**Defence Academy**
of the United Kingdom

Defence Academy Yearbook 2009

The Defence Academy Yearbook 2009

A Selection of Commended Essays

With a foreword by
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The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and policy either of Her Majesty's Government or of the Ministry of Defence.

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There have been minor alterations to the texts of these essays to conform with the constraints of this volume.

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Foreword

The Defence Academy is at the centre of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence's training and education effort. Each year more than 400 military and civilian students graduate from the Royal College of Defence Studies, the Joint Services Command and Staff College or the College of Management and Technology with Masters degrees awarded by one or other of our partner universities, Cranfield University and King's College London. I am very pleased to introduce a selection of essays researched and written by students studying at one or other of the component colleges of the Defence Academy in 2008/09.

The strategic issues for the next 20 years with which the students must grapple encompass a subtle and interwoven blend of the implications of the shift in global power, the current and developing economic climate, globalisation, climate change, global inequality, and radicalisation. One clear deduction is that operations and defence and security 'business' will be conducted in environments that are multi-facetted, multi-dimensional, inherently ambiguous and potentially chaotic. To thrive in that environment will require civilian and military leaders and commanders, and their advisers and staff, to possess a feel for, and understanding of, context and situation, great touch and acute judgement, an ability to raise their eyes from the tactical, headline-grabbing here-and-now to the broader issues, and the intellect, energy and ability to exercise positive control to keep matters on a relatively even keel in pursuit of long term and strategic goals.

The Defence Academy exists to develop commanders, leaders and staff, military and civilian, who are adaptable, broad-minded, calm yet decisive, able to cut through complexity, intellectually agile, able to manage risks and handle setbacks effectively – the buzz phrase is 'comfortable with ambiguity'. Building that capacity in our people is essential if we are to continue to secure the UK's reputation, prosperity and effectiveness as a respected actor in world affairs. It will only be achieved through appropriate training and education, underpinned by cutting edge research to challenge and then develop the way we think and the way we teach.

These essays are a snapshot sample of the range of subjects addressed by students in the course of an academic year and reflect the extremely high standard of research and educational activity conducted at the Defence Academy. Many of the subjects addressed have been suggested by areas of the Ministry of Defence keen to capitalise on the capacity that is available to research questions that time may not allow to be addressed as part of routine business.[1] Space demands that we can only offer a small sample selection of papers. In commending them to you please treat them as an appetiser for the much wider selection available for reference at the Defence Academy website: www.da.mod.uk.

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[1] If you have a requirement for directed research, in an area that would benefit Defence, please do not hesitate to contact the Chief Research and Assessment at: cra.hq@da.mod.uk with details of the research you need and the name of the sponsor.

A 'Pashtun Awakening?' Can the Iraqi Anbar Province Strategy of Co-Opting Local Militias to Fight Against Insurgents be Successful in Afghanistan?

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I once heard a story. It was a dark time for the US-led coalition in Iraq's Anbar Province. Far from ushering in an era of paradise, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath regime quickly devolved into constant attacks from a sinister and shadowy insurgency. Marginalized Sunnis were enlisted as cannon fodder under the spell of Al Qaeda: the *jihadist* enemy. Masterful deceivers, Al Qaeda in Iraq had hypnotized the Sunni population and bent it to its will. In the face of the insurgency, the coalition was confused and aimless: lost in the woods. But there was hope, and they found their salvation. The lost and arcane art of counterinsurgency warfare (COIN) was rediscovered, and under the banner of a new commander, General Petraeus, the gospel of COIN spread from forward operating base FOB to FOB. Company and battalion commanders opened the eyes of the Sunni leaders, and the Al Qaeda spell was broken. Now free, the Sunni tribes awoke and turned on Al Qaeda, driving them from the land. Or so goes the myth.

Now, in mid 2009, the dark days are in Afghanistan. The ring road around the country is largely controlled by the Taliban. By some accounts, the Taliban insurgency controls 72% of the countryside and conducts a gruesome murder and intimidation campaign against all who resist. Facing the human and financial cost of another 'war without end' in Afghanistan, the gospel of COIN is consulted for an answer, and many think they have found it in the Anbar Awakening. A strategy that turned Anbar Province from one of the deadliest to one of the safest places in Iraq must have application in Afghanistan, right? Again, so goes the myth.

This essay will de-mythologize the Anbar Awakening and consider realistically whether a similar strategy: co-opting local militias to provide for their own security, can work in the conditions in Afghanistan. Such a strategy has been recently launched by coalition forces in Wardak Province, with effects still to be determined.

The first section will look at the goal and purpose of a COIN campaign and consider the conditions that the counter-insurgent must recognize and overcome. COIN doctrine will be reviewed with an eye to conditions that existed in Anbar and can shed light on the origins and sustainment of the Anbar Awakening Movement. We will also look for factors that will warn of different challenges in Afghanistan.

The next section will survey the risks and challenges when a central government does not have the monopoly on armed force. Armed groups, whether they are called 'militias' or innocuously named 'neighbourhood vigilance patrols', are ubiquitous in failed or failing states. In some cases these groups are sponsored or encouraged by a government or counterinsurgent, when the military and security forces of a government are insufficient to provide security. We will see that such groups frequently become forces unto themselves, preying on local civilians or fighting for greater power. An in-depth review of militias and warlords is beyond the scope of this research, but understanding common themes highlights special considerations of including militias into a COIN strategy.

The third section will consider the insurgency and Awakening Movement in Anbar Province, Iraq. The conditions that permitted the Awakening to occur will be considered along with the reaction and response of coalition forces. We will observe that the conditions in Anbar Province made the Awakening possible, and coalition forces were well positioned to encourage, develop and exploit what was a Sunni tribal grass-roots movement against Al Qaeda in Iraq. While coalition support for the Awakening can be considered a success in terms of reduced violence in the province, we must also consider the potential impact of the Awakening on national reconciliation and state fragmentation.

Finally, we will compare the conditions in Afghanistan to the conditions in Anbar Province. Afghanistan has never experienced effective central authority, and local militias have had a major impact on Afghan society, from the *mujahideen* resistance against the Soviet occupation to the descent into warlordism and rise of the Taliban. In a decentralized society, perceptions of the Taliban are dissimilar from the Sunni Anbaris' perception of Al Qaeda. Further, the rapid rise of Taliban militancy in Pakistan has added a deep complexity to the Afghan insurgency. We will also consider the Taliban insurgency in light of COIN doctrine. What is the Taliban's appeal to the population, and what mechanisms can be employed to counter them? Finally, we will consider and evaluate what we know about the Afghan Public Protection Force, the newly launched pilot programme to create and empower local militias on the Awakening model.

This research will conclude that empowering local Afghan villages to defend their territory can have moderate local success in reducing violence and Taliban influence. However, international fatigue and ambivalence to Afghanistan's future create an extreme risk that militias will revert to predation, local warlordism, ethnic clashes and exploitation by the Taliban. It is unlikely that improved local security alone will increase the reach, legitimacy and influence of the Afghan central government. The Sunni Anbar tribal makeup and history permitted a 'bottom-up' movement against Al Qaeda. The considerable differences between the Sunni Anbaris and Afghan Pashtuns and the nature of the insurgencies do not suggest the likelihood of a similar 'bottom up' Pashtun Awakening against the Taliban.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Conflicts

> *We have learned, after seven years of war, that trust is the coin of the realm – that building it takes time, losing it takes mere seconds, and maintaining it may be our most important and most difficult objective…until we prove capable, with the help of our allies and Afghan partners, of safeguarding the population, we will never know a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan.*[1]

This comment from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff neatly captures the essence of counterinsurgency. The role of government is to provide a population with a safe and secure environment, which will permit economic and social development. Providing this environment is the basis of a government's legitimacy. Any insurgency is basically an attack on the government's right to rule. The right to rule has been challenged in Iraq by Al Qaeda and various independent insurgencies and in Afghanistan by the Taliban and affiliated groups. The United States and different coalition partners have presumably 'relearned' how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign, and have been assisting the Iraqi and Afghani governments using COIN rationale and doctrine.

The US Army Counterinsurgency Manual defines insurgency as 'an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.'[2] The role, then, of the counterinsurgent is to utilize the 'military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic action'[3] of a government to assert the legitimacy of the government and defeat the insurgency. Legitimacy in the eyes of the population is the driving force of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent. An insurgency that can demonstrate that a government is illegitimate will draw the support of the population, further weakening the government. The government that is demonstrably responsive to the people and provides for their safety and security will maintain the loyalty of the population and discredit the insurgency until it dissolves or is no longer a threat.

Because legitimacy in the eyes of the population is the goal, an insurgency movement is often called a 'war amongst the people'. Support, or at least acquiescence, of the population will determine which side weakens and the other strengthens. Members of the population are essentially presented with a choice. The goal of each side is to influence the population to choose them.

The competition for the population is often described by the phrase 'win the hearts and minds'. While the phrase may be trite, it accurately captures the battle of perceptions. 'The "Hearts" dimension seeks to persuade the populace that their best interests are served by the COIN force's success.'[4] That is, that their safety and security can better be assured by supporting the government and COIN supporters. Similarly, 'the "Minds" dimension seeks to persuade the population that the COIN force is going to succeed in its mission.'[5] A neutral population in the midst of civil war will hedge its bets, or support the side they believe will ultimately triumph. According to COIN theory, most people are rational and will make decisions based on beneficial outcomes.[6] If people are convinced that the government will provide them a better life and that the government will win, they will resist the insurgency. By offering the more attractive choice to the population, the government attempts to drive a wedge between the people and the insurgents, siphoning off their supporters.[7]

The insurgent, without the resources of the state at his disposal, has one key advantage. The government has the presumptive responsibility to protect and secure the people. It has the burden of maintaining this security in order to maintain its legitimacy. The insurgent on the other hand, can weaken government legitimacy merely by preventing the government from functioning.[8] Similarly, the government is presumed to be fair and to provide justice. In order to be legitimate, people expect that the government will act under law. Perceived injustices of the state, including official corruption, arbitrary and illegal punishments and brutality also undermine the state and fuel the insurgency.[9]

An insurgency need not be 'liked' to survive, as long as it is sufficiently feared. The insurgent will influence the population with a calculated and often ruthless mix of carrots and sticks. A well supported and well funded insurgency may be in the position to set up a 'shadow government' as a 'carrot', able to provide some government functions to protect and secure a population in the absence of the real government. This is a powerful 'hearts and minds' weapon if the insurgency can meet the needs of the population.[10]

An insurgency, unlike a government, is less accountable and less likely to operate under the law. It therefore can use murder, intimidation and coercion as powerful 'sticks' to either force a population to comply with its demands or punish any support of the government. While murder, intimidation and coercion will not draw the affection of the people, it is an effective 'hearts and minds' tactic. A population that is regularly tormented for supporting the government will quickly come to believe that its immediate safety and security are better met by complying with the insurgents, and the failure of the government to protect them is evidence that the insurgents will prevail.[11]

The West's recent experience with COIN has been to assist weakened allied governments to develop and maintain legitimacy. Capacity building within the allied government has become a major characteristic of a COIN campaign. Weak states, with gross poverty, high unemployment, high crime and poor governance provide a myriad of 'causes' to support the insurgent's narrative. Improved capacity building generally increases popular support.[12] Unity of effort between multiple civil and military agencies is considered essential to build legitimacy. While military and constabulary forces provide security, the counterinsurgent invests in economic, social and governance services to enable and encourage local support for the government and deflects the insurgent's narrative.[13]

Providing local security becomes the backbone of the COIN effort. Governance and economies cannot develop in the face of a murder and intimidation campaign. The US COIN manual devotes an entire chapter to training local police and military forces.[14] The generally accepted practice is to pair COIN trainer-troops with local troops, building their capacity and legitimacy until they can execute security missions on their own.[15] The pairing of local forces and trainer forces is considered ideal, with the assumption that local forces will have greater legitimacy and local knowledge and will develop greater intelligence on insurgent activities.[16]

As another means to draw support away from the insurgency, a government may attempt a form of amnesty or reconciliation for former insurgents who give up the struggle. This is quite common, as most civil wars end with some form of negotiated settlement.[17] Amnesty also gives insurgent fighters a 'way out', so they do not feel that they must either succeed or die in the attempt.[18] It can also be counterproductive when it appears that the government is losing against the insurgency. The population would perceive peace overtures as a sign that the government doubts its ability to succeed, encouraging people to support the insurgents.

As indigenous security forces develop and the legitimacy of the government is enhanced, the insurgent's freedom of action is increasingly limited. If an insurgency is contained, a successful COIN campaign can eventually smother it. Unfortunately, most insurgencies have an international dimension. Most insurgencies rely on external support, including safe havens across international borders, training, funding or logistics and weapons.[19] As the COIN force attempts to separate the insurgents from the people, a safe haven in a neighbouring country is a tremendous problem that can permit a weak insurgency to sustain itself indefinitely.

The goal of the counterinsurgent is to work himself out of a job. By protecting the population while building capacity for governance, economic development and rule of law, the counterinsurgent erodes the insurgent's cause and draws off his support. The government then has the monopoly of power, with security provided by local police and military.

Shortfalls of Modern COIN Doctrine

As COIN doctrine has developed in recent years, shortfalls in COIN theory and strategy have been noted. Even the most robust COIN strategy does not address the complexity of a weak or failed state. The bulk of Western COIN experience has resulted from post-colonial and Cold War conflicts of the late 20th century. 21st century failed-state interventions have generally not been civil wars based on nationalism, but 'complex communal conflicts,' that are virtually intractable without a heretofore unprecedented, massive and sustained international effort.[20] Internal wars of this type have innumerable participants, including competing local elites, multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian populations, exploitive neighbouring states, criminal organizations, international corporations and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), all with fluid interests and motivations. These intra-state conflicts are not merely about gaining governmental authority. An insurgent could be interested in exploiting resources, controlling territory and securing business opportunities, but have no intention of governing an area or supporting a population. Modern conflicts are a bewildering mosaic that COIN strategy cannot hope to appreciate.[21]

In short, COIN doctrine suggests that the people have an 'A' or 'B' choice: to support either the insurgent or the government. Critics contend that the complexity of intra-state conflict presents the population with a range of choices. An individual could choose to support one or more of a number of tribal, militia or quasi-governmental or criminal organizations, and could change allegiance at any point based on self-interest. While US COIN doctrine warns that 'effective COIN strategy must be multifaceted and flexible,'[22] the operational landscape is an unknowable Heisenberg world, rather than a Newtonian predictable clockwork of cause and effect.

It is this very complexity which makes the provision of security such a challenge. In a choice between life and death, people will choose life, even if the living conditions are miserable. If a government cannot provide security, people will usually submit to the will of any armed force willing to use violence. The combination of anaemic governance and small arms proliferation has permitted the rise of armed groups beyond government control in many parts of the developing world. They are part of the social dynamic in weak states, and the Western forces have already contended with them in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These armed groups are often known as militias.

'A World Theirs for the Taking:' Militias, Warlords and Security 'Surrogates'

Militias can broadly be defined as organized armed groups outside the control of a central government authority. A tighter definition is difficult, as militias are a product of their environment. They can have broad legitimacy in the eyes of the population and take the role of security provider in the absence of 'official' police, or they can be predators and parasites, terrorising and controlling a population through fear and coercion. Because of their ubiquity in weak states, it is inevitable that COIN forces will encounter them.

The initial problem with militias is that they should not exist. To maintain control and legitimacy, the modern state is able to 'monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory'.[23] Rule of law governs the legitimate use of force and the only armed and organized bodies within a territory empowered to use force are the police and the military. However, since the late 20th century, the concept of the 'state' is frequently at odds with painful reality. State competence was defined by 'the ability of states to independently govern and maintain economic, social and welfare standards in their own territories'.[24] In parts of the world,

the competence of the state has been eroded. In some cases a central government becomes marginalised due to corruption and incompetence. In other cases, a historic absence of central authority has led populations to rely on local forces for security. These are often described as 'failing states'.[25]

Failing states are characterized by a government that severely lacks legitimacy and ability to function. Aside from not having a monopoly on use of force within the territory, 'these are states that lack the core identifying characteristic of an effective state…civil society is weak and disorganized, security forces serve regime rather than state interests…The faith in the law and political institutions that underpins policing and order in effective states does not exist'.[26] The failing state finds itself outside the normal, accepted definition of what actually constitutes a 'state'.[27] In its place is a vacuum of governance and power. Unfortunately, power vacuums are not filled by good guys.

Who does fill the power vacuum? History asserts that there will never be a shortage of armed men ready and willing to assert control over ungoverned space. As a state collapses from civil war or insurgency, multiple armed groups will begin fighting amongst themselves to carve fiefdoms out of the carcass.[28] 'Warlords' spring from the weakness and decline of state authority.[29] In a failing state, warlords and chiefdoms may be openly hostile to the remnants of a central government, or if the government is too weak be a threat, they may ignore it altogether. In these circumstances, power flows from the barrel of a gun. Leaders of private armies typically use ruthlessness, violence and terror to maintain or extend power.[30] As such, 'the rule of such strongmen has tended to inhibit the emergence of any sort of resilient civil society'.[31] Because they operate beyond the rule of law and accountability, many militias are predatory and exploit the security vacuum for profit.[32] Militias, depriving the state of its monopoly on the use of force, are usually one of the greatest spoilers to peace and security the COIN force will encounter.

However, militias are defined by local conditions. Tribal societies that have never been under the control of a central government could have an entirely different experience with militias. For them, a militia might not be the private army of a regional warlord, but rather assumes the role of security provider: a tribal 'police' and 'army'. A militia could spring from and empower a civil society if it is perceived as legitimate. Examples of legitimized local militia come from the 'Pashtun belt' of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Deriving from the tribal code of *Pashtunwali*, two tribal security institutions have survived to the present day. *Arbakai* is a form of community policing, authorized and empowered by a tribal *shura* or *jirga* (loosely defined as 'elders'), and a *lashkar* is a temporary army, often from different Pashtun tribes, called up for common defence against outsiders.[33] While Afghanistan has had an extensive and painful history with warlordism, *arbakai* community policing is very distinct. *Arbakai* service is considered an honour and a responsibility, 'approved and recognized for the common or public good'.[34] They are empowered by the *shura* specifically to enforce and implement tribal decisions and maintain law and order: the exact functions provided by police in a state with central authority.[35] Unlike the militias of a warlord, the *arbakai* are accountable to their tribe through the *shura*. Composed of 'honourable men' of the community, the *arbakai* provide a public service with transparency and legitimacy.[36]

What does the COIN force do when encountering private armed groups? Under COIN doctrine, private armed groups are inherently destabilizing.[37] Failure to disarm private militias 'gives faction leaders leverage to obstruct any aspect of the peace process they deem inimical to their

interests'.[38] Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes are integral to most post-conflict recovery plans. Unfortunately, DDR is also extremely difficult to achieve.[39] With no viable economic options, militias have little incentive to disarm. The COIN force would prefer to replace militias with responsible and accountable trained police and military forces to promote government legitimacy. Unfortunately, training security forces can take years, time that a government facing an insurgency cannot afford.[40]

An imperfect solution calls for co-opting private armed indigenous groups as surrogates to provide security in the absence of regular police or government forces.[41] Surrogate groups can take many forms and have certain advantages.[42] Coming from the indigenous population, they will have local knowledge and cultural understanding that a foreign COIN force cannot hope to equal. They also might offer a degree of legitimacy that COIN forces lack. If they are providing security for their own territory, they can identify outsiders and insurgents. Directly enlisting local populations to provide their own security frees up a portion of COIN forces from garrison duties, allowing for offensive operations. Several successful COIN campaigns have paired local militias with small numbers of trainers and advisors to provide local defence.[43]

However, the use of private armed forces to augment a COIN campaign is fraught with risks. The practice violates COIN doctrine by increasing the power of armed groups beyond government control. This can easily have exactly the opposite effect: the government becomes less legitimate than before. A co-opted militia could assist with defeating an insurgency, and then become an insurgency itself when required to disarm.[44] Militias that are formed on tribal or religious lines might use their strength for political leverage. There is also a well documented connection to militias turning to organized crime, taking advantage of their power and the state's weakness.[45] Even 'loyal' militias that work towards defeating insurgents can have a negative impact on a government's legitimacy. Militias are not typically trained or predisposed to follow the laws of armed conflict, and surrogate militias which inflict atrocities can turn the population against the government.[46]

For these reasons, co-opting militias into a COIN strategy as security surrogates should only be attempted when the conditions are dire. If government legitimacy is at such a low point that the insurgency may be on the verge of being unstoppable, the COIN force may have little to lose by enlisting or co-opting private militias, with full awareness of the grave risk to future stability. The US led coalition faced this dire condition in Iraq's Anbar Province in 2005 and faces this condition in many parts of Afghanistan today. The conditions described in this section have defined those two conflicts. Both have experienced the failure of central authority due to a severe lack of credibility and inability to protect the population. Both have had private armed groups assert authority over local territory and engage in crime, predation and exploitation of the population. Iraq has seen private militias battle along sectarian lines and Afghanistan has seen Taliban militias simultaneously cajole and terrorize civilians and operate with near impunity in rural areas. In both Anbar Province and Afghanistan, conditions prompted the coalition to attempt to use surrogates to restore order, while simultaneously attempting to avoid the dangers that surrogates pose to the overall COIN strategy. Through a masterful strategy, the coalition successfully co-opted the Anbar Awakening to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq and has been reasonably successful in avoiding many of the dangers of using militias as surrogates. We now turn to an analysis of the Anbar Awakening Movement.

The Anbar Awakening Movement and Counterinsurgency Strategy

Before analyzing the Awakening, it is necessary to consider the conditions and people of Anbar Province during the Saddam regime and the causes for the Sunni insurgency. As discussed in the first section, a successful COIN strategy must focus on enlisting the support of the population. The population is courted and encouraged to reject the insurgency with both a rational and emotional appeal. The people must be convinced that it is in their interest to support the COIN force and believe that they will ultimately prevail. Because of their generally comfortable relationship with the Saddam regime, the Sunni population and tribes of Anbar were not inclined to support the US-led coalition upon the regime's collapse. On the other hand, the generally secular tribal structure did not suggest an ideological meeting of the minds with Islamic *jihadists* who rushed into the new Iraqi battleground. A review of the development of the insurgency is necessary to trace the Anbari 'hearts' and 'minds' exposed to these influences.

In the decades since his rise to power, Saddam Hussein carefully cultivated his relations with different regional, religious and tribal groups. He proved to be a master at engaging and manipulating local power structures. Tribal power had once been the basis of a diverse political authority in Mesopotamia and many tribes had had semi-autonomy under the British-backed Hashemite monarchy in the 1920s. As Iraq developed the institutions of a modern state in the 1950s, Sunni tribal power in Anbar began to decline.[47] However, the Ba'ath Party's assumption of power in 1968 was an invigorating influence on tribal identity and authority. As a means of retaining control, Ba'ath leadership developed a programme of patronage and favouritism for tribes supporting their rule. While the Ba'athists did not deliberately attempt to strengthen tribes, tribal sheikhs had strong incentive to reap the rewards for loyalty to the regime.[48] Saddam Hussein allowed this process to grow, as economic sanctions reduced the 'carrots' he could award for tribal loyalty. By the late 1990s, Saddam permitted local sheikhs to develop private security forces to police their regions. This decentralization gave tribes access to 'extra-legal sources of additional revenue from smuggling, government corruption and kickbacks, and even outright extortion and hijacking'.[49] Weakness of state institutions also caused the Anbari people to turn to their tribal leadership for healthcare, employment and social welfare.[50] Anbari tribes were essentially urbanized, living around population centres along the Euphrates River. Sunni tribal culture was also strongly founded on personal authority and a patronage hierarchy, making tribal sheikhs largely able to control their tribe's activities.[51]

Even as tribal autonomy increased, the Anbaris were aware that Saddam ensured Sunni dominance over the Kurds and Shia Arabs, the other two major population groups in Iraq. Sunnis widely, if wrongly, believed that they constituted the majority of the Iraqi population, making Sunni dominance not just natural but appropriate.[52] While Saddam was certainly not loved by the Anbar Sunnis, there was a tacit understanding that their future well-being was tied to his longevity.[53]

The 2003 unseating of Saddam Hussein ended the Anbari Sunnis' privileged position. Ba'ath patronage had ensured a higher standard of living in Anbar than nearly anywhere else in Iraq as well as access to government jobs, contracts, employment and educational opportunities. Tribal sheikhs had derived their legitimacy in large part from the benefits they could dispense to their people. Loss of Saddam's patronage caused a loss of honour and legitimacy among tribal leaders.[54] Anger at their marginalization led to a broad Sunni boycott of the general elections in January 2005, which only ensured that their Shia and Kurd rivals became firmly entrenched in

the new government.[55] Not having a seat at the political table ensured that reconstruction and economic marginalization would follow.

Adding to these grievances, early missteps by the US-led coalition dashed any chance of Anbari Sunni support. The Coalition Provisional Authority decision to dissolve the Iraqi army and a broad de-Ba'athification agenda put most of the educated technocrats and tens of thousands of armed men out of work.[56] Crude, early counterinsurgency operations including home invasions, personal searches, restraint and detention, and 'collateral damage' killing of non-combatants reinforced the belief that the US occupation had to be resisted.[57] An insurgency of mostly secular ex-Ba'athists began to take shape and grow by late 2003.[58]

This Sunni insurgency initially found common cause with Islamist insurgents who fought to remake Iraqi society. While many Anbari Sunni insurgents had a religious motivation to resist, the influx of *jihadist* ideology was something new. The most brazen Islamist leader, Musab al-Zarqawi and his Al Qaeda in Iraq organization 'produced mayhem in the hapless country [conducting] abductions, beheadings and suicide bombings'[59] tied into a broader agenda to carve a Sunni caliphate out of Iraq. These Islamists drew on the Anbari Sunnis, aggrieved at their political marginalization. Arab media spread the call for *jihad* and foreign fighters infiltrated Iraq.[60] With the Islamist influence, the Anbari insurgency began to shift from attacking the US-led coalition and Iraqi government toward a broader ideological struggle.

Looking at the insurgency through a COIN lens, the Anbari tribes had decided that their well-being would not be met by supporting the US-led coalition or the new Iraqi government. They were politically and economically marginalized with no realistic prospect of returning to power. American power had removed their patron and clumsy US tactics to crush the insurgency only alienated the population. Further, there was strong belief that the US would withdraw from Iraq if the insurgency continued, raising doubts that supporting the coalition would bring any benefit.[61] The US also did not seem capable of a military victory and had demonstrated an inability to hold a territory once seized.[62] As a rational and emotional choice, it did not make sense to support the US-led forces or seek reconciliation with the new government.

However, as the Al Qaeda/Islamist faction of the insurgency (hereafter AQI) expanded, the 'common cause' between the secular and Islamist insurgencies began to strain. Like the US-led coalition, AQI was not sensitive to the interests and needs of the Anbari population, and began to make its own tactical missteps that would begin to shift the weight of the people's support.

Origins of the Awakening

While it can be argued that the US 'flipped' the Sunni Anbari tribes to become surrogate militias against AQI, this belief is a gross oversimplification of complex interrelationships within a disparate insurgency. Friction among the various insurgent groups had been growing before any shift in US COIN strategy. This friction manifested itself in two ways. First, AQI began to impose control over social elements of tribal society, including seizure of the local illegal sources of revenue away from the tribal sheikhs and unwelcome forced marriages to build connections with the tribal structure. Second, AQI initiated a severe murder and intimidation campaign both to control the illegal revenue and to impose Islamist practices on the Anbari tribal/secular society. These practices eroded the 'common cause' between secular insurgents and AQI and made the Awakening Movement possible.

As discussed in the previous section, there is a common connection between militias and criminal activity. The weakness of the central government and absence of rule of law ensures that a private armed force will seize control of sources of profit. For tribal leaders in Anbar, wealth had been generated from the 'extra-legal' autonomy tolerated by Saddam Hussein. Low-level government corruption, hijacking oil trucks, smuggling and imposition of local tolls and levies were the basis of tribal power.[63] As the AQI presence in Anbar grew, it began to strong-arm tribal leaders to seize control of these revenue streams. Conducting the insurgency was expensive. AQI needed this income to sustain its operations, and was prepared to steal it away from the sheikhs.[64] As a key example, Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi of the Albu Risha tribe, who would go on to found the Awakening Movement, was himself 'a smuggler and highway robber' who saw his power base eroding as AQI asserted control of his criminal enterprises.[65]

AQI also attempted to integrate with the tribal structure by forced marriages. As examined by a COIN scholar, 'the strategy works by creating a bond with the community, exploiting kin-based alliances, and so "embedding" the AQ network into the society…Allow[ing] them to manipulate the local people'.[66] While this strategy has worked for Al Qaeda in other Islamic countries, the more secular Anbari Sunnis took this as a cultural invasion.[67] The initial push-back from tribal leaders against AQI for control of resources and cultural intrusion initiated the first major fighting within the insurgency and prompted *jihadist* leaders like al-Zarqawi to punishing brutality.[68]

AQI's murder and intimidation campaign against the Anbari tribes had an important, if gradual, effect on the Anbari leadership. The Islamists imposed a brand of sectarian rule that conflicted with tribal structures and acted with a ruthlessness that alienated Anbari sheikhs.[69] AQI's declaration of Ramadi as the 'capital' of a new Islamic Caliphate of Iraq disillusioned many Anbaris about the value of their AQI alliance.[70] AQI had essentially made itself an 'enemy' in the same manner that coalition forces were the 'enemy'. Rather than offering a path to political and military power, the Islamist insurgency was marginalizing tribal leadership. However, this did not immediately bring the Anbari tribes into common cause with the coalition. Initially, tribal organizations saw both AQI and coalition forces as enemies, launching attacks against both. In late 2005 a coalition of tribes attempted to oust AQI from Anbar while simultaneously fighting coalition forces, but was defeated and humbled by the better organized AQI insurgents.[71] This was followed by further AQI murder and intimidation to punish the tribes for resisting their control, a campaign that was largely effective at cowing the Anbari population.[72]

AQI's assault on the economic, political and social makeup of the Anbari tribal structure set the conditions for the Awakening Movement. By early 2006, Anbari tribes were more fearful of the absolute domination by Islamists than they were of political marginalization from Baghdad. Slow but visible improvements in the structure of the Iraqi central government, supported by the coalition, began to convince Anbari leaders that the boycott of the January and December 2005 elections had been an error, and that Sunnis were more likely to gain from the political process than from further resistance.[73] Further, two years of fighting against the coalition forces had not caused them to withdraw. Rather, there was increasing evidence of coalition commitment to long-term stability, economic development and political inclusiveness.[74] In mid-2006, a coalition information campaign targeted the tribal leadership, emphasizing that the coalition was committed to remaining for as 'long as necessary' to defeat AQI and achieve stability.[75] The coalition had also demonstrated in other parts of Iraq that they could defeat AQI and protect local populations from murder and intimidation, provided the population gave them general support.[76]

Using the 'hearts and minds' analysis, it began to make rational sense for Anbaris to end their resistance to the coalition and find common cause against AQI. Their short-term and long-term interests would be better met through political mediation with Baghdad, with the coalition as a safeguard against their political marginalization. Sustained coalition reconstruction efforts, even in the face of insurgent attacks, also began to convince Anbaris that the coalition would eventually prevail.

US Co-opting of Anbari Tribes & Use of Tribal Surrogates

Sheikh Sattar (the previously mentioned 'highway robber') was the first Anbari sheikh to enter a serious alliance with coalition forces and was the primary driver of the Awakening Movement.[77] It is essential to understand that the Awakening was a tribal-launched, grass-roots movement in defence of local interests. At this key point, the evolution of US COIN strategy enabled the Awakening Movement to expand and succeed.

The early Iraqi COIN strategy had depended on growing and training the national Iraqi army and police and turning security operations over to them as quickly as possible.[78] With Sunnis largely boycotting all aspects of the national government, army and police units were recruited mostly from the Shia population and were not perceived to be legitimate in Anbar.[79] Coalition attempts to empower elected or appointed officials had also largely failed, with most having been killed or abandoning their positions in the face of the insurgency.[80]

In June 2006, the 'Ready First Combat Team' (1st Bde 1st Armored Division, US Army) initiated operations in and around Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province.[81] Ready First officers now accurately perceived that the tribal structure had local legitimacy in a way that the 'official' government did not. Commanders made the decision to enable the local tribal power structures. By encouraging the tribes as a basis for governance and security, the coalition was essentially assuming the same role of patron that Saddam Hussein had taken.[82] Under semi-autonomous tribal sheikhs, corruption, fraud and criminality would occur as they had under Saddam, but a restoration of their prestige and revenue gave sheikhs a stake in their future and a path to end their marginalization. The coalition accepted this extra-legal activity as the price for the tribes to accept their assistance. As AQI influence was reduced, the tribes regained control over smuggling and local corruption, to which the coalition quietly turned a blind eye.[83]

Enabling the authority of tribal structures was the beginning of extensive key leader engagement which began to develop trust in the months before the Awakening. In June 2006, as tribal leaders felt the sting of AQI murder and intimidation, coalition engagement offered a quid pro quo: the coalition would commit to providing local security if the tribes would supply men to be trained for local police and army units.[84]

Along with key leader engagement, the coalition forces had also radically altered their COIN strategy by maintaining FOBs in urban centres. With visible FOBs and daily engagement with the population, US forces reduced AQI's freedom of movement and demonstrated their ability to protect the population. The coalition presence permitted tentative but demonstrable infrastructure and economic development.[85] This combination of efforts had the effect of giving the Anbaris a stake in their own future, with demonstrable rewards for success. Tentatively at first, Anbari tribes began to supply recruits to the Iraqi Army (IA) and police (IP), referred to collectively as Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Coalition forces took great care in cultivating their ties to locally recruited ISF. Living and training with ISF units, coalition Military and Police Transition Teams shared risks with their counterparts, instilling confidence and professionalism, deterring the potential for the forces to revert to lawlessness.[86] The visible and reassuring presence of ISF in Anbar began to have a 'ripple effect' of trust in the coalition and increased legitimacy of the tribal leadership.[87] AQI had lost the initiative, but would make one more drive to bring the tribes to heel.

The proximate cause for the Awakening was a final AQI atrocity in an attempt to halt the growing coalition influence. On 21 August 2006, AQI murdered and mutilated a Ramadi sheikh who had organized IP recruitment and had also refused to give a woman of his tribe over to AQI for marriage.[88] The outrage against AQI drove several vacillating sheikhs to formally turn away from AQI and set the conditions for Sheikh Sattar's tribal council of 9 September 2006, announcing the 'Awakening' of 50 tribes to expel AQI and restore local governance.[89] In September 2006, militias organized on tribal lines and headed by local sheikhs initiated operations against AQI, as they had done in late 2005. However, this time they actively solicited US support for their operations and requested recognition as a legitimate source of public security.[90] The Awakening-Coalition partnership met its first test in November 2006, when AQI attacked the Albu Soda tribe with the intent of intimidating them back into compliance. The tribe requested coalition assistance, and a combined ISF and coalition response routed AQI, inflicting devastating losses.[91] By January 2007, every tribe in the vicinity had joined the Awakening. The effect is best summed up by Ready First's Commanding Officer, Col Sean MacFarland, 'Once a tribal area joined the Awakening, enemy contact in those areas typically dropped to near zero.'[92]

Once the Awakening Movement was well established, the coalition made use of Anbar 'surrogate' fighters in two primary ways. First, tribes formed their own security forces funded by the coalition but operating more or less independently under tribal control. Second, the tribes provided massive recruitment to the ISF units, with the caveat that recruits would be permitted to serve near to their homes.

Tribal security forces can broadly be divided into Emergency Response Units (ERUs), Auxiliary Police and Neighbourhood Watches. ERUs were essentially tribal militias that conducted operations against AQI insurgents within their areas, nominally under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior.[93] Auxiliary Police units were recruited in remote villages too isolated to receive much coalition training, logistic or combat support and acted as quasi-official police in the absence of an IP presence.[94] Neighbourhood watches had no official recognition but worked closely with coalition and Iraqi forces, providing intelligence and acting as a visible sign of village security.[95]

The recruitment of Anbaris to the ISF was the essential element to the reduction of violence and expulsion of AQI from Anbar Province. Police recruits were given large cash incentives if they completed training and remained on the job for at least 90 days. Army recruitment was initially problematic, as Anbaris were reluctant to serve in national units away from home. A deal was struck to ensure that IA recruits would be assigned to battalions close to their homes after completing training.[96] Numbers of locally recruited IA and IP forces rose steadily by autumn 2006 with the general support and approval of many Anbari tribal leaders.[97]

Awakening Success?

The Anbar Awakening can rightly be called a success for bringing substantial peace and security to Anbar Province and offering a roadmap for other regions in Iraq to do the same. Awakening movements and the coalition COIN strategy to enable their success sprouted in other Sunni areas and were even copied to some extent by Shia tribes.[98] Along with the US 'surge' of troops in 2007, the Awakening Movement provided enough security and stability to give the Iraqi political process breathing room for a national reconciliation. If the short-term goal of driving out AQI and providing local security was successful, the long-term goal of a sustainable peace is yet to be determined. Signs are mixed.

Even as the Awakening was unfolding, coalition forces recognized the risks.[99] On one hand, empowering tribes could build local legitimacy and improve security. On the other, it was essentially militia-building along sectarian lines. The coalition mission in Iraq was to bring all parties peacefully into a representative government. The Awakening created a powerful Sunni bloc which had the potential to turn against the national government if it felt that political and economic marginalization would continue. Preventing the Balkanization of Iraq into separate Sunni, Shia and Kurd states remains a concern.

There are positive signs. Even at the outset, the Awakening called for a reestablishment of local government, rather than outright tribal rule.[100] Coalition forces did not neglect the political aspect of the Awakening, providing increased protection for local officials and Awakening leaders, and effecting the appointment of government officials acceptable to the tribes.[101] The Shia-based government in Baghdad overcame its initial reluctance for the Awakening, with the understanding that tribal militias would be disbanded as ISF forces came to strength.

To a great extent, Anbari Sunnis have adopted the political process. There is general recognition that increased national political representation will prevent Anbar from being isolated, and could even be the basis for dominance.[102] In the provincial elections of January 2009, there was broad Sunni participation and very little violence.[103] Continuing the trend that Anbaris are generally secular in outlook, the Awakening-based political parties did very well in the elections, largely defeating the rival Iraqi Islamic Party and giving the Anbari Sunnis bargaining power in a coalition government.[104]

More importantly, there is some evidence that the Awakening may formally abandon their militia status and disarm. On 5 April 2009, Hamid al-Hayis, one of the Anbar Awakening founders, stated that 'The Awakening Forces in Al-Anbar have now turned into a political organization…they currently do not carry weapons and they participated in the recent provincial council elections… Weapons must remain in the hands of the police and armed forces. The law, not the militias, must prevail.'[105] If the Awakening does indeed return the monopoly on the use of force to the government, Iraq could avoid the warlordism present in so many weakened states.

However, several factors bring the success of the Awakening into question. While a window for political reconciliation may be open, Sunnis could turn to open conflict with Baghdad if they perceive that their political marginalization will continue after the departure of coalition forces. The Shia-majority government of Prime Minister Maliki has been slow to incorporate the bulk of Awakening militias into the ISF as promised.[106] This adds to Sunni fears that the ISF will be dominated by a Shia government they do not trust. Adding to Sunni concerns, the central government has begun to arrest Awakening Movement leaders.[107] There has also been little

progress at the national level to permit former Sunni Ba'athists to have a role in government, or to pass a hydrocarbons law that would equitably distribute oil revenue to oil-poor Sunni regions.[108] While the central government may be attempting to regain its monopoly on the use of force, it also increases the Sunni perception that they will be a targeted minority in post-occupation Iraq. The Iraqi government continues to promise Sunni incorporation into the government, but many fear that only the continued US presence has prevented broad Shia domination.[109] An Awakening-backed assault on the Iraqi government may already have begun. On 6 April 2009, several car bombs detonated in Baghdad and have been linked to former Awakening militias, following the arrests of several Awakening leaders.[110] One Awakening group that had promised to disband has actually become more militarized following the arrest of their tribal leader.[111]

As we prepare to consider whether an 'Awakening' can occur in Afghanistan, three key points must be emphasized. First, the Awakening was a bottom-up social movement. Due to Saddam's strategy of tribal patronage and semi-autonomy, a strong tribal structure permitted sheikhs to effectively mobilize their tribes for their collective interest. At first, this interest had common cause with the *jihadists* against the coalition. Only later, as a result of AQI missteps and a prudent shift in US strategy, did tribal interest become more identified with the coalition's success, permitting the 'flip' to the US side. Second, the Anbari insurgency was more or less confined to Anbar itself. The largely urbanized Anbari population allowed for a credible coalition presence as US strategy shifted to protecting the local population and partnering with local ISF. Cities could be defended and surrogate Awakening militias and ISF could be monitored and partnered with coalition forces. The flat desert terrain and distance from the closest international border (with Syria) precluded significant safe havens for AQI once the Awakening had gained momentum. Security could permit development in a classic 'clear, hold and build' COIN practice.[112] Third, despite strong tribal identity, Anbari Sunnis also thought of themselves as Iraqi, having been a ruling minority for generations, and they retain the aspiration for political control over the whole country. These key points are in stark relief to conditions in Afghanistan, to which we will now turn.

The Afghan/Pakistan Insurgency and COIN Strategy

It is generally acknowledged that the security situation in Afghanistan has worsened over the past two years, with a resurgent Taliban and faltering international efforts to rebuild the political and economic infrastructure. In October 2008, a former Central Intelligence Agency counterterrorist agent in Afghanistan described the situation as 'bad, and getting worse'.[113] As of December 2008, the Taliban had a permanent presence in 72% of the country and controlled large portions of the 'ring road,' the main highway circling the edges of the country terminating at Kabul.[114] The permanent presence of the Taliban has permitted them to set up 'shadow governments' in some areas of the country.[115] The strength and resilience of the Afghan Taliban is bolstered by the increasingly bold militancy in neighbouring Pakistan. Once merely a safe haven for the Afghan insurgents, the Taliban in Pakistan have quickly exploited government ambivalence and spread their influence outside traditional tribal areas. At the time of writing, Pakistani troops were fighting to regain control of the Swat Valley.

Under COIN doctrine, these trends must be reversed before success of any sort can be achieved. For the Afghan government to win the 'right to rule' in the eyes of the population, it must demonstrate that it is capable of providing security and governance for the people's benefit. In 2008 the Pentagon estimated a need for 500,000 troops to 'mollify' Afghanistan.[116] Even adjusting

the troop number to protect only the most dangerous areas, there is absolutely no prospect that security forces on this scale can be deployed in the foreseeable future. While President Obama has already authorized an additional 17,000 troops, the numbers are hardly sufficient.[117] In March 2009, Iraq still had 145,000 coalition troops supporting over 600,000 trained Iraqi security forces. In Afghanistan only 69,000 US and NATO and 150,000 Afghan forces are attempting to pacify a country over 30% larger and more populous.[118] As an additional complication Afghanistan has a much less urbanized population than Anbar, requiring forces to protect isolated villages from Taliban influence.[119]

With no prospect of sufficient security forces, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) planners have drawn inspiration from the success of the Anbar Awakening to sponsor a parallel programme. As an alternative to regular forces, a pilot programme has recently been implemented to create surrogate forces, raised from local Afghan tribes and empowered to provide their own security, in a manner similar to the 'Sons of Iraq' Awakening forces.[120]

Wisdom of Surrogate Forces for Afghanistan?

Despite the necessity, the concept of empowering tribal forces to defend their villages has been highly controversial and carries tremendous risks. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has a history of warlordism that has produced misery in recent decades and prevented earlier attempts at national unity. In 1987 as part of the Soviet plan for a managed withdraw from Afghanistan, a National Reconciliation Policy under Afghan President Najibullah permitted local autonomy to numerous bands of *mujahideen* fighters if they would maintain a ceasefire.[121] The Soviet strategy was to maintain peace by buying off tribal fighters, while simultaneously building up the Afghan army to maintain their client Afghan government. However, strong local influences tribalized the Afghan army, eroding its effectiveness against the unruly militias.[122] By 1991, the Soviet Union stopped funding the Afghan regime, and the tribal fighters quickly turned on the remnants of the government. 'Militias…became a law unto themselves, engaging in narcotrafficking, highway robbery, rape, looting, and fratricidal conflict.'[123] The British had had a similar experience during their Northwest Frontier campaigns from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries. Tribal fighters could be kept under some control with regular payment, but the fierce independence and suspicion of outsiders made inter-tribal fighting a constant concern.[124]

This history is not lost on the Afghan public, who recall the predation of post-Soviet warlordism and are deeply concerned that it will return with private militia groups. On 24 December 2008, the Afghan Interior Minister strongly denounced the concept, citing the destabilizing effect of armed groups beyond government control and denying any similarity between the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies.[125] In the following weeks he was echoed by numerous Afghani newspapers and media reports, calling the plan to create tribal militias 'a dangerous scheme' and referencing the post-Soviet warlord experiences.[126] A frequently cited concern is that empowering local militias will further erode national unity. This has already been the case for much of Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion.[127] President Karzai has never had much authority beyond the capital, and has been jokingly referred to as 'the Mayor of Kabul'.

The Afghan militia concept has also been criticized as poor COIN strategy. Oxfam has condemned the concept, pointing out in an April 2009 review of the NATO efforts that the strategy contradicts the current DDR programme for Afghanistan, on which the US has already spent $150M.[128] The study also repeats the concerns of warlordism, highlighting that the lack of professionalism of

militia fighters will result in human rights abuses and contends that the strategy is inherently inconsistent with the Afghan government's efforts to extend its authority.[129]

Nevertheless, the extended reach of the Taliban and absence of other forces has apparently left ISAF planners no other options to prevent the Taliban from making permanent gains in the countryside. We will now consider the elements of the Afghan militia programme.

Afghan Militia Strategy: The Afghan Pubic Protection Force

The initiative to create and enable tribal surrogates to provide local security is called the Afghan Public Protection Programme (APPP), and those enlisted join the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).[130] It is an attempt to co-opt the cultural acceptance of the *arbakai* system of locally sponsored community policing, but subordinate it under the authority of the central government. Recalling from a previous section that the Pashtun-based tribal practice of *arbakai* permits a local council to call on honourable men of the tribe to enforce the *shura's* decisions, the APPP attempts to prompt tribal leaders to nominate men of the community to protect their communities on behalf of the government. The traditional *arbakai* maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the population because they are trusted to act on the community's behalf, and not for private interests or financial gain.[131] The APPP attempts to capture the same degree of community trust, while linking the provision of security to the government. According to a 2 April 2009 US State Department press release upon the graduation of the first APPF recruits, 'The program is intended to foster links between the community, the local government and the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.'[132]

Advocates of the programme emphatically deny that it is a militia. Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Wardak has called the APPF a response to a 'pressing need for more troops' to provide local security, but stressing that the government would 'exercise maximum caution [not to] create a new warlord or reinforce the old ones'.[133] At a press conference on 18 February 2009, then ISAF commander General McKiernan also made the careful distinction. '[The APPF] is different…that's not a tribal militia. It's community based, to represent everyone that lives in that geographic area.'[134] The creation of the APPF resembles in part the creation of the Awakening forces. In regions with a Taliban presence, 'tribal power brokers (a *shura*) will be invited to agree to a contract. The government, backed by ISAF, will undertake to provide security, bring economic development, and give each tribal council a greater say in the running of local affairs. In return, the tribes promise to expel and deter insurgents, and to provide recruits for a local force that would perform guard duties.[135]

Recruits nominated by their *shura* are vetted by ISAF and the Afghan government and provided three weeks of training before returning to their own districts. Unlike many Anbari Awakening forces, the APPF mandate is limited to site security, freeing up better trained ANA and ANP units to conduct combat operations against Taliban insurgents. The APPF will 'protect and guard schools, clinics, highways, mosques and governmental projects in addition to protecting the people'.[136] The initial pilot programme calls for 8,000 members in 40 of the 365 Afghan districts.[137] Like the Awakening force, the APPF is intended as a temporary measure to improve local security in order to permit improved governance and development and to buy time for ANA and ANP numbers to increase.

Despite the assurances to the contrary, critics of the programme see parallels to unregulated militias and doubt the government's ability to ensure their loyalty. An April 2009 report by the

British Agencies Afghanistan Group vigorously argues that the deep complexities of Afghan tribal allegiances and lack of national identity make it almost impossible to ensure the loyalty, discipline and competence of any armed community defence initiative.[138]

ISAF planners anticipated that the Taliban would target the APPF as part of their murder and intimidation campaign.[139] In fact, it has already begun. On 26 April 2009 three APPF members were killed as their vehicle was struck by a Taliban improvised explosive device (IED). The Afghan media report labelled the APPF members as *arbakai*.[140]

Comparing the Anbar Awakening & Afghan Public Protection Forces

On analysis, the APPF programme appears as a top-down initiative by the Afghan government and ISAF to generate a bottom-up movement resembling the Anbar Awakening. Key leader engagement, so vital to the Awakening, is also a strategy of the Afghan government, creating or engaging local *shuras* to address local concerns. But here the Anbar parallel ends, due to the natures of the different insurgencies and the differences in Anbari and Pashtun tribal culture.

As a bottom-up reaction to Al Qaeda violence in Anbar, Awakening leaders were able to mobilize their tribes and bring them into the movement. The tribal system of patronage and hierarchy ensured that tribal leaders could depend on members of the tribe to follow their example and turn against AQI. Pashtun tribal culture places less emphasis on tribal hierarchy. Rather than follow the lead of a recognized tribal sheikh, Pashtun communities finder greater legitimacy in *shura* councils. *Shura* (or *Jirga*) membership is reserved for community members with the 'requisite skills, knowledge and analytical power' to act on the community's behalf.[141] Since the *shura* is self-selected from among the community based on merit, it has great local legitimacy. However, APPF recruits are not nominated by a traditional self-selected *shura*. Under the APPP, the Afghan government itself creates a *shura*, who then select the APPF recruits. With a government created, rather than a community created *shura* as its basis, the local legitimacy of APPF forces is already questionable.[142] Traditional *arbakai* are trusted because they have no apparent ulterior motive other than supporting their tribe. The APPF, serving under the Ministry of the Interior and receiving government salaries, can easily be painted by critics as tools of a corrupt government.[143]

Another difference from Anbar is the broad ethnic and tribal diversity in Afghanistan. Unlike the homogeneous Sunni Anbar Province, Afghanistan is estimated to have 'anywhere from fifty to two hundred ethnic groups.'[144] Wardak Province, the site of the APPF pilot programme, has large Tajik and Hazara populations, as well as Pashtuns. Since the Taliban is overwhelmingly a Pashtun movement, Tajik and Hazara support of the government against the Taliban has been overwhelming, and APPF forces were quickly recruited among Tajik and Hazara tribes.[145] Because of tribal ethnic diversity, APPF forces are already being recruited along ethnic lines, and the possibility of Tajik or Hazara APPF fighting neighbouring Pashtun tribes is foreseeable.[146] As stated by Afghan MP Salih Mohammad Registani, 'There will be fighting between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. A civil war will start very soon.'[147] As we discuss in detail in the next section, there remains great reluctance among many Pashtun to fight against the Taliban.

That the APPF is only a mimic of the *arbakai* system is not lost even on its supporters. As the concept was in development in October 2008, Gen McKiernan described the difficulty of Afghan tribal engagement: 'it's [a] much more complex environment of tribal linkages and internal complexity than there is in Iraq. It's not as simple as taking the Sunni Awakening and doing the Pashtun Awakening in Afghanistan. It's much more complex than that.'[148]

The greatest difference between Anbar and Afghanistan is how the population relates to the insurgency. An Anbar Awakening was possible because the people saw support of the insurgency as harmful to their interests, allowing a clever COIN strategy to split the insurgents from the population. Is such a split possible in Afghanistan?

COIN Strategy in Afghanistan: Hearts and Minds?

Returning to the COIN 'hearts and minds' analysis: do the Afghanis believe that supporting ISAF and the Afghani government (including the new APPF) is in their interest? Equally important, do they believe that the Afghan government will actually defeat the Taliban?

Distilling the 'interests' of the Afghanis, or even just the Pashtuns, is incredibly difficult. According to broad polling in 2008, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are widely perceived as 'negative forces' in most parts of Afghanistan, and insurgent tactics of kidnapping, suicide bombing and murder are 'never justified.'[149] Among Afghanis there is also widespread condemnation of the Taliban's murder and intimidation campaign and their enforcement of extreme Islamist practices on the population.[150] But for all the anger against them, many Pashtuns show an extreme reluctance to label them as enemies.[151] At its inception, the Taliban was a Pashtun-based movement, which grew in strength largely from its ability to marginalize and co-opt traditional Pashtun power structures.[152] Only after the movement was closely identified with the Pashtun culture did it alter its message as needed to appeal to other Afghan ethnic groups.[153] For many Pashtuns, the Taliban represents Pashtun political strength, and cannot support a government committed to their outright defeat. This may explain that while 73% of the population consider the Taliban a 'negative force', 74% support negotiation with the Taliban and 53% would like them included in a coalition government.[154] While the Anbari Sunnis came to see AQI as an external and destructive force, many Pashtuns perceive the Taliban at least in part as an expression of local culture.[155]

There is also little economic incentive for many Afghanis to turn against the Taliban. In Iraq, AQI's takeover of illegal fuel smuggling created a huge economic incentive for tribal sheikhs to turn against AQI. AQI had become a competitor over resources, making an alliance of convenience with the US a logical move. There is no easy parallel in Afghanistan. The greatest source of income in areas with a large Taliban presence comes from the poppy harvest and the illegal drug trade. In Anbar, coalition leaders could afford to turn a blind eye to sheikhs' illegal revenue as a condition for their support to the Awakening. In Afghanistan the destabilizing effect of narcotrafficking and related corruption severely undermines the government. In response, the US sponsors large-scale poppy eradication efforts.[156] It was estimated that in 2007, 3.3 million Afghanis were involved in poppy cultivation, providing each household an average of $5,200.[157] A household cultivating wheat instead of poppies earned an average of only $546, giving farmers an obvious incentive to grow poppies.[158] With the Taliban reaping $300m from the opium trade, they are willing to fight for regions of high poppy production, and the local population faces financial ruin if they are defeated.[159]

Afghanis also intensely distrust Western motives and their conduct of the war. Civilian casualties from ISAF air strikes have caused outrage against both Western forces and the Afghan government, damaging the trust essential in COIN operations.[160] A January 2009 UN report on Afghan civilian casualties lists 828 civilian deaths from ISAF and Afghan military operations in 2008, 552 from air strikes alone.[161] Civilian deaths from Taliban attacks, including murder, suicide bombings and IEDs rose from 700 in 2007 to 1160 in 2008.[162] Since the government bears the responsibility to protect

the populace, the fact that the Taliban killed more people on purpose than ISAF did by accident is not a reason for people to support their government. Mistrust of the US is present even at high government levels. On 13 May 2009, Afghan MP Haji Ahmad Farid suggested in an interview that US forces deliberately targeted civilians and were in Afghanistan for 'testing their weapons and giving training to their army'.[163]

If the 'interests' of the Afghani people cannot be distilled in such a complex environment, one thing is certain. It is in their interest to survive. In the war-torn decades since the 1970s, Afghanis have best served this interest by being on the winning side of a conflict.[164] As articulated by one analyst, 'As the past has demonstrated in Afghanistan, the uncommitted component will side with those who are perceived to be winning the fight: this is a reflection of Pashtun culture.'[165]

Belief that the COIN force will succeed is the second element of the 'hearts and minds' analysis. At present, the Afghanis have little reason to be confident in a government victory. Upon inheriting the war, President Obama stated that the US and NATO were 'not winning' in Afghanistan.[166] Administration officials have quietly laid much of the blame for Afghanistan's deterioration on Hamid Karzai, who is not perceived as showing the leadership Afghanistan needs.[167] Lack of confidence on both sides has caused a 'nosedive in Afghan-US relations'.[168]

President Obama's April 2009 comprehensive strategy calls for the decisive defeat of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but opens the door to reconciliation with 'moderate' elements of the Taliban.[169] This has led to the charge that the Obama administration has 'defined success down' to merely defeating Al Qaeda and abandoning the difficult, long-term governance, rule-of-law and economic development that plagued his predecessor in Iraq.[170] The recent change in ISAF commanders also suggests this shift in focus. Gen McKiernan spoke frequently of a patient, incremental development strategy to enable the Afghan government and security forces. His replacement at ISAF, Lt Gen McChrystal comes fresh from US Special Operations Command and directed special operations in Iraq, including the killing of Al Zarqawi and the capture of Saddam Hussein, nicknamed 'Manhunter'. His appointment may be interpreted that targeted combat operations will take precedence over protecting the population.[171] If civilian casualties continue to rise even as the Taliban is more aggressively targeted, Lt Gen McChrystal may find himself winning the battles but losing the war.

Neither the behaviour of Afghanistan's neighbours nor the apathy of the international community instils much confidence of success either. After a wave of nation-building enthusiasm and pledges of support in 2001, the international community has become weary of the costs of sustained engagement. The last major international conference on Afghan development generated $10Bn in pledges, less than half of the estimated amount required for baseline development.[172] NATO allies are war weary as well, giving a tepid response to President Obama's call for greater NATO military commitment.[173] By far, the greatest destabilizing factor is the political and military situation in neighbouring Pakistan. This work cannot do justice to the complexity of Pakistan's relationship to Afghanistan, separated by the arbitrary Durand Line, which for generations of Pashtuns has been an international boundary in name only.[174] It is enough to say that the rapid growth and reach of the Pakistani Taliban has provided the Afghani Taliban with more than a safe haven. While the Pakistani army may dislodge the Taliban from the Swat Valley, the morale boost to the Afghan Taliban is incalculable. The Pakistani safe haven has allowed the movement to grow in size and sophistication, after being routed in 2001. The fluid border and safe haven has made the Taliban impossible to fix and destroy, unlike AQI in Anbar.[175]

As a result, the Taliban is not close to being subdued or accepting 'reconciliation'. Reconciliation with the Taliban is widely cited as part of a necessary political endstate to end the violence. However, offering reconciliation is only a valid strategy if the COIN force is already winning. Far from losing, the Taliban continue to enjoy almost perfect conditions for conducting an insurgency: 'rough, mountainous terrain, poverty, popular mistrust of the state, large family size (allowing sons to risk becoming militants), foreign support and cross-border sanctuaries, as well as an easily transportable commodity (in this case, opium) for financing'.[176] Even moderate elements of the Taliban have reason to be optimistic of their chances, and thus have nothing to gain from rapprochement with the Afghani government. As stated by the Afghan ambassador to the US, 'If they are not losing, why should they talk to us?'[177]

The choice for the Afghan population is clear: wait. A renewed US commitment to the war and improved Afghan security forces, including the APPF, are about to pit themselves against a robust and confident cross-border insurgency. The most logical choice for a population is to passively acquiesce to the insurgency and survive. The strength and confidence demonstrated by the Anbari tribes is not present in Afghanistan. There will be no 'Pashtun Awakening' in 2009.

Conclusion: Realistic Limits – the 'Art of the Possible'

An expression of glib irony is used at ISAF headquarters: 'We know what the Afghanis want. We tell them what they want every day.' The COIN success in Anbar came from recognizing what the Anbaris wanted. What do the Afghanis want? Based on media reports and interviews, we can make some broad generalizations. Afghanis do not want a return of harsh Islamist rule, but do want conservative Islamic cultural practice to be an element of their society. They also do not want a return of the warlordism of the past decades. The first rise of the Taliban was initially supported by a population weary of warlord predation, changing only when harsh Islamist practice was imposed.[178] Afghanis want a safe and secure society based generally on Islamic principles and cultural practices. They want this way of life to be supported by a non-intrusive government, with security maintained by non-corrupt police and government officials. In short, they want a functioning state that does not unduly interfere in their cultural or personal lives. Can the APPF surrogate force contribute to this goal?

The risk is that the APPF foreshadows a return to ethnic conflict and warlordism. ISAF and the Afghan government need greater safeguards to prevent this. First, the APPF should be modified to include partnership and mentoring by western forces to maintain discipline and build professionalism. As a model, in Vietnam the US Marine Corps initiated the very successful (if short-lived) Combined Action Program (CAP), which housed small units in remote villages, leading local irregular Vietnamese forces against Viet Cong insurgents.[179] A CAP-like mentoring programme for the APPF is perfectly in line with COIN doctrine and would greatly improve the Afghani pubic perception of ISAF efforts. Second, the APPF must remain a short-term measure. Close supervision is required to ensure APPF units are disbanded or incorporated into regular ANA units, once the need for them has passed. As a positive sign, the new comprehensive strategy adds 4,000 military trainers to grow the ANA.[180] In late 2008, ISAF and the Afghan government agreed to increase the projected size of the ANA from 70,000 to 134,000 troops, hopefully extending the reach of the government in the foreseeable future.[181] If properly supported and partnered, APPF could be an effective stop-gap measure to provide security, especially in non-Pashtun areas that do not support the Taliban. The APPF may not be an 'Awakening', but it can have a significant role to play.

If APPF forces can successfully defend their regions from the Taliban, they may open a window of opportunity for improved governance and economic development. The window will only be open for a short time, so governance and economic progress will be necessary to build public confidence. The 'civilian surge' promised in the Obama strategy is long overdue.[182] While the Afghan economy cannot be re-vamped quickly, farmers need a profitable and sustainable crop other than poppy. A promising alternative may be the large-scale cultivation of jatropha, a robust shrub whose berries can be refined into a powerful petrol-alternative biofuel.[183] The shrub grows well in India and Pakistan and could regenerate corporate interest in Afghan development.[184] Whatever governance and economic solutions are chosen, they must be vigorously pursued as security improves.

The temptation to import the Awakening from Iraq to Afghanistan is natural. As we have seen, COIN strategy requires protecting the population while the government extends its reach, legitimacy and acceptability. Despite their very different histories and conditions, the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, indeed all people, have in common the basic desire for security, opportunity and well-being. In lawless environments, those with guns will ensure their own well-being at the expense of others. As the intervention in Iraq draws to a close, it is possible that people are secure enough to reject a violent future. The Awakening Movement helped make this possible. If properly monitored and supported, the APPF may give Afghanistan the same chance.

