

Renouncing the Rebels: Local and Regional Dimensions of Chad–Sudan Rapprochement

By Jérôme Tubiana



Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken



HM Government



NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

AN	Alliance nationale
ANCD	Alliance nationale pour le changement démocratique
ANR	Alliance nationale de résistance
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CDR	Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire
CFA	Chadian franc
CNT	Concorde nationale du Tchad (or Convention nationale du Tchad)
CPJP	Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
FPRN	Front populaire pour la renaissance nationale
FSR	Front pour le salut de la république
FUC	Front uni pour le changement
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally displaced person
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JEM-CL	JEM-Collective Leadership
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army

MDJT	Mouvement pour le démocratie et la justice au Tchad
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in CAR and Chad
MPRD	Mouvement pour la paix, la reconstruction et le développement
MPS	Mouvement patriotique du salut
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIF	National Islamic Front
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
NMRD	National Movement for Reform and Development
RFC	Rassemblement pour les forces du changement
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade (launcher)
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SFDA	Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLA-AW	Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur
SLA-MM	Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UFCD	Union des forces pour le changement et la démocratie
UFDD	Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement
UFDD-F	UFDD-Fondamentale
UFR	Union des forces de la résistance
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
USD	US dollar

Executive summary

From 2003 to 2009 the governments of Chad and Sudan engaged in a fierce proxy war waged through the provision of material support to each other's armed opposition forces. Chad's support for the Darfur armed opposition was motivated by key individuals in the innermost circle of the government, exacerbated by direct family ties with Darfur rebel leaders. Sudan's conviction that Chad's backing would remain as long as President Idriss Déby remained in power provided the impulse to support Chadian rebel efforts to depose him. The war culminated in armed opposition attacks on N'Djaména in April 2006 and February 2008 and an assault on Khartoum in May 2008.

By May 2009, however, frustration and fatigue were affecting both regimes' willingness to continue the conflict. Proxy raids were repeatedly falling short of their objectives, partly as a result of the failure of each regime to unite its neighbour's opposition groups into efficient coalitions. At the same time, major domestic political processes were looming in each country—notably the referendum on South Sudanese self-determination in January 2011 and presidential elections in Chad, now scheduled for May 2011.

These and a number of other factors led Khartoum and N'Djaména to begin a serious rapprochement starting in late 2009. Khartoum began to move Chadian opposition forces away from the border. Chad reciprocated by demanding the withdrawal of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) from its territory and strongly pressuring the Darfur Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to sign a peace agreement, before expelling the movement and its chairman, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, from Chadian territory in May 2010.

Bolder steps followed. Déby visited Khartoum in February 2010 and Sudanese president Omar al Bashir flew to N'Djaména in July. That same month, Sudan ordered four main Chadian armed opposition group leaders to leave its territory, sending them to Qatar. Since then, several hundred Chadian opposition forces, most from marginal splinter groups, have given up fighting and



returned home, some on flights chartered by the governments of Chad and Sudan, others by their own means. In October 2010 some 2,000 Chadian rebel combatants—most of those remaining in Darfur—agreed to be disarmed by the Sudanese government. By mid-2010 it appeared that both countries had almost completely repudiated their proxy conflict.

This *Working Paper* reviews the specific circumstances of the recent Chad–Sudan rapprochement and the series of events that took place to bring this extremely divisive six-year conflict to a close. The study focuses specifically on the effects of the rapprochement on the armed opposition movements and the internal crises facing each country. Among its key findings are the following:

- The rapprochement has unquestionably increased stability in the region. The loss of external support to both Chadian and Darfur rebel groups reduces the immediate threat of armed attack in either country.
- Despite this increased stability, there are no political solutions to either the Chadian political crisis or the Darfur rebellion in sight, providing a combustible mixture that may once again ignite into collective violence.
- Government reshuffles in both countries paved the way for the rapprochement. Key personnel who supported regime change in the other country were moved from their posts and individuals supporting the new policy of cooperation were appointed.
- Domestic factors—most notably electoral processes—in both countries were crucial to turning the two governments towards rapprochement. The costs associated with the proxy conflict, made more significant by fluctuating oil prices, were also important.
- The inability of the Chadian and Darfur rebels to unite contributed to their failure to secure external political support and the eventual cessation of material support from Sudan and Chad, respectively.
- One of the main achievements of the *détente* is the weakening of the Chadian armed opposition to approximately 1,000 fighters as of early 2011. The main groups are now more divided than ever, having lost their sole backer, the Sudanese government.
- While Chad has expelled JEM from its territory, the group has not been disarmed and is managing to survive by expanding its areas of operations and recruitment—and could pose challenges to future relations between North and South Sudan. JEM’s primary external supporter is now Tripoli (at least until the February–March 2011 turmoil in Libya).
- The immediate impact of the rapprochement is not all positive: it has left dissatisfied combatants from both countries in the most unstable areas of the region, namely the Sudan–Chad–Central African Republic (CAR) tri-

border area and the contested border between North and South Sudan, thereby adding to existing instability.

This *Working Paper* is based on field research undertaken in Chad (N'Djaména and south-eastern Chad) in November 2010. The author also used material from previous original research and additional missions in Chad (April–May 2009 and March–April 2010), Sudan (Khartoum, Darfur, and South Sudan, December 2009, June 2010, and December 2010), and Qatar (July and December 2010), in addition to interviews in France. This report is based primarily on a wide range of interviews with government officials, Chadian and Sudanese armed opposition leaders and combatants, international diplomats, mediators, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It was researched and written before author Jérôme Tubiana joined the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Sudan as a ‘regional expert’. 📄

I. Origins and development of the Chad–Sudan proxy war

Cross-border ethnicities and dynamics

The current leaders of Sudan and Chad, Presidents Omar al Bashir and Idriss Déby, respectively, are two officers who took power by force at about the same time—in 1989 and 1990, respectively. Déby overthrew his former mentor, Hissène Habré, in 1990 from a base in North Darfur, where he had fled in 1989 after the persecution of his ethnic group, the Beri. Déby was supported there by the Sudanese Beri and Bashir, who had recently seized power in Sudan. More widely known by their Arabic names of Zaghawa and Bideyat,¹ the Beri straddle the Chad–Darfur border (Tubiana, 2008b). Crucially, Déby and a number of the main Darfur rebel leaders are Beri. After Déby became president, civilian, military, and economic power in Chad was consolidated within the Beri community, and particularly within his own sub-group, the Bideyat, and his own clan, the Kolyala (Marchal, 2006).

Prior to 2005 Déby was a loyal ally of the regime in Sudan. He consistently refused to supply aid to Sudanese rebels—whether from Darfur or South Sudan—despite requests to do so since the early 1990s (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, p. 20). But from 2003 he was unable to stop the two armed opposition movements in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and JEM, from using Chad as a rear base, recruiting combatants even among the Chadian Republican Guard (a pillar of his regime) and garnering support among the Chadian Beri, including those close to the government. In March and April 2003 Déby sent Chadian troops to fight the SLA and JEM inside Darfur. Not surprisingly, however, Beri soldiers from Chad showed little inclination to fight against other Beri and gave the Darfur opposition forces advance warning of the attack. In return, in particular since 2005, Bashir started to support Chadian armed opposition groups seeking rear bases and arms in Khartoum.

The dynamics of the eventual proxy war were thus deeply intertwined with long-standing cross-border ethnic relations and conflicts (Fontrier, 2009, p. 86). The Chad–Sudan border closely mirrors the older (less precise) border between the Darfur and Ouaddaï sultanates, a pre-colonial boundary that colonial powers generally respected. Darfur and Ouaddaï were imperial powers in conflict with each other, both trying to capture areas and populations through force or the offer of protection to tribal leaders. Communities in the ‘buffer zone’ between the two were often able to choose whether to seek refuge in either side or trade on their position as guardians of a key interstice.

After Chad’s independence from France in 1960, the border continued to provide opportunities to some groups. The Beri were one of a few ethnic groups bisected by the border. The group’s cross-border presence underpins its dynamism in trade and its military strength, partly explaining how its armed opposition movements had no problem crossing the international border to create safe rear bases in both Chad and Sudan (Tubiana, 2008b). The new border also affected the area immediately south of Dar Zaghawa. The Tama sultanate became Chadian whereas the Gimir sultanate went to Sudan. Further south, Dar Masalit was split, with the larger part going to Sudan. The small Sinyar sultanate, near the CAR border, was also divided between Chad and Sudan.

Other ethnic groups were not divided by the border, but had migrated across it long before, as they sought new pastures (Arabs, Pula) or fled the collapse of old kingdoms (Dajo, Tunjur). These include the large Rizeigat, Missiriya, and Hemat (or Ta’aisha) Arab sub-groups, and non-Arab groups such as the Dajo, Tunjur, Borgo (Ouaddaïans), Tama, Bornu, and Pula (Fellata). Of particular importance in Sudan is the migration from the West of *fuqara* (Muslim scholars), and more recently of labourers attracted by the Gezira cotton schemes between the two Niles, most of them from the Bornu and other West African communities, and the Chadian Borgo and Tama. During the colonial period, entire communities continued to cross between countries to avoid taxes or escape attempts by the colonial powers to replace various traditional chiefs. Notable examples are the Arab Rizeigat (Mahamid and Mahariya), Zaghawa, and Bideyat leaders, including Idriss Déby’s own family and their followers who left Chad for Darfur.

The role of ethnicity in determining support

Both Chad and Sudan were acutely aware of ethnicity when deciding which rebel groups to back. Chad mostly supported Beri factions, whereas Sudan was reluctant to trust any trans-border groups, including the Chadian Beri who were rebelling against Déby (see Box 1). As proof of Khartoum's caution, only the last of the three successive Chadian rebel coalition leaders it chose, the Bideyat Timan Erdimi, belongs to a trans-border ethnic group. His predecessors, the Tama Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim and the Goran Mahamat Nouri, belong to groups with limited influence in Sudan. It is more surprising that Khartoum distrusted the Chadian Arabs, who were of the same tribes as most of the Khartoum-backed 'janjaweed' proxies in Darfur. The mistrust of Arab groups might have been aggravated after 2006 when Darfur Arabs began to turn against Khartoum, encouraged by Chadian Arabs allied with Déby.

A second pattern shared by both Khartoum and N'Djamena was their partisan involvement in local ethnic conflicts. In Chad, the regime provides immunity to Déby's Beri kin, who are involved in local conflicts in the rural areas and in student violence—which increasingly involves firearms—in cities.² Rebel political leaders capitalized on the lack of neutrality of the Chadian and Sudanese governments, using it to transform local grievances into a broader political agenda by invoking experiences of 'discrimination' or 'marginalization'.

If rebel speeches on either side of the border sounded similar at times, the inequalities they denounced were not. Modelling their speech on the rhetoric of John Garang, the historic leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Darfur rebels denounced the marginalization of their region (and all Sudanese peripheries) by the 'riverine' elites of the northern Nile Valley ever since independence (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, p. 23). Chadian rebels also railed against marginalization, but identified it as tribal, with Déby's tribal clan having concentrated power and wealth since 1990. Although many individual Beri feel excluded from government, this tribalist, anti-Beri discourse resonated with most Chadian rebel groups—except, of course, the Beri faction led by Timan Erdimi.

Many members of both Chadian and Darfur rebel groups had been recruited in local and tribal conflicts, which together with other factors deepened the impression among international mediators that neither armed uprising had a political programme. But in fact the Chadian rebels were quite different from

their Darfur counterparts: many were former government ministers who were well educated and politically experienced. As a result, negotiations with them were far easier even though they received less publicity. But the international community had a negative opinion of Chadian rebels, mainly because the unpopular Sudanese government backed them, but also because there had been little direct diplomatic contact with them.

Déby skilfully played on Sudan's pariah status to secure international support. He depicted the rebels as 'mercenaries', with an agenda to Arabize and Islamicize Chad. The international community, receptive to his hyperbole, preferred to focus on Darfur rather than on Chad's internal conflict, viewing Déby as the lesser evil when compared with Bashir.

Understandably, both Chadian and Sudanese authorities have played up their portrayal of regional factors in order to minimize their own responsibilities. Recently, Chadian general Oki Dagache, Déby's representative to MINURCAT, explained that the displacement of some 180,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Chad since 2005 was 'not due to an inter-community conflict, but to the "janjaweed", the militias that come from another territory'.³

Too often, the international community—in particular France and the EU—repeated the simplistic argument that Chad's problems were all 'cross-border' (Tubiana, 2009). This misguided analysis may have served the interests of Chad and France, but it paralyzed the international community's ability to respond correctly to either the trans-border context or internal Chadian and CAR dynamics. A number of conflicts connect at the borders between Chad, Sudan, and CAR, and cross-border elements are of varying importance to each of them.

With the violence in Chad incorrectly perceived as a consequence of the war in Darfur, it was thought the solution lay in resolving the conflict between Chad and Sudan. Events leading to and following the February 2008 rebel raid on N'Djaména proved that if in the regional 'system of conflicts' (Marchal, 2006) one war could fuel the other, a ceasefire in one area did not necessarily help bring peace elsewhere. It also proved once again how inept international interventions can be when based on a simplified understanding of a complex situation. Local actors were able to escape international pressures and at worst were able to manipulate the international community for their own benefit, often at the cost of peace.

Box 1 **Cross-border ethnicities and multiple allegiances**

Cross-border ethnic connections have deeply influenced the relations between Chadian and Darfur armed opposition groups. Ethnicity—like ideology and plain opportunism—drives some groups and leaders to adopt multiple or ‘fluid’ allegiances (Debos, 2008). The paths of two opposition players illustrate this phenomenon.

Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim, a Chadian Tama and captain in the Chadian army, began his career in 1994 with the Chadian armed opposition group *Alliance nationale de résistance* (ANR). He later fought for the Sudanese government in both South Sudan and Darfur, before becoming briefly, in 2005–06, the leader of the *Front uni pour le changement* (FUC), the main Khartoum-backed Chadian armed opposition coalition (Tubiana, 2008a, p. 29).

Adam Mahamat Musa ‘Bazooka’ also served in the ANR. He was one of several Masalit from the border area who moved from the ANR to another Chadian rebel group, the *Front populaire pour la renaissance nationale* (FPRN), in 2001. Founded too early to benefit from Khartoum’s support, the group allied itself with the SPLA in South Sudan. When in 2003 Khartoum’s counter-insurgency campaign targeted the Sudanese part of Dar Masalit, the Masalit members of the FPRN elected to fight alongside the Darfur rebels of the SLA. ‘Bazooka’ was made deputy of SLA first chief of staff Khamis Abdallah Abakar.⁴ Others also joined the SLA, where they were backed by the very Chadian government they had set out to overthrow (Tubiana, 2008a, pp. 42–43). ‘Bazooka’ was killed in West Darfur in a joint operation of Sudanese and Chadian forces (De Waal, 2008).

The Darfur rebellion drew heavily on Chadian and Sudanese Beri from the Chadian army. Many Sudanese Beri had joined Idriss Déby’s *Mouvement patriotique du salut* (MPS) when it was based in Sudan in 1989–90. After successfully overthrowing Hissène Habré’s regime in N’Djaména, some remained in Chad and joined the Chadian armed forces. Of these, a number later joined the Darfur rebellion, where some became powerful military chiefs, including Abdallah Abbakar ‘Juli mye’ (‘black string’), Hassan Abdelkarim ‘Peugeot’, and Adam Bakhit (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, pp. 22, 49). JEM benefits from similar links: JEM Bideyat leader Suleiman Jamous, formerly of the SLA, claims to be related to more than 50 officers in the Chadian army.⁵

Cross-border ethnic ties have also been influential in dealings with the Sudanese government’s proxy militias, the ‘janjaweed’. For example, in 2006–08 the Governments of Sudan and Chad and different Darfur armed opposition factions competed for the support of Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo ‘Hemeti’ of the Awlad Mansour branch of the Rizeigat Mahariya tribe. In May 2006 N’Djaména used the influence of its defence minister, Bichara Issa Jadalla, himself an Awlad Mansour, to get ‘Hemeti’ to sign a non-aggression agreement in Chad with JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim (Tubiana, 2008a, pp. 45–46; 2010b, p. 218).

Although ethnic connections and migrations are fundamental to understanding cross-border dynamics, it is also important to examine the underlying reasons for combatants’ mobility. These typically include the inability of ‘professional’ armed opposition leaders to leave the field of combat; the inability of Chadian politicians to achieve significant power without going through the armed opposition movements; and the failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in Chad.

Deteriorating relations

At the start of the rebellion and counter-insurgency in Darfur, the dominant view within the Sudanese government, championed by the Sudanese security services, was that Déby was motivated by his ethnic ties to support Darfur Beri rebels, but did not involve himself personally, leaving his family and the innermost Beri circle to do the work. The Sudanese government now appears to accept Déby's own position, which is that he did not support the Darfur rebels until 2005, but had been unable to prevent his family members and officers from doing so for two years before that.

