



The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: Lessons Learnt for EU Security Sector Reform

Kseniya Oksamytna

Abstract

The European Union's mission to contribute to the training of the Somali Security Forces is the first military training mission launched by the EU. Deployed in April 2010, EUTM is nearing the end of its mandate: the training of the recruits will be completed by mid-July 2011. The mission was carried out in close coordination with the US, the African Union and the Ugandan army, and contributed to the EU's visibility in East Africa. However, given the overall feebleness of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its inability to implement reform, the political effectiveness of the mission is doubtful. In the current context, EUTM should not be extended beyond its original mandate. The EU and other donors should instead support more functional local administrations and make future assistance to the TFG contingent upon tangible progress towards completing transitional tasks, a normalization of political life, and restoring the provision of public services.

Keywords: *European Union / Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) / Somalia / Security sector reform (SSR) / European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia*

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by Kseniya Oksamytna*

1. The EU and Security Sector Reform

Over the past few years, the EU has emerged as a worldwide leader in security sector reform (SSR). The European Security Strategy (ESS) places SSR at the core of institution building.¹ It stems from the conviction that an efficient and transparent security sector - the police, military, and intelligence services - is “a crucial element for ensuring peace, democracy and socio-economic development”.² Out of 28 civilian and military missions in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, formerly ESDP) since 2003, three have been SSR missions: EUSEC RD Congo (ongoing since 2005), EUSSR Guinea-Bissau (launched in 2008 and closed in September 2010) and EUTM Somalia (initiated in April 2010 and expected to last until July 2011). Additionally, the EU has deployed six police training missions with SSR-related tasks: EUPOL Proxima (launched in 2003, succeeded by EUPAT FYR Macedonia in 2005 and completed in 2006), EUPOL Kinshasa (initiated in 2005, succeeded by EUPOL RD Congo in 2007 and expected to last until September 2011), EUPOL COPPS Palestine (launched in 2006 and extended until December 2011), and EUPOL Afghanistan (since mid-June 2007)³.

All three SSR missions have taken place in Africa. The EU endorses the principle of African ownership of solutions to the continent’s problems. Therefore, rather than expanding its military presence there, the Union seeks to empower local and regional actors to cope with the challenges Africa faces. Security sector reform is the cornerstone of this endeavor.

EUSEC RD Congo assists Congolese authorities with reconstructing the country’s security sector by establishing a transparent chain of payments, creating biometrical census of security personnel, reintegrating former insurgents into regular armed forces, and combating violence against women. EUSEC RD Congo works alongside another EU mission, EUPOL, aimed at fostering the reform of the civilian police. EUSSR

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¹ Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

² Council of the European Union, *EU mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Factsheet)*, September 2010,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100930%20FACTSHEET%20EU%20SSR%20Guinea-Bissau%20-%20version%2012_EN.pdf.

³ For an overview and classification of CSDP missions, please see CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership (CSDP MAP), *Mission Chart*, <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart>.

Guinea-Bissau, terminated in September 2010 in the aftermath of an unconstitutional military coup, supported local authorities in elaborating a national SSR strategy and legislating on matters related to the army, police and public prosecution.

Both EUSEC RD Congo and EUSSR Guinea-Bissau are civilian SSR missions. EUTM is the first EU military training mission. It is aimed at strengthening the Somali security forces and takes place in Uganda due to the dire security conditions in Somalia itself. In Uganda, the Somali security forces had already been trained by the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) on behalf of the African Union Military Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). While the UPDF continues to provide basic training for recruits, the EU complements these efforts by offering specialized modules in communications, medical evacuation, countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED), fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA), and the humanitarian aspects of conflict management.⁴

EUTM comprises two consecutive training periods of six months. The second training period which started on 14 February 2011 is coming to an end in mid-July 2011. At present, the EU is debating a possible extension of EUTM or the launching of a further Uganda-based training mission. The decision will depend "on the political context, satisfactory progress on a command and control structure, and on the evaluation of the reintegration of the first batch of trainees".⁵

At this juncture, it is critical to carefully examine whether the EUTM been successful so far in fulfilling its mandate. What are the lessons the EU can learn from EUTM for its future SSR missions in Somalia, Africa and elsewhere? On the grounds of the EUTM experience, which challenges are SSR missions in Africa likely to face and what are the best ways to respond to them?

