EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations
Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration

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1. The European Security Strategy underlined the importance of the United Nations in international relations, and recalled that the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It also underscored that "strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority". This commitment will be consistent with other priorities set out in the European Security Strategy.

2. The signature of a "Joint Declaration on EU-UN co-operation in Crisis Management" in September 2003, building on the success of Operation Artemis, has identified tracks to implement the longstanding EU commitment to support the UN in crisis management. A joint consultative mechanism (also known as "the Steering Committee) was established at working level and regular meetings between staffs from both organisations have taken place. Work on the implementation of the Joint Declaration was given further impetus by the meeting in January 2004 between the EU Presidency Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Brian Cowen, and SG Kofi Annan. One of the tracks identified in the Joint Declaration under the heading "planning" aims at identifying the modalities under which the EU could provide military capabilities in support of the UN. Work on a complementary document on civilian aspects of EU-UN co-operation in crisis management operations is being taken forward in the appropriate instances of the Council.

3. At this stage, two main options can be identified:
   - provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation, or,
   - an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN.

PROVISION BY MEMBER STATES OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

4. The decision to provide military capabilities to a UN operation is a national responsibility. Military capabilities are in no way "frozen" for ESDP purposes, and it remains a national decision to assign these forces to the UN.
5. A complementary role could be envisaged for the EU in the form of a "clearing house process" among Member States. The "clearing house process" aims at creating a framework by which Member States could, on a voluntary basis, exchange information on their contributions to a given UN operation and, if they so decide, co-ordinate these national contributions. This would be of particular relevance for what is called by the UN the "enabling capabilities". These are scarce, expensive capabilities requiring a very high level of expertise for their deployment and maintenance (field hospitals, ELINT or SIGINT assets....). Such a "clearing house process" would not, nor is intended to, modify modalities for national decision making and national participation in a UN operation, or affect existing bilateral arrangements with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Such participation will remain a national decision and will be managed in accordance with UN Force Generation procedures. The EU Permanent Missions to the UN in New York could play a role in this regard.

6. The "clearing house process" would be activated at the request of one Member State willing to contribute to a UN operation and desiring to share this commitment with other Member States. Following the receipt of requests by Member States from the UNSG, the SG/HR could also propose the activation of the "clearing house process" to Member States.

AN EU OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF THE UN

7. The other main option is the launching and conduct of an EU operation in support of the UN and under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. Different modalities could be envisaged. The EU could conduct operations under a UN mandate, either as a stand alone operation, as could be the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or take responsibility for a specific component within the structure of a UN mission (so called "modular approach"). In this case, an EU component would operate under political control and strategic direction of the EU. These models will have to be assessed from an EU perspective, building on existing and past experience.

8. Special attention should be given to operations calling for a rapid response. In that specific case, the rapid response capability of the EU would bring a particular added value. The UN Secretariat has expressed the view that two broad categories of rapid response operation in
support of the UN could be identified, namely the "bridging model" and the "stand by model". Work underway on the "Battle Group Concept" and implementation of the "Headline Goal 2010" document will have to be taken into account in further consideration of these and other possible options for EU/UN co-operation. Experience gained by the Member States concerned from the use of Standby High readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) would also be useful in assessing the modalities for EU support to the UN in military crisis management.

**Bridging model**

9. The "bridging model" aims at providing the UN with time to mount a new operation or to reorganise an existing one (e.g. Artemis case). Such a model calls for rapid deployment of appropriate military capabilities and agreed duration and end-state.

10. The exit strategy from such an operation is the arrival, in time, of a UN force able to take over from the EU force deployed and tailored to the mission. The deployment of an EU force should therefore be complemented by a range of other activities aimed at facilitating the deployment of the UN force:

   - Political efforts in the UN framework to make sure the UN force would have the appropriate mandate and capabilities and be deployed in time, making full use of Art 19 of the TEU.

   - Technical assistance and exchange of information with the UN and the UN troop contributing countries to facilitate the deployment of the UN forces and the hand-over of responsibilities between the EU and UN forces.

11. Early deployment of UN troops before the actual hand over would facilitate a smooth transition by getting the UN force used to the tactical situation on the ground, and familiar with the course of action of the EU forces. It would also allow for the transfer of intelligence. Discontinuity between the two operations would therefore be avoided, depriving hostile forces of the opportunity to exploit such a discontinuity.

12. The UN Secretariat has underlined that the transition between the two operations would be facilitated further by the "re-hatting" (participation in a UN operation of forces previously committed to an EU operation) of EU forces, or by maintaining after the end of the EU
operation a number of enabling capabilities. In practical terms, the “re-hatting” would be a national decision to commit the forces to the UN after the end of the EU operation. Maintaining enabling capabilities could be done the same way (national decision to commit assets to the UN operation) or through an EU operation (under political control and strategic direction of the EU) in support of the UN operation.

Stand By Model
13. The "stand by model" as described by the UN Secretariat, would consist of an "over the horizon reserve" or an "extraction force" provided by the EU in support of a UN operation. This would be of particular relevance in an African context. Such a type of operation calls for immediate reaction and is therefore very demanding. It would involve complicated coordination between the EU and the UN, and is limited in its usability. Such an operation could carry considerable associated risks. This model raises a number of issues that need to be analysed. The work on the Battle Group Concept will inform this analysis, with a view to ensuring consistency and coherence.

14. The issues that require further detailed analysis in ascertaining the feasibility of this model are inter alia involvement of the EU in the planning of the UN operation, command and control, situation awareness and transfer of authority arrangements.

WORKING TOGETHER
15. An in-depth knowledge of each others’ procedures, concept and structures would facilitate cooperation between the two organisations in military crisis management. This could be achieved inter alia through further enhancing the network already established between the two staffs that is taking forward work on the implementation of the Joint Declaration. Cross participation in exercises and training activities, exchange of information on respective operational standards and concepts, temporary and short duration exchanges of officials, and reinforcement of the expertise of the respective liaison offices in the field of crisis management, would greatly contribute to the development of that mutual knowledge in both organisations. This should be complemented by a possible supporting work by the Institute for Security Studies and other relevant policy study bodies.
16. The prospects for building on existing co-operation between the EU Satellite Centre and relevant UN agencies should also be explored, including the possibility of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations. Finally work on modalities to further enhance intelligence sharing between the two organisations should be pursued.

WAY AHEAD

• Development of proposals for the establishment of a "clearing house process", in accordance with paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. This work will focus on the provision of the "enabling capabilities", to be defined in association with the UN. Permanent Missions to the UN could play an important role in it.

• For the "bridging model": development with the UN of modalities to ensure the proper level of co-ordination with DPKO, with the UN Troop Contributing Countries and, when appropriate, with the UN mission headquarters on the ground as set out in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12. The aim would be to facilitate the deployment of the EU force, to ensure adequate co-operation with the UN during the EU operation, and to guarantee a smooth and timely hand-over.

• For the "stand by model": Analysis of the implications of such a model, as outlined in paras , 13 and 14.

• Development of proposals for the further development of relations between the two Staffs, in particular modalities for the reinforcement of respective liaison offices with Crisis Management expertise.

• Development of a more co-ordinated approach by Member States for the provision of support to third countries participating in a UN operation with a view to enhancing the EU contribution in that regard

• Development of a Memorandum of Understanding for the use by the UN of EU Satellite Centre products.

• Work on possibilities for developing supporting work by the Institute for Security Studies and other policy study supporting bodies.

• Work on developing modalities for further strengthening intelligence sharing between the two organisations.

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