The Sudanese Beri had played a vital role in bringing Déby to power in 1990. It was Beri community leaders who had in 1989 helped put Déby in contact with the new regime of the National Islamic Front (NIF)—his key backer along with Libya and France. Among those Beri leaders was General Tijani Adam Taher, a close friend of President Bashir and one of the main leaders of the early NIF, as well as future Darfur rebel leaders such as Suleiman Jamous. But during the 1990s Sudanese Beri grew disappointed by their perceived marginalization by the NIF and by Chad's failure to deliver the support they expected as a reward for having supported Déby.

Some of the Sudanese Beri elite remained on the Sudanese government's side, however. They included Taher, who remained a minister until 2005, and Hassan Mohammad Abdallah Borgo, National Congress Party (NCP) director for African affairs and a cousin of Mahamat Ismaïl Chaïbo, the head of the Chadian security services. The Chadian regime counted on those Beri in Khartoum to help diffuse Sudan's growing distrust. Thus Chaïbo and Borgo cooperated to weaken JEM by creating a splinter group, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, pp. 60–62). But they progressively lost influence in Khartoum as they were suspected of playing a double game in favour of N'Djaména, in particular after JEM's raid on Khartoum in May 2008.

Despite tension created by Chad's support of the Darfur rebellion, Chad–Sudan relations remained good until 2005. But in mid-2005 Khartoum changed tack and started to welcome all Chadian opponents, armed or not, coming from Chad or in exile. The real turning point in bilateral relations came in December 2005, when a Chadian rebel force arriving from neighbouring West

Darfur and wholly backed by the Sudanese government attacked the Chadian border town of Adré. In response, Déby increased support to the Darfur rebels and made it a policy he supported personally.

The February 2008 attack on N'Djaména

Two separate attacks on N'Djaména marked the climactic points of the proxy war. The first, in April 2006, was the work of the FUC, led by Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim (Tubiana, 2008a, pp. 32–36). The second assault constituted the most serious threat to the Chadian government. A coalition of forces attacked between 28 January and 3 February 2008, just prior to the deployment of the 3,700-strong EU Force (EUFOR), the EU peacekeeping force. President Déby managed to repel both challenges with support from France and from some of the Darfur rebel movements, especially JEM.

The Chadian rebels' failure to create an integrated force going into the February 2008 attack also contributed to their failure. Three distinct groups made up the attacking force: the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement (UFDD), led by the Goran Mahamat Nouri; its Arab breakaway UFDD-Fondamentale (UFDD-F) led by Abdul Wahid About Makaye; and Timan Erdimi's Rassemblement pour les forces du changement (RFC). A fourth group, the recently formed Front pour le salut de la république (FSR), led by Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, did not join the main offensive, but profited from the distraction to mount a lightning attack on the border town of Adré with some 250 combatants.⁶

After a first victory over the Chadian army at Massaguett, near the capital, the rebels' disunity began to undermine their progress. As victory looked increasingly possible, discussions began over how to share power in the new government. Timan and Makaye acknowledged the superior strength of Nouri's UFDD and agreed to cede him the presidency. The two remaining movements would settle for the main ministries: defence and interior for the UFDD-F; finance and foreign affairs for the RFC. To appease other opposition forces in Chad and the international community, the rest of the government would go to the unarmed opposition. Nouri rejected the arrangement, however, with the result that UFDD-F and RFC troops stopped fighting.⁷

While the rebels' internal quarrelling slowed the offensive, it also helped the French decide whom they would support. Sensing the prospect of a rebel victory, the French manoeuvred to protect their key interest: a continuing beneficial relationship with Chad.⁸ While the French had been communicating with the rebels in the frenetic last days of the attack—and reportedly offered not to intervene if the rebels could unite⁹—they eventually swung behind the government, concluding that if the rebels were unable to fight together for a greater cause, they would not be able to govern effectively. Thus the defence attaché of the French embassy was heavily involved, as he had been in 2006, in organizing the defence of the Chadian presidency and the capital. His efforts earned him the title of 'real chief of staff' of the Chadian army (Marchal, 2009). France also obtained Libyan help to transport tank ammunition to the Chadian army (Enough Project, 2009, p. 5; Lanz, 2011).

Only a few weeks after the raid, in March 2008, Chad and Sudan signed a non-aggression pact, similar in substance to many former agreements, at the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Dakar, Senegal. It was their sixth attempt at reconciliation in five years. But the accord was quickly brought to an end, this time by JEM's spectacular raid on Khartoum in May. The attack mirrored so closely the February 2008 attack on N'Djaména that in Sudan it was interpreted as an act of retaliation by Chad. 📌

II. From proxy war to rapprochement

Chadian support for JEM prior to its May 2008 assault on Khartoum

The February 2008 raid on N'Djaména marked a turning point in relations between the Chadian regime and the Darfur armed opposition. Up to that point President Déby and his inner circle had agreed to back the Darfur rebels, but were divided over which factions to support. There were three main currents:

- JEM enjoyed the support of the Zaghawa Kobé (the sub-group from which most JEM troops and leaders then hailed), who were close to Déby and included the president's half-brother, Timan Déby (sultan of the Bideyat Bilia and a cousin of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim), and his cousin, General Abderahim Bahar Mahamat Itno (Chadian army chief of staff until April 2009).
- Idriss Déby and most of his Bideyat inner circle, including his other half-brother, Daosa (one of the men in charge of the Darfur file in N'Djaména) distrusted JEM and the Islamist background of many of its leaders. They supported the Darfur Beri splinter factions from the secular SLA, to whom they had kin connections, notably to SLA-Unity's Bideyat leader Suleiman Jamous (although he had been an Islamist as well) and his co-leader and rival Dr. Sharif Harir, a Zaghawa Wogi.
- Mahamat Ismaïl Chaïbo, the head of the Chadian security services and a Zaghawa Kabka, was also at odds with JEM. He had largely contributed to the creation of the NMRD, a Zaghawa Kabka dissident branch of JEM led by Jibril Abdelkarim 'Tek'. Chaïbo later joined members of the Kobé elite in supporting the more important JEM dissident faction, JEM-Collective Leadership (JEM-CL), founded in mid-2007 by JEM vice-president and secretary-general Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, JEM chief of staff Abdallah Banda, and JEM deputy chief negotiator in Abuja Tajeddin Bashir Nyam. The NMRD and JEM-CL were, thanks to Chadian support, the two most powerful rebel factions in the United Revolutionary Front coalition. Both competed with JEM

for support from Darfur refugee camps in Chad, in particular the Zaghawa camp of Am Nabak, south of Hiriba. The split was notably based on internal rivalries within the Zaghawa Kobé, with smaller clans such as the Borso (Abu Garda and Nyam's clan) and the Wera (Banda's clan) progressively challenging Khalil's 'Angu' royal clan.¹⁰

The level of animosity among JEM splinter groups remained so great that although President Déby managed to obtain Khalil's signature on a 'framework agreement' with Khartoum in February 2010, he was not able to reconcile the JEM chairman with Abu Garda and Jibril 'Tek'.¹¹ In the following month the dissidents joined the new Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), with JEM-CL leaders gaining prominent positions—secretary-general for Abu Garda and secretary for peace negotiations for Nyam.

JEM's response to the February 2008 offensive changed things dramatically. According to a JEM leader, General Mahamat Ali Abdallah—a fellow Chadian Zaghawa Kobé and a long-standing pillar of the Déby regime—telephoned the JEM leadership in the middle of the night of 1 February to ask them for help.¹² Worried about the effects on Darfur should Déby fall, JEM raced to Chad to support the government, abandoning very good positions in West Darfur around El Geneina (Tubiana, 2008a, p. 48). Déby's reaction to the attack had been so quick, however, that JEM arrived too late for the main battle, reaching N'Djamena on 4–5 February. But JEM did help the Chadian army chase the rebels back to Sudan, and fought them at Addé and again at Am Zoer (Fontrier, 2009, p. 231). This was enough to gain JEM the trust of both Idriss and Daosa Déby, at least in the short term. Asked by Chad for assistance at the same time, the divided SLA-Unity also brought troops back from North Darfur to Chad to help Déby, but by then the Déby family was fed up with their SLA relatives' inability to reunify the movement under a single leader.¹³

Now convinced that JEM could be relied on, the government started to encourage all Darfur Beri rebels to join JEM. One notable convert was Suleiman Jamous, who joined JEM in the spring of 2010. The incentives for joining were clear. Between February 2008 and mid-2009 Chad gave JEM vehicles and guns and allowed it to establish rear bases in its territory. The main JEM base was at Am Djéress, Déby's clan hometown, south-east of the Ennedi Mountains and some 100 km from the border with North Darfur. Once only a nomadic settle-

ment during the dry season and almost completely deserted during the 1990s, there the Déby family was building houses and services, and Sultan Timan Déby was planning to move his capital there from Bahay, on the border with North Darfur. JEM troops had the use of a 2.8 km-long airstrip, a hospital, and a makeshift prison. They had also established a training camp some 40 km north of Am Djéress and another more remote camp in Wadi Doum, across the Ennedi Mountains, at an ex-Libyan airfield that the Chadian army had taken in the 1980s.

A further encouragement to JEM was the appointment of General Mahamat Ali Abdallah as Chadian minister of defence. Prior to this, he had been, together with Daosa Déby and Mahamat Ismaïl Chaïbo, in charge of the Darfur file since the conflict flared in 2002. One of his early responsibilities as minister of defence was reportedly to provide JEM with some 400 vehicles and weapons, which were used during the raid on Khartoum in May 2008 (Enough Project, 2009, p. 8). But unofficial support from the Déby family was also provided in the period preceding the raid.¹⁴ The UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan found that some of the vehicles used during the raid had been exported from Dubai to N'Djaména by a Chadian company whose chairman is another cousin of President Déby (UN, 2009, p. 42).

It remains unclear whether Chad approved Khalil's adventurous desert crossing from Chad to Khartoum. Some within the Chadian presidency say Khalil went 'without Déby's green light'.¹⁵ What is clear is that the Beri inner circle was not unhappy to send Bashir a symmetrical response to the February 2008 raid. Although Chad denied any involvement in the raid, Khartoum immediately broke off diplomatic relations with N'Djaména.

The last round of proxy attacks

Sudan was quick to acknowledge the divisions among the rebels as the reason for the failure of the February 2008 coup attempt against Déby. Only a few weeks after the raid, on 25 February, Khartoum made a new attempt to unite the rebels into a coalition, the Alliance nationale (AN). Mahamat Nouri led the coalition, but again failed to resolve divisions among the rebel factions and their leaders, in particular between himself and Timan Erdimi.

It took the Sudanese government almost a year to acknowledge Nouri's failure and back the formation of yet another coalition of Chadian armed opposition groups in January 2009, the Union des forces de la résistance (UFR), led by Timan. The Sudanese security services had previously been reluctant to support Beri rebels and above all to put Timan at the head of a coalition. They had assumed that if Beri leaders ever reached power they would be no more able than Déby to prevent their kin from supporting Darfur rebels. The new strategy seemed to reflect the hope that Timan might help convince the Beri community in N'Djaména—which in 2008 had mobilized to defend the government against Nouri—to change sides. Timan Erdimi and his twin brother Tom—the latter in exile in the United States—had served as successive chiefs of staff in the Déby government.

The UFR launched a new major raid on Chadian territory on 3 May 2009, the day after Chad and Sudan had signed a new reconciliation agreement in Doha, Qatar.

Preparing for war

Two months before this attack, Khartoum gave funding, ammunition, food, fuel, and one of the largest fleet of vehicles and arsenal of weapons ever supplied to the Chadian rebellion, according to a former Chadian rebel leader.¹⁶ In its 2009 report, the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan published a 'letter from [UFR chairman] Timan Erdimi to the director of the [Sudanese] Security Services', probably General Salah Abdallah Gosh, dated 15 April 2009, outlining the requirement of 2,000 vehicles, 12,000 rounds of SPG-9 recoilless rifle ammunition, 30,000 rounds of 37 mm ammunition, 10,000 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rockets, 20,000 Goronov machine guns, 4,800 107 mm shells, and 3,000 Doshka machine guns (UN, 2009, pp. 93–94). Chadian authorities say they handed the document to the panel after finding it in a car captured from the UFR during its May 2009 raid.¹⁷

UFR leaders admit that Timan Erdimi's letter could be genuine, but say the very high numbers do not necessarily reflect what the UFR received.¹⁸ But even before the letter was supposedly written, the group had received hundreds of vehicles and large quantities of arms of the types mentioned in the letter, as well as some SAM-7 missiles.¹⁹ Moreover, Khartoum had already rearmed some of the UFR component movements before the coalition was formed.²⁰

The UFR needed its greater firepower to face the Chadian army, which had been heavily rearmed after the February 2008 raid. The 2009 UN Panel of Experts report notes that after this attack, Chad had ‘acquired additional armoured vehicles, Sukhoi-25 jets and attack helicopters’, triggering a costly arms race between the government and the rebels—or rather their Sudanese backers, as Chadian rebel leaders themselves admitted to the panel (UN, 2009, p. 34). Yet the Chadian army’s weapons capability remained patently superior, allowing it to defeat the rebels in May 2009 without relying on French support (Marchal, 2009).

Chad was also arming its Sudanese proxies, specifically JEM. In May 2009 JEM had more than 400 vehicles, most of which were armed with anti-aircraft guns (ZPU-2 or Chinese Type 58 and 14.5 mm), 106 mm recoilless rifles, and Doshka machine guns.²¹ Chadian soldiers (including 20 artillery officers, according to the Sudanese army) reportedly supplied military hardware to rebels during two major battles between JEM and the Sudanese army in North Darfur in May 2009 (Marchal, 2009; UN, 2009, p. 26).

At the same time, Chad tried to forge an alliance between JEM and the faction of the SLA still led by Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur (SLA-AW) from his place of exile in Paris. President Déby hosted talks in N’Djaména attended by SLA deputy general commander Mohamed Adam Abdelsalam ‘Tarrada’ and his close associate, military spokesman Nimir Mohamed Abderahman, and JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim. Déby promised 150 vehicles to JEM and 50 to the SLA-AW if the groups could find common ground, but no serious agreement was reached.²²

Further failed attacks—and their consequences

By May 2009 the UFR had a cumulative strength of 600–800 vehicles for some 6,000–8,000 combatants.²³ Not all these troops went to Chad, however.²⁴ Waddayan rebel leaders said Timan Erdimi only armed and sent 2,000 combatants. In the meantime he sent vehicles carrying arms instead of troops, apparently counting on support from members of the Beri community inside Chad whom he planned to arm.²⁵ This had already proved a risky strategy in February 2008, when the Beri community had once again sided with Déby. The difference now was that Timan, a Beri, was paramount leader.

The Chadian army defeated the rebels at Am Dam, south of Abéché and a long way from the capital. The UFR lost a number of its vehicles during this and subsequent battles in May, while others were dispersed into Chad, to be eventually sold or returned to the government. Khartoum confiscated some 40 vehicles as the defeated UFR crossed back into Sudan.²⁶ Following the defeat, the UFR started to move its rear bases from West Darfur to North Darfur and began to prepare for a new, smaller, attack. The aim was to use some 150 vehicles to enter Birak, at the border north of El Geneina and Kulbus, and eventually occupy Chadian territory in the mountains of Dar Tama or Dar Zaghawa.²⁷ But the plan was never implemented.

As the Chadian army routed the Chadian rebels in Am Dam, JEM, whose presence was not needed on Chadian soil, entered North Darfur. It easily seized Kornoy garrison, 60 km from the border, and captured arms from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), including OF-843B 120 mm mortar shells.²⁸ The plan was to progress toward bigger targets such as Kutum town, but the next objective, Am Boru garrison, proved more difficult to seize. JEM troops suffered many casualties and controlled the garrison for only a few hours.²⁹ This unexpected resistance put an end to JEM's May 2009 raid into Darfur.

By the end of May 2009 both governments realized that arming rebel proxy forces for lightning raids was no longer efficient or effective and that the investments in proxy forces would be better used to arm their own forces for defence. It was thus clear in both Khartoum and N'Djaména that the offensive military options against each other had failed (Tubiana, 2010a).

Reaching the tipping point

There have been many false dawns in relations between Chad and Sudan, typically following failed military escalations by one side or the other. Among the many agreements were the February 2006 agreement in Tripoli, Libya; the August 2006 agreement in Khartoum; the February 2007 declaration in Cannes, France; the March 2007 talks in Tehran, Iran; the May 2007 agreement in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; the March 2008 agreement in Dakar, Senegal; and the May 2009 agreement in Doha, Qatar (Enough Project, 2009, p. 8; Fontrier, 2009, p. 234). But near the end of 2009 the most sincere efforts at rapprochement began.

