic violence**. This may especially be the case with ex-combatants returning to their partners and spouses, as they find tasks which previously were part of their societal roles taken away from them.

## identity

The loss or diminishment of tasks that formerly supported and formed an individual's **identity** reduce his/her level of personal security. Hence, dealing with changing interpersonal roles is a major factor in estimating how the society will emerge from the war.

## high expectations

The privations of war may also create **high expectations** in times of peace. In many cases, the combatants were promised access to education, work and land in the event of victory. These concepts then shape their plans and wishes when they are demobilised. Disappointment is an inevitable consequence.

## self-help

## refugee-warrior-communities

The short-term and long-term reintegration of ex-combatants represents an important element within the scope of development-oriented emergency aid, and is necessary in war-torn societies. Reintegration measures can prevent the use of force, both to create income through criminal activities and as a means of resolving social conflicts. Measures aimed at ex-combatants are designed for a target group that generally has a particularly weak potential for **self-help** in the phase of general reintegration. Reintegration programmes should, therefore, strengthen the self-help potential of ex-combatants, be poverty-oriented and promote integration with civilians. The involvement of ex-combatants in measures to rehabilitate the infrastructure is expedient in post-conflict phases because it also enables communities to experience a direct improvement of their post-war situation.



Post-war situations in some countries can make regional and class differences more apparent, particularly if the destruction and suffering only affected a specific region of a country or was limited to a social strata. This contrast is most evident in the case of the return from exile of **refugee-warrior communities**. This term has been created to describe organised exile populations with no clear division between refugees and combatants. In some cases, refugees may

also consider themselves to be combatants. When a group such as this is to be integrated into the dominant economic and social structures, access to the employment market as well as to respected social positions is often difficult. While the returning refugees and ex-combatants are emerging from a war, the dominant culture and institutions in the country often deny recognition of these experiences. This quickly leads to frustration and demands among the demobilised, which are emphasised by the use of force. In such situations, the reintegration programme must be seen as part of a greater entity, namely the rebuilding or creation of a functioning society. Without this umbrella, reintegration will simply consist of never-ending handouts and welfare. A return to some sort of structured society, with responsibility reverting to local government, must be the aim of the reintegration programme.

#### 4.4.3.2 REINTEGRATION IN STABLE, LARGELY CIVILIAN SOCIETIES

The reintegration of ex-combatants into relatively stable societies with functioning markets and economic cycles raises problems that differ from those in war-torn societies. This category includes the demobilisation of standing armed forces as well as all other armed groups that participated in the conflict. The **consequences of such wars** are not perceived in the same light throughout the country. This is the case, for example, in South Africa, whose society has been very unevenly affected by internal violence and war. The general economy in the country, especially in the areas with a white population of the major cities, was never directly impaired by the war. Similarly, in Zimbabwe and Namibia the guerrillas returned to countries whose formal sector had not been destroyed by the war, and to which the ex-combatants previously had enjoyed only restricted access.

The need for **targeted reintegration** measures is often underestimated in countries with a relatively strong economy. Yet it is in these countries in particular that ex-combatants remain permanently excluded from the formal sector. Their lack of skills and formal qualifications means they have no access to jobs, while competition in the informal sector is high. Without qualified training or social acceptance, they are likely to remain marginalised.

#### ■ 4.5 REINTEGRATION ON THREE LEVELS: NATIONAL – REGIONAL – LOCAL

No matter what the background and strategy of reintegration is, implementation policymakers and development agencies must define their tasks and responsibilities with respect to three different levels: national, regional and local. The distinction between the national (**macro**), regional (**meso**) and local (**micro**) levels is not only useful in recognising regional differences; it should also inform the policy levels of possible reintegration measures. Reintegration is a process that mainly takes place in communities at the local level. It is at this level that policymakers must identify the needs of the target group and the potential for successful reintegration. An efficient and effective national programme should, however, link and co-ordinate activities at all three levels. The desire to advance the process and make improvements must be tempered by the essential need to include local culture and participation in any programme which is to be effective and sustainable. This must be clear regardless of the level – grassroots programmes are essential.



#### 4.5.1 NATIONAL OR MACRO LEVEL

National level policy determines the requirements for reintegration. It is also at this level that **programmes are formulated** and a concept of reintegration is clarified. The concept must take regional needs, differences and capacities into account. In addition, the general conditions and objectives of reintegration are formulated and negotiated between the parties and government ministries involved. The **planning and financing** tasks of reintegration programmes generally exceed the capacities of the government ministries, resulting in the need for assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors.

##### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

**consultancy services** At the macro level, development co-operation can provide **consultancy services** to institutions and legislators. Consultancy on the organisational development of planning or implementing agencies, together with the planning of areas of responsibility and the establishment of monitoring systems, is particularly necessary in cases where new institutions are created with the mandate of promoting reintegration measures. In many countries, there is also a need for consultancy services for the legislative branch, since without a clear political mandate and a legal framework, the responsible institutions cannot act.

#### 4.5.2 REGIONAL OR MESO LEVEL

**decentralisation** The implementation of national programmes at the regional level can be carried out by both government implementing agencies and local NGOs. This is the level at which civil society organisations participate. The **decentralisation** of reintegration programmes is particularly expedient when the regions are affected by reintegration in very different ways. With decentralised national strategies, it is possible to react to regional problems more flexibly. The national reintegration authority frequently maintains local offices where regional activities are co-ordinated and overseen and which serve as points of contact and advisory centres for ex-combatants. A lack of communication and co-ordination between central and regional institutions can, however, also delay and complicate the implementation.

##### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

**civilian structures** Particularly in places where the reintegration of ex-combatants is a task for development-oriented emergency aid and where there is no strong implementing agency available at the national level, co-operation with local NGOs and community organisations has priority. At the meso level, the support of regional and local implementing agencies and NGOs represents an important line of approach for reaching the target group directly, as well as for promoting the emergence of **civilian structures**. Work with regional organisations has proved particularly successful in the field of employment creation. However, the supporting agencies must be careful not to assist organisations which only reflect the donors' wishes, rather than having significant links to the local population and customs. This may well be the case, as there will be **competition for funding** and assistance. Donors must remember that their values and expectations are not necessarily culturally appropriate in a different context. Forgetting this may easily alienate the local population from the reintegration process.

**competition for funding**

### 4.5.3 LOCAL OR MICRO LEVEL

The social and economic reintegration of the individual takes place at the local level. Acceptance in the community and family creates an important framework, without which government or private reintegration aid cannot take effect. Here the scarce resources mobilised are an important means of creating **civilian opportunities** for ex-combatants. Access to land and employment is generally regulated by the communities. This may be particularly difficult for women, who may not find the same support within their communities as men do. At this level, the infrastructure must be strengthened to create better economic conditions in the long term. Reintegration at the micro level is also the basis for sustainable reconciliation.

### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

**Direct intervention** takes place at the micro level. Emergency aid measures, QIPs and reinsertion packages aim at directly improving the situation at the local level. In the long term, strengthening local communities, which form the social network of ex-combatants, is an important task of sustainable development co-operation. The support of local NGOs, local businesses and other private enterprises (e.g. schools, training institutes) has priority for development co-operation, if such organisations exist. The rehabilitation of roads, bridges, schools and health care facilities by labour-intensive food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes can stimulate local markets in the short term. The local level is also where social services and reconciliation measures can prove most valuable. Lessons learned from weapons-for-development programmes, such as the Gramsch Pilot Programme in Albania, must be analysed. Such programmes offer funding for small development projects in exchange for the handover of weapons. Although the Gramsch programme was not a reintegration programme as such, lessons for reintegration programmes can nevertheless be learned from it and its successors in the city of Elbasan and in the district of Diber.




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**NOTE:** It is important to be aware that all in-kind assistance must be evaluated in relation to its impact on the local market. Too much assistance will increase the number of people depending on aid and will therefore reduce local production.

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## ■ 4.6 REINTEGRATION PROCEDURES

### 4.6.1 THE TRANSITION FROM DEMOBILISATION TO REINTEGRATION

While discharge is the last step of demobilisation, it is only a part of the transitional or reinsertion phase. The first step of reintegration programmes involves the reinsertion packages and other discharge measures, which provide for the immediate short-term needs of ex-combatants just after their official demobilisation.

### 4.6.2 ORIENTATION PHASE

The first months after demobilisation are characterised by very high mobility for many ex-combatants, as is the case with returning refugees and IDPs. In order to make contact

with family members, to determine who has survived the war, and above all to seek employment, ex-combatants wander and travel between towns and regions. This is also an expression of the displacement and disorientation caused by the war. This orientation phase is enormously important for individual solutions. If possible, a reconciliation programme should be planned and executed prior to reintegration, perhaps as part of the disarmament and demobilisation programme. Such programmes attempt to minimise possible clashes between different segments of the reunited society, and seek to provide community leaders with methods of dealing with social discord. However, the **high degree of mobility** makes it difficult for many ex-combatants to join the long-term projects that require their continual presence, as it is generally also unclear where they will be able to settle.

high degree of  
mobility

In order to facilitate the co-ordination of reintegration assistance and employment opportunities for ex-combatants, nationwide **information systems** are necessary. The Information and Referral Service (IRS) in Mozambique is an example of this. Ex-combatants receive advice in IRS offices in all the country's provinces, as well as information on the range of opportunities offered by the many NGOs and government organisations. A system such as this serves the purposes of communication, but is also important in providing ex-combatants with a realistic idea of their prospects and chances on the labour market. Ex-combatant organisations can also be useful in this regard by being responsible for information and referral systems. They can assist the government and the UN in keeping track of ex-combatants, especially those involved in reintegration programmes.

information systems



Usually, news about planned or actual projects spreads very rapidly amongst ex-combatants, as their old networks of communication are still intact after demobilisation. With few real facts at hand, they develop high and often exaggerated expectations. An IRS, on the other hand, will inform interested people about planned or actual projects and the conditions and requirements for receiving benefits from such projects. This is particularly helpful in the case of receiving awards of credit and subsidies for micro-businesses, which may not be possible without previous **detailed advisory inputs**. An IRS can also provide information about vacancies in training programmes and plots of land available

detailed advisory  
inputs

under resettlement programmes. For national programmes to reach regional and remote areas, an IRS is essential to target groups not living in or near the capital. IRS offices can serve as branch offices for the institutions and NGOs offering support for ex-combatants.

programme-specific  
coherence

Providing the implementing organisations with consultancy services is essential for the creation of a nationwide information and employment exchange system. An information system such as this can create **programme-specific coherence**, especially in cases where there are multiple donors operating in the field.

#### 4.6.3 RESETTLEMENT AND ACCESS TO LAND

The provision of shelter and sustainable resettlement solutions for ex-combatants is an immediate task of a national reintegration programme. The issue of resettlement encompasses two main factors: immediate resettlement and long-term solutions (including land reform).



### 4.6.3.1 RESETTLEMENT

The immediate resettlement solution is usually to settle the ex-combatant in his/her village or community. Providing an adequate supply of **shelter** and accommodation is an urgent task at this stage. In Uganda, demobilised combatants were given construction materials for simple huts as a part of their reinsertion packages. Such construction materials should be locally available if possible, and local market conditions and the effect on the local market must be taken into account to avoid abrupt rises in the prices of such commodities.

Combatants who have been stationed in barracks are likely to have maintained close links to their homes, and many have families. Conversely, those who have been fighting in remote areas or outside the country find it more difficult to resettle in an environment where they have not lived for years or decades. Shelter for ex-combatants and refugees who return after a long period of war can only represent a short-term solution. Without a **sense of belonging**, people will not resettle permanently and will take matters into their own hands. Arable land, employment and social acceptance are factors that influence the long-term prospects and decisions of the target group.



Settlement solutions need to be available to the ex-combatants, but the decision of when, where and under what circumstances settlement is to take place is so complex that it cannot be taken by a resettlement programme alone. These decisions fall to the individual, who is influenced by many social and economic **push and pull factors**. Local communities and their elders must also decide whether or not to accept ex-combatants and their dependants. Many ex-combatants are drawn to urban rather than rural areas. In many cases, they can no longer imagine earning their living by working in the countryside. This may be because they lack sufficient land to earn their livelihood, or because they prefer the higher social status associated with city life and do not want to revert to earning their living through hard agricultural work.



The long-term integration of the target group in **reconstruction projects** is recommended as being particularly expedient and sustainable. As a result of the reconstruction and government rehabilitation measures, there is often a relative boom in the construction sector after civil wars. Expectations are high that the government will now deliver houses to those who fought for them. One of the priorities of a resettlement policy should be that the target group be directly involved, but not given houses as gifts. They should instead be supported in their efforts to build their own houses, as the sense of belonging is closely linked to a sense of ownership. In Liberia an approach which seemed to work in the past in devastated rural communities was to use locally developed requirements and local labour. Communities were asked to define priorities for construction or repair. They were then given the technical requirements, and a joint construction programme (involving the ex-combatants and the local population) was

developed commensurate with available resources. Adopting approaches like this very early in the process develops trust and confidence and starts the very long reconstruction process.

A sound and well-co-ordinated resettlement policy can, therefore, have a very positive employment and training effect; the beneficiaries are not only ex-combatants, but returnees and local craftsmen as well. Training programmes and employment measures in the private sector can be initiated by making funds available for **housing projects**. Micro-businesses can develop in this sector if appropriate technologies that are not capital-intensive, such as clay brick presses, are promoted. Low-cost housing in semi-urban and rural areas is an appropriate measure to make these areas more attractive to returnees and ex-combatants, in terms of both employment and housing.

housing projects



#### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

International assistance should focus on the following tasks:

- provision of shelter and building materials;
- promotion of building construction programmes (transfer of appropriate technologies and vocational training in the construction sector, measures to rehabilitate buildings and social facilities);
- support for resettlement programmes by improving infrastructure and building up social facilities in new settlements.