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Analyse the Impact of the Changing Strategic Environment on the Delivery of Air Power

Wg Cdr Stuart Hatzel RAF
ACSC 12 Component Studies Essay
Joint Services Command and Staff College

Introduction

> *It used to be the custom to settle strategy in the capital, and not in the field – a practice that is acceptable only if the government stays so close to the army as to function as general headquarters.*[1]

This essay seeks to define the strategic environment in which the military, and in particular deliverers of air power, play a role. It will examine the changing nature of the strategic environment and discuss the probable catalysts of such change; particularly strategic culture, globalisation, military transformation, the transformation of war and the profound effect of the irregular adversary. The examination will aim to isolate the chief driver in recent times, and the challenge this poses to the delivery of air power. Having examined the historical aspects of change, the essay will go on to consider whether we can validly expect recent changes to the environment to be constant sufficiently far into the future for us to plan our recruitment, training and equipment procurement programmes as a regular military force or whether we need to make urgent changes to our structure and methods to ensure maximum flexibility and agility against all possible adversaries. The role played by air power through its less than 100 year military evolution will be scrutinized in order to question if it is still so young that it simply has not been exposed to all manner of warfare as a technologically advanced military arm, to be capable of reliably achieving the political aim. The clear answer to this must be that it is still very much an immature service that has yet to develop the doctrine required as an independent military force, unfettered by land-centric history and strategy, in order to understand the best use of air power in various situations; particularly those that sit below general war and employ such doctrine as part of a comprehensive approach to operations. The essay will explore the perceived imbalance between what proponents of air power believe it can achieve in terms of strategic effect and what is considered right and proper by liberal democratic nations when fighting lesser equipped adversaries. An analysis will thus be made of the dynamic of war's paradoxical trinity; violence, probability and subordination to policy, that Clausewitz spoke of[2] and whether this has value for purveyors of air power in the modern military operating environment. Whilst British Air Power Doctrine – AP3000 (1999) defines space as part of air power, recent analysis suggests that 'one cannot build space power theory and doctrine in general upon air power theory and doctrine'.[3] Whilst the air component will undoubtedly assist development of space power doctrine, as land and maritime doctrine helped air in its early days, space power requires fundamental, distinct doctrine, being as different from air as air was from land and maritime. Therefore, this essay will draw a line between them, and limit analysis of the changing strategic environment to the delivery of air power alone. Finally, the essay will conclude with lessons drawn from recent changes in the strategic environment that deserve further scrutiny for future utility.

What is the Strategic Environment and how does it Change?

There are many accepted definitions of the terms strategy and environment, and it is therefore useful to define exactly what it is that we are referring to in this analysis. Clausewitz' view of strategy is 'use of the engagement for the purpose of war'.[4] An 'active' environment, as this must be if we are to conduct strategic aims within it, is 'the surroundings, conditions and circumstances as affected by human activity'.[5] Therefore, the strategic environment could be 'the surroundings, conditions and circumstances that influence or affect the military engagement'. However, given inter-relationships in the international system it must also be recognized that security goals are shaped by a complex combination of geo-strategic factors, which include geo-spatial, resource, social, political, scientific and technological, in addition to military aspects.[6] Furthermore, constant security environment horizon-scanning takes place within the MOD with the aim of identifying possible future strategic shocks to the system of international collaboration and collective security of which the UK is a part.[7] From this it is clear that there are many more facets to the strategic environment than purely military and thus, for the purposes of this essay, the strategic environment is defined as 'a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that describe the geo-strategic situation, including geo-spatial, resource, social, political, scientific and technological aspects, which affect the employment of military forces, and the decisions of the chain of command'.[8]

It is acknowledged that the strategic environment changes over time, owing to uneven rates of growth and variations in technology, demography and resources.[9] Moreover, it can be robustly postulated that in an era of globalisation the balance of power can also be affected by non-state actors including international organisations, multi-national corporations, non-governmental organisations, religious institutions and politically motivated terrorist groups; all of whom are able to affect one or more decisive levers in the strategic environment. Following the cessation of the Cold War the global strategic environment has become complex, uncertain and unpredictable.[10] By the end of the 20th century, the British were putting themselves forward as 'an internationalist people' and a 'force for good'[11] which whilst undoubtedly intended as an altruistic statement of foreign policy was almost certainly seen as a direct threat by other actors, and thus risked a reaction that, ironically, endangered national security and international order more generally.[12] The UK fought as part of a broad United Nations coalition under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 678, removing Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, and maintained the Iraqi no-fly zones using the justification of UNSCR 688. However, from other perspectives it is estimated that since 1991, anywhere from 80 to 210 million people globally had lost their hopes, their property, or their lives. The political alienation, reinforced by economic and social deprivation, tended to direct this 'underclass' toward conflict and despair terrorism. This disillusionment and resort to violence and terrorist strategies showed in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda; USS COLE, Khobar Towers, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.[13] In essence, whilst the state actors in the international system were seemingly predictable and 'under control'; it was the sub-state actors that mobilised to influence the strategic environment.

Is Strategic Culture the Main Influence on the Strategic Environment?

Given the virtual hegemonic status of the USA since the decline of the USSR, it could be postulated that the United States is also the major controlling influence within the strategic environment. It is clearly able to wield power through the international system and bring pressure to bear as it sees fit. Snyder theorised that 'strategic culture' was, in essence, 'the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional

responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a strategic community share'.[14] If we accept the theory that 'defence related decision making is not an abstract construct based purely in the present moment, but is steeped in the beliefs, biases, traditions and cultural identity of the individual country; feeding its strategic culture'[15] and that this culture is generated through crisis periods overlaid on past experience,[16] we could speculate that the strategic environment is primarily influenced by the strategic culture of the most powerful actors in the system; in this case the hegemonic power. It would appear that former US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld adhered to this viewpoint when we examine his association between military power and politics, and its manifestation at the grand strategic level. The US administration demonstrated a capacity not only to co-opt support for military intervention, but also to shape the context in which force could legitimately be used.[17] Admiral Cebrowski, Rumsfeld's chosen architect, wanted to transform US military power in order to transform warfare and he saw network-centric capability as key to this.[18] There appeared to be a belief that overwhelming superiority in cutting edge technology and network-centric warfare would transform the strategic environment, making the US military supreme in terms of technology, efficiency and intelligently precise firepower, in order to deter any challenge. Ensuing operations proved the assertion that there is a great difference between military transformation and the transformation of war.[19] Whilst Rumsfeld believed he was transforming the future nature of war, it is now clear he was merely transforming the US military. In essence, a hegemonic nation's strategic culture does not shape the strategic environment in the manner it would like. An intelligent enemy, particularly a non-state actor with global reach, is able to analyse a nation's strategic culture and formulate its tactics to exploit the weakness it finds, and in so doing shapes the strategic environment relevant to its political and military aims. In this case, the US military's apparent inability to deal with guerrilla or terrorist tactics led to an increase in the use of those tactics. There is a limit to how much 'smart weapons' can achieve against a shadowy foe.[20] Defeating insurgents, as Washington learned in Iraq, requires an effective counter-insurgency force that also engages in nation building. Yet it is precisely those areas in which the US remained weakest under Rumsfeld.[21] Moreover, in the modern strategic environment it is incredibly difficult to efficiently configure military components to better an adversary that has an unknown or unidentifiable strategic culture.

How has Globalisation Affected the Strategic Environment?

It is clear that the major difference between the strategic environment of 1991 and today is the increasing complexity of the international system. Whilst globalisation can be defined in many ways, possibly the most pertinent to this essay is 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away'.[22] Whilst non-military, it accurately reflects the importance of the information operation in modern conflict. Whilst we find ourselves in a new environment that involves the economic integration of free markets, technologies and countries, it is also an environment of fragile peace and disarray caused by those who destabilise states and frequently espouse an ethos that rejects modernity,[23] yet derive much of their power from the global information highway. It is this ability that empowers terrorist networks and connects them with the empathetic ear of a distant supporter or soon-to-be-supporter, in accord with the chosen definition. The preparations for the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 spanned several continents, and so did the effects: the World Bank estimated the reduction of global GDP at almost 1%.[24]

Military operations since 9/11 have also seen the rise of pre-emptive action, in which air power has played a central role, as a desperate response to the perceived asymmetric threat.[25] A prime example of this usage followed from the human intelligence-led US targeting of Saddam Hussein and his sons. On 19 March 2003, American agents believed they had located Saddam, but cruise missiles would not penetrate his bunker. They would need 2,000lb EGBU-27 bombs loaded on F-117A Nighthawks. General Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, reached Franks on a secure phone to give the order.[26] In a pre-globalised age it would have been impossible to transmit real time intelligence between Central Intelligence Agency informants and their handlers in Iraq, hundreds of miles apart, to Washington DC and then to operational commanders in theatre to enable a high tempo attack of this type. Nye and Owens clearly assumed that it was this technological advantage which would see the USA hold the upper hand in any future conflict.[27] However, ultimately pre-emption is a means not an end and a doctrine of pre-emption that suits the US could equally suit other countries and non-state actors with less worthy motives. In an era where winning the global information war matters more than winning the battle it becomes apparent that those who would adopt pre-emption need to be clear about the limits of doctrine and their aims.[28] Lessons learned show that pre-emption would actually require better intelligence and co-operation with other intelligence services to be effective, either in the information campaign or the battle.[29] Thus, whilst the past decade has demonstrated the military's capability to turn intelligence into targeting action at a previously unseen speed utilising the modern global communications environment, the same medium is frequently used to disproportionate effect by the irregular enemy, not only in the battle winning ways of 9/11 but also in winning the information campaign.[30]

Can We Foresee the Future or Are We Destined to Assume the Recent Path Will Continue?

Where the enemy is a non-state actor or a technologically poor state that cannot match the military power of his adversary, he will be forced to rapidly adapt to fight effectively. The enemy's readiness and ability to adapt could be an impediment to us correctly forecasting the equipment and training requirement for his chosen style of warfare. With a procurement cycle measured in decades and an opponent that has the ability to quickly transform, it seems clear that the regular force is unlikely to be correctly equipped to fight. Taking the Typhoon programme, the UK commitment to buy 232 aircraft in January 1998 arose from a study in 1983 in securing air supremacy over Europe utilising beyond visual range technology and an excellent close combat capability with the Su-27 and MiG-29 as benchmark adversaries.[31] Delivery of the first single seat aircraft into Royal Air Force (RAF) service was January 2005, 22 years after the initial study and 15 years after the Cold War ended. At present the Typhoon Force holds quick reaction alert in defence of the UK but is not deployed on operations as its air to ground capability is not yet sufficiently developed.

However, if military strategists are correct, we know a great deal for certain about future warfare. What changes about war is overmatched by the eternal features of war's nature.[32] The RAF maintains a stance that is capable of high end warfighting, and therefore lesser equipped adversaries will be forced to adopt an indirect or irregular way. The underlying premise of this type of assault is that the outcome will be determined by the relative ability of the attacker and the target to win the support of the people or global society in their respective favour.[33] In fact, the inability of the opponent to match the military capability held by the UK makes the future easier to forecast, only leaving the question of whether to specifically equip as well as train to fight

irregularly, or accept that by equipping as it has, the enemy is predictable. Key to this decision is analysis of the air component's performance against the enemy, equipped and trained as it is, supplemented by urgent operational requirements.

If viewed through the 'air power lens', two opposing viewpoints become apparent. One would point to the purchase of originally leased C17 aircraft, and the increase in fleet size, as an example of not correctly equipping for the fight the UK is in. However, the core programme would actually have seen A400M entering service had Airbus met the stipulated requirement[34] which would have negated the requirement to purchase C17. Moreover, the present procured forces have been adequate to succeed in the modern strategic environment, with the possible exception of ISTAR and persistent armed reconnaissance. Here, a minimal urgent operational requirement (UOR) purchase of 3 MQ-9 Reapers filled the perceived gap.[35] In short, there are issues with the procurement process, but the policy of continuing legacy Cold War programmes has seen the RAF succeed in irregular operations, with minimal UOR gap-filling. Vitally, there is significantly less danger to the integrity of the state, maintaining a policy of equipping for high end warfare, than might be posed if it equipped purely for asymmetric warfare, thereby becoming incapable of fighting inter-state war.

What Role Has Airpower Historically Played in the Strategic Environment?

During the Great War air power was utilised in a support role for the two senior arms and the roles of close air support, transport, reconnaissance, communications, interdiction, artillery spotting, re-supply, rescue and special forces insertion. Anti-submarine warfare, convoy escort, search and rescue, maritime attack and minefield survey missions, albeit in a primitive form, contributed to the campaign.[36] Only a minority of people had experienced military aviation, but it fired the imagination of the masses. With this rapid build-up of essential war winning roles, expectation for power from the air built and there was much debate over what it could achieve as it gained maturity.[37] After the Great War theorists such as Douhet and others, who had experienced the horror of trench warfare, expounded theories of strategic bombing of enemy centres of civilian population, with the aim of causing mass hysteria and public influence on the enemy government, forcing surrender.[38] The result of this was a rapid build up and development of aircraft between the wars, by those countries with military ambition, to ensure that when battle commenced they had a war winning capability. The RAF's experience of colonial air-policing, whilst leaving it less than ideally trained, at least gave some operational pedigree that was an important baseline from which to start the fight.[39] Germany's main lever of power in the inter-war strategic environment was military, and airpower as the cutting edge of technology was used to its fullest effect, with the introduction of primitive ballistic missiles (V1 and V2), in addition to manned aircraft.[40] During the Cold War, the strategic role of air power was subject to periods of 'long operational stagnation', especially after the strategic nuclear deterrent role passed to the Royal Navy, but in every other respect air power was extremely busy.[41]

Is Air Power Still Sufficiently Immature That it is Being Shaped by Events, Finding its Feet Outside Major Conflict and Writing a New Doctrinal Chapter?

Given the excitement generated by projection of power from the air in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, politicians and the civilian population almost certainly favoured strategic effect generated in this manner. It appears to carry less risk to friendly forces, and thus typically enjoys

low casualty rates as demonstrated by the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, yet appears to promise decisive victory. Yet critics categorically state that air power has failed to deliver true strategic effect on every occasion attempted; whether in World War 2, Vietnam, Kosovo or the Gulf conflicts. On each occasion, there was a requirement for 'boots on the ground' to achieve the political aim. As Gray comments,

> the ghosts of Trenchard et al will have approved of Hallion's judgment that air power execution caught up with air power theory, as evidenced by the conduct and results of the 1991 Gulf war, and yet the point is that classical air power theory often, though not invariably, postulated the wrong requirement of the air weapon—that it be capable of winning wars on its own.[42]

Moreover, these critics of air power would point to the immensely dynamic period of air role expansion during the Great War and question what new roles have been found. To some degree this is fair, and even the RAF no longer advocates air power as a feasible independent war winner, but always as a part of a joint campaign.[43] However, whilst the list of air power roles does not grow at the same rate it once did, there are two key elements that must be considered before judging air power in the modern strategic environment.

The first is that until 1956 the RAF was commanded by men who had started their careers as naval or army officers whose staff were also 'in-comers'. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that developing air power doctrine came from a skewed air-surface influence. One factor that could be particularly relevant is that whilst these great leaders believed in air power, they may have measured effect as Land or Maritime do, ie winning means decisive victory and control of the surface. If this is pertinent and had stifled truly independent development of air doctrine, then development should have become apparent after 1956. However, by then the strategic environment was dictated by the Cold War and inflexible doctrine, for all 3 components, was the order of the day. Thus, it was not until 1990 that the RAF was able to begin a truly independent doctrinal journey.

The second related element is that only in the past 20 years has technology appeared to catch up with the 'blue-sky thinking' of early theorists and technical boundaries now seem limitless. All-weather day/night precision-guided weapons accurate to within a metre, the ability to penetrate hardened bunkers or limit effect to one area of a building, delivery from manned or unmanned platforms, stealthy armed reconnaissance over a target for 10 hours or more; all of these capabilities are what Douhet et al envisaged for the strategic application of air power, yet were impossible without today's technology. I would therefore theorise that development of independent air power doctrine is actually in its infancy. Thanks to a series of conflicts in the intervening period, exploration of its strategic effect in battle and how its use affects the wider strategic environment has again accelerated.

Is There an Imbalance Between What Air Power Can Achieve and the Perceptions and Will of the Public, Other Military Components, and the International Community?

Air power clearly delivers devastating effect if unleashed on the enemy as on the Basra highway in 1991 and in Gaza in January 2009, but public perception is of heavy handedness when such power is let loose against an ill-equipped adversary.[44] First raised by Thucydides, social divisions represent a potential barrier to military effectiveness, especially in longer wars and this is especially true for societies with ethnic or religious divisions.[45] In the modern strategic environment, using

the UK as an example of a multi-cultural society with some unrest and division between cultures,[46] a widening gap between the civil and military classes,[47] and engaged in two unpopular wars of political choice, we find three military forces engaged in an internecine battle for relevance in an age where there is a limited defence budget available and every military system is increasingly expensive.[48] It is no longer a case of winning the information war alongside the battle, but also winning the 'argument' with the other military components, gaining the support of politicians and public, if air power is to continue its doctrinal quest for strategic effect. The problem faced by those to be convinced is that whilst land forces are probably seen as more equitable when fighting ill-equipped adversaries, and the UK land component clearly enjoys this perception (winning relevance and an upper hand in the 'domestic' information war) there can be little doubt that Land is less efficient at containing an enemy and also more costly in human terms.[49] The air component must therefore become better at applying elements of its developing doctrine in the irregular fight, in order not to be seen as 'a sledgehammer cracking a walnut'. This would clearly ease the task in winning support at home and abroad, but will not be easy while we procure systems such as MQ-9 Reaper that allow RAF operators to enjoy complete personal safety whilst directly engaged in killing the enemy through the high tech mediums of space coupled to unmanned air systems which provide persistent intelligence feeds and armament.

Can Air Power Ever Play its Full Role in Expected Future Operations, or is it Too Expensive and Distasteful to Use Fully in Asymmetric Warfare?

The air component has played a controversial role in the use of pre-emptive action during the war against terror.[50] A glaring example must be the Israeli use of air power in Gaza in January 2009. Recognition that winning the information war was key to being militarily effective led to a 'lockdown' of the media. This was not an attempt to win the information war but to limit the Palestinian ability to win popular support in the international community; which arguably failed with the length of conflict and the global capability of modern communications.[51] Disproportionate uses of air power do not assist its future development and moral damage is not limited to the offending user. If the dilemma of whether it is fair to fight a lesser adversary with all conventional means at our disposal is not solved, it is unlikely that air power's full utility will be unlocked in the complete range of warfare. Moreover, if air power users get this wrong, they will empower another generation of extremists to find new ways to fight.[52] If a new way can be found, air can conceivably achieve the strategic effect early theorists believed existed.[53] However, the nature of air's strategic effect is likely to be different, at least in the immediate future, than Douhet et al envisaged. They envisaged such effect to be as Land promises, decisive victory and direct imposition of your will on the enemy population.[54] To clarify, strategic effect must be to 'achieve the effect your strategy intends' and if the containment of Iraq is taken as an example, through the imposition of UN sanctions and the utilisation of coalition air power, strategic effect was achieved between 1991 and 2002. Firstly, there was widespread international support, publicly and politically, for the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. There was insufficient political will to extend the UN mandate to force regime change in Iraq[55] in the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War but Saddam Hussein remained a 'bona fide villain' in the international system, with his brutal suppression of Shia and Kurdish uprisings as evidence of his evil nature. Politically, there remained worry about Saddam Hussein and his regime but there was also recognition that he counterbalanced an Iranian threat; in essence a steady triangle of regional power was shared between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran.[56] This balance was important and Saddam's behaviour to his own population provided the way for this un-stated political aim to be acceptable. Thus, air

power was used to deliver a decisive 'steady-state' in the Gulf, utilising no-fly zones and limited bombing campaigns which allowed the Iraqi civilian population to go about its business without foreign intrusion. At the end of 2002 Iraq was stable, presented no threat to its neighbours with a vastly weakened military and no remaining weapons of mass destruction, there had been no friendly loss of life and minimal enemy loss of life; all at a cost of £80 million per year[57] for the UK. In essence, aerial coercion had been successfully used in a non-war situation at no cost to our forces and relatively low cost to the Treasury. It was successful on all levels, as the international community and, most importantly, the UK public understood (or thought they did) why air was being used and it was seen as proportionate despite Iraq's lack of credible opposition. By contrast, the use of air power for strategic effect will have to be explained more carefully to the public in the future, than it has been since 2003.[58]

Conclusion

In a strategic environment as complex as that delivered by the post-Cold War globalised world, sub-state actors are no longer constrained by a bi-polar world order that threatens nuclear cataclysm as an escalation of local conflict, and enjoy the technical benefits of globalisation, drawing supporters to their cause from the global village. An intelligent non-state actor empowered by global reach is able to analyse a nation's strategic culture and formulate the requisite tactics to exploit the weakness it finds. Recently, this has had an even greater effect on the strategic environment than that wielded by the sole remaining superpower. Furthermore, efficiently configuring military forces to better an adversary that has an unidentifiable or non-existent strategic culture is a difficult task. Pre-emption, often using air power, was an early response in the war against terror but has frequently been seen by the international community as indiscriminate and heavy-handed and gifted victory in the information war to opponents. Looking to the future, if the public accepts the requirement to conduct counter-terrorist operations as far from their homes as possible, this essay has put forward that it is preferable for the air component to have an enemy that is more regular than irregular. As such, it may have been better to contain Al Qaeda within Afghanistan than force it to disperse. This would have allowed the use of airpower to strike surgically as required over a long period, as it did over the Iraqi no-fly zones. In this way it would have worked to the RAF's strength and exposed Al Qaeda's weakness. On a 'regular to regular' basis, it would probably have been seen as a proportionate use of air power, and would have utilised assets held in numbers, ie fast jet and legacy ISTAR, rather than having to rely on weaker capabilities such as support helicopters and air transport.

Technology is starting to address some of the weaknesses historically levelled against airpower, such as lack of persistence and failure to achieve strategic effect. Importantly, air power users must educate politicians, the public and even the other services regarding use of the air component, how to employ it, and ultimately, how success should be measured when it is used as your primary lever of coercion. The UK will leave Iraq in 2009 and possibly the region will be less stable and more vulnerable than it was to 'undue influence' between 1991 and 2003. If so, it can only be hoped that in the lessons learned from Operation TELIC, the Chiefs of Service, Permanent Joint Headquarters and the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre contrast the stability delivered by coalition air power between 1991 and 2002 and analyse the delta between the two. This essay puts forward that in the changing strategic environment, air should stop seeking decisive victory and recognise that that language and approach outside major war is unhelpful, unrealistic and better suited to the land environment, although even that is doubtful. Air power

is still not fully matured and is learning how to apply itself in asymmetric warfare, which it has previously seen but not since its infancy. Equipped with new technology, it must learn to finesse its options according to the situation and communicate what effect it is achieving and how. It is, however, probable that air power better suits stabilisation through containment, which is in itself decisive; using Iraq as an example where air forces lacked the antagonistic presence of land forces during their 12 year tenure, whilst achieving the (un-stated) aim of safeguarding the regional power balance. 'If airpower captures the public imagination of war in the 21st Century to the degree that it captured it in the 20th Century, airmen and airwomen will find themselves again at the forefront of the image. That may not be such a comfortable prospect when there is so much still unclear about the nature of conflict in our new century.'

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Evaluate the Implications for the Maritime Component of the Likely Characteristics of Future Conflict

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The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.[1]

As the great commentator on war, Carl von Clausewitz, states, a government and its military leaders need to establish the character of the wars and conflicts they will be facing. This judgement should shape the structure, training and equipment of the state's armed forces in order that they are best prepared to face those conflicts. With this in mind, this essay will look at the characteristics of future conflict, and what implications these characteristics will have for the maritime component. Analysis will be limited to the next 15 years and the implications restricted to those facing Western maritime forces.

The essay will start with an examination of the importance of the subject, and the proposition that although there are inherent difficulties in trying to predict the future, we must nevertheless do so. It will set the context, by looking at how the nature of globalisation appears to be reducing the likelihood of inter-state warfare, but increasing the level of intra-state conflict. It will also note the extent to which the 'globalised' system is reliant upon the safe passage of maritime trade. The essay will then examine some of the different theories on contemporary and future war, before arguing that the 'hybrid wars' model offered by Frank Hoffman[2] best reflects the nature of future conflict. It will next analyse some of the trends in the maritime environment that will shape how conflict in this arena will develop, arguing that maritime forces will need to optimise their capabilities to conduct expeditionary operations and maintain good order at sea, whilst still being able to counter a conventional threat. The essay will then examine the effect of new technology in the maritime arena, arguing that although technology will undoubtedly provide opportunities to Western maritime forces, it will also expose vulnerabilities unless its implementation is subservient to strategy.

As a result of this analysis, it will be argued that maritime forces will most likely see a return to fighting 19th century-style small wars and 'policing the system', but at the same time, the return of state-on-state conflict cannot be ignored entirely. In order to carry out these roles effectively, Western maritime forces will need to be able to provide access to the shore, and support forces operating ashore. They will also need to develop a broad intelligence picture, improve their constabulary capability, co-operate with a wide range of other maritime forces, and increasingly focus their efforts on the application of soft power. The equipment, training, and structural implications of these roles will also be examined. The essay concludes that Western maritime forces will need to focus on operating in the littoral, and shift some of their efforts toward coastguard and constabulary activity, whilst still maintaining a conventional war-fighting capacity. To achieve this, maritime forces will need to complement their small number of high-capability, expensive platforms with greater numbers of less complex, cheaper platforms, in order to be able to procure the numbers necessary to provide the presence required for the maintenance of good order at sea.

Before analysing the nature of future conflict, it is useful to examine why this is necessary, and look at some of the dangers involved in doing so. The future is by its very nature both unknown and unknowable. In trying to predict the future, we are guided only by what has gone before and what is happening now. We can take the past and the present and attempt to draw trends, which we can then extrapolate into the future. However, when analysing warfare, there is great peril in extrapolating the nature of the last conflict to try to predict the next. No two wars are the same and history often moves in non-linear ways, with elements of chance, small events, or technological innovations having unforeseen consequences. We can recognise trends but it is trickier to guess correctly the consequences of those trends, or the complex interplay between several disparate trends. However, policy-makers must attempt to do so, in order to guide policy, drive procurement, and develop strategy so that a state's armed forces are broadly configured for the nature of the conflict they will face. A failure to do so will result in catastrophic failure. Colin Gray expresses this as needing to be 'correct enough' and 'getting the really big things right enough' in our predictions.[3] A further complication is our own involvement in the process – by making predictions of the future, and then implementing decisions based on those predictions, to which others will react, we ourselves will shape the future, and the outcomes we envisage may become either self-fulfilling or self-defeating.

Thus having looked at the importance of trying to predict the nature of future conflict, despite the difficulties in doing so, it is necessary to examine the context in which conflict will occur – the 'globalised' world we inhabit. Modern globalisation, a combination of economic, political, technological and socio-cultural forces, has resulted in a large increase in cross-border flows of trade, ideas, services and people. This has had the result of binding together nation-states economically, and to a certain extent politically, in mutual interdependency; all dependent upon the efficient functioning of the global economic system.[4] However, other effects of globalisation, including the growth of non-state actors such as trans-national companies, non-governmental organisations, supra-national states, sub-state entities, and trans-national organised crime and terrorist groups has had the effect of marginalising the nation-state. Moreover, the poverty and inequality caused by the deregulated neo-liberal globalisation model of the last thirty years has further weakened the legitimacy of the whole system as well as many nation-states, and is one of the greatest threats to the stability of the system. These factors would seem to point to a decrease in the likelihood of major inter-state conflict, but an increase in intra-state conflict in the near future. This appears to be borne out by recent conflicts across the globe. These intra-state conflicts are likely to occur in weak or 'failed' states, and involve the interests of a number of state and non-state actors, where the use of force is no longer the sole preserve of the state. However despite this prediction, a return to major inter-state warfare cannot be ruled out, in particular as the present economic crisis will have unforeseen consequences, and may include a return to protectionism, exacerbating the economic collapse, and increasing the potential for conflict between states no longer so interdependent or bound into the system, and competing for scarce resources.

Another facet of our globalised world is the importance of the sea to the 'system'. With 90% of the world's goods moved by sea,[5] maritime trade knits the global economic system together – it is a truly 'maritime' system. However that system is extremely sensitive. The complex interdependence of global production and the modern logistical concept of 'just enough, just in time', with today's enormous container ships acting as floating warehouses, means that any localised disruption to this shipping will have a disproportionate effect on the global economy.

Moreover, the concentration of much of this trade via hub-and-spoke operations into a handful of 'megaports', and the transit of 95% of this trade through just nine chokepoints[6] mean that trading nations are particularly exposed to even small shocks to the system. This trade is reliant upon good order at sea, and thus maintaining this good order and defending the 'system' so fundamental to Western peace and prosperity, will remain a critical task of maritime forces. As this web of maritime trade is complex and truly global, the world's maritime forces will only achieve this through forward presence, co-operation, and partnership with each other. The implications of this will be examined later in the essay. Furthermore, the importance of the sea can only grow as the world's population grows, guaranteeing the continued strategic importance and relevance of maritime forces, notwithstanding the current Western focus on stabilisation operations in land-locked Afghanistan.

Having examined the context of our globalised society, it is now necessary to analyse some of the different theories on future conflict. These can be split into three schools – those such as Colin Gray who argue that we are only in an inter-war or pre-war period before another large scale conventional inter-state conflict; those such as William Lind, Thomas Hammes, and Rupert Smith who argue that large-scale inter-state industrial warfare has been consigned to history and replaced by smaller-scale irregular forms of warfare waged by non-state actors; and those such as Frank Hoffman who argue that future warfare will be a 'hybrid' of both these schools.

Looking at the first school, Gray argues that despite the present dominance of irregular warfare, in the future we are likely to see a return to traditional clashes between great power rivals over power and influence, and that the potential for harm from such a conflict far exceeds that which we are currently seeing from irregular warfare.[7] He also ventures to suggest that this could be based on a growing rivalry between the US and a Sino-Russian axis, where China's growing economic, technological, and military capability, and Russia's natural resources may well provide a peer competitor in the future.[8] However, whilst the US remains the undisputed global hegemon with a conventional military and nuclear capability far superior to any other challengers, other states are unlikely to challenge the US or its allies on conventional military terms. Smaller-scale conventional warfare is still likely, nevertheless, to be a feature of conflict between nation-states where the US is not a participant, such as in the Far East, where resource-hungry, highly competitive nation-states vigorously defend their interests and sovereignty. Moreover, nations such as the UK, which still have overseas dependent territories such as the Falkland Islands, will continue to need to demonstrate that they can fight and win conventional conflicts without US support. Thus although the likelihood of conventional war has presently reduced due to the unassailable US conventional superiority, Gray is correct to state that both its lethality and its possible return at some stage in the future, mean that it is to be ignored at our peril. However, acknowledging this prediction is not the same as saying that Western militaries should concentrate exclusively on the more abstract large-scale conventional warfare at the exclusion of the very real irregular conflicts, in which they are presently engaged, but it is to say that they must maintain the capability to ensure that when required, they can fight in a large-scale conventional conflict. It is precisely the deterrent effect of the US and its allies' capability to so effectively do so, that keeps the threat from large-scale conventional war at a low level in the near future.

The post-modern school, on the other hand, argue that the nature of conflict has changed from the modern industrial warfare of conventional state armed forces to a post-modern irregular warfare fought by non-state actors in conflicts where the divides between war and peace, and

combatants and non-combatants are blurred. Two of the best known models in this school are the 'Fourth Generation War'[9] and the 'War Amongst the People' models. Lind et al in their concept of the Fourth Generation War describe these conflicts taking place in weakened or failed states, where non-state actors use irregular means such as terrorism and information to undermine the political will of a state and challenge its legitimacy. Rupert Smith in his concept of 'War Amongst the People' identifies 6 themes – first, that in these wars the ends for which force is used are changing from hard objectives to those of establishing conditions; second, that armed forces fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield; third, that the conflicts tend to be timeless; fourth, that commanders fight to preserve the force; fifth, that new uses are found for old weapons and organisations; and sixth, that the sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multi-national grouping against non-state actors.[10] These are both useful models, which accurately describe several aspects of contemporary and likely future conflict. However these models ignore the possibility of a re-emergence of state-on-state conventional war, whose lethality and effect on Western way of life would be on a much larger scale than the smaller conflicts described by the post-modernists, and as argued above, they cannot be entirely ignored despite the reduced likelihood of occurrence.

A more inclusive model is offered by Frank Hoffman, who draws upon all of the schools of thought described above and argues persuasively that future conflicts are more likely to be 'hybrid wars', which 'blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular warfare'.[11] In hybrid warfare, the division between conventional and irregular forms of war is blurred, with both state and non-state actors synergistically employing all forms of war (conventional, irregular, and terrorist) to achieve their political objectives against a disruptive background of criminal activity and disorder. An example of the hybrid nature of modern warfare is the 2006 Israel/Lebanon war, with Hezbollah, an irregular non-state actor, using conventional high-technology weaponry, such as man-portable surface-to-air missiles and C-802 Anti-Ship Missiles. Another example is the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, where co-ordinated cyber attacks and Abkhazian and Ossetian irregular militias supported Russian conventional naval and land forces. The hybrid warfare theory also highlights the implications of the 'virtual theatre' of future conflict, played out to global audiences, with opponents using media and information networks to promote their 'narrative' of the conflict. Rupert Smith's metaphor of opposing commanders as duelling producers in a theatre where the noisiest actors attract the attention of the audience looking down through drinking straws, is a good analogy of the battle to shape the world's perceptions of a conflict, which will be so important to the results.[12]

By fusing together the pertinent analysis of several schools of thought, Hoffman provides the most useful model, in which the complex nature of future conflict can be analysed. Hybrid warfare theory does not announce the demise of conventional warfare, but does present a model which reflects the complexity of future conflicts, in which western militaries will be involved, and which is entirely applicable to the maritime environment. This can be clearly seen, for example, in the hybrid nature of a potential adversary – the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, which although an arm of the Iranian state's military, is irregular in its structure, composition, and tactics of suicidal small boat swarm attacks. Thus hybrid warfare theory provides a practical model for the likely characteristics of future conflict, in which maritime forces will be involved.

Thus having examined the different theories of future conflict and decided that the hybrid warfare model is the most apt, it is now necessary to look at some of the trends in the maritime

environment that will shape future conflict. The first major trend is the ever-rising importance of the littoral, which is becoming an increasingly complex, crowded space, and consequently an area of growing conflict. With the littoral regions of the world already containing the bulk of the world's population, the future is likely to see a continuation of what Martin Murphy calls 'migration to the sea'.[13] Ever more people will be living on the coast in vast and often poorly-governed conurbations. Human activity in the coastal seas will expand driven by the need for energy in the form of oil, gas, or installations capturing wind, wave, or tidal power; food in the form of fish from depleted fish stocks or fish farms; water from desalination plants; and minerals from the seabed. The exploitation of coastal seas for tourism and leisure will add another layer of complexity.

The growing littoral population will also mean a corresponding rise of a second trend – the range of maritime criminality and disorder. This includes piracy; terrorism; illegal, unlicensed and unreported fishing; people, arms and drug-trafficking by trans-national organised crime; smuggling; and toxic waste dumping. Moreover the complexity is increased by the participants' ability to move freely between activities: fishermen can fish both legally and illegally, and if their livelihood is removed, they can become pirates; pirates can smuggle; and smugglers can move weapons for terrorists.[14] Efforts by maritime forces to combat the conflicts generated by this disorder will be exacerbated by a third trend – seaward territorial expansion, with the majority of states now claiming 12 mile territorial seas and 200 mile exclusive economic zones. For weak states, unable or unwilling to police these waters effectively, this represents an increase in ungoverned spaces, in which criminals, pirates, and terrorists can take sanctuary, and where resources will be illegally exploited, and criminal activity increase.[15] This territorial expansion also means that coastal navies are becoming less coastal, particularly in areas where jurisdictions are disputed, such as the South China Sea.[16]

The fourth trend is that the increasingly crowded nature of the littorals will be ever more susceptible to large-scale environmental disasters, driven by climate change, rising sea levels, extreme weather conditions, and seismic events. The requirement for the west to assist in relieving the misery caused by these disasters will come from a combination of the sympathy of home populations, and the need for rich Western nations not to be seen to stand by and do nothing. Maritime forces will be the only forces likely to be quickly on scene, and have the lift, sustainability, and command and control facilities to be able to respond effectively.

Due to the trends outlined above, conflict and disorder in the littoral, both on land and at sea, is likely to remain endemic. At sea, disorder will result from the effects of conflict on land, and emerge in its own right at sea in the competition amongst states and non-state actors for scarce resources, and in the growing criminality and disorder caused by the combination of poorly governed spaces, the lure of profit, and economic desperation, inequality and poverty. In this complex littoral environment, Western maritime forces will need to conduct expeditionary operations to project power and support land forces operating in conflicts ashore, as well as their traditional task of defending the trade necessary for the global maritime system to function. The threat to trade is likely to come from hybrid threats such as state-sponsored terrorists, and from disorder such as piracy and crime, rather than a conventional state threat. Thus maritime forces will need to maintain good order at sea, or as it is now commonly called, conduct 'maritime security operations'. For Western maritime forces this will involve dealing with the hybrid/irregular threat, expanding constabulary and peacekeeping capabilities, and maintaining long-term forward

presence in areas of conflict. Like irregular conflict on land, the battlespace will be crowded and confusing. As Martin Murphy states, 'the conflicts [in the littoral] will be fought amongst confusing numbers of people, not all of whom will be engaged; the majority of participants, in fact, will be the partially engaged, the previously engaged, and unengaged'.[17]

Again, this is not to say that the conventional inter-state threat has disappeared, and the traditional view of navies acting as agents for defence of national rather than international values against threats remains amongst many nations. This is particularly strong in the Asia-Pacific region, where intense competition for power and influence, and assertive notions of statehood still drive navies to traditional roles of defence of sovereignty, access to marine resources, and protection of national interests.[18] Moreover, with the emergence of hybrid warfare detailed above, Western navies will be confronted by high-technology weaponry from both state and non-state actors, and thus will need high-technology defences.

It is therefore useful to briefly look at some of the trends in maritime defence technology. The first trend is that maritime platforms are becoming ever more expensive, with the unit cost of most types of military equipment rising by between 7 and 10 per cent per year.[19] This is leading to navies being able to afford ever fewer platforms. These platforms, although far more capable, and able to project more power further inland, can only be in one place at one time. Furthermore, the slow speed of the platform procurement cycle[20] means that weapon systems will enter service several years behind the politics and strategy in which their existence was conceived.[21] Thus unless they are designed with inherent flexibility and a multi-role capability they are in danger of being obsolescent even as they enter service.

This slow military procurement cycle contrasts with the much speedier development of civilian technology, to which non-state actors have ready access on the open market. Secure global communications and satellite surveillance are already available over the internet through email and the likes of Google Earth, and tactical communications are provided by the ubiquitous mobile phone. Moreover, civilian technology can be easily weaponised to great effect, as terrorist groups have shown with remote and human-activated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Western navies operating predominantly in the littoral will be increasingly vulnerable, as state and non-state actors will have growing access to both easily-weaponised civilian technology and abundant cheap military technology, proliferating around the world. More states and non-state actors will possess area denial weapons such as mines, anti-ship missiles, fast inshore attack craft, IEDs and coastal submarines.[22]

Western militaries have turned to information technology (IT) to try and give them the winning edge. The US concept of network-centred warfare and its UK derivative, network-enabled capability, is a system of systems approach that aims to improve shared situational awareness and speed up the sensor-to-shooter time lag in the future. However IT does not guarantee the relevance of the information within the networks, especially when conducting stability or nation-building tasks 'amongst the people'. Furthermore, reliance upon IT systems will make Western militaries more vulnerable to cyber attack from a hybrid opponent.

Maritime forces will still need technical innovation to maintain their edge over opponents, particularly as even non-state actors will have access to high-technology weaponry. However, as Geoffrey Till points out, technology must be subservient to strategy, and be a means to an end and not an end in itself.[23] Although necessary against peer competitors, high-technology

platforms with networked precision-guided weapons are an expensive unusable luxury when combating maritime criminality, terrorism and piracy. Enemies will not be static, and opponents will counter high-technology by either gaining their own high-technology weapons, or acting asymmetrically, using low-technology weapons under the awareness horizon of Western militaries. This was clearly demonstrated in the highly successful attack on the state-of-the-art USS COLE by two men in a rowing boat in 2000.

Having looked at the context in which future war will be fought, the competing theories on how it will develop, the trends apparent in the maritime environment, and the effect of technological progress, we must now examine in more detail the implications we have drawn for Western maritime forces. Although US and Western experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan will probably mean that these two conflicts mark the high tide of liberal interventionism, there will still be the requirement to conduct military operations in support of political objectives, whether they be protecting national interests, building indigenous capacity, restoring order, or providing humanitarian relief. Moreover, as Geoffrey Till points out, the limited liability offered by sea-based responses to events ashore may well be far more attractive to politicians than a large-scale commitment ashore.[24] For the UK as an island, the US as a 'continental island', and most of western Europe, it is safe to say that future conflicts, in which they will be involved, will be away from the home base. Thus operations will be expeditionary in nature, joint in their planning and execution, and reliant upon seapower in its traditional sense to transport the necessary forces and their equipment to where they need to go and support them whilst they are there.

For Western maritime forces, without a peer competitor to challenge the might of the US Navy, this is likely to mean a return to fighting 19th century-style small wars and 'policing the system', rather than concentrating on the fleet-on-fleet engagements of the 20th century's two hot and one cold war. Whilst the US Navy retains its substantial qualitative and quantative advantage over all other navies, the Corbettian view of projecting power from the sea will prevail over the Mahanian belief in achieving victory in a decisive battle. However, as noted earlier in this essay, the return of state-on-state conflict, pitting navy against navy, either in a conflict without US participation, or with a future peer competitor to the US Navy, cannot be ignored entirely.

Although it is a return to traditional roles and missions for Western maritime forces, there will be both much new and much enduring in how they achieve these missions. In supporting expeditionary operations, navies will need to ensure access to the shore for land forces, which will still involve gaining and maintaining sea control, and in particular by overcoming the anti-access threats such as mines, anti-ship missiles, swarms of fast inshore attack craft, IEDs, and coastal submarines from hybrid opponents in the littoral. In supporting forces ashore, a range of capabilities is likely to be required, ranging from sea-based close air support, tactical lift, medical facilities and logistics, to coastal and riverine patrols. All these missions will require medium-sized navies such as the Royal Navy to maintain a broadly balanced fleet, with the capability to defeat hybrid opponents, who will employ a mixture of high-technology conventional, and low-technology irregular weaponry and tactics.

In their role of preserving good order at sea in order to defend trade, promote security and stabilise conflict, maritime forces face a greater challenge. For this mission, intelligence will be the key. This will require a multi-national and multi-agency approach, sharing open systems to generate a common picture. Operating in the complex, crowded littoral described earlier in this essay, amongst a multitude of legal, semi-legal and criminal users of the sea, maritime

forces will need to truly understand what is happening around them, to be able to identify the enemy, whether combatant, pirate, insurgent, terrorist or criminal. This requirement, expressed as 'maritime domain awareness', will need systems that permanently monitor all civilian activity on the world's oceans in order to be able to pick out the abnormal from the normal. Moreover, in a 'war amongst the people', this information will need to be combined with human intelligence, involving sailors and marines foregoing some of their force protection and getting out in boats and on land to interact and gather information with the people they are protecting.[25]

Preserving good order at sea in this future littoral environment will, in more permissive environments, be primarily a law enforcement and constabulary task – a coastguard rather than a naval function. If warships are to conduct this role effectively, then there will be a significant training burden and a commensurate loss in war-fighting training. More effective will be developing co-operative relationships between the world's various maritime forces, agencies and commercial interests. This requirement is recognised in the US Sea Services[26] new Maritime Strategy of 2007 entitled 'A Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower',[27] as the 'Global Maritime Partnership initiative'. Interoperable systems, a habit of working together, cultural awareness and linguistic skills will be vital to building these relationships.

Finally, the information battle to shape global perceptions will restrict the utility of 'kinetic' force and mean an emphasis on soft power for maritime forces, in particular naval diplomacy and the constabulary and benign application of seapower. This will involve a forward-deployed maritime presence acting as 'bobby on the beat' – showing interest in a region, building up a picture, and assisting the development of a sense of international community through active coalition-building.[28] By being forward-deployed and having operated with local forces, maritime forces will be able to respond swiftly and effectively to both emerging conflicts and humanitarian crises, with the associated beneficial effect on world opinion.

Having examined the implications of the missions that Western maritime forces are likely to undertake, it is now necessary to briefly look at some of the key procurement and training implications. Western maritime forces will need to operate forward-deployed in the littoral environment, and there will be a shift towards coastguard and constabulary functions, whilst still maintaining the war-fighting capability necessary to deal with hybrid opponents and state-centric threats. However, the cost of platforms able to operate in the high-end war-fighting environment means that they will be too expensive to risk in low-intensity tasks and unaffordable in sufficient numbers to generate the presence required for the people-centric constabulary operations that will form the majority of their tasking. Moreover, by using high-technology platforms in this role, their expensive capabilities will fade through lack of training and exercises. A more cost-effective solution for maritime forces will be to procure a greater number of cheaper, quicker-to-build, less complex platforms, manned and operated by either a coastguard or navy, for constabulary missions[29] to complement the fewer highly expensive high-technology platforms optimised for high-intensity war-fighting.

Other implications for maritime forces will be that ships will be required to remain on station for much longer to maintain the forward presence necessary for continuity and understanding the complex operating environment. This will require novel manpower solutions such as crew rotation or swapping, and an emphasis on technology which requires little maintenance. The need for interoperability with many different partners means that platforms will need the open architecture necessary to take several different sensor feeds. Furthermore, there will also be a

requirement for more linguists, human intelligence specialists, and regional culture experts to prevail in the 'wars among the people' and hybrid conflicts in which maritime forces will be involved.

Thus, to conclude, there are many perils in attempting to predict the nature of future conflict, but we must do so in order to guide policy, drive procurement and develop strategy, so that our forces are broadly configured to deal with the most likely future conflicts. These conflicts will be shaped by the latest phase of globalisation, which has bound states together economically, increasing their interdependence, and reducing the likelihood of major inter-state war. At the same time, the failure of the global system to reduce inequality and poverty, the rise in the number and power of non-state actors, and the corresponding marginalisation of weaker states has made intra-state conflict far more likely. The global economic system itself relies upon maritime trade, and the sensitivity of this trading system means that local disturbances can produce global economic effects. Thus maritime forces will retain their strategic role of protecting the flow of trade necessary for the global economy to function.

There are several models for the nature of future conflict, but Hoffman's hybrid war theory, encompassing many of the pertinent factors of several other schools of thought, is the most inclusive and useful. Using this model, we can see that future conflicts in the maritime environment will be as complex as in the land environment. Maritime forces will need to operate in the crowded littoral, where both lawful users of the sea and hybrid opponents operate amongst the crime and disorder thriving in poorly-governed spaces. Moreover it is in the littoral that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely in the form of more frequent large-scale environmental disasters. Conflicts will be fought under the spotlight of 24hr news media and internet coverage, where all parties will be trying to ensure their own narrative of events prevails in order to influence world-wide perceptions. Technological development will continue to play an important role, but military technology is likely to lag behind civilian technology. Opponents will be both quick to make use of technological developments and use tactics that negate any advantage from Western technology. Thus to maintain their effectiveness, Western navies will need to ensure that their utilisation of technology is subservient to strategy.

Western maritime forces, in a return to 19th century-style operations, will be required to support expeditionary operations by projecting power and supporting forces ashore, and to preserve good order at sea for local and international sea-users. At the same time, they will need to maintain their high-end war-fighting capabilities, both to cope with the high-technology threats posed by hybrid opponents, and as a guarantee against the return of inter-state warfare. In conducting their missions, maritime forces will face challenges, particularly in orientating themselves to preserving good order at sea in a people-centric environment. Maritime domain awareness will be essential to this mission, and will involve a significant shift in intelligence collection from technical to human means and from military to civilian sources and targets. Moreover, long-term co-operative partnerships with regional maritime forces and agencies will need to be developed to share information and generate common understanding.

The increasing cost and complexity of high-technology war-fighting platforms combined with the shift towards conducting constabulary operations will lead to a crisis in costs and numbers of platforms. One solution is a procurement policy of a 'high-low' mix of a small number of expensive but extremely capable platforms, combined with a large quantity of cheaper, simpler platforms

optimised for constabulary operations. Maritime forces will also need to adjust their training and manning policies in order that their platforms can effectively conduct forward-deployed presence operations in environments where empathy with the people is essential.

Endnotes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 88-9.
2. Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington: Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, 2007.
3. Colin Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, London: Phoenix 2006, 46-7.
4. This is demonstrated in the relationship between China and the US. China depends on the US export market to generate jobs for its workers, while the US relies on China to buy up its public debt.
5. Jonathan Band, 'UK Maritime Power – The Future Navy', *The Naval Review* 94, no3 (2006): 207.
6. ibid.
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8. ibid.
9. Lind et al, 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,' *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct 1989, 22-6.
10. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force The Art of War in the Modern World*, London: Penguin, 2006, 269.
11. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century*, 28.
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13. Martin Murphy, 'Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Suitable Role for a Navy?', *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 3 (2007): 32.
14. ibid, 34.
15. ibid, 33.
16. Geoffrey Till, 'The Royal Navy in a New World: 1990-2020,' in *Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, ed P P O'Brien, London: Routledge:2001, 221.
17. Murphy, *Suppression of Piracy*, 35.
18. Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass, 2004, 356.
19. ibid, 147.
20. The time taken from first conception to entering service for warships is often as long as twenty years. The UK future aircraft carrier is a good example.
21. Due to the length of this process, the UK has developed the Urgent Operational Requirements process, which avoids the standard bureaucratic procurement cycle, to speed the delivery of new equipment into operational theatres. However, this speedier process is unlikely to be suitable for large complex platforms such as warships or aircraft.
22. Till, *The Royal Navy in a New World*, 222.
23. Till, *Seapower*, 378.
24. Geoffrey Till, 'New Directions in Maritime Strategy? Implications for the US Navy,' *Naval War College Review* 60, no 4 (2007): 32.
25. Murphy, *Suppression of Piracy*, 42.
26. US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.
27. Thad Allen, James Conway, Gary Roughead, 'A Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,' *United States Naval Institute*. Proceedings 133, no 11, 14-21.
28. Till, *New Directions*, 36.
29. The US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship, procured quickly at half the cost of the next generation US Naval destroyer is a good example of this type of platform.

Behind Armour Effects of Explosively Formed Projectiles

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Introduction

In this chapter mechanism of EFPs and the threat they pose to armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) is outlined and the use of spall liners is discussed. Developments in the science and technology of spall liners are reviewed.

The EFP Threat

Explosively formed projectile (EFP) warheads (also known as self forging fragments), commonly found in conventional anti-tank weapons, are regularly being used with devastating effect by insurgent forces against allied troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The energy of these warheads is significantly greater than that of small to large calibre ammunition, such that against AFVs a threat is posed to the occupants both by the perforation of the armour itself and the behind armour effect (BAE). Upon impact, behind armour debris (BAD) or spall is generated and projected from all but the thickest or complex armours, even in the absence of armour perforation.

For armoured vehicles encountering high energy threats, such as EFPs, shape charge (SC), long rod penetrators (LRPs) and to some degree small arms ammunition (SAA), high hardness metallic armour makes them susceptible to behind armour spalling when attacked. Whilst the main threat may possibly be defeated and kept out of the vehicle, BAD poses a serious threat to the integrity of internal systems, stored munitions and the human occupants.

EFPs

Mechanism

As the name implies, an EFP is a projectile that is formed and projected through the application of explosives. EFP warheads are non-complicated devices, consisting simply of a casing, a quantity of explosives and a dished concave liner.

Figure 1: EFP Warhead and Slug Formation (Davies, 2007a)

Explosives

Casing

50   100   150   200   250   300   350 μs

Dished Liner ⟶ Time after Detonation ⟶

It is this dished liner that distinguishes EFPs from shape charge, which has a conical liner which produces a jet rather than a slug. When detonated, the explosive shock wave turns the liner into a super-plastic, turning it side out, driving it forward apex first until the entire disc has folded in on itself to form a slug (see Figure 1). It is estimated that 15-20% of the energy of the explosive is imparted into the slug as kinetic energy, generating typical slug velocities in the region of 2,000 to 3,000 m/s. The slug will then remain stable in flight for a distance in excess of 1 km.

Velocity will determine the final slug geometry, which in turn will influence the effect on target as discussed below. A fast slug will be long and thin, providing greater penetration than that of a slower and so fatter slug. If slug velocities are sufficient, the stretching effect may be sufficient to cause the slug to break up, possibly resulting in multiple impacts upon the target.

Penetration Mechanism

As slug velocities are in excess of 1,150 m/s, impact with a target results in hydrodynamic penetration. Where velocities drop below this threshold velocity, penetration via a combination of plastic flow and plugging will dominate.

Hydrodynamic penetration is well publicised, also being associated with shape charge, but is not entirely understood. The mechanism can be described as the target material 'flowing', like a fluid, out of the way of the projectile as a result of the extreme pressures (way in excess of the target's yield strength) exerted at the projectile/target interface. However, confusion exists as it is known that the flowing material is not a fluid at all, but a super-plastic like solid. Depth of penetration can be estimated by rearranging Bernoulli's equation for incompressible flow into the form given in Equation 1. This equation demonstrates that penetration is a function of both projectile length (ie slug length) and the ratio of the projectile and target's densities. During this interaction, both target and slug materials are eroded to varying degrees.

Equation 1

$$P = \lambda L \sqrt{\frac{\rho_j}{\rho_t}}$$

Where:
P = Penetration Depth   λ = Efficiency factor
L = Slug length ρ_j = density of slug material
ρ_t = density of target material

Slug velocity may be approximated by using Gurney's equation for an open sandwich (Equation 2) (Davies, 2007b). The mass of explosive assumed to be effective is taken as that contained within a cone of angle 60% and base equal to the diameter of the liner.

Equation 2

$$V = \sqrt{2E}\left[\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{4M}{C}+1\right)\left(\frac{M}{C}+1\right)\right]^{-\frac{1}{2}}$$

Where:

$\sqrt{2E}$ = Gurney constant (= Detonation velocity/2. 97)

M = Mass of EFP liner = $\frac{1}{4}\rho_{lin}t\pi cd^2$

C = Mass of explosives = $\left[\frac{1}{12}\rho_{exp}\pi cd^2\right] \times \left[\frac{1}{2}cd\sin 60\right]$

t = liner thickness   cd = Cone diameter
ρ_{lin} = Density of liner ρ_{exp} = Density of explosives

Below slug velocities of 1,150 m/s penetration will occur via combination plastic flow and plugging deformation. This can be approximated using Equation 3.

Equation 3

$$\frac{mv^2}{d^3} = k\left[\frac{t}{d}\right]^n$$

Where:

1<n<2   m = mass of slug
v = slug velocity   t = depth of penetration
d = slug diameter   k = constant for particular target material

Performance

Performance of EFP warheads is generally measured as a function of target penetration and is normally measured as a fraction of the EFP's cone diameter (CD). However, if the depth of penetration exceeds target thickness (ie perforation occurs) the target is said to be overmatched.

Equation 4

Depth of Penetration (CD) = Depth of Penetration
                                  CD

Equation 5

Overmatch = Depth of Penetration
                  Thickness of Target

Conventional weapon warheads achieve greatest penetration with up to 2 cone diameters, whilst improvised devices attain as low as 0. 6 cone diameters. This disparity in performance results from differences in warhead design and explosive composition parameters. A number of the most sensitive and influential parameters are discussed below.

Liner material, metallurgy and thickness: These properties influence the final slug geometry and its depth of penetration. For any given cone diameter, an optimum liner thickness will exist (typically 2-4% CD). A chemical interaction between target and liner is undertaken during penetration and it has been found that some materials provide greater effect against particular materials; for example aluminium against concrete and copper against steel.

Liner cone angle: This feature distinguishes EFPs from shape charge, with angles greater than 140 degrees and being dished in appearance (see Figure 2). Below this angle the liner will tend towards the conical liner of a shape charge, from which a jet will be formed.

Figure 2: EFP Design

Head height: This dimension (see Figure 2) influences the strength and nature of the explosive shockwave acting upon the liner. Greater head height will achieve intensification of the shockwave, through complex reflections within the casing, and provide a more desirable, planar wave to impinge on the liner. This will result in a fast and well formed slug. Too little head height on the other hand will result in a weaker and more hemispherical shockwave reaching the liner. This will result in a slower and less well formed slug. Axial detonation of the charge has been assumed.

Explosive filling: Explosives with the highest velocities of detonation and detonation pressures will impart maximum energy into the liner. However, the nature of the filling is of equal importance. To achieve the most effective filling, good intimacy of the liner and explosive must exist, whilst the explosive must be homogeneous and densely packed. Maximising the filling and power of explosive will result in a slug with high velocity and high length to diameter (L/D) ratio (i. e. the stretching) of the slug. Considering Equation 1 once more, it can be seen that the length of the projectile is proportional to the depth of penetration. In practice, beyond L/D=1. 5 a diminishing return is found. As discussed above, slug break-up may also occur with slugs of higher velocities and greater L/D ratios.

Symmetry: Asymmetry within the warhead fill, liner or incident shockwave will generate asymmetry and yaw in the slug, possibly even bifurcation. Ultimately, asymmetry leads to dramatically reduced penetration performance.

Spall

Spall is the term given to the BAD particulate and fragmentation projected from the rear surface of a solid material following frontal face impact, under a given set of conditions. Grady (1987a) describes this process as 'rupture within a body due to stress state in excess of the tensile strength of the material'. This type failure may be further described as brittle fracture and is characterised by the fracture toughness of the armour material. The mass, velocity and emission or cone angle (total angle about central axis) of spall fragments, for a given EFP strike, will vary. As target overmatch is increased the number, mass, velocity and lethality of BAD is increased. Figure 3 illustrates typical BAD fragment trajectories (illustrative purpose only).

Figure 3: Typical BAD Fragment Trajectories (Yossifon and Yarin, 2002)

Fragments can be characterised by the mode in which they were formed, being referred to as erosion or ring fragmentation. Erosion fragments comprise target material punched out and/or entangled with the projectile and fragments of the projectile itself. Ring fragmentation originates from the target material and is projected through dynamic failure following transmission of a shock wave and resulting tensile wave through the target. Characteristically, large numbers of small erosion fragments, weighing milligrams and travelling between 1000 m/s and the residual velocity of the projectile form one extreme of the spall spectrum, whilst fewer large ring fragments, weighing into grams and tens of grams travelling at a few hundred m/s form the other. Whilst a proportion of fragments will be of negligible mass and are therefore likely to be relatively benign, an innumerable quantity will possess significant kinetic energy and surpass human lethal energy density thresholds.

Spall Liners

To arrest or at least mitigate the effect of spall and increase crew survivability, spall liners are regularly employed in AFVs.

Response Mechanisms

Extensive evidence exists demonstrating that their use significantly reduces BAD by reducing the number of spall fragments and their projected cone angle entering a crew compartment. There are five mechanisms (W Arnold & E Rottenkolber, 2006) by which liners operate and can be described as:

- Retardation: Decelerating the target's rear surface and onwards transmission of the compressive shock wave such that tensile stresses within the armour are reduced. Dependent on high impedance and high density liner materials. Note: this mechanism is only applicable for liners in contact with armour.

- Retraction: Catching of fragments by deformable liners. Benefits from high tensile strength and large failure strains

- Substitution: Replacing target material by liner material. Increased effect with increased liner thickness

- Contraction: Reducing and focusing of fragments due to narrow craters within the liner. Increased effect with low density liners with low sound wave velocities

- Dissipation: Transforming of mechanical energy into heat energy. Benefits from large failure strains.

These mechanisms rarely act in isolation, but as the desirable material properties for each conflict for a given liner, one or a number of mechanisms will prevail.

Materials

Traditionally, S-glass or aramid (Kevlar, Twaron) fibre reinforced composites have been used as spall liner. However, other newer materials are becoming increasingly common; for example ultra high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE) (Dyneema, Spectra) and PBO (Zylon) based products. Ultra high molecular weight polypropylene (UHMWPP) (Tegris) may also be of interest. A brief summary of a number of these is presented below.

S2: S2 refers to a military grade of glass fibre, similar to commercial grade E-Glass. This fibre, woven to form glass-fibre-reinforced plastic composites, is possibly the most well established spall liner material of the three investigated. Unlike the other two materials, fibres are wetted by and suspended in a phenolic resin matrix in order to provide rigidity. As fibres possess high axial tensile strength but the matrix is relatively weak, if omni-directional strength is desired fibres are woven or plies of aligned fibres layered in alternating orientations (normally 0° and 90°, and occasionally 45°). The volume ratio, or volume fraction, of fibres to resin determines and the orientation of the fibres together with the size of yarn will ultimately determine the stiffness and strength within a given direction. Structural components, requiring strength and stiffness, will typically have a lower volume fraction than that of ballistic components, requiring maximum strength and minimal stiffness. Ballistic glass-fibre-reinforced fabrics are therefore referred to as being made 'dry' to allow for greater impact energy absorption. Typically volume fractions for woven ballistic S2 fabrics are in the order of 0. 64.

Aramid: Aramids or aromatic polyamides are possibly the most famous of materials used in ballistic applications. This class of fibre includes Kevlar and Twaron, trade names for virtually identical materials, manufactured by Dupont, USA and Akzo, Holland. Fibres are manufactured by extrusion spinning of an acid solution of a liquid crystalline polymer. This process produces fibres of highly orientated (axially) and highly ordered semi amorphous, semi crystalline molecules. Peptide bonds (CO-NH) and alternating hydrocarbon/amide positions thus result in an extremely high tensile strength. Fibres can be formed into sheets of yarns; the latter may then be woven. These fibres possess a range of properties desirable in a spall liner, including: high tensile strength, high fibre toughness, resistant to impact and abrasion, heat resistant to 500°C and low flammability. They are however, sensitive to UV light, acids and salts.

Figure 5: Aramid Fibre (Kevlar) (DuPont, 2008)

Dyneema®: Dyneema® is a UHMWPE thermoplastic fibre. Fibres are available as yarn or sheets of alternating unidirectional fibres consolidated under heat and pressure. Product applications range from rope and medical implants to ballistic armour. DSM, Heerlen, Netherlands, manufacturers of Dyneema®, claim that 'it is up to 15 times stronger than quality steel and up to 40% stronger than aramid fibres, both on weight for weight basis'. (DSM, 2008a)

The patented manufacturing process of 'Gel Spinning' forms fibres of long chains of highly aligned polyethylene monomers, of lengths several magnitudes greater than normal high density polyethylene. These allow high strain to failure, the long polymer chains transferring

load along their length. Fibres are self lubricating allowing neighbouring fibres to slip past one another uninhibited under strain. UHMWPEs are attractive for use as spall liners as they are non-hydroscopic, highly resistant to corrosive chemicals and abrasion. They are however difficult to bond to other materials and reasonably flammable. To mitigate the latter, a sheet of S2, a few mm thick, is bonded to external surfaces as a protective layer.

Figure 6: Dyneema® Yarn (DSM, 2008b) and Liner (SPC, 2008)

Tegris™: Tegris™ is a self-reinforced UHMWPP thermoplastic manufactured by Milliken & Company, Spartenburg, Belgium. Suitable for light weight, high stiffness applications, sheets are formed by consolidating sheets of Tegris™ fabric under heat and pressure. Fabric consists of woven Tegris™ tape like yarns, each with a thermally stable core and low-melt outer sheath. As with UHMWPE fibres, UHMWPP fibres possess long chains of highly aligned monomers, of lengths greater than normal high density polypropylene. These allow high strain to failure, the long polymer chains transferring load along their length. UHMWPPs are attractive for use as spall liners as they are non toxic, non-hydroscopic, resistant to corrosive chemicals, easily bonded to other materials, but chiefly because of their low production cost.