In addition to the realization that supporting their own defence forces was a better investment than arming proxy offensive forces, electoral events demanded the attention of both countries' leaderships. In Sudan, general elections were scheduled for April 2010 and the referendum on Southern self-determination for January 2011; in Chad, the presidential, legislative, and local votes were scheduled between February and May 2011 (Tubiana, 2010a). It was also increasingly apparent that proxy arming would be more costly as a result of the global economic downturn, which had depressed oil prices—a primary revenue generator for both countries.³⁰

Outside pressures contributed to the decisive turn to rapprochement. Djibril Bassolé, the African Union (AU)–UN joint chief mediator for Darfur, described the peace between Chad and Sudan as the third axis of his strategy, together with negotiations between Khartoum and the rebels, and civil society talks.³¹ Scott Gration, the US special envoy for Sudan, was also showing interest in Chad, as was China. Although a traditional ally of Sudan, Beijing had entered into an economic and trade partnership with Chad after Déby gave up his recognition of Taiwan following the April 2006 Chadian rebel raid on N'Djaména. China became involved in oil exploitation, road building, and other infrastructure projects in Chad, and had an interest in Chad and Sudan amicably settling their differences (Large, 2008, pp. 11–12; Tubiana, 2008a, p. 29; Fontrier, 2009, p. 264).

France remained the major international player in Chad—albeit increasingly under the banner of the EU. At the same time, France's long friendship with Sudan's leadership had suffered because of its support for Déby, its backing of the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment against Bashir, and its hosting of SLA leader Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur in Paris (Tubiana, 2010a). In the aftermath of the events of February 2008, France made reconciliation between Chad and Sudan the priority of its regional diplomacy and even of its Chadian policy. As usual, the internal dimension of the Chadian crisis remaining largely neglected.³²

The inner circles turn towards rapprochement

A final and decisive change that influenced the turn to rapprochement was a turnover of key personnel on both sides. In Sudan, the country's Chad policy

had always been considered a part of its Darfur policy. At the beginning of the war in Darfur and until 2005–06, the late Dr. Mogzub Al Khalifa was largely responsible for Sudanese policy on Chad, while the interior minister, Lieutenant General Abderahim Mohamed Hussein, was the focal point for managing Darfur. Mogzub, the minister of agriculture, had overseen the Darfur negotiations in Abuja. He was opposed to war with N'Djaména and acted as a counterweight to the more bellicose views of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).³³

Sudan's policy towards Chad eventually lost coherence, as it had on Darfur. Sudanese officials vied to raise their profiles through involvement in the two regions, but internal divisions within the government contributed to the failure of the various agreements signed with Chad. Some Sudanese government officials more familiar with the Darfur region understood the Beri dilemma facing Déby; others further removed thought the support shown to powerful individual Beri could only mean that the Chadian government supported the rebellion.

Over time, hardliners in Khartoum became convinced that Déby was not sincere in his attempts to undermine the Darfur rebels. The NISS director, General Salah Abdallah Gosh, took control of the Chad file. Under him, two NISS generals in charge of the entire 'regional' department—which also dealt with Eritrea, Somalia, and Uganda—were the sole official contacts in Khartoum for Chadian rebel leaders, who complained that their relations with higher levels of power were too sporadic.³⁴ In the field in Darfur, however, NISS state-level heads regularly visited Chadian rebel bases and maintained permanent contact with Chadian rebel representatives in El Geneina and El Fasher.³⁵

Sudanese government policy towards Chad shifted again when on the eve of the détente President Bashir fired or transferred a number of officials who were in favour of regime change in Chad—and who were also often opposed to 'excessive' concessions on Darfur. The most notable was General Gosh, who was relieved of his post because he had failed to anticipate JEM's raid on Khartoum, among other reasons. His transfer signalled a weakening of the NISS's influence more generally and allowed Dr. Ghazi Salahaddin, who was overseeing Darfur negotiations, to centralize control over Darfur and Chad policy.³⁶ Ghazi convinced the Chadian government that change was possible³⁷

and the Sudanese government that war with Déby was a failed policy—not only had it contributed to reinforcing the Darfur rebels, it had also strained Sudan’s relationship with France.

There were personnel changes in Chad as well. With Sudan clearly indicating it did not want to deal with officials who had been involved in aggression against it, Déby moved responsibility for the Darfur–Sudan file out of the control of the Beri inner circle. General Mahamat Ali Abdallah left the ministry of defence to become one of many presidential advisers. Daosa Déby was appointed ambassador to Libya and disengaged from the issue, although he did have some involvement when Khalil Ibrahim was expelled to Libya in May 2010.³⁸ General Taher Essou Youssouf was initially nominated to lead the new Chad–Sudan joint force that started to deploy along the border in March 2010, but Khartoum rejected his appointment, remembering that he had led Chadian forces during the 2003 Chad–Sudan joint attack on Ain Siro and had forewarned the Darfur rebels of the assault.³⁹ Of the old hands, only Mahamat Ismaïl Chaïbo, the influential head of the Chadian National Security Agency, remained involved. But he was hampered by his poor relations with JEM; Khalil rejected him as an interlocutor because he had orchestrated the splintering of JEM into the NMRD movement in 2004.⁴⁰

To show good faith and a willingness to work with Khartoum, Déby was left with few options but to involve himself directly in dealings with Sudan, along with a few of the less visible Beri officers of his inner circle. Speaking at the close of negotiations between Ghazi and Khalil in N’Djaména, a Beri general said that Déby ‘does almost everything alone’.⁴¹ He spent ‘more than five days and five nights with Khalil to convince him to sign the framework agreement’, according to a JEM cadre.⁴²

Since there was no consensus within the Beri community on peace with Sudan, Déby had to be cautious with his own hardliners while attempting to inspire trust in Khartoum.⁴³ N’Djaména thus sought to appoint frontline officials without strong tribal connections to Sudan and in particular to the Darfur rebels. A key figure was Foreign Affairs Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, an ethnic Beri born to an Arab mother and with limited tribal connections. He had been nominally responsible for the Sudan file since 2008, but as the rapprochement gained traction, he became truly involved. Abderahman Moussa, an Arab from N’Djaména who had served as both interior and security minister, was

given the post of ‘national mediator’ with responsibility for dealing with the Chadian rebels.

Rapprochement talks

As early as August 2009 Ghazi and Moussa Faki held exploratory talks in Tripoli under Libyan auspices.⁴⁴ They met again in side talks during the September 2009 UN General Assembly in New York, this time with Dr. Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the Sudanese second vice-president.⁴⁵ Shortly afterwards, Sudan took the first serious steps towards détente when it sent Ghazi to N’Djaména in October 2009 with a message from Bashir to Déby.⁴⁶

Chad appeared enthusiastic about this visit and soon reciprocated by sending a delegation led by Moussa Faki to Khartoum in December to discuss the restoration of diplomatic relations.⁴⁷ A ‘normalization’ agreement was signed in N’Djaména on 15 January 2010 (Accord de N’Djaména, 2010). It reopened the border for the first time since 2003 and established a 3,000-strong joint border force operating under a joint command that would alternate its base every six months between El Geneina in West Darfur and Abéché in eastern Chad.

In another gesture to Khartoum, on 1 January Chad asked the UN, in a *note verbale* to the secretary-general, not to renew the mandate of the UN peace-keeping force based on its territory, which was set to expire on 15 March. Khartoum harboured suspicions that MINURCAT, like the European forces that had preceded it, could act as a Western forward base for the potential invasion of Sudan (Tubiana, 2010a). Déby then sent an important signal to Bashir by inviting him to N’Djaména despite the ICC warrant against him. As a signatory of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, Chad had an obligation to arrest Bashir. Its refusal to do so, which earned Déby criticism in Western capitals, was thus symbolically important.

JEM feels the fallout

As the rapprochement gathered momentum, pressure mounted on JEM. Border crossings became more difficult from March 2010, when the Chad–Sudan joint force began to deploy. Déby strongly pressured Khalil to sign a ‘framework agreement’ and ceasefire with Ghazi, which he did on 20 February, as well as a peace agreement prior to the Sudanese elections in April, which JEM resisted signing (Tubiana, 2010a).

The framework agreement reflects Chad's interests above all. 'We made most of the framework agreement here [i.e. in Chad]', Moussa Faki said publicly.⁴⁸ It was written in French and signed in N'Djaména under clear Chadian influence, before being sent to Doha to be signed by the representatives of Khartoum and JEM. This reflected weak international mediation and Chad's wish to return to its former role as mediator in the Darfur peace process. Its neutrality as mediator was continually challenged, however, this time not by Khartoum, but by an angry JEM (Tubiana, 2010a). Indeed, according to one of his close officials, even as he acted as unofficial mediator at the framework agreement negotiations, Déby 'made big efforts to have JEM withdraw demands we would not accept for our own rebels', such as delaying elections or keeping rebel forces armed.⁴⁹

After the Sudanese elections in April 2010, Déby intensified his policy of expelling JEM from Chadian territory. On 19 May Khalil and other JEM members were detained at N'Djaména airport for 19 hours and then expelled to Libya, where Khalil remains (AFP, 2010a). Khartoum had reportedly declined a Chadian offer to arrest the JEM chairman and hand him over.

Chad seeks a quid pro quo

By dealing with the Sudanese rebels quickly and decisively, Déby wanted to show Khartoum what he was expecting in return, namely similar treatment of the Chadian rebels. Moussa Faki publicly stated that Chad wanted 'to cut the roots of the problem'—i.e. Khartoum's provision of vital support to Chadian rebels. 'Toyotas don't grow by themselves in Darfur', he said.⁵⁰

Chad's official position was the strict application of the 'normalization' agreement signed in N'Djaména by Ghazi and Moussa Faki in January 2010. It states:

Once neutralised and disarmed the [rebel] groups have the choice, either to return to their country of origin, or to remain in the host country as refugees, on the basis of a nominal list agreed by the governments of the two countries. Refugee status seekers not admitted to the mentioned list have to be sent to a third country (Accord de N'Djaména, 2010; author's translation).

Sudan was wary of this method of dealing with the Chadian rebels, however, and did not want to implement large forced disarmament campaigns or mass expulsions.⁵¹ Khartoum was aware that without a political agreement providing an exit to the Chadian rebels and if they were not disarmed, the rebels might join an already combustible mix of armed groups in Darfur. To avoid a possible alliance between the Chadian and Darfur rebels (or the degeneration of the Chadian forces into 'janjaweed'-type militias), Khartoum continued to push for negotiations between the Chadian rebels and N'Djaména, to parallel Sudan's own negotiations with Darfur rebels. But Déby remained adamant in his refusal to negotiate with the Chadian rebels.

Khartoum was much slower and more cautious in its dealings with the Chadian rebels than Déby would have liked. As early as August 2009 the Chadian rebels moved from West to North Darfur, further from the border.⁵² It is not clear whether the decision to move northwards had been taken by Sudan in an earlier attempt to convince Déby of its goodwill, or by UFR chairman Timan Erdimi. UFR leaders say they planned the move, in part, because in West Darfur they were facing too much infiltration from the Chadian government. A more probable reason was that Beri leaders such as Timan had more tribal connections in North Darfur; only the Beri supported the move northwards, while rebels from other groups, in particular the Waddayans and Arabs, followed reluctantly.⁵³

Khartoum hoped that the Chadian rebels would block attacks in the area by Darfur rebels, in particular JEM. The UFR had already made clear it would not fight the Darfur rebels, however. It no longer wanted to engage in proxy fighting that made it look like a group of mercenaries, and its Beri leaders and troops wanted to avoid clashes with their Sudanese kin in JEM.⁵⁴

Whatever the motivation for the move northwards, it was not enough to convince N'Djaména of Khartoum's good intentions. The fact that the UFR first settled around the Ain Siro-Furnung Mountains—the very place from which Déby had launched his successful raid on N'Djaména in 1990—was viewed as provocative. The Chadian rebels initially encouraged this interpretation, but water shortages in Ain Siro soon pushed the troops further northward along the government-controlled road between Kutum and Am Boru, close to the Sudanese garrison at Abdeshakur. They set up camps at the Kurbya and

Urshi dams (major sources of water in this dry area), located in Dar Zaghawa very close to the Darfur rebels' positions.⁵⁵

By late 2009 the UFR was fragmenting and its dissident factions, in particular Mahamat Nouri's Alliance nationale pour le changement démocratique (ANCD), asked permission to return southward. Khartoum refused and Nouri was given the choice between the El Fasher area and the Mellit–Sayah area in Dar Berti, north-east of El Fasher. He chose the latter, which was located at the start of the road to Libya and might eventually allow his troops to return via Libya to Chad and settle in their Goran homeland in the far north of the country.⁵⁶

The pace of rapprochement quickens

While the Chadian rebels were not necessarily unhappy about their move northwards, the Sudanese authorities gradually contained them in their bases, while continuing to provide them with food.⁵⁷ Then, in July 2010, after N'Djaména had expelled Khalil, Khartoum genuinely started to fulfil Déby's requests to dismantle Chadian rebel movements.

Déby drew up a list of rebel leaders whom he wanted expelled from Sudan. The January 2010 agreement gave him the right to do so by specifying that rebels who did not want to return to their home country could stay in the 'host country' only with the agreement of both Chad and Sudan (Accord de N'Djaména, 2010). Déby's blacklist included only Bideyat and Goran leaders. At the top of the list were Timan Erdimi and Mahamat Nouri. The list also included:

- Tahir Guinassou (a Goran), former UFR defence secretary and former security adviser to Déby;
- Mahamat Abdelkarim Hanno (a Bideyat Borogat, a sub-group with a mixed Beri and Goran identity), UFR diplomatic adviser and a former short-lived chief of the Chadian National Security Agency; and
- Abakar Tollimi (a Bideyat Borogat), the secretary-general of the UFR.⁵⁸

In July 2010, two days before Bashir's visit to N'Djaména, Sudan deported Timan, Nouri, and Guinassou to Qatar. They were joined by Adouma Hassaballah Djadareb, UFR first vice-president, whom Déby subsequently added to his list,

opposing his return to Sudan.⁵⁹ Hanno and Tollimi had already left for France when they were told they would also be prevented from returning to Sudan. Hanno remained in France; Tollimi left for Mali. Of the major political opposition leaders, only Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, interim president of the UFR, remained in Sudan. With their leadership weakened, the rebel movements continued to fragment and sought to negotiate their return with Déby in increasingly personalized ways. 📌

III. Chad and Chadian rebels after the rapprochement

Chadian rebels' perilous return

The January 2010 normalization agreement between Chad and Sudan left open the possibility of Chadian rebels' returning to Chad. But after the rapprochement, the Chadian government was in a stronger position than ever, making the prospect of return very unattractive. However, with the rebels becoming increasingly fragmented and the Sudanese government steadily reducing their other options—even expelling the main Chadian rebel leaders to Qatar in July 2010—individualized negotiations on conditions for their return accelerated.

Claiming that the Sirte Agreement of October 2007 remained valid, the Chadian government refused rebel calls for political negotiations.⁶⁰ Four armed opposition groups had signed the agreement, but only one of them, the *Concorde nationale du Tchad/Chad National Concord (CNT)*, implemented it, with its 1,600-strong force joining the Chadian government. The other three were among the main UFR factions: the UFDD (which then included Adouma Hassaballah Djadareb's faction), the UFDD-F, and the RFC. These groups insisted the document was no longer valid, while other factions argued that since they had never been signatories, the agreement did not apply to them. Two further issues complicated the return of Chadian rebels. First, the Chadian judiciary in August 2008 condemned to death or life imprisonment the main Chadian rebels in absentia. Although President Déby and National Mediator Abderahman Moussa promise complete 'forgiveness' for those who return, many doubt their sincerity.

Second, N'Djaména appeared to renege on the Sirte Agreement provisions on the reintegration of ex-rebel forces into the Chadian military. According to Abderahman Moussa, former military officers and civil servants should be reintegrated 'on an individual basis', which opens the door to unequal treatment.⁶¹ Since July 2010 Chadian authorities have informally told Western diplomats that the army is already too big and thus reintegration plans for ex-rebels need

to be scaled back. The government is instead offering jobs such as tree planting in the Environment Ministry or construction in the Infrastructure Ministry.⁶² During the second half of 2009, Chadian authorities offered 400,000 francs (CFA) to each rebel who returned to the government, and as much as 11,000,000 francs for each vehicle brought back from Sudan.⁶³ By late 2010, things had changed significantly. In the words of one Chadian official, 'the only favour we can do to the rebels is to forgive them, to grant them an amnesty'.⁶⁴

The problem for those rebel leaders seeking substantial rewards in return for their surrender is that Déby's regime has a poor record of keeping its promises. There are several recent examples of would-be returnees being offered senior positions, money, and inducements, only to be sacked, imprisoned, or even killed upon their return.