#### 4.6.3.2 THE LAND ISSUE

Problems arising from the resettlement of returned refugees and ex-combatants are linked in nearly all countries with the question of land reform. Land rights and access to resources are often among the most important **political demands** made by the armed groups.

political demands

Expulsion from their own country is a direct experience for many ex-combatants in Africa as well as in Latin America. Disputes over land and access to water or mineral resources are the **root causes** of many conflicts. In many cases, these conflicts have escalated into war and have led to the expulsion of ethnic minorities and the formation of ethnic guerrilla movements. Regardless of the political compromises with which these wars are settled, reintegration programmes must consider these demands if they want to address the conflict.

root causes

**Women** in particular face obstacles and are often unable to hold land titles, have access to land, or to buy or inherit it. Although in Guatemala, for example, the deeds to the land plots allocated to ex-combatant couples were written in both names, it is especially difficult for widows or female heads of household to gain access and rights to land. In spite of their contribution to the war effort, they generally lose.

women

However, it cannot be the task of reintegration programmes to advance land reform. **Land reform** is a national policy issue with consequences for all segments of society. There is a broad target group for land reforms, and groups besides ex-combatants will be

land reform



affected. Ex-combatants only represent a small proportion of the people who could profit from the (re)allocation of land. The resettlement of ex-combatants to the detriment of other groups will inevitably lead to new disputes that have the potential to turn into violent conflicts. In contrast to rented or community land, owned land is a positive component for further development and increasing production capacity. This relates to the development of private property and capital that neither the state nor other persons can demand all or part of (except for taxes). Legal ownership provides security and sustainability. Yet the **appropriateness** of supporting individual ownership and private property must be balanced against the local culture and customs, which may place the community or other units before the individual.

#### 4.6.3.3 ACCESS TO LAND

**NOTE:** Access to land is a main concern of ex-combatants, as well as of returning refugees, IDPs and other landless groups. These demands for land cannot be addressed solely within a DDR programme. Reintegration programmes, therefore, should be linked with existing programmes for agricultural training and land redistribution, in order to facilitate access to land. This might, however, entail a number of different measures and policies.

It is rare that ex-combatants have access to land immediately after demobilisation. The use of land is generally linked to acceptance and a respected **social position** in the community. When ex-combatants are reunited with their families and villages, they are usually welcomed as additional labour for the fields and often given a small piece of land. This might be a good solution in the short term, but over time, reintegration programmes should survey the situation of ex-combatants to identify their specific needs. Existing land legislation should be reviewed and opportunities for ex-combatants to obtain access to agricultural land should be explored.

The skills of ex-combatants in the agricultural sector are another aspect to consider. Commercial farming requires experience and often specialised knowledge. **Agricultural training** should be a priority for those ex-combatants who are given land or land rights as part of a DDR programme. This training programme might be linked to subsidies or credits for smallholders. In communal areas, social integration and acceptance are of major importance for ex-combatants who want to obtain land rights from traditional authorities. Many cleansing rituals that mark reintegration are, therefore, linked to planting and harvesting.



#### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

International assistance should focus on the following tasks:

- provision of support to government ministries in evaluating the possibilities of land allocation;
- policy consultancy for a land distribution policy;
- agricultural training for ex-combatants;
- subsidies for smallholders.

#### 4.6.3.4 SETTLEMENT SCHEMES

incentives

Many governments settle combatants and their families on newly allocated land within the scope of government programmes. Free land, cheap credits and improved infrastructure are some of the **incentives** that will attract young and able-bodied ex-combatants in particular to farming. Often organised in the form of co-operatives, these settlement schemes are meant to compensate those who fought and, at the same time, increase agricultural production. Governments that feel unable to promote land reform on a national scale are often eager to implement small projects with small groups.

controversial policies

**Controversial policies** from a development perspective include (among other factors) the settlement of ex-combatants in large agricultural agglomerations or on government farms. Experiences in southern and eastern Africa have shown that such centres remain permanently dependent on government aid if the infrastructure, management and individual initiative are insufficient. Transport for agricultural goods, access to local and national markets and adequate access to health care and social services are essential conditions for the acceptance and sustainability of such settlement programmes. Two factors make settlement schemes for ex-combatants a risky and often expensive experiment:

selection

- The settlers and farmers are **selected** from a group that has hardly any experience with farming or with commercial agricultural production. Settlers are often selected on the basis of their political or military merits rather than their skills.

links to local market space

- Many settlement schemes have insufficient **links to local markets**. They remain a special field of national rural development policy, as they rely on direct subsidies from the state or foreign donors. The management often reflects military command structures with little agricultural or managerial know-how. Many ex-combatants see these schemes as a source of income rather than as a place to stay.

misimpression

These schemes must be open to other people (e.g. returnees, IDPs, the landless poor) to avoid the **misimpression** that they are actually outposts of the armed forces.



#### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

International assistance should focus on the following tasks:

- agricultural extension services;
- credit schemes;
- consultancy on land use and demining;
- support for NGOs and community organisations.

#### 4.6.4 ACCESS TO TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT

acquisition of skills

Improving access to work and employment is a central element of reintegration programmes. The **acquisition of skills** should improve the chances of ex-combatants on the employment market. Business training and small credits should support those who want to set up their own businesses. However, the contextual situations differ in each country, as ex-combatants generally only have low-level or no formal vocational qualifications.

Courses in skills training are offered within the scope of DDR to improve the opportunities of ex-combatants on the labour market. Training programmes for ex-combatants are, therefore, frequently directly connected to employment promotion measures. When designing training packages, the needs of female ex-combatants should be considered, e.g. access to child or elder care.

#### 4.6.4.1 TRAINING

The employment market in post-conflict societies generally has limited capabilities to absorb large numbers of ex-combatants (or other groups such as refugees or IDPs). The lack of training and experience intensifies this problem. Vocational training for adults who have hardly any relevant working experience and who have little or no formal education is difficult and extremely costly. Many countries lack the capacities to offer training to a large number of ex-combatants at the same time. For this reason, DDR programmes include special training courses for ex-combatants, ranging from on-the-job training to vocational training. In designing these courses, it is important to consider the cultural, social and gender norms associated with education and training programmes in the recipient country.



Designing special **courses for ex-combatants** offers several advantages:

courses for  
ex-combatants

- Courses focus on the level and background of the target groups.
- Training courses develop existing skills and qualifications of ex-combatants.
- Training courses should be market-oriented to enable ex-combatants to find employment or to start their own small businesses.
- In short-term skills training programmes, ex-combatants familiarise themselves with the demands of work outside the armed forces.
- Courses can be organised as part of DDR. This should also involve private training institutions. The capacities of the vocational training system are not necessarily affected.
- Short courses outside the formal qualification system can be offered on a decentralised basis at the regional level.
- Training courses linked to grants or small credits can help bridge the gap to self-employment (business skills, accounting and marketing).
- Training courses are important for future employment opportunities, as most ex-combatants have no employment record outside the armed forces.

Courses for ex-combatants should address the requirements of the **informal sector**. Most ex-combatants have no chance of finding employment in the small formal sector (see section 4.4) There is, therefore, the danger that



ex-combatants will be marginalised. Skills alone are not sufficient to start a small business; a basic knowledge of market structures and accounting is needed as well, as ex-combatants have generally lived outside a market economy for years. Training courses are required to make ex-combatants qualify for grants and credit programmes.

**market requirements** To ensure that training is actually in line with **market requirements**, it is vital to estimate needs in advance for both the formal and the informal sector. If ex-combatants are trained in skills for which there is no demand, long-term unemployment and growing frustration will be the result. Before the start of any training programme, a detailed needs assessment should be conducted. If training courses reflect the demands of public and private employers, ex-combatants have a better chance of finding employment.



It often remains uncertain whether ex-combatants will find work after the completion of a training course. However, reintegration programmes in Ethiopia and Mozambique have shown that training courses in and of themselves can have a positive effect. They create temporary positions for ex-combatants. Training courses can be seen as just one form of support and employment for ex-combatants at times when they need money, a civilian job and future prospects. These measures buy time for the **consolidation of peace** and for the reconstruction of war-torn countries.

**social effects** Training is not only a matter of professional qualification. The **social effects** of training courses are often underestimated and are hard to measure. For many ex-combatants, the training courses offered as part of a reintegration programme are their first chance to receive some sort of professional training. The experience of learning and applying this new skill can in itself be a positive effect. The completion of a training course also elevates participants' social status. By the time the training courses are over, the individual ex-combatant might have established more contacts and have a clearer idea of what he/she can do for a living.

#### **TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE**

International assistance should focus on the following tasks:

- surveying the demand for training;
- conducting labour market surveys;
- developing a selection process;
- developing and implementing training modules for crash courses;
- rehabilitating existing training institutions and skills development centres;
- identifying private businesses that are suitable for on-the-job training;
- administering training systems;
- developing training modules for job applications.

#### 4.6.4.2 PROMOTING EMPLOYMENT

Employment creation and promotion are vital components of reintegration projects. Employment creation takes place on two levels:

- financial incentives for new jobs created for ex-combatants;
- financial subsidies for businesses set up by ex-combatants.

Employment promotion programmes for ex-combatants can be administered through different organisations, such as NGOs, commercial banks, private businesses, or extension offices of government institutions. In many countries there are no banks to administer small credits to ex-combatants. In such cases, **structures for employment**

programmes must be set up. Employment promotion measures should not only focus on urban areas, but must also be implemented in the regions and rural areas where many of the ex-combatants live with their families. It is also vital for the sustainability of the process that ex-combatants mix with other social groups in these activities.

Wage payments or wage subsidies to employers who employ ex-combatants are a measure frequently used to open up the employment market to the target group. This is particularly expedient after training courses. For many younger ex-combatants, this represents a first step into the employment market and thus constitutes their first reference for future employers. This employment relationship can lead to the creation of future jobs, while **financial incentives** for companies offering on-the-job training can provide realistic training and good prospects of further employment.



**Grants and credits** for ex-combatants: Most DDR programmes offer special grants to ex-combatants starting their own businesses. Grants and credits from special funds are usually the only source of funding for ex-combatants, as they otherwise do not fulfil the conditions for commercial credits. Many DDR programmes have experienced difficulties with credit schemes.

A large number of small businesses in the past have been unable to service their debts. Offering grants in connection with accountancy training and management advice has been a successful instrument. Before a small business is started, a detailed **market analysis** should be conducted. Advice on market strategies and continuous counselling over the first year should be linked to the disbursements of grants.



#### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

International assistance should focus on the following tasks:

- conducting market research;
- funding new micro- and small-scale businesses set up through an open reintegration fund, e.g. Mozambique, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Guatemala;
- funding on-the-job training;
- co-operating closely with private businesses;
- accountancy training and management advice.

#### 4.6.5 PROMOTING SOCIAL REINTEGRATION

acceptance of ex-combatants

Social reintegration means, above all, broad **acceptance of ex-combatants** in the population. In post-conflict societies, the political and legal equality of all ex-combatants is a basic precondition for their social reintegration. At the same time, it is important to remember that every war leaves in its wake severe trauma and embitterment which can only be dealt with slowly. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the psychological consequences are the same for men, women and children. Women and children may be confronted with particular traumas. They are more likely than men to



have suffered from sexual abuse and rape, and may have a child as a result or be forcibly married. When designing support for the social reintegration of ex-combatants, it cannot be assumed that the psychological consequences of the war will disappear. Interpersonal social reconciliation processes at the local level must be supported. Such activities involve the local population and are more tangible than nationally proclaimed appeals to work towards reconciliation. Social reconciliation at the local level is the most direct method of rebuilding social cohesion which has been damaged by armed conflict and violence.

##### 4.6.5.1 RECONCILIATION

social equilibrium

Reconciliation refers to the restoration of normal relations or a state of **social equilibrium** between individuals, social groups or political entities which were formerly in conflict. In the ethical-religious sense of the concept, reconciliation denotes forgiving and forgetting offences which have been committed. Reconciliation may require restitution, penance and forgiveness.

civic and political values

Those who have achieved reconciliation are seen to have integrated a set of **civic and political values** that include tolerance, pluralism, mutual respect and peaceful co-existence. Reconciliation among former protagonists is the basis for the sustained, peaceful resolution of conflicts. The process of reconciliation involves efforts to identify the wounds in society and to assist in the healing process.

moral and social order

Reconciliation encourages formerly hostile members of a community to live together. In post-conflict societies where communal strife was either a direct or proximate cause, or in which ethnic strife was aggravated by the conflict, the **moral and social order** which



previously connected mixed populations in a shared culture frequently disintegrates. Such events deprive a society of its ability to function effectively. Violence, displacement and chaos traumatise individuals and destroy or severely damage the interpersonal trust that supports social cohesion.