2. The EU in Somalia

Somalia has been without a functioning government since the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorial regime in 1991. Interventions by the US and the UN in the mid-1990s did not succeed in reestablishing order and came to an end amid numerous casualties among international troops. The country has fragmented into regional blocks that loosely reflect the territorial distribution of the major clans which dominate the country's social, political and economic life.⁶ Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and created its own system of public administration; it is now the most well-governed area in the country.⁷ The coastal province of Puntland announced its autonomous status in

⁴ Council of the European Union, "EUTM Somalia: contributing to the stability of Somalia", in *CSDP Newsletter*, No. 10 (Summer 2010), p. 19,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/online_100818_CSDP_Newsletter_hw.pdf.

⁵ Council of the European Union, *3076th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Conclusions on Somalia*, Brussels, 21 March 2011,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/120072.pdf.

⁶ European Commission, *Somalia: Joint Strategy Paper for the period 2008-2013*, 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_so_csp10_en.pdf.

⁷ Alison K. Eggers, "When Is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland", in *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (December 2007), p. 211-222, <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=iclr>.

1998 and is trying to negotiate an attractive power-sharing agreement with the central government.⁸

In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed, with a mandate to prepare grounds for a federal Somalia and draft a new constitution. The TFG commands virtually no support inside the country and has made little progress towards either its unification or stabilization. In 2006, the more popular Islamic Courts Union (ICU) gained control of the Mogadishu area and restored a semblance of order. However, amid fears about the spread of militant Islam, the ICU was ousted by US-backed Ethiopian forces. The AU deployed a peacekeeping mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. In 2008, the so-called Djibouti peace process was launched by the UN to reconcile moderate Islamists from the ICU with the TFG. However, the radical wing of the ICU, al Shaabab, refused to cooperate with the TFG and continued its struggle against the transitional government. It is linked to Al Qaeda and has ambitions to create an Islamic state in Somalia and perhaps the entire Horn of Africa.⁹ Al Shaabab dominates most of south-central Somalia and a large portion of the capital. The northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland are also outside the TFG's de facto rule. The TFG controls only a few districts of Mogadishu and relies heavily on AMISOM for that.

Fragmentation and lawlessness has led to another development that has brought Somalia to the top of the international news agenda: maritime piracy. Groups of well-armed Somalis have kidnapped merchant ships passing through the Gulf of Aden, a narrow waterway that carries 20 percent of global trade, demanding enormous ransoms. Several multinational flotillas have been deployed to interdict these pirate attacks, including the EU's first-ever maritime operation, EUNAVFOR Somalia.

It is universally recognized that the roots of maritime piracy lie in instability ashore. To assist the TFG in providing basic security to its citizens and thus discouraging piracy and other illegal activities, the EU has launched EUTM. The training mission is a part of the EU's much-emphasized "comprehensive approach" to Somalia. Firstly, the EU is Somalia's largest donor: its Special Support Programme for the years 2008 through 2013 has a budget of EUR 215.4 million and finances projects in the areas of good governance, education, food security, conflict prevention, gender, environment, and HIV/AIDS.¹⁰ Secondly, AMISOM's existence is contingent upon the Union's support: peacekeepers' salaries, medical costs, housing, fuel, and communication equipment are all covered by EU and member states' contributions.¹¹ EUTM has even been

⁸ Jort Hemmer and Ana Uzelac, *When the Centre Doesn't Hold: Imaging a Different Somalia*, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', March 2011 (CRU Policy Brief, 16), http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110321_cru_policybrief_jhemmer.pdf.

⁹ Axadle International Monitoring, *Somali government has decided to postpone national elections until 2012*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.axadle.com/africa/somali-government-has-decided-to-postpone-national-elections-until-2012.html#axzz1OvIcqlYg>.

¹⁰ European Commission Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid, *EC Assistance to Somalia*, January 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/documents/dev_ec_assistance_somalia.pdf.