The first Khartoum-backed coalition leader, Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim, was offered the position of minister of defence, but in October 2007, just eight months after his return to N'Djaména, he was dismissed. He took refuge at the Libyan embassy amid rumours that Déby wanted him killed in retaliation for an alleged coup attempt. He escaped Chad during the February 2008 attack and returned to Khartoum at the end of 2009, but failed to gain unanimous favour from his former NISS supporters. He was expelled after a few days and is now said to be in the Persian Gulf area.⁶⁵

Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, an important Chadian politician throughout the Déby era and a former ambassador to the United States, joined the rebellion in the hope of becoming its main leader. Disappointed not to be chosen by Khartoum as a coalition leader, he reluctantly joined Timan Erdimi's UFR on its creation on 18 January 2009. A week later he challenged Timan's leadership and withdrew from the movement, although he was not followed by all of his troops. He did not join the battle at Am Dam in May 2009.⁶⁶ N'Djaména opened negotiations with him in Libya, resulting in his rejoining the government in July 2009 with some 1,800 troops (most of his men) and some 40 vehicles.⁶⁷ But things quickly turned sour. Déby rebuffed his old MPS comrade's traditional reconciliatory hug. The senior government position never materialized, although Soubiane was eventually made one of many presidential advisers. His combatants were confined to the Moussoro camp and have yet to be integrated into the army. Many have since left the camp to resume civilian life in Chad or return to the rebellion in Sudan (Debos, forthcoming).

Meanwhile, what remained of the UFR continued to fragment. Some of the splinter groups joined the Chadian government, generally relying on well-placed relatives to help negotiate their return. The first to return was Ismaïl (Soumaïn) Boloki, a Goran of the Murdya sub-group and a former Chadian police colonel who had joined the UFDD in 2007. He was director of Mahamat Nouri's military cabinet before becoming deputy chief of staff and finally deputy to defence commissioner Tahir Wodji (who later became the UFR's chief of staff). Following the Am Dam defeat, Boloki appealed to his powerful relative, Infrastructure and Transport Minister Adoum Younousmi, a Goran from the Gaeda sub-group.⁶⁸ Confident that he would be given a higher police ranking and an important political position, he and Ordji Wardougou, then the UFDD chief of staff, took 11 UFDD vehicles and attempted to leave the UFDD base at Shinjabak, some 30 km north of El Geneina, in September 2009. But troops loyal to Nouri attacked them, capturing five vehicles. Ten loyalists and seven mutineers were killed in the clashes. So far, this is the only case where rebel attempts to join the government have provoked internal fighting.⁶⁹

Boloki and Wardougou took the remaining six vehicles and 190 men and crossed the border to Adré, from where they were escorted to Abéché and then Moussoro. Government forces in Moussoro took their vehicles and arms, registered their names, and promised them reintegration. When months later no further action had been taken, many lost patience and returned to Sudan in civilian clothes to join the rebellion once more. Those who stayed in Chad, including Boloki, received nothing of what was promised to them.⁷⁰

The pace of returns accelerated after the expulsion of the main rebel leaders to Qatar in July 2010. Shortly after their expulsion, N'Djaména and Khartoum chartered the first of a number of flights bringing ex-rebels from Khartoum and El Fasher in North Darfur back to Chad.⁷¹ The majority of returning Chadian rebel combatants crossed the border by land, however.⁷² Some returned with their vehicles and arms, but as the prospects of receiving compensation diminished, many began to sell their vehicles and guns before crossing the border, typically in the 'janjaweed' camps.⁷³ Most of the several hundred rebels who joined the government in the second half of 2010 are defectors from Mahamat Nouri's ANCD. Many split from Arab rebel movements, namely the FSR, UFDD-F, and Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire (CDR). But they also

include some Goran from the original UFDD, among them Mahamat Nouri's own brother, Adoum Nouri.

A few relatively marginal components of the UFR also left the coalition to join the government. They include a number of UFR fighters from the Hadjeray ethnic group (from the Guéra Mountains of central Chad) who were escorted back to N'Djaména by the national mediator in September 2010. Led by Mokhtar Nantcho, the group had initially been part of the *Mouvement pour le salut national du Tchad*, a Hadjeray rebel group that joined the *Union des forces pour le changement et la démocratie* (UFCD) in 2008.

At around the same time, members of the Goran and Bideyat Borogat ethnic groups also left the UFR, exploiting kinship connections with government members to negotiate their return. Among this group were important leaders, in particular Tahir Wodji, a Goran from the Daza sub-group who had served as chief of staff in both the UFR and Mahamat Nouri's UFDD. Wodji failed to return to the UFR headquarters in Abdeshakur after leaving to recover some 40 vehicles that had been stationed some 20 km away by the movement's secretary-general, Abakar Tollimi. Tollimi had left for France, but was unable to return to Sudan. Both Wodji and Tollimi were removed from their positions, which both contested. But days later the Sudanese authorities announced to the remaining UFR rebels that they would be disarmed within one month. Over the next few days 800–1,000 rebels returned to Chad to join the government, taking with them some 100 vehicles. Wodji went home with 17 of Tollimi's 40 vehicles, while Adam Defallah, another Borogat leader, took a further 20. Only three vehicles were left for the men loyal to the absent Tollimi. In October some 2,000 UFR rebels remaining in Darfur were voluntarily disarmed in El Fasher. They gave back hundreds of vehicles and guns to the Sudanese authorities.⁷⁴

Another Goran leader, Tahir Guinassou, joined the Chadian government on 27 October. So far he is the only one of those expelled to Qatar to have returned to Chad; his treatment since his return is discouraging for any would-be followers. He returned via Addis Ababa, after talks with Koni Worrimi, an adviser of President Déby and an ethnic Goran. He was arrested the following month, along with Wodji and three other Goran and Bideyat ex-rebel leaders. The government pretended not to have any hand in the event, claiming to have no influence over the Chadian judiciary.⁷⁵ In January 2011, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Chad's independence, Déby granted the detainees amnesty.⁷⁶

In November 2010, just after the arrest of Guinassou and Wodji, one former rebel lamented that ‘the government does not implement what it said during the negotiations on the phone while we were still in Sudan’.⁷⁷ At the same time, President Déby made a speech at the Moussoro camp in which he clarified his views on reintegration, calling the ex-rebels ‘mercenaries’ and saying he did not need them in his army. Most of them were subsequently given CFA 150,000 (USD 300) to help their return to civilian life. The few hundred who completed the reintegration were incorporated as simple soldiers, regardless of their previous rank. Two Goran fighters, ex-bodyguards of Mahamat Nouri, protested against this treatment and were reportedly killed during the night. There were also rumours that rebels could be lent to Khartoum to fight the SPLA in the event of a new war between North and South Sudan. These events prompted a number of ex-rebels to return to Sudan.⁷⁸

Box 2 **The UFR’s political ambitions**

In the summer of 2009 the governments of Switzerland and the United States, European Union representatives, and a UFR delegation led by Secretary-General Abakar Tollimi held confidential meetings in Geneva. The meetings sought to explore the UFR’s political position and act as a springboard for talks with the Chadian government. The parties discussed confidence-building measures that might help jump-start the process by demonstrating the concrete benefits of dialogue. The UFR proposed issuing positive media statements about dialogue, as well as the potential withdrawal from the Chad–Sudan border (which was already occurring, see ‘Chad seeks a quid pro quo’, above).

The UFR produced an ambitious political vision statement with sections on public security, the army, the management of state finances, general administration, justice sector reform, and transitional institutions. In a subsequent ‘Declaration of general interest’ (UFR, n.d.), the UFR reasserted its long-standing demand for the inclusion of the official (political, non-armed) opposition in talks with the government, as well as involving international observers. It proposed that MINURCAT, the UN force based in eastern Chad, should oversee the joint disarmament of its forces and the Chadian army, and that both forces should be confined in the far north of the country, where they would be trained to become a ‘real army’. The UFR also called for a government of national unity, led by a prime minister from the opposition during an 18–24-month transition period. This would give the rebel movement enough time to transform itself into a political party to take part in the 2011 elections. Operating from a position of strength and feeling no need to negotiate or make concessions, the Chadian government refused to start direct talks (UFR, 2009; n.d.).⁷⁹

Both Chadian and Sudanese authorities claim that some 4,000 rebels returned from Sudan to Chad in 2010.⁸⁰ But this number probably refers to ex-rebels who were taken in 2010 to the Moussoro camp, between N'Djaména and Faya, where most ex-rebels are confined before going through DDR.⁸¹ Moreover, of these 4,000, only about 2,000 would have joined the government in 2010.⁸² Other camp internees returned from Sudan in 2009, before the rapprochement, and included 1,500–1,800 members of Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane's FSR.⁸³ They also included rebels who were not based in Darfur or supported by Sudan, such as 500 rebels from southern Chad and more than 1,000 rebels from several factions of the Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad (MDJT), founded in 1998 and based in the Tibesti Mountains in the far north of the country.⁸⁴ In the meantime, some rebels based in Sudan went back to Chad on their own, returning to civilian life without passing through the Moussoro camp.

Chadian rebels in Darfur

Sudan's caution in moving forward with the rapprochement was not linked solely to a distrust of Chad. Déby's refusal to negotiate a settlement with the Chadian rebels, contrary to Sudan's dialogue with the Darfur rebels, left only surrender or disarmament as options. Sudan feared this hardline stance would drive the Chadian rebels to Darfur, where they would join an already chaotic mosaic of actors. In the past, combatants had moved in both directions between Chadian rebel groups and Sudanese government militias, as well as between Chadian and Darfur rebel groups. In addition, Chadian rebels, in particular those with shifting allegiances, had already posed security problems for civilian populations in Sudan.

Relations between Chadian rebels and 'janjaweed' militias

Most, if not all, Chadian Arab rebel movements recruited 'janjaweed' fighters. They included the CNT, UFDD-F, FSR, and CDR, which had kinship connections to 'janjaweed' leaders and troops who had migrated from Chad to West Darfur between the 1960s and the 1980s (Tubiana, 2008a, p. 16).

This practice caused a number of problems. For example, 'janjaweed' fighters recruited by Hassan al Jineidi's CNT in 2006–07 looted civilian properties during

the CNT occupation of Chadian territories in Dogdoré and Tissi in remote south-eastern Chad.⁸⁵ Another problem was that although some of the ‘janjaweed’ brought their own guns, others soon abandoned the rebel groups, taking with them guns they had been given by the Chadian rebels.⁸⁶ In late 2006 Chadian rebels raided Abéché and other smaller towns in eastern Chad, which increased the scope for Chadian–Sudanese ‘janjaweed’ activity in south-eastern Chad and prompted the main Chadian rebel leaders to agree to stop recruiting Sudanese troops.⁸⁷ But not all Chadian rebel groups fully implemented this decision.

Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane’s FSR recruited particularly heavily among the ‘janjaweed’. A late arrival among the rebel leaders, Soubiane rushed to amass troops to challenge rival Chadian Arab rebel leaders and eventually take over the leadership of the whole rebellion. Son of the traditional leader of the Chadian Mahamid Rizeigat, he relied mainly on his kinship ties to Sudanese Mahamid Rizeigat, who were particularly well represented among ‘janjaweed’ in both North Darfur and West Darfur.⁸⁸ When he was still with Déby, he had been used in the Chadian effort to turn the ‘janjaweed’, particularly the Mahamid Rizeigat, away from Khartoum. In May 2006 these efforts had led to an agreement between two representatives of Musa Hilal, one of the main ‘janjaweed’ leaders and the tribal chief of the North Darfur Mahamid, and JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim, under Chadian auspices.⁸⁹ When Soubiane arrived in Sudan, he made a bid for elements of Hilal’s North Darfur militias, but reportedly without much success.⁹⁰ He fared better in West Darfur among his own sub-group, the Awlad Zeid branch of the Mahamid.

The Awlad Zeid militias had made overtures to the Chadian rebels on a number of occasions since 2005.⁹¹ A few weeks after the failed February 2008 raid, the *agid-al-ugada* (‘chief of the war chiefs’) of the Awlad Zeid offered troops to Mahamat Nouri’s new AN faction. Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, interim president of the UFR, claims that Nouri and Soubiane supported the offer, but that he convinced Nouri to reject it.⁹² Nouri’s refusal did not prevent Awlad Zeid troops from joining the FSR; when Soubiane joined the Chadian government, many of the 1,800 combatants he brought were Darfur Arabs, to whom he had promised money and positions in the Chadian army. Dissatisfied, most later returned to Sudan.⁹³

Since the rapprochement between Chad and Sudan, Chadian rebels, in particular splinter groups from Arab factions, have reportedly joined ‘janjaweed’

militias in North Darfur.⁹⁴ There have also been unconfirmed reports by both Chadian rebel sources and JEM of Chadian rebels agreeing to fight alongside Khartoum's forces in both eastern Sudan and Abyei (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010g).⁹⁵ Located at the border between North and South Sudan, Abyei is the site of a major dispute between South Sudan and Arab militias from the Missiriya subgroup—Makaye's group. At the end of 2010, 300–400 Chadian Missiriya rebels, together with Missiriya Jebel militias (including JEM defectors) from Jebel Mun in West Darfur⁹⁶ reportedly moved to the disputed area.⁹⁷ Similarly, according to JEM leaders, another 400 ex-Chadian rebels (Arabs as well as Ouaddaians and Tama) together with several thousand recruits from Darfur were trained near Damazin in southern Blue Nile state, another conflict-affected area of the North–South boundary.⁹⁸

Relations between Chadian and Darfur rebels

Just as Déby on crucial occasions used Darfur rebels (in particular JEM) against the Chadian rebels when they penetrated Chadian territory, Sudan may have hoped to use Chadian armed groups against the Darfur rebels. But unlike JEM, the Chadian rebels were careful to avoid being used as proxies in this way. Furthermore, in the case of the UFR, its Beri leaders and troops did not want to fight their Sudanese kin in JEM.

In January 2008 Khartoum pressured Chadian rebels to fight JEM forces that were threatening El Geneina. But, according to Abakar Tollimi, the UFR 'said we would do it only in one case: if JEM takes El Geneina airport', which is vital for channelling arms from the Sudan government to the Chadian rebels.⁹⁹ JEM could not take the airport, as the Chadian rebels left El Geneina to raid N'Djaména at the end of January 2008, obliging JEM to follow them into Chad.

The Chadian rebels' non-aggressive stance became harder to maintain when in 2009 they moved from West to North Darfur, very close to Darfur rebel strongholds. Chadian rebels first tried to settle in the Ain Siro Mountains, the stronghold of an increasingly dissident faction of the SLA-AW. Other Chadian rebel bases further north and east were home to other SLA splinter factions. JEM had also been active throughout the area.

At Ain Siro, the UFR took fire from much weaker Darfur rebels and retreated to the government area after a 30-minute firefight. The group sent Musa Markus,

the UFDD-F's chief of staff, to negotiate a coexistence agreement with the SLA-Ain Siro (renamed 'SLA-Abundulluk' by the Chadian rebels after its military leader, Ismaïl Adam 'Abundulluk' ('ground hornbill')).¹⁰⁰ Relations between the two groups became so good that the Chadian rebels mediated in ceasefire talks between the SLA-Ain Siro and the Sudanese authorities, specifically NISS leaders from the neighbouring town of Kutum.¹⁰¹

Relations between Chadian and Darfur rebels were more conflict-prone in the Mellit–Sayah area of Dar Berti, north-east of El Fasher, where Mahamat Nouri's troops had settled separately from the main UFR at the end of 2009. Nouri was seeking to regain the Sudanese government support that he lost after his split from the UFR and was reportedly open to 'lending' his troops to Khartoum to fight Darfur rebels, in particular JEM. The presence of autonomous ex-'janjaweed' among the dissident Arab rebel groups that joined Nouri's forces in the Mellit area might also explain the group's willingness to engage in proxy warfare.¹⁰² But JEM was not present in the area, and instead the Chadian rebels crossed paths with a weak SLA splinter faction from the Berti tribe operating in the Maw and Madu areas of Dar Berti and led by Dr. Saleh Adam Ishag (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, p. 49).

When the Chadian rebels arrived in Mellit in late 2009, the government sent them to the Maw and Madu SLA areas, escorted by some 20 vehicles from the army garrison in Sayah. As in Ain Siro, the Darfur rebels fired at the convoy, and the Chadian rebels retreated to Sayah. 'The government had told them our place was empty, but they didn't want to fight Sudanese rebels and refused to stay in SLA areas,' Saleh said.¹⁰³ A few weeks later they were moved to a location 2 km from Mellit town, where wells were dug for them. In North Darfur, the Chadian rebels' main problem, and the reason for their moves, seems to have been water.