Suppressing and forgetting the horrors of war can turn out to be counter-productive in the long term. The individual and collective assimilation of the war is one of the preconditions for social reintegration. **Forms of reconciliation** and coping with collective trauma differ widely between cultures and on a gender-specific basis. References to the run-up period to the war are generally involved. *forms of reconciliation*

People often need to deal with their own guilt before being able to accept and forgive others. For whatever reasons, they may have committed crimes and participated in violent acts against their own norms of behaviour. At the same time, people who have been victimised or witnessed violence directly will also have emotional traumas that need to be addressed. It is very important to remember that in war-torn societies, **identity formation and changes** take place in order to deal with the new post-conflict condition. These changes are firmly linked to the process of reconciliation. Reconciliation is, in this respect, an individual process triggered by group activities. Consequently, the understanding of group behaviour vs. individual behaviour is essential in this process. *identity formation and changes*

There are several different institutional arrangements for the promotion of reconciliation policies:

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### **WAR CRIME TRIBUNALS**

International law provides standards for human rights and military conduct in war which parties can be held responsible for.

In the case of the Nuremberg trials after the Second World War, the victors set up a international court, working under the international law existing at that time.

In the case of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, an International Criminal Tribunal was set up in the Hague under the auspices of the UN and International Court of Justice (ICJ), with support from the Centre for Human Rights, and was charged with the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

However, to take one example, Bosnian Serbs have no confidence in a Bosnian government controlled by Muslims; even bona fide convictions with full international endorsement will be viewed as evidence that the Serbs are being victimised. Therefore, representation and involvement of all parties to a conflict are important for sustainable reconciliation.

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### TRUTH COMMISSIONS

A truth commission is essentially a public board of enquiry. Its aim is to expose what really happened during a war. It can be conducted internally, as in South Africa, or under international supervision as in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Truth commissions conduct a public enquiry, by means of which atrocities and misdeeds are brought out into the open. The commissions aim to dispel any lies and distortions which may have been necessary to support the war effort. Such public acknowledgement of wrongdoing can form part of the reconciliation process.

In South Africa, a general amnesty was part of the enquiry process. People were granted a fixed period of time to come forward, after which they might be prosecuted for unconfessed crimes.

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### PEACE COMMISSIONS

Peace commissions deliberately engage opposed communities in potentially volatile intercommunal problems. They can be set up at the national, regional or local level and may advocate human rights or promote ethno-religious national harmony. Their goal is to prevent intercommunal violence, so that peace agreements will not be undermined. Staff are educated and trained in cross-group communication.

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#### awareness

Public education and **awareness** about the war and its consequences play an essential role in the reconciliation process. The promotion of such education in schools, the media and in communities can also be considered a kind of crisis prevention.

#### civil society

The strengthening of **civil society** by supporting the development of overlapping interest organisations is of the utmost importance: democratisation acts as an effective counter-weight to the developing strength of the new government, not least in the reconciliation process.



#### 4.6.5.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL

In addition to the social process of understanding and reconciliation, it is necessary to create social capital at the individual level. This process can assume widely varying forms for the groups distinguished above (see section 4.3). In traditional societies, the expectations of individuals differ according to age and gender. It is, therefore, important for ex-combatants to be socially recognised by the community and, at the same time, to be able to make a contribution to the community themselves.

#### 4.6.5.3 SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF MALE EX-COMBATANTS

#### readmission into the community

For many male ex-combatants, the ritual **readmission into the community** is connected with cleansing rituals led by the elders. If this formal acceptance is refused, these men remain permanently excluded, as in the north of Uganda, for example. However, once this ritual readmission has been carried out, male ex-combatants are still faced with the



task of feeding themselves and their families and assuming a respected social role. The promotion of employment and training can, therefore, be seen as making a direct contribution to the social reintegration of ex-combatants, and should be well underway by the time the reintegration phase of a DDR programme begins.

#### 4.6.5.4 SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF FEMALE EX-COMBATANTS

The return to **traditional roles** is more difficult for female ex-combatants. For women who have fought in liberation movements, completed training courses and shouldered **responsibility** in a guerrilla force, the return to civilian life is frequently bound up with limitations.

Social expectations restrict women to traditional roles that may have nothing to do with their current reality or expectations. These contradictions lead to **prejudice**, slander and rejection, even from their own families. Assumptions may be made concerning their role in the conflict. For example, women who fought with men in war are often considered to be prostitutes. This may bring out individual conflicts within the family and at work. Reintegration programmes can address this target group by offering specific training and employment programmes for women that go beyond traditional roles.

#### 4.6.5.5 SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF YOUTH AND CHILD SOLDIERS

It is particularly important that children and young persons who have grown up in a war situation or who have participated directly in the brutalities of war as child soldiers have access to **therapy** for trauma. In these cases, it is often hardly possible to speak of reintegration. In many countries torn by civil war, a state of war has become the normal condition for more than a generation, as many people – both children and adults – will have grown up surrounded by war.

The end of the war brings relief, but it also means new uncertainties about the future. Access to **education**, the **security** of maintenance supplies and the protection offered by their families and clans represent inestimable social capital for these children. Many learn peaceful forms of tackling everyday routines and conflicts for the first time. Support for psychosocial care and social reintegration is, therefore, to be seen as a long-term investment in the stability of the society. This age group must also be seen and dealt with from the viewpoint that they represent the next generation of leaders and social representatives.

#### 4.6.5.6 PSYCHOSOCIAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE

Psychosocial and mental health care for ex-combatants appear to be particularly urgent tasks, especially after decades of violence and civil war, such as in Somalia, Angola or Cambodia. Violent experiences at any age, but especially in early childhood years, leave not only physical but also emotional wounds. **Trauma** manifests itself among many ex-combatants in the form of recurrent states of anxiety and re-experiencing of the trauma, paranoid delusions, chronic depression, excessive substance abuse, drug-induced illnesses like psychosis, as well as psychosomatic disorders.



The **consequences** include severely impaired functioning, including occupational and emotional disablement, the inability to maintain social relationships, social isolation, aggressiveness, depressed feelings, and low self-esteem. All this leads to a vicious circle of suffering, which perpetuates the underlying disorders and reinforces the cycle of trauma. The artificial division between psychosocial and mental health services, which often exists in the field, must be seriously challenged, since they are two sides of the same coin. Mental health to mental illness is a continuum which is first and foremost made up of psychosocial coping and support mechanisms, both individual and collective. However, once individual coping measures have been exhausted, mental health measures, such as psychotherapy, counselling and medication are warranted. The affected groups, ex-combatants and their families need both.

post-traumatic  
stress

Ex-combatants, especially former child soldiers, are often severely affected by mental illnesses such as psychotic or mood disorders and drug dependence associated with aggressive and irrational behaviour. Often these disorders co-occur with **Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)**. The sufferers often end up as homeless persons or in prison; for their part, families can often do nothing but restrain the sufferers, e.g. by chaining them, in some cases for years on end. This is due to the lack of qualified psychiatric help.

adequate support

Ex-combatants severely affected by mental problems cannot profit fully from psychosocial and reintegrative activities as long as they remain in a severe state of impairment. Affected persons and their caretakers need **adequate support**; however, mental health services are non-existent in many post-conflict countries.



community-based  
health services

However, traditional centralised psychiatric units in large hospitals have severe limitations. Therefore, the promotion and development of adequate **community-based mental health treatment services** must be incorporated into the public health policies of post-conflict societies.

The promotion of psychosocial care requires some type of therapy or **counselling**, which must be based on local traditions and customs. Listening, understanding and advising, the social assimilation of the trauma and the ritual cleansing from a stigma – these are inputs which cannot be provided fully by service facilities of the health care system. These processes take place within families, in religious communities, within age groups and initiation groups. Collective and individual assimilation of the war are necessary and productive.

public and private  
roles

The division between **public and private roles** is different in each culture. These boundaries must be respected in psychosocial care measures. Public discussion of this theme can encourage people to articulate their war experiences and traumas in the privacy of their own homes. However, people do not easily talk about their traumatic experiences. In fact, avoidance of talking and thinking about the traumatic experience is a known clinical phenomenon, and isolation and withdrawal from social support networks are a common consequence of this. One way of effectively helping severely affected individuals to reassume their roles in society is to help them find words for otherwise inexpressible experiences. Once a survivor is able to talk about past ex-

periences, he/she is more open to social institutions or community-based groups dealing with recovery, reconciliation and integration, to facilitate assimilation of the trauma.

The question of which **institutions** can provide psychosocial care is answered differently from country to country. A key factor is the creation of specific psychosocial and mental health services within a community-based health centre approach.

Measures in this field should likewise target **multipliers** who assume counselling functions. Teachers, doctors, pastors, local dignitaries, health workers and traditional healers must play an important role in this process. Enhancing their awareness of ex-combatants' and returning refugees' psychological trauma and 'internal injuries' is a major task of reintegration programmes. The transfer of skills and knowledge to and by these multipliers is a further objective in this field. Capacity-building for health workers in the field of mental health should be developed in tandem.

### TASKS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

International assistance should focus on the following tasks:

- strengthening the capacities of those communities who take in ex-combatants;
- supporting reconciliation processes by promoting independent media and NGOs;
- promoting training and employment measures for women;
- promoting organisations which offer counselling at a local level;
- supporting capacity-building in the health care sector;
- providing information and training for multipliers in the communities;
- supporting therapy programmes for traumatised children.



#### 4.6.6 MONITORING AND EVALUATING REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES

If the economic situation of the majority of the ex-combatants has been improved by targeted reintegration programmes or by an improved general economic situation, the objective of reintegration programmes has been achieved. **Social indicators** might still differ, however, according to the political and social situation in the country. In studying the long-term effects of reintegration measures, social scientists often take the frequency of interactions between the formerly separated groups as one indicator. Other indicators could include differences in social status and representation in communal decision-making bodies.

social indicators

Any evaluation of the economic or social development of ex-combatants must be based on data from ex-combatants and non ex-combatants. DDR programme effectiveness is not measured by the success of individuals but by the differences and similarities between the target group and the **average population as a control group**.

control groups

**monitoring systems** However, these indicators are not easy to measure in many countries. Efficient **monitoring systems**, either of a programme or of single components, can also provide policy planners with useful data to assess the efficiency of the measures taken. Like a demobilisation pilot phase, analysis conducted by monitoring systems can assist in improving reintegration programmes while they are underway. As efficient programmes should be demand-driven, they should monitor any change in the demand for individual measures and benefits very carefully.

**starters vs.  
non-starters**

In many countries, a large proportion of ex-combatants have still not found regular work after five to ten years. After a short time it is possible to distinguish two groups of ex-combatants: **starters** and **non-starters**. The former are those ex-combatants with good prospects of reintegration, while the latter group consists of those with relatively poor qualifications for the employment market or of those who lack integration into a community. The instruments of reintegration programmes must be modified and improved parallel to economic and social development. Experiences from DDR programmes in several African countries show that sustainable programmes in the skills training and employment fields require continuous promotion for years in order to be successful.

**social networks**

Those ex-combatants with particularly poor resources of their own make up a large group in need of long-term, poverty-oriented reintegration programmes. It is crucial to know which **social networks** maintain these groups, and how these networks and the overall civil society can be strengthened. Promoting civil society can include supporting networks such as ex-combatants' and women's associations. Communication with such organisations will facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of reintegration measures – including the pre-discharge orientation and the reinsertion phase. On the strength of this knowledge, the reintegration programme can then be expanded to other target groups with similar

social profiles. Ultimately, the programme can evolve in tandem with general poverty-oriented development co-operation policy, before being phased out.

In effect, the measures of the reintegration programmes should be limited in time in order to avoid creating **dependency**. It should be made clear that special arrangements for ex-combatants can only be justified for a **limited time** after demobilisation. Any project is a response to special or additional needs. A clear time frame for the political and economic goals is needed for a fair evaluation of real costs and achievements.

In addition, it should be determined whether the target group has full **access to available projects**. Access to newly distributed land, government subsidies and upgrading courses is often limited to urban centres and is complicated by bureaucratic obstacles. In some countries, the capacities of government programmes are so limited that a large proportion of ex-combatants cannot benefit from them even after many years have passed. However, even training measures and government credits are



unattainable for many ex-combatants who do not fulfil the minimum requirements. Only regular monitoring at the start of a programme can identify these gaps at an early stage. The target group can be reached if the promotion instruments are adjusted according to the situation.

## ■ 4.7 OVERVIEW OF THE TASKS

The field of reintegration leaves many tasks for the international community to take on. The following is an attempt to list most of the planning and implementation measures that can be effectively carried out by the appropriate organisations.

### 4.7.1 PLANNING – FORMING AN ORGANISATION FOR THE REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS

- conducting a needs assessment and estimating demand;
- capacity-building to ensure the co-ordination and implementation of institutions;
- providing consultancy services to the implementing organisations on the planning and development of reintegration programmes and projects;
- organising workshops and exchanges of experience with collaboration partners from other countries;
- providing the necessary hardware and software to set up and maintain a nationwide information and employment exchange system.

### 4.7.2 IMPLEMENTATION – SECURING SUBSISTENCE OF EX-COMBATANTS

- providing reinsertion packages.

#### RESETTLEMENT

- providing shelter and building materials;
- promoting construction programmes;
- transferring appropriate technologies and vocational training;
- promoting measures to rehabilitate buildings and social facilities;
- supporting resettlement programmes by improving the infrastructure and building up social facilities in new settlements.

#### INTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN RURAL AREAS

- providing agricultural training for ex-combatants/families;
- training personnel for extension services;
- supporting local NGOs and co-operatives.

#### LAND ACCESS

- providing agricultural training for ex-combatants;
- offering subsidies for smallholders;
- providing consultancy for land distribution policy;
- supporting ministries in evaluating the possibilities of land allocation.

**SETTLEMENT SCHEMES**

- supporting agricultural extension services;
- offering consultancy services on land use and sustainable agriculture;
- supporting NGOs and community organisations.