¹¹ European Commission Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid, *AMISOM*, updated 2 December 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peace-support-operations/amisom_en.htm.

characterized as the EU's attempt to "ease AMISOM's training burden and free resources for its counter-insurgency efforts".¹²

In addition to the immediate goal of propping up the TFG through the training of its army, EUTM has set out for itself several other aims. For example, it is expected to enhance the visibility of the EU as a security provider in Africa and globally. EUTM Mission Commander, Colonel Gonzalez Elul of Spain, has noted with satisfaction that the EUTM has already contributed to the EU's "high visibility, not just in Uganda, but in the whole of Eastern Africa".¹³ One way of raising the EU's profile is by demonstrating its ability to cooperate effectively with external partners in the conduct of a single mission. In Africa, the EU's main partner is the African Union (AU) which has been training the TFG's security forces since the summer of 2009.¹⁴ Also, AMISOM is ultimately responsible for reintegrating EUTM-trained soldiers into the Somali Defence Forces: following the EU's training at the Bihanga camp in Uganda, recruits undergo two to three months of reintegration training by AMISOM at the Jazira facility in Mogadishu.¹⁵

As for other partners, the US supports EUTM in three ways: by participating in the selection of trainees, paying their salaries as well as providing airlift and individual equipment. This is the third time the US engages directly with a CSDP mission.¹⁶ Moreover, the EU sees EUTM as an opportune chance for building a stronger partnership with the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), the most significant military actor in East Africa. The UPDF supplies weapons and ammunition for EUTM recruits.¹⁷ Uganda is envisaged to continue training the Somali security forces on behalf of AMISOM after the EU's mission has ended. Hence, EU personnel focus "both the Ugandan trainers and the Somali trainees".¹⁸

The EU conceives of its crisis management activities as a way not only to bring stability to war-torn societies but also to transmit European values. The EUTM's curriculum includes modules on human rights, humanitarian law, gender issues, and protection of civilians in conflicts, particularly women and children. In addition, EUTM operates a quota scheme for female recruits: out of 35 trainees selected to attend the junior officers' training based on their performance during the basic training, at least one should be a woman. Those selected for junior officers' training receive instruction in leadership, platoon-level tactics, and collective weapons.¹⁹

¹² International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Transitional Government on Life Support*, Nairobi and Brussels ICG, 21 February 2011 (Africa Report, 170), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/170-somalia-the-transitional-government-on-life-support.aspx>.

¹³ Council of the European Union, "Medal parade in EUTM Somalia mission headquarters", in *News in brief*, 10 March 2011, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=1944>.

¹⁴ Voice of America, "African Union Training Somalis to Counter Insurgency", in *Voice of America*, 16 July 2009, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-16-voa29-68819967.html>.

¹⁵ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Transitional Government on Life Support*, *cit.*

¹⁶ The other EU missions in which the US has participated are EULEX Kosovo and EUSEC DR Congo.

¹⁷ Juan Pita, "EUTM Somalia", in *Impetus. Bulletin of the EU Military Staff*, No. 10 (Autumn/Winter 2010), p. 8-9, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Final-Impetus-N10.pdf>.

¹⁸ Council of the European Union, "Interview with Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez Elul, Mission Commander of EUTM Somalia", in *CSDP Newsletter*, No. 10 (Summer 2010), p. 20-21, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/online_100818_CSDP_Newsletter_hw.pdf.

¹⁹ Juan Pita, "EUTM Somalia", *cit.*

Based on this background, what can be said about EUTM's actual performance? The following section critically evaluates whether EUTM has been successful in achieving the goals laid out for the mission.

3. An assessment of EUTM

While criteria for systematic evaluation of EU external action are still underdeveloped, three categories of factors are usually taken into account when assessing CSDP missions: political, operational and symbolic.²⁰ The first category of factors refers to the mission's advancement of the EU's political agenda in a certain country. The second category helps to evaluate how rapidly a mission was deployed and how successful its staff were in responding to the day-to-day challenges. The third category describes whether the mission enhanced the visibility of the EU as a security provider. Given the EU's commitment to multilateralism and support for the UN and regional organizations like the AU, the Union aims at raising its profile through, *inter alia*, inter-organizational cooperation. Such cooperation is viewed as a means to constructively multiply the EU's impact and thus visibility. This assessment of EUTM follows a similar approach and analyzes the political context, practical considerations, and the mission's contribution to the visibility of the EU through multilateral cooperation.