Musa Markus again acted as emissary for the UFR, aiming to bring back some of the splinter groups that had joined Mahamat Nouri.¹⁰⁴ He assured Saleh of the Chadian rebels' peaceful intentions, saying they merely sought refuge and water.¹⁰⁵ The SLA rebels were not aware of the splits among the Chadian rebels, nor that the troops based in the Mellit area were largely autonomous from UFR leadership. Neither the UFR nor Nouri was able to prevent some of these troops from committing abuses against the local Berti population,

including killings, rapes, and looting of money, food, and wood.¹⁰⁶ The troops included ex-‘janjaweed’ who had been integrated into Chadian rebel movements, in particular the FSR and CNT, and who might have contributed to the abuses.¹⁰⁷ Given the lack of support from Khartoum, UFR splinter groups needed supplies such as food and wood.¹⁰⁸ Many are said to have later returned to ‘janjaweed’ militias.¹⁰⁹

Both Berti rebels and traditional and local authorities publicly denounced the abuses. An ad hoc council was formed, which in January 2010 reported the abuses in a letter thought to have reached North Darfur governor Yusuf Kibir, a Berti himself, and Second Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha.¹¹⁰ The letter no doubt sensitized the Sudanese authorities to the risks associated with spurning formerly allied armed groups.

More pressing still was the fear that disillusioned Chadian rebels might join Darfur rebels. In the past, Sudanese Beri had joined Timan Erdimi’s RFC. Among them were JEM ex-combatants, including its ex-deputy chief of staff Gerde Abdallah, as well as former members of the SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), which had become increasingly weak since it had joined Khartoum after the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).¹¹¹ In 2010, after the Chad–Sudan rapprochement, and in particular after Khartoum announced the disarmament of the Chadian rebels, some UFR Beri fighters joined (or rejoined) Darfur rebel groups, including the SLA-MM, which had resumed its rebellion, and JEM, which is rumoured to have offered significant inducements to potential recruits. UFR leaders also claimed to have had good relations with JEM since the Chad–Sudan rapprochement.¹¹² This played into fears that had existed since 2003–04¹¹³ that JEM could turn against Chad. The prospect of a common enemy in JEM became a further incentive for both Khartoum and N’Djaména to uphold and widen the rapprochement.

Disarmament of the Chadian rebels

Soon after Sudan and Chad engaged in their rapprochement, the Chadian rebels asked the Sudanese government to be given a last chance to attack the capital or at least cross back over the border with their arms.¹¹⁴ In summer 2010 the Goran and Bideyat Borogat factions planned to settle in the Ennedi Mountains, the area of their kinsmen in north-eastern Chad, where they had connections

with a small group of Borogat defectors from the Chadian army. But this plan was unworkable, given the newly deployed joint border patrol and the lack of material support from Khartoum. Large quantities of fuel would have been needed, especially if they travelled through southern Libya to avoid the Chad–Sudan joint border forces.¹¹⁵

Others tried to enter via the other tri-border area between Chad, Sudan, and CAR. During the May 2009 UFR raid on Am Dam, the FPRN, led by long-time rebel leader Adoum Yacoub ‘Kougou’, broke away from the bigger movements to occupy this tri-border area. The area included parts of remote south-eastern Chad that had traditionally been the group’s main area of activity. The group at the time had some 600 combatants, who were well armed by Khartoum via the UFR, and 50–60 vehicles. When the UFR retreated from Chad to North Darfur, ‘Kougou’ refused to join the other movements. He remained on Chadian territory and laid landmines to defend his positions. Khartoum had no part in this decision, but then prohibited the FPRN’s return to Sudan.¹¹⁶

The FPRN sought to coordinate with other marginal armed opposition groups active in the border between southern Chad and CAR, in particular the *Mouvement pour la paix, la reconstruction et le développement* (MPRD). The latter had been founded in November 2005 by Colonel Djibrine Dassert, an MPS founding member and defector from the Chadian army. With a base in the Nyellim Mountains close to Sarh town in southern Chad, the MPRD was the main southern Chadian rebel movement until Chadian forces captured its leader in January 2010, reportedly in the Tissi area.¹¹⁷ This put an end to the FPRN’s hopes of settling in southern Chad.

It took almost a year, until April 2010, for the Chadian army to retake the Tissi area from the FPRN. By then the Chad–Sudan agreement had been well implemented. The defeated FPRN troops that fled to Sudan through CAR were disarmed by Sudanese forces in the Um Dukhun area, at the border between CAR and South Darfur. While ‘Kougou’ took refuge in Europe, the remaining FPRN forces returned to their pre-UFR state: a small group of well-trained and highly mobile combatants without external support, active at the CAR–Chad–Sudan border.¹¹⁸

The core Chadian rebels remained in North Darfur. In September 2010 the Sudanese government announced that UFR troops who had not yet joined

the Chadian government would be disarmed next. From their exile in Qatar, Timan Erdimi and Adouma Hassaballah Djadareb discussed sending armed fighters back to Chad before the disarmament.¹¹⁹ Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, then the main leader inside Sudan, did not agree with this strategy, but did not reject disarmament. At the same time he offered no objection to those who refused to disarm and left for the tri-border area.¹²⁰

As a consequence, in October–November 2010 an unknown number of Chadian rebels returned individually to Chad with their guns without necessarily joining the government. Others left in small groups for the remote area between South Darfur and CAR. They included rebels from various factions of the UFR, and above all remnants of Mahamat Nouri's ANCD, who refused to join the Chadian government or chose to remain in Sudan as refugees. In October 2010, just one week before the disarmament, seven vehicles drove to the remote area between South Darfur and CAR. The crews of four of the vehicles were loyal to Nouri and three to Abakar Tollimi. The convoy was led by Rozi Mayna, a Goran of the Anakazza sub-group.¹²¹ Goran forces in this area are now under the leadership of Commandant Jean-Louis Vertu (a nephew of ex-Chadian president Hissène Habré, and also a Goran from the Anakazza sub-group).¹²²

Chadian authorities pushed Khartoum to harden its attitude toward rebels who refused to be disarmed. In late November 2010 the Chadian members of the joint border patrol arrested Jibrin Azzein, the CDR chief of staff and an ex-colonel in Déby's presidential guard, south of El Geneina as he returned from CAR. Jibrin is a Chadian Awlad Rashid Arab, like most CDR leaders, and had support from West Darfur Arab 'janjaweed' militias, who protested against his arrest. When Sudanese authorities resisted delivering him to Chad, the Chadian government threatened to put an end to the joint border force. He was finally handed over to the Chadians and imprisoned in N'Djaména.¹²³

There are cases of Sudanese forces attacking Chadian rebels who refuse to disarm. In early November 2010 'janjaweed' militias from the Al Istikhbarat al Hudud ('Border Intelligence Brigade', also called 'Border Guards', one of the main Sudanese paramilitary forces in Darfur) attacked Musa Markus, the UFDD-F's chief of staff. He gave his two vehicles to the joint border force and was left free to return to N'Djaména as a civilian.¹²⁴ His Arab background (from the Hawazma tribe) did not insulate him from attack by the Arab 'janjaweed' group.

It is difficult to estimate how many of the Chadian rebels are still armed. UFR leaders say they had some 3,200 troops (from the UFDD-F, UFCD, and RFC) in October 2010 just before the disarmament, and that as many as 2,000 of them disarmed.¹²⁵ In December 2010 Timan Erdimi estimated that the Chadian rebels had lost 80 per cent of their forces.¹²⁶

Among those still armed, Timan's RFC still has an active nucleus in Wadi Seyra in southern Dar Zaghawa, which turned to banditry under the command of ex-JEM commander Gerde Abdallah (see above).¹²⁷ Their activities include looting the camels of the Awlad Zeid Arabs, who migrate from West Darfur to grazing lands in southern Dar Zaghawa—thus reviving an old conflict between the Awlad Zeid and Zaghawa and threatening recent attempts by traditional leaders to restore peaceful coexistence (Tanner and Tubiana, 2010, p. 31).

Perhaps more importantly, Chadian rebels who refused to be disarmed or controlled by Khartoum remain active in the tri-border area between CAR, Chad, and Sudan (see above). Newly arrived Chadian rebels in north-eastern CAR are said to coordinate with CAR rebels of the Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP). At the end of November 2010, as the CPJP seized Birao town (CAR) from CAR government forces, Chadian planes bombed the loose coalition of CAR and Chadian rebels in the area and retook the town.¹²⁸

Chadian rebels who settled in the tri-border area hope to find support in South Sudan, where some of them already had connections before the Darfur conflict. There have been unconfirmed reports that Chadian rebels have made contact with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and that some of those refusing to be disarmed have moved from South Darfur to South Sudan (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010h; 2010g). Among the Chadian armed movements, the FPRN's former relations with the SPLM make it the most likely to find a safe haven in South Sudan, in particular in the event of the resumption of the conflict between North and South Sudan.¹²⁹ In December 2010 Adouma Hassaballah Djadareb, who had been part of the FPRN before he joined the Khartoum-backed FUC, was arrested in Ethiopia¹³⁰ and it is rumoured that he was on his way to South Sudan.¹³¹ Several Chadian rebel leaders admit that after the Chad–Sudan rapprochement, they hoped a resumption of the North–South war would give them opportunities to find a new source of support, this time not in Khartoum, but in Juba. But their hopes vanished after the January 2011

referendum and Bashir's conciliatory declarations on Southern independence—although future developments might give Chadian rebels new opportunities.¹³²

Withdrawal of international forces from Chad and CAR

The international community viewed the new humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad and northern CAR as an extension of the pattern of violence in Darfur. Its response focused first on protecting the 250,000 Darfur refugees and, second, on the 180,000 Chadian IDPs. Some 3,700 peacekeepers were deployed under EUFOR, which was operational for 12 months until 15 March 2009, when MINURCAT took over (Tubiana, 2008a, pp. 53–56).¹³³

French foreign affairs minister Bernard Kouchner was largely responsible for securing the deployments. He had taken a particular interest in the violence in eastern Chad and Darfur even before his appointment in 2007. His initial aim was to use Chad—where 1,000 French soldiers were already based—as a rear base to launch a French-led military-humanitarian intervention that would open 'humanitarian corridors' or an 'air bridge' from Chad to Darfur. But since humanitarian NGOs were already managing to provide aid inside Darfur, he proposed a peacekeeping effort in eastern Chad instead, aimed primarily at victims of violence from Darfur. His activist allies in the French umbrella group Urgence Darfour publicly criticized the change of direction, accusing him of abandoning his humanitarian ideals.

In a series of statements to the media, Kouchner revealed his confusion about the facts on the ground. Not only did he incorrectly present the Chadian violence as originating from Sudan, but he insisted on prioritizing the protection of the Darfur refugee camps (although these are in many ways much safer than rural areas in eastern Chad) and repeatedly confused the Darfur refugees with the new Chadian IDPs (Tubiana, 2009). He also confused the peacekeeping operation in Chad with the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which is quite separate.¹³⁴

Although media reports similarly confused civilians in Chad and CAR as victims of Darfur-patterned violence, this did not reflect the dynamics in the Darfur–Chad–CAR triangle driving the violence that led to these new displacements. Cross-border activity was limited to the raids by Sudanese-backed

Chadian rebels from Darfur to Chad, and by some Chadian-supported Darfur rebel groups from Chad to Sudan. This military activity had almost no impact on civilians. Violence in south-eastern Chad did involve militia attacks on villages and fighting among rival militias, but was only marginally linked to the Darfur conflict (Tubiana, 2009). The violence in north-eastern CAR is due largely to internal problems. Thus the deployments of EUFOR and later MINURCAT were wrongly justified by cross-border violence. As Marchal (2009) writes, 'it took months for EUFOR to accept that most of the violence and insecurity in eastern Chad was coming from Chad, not Darfur'.

Neither the EU nor the UN force had the ability to address the internal causes of conflict in south-eastern Chad, which would have involved them deeply in local conflict resolution. Nor did they have the capacity or ambition to solve the proxy war between Chad and Sudan fought via rebel groups, as this would have brought the international forces into confrontation with the Chadian government. Before accepting EUFOR, the Chadian government had made sure the force would have neither a political mandate nor one to operate in areas immediately bordering Darfur, where it could have hindered Darfur rebel activities (Lanz, 2011). Similarly, when MINURCAT took over, France made it clear that its Chadian ally would not accept a force with a political mandate (Marchal, 2009).¹³⁵

Thus, although the EU (in particular France) presented EUFOR to Chad and the rest of the world as a solution to a cross-border conflict, the force paid little attention to cross-border attacks by the Chadian and Darfur rebels. Indeed, EUFOR and MINURCAT were cross-border peacekeepers only insofar as they had a presence in both Chad and north-eastern CAR. But the CAR–Chad border mattered little to them, since the dynamics there were relatively unimportant compared to those on the Chad–Sudan border (the CAR–Sudan border remained a marginal concern as well). And neither EUFOR nor MINURCAT was present in Sudan.

Rebels were not deterred by the peacekeepers' presence: even after the EUFOR deployment, the Chadian rebels launched a major attack in May 2009 (Marchal, 2009; Tubiana, 2009). Furthermore, EUFOR did nothing to prevent attacks by Darfur rebels from Chad on Sudan, the most significant being JEM's raid on Khartoum in May 2008. Neither EUFOR nor MINURCAT asked the Chadian

government to stop providing massive and visible support to JEM, in particular in Am Djéress village in north-eastern Chad, 100 km from the border. Nor did they ask UNAMID, their partner on the Sudanese side, to act on the issue of Chadian rebels based in Darfur, although UNAMID has consistently engaged Sudan authorities on addressing Chadian armed opposition issues.

Even according to the limited terms of their mandates, the achievements of EUFOR and MINURCAT are questionable. The forces focused on the displaced population in south-eastern Chad, which presented the most acute humanitarian crisis (although again only marginally linked with Darfur). Despite Kouchner's repeated claims that the international forces had allowed the return of the IDPs, the number of IDPs remained constant throughout EUFOR's and MINURCAT's existence (Tubiana, 2009). This soon became embarrassing for the forces' backers, who said they should be judged on the number of returns (Marchal, 2009). General Oki Dagache, Président Déby's representative to MINURCAT, claimed that of some 180,000 IDPs 'more than 100,000 people had returned home'. This compares with about 40,000 returnees, according to the UN and NGOs such as Oxfam. Some NGOs present in Chad and a number of MINURCAT officials think even this lower number is optimistic.¹³⁶ According to one of these officials, 'MINURCAT, like EUFOR, claimed it should be evaluated on the returns, and no return happened.'¹³⁷

The Chadian government's evaluation of EUFOR and MINURCAT is even more negative. It had only accepted the international force because it thought peacekeepers would act as force multipliers, freeing up Chadian government troops for the fight against the Chadian rebels. General Dagache noted: 'we accepted the international force to relieve our own armed forces so that they could concentrate on the defence of the territory.'¹³⁸ Another Chadian official who witnessed negotiations with Kouchner said that 'Kouchner let us believe our border with Sudan would be closed'.¹³⁹ But EUFOR, and even French general Jean-Philippe Ganascia, who led the operation in Abéché, wanted to prove its neutrality and its autonomy from France—even though 2,100 of its 3,700 troops were French (Marchal, 2009; Lanz, 2011). The force showed no intention of opposing Chadian rebel incursions.

The Chadians could not oppose a European force strongly backed by its French ally, but gave early and clear signals that 'they did not wish it to be replaced by a UN force'.¹⁴⁰ According to one MINURCAT official,

*Chad's consent to MINURCAT was obtained under pressure or friendly persuasion . . . dragged by Kouchner. The Chadians were not convinced; they grudgingly accepted this. We should not have been surprised when they asked us to leave.*¹⁴¹

Indeed, Chadian disappointment at the inability of international forces to play even a deterrent role against rebel raids is the reason Chad asked the UN to withdraw MINURCAT at the end of its mandate on 15 March 2010. 'The mission's performance was not up to our expectations,' said General Dagache.¹⁴²

In contrast to the Chadian government's position, the Chadian rebels opposed EUFOR, which they saw as a French force aimed against them, but were supportive of MINURCAT, which they did not view as a threat. In 2009, during confidential talks in Geneva with the EU, the United States, and the Swiss government, the UFR had even proposed that MINURCAT be the guarantor of a joint disarmament of rebel and Chadian troops (see Box 2). According to Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, this unrealistic proposal could have heightened N'Djaména's antipathy towards MINURCAT.¹⁴³ In 2010 UFR spokesman Abderahman Koulamallah criticized the decision to withdraw the force (AFP, 2010c).

The Chadian demand for withdrawal came as a blow to the UN force. One MINURCAT official described how

*EUFOR had withdrawn with everything; only its Irish troops converted to MINURCAT. With the usual UN delays, it took almost one year to bring vehicles, food, water, and translators. With no translators, the Ghanaian troops had been unable to speak with anyone for ten months. So in February 2010 we just started to have enough troops and equipment to become operational and the security even started to improve, and that was when the Chadians said: leave!*¹⁴⁴

Following negotiations between Chad and the UN, a withdrawal calendar was established under Security Council Resolution 1923, unanimously approved on 25 May 2010.¹⁴⁵ MINURCAT would reduce its military component from 3,300 to 2,200 men (1,900 in Chad and 300 in CAR) before July 2010, and in October start a withdrawal of both its military and civilian components (the latter of 1,000 personnel), to be completed by 31 December 2010 (AFP, 2010b). The Chadian government had indicated that it would accept a prolongation of the civilian

component (UNSC, 2010). Some UN negotiators admit that they made a mistake in insisting that the civil and military components could not be separated—in the end both had to withdraw in haste after achieving very little.¹⁴⁶

According to a MINURCAT official, 'France didn't lift a finger when the Chadian government first asked for our withdrawal in January 2010.'¹⁴⁷ France and the EU were happy to end EUFOR after one year, claiming it a 'success' (Marchal, 2009). But once Chad had accepted MINURCAT, thanks to French pressure, Europe appeared indifferent to the fate of the UN force. European officials might have even enjoyed the favourable comparison that could be made between the European and UN peacekeeping experiences. France and the United Kingdom were, however, the two Security Council permanent members to seek the renewal of the UN force's mandate until the end of 2010.