**TRAINING**

- conducting a needs assessment (demand for training);
- conducting precise market studies in advance to ensure that training is in line with market requirements;
- developing a selection process;
- developing and implementing training modules for skills training programmes;
- developing training modules for job application courses;
- rehabilitating existing training institutions and skills development centres;
- administering training systems;
- monitoring and evaluating ongoing training measures;
- offering assistance programmes following training;
- funding on-the-job training;
- identifying private businesses which are suitable for on-the-job training.

**PROMOTING EMPLOYMENT**

- conducting market research;
- planning and implementing labour-intensive food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes (rehabilitation of roads, bridges, school and health-care facilities);
- training in accountancy and management;
- funding and administering open funds;
- providing grants for small and medium-sized businesses that employ ex-combatants/families;
- working in close co-operation with private businesses;
- providing financial and consultancy support for local NGOs, local businesses and other private enterprises (e.g. a school, training institutes).

**SOCIAL REINTEGRATION**

- promoting training and employment measures for women;
- supporting therapy programmes for traumatised children and adults;
- promoting organisations which offer counselling at a local level;
- strengthening the social service capacities of those communities that take in ex-combatants;
- providing information and training multipliers in the communities;
- supporting reconciliation processes by promoting independent media and NGOs.

**MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)**

- conducting surveys among veterans' associations and other organisations that support ex-combatants;
- providing (and maintaining) hardware and software to support M&E systems.

■ 4.8 CONCLUSION

The concerns dealt with in this chapter show the importance of co-ordinating disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration measures if the latter, as a civilian task, is to be successful. If disarmament and demobilisation procedures do not create **confidence** in and **commitment** to the DDR programme, discharged combatants may remobilise or resort to violence and coercion to survive.

confidence and  
commitment

The reintegration phase is intended to provide ex-combatants with useful skills and realistic prospects for civilian life. However, reintegration only works in a functional society with sufficient **human security** provisions for ex-combatants and the public. Therefore, like projects aimed at increasing human security, even though reintegration in itself aims at achieving economic and social security. Without a secure environment, however, reintegration programmes cannot be successful.

human security





Building roads and bridges, Mozambique



## 5 CONCLUSIONS

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants pose a challenge for governments, peacekeepers, development agencies and NGOs alike. In the **transition process** from war to peace, demobilisation programmes can play a crucial role. The successful integration of ex-combatants into civilian society lays the foundation for sustainable peace and demilitarisation. Thus, it is important to develop specific tools that are directed at the special and individual needs of demobilised combatants. From this initial focus on the individual, the process must shift towards a community-oriented perspective, making the individual ex-combatant part of society and providing a sense of belonging and responsibility as the reintegration programme matures.

A considerable amount of experience has been gained in a number of different countries. Close co-operation between DDR partners and development agencies has resulted in a number of successful projects. New ideas, initiatives and instruments have been developed over the past few years. The guidelines and instruments presented in this handbook show that there are a variety of specific instruments and targeted approaches that can support DDR programmes. The previous chapters have specified the areas on which humanitarian assistance and development co-operation should focus. As the various components of disarmament and demobilisation programmes require the expertise of military personnel, **civil-military co-operation** is essential and should not be underestimated. The co-ordination of chronologically overlapping projects during the DDR process is essential if all elements are to prove worthwhile.

The planning guidelines present a **catalogue of possible measures**, although the conditions for implementation differ widely. Every country has its own specific approach to demobilisation. The various instruments must be adapted to the specific conditions in each country: not every instrument will work in every environment. Specific instruments and indicators must be developed for the M&E of DDR programmes. The formulation of specific M&E systems for DDR, especially in the reintegration phase, remains an important task for the future. Demobilisation can take place in times of peace or immediately after a civil war. In any case, there are various political forces and social groups which will take an interest in a programme such as this. A successful DDR programme will manage to include them all.

There are **new challenges** ahead as prolonged civil wars confront peacekeepers and humanitarian aid and development organisations with increasingly complex situations. In countries where all state structures have collapsed, new tasks for emergency aid have arisen in connection with demobilisation programmes. Experiences in Africa show that disarmament and demobilisation without a state structure might bring temporary peace to some regions, but cannot be sustainable over the years.

Programmes for demobilised combatants are part of development-oriented emergency aid. At the same time, they represent an important link in the humanitarian relief to development continuum. **Planning** in this transition requires a high degree of flexibility and sensitivity to political change. Most of the programmes start under enormous time

pressure and face difficult security conditions. In many countries, only early intervention can keep the momentum in a fragile peace process alive. Therefore, it is important to start the planning of demobilisation measures as early as possible. Successful demobilisation and reintegration programmes create the basis for long-term development programmes and sustainable reconstruction measures.

#### comprehensive accords

Parties involved in the negotiating and planning phase, from both sides, need to consider all relevant factors in order to negotiate as comprehensive and appropriate a DDR plan as possible. This proved to be very true in the El Salvador and Guatemala cases and resulted in very **comprehensive accords**. If any of the different elements of DDR are neglected, the best intentions cannot produce a successful and effective DDR programme. The information available in this handbook is intended to serve as a guide to the persons involved in the negotiation and planning phase, and to help secure the comprehensive accords that are needed in post-conflict environments to build trust and a basis for sustainable peace and development.

#### co-ordination

Overall, this work underlines the need for the **co-ordination** of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts to make all three approaches more effective and efficient. The chances of success are higher and the benefit for the target groups of ex-combatants and receiving communities may be increased. A lack of co-ordination between the humanitarian aid and development agencies working on DDR programmes wastes funds and decreases local communities' confidence in and support for the programmes. As this confidence is essential for the process to work, co-operation in the field of DDR is crucial. This handbook represents an effort to increase co-operation and co-ordination between current and future DDR operations and humanitarian and development programmes, with the objective of achieving sustainable peace and development.





Registration of army personnel, Cambodia

## 6 ANNEXES

### ■ 6.1 HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS FOR ENCAMPMENT SITE SELECTION AND OPERATION

This table provides personnel with an overview of the generally accepted and/or applied standards for setting up camps for displaced populations. With permission from the publishers, the information is taken from publications by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR and the SPHERE Project. A column is set aside for personnel working in a relevant environment to note down their own assessment and decisions.

*Remember that all decisions must be made taking the local level of economic development, as well as social and cultural habits, into account. Moreover, decisions must be sensitive towards the needs of all target groups: men, women, children, young adults, the elderly and the disabled.*

*In addition, during the selection of a site for weapons, food and medical supplies and their storage must be considered, as well as administration offices, etc.*

*Unnecessary isolation through accommodation planning is to be avoided to prevent the further stigmatisation of combatants and especially of the vulnerable groups among them. All services must be accessible to all target groups, without exposing them to physical and mental abuse. Facilities such as latrines, baths and showers should be segregated by sex.*

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**NOTE:** At the time of publication the SPHERE Project was reviewing its standards; for current information, SPHERE should be contacted at [sphere@ifrc.org](mailto:sphere@ifrc.org) or at their web site: [www.sphereproject.org](http://www.sphereproject.org). The reader can also find updated versions of the UNHCR handbook and ICRC recommendations on their web sites ([www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org) and [www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)), where these organisations can also be contacted.

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#### SOURCES:

McConnan, Isobel, ed. *The Sphere Project – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Geneva: The Sphere Project, 2000.

Perrin, Pierre. *Handbook on War and Public Health*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Handbook for Emergencies*. (2nd Edition). Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2000.

	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
<b>Location</b>				
access	'Proximity to national services is desirable, particularly health care services. Roads must be 'all-weather', providing year-round access.' (p. 138) transit camps: 'good access (road, port, airport)' (p. 146)	'It is accessible by heavy trucks from an all-weather road. If it is necessary to construct a road, the soil type and terrain should support this activity. Communal facilities are accessible by light vehicles.' (p. 199)	'Access roads must be passable all year and navigable by relief trucks.' (p. 118)	
security	'... it is recommended [refugees] be settled at a reasonable distance from international borders as well as other potentially sensitive areas such as military installations.' (p. 138)	'It is located at a safe distance from possible external threats to physical security, usually not less than 50 km.' (p. 199) 'Social, health, sanitation and other essential facilities are safely accessible for everyone, and are lit at night if necessary.' (p. 205)		
flooding and drainage concerns	'The whole site should be located above flood prone areas, preferably on gentle (2-4%) slopes.' (p. 138) transit camps: 'security fencing (depending on circumstances)' (p. 146)	'The ideal gradient is between 2% and 4%.' (p. 202)	'... plan the camp on enough of a slope to permit waste water to drain naturally ... More specific measures may be undertaken as well: supply points; drainage ditches along the roads; construction of a cesspool at the foot of the slope.' (p. 117)	
soil	'The subsoil should permit good infiltration (i.e. allowing water absorption by the soil, and the retention of solid waste in the latrine).' (p. 138)	'Permeability of the ground. For example, fissured rock will disperse latrine waste widely; volcanic rock makes latrine construction difficult.' (p. 202)		
vegetation	'The site should have a good ground cover (grass, bushes, trees). Vegetation cover provides shade, and reduces erosion and dust.' (p. 138)	'There are sufficient grasses, shrubs and trees for shade and to avoid soil erosion.' (p. 200). 'Availability of sufficient, sustainable quantities of wood or fuel and construction for both the displaced and host populations.' (p. 203)		

	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
water table	'The groundwater table should be a minimum of 3 m below the surface of the site.' (p. 138)	'[The site] is not less than 3 metres above the anticipated water table in the rainy season.' (p. 200)		
<b>Layout</b>				
admin. offices	'Buildings for administrative and communal services should be traditional structures, if possible of a multi-purpose design to facilitate alternative uses.' While the importance of decentralisation is stressed, these services and facilities tend to be centralised. (p. 143)			
<b>Distances</b>				
water point/ shelter	'Ideally, no dwelling should be further than 100 metres or a few minutes' walk from [water] distribution points.' (p. 226)	'The maximum distance from any shelter to the nearest water point is 500 metres.' (p. 30)	'The UNHCR recommends, for example, that latrines be available within a radius of 50 metres, and water within about 100 metres.' (p. 118)	
shelter/ latrine	'... not farther than 50 m from user accommodations and not nearer than 6 m.' (p. 373)	'Toilets are no more than 50 metres from dwellings, or no more than one minute's walk.' (p. 36)	'The UNHCR recommends, for example, that latrines be available within a radius of 50 metres, and water within about 100 metres.' (p. 118)	
water point/ latrine	'Latrines should be at least 30 m from any groundwater source and the bottom of any latrine at least 1.5 m above the water table.' (p. 236)		'The recommended minimum distance ... is 15 meters.' (p. 107, note 45)	
refuse bin/shelter	'The containers should be placed throughout the site in such a manner so that no dwelling is more than about 15 meters away from one.' (p. 238)	'No dwelling is more than 15 metres from a refuse container or household refuse pit, or 100 metres from a communal refuse pit.' (p. 46)		
refuse pit/shelter	'Areas designated for burying garbage should be well away from dwellings, and fenced off.' (p. 238)	s.a.	'... the dump must be away from the population ...' (p. 109)	

	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
groundwater /latrine	'Latrines should be at least 30 m from any groundwater source and the bottom of any latrine at least 1.5 m above the water table.' (p. 236)	'Latrines and soakaways in most soils are at least 30 metres from any groundwater source and the bottom of any latrine is at least 1.5 metres above the water table.' (p. 37)		
firebreaks	'As a rule of thumb a firebreak (area with no buildings) 30 m wide is recommended for approximately every 300 m of built-up area.' (p. 143) 'A minimum of 1-1.5 m should be provided between guy-ropes of neighbouring tents on all sides.' (p. 373)	'There are adequate firebreaks of at least: 2 metres between dwellings, 6 metres between clusters of dwellings, and 15 metres between blocks of clusters.' (p. 204)		
gross area	'Ideally, the recommended minimum surface area is 45 sq m per person when planning a refugee camp (including garden space). However, the actual surface area per person (excluding garden space) should not be less than 30 sq m.' (p. 137)	'The site provides 45 sq m space for each person. This includes infrastructure (roads, sanitation, schools, offices, water systems, security/fire breaks, markets, storage facilities, shelter locations), but excludes land for agriculture (crops and livestock).' (p. 204)	'The accepted space standard in a camp is an average 30 sq m of space per person, [this includes] the actual dwelling and ... community infrastructure (distribution areas, dispensaries, etc.).' (p. 117)	
infrastructure	'Access roads should be all-weather roads above flood levels and have adequate drainage. If there has to be significant amount of vehicle traffic on the site, it should be separated from pedestrian traffic. All structures, including fences, should be set back some 5 to 7 m from roads to provide adequate visibility for pedestrians and vehicles.' (p. 143)	see above		