Figure 7: Tegris™ Fabric & Formed (Milliken, 2005)

Mechanical Properties

Materials employed as spall liners are typically of relatively low densities, high tensile strengths, high modulus and offer large strains to failure; high values of course indicating the material's ability to absorb high energies. For good ballistic performance, however, it has been identified (Jacobs and Van Dingenen, 2001) that fibres must have a high sonic velocity. Essentially, the higher the sonic velocity, the faster the reaction and more efficient loading of the fibres and thus greater distribution of impact energies.

Figure 8: Primary Ballistic Figures of Merit for Various Fibres (Jacobs and Van Dingenen, 2001)

Liner Configuration

Traditionally, spall liners have tended to be mounted directly in contact with the rear face of the armour. This provides a compact design, leaving internal compartments to be maximised or allowing for thicker liners. Evidence exists, however, to suggest liners stood off from the rear face of the armour provide increased liner performance (reduced number fragments and cone angle) against shape charge. Indeed examples of 'detached' liner exist, the US Ml13A3 for example. In spite of this, a dearth of information exists on the performance of 'detached' liners against EFPs. Whilst it may be considered logical that the same benefits could be gained in mitigating spall from EFPs, a dearth of evidence exists to support this rationale. Furthermore, investigation by Arnold and Rottenkolber (2006) even intimates that a liner giving superior performance against shape charge may provide inferior performance against EFPs.

Project Aim and Objective

This project aims to explore the BAE of EFPs and to investigate the effects of spall liner materials and geometry in order to determine simple design rules for such systems. More specifically, the BAD mitigation performance provided by spall liners of different materials and in varying configurations is to be studied. Influential parameters affecting performance are to be identified. BAE will also be compared and contrasted against those of shape charge. Suggestions made by Arnold and Rottenkolber (2006) are, however, not to be investigated. The following objectives were set in order to achieve the project aim:

- Identify an EFP warhead with sufficient target overmatch to generate spall reliably and repeatably;

- Undertake a number of firings to identify BAD from basic target set (rolled homogeneous armour, RHA only) in order to provide baseline;

- Complete a series of EFP firings into target sets (RHA/spall liner) in varying configurations (stand off of the liner from rear of RHA);

- Undertake a number of shape charge firings into basic and lined target sets;

- From the completed firings, distinguish between perforated and partially penetrated target sets. Analyse witness packs as necessary.

- Determine the behaviour and physical mechanisms of a number of spall liners upon receiving spall.

- From witness pack analysis, evaluate the area of effect of spall fragmentation for each target set and examine the effect of varying spall liner stand off from rear of RHA target.

The Experiments

Details of the experimental firings and the conditions under which they were undertaken are contained within this chapter.

Target Set

Each target set consisted of a sheet of RHA, a spall liner and a witness pack to capture any spall projected through the spall liner. Plates of RHA to the specification below were used. The choices of steel grade and to an extent the plate thickness were dictated through material availability. The plate thickness did, however, ensure warhead/target overmatch when using either the 32mm or 50mm diameter EFP warheads available. It also provides realistic and reliable simulation of spall from armour plate. Where possible, plates were re-used to conserve target material. A summary of the ballistic properties is given below in Table 1.

Table 1: RHA Ballistic (AML UK, 2008)

Dimensions (length x breadth x thickness):	300 x 300 x 12 mm
Hardness (Brinell):	450 – 530
Ballistic protection:	EN1063 – BR6*
Yield Strength (MPa)	1,250
Tensile Strength (GPa)	1,600
Strain to Failure (%)	8

*Level BR6 = 7. 62cal FMJ 9. 5g ball soft core @ 830±10 m/s, 3 strikes per panel.

Three types of conventional spall liner material were available for this trial. These were Dyneema®, S2 Glass and Tegris™. Each sample was of equivalent 25 kg/m^2 areal density. Where possible, samples were re-used to conserve target material. A summary of material properties can be found in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Summary of Liner Material (Jacobs and Van Dingenen, 2001 & Milliken, 2005b)

Liner Material	Dyneema®		S2		Tegris™	
Property	Fibre	Fabric	Fibre	Fabric	Yarn	Fabric (Warp/Fill)
Density						
(g/cm³)	≈0. 97	-	2. 48	-	-	0. 78
Tensile Strength (MPa)	2. 8-4	-	4	-	-	0. 2
Tensile Modulus (GPa)	90-140	-	86. 9	-	-	5-6
Strain to Failure						
(%)	3. 7	-	4. 6	<1	-	6
Velocity of Sound (m/s)	9,600-12,000	-	5,900	-	-	2,500-2,700

Due to the risk of fire, straw board witness packs could not be used within the containment building. An alternative NATO standard witness pack was therefore used, as detailed in AWE FTN 103/89, Corbett & Martin (1998) and Verolme, Szymczak and Broos (1999). The construction of these packs is illustrated in Figure 9 and detailed in Table 3. This design specification has been calibrated to allow the kill probability of individual spall fragments to be determined. Calibration is based on Kineke analysis, relating kill probability to mass and velocity (See Equation 6).

Equation 6

$$P_K = 0.1609 \log_{10}(mV^3) - 0.4155$$

Figure 9: Witness Pack Construction

1m POLYSTYRENE

1mm ALUMINIUM

3 x1mm ALUMINIUM

1.5mm MILD STEEL

Table 3: Witness Pack Construction

Layer	Material	Thickness	Specification	Cumulative Areal Density	Kill Probability
1	Aluminium	1mm	BS1470 (1972)Grade 1200114 Thickness Tolerance ±2%	2. 7	0. 092
2	Aluminium	1mm		5. 4	0. 224
3	Aluminium	3 x 1mm (3 layers in contact)		13. 5	0. 349
4	Steel	1. 5mm	BS 4360 (1979) Grade 43A Thickness Tolerance ±2%	25. 2	0. 425
5	Steel	1. 5mm		36. 9	0. 488
6	Steel	1. 5mm		48. 6	0. 459
7	Steel	1. 5mm		60. 3	0. 59
-	Each layer separated by 25mm thick polystyrene to BS 3837 (1977 Grade SDN or SDA)				

Warheads

Small 33mm diameter experimental shape charge warheads were also available in order to provide a comparison/contrast in the BAE of the EFP firings. Firings were conducted to identify a BAE reference and observe behaviour of two of the spall liner materials.

Two EFP warheads were considered, a 32mm diameter 'workshop made' EFP and an army issue 50mm diameter EFP (codename BALDRICK). These could be filled with either the liquid explosive nitro-methane or hand packed with PE4.

Table 4: NM & PE4 Explosive Properties

Explosive/Property	Nitro-Methane	PE4
Chemical Formula	CH_3NO_2	88% RDX – $C_3H_6N_6O_6$ 12% Plasticiser: 80% liquid Paraffin 20% Lithium Sterate <1% Pentaerthritol Diolate
Sensitiser	Diethylene triamine 5% Vol	N/A
Density (g/cm³)	1. 1385	1. 55
VoD (m/s)	≈6,400	≈8,400
Mass Used Per firing	150 ml	150 grams

To select a warhead with suitable performance, in terms of target overmatch, provisional test firings were carried out into a steel plate stack (10 plates, each 70mm x 70mm x 25mm). To allow fair comparison of results it was desirable to select a warhead which produced repeatable EFP slug formation and thus consistent effects on the RHA target plate. To assess target effect, firings into RHA targets with witness packs behind were undertaken with the warhead achieving greatest penetration into the steel stack. The warhead and filling providing the greatest penetration in the steel stack and most consistent target effect would therefore be carried forward into the remaining firings. The RHA targets from this initial assessment would form a BAE reference for a RHA target without a spall liner present.

32mm Dia EFP

Workshop facilities were available to manufacture a copper cone of maximum diameter of 32mm by 2mm thick. Assuming, at worst, a maximum depth of penetration of only one CD this would prove to be acceptable and overmatch the 12mm RHA target plate. Previous student projects had proved that a head height provided by a length of approximately 200mm offered good warhead performance when filled with nitro-methane. The designed warhead was of a similar head height. Figure 10 illustrates the assembled design.

Figure 10: 32mm 'Home Made' EFP Warhead

50mm Dia EFP 'BALDRICK'

The 50mm diameter BALDRICK (Injector EOD L5A1, NSN: 1385-99-876-0068) offered a larger and more precisely machined warhead. A larger internal diameter facilitated easier and a more homogenous packing with PE4 than that offered by the 32mm diameter warhead. More reliable and repeatable performance was therefore anticipated from this store than that expected from PE4 packed 32mm diameter warheads.

Figure 11: Sectional View of BALDRICK

During the provisional tests, BALDRICK hand filled with PE4 gave greatest penetration of the steel stack and provided consistent target effect. This warhead and filling combination would therefore be carried forward into the remaining firings.

Instrumentation

Timing Equipment

A Gould Timer Counter TC314 and 'break and make' foils were used to record the velocity of the leading EFP slug over a known distance prior to striking the target set. Foils were made using two pieces of kitchen tin foil and separated from one another by a piece of office paper. For each instrumented firing, two foils, one to start and one to stop the counter, were located in slots in a piece of drain pipe 200mm apart. The drain pipe was then positioned in the path of the warhead.

*Figure 12: Velocity Timer Counter & 'Break and Make' Foils*

High Speed Video

Video footage of firing events was captured using a Phantom 640 high speed (20,000 frames per second) camera. Line of sight to the target set was achieved via a mirror in order to preserve the recording equipment. To provide additional lighting on to the target set two flash boxes were used, triggered via a parasitic feed off the Shrike and firing cable.

Experimental Set-Up

A robust metal frame work was used to suitably position the warhead, target set and witness pack, as illustrated in Figure 13 below. Standoff of the spall liners from the rear of the RHA was provided by polystyrene sheeting. Standoff from the target set was maintained at approximately 12 cone diameters for the EFP warheads and approximately 2 cone diameters for the shape charge warheads. Due to the risk posed by fragmentation, all firings were undertaken within the containment building.

Figure 13: Firing Set-up

Warhead

Polystyrene Block

'Break and Make' Foils
(200mm Apart)

Drain Pipe (300mm Long)

Polystyrene Block

Metal Frame

Target Set
(RHA/
Polystyrene Spacer/
Liner)

Witness Pack

Wooden Support
Struts

Firing Sequence

Table 5: Summary Of Firing Sequence Completed

Firing Sequence Detail					
Serial	Store	Explosive Fill	Liner	Armour/liner Offset (mm)	Instrumentation
1	32mm EFP	Nitro-Methane	Steel Stack	-	None
2	32mm EFP	PE4	Steel Stack	-	None
3	BALDRICK	Nitro-Methane	Steel Stack	-	None
4	BALDRICK	PE4	Steel Stack	-	None
5	BALDRICK	PE4	N/A	N/A	Video
6	BALDRICK	PE4	N/A	N/A	None
7	BALDRICK	PE4	N/A	N/A	None
8	BALDRICK	PE4	Dyneema	0	None
9	BALDRICK	PE4	S2	0	None
10	BALDRICK	PE4	Tegris	0	None
11	BALDRICK	PE4	Dyneema	50	Video
12	BALDRICK	PE4	S2	50	None
13	BALDRICK	PE4	Tegris	50	None
14	BALDRICK	PE4	Dyneema	25	None
15	BALDRICK	PE4	S2	25	Velocity
16	BALDRICK	PE4	Tegris	25	Velocity
17	BALDRICK	PE4	Dyneema	16	Velocity
18	BALDRICK	PE4	S2	16	Velocity
19	BALDRICK	PE4	Tegris	16	None
20	BALDRICK	PE4	Tegris	37	Video
21	M42	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
22	M42	N/A	S2	0	None
23	M42	N/A	Tegris	0	None

Results

Results are presented within this chapter in graphical form. Where deemed appropriate, photographs have also been included.

Witness Pack Analysis

Upon perforation of the target set, marked witness packs were removed for analysis. Each sheet of each individual witness pack was examined for perforation marks. For convenience, concentric circles (of diameter D^x) were marked at 50mm intervals about the original axis of the warhead. Perforation marks within each interval were recorded. Each interval could then be related to the cone angle of emission from the rear of the target set by simple trigonometry. The height of target set above witness pack was 0.35 metres; the thickness of the witness pack was ignored.

Equation 7

$$\frac{1}{2} Cone\ Angle = \frac{1}{2}\sin^{-1}\frac{0.35}{D_x}$$

With each sheet of the witness pack equating to a kill probability, it was anticipated that it would be possible to determine the energies of the individual spall fragments through analysis. This should be possible as the kill probability is a function of fragment mass and velocity (see Equation 7). Establishing individual fragment energies would then be of benefit to assess their lethality against the occupants of a vehicle with varying degrees of personal protection (i.e. body armour). The means by which the known kill probabilities can be equated to particular fragment energies is, however, unknown. As such, detailed evaluation of the effect of spall fragments on vehicle occupants has not been made.

Ideally, a mean area of effect should be calculated to assess the lethality of spall fragmentation over a distance within the vehicle. As only single firings were undertaken for each target set configuration, this assessment can not be made. A comparison of the relative lethality of the spall generated and captured in the witness packs can, however, be made. This can be achieved by calculating the difference in the number of perforations between two adjacent witness pack sheets to obtain the number of fragments arrested by each sheet for a given sample area or emission angle and then multiplying this by the respective kill probability (of the perforated sheet). Summing the relative lethalities for each sample area then allows plots of cumulative lethality against emission angle to be made. High lethality and larger affected areas will be marked by peaks at increased emission angles, which are of course undesirable.

Equation 8

$$Lethality\ = \sum\left[KP\times\left(x_n - x_{n+1}\right)\right]_{n_{1-8}}$$

Where:
KP = Kill Probability
X_n = Sheet number

Provisional Warhead Testing

The following table and photographs illustrate penetration of the different warhead and filling combinations into a stack of steel plates, each 25mm thick.

Table 6: Summary of Steel Stack Penetration Trial

Warhead Filling Combination	Depth of Penetration (mm)	Penetration (Cone Diameters)	Overmatch of 12mm Thick Armour
32mm Dia + Nitromethane	15	0.5	1.25
32mm Dia + PE4	15	0.5	1.25
50mm Dia + Nitromethane	32	0.64	2.67
50mm Dia + PE4	74	1.48	6.17

*Figure 14: Steel Stack Penetration by 32mm Dia Warhead Filled With Nitromethane*

*Figure 15: Steel Stack Penetration by 32mm Dia Warhead Hand Filled With PE4*

Figure 16: Steel Stack Penetration by 50mm Dia Warhead Filled With Nitromethane

Figure 17: Steel Stack Penetration by 50mm Dia Warhead Hand Filled With PE4

EFP Firings Against Target Sets

Table 7 summaries the effect of EFP firings against target sets. Analysis of the marked witness packs from these and the reference firings (V1, F13 and F14) are detailed below.

Table 7: Summary of Target Effect

Firing Ref	Liner	Armour/liner Offset (mm)	Perforation of Spall Liner	Slug Speed (m/s)	Multiply Penetration Hole
F4	Tegris	0	Yes	-	No
F5	S2	0	Yes	-	No
F6	Dyneema	0	Yes	-	No
F7	Tegris	50	None	-	No
F8	S2	50	None	3,448	No
F9	Dyneema	50	None	3,390	Minor*
F10	Tegris	25	Yes	3,279	Minor*
F11	S2	25	None	3,509	Major^
F12	Dyneema	25	None	-	Major^
V1				-	No
F13				-	No
F14	Reference Firings			-	No
F15	Tegris	16	Yes	-	No
F16	S2	16	None	-	No
VF17	Dyneema	16	None	-	Major^
VF18	Tegris	37	Yes	-	No

* Minor: two separate but adjoined holes within the RHA.

^ Major: two quite separate holes or major impact regions in the RHA.

Using the Gurney equation (Equation 2), predicted EFP velocities were calculated for a 60 degree effective charge cone and a completely effective charge.

Table 8 Calculated Gurney Velocity

Explosive	Effective Charge	Cone Mass (M) (grams)	Mass of Explosive (C) (grams)	M/C Ratio	Gurney Velocity (m/s)
PE4	60° Cone	18	21	0.86	1,780
PE4	Complete Charge	18	150	0.117	3,823
NM*	60° Cone	18	16	0.88	1,462
NM*	Complete Charge	18	150	0.117	1,538

*Gurney constant for nitromethane assumed to be 2,154 m/s.

Figure 18: Spall Vs Spall Emission Angle – Reference Firings

Plot of spall fragment number against spall fragment emission angle measured as half of the cone angle.

Figure 19: Lethality Vs Emission Angle

Plot of cumulative lethality against emission angle. Lethality expressed as a function of fragment number multiplied by kill probability of individual fragments. High lethality and larger affected areas will be marked by peaks at increased emission angles.

Lethality Vs Emission Angle
EFP Vs Armour - Reference Firings

Figure 20: Spall Vs Spall Emission Angle – EFP Vs Armour & Spall Liners in Contact with RHA

Plot of fragment number against spall fragment emission angle measured as half of the cone angle. Plot for liners in direct contact with RHA.

Figure 21: Spall Vs Spall Emission Angle – EFP Vs Armour & Tegris Spall Liners

Plot of cumulative lethality against emission angle. Lethality expressed as a function of fragment number multiplied by kill probability of individual fragments. Plot for liners in direct contact with RHA. High lethality and larger affected areas will be marked by peaks at increased emission angles.

**Spall Emission Angle
(Witness Pack Sheet 1)
EFP Vs Armour/ Tegris Liners in Contact with Armour**

Figure 22: Lethality Vs Emission Angle – EFP Vs Armour & Spall Liners in Contact with Armour

Plot of spall fragment number against spall fragment emission angle measured as half of the cone angle. Plot for Tegris liners.

Lethality Vs Emission Angle
EFP Vs Armour/ Liners in Contact with Armour

Figure 23: Lethality Vs Emission Angle – EFP Vs Armour & Tegris Spall Liners in Contact with Armour

Plot of cumulative lethality against emission angle. Lethality expressed as a function of fragment number multiplied by kill probability of individual fragments. Plot for Tegris liners. High lethality and larger affected areas will be marked by peaks at increased emission angles.

Lethality Vs Emission Angle
EFP Vs Armour/ Tegris Liners

Figure 24: Spall Vs Spall Emission Angle – Shape Charge Vs Armour

Plot of spall fragment number against spall fragment emission angle measured as half of the cone angle.

Figure 25: Lethality Vs Emission Angle – Shape Charge Vs Armour

Plot of cumulative lethality against emission angle. Lethality expressed as a function of fragment number multiplied by kill probability of individual fragments. High lethality and larger affected areas will be marked by peaks at increased emission angles.

**Lethality Vs Emission Angle
Shape Charge Vs Armour/ Spall Liners**

Spall Liner Response

Post trial, the liners configured in direct contact with the RHA target plates were sectioned, allowing evaluation of the material deformation caused. Results are detailed in Table 9 and photographs illustrating liner deformation are given below.

Table 9: Liner Material Deformation (Firings F4 – F6)

Firing – Liner	Thickness Supplied (mm)	Thickness After EFP Impact At Edge of Perforation Hole (mm)	Percentage Change (%)
F4 – Tegris	33	56	170
F5 – S2	11	20	182
F6 – Dyneema	22 (Excluding S2 Sheets)	37 (Excluding S2 Sheets)	168

Figure 26: F4 – Tegris Liner Deformation

Figure 27: F5 – F5 Liner Deformation

Figure 28: F6 – Dyneema Liner Deformation

Video

Figure 29: V1 – RHA/No Liner

Frame 6123

Frame 6121

Frame 6119

Frame 6117

Ring
Fragments

Frame 6115

Figure 30: VF17 – RHA/Dyneema @ 16mm Offset

Frame 06566

Frame 06564

Figure 31: VF19 – RHA/Tegris @ 37mm offset

Frame 07018

Frame 07015

Figure 32: VF18 – RHA/Tegris @ 16mm Offset

Frame 07016

Frame 07015

Frame 07014

Frame 07013

Recovered Spall Fragments

Most of the spall fragments were not recovered as a result of the handling required of the witness packs. Figure 33 illustrates fragments that were recovered post witness pack analysis. Unfortunately, the firings to which each belongs can not be determined, hence the Figure is presented for illustrative purposes only. Their mass and volumes range between 0.1 grams/0.01 cm³ for the smallest fragments and 14.5 grams/1.8 cm³ for the largest.

Figure 33: Recovered Spall Fragments

Discussion

This section discusses the results obtained during this trial. Where deemed appropriate photographs and graphs have been use to facilitate discussion.

Preliminary Warhead Testing

Following the trial, the steel stacks were cross-sectioned to allow evaluation of the penetration pattern provided by each warhead/explosive combination.

The depth of penetration achieved by both fills of the 32mm diameter 'home made' warhead were identical, with penetrations of 0.5 cone diameters in line with basic improvised devices. Similar penetration was not expected, it being anticipated that the PE4 fill would out-perform that of the nitromethane, as demonstrated with the BALDRICK. Indeed, possessing a higher velocity of detonation (approximately 30% higher) and a greater detonation pressure, the PE4 should have provided greater penetration. It is suspected that this poor performance arose from deficiencies in the PE4 fill, namely packing density. Whilst nitromethane, being a liquid, pours easily into the warhead and achieves a homogeneous fill of maximum density, the hand filling of PE4 is a comparatively arduous process and rarely reaches anywhere near the explosive's maximum packing density. In addition, working the explosive into the small cross-section of the 'home made' device is likely to have entrapped air pockets, thus providing a non-homogeneous fill and further reducing the packing density. Thus, the importance of packing density in relation to the performance of an EFP warhead is highlighted.

The cross-sectioned stacks from the 'home made' warhead firings (Figures 34 and 35) show short and fat (i.e. low L/D ratio) penetration patterns, indicating low slug velocities. Whilst a nice 'ink well' shaped hole was formed in the case of the Nitromethane firing, the rough uneven hole from the PE4 firing may be an indication of some deficiency in the warhead design or cone material properties. Results from two firings are, however, inadequate to draw conclusion.

Cross-sectioning of the steel stack from the BALDRICK/PE4 warhead/explosive combination firing revealed that the penetration pattern (Figure 36) appeared to tend towards that more typically associated with shape charge. The penetration hole clearly shows uneven erosion of the steel plates, tapering along its length and even bending slightly off the vertical axis. Deposits of copper along its length were also apparent. However, slug velocities recorded during the main trial serial, averaging 3,400 m/s and providing reasonable correlation to predicted Gurney velocities of 3,823 m/s, indicate velocities below those expected of shape charge jet. It is concluded that the penetration pattern was that of an EFP, albeit that of a fast, elongated (L/D ratio greater that 2.4) slug (N Davies, 2007). The depth of penetration of 1.48 cone diameters (approximately 74mm) is exceptional for a hand filled store, close to that of factory filled conventional munitions.

In contrast, the cross-sectioned stack from the firing of BALDRICK warhead filled with nitromethane (Figure 37) illustrates more typical EFP penetration. The formed hole can be seen to be 'short' and 'fat' (i.e. low L/D ratio) in comparison, with remains of the slug still intact at the bottom of the hole. The depth of penetration is approximately 40% less than that obtained with PE4. This is found to agree with the percentage reduction in slug velocity predicted using the Gurney equation (assuming a 100% effective charge mass; Equation 2).

The preliminary warhead tests provided clear evaluation of both the 32mm 'home made' and 50mm BALDRICK EFP warheads. Of the four warhead combinations tested BALDRICK with either PE4 or Nitromethane would have been suitable for the main trial series, providing 6.17 and 2.67 overmatch of the 12mm RHA target plate respectively. However, at the time of the main trial series, due to force majeure BALDRICK filled with PE4 presented itself as the only option. This would however, ensure perforation of the RHA.

RHA Target Penetration

In the main trial series all RHA target plates were perforated successfully with, in the majority of cases, only a single perforation hole present. However, on a number of firings multiple perforations of the RHA were recorded, indicating break-up of the EFP slug during flight. This behaviour was highly undesirable for the purpose of the trial as the energy of each slug impact would be less than that of a single, coherent slug and would mean loss of consistency over the firing series. Two possibilities are suggested for causing this behaviour: high slug velocities and asymmetry of the explosive charge. As recorded slug velocities are considered to be comparatively high for EFPs, slugs would have been long and thin (i.e. high L/D ratios). Stretching and break-up of the slugs may therefore have occurred, with each slug element having a slightly different trajectory and thus causing separate perforation of the target. Asymmetry of the explosive charge may have arisen through the packing of explosives; a batch of older PE4 was used in these firings. This batch was brittle and less malleable, as a result of leaching its plasticising agent, making it more difficult to work it into the BALDRICK warhead. Thus, voids were almost certainly trapped within the fill, creating asymmetry and causing the slug to split upon launch. Whatever the cause, where it was deemed results were undermined, firings were repeated.

Figure 34: Multi-Slug EFP Impact – RHA Front Face

Upon examination of the RHA target plates perforation holes were seen to be relatively consistent in diameter, between 20mm to 30mm or 0.4 – 0.6 cone diameters. This is greater than the hole diameter achieved in the preliminary trial as a result of the RHA targets being of finite thickness. The through material hole pattern left by the EFP slugs were consistent and presented two distinguishing features.

The impact site on the front face of the RHA targets was seen to taper inwards up to a depth approximately half way through the thickness of the armour. In these tapered section, material was roughened in a similar way to the sides of the holes formed in the preliminary warhead testing; although copper deposits were not identified.

Viewing holes from the rear of the RHA targets, material was seen to be missing behind the tapered section, as if the scabbed material had been cut away in a counter bored fashion referred to as discing (See Figure 35). Indeed, upon examining the spall fragments recovered, it was obvious that a number of larger annular pieces appeared to fit the recess in the rear of the holes.

Figure 35: RHA Perforation Hole – Front & Rear Face (F8)

The penetration patterns observed suggest two separate mechanisms occurred in the perforation of the RHA armour plates. Upon impact of the EFP slug, travelling greatly in excess of 1,150 m/s, hyperdynamic penetration took place eroding the armour material. This continued until approximately the mid-point of the through material thickness, by which time significant deceleration had occurred, promoting plastic deformation and plugging.

Recovered Spall Fragments

Unfortunately, much of the spall captured in the witness pack was lost during the handling of the packs. The fragments which were recovered fit three general descriptors.

> 1. Larger annular pieces or 'ring fragments', one surface originally being the rear surface of the RHA plate (See Figure 36), resulting from a combination of petalling (ductile) and shear failure of the armour material.

Figure 36: Ring Fragments

2. Large cylindrical pieces or 'plugs', one surface originally being the rear surface of the RHA plate (See Figure 37), resulting from the failure in shear of the armour material during plugging. Material is driven out of the armour ahead of the EFP slug.

Figure 37: Plug Fragment

3. Smaller pieces of random shape and size, resulting from internal shockwave reflection, erosion and plugging.

Whilst the majority of fragments were lost during the handling of the witness packs, the most prevalent nature of fragment would almost certainly have matched the third description.

EFP Reference Firings

The purpose of the reference firings was to provide a baseline of the BAD produced from 12mm RHA and to allow comparison of the firings into lined target sets. Three firings were undertaken, all of which perforated the target plate with a single hole.

The plot of cumulative lethality vs emission angle illustrates a possible distribution trend. Spall appeared to be emitted with an almost linear frequency up to an emission angle of 45 degrees (i.e. half con angle), but with fragment lethality reducing towards this angle. In each of the three firings, the top two aluminium sheets saw the retardation of 90% of spall fragments generated. The penetration depth of the remaining 10% and indeed the maximum depth achieved did however vary. Whilst the hole size and distribution were not recorded, inspection of the witness packs gave clues as to the penetration pattern. Small pinhead holes dominated in the upper sheets, scattered at an emission angle up to 45 degrees. Larger holes, presumably made by ring or plug fragments, were few in number and present up to an emission angle of approximately 30 degrees. The frequency of both these and pinhead sized holes decreased dramatically within

the first couple of layers of aluminium. It is suggested, therefore, that these accounted for the 90% of fragments, the remaining 10% being the more penetrative fragments. These more lethal fragments typically left perforations between 5 and 10mm in diameter.

The quantity of spall generated by each of the three firings varied considerably, averaging 295 with a standard deviation of +/- 223. Firing V1 provided the highest fragment frequency. A larger number were also seen to penetrate further into the witness pack than the other two firings, thus indicating a greater lethality (fragment number multiplied by the individual fragment kill probability) up to the maximum emission angle. Through summing the kill probabilities of the fragments from each firing it is found that the total lethal effect of firing V1 was greater than that of firings F13 and F14 by 263% and 693% respectively.

The reason for this large variation in fragment number and lethality is unknown, but it is suspected to be as a result of differences in slug shape/velocity and metallurgy of the RHA targets. As a slow, fat slug will have a larger cross-sectional area than a fast, thin slug it can be assumed that the area impacted will also be greater. Assuming that perforation of a target occurs in two stages of hydrodynamic followed by plastic deformation and plugging, a greater volume of material will be projected through impact of the slower slug. It is also known that the hardness of the armour is within the range of 450 – 530 Brinell. Whilst this represents a range of high hardness, this provides scope within which the relative degree of ductile and brittle material failure will vary. A combination of very hard armour and a slow, fat slug and low hard armour and a fast, thin slug will therefore produce a high and low degree of fragmentation respectively.

EFP Firings – Lined Target Sets

Three spall liners were trialled in a number of configurations, with varying standoff from the rear surface of the armour. When configured in direct contact with the RHA target plates, all three of the liners were perforated. Without any concept of liner performance against the selected warhead, a standoff of 50mm (1 cone diameter) was deemed suitable for the next round of firings, upon which spall and the EFP slugs were defeated. Reductions in standoff to 25mm and then 16mm (0.5 & 0.32 cone diameters respectively) also saw defeat of both spall and EFP slugs with S2 and Dyneema liners. With what range time and explosives remained it was deemed appropriate to re-trial the Tegris liner at a standoff less than 50mm but greater than 25mm (37mm, 0.74 cone diameters) in an attempt to identify its perforation threshold. This configuration was, however, also perforated. Details of each liner's performance are discussed below. Comparison is drawn with reference firing V1 which provided the most severe spall generation in terms of fragment numbers, emission angle and penetration of the witness pack.

Whilst the approach undertaken and detailed above has provided valuable results within the limitations of this project, in hindsight the author has constructively criticised his approach. It is felt that more advantageous results, from the perspective of analysing BAE, would have been obtained if standoff had been increased in smaller increments. It is anticipated that this would have allowed further liner perforations and the capture of spall via witness packs, thus providing greater opportunity to observe liner/spall behaviour and identify possible trends.

Tegris

Of the five Tegris lined target sets four were perforated during the EFP firings. Only with the liner stood 50mm off from the rear face of the RHA plate were spall and the EFP slug defeated. The liner performance and spall pattern observed over these four firings presented interesting results.

The presence of a Tegris liner, in comparison to the reference firing V1, demonstrated a significant reduction in the total number of spall fragments reaching the witness packs and reduction of the emission angle by 20 degrees, making the maximum cone angle 70 degrees. The number of fragments reaching the witness pack seemingly reduced with greater liner standoff. This is with the exception of a liner stood off at 16mm from the rear face of the RHA (firing F15). This configuration produced a spall pattern, in terms of fragment emission angle and depth of penetration, comparable to that of the reference firings. Surprisingly with this firing, rather than reducing, the relative lethality increased, with overall lethality (fragment number x fragment kill probability) and lethality towards maximum emission angle being more severe than any of the reference firings (see Figure 38).

Figure 38: V1 Reference Firing and Tegris @ 16mm – Lethality Vs Emission Angle

This suggests that the liner was in some way increasing the emission angle of the more lethal fragments at this standoff and thus worsening the BAE. It was seen that the perforation hole tapered from a small entry to a larger exit hole. Could this be indicative of the liner re-scattering spall fragments? Initial consideration suggested that this may be an erroneous result. However, examining the results of 25mm liner standoff it is seen that little or no improvement is gained over the results obtained from the liner being in contact with the RHA. Furthermore, standoff of 37mm, whilst mitigating the vast majority of BAD, emitted a single, most likely high energy, fragment from the rear of the liner at approximately 45 degrees (See Figure 39).

Figure 39: F18 Cross-Section – Tegris @ 37mm Standoff

An explanation for this behaviour can not be given and unfortunately the fragment's lethality or equivalent kill probability can not be determined as it was not captured in the witness pack. This does, however, bolster concerns that the liner may actually intensify the effect of BAD perforating the liner. However, as only single firings were undertaken for each configuration, insufficient evidence was collected to allow conclusions to be drawn.

In all firings, the impact sites were charred black and exposed fibre ends had the appearance of being melted and congealed together. With the exception of the firing with the liner in contact with the RHA, ring fragments were clearly visible, buried in the top surface of the liner. Perforation holes presented comparatively small entry and large exit holes, around which fibres appeared to demonstrate necking and were blown outwards (see Figure 40).

Figure 40: F15 Rear Face – Tegris @ 16mm Standoff

Examining the perforated liners side on, delamination was visible through the thickness of the material, but increasing towards the rear face (see Figures 47 and 41). In firing F7 and VF18, when perforation did not occur or was almost prohibited, delamination was not obvious, although the rear surface appeared to be swollen. In these firings fragmentation was stopped in the first half of the material's thickness.

Figure 41: F15 Side View – Tegris @ 16mm Standoff

The observations made suggest that the response mechanisms of the liners trialled can be classed as retraction, indicated by necking of the fibres, delamination, and dissipation. Heat generated through the latter may be the cause of the melted appearance of fibres, the temperature at which polypropylene melts (approximately 165°C) having been exceeded.

S2

Of the four firings into target sets lined with S2, only the liner configured in direct contact with the RHA was perforated. Standoff of the liner at 16, 25 and 50mm saw defeat of both spall and the EFP slug.

When in contact with the RHA, the presence of the S2 liner resulted in a significant reduction in the number of spall fragments reaching the witness pack; only 6% of that generated in reference firing V1. The maximum emission angle and the lethality (fragment no x fragment kill probability) of the fragments reaching the witness pack were also reduced. The emission angle was decreased by 15 degrees to 30 degrees, giving a maximum cone angle of 60 degrees. It is of note, however, that maximum depth of penetration into the witness pack (i. e. the fragment of highest lethality), up to sheet 5, occurred at this angle.

In all firings, impact sites were of similar appearance to Figure 42, demonstrating typical failure modes of fibre reinforced composites. It can be seen that fibres have clearly failed, debonded from the matrix and become fluffy and the matrix has undergone gross fracture, with cracks running to edges of the liner sheet.

Figure 42: F16 Front Face – S2 @ 16mm Standoff

Gross Fracture

Upon perforation of the liner (firing F5) delamination and separation of fluffy debonded fibres was also observed, as illustrated in Figure 43 below.

Figure 43: F5 Cross-section – S2

These observations suggest that the response mechanisms of this liner can be classed as retraction and dissipation.

Dyneema

Of the four firings in to target sets lined with Dyneema, only the liner configured in direct contact with the RHA was perforated. Standoff of the liner at 16, 25 and 50mm saw defeat of both spall and the EFP slug.

When in contact with the RHA, the presence of the Dyneema liner resulted in a significant reduction in the number of spall fragments reaching the witness pack; only 13% of that generated in reference firing V1. The maximum emission angle was also reduced by 15 degrees to 30 degrees, giving a maximum cone angle of 60 degrees. The lethality of the spall fragments reaching the witness pack was greatly reduced.

In all firings, impact sites were of similar appearance to Figure 44. Fibre ends were exposed, charred black and had the appearance of being melted and congealed together. With the exception of the firing with the liner in contact with the RHA, ring fragments were clearly visible, buried in the top surface of the liner.

Figure 44: F9 Front – Dyneema @ 50mm Offset

From the cross section of the liner perforated in contact with the RHA, it is seen that the entry hole is larger than the exit hole (See Figure 45). It is suggested that this profile, as a result of the contraction of Dyneema fibres, is responsible for focusing of the BAD. Delamination also occurred through the thickness of the material, particularly towards the rear face of the liner. In the remaining firing, where the liner was not perforated, delamination was not obvious, although the rear surfaces did appear to be swollen.

Figure 45: 4F6 Cross Section – Dyneema

From the observations made, the response mechanisms of the liners trialled can be classed as retraction, indicated by delamination, dissipation and possibly contraction. Heat generated through the latter may be the cause of the melted appearance of fibres, the temperature at which polyethylene melts (approximately 115°C) having been exceeded.

Shape Charge Firings

All three experimental shape charges successfully perforated the target sets. Typical perforation holes in the armour were approximately 8mm in diameter and showed signs of hydrodynamic penetration having occurred through the entire armour thickness; the metal appeared to have melted and flowed. From the rear, it was apparent that a proportion of the material immediately surrounding the holes (within a couple of millimetres) had been lost, suggesting the loss of material through ring fragmentation. The extent of this looked relatively minor in comparison to that observed in the EFP firings.

The impact damage on the S2 and Tegris liners was extremely localised, up to a distance of 3 hole diameters from the perforation hole. Again, the exposed fibres of the Tegris appeared to be charred and melted and at the rear face, appeared to demonstrate necking and were blown outwards. Unlike the perforation holes witnessed during the EFP firings, the hole made by the shape charge had parallel sides and only slight, extremely localised swelling of the material was visible towards the rear of the liner. Once more, S2 fibres had clearly failed, de-bonded from the matrix, though gross cracking and 'fluffy' exposed fibres were not apparent. The behaviour of the liners observed differs from that observed with the liners from the EFP firings, suggesting different dominant response mechanisms were in action. Localised damage suggests that the materials are unable to respond quickly enough to the impact of the shape charge jet and are unable to dissipate the impact energy. Reduction in the frequency of the spall is therefore much more likely to have occurred by the response mechanism of retardation, deceleration of the rear face of the armour and dissipation of the compressive shockwave; although Tegris, with low impedance (low modulus and low density), is less conducive to this response mechanism.

Considering the spall generated in the unlined firing, it is recognised that the vast majority (97%) of fragments are of minimal lethality, only perforating the very top sheet of the witness pack. Indeed, most of the perforations in the top sheet were of pin-hole size, indicating spall fragments of negligible size and mass (see Figure 46, for clarity shown as negative image).

Figure 46: Shape Charge vs. RHA (F1) – Witness Pack – Top Sheet

In the presence of both S2 and Tegris liners in contact with the RHA, the total frequency of spall reaching the witness pack was reduced to approximately 6% of the unlined firing. The lethality of these fragments was also greatly reduced. Of the two liner materials, Tegris was seen to demonstrate greater mitigation of the lethal fragments and reduced the maximum angle over which they were emitted from 35 to 30 degrees, over the half cone angle.

Shape Charge and EFP BAD Comparison

Of the EFP and shape charge reference firings, shape charge was found to generate the greatest frequency of spall fragmentation. As discussed, a large percentage of these were of minimal lethality, being of negligible size and mass.

Figure 47: EFP vs. RHA (V1) – Witness Pack – Top Sheet

In contrast, EFPs were found to generate comparatively low frequencies of spall fragmentation, but of reasonable size and of higher cumulative lethality. The emission angle over which these were distributed was also seen to be greater, hence providing a larger and less desirable area of effect. It is however worth recalling that the shape charge and EFP warheads trialled were not of equivalent cone diameter or explosive charge, the shape charge being considerably smaller on both accounts. It can be assumed that a shape charge warhead of equivalent size would have undoubtedly generated significantly more BAD of greater lethality.

Figure 48: EFP & Shape Charge Reference firings – Lethality Vs Emission Angle

Lethality vs Spall Emission Angle
Shape Charge & EFP vs Armour

Figure 49: EFP & Shape Charge Reference firings – Spall Vs Emission Angle

Spall Emission Angle
(Witness Pack Sheet 1)
EFP Vs Armour - Reference Firings

The S2 and Tegris liners were both trialled in contact with the RHA target plate against EFP and shape charge warheads. Figure 50 below compares the plots of the cumulative lethalities of these firings. From these, it can be seen that spall lethality appears worse with the S2 liner in the EFP firings and worse with the Tegris liner in the shape charge firing, in terms of cumulative lethality. Whilst not focused upon in this investigation, could this be evidence supporting the claims by Arnold and Rottenkolber (2006) of a liner giving superior performance against one threat and inferior performance against the other?

Figure 50: EFP & Shape Charge Vs Armour/Liner – Lethality Vs Emission Angle

Lethality Vs Emission Angle
EFP & Shape Charge Vs Armour/ Liners in Contact with Armour

Liner Comparison

The liners trialled all demonstrate the ability to reduce the frequency and emission angle of BAD generated by the EFP and shape charge warheads tested. Against EFPs, greatest benefit was seen with the Dyneema and S2 liners, mitigating all spall and the EFP slug when stood off from the RHA at a distance of only 16mm (0.32 cone diameters). In contrast the Tegris liner required 50mm (1 cone diameter) to achieve the same effect. This may suggest inferior performance of the Tegris, with some BAD characteristics even potentially being amplified, as discussed above. However, when in contact with the RHA the Tegris liner appeared to fare better than the other two liner materials against EFPs and superior to the S2, Dyneema not having been tested against shape charge. The liner was seen to reduce the fragment number and lethality over emission angle, also reducing maximum emission angle in the case of the shape charge firing.

Geometry

Against EFPs, the results obtained indicate and, in the case of the Tegris liner, demonstrate that a threshold liner standoff distance exists past which perforation will not occur; i.e. less than 0.32 cone diameters for the Dyneema and S2 liners in this trial. In the same vein, whilst it is not known at what standoff distance perforation of the Dyneema and S2 by the 50mm diameter warhead would cease, the results obtained suggest that these liners would be capable of successfully mitigating large warheads at the offsets trialled. Whilst only liners of 25 kg/m^2 and a single size of warhead were trialled, it stands to reason that a more powerful warhead or a thinner liner would see this standoff threshold move further away from the RHA target, assuming overmatch of the armour were to be maintained. As such it can be suggested that such a threshold is related fundamentally to the areal density of the liner and the residual velocity of spall fragments and the EFP slug, which themselves are related to warhead size (cone diameter and charge mass) and target overmatch.

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Liner performance clearly benefits from greater standoff. This is as a result of a combined effect of increased effective liner area, increased time for a liner response and the reduction of spall fragment energies. These are now discussed further.

With a liner in contact with armour, the entire spall cloud will impact on the liner almost as an instantaneous mass and load. As spall fragments will depart from the rear of the armour at varying velocities, with a liner stood off from the rear of the armour, fragments will arrive at the liner at different, albeit small, time intervals. Peak loading of the liner is therefore reduced and the duration of loading is extended, giving the liner longer to respond to the impact loading. As fragments are emitted across a range of angles from the armour target, as has been demonstrated, standoff will increase the area of the spall liner over which they are distributed, thus decreasing the impact energy received per unit area. A greater proportion of the liner will therefore be placed under load. With further to travel to the liner, deceleration of the fragments will also occur, thus reducing the impact energy or kinetic energy density (KED, see Equation 9) of the individual fragments. As velocity is a squared term, a drop in velocity will have a marked effect in the reduction of KED.

Equation 9

$$KED = \frac{0.5mV^2}{A_{Frag}}$$

Where:
V = Velocity,
m = Fragment mass,
A_{Frag} = Fragment cross-sectional area

Material

Similar response mechanisms were present in all of the three liner materials trialled. These were observed to be bulging and dissipation, the Dyneema liner also showing signs of contraction. The results obtained indicate that both S2 and Dyneema liners benefit from having high tensile strengths, tensile modulus and high strain to failure. Whilst these fibres also have velocities of sound greater than that of the Tegris fabric, the data collected are insufficient to determine and therefore inconclusive as to the influence this has upon the response of the liner suggested by Jacobs and Van Dingenen (2001).

Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Work

The parameters influencing the frequency and lethality of spall fragmentation following the strike of EFPs on armour are numerous and in themselves relatively complex. Through keeping a number of these constant (warhead/explosive fill, armour type and thickness, and liner areal density) the BAEs have been investigated and the following conclusion can be drawn.

- The quality of the EFP warhead design, build and explosive fill ultimately determines the penetration characteristics against a given target.

- Perforation of a RHA target plate may occur both hydrodynamically and through low velocity penetration mechanisms. The latter will promote plastic deformation and plugging of the target material.

- Spall may be categorised as ring, plug or emission fragmentation, each characterising the mechanism by which it was formed.

- The use of spall liners reduces both spall fragmentation frequency and the lethality distribution, with a typical decrease in maximum emission angle (or cone angle) focusing the BAD.

- Offset of spall liners from the rear face of armour improves mitigation performance of spall liners, through the combined effect of increased effective liner area, increased time for liner response and the reduction of spall fragment energies. The response mechanisms of retraction, delamination, dissipation and contraction were seen to have occurred in the liner materials trialled.

- Liner performance is fundamentally dependent on the material properties and areal density. Below a threshold limit, spall mitigation performance may vary with standoff of the liner from the rear of the armour target.

- Against armour, assuming warheads are of equivalent cone diameter and charge mass, shape charge will generate higher frequencies of spall fragmentation of higher lethality than that produced by EFPs. Evidence suggests, however, that the maximum emission angle and so area affected within an armoured vehicle will be greater with EFPs.

- Liners which perform well against mitigating the spall from shape charge may not demonstrate desirable performance against shape charge; and vice versa.

In consideration of the trial undertaken and the results obtained the following recommendations are made for further work in the area of BAEs of EFPs.

- *Warheads*   The evidence presented indicates that the slug formed by the BALDRICK/PE4 combination formed a slug of high L/D ratio (long and thin) and this in turn may have led to excessive stretching and particulation of the slug. However, this is unconfirmed and in order to properly assess the nature of the slug prior to impact it is recommended that flash x-ray is employed in future firings.

- *Witness Pack Analysis*   In order to fully interpret and make best use of the data obtained from the metal, NATO standard witness pack, knowledge is required of how to relate the kill probabilities detailed to fragment energy. It is also suggested that smaller sample intervals or an alternative analysis technique may disclose more variations in spall fragment frequency and lethality over the emitted cone angle.

- *Repeat Firings*   The results presented within this paper were obtained from single EFP firings into each target set configuration. Whilst this allows general trends in the behaviour of BAD to be identified, it by no means provides conclusive evidence. With a vast array of parameters influencing the formation of the BAD, more data are required to verify and validate the results obtained. As such, repetition of the firings for each target set should feature in future work.

- *Target Overmatch* Due to restraints on this project, assessment of the BAEs of EFPs has been made using a single warhead/explosive fill combination, target type and thickness, and liner areal density. Through fixing these parameters, evaluation of the effect of stand off and different liner materials has been made against a common, identical threat, whilst the effect of changing the degree of warhead/target overmatch assessment has not been made. Furthermore, the influence and interaction of target thickness and liner areal density with liner material type and liner stand off have not been explored. Further investigation should be made in order to properly consider the key performance variables for various armour/spall liner systems.

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Failing States: Have the Humanitarian Interventions of the 1990s Created Them?

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One: Introduction

Background

Two events have defined the contemporary debate in international relations and security studies: the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 ('9/11'). The time in between these events was characterized by perceived Kantian Peace.[1] In cases of conflict, attempts were made to correct the flaw. These attempts originated from the victory of liberalism over communism. The liberal zeal was then interrupted by the attacks on the very symbols of this ideology: the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York. After the end of all ideological history had been proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama,[2] a new war had to be fought in the name of the epitome of western civilization, democracy and open markets.

In the search for the geographical origins of the terrorist threat, the phenomenon of weak states was quickly identified. They provided evil with a safe haven. The National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002 gave the phenomenon its prominent place in the current debate by proclaiming that 'America is now threatened less by conquering [states] than by failing ones'.[3] Indices measuring state failure were developed,[4] which served as a device for policies seeking to correct the wrong, and state-building became a moral imperative not only to protect oneself against the products of failing states,[5] terrorism and organized crime.

The history of interventions in other nations' internal affairs is long, and attempts to bring democracy are not new either.[6] But it was only during the nineties that democracy and liberalism could be spread without being challenged by other concepts. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the liberal West zealously engaged in spreading democracy into all corners of the world. The hope was to achieve what Kant called perpetual peace,[7] driven by the conviction that 'republics' ('democracy' was rather a dirty word for Immanuel Kant) were unlikely to fight each other.

Hypothesis

The central hypothesis of this paper is that the endeavours to establish liberal democracies during the 1990s helped to create failing states. The reason for this is that liberal state-building attempts in post-conflict societies allowed for the creation of parallel structures: those whom the international community[8] currently refers to as the government; and those who do not identify themselves with the institutions built to provide a territory with a governmental structure. It is exactly this circumstance, created by liberal ideology that has created the fertile ground for terrorists and organized crime. To be more allegorical: in its attempt to contain violence by building rational structures, the west has contained the natural flow of development in the

countries in which it intervened, and built a pond; as these ponds are exposed to sunshine, the growth of malicious algae was facilitated, and modern terrorism, organized crime and warlordism are the putrefactive gases we are made to inhale as a result of externally induced stagnation. The sunshine, long absent from many of these waters, was provided by globalization, especially the revolution in global telecommunications.

The aim of this paper is to critically assess interventions in the name of democracy during the 1990s. Upon this assessment alternative approaches shall be advised. This paper searches for answers to the following questions related to post-conflict reconstruction and intervention:

- How to move ahead in order to break these dams to allow the water to flow again, without creating floods of violence due to the breakup of the structures?

- If past and current attempts render negative results, what is it that has to be done in future, and how can it best be achieved?

Addressing the issues of intervention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, this paper offers an alternative approach to ongoing efforts. Albeit it does not address the 'hot cases' of Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo the findings of the paper are applicable to each of these cases, as the underlying notions of current policy-making are distinguished and critically assessed. Policy-makers and academics in search of alternative approaches related to intervention and post-conflict reconstruction will find the following discussion of relevance.

Structure

The first step is to find out the ideological underpinnings that guided interventions and peace-building attempts during the period of observation, the nineties. Applying reverse logic, this is in essence the question of what the conception of a functional state was in the aftermath of the Cold War. Three main ideas are elaborated on by examining the history of the concept of the nation state: Liberalism, Continental Conservatism and Radicalism. The paper then looks at the phenomenon of failed or failing states, seeking to discover the root causes commonly attached to their occurrence, and linking it to the various notions of statehood. The next section turns its attention to the issue of interventions. Two aspects serve as a guideline, namely the legal and the normative aspects influencing the debate on intervention. Only after having examined domestic and international politics can the dominant ideological underpinning which informed Western action throughout the nineties be named: Liberalism.

Having laid a theoretical background, the next section addresses the impact of interventions informed by liberalism, and whether they created functional states or anarchy and instability. It examines the cases of Guatemala, Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda. Based on the empirical observations of the case studies, the paper discusses whether it can be argued that liberal interventions during the 1990s did accelerate the occurrence of failing or failed states. It finds that although there is no causal link between liberal interventions and state failure, the phenomenon of fragile statehood is an issue related to the normative underpinnings of liberal thought. Because liberalism only regards a monopoly of violence if achieved through democratic elections as legitimate, cases such as Rwanda and Cambodia are regarded as failed – in neither country stability has been achieved through democratic means. This in turn leads the author to argue that inherent in this normative argument lies the danger of creating a cycle of interventions, which will repeatedly seek to install a form of governance which may be regarded as legitimate from

an outsider's point of view, but not from the affected population's point of view. The disaffection with the newly created system will subsequently lead to anarchy, and call upon the international community to intervene again.

The author then seeks to find alternatives which could overcome the paradoxical cycle informed by liberalism, arguing that the focus of contemporary state-building efforts is on only one of three aspects comprising a nation state. Unlike the building of an integrative ideology and the integration of society, which are political-cultural and thus leadership tasks, state building is a managerial task. As a result, efforts to create stability leave a gap between the passion and rationality of a country. In order to bridge this gap, and overcome the cycle of interventions, the author suggests that the international community should refocus its efforts on influencing domestic leadership. This dissertation concludes by giving policy recommendations and outlines future areas of research.

Methodology

The guiding question of this paper is to find out whether liberal efforts during the nineties to establish democratic governance as the means for conflict resolution have contributed to the occurrence of the fragile state phenomenon.[9] The dependent variable thus is the occurrence of a failing or failed state. The phenomenon is contested, and no clear cut definition emerges from the literature. In order to operationalise the dependent variable, it is necessary to define what is understood here as a fragile state. The author applies Max Weber's definition of a nation state as an entity that successfully and legitimately claims the monopoly on physical violence, thus depicting an organization of power relationships between those who govern and those who are governed.[10] A failed or failing state is characterized by:

- The state is unable to claim the monopoly of violence

- The state is unable to control its territory

- The population of the state does not identify itself with the nation state, but alternative sources of identification such as religion, tribe, criminal or terrorist networks.

In sum, a failed or failing state is characterized by anarchy as opposed to order, which results in widespread violence. Despite critical accounts of humanitarian interventions and democratization efforts, most of these accounts have been focused on whether despite these efforts a recurrence of fighting could be observed. This usually refers to large scale violence of 1,000 or more dead, as defined by the correlates of war project.[11] It also implies the existence of clearly distinguishable factions seeking to win over their side. Because the focus of these studies is civil war, this includes state and non-state actors. For the case presented here, a different stance is taken. It is argued that the view is too narrowly focused on the dichotomy of war and peace as induced by political considerations. Thus this paper widens the scope of critical analyses of liberal interventions during the nineties by looking beyond a mere relapse of conflict into the persistence of violence and anarchy.

The independent variable seeking to explain the phenomenon of failing states is interventions conducted by the international community during the nineties. Most literature on intervention is concerned with the use of force by external actors in order to achieve peace.[12] Such a definition is too narrow for this paper. Intervention is defined here as any interference into the developments of a sovereign state by the international community, personified by the United Nations (UN).[13]

Critical accounts on the outcome of interventions abound. They tend to focus on the question of whether a relapse into conflict occurred. According to these studies, war and peace are necessarily products of political aspirations. In a failed or failing state though, this does not necessarily have to be the case. As proponents of the 'New Wars' approach point out, the nature of conflict in the 21st century has become less political, and more material.[14] Furthermore, due to the absence of a monopoly of violence, and the presence of a situation of Hobbesian anarchy in fragile states, violence is ubiquitous, and can be an expression of political aspirations as much as of economic or even private pursuit of interests. The paper thus widens the scope of critically assessing interventions during the 1990s.

Several intervening variables have to be acknowledged, as the phenomenon of weak states, just like any other social phenomenon, can not be monocausal. Since Samuel P Huntington's elevation of anthropological knowledge into the mainstream debate through his epic 'Clash of Civilization', cultural aspects play a prominent role in any debate revolving around international relations and security.[15] In relation to failing states, this means that there could be cultural explanations for the inability to organize a society in the form of a nation-state. This argument is not easy to rebut, as there are other forms of organizing a society, for example along religious or ethnic lines. On the other hand, it is argued here that it is of little relevance how a society is organized, as at the core of it will be a legitimate claim to uphold the monopoly of violence. This paper does address the intervening variable 'culture' though, as it examines cases from Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Another intervening variable, which finds prominence in the debate revolving around failed or failing states, is the historical development of a multitude of states characterized as fragile: the legacies of Colonialism and the Cold War.[16] The historical development of any case studied can never be ruled out, as it provides the backdrop against which a current situation must be seen. This variable is addressed in the case studies, which can not be sincerely conducted without addressing the historical background of each case.

The last intervening variable that is often regarded as a cause for state failure is the notion that it is only the poorest countries that fail, as their lack of economic development inevitably leads to the erosion of any ordering structure for lack of resources. This explanation is commonly adopted by developmental or financial institutions like the World Bank. The question here is similar to the question of chicken and egg – is a thriving economy a necessary precondition for a nation-state, or is a nation-state the necessary precondition for a thriving economy? This paper takes the latter view, and focuses on the question whether the current political situation of an examined case is characterized by anarchy or stability.

Two: The Nation State – 'State' of a Nation or Static Nation?

After seeking to define the 'nation state' as seen today, this section turns its attention to the historical development of the nation state, using the Peace of Westphalia as a starting point. The objective is to distinguish between the underlying ideological differences that inform our current reading of the concept of the nation state, as these preconceptions inform the debate on state failure.

Seeking a Definition

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the term state as 'the condition of someone or something'.[18] This is precisely depicted by the German term *Zustand*. It is not, though, what German refers

to when talking about *Staat*. The word *Staat* translates into 'nation state', and according to the dictionary refers to 'a sovereign state of which most of the citizens or subjects also share factors such as language or common descent'.[19] Such a definition is very broad indeed. If one is to look for more certainty and precision, it is worthwhile to turn to a legal definition as offered by Georg Jellinek.[20] According to him a state is an entity that needs to fulfil three criteria:

    (a)   has a defined territory

    (b)   has a population

    (c)   has the monopoly of violence.

Although this legal attempt to define a state offers greater precision, it still does not answer one very important question: what is the state for? An answer to this can be found in the spheres of political science and sociology. A narrow definition is given by Max Weber. He regards the state as something that successfully and legitimately claims the monopoly on physical violence, thus depicting an organization of power relationships between those who govern and those who are governed.[21] Finally, there is a wider and more normative definition offered. From this perspective, the state is a set of institutions or persons, who are entrusted with government, and who seek democratic opinion and decision making. In order to enforce their decisions, these institutions or persons are provided with certain sanctifying measures.

The concept of the nation state is contested – it evades a clear cut definition. Historically speaking, the concept of the nation state is a relatively new phenomenon, and it is commonly argued that it came into existence only after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended 30 years of anarchy and violence in Europe. The essential questions of religion and governance were dealt with here, and brought about an understanding of sovereignty. The motto *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose region, his religion) has two important implications.[22] First it grants a worldly ruler absolute powers, including spiritual ones, and second it emphasizes that a territory assigned to this ruler is a 'key requirement'.[23]

The Historical Development of the Nation State

Absolute Powers In Times Of Anarchy: Thomas Hobbes And Jean Bodin

Like any other historical event, there are larger processes and developments at hand, which eventually lead to this one event which in retrospect is considered as the birth of a new era. Development and change are essentially products of their time. Thus it will be of help to turn to the two most outstanding political theorists of the time, Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. Focusing on the most important elements in their respective tracts, *Six Livres de la République* and *Leviathan*, the guiding question for this historical excursion is to ask what they were seeking answers for – in other words the question what the world around them looked like.

Jean Bodin (1530-1595) is the father of the term sovereignty.[23] It was he who introduced the concept, and who defined in a workable manner. To him, sovereignty is to be understood as 'absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth'.[25] Bodin develops this definition systematically, when he specifies further what he understands as absolute power. Sovereignty is thus only achieved if a monarch is not subject to any superior law making institution, and capable of upholding the laws he made, if necessary by coercion.[26] Although much more ought to be said about the theory Bodin developed, for this paper a brief description of the main thrust of his *Six Livres de la République* shall suffice.

Why was Bodin advising absolutist regimes? The answer is one word: anarchy. During his life Jean Bodin had to witness how France experienced a time of anarchy, fuelled by the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants. The old Catholic world order had been shaken to its foundations, and the stability it once provided was lost. Bodin only saw one way to leave this state of anarchy: the prescription of one authority, whose function was to provide stability. Stability, though, he believed, could only be achieved if that authority had absolute powers to establish laws and maintain order.

The argument for the necessity for an authority that holds all powers was further developed in a book which up to this day sparks lively debate: Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*.[27] In a world characterized by a 'war,... of every man, against every man',[28] Hobbes sought remedy by creating an even greater evil, the Leviathan. Only when men fear that the pursuance of their individual interests may be castigated by something that holds greater powers, will they adhere to a law. Thus, Thomas Hobbes introduced the notion of the monopoly on violence a ruler must posses if the state of nature is to be brought to an end. Whereas Jean Bodin was not overly concerned how absolute power is to be established (to him it remained a divine matter), Hobbes describes two ways to attain it:

> One, by natural force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by institution; and the former, a commonwealth by acquisition.[29]

Did the state of nature only exist in Thomas Hobbes' mind? Even more than Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes experienced a Europe reigned by anarchy. Whether the English Civil War, or the Thirty Years War that ravaged the continent, Thomas Hobbes' life was surrounded by insecurity and chaos.[30] His conclusion was similar to that of Bodin: only one absolute power could create an environment of peace and security.

The Treaty of Westphalia and *cuius regio, eius religio* enshrined the absolutist principles to the understanding of the state for years to come. At least within the boundaries of the newly discovered idea of territorial sovereignty relative peace was attained, upheld by absolutist monarchs. Between them on the other hand warfare was as common as before, as many sought to expand their 'commonwealth by acquisition'.[31] The costs and organization involved in these endeavours, coupled with a mercantilist economic approach, slowly led to the emergence of a different notion of sovereignty. What once was perceived divine and singular became popular – at least in theory.

Enlightenment – Peace as a Natural Condition

Two interrelated factors contributed to this development. The first was the growing discontent with resting the powers of the state in the hands of only one ruler by an increasingly affluent middle class, which disagreed with the heavy cost of maintaining the absolutist state and its tendency to continuous interstate warfare in search of territorial enlargement. This was especially true at the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, namely England and the Dutch territories.[32] Opponents of the absolutist monarchy argued that it was their rational self interest that would promote the wealth of the nation, rather than allowing one person to define a national interest. This signifies

a complete turn to the perceptions of Hobbes and Bodin – it meant a different understanding of the state of nature. The political thinkers of the 18th century like Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Jefferson all perceived peace as the state of nature, and thus man as inherently peaceful and it was only society that corrupted the individual to violently pursue its interests.[33]

The concept of sovereignty was not abolished though, as all thinkers of the time agreed that inter-personal relations needed to be regulated because society will continue to corrupt mankind.[34] But if the individual in the state of nature was rational and therefore peaceful, then sovereignty can not be left in hands of one, but must be the responsibility of all. Thus the idea of popular sovereignty was born, most famously expounded by John Locke, and most famously implemented by the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789.

Another important idea was born during the Age of Enlightenment and Revolution concerning the conduct of statehood – the idea of checks and balances. Because man is born into a society of individual ambition, Montesquieu argued that these ambitions must be checked by countering them with equal powers – he therefore made the case to divide the powers of sovereignty into three branches, executive, legislative and judiciary.[35]

The changing notions of sovereignty that developed during the 17th and 18th centuries were drastic – and just like the theories of earlier thinkers, they did not evolve in a vacuum, nor can they be pinned down in dramatic events like the American or French revolutions. So what led to such different readings? Unlike the anarchic times of Hobbes and Bodin, where nothing was certain, the Peace of Westphalia and absolute monarchy paved the way to *über*stability. Everything was controlled and conducted by one absolute power, often with an iron grip – and the sole purpose of control was to enlarge the power of that very power, the absolutist monarch. The interest of the state was to be defined by one person, and the state had to follow. This did not gain the approval of a growing middle class, first in England and the Dutch territories, then in the United States and France. The increased accumulation of independent wealth, and therefore the growing financial losses through taxation led the middle classes to demand a say in interest formulation.

The 18th century was hugely important to our understanding of the state and its functions today. A commonwealth can only be described as a state if its members have a say in defining that commonwealth, and thus it is the populace rather than a monarch that should define the interests of the commonwealth. It also describes an important function of the state – rather than solely promoting the monarch's interest, one of its core functions is to promote its citizens' interest. That interest in essence is the accumulation of material wealth. Therefore the cradle of birth for the nexus of democracy and capitalism can be found in these enlightened times. And so can the inception of US-American thinking.