By the time MINURCAT took over, the Chadian government's position had changed. It required less international support and so was less sensitive to Western pressure. 'The situation has changed: the Chadian government now feels much more in control', a MINURCAT official said in November 2010.¹⁴⁸ N'Djaména did not need foreign support to ward off the UFR raid of May 2009 (Tubiana, 2010a). It now sought to demonstrate that it could protect the civilian populations, including the Darfur refugees, by itself. As a consequence, MINURCAT's renewed but shortened mandate was deprived of its previous main focus, the protection of civilians. According to a MINURCAT official, 'Our instinctive distrust of the Chadians' capacity to ensure security on their own territory legitimately irritated them.'¹⁴⁹

Now less sensitive to French pressures, Chad paid more attention to its immediate neighbours, Sudan and Libya. Tripoli did not welcome an international force on its southern border (this holds for UNAMID in Darfur as well).¹⁵⁰ This might be explained by the perception, common in the region, that international (UN and even more so European) peacekeeping missions are tools of a Western 'imperialist' or 'neo-colonial' agenda, and by the fact that France reportedly refused Tripoli's offer to provide troops to MINURCAT (ICG, 2009, p. 21). ▣

IV. Darfur rebels after the rapprochement

From Chad to Libya: JEM's regional backers

Between 2005 and 2009 Chad was the major external supporter of the Darfur armed opposition. Following the rapprochement, Darfur groups had to look for new friends in a region that had become more turbulent than ever. The most significant new dynamic was the prospect of South Sudan breaking 50 years of seemingly untouchable colonial borders to become Africa's newest state.

JEM still benefits from support from Beri kinsmen in Chad, but unofficially and 'underground', as in the period 2002–04.¹⁵¹ Chadian forces reportedly refused to participate in planned joint operations with Sudanese army forces against JEM at the border between Chad and North Darfur in late 2010.¹⁵² Chadian opposition forces claim Chadian Beri officers in the joint Chad–Sudan border patrol sent vehicles to JEM forces in North Darfur. They also assert that vehicles and arms, including 106 mm recoilless rifles and French–German Milan anti-tank missiles, given by Libya to the Chadian army or bought by the Chadian government from other countries, were found with JEM.¹⁵³

On 24 December 2010 President Déby removed his half-brother Timan from his position as sultan of their Bideyat Bilia tribe and took the title himself.¹⁵⁴ Timan Déby, related to Khalil Ibrahim through his mother and a grandmother, is known to be one of the main Chadian supporters of JEM and is very active from his 'capital' of Bahay on the border between Chad and North Darfur.¹⁵⁵ Although the president did not explain why he was dismissing his half-brother, Chadian Beri invoked Timan Déby's constant support of JEM, his anger with the president for having expelled Khalil, and even rumours of a possible plot by Khalil and Timan against the president. Similar rumours circulated when relations between President Déby and JEM were bad, in particular in 2003–04 and 2007, and since 2009.¹⁵⁶ JEM is said to still enjoy support from the Beri diaspora, which is considerable in particular in Libya and the Persian Gulf, as well as from Islamist networks.¹⁵⁷

Eritrea had also been an earlier supporter of the Darfur rebels, primarily by arming the SLA through the SPLM/A in South Sudan in 2003–04. In 2006–07 Asmara joined N'Djaména in attempting to unify the JEM and SLA factions into the National Redemption Front, and facilitated the supply of arms to the coalition (De Waal, 2008; Lewis, 2009, pp. 47–48; Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, pp. 53–59). Asmara's involvement seems to have since decreased and is currently limited to allowing JEM to maintain a symbolic presence (around 20 vehicles) in eastern Eritrea at the border with Sudan.¹⁵⁸ In late 2009, however, Eritrea invited JEM officials present at the Doha negotiations to meet the prominent Arab 'janjaweed' leader Musa Hilal, known for his autonomy from Khartoum and his openness to talks with the rebels.¹⁵⁹ In early 2011 an Eritrean envoy was sent to Kampala, Uganda, where he had meetings with SLA-AW, SLA-MM, and JEM representatives (the groups that were attempting rapprochement at the time), which fed rumours of renewed Eritrean support for the Darfur rebels. But it seems unlikely that Asmara could again become a major rebel supporter.

Libya's policy has been more ambiguous.¹⁶⁰ On the one hand, it has played a major mediation role in the region, hosting numerous negotiations since 2004, including talks between Khartoum and the Darfur armed opposition groups, among competing Darfur armed opposition forces, and between N'Djaména and the Chadian rebels. But Tripoli has sometimes supported armed parties—in particular, after 2007, the Beri SLA-Unity, one of whose leaders, Osman Bushra, had long lived in exile in Libya.

In 2009 Libya managed to unify several armed opposition factions (mostly SLA splinter groups) into a coalition called the Sudan Liberation Revolutionary Forces or the 'Tripoli Group'. Some of those factions subsequently joined the new LJM in Doha as an umbrella for negotiations with Khartoum. Tripoli's initial sympathy for the LJM waned as its components proved to be autonomous from their backers and did not support Libyan wishes to move the peace process from Qatar to Libya.

Khalil Ibrahim's expulsion from Chad to Libya in May 2010 provided a convenient means for Tripoli to switch its influence to the more powerful JEM, which left Doha when the rival LJM joined the peace process. Libya had had previous relations with JEM and is said to have armed the movement, through and together with Chad, before its 2008 raid on Khartoum.¹⁶¹ Sudanese govern-

ment sources claim that Libyan support has been underestimated because it was mostly channelled via Chad—although Khartoum has intercepted some direct aid.¹⁶² In any event, Tripoli has become JEM's main external and direct supporter since May 2009, reportedly giving Khalil vehicles, fuel, and arms such as B-10 recoilless rifles and anti-aircraft guns.¹⁶³

In June 2010 Khartoum closed its border with Libya, which it recognized was almost completely uncontrolled (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010d). In the meantime, between June and August it repeatedly claimed that Tripoli would quickly expel Khalil, but this did not happen (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010c; 2010e).

In early 2011, before the Libyan uprising, JEM approached international players to find another haven for Khalil, which gave them an opportunity to pressure the rebel leader to return to the Doha talks. After the uprising started, the JEM leadership publicly called for the UN to 'rescue' the movement's chairman.¹⁶⁴ The AU–UN Joint Mediation Support Team then tried to charter a plane to fly Khalil to Doha, but in late March 2011 it seems that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was still blocking his departure.

JEM estimates that its chairman's life might be put at risk by Khartoum's claims that JEM troops were among Gaddafi's alleged 'mercenaries' (Reuters, 2011). The Sudanese government, the Chadian government, and the Chadian rebels have all been spreading rumours that their respective enemies (Darfur rebels for Khartoum, Chadian rebels for N'Djaména, and the Chadian government for the Chadian rebels) were lending troops to Gaddafi. All sides have denied the accusations, pointing out that Gaddafi had already recruited a number of Darfurians and Chadians (including ex-Chadian rebels of the CDR) in his 'Islamic Legion' founded in 1972 (Hagggar, 2007). They claim there are enough migrants in Libya from Chad and Darfur from which Gaddafi can recruit 'mercenaries', while expressing fears that the involvement of these populations could bring reprisals from Libyan rebels against Sudanese and Darfur migrants.¹⁶⁵

JEM's initial inclination might have been to fight as proxy forces for Gaddafi, as it had done for Déby in Chad, in the hope of further support from Gaddafi against Bashir. The international intervention against the Libyan regime is likely to make JEM—which still suffers from the Islamist image of many of its leaders—think twice about doing so. JEM also insists that it has only a few cadres in Libya, including Khalil and his adviser, Izeddin Yusif 'Beji'.¹⁶⁶

The Libyan uprising may nevertheless provide JEM with opportunities to acquire arms from Gaddafi's abandoned armouries, a fear Sudanese defence minister Abderahim Mohamed Hussein implicitly expressed at a press conference in N'Djaména on 17 March 2011 (*Sudan Tribune*, 2011e). JEM troops are present in Wadi Howar, at the border between Sudan and Chad, which is some 1,000 km from the Kufra garrison in south-western Libya.

Missed opportunities in South Sudan

The SPLM/A's founder and first leader, Dr. John Garang, famously framed the rebellion as a Sudan-wide cause, articulating it as a fight of all the marginalized peripheries against the riverine elite. The SPLM/A attempted to open a Darfur front as early as 1991 under Daud Bolad, an ethnic Fur member of the SPLM. Bolad established some connections among Darfur's non-Arabs, but was killed by government forces that had been tracking him since his entry from South Sudan. His Darfur network collapsed with his death, delaying by many years the birth of a rebellion in western Sudan.

SPLM/A support for Darfur re-emerged in the early 2000s. Eritrea, at odds with the NCP and allied with the SPLM/A, acted as a conduit and meeting place. The SPLM/A's main northern leader, Yassir Arman, was then stationed in Asmara, from where he was able to build ties with Darfur opponents in exile represented in the umbrella National Democratic Alliance, including the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) headed by the Fur Ahmed Diraige, a popular ex-governor of Darfur in the 1980s, and the Zaghawa academic Sharif Harir. Hoping to create an SFDA armed wing in Darfur, Harir supported some future SLA leaders, notably his younger kinsman (and relative by intermarriage) Minni Minnawi (Tubiana, 2010c, pp. 125–26).

Even more clearly than Minnawi, the Fur lawyer Abdul Wahid Mohammed al Nur drew a clear ideological inspiration from John Garang. As an indication of this, in 2003 he rechristened his new Darfur Liberation Front the SLA. As the North–South Naivasha peace talks made more serious progress, the SPLM/A channelled support, notably from Eritrea, to the Darfur movement (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, p. 22).

The aim of this support was to weaken Khartoum's positions in the talks, but without threatening the peace process. The SPLM/A's primary strategic

interest was to secure the South's political future. When the Naivasha talks reached their critical phase in 2004, SPLM/A support for the Darfur rebels diminished; it largely evaporated after Garang's death in 2005 and Salva Kiir's increasing distance from his unitarian legacy (Lewis, 2009, p. 54). It was a difficult but important lesson for the Darfur rebels—the SPLM's ideological kinship went only so far. In the years that followed, the SPLM/A tried to play a role in Darfur from time to time, primarily as a political broker in support of unifying the Darfur rebels, but its efforts lacked focus. The senior leadership remained preoccupied with more pressing matters. But as tensions between the North and South escalated in the months prior to the 2011 referendum, Darfur re-emerged as a priority for the SPLM/A.

The Southern referendum and Darfur

As the Chad–Sudan rapprochement threatened to undermine the Darfur rebel movements, the referendum on Southern self-determination presented a potential lifeline. The weakened and divided rebels turned to Juba, looking for any opportunity to strengthen ties to the SPLM/A, including putting themselves at the South's disposal to use as proxies against the North. The SPLM in turn saw in the Darfur rebels a means of leverage against the NCP to ensure that the North lived up to its Comprehensive Peace Agreement commitments (Naftalin, 2011). The revitalization of ties between the SPLM/A and Darfur groups began in earnest in the summer of 2010. During the six months preceding the referendum, Juba became the main rear base for Darfur rebel politicians.

Some of the weaker Darfur splinter rebel groups had been migrating to the South even earlier. Former SLA-AW Fur leader Ahmed Abdeshafi, concurrently a formal SPLM party member and married to a Southerner in Juba, was the first. Having split with Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur in 2006 after the DPA, his faction was expelled from the common Jebel Marra stronghold in 2007. Although he had lost most of his troops, he partly recovered when he formed a new SLA wing in Juba in 2008 under SPLM auspices. Called the Juba Group (or SLA-Juba or the Juba Alliance), it is made up of a few hundred Fur and Masalit who received training but no arms from the SPLM.¹⁶⁷ Its lack of support inside Darfur forced it to remain in South Sudan, although it consistently sought

external diplomatic and logistical support to re-establish a foothold inside Darfur. A Masalit unit of this group led by the faction's chief of staff, Sadiq 'Masalit', was en route to South Darfur from South Sudan in December 2008 when the murder of its leader put an end to the expedition.

In April 2010 Ahmed Abdeshafi joined the newly formed LJM with only a few of his cadres—most stayed in Juba.¹⁶⁸ Formed in February 2010, the LJM is a coalition composed of various small SLA and JEM splinter groups, and is backed by Libya and the United States, each of which in the previous months had gathered most of the factions into two groups.¹⁶⁹ The AU–UN mediation hoped that the LJM would be broadly representative; negotiate with the government in Doha; and engage Darfur civil society, particularly in the IDP camps, which had quickly rejected the DPA (Murphy and Tubiana, 2010, pp. 8, 15).

To compete with Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur's popularity among his Fur kin in the camps, prominent Fur politician and ex-Darfur governor Dr. Tijani Sese was appointed LJM chairman upon the coalition's creation in February 2010. Sese and another Fur ex-governor from the 1980s, Ahmed Direige, had been considered possible leaders of the Chadian-backed National Redemption Front. The problem was that both Sese and Direige had spent a long time in exile and would not be accepted by the Fur fighters in the field (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, p. 58), and this remains an issue for Sese today.

Some splinter groups from the SLA-AW (including Fur leaders Babiker Abdallah,¹⁷⁰ Abdallah Khalil, and Ali Haroun Dud, the last from the SLA-A in Siro) went to Doha less to negotiate with the governments participating in the talks than to attempt to join a coalition with other factions. In Doha, their only choices were the LJM and JEM, and they were encouraged by the mediation to join LJM. They refused to do so and requested to be flown to Juba—not Darfur—in hopes of gaining SPLM/A support (and knowing that the mediation and UNAMID are better at flying anti-Doha rebels to Darfur than bringing them back).¹⁷¹

As the LJM moved forward into the Doha negotiations, some of its leaders, mostly former SLA commanders such as Ahmed Abdeshafi, also left Doha for Juba. In case the Doha talks failed, most of the LJM cadres prepared to go back to Juba or Kampala, Uganda—a long-time SPLM/A backer. If this occurs, the coalition's already divided components will probably fragment, but new coalitions could easily emerge—with the SLA-AW, the SLA-MM, or even JEM.

Thus SLA splinter groups already in Juba have resumed relations with their former 'secretary-general' Minni Minawi, the sole signatory of the DPA.¹⁷² Reports of Minawi's renewed ties to South Sudan emerged in late August–early September 2010.¹⁷³ At that time, the SLA-Juba met with SLA-MM officials together with Abdelgasim Imam al Haj, a former SLA-AW commander who joined the Sudanese government after the DPA, then left it in 2010, basing himself in Juba. The government publicized Minawi's relocation with his troops to South Sudan in October and accused the SPLM/A of giving them training. Fighting between Sudanese and SLA-MM troops in Khor Abeshe, South Darfur, occurred in the same month (GoS, 2010). Minawi left Khartoum for Darfur in the summer of 2010 and reached Juba in November, while some of his troops moved south of the North–South border in December. In reaction, President Bashir removed Minawi from his government post as head of the Darfur Transitional Authority on 5 December 2010; in reaction, Minawi declared the DPA 'dead' on 12 December (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010m; 2010o).

In spite of strong ideological affinities, Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur's relationship with the SPLM/A is complicated. The SPLA's withdrawal of support when the Darfur rebels needed it most angered the SLA. Abdul Wahid's subsequent rebuff of SPLA efforts to engage him in the Darfur negotiations has deepened the enmity. Nevertheless, the mainstream SLA has maintained a liaison office in South Sudan since the early days of the Darfur rebellion, as well as a presence in Nairobi, Kenya and Kampala, Uganda.

As the referendum approached, Abdul Wahid left France in November 2010 for an exceedingly rare trip to Nairobi and Kampala for consultations with some of his own cadres, the wider SLA movement, and others, ostensibly aimed at charting a new political course (including possibly joining the Doha talks). Although his relations with the SPLM/A remain distrustful, there are rumours, relayed by Khartoum, that he went from Kampala to Juba by road and met some of his forces relocated there on 22 November (Hussein Mohammed, 2010). Despite his unprecedented effort to stop the erosion of the SLA, the Fur leader seems more and more marginalized. Now France has barred him from returning to its territory.¹⁷⁴

JEM had been working even harder than the SLA leadership to locate alternative supporters as the Chad–Sudan rapprochement proceeded. The movement

has so far managed to survive its expulsion from Chad. An alliance between JEM and the SPLM/A is clearly a major concern in Khartoum, as expressed in the Sudanese government's *Special Report on the Presence of Darfur Movements' Elements in the South*, circulated at the end of 2010, which began:

Following Chad's change of stance and expulsion of JEM from its lands, besides the persuasion of JEM elements, all these factors instigated JEM elements to look for another alternative to attend to the movement and provides its forces with their needs such as weapons, ammunitions and fuel (GoS, 2010).