	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
food distribution points	'Distribution points should be close to where people live and located so that the access of particular groups is not restricted. The timing of distributions should suit the beneficiaries.' (p. 152) '4 commodity distribution points per 1 camp module (20,000 persons)' (p. 377)		'The distribution points must be rationally organised according to certain criteria: extensive open spaces; separate routes for the flow of food and for the flow of beneficiaries; possibility of setting up support activities.' (p.58) '... distribution areas must be big enough to permit orderly distribution. Between distributions they can be used as football fields!' (p. 118)	
<b>Water</b>				
delivery	'There should be at least one tap per 80-100 refugees and no more than 200 refugees per handpump or per well with one rope and bucket.' (p. 226)	'Flow at each water collection point is at least 0.125 litres per second. There is at least one water point per 250 people.' (p. 30)		
quality	'1-10 faecal coliforms per 100 ml is 'reasonable' quality' (p. 218)	'There are no more than 10 faecal coliforms per 100 ml at the point of delivery for undisinfected supplies.' (p. 31) In case of disinfection: 'residual free chlorine at the tap is 0.2-0.5 mg per litre and turbidity is less than 5 NTU* [and] dissolved solids are no more than 1,000 mg per litre.' (p. 31)	'microbiological constants: 1-10 faecal coliforms/100 ml physical characteristics: appearance, smell, taste chemical constants: arsenic < 0.05 mg/l; fluoride < 1.5 mg/l; cyanides < 0.1 mg/l; mercury < 0.001 mg/l; lead < 0.05 mg/l' (p. 84)	<b>Note:</b> 'The general consensus is that the quantity of water takes precedence over the quality.' (ICRC p. 86)
quantity	'Minimum daily requirements: Minimum survival allocation: 7 litres per person per day. This should be increased to 15-20 litres per person as soon as possible. Communal needs and a spare capacity for possible new arrivals should be added. Health centres: 40-60 litres/patient/day; Feeding centres: 20-30 litres/patient/day.' (p. 217)	'At least 15 litres of water per person per day is collected.' (p. 30)	'In general, the standard of 20 litres per day per person can be considered appropriate for emergency situations, with the proviso that this "norm" is very relative and must be adjusted as the situation demands.' (p. 82) 'The general view is that 10-15 litres of water should be supplied per person per day, but this quantity varies considerably from one culture to the next.' (p. 81)	

	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
<b>Shelter</b>				
sheltered area	'... minimum of 3.5 sq m per person in tropical, warm climates, excluding cooking facilities or kitchen; 4.5-5.5 sq m per person in cold climates or urban situations including the kitchen and bathing facilities.' (p. 144)	'The covered area available per person averages 3.5-4.5 sq m.' (p. 189)	'WHO recommends that a camp should provide 30 sq m of space per person, 3.5 sq m of that for housing.' (p. 113)	
plastic sheeting for temporary shelter	'Tents may be useful and appropriate for example when local materials are either not available at all or are only seasonally available for refugees of nomadic background.' (p. 145) [UNHCR material: reinforced plastic tarpaulins in sheets, 4 m x 5 m (p. 263)]	'If plastic sheeting is provided for shelter, it meet the specifications defined by UNHCR.' (p. 189)	'The use of prefabricated dwellings or imported tents should remain the exception. ... The best solution is to use local materials to reconstitute simple dwellings acceptable to the population.' (p. 114)	
<b>Hygiene – sanitation</b>				
medical waste treatment	'Incineration is justified on a small scale and usually only for medical waste.' (p. 239) 'Final disposal: 1 incinerator and 1 deep pit for each clinic.' (p. 232)	'There is a correctly designed, constructed and operated incinerator with deep ash pit within the boundaries of each health facility.' (p. 45)	'In an emergency, the rule is simple: <i>Burn what you can and bury the rest.</i> ' (p. 109)	
shower/bathing facilities	reception and transit camps: '50 persons per shower' (p. 146)	'Where communal bathing facilities are necessary, there are sufficient bathing cubicles for bathing at an acceptable frequency and at an acceptable time, with separated cubicles for men and for women.' (p. 32)		
laundry	'Encourage personal hygiene including clean clothes by providing amenities such as showers and laundering areas and basins.' (p. 242)	'Where communal laundry facilities are necessary, there is 1 washing basin per 100 people; private laundering areas are available for women to wash and dry undergarments and sanitary cloths.' (p. 32)		

	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
soap	'The recommended monthly supply of soap is 250 g soap per person per month.' (p. 240)	'Each person has access to 250 g of soap per month.' (p. 195)		
waste treatment	'Sanitary land-filling (also known as controlled tipping) remains the most advisable method. Areas designated for burying garbage should be well away from dwellings, and fenced off; ii. Incineration is justified on a small scale and usually only for medical waste. After each incineration, cover the waste with a layer of soil; iii. Composting is an attractive option but requires technical knowledge, which may not be available. In addition, garbage must be sorted to produce good compost.' (p. 239)	'Whatever means of final disposal is chosen, for instance burial or incineration, this should be done in such manner as to avoid creating health and environmental problems.' (p. 48)	'In an emergency, the rule is simple: <i>Burn what you can and bury the rest</i> ; reuse or recycling.' (p. 109)	
refuse bin size	'A ratio of one container (100 l capacity) per 10 families (50 persons) has proved to be effective.' (p. 239)	'One 100 litre refuse container is available per 10 families, where domestic refuse is not buried on site.' (p. 46)		
refuse pit size	'1 communal refuse pit (2 m x 5 m x 2 m = 20 sq m [= 20,000 l]) per 500 people' (p. 373)			
toilets, latrines	'ideally one latrine for 6-10 persons (p. 377); as second option 1 cubicle/20 persons, or third option 1 cubicle/100 persons or defecation field.' (p. 232)	'Maximum of 20 people per toilet.' (p. 36)		

	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
<b>Health care</b>				
centres	1 referral hospital per 10 sites (200,000 persons) (p. 140); 1 health centre per camp (20,000 people) (p. 377)	'Peripheral health facility level (for approximately 10,000 population) [...] Central health facility level (for approximately 50,000 population) [...]' (p. 252)	'The general assumption is that: a health station [operated by community health workers] serves 500-3,000 people; a dispensary or local clinic serves 5,000-10,000 people and a district hospital serves 100,000-200,000 people. These considerations are completely different in emergency situations.' (p. 219)	
<b>Food</b>				
calories	'A minimum requirement of 2,100 kcals per person per day is used as the planning figure for a developing country population at the beginning of an emergency.' (p. 192)	'The following ... can be used for planning purposes in the initial stage of an emergency: 2,100 kcals.' (p. 121)	'The ICRC suggests a ration providing 2,400 kcal and 70 grams of protein. In general, the accepted level is in the neighbourhood of 2,200 kcal. Obviously, this figure has no validity for a specific individual, since nutritional requirements are affected by age, sex, degree of physical activity, and other factors.' (p.28)	
makeup	'The level of fat intake should provide at least 17% of the dietary energy of the ration, and protein intake should provide at least 10-12% of the total energy.' (p. 192) One example of an adequate full ration in grams per person per day: '... cereal flour/rice/ bulgur 350; pulses 100; oil (vit. A fortified) 25; fortified blended foods 50; sugar 20; iodized salt 5.' (p. 205)	'... 10-12% of total energy is provided by protein; 17% of total energy is provided from fat. Adequate micronutrient intake through fresh or fortified foods.' (p. 147)	'A complete ration should furnish: 2,200 kcals and 60 g of protein [and] essential vitamins ... The complete basic ration generally consists of: cereals = 400 grams; legumes = 100 grams; oil = 50 grams.' (p. 55)	

	UNHCR	SPHERE	ICRC	Considered and Assessed
delivery	'decentralised distribution points: 4 per 20,000 persons' (p. 377)			
Non-food items				
clothing	'Consider purchasing particularly locally made clothes, and ensure that what is provided is culturally acceptable.' (p. 255)	'People have access to sufficient blankets and [...] at least one full set of clothing in roughly the correct size, appropriate to the culture, season and climate. In addition, women and girls have a regular supply of sanitary protection.' (p. 193)		
eating utensils		'People have appropriate household items: 1 cooking pot with well-fitting lid, 1 basin, 1 kitchen knife, 2 wooden spoons; [...] Each person has 1 eating plate, 1 metal spoon and 1 mug.' (p. 195)		
water containers	'[Families] must be able to transport at least 10 litres (from water distribution points to the household) and store at least 20 litres per household (1 household = 5 persons). Suitable containers (10-20 litres) are essential.' (p. 219)	'Each household has two water collecting vessels of 1 – 20 litres, plus water storage vessels of 20 litres. Water collection and storage vessels have narrow necks and/or covers.' (p. 32)		
*NTU – Nephelometric Turbidity Unit NOTE: Remember open spaces and facilities for leisure activities, space for warehouses and weapons storage				

## ■ 6.2 CHECKLIST FOR DDR PLANNING

Parts of the following checklists are adapted from Marley, Lt. Col. Anthony D. (ret.). *Negotiating the Military Components of Civil War Peace Agreement*. Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999.

Ideally, local rather than international organisations should take responsibility and the initiative. Yet international organisations should assume tasks in a state of emergency with the aim of involving the national government and local organisations at the planning stage, so that there is a transition to national ownership for this process, with international assistance and validation. However, civilian rather than military organisations should take the lead, with clear boundaries between tasks and roles, in order to permit co-ordination. Donor co-ordination, ensuring that they clearly understand the situation, facilitates effective international involvement.

### **THE MAJOR ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN THE NEW PEACEKEEPING PARTNERSHIP ARE:**

- Politicians and diplomats, e.g. SRSG
- UN Agencies, i.e. UNHCR, UNDP, WFP
- Major banks, e.g. World Bank, IMF
- Humanitarian relief and development organisations, e.g. CARE, Oxfam, IOM, ILO
- Military forces and observer missions, peacekeepers
- Civil police, i.e. seconded police from supporting countries
- Human rights organisations, e.g. Amnesty International (AI)
- Media – local and international

### **REQUIREMENTS FOR DDR**

- cessation of hostilities, peace agreement for regional security and stability, third party verification identified and ready to participate
- credible central authority, control within parties
- control of parties to the conflict, while the international community supports
- financial support
- transparency in arms collection is vital
- disarmament must go beyond individuals to include national/regional disarmament

## **CHECKLIST – PLANNING**

### **EVALUATION PLAN**

- political framework
- timeline
- international guarantors
- ceasefire and disengagement
- technical threat assessment
- cantonment of forces
- integration of new force
- demobilisation
- planning for reintegration (estimation of costs, needs assessment, etc.)
- What are the estimated costs for the demobilisation programme (per capita in the country concerned)?
- How will the demobilisation process be funded?

**SECURITY PLAN**

- brief outline of the security situation and likely areas of concern
- state of preparedness of the United Nations system to deal with areas of concern
- list of who to contact at Peace Operations Headquarters
- list of names and regular functions of all officials directly concerned with/responsible for the implementation of the security plan (including: Field Security Officer, Security Management Team, all wardens and deputy wardens for international and locally recruited staff)
- list of all international and locally recruited staff and recognised dependants
- map clearly locating staff residences

**COMMUNICATIONS AND CO-ORDINATION PLAN**

- Field (co-ordination centre) – UN New York
- projects – sub-offices outside capital
- sub-office – co-ordination centre
- co-ordination centre – wardens' vehicles
- neighbouring countries' communication
- system for co-ordination meetings by teams involved in the operation
- public relations and communications points of contact (see Public Relations Plan)

**TYPES OF COMMUNICATIONS**

- telex
- radio (HF and VHF)
- telephone
- fax
- messenger
- satellite
- e-mail
- other
- specific communication times in case of emergency and/or power failure

**SELECTION CRITERIA FOR CO-ORDINATION CENTRE LOCATION**

- food and water
- sanitation
- medical
- distance from potential targets
- central location, i.e. access by road, rail or air
- communications
- proximity to potential evacuation points
- parking
- basement bunkers
- storage of automobiles and household goods



**PUBLIC RELATIONS PLAN**

- establish and list contacts with international and local media, print, radio and television
- establish contacts with government officials at all levels
- establish contacts with local community leaders

**EVACUATION PLAN FOR THE TEAMS**

- list of Co-ordination Centre and Concentration Points plus means of communication
- establish safe havens for staff and dependants and transport by land, sea and air for them to get there
- ensure evacuation plans from safe havens out of the country by land, sea and air
- ensure reserve supplies exist in case of difficulties

**DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION: ISSUES**

- Who are the beneficiaries of the DDR programmes?
- Families and dependants of the demobilised, receiving communities?
- Who is eligible for these programmes?
- Will personnel to be demobilised have their families with them?
- What are the numbers of ex-combatants and their families involved, according to agreements?

**ENCAMPMENT**

- How many camps are there for each side?
- Encamped personnel will be fed for how long? For what period of time will camps operate?

**OPERATING ASSUMPTIONS**

- Throughput or holding camps?
- Are the same camps to be used for disarmament and demobilisation?

**WHAT NEEDS CAN BEST BE ADDRESSED BY NGOS OR PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS (PVOs)?**

- Have NGOs/PVOs been identified to fill any needs?
- If so, have they been included in the planning process?
- If no NGO/PVO has been identified, how will the gap be filled?

**SITE SELECTION**

- How was it selected?
- When?
- By whom?
- Where are individual camps located?
- Is the size adequate for the number of soldiers being demobilised?
- Is accommodation available for the number of soldiers and of the correct quality?
- Sites should be near major communication links, main roads, rivers, air fields
- Water and sanitation facilities
- Closeness to forces to be demobilised
- Are there already existing facilities which can be used, i.e. military barracks or camps?

**SITE PREPARATION**

- When can it start?
- Who will prepare it?
- What is the minimum standard? (See 6.1)
- How is it funded?
- How long will it take?
- AAs need food, water, health facilities and basic supplies for minimal health and nutritional standards
- Without food and water there is no incentive for soldiers to stay in the camps
- The weapons storage area must be monitored at all times
- Ensure proper distribution of supplies to soldiers so that supplies are not diverted or used for improper uses

**MOVEMENT TO THE ENCAMPMENT SITES**

- Mode of travel?
- Routes
- Timing
- Security during movement
- En route checkpoints?
- Verification by neutral force and other parties?