The Age of Isms – Enlightened Thought at a Crossroads

Attaching names to dominant thoughts becomes increasingly difficult for what is to follow. This has been greatly influenced by technical innovations such as the printing press, allowing for a wider circulation of ideas. Two historical events mark this age of isms – the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Both paved the way for a marked split in conceptualising the state, and laid the base for the ideological clash between the liberal brothers Liberalism and Socialism that would rule the world until 1989. It furthermore triggered a third way, that of conservative nationalism.

In essence, nationalism is a continental product. The events of the French Revolution triggered a conservative reaction by the monarchical regimes of Austria-Hungary, Prussia and Russia, which sought to contain potential follow-up revolutions in their own territories. Although combining their forces, they could not stop Napoleon's army in its attempt to establish French dominance over the Continent. The bitter defeat of the Prussian troops at Jena in 1806 led Clausewitz to realize why Napoleon had been so successful: he had successfully coupled the rational principles of organization of prerevolutionary times with the passionate momentum of the French Revolution by announcing the *levée en masse* – and France followed suit. In *On War* Clausewitz synthesized the lessons learned of the Prussian defeat: he added the people and their passion to the trinity of rational leadership and a military ready to take chances and luck.[36] For the understanding of the state this meant that the people that live within its territory need to identify themselves passionately with this entity, a *Volk* was needed – an argument also found with Hegel, and applied with Prussian precision by Bismarck, finally finding its perversion with Hitler.[37] It is this notion of *Volk* and *Vaterland* with the underlying notion that a state is the expression of a shared historical evolution by one people that differentiates continental conservatism from liberalism.

For liberalism itself, the 19th century was the starting point of an argument that would find its ultimate expression in the Cold War. The advent of the Industrial Revolution, and the growing disparity between a wealthy class of proprietors and poor workers, divided the struggle for liberty sharply. Whereas one side maintained the argument that man as a rational actor will add to the greater good by pursuing his own interest, the other side saw a continuation of Rousseau's famous exclamation 'Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains' in the distribution of wealth.[38] Regarding demand for a greater political participation, liberals and radicals initially fought the same enemy, an aristocratic political class. The more political participation was possible though, the more apparent became the divide, and the more pronounced became their expressions: individualism, based on the assumption that if the individual is allowed to pursue his goals it will advance society, and egalitarianism, arguing that property is at the core of societal corruption and should therefore be abolished.

Interestingly, it was a conservative government that first introduced a more active state, Prussian Bismarck. Arguably he did not do that because he believed it right, but he feared that if he did not make concessions to the demand voiced by an increasingly successful socialist opposition, the ruling conservatives would not be able to uphold their political dominance. It was more the deed than the theory that included the element of providing basic welfare to the population into our understanding of the nation state.

The 20th Century – Bellicose Expression of Ideologies

By the end of the 19th century the modern state was thoroughly recognisable. It is thus not surprising that the notions of statehood developed by Georg Jellinek or Max Weber are discussed to this very day. But any account if its development would be incomplete if the major events of the 20th century were not mentioned, leading to the perception that there can only be one winner in the conflict between Anglo-Saxon Liberalism, Continental Conservatism and International Socialism. The first to go down in this run was Continental Conservatism. The First and Second World Wars signified an end to the ideas of *Volk*, *Vaterland*, and Romantic Passion – because by their very perversion they invoked the passion of those they aimed to oppose: Liberal Democrats in the First, and both Democrats and Communists in the Second World War. The two alienated brothers even briefly combined their forces to fight back the threat posed by Nazi Germany.

After 1945 the stage was then open for the last ideological battle between liberal democracy and totalitarian egalitarianism. It was decided in 1989, and it was liberal democracy that left the ideological battlefield as a victor.

From State of Nature to Liberal Nation State – Process or Mere Expression of Rationality?

Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause suggest that 'the triumph of the nation state as *the* solution to political order can be told in … three different … ways': the first is Hobbesian in outlook, and is most outspoken in Charles Tilly's *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*, where 'war makes states'.[40] This implies that the state, being in an ever hostile and insecure environment with other states, needs to provide its citizens with security – which may imply war and the constant threat thereof. Secondly, and along the lines of the Enlightenment, is the notion that the state needs to be representative of its population, and legitimate in its eyes. It is these two notions of the state that are most challenging. It is now commonly acknowledged that democracy and its expression through various institutions are the most appropriate form of securing representation. But is it legitimate? This brings up the issue of nationalism again, and with it the question whether institutions are an expression of man as a rational actor, or the result of a complex, historical process shared by a larger group of people. The answer to this question is crucial when seeking a remedy for failing states. Effectively, a preliminary answer has been given with the victory of liberal democracy in 1989, and the subsequent multitude of humanitarian interventions and state-building efforts during the 90s.

The third and last element of what constitutes a nation state is the provision of wealth and welfare. This idea is firmly linked to the Industrial Revolution and the growing material disparity. Quickly it was acknowledged that a more even spread of wealth would, if not altogether hinder, then at least minimize the risk of recurring economic crisis due to overproduction and underconsumption. Although this was not altogether the rationale for Bismarck introducing a welfare system, he was the first to introduce it, and thereby added to this understanding of the state's function.

Interestingly, although inherent in all the above, the issue of a state's leadership is at most only mentioned in passing. Its strongest expression is to be found in the Hobbesian and Conservative tradition. As Liberalism from its inception was concerned to abolish the concentration of power in the hands of the few, they were consequently concerned to point out that if the population serves as sovereign, leadership is not an essential issue. Again, this notion is firmly linked with the view of Liberals that the state of nature is peace, and the individual a rational actor, who will remain peaceful if he is able to pursue his individual aspirations. So to liberals it is not individual leadership but rather institutional leadership whose goal it must be to enable this individual pursuit of happiness. Conservatism starkly differs from this view. It is expressed by Clausewitz' trinity, where a rational political leadership differs from the passionate population. This differentiation carries the notion that it is the very rationality of the political leadership that ought to inspire the passion of the people.[41] This in turn is related to the overarching understanding of the concept of the nation state, where there are historically grown differences between those who lead and those who are led.

Returning to the definitions of state and nation state, one can conclude that liberal thinkers view the nation state rather as a condition of something, while conservative theorists are more akin to the definition of the nation state as 'a sovereign state of which most of the citizens or subjects also share factors such as language or common descent'.[42] In sum, the concept and functions of

the state remain a matter of debate. This debate notwithstanding, history and the development of the varying concepts of the nation state allow for an analysis of the debate on failed and failing states as well as attempts at nation-building. The guiding question which will be addressed in the following section is which concept the debate on failed states followed, and whether its outcome successfully contributed to stabilize these states in a satisfying manner. Only when this question is answered can alternatives be devised.

Three: Failing States – Territories in Troubled Waters

The different notions of what a state is and what functions it has to fulfil now allow us to turn to the issue of failing states. The three schools distinguished above will provide a framework here as well, for if they offer differing views of the nation-state, they will equally differ on what a failing or failed state is. It does not suffice, though, only to look at the varying definitions of the phenomenon of failing states, which will be done as a first step. In order to clearly distinguish between the varying schools of thought attention has to be given to the respective analyses of the root causes of the phenomenon. It is these root causes which inform attempts to provide a cure for territories in troubled waters, and offer insights in the underlying interpretations of the functioning state. The section does not set out to discuss these divergent approaches yet – this can only be seriously attempted after having turned to empirical evidence.

The Ongoing Debate on Renaming Anarchy

The debate about the phenomenon of failing or failed states is not an entirely new debate.[43] It commenced in the wake of the end of the Cold War, when Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner in a contribution to *Foreign Policy* pointed out the dangers of 'the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community'.[44] To them, this phenomenon was triggered by the explosive increase in nation-states in the wake of post-colonialism and post-socialism. This view was commonly held, and found its way into policy making when in 1995 then United Nations Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali announced in a supplement to *An Agenda for Peace* that peacebuilding also has to involve state-building. To him, this meant helping utterly incapable states to build institutional mechanisms able to maintain peace.

Although failed states did play a role during the 90s, this was perceived to be a soluble problem in the wider context of peacebuilding. The events of 9/11 led to a renewed focus on failed or failing states, as they were perceived as a threat to international security, providing safe havens for terrorists and organized crime networks.[45] This is epitomized in the US National Security Strategy of 2002, which states that 'America is now threatened less by conquering than by failing ones'.[46]

But what is a failing state? Although there is widespread agreement on the consequences of a failed state the phenomenon is, as Stefan Mair points out, contested.[47] Robert Rotberg, for example, defines a failed state as '…tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions',[48] and the state is therefore unable to provide its population with public goods. To Michael Ignatieff, a state has failed when the government loses the monopoly of violence, and thus can not fulfil the Weberian criterion.[49] In his detailed study on the issue, William Zartmann regards a state as collapsed when the basic functions of a state are no longer performed.[50] In sum, instead of providing a social order, a failed stated is experiencing a state of anarchy, accompanied by violence. Another feature commonly added to a failed state is its inability to exercise control over its borders.[51]

There is disagreement on the term itself however, and several alternatives are offered. Generally speaking, the disagreement on the term itself relates to the emphasis the authors place in their analyses. Failed States, Weak States, Collapsed States, Failing States, Fragile States, Recovering States, Crisis States or Low Income Countries Under Stress are all attempts at giving an appropriate name to the phenomena of political instability, violence and lack of economic development.[52] In a nutshell: anarchy. Rather than discussing them individually, this paper will group them according to their ideological underpinning, to distil the current trend, and enable the search for alternatives. The following table summarizes the main aspects of indices seeking to categorize state failure.[53]

Table 1: Summary Of Indices Rating State Failure
Source: Author

	Emphasis	**Definition/ Categorisation**	**Indicators**
Bertelsmann Transformations Index[54]	• Democratic transformation • Economic liberalization	States can be characterized as having • Bad preconditions • Serious obstacles leading to failure.	• Political transformation • Economic transformation • Capacity to manage public resources • Delivery of basic services
Centre for Global Development[55]	• Development • Economic performance	States don't fail but perform badly, and there are 3 categories of 'Poorly Performing States': • Worst perfomers • Struggling on many fronts • Near misses	• Political and economic freedom • Rule of law • Public spending
Department for International Development (DFID)[56]	• Development • Poverty reduction	A state is regarded as fragile when the government can not or will not deliver its core functions	• Territorial control • Safety & security • Capacity to manage public resources • Delivery of basic services
Crisis State Research Centre, London School of Economics[57]	• State vulnerability • State effectiveness	States are categorised as: • Fragile states • Crisis states • Failed states	• Territorial control • Safety & security • Institutional performance

Failed State Index[58]	• Security • Liberal democracy	States are: • Critical • Endangered • Latently endangered to failure	• Mounting demographic pressure • Massive movement of refugees/internally displaced persons • Legacy of vengeance • Group grievance
Political Stability Task Force[59]	• Security	States fail if an instance where central authority collapses for several years	• Revolutionary wars • Ethnic wars • Adverse regime change • Genocide/ politicides
UN Human Development Index, UN Development Programme[60]	• Development • Economic performance	Low human development index rating characterises least developed countries	• Life expectancy • Literacy rate • Educational level • Gross national index per capita • Nutrition • Economic stability
World Bank Governance/Low Income Countries under Stress Indicators[61]	• Governance • Use of foreign aid for poverty reduction	4 categories of low income countries under stress: • Prolonged political crisis • Deteriorating • Fragile transition • Gradual improvers	• Ability to protect & support the poorest • Economic performance • Structural policies • Inclusion/equality policies • Public sector management

Major Trends in the Failed States Debate

Jonathan Di John distinguishes between five major trends that prevail in contemporary literature on the failing state phenomenon:[62]

- Liberal markets and transparent, accountable states with bureaucracies with classic Weberian structures are a necessary input for successful economic development to proceed.

- Economic liberalisation and democracy promote peace; war is development in reverse.

- Clientilist and patrimonial states are purposefully constructed by elites to promote their interests in capital accumulation and power; state failure can not be measured, as it fails to incorporate how political leadership adapts to historical constraints.

- 'New War' Thesis: due to the process of globalisation war has become apolitical; resources have become object of struggle.

- 'Resource Curse Argument': abundance of natural resources, and in particular oil, causes poor growth, and raises the incidence, intensity and duration of conflict.

These views can be linked to the ideological underpinning of what constitutes a state, and how it is constructed. Two further aspects can be derived from them: the causes for state failure and the way ahead from each view. The table below provides an overview.

Table 2: The Five Major Trends In State Failure Linked To The Three Notions Of Statehood
Source: Author

	Ideological Underpinning	Reason for Failure	The Way Ahead
Liberal markets & good governance	Liberalism	The lack of integration of domestic and global markets coupled with institutions incapable of adapting to new challenges cause a state to fall into anarchy	Institutional & economic reform will lead to a peaceful liberal democracy[63]
Economic liberalisation & democracy	Liberalism	Failed & failing states lack democratic government. The autocratic regime striving to stay in power applies protectionist policies, hindering economic development	Establishment of democratic government, primarily through elections[64]
Leadership adapting to historical constraints	Continental Conservatism	The post cold war world, independence and globalization pose a major challenge to the traditional elite, whose ability to uphold stability is limited	External actors can not impose a way out, which as part of a larger historical process will only be found by domestic actors[65]

New Wars	Radicalism	Globalisation and market liberalization have led to a change in the nature of war: instead of resources being a means for struggle, they become the object, which leads to endemic anarchy	Violence will persist as long as there is no even distribution of wealth[66]
Resource curse arguments	Radicalism	Possession of natural resources, especially oil	Violence will persist as long as resources provide huge profit margins[67]

There is great variety in the debate, and just like most other phenomena in the human sphere, failing or failed states are contested. Whether it is the term itself, the root causes, or the ways ahead – there is no widespread agreement. Despite this lack of conformity among policy-makers and academics alike, and despite the varying theoretical lenses, there is one point which is agreed upon: without the establishment of security first, there is no way out of the anarchic spiral through time.[68]

But how can security be established if there is no one to establish it? Security, according to all definitions and interpretations of the nation-state is a core function of the state. A failed or failing state fails exactly because it is not able to provide this security to its population. A facilitator is needed, and this facilitator is the international community. This call for the international community as a first aid to struggling states brings up the issue of intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign state, which will be discussed in the next section.

Four: Victor's Justice – The Triumph of Liberalism After 1989

This section will differ from the previous section in two ways. First, the level of analysis changes from domestic politics to international politics; second, it will argue that one of the above mentioned theories has been dominant after the Cold War. Immediately after the Cold War, liberal peace euphoria occurred. Liberalism, the triumph of the Cold War, was coupled with a hands-on 'manifest destiny', viewing liberal markets and the establishment of democracy as the panacea to all evil and wrongdoing in the world. In order to develop this argument, two aspects closely related to the issue of weak states shall be highlighted: intervention and nation-building.

Interventions in the 1990s – Damming the Flood of Violence?

Interventions in sovereign states are a problem of international law. But law is not merely a catalogue of paragraphs, rather it should be seen as a combination of many factors which impact on law – morals, ethics, traditions, religion and culture, to name but a few, all influence the codes of law we seek to apply.[69] The core of law is to establish rights and duties to its subjects. Generally speaking, the establishment of rights and duties, whether domestic or international, has been a liberal cause.[70] Law breathes the air of rationality, in the individual as much as in the institutions whose task it is to uphold them.

Unlike in the domestic context, where a domestic order is already established through the existence of an authority, the international system is ruled by anarchy. This notwithstanding, international law has developed since Hugo Grotius *De Iure Belli ac Pacis*, seeking to bring order into anarchy and interstate relations.[71] Without dwelling on the history of international law, and the problematic system it operates in, the issue of intervention is discussed here along two lines. The first, following the argumentation of legal positivists, identifies the codified aspects of international law related to intervention. The second is more akin to a natural law interpretations, and explores the normative aspects of interventions.

Before turning to the legal aspects *per se*, it first has to be established what is understood as an intervention in international law. The starting point for this is to state that states, the most important subject in international law, are sovereign. Akin to the Westaphalian *cuius regio, eius religio*, the domestic affairs of a sovereign state remain a matter of its jurisdiction. Interference into the jurisdiction of one state by another state, however well-intentioned, is thus regarded as an intervention.[72] This may include the threat or application of diplomatic, economic or military sanctions.

Drafted in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the UN Charter's main thrust was to regulate the use of force.[73] It is for this reason that intervention is mostly related to the use of military force in order to achieve a specific goal within another state's jurisdiction without its consent, or more simply, to wage a war. The UN Charter, and its regulation of the use of force thus provide the departure point to discuss the legal aspects of interventions.

The Use of Force: No Law Without Exceptions

The UN Charter issues a general prohibition on the use of force, stating in Article 2 (4) that all countries shall 'refrain from the threat or use of force'. Only two exceptions to this general prohibition are acknowledged by the Charter. The first, and arguably the most applied until 1989, is the 'inherent right of individual and collective self defence if an armed attack occurs'.[74] The second exception is if the UN Security Council, as the guardian of world peace and stability, recognizes a situation as a '... threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression' (Article 39), and subsequently authorizes UN member states to 'use all necessary means' in order to secure peace again (Article 42).[75]

While the United Nations was reduced to a rather inactive role during the Cold War, as the Security Council was rendered ineffective through the veto-power the opposed ideological representatives possessed, the end of the Cold War made way for a renewed role for the UN. It was perceived that now, with the potentially most futile of all wars ended, the UN could finally take up its intended role as the supervisor of global peace and stability.[76] And the UN took up this new role with great zeal, engaging in a multitude of activities that were tailored to bring peace to the world.

When Interventions Become Just: Normative Aspects of Interventions

The belief in the moral superiority and legitimacy of the UN was coupled with a perception that eternal peace and a world community are bound to happen in the near future. Underlying this was a clear idea: liberal democracy has won the battle, and albeit imperfect, it is the panacea to all problems. Empirical evidence was soon found. Huntington established a third wave of democracy, and Bruce Russett discovered in large scale studies that democracies are less likely to resort to violence – between them as much as within them.[77] States that once were ruled by egalitarian

communism were busy transforming their system of governance to liberal market democracies. Additionally it seemed that the process of decolonization, once hindered by the Cold War overlay, could finally come to an end. After centuries of violence, the victory of liberal rationality was at arm's length.

As this paper is not concerned about the legal aspects related to intervention and the accompanying discussion among legal scholars and policymakers, but more with actual policy outcomes of humanitarian interventions during the nineties, these most interesting debates shall be left aside.[78] The guiding question here is which normative perception led the United Nations and much of the Western world (or, in other words, the international community) to intervene in a multitude of sovereign nations? What allowed for qualifying interventions normatively? What made interventions 'humanitarian'?

Figure 1: Global Regimes by Type
Source: Polity IV[79]

Quickly the euphoria described above was dampened: brutal civil wars were raging in many places.[80] In 1992 a report on conflicts by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research counted 100 ongoing violent conflicts in the world, of which 38 were new.[81] Europe was facing violence at its front-doors in what used to be called Yugoslavia; Africa experienced violent internal conflicts in Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Sudan to name but a few famous cases; Asia faced ethnic strife in Myanmar and the Indian Kashmir region; and in the Americas the conflicts of El Salvador, Guatemala or Peru had not tuned into the ode to peace.

Figure 2: Development of Intra- And Interstate Conflict Since 1945
Source: Conflict-Barometer 2007[82]

Legally speaking, a civil war is a matter of a sovereign country's jurisdiction, and not a matter for any other state. It may well become a threat to international peace and security though, if the Security Council decides so. And in the wake of a Wilsonian democratic manifest destiny the Security Council decided on 14 occasions that international peace and security were threatened, and peace needed to be built.[83] That this was essentially a task for the UN was announced in *An Agenda for Peace* by the former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros Ghali.[84] *An Agenda for Peace* distinguishes between four forms of UN-interventions: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Figure 3: Development of Active UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2006
Source: Heritage Foundation[85]

Number of Active U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2006

Figure 3 shows the dramatic increase in UN-led operations since the end of the Cold War. What was the main thrust behind these efforts? What made the UN intervene in the first place? The end of a world divided by ideological boundaries and iron curtains gave way to the processes of globalisation and regional integration. 24 hour global news coverage brought the grievances of people experiencing civil war into the households of those who had television.[86] In the eyes of the western public the violence and brutality was unbearable. What was on display was at odds with moral preconceptions. Human rights, it was argued, are for humanity, and those capable of ensuring the observance of human rights must do so – if necessary by force. Thus public pressure had a major influence on the operations by the UN. Opponents to this view argued that such intervention, albeit authorized by the UN, violated the *ius cogens* of self-determination and sovereignty. Not so according to liberal thinkers, like Fernando R Tesón, who argues that interventions intended to bring an end to suffering are a categorical imperative.[87] If force is needed to achieve this end, they too involve violence. This is to be considered the lesser evil compared to the atrocities a population has to suffer. It was, in other words, altruistic humanitarian intervention seeking to establish perpetual peace, rather than intervention guided by *realpolitik* power interests.[88]

While there was no ground for debate if interventions were authorized by the Security Council, and led by UN-mandated forces, the issue of humanitarian debate came to the fore with the NATO led 'humanitarian intervention' in Kosovo in 1998. NATO, having had to adapt to the lack of an enemy to defend against, elevated itself to similar moral high ground when it decided to intervene in Kosovo with the declared goal of stopping Serbian atrocities against Kosovars. Although there was considerable debate between the members of the Security Council as well as among legal scholars, the *post facto* sanctioning by the UN Security Council, and the absence

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of condemnation through a Security Council member led to the conclusion that the intervention was legally dubious but morally justified.[89] The Kosovo incident thus set a precedent for a further exception to the general prohibition on the use of force – humanitarian intervention, legitimized by the zeal to bring an end to human suffering. In other words, enlightened liberal theory had not only won the battle against its radical egalitarian brother in 1989, it also solidified its aspiration to be the guardian of world peace.

Bringing peace and making it last though are two different tasks. Quickly it was realized that the main challenge for liberal crusaders was not to make peace, but to make it last. It was the fourth of Boutros Ghali's categories in his *Agenda for Peace*, post-conflict peace building. It is away from the moral high ground where the issue of failing or failed states proved to be of high relevance, as the interveners quickly realized that in many cases the root cause of the conflict was that civil war was a systemic error of the state in question, and merely bringing peacemaking did not suffice. The concept of technocratic state-building was born.

Reinforcing the Dykes – State Building

The aim of state building is to develop a 'functional state apparatus'.[90] This includes security, governance, economic stabilization, democratization and fostering of economic development.[91] The following will show that during the 1990s an emphasis was placed on democratization efforts.

As Timothy Carothers points out, the idea of aiding democracy abroad was not an entirely new idea of the 90s.[92] He distinguishes between three 'waves' of democratic efforts prior to the 90s. During the 60s and 70s, under the influence of the Kennedy administration, the US believed it had 'the unique capacity, as well as the duty or even destiny, to do good in the world'.[93] The theory of modernization held sway in the western world, particularly in the US, and it was put to a test. The idea that (economic) development assistance would inevitably lead to a development of liberal democracy and fight back terrorism could not be translated into reality. Hence the applied modernization theory soon lost its credibility,[94] and attempts to promote democracy abroad received another impetus during the Reagan administration during the 80s.

President Ronald Reagan's staunch anti-communist policy slowly but progressively incorporated the idea of the promotion of democracy abroad. Central America, which was a focus of anti-communist operations at the beginning of the 80s, became the laboratory for these attempts. By and large these programmes remained only one aspect of the battle against communism, and the support of non-democratic but staunch anti-socialist dictators waned only slowly under the impression of a greater wave of democratization not only in the western hemisphere, but also in Asia.[95]

When in 1989 the fall of the Berlin Wall epitomized the end of socialism, promotion of democracy became a priority. After all, 'democracy's won!'[96] and some even foresaw the 'end point in mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human governance'[97] as a result of this victory. The disintegration of the former Soviet bloc marked the rapid expansion of regimes seeking democratic governance, soon followed in other parts of the world. Aiding democracy abroad was suddenly of intense interest, and remained 'a core priority' for the remainder of the 20th century. This is exemplified by the US government funding for democracy assistance.[98]

This trend was accompanied by a steep incline in intense civil conflict in many parts of the developing world. Hence although the liberal democracies skyrocketed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, so did civil wars. Under the impression of the liberal victory, in parts still informed by earlier successful pacifying effects of democracy in Germany and Japan, a solution was soon found: liberal democracy. Numerous studies seeking to empirically prove Immanuel Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' were conducted, and a positive correlation between democratic forms of government and peace was established.[100]

The academic debate found its way into policy-making, and it was Boutros Boutros Ghali again who furthered his 'An Agenda for Peace' to 'An Agenda for Democratization'.[101] The aim of interventions suddenly became clear: A transition to a liberal democracy, with free markets and democratic institutions needed to be established. After peace was achieved through negotiation or the use of force by the international community, the first step towards this was to hold multiparty elections. The second step was to open formerly closed markets to foreign direct investment. It was only upon the realization that despite these efforts the established peace was of short duration – relapse into conflict was the norm rather than the exception – that institution-building became more and more important.[102] The difficulties notwithstanding, the trust in democracy as the best, albeit imperfect, form of government remained undisturbed, and an industry of democratization coupled with peace-building emerged during the mid-nineties.[103]

But what impact does institution-building and the demand for good governance have on establishing lasting peace if the overarching institution, the state itself, is fragile or weak? Without the fulfilment of the Weberian criteria of a state, specific programmes would not suffice. A coherent approach was called for on an even greater scale: 'the imperative of state-building',[104] in the wake of realizing that disintegrating or failed states not only are characterized by internal anarchy, but also may be the breeding ground for terrorism and transnational organized crime, and thus pose a threat to international security.[105]

From Emergency Dams to Dykes Against Violence

This section has characterized the nineties as a decade of liberal triumph. After winning the Cold War, liberal moral values found their way into international law, and liberal notions of eternal peace their way into international politics. A democratic 'manifest destiny' was firmly based on the liberal assumption that man is a rational actor that adheres to the rational checks and balances provided by a system of democratic institutions, and that peace rather than violence is the state of nature. Hence the international community set out to contain the wild waters of violence by establishing emergency dykes creating and upholding peace. Upon realization that the dams of peace are fragile and weak, and violence the result of structural errors in the development of a country, the dams were reinforced by building democracy and institutions.

The issue of failed or failing states questions whether these attempts have been successful. The following section thus asks whether these dams have actually been built where the troubled waters are. More poignantly: what was the impact of humanitarian interventions during the nineties on the issue of fragile states? And if they did have an impact, what could have been lacking in the consolidation of the fragile peace established by liberal interventions?

Five: Case Studies

This section will look at three cases of civil conflict with intervention by the international community. In order to test the hypothesis that striving to bring democracy to establish lasting peace, and by that creating fragile statehood, the following questions are asked:

- What was the role of the international community in peacemaking?

- How did the international community promote peace after peace had been made?

- What is the current status of the countries intervened into? Can they be described as stable countries?

- Why?

The cases are drawn from a variety of regions, in order to enable conclusions which are not bound by cultural or regional peculiarities. Another reason to choose Guatemala, Cambodia and Rwanda as cases was to falsify the main hypothesis of this paper. *Prima facie* a case needed to be examined where no intervention had taken place. It is argued here that although there was a UN engagement in Rwanda, it failed, and left Rwanda to take care of its own fate. Secondly, in order to maintain the view that interventions do not necessarily mean the use of force, but that any interference within the jurisdiction of a state with the proclaimed goal to establish a liberal democracy in order to achieve peace suffices, a case needed to be examined where mainly political interference occurred (Guatemala).

Another point has to be made before discussing the cases individually. None of these cases plays a prominent role in the current debate on nation-building in the wake of western interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Neither of these cases has been selected. The first reason for this is that they do not fall within the timeline in question, as both occurred in the 21st century, rather than during the last decade of the 20th century. The second reason is that although they are widely discussed, the underlying notion which informs reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not substantially changed since the first interventions in the name of liberal democracy as the favoured panacea to violence. It is argued here, therefore, that the lessons to be drawn from these cases can to a large extent, at least in regard to the principles guiding post-conflict reconstruction, be applied to the current *status quo*.

Guatemala

Figure 4: Map of Guatemala
Source: CIA World Factbook[106]

Guatemala is most populous Central American country, situated just south of Mexico, bordering Belize to the east, El Salvador to the west and Honduras to the south. Of the approximately 12,000,000 inhabitants 60% are of indigenous origin, with the remainder being *ladino*. 23 different languages are spoken, dispersed over a territory of only 108,890km². Economically speaking the country is characterized by an extreme socioeconomic divide, the highest in Latin America.[107]

Within the Latin American context, Guatemala suffered the longest and most costly of wars. During its 36 year duration, 200,000 people lost their lives, 1 million people were displaced.[108] It was in essence a peasant revolt led by the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (URNG)[109] against the disproportionate distribution of wealth, in which unequal access to land played a central role. With a majority of the population being indigenous, the socio-economic issue was quickly coupled with ethnic considerations, culminating under the rule of General Efrain Rios Montt. After a coup in 1982, he triggered an ethnic war against the Maya, applying scorched earth tactics, the internment of Maya in model villages, and is accused of having committed genocide. Montt's authoritarian regime did not last longer than a year, as another coup occurred in 1983. In 1986, Guatemala held the first democratic elections since the beginning of the war, and Vinicio Cerezo became president. Although the fighting between the major factions continued, it became more and more evident that there would not be a military solution to the problem. This was also the case in the other looting civil wars in the region (Nicaragua, El Salvador), and in a summit in Esquipulas in 1987 the three heads of state signed an agreement that committed them to negotiate peace. Unlike Nicaragua and El Salvador, which achieved peace within the next 5 years, the Guatemalan peace negotiations lasted almost 10 years.

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The reason for this is to be seen in the largely exclusive society, where the major power-holders, namely the military establishment and big business, and the insurgent group URNG sought to keep their respective positions. In 1996, after ten years of negotiation, a peace deal that should bring peace to the country was signed between the URNG and the Guatemalan government.[110]

Peace achieved

Without spending too much time on the negotiations themselves, three dominant factors stand out in the process which ended in the final signature.[111] The first is the continued effort of the international community. At the forefront stands the UN, which not only helped mediating the talks, but also committed to oversee and verify the peace process with the *United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala* (MINUGUA).[112] Other international actors involved were the 'Group of Friends' (Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the USA and Venzuela) and the Organisation of American States. Although not directly involved in the negotiations, international monetary institutions also exercised considerable influence on Guatemala's economic elite, which resulted in a shift of attitude of the elite, fearing that if peace is not achieved, Guatemala would remain isolated in the process of globalization.[113] The second is what Susanne Jonas calls the 'decentaurization', which refers to the gradual decline of importance of the Guatemalan military. While the military traditionally saw itself as the 'spinal column of the Guatemalan state, and has involved itself in everything from counterinsurgency and internal security to civic action and vaccinating babies', it gradually acceded to the position that its centrality to the state had to diminish if peace was to be achieved.[114] A 'never' turned into agreement to drastic cuts in finance and personnel, as well as a role limited to the defence of the country from external threats. The third and last aspect that stands out is that the peace accords do not single out a victor, but are the result of a process which made all parties sacrifice for the aim of establishing a democratic, multiethnic society which strives to enhance greater socio-economic equality. The process was to be led by Guatemala itself, with financial and technical support by the international community.[115]

Peace maintained?

Two broad aspects guided the efforts to make peace last.[116] On the political side, Guatemala, with the help of the international community, sought to overcome its exclusionary politics by allowing free and fair elections as a first step. Further steps included the integration of indigenous people into the policy-making process, and the creation of effective institutions that would manage the relations in society. A focus here was to reform the justice sector, which was characterized by its lack of effectiveness, which created a state of impunity. The buzzword of good governance took hold. On the economic side, where much of the root causes of the civil war were to be found, issues that were addressed were largely macroeconomic. This process was guided by the international financial institutions. Although the problem of land tenure was of vital importance during the negotiations, this issue remains unsolved; equally unsolved remains the issue of tax reform. Thus although steps for change have been undertaken on the macroeconomic scale, in order to adapt and integrate Guatemala into the world market, the microeconomic sector remains largely unchanged, leading to little change in the socio-economic divide characterizing Guatemalan society.

The status quo

Where is Guatemala now, 12 years after the peace accords have been signed? Have the high aims of change in a liberal democratic direction been achieved? Formally speaking Guatemala is a democracy with free and open elections, and the old warring factions have not taken up arms against each other. But, as Fishel argues, Guatemala provides a showcase for the 'illusion of peace'.[117] While Guatemala today does not face political violence as it did during 36 years of civil war, there has been a 'transition of violence' to criminal activity.[118] In 2006, Guatemala experienced 45.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, fifth highest in the world (neighbouring El Salvador, also a country that experienced intervention during the nineties, leads the list). This equals 16 lives claimed daily through non-political violence, or 5885 victims of homicide in 2006, an increase of 64% since 2001.[119] This exceeds the number of daily victims claimed during the civil war. Guatemala is plagued by endemic crime, mostly drug related, but also illegal trading of tropical woods, human trafficking and youth delinquency.[120] The state of impunity in Guatemala prevails, with a conviction rate of a mere 5%. According to a RAND study, the Guatemalan state has lost the ability to exercise control over its territory.[121]

Which factors contributed to this development? Three factors stand out: the first factor is related to 'decentaurization'. The Guatemalan military which was traditionally responsible for internal security, today has a role limited to defence against external threats. Internal security now lies in the realm of the National Civil Police (PNC). 12 years after the peace accords, it is questionable whether the PNC is capable and willing to address this task. The PNC is known for endemic corruption, involvement in the drug business, and death squads.[122] The second factor is the lack of reintegration of former combatants after demobilizing the URNG and the armed forces. After reintegration courses, they quickly realized that resort to their old trade – violence – was more profitable. This has to be seen in the wider context of economic reforms initiated since 1996, which largely focused on macro-economic issues, rather than seeking to close the socio-economic gorge.[123] The lack of micro-economic reform meant no change for the majority of the population, and hit former combatants especially hard, as they had lost their traditional trade.[124] Organized crime therefore proved a lucrative alternative, where the acquired skills were a welcome qualification. The last factor is that Guatemala still is a divided country with no common *patria*. On the one hand are the wealthy *ladinos*, a small percentage of the whole population, on the other hand the vast majority of the Mayan population, almost 60% of the overall population. Between them are those unlucky enough to share the burden of the 70% of Guatemalans who are estimated to live below the poverty line. But not only does the economic divide hinder a common understanding. The indigenous population, which is traditionally cautious of any foreign influence, identifies itself not only against these foreign 'invaders', but also against other Mayan tribes in Guatemala.

Summary

The Guatemalan peace accords of 1996 are the result of a rational compromise, which did not address the root causes of violence in Guatemala. The accords, albeit perfectly suited to change the country on paper, lacked passion that could motivate the population to regard peace as their project. The political leadership was cautious to manage the accords rather than to use them as a base to bring about change, and did not receive any stimulus to do so by the international community.

One of the reasons for this can be found in the exclusive society in Guatemala.[125] During the Civil War three groups prevailed, the military, business and the insurgents. The Guatemalan government was a puppet to the former two groups during the war, and can thus not be regarded as a faction with a serious role in the negotiation process. The duration of the peace process showed that these three parties saw peace as a compromise, as no military victory was achievable. But all three parties used the negotiations to continue their struggle on paper, and sought to broker the best deal.

The international community ought to be regarded as a fourth actor at the negotiation table. And the solution they pushed left a clear winner and loser within the Guatemalan context, and a third party being in the same position as before. The decision to reduce the Guatemalan military in size, function and impact left the largest gain to big business. Another factor that contributed to the victory of big business was the incoming financial aid, which largely relied on macroeconomic initiatives. What the URNG had fought for, and which was agreed upon on paper, were microeconomic reforms, which the government, traditionally powerless in Guatemala, was to implement. Little progress has been made on this issue, demonstrating that the URNG left the negotiating table neither as winner nor as loser – after all, the violence directed against them had stopped, and a return to 'normal' life seemed possible.

The effect created by the peace accord was thus that the socio-economic vacuum that existed prior to the war continues to exist. However it was de-politicized. For many Guatemalans the only option to improve their livelihood was to return to what they knew best: violence. They found ready employers in the drug business, which could use the skills acquired during the war to further their trafficking interest. Traditionally, the military would counter such internal violence. But just as many ex-soldiers as former guerrilla fighters are now serving in organized crime groups, and their unpolitical, materialistic war, is being turned into a new generation of violent actors.

Cambodia

Figure 5: Map of Cambodia
Source: CIA World Factbook[126]

Cambodia is located in southeastern Asia, with Thailand on its north-western borders, Laos towards the northern borders, and Vietnam being the neighbour to the east. The approximately 14 million inhabitants share a territory of 181,040 sq km, although much of the country is scarcely populated. Cambodia is ethnically homogenous, with 95% of the population being ethnic Khmer, or Cambodians, 5% Vietnamese, 1% Chinese and 3% of other ethnic origins.[127]

Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953, being ruled by King Sihanouk until 1955. The king then stepped down to allow for democratic elections, which subsequently made him head of state again. After 15 years of political stability, a military coup was staged against the government of Sihanouk by General Lol Non, which was successful, but contested by a group of communists later called the Khmer Rouge. The coup of 1955 put Cambodia on the international agenda, as the seat Cambodia held in the UN was quickly occupied by the government of Lol Non, but retaken by Sihanouk in the same year, as the Khmer Rouge, with support of Vietnam and the king began their armed struggle against the regime of General Non.[128]

This group successfully challenged the military junta, and came to power in 1975. During their rule Cambodia suffered a genocidal campaign, as the Khmer Rouge were trying to establish an agricultural Cambodia according to the example of the Khmer regime in the 11th century.[129] This 'perverse re-engineering of society' would cost between 1.4 and 1.7 million Cambodian lives.[130] Again it was Vietnamese involvement that brought the Southeast Asian country back on the international agenda, as it forcefully intervened into Cambodian territory. The intervention was

backed financially by the Soviet Union, and led by defectors of the Khmer Rouge who lived in Vietnam. It was successful, and rid Cambodia of the Khmer government, but could not defeat them absolutely. This marked the beginning of 13 years of civil war in Cambodia.

The civil war was greatly influenced by Cold War overlay. The Vietnamese continued to receive support from the Soviet Union, and could therefore afford continuous support to the newly installed government in Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge proper were supported by the Chinese government, which feared Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia and growing Soviet influence in the region. Two minor factions fought alongside the Khmer Rouge, of which the *Front Uni Pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif* (FUNCINPEC) was most influential. It was led by King Sihanouk, and received support from western governments.[131] The other faction was the non-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPLNF).

When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union, and announced his policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, this meant an end of Soviet support to Vietnam. Faced with this challenge, Vietnam seized the diplomatic initiative, 'encouraged by ... Sihanouk breaking ranks with his coalition partners during 1987'.[132] With the support of the Asian countries, a solution was sought in negotiations between Sihanouk and the prime minister of the Cambodian government, Hun Sen. The aim of the coalition of Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC and KPLNF was to establish an interim government until elections under international supervision could decide the future government. This proposal was rejected by Hun Sen, primarily because he did not want to see the Khmer Rouge as an equal partner. The regional approach failed, and opened the door for the international community to step in as a negotiator.

Peace achieved

Because the factions of the civil war remained resistant to the idea of power sharing, the international community followed a plan giving the UN its most prominent role and difficult task since the end of the Cold War. Upon suggestion of US congressman Stephen Solarz, and promoted by the Australian government, the UN was to take an administrative role until elections were held. The role of the UN in the administration was balanced by a Supreme National Council, in which all warring factions were represented. It was headed by King Sihanouk, who in turn stepped down as leader of the FUNCINPEC party. This idea was finally accepted by the Phnom Penh government, still led by Hun Sen, on 23 October 1991 in Paris, and hence was called the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement gave the UN a prominent role. It was to prepare Cambodia for free and fair elections, by ensuring a 'neutral political environment'. That the UN would take over transitional responsibility for administrative aspects of a sovereign country was a novelty, and gave the mission its name: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC. Besides the administrative role of the UN, there was a large military component seeking to disarm and demobilize the armed forces of the warring factions, as well as a civilian aspect promoting the idea of elections and the prospects of liberal democracy. In order to fulfil this challenging task, the UN mounted the biggest operation since intervening in Congo in the 50s, with 22,000 personnel on the ground, spending an overall sum of US$1.5 billion.[133]

Peace maintained?

UNTAC is widely described as a success. In 1993, 18 months after the beginning of the mission, Cambodia held what were regarded as free and fair elections.[134] The result of these elections, however, shed light on a severe shortcoming of UNTAC. Albeit being integrated into the local

administration in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), led by Hun Sen, had managed to maintain its control over a vital sector of the administration, namely the security sector.[135] This allowed Hun Sen, whose CPP only came second behind Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC in the 1993 elections, to press for a coalition government with two prime ministers (the son of Sihanouk, Prince Ranariddh was first prime minister, Hun Sen occupied the post of second prime minister), and King Sihanouk the head of state. An important factor contributing to this bipartisan struggle for absolute power in Cambodia was the fact that the Khmer Rouge boycotted the elections completely, thus missing the chance of continuing their bid. The Khmer Rouge to this day controls territories in the northwest of Cambodia, close to the border with Thailand.

Power sharing came to an end shortly after the second elections in 1997. The struggle was decided in favour of Hun Sen and the CPP. In an apparently bloodless coup, which had been predated by severe political violence though, he ousted Ranariddh and became first and only prime minister of Cambodia.[136] Due to his control over the vital sectors of the administration, he claimed sole power for the CPP 19 years after he and other defected members of the Khmer Rouge led the Vietnamese invasion into Cambodia.

The surge of economic aid that Cambodia received as part of the international community's commitment was desperately needed, but was not able to influence any of the political events. As in Guatemala, these efforts were largely macroeconomic, and thus had little impact on the overall situation of the great majority of the population.[137]

The Status Quo

Hun Sen and the CPP have maintained their power since 1997. Cambodia is increasingly becoming a focus of organized crime, especially illegal logging, human and drug trafficking. Most of these activities are linked to corrupt public officials, with the military and police playing a prominent role.[138] In addition, the judicial system is marked by its chronic lack of effectiveness, leaving a state of impunity. On the other hand, politically speaking Cambodia is much more stable than before.[139] It is thus surprising that most indices related to state failure rate Cambodia as a failed state in 2006. An aspect in favour of this assessment is the inability of the government to fully control its borders. Taking into account the endemic corruption and involvement of government representatives in organized crime on the one hand, and the seeming success in keeping opposition parties firmly in check through the apparatus also involved in crime, this seems more a lack of will than a lack of ability (especially since the last strongholds of the Khmer Rouge have been taken by government forces).

Summary

The question is whether this stability has been achieved because of the intervention of the international community. If one considers the Hun Sen government as the representation of the will of the Cambodian majority, as depicted in the relatively free and fair elections since 1993, then this stability certainly is an expression of UN success, and would falsify the hypothesis that UN missions encourage state failure. On the other hand, taking a closer look at the historical development before the international intervention, it seems that the UN was used by the three main political factions in Cambodia to continue their struggle for absolute power under different circumstances. With the overlay of the Cold War gone, which had allowed the three factions to pursue their aim by violent means, by supporting them financially and materially, they had to discover new strategies for the post Cold War environment. The strong opposition of Hun Sen to

allowing the Khmer Rouge any political position in a democratic Cambodia played well into the hands of the humanitarian waves sweeping the West at the time, as the atrocities they committed started to come to light. Today, the Khmer Rouge, once the strongest opponent of Hun Sen's CPP, serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations about aid.

Only FUNCINPEC and CPP remained. Due to the realities of power distribution in the country, a power-sharing agreement was agreed upon. In retrospect, it was easy to predict that one of the two parties would eventually vanish. Although it seems easy to point to the CPP as the party likely to win this battle due to its control over the security sector, reality was not so easy due to the immense standing of King Sihanouk and the royal family in Cambodia. The challenge Hun Sen faced was to keep the king and his moral high ground untouched, but remove his political party from power. In 1997 he succeeded. Seen from this point of view, the impact of UNTAC was to remove one faction from the list, and allow the remaining two to adapt themselves to the renewed circumstances at the end of the Cold War, until they could continue their struggle along the new parameters.

Rwanda

Figure 6: Map of Rwanda
Source: CIA World Factbook[140]

Rwanda is a very small Central African country covering an area of only 26,338 sq km. It is landlocked and shares borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the east, Uganda to the north, Tanzania to the west and Burundi to the south. Rwanda is the most densely populated

African country, being home to a population of approximately 10 million. Although there are only three ethnic groups that can be distinguished in Rwanda, namely Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, with Hutu being the majority of the population, the tensions between the groups have had considerable effect on its recent history, leading to one of the most terrible incidents in the 20th century: the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[141] Although the genocide was committed along the fault lines between Hutu and Tutsi groups, history suggests that rather than ethnicity, access and control of state power was the underlying cause, as the ethnic differentiation between the two groups is by and large a product of early colonial days.[142] Prior to colonization the terms Hutu and Tutsi referred more to social class rather than ethnic origin, and social mobility in both directions was possible. Nonetheless, the Tutsi represented the upper caste in pre-colonial Rwanda.

When the first colonial master, Germany, arrived, it did little to change the strata of society it found. After Germany's defeat in the First World War, its former colonies were re-distributed, and Belgium became Rwanda's new master.[143] The Belgians had no intentions to change the Rwandan system of governance either, and supported the Tutsi predominance. This led to violent upheavals by the Hutu. In order to facilitate the policies supporting Tutsi, the Belgian authorities imposed a law that made all Rwandans carry an identification card signalling whether they were Hutu or Tutsi. As it was difficult to distinguish between the groups, the Belgians applied a rule of thumb, which marked anyone owning ten or more cattle a Tutsi, anyone else a Hutu. This administrative act further entrenched ethnicity into Rwandan society.[144]

In the wake of decolonization and democratization that followed the Second World War, the so far undisrupted support for the Tutsi suddenly changed sides, and thus granted power to the Hutu in the First Republic of Rwanda. Violence between the groups became widespread, leading to mass atrocities in 1959, which in turn led to a massive flow of refugees into neighbouring Uganda.[145] The First Republic came to an end in 1973 when Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu from northern Rwanda, toppled President Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu from southern Rwanda.[146] During the first ten years of his rule, President Habyarimana's policies were characterized by a more integrative and democratic approach. Being the only country in Central Africa not riddled by dictatorship and civil war, Rwanda became a darling of the international donor community. This led to increasing economic prosperity, earning Rwanda a reputation as 'Switzerland of Africa'.[147] However, at the beginning of the 1980s, it became clear that Habyarimana's government was granting privilege to Hutu from northern Rwanda, and that he had surrounded himself by a powerful clique.[148]

Towards the end of the nineties, Rwanda suffered a severe economic crisis, which was caused primarily by the sudden fall of coffee prices on the world market. Coffee was Rwanda's major export. In addition to the falling prices a drought caused further suffering, especially with the people in southern Rwanda. The economic suffering and the political exclusiveness of Habyarimana's regime led a group of second generation Rwandans in Uganda to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), whose aim was to oust Habyarimana's Government of Rwanda (GoR). The leaders of the RPF were offspring of the Tutsi refugees that left Rwanda in 1959.[149] After Idi Amin of Uganda had been ousted by Milton Obote, this group suffered severe atrocities, and it was therefore not surprising that a group of young Rwandans joined the efforts of Yoweri Museveni to depose Obote. They played an integral part in Museveni's efforts, which after seizing power Museveni acknowledged not only by integrating them into the new Ugandan army, but also by giving them senior positions. Rwanda's current president Paul Kagame, for example, was head of military intelligence. Towards the end of the 80s, Museveni increasingly faced domestic opposition to

this integration of refugee children. It was therefore not surprising that he quietly supported the preparations of the RPF to invade Rwanda. This support included military equipment and finance.[150] The RPF was thus well versed in military matters, and invaded Rwanda in October 1990. The initial offensive was fought back by governmental forces, which caused the RPF to change to guerrilla tactics. For the next two years, sporadic fighting continued, until with the influence of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a ceasefire was agreed, and negotiations started.[151]

Peace achieved

It was agreed by the warring factions that peace negotiations should commence in Arusha, Tanzania. It was largely a regional initiative led by the OAU, in which the countries bordering Rwanda took specific interest. Other states actively involved included France and the United States, and the two former colonial powers Belgium and Germany as observing but largely passive parties. Tanzania presided over the peace talks, as it was regarded as neutral. The negotiating process itself, as well as their content, laid the base for the genocide.[152]

Two issues stand out regarding the negotiating process itself. First and foremost, the delegation sent by Habyarimana was not representative of the core circle surrounding the government, which would not accept any peace agreement, but more moderate politicians like foreign minister Boniface Ngulinzira, who headed the delegation. The diverging interest between hardliners in the government and modest politicians willing to compromise left the GoR delegation without a clear agenda, and in the awkward position of having to negotiate on two tables at the same time.[153] They also faced increasing pressure from the extremist Hutu government coalition party *Coalition pour la Défense de la Republique* (CDR) whose representative at the negotiations, Colonel Bagasora, threatened at one point that 'if the peace accords are signed, Rwanda will experience apocalypse'.[154] This contrasted starkly with the RPF delegation. They had a clear agenda, were well organized and demonstrated their willingness to end the conflict by negotiation.

The second factor is that the RPF had a military advantage.[155] When the negotiations were breaking down in February 1993, the RPF launched an offensive. They stopped the offensive 20 miles outside Kigali, demonstrating their military superiority. However, the movement adhered to international pressure and returned to the negotiating table. The RPF also agreed that a demilitarized zone was to be established in the territory it had just gained control over. Why did they return to the negotiating table? 'We wanted to demonstrate clearly that we are committed to our aim, which was to establish a democracy in Rwanda'.[156] But clearly, the RPF was aware of the fact that with an opponent that was internally divided and beaten on the battlefield, they could only leave the negotiating table as the victor. This was the case and when the so called Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993, they were regarded as a victory for the RPF.[157]

The Arusha Accords called for the establishment of a transitional government, sharing power between Hutu and Tutsi. The aim of this transitional government was to prepare elections for 1995. Additionally, the Accords catered for the 'integration of the two armies, [and] the return of refugees to Rwanda'.[158] In order to guarantee the implementation of these goals an international observer force was called for, laying the base for the deployment of a UN mission.

Peace maintained?

In retrospect, the answer is too obvious to merit further discussion. The horrific events of April to July 1994 are still present. So is the failure of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, which withdrew its forces during the genocide. Both have been covered widely elsewhere, and

the details which remain debated are not of interest to this study.[159] For this study, it is more interesting to continue with the question of how peace was maintained after the military victory of the RPF in July 1994, and what role the international community has played in promoting stability in Rwanda after the genocide.

After the victory of the RPF, a government of national unity was installed, including all parties but the former ruling party of Habyarimana and the extremist Hutu CDR. Both were regarded as the driving motors behind the genocide. The main effort was to reconcile the country, and bring the perpetrators to justice. Another pressing concern was the re-integration of refugees and internally displaced people. The new government was to be supported in these endeavours by a second United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR II). UNAMIR II was 'to enhance security and foster reconciliation throughout the country' in cooperation with the Rwandan government. At its peak in November 1994, UNAMIR II numbered 5,635 personnel from 15 countries.[160]

Four years of ongoing civil war, culminating in a destructive genocide left the country ruined, which made the tasks set extremely difficult. There was not much of a justice system left, which made bringing the perpetrators to justice extremely difficult. Most judges had been killed in the genocide and so were prosecutors and lawyers. The prison infrastructure had been destroyed.[161] Furthermore, the new government was lacking the resources to successfully pursue its goal. The UN sought to remedy this by setting up the International Court Tribunal for Rwanda, which worked painfully slowly. The slow process upset Rwandans, who were already weary of the contribution the international community could make to help resolve their conflict.

The second major issue the new government faced was the re-integration of refugees and internally displaced people. Many of the refugees feared to return home with the prospect of having to face prison, trial or extra-judicial retribution.[162] Reintegration on the other hand was crucial to reconcile the country, a fact both the government and the UN were well aware of. But again, the legacy of the genocide and civil war proved to be a major obstacle. Property left by the refugees had been claimed by others, and infrastructure and resources were not available to cope with an influx of almost 2 million people. In addition, with the lack of justice brought to perpetrators of the genocide, the risk of violent retributions was imminent, and expressed itself on several occasions.[163] Furthermore, militias and troops of the former government used the relative safety of the refugee camps to reorganize, especially in camps located in Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire, which had been a close ally of Habyarimana.[164] UNAMIR II was not able to overcome these challenges, and started to withdraw its troops in July 1995. In March 1996, all personnel had been withdrawn.[165] By then, Rwanda was as far away from reconciliation and peace as it was when the mission started.

The Status Quo

Disappointed by the two failed UN missions, Rwanda decided to take a critical stance towards any involvement of the international community in its further development. The refugee issue set Rwanda at odds with the international community, as the RPF, supported by Uganda, intervened in Zaire with two objectives in mind: dispose of Mobutu Sese Seko, and attack the remaining militias and troops which had reorganized themselves in the refugee camps in Zaire. These groups were considered an immediate threat, and invasions into the territory of Zaire were claimed to be acts of self-defence.[166] The issue of Rwandan troops invading Congolese territory remains an

issue of regional security to this day, although a sincere effort by the Rwandan and Congolese governments to solve the issue has been launched with the peace agreement of Goma, signed in January 2008.[167]

The shaky start of the new Rwanda was also characterized by the notable absence of democratic institutions. It took until 2001 until the first elections were held, albeit only on community levels and candidates were to stand as individuals rather than representatives of political parties.[168] Prior to the elections a major reshuffle in the Rwandan government had taken place, and Maj Gen Paul Kagame, who until then served as vice-president under Pasteur Bizimungu, became the new president of Rwanda.[169]

After having held local elections in 2001, the new government under Paul Kagame installed a system of *Gacaca* courts in 2002 in order to speed up the pending trials. *Gacaca* courts are the traditional community based court system in Rwanda.[170] This helped to relieve the overcrowded prisons in Rwanda, and delivered results. Both acts did not meet with the enthusiasm of the international community, which was critical of the lack of democratization Rwanda showed, and thus pressured the new government to call for national elections. Reluctant at the beginning, Kagame gave in to international pressure, as the donor community threatened to cut financial aid, on which Rwanda still heavily relied.[171] In 2003 national elections were held, which confirmed Paul Kagame's presidency.

There is little doubt that Rwanda is controlled by Paul Kagame, who allows only minimal domestic opposition.[172] Some critics point out that the ethnic divide between Hutu and Tutsi remains, since Kagame one-sidedly favours Tutsi representatives. Allegations of human rights abuses persist. The power of the armed forces in Rwanda is another point of concern to some international observers. On the other hand, Rwanda is lauded for its economic progress and internal stability. Others laud Paul Kagame for his policy of 'one Rwanda', which forbids any reference to Hutu and Tutsi, but instead focuses on 'Rwandans'.

Summary

No matter which stance one takes on the question of whether Rwanda is following the right track, the impact of the international community's interventions in 1994 and 1995 on this was minimal. Not only was it Rwandans who brought the civil war and genocide to an end, it was also mainly Rwandan initiatives that brought the country to where it is in 2008. This does not mean that Rwanda is not subject to international influence. For example, the elections of 2005 were a direct result of international pressure. This is largely due to Rwanda's continued dependence on international donations. However, the focus of this paper is on the effect of humanitarian interventions during the 1990s, and whether they promoted sustainable peace and democracy. In the case of Rwanda, the answer is a simple no. The stability in Rwanda today is by and large the product of domestic politics, which although facilitated by financial aid, were pursued and realized by the country itself.

Six: Discussion of the Cases

The following discusses whether the interventions the countries experienced during the nineties contributed to fragile statehood. It finds that albeit the hypothesis contains some truth, it has to be modified. Rather than regarding interventions as the most important contributor to fragile statehood, it argues that it is the lenses of liberalism itself that identify a state as failing or fragile.

This in turn leads to two problems. The first is that if fragile statehood is a generic liberalist phenomenon, then liberalist cures have failed to solve the issue. The second is that in order to solve the problem with tools provided by liberalism, the underlying notions of liberalism will indefinitely defy themselves and thereby contribute to fragile statehood.

Are They Failing?

How do indices rate the statehood of Guatemala, Cambodia and Rwanda? Are they failed, failing, fragile or weak? Do they fulfil the minimal criteria of statehood? Do they possess the legitimate monopoly of power? Can they control their borders? And, taking the findings of the case studies into account, do the indices rate them correctly?

According to a comparative study of eight indices on state failure by Ulrich Schneckener in 2007, Guatemala rates as fragile in four of them.[173] The UN Commissioner for Guatemala, Anders Kompass, in 2007, declared Guatemala a failed state.[174] Taking into account endemic impunity, extremely high rates of homicide and the lack of control over Guatemalan territory since the signing of the peace accords in 1996 this judgement is hardly surprising. Furthermore, the case of Guatemala supports the hypotheses that the interference of the international community, and its focus on liberal markets and democratic governance set the stage for failure in Guatemala.[175] Although the country has not fallen back into political conflict, it nonetheless suffers from a security vacuum, which security institutions devised by the international community are unable and unwilling to fill.

This is surprising if one takes into account that the peace accords in Guatemala were in theory adapted to bring an end to violence in the Central American country. Three reasons for this failure can be brought to the fore. The first is the narrow focus on establishing democracy and liberal markets rather than seeking to address the underlying causes of the problem. The international community was eager to establish a democracy, characterized by free and fair elections, and to integrate the Guatemalan economy into the global market. The results of this policy were largely macroeconomic reforms instead of microeconomic reforms to pacify the country in the longer perspective.

The second factor was the focus of the international community on human rights, and their abuse. Here the judgment was clear: human rights were grossly abused in Guatemala, and the military was responsible for most abuses. This resulted in a 'decentaurization' of the military, without taking into account that traditionally the military provided internal security. The vacuum this created was to be filled by the National Civil Police. So far, none of the attempts to reform the Guatemalan police have been successful.[176]

The third factor was the unwillingness of the international community to coerce the newly elected Guatemalan leadership to actively pursue the goals set in the peace accords. Elections and reforms were regarded as sufficient to bring peace to the country, and the fact that Guatemala has not relapsed into political conflict seems to support this. What this view does not take into account on the other hand is the fact that just as much as political systems can transform themselves, so can violence. And in Guatemala, widespread violence has not disappeared, but changed its character from political to materialistic.[177]

Taking all three factors together, it can thus be said that the international community's involvement has contributed to the failure of Guatemala, and thus provided fertile ground for organized crime.

To name but one figure: 75% of the cocaine consumed in the USA passes through the Central American country.[178] In terms of drug cartel interests, Guatemala is strategically placed between the spheres of influence of Mexican cartels to the north, and Colombian cartels to the south. Without an agency able and willing to face the challenge posed by those cartels, Guatemala will remain a failing state.[179]

The southeast Asian country Cambodia is ranked a failed state in seven out of eight indices examined by Schneckener.[180] At first glance it therefore seems easy to regard Cambodia as equally supporting the central tenet of this paper. However, the case study suggests that a closer look is necessary. Although nominally democratic, Cambodia is controlled by president Hun Sen.[181] Political oppression is widespread and no real opposition allowed. Evidence suggests that government institutions, or at the very least individual members are involved in organized crime such as human and drug trafficking and illegal timber logging. Corruption is endemic, and the justice sector does not function to penalize organized crime perpetrated by high representatives of the government. All these factors speak for a failed state.

The case of Cambodia forces us to turn back to the definitions of a viable state, and to existing definitions of state failure. According to Max Weber, who offers a minimalistic but nonetheless often cited definition, a state is characterized by having a legitimate monopoly on violence.[182] A weak state then does not hold a legitimate monopoly on violence, which inevitably leads to anarchical circumstances. Cambodia is not marked by anarchy, like Guatemala, but rather by a very clear monopoly on violence, held by Hun Sen and his CPP. So, if Cambodia fulfils the minimal definition of a state, why is it still characterized as failed by seven out of eight indices? The answer lies in the word legitimate. It is this very word where liberalism seeks moral high ground. It is the absence of the principles of liberal good governance, such as transparency, accountability and participation that characterize Cambodia as failed – not the absence of a monopoly of violence, or anarchy. The argument put forward by those indices is thus normative rather than functional.

This normative reading would attribute the failure of Cambodia to the impact of the international community. The failure to recognize the intricacies of domestic Cambodian politics prepared the ground for Hun Sen to solidify his power in 1997, four years after UNTAC left.[183] The three main factions involved in the civil war in Cambodia, Khmer Rouge, King Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC, and Hun Sen's CPP all acceded to peace talks not because of a willingness to give up the struggle for political power, but rather adapted their strategies to the renewed circumstances after the end of the Cold War. The leniency of the international community towards the FUNCINPEC, its acknowledgment of Hun Sen and the CPP, and its distaste for the anachronistic Khmer Rouge singled out the two factions that would continue their striving for power. The inability to fully implement the comprehensive mandate left UNTAC as a third party, whose investment and services were welcomed by both Sihanouk and Hun Sen. Behind the stage, however, both were pulling the strings to solidify their power. In the end it was Hun Sen's control over the security sector that gave him the advantage over Sihanouk. Thus even if Hun Sen's absolute control over Cambodia is not regarded as legitimate, the international community has nonetheless greatly facilitated this.

A more functional approach on the other hand, like the one offered by the Failed State Index of *Foreign Policy*, does not regard Cambodia as failed. According to this view, the impact of the international community was positive, and helped Cambodia to overcome years of internal

violence and anarchy, as in 2008 none of them prevail. It is thus not surprising if the index regards Cambodia as a weak state with positive trends. Interestingly the index attests Cambodia to lack a sense of national identity.[184]

Rwanda offers a similar paradox, although it is very clear from the outset that the international community failed utterly in its attempt to bring peace and stability. So, if Rwanda is also ranked by seven out of eight indices as a failed state, this comes as no surprise.[185] According to this view, the reason for failure is to be found in Rwanda itself. The path Paul Kagame and his government chose are regarded as exclusionary, non-democratic and expansive.

But yet, in its recent history, Rwanda has never been a more stable country, showing only minimal levels of violence. It furthermore has not relapsed into conflict, despite the efforts of Kagame to keep opposition at a minimum, and his reluctance to acknowledge the worthiness of democratic elections. However surprising this may appear if looking at Rwanda through liberal lenses, it is less surprising if one analyzes the history of Rwanda since its colonization, and how closely this history is interwoven with Paul Kagame's policy.

In sum, the hypothesis that interventions during the nineties provided the ground for state failure can only be maintained in the case of Guatemala. Rwanda and Cambodia are more ambivalent. Taking the majority of current indices of state failure, they are regarded as failed. Looking at the situation on the ground, on the other hand, they appear to be stable. Thus the two cases take the discussion to another level, as their rating as failed states is based on a judgment of the legitimacy of the monopoly of violence.