a) *The Political Context*

Firstly, it is necessary to evaluate the appropriateness of the EU's choice to support the TFG through the training of its military. The mandate of the TFG was set to expire in August 2011, yet it failed to complete any of the transitional tasks it set out for itself. In February 2011, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) voted to extend its own term by an additional three years; the decision came under heavy criticism from both the TFG and the international community. However, in April 2011, the TFG unilaterally postponed elections until 2012, citing insecurity as the main reason. It was challenged as unconstitutional by the TFP, and a political deadlock ensued. After a prolonged stalemate, a UN-sponsored deal, the so-called Kampala Accord, was signed by the president and speaker of parliament, extending the mandates of both institutions for one year. One of the deal's conditions was the resignation of a popular prime minister, Abdullahi Mohamed, who managed to improve the situation in Somalia by appointing technocrats to his cabinet, restoring the provision of some public services and ensuring the regular payment of soldiers and civil servants' salaries.²¹ However, he is perceived as unwanted competition by the president and the speaker of parliament; in addition,

²⁰ Maria Raquel Freire *et al.*, *Mapping Research on European Peace Missions*, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November 2010, http://www.ces.uc.pt/myces/UserFiles/livros/609_Mapping_Research_on_European_Peace_Missions.pdf.

²¹ Michael Onyiego, "Somali PM Defies Kampala Accord, Refuses to Step Down", in *Voice of America*, 15 June 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Somali-PM-Defies-Kampala-Accord-Refuses-to-Step-Down---123913229.html>.

he comes from the Ogadeni clan, and the TFG had been under pressure from Puntland to replace him with an ethnic Darod.²²

This is the clearest example of the TFG's inefficiency and weakness. The TFG is dominated by internal bickering, clan politics, and logrolling. The International Crisis Group (ICG) names it the most corrupt among all transitional governments in Somalia and argues that its officials "are not fit to hold public office and should be forced to resign, isolated and sanctioned".²³ Still more unsettling is the fact that the TFG is unwilling to share power with other political factions, civil society groups and regional administrations. This is inopportune at a time when ordinary Somalis have grown increasingly distrustful of any central government, given the latter's bad record of oppression and predation.

In this political environment, the EU has to decide whether to continue propping up the TFG (through a prolongation of EUTM or the launch of a similar training mission) or to look for another mode of engagement in Somalia, possibly by diverting its resources to more functional sub-national entities. TFG troops are sadly notorious for their human rights violations, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and a desertion rate estimated by some sources to be as high as 80 percent, with recruits defecting to join al Shabaab militia.²⁴ The Somali security sector is in such a despicable condition that some commentators go as far as to liken EUTM with the mere arming of one party in the civil war because there "is no military structure in Somalia in which the soldiers could be integrated".²⁵ The ICG reports that there is "resistance to creation of an effective chain of command, rational military formations and even a credible troop roster".²⁶

The West has continued to support the TFG because of its perceived role of fighting radical Islamists. However, many donors have already shifted attention and funding not only to Somaliland and Puntland, but also to local administrations in south-central Somalia, regardless of whether they are affiliated with the TFG or not.²⁷ The EU is also moving in this direction: the EU Council of Ministers has stated that it is "actively considering increasing its financial assistance to support central, regional and local level administrations".²⁸ Yet while the decision to channel development aid through local rather than central authorities is relatively uncontroversial (and indeed should be applauded in the light of the TFG's ineffectiveness), the dilemma is whether to carry on with the efforts to build a national army through the TFG. Most local administrations

²² AFP, *Somali PM quits under Kampala accord*, 19 June 2001, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hQc6VcYgVbP4dBeANJgQnWes68CA?docId=CN.G.105975a399e42bed5c5d964daff21f4a.381>.

²³ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Transitional Government on Life Support*, cit.

²⁴ Max Delany, "EU trains army to fight in Somalia", in *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 June 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0618/EU-trains-army-to-fight-in-Somalia>.