The document mentions that in August 2010 senior JEM representatives travelled to Kampala for a meeting with SPLA and Ugandan officials. The JEM delegation included Ahmed Tugod Lissan, the secretary for negotiations and peace affairs; Ahmed Adam Bakhit, the deputy chairman in charge of Darfur (sometimes called 'Darfur Governor'); and Mansur Arbab, the secretary for presidential affairs. Before he joined JEM in 2009, Arbab had been a close associate of his Masalit kinsman Khamis Abdallah Abakar, the former vice-president of the SLA, who is known to be close to the SPLM/A and Uganda. After this meeting, some JEM cadres travelled to South Sudan, including Bakhit, who went to Yei, south of Juba in Central Equatoria State, at the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They also included ex-SLA-MM commanders who had joined JEM, in particular Arko Suleiman Dahiya, Minni's ex-chief of staff and cousin (GoS, 2010).¹⁷⁵

The Sudanese government report claims that JEM established a small camp (25 combatants, armed with 23 AK-47s and 2 Goronov machine guns) in Gok Machar, the capital of Aweil North county of Northern Bahr al Ghazal state, not far from the border with South Darfur, under the 'complete custody' of the SPLA commander for the area (GoS, 2010). In January 2011 NISS director Mohamed Atta al Mula claimed JEM had moved forces to Western Bahr el Ghazal, at the tri-border area between CAR, North Sudan, and South Sudan, as well as into the Kafia Kingi enclave in the extreme south of South Darfur, one of the disputed areas of the North-South boundary.¹⁷⁶ He also accused some JEM leaders, including Suleiman Sendel, deputy chairman in charge of security, of being with these forces in the South. At the end of March 2011 Sendel was still reported to be in South Sudan, at the border with CAR.¹⁷⁷

According to Khartoum, JEM sought arms from the SPLA, including anti-aircraft guns (14.5 mm and ZU-23), 107 mm multiple-barrel rocket launchers, recoilless rifles (SPG-9 and B-10), RPG rocket launchers, other missiles, ammunition for AK-47 assault rifles, and Doshka and Goronov machine guns. The report asserts that the SPLA in turn provided JEM with an unknown number of AK-47s, 14.5 mm guns, 106 mm recoilless rifles, 107 mm rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft shells in November 2010 (GoS, 2010). In the same month, NCP secretary for political relations Mohamed Mandour al Mahdi accused the SPLM of forced recruitment for JEM among Darfurians residing in South Sudan (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010k).

There are also reports, relayed by Khartoum, that the SPLA and the Uganda Peoples Defence Force gave JEM recruits training in anti-tank weapons use in Uganda. The SPLA denied the accusations.¹⁷⁸ For its part, Uganda, together with the SPLM/A and the Darfur LJM, accused the Sudanese government of providing renewed support to the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). In September 2010 the LJM accused the LRA of attacking its troops in the Am Dafog area in southern South Darfur at the border with north-eastern CAR (where the LRA presence is well established) (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010a; 2010b; 2010f).

Khartoum has also criticized the SPLM for welcoming some JEM soldiers wounded in fighting in Darfur. In November 2010 some men were evacuated to South Sudan under the command of Ali al Wafi, a JEM spokesman, himself a Rizeigat Arab from Al Da'ein in South Darfur, not far from the border with Bahr al Ghazal (GoS, 2010). At this time, JEM was active in the North-South border areas of South Darfur, South Kordofan, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal.¹⁷⁹ The government report mentions clashes between JEM and SAF inside South Sudan (GoS, 2010). JEM's presence in the disputed border area between South Darfur and Northern Bahr al Ghazal made headlines when the Sudanese government responded with aerial bombing attacks against JEM, in particular on the village of Kiir Adem, some 50 km north of Gok Machar, in November and December 2010. Khartoum admitted the bombings of 14 November, but denied SPLM/A accusations of additional air attacks on 24 November and 6-8 December (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010j; 2010n; Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2010). On 21 March 2011, the government reportedly bombed what it claimed were JEM positions in the Raja area of Western Bahr al Ghazal.

In January 2011 Khartoum claimed to have found new documentary evidence of the SPLM/A providing logistical and training support to JEM after the capture of a JEM convoy in West Darfur. Present in the convoy was Ibrahim al Maz Deng, a Dinka Southerner who was a member of Hassan al Turabi's Popular Congress Party before joining JEM in 2008 and becoming its vice-president in charge of South Sudan (*Sudan Tribune*, 2011d).

Between November 2010 and January 2011 Khartoum officials, including Mohamed Atta al Moula and President Bashir himself, repeatedly criticized the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) for sheltering Darfur rebels and demanded their arrest (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010h; 2011a). Mohamed Mandour al Mahdi considered their presence in Juba 'a declaration of war' by the SPLM/A (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010k).

Western diplomats consider Khartoum's fears that JEM and other Darfur rebels are seeking SPLM/A and Ugandan support to have some basis in fact. But to most observers there is no evidence that either of these supporters is providing anything more than very light backing. Both the United States and UNAMID have been pressing the GoSS to expel Darfur rebels from its territory.¹⁸⁰ On the eve of the Southern referendum in January 2011 Salva Kiir tried to reassure his Western backers that he had expelled Darfur rebels, in particular Minni Minawi.¹⁸¹ But on 13 January Minawi himself provocatively said that the GoSS had not made any move to expel him or any other Darfur armed groups that had signed agreements with Khartoum (*Sudan Tribune*, 2011c). In fact, Minawi left Juba at the end of March 2011 and reportedly returned to his home area of Forawiya in north-western Darfur, but some of his troops were still in southern South Darfur at the border with South Sudan. In the meantime, rebel leaders opposed to both the DPA and the Doha talks were allowed to stay in Juba.¹⁸² However, pressure from Khartoum and abroad, and perhaps even more Bashir's accommodating stance after the referendum, pushed Juba to ask the Darfur rebels to be more discrete in their activities. As a consequence, Kampala became the main hub for Darfur rebel politicians from all movements (SLA-AW, SLA-MM, and JEM representatives there were even joined by LJM envoys) attempting to unite. Given the closeness of Uganda to the SPLM/A, it is unlikely that this move to Kampala will be sufficient to reassure Khartoum about the Darfur rebels' links with Juba.

South Kordofan: JEM's next field of operations?

The clashes in Northern Bahr al Ghazal were only the most visible part of the fighting between JEM and Sudanese government forces in South Kordofan during the same period (November–December 2010). Prior to its expulsion from Chad, JEM was already finding ways to expand its operations in Kordofan, including South Kordofan, one of the contested border areas between North and South Sudan.¹⁸³ JEM has long sought a foothold in Kordofan as a platform to achieve a national scope and to move closer to the geographical centre of the country. Often together with SLA Zaghawa factions, JEM attacked targets in Kordofan several times, including Hamrat ash-Sheikh in North Kordofan in July 2006, Wad Banda in West Kordofan in August 2007, and Chinese oil operations in South Kordofan in October and December 2007 (Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, p. 55; Fontrier, 2009, pp. 213–14).

As far back as 2004 JEM had established links with opposition groups in Kordofan, including the armed *al Shahama* ('valiant' or 'noble' in Arabic), founded in 2004 by Missiriya Arabs who had previously been members of Hassan al Turabi's Popular Congress Party (a common background with most JEM founders), and the less violent Kordofan Alliance for Development formed in 2006.¹⁸⁴ JEM recruitment from these movements and other Arabs of the region, in particular the prominent Missiriya and Hamar tribes, has increased since JEM's expulsion from Chad and will likely continue to grow with Missiriya dissatisfaction over the referendum and the ongoing dispute over Abyei. These links are demonstrated by the presence of the most recent head of the JEM delegation to the Doha negotiations, Mohamed Bahar Hamadein, a Kordofan Missiriya and JEM vice-president in charge of Kordofan.

Soon after sending a delegation to consider the possibility of rejoining the Doha talks, JEM reasserted its long-standing demand for Kordofan to be included in the Darfur peace negotiations, this time as a precondition for its participation in the peace process.

South Kordofan is an extremely sensitive area of North–South tension and contains a number of potential conflict flashpoints. It is unclear what JEM's current role and presence are in Abyei and the Nuba Mountains. But in drawing in new recruits, JEM must carefully weigh its alliances. For example, in Abyei, siding with the Missiriya who are in conflict with the Ngok Dinka, who

are in turn backed by the SPLM/A, threatens JEM's relationship with Juba. The reported presence of Chadian rebels in Abyei on the side of the Missiriya, if confirmed, would complicate matters further. Further east, the Nuba youth, feeling betrayed by the SPLM/A, might be keen to connect with JEM, but they would once again risk being forced to relinquish their local objectives for a wider agenda.

Post-secession fears

The Darfur conflict is now more connected than ever to South Sudan. For its part, the South appears content to dangle the offer of increased support, but will not make good on it at the risk of jeopardizing its self-determination. Despite JEM's efforts, it is difficult for it to escape its history as a northern, Islamist-oriented group and Khalil Ibrahim's previous role as a mujahideen against the SPLM/A (Baldo, 2009, p. 28). Opportunistic links will undoubtedly continue, but the chances of deeper cooperation seem small.

The attention of the international community has also predictably shifted to the South, as it did before the Darfur conflict. What is left over for Darfur—not to mention Chad or CAR—focuses on threats from Darfur to the North–South peace process more than on resolving Darfur's political conflict with the government. This reduced attention, combined with the mounting sense that a negotiated settlement for Darfur is extremely unlikely, the constant one-upmanship among Darfur rebel leaders, and the apparent success of the Southern referendum process, has the power to radicalize the political discourse in Darfur and move it towards demands for secession.

Only a small number of radical JEM splinter groups advocated Darfur's right to independence early in the conflict. While most Darfur civilians and rebels empathize with the South's right to secede, they regret it. They had hoped the South would have been their ally in a united Sudan, and now fear being left alone facing the centre. Recently, however, some of Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur's dissidents have openly questioned his Garang-style credo for a united Sudan.

In fact, the rebel movements and 'civil society' in Doha have called for combining Darfur's three states into one autonomous region, which Khartoum rejects as a precursor to eventual secession. (At the same time, if Darfur remains

within Sudan, its population will make up a greater proportion of the North when the South becomes independent.)

Many Darfur (and Chadian) rebels dream of the renewal of North–South conflict and the opportunities it would bring. If NCP–SPLA tensions flare into conflict, this reasoning goes, the Darfur rebel movements—and possibly even some of the Chadian rebels—could build new alliances with Southern forces and reinvigorate their armed struggle. ‘Better a good war in the South than a bad peace in Darfur’ is the often-heard refrain. From the perspective of the Chadian rebels, however, it is Southern secession, and Idriss Déby’s clear opposition to it, that tantalizes and inspires them—and other marginalized African communities. This explains the fear of many African leaders, not least in N’Djaména, about the emergence of an independent South Sudan. 📌

V. Extending and building on the rapprochement

Few predicted the onset and rapid advancement of the rapprochement between Chad and Sudan. On the contrary, most analysts believed that internal dynamics in each country would continue to drive the conflict. The kinship ties between Déby's inner circle and many of the Darfur armed opposition movements were perceived as a critical, long-term stumbling block. With Khartoum convinced that Déby's presidency in Chad would perpetuate the Darfur rebellion, an ever-deepening spiral of conflict appeared inevitable. Yet both countries managed to surmount those obstacles.

The stabilizing impact of the rapprochement on the armed rebellions in both countries is undeniable. The Chadian armed opposition forces are severely weakened, all but eliminating the immediate possibility of a violent overthrow of the Chadian government. The loss of Chad as a backer of Darfur armed opposition groups has also accelerated the already significant decline in their military options brought about by chronic infighting.

Despite these positive effects, Darfur armed opposition groups have managed to remain militarily relevant and have partly secured new means of support. JEM in particular is likely to continue to keep its options open for armed struggle. The Libyan uprising, dangerous for JEM in the short term, might also give Darfur rebels new opportunities for acquiring arms. A satisfactory peace process between the Sudanese government and the rebel movements, while elusive to date, remains vital. Policy towards Darfur should retain focus on the armed opposition groups, not as the only protagonists, but as continually relevant actors. Without renewed and strongly backed negotiations with the government, the Darfur rebels risk becoming a spoiler of North–South relations, thereby worsening regional stability.

Rapprochement itself has had some worrisome side-effects. The involuntary disarmament of Chadian rebels has injected a large number of fighters back into the already unstable communities of eastern Chad, Darfur, and CAR—and even possibly on both sides of the Sudanese North–South border. It remains

to be seen what new, unexpected alliances Chadian opposition leaders will seek in order to survive. It is not out of the question that they will forge links with their erstwhile enemies, the Darfur opposition forces, or transform themselves into pro-Sudanese government militias to be used in Darfur or South Sudan. Even if neither of these possibilities materializes, there are plenty of armed, politically directionless militias roaming Darfur to which the Chadian groups can add their number, increasing instability and preying on civilian populations.

At the same time, the rapprochement has left the political crisis that gave rise to the armed rebellion in Chad completely unaddressed. While some progress has been made in the form of national dialogue and upcoming elections, more movement toward democratization is needed. Since many Chadians view these processes as being fundamentally flawed, discouraging them from seeking peaceful political change, creating openings for political—rather than military—opposition will be vital to removing the oxygen of armed resistance. As such, the reform of Chadian governance is essential.

There are a number of openings for the international community to play constructive roles at this important juncture. The Chadian government has clearly reached the limit of what it can achieve in reintegrating ex-combatants from the opposition into its bloated army. International assistance can improve reintegration.

The rapprochement has not resolved the many local ethnic conflicts in eastern Chad, including conflicts between farmers and pastoralists, as well as between long-settled communities and newcomers. These continue to fuel instability and provide political cover for armed opposition. They are the primary cause of the displacement between 2005 and 2007 of some 180,000 Chadians, most of whom remain in IDP camps in eastern Chad to this day. If appropriately staffed and resourced with quick-impact funding, international actors could partner with the Chadian government to facilitate community-based dialogue and solutions supported by local relief and development programmes. Work to facilitate the return of displaced Chadians to their original homes should also continue, but will succeed only if it is linked with peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives.

The governments of Chad and Sudan have already taken a number of steps to extend the rapprochement and mitigate the inevitable reemergence of tensions,

notably through various agreements and plans to develop political and economic relations, including the creation of a joint company to explore for oil in the border regions. These agreements have now to be enforced or reinforced. Continued support for the joint border force (a mechanism that should be extended to the Sudan–CAR border) is one example, in addition to resuming direct flights between Khartoum and N'Djaména, rebuilding cross-border trade, supporting border markets, and creating a preferential economic zone between the two countries. Cross-border development programmes could also help to reinforce ties. Communities in these border areas, often isolated from their respective governments, are sometimes more proximate to neighbouring countries. Coordination would avoid development disparities, thus preventing migrations of people from less- to more-developed areas. Specifically targeting programming to nomads is vitally important.

These efforts would be a major incentive for displaced populations to return home. This concerns not just Chadian IDPs and Darfur refugees in Chad, but also the thousands of Arab nomads who left Chad for Darfur because of insecurity and underdevelopment in their home areas. Arab communities of Chadian origin have played an important role in successive conflicts in Darfur, and other non-Arab or sedentary communities, in particular among displaced populations, have repeatedly demanded their expulsion. In the event of the expulsion of these Arab newcomers (most probably only those who arrived during the war) becoming part of a peace deal between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels and/or civil society, or if some wish to return to Chad, the Chadian government ought to be prepared to deal with them. Providing security and development to all would-be returnees is essential.

Finally, improving rural security in Chad depends on the coordination of different international and national security reform and development initiatives. DDR and support to security forces such as the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* formed by MINURCAT should be coordinated with other programmes related to security and arms control. These include anti-poaching activities (notably through the newly formed brigade for the protection of the environment), the mitigation of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists, and the provision of development in rural areas, in particular for the nomads. Thus, providing security to the often heavily armed nomads during their migrations and

mitigating their conflicts with both settled communities and the environment (through deforestation and poaching) would improve general security. For all security and disarmament matters, a coercive approach should be mixed with incentives.