The Quest for Legitimacy of the Monopoly of Violence

According to liberal theory, man is a rational actor and the state of nature is peace. Peace on the other hand is constantly threatened because the system in which rational actors live is in danger of becoming disequilibriated. Such disequilibrium will lead to violent behaviour, as it seems rational to the individual.[186] In order to maintain a balanced system, liberal theory places great emphasis on institutions which manage and administer the relations between state and citizen, as well as between citizen and citizen.[187] The reason why these institutions can work successfully is that the population has signed a social contract with the state, which legitimizes the monopoly of violence of the nation-state.[188]

The base for this social contract is laid by democratic elections, which are as much an institution as a constituting fact, as they establish the legitimacy of the monopoly of violence.[189] The importance the international community ascribes to elections as the first step to establishing a democracy is underlined by the fact that in all cases examined, to assure elections was at the core of all endeavours. The argument is simple and persuasive: if a legitimate monopoly of violence is established through elections, then no one has reason to take up arms against a government again. This has several shortcomings. Firstly, it neglects that the cause of those perpetrating and supporting violence prior to elections, legitimized the use of violence. This is clearly the case in Guatemala, Cambodia and Rwanda. Secondly, this view regards elections as having a monopoly to establish legitimacy of a state. This latter point is crucial, as in all three cases observed elections seem to have played a minor role in relation to the status quo. In Cambodia, the struggle for the monopoly of violence was continued out of sight of the UN mission. In Rwanda it was achieved by military victory. In Guatemala elections have had no impact on the life of the majority, which in turn regards them as an institution unable to provide legitimacy.

Further institutions, ranging from ministries to a local mayor's office, derive their legitimacy from these elections. Arguably, institutions have existed before democratic elections were brought to Guatemala, Cambodia and Rwanda. In Guatemala and Cambodia the international community oversaw the main problem with this statement: institutions are more than the structure they provide, as this structure is filled by individuals who are not subject to democratic elections. This provides continuity rather than change, a fact that has been seen already in the Versailles Treaty, which largely left the administration of Prussian Germany intact. This administration did not regard elections as a source of legitimacy, even less so as many were persuaded that Germany had not lost the war on the battlefield.[190]

The personal continuity in Cambodia, and the control Hun Sen and the CPP exercised over the administration was crucial to his later success. Hun Sen in return had to demonstrate gratitude to the stakeholders in his power, thus turning a blind eye to the profitable but illegitimate businesses led by them. In Guatemala the case is slightly different, as it was decided to greatly reduce the power of a central institution in Guatemalan society, the military. But the international community merely pushed for a reduction in size and mandate, and failed to reintegrate former personnel into civilian life. The mandate to provide internal security was swiftly given to a newly created police force, which proved incapable of fulfilling the task for two reasons. Firstly, the training of policemen did not change substantially. Secondly, and more importantly, recruitment practices for the PNC favoured those who had been working in the service previously – precisely the personnel that was known for corruption and links to organized crime. As a result, non-state actors have often assumed police work, ranging from private security firms to organized crime. Thus the failure to replace the military with an institution able and willing to provide public security has led to the growth of parallel structures that question the monopoly of violence of the Guatemalan state.[191]

In Rwanda on the other hand, neither personal continuity nor an abuse of institutions for the sake of expanding personal power can be observed, as the whole state apparatus had changed due to the military victory of the RPF. The legitimacy of the monopoly of violence was achieved on the battlefield, and not through elections. In order to pacify the international donor community, Paul Kagame adhered to their demands for national elections in 2003. The resulting 95% of the vote in favour of his presidency was thus of little surprise – but remained criticized by the international community as not being the result of a free and fair process. According to this view the monopoly of violence in Rwanda is not legitimate. On the other hand, Rwanda today is characterized by unprecedented political stability and economic growth, as well as a growing sense of national rather than ethnic identity.[192]

Summary

In sum, whether to rank a country as failed or viable depends on the ideological underpinning that guides the observer. From the liberal point of view guiding the interventions during the 1990s, a monopoly of violence can only exist if it is regarded as legitimate by the international community. The decision whether a monopoly of violence is legitimate or not is taken far away from the affected country, and the parameter measuring it is the existence of free and fair elections and democratic governance. However, as outlined in the discussion above, legitimacy may have alternative sources. This is demonstrated by the development of the notions of statehood as much as by the case studies. Historically speaking legitimacy through elections is a recent phenomenon even for the main proponents of liberal democracy ('the West', 'International Community'). More

recent, in Rwanda and Cambodia where stability rather than anarchy is evident, elections had little impact on the status quo.

This paper implies that policies inspired by exporting democracy have the potential to create an paradoxical cycle of efforts by 'the West' or international community, which can be summed up as:[193]

- A country experiences anarchy due to the domestic struggle for the legitimate monopoly of violence.

- The international community decides to intervene and stop the domestic conflict.

- Post intervention, a 'legitimate' monopoly of violence is established through elections and subsequent efforts in institution building.

- A democratically elected government is established and acknowledged by the international community.

- The population of the affected country does not regard elections, democratic governance and institutions as appropriate to decide the struggle for legitimacy. It refuses to acknowledge the democratically elected government as an authority.

- Parallel authoritative structures come into existence.

- The previously legitimate monopoly of violence becomes contested by various actors.

- The state is regarded as failed, anarchy and violence prevail.

- In face of the gross domestic violence, the international community is challenged to intervene and stop the domestic conflict.

Seven: The Way Ahead

So does this cycle mean that interventions that saw democracy as the panacea to end domestic violence have created failed or failing states? The answer can not be a clear yes or no, but lies in between. Since anarchy prevailed prior to such interventions, they can hardly have created the failure of the state. On the other hand if democratic governance was not able to produce a stable state in the medium term, the case can be made that democracy brought by external actors has contributed to state failure. In relation to the cases examined, this can clearly be said for Guatemala. Cambodia and Rwanda differ from this. While Cambodia has used free and fair elections to create an authoritative regime, Rwanda has sought to minimize international participation in its development. Both can be regarded as stable countries with a working monopoly of violence.

Bridging the Gap Between Rationality and Passion

What does this mean in practice? Should a 'let them fight it out' approach be taken?[194] Should interventions based on moral grounds be stopped? Should the international community or any other democratic external actor refrain from exporting democracy as its core value? The first question that policy-makers need to answer is whether they want to achieve stability or anarchy. There is little debate that stability is the more desirable outcome of interventions. Stability was the strategic objective of Western policy makers during the 1990s as well – but how best to achieve it? During the 1990s democracy was regarded as the axiom for peace. But as outlined in

this paper, 'project democracy' failed, and if continued renders the danger of entering an eternal spiral of intervention-state failure-intervention. The most preferable place to leave the spiral is between stability and relapse into anarchy. If this could not be prevented by liberal democracy, then alternatives must be sought.

In search for an alternative derived from the three readings of statehood, the author suggests to integrate the views of Continental Conservatism and Liberalism. Such a model is developed by Jochen Hippler; he distinguishes three elements of nation-building:[195]

- Creation of an integrative ideology – in other words a sense of national identity opposed to a tribal or ethnic identity.

- Integration of a society – society needs to be integrated from loosely connected groups that existed before.

- Functional state apparatus – the focus of state building, seeking to build institutions that enable the state to exercise its legitimate monopoly of violence.

These three elements are interconnected. Jochen Hippler points out that the creation of an integrative ideology and the integration of society are political-cultural issues. They carry passion, traditional values and perceptions. They are the result of a shared history and traditions. To overcome and change the perceptions derived from such shared group experience is a question of leadership. Political leadership can be defined as 'the process of inducing others to take action toward a common goal'.[196] Relating integrative ideology and integration of a society to the notions of statehood, they are akin to the central tenets of Continental Conservatism.

State-building on the other hand is more akin to the liberal notion of man as a rational actor. Seen in this light, state-building is a technocratic challenge, which can be compared to management. 'The key function of a manager is to implement the vision. The manager and subordinates act in ways that constitute the means to achieving the stated end'.[197] The definitions of leadership and management provide a hierarchy, as the function of the manager is implementation rather than directing.

It has been argued here that the main efforts of the international community during the 1990s focused on the managerial task of state-building. The result of this was that the efforts lacked connection to the more passionate element of a stable state, its history and values. The concentration of resources and attention on state-building, guided by the perception that democratic governance will bring peace, created a gap between the passion of the population affected, and they way they are governed.

In order to bridge this gap, it is crucial to bring passion back in. It is impossible for external actors to relate to the shared history of a whole population in such a way that it arouses the passion of a population. The passion of a state is instilled by its own leadership. The leadership, however, will use the emotions of a population to achieve rational goals. Rational goals can not be seen in isolation – they are the product of internal as well as of external pressures. Leadership thus serves the role that binds the passionate and technocratic elements a nation state consists of.

This observation could provide a way out of the eternal spiral. If stability is the core interest for the international community, then it ought to influence the leadership which is acknowledged by its own population. Addressing the rationality of the political leadership could then lead to an

integration of the three elements that need to be in balance if a nation-state is to be stable, as they have to translate their rational decision into the context of their domestic politics

The world today is becoming more interrelated. The end of the Cold War brought to the fore a truly global world. In its immediate aftermath, the perception of those that left the Cold War victoriously was that global peace could be accomplished. Although the 1990s were anything but peaceful, domestic conflicts were regarded as manageable interruptions of the global desire for eternal peace. This perception was brought to an end with the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001, and the subsequently announced 'Global War on Terror'. This war continues to be fought with all intensity. At the same time, the globalization process continues to integrate world markets, and the communication revolution brings individuals from all corners of the planet together. One of the results of integrated markets is the emergence of contestants to Western hegemony. The growing economic importance of Russia, China, India and Brazil increases their leverage in world politics. This challenges the core of Western global order politics, as Russia and China are able to integrate liberal markets without adhering to the principles of Western democracy. This incongruence is reflected in their international politics. Neither Russia nor China seeks to alter the form of governance in other countries. Both are characterized by their pragmatic approach towards countries they seek to trade with. This provides countries formerly exclusively dependent on Western merit with alternative sources of income. Because of the non-interference policies, China and Russia offer a lucrative alternative to the Western model which couples democratic messianism with trade agreements. This trend challenges Western hegemony. The ease with which especially China could enter Africa as a source for resources clearly demonstrates that for many countries the West sought to impose democracy as a form of governance; adherence was a matter of pragmatism rather than belief.

How can North America and Europe answer this trend? This paper has shown that bringing democracy does not mean peace and stability, the base for further economic development. So, a specific form of governance can not be the answer. It is time for North America and Europe to decide whether they want to achieve stability or chaos.[198] If stability is the answer, then the current idealistic world order policies have to be put under scrutiny. This suggests a return to pragmatism by the West. Is this immoral? The appropriate answer is that it can not be regarded as more or less immoral than democratic idealism, since it can not assure peace. Security and stability largely depend on the existence of a legitimate monopoly of violence. A pragmatic approach to global politics suggests that the question of legitimacy within a state should be answered by the population affected – and not by outsiders. Inherent in these idealistic efforts is that they are susceptible to pragmatic interests. The inherent danger of such policies is that they are open to the challenge of double standards. The allegation of double standards on the other hand is precisely what provides actors like Russia and China their leverage in world politics.

So should the West merely copy Russian and Chinese world politics? Should it be a simple pragmatic way ahead? This paper has sought an answer to this question, and suggested that the West should not abandon its policies entirely – but yet step down from the moral high ground of regarding its own path as the chosen path. Although the rise of Russia, China, India and Brazil challenges the West, they still have considerably less weight – and the only way to enhance their weight is to scapegoat North America and Europe. The West, on the other hand, has no need to scapegoat yet – it still has enough room to manoeuvre its global politics in a way that pragmatism will eventually lead to democratic forms of governance. And pragmatism means to stop imposing.

If democracy really is successful, then others will copy it according to their own needs – North America and Europe should allow this political product piracy.

Policy Recommendations

This leads to the following policy recommendations:

- *Interventions should be carefully weighed*. The guiding principle should be pragmatism rather than humanitarian considerations. The core interest guiding interventions should be to establish stability in the country intervened.

- *Security First, Governance Second*.[199] In order to facilitate stability and development, anarchy needs to be changed to order by the establishment of a monopoly of violence. Rather than viewing the willingness to implement democratic governance by one of the warring factions as the reason to support this faction, considering the ability of this faction to uphold a monopoly of violence should guide peace-building efforts.

- *Focus on good leadership rather than management*. Liberal democracy is the product of a long development experienced in Europe and North America. Notions of legitimacy are normative products of these developments. They are not necessarily shared values. In order to establish security, it is thus necessary to seek legitimacy within the normative boundaries of the country intervened into. This demands a close examination of the political leadership. The questions who are in power and why do they have power must be answered. Answers do not necessarily lie within the boundaries of western notions of legitimacy. Legitimate leadership is furthermore not necessarily held by an elected government.

- *Change through pragmatism rather than idealism*. Once stability is achieved, the guiding interest of the external actors should not be to question the legitimacy of a government. The government should be recognized as such. In negotiations with the government in question the guiding principle should not be to change the governance of a country, but negotiations based on mutual interests, i.e. trade and economics. European and North American nations remain the economically most powerful, and are thus the most interesting markets. The negotiation power of pragmatic interest is more likely to instil change than combining negotiations with normative demands in relation to the governance of a country. With stability in place, domestic development should remain the responsibility of domestic actors.

- *Good leadership*. Although the quintessential role of leadership is acknowledged by those seeking to promote good governance,[200] little research on how good leadership may contribute to nation-building is conducted.[201] Further research should seek answers to:

  o What is leadership comprised of in different cultural contexts?

  o What does good leadership mean in different cultural contexts?

  o How can external actors support this leadership?

  o How can external actors influence this leadership?

Endnotes

1   Kant, Immanuel: *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, transl. Ted Humphrey, Hackett, Cambridge, 1983.

2   Fukuyama, Francis: 'The End of History?', *National Interest*, 16 (Summer), 1989.

3   National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss1.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

4   The most influential of such indices is published by the US magazine *Foreign Policy*, in cooperation with Fund for Peace, see: http://www.fundforpeace.org, last accessed 14.08.2008.

5   Fukuyama, Francis: 'The Imperative of State Building', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 15, No 2, April 2004, pp17-31.

6   Timothy Carothers, for example, distinguishes three waves of democratization attempts. See: Carothers, Timothy: *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1999, pp 19-58.

7   Kant, ibid.

8   It is argued here that the International Community is upheld by Europe and North America, 'the West'. Instead of continuing the use of 'West', the author will use the term International Community instead, as most interventions during the nineties were funded and directed by western nations.

9   Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks argues that failing or failed states are not a new phenomenon, but rather the concept of the nation state as the system to order society has been a failure. Inherent in this argument is that state failure can only occur where a functional state has existed prior to failure. Although these arguments should not be refused from the outset, it would go too far for this paper to examine these statements as well, since the period of observation is limited here to the decade after the Cold War. See: Brooks, Rosa Ehrenreich: 'Failed States, or the State as Failure?', in *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol 72, No 4, Fall 2005, pp 1159-96; see also Volker, Matthies: 'Eine Welt voller Neuer Kriege?', in: *Der Bürger im Staat*, Heft 4/2004, Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart, 2004, pp 185– 90.

10   Weber, Max: *Politics as a Vocation*, available at
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/lecture/politics_vocation.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

11   See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/, last accessed 14.08.2008; also Sollenberg, Margareta; Wallensteen, Peter: 'Armed Conflict, 1989-2000', in J*ournal of Peace Research*, 38:5, September 2001, pp 629-44.

12   Holzgrefe, J L: 'The Humanitarian Intervention Debate', in Holzgrefe, J L; Keohane, Robert O (eds), *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p18; Welsh, Jennifer M: 'Introduction', in Welsh, Jennifer M (ed): *Humanitarian Interventions and International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p3.

13   For this wider definition of intervention see: Scheffer, David J, 'Towards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention', in *University of Toledo Law Review*, 23, 1992, p266.

14   Münkler, Herfried, *Die Neuen Kriege*, 3rd ed , Rowohlt, Reinbek, 2007.

15   Huntington, Samuel P: 'The Clash of Civilizations?', in *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 3, 1993; Huntington Samuel: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Touchstone Books, London, 1996.

16   Langford, Tonya: 'Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention', in *International Studies Association*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999.

17   See: http://go.worldbank.org/58UM59SLG0, last accessed 14.08.2008.

18   Soanes, Catherine; Stevenson, Angus (eds), *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, 11th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p1409.

19   Ibid, p 952.

20   See http://wendt.jura.uni-saarland.de/AktuelleVeranstaltungen/DrElicker/SS08/Allgemeine%20Staatslehre/ Material/Komplex4_Folien.pdf, last accessed 14.08.2008.

21   Weber, Max, op cit.

22   The Treaty of Augsburg of 1555 first mentions *cuius regio, eius religio*, but it was only in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia that it became widely accepted. See Knutsen, Torbjörn L, *A history of International Relations: An introduction*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, p50.

23   Ibid, p 71.

24   Bodin, Jean,, Book I-III, in Mayer-Tasch, Peter C (ed), *Sechs Bücher über den Staat*, Munich, 1981; Arlette, Joan 'Die Debatte über absolute Gewalt im Frankreich der Religionskriege', in Asch, Ronald G (ed) *Der Absolutismus – ein Mythos? Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft in West- und Mitteleuropa*, Cologne, 1996, pp 57–8; Bermbach, Udo, 'Widerstandsrecht, Kirche, Souveränität und Staat', in Fetscher, Iring; Münkler, Herfried (eds), *Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen*, Vol 3, Munich, 1985, pp 134–62; Knutsen, Torbjörn L, op cit, pp58–64; Schwan, Alexander, 'Politische Theorien des Rationalismus und der Aufklärung', in Lieber, Hans J (ed), *Politische Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Wiesbaden, 2000, pp 157-200.

25   Cf Knutsen, Torbjörn L op cit p60; Bodin develops the theoretical understanding of sovereignty in his first book, see: Bodin, Jean, op cit, pp 98-187.

26   Bodin, Jean, op cit, p 206.

27   Hobbes, Thomas: 'War, Peace and Sovereignty', in Lessnoff, Michael (ed), *Social Contract Theory*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, pp 50-67; Knutsen, Torbjörn L, op cit, pp 86-92; Navari, Cornelia, 'Hobbes, the State of Nature and the Laws of Nature', in Clark, Ian; Neumann, Iver C (eds), *Classical Theories of International Relations*, Macmillan Press, Oxford, 1996, pp 20-41; Tuck, Robert, *Hobbes*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.

28   Hobbes (op cit p53) famously claims of the world in his times that 'men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture on Earth; no Navigation or use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, the life of man, solitary, nasty, brutish and short'.

29   Ibid p62.

30   Knutsen, Torbjörn L op cit, pp 69-81; 92-8.

31   Hobbes, Thomas op cit p 62.

32   Knutsen, Torbjörn L op cit, pp 100-2.

33   Ibid p 104.

34   An argument that is especially found with Jean Jacques Rousseau. See Cranston, Maurice: 'Introduction', in Jean Jacques Rousseau: *The Social Contract*, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1968, pp 9-43; Fidler, David P, 'Desperately Clinging to Grotian and Kantian Sheep: Rousseau's Attempted Escape from the State of War', in: Clark, Ian; Neumann, Iver (eds), op cit, pp 120-41.

35   Knutsen, Torbjörn L: op cit, p 124.

36   Clausewitz, Carl von: *On War*, in Howard, Michael; Paret Peter (eds), *On War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, p89; Knutsen, Torbjörn, op cit, pp144-7.

37   Knutsen, Torbjörn L op cit, pp 147-50; 155-9; 163-7.

38   It has to be said that liberals did debate the role of the state in relation to wealth distribution from early on.

39   Milliken, Jennifer; Krause, Keith, 'State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies', in *Development and Change* 33 (5), Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pp 755-62. For a critical view on the concept of the nation state in a post-Westphalian age, see Brooks, Rosa E, 'Failed States or State as Failure?' in: *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Fall 2005; 72,4, pp1159-96.

40   Tilly, Charles, 'War making and State-Making as Organized Crime', in Evans, P; Rueschemeyer, D; Skocpol, T (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p 170.

41   This argument can also be found in Max Weber's 'Politics as Vocation', where he dwells on the essential qualities that should characterize the statesmen.

42   Soanes, Catherine; Stevenson, Angus (eds), op cit, p952.

43   Jonathan Di John points out that the debate can be traced back to colonialism, where colonial aspirations were often legitimized by arguing that their rule would save these territories. See John, Jonathan Di: 'Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature, in *Crisis States Working Papers*, Series No2, London School of Economics, London, January 2008, p1.

44   Helman, Gerald B; Ratner, Steven R, 'Saving Failed States', *Foreign Policy*, Iss 89, Winter 1993, p3.

45   For a detailed discussion why failed or failing states are a threat to security, see Schneckener, Ulrich, 'Fragile Staatlichkeit als globales Sicherheitsrisiko', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 28-29/2005, Bonn, July 2005, pp26-31.

46   National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p1, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss1.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

47   Mair, Stefan, 'Interventionen und "state-failure": Sind schwache Staaten noch zu retten?', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 3/2004, Berlin, 2004, pp82-5. The issue of defining the phenomenon is also discussed in Langford, Tonya, Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention', *International Studies Association*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999, pp59-66; Thürer, Daniel: 'An Internal Challenge: Partnerships in Fixing Failed States', *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2008, pp42-4.

48   Rotberg, Robert I, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2002, p85.

49   Ignatieff, Michael, 'Intervention and State Failure', *Dissent*, Winter 2002.

50   Zartmann, William (ed) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, pp2-4.

51   Di John, op cit, p 4.

52   A critical discussion on the varying results of attempts to index failed states can be found in: Schneckener, Ulrich, 'Rankings und Indizes: Welche Staaten gelten als fragil?, in SWP Berlin (eds): *Diskussionspapier* FG 8, 2007/Nr3, Berlin, 2007.

53   The table draws on the summaries of Schnecker, Ulrich op cit, 2007; Anderson, M; Torres, M, *Fragile States: Defining Difficult Moments for Poverty Reduction*, Policy Division, Department for International Development, London, 2004.

54   http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/16.0.html?&L=1; last accessed 14.08.2008.

55   Weinstein, Jeremy; Vashinav, Milan, 'A Mismatch with Consequences: US-Foreign Policy and the Security-Development Nexus', in Birdsall, Nancy; Vaishnav, Milan; Ayres, Robert L (eds), *Short of the Goal. US Foreign Policy and Poorly Performing States*, Centre for Global Development, Washington DC, pp 8-16.

56   www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestatespaper.pdf, last accessed 14.08.2008.

57   Di John, op cit.

58   http://www.fundforpeace.org, last accessed 14.08.2008.

59   http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/papers/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf, last accessed 14.08.2008.

60   http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm, last accessed 14.08.2008.

61   http://www¬wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/01/10/000020953_2007 0110085019/R endered/PDF/382850Revised01gile0states01PUBLIC1 .pdf, last accessed 14.08.2008.

62   Di John, op cit, pp 2-3.

63   See for example: Cleary, Laura; McConville, Teri (eds): *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, Routledge, London, 2006.

64   See for example: Diamond, Larry, *Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges*, National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security and America's Purpose, September 2005, http://www.stanford.edu/%7Ediamond/papers/PromotingDemocracy0905.htm, last accessed 14.08.2008.

65   Thürer, Daniel op cit, pp42-5.

66   See for example Münkler, Herfried: *Die Neuen Kriege*, 3rd ed., Rowohlt, Reinbek, 2007.

67   See for example: Collier, Paul: 'Doing well out of war: an economic perspective', in: Berdal, Mats; Malone, David M (eds): *Greed and Grievance: an economic perspective in civil wars*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2000.

68   Stefan Mair, Director of Studies of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs is an outspoken proponent of 'Security First'; see Mair, Stefan: 'Interventionen und "state-failure": Sind schwache Staaten noch zu retten?'; Mair, Stefan: 'A New Approach: The Need to Focus on Failing States', *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2008, pp52-5; Mair, Stefan; Ottaway, Marina: 'States at Risk and Failed States: Putting Security First', Carnegie Endowment for Peace; German Institute for International and Security Affairs (eds): *Democracy and Rule of Law Project*, September 2004.

69   Malcolm Shaw offers a detailed account on the nature of and development of international law in: Shaw, Malcolm N, *International Law*, 5th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp 1-65.

70   The differences in understanding role and impact of international law in international relations are emphasized in Byers, Michael (ed), *The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; Slaughter, Ann Marie: 'International Law and International Relations Theory', in Benvenisti, Eyal; Hirsch, Moshe (eds), *The Impact of International Law in International Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp 16-49. It is argued here that while realists regard international law as an instrument which states employ according to their interests, liberals will argue that international law is in the interest of states as it contains anarchy and allows order in the international system.

71   Grotius, Hugo: *De Iure Belli ac Pacis*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1925.

72   This is governed in Art II (7) of the UN Charter; See also the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5, last accessed 14.08.2008; Corfu Channel Case http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=cd&case=1, last accessed 14.08.2008.

73   Earlier attempts, such as the League of Nations remained ineffective, and allowed the Second World War to take place. The UN Charter was designed to end all wars, but due to recent experience focused mainly on inter-state wars. See: Gray, *Christine: International Law and the Use of Force*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p6.

74   Art 51 UN Charter.

75   These Articles are all part of chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which can be accessed at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm, last accessed 14.08.2008.

76   Farer, Tom J, 'Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11', in Holzgrefe, J L; Keohane, Robert O (eds): *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p 56.

77   Huntington, Samuel P, *Third Wave: Democratization In The Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1991; Russett, Bruce: *Gasping the Democratic Peace: Principles For The Post-Cold War World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993.

78   For a discussion of the legal aspects see: Gray, Christine op cit pp 1-58; Carty, Anthony: 'Intervention and the Limits of International Law', in Forbes, Ian; Hoffmann, Mark (eds): *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 1993, pp 32-41.

79   http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, last accessed 14.08.2008.

80 Detailed analysis of conflicts since 1992 has been collected and published at the Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research, see: http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html

81 http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/Konfliktbarometer_1992.pdf, last accessed 14.08.2008.

82 http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2007.pdf, last accessed 14.08.2008.

83 The argument of Wilsonianism can be found in Paris, Roland: *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp 40-51. The 14 peacebuilding missions were Namibia; Nicaragua; Angola; Cambodia; El Salvador; Mozambique; Liberia; Rwanda; Bosnia; Croatia; Guatemala; East Timor; Kosovo; Sierra Leone, see: Paris, op cit p 61.

84 Boutros Ghali, Boutros: *An Agenda for Peace*, http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

85 http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/bg2006.cfm, last accessed 14.08.2008.

86 Bellamy, Christopher C, 'Television Milestones', Lecture given at Cranfield University, January 2008. Prof Bellamy argues that CNN's live coverage of the First Gulf War with an estimated 1bn viewers on the first night of war (17 June 1991) brought the role of the media in the era of globalization to light. Subsequently, coverage became more constant and detailed as opposed to the occasional news broadcasts experienced before 1991.

87 Tesón, Fernando R, 'The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention', in Holzgrefe, J L; Keohane, Robert O (eds) op cit, pp 93-129; another passionate account for humanitarian intervention is published in association with the 'Center for Presidential Studies George Bush School of Government and Public Service'; see Brands, H W (ed), *The Use of Force after the Cold War*, Texas A&M University Press, 2000.

88 Whether humanitarian interventions should be considered legal or not is not a new debate. See Walzer, Michael: *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3rd ed, Basic Books, New York, 2004; Forbes, Ian; Hoffmann, Mark (eds): *Political Theory, International Law and the Ethics of Intervention*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 1993; Wheeler, Nicholas, J, 'The Humanitarian Responsibilites of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society', in Welsh, Jennifer M (ed): *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004, pp29-51.

89 On the issue of Kosovo see Müllerson, Rein: *Ordering Anarchy – International Law in International Society*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2000, pp303-15; Gray, Christine: op cit, pp 37-49.

90 Hippler, Jochen: *Nationbuilding: a key concept for peaceful conflict transformation?*, Pluto Press, London, 2005, p9; emphasis in original. Hippler (pp7-9) points out that state building is only one of three elements in nation-building, the others being the formation of an integrative ideology and the integration of a society.

91 Dobbins, James: *The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2007, p xxii.

92 Carothers, Thomas: *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1999, pp19-58. See also: Hippel, Karin v, *Democracy by force: US Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp 9-10; Hippler, Jochen: op cit, pp.3-6; Watson, Cynthia, A, *Nation Building: a reference handbook*, ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara, 2004, pp. 9-19.

93 Carothers, Thomas: op cit, p19.

94 On the impact of modernization theory in the developing world, and its failing capacity to yield positive results see also Hein, Wolfgang: 'Vom Entwicklungsstaat zum Staatszerfall', in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed), *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 28-29/2005, Bonn, 2005, pp 6-11. Unlike Carothers, who focuses on the political side of democracy promotion, Hein draws his arguments mainly on economic insights, and agrees with Carothers' observation that there has been a development from a modernization theory guided approach to a renewed focus on politics.

95 Carothers, Thomas: op cit pp 9-40.

96 Krauthammer, Charles: 'Democracy's won!', *Washington Post*, 24.03.1989; cf Paris, Roland: *At War's End*, p34.

97 Fukuyama, Francis: 'The End of History?', *National Interest*, 16 (Summer), 1989, p4.

98 Carothers, Thomas: op cit, p48.

99 The argument of the successful transformation of Germany and Japan into democracies can not be applied to the context of civil wars. They were the result of a total defeat in an inter-state war, and the fate of these states were in the hands of the respective victors. For arguments supporting this view see Hippel, Karin v op cit, pp11-19.

100 This counts as much for *inter-* as *intra*-state war; For an overview of the literature concerning the democratic peace theory see: Russett, Bruce; Starr, Harvey: 'From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the International System', in Midlarsky, Manus: *Handbook of War Studies*, 2nd ed, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000; R J Rummel established that democracies are also less likely to experience internal violence; see Rummel, RJ: *Understanding Conflict and War, Vol4: War, Power and Peace*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1979.

101 Boutros Ghali, Boutros, *An Agenda for Democratization*, United Nations, New York, 1996.

102 An early account on the importance of institutions in a democracy is Rockman, Bert A; Waever, Kent R, *Do Institutions Matter?*, Brookings Institution Press, Brookings, 1993.

103   It was the era of comparative politics. Indices to measure democracy and freedom served as guidelines for policymakers and academics alike, and there was a sincere attempt to aggregate the lessons learned from democratization efforts. See the many works of Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Arendt Lijphart and Juan L Linz concerned with the topic.

104   Fukuyama, Francis: 'The Imperative of State-building', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol15, No 2, April 2004, pp 17-31.

105   As stated in the US and EU security strategies.

106   https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

107   Statistical data derived from the CIA World Factbook, see: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world¬factbook/geos/gt.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

108   On recent Guatemalan history, US-involvement and the sources of conflict in Guatemala see Schlesinger, Stephen; Kinzer, Stephen: *Bitter Fruit*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1982.

109   There were other minor groups at the beginning of the war, but they quickly united themselves in the URNG. This is one of the most important differences between the Guatemalan civil war and the El Salvadorian, where there were several insurgent groups, which led a two level war: one against the military and business establishment, and the second against each other. The murder of Marxist rebel leader Ana Maria epitomizes this problem, as it subsequently led to the complete disintegration of the leadership of the rebel movement (all leftist factions were united in the FMLR). (Private Interview, Donald Langley) It has to be said though that this internal fragility in the El Salvadorian movement has been abused by external parties with an interest in El Salvador, namely the Sandinista and Cuban governments. Both feared the high level of military and organizational capacity of the El Salvadorian FMLR, and were ideologically at odds with them; a direct involvement of the two governments in the murder of Ana Maria can not be excluded. (private interview; anonymous).

110   See for example Ardón, Patricia: 'Post-war reconstruction in Central America', *Oxfam Working Papers*, Oxfam, Oxford, 1999, pp 36-47.

111   Peter Calvert offers a comprehensive study of the peace process in Guatemala in 'The Democratic Transition in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama', *Conflict Studies*, March 1998, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

112   A detailed account on the work of MINUGUA is presented by Louise, Christopher: 'MINUGUA's Peacebuilding Mandate in Western Guatemala', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 4, No2, Summer 1997, pp50-73.

113   Ardón, Patricia, op cit, p 42.

114   Jonas, Susan: 'Democratization through Peace: The difficult case of Guatemala', *Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs*, 9-38 42, no 4, 2001, p13. Jonas uses a term coined in the eighties by the Guatemalan writer Carlos Figueroa Ibarra, 'Centaurization', which describes the military as half men half beast due to its omnipotence in the contemporary Guatemala. Stephen Baranyi and Seán Loughna argue that this self-perception of the Guatemalan armed forces is rooted in its history, 'namely in centuries of conflict between Spanish elites and indigenous people. In that context, military forces tended to be inward looking, defending the interests of powerful landowning elites, and, with increasing frequency in the 20th century in political life through dictatorial regimes'. See Baranyi, Stephen; Loughna, Seán: 'Guatemala at the crossroads', in: *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Oct 1998, pp472-7.

115   75% of the costs for the institution building programmes in Guatemala were delivered by the international community: Louise, Christopher op cit, p63.

116   Kimbra Fishel provides a comprehensive analysis of the efforts to make peace last in Guatemala. See Fishel, Kimbra L, 'From Peace Making to Peace Building in Central America: The Illusion versus the Reality of Peace', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol 9 no 1 Spr 1998, 1998, pp 32-49 ; see also Paris, Roland, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp112-34; Carothers, Thomas: *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington DC, 1999, pp65-84.

117   Carothers, Ibid.

118   Kurtenbach, Sabine: 'The Central American Conflict System: External Players and Changing Violence', in Debiel, Tobias; Klein, Axel (eds), *Fragile Peace – State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions*, Zed Books, London, 2002, pp132-45.

119   Eitel, Peter, 'Guatemala: Failed State oder Staat im Koma?', e-politik, 27.05.2007, http://www.e¬politik.de/lesen/artikel/2007/guatemala-failed-state-oder-staat-im-koma/, last accessed 14.08.2008.

120   Youth delinquency is a massive problem in all of Central America. The gangs, called Maras, are estimated to total 300,000 members, spread between Toronto, Canada and southern Panama. Their increasing organizational expertise makes them a serious threat to regional stability. Initially these gangs were contracted by drug cartels, they have become involved in trafficking activity, adding to turf war with drug cartels who traditionally controlled Guatemala. See McDermott, Jeremy, 'Criminal Mara gangs pose threat to Central America', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 2004; Gilmour, Anna, 'Gang warfare – Mara activity becomes international threat', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2007.

121   Boraz, Steven: 'Case Study: The Guatemala-Chiapas Border', in Rabasa, Angel et al (eds): *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, RAND Project Airforce, Santa Monica, 2007, pp277-307.

122   Eitel, Peter: op cit.

123   In a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Berlin to celebrate 10 years of peace, then vice-president and former chief negotiator in the process Eduardo Stein had a simple answer to the question whether Guatemala would ever reform its tax system (Guatemala has the lowest income tax in the western hemisphere): 'Every time a minister of finance mentioned the word tax reform, he left office the next day'. See Eitel, Peter: 'Der Optimist', e-politik, 30.06.2006, http://www.e-politik.de/lesen/artikel/2006/der-optimist/, last accessed 14.08.2008.

124   Roland Paris argues that because of this lack of microeconomic reform the sources of conflict have been reproduced. See Paris, Roland, op cit, pp112-134.

125   The summary is based on personal observations in Guatemala April to May 2007, and many private conversations, of which the ones with Daniel LeClair, Reuters Correspondent in Guatemala, stand out as being most fruitful.

126   https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

127   Data derived from CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world¬factbook/geos/cb.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

128   The complicated political history of Cambodia and the ambivalent roles of King Sihanouk and the international community are analysed by Berdal, Mats; Leifer, Michael, 'Cambodia', in Mayall, James (ed), *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 pp25-33.

129   Dobbins, James et al (eds), *The UN's Role in Nation Building: From Congo to Iraq*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2005, p69.

130   Paris, Roland, op cit, p80.

131   The role of external actors is described in detail in Schear, James A,'Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace', in Durch, William J (ed), *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, Macmillan, Houndsmill, 1997, pp136-42; Berdal, Mats; Leifer, Michael, op cit, pp26-35.

132   Berdal, Mats; Leifer, Michael, op cit, p32.

133   A detailed account of UNTAC by Findlay, Trevor: Cambodia: *The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, SIPRI Research Report No9, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp21-51; see also Schear, James A, op cit, pp143-76.

134   Which was a massive task. See Dobbins, James et al (ed): op cit, pp85-6.

135   Dobbins, James et al (eds), op cit, p83; Berdal, Mats; Leifer, Michael, op cit, pp43-5.

136   Paris, Roland: op cit, pp88-9.

137   Dobbins et al (eds): op cit, pp87-8.

138   See Anonymous: 'Cambodia still frets about drug traffic-king', *KI-Media*, 21.05.2008, http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2008/05/cambodia-still-frets-about-drug.html; Anonymous: 'Cambodia struggles with drug smuggling escalation', Janes Intelligence Review, June 2005; UN Office on Drugs and Crime: *Summary Report of the Illicit Drug Situation in Cambodia 2002*, http://www.unodc.un.or.th/material/document/2003_2.pdf; Ana, Phann; Doyle, Kevin, 'Traffic King – Stung Treng Said to be Busiest Transit Point for Golden Triangle Heroin, *Cambodia Daily*, 26.10.2002, http://www.camnet.com.kh/cambodia.daily/selected_features/drug.htm, last accessed 14.08.2008.

139   Anonymous: 'Internal Affairs, Cambodia', in: *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia*, 21.01.2008; see also Peou, Sorpong: *Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?*, Silkworm Books, Singapore, 2000.

140   https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

141   Statistical data derived from CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world¬factbook/geos/rw.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

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147   Jones, Bruce D, op cit, p 24.

148   Ibid.

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151 Paris, Roland: op cit, p70.

152 This view is put forward most strongly by Jones, Bruce D, op cit, pp 89-102; see also Paris, Roland op cit pp70-1.

153 Jones, Bruce D op cit p92.

154 Cf Jones, Bruce D op cit p95.

155 Jones, Bruce D op cit, p83.

156 Private Interview with Brig General Richard Rutatina, RPA, 06.08.08.

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159 On the failure of the UN Mission see Carlsson, Ingvar: 'The UN Inadequacies', *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, Vol3 No4, September 2005, pp 837-46; Jones, Bruce D op cit, pp103-34; Laegreid, Turid, 'UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda', in Adelmann, Howard; Suhrke, Astri (eds) op cit pp231-52; Paris, Roland op cit pp69-78; Vaccaro, Matthew J, 'The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Rwanda', in Durch, William J (ed) op cit, pp 368-407.

160 Vaccaro, Matthew, J op cit p393.

161 Uvin, Peter 'Difficult Choices In The New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community In Rwanda After Genocide, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol22, No2, 2001, p181.

162 Vaccaro, Matthew, J op cit, p395.

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166 Anonymous: 'External Affairs, Rwanda', in *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Central Africa*, 11.03.2008.

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173 Schneckener, Ulrich, 'Rankings und Indizes: Welche Staaten gelten als fragil?', *Diskussionspapier*, Mar 2007, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2007, p6.

174 Eitel, Peter, 'Guatemala: Failed state oder Staat im Koma?', e-politik.de, 21.05.2007, http://www.e-politik.de/lesen/artikel/2007/guatemala-failed-state-oder-staat-im-koma/, last accessed 14.08.2008.

175 Roland Paris argues that the intervention by the international community merely reproduced the sources of conflict. See Paris, Roland, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp112-34. Timothy Carothers on the other hand regards the case of Guatemala as a moderate success. See Carothers, Timothy: *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, pp79-85.

176 Fishel, Kimbra L, 'From Peace Making to Peace Building in Central America: The Illusion versus the Reality of Peace, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol,9, No1, Spring 1998, pp32-49.

177 The transformation of violence in Guatemala is the central tenet of Sabine Kurtenbach in: 'The Central American Conflict System: External Players and Changing Violence', in Debiel, Tobias; Klein, Axel (eds): *Fragile Peace – State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions*, Zed Books, London, pp132-45.

178 Eitel, Peter: 'Guatemala: Failed State oder Staat im Koma?', e-politik, 27.05.2007, http://www.e¬politik.de/lesen/artikel/2007/guatemala-failed-state-oder-staat-im-koma/, last accessed 14.08.2008.

179 Not surprisingly, the most important topic in the general elections in 2008 was how internal security could be achieved. While one of the candidates, Otto Perez Molina, the former head of military intelligence, called for a greater role of the military in providing internal security, now President Alvaro Colom sought remedy in tackling the root causes for violence. He also promised to focus on reforming the national police. Faced with the responsibility to act, he now increasingly uses joint operation between military and police. See http://www.reuters.com/news/pictures/searchpopup?picId=4428566, last accessed 14.08.2008.

180 Schneckener, Ulrich, 'Rankings und Indizes: Welche Staaten gelten als fragil?', *Diskussionspapier*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, March 2007, p7.

181   Sorpong Peou therefore calls Cambodia an illiberal democracy. See Peou, Sorpong: *Intervention and Change in Cambodia: towards democracy?*, Silkworm Books, Singapore, 2000 pp409-31.

182   See Weber, Max: *Politics as a Vocation*, http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/lecture/politics_vocation.html, last accessed 14.08.2008.

183   This argument is most strongly expressed in Berdal, Mats; Leifer Michael: 'Cambodia', in Mayall, James (ed.): *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp25-33.

184   See http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=48&Itemid=275, last accessed 14.08.2008. The country profile of Cambodia regards the country as weak, but on the way to stability.

185   See Schneckener, Ulrich, 'Rankings und Indizes: Welche Staaten gelten als fragil?', *Diskussionspapier*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, March 2007, p7.

186   The liberal view that violence is an expression of a disequilibriated system is best expressed in Gurr, Ted R, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970.

187   The importance of institution building is also advised by critics of liberal theory; see Ottaway, Marina, 'Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States', *Development and Change*, 33(5), 2002, pp1001-23; Paris, Roland op cit, pp179-211.

188   Thus the contemporary reading of legitimacy has not changed greatly since it was expressed by John Locke and other enlightenment thinkers.

189   On the definition of institutions, and democratic elections as an institution see Ottaway, Marina: 'Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States', *Development and Change*, 33(5), 2002, pp1001-23.

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191   Fishel, Kimbra L, 'From Peace Making to Peace Building in Central America: The Illusion versus the Reality of Peace', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol9, No1, Spring 1998, pp32-49; Kurtenbach, Sabine, 'The Central American Conflict System: External Players and Changing Violence', in Debiel, Tobias; Klein, Axel (eds), *Fragile Peace – State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions*, Zed Books, London, pp132-45.

192   Personal interview with Brig General Richard Rutatina, 15.05. 2008.

193   An excellent overview of the dilemmas this cyclical paradox mean to liberal interventions is provided in Debiel, Tobias; Klingebiel, Stephan; Mehler, Andreas; Schneckener, Ulrich: *Between Ignorance and Intervention: Strategies and Dilemmas of External Actors in Fragile States*, Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, Policy Paper 23, January 2005; see also Uvin, Peter: 'Difficult Choices In The New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community In Rwanda After Genocide', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol22, No2, 2001, pp177-89.

194   A view that for example Marina Ottaway promotes, see: Ottaway, Marina: 'Keep out of Africa', *Financial Times*, 25.02.1999.

195   Hippler, Jochen, *Nationbuilding: a Key Concept For Peaceful Conflict Transformation?*, Pluto Press, London, 2005, pp7-9.

196   Locke, Edwin A et al (eds), *The Essence of Leadership: The Four Keys to Leading Successfully*, Lexington Books, Macmillan, New York, 1991, p2.

197   Ibid p4.

198   On this thought I am indebted to Brig General Richard Rutatina for stating in a private discussion: 'The West has to decide what it wants: Stability or Chaos!'.

199   Stefan Mair, director at the German Institute for International Affairs and Security is a prominent supporter of this view. See eg Mair, Stefan: 'Interventionen und "state failure": Sind schwache Staaten noch zu retten?', in: *Internationale Gesellschaft und Politik*, 3/2004, pp82-98.

200   Cleary, Laura; McConville, Teri (eds), *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, Routledge, London, 2006 for example acknowledges the role of leadership, but at the same time argues that to constrain executive power by transparency and accountability by the opposition are of higher relevance. A critical view on the promotion of good governance according to the above mentioned parameters is provided in Chuter, David: *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues*, Institute for Security Studies, London, 2000.

201   The impact of good leadership is increasingly being recognized; see Nye, Joseph S, *The Powers to Lead*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008; Stuart, Rory, 'How to save Afghanistan', *Time*, 17 July 2008; Thürer, Daniel, 'An Internal Challenge: Partnerships in Fixing Failed States', *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2008, pp42-5. While Nye is primarily concerned with domestic politics, both Stuart and Thürer emphasize the role of leadership in fixing failed states. They argue that external actors will need to find ways to influence the leadership of a given country regarded as failed.

'Identify a crisis and:
a) describe the nature of the leadership displayed during the event,
b) argue whether event confirms/disconfirms relevant academic literature.'

Case Study 1: Hurricane Katrina – A Wicked Waste

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Introduction

'A Nation Still Unprepared' and 'A Failure of Initiative' are titles of the two congressional reports conducted by the US House of Representatives (House Report, 2006) and the US Senate (Senate Report, 2006) respectively, into the response to Hurricane Katrina, which devastated large areas of New Orleans in August 2005. The titles suitably summarise the findings of investigations which expose the widespread failure of government authorities at all levels to envisage, plan for, and respond sufficiently to a crisis of catastrophic proportions. The following investigation into how senior government leaders responded to the unfolding catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina provides insight into leadership praxis juxtaposed with academic theory. This analysis will describe the nature of leadership displayed during Hurricane Katrina and argue whether the event confirms or disconfirms academic theory. To achieve this aim, academic theory of crisis management will be introduced, with emphasis placed on leadership. The concept of Critical, Tame and Wicked problems will be proposed as an appropriate taxonomy for leaders to utilise when assessing the nature of a crisis and determining how to resolve or mitigate the situation. Although the success or failure of leadership exhibited at all levels of government during Hurricane Katrina has been a subject of debate, this investigation will focus on President Bush and his White House advisors, who became ultimately responsible for the command, control and coordination of disaster response.

Hurricane Katrina – a Catastrophe

A crisis is said to occur when 'core values or life-sustaining systems of a community come under threat' and comprises three key components of 'threat, uncertainty, and urgency' (Boin et al, 2006: 2). In an area that periodically experiences the devastation caused by hurricanes, what made Katrina so lethal and caused it to become a 'catastrophe' as defined by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Response Plan (2004: 43)? Unlike 'routine' hurricanes, it was the momentous flooding which caused massive loss of life, damage to property and long-term disruption to local society. A post-event assessment of Katrina stated that it 'destroyed an entire region, killing more than 1,500 people, leaving hundreds of thousands of people homeless, and…laid waste to 90,000 square miles of land, an area the size of the UK' (Senate Report, 2006: 21). Other assessments report 300,000 homes destroyed or damaged and $96 billion damage to property, a level of destruction and fatalities far in excess of the impact of hurricanes Camille (1969), Andrew (1992) and Ivan (2004) combined (White House Report, 2006: 7).

What Happened and Where Did It All Go So Horribly Wrong?

For reasons of space, a comprehensive narrative of the course of events of Hurricane Katrina will not be related in this investigation, as the main facts are assumed to be common knowledge. Should a reminder be required, full accounts are contained within each of the two Congressional reports. However, key details will be highlighted where they pertain to analysis of the situational challenge and leadership behaviour displayed. From the receipt of the first storm warnings, through the time that Katrina struck the New Orleans area, and over the days that followed, the event timelines itemise a succession of misunderstandings, failed communications, lost opportunities and errors of judgement. However, it is the failure to realise the implication of the massive flooding caused by the overtopping of the levees, nor plan and prepare for such an event, which lie at the heart of the tragedy that is Hurricane Katrina. Senator Joseph Lieberman and colleagues in the Senate Report (2006: 667), state that: 'Despite the clear warnings before landfall that Katrina would be catastrophic, the President and the White House staff were not sufficiently engaged and failed to initiate a sufficiently strong and proactive response'.

This failure is especially poignant since the devastation that would result from storm surge flooding of an urban area situated below sea level was widely known to civil authorities and emergency management practitioners as the 'New Orleans Scenario': 'The White House had been aware of the "New Orleans Scenario", a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans. Despite this awareness, the White House failed to ensure that the federal government was prepared to respond to this catastrophic scenario' (Senate Report, 2006: 667).

Having identified these failings, this investigation will now focus on academic theory which, if utilised, might have assisted in evaluating the nature of the problem, thereby making sense of the crisis, and facilitating improved, coordinated direction of emergency response activity.

Crisis Management Theory – Models Examined

The Senate Report into Hurricane Katrina concluded that the extraordinary and extensive impact of the event was a result of 'the failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare for, and respond aggressively to the storm' (2006: 2). Of the four overarching factors identified as contributing to the outcome, two relate to government officials' 'insufficient actions or poor decisions in the days immediately before and after landfall' and 'failure to provide effective leadership' (ibid). That these areas should be singled out for criticism is hardly surprising, as academic theory proposes that leadership and decision making are two of the key skills for safe and efficient performance in high risk operations (Flin *et al*, 2008: 1). With these aspects in mind, and whilst acknowledging that long-term preparedness is obviously a vital factor, this analysis will limit its focus to leadership, and related decision making, in the week spanning immediately prior to and following landfall (Saturday 27 August – Friday 2 September) and with particular regard to the leadership displayed by President Bush and his closest advisors.

Katrina – Critical, Tame or Wicked?

Although leadership academia offers a multitude of theoretical models for problem solving and associated leadership behaviour, this investigation will utilise the Wicked, Tame and Critical Problems framework. The typology of Wicked and Tame Problems was expounded by Rittell and Webber (1973), to which Grint (2005) introduced a third category of Critical Problems. Critical Problems are typically self-evident with very little situational uncertainty, permit minimal time

for decision and action, require an authoritative response to provide an answer and decisive and immediate action that is typically associated with Command (Grint, 2005: 1473). An example of Critical Problems from Hurricane Katrina would be those faced by the Coastguard search and rescue teams conducting immediate life-saving operations. Tame Problems are complicated yet resolvable, involving a limited degree of uncertainty, and are rarely novel. They are manageable and can be resolved through application of proven process; therefore, Tame Problems are associated with Management (Rittell and Webber, 1973; Grint, 2005). An example from Hurricane Katrina would be the routine evacuation of endangered personnel prior to landfall. Wicked Problems, however, are characterised by huge uncertainty as to their nature and appropriate response, are generally novel, complex as opposed to complicated, and lack a definitive solution or stopping point. Attempts to resolve one aspect of a Wicked Problem generally lead to the emergence of another dilemma (Grint, 2005). Grint posits that, when addressing a Wicked Problem, 'there is no 'right' or 'wrong' answer, but there are better or worse alternatives' (ibid: 1473). Effective leadership is essential to identify these alternative categorisations; through posing the right questions rather than providing the right answers, thereby facilitating a collaborative process between leader and followers (Grint, 2005). The relationship between Critical, Tame and Wicked Problems is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Typology of Critical, Tame and Wicked Problems
(Adapted from Grint, 2005, fig 1, p 1477)

Adopting Clumsy Solutions for Wicked Problems

Unlike Critical and Tame Problems, which can be resolved through the application of linear, 'tried and tested' remedies and 'standard operating procedures', which Grint terms 'Elegant solutions', Wicked Problems require a 'clumsy' problem solving approach, which is likely to necessitate incorporation of a multitude of diverse, creative initiatives applied in concert (2008: 7). Grint proposes that Clumsy solutions include the following problem solving and decision making principles:

- Ask questions and question the obvious

- Manage ambiguity

- Adopt a collaborative approach

- Promote Constructive Dissent over Destructive Consent.

Katrina was an original, albeit predictable event. The combination of a Category 5 hurricane, allied with landfall adjacent to a large, heavily populated conurbation, largely sited below sea level, resulted in torrential flooding as the levees succumbed. Widespread disruption of services, communication systems and infrastructure followed. Therefore, despite the emergency containing subordinate local challenges and problems which might individually be termed Critical and Tame, this investigation contends that the overarching nature of such a problem can only be described as Wicked. It is proposed that the failure of government senior leadership to correctly identify it as such, and apply appropriate 'clumsy' corrective action, is at the heart of the Katrina tragedy.

Wicked and Clumsy – White House Leadership Reviewed

President Bush's leadership competency and style, as displayed during the immediate Hurricane Katrina crisis, together with that of the his key advisors within the crisis management team, will be examined against the proposition that Hurricane Katrina was a Wicked Problem requiring a Clumsy solution. Through examination of the leadership behaviours against the four problem solving and decision making principles described above, an assessment will be made as to whether or not Hurricane Katrina was correctly recognised to be a Wicked Problem and appropriately addressed by application of a Clumsy solution.

Ask Questions and Question the Obvious

There is considerable evidence to show that Bush and his advisors failed to realise that their understanding of the nature of the crisis was lacking and that they needed to pose questions to elicit debate, thereby promoting increased awareness of possible outcomes and identifying appropriate remedial actions. On Saturday 27 August, two days before landfall, in a conference call involving Michael Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DHS and White House officials, dire warnings of the hurricane's potential impact were voiced by National Weather Service forecasters and Director Brown: 'Yet White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, the senior White House official participating in the FEMA video teleconference, asked no questions…' (Senate Report, 2006: 670).

Similarly, the following day, when told by Brown that 'this is a bad one and a big one' and that Katrina could be 'a catastrophe within a catastrophe', President Bush asked no questions but made a bland statement of assurance to the 'folks' invoking the efficacy of prayer and that 'we just hope for the very best' (Senate Report, 2006: 235). Bush's behaviour at this time might be described as the 'fingers crossed school of leadership'. These two examples of lack of inquiry are indicative of a failure by Bush and his aides to grasp the complexity and danger of the situation that faced them. They continued to regard Katrina as a routine event; just another hurricane; a Tame Problem, and so to failed to develop and implement the appropriate corrective action. It might be said that Bush was unable to recognise the Wicked Problem because he lacked the imagination to realise that the 'worst case scenario' which had been forecast long before could actually become reality.

Manage Ambiguity

It is natural to want to 'tame' Wicked Problems by drawing them down to the realm of the manageable through tackling ambiguity, a process which follows on from the 'ask questions and question the obvious' principle described above. However, this is best achieved at the planning and preparation stage to pre-empt a potential problem by the application of foresight – imagination and creativity – to ask the 'what if?' questions, then apply management skills to put in place process and procedure to mitigate likely eventualities. Despite being aware of the New Orleans Scenario, and despite being warned as early as January 2005 that FEMA was ill prepared and poorly equipped to cope with a major natural disaster, President Bush and senior White House advisors failed to take appropriate steps to investigate what should be done and apply corrective action. They failed to manage the ambiguity – to 'manage the risk' – and the people of New Orleans paid the price (Senate Report, 2006: 235). Once faced with the actual event, Bush's lack of situational awareness and understanding of the implications of the disaster are characterised by his seeming 'sense of relaxation' when Hurricane Katrina did not hit New Orleans directly and by his continuing confusion, for at least a week after the event, about when, exactly, the levees had failed (Senate Report, 2006: 236). Bush appears to have failed to recognise, let alone cope with the ambiguity resultant from ineffective coordination between departments and lack of clear command and control, exacerbated by failed communications systems. Nor could he go that step further in adopting the approach Grint commends: '…by definition Wicked Problems remain ambiguous, so the real skill is not in removing the uncertainty but in managing to remain effective despite it' (Grint, 2008: 11).

Adopt a Collaborative Approach

Grint (2008) identifies the need for a collaborative approach between leaders and followers when faced with a Wicked Problem. He proposes that: 'The leader's role with a Wicked Problem, therefore, is to ask the right *questions* rather than provide the right answers because the answers may not be self-evident and will require a collaborative process to make any kind of progress' (ibid: 3).

Bush has been severely criticised for lack of direct personal involvement in the crisis response when strong leadership was essential. In the period leading up to landfall and for two days after, there is little evidence that he either promoted debate and enquiry or ensured a united, cooperative response. Instead he chose to adopt a 'business as usual' approach, relying on reports from his staff and offering vague assurances to the public; only returning to the White House to convene the Cabinet nearly 60 hours after landfall. Senator Lieberman complains that it is not known exactly how the president and his staff reacted to events prior to this, due to the White House's refusal to cooperate with the Senate Committee investigation; however, he offers a damning indictment of the presidential leadership displayed: 'What we do know is that instead of responding to the ominous reports from the Gulf, the president spent the day of landfall discussing Medicare in Arizona and California, as well as joining Arizona Senator John McCain at his birthday celebration' (Senate Report, 2006: 673).

Promote Constructive Dissent over Destructive Consent

The House Report (2006: 2) suggests that the president appeared not to have received adequate advice and counsel from a senior disaster professional. If this is true, was it due to a cultural reluctance within his executive team to voice 'bad news' for fear of attracting disapproval, as it is

only in an atmosphere of trust that Constructive Dissent can flourish over Destructive Consent? Grint warns that: '…subordinates will acquiesce to the enfeebling of their organisation rather than challenge their boss through Constructive Dissent. Destructive Consent, then, is the bedfellow of Irresponsible Followership and a wholly inadequate frame for addressing Wicked Problems' (Grint, 2008: 11).

It is known that there were fractures and factions within the executive team. In contravention of National Response Plan process, FEMA Director Brown refused to communicate with DHS Secretary Chertoff, and chose to pass reports directly to White House staff (Senate Report, 2006: 8). Howitt and Leonard (2006: 220) also cite concern over jurisdiction and apportioning of blame as causes of friction between staff at city, state and federal levels. In the prevalent atmosphere of misunderstanding and self-interest, trust appeared to be lacking, and Constructive Dissent was not observable within the White House.

Wicked and Clumsy – Summary

The failure to accurately identify Hurricane Katrina as a Wicked Problem and employ methods to correctly apply a Clumsy Solution is reflected in the House Report's Conclusion: 'We are left scratching our heads at the range of inefficiency and ineffectiveness that characterized government behaviour right before and after this storm…The Select Committee believes too many leaders failed to lead' (2006: 359-60).

Whether the cause of this leadership failure is hubris or incompetence will be left for conjecture; however, as Grint concedes: 'If we knew what to do it would be a Tame Problem not a Wicked Problem' (2008: 2).

Conclusion

This paper has sought to investigate how senior government leaders responded to the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe, and provide insight into leadership praxis juxtaposed with academic theory. With a focus on presidential leadership, and that of his executive team responsible for disaster response, an analysis of the nature of leadership displayed during Hurricane Katrina has been made. The academic leadership model of Critical, Tame and Wicked problems has been introduced together with their counterparts of Elegant and Clumsy solutions. Practice has been compared to theory and inconsistencies noted. As a result of this process, the following conclusions have been reached:

- Prior to the existence of Hurricane Katrina, and despite multiple warnings, senior leaders failed to ensure that adequate planning and preparation were made to counter a natural disaster of such significance. This was a failure of risk management.

- In the face of Hurricane Katrina, senior leaders failed to recognise the event as a Wicked Problem. This was a failure of imagination.

- To ameliorate the impact of Hurricane Katrina, senior leaders failed to apply appropriate problem solving and decision making principles to identify and construct Clumsy solutions. This was a failure of leadership.

It is therefore proposed that the impact of critical leadership failings and flawed judgement displayed in response to Hurricane Katrina confirm Flin *et al*'s academic theory (2008: 1) which states that leadership and decision making are two of the key skills for safe and efficient

performance in high risk operations. It is conceded that there are no easy answers in leadership, and this is especially true when confronted with a Wicked Problem. In the words of Laurence J Peter: 'Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them' (in Grint, 2008: 14).

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Case Study 2: BlackHawk – A Case of Mistaken Identity

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Introduction and Definitions

'A crisis is a change – either sudden or evolving – that results in an urgent problem that must be addressed immediately…a crisis is anything with the potential to cause sudden and serious damage to its employees, reputation, or bottom line' (Harvard Business Essentials: xvi). There are principally three types of crisis:

- those which befall an organisation

- those which are manufactured

- and those which escalate from an accident (after Curtin, 2005).

The crisis I have chosen is the accidental shoot-down of the US Black Hawk helicopters over Northern Iraq in 2004. The event principally falls in the first type of crisis. I have chosen it because, although it is relatively small in scale and measured in minutes, it usefully encompasses many aspects of leadership theory. The event has also been well documented, not only in official reports (Perry, 1994; US General Accounting Office, 1997) but also in general academic literature (Snook 2002).

Bass famously stated that there are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept (Bass: 11). This essay will use the definition given by Haslam as a starting point: 'Leadership is commonly defined as the process of influencing others in a manner that enhances their contribution to the realization of group goals' (Haslam: 40).

The structure of the essay follows the contention that crises follow a certain pattern (a crisis curve (Curtin: 11)) and exhibit certain phases: gestation, pre-tremor, the crisis and aftermath. I will look at these four parts in detail, critically assessing the role of leadership during the different phases. I will draw upon the work of Northouse (2004), Bratton et al (2005), Grint (2000), Haslam (2002) and Pfeffer (2007) to provide the relevant academic leadership theory (as applied to the concepts of group think, 'methodism', social identity theory and complexity) which were prevalent during the crisis. I have also drawn upon the work of Alexander (2002), Curtin (2005), Dorner (1996), and peer reviewed journals to provide relevant crisis management theory.

Background

The events on 14 April 1994, when two US Air Force F-15 fighters accidentally shot down two US Army Black Hawk helicopters in a friendly fire incident, provides a wealth of material for analysing how leadership, or lack of it, can play a part in creating a crisis. Given all the training, experience, safeguards, sophisticated electronic and technical equipment and the relatively benign conditions at the time, how could those in command allow such an accident to happen?

Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was set up shortly after the end of the first Gulf war in April 1991 to ensure security for UN relief operations to help Kurdish refugees. A significant part of this operation was the setting up of a 'no-fly' zone above the 36th parallel in which Iraqi planes were not allowed to fly (see map). This no-fly zone was enforced by a combined task force of daily

armed aircraft patrols from a variety of coalition nations, including the UK. During the three year period leading up to April 14 1994, approximately 27,000 fixed wing and 1,400 helicopter flights took place without accident (Snook, 2002: 8). The missions which took place were consequently of a routine nature.

Map of Northern Iraq (Source Snook: 5)

Crisis in Gestation: Leadership Responses

What were the main ingredients that led to the crisis and what part did leadership play in attempting to mitigate them? The USAF investigations identified four key issues:

- F-15 pilot misidentification of the helicopters as hostile (poor recognition training)

- AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) crew inaction in failing to exercise appropriate control and for not intervening in the situation (poor communications)

- Task force non-integration of US Army helicopter operations into overall air operations (poor planning)

- The identification friend or foe system had not identified the Black Hawk helicopters to the F-15 pilots (technical issues) (after Perry, 1994).

Note that all of these issues were in existence before the crisis. In this section I will concentrate on point two only.

From 1991 to April 1994 there had been thousands of sorties without incident. Had those in command become complacent or was it simply impossible to conceive of something going wrong with all the 'fail-safe' devices? As Dorner points out in relation to Chernobyl, everything the operators did they did consciously and apparently with the complete conviction that they were acting properly (Dorner: 34). The leaders were under the flattering delusion that they were far too professional for anything to go wrong.