²⁵ Sabine Lösing, "Security or Armament? The European-African Military Cooperation", paper presented at the *Rosa Luxemburg Week*, Dakar, 5-11 February 2011, <http://www.rosalux.sn/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/translation-final.pdf>.

²⁶ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Transitional Government on Life Support*, cit.

²⁷ Jort Hemmer and Ana Uzelac, *When the Centre Doesn't Hold: Imaging a Different Somalia*, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', March 2011 (CRU Policy Brief, 16), http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20110321_cru_policybrief_jhemmer.pdf.

²⁸ Council of the European Union, *3076th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Conclusions on Somalia*, cit.

have their own rudimentary armed forces, yet training and arming them presents the danger of fragmentation and does not constitute a feasible option at the moment.

b) Practical Considerations

Apart from operating in a highly volatile political environment, EUTM has had to grapple with a range of technical difficulties. These difficulties, as well as the EU's responses to them, are outlined below.

Force Generation. Many EU missions have been criticized for being underfunded and understaffed due to the lack of commitment on the part of member states. Both the number and quality of personnel have been enduring concerns.²⁹ Lengthy delays in deployment are also frequent. On the contrary, EUTM was launched on schedule, and the size of the mission is approximately 150 EU personnel (compared with only eight European staff seconded to EU SSR Guinea-Bissau and approximately 50 working for EUSEC RD Congo). Fifteen EU members participate in the mission; each training module is led by either one or two of them, reflecting national armies' differentiated expertise. As a result, EUTM has been referred to as "superior in quality and variety" compared with previous training efforts by France, Uganda, Djibouti and Sudan.³⁰ The willingness of member states to second staff for the mission might be associated with the fact that, unlike most other military missions, EUTM does not involve combat tasks but is "just training in a positive, permissive, favorable environment".³¹ This has helped EUTM to fulfill its narrowly defined mandate, i.e. to provide high-quality, specialized training to Somali security forces: while there are doubts about the mission's appropriateness in political terms and AMISOM's ability to integrate recruits, the training itself has been effective in equipping Somalis for the combat tasks they are likely to face.

Moreover, some EU missions have been accused of advancing national rather than European interests using CSDP as a tool. EU missions in Africa led by former colonial powers are a case in point. For example, Operation Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA are believed to be essentially French endeavors.³² As for EUTM, Spain pushed for the deployment of the mission and served as the main troops contributor. Here, it is Spain's position as a maritime trading nation rather than its colonial history that has motivated Madrid to take the lead in countering Somali piracy by actively participating in both EU NAVFOR and EUTM. While some analysts deplore the lack of a "common" element in a CSDP mission initiated by a particular member state, the reality is that some countries are always more active than others in shaping the EU's foreign policy agenda on a certain issue. The important thing is that member states choose to act through CSDP instruments, rather than unilaterally, in dealing with crises like Somalia and that it does not hamper the potential effectiveness of the mission due to their specific political baggage in a particular state.

²⁹ EUPOL Proxima, EUPOL Afghanistan and EUFOR RD Congo have been criticized for inadequate staff quality. See Maria Raquel Freire *et al.*, *Mapping Research on European Peace Missions*, *cit.*

³⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Transitional Government on Life Support*, *cit.*

³¹ Council of the European Union, "Interview with Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez Elul ...", *cit.*

³² Maria Raquel Freire *et al.*, *Mapping Research on European Peace Missions*, *cit.*

Selection of Trainees. The selection of Somali trainees has been a challenge for at least three reasons. Firstly, there are apprehensions that they can switch sides and use the skills acquired through the training to advance al Shabaab's insurgency. Establishing a reliable chain of payment is crucial in this respect. Yet the ICG argues that it is insufficient: training the Somali army "can only be meaningful and ultimately successful within a larger political plan and in concert with a TFG leadership that is able to imbue its soldiery with a sense of loyalty, patriotism and direction".³³