**SEGREGATION (IF WARRANTED) OF PERSONNEL**

- Between factions
- Age groups, with special consideration for child soldiers
- Sexes
- Ranks
- Medical cases

**SECURITY FOR THE CAMPS AND PERSONNEL**

- Who provides security?
- What are the numbers?
- How is it conducted?
- How is it co-ordinated?
- Who is responsible for discipline for encamped personnel?

**MEDICAL AND EMERGENCY CARE**

- Provided by whom?
- What is the clinic capability?
- How is it funded?

**LOGISTICS**

- How are the camps supplied?
- By whom?
- Will mass rations or individual rations be used?

- What is their planned capacity?
- How are they to be funded?
- What mechanisms will be established to resolve administrative and logistics problems?

#### **WHO CAN VISIT/INSPECT CAMPS?**

- Red Cross?
- Journalists?
- Human rights organisations?
- Donor representatives?
- Who (by organisation) must enter camps? Police?
- Who can enter camps (families)? What status/provision for families?
- Leaves or passes while in camps?
- Who will provide the maps to each faction and the ceasefire monitors for encampment planning?
- How will the encampment process be monitored?
- Has a process been established to review the operation of each camp, with an eye to closure, consolidation, or continuation of the camp's existence?

#### **CAMPS ARE TO BE CLOSED WHEN**

- All documentation has been completed and sent to the appropriate authorities
- All soldiers have been disarmed, demobilised and discharged
- All kit and surplus supplies accounted for
- All local staff and contracts have been paid

## **DISARMAMENT**

#### **SAFETY PRINCIPLES**

- **Decision-making:** Environmental, health and safety concerns are an integral part of the team's decision-making. All strategic and operational decision-making will take into account environmental, health and safety implications.
- **Compliance:** The team will comply with all environmental, health and safety laws and regulations. Environmental, health and safety programmes will be established and maintained. Audits will be conducted to assess compliance with laws and regulations as well as these principles.
- **Operational Practices:** The team will use internal procedures and adopt practices or other operating guidelines toward the goal of protecting the environment, as well as the health and safety of employees and the public.
- **Emergency Preparedness:** The team will maintain emergency response procedures to minimise the effect of accidents as well as to enhance, maintain and review procedures to prevent such occurrences.

- **Reduction of Pollution:** The team will develop, maintain, and review explosive waste management programmes. These programmes will address the source and nature of wastes generated as well as, to the extent technically and economically feasible, methods to reduce the generation of these wastes.
- **Conservation of Resources:** The team will enhance, maintain and review guidelines for the efficient production and use of energy and natural resources.
- **Legislative/Regulatory Development:** The team will co-operate, as appropriate, with legislative and regulatory bodies in creating responsible laws, regulations and standards to safeguard the community, workplace and the environment.
- **Research and Development:** The team will support research and development toward the goal of environmental, health and safety improvement and excellence.
- **Communication with Employees and Local Population:** The team will promote among its employees an individual and collective sense of responsibility for the preservation of the environment and protection of health and safety of individuals.
- **Communication with the Public:** The team will communicate its environmental, health and safety commitments and achievements to the public and will recognise and respond to community concerns.
- **Measurement of Performance:** The team will continue to develop and enhance methods to measure both current and future environmental, health and safety performance in meeting these principles.
- **Risk Management:** The team will manage risk by implementing management systems to identify, assess, monitor and control hazards and by reviewing performance.

#### **DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS**

- Crew served – inventoried, verified, surrendered
- Individual – inventoried; when were they turned in; what will be done with the excess (storage, destruction)?
- Has triage been conducted (operational weapons, inoperative weapons, and non-military weapons)?

#### **SAFE STORAGE**

- Are the weapons unloaded?
- Who will guard the weapons (e.g. local military or police, commercial contractors, international military peacekeeping forces)?
- Has there been a hazard and risk assessment?
- Is safe storage possible (containers, can buildings for this purpose be locked)? Are there separate spaces for ammunition and weapons?

**SAFE DESTRUCTION**

- What are the environmental effects?
- Is the demolition area for UXO large enough (200 sq m minimum)?

**REGISTRATION**

- What will the timetable be for registration of personnel in camps?
- Personnel registration
- No later than what date?
- What forms are needed?
- How will they be verified?
- Photo identification?
- Fingerprints?

**UNIT ROSTERS**

- Who provides them?
- When?
- What about any people not on the rosters?

**WHAT MUST PERSONNEL BRING TO ENTER/REGISTER?**

- Weapon?
- Uniform?
- Field gear?

**ARMAMENTS LISTS**

- When are they submitted?
- How are they verified?

**WHO MUST SURRENDER WEAPONS?**

- Police?
- Private citizens?
- Verification procedures

**WHO CAN KEEP WEAPONS?**

- Police?
- Bodyguards for high officials?
- Will factions guard their own areas?

**ARE THERE REWARDS FOR WEAPONS TURNED IN? IF SO,**

- What type?
- What value?
- Graduated by type of weapon?
- Weapons cache searches? Rewards for information?

**WHAT IS THE STATUS OF OTHER MILITARY ITEMS?**

- Uniforms
- Radios
- Web gear
- Knives

**WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH ANY VEHICLES?**

- Military
- Commercial
- Person-operated vehicles (POVs)

**DEMOBILISATION ISSUES****STEPS IN THE DEMOBILISATION PROCESS**

- Encampment
- Registration
- Identification card
- Health check
- Accounting for equipment, weapon and uniform
- Pre-discharge information
- Discharge certificate
- Transportation away from the discharge location
- Assessments for reintegration purposes: Are the surveys gender-sensitive? Appropriate to culture, age, etc.?
- Where are AAs located? Are they the same camps as for disarmament or co-located?
- What are the operating assumptions for the AAs? Are they throughput or holding operations?
- How long will personnel identified for demobilisation remain in camps?
- Will there be participation by NGOs/PVOs?
- How will security for AAs be provided?
- Will there be verification/confidence-building measures for the factions?
- What is the total cost estimate for the demobilisation programme?
- How will the demobilisation process be funded?
- What will be done concerning unpaid salaries and disability pay for each side?
- What will become of ex-officers not retained in military service (potential trouble)?
- Is there equal treatment of all factions?
- Is there a system for the distribution of pre-discharge information (economic, political, social, etc.)?

**GATHERING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION**

- Are questionnaires sensitive in terms of culture, gender and age?
- Do the surveys provide the information necessary to plan adequate reintegration measures?

**DISCHARGE**

- What documents will be issued for discharge?
- What will be the disposition of registration/discharge information?
- How will demobilised personnel be transported? To where?

**DEMobilISATION INDUCEMENTS OR BENEFITS SUPPORTING REINTEGRATION**

- Money
- Immediate discharge pay (How much? Funding on hand? How is it funded?)
- Follow-up payments (Paid where? How? When? For how long? How are they funded?)
- Disability pay (How does one qualify? How much? How is it funded?)
- Military pensions

**TRAINING**

- Type (literacy, academic, vocational)
- Where is it provided?
- Who qualifies (ex-combatant and/or family members)?
- Who conducts the training?
- When does it start?
- What is the duration?
- Documentation (vouchers)?
- Is funding available? How is it funded?
- Is there joint or separate training for women, men and young adults?

**AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE**

- Land
- Tools
- Seeds
- Outreach programmes
- How is it funded?

**HOUSING ASSISTANCE (CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS)**

- Lending/business assistance
- Food aid

**EX-COMBATANTS' BENEFITS**

- Health care
- Preferential hiring
- Tax holiday
- Reduced cost of using public transportation

**FOLLOW-UP MEDICAL CARE**

- Who is going to provide it?
- Who will fund it?
- For how long?

- Care to be provided
- Counselling
- Psychiatric care
- Prostheses
- Hospitalisation

#### **DEMINEING OPERATIONS**

- Will each side identify their minefields? If so, how? (Maps to be provided; information exchanged when there are no maps). By what date?
- Who will conduct demining?
- When will demining start?
- What will be done with the removed mines?
- Who will fund the demining operations?
- Is there equal treatment for all parties?
- How will any non-signatory parties to the agreement be handled?
- Is there verification/confidence-building between factions?
- Who will provide security/police functions throughout the country during the encampment phase?

#### **CRITICAL MATERIAL ITEMS AND PERSONNEL**

- Cameras for identification photos, with special ID card film
- Civilian clothing
- Communications radios
- Concertina/barbed wire
- Construction equipment
- Construction materials
- Data system
- EOD and technical support specialists
- Generators
- Maps
- Medical supplies
- Office equipment
- Office supplies
- Personnel surveys
- Psychiatric nurses
- Rations
- Registration forms
- Storage containers for weapons and ammunition
- Tentage
- Translators, interpreters
- Vehicles
- Water pumps/purification units



### ■ 6.3 COMPONENTS OF DEMOBILISATION/REINTEGRATION BY PHASE

Adapted from Carballo, Manuel/ Mansfield, Carolyn/ Prokop, Michaela. *Demobilization and its Implications for HIV/AIDS*. Geneva: International Centre for Migration and Health, 2000.

	ASSEMBLY/ CANTONMENT	DISCHARGE	REINSERTION	REINTEGRATION
FOOD SUPPLIES/ CLOTHING SANITATION	Food, water  Civilian clothing Sanitation	Food supplements Household goods		
TRANSPORTATION		Transport to district of residence		
MEDICAL CARE/ COUNSELLING	Medical exams and medical care Health counselling	Medical care	Health care Rehabilitation programmes for mentally and physically disabled soldiers	
HOUSING	Shelter	Housing support Financial, logistical and material support for housing construction or repair, including provision of construction materials		
LAND			Land Basic agricultural supplies (seeds/tools)	Agricultural extension services
INFORMATION/ ADVICE	Orientation on adjusting to civilian life	Information on living situation in district of residence		
	Legal advice			
FINANCIAL SERVICES/ CASH ALLOWANCES	Information on income generation  Financial counselling	Reinsertion benefits	Credit schemes  Wage subsidies	
EDUCATION/ ACTIVITIES	Basic education and leisure activities		Education for children	
TRAINING/ JOBS				Job creation Micro-enterprises Job placement services Skills training
OTHERS	Information gathering/census Discharge documentation			
CHILD SOLDIERS	Special assistance	Rehabilitation programmes		

## ■ 6.4 RECOMMENDED HIV/AIDS INTERVENTIONS DURING DEMOBILISATION

Adapted from Carballo, Manuel/ Mansfield, Carolyn/ Prokop, Michaela. *Demobilization and its Implications for HIV/AIDS*. Geneva: International Centre for Migration and Health, 2000.

Mobilisation/ Active Duty	Assembly/ Cantonment	Discharge	Reinsertion/ Resettlement	Reintegration
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ HIV testing and counselling</li><li>▪ STD and HIV pre-vention education</li><li>▪ Expanded STD treatment</li><li>▪ Addressing other vulnerability factors</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Medical exams/emergency care</li><li>▪ Testing and infor-mation gathering</li><li>▪ Counselling area and treatment</li><li>▪ Prevention/education interventions</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Medical care, exit testing and counselling</li><li>▪ Advice on medical benefits</li><li>▪ Distribution of take-home HIV/AIDS information package, which could include condom distribution</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Continued access to care, testing and counselling for ex-combatants, as well as for families and communities</li><li>▪ Preventive education campaigns</li></ul>	
Planning officials should identify civilian health resources in communities of return HIV-positive returnees and their families should be informed of these existing facilities				
<b>Condom Promotion</b> including education and free or subsidised distribution to everyone during all phases				
<b>Community Interventions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ all interventions should also target families accompanying soldiers, nearby refugees or IDPs, local sex workers</li><li>▪ locally deployed peacekeeping forces should also be targeted</li><li>▪ programmes aimed at sensitising communities of return (as in Uganda) could include an AIDS awareness component (e.g. mass information campaigns, radio broadcasts)</li></ul>				
<b>Participatory Approach</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ combatants and ex-combatants should be involved in programme design at all stages</li><li>▪ possible model could include one centralised agency which has decentralised community support groups (e.g. UVAB)</li></ul>				
<b>Peer Counselling and Education</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ should be initiated during active duty and expanded to the community during reinsertion/reintegration (see Bolivia's Sentinels of Health)</li><li>▪ builds on strong peer relationships within military and therefore may enhance acceptance</li></ul>				
<b>Health Infrastructure</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Planning of a health infrastructure comprising both military and civilian resources (clinics, health benefits, care facilities)</li><li>▪ Improving civil-military co-operation</li></ul>				
<b>ENABLING FACTORS</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ military confined, homogeneous group</li><li>▪ disciplined, highly organi-sed command structure</li><li>▪ esprit de corps</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ large captive audience</li><li>▪ initial contact with non-military organisations</li><li>▪ availability of national and external funding</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ could be linked to distribution of other benefits, thus enhanced participation rate</li><li>▪ increased involvement of the wider community and families</li><li>▪ increased integration with civilian health resources</li></ul>		
<b>POLICY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS</b>				
<b>Ethical/ Human Rights Considerations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ testing, confidentiality of test results raise human rights issues</li><li>▪ tracking, targeting, identification and possible exclusion of HIV-positive ex-combatants from certain perhaps expensive reintegration programmes pose serious ethical issues</li><li>▪ High rate of HIV infection may make exclusionary approach impractical; HIV-positive individuals may not be incapacitated by their infection for a considerable period, during which their human capital should be maximised</li><li>▪ resulting stigmatisation may raise certain security concerns, i.e. resort to violence as a result of social and economic disenfranchisement</li></ul>				
<b>Special Groups</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ irregular forces may only be included in intervention programmes during cantonment/assembly phases</li><li>▪ Female ex-combatants and child soldiers may require specially designed interventions with reference to their increased risk at all stages</li></ul>				

## ■ 6.5 GENDER-SENSITIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR QUESTIONNAIRES AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS/OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

These suggestions and recommendations are adapted from Annexes 1 and 2, Watteville, Nathalie de. *Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes*. Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 33. Washington: World Bank, 2002.