The AWACS crew have been criticised for failing to exercise appropriate control and for not intervening in the situation. Snook (Chapter 4) concludes after examining the extensive evidence that the AWACS mission crew were not cohesive as a group (reflecting the attitude survey – see below). Group cohesiveness is related to group effectiveness, and factors which constitute cohesion can be seen to parallel aspects which determine a group's effectiveness (Brooks, 2006: 100). Haslam would argue that the social identity of the group was weak and dominated by the 'I' rather than the 'we'. Cohesiveness is more likely when members of a group are together for a reasonable length of time, and change only slowly (Mullins, 2002: 473). Leadership theory suggests that a leader is critical in building and supporting the social identity and cohesiveness of the team (Haslam, 2002; Grint, 2000). The AWACS team was certainly undeveloped and not a mature team and was simply not in a position to respond to an event out of the ordinary.

Leadership on the AWACS was suffering from what Dorner calls Methodism (Dorner: 45). Many psychological experiments have demonstrated how people's range of action is limited by their tendency to act in accordance with preestablished patterns. To be successful, a leader must know when to follow established practice and when to strike out in a new direction. Recognizing the strategy appropriate to a particular situation will help leaders plan effectively. Methodism is most prevalent during the period of gestation when a false sense of security is established by crippling conservatism of activity and thought processes.

Pre-tremor Warning: Leadership Response

'It will take a serious tragedy, an airplane and crew lost due to their (senior leadership's) indifference, before they in the ivory tower wake up to the realities of AWACS today…the planes are broke, dangerous and in need of maintenance…morale is poor' (Snook: 108). The above comments come from an attitude survey of AWACS crews several months before the fatal shooting down of the helicopters in 1994. This report is the starkest pre-tremor warning before the event. Unfortunately the leaders who could have acted on these comments preferred to remain in their 'ivory towers' under extreme pressure of budget cuts. Leadership theory suggests (Northouse: Chapter10) that critical leadership functions include diagnosing group deficiencies and taking remedial action, however no action was taken by leaders in Washington or those geographically closer in managing OPC at Incirlik.

AWACS (Source:Boeing http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/ic/awacs/index.html)

Friendly-fire incidents are not uncommon in conflict situations and the two Gulf wars provide plenty of examples. US Air Force (USAF) pilots do have a reputation of being 'trigger happy' amongst their coalition colleagues. Whether this is fair or not, there were pressures for officers to make a name for themselves. There is an element of narcissistic leadership behaviour as described by Kellerman (2004) which can lead to glory (to become an ace is a pilot's aspiration) or could lead to derailment. In effect USAF pilots were looking for an opportunity to shoot down Iraqi aircraft for the glory for themselves and for the Service, because they had very little chance to prove themselves during the Gulf war when the Iraqi Air Force had fled to Iran.

In addition, previous USAF reports had identified that F-15 pilots' helicopter recognition skills were limited because their main foe was other fighters, not helicopters (USGAO, 1997). All these minor points (small tremors) point to what was to happen in 1994. Leaders could not connect these very different pieces and create a coherent picture. As Dorner has described in other crisis situations, there was logic to the shoot-down. None of the actors wanted to do a bad job; it was simply that the 'leadership' applied to the situation was incorrect.

F-15 Fighter (Source: http://www.wallpaperbase.com/wallpapers/military/f15eagle/f_15_eagle)

Leadership During the Crisis: a Case of Structurally Induced Inaction?

Battram (1996: 61) argues that it is critical that leaders should have a proper form of dialogue with their team, not just communication (i.e. simply as the sending and receiving of messages). This is needed if leadership failure during a crisis is to be avoided. Battram cites three key rules of effective dialogue:

- Respect the person who holds the context

- Treat everyone's views as equally valid

- Suspend your tendency to judge.

This need for effective communication has been highlighted by other commentators: 'It is important to communicate effectively with people, especially colleagues, and to maintain a sense of realism by recognizing the limitations of people, equipment and specific situation' (Alexander: 136). There was no effective dialogue between the two F-15 pilots, or the F-15 pilots and the AWACS crew. Why was this? It is clear that the wingman of the second F-15 (who was the senior pilot) did not question the lead pilot's assessment that they were facing two enemy Hinds rather than two friendly Black Hawks. Instead of making sure himself, he devolved the responsibility. This 'laissez faire' approach to leadership is generally unsuccessful during crises and it had catastrophic results in this case. There was almost no dialogue between the F-15 pilots and the AWACS. While the AWACS crew followed Battram's first rule 'respect the person who holds the context' (i.e. the F-15 pilots were at the scene) it was the AWACS crew who had the critical information that Black Hawks were in the area. Failure to transmit this data was also critical in the shoot-down.

Leadership theory suggests that the more divided an organisation is the more effort is needed to rejoin (Bratton, 2005; Grint, 1997 & Northouse, 2004). In deeply differentiated, complex organisations (such as the US Department of Defense, DoD), whose coordinating mechanisms fail to effectively integrate parts, it is possible to see why the Black Hawks were not adequately integrated into the overall task force. This raises the issue of whether a leader goes for standardisation or flexibility. In the Black Hawk example, rules, orders, directives, procedures and checklists were static tools which were ill-fitted to meet the ever-changing requirements of a

complex system. In the end, largely rule-based leadership efforts to manage complex evolving actions of highly differentiated subgroups failed.

The AWACS team had had little time to gel during the formation phase because of enforced absence of critical members of the team and this led to a lack of mutual trust and a level of dependency which militated against quick responses. This in turn led to a diffusion of responsibility where nobody knew who was responsible for tracking the ill-fated helicopters. There were certainly enough people to take control of the situation (Mission Crew Commander, DUKE (overall AWACS Commander) and MAD DOG (Mission Director – ground-based at Incirlik, Turkey)) but mirroring the infamous case of Katherine Genovese, and the principle of divided impact, the AWACS crew effectively became bystanders. This was compounded by a lack of a straightforward authority relationship. The AWACS had in practice no authority over the F-15 fighters, who wanted to be left alone (Snook, 2002: 133). Social impact theory can go some way in explaining how unresponsive bystanders can allow inaction at critical times. Thus leaders without authority in crisis situations effectively become bystanders.

Janis (1982: 9) defined Groupthink as 'a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action'. Groupthink is likely to occur when groups are under stress, especially if the stress emanates from an external source. As McConville (2008: 9) states: pressures for unanimity within a decision making group induce a restricted ability for group members to handle information. The lead F-15 fighter told his subordinate wingman that the Black Hawks were definitely Hinds and the pressure of unanimity was so great that the wingman agreed even when he was not sure. Leadership can quickly capitulate to group think and this is part of the reason why those onboard the AWACS failed to get involved.

The ill-fated helicopters taking off from Zakhu, Northern Iraq. Note the American flag clearly visible on fuel blister. (Source: Author)

Aftermath of Crisis: Leadership Response

Often what emerges from an organisation during a crisis is late and with little content (Curtin: 37). Leaders learn from crises. They need to act quickly and decisively to put things right (Harvard Business Essentials: 67). To their credit DoD did act quickly for such a big bureaucracy. Following the shoot-down, senior DoD Officials faced intense pressure to find someone accountable for the twenty-six lives lost. To their credit they did not seek a scapegoat. They spent a great deal of time and resources to understand what went wrong and to ensure that a similar event could not happen in future. The events of 14 April 1994 led to a series of extremely detailed investigations into what went wrong, including a twenty-seven volume report from the US Aircraft Investigation Board. The leadership response was to acknowledge the mistakes, which is critical to start the process of resolving the crisis.

In general, the DoD leadership also followed the four rules suggested by Harvard Business Essentials to help leaders alleviate the crisis:

- act quickly and decisively (an immediate inquiry was instituted)

- put people first (did not try to scapegoat individuals involved)

- be on the scene (comprehensive investigation in theatre as to what happened)

- communicate liberally (open military hearings and extensive publication of findings).

These actions by the DoD helped to repair the damage done between the various services working on OPC and helped with the grieving process of the families and relatives of the 26 dead.

Conclusions

I have shown that the leadership responses to the events surrounding the shoot-down of the two Black Hawk helicopters were flawed in a number of areas. There were three key aspects of the crisis which confirm certain aspects of leadership theory: the detrimental effect of groupthink on a leader's ability to come to a correct decision; a lack of effective dialogue between leaders and followers and inappropriate leadership styles for the occasion. Whilst one individual case study on its own cannot ultimately prove or disprove aspects of leadership theory, this particular example does lend weight to certain theoretical constructs, such as the importance of a leader having effective dialogue; awareness of structurally induced inaction caused by adherence to pre-established patterns; and a leader's ability to identify and remove the possibility of narcissist derailment. If we take Haslam's conjecture that leadership is the process of influencing others in a manner that enhances their contribution to the realization of group goals, then we can finally conclude that there was a significant absence of leadership by all the key participants during the crisis of 14 April 1994.

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Case Study 3: Leadership Amid the Rwanda Crisis

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> *One of the marks of good leadership is the ability to dispense with denial quickly and face into the hard stuff with eyes open and fists raised. With particularly bad crises facing them, good leaders also define reality, set direction and inspire people to move forward. Just think of Giuliani after 9/11 or Churchill during World War II. Denial doesn't exactly come to mind – a forthright, calm, fierce boldness does.* Welch (2005)

Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian Force Commander of the deployed United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), reflected that, from its establishment resulting from UN Security Council Resolution 872 in 1993, UNAMIR suffered appalling shortfalls in equipment and training (Dallaire, 1998). An estimated 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda in 1994 over a bloody period of 100 days, during which time requests from Dallaire to the UN Headquarters in New York for additional resources and authorization to end the killing were refused. Counter-intuitively, all but 270 of the UN's 2,500 peacekeepers were withdrawn after the murder of 10 Belgian blue-helmet soldiers (Dallaire, 2001: 250-1).

On his return home to Canada in August 1994, Dallaire suffered post-traumatic stress disorder. He continued to serve with distinction in the armed forces, was promoted and held a key appointment overseeing the professional training of officers, including their leadership development (Off, 2001: 345). In 2000, the UN Security Council explicitly accepted responsibility for failing to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, with Council members acknowledging that their governments lacked the political will to stop the massacres (BBC News, 2000). In the same year, Dallaire attempted suicide by combining alcohol with his anti-depressant medication.

This aim of this paper is to describe the nature of the leadership displayed during events in Rwanda, at both the personal and organizational levels, Dallaire and the UN respectively. In so doing, a brief case will be constructed as to whether the event confirms or disconfirms relevant academic theory of crisis leadership. The paper will first explore key definitions to set the rules for debate, identify specific crises with the underpinning analysis set to assess the actual behaviour of the main actors against the academic ideal. Given the nature of the case example, an ethical and political viewpoint will also be considered. Conclusions are then drawn that suggest ideal leadership behaviours employed in a crisis have practicable utility, and that the lessons can enhance future performance.

Definitions of Crisis, Leadership, Moral and Academia

Chambers Dictionary (Brookes, 2006: 387) defines a crisis as a point or time for deciding anything, the decisive moment or turning-point. There were arguably two decisive moments in the Rwanda crisis in 1994. The first, on 10 January, was when Dallaire notified UN Headquarters of major weapons caches, and of plans by Hutu militia forces to provoke the Belgian troops, to guarantee their withdrawal, and then exterminate the Tutsi ethnic minority population (Dallaire, 1998: 77-9). The second, on 12 April, was when friendly French, Belgian and Canadian forces flew into Kigali airport to evacuate foreign nationals from Rwanda and, on the sixth day of the unfolding genocide, departed leaving a much smaller UNAMIR in place. Dallaire (2003: 291) had been forced to decide whether to go or to stay.

The Defence Leadership Centre (2004: 2) defines leadership as a combination of example, persuasion and compulsion dependent on the situation. It describes the ideal outcome from a typical situation as being transformation, so that leaders inspire change by motivating others to do more than they originally intended and often more than they thought possible. Moreover, good leaders can balance boldness with risk management and then make an appropriate decision in an appropriate timescale. Moral is a term related to conduct considered to be good within an ethical framework (Brookes, 2003: 854); a relevant such framework for this paper is Article 3 of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states 'everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person' (UN, 1948). Academia is sometimes contrasted pejoratively with practice, though study and analysis of real events can help practitioners to improve their performance.

These definitions collectively imply that crisis situations require leaders to make time-related decisions to change events for the moral good, and that subsequent reflection on events can improve future performance. The implication is that disasters can be avoided if a crisis is dealt with effectively. Rwanda was an unmitigated disaster.

The Nature of Leadership Displayed During the Rwanda Crisis

Strategic Level – The United Nations

The UN was founded to maintain peace and security for all of its member states. The organization's realpolitik lever to achieve this is the Security Council, which has power to authorize the deployment of member states' militaries, mandate cease-fires and enforce sanctions on noncompliant states. Against this clash of moral, ideal and carrot and stick arrangements, the UN Secretary-General's leadership task of catalyzing 192 member states to cooperate decisively is a complex one, as Rwanda knows to its cost (Grünfeld and Huijboom, 2007).

Indeed, Grünfeld and Huijboom (2007) argue that the lack of strategic international response to events in Rwanda was down to political decisions taken by top UN Secretariat officials, with the problem being the unwillingness to pass on unexpected bad news, knowing that agreement to act would be difficult and arguing among themselves that Dallaire's reports were unsubstantiated. The UN lacks the ability to act without the support of its more powerful members, notably the United States (US). President Clinton wanted to avoid a repetition of its unsuccessful intervention in Somalia in 1993, in which 34 US troops were killed, and mandated certain financial and military pre-conditions for action, including the need for direct relevance to US interests (Glover, 1999: 119-22).

Later a force of 6,800 soldiers and police were deployed, mainly from Africa, and after lengthy delays caused by arguments over finances (Prunier, 1998: 336). UN leadership did things right procedurally, rather than compel the right things to be done morally (Bennis and Nanus, 1985); this implies the UN is managed and not led. This case highlights in a practical way the resource organizational dependency theory, where managerial behaviour is explained by the organization's reliance on a particularly powerful stakeholder (Bratton et al, 2005: 76-7). In this case, the US government held political control over the UN's ability to act, and the resultant outcome was a highly immoral one (Miller, 2003: 245).

The Personal Level – Lieutenant-General Dallaire

In a fax to the UN Headquarters on 10 January, Dallaire warned of Hutu threats to exterminate the Tutsi people, and stated that he intended to take preventive action within 36 hours; however, the prompt answer from New York was to prohibit any direct response. The request for authority to seize arms caches was repeated another five times, and rejected on each occasion (Grünfeld and Huijboom, 2007: 95-101). After the killing had started, Dallaire (1998: 78-9) opined there was a void of leadership in New York, and changed tack from requests for reinforcement to ensuring there was no abandonment. This aligns with the 'if-then' style of contingency leadership theory (Bratton et al, 2005: 163). Indeed, Sun Tzu lectured 'there are occasions when the commands of the sovereign need not be obeyed' (quoted in ibid: 97). Adopting this approach, against conflicting advice from New York as to whether he could withdraw troops protecting the demilitarized zone, and on threats from the Rwandan Army, Dallaire decided unilaterally that he would take any decisions to move his troops or not. This aligns with Sun Tzu's view that war creates sufficient environmental turbulence to require a high degree of informal and decentralized leadership.

Dallaire (2003: 291) marked 12 April as 'the day the world moved from disinterest in Rwanda to the abandonment of Rwandans to their fate'; he reports not sleeping that night due to guilt. Through the bravery of Dallaire and his beleaguered force in the face of extreme provocation, UNAMIR saved some 30,000 Tutsi and Hutu lives by providing areas of 'safe control' in and around Kigali (Dallaire, 1998: 79).

Academic Theory of Leadership in a Crisis

Most organizations operate in a complex and uncertain environment in which strategies that were successful in the past quickly become redundant in the face of legislative, technological and environmental change (Emmott, 2003: 25-7). Those that are ill-prepared for change will undoubtedly face problems, some of which might evolve into crises. Against this backdrop, Seijts (2004) identifies six key approaches that are critical for leaders in crisis situations. These form an adequate framework to explore whether or not the events in Rwanda confirm relevant academic theory.

Use Foresight

Toft and Reynolds (2005: 80) foretold that even the greatest improbability always remains a probability, however small, and thus will someday happen. Moreover, Seijts (2004: 3) argues that a leader in a crisis must use foresight proactively, 'anticipate the unexpected and prepare steps' that would mitigate the potential damage a crisis can inflict on an organization and stakeholders. Borodzicz (2005: 85) opines that exercising such responses through simulated emergencies is good business continuity management: 'thinking the unthinkable' and then 'mitigating the unthinkable'.

The UN had shown foresight by deploying UNAMIR to contribute to the security of the Kigali area, and thus had undertaken strategic contingency planning. However, its estimate of the subsequent post-deployment branches and sequels was inadequate; the resultant response to the 10 January crisis was virtually without counter to the subsequent damage sustained. Of note since, Dallaire (Seijts, 2004: 3) reflects generically that crisis leadership is about anticipating the worst and 'building confidence in teams as to what they might expect' in the future. Throughout the subsequent slaughter, Dallaire spent all the hours he could devising a military plan to stop the

genocide (Off, 2001: 340). However, by then, the first crisis had passed and the unthinkable was happening without forethought mitigation.

Be Decisive

Garcia (2006: 5) talks of the 'golden hour' of crisis response, referring not to a specific period of time, but rather that incremental delays in decisive response have greater than incremental impact on the outcome. Seijts (2004: 3) adds that 'too many leaders wear rose-coloured glasses for too long', and hope that their organization is turning a corner. This particular phenomenon was occurring at the UN Headquarters, while Dallaire claimed to be having 'to make a nanosecond decision' about launching a rescue mission for the captured Belgian troops (Off, 2001: 338). He determined that a rescue operation would not succeed and just place at risk more of his troops; the Belgian government has argued since that Dallaire was reckless with the lives of its peacekeepers. Hosmer (2001: 91) argues, however, that 'ethically-based decisions are superior as they lead to stronger commands' and drive more easily towards a common purpose. Dallaire believed he had a moral obligation to act as he did as his higher-purpose consideration at the time was the security of the Rwandan state (Off, 2001: 344-5). In hindsight, while he was decisive, Dallaire's moral convictions neither saved the Rwandan people nor his own sanity.

Be an Exceptional Communicator

Borodzciz (2006: 32-5) urges leaders in crisis situations to articulate risk levels clearly, and to be honest when communicating with people. Ambiguity fosters uncertainty, he adds, and thus leaders should explain what they are going to do, and tell them why they are doing it. The Defence Leadership Centre (DLC) (2004: 23) rates a leader with sound communicator competency as having skills in negotiating, influencing and persuading. While their approach is potentially too slow in a crisis, Bratton et al (2005: 288) encourage leaders to generate ideas, using a sharing 'exchange' model rather than straight 'transmission' of message. Throughout, Off (2001: 340) records that the troops were profoundly traumatized, but Dallaire 'was clear, firm, strong and uncompromising'. Plus, from January to July 1994, Dallaire was in continual dialogue with the staff in New York. Notwithstanding his effectiveness at communicating with his troops and negotiating with various militia forces, his pleading for additional soldiers to stop the killing and for a Chapter VII mandate were refused by the UN, who considered his plans as ill-conceived (Prunier, 1998: 138-9).

Be Prepared to Take Risk

Crisis situations are frequently fraught with uncertainty and require leaders to make quick decisions, and thus leaders must be prepared to accept the risk of making the wrong call (Borodzciz, 2006: 93). The UN Headquarters staff's risk strategy between January and March 1994 was to trust the Rwandan president and his delivery of the peace process between the Hutus and Tutsis, with the ultimate threat being the possible withdrawal of UNAMIR (Grünfeld and Huijboom, 2007: 253-5). Given that the president's death on 6 April, which was foreseen by some in country, acted as the immediate catalyst for the massacres to begin, it can be concluded that the UN was prepared to take risks following the 'organizational process model'. Arguably against normal convention, once the second crisis on 12 April of whether to withdraw or stay had passed, Dallaire was unable to transfer or significantly mitigate the mortal risks that UNAMIR faced and remain operating, so he and his force tolerated them. On reflection, there appears to have been little aversity to taking risk over Rwanda.

Connect with People

On the 50th Anniversary of D-Day, Dallaire (2003: 409) reported on the irony of 'being out of food, being shot at, the slaughter in full flood, and there being still no cavalry coming over the hill'. Seemingly needlessly in this case, Burns (1978) argued that gaining commitment to challenging goals and sustaining commitment in the face of obstacles and setbacks is a key leadership challenge. The DLC (2004: 75) claims that successful leaders are able to connect with people by understanding when stress begins to have an adverse impact on individuals and the organization as a whole, as it must have done continually for UNAMIR. However, compliance in this case might equally have rested on Dallaire's legitimate power (Bratton et al, 2005: 127). Dallaire sent his men out into the danger, and even when they returned traumatized he made them write up their reports and prepare to go out again. Certainly, when all around was so chaotic, using Bratton et al's (2005: 221) explanation, Dallaire's 'socialized' orders to protect whom the troops could, and themselves, appeared wholly rational. The commander was well connected to his men.

Be Visible

Seijts (2004: 4) stated that a good leader would 'be among the first on the scene' of a crisis and 'lead from the front' to give direction and offer solace. Garcia (2006: 4) reinforces the need to act, stating that the perception of indifference is the single largest contributing harm in the aftermath of a crisis, especially when there are victims. Dallaire explained that a 'no comment from the general' media approach does not work (Seijts, 2004: 4). He added that leaders have to be in the forefront of wanting to talk to anyone, and are 'expected to be omnipresent'. Indeed, Dallaire's visibility on the ground, and the presence of the media, guaranteed global visibility of events in Rwanda, which in great part led to the eventual deployment of additional UN troops and the end of the massacre.

Ethics and Organizational Politics

Ethics is central to leadership, argues Northouse (2004: 307), as it is core to the process of influence over organizational and political values. The UN's response to the Rwanda crisis was stifled as central authorization was needed for decisive action to restore seriously-violated human rights. Kant would argue that this position is unethical if lives were lost as a consequence. Stone (1997: 23) argues that when people have a choice between a rational decision and their ego, they always choose their ego. Therefore, political preference prevails as the norm rather than the exception (Buchanan and Badham, 1999: 610). In practice, the US's ego was bruised after its Somalia experience, and thus the UN was stymied from orchestrating the logical response of a further deployment of troops until the evidence was overwhelming.

Miller (2003) opined that the more an intervention is removed from the partial interests of particular states, especially powerful ones, the more likely it is to approximate toward justice, and the more likely that this is to be perceived as legitimate by the parties in conflict and the international community. This particular lesson has been learnt by the UN as 'the right of humanitarian intervention' has been replaced with new proactive language describing the 'responsibility to protect' (Grünfeld and Huijboom, 2007: 241). Bratton et al (2005: 76) describe such causal managerial behaviour as political theory in action.

Conclusion

This paper explored the leadership action of two actors in crisis conditions, set against a six-point framework of ideal leadership behaviour. A managerial and procedurally-bound approach was employed by the UN to Rwanda at the strategic level, which seemed inappropriate and proved ineffective in preventing the subsequent genocide. Meanwhile, Dallaire's behaviour on the ground matched positively each of the six ideal criteria. However, despite enormous personal commitment by Dallaire to the task, the required outcome was not timely enough. Overall, the analysis confirms in principle the relevant academic crisis leadership theory. In particular, if the UN had used more foresight and been decisive, the disaster might have been averted. Moreover, Dallaire's good communication skills and bold visibility assured eventual action by the UN.

Indeed, reflecting on Welch's (2005) words, while the UN might have been in denial, Dallaire faced into the hard stuff, and with fists raised defined his own reality and motivated UNAMIR in the enveloping crisis in Rwanda to do more than it thought possible. This was transformational leadership in the extreme, the moral experience of which went on to shape future international policy change.

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'Two Things are Going to Win or Lose This War and Nothing Else Will Affect it a Damn. Our Armies Might Advance a Mile a Day and Slay the Hun in Thousands, But the Real Crux Lies in Whether we Blockade the Enemy to His Knees or Whether he Does the Same to Us.' Was Beatty Overstating the Case in 1917? How Effective are Sanctions as a Lever of Power in the Modern World?

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Introduction

The naval strategist Sir Julian Corbett held that *'…a great power [could be] brought to its knees by preying on its commerce'.*[1] An island nation dependent on maritime trade would instinctively warm to this idea, but with less than one million men mobilised at the start of the First World War, Britain depended upon additional factors to redress the seven million men under arms on the continent. Britain's dilemma was that its sea power could not afford to be indifferent to an imbalance of continental power.[2] The war was to be industrial and fought from trenches, but Germany would not run out of soldiers, weapons or munitions; it would suffer most from dwindling economic reserves and appalling shortages of food. Agrarian resources decided it; '[It was] not only a war of steel and gold, but a war of bread and potatoes'.[3] Germany anticipated a swift victory, but would need significant trade by sea to sustain what became a long war. This proved fundamental to the establishment of a blockade that was to bring agony to Germany.[4]

From the mid 19th century, Britain emphasised upholding neutral rights to safeguard her maritime commercial interests, but international concessions to achieve that were at the expense of national belligerent rights. This paper will examine the criticality of maritime communications to both belligerents and neutrals in the First World War. It will show how a confused evolution of legal and military measures weakened Britain's initial ability to exploit its sea power; an error that was compensated for only when Germany unleashed a brutal offensive at sea. After explaining how Britain eventually enforced a successful blockade, the paper will examine the utility of modern day sanctions, noting that the humanitarian consequences of blockade could not be repeated in anything other than a war of national survival. The paper will conclude that comprehensive sanctions are indiscriminate and that the mechanisms for them remain in need of reform.

The Criticality of Maritime Communications

The Allies operated on external lines, which were more vulnerable than those of the Central Powers, whose mainly internal lines were almost immune from Allied attack.[5] Nevertheless, as the war lengthened, the Central Powers depended on supplies coming through the North Sea, the Baltic and the Mediterranean. One British sea line of communication ran north to Murmansk, to supply Russia, because the Black and Baltic seas were closed by Turkish and German blockades.[6] Britain also had southward communications through the Straits of Gibraltar to reach the Balkans

and the Middle East, and its principal supply route to the Western Front was across the English Channel to the French ports. It had many other external lines of communication: from North America, South America and Africa, all using the Atlantic; from China and India through the Indian Ocean, thence to Suez and the Mediterranean; and from Australia and New Zealand through the Middle East or alternately through the Panama Canal.[7] Britain defended these communications with a strong surface fleet, but Germany would quickly learn to exploit its U-boats in an offensive role against Allied and neutral merchant shipping. Its principal areas for interdiction would be in the Mediterranean, the eastern Atlantic and on the eastern seaboard of North America.

Evolution of the Legal and Military Instruments of Blockade

However effective command of the sea might have been in stopping trade under a hostile flag before the war, it was increasingly subject to international law.[8] A critical requirement was not alienating America, a major neutral trading partner with both Britain and Germany. Therefore, Britain had to strike the right balance between its belligerent and neutral rights.[9] However, at a time when international law was still in its infancy, Britain surrendered some crucial rights. Lassa Oppenheim published a seminal treatise on international law in 1906 that articulated the evolving legal dimensions of warfare at sea.[10] It highlighted the difference between pacific and belligerent blockade, noting that a belligerent blockading state was within its rights to bar all shipping between the blockaded state and the external world. Whitehall reasoned that Britain could be effective by destroying an enemy's merchant fleet and by seizing contraband from neutral vessels. Contraband was prohibited goods that would support an enemy's war effort. The choice of word was significant. Its connotations of smuggling and illegality were designed to place enforcement on a quasi-legal basis.[11]

The Russo-Japanese war in 1904 confirmed the British government's belief that its interests lay in the primacy of neutral rights.[12] This led to proposed definitions of absolute contraband, goods that would always be subject to seizure, and conditional contraband, goods that could be used for both military and peacetime purposes. However, by 1905, '…the end result was legislation that served as…a hindrance to Britain in the early stages of [the war]'.[13] The essential point was that: '…undiminished belligerent rights and the widest possible freedom for neutrals are opposite principles. They cannot coexist. Enlarge the one and you impair the other.'[14] Britain had also failed to consider the impact of emerging technology. The term *command of the sea* was superseded by control of the sea, because mines, submarines, torpedoes and long range guns made it difficult, even for a strong navy, to gain and sustain command of the sea.[15] This undermined the utility of close blockade, but the alternative – distant blockade – had legal and practical difficulties. A blockade could not legally extend beyond the coasts and ports belonging to or captured by the enemy, and the blockading force could not cover neutral ports or coasts.[16] By giving up belligerent rights and then being forced by technology into distant blockade, Britain had rendered its navy weaker. The government considered economic blockade as only secondary to decisive engagement at sea. 'There had always been doubt…over the effectiveness of blockading Germany owing to the neutral ports in adjacent countries. From these Germany could continue to receive the raw materials…regardless of what the British did at sea.'[17] A blockade could not be decisive if neutral rights were observed. Nevertheless, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill imposed a policy of distant blockade in May 1912 and closed the northern entrance to the North Sea.[18] Under these orders, the Royal Navy assumed its war footing in 1914 and the economic dimension was now ensconced as an indirect approach.[19]

Alfred Mahan's view of Britain's pre-war naval posture now seems remarkably superficial: 'The British Fleet is concentrated in the North Sea. There it defends all British interests, the British Islands, British commerce and the colonies and, offensively, commands Germany's commercial sea routes.'[20] Britain's position was not as strong as Mahan suggested. Germany also went through legal contortions, although as a Continental Power, its focus had been principally on its army. It '…felt compelled to justify submarine attacks on merchantmen as exceptional in international law, but…the justifications…lost their cogency in the eyes of neutrals…and even of the German politicians.'[21] After war broke out, Germany's navy – never as strong as Britain's – would continue to agonise whether it could legally and morally exploit its U-boats to maximum effect. One reason was the uneasiness of America. In August 1915, it criticised both Germany and Britain for their tendencies towards international lawlessness.[22]

The Blockades

Britain's war strategy was confirmed at a meeting of its War Council on 5 August 1915, where political leaders and strategic experts overwhelmingly voted for an expeditionary land force.[23] In any war, land and sea battles are closely related.[24] However, as the British army commitment to the continent increased, the synergy of land and naval power seemed to unfold more by accident than by any grand strategic design; the national focus was on the trenches. The British blockade was based on its powerful surface fleet, whereas the German counter-blockade would depend principally on interdiction by U-boat. Britain never formally declared its blockade, because its navy could not enter the Baltic to prevent trade between Germany and the Scandinavian countries; therefore, its blockade was incomplete and technically illegal.[25] Although the term blockade was avoided in government, in everyday speech it was common and by 1916 it became official when Lord Cecil became Minister for Blockade.[26] Britain began to pursue a more comprehensive strategy using new structures, including a National Contraband Committee, a Ministry of Shipping and an Allied Maritime Transport Council.[27] This allowed effective cooperation between government departments, agencies and Allies, which fine-tuned commercial shipping and overseas markets to guard against the impending U-boat storm.

The Royal Navy had two essential tasks: dominate the German fleet; and maintain Britain's sea lines of communication. 'If the Navy failed in either of these tasks, Britain could be assumed to lose.'[28] Maritime communications can be disrupted by attacking ports, defending convoys, interdicting high seas shipping or controlling choke points. There was early Admiralty doubt about convoys but, after the introduction of the system in June 1917, over 16,000 ships were escorted across the oceans, of which only 154 were torpedoed.[29] For Germany, the English Channel promised direct access to the Atlantic trade routes, albeit through a narrow choke. Atlantic access through the North Sea was guarded by the Royal Navy's Northern Patrol, which would assert a firm grip north of the British Isles.[30] The engagement between the opposing battle fleets at Jutland in mid-1916 was '…one of the cheapest strategic victories in history', albeit a source of prolonged acrimony in the Royal Navy for years to come.[31] The German fleet was not destroyed at Jutland, but at least it was fixed. If the blockade was subsequently intended to lure it out to destruction on the high seas, it failed.[32] The stalemate favoured Britain; Germany was fixed on land and at sea.

Germany lost use of its merchant fleet at the outset of war. Hundreds of ships took neutral refuge and were detained. The problem for Britain was how to deal with neutral trade bound for Germany. She initially shaped maritime operations by taking advantage of indiscriminate

German mine laying in the North Sea. This allowed Britain to declare it a military area within which all shipping would be at risk. Routes for neutral ships were thus funnelled towards the Channel, where only British pilots could guarantee safe passage through the minefields, allowing Britain to start controlling neutral trade.[33] Germany declared a counter-blockade, but it missed a diplomatic opportunity. Although Germany had a good case in international law against the British blockade, 'She failed to exploit it effectively in neutral eyes and eventually aroused the neutrals to anger.'[34]

Germany made several bids to turn the land battle after its failure to deliver a quick initial victory. Its offensives in Flanders, to the east and at Verdun led to a belated attempt more fully to exploit its navy. The German Admiral Scheer argued that '…a victorious end to the war within a reasonable time can only be achieved with the defeat of British economic life – that is by using the U-boats against British trade.'[35] The German focus of the naval war thus shifted from the North Sea to the Western Approaches; the focal points of the major shipping lanes. The U-boat threat to Britain first emerged in September 1914, when a submarine torpedoed three British armoured cruisers. It reversed the preconception that U-boats would be used mainly in a coastal defensive role.[36] Royal Navy intelligence staff had long suspected that U-boats were moving into the Atlantic shipping lanes through the Channel, but its assessments were initially ignored.[37] Once in the Atlantic, the German raiders could savage Allied shipping.

British tactics for controlling neutral shipping were businesslike and courteous, with favourable standards applied to intercepted American ships in particular. This helped to build the equivalent of modern-day campaign authority. In 1915, only 90 American ships were stopped, yet in the same period, over 1700 Norwegian, Danish and Swedish vessels were intercepted.[38] This reflected British strategy to keep America on side. Foreign Secretary Grey said that 'the surest way to lose this war would be to antagonise Washington.'[39] This contrasted sharply with the impatient Grand Admiral Tirpitz. He wrongly believed that America's entrance to the war would be inconsequential and advocated aggressive U-boat tactics. An article in the New York Times in August 1916 captured the aggressive influence of the recently-retired Tirpitz and also expressed American irritation at the crude German propaganda.[40] The Kaiser eventually acquiesced to German public pressure and declared unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, '…to be commenced… and to be prosecuted with the utmost energy.'[41] By April 1917, a dozen Allied and neutral ships were being sunk every day. However, the ruthlessness of some U-boat captains compounded an earlier strategic error. When on 7 May 1915 a German U-boat torpedoed the *Lusitania* with a loss of 128 American citizens, it had infuriated America. Initial German contrition later gave way to the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare and heralded the tipping point of the war: American entry into it on the Allied side.

Although German U-boats sank over 550,000 tons of shipping in 1917 and 323,000 tons during 1918, Allied construction exceeded two million tons.[42] Yet even towards the end of the war, the Admiralty still judged Britain sufficiently threatened to approve a direct attack against the U-boat bases in Flanders. A striking force assaulted the ports in April 1918 and partially blocked Zeebrugge, but failed to close Ostend. Some argued that Zeebrugge '…was a disaster for the Germans…out of all proportion to its military weight, for there is nothing so well calculated…as a sudden threat to the [German] flank.'[43] However, former First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher was scathing. He said that 'For Sailors to go ashore and attack forts, which Nelson said no sailor but a lunatic would do, is not only silly…it's murder and it is criminal.'[44] Although the raid may have kept German divisions fixed in Belgium, impact on the U-boats was negligible. In the months after

the attack, the number of U-boats at sea was fairly constant at between 35 and 45% of its total strength.[45] This author's analysis concludes that the German submarine fleet was an operational centre of gravity, but that the coastal defences at Zeebrugge were too effective sufficiently to expose any of the critical vulnerabilities.

The impact of the British blockade was severe. By the summer of 1917, the average food intake of a German citizen had fallen to 30% of its pre-war levels.[46] People starved and food riots frequently took place in German cities. At the close of war, Germany's Health Office estimated that 763,000 deaths were a direct result of the blockade.[47] The majority of the surviving population suffered incredible depredations. Germany's counter-blockade had been equally ruthless, but not enough to break Britain or its Allies. The humanitarian consequences of both blockades were appalling. German U-boats drowned civilian passengers while the Allies caused widespread starvation. Contemporary wars of national survival are fortunately quite rare and nations in conflict now seek more digestible ways to coerce their adversaries. The most common is economic sanction.

The Efficacy of Modern Sanctions

Sanctions for international statecraft have a long pedigree; they were first used in the Peloponnesian war.[48] They can be economic, financial, diplomatic, sporting or cultural and the motive for imposing them may be to respond to a breach of international norms or to promote foreign policy agendas.[49] The most common mechanisms are through the United Nations or regional organisations. Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the post Cold War period witnessed a dramatic increase in sanctions; twenty three UN sanctions regimes were enacted between 1990 and 2007.[50] At face value, they are more palatable than military force. Yet despite frequent recourse to sanctions, there is no consensus about how they work to change the behaviour of states or targeted elites.[51] Paradoxically, sanctions are also least effective against those countries to which they have most often been applied.[52] Even when individual nations support or initiate sanctions, it often serves only to relieve governments from public pressure to do something short of military intervention. 'In this explanation, sanctions are only symbols; their effectiveness is of secondary concern.'[53] Moreover, studies of international sanctions note that mutual sacrifices can create an esprit de corps among the people and closer identification with their government.[54] And some evidence suggests that UN Security Council preparedness to act depends more on the range of measures to be adopted than on the reasons for sanctions.[55]

UN sanctions are generally intended to enhance international peace and security, not to resolve internal problems or punish a regime, but in practice the reverse can occur. For example, objectives have ranged from compelling an occupying state to withdraw its troops (Iraq), through to preventing a state from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (North Korea and Iran) and stemming human rights violations and promoting a peace process (Sudan and Congo). Sanctions can be indiscriminate. The oil-for-food programme, designed to soften the impact of UN sanctions on the Iraqi people, threatened to discredit the whole UN system.[56] A UN team visiting Iraq in March 1991 concluded that if the UN sanctions were not lifted, Iraq would face catastrophe.[57] Iraqi infant mortality rose from nearly 5% of births during 1984-89 to over 10% in 1994-99.[58] However, Iraq exploited media coverage and Western revulsion to distract audiences from the people within both Iraq and the UN who had profited from the very mechanisms intended to relieve suffering.

Different UN Secretary Generals have held markedly different opinions about the utility of sanctions. On the fiftieth anniversary of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali reported that: 'Sanctions… are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects.'[59]

Yet ten years later, Kofi Annan said that, 'Sanctions are a vital tool at the disposal of the Security Council…They constitute a necessary middle ground between war and words'.[60] Annan also alluded to a requirement for better targeting. Yet there is neither equal treatment nor equal representation within the UN to promote this. The power of Security Council veto undermines equal representation and there are many examples of the UN not responding equitably. For example, Iran complained that the Security Council had been prepared to apply sanctions against it, but had done nothing to restrain similar nuclear aspirations in Israel.[61] Many countries have spent years wielding sticks and offering carrots in an attempt to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions. In UN negotiations, Russia's co-operation with the other countries leading the diplomacy will be vital if Iran is to be squeezed into compliance.[62] But the power of Security Council veto undermines UN credibility and the most powerful nations revert instead to ad hoc engagements, further undermining the benefits of a truly multilateral approach. The USA recently offered direct diplomatic engagement with Iran after years of confrontation. The approach was welcomed by many, but it also threatened new sanctions, for example on Iranian banks that finance uranium enrichment.[63]

The short term costs of sanctions are important to both the target and the sender, but they are not the only factor; conceding to economic coercion implies a redistribution of political capital.[64] Drezner argues that it matters whether the parties have been and will remain in long-term conflict. He also notes that the chances of sanctions working vary greatly depending on the differential between costs for the target and the sender.[65] Sanctions are most likely to work between parties that are not in long term conflict and where the gradient of costs incurred is in favour of the sender. A good example is the successful US unilateral coercion of Israel to limit its controversial West Bank and Gaza settlement programmes. In 1991, the US was trying to convene a multilateral Middle East peace conference. A stumbling block was the Israeli settlement programme in the occupied territories, so the Bush administration withheld loan guarantees. Although the Israelis initially refused to cooperate, the initiative led to a change of Israeli government, after which Yitzhak Rabin acquiesced to the US terms; this paved the way for the 1993 accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.[66]

Conclusion

The effects of the British blockade from 1914-1918 were felt most severely by the German civilian population. Germany was beaten in part by the Allied convoy system and sheer weight of Allied shipbuilding capacity. The tipping point was America's entry into the war, which pivoted in part around the fulcrum of British diplomacy, but the balance was forced by a heavy German hand on the high seas. The German naval staff had pressed for freedom to win the crucial logistics battle, but had not anticipated that its proposed ways and means would lose the war. Its policies were ruthless and inconsistent, switching off its offensive U-boat capability when America protested in 1915, then back on again with a vengeance in 1917. 'Attacking the enemy's commerce has always been fraught with moral, legal, political and strategic difficulty, especially when it infringes the rights of a powerful neutral.'[67] Royal Navy tactics were more sensitive to American neutrality,

despite earlier British failures to anticipate and reconcile the changing relationship between economics, military technology and international law. The German U-boats were a significant threat that Britain had to contain but, like most weapons, they were not decisive in isolation. The British approach was painted on a much broader canvas, from which there is an enduring lesson: '…the economic encirclement…which at the outset was carried on solely by naval means, developed into an undertaking of a diplomatic, economic and financial character.'[68] Diplomacy and economics were primary colours. So too were the levels of British inter-departmental efficiency in controlling the crucial shipping routes and flow of supplies by sea. Government machinery is most effective when directed to a clear purpose and then finely tuned to the outcome.

Britain's blockade was therefore an effective weapon, although not one that by itself could have brought the war to an end.[69] The blockade was a powerful indirect attack, but Germany was a continental power with a huge army. That was its strategic centre of gravity and at some stage the Allies would have to attack it. To that extent, Beatty was wrong to suggest that only two things mattered. Given the time taken for a blockade to become effective, a major land effort was always required, if only to fix the German army. Without the incredible sacrifices in trench warfare, naval power could not have had its slow, but ultimately crushing effect on Germany. The lesson is that the various instruments of military power are complementary. In this case, despite the alternating British hope for a decisive victory at sea or a winning offensive on land, the Royal Navy and British army had worked most powerfully in combination. The evidence suggests that this was not necessarily by prior strategic design.

The Zeebrugge assault was fascinating, because it gained a much higher media profile than its pure military merit deserved. The novelty of the attack probably made it a temporary respite from the otherwise relentless news of murderous trench warfare. This may have had an unintended, but positive psychological effect. After Zeebrugge, the world probably sensed that Germany would lose the war, because its navy had proven incapable of defending at sea against an audacious British attack. It underscored that Britannia still ruled the waves, even if it was essentially stalemate on the Western Front. Under those circumstances, a maritime nation with secure communications and willing allies would inevitably triumph over an encircled Continental power. Soon after Zeebrugge, bankers cut credit to Germany and suppliers demand gold in advance, because only winners are in a position to pay their debts.[70] So, if far from decisive in its own right, taking the offensive to the enemy on an unexpected flank could have been an important psychological nail.

Modern day sanctions can be just as brutal as warfare and for them to be more effective, the UN should refine its policies. It must reform its model of decision making in a way that will help reassure the broader community of states that the Security Council is committed to:

- greater transparency, for example by sanctions committees meeting in open session wherever possible;

- improved consistency, for example by the use of standard terms in UN Security Council Resolutions;

- promoting equality, for example by controlling the use of the Permanent Five veto;

- providing due process, for example by more objective assessments;

- and ensuring proportionality, by permanently exempting from comprehensive sanctions food, medical supplies and educational equipment.[71]

Intelligence-led targeting of the individuals responsible for unacceptable policies – and not of their subjects – could help avoid collateral damage. However, it is generally only comprehensive sanctions that are blunt and, given that targeted sanctions have worked elsewhere, particularly where there is not a track record of constant conflict between the parties concerned, they could remain useful. Nevertheless, sanctions are not universally effective as a lever of power.

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To What Extent can Decisive Victories in Naval Battles have a Significant or Even Decisive Effect on Land Campaigns Ashore? How has Their Impact Changed Over Time?

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The effect of sea-power upon land campaigns is in the main strategical. Its influence over the progress of military operations, however decisive this may be, is often only very indirect.

C.E. Calwell (1897)[1]

Command of the Sea is only useful for the end that it serves.

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond RN (1915)[2]

Unlike the situation ashore, the successful application of sea power does not simply equate with battles fought.[3]

Introduction

The outcomes of naval battles and maritime campaigns have had significant impacts on the land campaign since the days of the Ancient Egyptians.[4] These impacts vary from the tactical through to the strategic, and, like many other areas, have evolved with the changing character of warfare. The extent to which battles can impact the land campaign has principally been determined by the land campaign's physical and political geography. Technology too has played an important role, particularly in the last century with the introduction of submarines, sea and land based air power, information technology and the advent of nuclear weapons.

While focusing on the outcome of a battle is possible, it is rather like when surveying a new cuisine for the first time, one sometimes chooses a single entrée and ignores the tasting plate. In answering this question, sea power is the tasting plate and has so much more to offer than the single entrée of 'battles'. It has, as Colin Gray points out, been persistently misunderstood as a strategic instrument of state policy.[5] Sea or naval power has never only been about battles, whether decisive or otherwise, and battles are certainly not the only way that sea power influences the land campaign.[6] Rather, sea power's strength has always been about the broader effect that results from its use in the wider political context. Effects range from the direct to, as the quote from Calwell suggests, the 'very indirect'. So, in an attempt to answer the question as fully as possible, this essay will roam a little more widely than the title may suggest.

Because it frames the broader sea power debate, this paper will start by examining the relationship between continental and maritime powers and the historical context underpinning that relationship. It will then briefly examine the naval fascination with 'decisive battles' and argue why a broader approach to the impacts on the land campaign is required. The paper will then highlight how sea power has and continues to affect land campaigns under two very broad thematic headings, that of the enabling and offensive functions of sea power. It concludes that sea power's effects on the land campaign are of an enduring nature.

Within the framework of this paper neither all aspects of sea power, nor all phases of maritime history can be examined. The historical examples have been chosen largely from the last 300 years to highlight two areas of sea power which have an enduring importance in the contemporary maritime debate: amphibious warfare and the global maritime trading system. Consistent with the broader nature of sea power, the examples are not all constrained to traditional combat scenarios.

This paper is written from a small defence force perspective, a joint force without the benefits of some components of sea power considered necessary in so many other navies. This has no doubt led to a different emphasis on aspects of sea power's ability to impact on the land campaign. Some of the examples used are relatively small in scale, but they have been chosen deliberately to provide an alternative perspective on this subject and hopefully to reinforce the notion that scale is not a defining characteristic of the operational level.

The Relationship Between Maritime and Continental Powers

In the past, debates about seapower and its impact ashore have been dominated by the largely binary discussion about continental and maritime powers and their different strategic approaches. As far back as the Peloponnesian Wars we see the strategic mismatch between maritime and continental powers played out. The more modern western maritime debate has largely centred on the struggle between Britain and 'enemies various' from continental Europe where the strategic mismatch remained central.

The basic premise was that sea powers would wage war against continental powers by:

- denying the enemy the use of the sea,

- financially exhausting the enemy through a blockade,

- seizing overseas territories,

- providing a limited continental ground commitment by using forces to conduct raids around an adversary's periphery (with their length and complexity depending on the size of the sea power's army); or

- by forming an alliance with other continental powers.[7]

For the continental power Gray cites a number of strategic approaches which include:

- making the continent a fortress,

- a direct amphibious invasion of the sea power,

- closing off continental markets to the sea power, or

- forming an alliance with another sea power.[8]

The challenge for both sea and continental powers has been how to attack very different strategic and operational centres of gravity, usually without the means to do it directly. In many ways the relevance of the sea and continental power debate was overtaken, first by the emergence of land based and sea borne aviation and then by the advent of nuclear weapons. These developments provided the ability, from either land or sea, to bypass the traditional strengths of the major powers. But most of the world's navies do not possess nuclear weapons, and while there may be

a nuclear backdrop to their strategic thinking, this aspect has played little direct role in the ability of seapower to impact on either the land or broader political campaign.

The importance of the littoral in contemporary maritime debate has sharpened the focus on the interface between sea and land power, mostly as a sub-set of the application of joint force. Geographic context plays an important part in this debate. An island nation like Australia for example, dominated as it is by the sea, entirely dependent on its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and ringed by an extensive and oft-troubled archipelagic arc extending from Sumatra in the northwest out into the southwest Pacific, finds the grander sea and continental power debate to be less central than it may be for European powers. Nevertheless, due to the scale of both its geography and armed forces, and the inherently expeditionary nature of its military operations, Australia's seapower must be able to contribute to the joint land campaign in a significant way.

Sea Power and the Decisive Battle

Sea power in the ancient world, in terms of its diplomatic and constabulary roles, had much in common with modern thinking.[9] Its military role in supporting land forces also had much in common with today. Early battles at sea, however, effectively involved a continuation of land warfare by other means. Galleys provided the means to transport soldiers to a place where they would meet similar vessels containing their opponents and would then proceed to engage in 'hand to hand combats (sic) between crews of the ships grappled close together'.[10] This changed with the development of the ram as a naval weapon in its own right. Once the ram was perfected maritime warfare was sufficiently differentiated from its land counterpart and the 'weapons and methods of land warfare were largely discarded from the warship'.[11]

Command of the sea, or the more limited concept of sea control, is central to an understanding of sea power; it is largely about being able to use the sea for your own purposes while denying its use to an adversary. Traditional accounts have generally seen decisive battle as being central to the way that command of the sea was won or maintained.[12] The British preoccupation with decisive battle stems from the influence of land warfare on the reforms made to the English fleet by Generals Monk, Deane and Blake in the mid seventeenth century.[13] Decisive battle as a concept became entrenched during the Napoleonic Wars, was formalised by Mahan in the late 19th century and was not seriously challenged until Corbett in the early 20th century. Corbett believed that decisive battle had become an almost unassailable creed and he was concerned that 'there is nothing so dangerous in the study of war as to permit maxims to become a substitute for judgement'.[14] Corbett's insight was to recognise that sea power was really about either obtaining (or disputing) command of the sea or exercising control of sea communications whether or not complete command had been secured.[15] The controversial aspect was Corbett's belief that both decisive battle and blockade had a role to play in obtaining or disputing command of the sea.[16]

From the western naval perspective, the Battle of Trafalgar is often cited as a decisive sea battle which had a significant and enduring impact on subsequent land campaigns. There is little doubt that Trafalgar did cement British naval superiority for the remainder of the Napoleonic Wars and well beyond. There would be much harder fighting on land and sea to come, but Trafalgar marked the end of Britain's defensive phase against Napoleon and ushered in a phase which allowed Britain to use its sea power and army much more offensively.[17] The resulting ability to commit land forces in continental Europe helped secure coalition partners; exemplified by the commitment in Holland just after Trafalgar, British presence in Naples and Sicily and in campaigns such as the

Peninsular Wars.[18] Friedman believes that Trafalgar provided such free use of the sea that Britain could use its smaller army to 'tie down and exhaust the much larger French ground forces on Napoleon's strategic flank'.[19]

But was this effect simply due to the outcome of a single naval battle or was it part of a wider naval campaign? The close blockade of France enforced by the British navy throughout the 1790s and early 1800s contributed to a significant long-term weakening of the French navy and its readiness to conduct combat operations. In the immediate post revolutionary period the 'French Fleet was known to be in turmoil and…paralysed by mutiny'.[20] Importantly, the blockades (and not Trafalgar) prevented Napoleon's fleets from concentrating in force and thereby thwarted any invasion plans for Britain. This degradation in readiness, as we would describe it today, was an important factor in Nelson's victory and the subsequent impact of the victory on the Napoleonic campaign as a whole. It illustrates the cumulative effect of seapower and underscores the importance of considering seapower as a whole rather than viewing it through the lens of a single battle, no matter how 'decisive' that battle may be.

Trying to isolate, analyse and apportion the cause and effect of the component parts in complex campaigns is fraught with danger. Notwithstanding the risk, it is worth thinking through and posing, if not necessarily answering, one or two questions. Was it the effectiveness of Wellington's operations in Portugal and Spain during the Peninsular campaign that proved decisive? Or, was his success due to the Trafalgar-enabled command of the sea that allowed the campaign to be sustained? How much of this ability to sustain the force was due to the continuing blockades of the remnants of the French fleet rather than Trafalgar itself? In reality it was a combination of all three, together with Napoleon's decisions on where, when and how to commit his forces. What is clear is that from the French perspective, the Peninsular campaign 'consumed a quarter of Napoleon's disposable military force' for little strategic benefit.[21] The Peninsular campaign does highlight the critical interdependencies between sea and land power and the decisive impact that sea power can have. However, it reinforces that it was due more to the broader naval campaign than a single battle.

Whilst a very different type of battle, the Battle of Midway is often considered the most decisive of the Pacific battles in World War 2. The loss of four imperial Japanese navy aircraft carriers was devastating and severely constrained future Japanese initiatives. No longer did they have an unquestioned ability to contest control of the maritime battlespace. It was the US navy's increasing maritime supremacy, both in the air and on the sea, which allowed allied land power to be used to its best effect in the subsequent drive towards the Japanese home islands. But Midway did not eliminate the Japanese threat, nor was it a battle without context. Midway was enabled by the confidence gained by Allied commanders following the Battle of the Coral Sea and by the impact on Japanese planners caused by the carrier launched 'Doolittle' raid on the Japanese home islands.[22] The Battle of the Pacific was not won at Midway alone; it was won through the cumulative effect of the joint and combined campaign in the Pacific theatre as a whole.

The Enabling Function of Sea Power and its Impact Ashore

A key point is that sea power has an enabling function that has multiple direct and indirect impacts on the land campaign ashore. It revolves around access to the maritime environment and the effective use of SLOCs. This function has been necessary since naval warfare moved from coastal waters to the high seas in the late 16th and early 17th centuries because 'the control of Sea Lines

of Communications had become critical to the wealth and hence, the strategic staying power of states'.[23] For the land campaign this manifests in one of two ways. The first and more obvious is the security of SLOCs to either directly sustain one's own operations, or, to deny an adversary the use of SLOCs to support its land campaign.

The advent of the submarine posed the most significant challenge to SLOC protection and had a range of impacts on the land campaigns in both World Wars. Arguably the starkest examples of this were the operations to protect merchant shipping in the Atlantic to secure the safe arrival of food, troops and materiel from Britain's far-flung friends and allies. In both wars there were phases where German U-boat operations inflicted such heavy losses that Britain was close to economic and military collapse.

During World War I there were some 22 million seaborne allied troop movements. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of workers were brought to Britain and France by sea from their overseas colonies. In 1918 alone 22,550 ship journeys were needed to transport vital coal stocks from Wales to France.[24] These numbers do not take into account the ongoing transport of ammunition, supplies or replacement equipment, but they do provide a glimpse, not only of the effort to muster that sort of shipping capacity, but also the parallel effort required to maintain sea control in a contested environment. This level of direct sustainment was clearly vital to the conduct of the campaigns on the Western Front, Middle East and elsewhere, and thus to the success or otherwise of achieving Allied objectives.

During World War 2 the situation was equally dire with a sophisticated and well organised U-boat operation that almost halved the pre-war amount of commodities that were being imported into Britain. Again the numbers are instructive. Britain required around 1.1 million tons of food to be imported each month just to maintain the already meagre wartime rations.[25] While critical to Britain's survival and the efforts to support deployed forces, sea power simultaneously allowed the build up of the requisite forces and equipment for the invasion of Western Europe and the eventual defeat of Germany.

Of at least equal importance to the overall land campaign in the West was the battle to keep the SLOCs open to the Soviet Union and thereby keep the communist nation in the war.[26] Lend Lease goods from the US accounted for over half of the vehicles in the Red Army, thousands of tanks (around 10% of Soviet wartime production), aircraft (equivalent to 12% of Soviet wartime production), together with specialist fuels, infrastructure and raw materials.[27] These materials alone played a significant role in keeping the Soviet war machine running. However, the motorisation of the Red Army was to be a crucial factor at the tactical and operational level as it provided the mobility that allowed the Soviets to overcome the Germans on the Eastern front.[28] Keeping the Germans operating on two or more fronts was of course critical to the overall war plan.

The reverse of the coin may be seen in the Pacific in Word War 2. Like Britain, Japan is a maritime nation and the blockade enforced by allied sea power on Japan's maritime shipping had a strategic impact on the war's outcome. The success of the campaign against Japanese merchant shipping was, according to General Tojo, one of the three factors which contributed to the loss of the war.[29] The Japanese lost over 1,100 merchant vessels larger than 500 tons, equating to a loss of around 5.3 million tons of shipping.[30] Unlike the Allies in the Atlantic, Japanese merchant ships were not adequately defended, and their naval doctrine, focused on the Mahanian ideal of

the offensive, gave insufficient attention to the importance of so-called defensive tasks.[31] For the Japanese land campaign the growing shortfall in the raw materials that were required to continue the war effort and the inability to supply deployed forces was disastrous. It resulted in Japanese troops becoming isolated and reliant on what would turn out to be ineffectual attempts to keep them supplied via submarine. Large numbers of Japanese troops, particularly in New Guinea, were effectively abandoned and were 'never to come to grips with allied forces'.[32]

Today, in the absence of major state on state conflict, SLOC security is not currently contested by conventional naval forces. Nevertheless, the threat has not disappeared and an increasing number of navies have the capacity to do so should their interests dictate. Moreover, there are now non-state actors which can and do threaten maritime security in particular areas: some, such as the Somali pirates, operate well into what would be traditionally considered 'blue water' areas.[33] Countering these threats remains essential to ensuring the continued flow of maritime based logistic support to ongoing expeditionary operations in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Just as the Trafalgar campaign provided the freedom for Britain's economic prosperity to continue throughout the remainder of the Napoleonic Wars, maintaining the free movement of trade today along the world's SLOCs (not just in the vicinity of choke points) remains critical to global prosperity. It is this indirect effect that has grown in significance in recent decades as globalisation has taken hold, or, as some have posited, simply entered a new phase having emerged from the colonial period of 'globalization by force'.[34] With the increasing weight of protected land force vehicles, the need for rapid and assured military deployment by seaborne assets remains critical and will invariably prove decisive in all but the most benign of campaigns.

Modern militaries, just like their forebears, are resourced by the enduring prosperity that is underpinned by the free movement of global trade; the vast majority of which is still transported by sea. Contemporary and largely discretionary land campaigns continue to rely on this enduring prosperity.

Maritime presence and poise is a feature of sea power that can be of significant impact in certain phases of a land campaign and particularly so in the early phases of stabilisation operations. Maritime force presence can set the conditions for the initial entry of land forces and in some cases set these conditions in a way that shapes the character of the remainder of the campaign. The International Force East Timor (INTERFET) intervention in Dili in 1999 is an excellent example. With 18,000 Indonesian troops and approximately 20,000 militia forces on the ground, the initial force build up of the much smaller INTERFET force was conducted in an unpredictable and tense environment.[35] The maritime task force's presence acted on 'minds' at two levels. At the strategic level the Indonesian government was well aware of the forces arrayed and at the tactical level the maritime force provided a highly visible presence (due to the geography of Dili) to those on the ground. The latent power of the force, enhanced as it was, with a US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit poised over the horizon, set the conditions for the land force entry with a clear statement of international resolve. The Joint Force Commander, the then Major General Peter Cosgrove, acknowledged that the naval presence was not 'an incidental, nice to have add-on'.[36] The Canadian Joint Task Force Commander went further: 'The Coalition's massed tonnage and naval might in the approaches to Dili helped convince the TNI [Indonesian military] and the Government of Indonesia that the international community had in fact ranged itself in full support of an independent East Timor, in a way that Coalition forces ashore could not.'[37]

The Offensive Function of Sea Power and it Effect Ashore

As important as the enabling function is, it is the impact that sea power's offensive function can have on the land campaign that has undergone the greatest change over time. The emergence of submarines, sea based air power, long range precision guided sea based weapons and the development of industrial scale amphibious capabilities have all resulted in the ability to make significant offensive naval contributions to the outcomes of land campaigns.

Potentially the most strategically decisive effect that sea power can bring to the land campaign is the ability, through amphibious warfare, to use the sea as an extension of the land manoeuvre battle space. Arguably the most difficult form of warfare to execute, it has been practised for thousands of years at various scales. Corbett argued strongly that amphibious operations could decide wars although his timing was not ideal in the aftermath of World War 1 and the memory of the Gallipoli failure fresh in the collective consciousness.[38] Leaving Normandy to one side, the classic 20th century amphibious operation is the Inchon landing in the Korean War in late 1950. Allied forces had been driven back and pinned down to a small area around Pusan in the southeastern end of the Korean peninsula known as the Pusan perimeter. As a result of the Inchon landings however, the North Korean army, which was on the verge of a stunning victory, was defeated and destroyed within two weeks. Only the intervention of Chinese forces prevented a total allied victory.[39] US Army General Douglas MacArthur conceived of the Inchon plan as a counterattack which would retake the symbolically important Korean capital of Seoul, break the North Korean army's lines of communication and, when synchronised with the breakout of allied troops from the Pusan perimeter, envelop and destroy the North Korean army.

If a marine or naval officer had developed the plan for a counterattack somewhere on the Korean coast, it is probable that Inchon would have, at best, ended up as a discarded course of action. From a naval perspective an exact description of the Inchon operation might better be characterised as 'a list of amphibious don'ts.'[40] The extreme tidal ranges, poor landing areas, narrow seaborne approaches and good enemy defensive positions certainly did not bode well. Seeing only the risks, even the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were extremely hesitant and did not understand the operational artistry in what was being proposed.[41] As Alexander puts it 'no one else in the West quite grasped the point…'[42] MacArthur had to battle all the way to get his plan adopted but he had the strength of character to achieve it. Inchon shows that sometimes being an environmental specialist might not always be the best thing in operational higher command positions. MacArthur's 'kookaburra moment' was enabled by his experience in amphibious operations during the Pacific campaign, and more particularly his understanding that he was again blessed with sea control.[43] Critically, though, his idea was able to germinate due to his naturally bold disposition and the lack of 'environmentally based' bias in play to consign the idea to the campaign cutting room floor.

In 1943, the combined amphibious and airborne landings at Lae in New Guinea showed the role of sea power with all service environments combining in what represents a very contemporary manifestation of the joint manoeuvrist approach to war.[44] The rugged country around Lae had few internal lines of communications making a conventional land approach extremely difficult. Air and sea control permitted the Australian 9th Division to be inserted to the east of Lae in an amphibious operation while the US 503rd Parachute Regiment and hastily trained Australian gunners jumped into and secured Nadzab airfield to the west of Lae. This allowed the Australian 7th Division to be flown in and negate the need for what would have been a debilitating overland march. Having achieved surprise, the two Australian divisions then fought their way into Lae

from opposite directions, dividing the defending forces and taking the town and the key base there.[45] Without the combination of air, ground and sea manoeuvre, taking Lae would have been a costly and protracted operation. Lae was an important Japanese base and was critical to the Allied advance along the New Guinea coast towards the Philippines; its capture unlocked Allied air access to central New Guinea.