Secondly, the EU had to take care not to recruit underage soldiers, since there is no reliable way to ascertain the identity of most Somalis. Also, a clean human rights record was considered as a precondition for the selection.³⁴ Finally, EUTM paid special attention to ensure fair representation of the multitude of Somali clans within each intake of trainees. In order to find candidates who meet these criteria, potential recruits were suggested by the TFG and then checked by the US, AMISOM, the EU, and the UPDF.³⁵ Still, the ICG estimates that the selection process was skewed in favor of certain clans. When the mission began in the spring of 2010, quarrels erupted amongst Somali trainees of diverging clan affiliations, which led to a short interruption of EUTM's activities.³⁶ In addition, since candidates were initially chosen by the TFG, local authorities proved reluctant to send their troops for training. The fact that the final phase takes place in Mogadishu generated suspicions that it would create a partisan force loyal to the president rather than a cross-clan national army.³⁷ While it was impossible to avoid the TFG's involvement in the selection process because of the need for ownership of the SSR, greater representativeness could have been achieved by consulting at least one more local actor (e.g. a civil society organization) or an actor with an in-depth understanding of Somali realities (e.g. an international humanitarian NGO with a significant history of in-country presence).

Intercultural and Gender Issues. When the training commenced, recruits complained about language problems, inadequate nutrition, and the insensitivity and rough practices of the Ugandan trainers. The dissatisfaction grew and almost led to a mutiny. In order to design a culturally sensitive training programme, EUTM hired several ethnic Somali servicemen from Kenya as translators and mentors. Recruits' concerns were addressed, bolstering the soldiers' morale.³⁸ This was a visionary decision on the part of the EU and its international partners: unlike the selection process, the training takes local idiosyncrasies into account.

As for women's issues, EUTM's gender adviser, a Finnish female captain, is in charge of modules on human rights, especially regarding protecting the rights of women and children in conflict. The presence of European and Ugandan female instructors is also a positive contribution (5 out of 27 Ugandan trainers are women). Female trainees are fully integrated with their male counterparts, however their number is low: during the

³³ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Transitional Government on Life Support*, *cit.*

³⁴ Juan Pita, "EUTM Somalia", *cit.*

³⁵ Sebastian Bloching and Giji Gya, "CSDP and EU mission updates, July 2010", in *European Security Review*, No. 50 (July 2010), http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_545_esr50-csdp-update.pdf.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Transitional Government on Life Support*, *cit.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

first intake, they were 12 out of 900.³⁹ Thus, while the EU shows continuous commitment to mainstreaming gender into its SSR activities, the situation on the ground sometimes precludes women from participating in the peace process to the same extent as men.

c) *EU Visibility*

The EU has expressed satisfaction with its ongoing cooperation with key international partners in the framework of EUTM. It should be noted that the EU relies on the US for the critical assets which it lacks, such as strategic airlift. This transatlantic cooperation compares positively with the international response to the Darfur crisis when NATO and the EU were conducting two separate yet duplicate airlift operations in support of the AU, denounced by critics as a “beauty contest”.⁴⁰ Yet the process of cooperation has not been without difficulties. Given the variety of actors involved in the selection process, there has been a delay in accepting the trainees. Colonel Elul attributes this problem to the difficult situation in Somalia and the novelty of the cooperative arrangement rather than the deficiencies of the EU or any of its partners.⁴¹ Despite the initial delay, the process went smoothly, with each partner fulfilling its responsibilities in good faith. An effective division of labour was established between the EU, the AU, and the US.

4. Moving Forward: Lessons Learned from EUTM

Although the situation in Somalia is sadly unique, the EU civilian and military staff is likely to encounter similar challenges in their SSR activities elsewhere in Africa. Several recommendations can be made on the basis of the above evaluation of EUTM.

a) *The Political Context*

If the EU and other donors eventually withdraw their support for the TFG due to its lack of progress towards completing transitional tasks, the money and effort spent on training the TFG forces would be effectively lost. Without international aid, the TFG would not be able to pay soldiers' salaries, and most of them would defect to join the insurgency. Like in the case of previous CSDP operations, “a trend is the EU's underestimation of the political context, which crucially affects the success or failure of a mission”.⁴² This provides an important lesson regarding the timing and sequencing of SSR activities: such efforts should be initiated in countries which have succeeded in achieving a degree of internal peace and stability and where governments have

³⁹ Sebastian Bloching and Giji Gya, “CSDP and EU mission updates, July 2010”, *cit.*

⁴⁰ Leo Michel and Zoe Hunter (eds), *NATO and the European Union: Improving Practical Cooperation*. A Transatlantic Workshop ... Washington, DC March 20-21, 2006, Washington, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 2006, <http://dodreports.com/ada522171>.