Gender-Sensitive Suggestions for Questionnaires		
Questions for a Socio-economic Profile		
TOPIC	QUESTIONS	COMMENTS
Presence of polygamy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How many spouse(s) do you have?</li> <li>How many households?</li> </ul>	Traditional, religious or civil weddings should all be taken into account
Number of dependants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How many people depend on you? Of those, how many are female?</li> <li>How many dependants are less than 16 years old? How many of them are girls?</li> </ul>	
Household	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the economic activity of your spouse(s)?</li> <li>Were you able to give some money to your spouse/dependants during the conflict?</li> <li>If yes, was it on a regular basis?</li> <li>Did you see your spouse/partner/parents (if single) during the conflict?</li> <li>Where are your dependants now? Will you join your spouse after demobilisation? If not, why?</li> <li>Where will your household be in the future?</li> </ul>	<p>Per household if several</p> <p>Classification per household Village, city or province</p>
Wedding during conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did you get married during the conflict?</li> <li>If yes, do you plan to stay with your spouse?</li> <li>If you do not plan to stay together, what is the reason?</li> <li>Does your family know about your marriage?</li> <li>Is your spouse from the same area/tribe as you?</li> <li>Did you have a customary wedding ceremony?</li> </ul>	
Possible Vulnerability Criteria		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of dependants less than 16 years old</li> <li>Total income of household</li> <li>Capital: land, livestock, house</li> <li>Health problems</li> </ul>		
Gender-Disaggregated Interesting Comparisons		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Family status</li> <li>Rank</li> <li>Years of service</li> <li>Age group</li> <li>% of single head of household</li> <li>Number of singles not going back to their parents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Region of settlement</li> <li>Number of vulnerability criteria met</li> <li>Level of education</li> <li>Professional experience</li> <li>Ongoing income activity besides armed forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Type of intended activity after demobilisation</li> <li>Health problems</li> <li>Type of support needed</li> <li>Selected topics for information</li> <li>Fears about settling in community</li> </ul>
Gender-Sensitive Measures for Interviews		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men and women should be interviewed separately</li> <li>Interviewers should be of both sexes</li> <li>Attention should be paid to men and women's different work</li> <li>Schedules and constraints for participation in interviews</li> </ul>		

Intra-household Analysis		
Questions for demobilised soldiers		Questions for the spouse/partner
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Who takes decisions about spending money for the family?</li><li>▪ Who takes decisions about spending the income of the spouse/partner?</li><li>▪ Who is responsible for buying food?</li><li>▪ Who is responsible for the health of the family?</li><li>▪ Who is responsible for the education of children?</li><li>▪ Who is responsible for buying clothes?</li><li>▪ Would you accept that part of the settling-in assistance to be provided under the programme for you and your family be given directly to your spouse?</li><li>▪ If no, why?</li><li>▪ If yes, why?</li><li>▪ If yes, what percentage?</li><li>▪ If yes, under what conditions?</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Who should receive the settling-in assistance for the family?</li><li>▪ What do you think your spouse/partner would do with the settling-in assistance?</li><li>▪ What about the other spouses (if polygamy)?</li><li>▪ What has changed or would change with the return of your spouse?</li><li>▪ Would you continue your activity?</li><li>▪ If no, why?</li><li>▪ Would you keep the same responsibilities (inside and outside the household)?</li><li>▪ If no, why?</li></ul>
Summary of Recommendations/Operational Implications		
ISSUES	RECOMMENDATIONS	OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Targeting female ex-combatants	Give ex-combatant status without gender discrimination For guerrilla context, avoid confirmation of rank or ex-combatant status by potentially discriminating officers	Non-discriminating criteria Gender-aware verification committees Dispatching clear and gender-sensitive instructions to confirmation authorities Gender-aware verification committees
Targeting of girls	Outreach programme to avoid them being sent away without going through demobilisation programme	Radio campaigns and encouraging of government to acknowledge the existence of child soldiers or abducted girls
Targeting of families	In some contexts give part of benefits directly to families	Intra-household analysis Husband's acceptance evaluation Identification of families Guidelines for polygamy Sensitisation of ex-combatant during pre-discharge orientation Sensitisation of community to limit misuse of TSN (Transitional safety net) by ex-combatant
Socio-economic profile	Define a profile for each target group	Adapt questionnaire and disaggregate data collection
Targeting mechanism	Measures to avoid gender discrimination	Gender-sensitive staff
Encampment	Male and female soldiers in discharge centres	Specific logistics for women: shelter, sanitation, clothes
Encampment	Pre-discharge orientation adapted to female needs	Give clear information about benefits to avoid misuse and inflated expectations General information about income-generating possibilities and skills transfer General information about rights, HIV/AIDS and domestic violence Separate sessions for men and women and strategies adapted to each group
Encampment	Separate health facilities for women	Non-discriminating medical screening staff Female medical staff Unit for trauma counselling initiation

ISSUES	RECOMMENDATIONS	OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Transport home	Avoid forcing abducted women to follow partner	Separate interviews Separate transport
Demobilisation of abducted girls	Send them to recovery camps or directly to home communities if possible	Organisation of recovery camps prepared to deal with girls' specific traumas (sexual abuse) and young children or babies Family tracing
Demobilisation/preparation of families and women in host communities for the return of ex-combatants	Prepare them to receive the ex-combatant	Information campaign about signed peace agreements and DRP on radio, for example Lists with name and date of arrival of ex-combatants
Initiation of the TSN	Avoid gender discrimination	Do not use criteria for TSN that could result in gender discrimination Introduce vulnerability criteria if female ex-combatants or families are in a particularly vulnerable situation
Payment modalities	Avoid big threatening cash amounts	If possible, use bank accounts or payments in several instalments by DRP office
Housing benefits	Consider its importance in some contexts for women, as many work in their house	If house construction is part of the package, consider extra assistance for women not able to deal with self-built houses
Temporary medical care	Adapted to women and girls' specific needs (reproductive health services, family planning, trauma counselling and STD and HIV/AIDS)	Check availability locally and consider special measures for most serious cases (transport support to bigger hospitals, for example)
Post-discharge information	Ensure that DRP office or equivalent is able to give relevant and useful information to female ex-combatant	Train DRP staff/gender specialist and find relevant information or refer to efficient collaboration partner
Economic reintegration	Support access to credit and income generating activities for female ex-combatants	Outreach programme to overcome lack of geographic mobility Training for money management and writing of credit proposal Follow-up
Access to land	If government initiates programme, ensure that male and female ex-combatants receive equal treatment	Programme follow-up Support grassroots organisation helping women with legal issues (access to land ownership)
Access to employment	Promote the employment of female ex-combatants, abducted girls and ex-combatants' wives	Sensitisation campaigns targeting potential employers Use of ex-combatant networks Issuing of skills certificates Incentives to employers to hire female ex-combatants Follow-up
Education and training of female ex-combatants, abducted girls and ex-combatants' wives	Encourage access to vocational training and education	Complementary training for identified useful skills Training adapted to expressed demands and market needs Women-friendly schedules (not in conflict with their traditional errands) Follow-up by gender specialist

ISSUES	RECOMMENDATIONS	OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Child care facilities	Give female ex-combatants access to childcare facilities	Provide facilities or support self-started childcare initiatives
Education and training of girls	Adapt training and education programmes to girls' specific situation	Support their access to apprenticeship, skills training and remedial education
Female ex-combatant rejected by home community and vice versa	Support of female ex-combatants and ex-combatants' wives' associations Incentives for community projects involving residents, ex-combatants and families	Train them for better leadership Train them for participation in decision-making Fund to finance participatory projects Follow-up
Abducted girls rejected by home community	Sensitisation of families and home communities	Organisation of local media and radio campaigns Organisation of family counselling
Disabled female ex-combatants	Avoid gender discrimination	Quotas for participation in support programmes Outreach and sensitisation components of projects Female physicians (or gender-sensitive) for examination and disability classification
Trauma, drug abuse, and prostitution	Counselling and communication	Minimal bureaucratic procedures for rape victims Use of women-favoured communication channels (use of actors women trust) Trauma counselling and encouraging of ritual purification (if context requires) Trauma, drug or prostitution counselling
Unemployment and women in host communities	Beware of potential negative effects of DRP on civilian women	Implement support measures or ensure that other programmes address the problem (if existing)
Street violence and domestic violence	Violence reduction measures	Sensitisation during pre-discharge orientation and with mass media programmes Family counselling and conflict solving Discussions encouraging government to fight post-war violence and domestic violence
Reconciliation and peace	Encourage participation of women (female ex-combatants) in peace negotiations	Put pressure on belligerents during discussions
Interrelations between vulnerable groups and programmes	Use of an integrated approach	Assess side effects on other programmes, vulnerable groups; identify optimal strategy or compensation system
Implementation arrangements	Gender dimensions of DRP implementation arrangements	Recruitment of women for DRP implementing staff Training in gender issues Recruitment of gender specialist(s) and/or subcontracting Use of gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluating tools

## ■ 6.6 REGISTRATION: MODEL DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION FORMS

The Ex-Combatant Disarmament and Demobilisation forms in this annex are modelled after the forms designed for and used in Sierra Leone from 1998 onwards. The forms presented here are not the originals, but are modelled closely on forms DDR001 and DDR002 from the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)/United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).

 <b>National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)</b> <b>Ex-combatant Disarmament Form</b> 																															
<b>1. DISARMAMENT SITE INFORMATION</b>																															
1.1	Serial Number: <input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/>																														
1.2	Disarmament date: (USE DD-MM-YY FORMAT) <input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/>																														
1.3	Disarmament centre: <input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/>																														
<b>2. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION</b>																															
2.1	Family name: <input type="text"/>																														
2.2	Given name: <input type="text"/>																														
2.3	Sex: (1-MALE, 2-FEMALE) <input type="text"/>																														
2.4	Reported age: (WRITE AGE IN NUMBERS; USE '99' FOR N/A) <input type="text"/>																														
2.5	Is the person perceived to be an underage combatant? (1-NO, 2-YES) <input type="text"/>																														
<b>3. MILITARY INFORMATION</b>																															
3.1	Force: SLA - <input type="text"/> AFRC - <input type="text"/> RUF - <input type="text"/> CDF - <input type="text"/> Other - <input type="text"/>																														
3.2	Stated military rank: (USE CODES LIST TO SELECT MILITARY RANKS) <input type="text"/>																														
3.3	ID number in fighting force: (IF AVAILABLE) <input type="text"/>																														
<b>4. WEAPONS, MUNITIONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT</b>																															
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Qty</th> <th>Serial Number</th> <th>Type</th> <th>Cond.</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>4.1 First</td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>4.2 Second</td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>4.3 Third</td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>4.4 Fourth</td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>4.5 Fifth</td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> <td><input type="text"/></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Qty	Serial Number	Type	Cond.	4.1 First	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	4.2 Second	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	4.3 Third	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	4.4 Fourth	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	4.5 Fifth	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
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<b>5. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS</b>																															
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<b>6. UNAMSIL VERIFICATION</b>																															
<p>The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone certifies that the person registered on this form complies with the eligibility requirements to participate in the demobilisation and reintegration programme implemented by the Government of Sierra Leone, by means of:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> - Having demonstrated to the observer's satisfaction that he/she was formerly an active combatant in one of the fighting forces in Sierra Leone at the time of the signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement; and...</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> - Having delivered at least a personal weapon or belonging to a group of at most five combatants delivering at least one group weapon; or...</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> - Being an underage combatant, accompanying minor, unaccompanied minor, or any other participant under the age of 18, with any of the fighting forces.</p> <p><input type="text"/></p> <p>UNAMSIL Observer's Name: _____ Signature: _____ Stamp: </p>																															