Amphibious warfare remains a significant way to exploit manoeuvre and expand the land battlespace. The most recent example where it proved decisive was during the Falklands land campaign which was self evidently reliant on amphibious manoeuvre to achieve any of its aims on land. There has been somewhat of a renaissance in amphibious capability development around the world, particularly in the Landing Platform Dock and Landing Helicopter Dock type vessels. An effective amphibious warfare capability relies on high levels of readiness to maintain what is a perishable skill. Invariably its use is at relatively short notice. Degradation of these skill levels, whether through necessity due to competing demands or neglect, in this already complex and specialised field of joint endeavour is a risk that requires constant re-assessment and some good fortune.

Conclusion

Despite the changes that technology has brought over the last 300 years, the ability of sea power to impact the land campaign and indeed the broader strategic picture has remained both significant and enduring. The need to gain and maintain sea control and to be able to use SLOCs remains a critical enabler for peace time prosperity and for both continental and expeditionary land warfare. At the operational level sea power's ability to project force through amphibious manoeuvre remains central to land operations in the world's littorals.

If one is to think of sea power's contribution to the land campaign only in terms of the outcomes of decisive naval battles, then the strategic utility of sea power will continue to be underestimated. Likewise to think only in terms of its contribution in combat and without consideration of the other components that provide the overall joint effect, is to also miss the point. The land campaign continues to be crucial for overall campaign success, but remains only one aspect of the political use of the military instrument. It is important to 'gain some altitude' in these particular environmental debates and to see all the connections to the broader strategic picture.

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What are the Enduring Lessons of the Soviet Campaign in Afghanistan 1979-1988 and What Can the RAF Learn from the Russian Experience?

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When the Soviet Union began its invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979, the initial operation to insert ground forces with the ostensible aim of stabilizing the country and establishing a pro-Communist government in Kabul was a resounding operational and tactical success. Within 27 hours of the order to enter Afghanistan the Soviets had landed a division of airborne assault forces[1] into Kabul airfield, and had secured the majority of administrative centres, airfields and radio/television stations in the capital and across the country.[2] The following day, the presidential palace in the capital had been seized, the ruling president, Hafizullah Amin, had been executed and a pro-Soviet puppet, Babrak Karmal, installed in his place. By the middle of January 1980, with 50,000 troops of the Soviet 40th Army in place and a successful coup de main complete, the Soviets believed that the success of the initial operation might foreshadow what they hoped would be a brief intervention lasting only a matter of months.[3] They, of course, were wrong. Instead, the war with the Afghan Mujahideen lasted 10 years, resulted in Soviet defeat and withdrawal from the country, and was followed by the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

That the Soviets failed in their efforts in a war of counter-insurgency, insomuch as they failed to leave Afghanistan as a functioning state with a workable system of government, is, of course, of much contemporary interest. By looking at the Soviet use of air power in their campaign, this essay seeks to identify the enduring lessons to come from the Soviets' experience, and looks to place any critical observation into a contemporary context in an attempt to provide guidance for current RAF commanders involved in the application of air power in Afghanistan. Beyond the brief mention above, this essay does not seek to give a detailed description of the motives and history leading up to the conflict,[4] nor does it seek to identify the overarching political and cultural reasons for the Soviets' failure. In the conclusions, however, it should become apparent that the secondary effects of air power in counter-insurgency operations are intrinsically linked to the overall success of the campaign from a political perspective and, as the Soviets found, winning the tactical battle does not guarantee winning the war.

Many of the lessons to come from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan stem from an understanding of the nature of the conflict that the Soviets faced and how their doctrine failed to cope with a shift from large-scale conventional warfare to that of counter-insurgency. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan broadly followed a doctrine of 'Blitzkrieg' that had been born from the military experiences of the Russian Civil War (1918-1920) and had been successfully employed during the Cold War, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia for example.[5] The Soviet interpretation of 'lightning war' focused on overwhelming an enemy through the massive application of military force delivered at pace in order to gain decisive victory before an enemy had time to react. The emphasis for the Soviets was in strategic dominance through numerical supremacy rather than tactical flexibility and manoeuvre. Where numerical supremacy would have been applied in the European campaign through the rapid advance of Soviet mechanized forces across the central

European plain, rough terrain denied the Soviets the extensive and decisive use of mechanized forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, any mechanized force approaching from the north would need to cross the Amu Darya river (120m to 1500m wide) on the Soviet-Afghan border before progressing south.

Instead it was the use of air power, and particularly the use of strategic air-lift, that was employed to insert an overwhelming combat force into the country with the aim of stunning any rebel force into capitulation. Emulating the size and speed of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, a single lift operation comprising some 280 transport aircraft (constituting 38% of the entire Soviet Air Force's transport fleet)[6] completed the insertion of three airborne divisions[7] one of which, the 105th Guards Airborne Division, quickly secured a number of key political and military objectives in Kabul and achieved their aim of denying President Amin's supporters entry into the capital. The relative ease by which the Soviets were then able to overthrow the Amin regime and subsequently install a new pro-Soviet leadership was due in no small part to the size and speed of the airborne assault on Kabul. Without the valuable air bridge from the Soviet Union direct to Kabul, the initial invasion would almost certainly not have been the success it was, demonstrating the importance of rapid global mobility in expeditionary operations.

Moreover, that Soviet doctrine necessitated the massive insertion of military forces by air had the important secondary effect of power projection, perhaps intentionally signalling to NATO the strength of Soviet military capability. The enduring air power characteristics of speed and reach certainly facilitated Soviet strategy in the invasion of Afghanistan. These characteristics are also key enablers in the ongoing resupply operation. The Soviets quickly found lines of communication into Afghanistan particularly vulnerable both to seasonal factors and to Mujahideen attack.[8] The narrow mountain passes provided ideal locations for insurgent ambushes where the Mujahideen would occupy the high ground flanking the slowly advancing convoys. As a result the Soviet campaign eventually became dominated by a need to keep the resupply routes open[9] and the same may be true today. The supply routes from Pakistan through the Khyber Pass are vulnerable to Taliban attack in the border district of Peshawar, with the route effectively closed in December 2008.[10] So, although, as in the Soviet campaign, the movement of the majority of materiel into theatre still takes place by road,[11] this route cannot be relied upon and neither does it allow the rapid and direct movement of troops into theatre. Instead, the enduring lesson of maintaining an inter-theatre air bridge remains extant. Similarly, the capability to conduct intra-theatre lift is essential and is well illustrated where C17 transport aircraft movements into Camp Bastion (the British forward operating base in Helmand province) were scheduled to increase with the planned American surge in mid 2009 from the 30 sorties that occurred in January 2009 to 860 sorties a month in late summer 2009.[12] Considering the size of this air transport operation, without the integrity of an air bridge and forward operating bases the success of the operation in Helmand could be compromised; a fact that is undoubtedly at the forefront of RAF commanders' concerns.

With the air bridge intact for the Soviets, the Blitzkrieg doctrine appeared to be very successful in the initial phase of their invasion; however, within two weeks of the first Soviets entering Afghanistan, insurgency was rising and the Mujahideen were beginning to fight back. In the absence of any effective counter-insurgency doctrine, the Soviets instead relied upon conventional forces and doctrine. This meant employing large-scale forces of mechanized infantry and armour to pound the enemy into submission in a strategy more appropriate to the European theatre. Large mechanized forces were, however, ill configured for warfare in the narrow mountain passes of

Afghanistan. The terrain meant that the advance of Soviet tanks and armoured personnel carriers was both predictable and slow thereby facilitating Mujahideen ambushes. Moreover, Soviet reliance on armour and the unwillingness of troops to dismount and engage in close combat also ensured the Mujahideen were able to retreat to the high ground flanking the valleys and from there blend back in to the population. Soviet commanders began to realize that dogmatic reliance on large-scale mechanized forces was failing in the Afghan theatre and that counter-insurgency was a battle won through flexibility at the tactical level.

This reassessment of Soviet tactical doctrine yielded many innovations, not the least being the employment of the combat helicopter in order to utilize air power's inherent advantages of speed and flexibility to outflank the Mujahideen both metaphorically and physically. From 1981, the Soviets began using the tactic of 'leap-frogging' airmobile troops by helicopter along the ridgelines above the advancing convoys, thereby denying the Mujahideen the high ground from where to mount an ambush, whilst also blocking their retreat should they be brought into combat.[13] Later developments in helicopter tactics saw their use in delivering combat power in depth, where heliborne troops would seek to employ the element of surprise by landing in the rear and flanks of Mujahideen strongholds in order to isolate them and to cut off their escape routes, thereby bringing them into contact where superior Soviet firepower would be used to annihilate them.[14]

Helicopters also played an important part in the resupply of Soviet forces in the field. The Soviets employed a tactic of developing fortified outposts deep in Mujahideen territory in a similar way to the controversial 'platoon house' concept used by the British army in the current conflict. The roads connecting these outposts were, as with the entire Afghan road network, very poorly developed,[15] and the lines of communication that did exist were popular ambush spots for the Mujahideen. Instead, the Soviets learned to use transport helicopters like the Mi-8 HIP to resupply and reinforce outlying garrisons.[16]

The use of helicopters to evacuate casualties from the battlefield was similarly vital and had positive effects on troop morale. The Soviet soldiers would point to 'casualty evacuation as being the most important element in air operations'[17] illustrating the importance helicopters had on the battlefield. Had the Soviets been unable to conduct casualty evacuation operations then the strategic effect on troop morale could have been devastating and the necessity to maintain a casualty evacuation capability by the RAF in theatre today is certainly underlined by this Soviet experience.

An increased reliance on helicopters, however, brought with it issues of command and control (C2) that the Soviets struggled to overcome due in part to their rigid doctrine. Soviet commanders tended to hold C2 of air assets at Divisional HQ level, whilst an initial reluctance to promote initiative amongst ground commanders and aircrews also reduced the flexible employment and combat effectiveness of helicopters. This was notably true of the Mi-24 HIND gunships used in the close air support (CAS) role. Undeveloped air-land integration meant that the ground commanders in contact with Mujahideen had little control over the tasking of CAS assets. Instead, HIND pilots relied on training that encouraged them to rigidly follow pre-planned missions rather than adapt to a manoeuvrable enemy and a rapidly changing battlefield: one pilot commenting, 'in normal training we are used to acting by textbook…when the situation becomes complicated as in battle, we are not able to cope with the task…that is the cost of oversimplification and the

lack of initiative'.[18] This often meant the advantages of manoeuvrabililty and firepower that the helicopter offered were wasted; however, as Soviet doctrine developed from focusing on large-scale offensives to smaller and more flexible schemes of manoeuvre, so did the Soviet command philosophy. Rudimentary mission command was introduced to delegate C2 to lower levels giving helicopter and ground commanders – armed with their commanders' intent – the freedom to act autonomously, improving operational effectiveness and increasing operational tempo, thereby bringing CAS to bear before the Mujahideen could disengage and melt back into the background. As an enduring lesson, the problem of C2 is one which the RAF and UK forces in general still struggle with. For instance, army operations in Musa Qala have on occasion been planned without the expectation of air support because the army planning process and air tasking order cycle have been somewhat uncoordinated and operate in effective exclusivity.[19] The lessons from the Soviet experience for today's commanders suggest C2 and tasking for air support should be placed closer to the developing ground situation and not at a distant Combined Air Operations Centre.

Unfortunately for the Soviets, the employment of the helicopter, indeed of air power in general, was significantly hampered by the Mujahideen's development of an effective air defence capability. Covert support from the American Central Intelligence Agency meant that from 1986 onwards the Mujahideen received increasingly sophisticated air defence weapons,[20] including the Swiss-made Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannon and the British-made Blowpipe MANPADS[21] in addition to the rudimentary Soviet-made SA-7 MANPADS. It was, however, the introduction of the American-made FIM-92A Stinger MANPADS that had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the helicopters used in the campaign. Despite the fact that the introduction of Stinger into theatre had a debatable impact on the number of aircraft shot down,[22] the threat from the system forced helicopter and fixed wing pilots to operate at heights that made effective delivery of CAS more difficult than had the pilots enjoyed air supremacy.[23] The Mujahideen's use of Stinger denied the Soviets the tactical freedom of the air, but it also had far-reaching strategic consequences.

The iconic status that Stinger gained in winning the war for the Mujahideen may be somewhat overstated; however, the Stinger threat, and perhaps the particular threat of large scale loss of Soviet life may well have played a crucial role in demonstrating to the new Gorbachev government that the war in Afghanistan was wasteful, unwinnable and counterproductive. Indeed, the reduction in Soviet air activity in response to the Stinger threat has been suggested as a trigger for the overall reduction in the war effort that occurred shortly after Gorbachev took power.[24] From this perspective it would seem that the maxim that 'If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war...'[25] rang true for the Soviets and is a key lesson germane to contemporary operations.

The notion of maintaining control of the air to allow helicopters freedom of manoeuvre is linked to the maintenance of the air bridge for strategic purposes that was discussed earlier; were the Taliban to generate a credible air threat then the success of either task would be jeopardized. With memories of the strategic influence that the Mujahideen's use of Stinger had on the Soviet campaign, the fear of a similar weapon system falling into the hands of the Taliban is ever present. Every attempt to mitigate the MANPADS threat is necessary to prevent the RAF loss of a strategic asset like a C17, or perhaps, worse still, a Tri-star carrying 200 passengers into Kandahar airfield. Such an event happened to the Soviets in October 1984 with the loss of an An-24 aircraft and some 200 personnel on board,[26] and it might be difficult to assuage the concerns of the British public in continuing with the Afghan campaign were such a loss of life to occur today.

The porous nature of the borders with Iran and Pakistan makes the control of the flow of new weapons into Taliban hands difficult. Human intelligence sources and surveillance are vital in this task but are not infallible. Iranian built Misagh-1 missiles were smuggled into Iraq in 2007[27] and the worry is that similar high-tech air defence systems make it into Taliban hands. The use of rocket propelled grenades (RPG) against helicopters is similarly concerning. The Taliban appear to be mirroring tactics developed by the Mujahideen where RPGs are used to ambush helicopters as they make approaches into landing sites, a tactic that has seen RAF Chinooks targeted and hit by enemy fire.[28] The overarching lesson for RAF operations today must therefore be a continual focus on the development of suitable diversionary tactics, countermeasures and use of ground forces to secure landing sites in order to mitigate the MANPADS and RPG threat; however, the ubiquity of these systems and particularly of the latter will mean air supremacy in Afghanistan may be practically impossible to achieve.

In this examination of Soviet air power lessons in Afghanistan it is, however, the strategic use of fixed-wing assets that offers some of the most cogent lessons for contemporary operations and underlines why the Soviets' inchoate counter-insurgency military doctrine was doomed to failure. Large strategic bombers like the Tu-16 BADGER and Tu-22 BLINDER were used to flatten villages where Mujahideen support was high amongst the local civilian population. This method of denying the rebels their support base by driving the population from the villages unsurprisingly yielded a great many civilian casualties, whilst the deliberate targeting of Afghan livestock and crops, and the sowing of anti-personnel mines also had important unintended effects on the political campaign. Rather than crush civilian support for the Mujahideen, this 'scorched earth' policy served merely to strengthen sympathy for the rebel cause.[29] That the battle to win the support of the Afghan population was lost played a large part in the eventual Soviet withdrawal. In a meeting on 13 November 1986, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, informed the Politburo that '[we] have lost the battle. The majority of the Afghan people right now are with the counter revolution,'[30] and President Gorbachev shortly afterwards made the decision to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan.[31]

The Soviet strategy of using air power to deliberately target the civilian populace and undertake 'punishment' operations against villages suspected of harbouring the Mujahideen, was, therefore, the most flawed strategy of the entire war and perhaps the most enduring lesson for contemporary operations. The Soviets failed to understand their enemy, where the strength of the Mujahideen's religious and nationalistic beliefs meant they would endure Soviet military action, and, so long as they were able to escape to a safe haven and regroup, they would not be coerced by force. Moreover, the beliefs held by the proud Afghan nation as whole meant any infidel bearing arms in their country would be seen as an enemy; the punishment operations only served to strengthen this belief.

The kinetic use of air power by RAF and other NATO aircraft in theatre today must therefore be a delicate balance of providing support to troops under threat from Taliban insurgents, versus the secondary effect the use of kinetic means has on the wider population. In 2007 there were an estimated 321 Afghan civilian deaths due to NATO airstrikes, whilst a single US airstrike on 22 August 2008 resulted in 33 civilian deaths,[32] and although none of these civilian deaths were intentional it may be hard for the average Afghan to differentiate between unintended collateral damage and deliberate strikes. The end result in any case is likely to be failing support for the NATO mission; indeed, NATO airstrikes have previously prompted President Karzai to openly

criticize coalition use of air power.[33] The strength of the coalition's cause is therefore inextricably linked to the actions by RAF aircrews where the kinetic use of air power may have a powerful negative effect on the coalition's political standing within the country.

In conclusion, this essay has documented a number of enduring lessons in the application of air power that the Soviet experience in Afghanistan illustrated. A doctrine of Blitzkrieg meant the size and scale of the initial invasion force included important aspects of strategic power projection, sending a message on Soviet capability to the world. From a campaign perspective, the inherent capabilities of speed and reach meant air power could deliver a combat force of such a size and with sufficient pace to overwhelm an enemy by 'getting inside' his decision making loop. In terms of air power's utility in an enduring expeditionary operation, and therefore of interest to the RAF leadership today, the Soviet experience taught us that logistic resupply by road is unreliable and vulnerable to attack. Maintaining a strategic air bridge into and across theatre is therefore a priority.

The counter-insurgent threat that the Soviets faced, with a manoeuvrable enemy capable of blending into the population, suggested that any military power employed should be flexible and reactive; dismounted ground forces combined with the unique capabilities of helicopter assault and CAS from dedicated platforms proved to be the most effective solution. In order to make the most of the inherent flexibility of these assets, however, command and control should be placed at the tactical level with the commanders close to the fight. Although the advent of modern day intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets may provide the commander in the HQ with the 'big picture', the basic tenets of mission command may still prove to be the most adaptable and effective method of controlling the tactical battle.

The vulnerabilities of air power were also well illustrated when the Soviets failed to gain control of the air and the Mujahideen began employing anti-aircraft weapons. Under President Gorbachev, the Politburo's distaste for continued loss of Soviet life meant the continued presence of a credible air threat helped seal the fate for the Soviet mission and withdrawal under a veil of failure followed. The lessons of maintaining control of the air are fundamental to the success of the current operation. The loss of an RAF aircraft in theatre and the resultant large scale loss of life would have far reaching strategic consequences and may put doubt on the future of the British military mission in Afghanistan.

Finally, the examples of kinetic operations by Soviet bombers against the Afghan populace illustrated that the Soviets had failed to understand the cultural factors influencing the Afghans. The flawed Soviet doctrine may have yielded numerous tactical successes and their bombing of Afghan villages probably killed many enemy and temporarily denied them logistical support. However, this approach could not crush the will of the Mujahideen. Moreover, the Soviets turned the will of the general population against them and created an unwinnable war. The Soviet military campaign was therefore, prosecuted in isolation from political efforts to stabilize the country. With President Karzai's support for the current mission in the balance, all RAF airmen currently involved in the war in Afghanistan must learn the lesson from the Soviets and take their part in a comprehensive approach to the campaign or else risk contributing to a political failure and the generation of an unwinnable war once again.

Endnotes

1.   Each soviet airborne division comprised nearly 8,500 men and included artillery and combat support elements.

2.   L W Grau, M A Gress, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, USA: University Press of Kansas: 2002, 12.

3.   S McMichael, 'The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War', *Parameters* Dec 1989: 21.

4.   For a detailed historical and political background to the Soviet campaign, see G Hughes, 'The Soviet-Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview', *Defence Studies* 8, no 3, 2008: 326-50.

5.   C Van Dyke, 'Kabul to Grozny: A Critique of Soviet Counter-Insurgency Doctrine', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 9, no 4, 1996: 691.

6.   D N Nelson, 'Soviet Air Power: Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan', *Air University Review* Jan-Feb 1985: 32.

7.   Ibid.

8.   M Galeotti, *Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's Last War*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1995, 197.

9.   Ibid.

10. R A Oppel Jnr, 'Amid Taliban Rule, A NATO Supply line is choked', *The New York Times*, 24 December 2008: 14.

11. Grau, Gress, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, 282.

12. Ministry of Defence, 'Helmand Base to Treble in Size', http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/HelmandBaseToTrebleInSize.htm (accessed 13 April 2009).

13. D Isby, *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, revised edition*, London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988: 438.

14. Grau, Gress, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, 203.

15. Ibid, 3.

16. Ibid, 287.

17. Ibid, 124.

18. T Withington, 'The Experiences of the Soviet Air Force in Afghanistan', *Air Power Review* 8, no 1: 125.

19. Brief from senior RAF commander, April 2009.

20. Withington, *Air Power Review* 8, no 1: 120.

21. Man-Portable Air Defence System.

22. Grau, Gress. *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, 222.

23. P Towle, in *Soviet Air Power: a Prospectus for the Future*, E S Williams ed, London: Tri-Service Press,1990: 193.

24. G Hughes, 'The Soviet-Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview', *Defence Studies* 8, no. 3, 2008: 341.

25. Field Marshal Montgomery quoted in Royal Air Force, *British Air Power Doctrine: AP3000* 3rd ed, London, Ministry of Defence, 1999: 2.5.1.

26. Withington, *Air Power Review* 8, no 1: 125.

27. S N Yacoub, 'US Says Iran smuggling missiles into Iraq,' *USA Today*, 23 August 2007: 15.

28. B Leach, 'RAF Pilot Tells How he Won Bravery Medal,' *The Telegraph*, 8 March 2009: 14.

29. Hughes, *Defence Studies* 8, no 3, 2008: 345.

30. Ibid, 343.

31. Ibid.

32. A Roberts, 'Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan,' *Survival* 51, no 1, 2009: 42.

33. Ibid.

Do Ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict Help or Hinder Military Operations Today?

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> *Do not say, "Why were the former days better than these?" For it is not from wisdom that you ask this.*[1]

It is a prevailing human characteristic to imagine there is something unique about our times that sets us apart from our forebears and invalidates their bequeathed wisdom. That is no surprise. We enter the world prisoners of our individual development and gain awareness and experience only by painful life processes. Hindsight provides hundred-percent vision; the future lies unknown; and fear, laziness and tedium are distracting classmates in the schoolroom of life.

Some may presume the circumstances of our time have invalidated the military ethics and law of a pre-globalised or pre-'9/11' world. The question, however, deserves closer scrutiny. It is not intended to ask why people fight – quite apart from national self-defence, much of the impetus to war may be (far from religious or ideological as commonly alleged) greed,[2] boredom,[3] or simply that 'men like fighting, and women like those men who are prepared to fight on their behalf'.[4] Nor is it intended to debate the meaning of the terms 'ethics' (whether deontological, consequentialist or aretaic) or 'Law of Armed Conflict'. The latter has referred historically to ius in bello,[5] while ius ad bellum has been left to the ethicist. However, the UN Charter of 1945 has now enshrined into international law fundamental restraints on the international use of force.[6] Notwithstanding, law must be reinforced by moral authority to be effective; so law and ethics must work hand in hand.

The scope of this essay is to consider arguments on both sides of the question and then pose three pointers for extension in a brief conclusion. The indirect referent of 'help' or 'hinder' is not specified in the title; it is argued it cannot be narrowed to the military force (the tactical agent) but must be extended to comprehend the state (the strategic actor). 'Today' is taken to refer to the nuclear, post-Cold War era, characterised by the emergence of precision technology, non-state actors, asymmetric threats, and a weakened United Nations[7] – in short, a period of increased international volatility.[8]

Five arguments can be made in support of the utility of ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict in military operations today – ontological, political, pragmatic, aspirational and individual.

The ontological argument can be stated briefly. War is a social activity. Military operations are a societal function. They are conducted by groups not by individuals and, as such, must be governed by norms ('professional standards') which constrain their conduct if they are to achieve their social aims. The historical evolution of ius ad bellum (monitoring the case for war) and ius in bello (circumscribing the conduct of war, most recently through the principles of discrimination and proportionality) can be located against that backdrop.

The political argument is more significant. According to Clausewitz, 'War is a mere continuation of policy by other means…[W]ar is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.'[9] Clausewitz

identifies military operations as a lever of state power, where the state is the actor and the armed forces are the agent. The government – not the generals – sets the policy for the campaign. The conduct of the military campaign must serve the government's intention or else it fails. In common parlance, a risk which must be avoided is of 'winning the war' but 'losing the peace'. Sun Tzu long ago argued that the best general is one who achieves his government's intent without needing to fight (albeit he is forgotten by history).[10] In British joint doctrine, the Comprehensive Approach addresses the interplay of agencies involved in the effective prosecution of military operations,[11] recognising that government policy is achieved by wielding all the levers of power, not just the military. Seen in concert with the principles of democratic accountability (rule by consent) and the independence of the media, conformity to ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict provides a litmus test for the formulation and implementation of government military policy. Whetham approves of Keightley's comment after Suez: 'world opinion is now an absolute principle of war and must be treated as such'.[12] Conversely, failure to follow ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict undermines political success.

The pragmatic argument is the other side of the same coin. UK military operations today comprise a continuum spanning offensive, defensive and stability operations – the 'three block war'.[13] Such operations may revert into and out of armed conflict with little warning,[14] requiring a change of rules of engagement commensurate with the prevailing campaign theme. Military effectiveness necessitates not simply consent at home but consent in the theatre of operations. Consent derives not from kindness but from pragmatic reality, as demonstrated by the evolution of British counter-insurgency doctrine along six key principles – political primacy; unity of effort; effective intelligence; the campaign to win hearts and minds; neutralising the insurgent; and planning for the long-term[15] – all of which conform to the principles of ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict. Conversely, considerable damage is caused to campaigns for hearts and minds by alleged military abuses.[16]

The aspirational argument locates the Law of Armed Conflict against the background of its historical development. Deriving from the growing humanitarian spirit which marked nineteenth-century Europe, and given impetus by the publication of Henri Dunant's shocking account of the battle of Solferino in 1859,[17] early Conventions such as the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration and the 1907 Hague Convention considered 'that the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war' and that 'the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization' should be served even when war was unavoidable.[18] The horrors of the two world wars and the general inhumanity which threaten conduct in combat have meant that refinements to the Law of Armed Conflict have almost always been reactive. It lies outside the scope of this essay to discuss whether foreign policy can (or should) be 'driven by values' rather than by interests.[19] However, progress in the development of the Law of Armed Conflict has tempered many of the horrors of war – notwithstanding the graphic images which bombard our television screens – and has, according to Morris, been honoured far more than it has been breached in the international sphere.[20]

The individual argument amounts to observing the personal effect of their actions on many perpetrators of war crimes. A case in point is that of Private First Class Varnardo Simpson, a participant in the My Lai massacre (1968), whose life was destroyed by his guilt over his actions.[21]

These five arguments – ontological, political, pragmatic, aspirational, and individual – maintain that ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict help military operations today. Conversely, there are two principal arguments to the effect that ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict hinder military operations today – tactical and institutional.

The tactical argument is that the Law of Armed Conflict hinders military effectiveness against terrorists, insurgents or rogue states that employ 'dirty fighting' in disregard for ethics and international law. For instance, the use of civilians as 'human shields' is an asymmetrical tactic which poses a dilemma for the opposing force. Similarly, the lack of clear distinction between combatant and non-combatant in some theatres jeopardises effective application of the principle of discrimination. In the case of US troops in Vietnam, there is evidence that that dilemma led to a degradation of conduct. For instance, under cross-examination at his court martial after My Lai, Lt Calley stated, '[T]here was never any word of exactly who the enemy was, but to suspect everyone, that everyone was a potential enemy and that men and women were equally as dangerous and because of the unsuspectedness of children, they were even more dangerous'.[22] One may have sympathy for Calley's dilemma, especially given the casualties his company had taken without mounting an effective response. That said, questions over the definition of combatants are hardly new: Clark asks whether the Second World War 'cypher clerk working at Bletchley, engaged in cracking enemy codes [should] be classed as a combatant or not'.[23] Whatever grey areas exist in international law, public opinion might tolerate the indirect targeting of civilian personnel engaged in supporting the war effort – as in the flooding of the Ruhr during Operation CHASTISE in 1943 – but not the deliberate targeting of the manifestly innocent: the former does not impede the political aim, the latter does. At the ethical level, however, Johnson argues that, whilst the guilt for illegally using civilians as human shields belongs to the perpetrator, and 'the concept of precision use of force directed at the combatant behind the shield is a correct response to this', nevertheless 'the obligation extends to attempting to find other ways, less potentially destructive of the lives of nearby noncombatants, to achieve the legitimate military goal.'[24] The deliberate targeting of non-combatants by terrorist tactics can never be used to justify an erosion of regard for non-combatant immunity on the part of the opposing force,[25] as the core principles of ius in bello are, first, discrimination between unlawful and lawful targets and, second, proportionate limitation of force against the latter. Although military necessity may occasionally justify the harming of non-combatants under the doctrine of double-effect, Bellamy is right to contest 'hotly' the 'limit of acceptable risk'.[26] Geneva Protocol I (1977) is, in fact, extremely precise in its provisions for the protection of civilians in international armed conflict,[27] and Geneva Protocol II (1977) attempts broad protection in non-international armed conflict. Recent history has furnished too many examples where the doctrine of 'risk-transfer war' has mistakenly targeted the civilian population.[28] These considerations invalidate the tactical argument.

The institutional argument derives partly from the emergence of non-state actors in the international system but principally from the weakness of the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council in controlling international violence. Although, in the post-1945 world, the 'pacific resolution of disputes' should be safeguarded and provided by the UN Security Council or General Assembly (in terms of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter),[29] slowness of action and questionable use of the veto by members of the Security Council have impeded the effectiveness of process,[30] giving rise to an argument that the use of force cannot be restricted de iure by Article 2(4) of the Charter. The types of dilemma which arise concern the doctrines of pre-emption, prevention,[31] and humanitarian intervention. From an ethical perspective, whilst Schulte

cites Israel's strike on the Osirak reactor (1981) as justified use of prevention,[32] the difficulty of proving imminence generally poses a near-insuperable barrier to ius ad bellum. The weakness of international institutions calls not for ignoring ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict but for their more rigorous development and application.

It is not found, therefore, that ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict hinder military operations today at an operational or strategic level.

On balance, it is argued that ethics and the Law of Armed Conflict help (rather than hinder) military operations today, as has been established especially from the perspectives of Clausewitzian doctrine, the Comprehensive Approach, and global humanitarian aspirations.[33] The key challenges this raises are threefold: first, to inform the moral development of the 'strategic corporal';[34] second, to re-evaluate the western doctrine of 'risk-transfer', which inadequately protects civilian immunity;[35] and, third, to strengthen international mechanisms for dealing with the greatest civilian tragedy of our times – civil war or conflict in failing states, where the systematic murder and rape of civilians seems immune to effective intervention.[36]

Endnotes

1   Ecclesiastes 7: 10, quoted from *The Holy Bible, New Revised Standard Version*, Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1989.

2   Cf James 4: 1-2, ibid.

3   Cf Howard, Michael, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order*, London: Profile Books, 2000, p112.

4   Creveld, Martin van, 'Why Men Fight', in Freedman, Lawrence (ed), *War*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p87.

5   For the texts, see Roberts, Adam, and Guelff, Richard (eds), *Documents on the Laws of War*, 3rd edn, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

6   *Charter of the United Nations*, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/pdf/uncharter.pdf, accessed 12 March 2009, especially Article 2(4) and Chapters VI and VII.

7   Cf Weigel, George, 'The Development Of Just War Thinking In The Post-Cold War World: An American Perspective', in Reed, Charles, and Ryall, David (eds), *The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp 21-2.

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To What Degree has Military Force Lost Some of its Utility as a Strategic Tool in the Post Cold-War Era?

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One could be forgiven for thinking that the immediate aftermath of the Cold War had brought an abrupt end to the type of thinking that espoused the utility of military force as the ultimate guarantor of security. However, any reflection of the past twenty years forces a surprising paradox upon the analyst: the Cold War was not a war at all in terms of the use of military power, yet since its end, at least for the armed forces of the United Kingdom, military force has been used with an increasingly marked readiness.[1] The current commitments of UK personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan only begin to illustrate the scale and frequency of deployments that began in the Gulf in 1990, ran through the Balkans from 1992, briefly flirting in Africa in the mid 1990s, before returning en masse to the Middle East from 2001. But, almost without exception, these deployments have not seen the attainment of clear political settlements. Some have even argued that they demonstrate that conventional military power is now, quite simply, irrelevant.[2]

This paper will argue that since the end of the Cold War, military force has lost much of its utility as a strategic tool. The argument presented here will be three-fold: firstly, since the end of the Cold War, strategy has lost its meaning; secondly, as a result of this lost meaning, strategy no longer connects clearly articulated political desires to specific military objectives; and finally, that political leaders do not normally understand what results military forces are capable of achieving. As a result, this paper will conclude by suggesting that without careful consideration of these issues by political leaders before deciding to use military force, the future will continue to see military forces bogged down in long term operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan with no apparent achievable political end-state.

In order to consider the value of military force as a strategic tool, it is perhaps useful to begin with a definition of strategy in this context. A broad definition offered by Gray and relatively uncontested in the field of strategic studies (in particular during the Cold War) sees strategy, quite simply, as 'the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy'.[3] This definition therefore sees strategy in the realm of the military. Next, one must establish the purpose of strategy. Again, although largely dominated by realists and neo-realists, the field of strategic studies generally accepts that 'the central problem of international politics is war and the use of force, and the central actors are states'.[4] Logic therefore suggests that strategy is about using force and the threat of force to achieve security for, and further the interests of, the state. Here, the military would seem to simply represent a tool. Finally, one must consider the meaning of security. This can be seen as, quite simply, 'the absence of threats'.[5] Whilst this definition may be acceptable to some, the intellectual problems with it lie at the heart of the argument in this paper. In essence, these problems relate to what the reference point is when thinking about security and how this relates to the value of military force as a means through which security can be achieved by and for the state. If the referent object for security was indeed the state, one might expect those states with armed forces to have a very clear understanding of strategy. Here, the state would identify security threats, which by definition would be to itself. Next, it would consider

how military force could be used to provide that security – this would probably be security against others.[6] From this process, strategy could be developed – strategy itself therefore represents a 'how to do it' guide.[7] Yet, perhaps surprisingly, this logic is not matched in the statements of the most militarily powerful Western governments.

The US provides a good example of the confused meaning of strategy. In November 2003 President Bush made a speech to the Royal United Services Institute in London. Here, he attempted to explain the strategic desires of the US following the commitment of troops to Iraq. He said 'we will help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful and democratic country in the heart of the Middle East. And by doing so, we will defend our people from danger…[but] the forward strategy of freedom must also apply to the Arab–Israeli conflict.'[8] Here, Bush explicitly states that freedom can be a strategy – this does not sit comfortably with the traditional definition of strategy. It has already been established that strategy relates to the use of military force to provide security – so how can 'freedom' be a strategy? Yes, military force could be used to provide freedom, or even be an objective achieved through the use of military force, but surely 'freedom' cannot be a strategy in its own right?[9]

For the UK, the meaning of strategy appears to be just as unclear. In the Foreign Office's 2006 iteration of the document 'Active Diplomacy for a Changing World',[10] strategy is considered to be a means through which policy can be considered. The Foreign Secretary Jack Straw explained that this strategy allowed the provision of 'an analysis of how we expect the world to change over the coming decade…underlin[ing] the growing global opportunities and risks which we face [and] the deepening links between domestic and international issues'.[11] Not only does this document go on to provide a list of strategic priority goals, but it confuses the traditional meaning of strategy still further by stating that aspirational, moral, ethic and value laden areas such as 'sustainable development and poverty reduction underpinned by human rights, good governance and protection of the environment'[12] are strategic objectives. If this represents UK thinking on strategy then one must consider several points: firstly that strategy no longer means what it did during the Cold War; secondly, that the meaning of the term 'strategy' is now no longer clear; and finally, that many of the issues identified by the Foreign Office as making up the overall strategic priorities list are not achievable through any type of strategy in the traditional sense. In short, the strategic objectives identified by the UK Foreign Office as well as by President Bush are not objectives that can be achieved through the conflation of military force and political objective. The term strategy, since the end of the Cold War, appears to have lost its traditional meaning.

If strategy is no longer clear then any military leadership has a major problem. As Rupert Smith has argued, not only does this quandary mean that military force might be misapplied – or, indeed, not applied at all – it also means that the lack of understanding by political masters over what military force can actually achieve may hand the initiative over to whoever that force is being applied against.[13] This paper will therefore consider two further issues: firstly, the apparent disconnect between political objectives and the use of military force; and secondly, the lack of understanding amongst political leaders of what effect military force can deliver.

For both the US and the UK, the end of the Cold War marked the loss of a common enemy. Considered in the context of the world in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the concept of security seemed to have been re-thought in both countries. The 2002 US 'National Security Strategy'[14] and the UK 2008 document of the same name,[15] at least on the face, suggested a clear re-conceptualisation

of security as a result. Here, threats to security such as terrorism, weapon proliferation and state failure were introduced and said to be directly related to national security. For the US, the concept of pre-emption was introduced – this represented the declaration of an explicit right to use military force against a threat that might exist at some point in the future, regardless of whether it actually existed at that point in time. This in itself placed significant challenges upon the US military in terms of the requirement to rapidly deploy military force capable of delivering precise effect anywhere in the world at very short notice. But for the UK this re-conceptualisation masked a greater problem. The types of strategic objectives articulated by the Foreign Office were not ones that lent themselves to being achieved through the use of military force.

It is here that the UK provides an excellent example of the disconnect between political intent and military utility. During his ten years in power from 1997, Prime Minister Tony Blair had 'acquired a passion for military intervention without precedent in modern British political history'.[16] Indeed, Blair committed British forces to action on seven separate occasions during his premiership.[17] Each of these interventions was in one way or another associated with the pursuit of the ethical dimension of foreign policy, focussed around the desire to be 'a force for good, a friend of democracy…[with an] ethical dimension [going] beyond narrow realpolitik…[putting] human rights at the heart of its diplomacy…eliminating world poverty'[18] and so on. For Blair, it has been argued that these objectives were pursued with 'a combination of self-confidence and fear, of Atlanticism, evangelism, Gladstonian idealism, pursued when necessary through murky means. 'His was a combination of naivety and hubris.'[19] Regardless of motivation, desires such as human rights cannot form the basis of a strategy. Strategy must connect a clearly articulated political desire to specific military objectives. These were not issues that have always been articulated to the military. Take Afghanistan as an example: initially deployed to deny Al Qaeda bases, UK forces soon saw their missions change to objectives as diverse as countering narcotics, training the Afghan armed forces, provincial re-construction, extending the writ of the Kabul government to the provinces, enhancing and expanding security and undermining insurgent support.[20] Whilst the UK military in Afghanistan espouses the 'comprehensive approach', an approach acknowledging the requirement for 'a combination of dealing with the immediate symptoms of crisis and addressing the associated causes within the context of each individual situation… [through] a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency response',[21] one is left to wonder whether this doctrine was construed as a direct result of ambiguity in the overarching political objectives handed to the military as strategy at the outset. The types of end results desired in Afghanistan must be brought through the interaction of many agencies. The fact that armed forces were initially deployed without consideration of this fact only serves to reinforce the argument that there was a disconnect between political objectives and the ability of military power to deliver them. To deploy military forces in the pursuit of an unclear and ever changing strategy – if indeed a coherent strategy even existed in the first place – would appear to be at best an act of folly, at worst reckless.

Regardless of the argument presented thus far, one must finally consider what political leaders might reasonably expect military power to be capable of achieving before a judgment can finally be made relating to whether military force has lost some of its utility as a strategic tool in the post-Cold War era. Here one must return to some of the ideas introduced at the beginning of this paper. If political leaders understand the value of the utility of force then it logically follows that that value must be measurable in terms of its benefit to state (i.e. national) security. Once again, this is not a simple correlation to find. The key problem faced here is in trying to understand the

post-Cold War utility of military force within a traditional paradigm. Post-Cold War conflict may well still be about claims to power, it may well be hidden within nationalistic or other rhetoric, but there is no doubt that the globalized processes of change the world has experienced since 1989 have radically affected thinking on security.

Globalisation itself is one such process that seems to have broken apart the cultural and socio-economic divisions that previously allowed the conceptualisation of conflict.[22] Now, most governments recognise that global warming, poverty, disease and resource tensions as well as many other issues provide the focus of security for many people in the world. Indeed, for many of these people, security is now understood with the individual human being as the reference point. The interconnectedness of what is happening at one side of the world – be it pollution or ethnic cleansing – is also recognised as being directly threatening to our own security.[23] But does the deployment of military force, for example by the UK, as 'a force for good' deliver security? This would certainly appear to be a desirable thing, but this is not to say that if the UK declined to deploy military force we would not achieve security anyway.[24] To examine Iraq and Afghanistan, asking whether these deployments directly enhanced UK national security is therefore a problem: there is no clear evidence. The intervention in Iraq was at best controversial in its defiance of international law and the United Nations, at worst founded on falsehoods. The government never found the weapons of mass destruction it said justified the intervention in the first place. When one considers the 90,000 civilian dead since the start of hostilities,[25] any evidence suggesting either increased UK national security or security for Iraq is notable only by its absence. Given the rationale for Blair using military force, one must conclude that, at least in this example, he did not understand what military force could and could not achieve.

In conclusion, this paper has argued that military force has lost much of its utility as a strategic tool since the end of the Cold War. The reasons for this are numerous: firstly, the meaning of the term strategy has been confused by the massive changes occurring in the world since 1989; secondly, there is now a disconnect between political intent and military ability. The types of security threat existing post-Cold War are often not ones that can be overcome through the use of military force. So, when confused strategic objectives are pursued through the military instrument, it seems clear that despite the best efforts of military personnel they cannot be delivered through force alone. Finally, it would appear that political leaders do not understand what military force can achieve. Until these issues are recognised and addressed, it seems worryingly apparent that the military will continue to be committed to open ended operations with vague objectives that they may not be able to achieve at all.

Endnotes

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Is Globalisation Undermining the Military Capability of the Nation State – and does it Matter?

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Introduction

To survive in the modern globalised world, multinational companies are driven to ruthlessly pursue maximum business efficiency, removing duplication and levering economies of scale on a worldwide basis. This means, increasingly, that even powerful nations no longer retain the capability within their national boundaries to produce whole military systems such as ships, armoured vehicles or aircraft. Instead, individual nations will increasingly hold only niche technologies and capabilities. The situation is further compounded as major multinational companies in the civil sector increasingly dominate the technological cutting edge in many areas; indeed, many new military systems are based firmly on the back of civil developments and states have far less ability to control or steer the civil industrial landscape than they do the military sector. So, in essence, we seem to be moving from a world where states have industries, to a point where in some respects one could argue that industries have states.

Although this issue is recognized within nations, and was notably addressed in part through the UK's Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS)[1] in 2006, the trend is seen as an inevitable result of twenty first century globalization and technological development.

These profound changes are creating such a level of international interdependence in the industrial landscape that the modern state will typically need at least the non-objection of many other states if it is to deploy its forces. Even the US is not immune from this trend; for example the world's aerospace giants, Boeing and Airbus, compete neck and neck for world dominance in the civil aerospace market, and the drive for competitive efficiency is driving both companies to seek partners and to outsource major elements of work across the world, including the Far East. Any move by the US to limit export of Boeing work/technology could put at risk the company's competitive advantage. Similarly, as another example, any US move to limit access to the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite navigation system may well be the trigger for Europe to take its own version of the system to full development, thus creating competition for this current US monopoly.

Another important and relevant trend is the increasing linkage between companies, both in the commercial and the defence sectors. This means that even large and apparently independent companies such as BAE Systems (BAES) and European Aeronautics Defence and Space (EADS) are quite often linked in various ways, including through major common projects and through common ownership of the companies which form their capability portfolios (in this case, for example, Matra BAe Dynamics (MBDA)). This increasing level of industrial interdependence between the major multinational companies drives still further interdependence between states.

This paper will explore the extent of these trends, where they may ultimately lead us, and their implications for national defence and security. As the industry base increasingly grows as an interdependent entity with huge financial and political power that sits above state boundaries,

and with technological innovation driven essentially by the commercial sector, the dissertation will seek to assess the real impact of this on national defence and security capabilities. There are two core issues:

- Increasing international interdependence, leading to a reduced ability for states to act autonomously in pursuit of their defence and security interests.

- The transfer of technological leadership towards the commercial sector leading to an increased ability for non-state actors, including terrorist groups, to narrow the gap towards technological parity with states. This effect has already been observed in the exploitation of information age technologies, including the internet, by terrorist organizations.

The paper will go on to question whether more limited national military autonomy is a serious limitation, or even whether it could be a positive development for world peace and security. Its overall aim is to assess the impact of globalisation on both the military capability and the broader security environment of states. It will look specifically at two important trends; the increasing political and financial power of multinational companies, and the emergence of the commercial sector, rather than the military sector, as the driver of technological innovation. It will consider whether the impact of these factors on the autonomous military capability of states is a cause for concern in the wider security environment of the twenty first century, and where key risks emerge it will provide recommendations on how these might be addressed.

Globalisation: Its Nature, Impact and Stability

The Nature of Globalisation

The paper is not intended as a work on globalisation per se, but some analysis is necessary to place its arguments in the broader context of global trends, vulnerabilities and attendant risks.

A useful starting point is the definition of the 'four aspects of globalization' outlined by Ngaire Woods:[2]

- Internationalisation: the increase in transactions among states through trade, investment and capital flows.

- Technological Revolution: modern communications technologies that make distance and location less relevant.

- De-territorialisation: essentially a consequence of the technological revolution, this is the diminution of influence of territorial places, distances and territorial boundaries.

- Liberalisation: government policies to dismantle barriers to international trade.

Taken together, these factors have transformed the world of business, facilitating the creation of huge multinational companies which are critically interdependent across national boundaries. To complete the globalization picture, however, the concept articulated by Richard Rosecrance, of the world polarizing into multinational 'head' and 'body' companies and even 'head' and 'body' nations[3] is also of significant relevance to understanding the scale and impact of the industrial interdependence of states. This concept defines a company which only conducts the research, development, design, marketing, financing, legal and other headquarters functions in-house, whilst outsourcing its production capability, as a 'head' company. This is because its wealth is

based upon its intellectual rather than its physical output. Similarly, he goes on to propose that the highly developed nations, which tend to host the headquarters functions of these companies, are themselves becoming 'head nations' in that they play host to more and more intellectual capability, and less and less physical production capability, which tends to be outsourced to lower cost 'body' nations such as China, for example.

Another very relevant factor is materiality; the actual scale of globalisation in today's world. In simple terms it is massive. According to Manfred Steger,[4] in 2003 the 200 largest multinational companies accounted for over half of the world's industrial output and 51 of the world's 100 largest economies were corporations; with only 49 being countries. This latter figure is based upon a comparison of national GDP to corporation sales, and whilst many authors argue that this is not an 'apples with apples' comparison, it is certainly illustrative of the relative economic power of today's globalised companies.

The Impact of Globalisation on National Defence Industrial Capabilities

The trend towards 'head' and 'body' nations is key to understanding the impact of globalization on the defence capability of 'head' nation states, since the production of physical military systems is essentially a 'body' function. In this regard developed nations are often struggling against the tide to retain viable strategic industrial capabilities within their national territory, when the commercial world has taken those capabilities elsewhere. UK shipbuilding is a prime example of an industry that now survives mostly to fill a perceived strategic defence need as outlined in the UK's DIS. The DIS correctly recognizes that it is only feasible to retain a limited number of key strategic capabilities under 'onshore' sovereign control, within the limited objectives of:

- protecting the medium-term ability to support existing equipment;

- preserving certain sensitive strategic technologies such as weapons and nuclear;

and

- preserving some capability to deliver modifications and enhancements to meet urgent operational needs.

Nevertheless, to preserve even these limited sovereign capabilities is a very ambitious objective in the context of the globalised world. An important implication of the DIS is that the key capabilities identified must be sourced from UK based suppliers, where there may be limited scope for meaningful competition or access to world class capability. Thus, the DIS must be implemented with great care in order to avoid loss of capability and value for money through inward national investment.

Interestingly, it is not only 'head' nations that see vulnerability in the interdependent relationships brought by globalisation. In their 2001 paper, Gong Chuanzhou and Ai Hua of the Nanjing Army Command Institute[5] outline a Chinese perspective on this issue, arguing that by abandoning its indigenous design capabilities to switch to the manufacture of essentially western designs, China may lose the indigenous technological capability to design and develop its own military systems.

The Future Stability of the Global Economy and Associated Risk

To credibly assess the stability of the globalised economy would require a separate and complex analysis, yet because of the critical international interdependence of the world's commercial and defence industries, it is vital to form a view on this issue in order to inform the conclusions of

this paper. There are many published opinions on this, with some arguing that the combination of the massive benefits of the globalised economy, and the dire consequences of instability or breakdown, will drive all parties, political, commercial and non-government organisations, to seek all measures to ensure the ongoing stability of the international economy. Certainly, the direct actions of both the UK and the US governments to avert an international financial crisis following the recent sub-prime lending problems in the US support this view. For example, the effective nationalization by the UK government of the Northern Rock Building Society was by any measure an expensive and drastic action.

On the other hand, the very fact that the crisis occurred is evidence of the underlying potential vulnerability of the international globalised economy. The Southeast Asian crisis of the late 1990s presents another sobering lesson in how quickly and how severely a seemingly stable international position can dissolve into economic chaos; in this case resulting in the rapid withdrawal of over $100bn of investment from the region with disastrous consequences for the region and a real risk, which was only averted by the rapid construction of drastic rescue packages, of triggering a global financial crisis.

A particularly worrying consideration is that multinational companies are effectively forced to accept the risks arising from their total dependence on the continuity of the international free trade system. Even if they perceive such risks to be significant, their competitive edge, and therefore their survival, is dependent on their ability to achieve maximum efficiency at the global level. Equally, the scale and speed of globalization, and its huge economic benefits, mean that it would be politically difficult, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy, for national governments to pursue what would be seen as economically damaging protectionist policies in order to limit the scale of this interdependence risk. So, for different reasons, both industry and political leaders have accepted the interdependence risks of globalization. But this does not mean that those risks are not significant; only that they are largely accepted as practically unavoidable within the context of the modern, globalised, world. Bringing all this together, and recognising the political and commercial imperative to preserve the global economy, it will therefore be assumed for the purposes of this paper that a serious breakdown in the international global economy remains a credible but low risk.

This part of the paper has outlined the massive scale of globalisation, the polarisation between 'head' and 'body' nations and the critical importance of the stability of the global economy. As a first step towards assessing the impact of these factors on national defence and security capabilities, the next section examines the defence and security challenges of the twenty first century.

Defence and Security in the Twenty First Century

The defence and security threats of the modern age have been outlined by western national governments through a number of means including:

- the US National Security Strategy of 2002[6]

- the European Union Security Strategy of 2003,[7] which is further articulated in more detail in the European Defence Agency (EDA) Future and Long Term Vision of 2006[8] and

- the UK National Security Strategy of 2008.[9]

Although differing in emphasis and approach, these strategies focus on the following generic threat areas:

- Effects of regional conflict and failed states

- Terrorism

- Climate change

- Competition for energy, food, water and natural resources

- Security and economic impact of European and world demographic trends

- Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation

- Pandemic

- Harnessing and preventing misuse of new technologies

- Organised crime

- The rise of nationalism.

With the possible exception of the rise of nationalism, all of these threats are global in nature and all require a globalised response. In this sense, globalization will be an essential element in developing effective solutions. The main problem with dependency on global solutions, however, is that states are naturally cautious about which other states they could rely upon in any future crisis or conflict. It is for this reason of course that, historically, shared technology and defence projects in the more traditional military arena have been limited to within close regional groupings such as the European Union, or within military alliances such as NATO.

The national security infrastructure within western nations exists today as an amalgam of traditional military organizations and systems, together with emerging 'homeland security' infrastructures to tackle the more modern and globalised threats such as terrorism and international organized crime. These infrastructures are still not properly developed or integrated however and, being constructed around the traditional military systems designed for inter-state warfare, are generally lacking in agility and coherent command and control. It is fair to say though, that these limitations are to some extent already being addressed through the emerging strategies for security sector reform (as outlined, for example, in the UK National Security Strategy[10]) and in the increasing profile of international organisations such as the UN and the EU, and efforts to transform them to meet today's global challenges.

To summarize, globalization presents not only challenges and risks to the defence and security environment of the twenty first century, but also the only viable solutions, because problems such as international organised crime cannot be tackled effectively on a national basis. The down side, from a traditional security perspective, is that globalisation brings an unprecedented level of international interdependency, principally through shared dependence upon multinational companies in both the civil and defence sectors. This is explored in more detail in the next part of the paper, starting with an assessment of the relative power of states and multinational companies.

International Interdependence in Defence and Security

Global Companies and States: Their Power and Interdependence

Global or multinational companies operate in an international environment that is essentially ungoverned from a legal perspective. International Law, such as it exists, is mainly focused upon inter-state activities including military intervention and war, human rights and international criminal activity. Whilst there are a number of international legal instruments, these are mainly focused upon the higher levels of criminal activity such as murder, human trafficking and genocide, rather than providing any form of international legal framework for the civil operations of multinational companies and, generally speaking, corporations remain outside the scope of international law.[11]

Multinational companies, whilst generally having a head office registered within a specific state, actually exist as separate legal entities within the national laws of the various countries within which they operate. Whilst, theoretically, a state could seek legal redress against the offshore operations of one of its nationally registered companies, and there are indeed examples of such actions (for example under the US Alien Tort Claims Act), it is generally held that the host nation of the offshore subsidiary would hold principal jurisdiction under the principle of 'forum non conveniens'.[12]

Turning to the power of multinational companies over states, it is clear that through their massive economic power and their ability to bring wealth and prosperity, multinational companies have become extremely powerful players in the international political arena. Indeed, states now effectively compete to play host to wealth creating multinational company operations. This effect is clearly reflected in the reducing corporate tax rates imposed by states as they 'race to the bottom' to compete for the business of multinational companies. For example, average corporate tax rates within the EU 13 area have decreased steadily from around 38% in 1995 to around 28% in 2007,[13] and ultimately, states represent a 'buyers' market' for multinational companies, which can invest elsewhere and even move their operations to another country if local conditions become unattractive.[14]

Thus, whilst multinational companies wield huge political and economic power at a global level, states effectively retain full sovereignty over all company activity that is carried out within their national borders. The recent effectively forced sale by BP of one of the world's largest natural gas fields to Gazprom, the Russian natural gas monopoly, following threats by the Russian authorities to revoke the company's licence to develop it,[15] is clear evidence of the power of a determined nation state to act with impunity within its own national territory.

Whilst these sovereign powers bring at least some reassurance that the state still has real power over what happens within its own territory, there are likely to be serious consequences if a state takes action (which could range from the imposition of export controls, through nationalization, to actually closing down operations or production facilities) to limit the national operations of a multinational company. This is because multinational companies are designed to operate as efficient global entities and as such they are critically dependent on all their elements continuing to operate effectively.

For example, the ability to produce a particular product might depend on design information, software, hardware, processes, key skills, access to intellectual property rights and specialist

means of production. In a typical multinational company, these could be spread across many states and lack of access to any one of them could cripple capability, at least in the short to medium term. Also, confusion would reign; even the corporate company is unlikely to understand all of its international interdependencies. Even failure of relatively low-technology supporting systems, such as corporate IT or financial systems, could cause a real crisis. And in such a scenario, we must never forget the human element. Many capabilities will exist within people, and the position of foreign nationals including their status, goodwill and skills, during such a time of international tension would be a key risk to any international venture.

It is therefore concluded that action by a state to deny access by other states to key technological capabilities within its boundaries is likely to be successful, even though such action may affect the entire global operations of the company concerned and so bring a severe impact. Such reciprocal impact may well include the severe displeasure of many other nations and the loss of future investment from multinational companies.

In summary, multinational companies can be considered to be a collection of separate legal entities, each falling under the clear jurisdiction of its host state. But those same multinational companies only exist as commercially viable entities at an international level, so any action by a host state to disrupt or limit the activities of multinational company operations within its national boundary has huge potential to cause widespread disruption of company operations and capability on a global scale. This risk has been recognised to some extent within the defence sector, and states have pursued a number of avenues to limit its impact. The next section examines the effectiveness of such measures.

Holding Back the Tide: Multinational Programmes and Industrial Strategies

The globalisation of technologies and means of production, even in the military sector, has reduced the number of capabilities that are available within a given state. Recognising this, some nations have sought to sustain key sovereign capabilities in-country. The UK's DIS is an example of this but this approach is of limited effectiveness in the global world. Multinational, or 'collaborative', defence programmes offer a potential route for nations to pool their financial and industrial resources to procure capable major weapon systems at an affordable cost whilst retaining secure access to key technologies. Within Europe, for example, the Tornado and Eurofighter programmes signified the end of an era when the UK would retain all of the capabilities to design and develop a fast jet aircraft. Instead, the UK contribution was focused on a number of specific systems, relying on other 'partner nations' to contribute the remaining systems and capabilities.

In order to limit the impact of their risk exposure to multinational defence programmes, states participating in such multinational programmes have sought to protect their access to critical technologies and capabilities in other partner nations through treaties and agreements to ensure 'security of supply'. These have been present in Europe for many years and are generally covered within the memorandums of understanding around specific collaborative defence programmes. More recently, in the context of the emerging European Security and Defence Policy, the countries of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK signed a 'Framework Agreement'[16] to provide a generic level of mutual security of supply in order to encourage the development of a more integrated European defence industry. This concept has since been further developed under the auspices of the EDA, towards the development of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB)[17]. In putting forward its vision, the EDA recognises[18] that the DTIB must draw

upon recent advances in the civil and 'dual use' technology areas including the automotive and IT domains. However, since the cutting edge of these sectors, together with the civil electronics and aerospace sectors, is dominated by multinational global companies, even an industrial grouping at the European level will not enable the European nations to create a fully autonomous defence capability. What will be preserved, however, is a better spread of systems capabilities; that is the ability to systems engineer the integration of technology building blocks, such as processors, sensors and advanced composite materials to create complete military systems. In some areas, however, notably manned fast jet aircraft, even a EU level grouping is unlikely to be able to sustain a future systems capability, although this may not be strategically important, considering the possible future shift in focus towards unmanned air vehicles.

There is one other condition that must be satisfied if regional groupings such as the EDA are to grow credible regional defence industrial capabilities, and that is that the industries within the region must integrate and become competitive at a global level. This is because under international free trade regulations under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation,[19] nations are obliged to offer government procurement opportunities to worldwide competition, rather than directly to their own industries. So whilst the EDA, for example, can collate requirements to provide high value opportunities for research, development and manufacture, in a globalised world the final allocation of defence contracts must be competitive (apart from in the very limited category of nationally sensitive areas outlined, for example, in Article 297 of the Treaty of Rome). The ongoing controversy between the EU and the US over alleged subsidies to Boeing and Airbus[20] is indicative of the sensitivity around this key principle of global trade.

Staying with the European example, the defence sector industrial base continues at pace to adapt to the new globalised world. Partly as a consequence of the creation of a raft of European collaborative programmes, a number of which are being centrally managed by the Organisation Conjoint de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR) procurement agency, the European defence industry has undergone a series of mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in a high level of interlinking and interdependence within the European defence industrial base. For example, EADS brings together major civil aerospace companies such as Airbus, with many other technology and defence companies to cover a vast breadth of product diversity. In all, EADS brings together part or complete ownership of some 27 European aerospace and defence companies.[21] Notably, Europe's principal complex weapons manufacturer, MBDA, falls under the shared ownership of BAES and EADS, two major companies that compete fiercely in other sectors of the market.

From this European example, therefore, it is concluded that defence related industrial capabilities within regions can be highly interrelated and interdependent, but that regional defence groupings and security of supply mechanisms have the potential to protect national defence interests insofar as these are within the gift of partner nations to protect. What can not be guaranteed through regional groupings or treaties, however, is access to the critical underpinning commercial technologies, since these are beyond the control of existing measures to protect national sovereign capabilities in the international defence arena. The next part of the paper examines the scale and impact of this phenomenon.

The Shift From Military to Commercial Leadership in Technology

Commercial Content of Military Systems

The 2008 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development data on 'Main Science and Technology Indicators'[22] shows that civil research and development (R&D) expenditure greatly exceeds government funded R&D (of which defence R&D is but a subset) in all of the advanced world economies. In Japan, for example, civil R&D represents 77% of total national R&D expenditure. And even in the US, where defence expenditure is huge, civil R&D still accounts for some 65% of total national R&D expenditure.

Not only is the civil science and technology base supported by a much greater economic investment overall, but it must also be recognized that defence R&D is largely targeted towards a very specialist (and expensive) subset of niche technologies that cannot be sourced from the commercial sector. These include low observability (stealth), missile defensive aids, nuclear and complex weapon design. Thus, it is in the areas where the military and the civil markets both operate, the so called 'dual use technologies', that the superior might of the commercial sector has been brought to bear and the relative advance and impact of civil technologies is most prevalent.

It is in areas such as data and signal processing, high density memory devices, sensors (optical, thermal etc), composite materials and structures, and flat panel display systems, where the R&D power of the commercial sector has taken the lead. For example, the UK's Defence Technology Strategy[23] recognizes the global civil market lead in advanced materials and structures, and presents a strategy of 'technology watch' to monitor civil developments for applicability in the critical areas of low observability, platform structural materials, smart materials and active structures, structural modelling, design and through-life support. The commercial lead in the electronics industry is even more profound. Indeed, many military systems are 'system engineered' by bringing together a mixture of military and civilian market components. This blending of technology is actually more extensive than it appears, as commercial components are often re-packaged into military format to provide improved physical or thermal protection.[24]

In considering the indigenous capability of the state, therefore, the key issue becomes the potential vulnerability of military systems through the significant quantity of globally sourced commercial technology embedded within them, for which there is no longer a nationally produced alternative.

This vulnerability can affect states in two areas: security of supply and technological competence. Assuming that national (or 'partner nations') defence sector suppliers have the competence to integrate the technology, national procurement procedures normally dictate that system designers should analyze the supply market to find alternative and, as far as possible, independent sources of supply for such commercial components. If a component is in mass production on a global scale, it is at first sight difficult to conceive of circumstances where it would be impossible to obtain re-supply – even if TV sets or mobile phones had to be 'cannibalised' to find the required parts!

There are two possible drawbacks to this approach; one strategic and related to technological competence, and one concerning security of supply:

- At the strategic level, there is the issue that a defence supplier (and therefore the host state) that uses commercially sourced building blocks to system engineer defence solutions, becomes dependent upon core technology that is not of national origin or under sovereign control. Strategically, this takes the national industry out of the technology development cycle for that family of technology. This could have future consequences if, through a step change in the development of that technology, or a change in the strategic threat environment, a variant or upgrade to that technology enables a vital new capability, and the region or nation within which the technology is based is not willing to co-operate or share the technology.