⁴¹ Council of the European Union, “Interview with Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez Elul ...”, *cit.*

⁴² Maria Raquel Freire et al., *Mapping Research on European Peace Missions*, *cit.*, p. 47. See Ana E. Juncos, “Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Eva Gross et al., *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007, <http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1368>.

already demonstrated a willingness and ability to implement daring reforms in the interests of their populations.

Somalia has been designated as a pilot country for the implementation of the 2007 OECD principles for international engagement in fragile states.⁴³ These principles suggests that the political context should be taken as a starting point of any international engagement, which should, in turn, work towards strengthening existing local structures rather than creating new parallel systems.⁴⁴ The TFG is obviously far from being a functioning, indigenous Somali institution; therefore, international donors should switch to supporting local administrations capable of providing a measure of order and some public services. Any future support for the TFG should be contingent upon tangible progress.

A comprehensive SSR strategy is equally necessary, with due attention being paid to civilian oversight of the military and a sustainable chain of payment: training and arming security forces before these are in place can have undesirable repercussions. For example, in the Somali case, Amnesty International has recommended including modules on arms management into the training in order to prevent weapons from falling into insurgents' hands.⁴⁵ While missing from the EUTM's curriculum, such aspects should be included into any future training missions in fragile states.

b) Practical Considerations

Member states' commitment to the timely deployment of qualified personnel can be seen as an important factor contributing to EUTM's successes. Therefore, the EU's and its member states' political will and desire to engage are necessary for SSR missions to achieve their objectives. Inclusion of humanitarian and gender issues into the EUTM's curriculum is consistent with the EU's role as a normative power, which values SSR activities for their transformative potential; such issues should be mainstreamed into all SSR policies. Designing culturally sensitive training by consulting Somali ex-servicemen was another visionary decision. EU staff should seek to develop awareness of the host country's culture and try to incorporate local expertise into its SSR programmes, perhaps by leveraging links with civil society.

c) EU Visibility

Hybridization of peacekeeping, i.e. the participation of different international, regional, and non-governmental organizations in one peace mission, has become a significant feature of contemporary international relations. Pioneering new ways to work together with the US, the UN, and the AU is perhaps the most tangible achievement of EUTM. The EU should encourage burden-sharing for future missions as well, especially when external partners can provide assets which the EU itself lacks (like strategic airlift in the

⁴³ European Commission, *Somalia: Joint Strategy Paper for the period 2008-2013*, cit.

⁴⁴ OECD, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations*, April 2007, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Amnesty International, *Somalia: International Military and Policing Assistance should be reviewed*, London, Amnesty International Publications, 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR52/001/2010/en/86225a8e-1db3-427c-a2ca-03adb632e87/afr520012010en.pdf>.

EUTM's case). However, given the initial delay in receiving EUTM's trainees, international partners should improve their planning and coordination, with contingency plans being paid due attention to.

Beyond doubt, EUTM has contributed to the development of the EU's external actorness. The EU has demonstrated its ability to engage in a new type of post-conflict state-building, namely military training. An effective division of labour has emerged between the EU, the AU, the US, and the Ugandan army. However, given the current political context, EUTM should not be extended beyond its original mandate. In Somalia, the EU should continue to provide humanitarian assistance, offer political mediation, and support functioning local authorities. Future SSR initiatives should follow rather than precede the establishment of a government of national unity willing and able to share power with Somalia's regional administrations, civil society movements, and clans. The TFG's internal squabbling and squandering of foreign aid has delegitimized it in the eyes of both the international community and the Somali population. Assistance to the TFG should come with strict conditions attached and withdrawn if those are not met. The most important lesson EUTM offers for the EU in terms of future SSR activities, especially in Africa, is that such missions should be launched in countries where hostilities have ceased, where some functioning security sectors already exist, and where the prospects for government buy-in of the reform process are realistic.

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