<b>National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)</b> <b>Ex-combatant Demobilisation Form</b>																
<b>1. DEMOBILISATION SITE INFORMATION</b>																
1.1	Serial Number: <span style="float: right;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</span>															
1.2	Registration date: <span style="float: right;">(USE DD-MM-YY FORMAT) [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</span>															
1.3	Demobilisation Centre: <span style="float: right;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</span>															
<b>2. MILITARY INFORMATION</b>																
2.1	Period spent in the armed force: <span style="float: right;">(NUMBER OF YEARS) [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</span>															
2.2	District where he/she joined: <span style="float: right;">(USE LIST OF DISTRICT CODES) [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</span>															
2.3	Type of recruitment: <span style="float: right;">(1-VOLUNTARY; 2-FORCED; 3-OTHER; 9-N/A) [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</span>															
2.4	Units where he/she served															
	<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%; text-align: center;">FROM</td> <td style="width: 30%; text-align: center;">TO</td> <td style="width: 40%; text-align: center;">COMMANDER'S NAME</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">(M M - Y Y)</td> <td style="text-align: center;">(M M - Y Y)</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	FROM	TO	COMMANDER'S NAME	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	(M M - Y Y)	(M M - Y Y)	
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(M M - Y Y)	(M M - Y Y)															
2.5	Dates and places of engagement															
	<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 40%; text-align: center;">DATE</td> <td style="width: 40%; text-align: center;">PLACE</td> <td style="width: 20%; text-align: center;">TYPE</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> <td style="text-align: center;">[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">(USE DD-MM-YY FORMAT)</td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: center;">(USE CODE LIST)</td> </tr> </table>	DATE	PLACE	TYPE	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	[ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ] - [ ]	(USE DD-MM-YY FORMAT)		(USE CODE LIST)
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<b>3. TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAMME</b> <span style="float: right;">(Only for Adults)</span>																
The terms for your acceptance to enter this programme are the following:																
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>You are provided amnesty in accordance with the terms of the Lomé Agreement signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front / Sierra Leone.</li> <li>You will be treated in accordance with International Human Rights Treaties.</li> <li>You are entitled to the provision of assistance of basic needs during your stay at the Demobilisation Centre as designated by the Government of Sierra Leone.</li> <li>You will be entitled to the provision of a reinsertion package and have access to reintegration programmes as determined by the Government of Sierra Leone.</li> </ol>																
As a participant in the DDR Programme, the terms of your benefits are conditional upon the following:																
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>You must respect the National Pledge and Constitution of Sierra Leone.</li> <li>You renounce participation in any future military or insurgency actions designated to destabilise the democratically-elected civilian Government of Sierra Leone.</li> <li>You have surrendered all weapons and ammunition and will co-operate fully with the Government's efforts to recover illegal weapons and arsenals.</li> <li>You accept and conform with all the rules and regulations for programme activities as stated by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.</li> </ol>																
<b>Any violation of the aforementioned conditions will result in the termination of your benefits as a participant in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme and/or criminal prosecution in accordance with the National Law and Policies of the Government of Sierra Leone.</b>																
Understanding and agreeing to the previous conditions, I request to be accepted as a beneficiary of the Government of Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme by signing below.																
Ex-combatant/ _____	UNOMIL Observer's Name _____															



## ■ 6.7 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READINGS

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## RELATED SUBJECTS

### CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

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## ■ 6.8 SELECTED WEB LINKS

### 1. INTRODUCTION

**Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade**

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/general-en.asp>

**G8 Resolution on Conflict Prevention, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2002/g8conflict2.html>

**Saferworld**

<http://www.saferworld.co.uk>

**United Nations Statement on Maintenance of Peace and Security and Post-conflict Peace-building, 2000**

<http://www.un.int/usa/spst0010.htm>

**World Bank**

Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit

<http://www.worldbank.org/conflict>

### **GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

**GTZ Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

<http://www.gtz.de/security-sector>

**International Civilian Police (CIVPOL)**

This web site links UN missions with CIVPOL components, education possibilities for CIVPOL officers, etc.

<http://www.civpol.org/>

**International Alert**

<http://www.international-alert.org>

**Journal of Conflict, Security and Development**

<http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk/Publications/html/journal.htm>

**Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development**

<http://www.foundation.novartis.com>

**Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)**

Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

<http://www.oecd.org/dac>

**Transparency International**

<http://www.transparency.org>

**US Agency for International Development (USAID)**

Anti-corruption and Good Governance Resources

<http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/anticorruption/resources.html>

**US State Department**

International Police Programs Information Source

<http://www.policemission.com>

## **2. DISARMAMENT**

**Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)**

<http://www.bicc.de>

**Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII)**

The Practitioner's Guide to Conflict Prevention and Mitigation

<http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/outline.htm>

**GTZ Development Co-operation and Small Arms Control (decosac)**

<http://www.gtz.de/smallarms>

**International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)**

<http://www.iansa.org>

**Institute for Security Studies (ISS)**

Arms Analysis

<http://www.iss.co.za/AF/Arms/ArmsAnalysis.html>

**Small Arms Survey**

<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>

**South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC)**

<http://www.seesac.org>

**United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA)**

<http://disarmament.un.org>

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

Small Arms, Demobilisation & Reintegration

<http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/index.htm>

**United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)**

<http://www.unidir.org>

**COUNTRY SPECIFIC****Viva Rio (Brazil)**

<http://www.vivario.org.br/>

**Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia (WGWR)**

<http://www.wgwr.org>

**3. DEMOBILISATION****Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in the Greater Great Lakes Region (MDRP)**

<http://www.mdrp.org>

**US Agency for International Development (USAID)**

Demobilisation resources

<http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/resources.html>

**4. REINTEGRATION****International Rescue Committee (IRC)**

Post-Conflict Development Initiative

<http://www.theirc.org/post-conflict>

**US Agency for International Development (USAID)**

Reintegrating Ex-combatants

<http://www.usaid.gov>

**FEMALE EX-COMBATANTS****Eldis Gender Resource Guide**

<http://www.eldis.org/gender>

**United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)**

<http://www.unifem.org>

**World Bank**

GenderNet

<http://www.worldbank.org/gender>

**CHILD SOLDIERS****Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers**

<http://www.child-soldiers.org>

**Global Information Networks in Education (GINIE)**

Child and Young Adult Soldiers

<http://www.ginie.org>

**International Conference on War-Affected Children 2000**

<http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/links-en.asp>

**RECONCILIATION**

**Conciliation Resources**

<http://www.c-r.org/>

**Victim's Voice (VIVO)**

<http://www.vivo.org>

**5. RELATED SUBJECTS**

**CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION**

**North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)**

Civil-Military Cooperation branch (CIMIC)

<http://www.nato.int>

**HUMAN SECURITY**

**Commission on Human Security (CHS)**

<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org>

**Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS)**

<http://www.humansecurity.info>

**Human Security Network**

<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org>

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

**Amnesty International**

<http://www.amnesty.org>

**Human Rights Watch**

<http://www.hrw.org>

**United Nations**

Human Rights

<http://www.un.org/rights>

**CRISIS PREVENTION, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT****GTZ Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peace-Building**<http://www.gtz.de/crisisprevention>**International Crisis Group**<http://www.crisisweb.org>**Linking Complex Emergency Response and Transition Initiatives (CERTI)**<http://www.certi.org>**United Nations ReliefWeb**<http://www.reliefweb.int>**PEACEKEEPING****International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC)**<http://www.iaptc.org>**Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)**<http://www.kaiptc.org>**Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC)**<http://www.mil.no/felles/fokiv>**Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC)**<http://peaceoperations.org>**Swedish National Defence College (SNDC)**<http://www.fhs.mil.se>**United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)**<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml>

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## ■ USEFUL TERMS

<b>A</b>	ACUNS	Academic Council on the United Nations System
	AFNORTH	Allied Forces North Europe (refers to NATO structure)
	AFRICARE	Africare
	AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (refers to NATO structure)
	AOR	Area of Responsibility
	AP	Associated Press
	APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
	ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
<b>B</b>	BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
	Bde	Brigade
	BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
	Bn	Battalion
<b>C</b>	CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc.
	CANBAT	Canadian Battalion
	CARICOM	Caribbean Community
	CD	Conference on Disarmament
	CCIC	Canadian Council for International Co-operation
	CDR	Centre for Documentation on Refugees
	CDS	Chief of Defence Staff (refers to Canadian military structure)
	CERTI	Linking Complex Emergency Response and Transition Initiatives
	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
	CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
	CIMIC	Civil-military Co-operation
	CINC	Commander-in-Chief
	CIVPOL	Civilian Police
	CMOC	Civil-military Operations Centre
	CNN	Cable News Network
	COE	Council of Europe
	COMCEN	Communications Centre (refers to Royal Navy, UK)
	Comms	Communications
	Coy	Company (Military Infantry Term)
	CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
	CRS	Catholic Relief Services
<b>D</b>	DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team (refers to USAID/OFDA)
	DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (refers to Canadian political structure)
	DFID	Department for International Development (refers to UK's political structure)
	DFO	Disaster Field Office (refers to FEMA)
	Div	Division

DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
DND	Department of National Defence (refers to Canadian political structure)
DoD	Department of Defence (refers to US political structure)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (refers to UN structure)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (refers to UN structure)
<b>E</b>	
EASTLANT	Eastern Atlantic Command (refers to NATO structure)
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office (refers to EU political structure)
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council (refers to UN structure)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund (refers to EU political structure)
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (refers to UN structure)
EU	European Union
<b>F</b>	
FALD	Field Administration and Logistics Division (Term for UN operations)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAVDO	Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations
FC	Force Commander
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (refers to US political structure)
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System (refers to USAID)
FHA	Food and Humanitarian Assistance (refers to USAID)
FOD	Field Operations Division (Term for UN operations)
<b>G</b>	
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GINIE	Global Information Networks in Education
<b>H</b>	
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre
HOM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
HRO	Human Rights Officer
<b>I</b>	
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee (refers to UN structure)
IASU	Inter-Agency Support Unit (refers to UN structure)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programme (refers to US system)
ICVA	International Committee of Volunteer Agencies
IDRC	International Development and Research Council
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFOR	Implementation Force (refers to NATO structure)
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
ILC	International Law Commission
IMC	International Medical Corps
INSTRAW	International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
INTERACTION	American Council for Voluntary International Action
IPA	International Peace Academy
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRG	International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
<b>J</b>	
J-1	Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-3	Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-5	Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communication and Computer Systems Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-7	Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate of a Joint Staff
J-8	Force Structure and Resource Management Directorate of a Joint Staff
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JTF	Joint Task Force
<b>K</b>	
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
<b>L</b>	
LNO	Liaison Officer
LO	Liaison Officer
<b>M</b>	
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MC	Military Committee
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MICIVIH	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MILREP	Permanent Military Representative to the NAC (refers to NATO structure)
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MNF	Multinational Force
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police

	MPIO	Military Public Information Officer
	MSF	Médecins sans Frontières [Doctors without Borders]
	MSR	Main Supply Route
<b>N</b>	NAC	North Atlantic Council (refers to NATO structure)
	NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
	NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
	NET	Narrative Exposure Therapy
	NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
	NSC	National Security Council (refers to US political structure)
	NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
<b>O</b>	OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (refers to US political structure)
	OAU	Organization of African Unity (predecessor of AU)
	OCHA	UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
	OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
	OECD DAC	Development Assistance Committee
	OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
	OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
	OIC	Officer in Charge
	ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
	ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
	ONUMoz	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
	ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
	OP	Observation Post
	OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
	Ops	Operations
	OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
	OSD	Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense
	OSOCC	On-Site Operations Co-ordination Centre (refers to UN structure)
	Oxfam	(International NGO)
<b>P</b>	PDD	Presidential Decision Directive (refers to US structure)
	PERMREP	Permanent Representative (refers to NATO and UN structure)
	PFP	Partnership for Peace (a NATO Programme)
	POV	Person-operated Vehicle
	POW	Prisoner of War
	PRIO	International Peace Research Institute
	PSF	Pharmaciens sans Frontières [Pharmacists without Borders]
	PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
<b>R</b>	Regt	Regiment
	ROE	Rules of Engagement
	RRF	Rapid Reaction Force (refers to EU military structure)

<b>S</b>	<b>SACEUR</b>	Supreme Allied Command Europe (refers to NATO structure)
	<b>SACLANT</b>	Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (refers to NATO structure)
	<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
	<b>SAS</b>	Special Air Service (refers to UK military structure)
	<b>SDF</b>	Self-defence Force
	<b>SEESAC</b>	South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
	<b>SG</b>	Secretary General (refers to UN and NATO structure)
	<b>SHAPE</b>	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (refers to NATO structure)
	<b>SITREP</b>	Situation Report
	<b>SMA</b>	Senior Military Advisor
	<b>SOFA</b>	Status of Forces Agreement
	<b>SOMA</b>	Status of Mission Agreement
	<b>SOP(s)</b>	Standard Operating Procedure(s)
	<b>Sqn</b>	Squadron (of armoured vehicles, ships or aircraft)
<b>U</b>	<b>UIE</b>	UNESCO Institute for Education
	<b>UNAVEM</b>	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
	<b>UNBRO</b>	United Nations Border Relief Operation (Cambodia)
	<b>UNC</b>	United Nations Command
	<b>UNCDF</b>	United Nations Capital Development Fund
	<b>UNCHS</b>	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
	<b>UNCRO</b>	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (Croatia)
	<b>UNCTAD</b>	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
	<b>UNDAC</b>	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination
	<b>UNDCP</b>	United Nations International Drug Control Programme
	<b>UNDDA</b>	United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
	<b>UNDMT</b>	United Nations Disaster Management Team
	<b>UNDOF</b>	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
	<b>UNEF</b>	United Nations Emergency Force
	<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
	<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
	<b>UNFICYP</b>	United Nations Force in Cyprus
	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
	<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
	<b>UNGOMAP</b>	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
	<b>UNIDIR</b>	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
	<b>UNIDO</b>	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
	<b>UNIENET</b>	United Nations International Emergency Network
	<b>UNIFEM</b>	United Nations Development Fund for Women
	<b>UNIFIL</b>	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
	<b>UNIIMOG</b>	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
	<b>UNIKOM</b>	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
	<b>UNITA</b>	União Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]

UNITAF	United Nations International Task Force
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMBIH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNMP	United Nations Military Police
UNOE	UN-owned equipment
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMOR	United Nations Observer Mission in Mozambique and Rwanda
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOV	United Nations Office at Vienna
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventative Deployment
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNREO	United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNU	United Nations University
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
UNWFP	United Nations World Food Programme
UNWHO	United Nations World Health Organization
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USG	Under-secretary General (refers to UN structure)
USIP	US Institute of Peace
<b>V</b> VAP	Veterans' Assistance Programme
VIVO	Victim's Voice
<b>W</b> WB	World Bank
WCC	World Council of Churches
WEOG	Western and Other Group Countries
WEU	Western European Union
WGWR	Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia



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