- The practical limitation is that military systems generally have a much longer service life than do civilian systems. For example, the Tornado aircraft has been in service for almost 30 years and is planned to remain in service for a further 20 years or more. Conversely, commercial computers and their associated components have a design life of about 5 years. Thus, the military logistician is often faced with the problem of sourcing commercial components, such as processor chips, that are obsolete by commercial standards but critical to the operation of military systems. In these cases, special arrangements have to be made with the supplier to produce bespoke batches of the outdated product. Again, this relies on the co-operation of the company (and ultimately therefore the host nation/region) where the technology is based.

More modern defence systems seek to mitigate this risk through the application of open architectures, standardized data protocols and 'plug and play' interfaces to enable specific components and sub-systems to be more easily replaced without major re-design. This represents a significant challenge, however, and there has been relatively little real success to date.

Commercial Technology Leadership at the Major Systems Level

Not only is the civil sector leading at the core technology levels that form the building blocks of complete military and civil products, but it is also leading in many areas in the development of complete new products and systems, and the systems complexity of modern commercial products often exceeds that of military systems. This is the case across a broad spectrum of systems from the personal computing and communications market, to large aircraft and civil satellites.

As the systems complexity of commercial products grows, so does the extent of multinational content. For example, in the 1960s only 2% of the Boeing 727 passenger airliner was non-American, compared to 30% for the 777 in the mid 90s, and today at least 70% of Boeing's latest model, the 200-300 seat long-haul 787, will be built outside America.[25] This is an important development, since the 787 will be built mostly from leading edge technology including ultra-light, composite materials, and both the design and production of key wing components is to be conducted overseas, in this case mostly in Japan.

Meanwhile, Boeing's principal competitor, Airbus, is also diversifying its operations and focusing on China, not just as an overseas manufacturing base but also as a risk-sharing partner through a joint-venture engineering centre.[26] And this diversification is bringing the key aerospace supply base companies with it. For example, General Electric, the aero-engine manufacturer, has opened a Technology Centre in Shanghai.[27]

These examples demonstrate the rapidly reducing autonomous capability of the aerospace sectors within the US and Europe. Moreover, considering that new military aircraft rely heavily on civil aerospace developments, particularly in the areas of advanced composite materials and aircraft systems, and that Boeing and Airbus are also the principal future suppliers of fixed wing military aircraft for the US and Europe, this reduced autonomous capability will also impact on the military sector.

The Problem of Export Regulation

The shift towards global commercial leadership in key technologies is also making it increasingly difficult for states to hold even those technologies that are considered relevant to national security within their national borders, despite the existence of regulatory systems to control the export of such technologies.

The US International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR),[28] for example, form a very powerful and rigorous regime for the export control of potentially sensitive information and technology from the US, but these regulations become ever more controversial as the edge between military and civil technology becomes increasingly blurred, with US companies increasingly claiming that ITAR is restricting their legitimate commercial interests.

This aspect of ITAR has already created controversy around the Boeing 787 programme,[29] where Boeing has been under pressure to provide assurance that its advanced composite technology has been derived entirely from civilian sources. The space sector has experienced similar difficulties. For example, the satellite control system company EADS Sodern has been driven to replace US sourced elements of its 'Star Tracker' system with European sourced technology in order to avoid ITAR restrictions.[30] Also, the sheer administration of the ITAR system can in itself cause major problems for industry, with average clearance times at around 57 days and major companies such as Lockheed Martin, for example, employing over 200 staff dedicated to processing thousands of licence applications.[31]

Overall, therefore, a nation might achieve some protection of its military technology through the application of an ITAR style control regime, but in the modern globalised world it runs the serious risk that in the longer term such a regime might ultimately have the counter-productive effect of allowing suppliers from other nations to take the technological lead.

This part of the paper has concluded that national military systems have become highly dependent on globally sourced commercial technology at all levels and it follows that states are critically dependent on the continued free operation of the global commercial market for their security and defence capabilities. This risk is, in practical terms, unavoidable in the modern globalised world. However, a failure of the global free trade system would have such massive consequences that states are unlikely to allow such a collapse to occur. It is, nevertheless, a credible and potentially serious risk. It is also possible that a state's ability to deploy its forces could be undermined should another state object violently and be prepared to take direct action through its own national elements of multinational companies accordingly. Again, however, such action would have serious international consequences and states are therefore considered unlikely to pursue such action.

The technological strength of the global commercial sector brings a further, more sinister, threat, however and this is addressed in the next part of the paper.

Vulnerability to Mis-use of Civil Technology

Integrating Global Technologies to Produce Potent Weapon Systems

An important consequence of the technological lead of the commercial sector in the civil and 'dual use' technology areas is that hostile non-state actors, including terrorists, insurgents and criminals can easily gain access to high technology capabilities that in some areas rival those available to the security forces of nation states.

For example, the simple and relatively cheap purchase of a pick-up truck, a mobile phone, satellite internet access and a GPS receiver, can allow hostile groups to cover large distances with pinpoint accuracy and timing, even across desolate areas such as deserts, and to rendezvous with other hostile actors to exchange weapons, money, drugs, arms or hostages, or to execute direct hostile action. Internet access can provide a vast array of information and situational awareness. And more specialized technologies, such as off-the-shelf night vision equipment, can greatly expand such capability, again, at modest cost.

Of even more concern is the potential of new global technologies to be integrated to produce highly potent new systems. Outlined below are but a few examples of how very credible and potent capabilities can be generated cheaply, quickly and effectively through the integration of freely available off-the-shelf technology from the global market.

Communications

Communication is, and always has been, a vital element in the successful prosecution of armed conflict and it is an essential element in the areas of hostile action which form part of the twenty first century security threats, including terrorism, trafficking and organized crime.

The internet provides a freely available, near-real-time, global communications network with a high degree of security through robust encryption systems. Sensitive commercial and financial information, from internet shopping to major international business, can be channelled through global communication and internet systems with relative confidence, and these same systems are of course available to hostile actors. The anarchic nature of the internet also provides built-in redundancy, making it extremely difficult to block out or restrict geographic areas or specific user groups from having global access.

The modern mobile phone now works fairly effectively from almost any location in the world, whilst the advent of affordable satellite communications systems provides access to this global network from extremely remote locations, providing the potential for terrorists and criminals to continue their operations from covert locations, whilst being very difficult to locate.

Individual nations are largely powerless to prevent, restrict or control this interoperability and freedom to communicate globally. Even the systems imposed by China and Russia have had limited effect, and the regime in Zimbabwe, for example, has achieved only limited success in its attempts to prevent BBC reporting. In the latter case, coverage has been maintained via covert satellite links from within country, using small, portable systems. Robust, high capacity, satellite communication systems are readily available off the shelf,[32] as are secure, short range, communications systems.

Remote Piloted Vehicles (RPV)

RPV offer formidable capabilities for twenty first century armed forces, with many systems already in-service throughout the world. They vary in scale from small hand-launched surveillance drones, through bomb disposal robots and marine submersibles to large cruise missiles and unmanned conventionally armed unmanned air vehicles (UCAV), capable of identifying and destroying enemy positions over great distances. UCAVs offer speed, low observability and precision, and of course they do not place their operators directly in harm's way. For these same reasons, this generation of technology would be of huge benefit to hostile actors such as terrorists, insurgents and criminals.

To produce RPV capable of hostile action, either an aircraft, a land vehicle, a boat or submersible, it is necessary to have access to a number of technological building blocks and an appropriate competence to integrate these elements to form a complete system. These building blocks fall into the basic categories of control and navigation systems, power and propulsion systems, advanced materials and payload.

All of these building blocks, to a high level of capability, are now available from the commercial market. Thus, the ability to manufacture highly capable RPV is possible for low-budget non-state actors. This is explained, system by system, in more detail below, together with an explanation of how such systems can be integrated to form complex, potent systems.

Control and Navigation Systems

The ability to produce autonomous control and navigation systems for RPV, capable of operation over land, sea or air, is now well within the capability of the skilled amateur. For example, there are several readily available autopilot systems for model aircraft, capable of providing guidance control, stability augmentation and waypoint navigation (in 3 dimensions) for prices of around a few hundred dollars.[33] These units can incorporate GPS, as well as three axis solid state gyro/accelerometer systems and use sophisticated open source software code that can be readily adapted for use in a wide range of platforms. Such an integration of systems would allow an aircraft, say, to be pre-programmed to fly reliably and with great precision to any destination within its physical range, or to follow a pre-programmed route.

A good example of what can be achieved by integrating these technologies into a model aircraft is the Easy Star project on the FPV Video Pilot website.[34] In this example the designer uses a tiny video camera, integrated into a system with a servo controlled pan/tilt head and a data link to the ground. The pilot 'flies' the aircraft through a 'virtual reality' games headset fitted with solid state motion sensors to provide the perspective of being inside the aircraft's cockpit. The motion sensors on the headset allow the pilot to look around in any direction as he/she would if inside the aircraft. This virtual reality flying opens up the possibility of interactively flying a model aircraft (or RPV) beyond visual line from the ground to survey or attack a target with high precision. Range is only limited by the aircraft itself and the data up/down link, which can easily be a few kilometres.

The advent of globally accessible mapping information (Google Earth etc), together with the widespread uploading of millions of holiday photographs onto the internet in a searchable format (Flickr etc) provides a ready-made intelligence acquisition capability. The need for visits to a particular location for surveillance purposes (with the detection risk that that presents), has now been drastically reduced or removed. Online mapping services allow the creation of routes

and targets within maps, and the downloading of these directly into way-point form suitable for use in an RPV guidance system. The skill level needed for programming targets into an autopilot system has been reduced to a level that is attainable by most computer-capable individuals.

Power and Propulsion

Reliable, high power electric propulsion is now readily available in a wide range of sizes at low cost. Brushless model aircraft motors, capable of delivering in excess of 6kW, now cost around £170 and weigh about 1.7kg.[35] These motors can be used in land, air or maritime vehicles and have the advantage of being powerful, quiet running and difficult to detect due to their freedom from emissions and low thermal signature.

Batteries to meet the power and energy storage needs of lightweight electric vehicles are similarly readily available from the global market, due to the massive civil R&D investment in the development of high energy density systems for portable computers and mobile phones, for example. Very high energy density batteries, capable of propelling air vehicles over large distances are now readily available from internet retailers,[36] and have been widely adopted for the propulsion of model aircraft.

Advanced Materials and Payload

The civil market now leads the development of advanced materials, including carbon composites, and these are readily available from the model aircraft, motor racing and sports sectors.

The ease with which information can be spread via the Internet offers the potential for information on energetic materials (explosives) and non-energetic materials (toxins, chemicals or biological agents), for use as RPV payload, to be widely available. Internet offers both the ability for hostile groups to search out information from other malicious or irresponsible actors, to share information in order to develop and perfect production or deployment methods, or to identify sources of supply.

Systems Integration

As demonstrated by the Easy Star project,[37] it is quite possible to integrate the building blocks outlined above to produce some very potent capabilities. Moreover, the more skilled and determined actors who are prepared to develop some of the elements themselves and with a more significant budget of perhaps a few thousand dollars, can achieve even greater capabilities. It is even possible, as demonstrated by New Zealander Bruce Simpson's Website,[38] to produce a medium range, jet powered cruise missile with a sophisticated guidance/targeting system for between $(US)5,000 and 160,000, depending on the form of propulsion and therefore the range and speed. On a linked website, Simpson describes the various propulsion options, ranging from low cost pulse-jet to his own X-Jet project which he shows running on a test bed.

Building the skills and knowledge to produce such systems would require a good engineering foundation, including knowledge of modern computer/software systems. Beyond that, experience gained through trial and error in the application of the technical information provided on purchase of complex systems such autopilots, access to relevant hobby websites, and pooling of knowledge with similarly minded individuals, including through internet, will allow the fairly rapid acquisition of the relevant competence.

Returning to the production of RPVs such as the Easy Star, the potential application of such a system for precision attack in an urban environment is significant. It would be possible to covertly deliver a small payload, either a purely energetic device or a chemical, toxic or infective agent, with great precision. Moreover, as such systems could be small and unobtrusive, and built cheaply, a 'swarm' attack by a number of such systems could be feasible. This would multiply the potency of the attack, and make effective defence extremely difficult. Alternatively, such command and control systems could equally well be scaled up to provide a means to attack large maritime or land-based targets of strategic importance.

For example, a semi-submersible attack system could be created through the integration of powerful electric propulsion, a high accuracy autonomous guidance system, perhaps using GPS for waypoint confirmation and a large quantity of explosive. Such a platform, with the majority of its bulk below the surface, would be quite difficult to detect by radar, and its electric propulsion would be quiet, making underwater acoustic detection challenging, especially if the system was intended for use in a high noise environment such as a harbour or an oil rig.

The Threat of Asymmetric Agility

As has been demonstrated in this part of the paper, there is real potential to exploit global civil technologies and communication systems for harmful intent. The opportunity for small groups to collaborate freely, irrespective of their physical location on the globe, provides a ready means for information exchange with the result that development times for such systems can be radically shortened.

Moreover, the ability of states to control the proliferation of technology that can be exploited in this way is very limited. Action to restrict the availability of a particular technology from a specific source is likely to be undermined as the market is exploited by another global source. Control of the physical movement of equipment is also difficult. The volume of international parcel freight is such that effective national restriction on small volume import/export is extremely difficult.

However, the most significant advantage that hostile actors would have in exploiting such civil technology is agility; the ability to produce innovative, potent new systems in a fraction of the time taken through conventional military procurement cycles. Standard military procurement systems are fundamentally reactive, rather than pro-active, and military doctrine is largely based on tactics that have been developed from knowledge gained through previous conflicts.

Those seeking to exploit systems derived from civil technology are not hampered by doctrine or even conventional thinking. They are free to innovate and judge the effectiveness of their innovations in use. Their adaptability, together with an extremely short development cycle, makes them inherently more agile and hence a very potent threat.

It is therefore clear that the defence and security services of states will have to change their approach if they are to remain one step ahead of hostile actors using adapted civil technology. The only effective way to stay ahead would be for states to emulate the approach of potential hostile actors. That is, to invest in the creation of groups of small teams, of perhaps 5 to 10 people strong, each with the breadth of skills necessary to explore capabilities that could be quickly generated using civil technologies. This would include potential future threats, so that appropriate preventive measures, protection or countermeasures can be developed, and also new systems to enhance the capability and safety of defence and security forces.

The ideas and concepts produced could be offered to military users to assess whether the application could have real benefits. In other words, a "what could you do with that?" philosophy.

The UK 'Grand Challenge',[39] that was launched in association with the UK Defence Technology Strategy, and invites small companies, research laboratories and academic science faculties to "design a system with a high degree of autonomy that can detect, identify, monitor and report a comprehensive range of military threats in an urban environment" is a step in the right direction. But there needs to be more activity in this area.

Conclusions

Although globalisation presents serious risks, it brings huge benefits and wealth to the world economy and is generally a force for good in raising awareness and creating effective channels of communication across diverse cultures and regions of the world. Moreover, such is its scale that to opt out would have such serious and far-reaching consequences that this is not a realistic option for any advanced nation state.

Looking at the inter-state armed conflict dimension, the high level of interdependence that globalization creates is certainly a double-edged sword. On the one hand it severely limits the ability of states to act as self-sufficient entities, whilst on the other hand the reduced viability of the 'war option' in an interdependent globalised world will act as a force to swing states towards other options to pursue inter-state tensions.

The development of national strategies to protect 'sovereign' defence capabilities may be successful in preserving niche area capabilities such as complex weapons and nuclear systems, but the critical defence industry reliance upon global commercial technologies means that these initiatives will not be able to preserve truly autonomous system capabilities within states. Indeed, there is a risk that by turning towards inward investment in national industries, nations may deprive their armed forces of the best available capabilities and value for money. Similarly, the truly global nature of the commercial technology market means that even large regional defence and security groupings such as the EDA under the auspices of the EU, will have little more success in creating industrial autonomy than individual nations. However, such regional groupings can provide value by creating a more unified defence market within their region, reducing duplication in research, development and production of military systems. But this approach will only be successful if the regional defence industrial base can integrate and remain competitive in global terms to deliver cutting edge, best value capability and not fall foul of global anti-competition rules.

The imposition of export controls is also of limited effectiveness, and can only be deployed on a major scale by a nation with a highly capable military industrial base, such as the US. Yet the strength of the global commercial technology base and the vital need for industries to remain competitive at the global level has meant that even the US faces severe difficulties in pursuing this strategy. The examples of the tug-of-war over Boeing 787 technology, and the exclusion of US suppliers from new satellite systems programmes are illustrative of the potential for export controls to cause damage to the national commercial sector, with obvious counter-productive consequences.

On the wider twenty first century security dimension, considering that the key security threats are themselves largely global in nature, it is very clear that a global response is the only effective

action. Thus, globalization, including international organizations, pacts, treaties and governance will provide an essential tool in preserving world security.

The key risk area is vulnerability to hostile non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations and organized crime, because globalization has provided ready and low-cost access to some substantial technological capabilities. The potential now exists, through application of appropriate system design skills to civil technologies, to create extremely potent and dangerous weapons. Moreover, the rapid pace of civilian technological advance and potentially fast 'time to market' for the production of such weapons, compared to conventional military programme development and introduction to service timescales, means that innovative non-state actors could harness a significant advantage in agility and responsiveness in the application of new technologies. As a consequence, it is vital that research and development organizations, industries, procurement organizations and users in the military and security sectors raise their game as a matter of urgency to find rapid solutions to this generation of threat, and to put modern, innovative, information age solutions into the hands of security forces.

Returning to the principal question posed in this paper: is globalisation undermining the military capability of the nation state – and does it matter? It is concluded that globalization is significantly undermining the military capability of the nation state but, in the absence of a major international breakdown in the global economy, which seems unlikely due to the huge common interest in sustaining it, this is not considered to be a major threat. This conclusion holds true for both a natural breakdown of the global economy, such as an international financial crisis, or deliberate action by states to exploit global interdependence as a weapon against other states.

More fundamentally, if we move the argument from one of pure military capability to the broader definition of security in the twenty first century, it is clear that globalization provides the only means to preserve the security of states against twenty first century global threats.

So on to the question of 'does it matter?' It is concluded that the answer is broadly 'no' from an inter-state conflict perspective, but 'yes' in terms of the generally poor ability of states to harness the latest commercial off-the-shelf global technologies in order to counter the potential for emerging threats from non-state actors using that same new technology.

Recommendations

States should accept that globalization does significantly undermine their traditional military independence, but that it is also an inescapable feature of the modern world and provides the only viable solutions to global security challenges.

States should assess and manage the risks posed to them by globalization, and establish realistic industrial strategies that do not pretend that protectionist policies will preserve capable national defence industries.

States should continue to protect hot-end capabilities such as weapons and nuclear, and the ability to conduct short-term operations through preserving modest logistical support buffer stocks and the ability to system engineer urgent capability enhancements or changes.

States should harness new global technologies to meet 21st century global threats, and bring more innovation and agility in providing security and defence solutions. They should:

- fully exploit commercially available systems and technologies to shorten procurement times from years to weeks or months wherever possible;

- work this from both ends – finding solutions to known problems and capability gaps in the conventional way, but also looking at what capabilities new technologies can bring and being prepared to look at radically new ways of working;

- find solutions to potential threats before the 'other side' invents the threat;

- introduce more opportunities, such as the 'Grand Challenge' to stimulate innovative new solutions;

- minimise dependence upon commercial technology embedded within military systems, by placing more emphasis on developing systems that can readily accept technology upgrades throughlife, through open architectures and standardized interface protocols.

Endnotes

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The Role of China in Africa: An Agent for Developmental Transformation or Just Neo-Colonial Exploitation?

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The beautiful flower of Sino-African friendship is blooming…together we will greet a flourishing tomorrow. China, the fastest developing country in the world, is ready to join hands with Africa so that together we can march into the 21st century full of confidence and expectation.

President Hu Jintao, 13 May 2006

Introduction

China is fast becoming a developmental 'champion' and a beacon of hope for the world's poorest countries, many of which are to be found on the African continent. In the process it is fundamentally challenging the way in which the development of poor countries is considered; to the point where it is no longer axiomatic that the creation of a political democracy is an absolute requirement for economic and social progress.

At the end of the Cold War it seemed that Western ideologies had won the day[1] and it was generally accepted that there was a causal and symbiotic relationship between the establishment of a democratic political system and sustained developmental progress. China has now challenged that construct by promoting its own unique model of authoritarian centralized rule and the gradual adoption of market principles but with the preservation of many large state-controlled enterprises.

For a number of differing reasons of self interest the leaders of many developing African countries find this model attractive. They now seem to argue that their countries should reject the failed Western system with all of its demanding conditions and follow the freer Chinese developmental model, pursuing economic growth first and deferring the political reforms until later.[2]

This change of approach is beginning to undermine the West's developmental efforts in Africa. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) spent years negotiating a transparency agreement with the Angolan government only to be told in 2007 that Luanda was no longer interested in IMF money. Instead they had secured a $2billion 'no conditions' loan from China.[3] This scenario has been repeated across Africa in countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe.[4]

In its foreign policy pronouncements China has repeatedly reaffirmed its strong advocacy for the 'sovereignty' concept and the right of all states to be free of interference in their internal affairs.[5] This is a position in direct contrast to the West's growing consensus for the justification of humanitarian intervention.[6]

In the six weeks following the violence associated with the disputed election in Kenya, a procession of high profile diplomats, including the UN Secretary General and the Chair of the African Union visited Nairobi in an attempt to get the parties to negotiate.[7] Given that China has such a large economic stake in Kenya, and that China's president had visited just before the

elections, the absence of an envoy from China was most noteworthy. This was probably not due to China's indifference to the situation but rather explained by their ideology, a manifestation of the so-called 'sovereignty fetish' effect.

China's trade with Kenya was around $706 millions in 2007[8] and with China to fall back on President Kibaki could maintain his position even in the face of impending economic sanctions from the West. This delayed, and ultimately undermined, UN-led negotiations for a compromise agreement.

The Chinese establishment has actively defended its ideological stance on the Kenyan election issue. An editorial in a state-controlled Beijing newspaper defended the Kenyan government by stating that: 'Western style democratic theory simply is not suited to the African situation, but it rather carries the root of disaster. The elections crisis is a prime example of this and there are many more across Africa. Western countries need to leave African states alone'.[9]

Beijing is prepared to offer aid and developmental funding to African states with 'no strings attached'.[10] By contrast Western donors continue to tie their aid to demands for political reform and the protection of human rights. The Chinese are avowedly non-judgmental about the political and humanitarian behaviour of the countries with which they choose to deal.

However, there appears to be limits to these 'no interference' and 'no strings attached' policies and Beijing is now seemingly prepared to apply some subtle pressure to its African 'partner' states to avoid criticism from the international community. At the centre of international pressure concerning the Darfur situation in the Sudan, Beijing was encouraged to use its political leverage on the Sudanese leadership to better manage a conflict that has reportedly seen the death of 400,000 people and the displacement of two millions.[11]

There is little doubt that China could exert considerable influence in this instance as it sells Sudan weapons, buys two thirds of its oil and has invested $6 billion in its industries.[12] Yet China initially resisted UN Security Council plans for sanctions and the imposition of UN peacekeepers. As a consequence it was subsequently accused by the Western press of 'bankrolling genocide'.[13] At first China continued to frustrate UN plans for Darfur by insisting that forces should only be deployed with the Government of Sudan's full consent. However, as international pressure grew, and the Beijing Olympics were being branded as the 'Genocide Games'[14] by the world's media, it finally sent an envoy to Sudan to help persuade the government to admit UN peacekeepers (including Chinese forces) and to initiate negotiations with the rebel forces. This event may mark a small but perhaps significant shift in Chinese 'no interference' policy in Africa.

Much of the previous strategic analysis of the Chinese presence in Africa has focused China's ever-deepening economic engagement and the implications for the West in terms of the obvious competition for Africa's rich energy and mineral resources. This may be too simplistic a parameter for investigating the phenomenon of the Chinese presence in Africa. As the world's biggest consumers of many commodities, China's leaders need a steady supply of these resources to continue with its economic 'miracle' and will undoubtedly compete with Western companies to access these commodities in the future. However, the consensus of opinion amongst economists is that since commodity markets are global, the risk of any one consumer cornering exclusive supplies or indeed securing them at a lower price is negligible, even one that is heavily state subsidized such as the majority of Chinese enterprises.[15]

An alternative, and perhaps more sophisticated, analysis would be to undertake an examination of China's ideological challenge in Africa. It is an ideological position that contrasts with and directly undermines the Western approach at a number of differing levels. It is an approach that is finding considerable popularity amongst African leaders and their elites.

History may well show that China's developmental rhetoric in Africa was nothing more than a cynical political manoeuvre to seek competitor advantage in the exploitation of African resources. Alternatively, it might just be that the model for the Chinese economic 'miracle' is exportable beyond Asia and it might prove to be the much-needed catalyst required to transform the development of impoverished countries across the African continent.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of the deepening ideological influence of China on the African continent, to discuss whether the Chinese political and economic development model could be made to work for African states and to examine what the possible implications are for the West and how these could best be mitigated.

A Brief History of China in Africa

In 2007 China's President Hu Jintao announced the creation of a new 'special economic zone' not on mainland China, but in the copper mining region of Zambia.[16] A combination of export subsidies, tax breaks and investment in roads, railways and shipping would be extended across this zone. The Zambian leader, President Mwanawasa, was obviously delighted with the injection of an estimated $800 million into his economy, announcing this would prove to be a transformational event in the development of his country.[17]

The Zambian 'special economic zone' was the first of five that the Chinese are intending to establish on the African continent. The second zone will be in Mauritius and will look to provide Chinese businesses with preferential access to the twenty African states that make up the Common Market of East and South Africa. The third zone will be a transportation hub, probably in the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.[18]

Over the years China's engagement with the African continent has gone through a number of distinct phases, ranging from periods of intense activity to periods of relative neglect. Almost immediately after the inauguration of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 the Communist regime sought to restore China's historical international position through an increasing involvement with various African states but this aspiration was tempered by China's own internal political and economic developmental challenges.[19] These early, and limited, African excursions were very much undertaken under the guidance of Stalin's Soviet Union but as Mao Tse-Tung's relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated, China developed its own 'three worlds' policy, ostensibly acting as the non–aligned 'champion' of the developing world. This was the first example of China using Africa as a terrain for ideological competition.[20]

At the Bandung conference in 1955, Mao's charismatic envoy, Chou En-Lai, wooed the African countries present promising China's 'solidarity' in their struggle for independence from their colonial masters.[21] The level of concrete support to African nations that actually materialized was relatively limited but the low key contribution of the 'barefoot doctors' and a variety of Chinese agricultural specialists left a positive impression on the future leaders of a number of nascent African countries. Yet very much as today, there had to be some tangible benefit from this relationship for the Chinese. In this instance Mao used the goodwill of African nations (with

their numerical presence and block-vote tendencies) to further his main foreign policy objective of removing the Republic of China from the coveted position as a member of the UN Security Council.[22]

The onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1968 saw the emergence of a more introspective China and as part of its self-imposed isolation, many Chinese projects with African 'comrades' were curtailed. A notable exception was the construction of the TanZam railway in 1975, linking Zambia with the port of Dar es Salaam (thereby freeing President Kaunda's Zambia from dependence on Rhodesia).

It is interesting to note that many of the characteristics of that impressive project still resonate in China's relationship with Africa today, namely, the use of high profile 'signature' projects to cement relationships, a responsiveness to the personal requests of the African elites, the use of state sponsorship in large 'loss leader' infrastructure construction projects and a near total reliance on imported Chinese labour.[23]

In the 1980s Mao's 'internationalist' strategies began to lose ground to the more immediate quest for China's internal modernization as advocated by the new and more pragmatic leader, Deng Xiaoping. Deng set China off on an internally focused path of gradual capitalist-orientated development, the so-called 'Yellow River Capitalism',[24] that was largely responsible for producing the phenomenal levels of economic growth witnessed in China over recent years.

During this same period Africa was experiencing ever greater social and economic challenges (which may well have been another exacerbating factor in China's temporary withdrawal from the African scene)[25]. The ending of the Cold War left many African leaders looking for alternative sources of political, diplomatic and military support to the Soviet Union. The loss of one of their primary sponsors had created a void that African leaders desperately needed to fill.

In 1989, the Chinese leadership was taken aback by the action of its own people in the events around Tiananmen Square and also greatly angered by the Western world's reaction. It prompted an intense debate within the Communist Party hierarchy as to which direction the country should take. Deng Xiaoping's faction eventually prevailed,[26] resulting in a recommitment to the existing quasi-capitalist model for the transformation of China's economy.

As part of this period of post-Tiananmen reflection there was also reaffirmation of a foreign policy which was well encapsulated in Deng's subsequent statement: 'China needs to observe calmly, secure our position. Hide our capabilities and bide our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, do not interfere, and never claim leadership'.[27]

Nevertheless, the events of Tiananmen Square left China looking for new allies in the world. In a climate of near-universal condemnation, a number of African leaders grasped the opportunity to rekindle their relationship with China. Leaders from both Angola and Namibia (themselves with less than perfect credentials in terms of democratisation and human rights) used this occasion to show their solidarity with China, publicly congratulating the Chinese Army on their actions in quelling the 'rebellion'.[28]

At the same time China's ruling Communist elite had realised that their very survival depended on ensuring continued high levels of economic growth. Just as Deng exulted 'to get rich is glorious',[29] the Chinese leadership began to appreciate that China's self-sufficiency in a host of vital areas such as energy, strategic minerals and forestry resources could no longer be maintained.

Even its Diaqing oilfields, which Mao had made a byword for China's industrial zeal[30] were now running dry.

This series of interlinked events resulted in a renewed interest in the African continent, building on the firm foundations China had established in earlier years. The African elites in turn, remembering a China that had been a staunch supporter in the struggle for independence from colonial influence and against the domination of the Cold War superpowers, welcomed them back with open arms and set the conditions for the relationship that exists today.[31]

At this early stage of renewal it would seem that China's interests in Africa were purely driven by economic considerations, it being such a rich source of all the commodities that they desperately desired. This cynical, commercially-driven approach perpetuated one of the consistent features of Chinese engagement in Africa in that it has shown little discrimination in its choice of friends. As a direct consequence some of China's more long term partners in Africa are leaders of so-called 'pariah' regimes, as labelled by the international community. One prominent, and topical, example is in Zimbabwe, where the Chinese government supported the ZANU-PF movement in its struggle against white rule in Rhodesia. It then provided President Mugabe with decades of political, military and technical support in a relationship that continues to the present day, irrespective of a huge weight of condemnation from the international community.

Developing an Understanding of Modern-Day China

It would be impossible to achieve a true appreciation of the complexities of China's multilayered involvement in Africa without attempting to gain an understanding of modern day Chinese political thinking, especially concerning their engagement with foreign powers and their cultures.

However, it is first worth conducting a brief examination of the Chinese economic 'miracle'. Deng Xiaoping used the term 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' to describe China's political and economic strategy post-Tiananmen Square.[32] As already stated Deng and the other Communist leaders appreciated that their very survival depended on maintaining high levels of economic growth and they were content to compromise some, but not all, of their ideological principles to achieve this aim: 'It does not matter if the cat is black or white. All that matters is that it catches mice.'[33]

As a consequence China's economic base transformed itself from a centrally-planned system that was largely closed to international trade to a more market-oriented economy that has a growing private sector and is a major player in the global economy. Reforms started with the phasing out of collectivised agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalisation of prices, fiscal decentralisation, increased autonomy for state enterprises, the foundation of a diversified banking system, the development of stock markets, the growth of the non-state sector, and the opening to foreign trade and investment.[34]

The restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Measured on purchasing power parity basis, China in 2007 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US (however it must be recognised that in per capita terms the country is still lower middle-income).[35]

An authoritative assessment of the Chinese economy in 2007[36] suggested that the Chinese government faced several challenges:

- To sustain adequate job growth for tens of millions of workers laid off from state-owned enterprises, migrants, and new entrants to the work force.

- To reduce corruption and other economic crimes.

- To contain environmental damage and social strife related to the economy's rapid transformation.

- To add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil as its double-digit economic growth increases demand.

- To secure access to mineral and other commodities to sustain its continued industrial growth.

Chinese energy officials in 2006 agreed to purchase five third generation nuclear reactors from Western companies.[37] However these will not be completed until 2018 at the earliest; in the interim it needs to secure reliable external sources of energy to feed its voracious industrial complex. Recent practice would suggest that it seems to have a distinct strategic preference for obtaining from other sources than the Middle East.[38]

As already stated there can be little doubt that economic necessity was the initial driver for China's renewal of its relations with African states and China's future energy requirements suggest that its engagement in Africa will need to continue, or even deepen, in the near to medium term. Nevertheless, within the context of the overall success of 'Yellow River capitalism', China regards western policy-makers' clumsy attempts to manage, or manipulate, its inexorable rise as largely irrelevant. What seems to be of more interest to Chinese strategists is how to manage the inevitable decline of the Western powers so as to best advance Chinese interests.[39] China believes that it is already the major global economic power and awaits the inevitable time when this economic power can be translated into global political power.[40] It would appear that China's aspiration for a global political 'reach' is being realized through considerable influence across many sub-Saharan African states.

China is beginning to appreciate that its model, promising the delivery of rapid economic growth whilst maintaining state control, is rapidly turning into a beacon of hope for developing countries in Africa and around the world.[41] It also appreciates that, almost by default, this is becoming a real challenge to long-established Anglo-Saxon fundamentals in developmental macro-economics.

China fully accepts that the sheer pace of its economic progress has brought about some unintended consequences but it now considers that it has provided an alternative route for development that no longer requires the choice between assimilation of the 'Washington consensus'[42] or international isolation. Instead, they are promoting a new model, the 'Beijing consensus'[43] where they believe that national governments can be masters of their own destinies rather than be subjected to the manipulations of international capital and to the values of the Western world. It understands that the Beijing consensus is an increasingly attractive proposition in a period of disillusionment with its Washington counterpart. China will be well aware of the reasons for the backlash against the Washington consensus: the legacy of the financial turbulence in the 1990s in for example Latin America and Russia[44] and the US's confrontationist foreign policy.

The two 'consensus' positions have obvious structure differences. Whereas the 'Washington Consensus' is against state economic intervention, favouring privatisation and economic

prudence, the Beijing version promotes the use of public money to drive innovation. It also seeks both to protect public property and promote state-sponsored economic grand projects such as the 'Special Economic Zones'. However, the most important, and most contentious, difference is Beijing's lack of an insistence on a liberal-style democratic system of government as a precursor to achieving economic prosperity and social progress.

China's leaders, and the intellectuals who advise them, encourage China to engage with the world but on its own terms, and not to be overwhelmed by the effects of globalisation. They see a globalised world that still maintains the role of national governments in setting their foreign policy agendas, controlling their economies and managing their politics. It is somewhat ironic that globalisation was supposed to bring about the universal victory for the West's liberal democratic model but instead China's model of state capitalism may ultimately prove to be the biggest beneficiary.[45]

Chinese preoccupation with sovereignty seems to be sincere and may be explained by review of its political history. For centuries Chinese emperors were obsessed with keeping China shielded from the barbarian hoards on the other side of the Great Wall, thus preserving national sovereignty and the power of their state. Today's mentality is not one protecting the country from incursions but one maintaining the internal stability of the Chinese state in the face of secessionist movements in Tibet[46] and the rise of a sizable Islamist faction in the Western provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu.[47] Promoting the Chinese view of sovereignty to the countries of Africa and elsewhere is a natural projection of this policy.

China looked on in horror at the series of popular uprisings calling for democracy in a number of states in the former Soviet Union. The Chinese leadership's reaction was typically straightforward; it decided that it did not want foreign funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) promoting democracy and human rights within its territory and severely curtailed their activities within China.[48] This approach has been largely carried over into their increasingly strained interrelations with African-based NGOs.[49]

The Nature of the Chinese Presence in Africa

A measure of the importance with which Africa is held in China is that senior Chinese officials have established the diplomatic precedent of beginning each year with a major official visit to Africa. In 2007 the Foreign Minster, Li Zhaoxing, undertook a seven nation tour of Africa. The year before President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao undertook an extended visit to more than a dozen African nations. This last round of visits was preceded by the issue of the first ever Chinese white paper on Sino-African relations, timed for the 50th anniversary of the start of China's diplomatic relationship with Africa.[50]

At these meetings the Chinese leaders have routinely emphasised their commonality with Africa and their desire to support economic transformation whilst not interfering with the internal affairs of the African states.[51] In a rather formulaic manner, they reiterate a desire for closer dialogue and cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping missions, medicine and health, and business partnerships.

Beyond the rhetoric of these numerous bilateral meetings it is the three Forums on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summits that have actually provided the framework for Chinese expansion in Africa. The most recent summit (Beijing 2006) was by far the most impressive in its

ambition. It is apparent that the Chinese leadership expended considerable effort in ensuring a successful outcome and, by all accounts, the African leaders enthusiastically embraced the vision set out in the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan. The Action Plan set out a target based plan for greater cooperation in several major policy areas, namely political and economic cooperation, cooperation in international affairs, and cooperation in social development. More specifically, the Action Plan committed China to a development fund of $5billion to be made available to support reputable Chinese companies investing in Africa. As an integral part of this plan China up-rated its direct aid to Africa by agreeing to cancel all existing loans due by end of 2005, both to heavily indebted poor countries and to those least developed countries that had strong diplomatic ties with China.[52] This was the only condition that China applied to the loan cancellation initiative.

The FOCAC Action Plan should be put into the backdrop of the considerable investment that China has already provided to African states. According to the World Bank[53] Beijing's Export-Import Bank has provided a total of $800 million in concessional loans for 55 projects in two dozen African countries. The World Bank study further estimates that as of the end of 2006 the total amount of Export–Import Bank (ExIm) loans is $12.5 billion, mainly concentrated in Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe.[54]

Of course there are many hard commercial interests at play amidst all this largesse. China's energy needs continue to rise and oil imports from Africa account for 30% of China's total external oil dependence. China's stated intent of 'developing and rationally exploiting Africa's natural resources'[55] is based on the knowledge that Africa has about 8% of the world's proven oil reserves. Since 2003 Angola has been the leading African supplier to China. Indeed in 2006 it accounted for over 50% of China's oil imports, becoming China's biggest external supplier.[56] New off-shore discoveries in the Gulf of Guinea are expected to provide one in every four new barrels that enter the marketplace over the next few years.[57] Chinese oil companies are competing successfully with their Western counterparts to secure extraction rights, and to construct pipelines and refineries in this region.

Indeed, a recurring pattern emerges once these impressive 'partnership' arrangements have been agreed in concept at the multilateral level and in detail at the bilateral level. China's state-controlled commodities companies move in and secure access to valuable resources that before had been under the influence of Western conglomerates. Riding on the wave of diplomatic goodwill their speed of penetration of the resource market is nothing short of remarkable.[58] On the back of this resource exploitation are a number of Chinese construction companies who, through their initial objective of facilitaing access for resource extraction, have then broadened their exposure in the African construction market by successfully competing for a range of civil projects, such as hospitals, schools and sporting stadia.

Beijing's activist industrial strategy uses public money with some foreign private investment to build large capital-intensive industries across Africa. This would appear to have impressed their African partners to the point where they are reversing some of their economic policies, especially the privatisation programmes demanded by the World Bank in the 1990s.[59] Like China they are beginning to believe that the large state owned enterprises can produce transformational public profits which can be used in the national interest. Rather more cynically, the ruling elites in Africa also probably appreciate that by retaining control of these enterprises they can prevent politically motivated entrepreneurs from challenging their position.

The remarkable rise in commodity prices in recent years has further empowering the leaders of resource rich African nations, and the election of independent-minded populist leaders has probably hardened their anti-Western stance. Ultimately, however, it is the stunning success of China's economy that has been the major attraction for African leaders.[60]

It is important to acknowledge that the Chinese penetration of African states is not all conducted in economic and commercial areas, but has additional educational aspects. China announced a commitment to make available 100 agricultural experts to set up demonstration sites and send 300 volunteers under the Chinese Young Volunteers Serving Africa[61] programme to support education and sports related subjects. On the broader educational front China has undertaken to train 15,000 African professionals in the next three years, build 100 rural schools and double the number of scholarships available for African students in Chinese universities. Beijing has also sought to expand educational partnerships with Africa universities by creating three Confucius Institutes in Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa.[62]

Another almost unnoticed aspect amidst all this high-level penetration is that many African nations are experiencing a wave of unprecedented immigration by individual Chinese citizens. Their reputation as hard-working, small scale entrepreneurs is manifest across the African continent as settlers set up corner stores, restaurants and laundry businesses.[63] Exporting Chinese workers to Africa to work in both large and small scale enterprises may be a solution to one of China's key economic challenges, that of rising unemployment at home.[64]

Finally, it is worth commenting that with its increasing personal wealth China is set to become one of the world's largest outbound tourist markets with a projection of 100 million Chinese travellers by 2020.[65] In 2005 only 110,000 Chinese tourists visited Africa[66] but China has now actively promoted Africa as a tourist destination, with two dozen African states designated as official tourist destinations.

The African Perspective

African nations have found the way that Beijing has maintained control of its own destiny as impressive as its economic growth. China is perceived to have freed itself from the influence of Western financial institutions and is confident enough to deal with, for example, US pressure to devalue its currency on its own terms and in its own time. In African countries that increasingly believe that they have merely exchanged their past colonial masters for the overbearing diktats of the IMF[67] this is a most attractive and enviable position which they would aspire to duplicate in their own countries. African nations may wish to welcome the world's investment and trade but not necessarily welcome Western values or be overwhelmed by the forces of globalization.

It would be fair to state that the predominant African view on China's considerable and deepening involvement in their continent remains very positive. However, on a deeper analysis of the African perspective it would appear that a number of tensions have surfaced in China-Africa relationship. These will need to be addressed if a mutually empowering and developmental relationship is going to prove sustainable in the longer term.

It has become apparent that specialist African knowledge and expertise in China's policy advisory community is lacking. As its relationship with Africa becomes more complex China will need a far more comprehensive understanding of African partner states. To date, few Chinese scholars or policy 'think tank' specialists have the opportunity for extended travel or research in Africa. This

has resulted in a situation where the Chinese seem to be 'blind' (or perhaps intentionally ignore) African public opinion on a range of important issues directly related to their presence. This lack of a deep understanding has resulted in some relatively ad hoc, and ultimately unsatisfactory, Chinese solutions to local African challenges.[68]

There are other, more practical, obstacles to further Chinese influence and integration. Unlike English and French, Chinese is not widely spoken in Africa. Chinese diplomats and entrepreneurs will need to master these languages in order to properly progress their ambitions with their African partners. The 2006 FOCAC Beijing Action Plan called for increased exchanges between African and Chinese media in order to help address this cultural and linguistic divide.[69]

Furthermore, it would seem the Chinese have a policy of avoiding any engagement with the many emergent NGOs in Africa.[70] African NGOs are now less constrained by restrictions on freedom of speech and have demonstrated their influence across a number of important policy areas such as the independence in the media, labour relations and trades unions, anti-corruption initiatives, championing human rights and supporting the empowerment of women. There is an awareness that China has failed to recognize, or at least respect, the considerable role these organizations play in policy making deliberations across a number of African states.

Probably the most serious manifestation of these cultural and linguistic misunderstandings occurred in the Zambian mining belt in 2005. Local Zambian employees complained about low wages and the lack of any safety protocols in the mine. There was obviously a communication problem with the Chinese managers, probably exacerbated by the fact that the local trade unions and NGOs had been banned from operating at the mine. Unofficial strikes and civil unrest resulted in the Chinese management shooting indiscriminately into a crowd of workers, killing five of them. The event sparked a national debate in Zambia on the conduct of the Chinese and the opposition candidate in the national election built his campaign around the anti-Chinese sentiment. He was relatively successful, winning 28% of the vote.[71]

It is noteworthy that the Chinese engagement in Africa has not taken into account the influence of religion in African society or made any effort to adopt an approach for developing relationships with religious leaders.[72] The African Catholic and Protestant communities are amongst the fastest growing Christian groups in the world and Africa's 300 million Muslims are organized into many complex and dynamic communities. Both the Muslims and the Christians have a strong voice on matters of African public debate. They provide an important range of social services, especially in matters of education and healthcare. Furthermore, these faith communities maintain extensive linkages with powerful counterpart organizations outside Africa. To date, China has largely chosen to ignore Africa's religiosity but it can not afford to do so for much longer without aliening this powerful force in African society.

The massive deterioration of China's own environment in terms of air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table has been a well publicised side effect of its remarkable economic progress.[73] Resource rich African nations are becoming increasingly sensitive to the environmentalist agenda and are beginning to place demands on Chinese conduct vis a vis the environment. In 2006, for example, the government of Gabon discovered that Sinopec, a Chinese state-owned oil firm, did not have the required environmental permits and ordered it to halt a big drilling project within a National Park.[74]

From the African perspective one of the most contentious, and most consistent, features of Chinese investment in Africa is the preferred use of Chinese labourers rather than local workers. Thousands of Chinese labourers and engineers were brought in to build Ethiopia's $300 million Takazee Dam, for example.[75] In Sudan, Chinese workers constructed an extensive oil pipeline and it is estimated that 74,000 Chinese remain in the country even after its completion. Chinese workers are also being used in Namibia, Zimbabwe and a host of other African states.[76] This has produced a ground-swell of resentment based on an appreciation that recruiting workers from China provides little long-term benefit to local people; 'You end up with a stadium, but there's no knock-on effect, no financial benefit. It all goes back to China. One of the biggest demands in Africa is for jobs because much of the continent is inhabited by young people. The Chinese are bringing in their own people, and they are paying lip-service to employing Africans.'[77]

It is paradoxical that just as the interests of China and their state sponsored businesses deepen in Africa, it is inevitable that Beijing's policies of 'no political strings attached' and absolute respect for sovereignty will be subjected to mounting pressure, not least from fellow Africans. A recent illustration of these tensions was when the African Union joined the international outcry about the humanitarian abuses in Sudan's Darfur region.[78]

Sooner or later China will also need to confront issues of endemic corruption, absence of law and order, and targeted attacks on private energy and other business sector interests. The 'no interference' maxim will come under further pressure in these scenarios and just one ill-advised Chinese incursion into the internal affairs of an African country may lose the Chinese for ever the moral high-ground amongst its African partners.

There is a growing and seemly genuine consensus in African states around a number of anti-corruption initiatives. The Chinese business community diaspora in Africa are considered to be high risk in respect to bribery and counterfeiting amongst other controversial practices.[79] The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has exerted some degree of influence with regard to this reputational risk for the state-controlled enterprises[80] at home but their influence is minimal over the large numbers of entrepreneur independents active in Africa. At the present time China makes no attempt to subject its mining industries to the inspection of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.[81] This is contrary to the policies of the African Union and other African regional economic groups.

It is axiomatic that many impoverished African nations would accept developmental aid from whatever source it came. To date, Chinese government departments have resisted sharing any detail on donor activity in Africa with other international and bilateral donors who are involved in African aid. China makes little attempt to avoid duplication and integrate its assistance with key organizations such as the IMF and World Bank.[82] However, there seems to be a growing appreciation in Africa, certainly from the African Union, that uncoordinated aid donations can be counterproductive in the longer term. This has led to a mounting concern that this may be undermining the overall debt relief strategies and there has been some, limited, African support for the US Treasury Department belief that 'China is a rogue creditor practicing opportunistic lending'.[83] Whilst not averse to bypassing the World Bank and IMF, most African nations would still have reservations about alienating the US administration.

Finally, there is a sense that African nations are increasingly confused, and to a degree frustrated, by the very nature of China's broad multilayered approach. At present it is far from clear which

body in the Chinese system has overall coordination of its Africa 'enterprise'. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commence, the energy and extractive conglomerates, the large-scale construction companies and other important business actors are all involved. As Chinese enterprises become more market-orientated and independently minded they will become primarily concerned with the profit-making aspects of their international operations. It would not be unreasonable for African leaders to postulate that this could well contradict China's broader transformational agenda in Africa and thereby revert to a more traditional exploitative neo-colonial model.

Where It Could All Go Wrong For China

History would suggest that there are a number of constraints which affected external bodies wishing to engage with Africa and that these constraints have proved remarkably resistant to change. There are some authorities who contend that, in spite of its dramatic appearance on the African scene, China will ultimately conform to this pattern of constraints rather than providing a new model for transformation and development.[84] If China remains permanently engaged as a major player in Africa (which is looking increasingly likely), it will need to go through the same difficult learning processes that other outside powers have experienced in the past and is likely to resort to similar solutions; ultimately making and repeating the same mistakes.[85]

Africa has proved to be a difficult space to both organize and to govern[86] and the difficulties which have affected both the colonial powers and modern African states will undoubtedly remain as an enduring back-drop to the Chinese presence. African states and societies have historically proved extremely intractable to grand projects of social and economic reform, far more so than China itself and other Asian states.[87]

It has been suggested that Africa's innate intractability originates from the enduring features of the continent's demography.[88] With populations unevenly spread over extremely large land areas, established territorial states have been difficult to maintain and models of social organization and governance appropriate to the management of densely populated countries, such as China, have given way to an environment where personal pre-eminence, genealogical relationships and religious authority have instead played a major role.

Africa's past exposure to global economics and international systems of government have often resulted in some form of exploitation of local populations normally under the premise of a racial superiority over the indigenous peoples. Despite the public rhetoric claiming that China and Africa are equal partners[89] of the 'developing world', this is not at all substantiated by the economic data. There is no member state of the African economy that can even begin to engage with China on equal financial terms, so in this respect China is no different to Africa's past colonial masters. African attempts to break out of primary production have been undermined by the low-cost, efficient Chinese industrial machine. An objective analysis beyond the transformational 'solidarity' rhetoric would suggest there is no plausible way in which Africa can duplicate the astonishing pace of economic development experienced by China. Any goodwill that Africa feels for its Chinese partners is likely to be undermined in the face of their continued economic structural divergences.

As a consequence of the enduring inequalities across a succession of colonial and post-colonial presences African leaders have pragmatically developed coping mechanisms of accommodation.

These mechanisms have been well documented by Bayart,[90] who uses the term 'extraversion' to describe African elites using the resources provided by external actors to consolidate their own authority. Bayart suggests that the reason the Chinese have been so welcomed by African states is not that they are a beacon of developmental hope but rather because they have followed this well-established pattern and filled the vacuum created by the end of the Cold War. Bayart believes that, rather than providing a developmental alternative to the governance doctrine of the 'Washington Agenda', China's role has been to merely reinforce the old system.[91]

One area of China's Africa strategy which will invariably come under further challenge is its position on the sacrosanct nature of sovereignty and the rejection of western-style 'conditionalities'. It may well be that China's position on this issue is genuine, given its own past experience but it is, nonetheless, a paradoxical doctrine for such a powerful state to adopt with its ever more complex relationships with a number of weak and failing states. In the Cold War era the 'sovereignty' argument was in practice a pretext for the powerful 'sponsor' maintaining control over its investment by unconditionally supporting the existing elite. It became apparent to the key actors in the Cold War, and it is likely to become evident to the latest arrivals in the African scene, that this is a high risk strategy in a number of respects. One obvious problem is that might lock China into a relationship with an unpopular leader, for example President Mugabe, whose eventual demise or removal results in the new regime automatically reversing its external partnerships.[92]

Another lesson is to be learnt from the potentially counterproductive impact of China's developing arms trade with Africa.[93] In failing African states weapons can be easily lost from the control of the state to become a strong destabilizing influence to the very regimes they were meant to sustain. It cannot be long before China realises that the short-term gain from its arms trade with African states could compromise the more important priority of maintaining secure lines of supply from the mineral and energy extraction sources to their port of dispatch to China.

This is then the very scenario where the 'Beijing consensus' becomes seriously challenged; a partner state that fails to ensure internal control in certain areas of its territory and China's vested interests, for example mining concerns, then being reduced to making deals with local actors, which may well be criminal or separatist groups looking to further undermine the state. The unenviable position of many Western oil companies in the Niger delta provides a good illustration of this difficult scenario.[94]

At a certain point in time the Chinese African footprint is likely to come under moral pressure due to the narrow nature of its engagement. In China's denial of the social justice agenda it runs the risk of presenting itself to an increasingly aware African population as a short-term interloper fixated only on economic profiteering. In its rush to expand its commercial footprint, China has re-established an era of 'prestige projects' which have little benefit to local people.[95] The Chinese state-owned Jiangxi International built $4 million worth of new housing in Ethiopia after a flood left hundreds destitute, but instead of accommodating the homeless, the blocks were used by military officials. This amoral approach was commented on by a Jiangxi manager in an interview with the Wall Street Journal; 'It was an internal political decision and so long as the Ethiopian officials are happy, our goal is fulfilled'.[96]

There are also international constraints associated with China's incursion into the African economic landscape. China has firmly placed itself between Africa's existing relationship with the West, in effect converting it into a triangular relationship. It has not empowered new diversification in the African exports market but rather diverted these goods away from Western economies.[97]

The ideological challenge to the West is closely linked to China's economic positioning. Logic would suggest that this positioning will, ultimately, be counter-productive for all parties concerned and that a more collaborative, multilateral approach would be to everybody's interest.

A More Collaborative Approach?

Like China, the West has started a new expansive phase of engagement with Africa. A number of White House initiatives have focused on Africa: the president's five year $15 billion AIDS Relief Plan,[98] the Malaria Initiative looking at trans-continent health gains and the Millennium Challenge Corporation which looks to provide financial rewards for states that are well governed and performing well economically. The EU is also attempting to increase its ideological influence in Africa with the eight interlinked objectives of the EU-Africa Partnership strategy.[99]

It would be reasonable to anticipate that developments in Africa, especially in the context of weak state institutions, their high levels of conflict and their economic fragility, will repeatedly test the West's and China's ideological positions. It will be important to take into account such differences of ideology, past mutual suspicions and misunderstandings and competitive tensions when looking to negate the risk of a West-China clash in Africa.[100]

However, there appears to be a movement both within the US and the EU for the adoption of a more collaborative 'China in Africa' agenda which seeks to manage potential hot spots and mitigate them preemptively. For the West, such an anticipatory approach will demand a greater openness to engage and involve China in multilateral forums, such as the UN, the EU-Africa Partnership and the Bretton Woods financial institutions. The diplomatic process of consensus building may well prove to be frustrating and lengthy but could provide long term benefits for all parties concerned.

This consensus could be formed by focusing on existing shared interests such as the control of infectious diseases and public health initiatives. There could also be a convergence of interests in the military sphere, in matters of conflict prevention, peacekeeping efforts and counterterrorism. Differences persist in respect to Darfur but in respect to Al Qaeda's presence in Africa there are no significant differences of opinion. A global counterterrorism strategy that involves the Horn of Africa programme and the Trans-Sahara counterterrorism initiative would be welcomed by China. The Chinese are also likely to welcome the US's plans for improved maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea as there are obvious benefits for Chinese energy companies. In return there are some signs from Beijing that China may be prepared to further increase its peacekeeping commitments in Africa.

An excellent catalyst to promote this new collaborative environment would be to offer formal membership, or a standing invitation for Chinese officials to attend the G8 summits, where they would be able to contribute to concerted planning on both debt relief and aid. In the past the Chinese leadership has been lukewarm about the prospect of joining the G8, believing that it would not serve their national interests.[101] It viewed the United Nations as the only international organisation with legitimacy. However, under the presidency of Hu Jintao there has been a perceptible change and China has been responding positively to invitations to G8 meetings.[102]

It is accepted that closer collaboration over debt sustainability is a key area in developing a meaningful tripartite relationship. China's debt relief has been challenged by a past President of the World Bank,[103] who expressed apprehension that many of Africa's poorest countries may

be incurring excessive new debt as the result of unconditional loans made by Chinese banks and that they may affect the long-term impact of the debt relief initiative concluded at the time of the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005. However, Beijing seems to be awakening to the long term negative implications of its lending strategy. African debt sustainability was high on the agenda at the inaugural session of the Strategic Economic Forum 2006[104] bilateral between US and Chinese policy makers. Washington's attempt to engage the Chinese, bilaterally and later multilaterally through the World Bank, should be the first step to ensuring that the African states reap the benefit of a properly coordinated debt relief programme, whilst avoiding a new build up of unsustainable debt.

One of the features of the China-Africa relationship which greatly frustrates the West is the perceived lack of transparency associated with China's business dealings.[105] A degree of greater transparency would be of undoubted long-term benefit to China and the objective could be achieved through China's enrolment into the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),[106] a NGO which aspires to a greater transparency in the affairs of the extractive industries. China's participation in EITI would assist a number of African countries in fighting corruption in their energy sectors. Furthermore, logic would suggest that if China wishes to develop more technological efficiency in its extractive industries it may be advised to join in business partnerships with established Western companies working in Africa. There are those who argue that Chinese companies may also need to explore the establishment of public-private partnerships[107] as a means of building more acceptance amongst the African communities in which they are operating and to help defuse any cultural tensions.

As part of its emerging peace and security challenges China will need to consult more on joint solutions, involving other key players such the African Union, the European Union and the US. The formation of the EU–Africa strategic partnership for Peace and Security and the US's new Africa Command will make this integration easier. Immediate attention needs to be focused on the worsening situation spreading inland from the Horn of Africa, from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan to Chad. It would be in China's interests to have a collaborative approach to address security challenges emerging in the Niger delta, Angola, Zimbabwe and the maritime security of energy and raw materials shipments off the east coast of Africa. It is reassuring to note that the role of Chinese military in African peacekeeping operations has increased to the point where it is now one of the largest contributors to the UN, with over 1,600 troops or policemen working in 11 missions across Africa.[108]

African health issues are a common concern between the international community and China. These issues would include combating HIV/AIDS, stepping up the fight against malaria and tuberculosis. A truly international approach is required to establish a pan-African prevention and management regime for outbreaks of avian influenza and other such deadly infectious illnesses. It is not unreasonable to foresee a number of mutually beneficial 'quick wins' to a more collaborative healthcare approach; Western and medical NGOs could provide valuable experience and advice to the Chinese building of medical centres and the Chinese could promote a greater uptake of their traditional medicines and anti-malaria drug, Artemisin.[109]

Addressing the perceived inequalities of trade between China and African nations requires a greater dialogue between China and the African regional economic blocs;[110] these include the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development

Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA).

To date Africa's growing civil society movements and organizations have been largely neglected by China.[111] Working with civil society organizations, both locally and internationally, will engender a greater understanding of domestic issues and serve as a sensitive barometer of the reactions to China's growing presence. Such interactions should include supporting environmental groups, constructive engagement with trades unions and employment safety organizations, religious groups, healthcare groups, human rights associations including womens' rights groups. One positive first step that China could take over the issue of societal governance is the unequivocal endorsement of the African Union's Charter on Human and People's Rights.[112]

Finally, the FOCAC summits are internationally recognized as powerful forums for driving the Chinese agenda with its African partners but it lacks a permanent secretariat to drive and coordinate its deepening partnership. This would provide an opportunity for African leaders to have more input into shaping the nature of Chinese assistance so to best meet African needs. China's interests would also be served by such a body in that it would help prioritise its ambitious assistance goals and help legitimize Chinese policies by more regular consultations with its African counterparts. Furthermore, a permanent secretariat provides third parties, such as donor NGOs or the World Bank an appropriate route by which to coordinate their efforts.[113]

Conclusions

The developmental needs of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa remain as acute as ever and are likely to remain a major challenge for the foreseeable future.[114] It is increasingly acknowledged that Western attempts at transformation have largely failed African nations and as a consequence Western influence in Africa is on the wane.[115]

Gone are the days when IMF officials compromised national sovereignty by telling African leaders how to run their countries by controlling lifelines to capital investment and access to foreign aid. With the advent of the Chinese, IMF officials struggle to attract the attention of even the poorest countries in Africa.[116] For the time being at least, the Beijing consensus is proving far more palatable to African leaders than its Washington counterpart.

Freedom House has used the term 'freedom stagnation' to explain the fact that the number of free countries in the world has not increased in the last few years (the report particularly highlights the disappointing performance of African nations).[117] This cannot all be due to China's influence, but China has certainly helped prove the 'sequencing myth' i.e. that political reform must come before economic progress.

If the universalisation of Western liberal democracy in Africa has indeed stalled due to China's influence it is probably only as a side effect of a hard-nosed commercial approach. There can be little doubt that the original raison d'etre for China's re-engagement with Africa was to exploit its resource wealth. However, the story of the next twenty years may be of a self-confident China reaching out and more obviously trying to shape African nations in its own image. China already aims to plant its own growth model into the African continent by building a series of industrial hubs, the special economic zones.

China's linear ascent to superpower status may not be assured, and indeed, it is possible that its model of state capitalism, open markets and a closed political system may not survive the

challenges ahead. However, whilst the Western world is preoccupied with attempting to mould China's ever deepening relationship with Africa, it is probable that in Beijing, a discussion is taking place about how China can best capitalise upon the declining influence of the West across Africa and use it to advance Chinese interests and values.

The success of the Beijing model of government intervention has raised the morale of authoritarian regimes across Africa. Logic dictates that Beijing would have little interest in actively promoting authoritarian regimes but, by adopting a neutral approach that puts its national interest first, it would appear that almost by default China is emerging as the champion of autocracy in Africa, creating new options for dictators who previously were dependent upon those who insisted on human rights progress.[118]

China's 'sovereign fetish' approach has been directly challenged by events the Sudan, Kenya and Zimbabwe and the evidence would suggest that China will not risk the full force of international criticism to support the regimes of its less than savoury African partners. The fact that it has shifted its tactics slightly does not mean that China will ever be a champion of free multi-party democracy and human rights. After all why would it wish to promote rights for Africans that its own citizens do not enjoy?

In spite of China's mantra of 'non-interference' in the affairs of sovereign states, pragmatism would suggest that China will, in the future, choose to act within the mandate of an international or regional consensus to deal with political or security crises within its partner African states, especially when its own interests are being compromised. The special relationship between China and Africa will probably continue and deepen, but logic would suggest that China will have to adapt to circumstances and modify its policies on Africa, in similar ways to previous external actors in Africa.

As a result if an international consensus emerges which is properly legitimised through, for example, the UN Security Council, one of the UN operating agencies, or the African Union, Beijing may well be less obstructive to interventions, but still keep a relatively low profile in the coercive process.

In this new competitive environment Western policy makers will need to adapt their own ideologies to introduce more flexibility if they want to protect and promote their liberal democratic ideals. There is a strong perception amongst African leaders that the western model of developmental transformation, with all the associated conditions, has largely failed them.[119]

It is suggested that a more multilateral collaborative approach is urgently required by all parties, with initial cooperation potentially focused on areas of mutual interest such as counterterrorism, healthcare and partnerships in the extractive industries. The danger is that with humanitarian crises, developmental tensions and security concerns, the West (the US in particular) will not allow China the time for its African policy to mature and move into this more collaborative phase. That would be an error which could result in potentially serious consequences for all the major actors.

None of this is intended to downplay the changes that China has brought about for some aspects of life on the African scene, especially in terms of the enormous advances in African infrastructure that China has instigated.[120] However, China is unlikely to fundamentally change or transform the quality of life of the vast majority of Africans without coordinating its developmental agenda with that of the broader international community.

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