From President Déby's perspective, the immediate threat of overthrow by an externally backed armed group has declined dramatically. Yet Chad still faces considerable instability. Having steadfastly rejected political dialogue in favour of dismantling the rebellion, the danger is suppressed but not eliminated. In the meantime, many armed Chadian rebels remain scattered in Darfur or eastern Chad. With no means to sustain themselves, these armed groups will roam the volatile and lawless areas of Darfur and the tri-border area, preying on civilians or aligning themselves with whatever armed group is ascendant. If a new backer should emerge, these forces could easily coalesce once more into organized armed opposition. The Libyan uprising and the tensions along the future border between North and South Sudan are both adding to the regional instability and the risks of a renewed spread of arms to both Chadian and Darfur rebels. Neutralizing the armed groups is thus only a temporary solution. 🇳

Appendix 1. Chadian armed opposition groups and coalitions

Name	Leaders	Strength	Locations in the past	Relations with other groups
<p>Union des Forces de la Résistance/Union of Resistance Forces (UFR)</p>	<p>Timan Erdimi, a Beri from the Bideyat Bilia sub-group and a close cousin of President Idriss Déby. Since July 2010, Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye (see UFDD-F) as interim president.</p>	<p>At the movement's apogee in May 2009, UFR fighters were estimated at 6,000, with 600 vehicles. Numbers were reduced by half in September 2010 and by 80 per cent since October 2010.</p>	<p>West Darfur until May 2009, then the Kutum area of North Darfur. In the fall of 2010 remnants refusing disarmament sought shelter in the tri-border areas of CAR, South Darfur, and Chad.</p>	<p>Khartoum-backed coalition of eight main Chadian armed opposition groups.</p>
<p>Alliance nationale pour le changement démocratique/ National Alliance for Democratic Change (ANCD)</p>	<p>Mahamat Nouri, a Goran from the Anakazza sub-group.</p>	<p>See UFDD.</p>	<p>Mellit-Sayah area, north of El Fasher, North Darfur. In the fall of 2010 remnants refusing disarmament sought shelter in the tri-border areas of CAR, South Darfur, and Chad.</p>	<p>Founded in May 2010, the ANCD marked Nouri's formal withdrawal from the UFR. It presents itself as a coalition to rival the UFR, but in reality it is far narrower, comprising mostly the Goran (Nouri's ethnic group) core of the UFDD (see below), as well as Arab dissidents from groups that partly remained in the UFR, such as the CDR (see below) and UFDD-F (see below), or largely joined the government, such as the FSR (see below) and the CNT. A number of Ouaddaïan dissidents of the UFCD (see below) also joined the ANCD.</p>

<p>Rassemblement des forces pour le changement/Rally of the Forces for Change (RFC)</p>	<p>Timan Erdimi (see UFR).</p>	<p>When it was founded in February 2007, the RFC accounted for approximately 800 men, progressively dropping to nearly 400 in early 2009.</p>	<p>West Darfur, north of El Geneina (Hadjer Morfain Mountains), until May 2009 (see UFR).</p>	<p>A component of the UFR and the faction of its leader (see UFR), the RFC was itself an umbrella, mainly of groups of Bert defectors from the Chadian army (the principal movement within it being the Socle pour le changement, l'unité et la démocratie/ Platform for Change, Unity, and Democracy, established in October 2005), as well as of Ouaddaïan splinter groups of the FUC.</p>
<p>Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement/ Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)</p>	<p>Mahamat Nouri (see ANCD).</p>	<p>In early 2009, Nouri commanded approximately 200 vehicles and 2,000 men. Two years later he retains little more than a handful of vehicles and men.</p>	<p>West Darfur until May 2009, then North Darfur, first the Kutum area until late 2009, then the Mellit–Sayah area.</p>	<p>Founded in October 2006, the UFDD was itself a major coalition, but after several splits, was reduced to Nouri's group, the Union des forces pour le progrès et la démocratie. It then became a component of three successive coalitions, the AN, led by Nouri, between February 2008 and January 2009; then the UFR until May 2010; and finally the ANCD.</p>
<p>Union des forces pour le changement et la démocratie/ Union of Forces for Change and Democracy (UFCD)</p>	<p>Adouma Hassaballah Djadareb, half-Arab, half-Ouaddaïan.</p>	<p>Before being largely disarmed in October 2010, this faction numbered around 1,500 mostly Ouaddaïan combatants, making it the main fighting force of the UFR (and thus the entire Chadian opposition).</p>	<p>See UFR.</p>	<p>Formerly the vice-president of the UFDD, Adouma Hassaballah broke away to found the UFCD in March 2008. He joined the UFR to become its first vice-president. Some splinter groups joined the ANCD.</p>

Name	Leaders	Strength	Locations in the past	Relations with other groups
UFDD-Fondamentale (UFDD-F)	Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye , a Missiriya Arab. Initially, the UFDD-F operated a rotating presidency among Makaye, Acheikh Ibn-Omar Saïd (see below), and Amin Baraka (the last returned to Chad and serves as an adviser to the prime minister).	1,000 combatants in May 2009.	See UFR.	The UFDD-F splintered from the UFDD in May 2007. It rejoined Mahamat Nouri in the AN between February 2008 and January 2009, then the UFR, of which Makaye became second vice-president, and later, after Tirman Erdimi and Adouma Hassa-ballah were expelled to Qatar in July 2010, interim president. Some splinter groups joined the ANCD.
Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire/ Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR)	Acyl Ahmat Aghbach , an Awlad Rashid Arab, until his death in 1982, then Acheikh Ibn-Omar Saïd, also an Awlad Rashid Arab, who revived his old movement when he joined the Chadian armed opposition in Sudan in 2006. When the UFR was founded in January 2009, he left the leadership and the name of the CDR to al Badur Acyl Ahmat Aghbach, son of the late first leader of the movement.	A few hundred.	See UFR.	A component of several successive coalitions: the UFDD between October 2006 and May 2007, then the UFDD-F, whose rotating presidency Acheikh quickly gave up to return to France as a political refugee, to become the UFR's representative in Europe when the coalition was founded (see above). The CDR joined the UFR, of which al Badur Acyl Ahmat became commissioner for external affairs, and then splintered into the ANCD, but he was not followed by all his forces.

<p>Front pour le salut de la république/ Front for the Salvation of the Republic (FSR)</p>	<p>Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, an Arab from the Rizeigat Mahamid branch.</p>	<p>1,000 combatants in 2008–09.</p>	<p>West Darfur and Sudan–Chad–CAR tri-border.</p>	<p>Founded later than the other movements in 2007, the FSR was first allied with the marginal FPRN (see below) before joining Mahamat Nouri's AN, then the UFR for only a very short time. Just one week after the foundation of the coalition in January 2009, Soubiane challenged Timan Erdimi's leadership and opened direct negotiations with N'Djaména via Libya, resulting in his return to the government in July 2009. Some remnants joined the ANCD.</p>
<p>Front populaire pour la renaissance nationale/Popular Front for National Rebirth (FPRN)</p>	<p>Adoum Yacoub 'Kougou', a Ouaddaian of Goran origin and veteran of Chadian armed opposition.</p>	<p>At its peak between May 2009 and April 2010 the FPRN had only a few hundred combatants, although these possessed significant military experience.</p>	<p>Sudan–Chad–CAR tri-border.</p>	<p>Founded in 2001, the FPRN gathered elements from among the early armed groups opposing the government of Idriss Déby in the 1990s, in particular the ANR. Together with Ouaddaian forces, it included Masalit elements who decided to turn their movement against the Government of Sudan to support their Darfurian kin of the SLA. This prevented the FPRN from obtaining any Sudanese support until it joined the UFR between January and May 2009. Between 2005 and 2009 the FPRN attempted to coordinate with other marginal rebel groups active at the border between southern Chad and CAR, in particular the MPRD, one of the few movements active in southern Chad, led by Djibrine Dassert.</p>

Source: HSBA (n.d.c.)

Appendix 2. Chad–Sudan rapprochement timeline

2009

August Dr. Ghazi Salahaddin, the Sudanese government representative for the Darfur negotiations, and Moussa Faki Mahamat, the Chadian minister of foreign affairs, hold exploratory talks in Tripoli under Libyan auspices.

September Ghazi and Moussa Faki meet again in side talks during the UN General Assembly session in New York, this time with Dr. Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the Sudanese second vice-president.

October President Omar al Bashir sends Ghazi to N'Djaména with a message for President Idriss Déby.

December Chad sends a delegation to Khartoum led by Moussa Faki to discuss the restoration of diplomatic relations.

26 December Sudan and Chad agree to enforce border controls on each other's armed movements. Within days, Darfur-based Chadian armed opposition groups move away from the border, heading deep into Darfur.

2010

January Khartoum and N'Djaména sign a 'normalization agreement' (Accord de N'Djaména), reopening the border for the first time since 2003 and establishing a 3,000-strong joint border force operating under a joint command that will alternate its base every six months between El Geneina in Darfur and Abéché in eastern Chad. Chad asks the UN Security Council not to renew MINURCAT's mandate, set to expire on 15 March.

8–9 February Déby visits Khartoum for talks with Bashir, resuming the warm personal relationship they enjoyed before the insurgency. Both presidents seem

more serious than ever about their intentions to stop the proxy war. Déby reiterates his intention to end MINURCAT's mission, which he considers a 'failure'.

20 February Under Chadian pressure, JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim signs a 'framework agreement' and ceasefire with Ghazi in N'Djaména. The agreement is then sent to Doha to be signed by the representatives of the parties at the official talks there. Soon after, N'Djaména orders JEM to move its fighters out of Chad.

March Chad and Sudan deploy a joint force of 1,500 men each along their common border.

23 April After difficult negotiations, Chad and MINURCAT reach an agreement on the latter's withdrawal.

May Mahamat Nouri officially breaks with the UFR to form his own coalition, the ANCD.

19 May Denied permission to transit through Chad to Darfur, Khalil and other JEM members are detained at N'Djaména airport for 19 hours and then sent back to Libya. Sudan asks neighbouring states not to receive him—but reportedly declines a Chadian offer to arrest him and hand him over.

25 May Adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council, Resolution 1923 directs MINURCAT's withdrawal in two stages: its 3,300-strong military component is to be reduced to 2,200 (1,900 in Chad, 300 in CAR) before mid-July; after mid-October, the remaining forces and the civilian component are to be gradually withdrawn. All personnel are to be gone by 31 December. Notably, MINURCAT's mandate is renewed, but without its main former focus, the protection of civilians. The Chadian government claims it will fulfil this function by itself.

July Khartoum asks the main Chadian armed opposition leaders, including Timan Erdimi, Mahamat Nouri, and Tahir Guinassou, to leave its territory. Together with Adouma Hassaballah Djadareb, the three are sent to Qatar two days before Bashir's visit to N'Djaména. Shortly thereafter, a first wave of Chadian armed opposition members, mostly from Nouri's ANCD, are flown back to N'Djaména.

September After a visit to Khartoum, the Chadian 'national mediator', Abderahman Moussa, returns to N'Djaména with a second wave of armed opposition defectors.

October The voluntary disarmament of some 2,000 UFR fighters takes place in El Fasher, North Darfur.

November A few days after returning to Chad from Qatar, following separate negotiations with Chadian officials in Ethiopia en route, Tahir Guinassou is arrested together with Tahir Wodji, UFR ex-chief of staff, and three other armed opposition leaders.

2011

January South Sudan referendum on self-determination is conducted largely peacefully.

13 February First parliamentary elections in Chad since 2001.

Endnotes

- 1 Beri is the term used by the group itself; Zaghawa and Bideyat are the terms used by Arabic speakers.
- 2 Author interviews with ex-Chadian rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 3 Statement of General Dagache at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad, organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 4 Author interview with SLA-AW military spokesman Nimir Mohamed Abderahman, Nairobi, June 2010.
- 5 Author interview with Suleiman Jamous, London, June 2008.
- 6 Author interview with Union des forces de la résistance (UFR) interim president Abdul Wahid About Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 7 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 8 On 3 February France offered to evacuate Déby, but he refused categorically (Fontrier, 2009, p. 230).
- 9 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2009, and Paris, June 2010.
- 10 Author interview with a JEM leader, Abéché, March 2007.
- 11 Déby did manage to secure a verbal agreement to (military and media) non-aggression among the JEM factions, however (Author interview with a Chadian official, N'Djaména, March 2010).
- 12 Author interview with a JEM leader, Paris, June 2008.
- 13 Author interviews with Chadian officials and JEM leaders, N'Djaména and Abéché, January 2008, May 2009, and April and November 2010. See De Waal (2008).
- 14 Some of the Darfur rebel factions claim that Sultan Timan Déby and General Abderahim Bahar Mahamat Itno—both close relatives of President Déby, although not necessarily acting with his consent—gave JEM between 50 and 80 vehicles that had been taken from the Chadian rebels during their failed raid in February (Author interview with Darfur rebel leaders, Paris, April 2008).
- 15 Author interview with Chadian presidency official, N'Djaména, May 2009; see Fontrier (2009, p. 251).
- 16 Author interview with a former Chadian rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 17 Author interviews with Chadian officials, March–April 2010.
- 18 UFR leaders recognized Timan Erdimi's round-shaped signature, nicknamed the 'globe'. But they say the document was likely to have been leaked to the Chadian government rather than found in a captured car. The figure of 20,000 Goronov machine guns seems much too high to be correct (Author interviews with UFR leaders, Khartoum, December 2009, and Paris, December 2010).
- 19 Author interview with a former Chadian rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 20 For example, in late 2008 Mahamat Nouri's UFDD received 12.7 mm machine guns, 106 mm recoilless rifles, and rockets for 107 mm and 122 mm multiple rocket launchers. Shortly after receiving the equipment, Chadian rebels were trained in surface-to-air missile and guided

- anti-tank missile use at training sites in West Darfur, in the presence of Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service personnel (UN, 2009, pp. 28–29).
- 21 Author observations in Kornoy area, May 2009, and author interviews with JEM rebels, Kornoy area, May 2009, and ex-rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 22 Author interview with Nimir Mohamed Abderahman, Nairobi, June 2010.
- 23 Author interviews with Chadian rebels, Paris, July and September 2010, and Khartoum, December 2010; and with ex-rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 24 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 25 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 26 Author interview with a UFR leader, Paris, June 2010.
- 27 Author interview with UFR interim president Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 28 Author observations in Kornoy area and interviews with JEM rebels, including some who had participated in the Kornoy battle, Kornoy area, May 2009, and N'Djaména, Abéché, and Birak, March–April 2010. For descriptions of the battle of Kornoy and of Kornoy garrison after JEM raid, see Tubiana (2010c, pp. 295–321).
- 29 Author interviews with JEM rebels, including some who had participated in the Am Boru battle, N'Djaména, Abéché, and Birak, March–April 2010.
- 30 Author interview with a Chadian official, N'Djaména, March 2010.
- 31 Author interview with Djibril Bassolé, Doha, July 2010. See Murphy and Tubiana (2010).
- 32 Author interview with an official of the French minister of foreign affairs, November 2008. See Tubiana (2010a).
- 33 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 34 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Paris, September and November 2010, and Khartoum, December 2010.
- 35 Author interview with a former Chadian rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 36 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Paris, November 2010, and Khartoum, December 2010. See Flint (2010, p. 42).
- 37 Author interviews with Chadian officials, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 38 Author interviews with Chadian officials and JEM cadres, N'Djaména, March–April 2010.
- 39 See above, and Tubiana (2008a, p. 26).
- 40 Author interview with a JEM cadre, N'Djaména, March 2010. See Tanner and Tubiana (2007, pp. 60–62).
- 41 Author interview with a Beri general, N'Djaména, March 2010.
- 42 Author interview with a JEM cadre, N'Djaména, March 2010.
- 43 Author interview with a Chadian Beri official, N'Djaména, March 2010.
- 44 Author interview with Chadian foreign affairs minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 45 Author interview with Chadian foreign affairs minister Moussa Faki Mahamat and the intervention of Moussa Faki at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 46 Author interview with Chadian foreign affairs minister Moussa Faki and the intervention of Moussa Faki at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.

- 47 Author interview with a Chadian official, N'Djaména, March 2010 (see Tubiana, 2010a); interview with Chadian foreign affairs minister Moussa Faki Mahamat; and the intervention of Moussa Faki at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 48 Intervention of Moussa Faki Mahamat at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 49 Author interview with a Chadian official, N'Djaména, March 2010.
- 50 Intervention of Moussa Faki Mahamat at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 51 Author interviews with UFR leaders, including Acheikh Ibn-Omar Saïd, Paris, September 2010.
- 52 Author interview with a UFR leader, Paris, December 2010. Most of the factions were originally based in West Darfur, in particular north of the state capital, El Geneina. They moved southward to the Habila area in March 2009 in preparation for the May raid.
- 53 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2009 and December 2010, and Paris, December 2010.
- 54 UNAMID confidential report, 6 June 2010; author interviews with UFR leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 55 Author interviews with an SLA-Ain Siro commander, Doha, July 2010, and a UFR leader, Paris, December 2010.
- 56 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 57 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Paris, September 2010.
- 58 These are the five leaders who were 'expelled' from Sudan, but some rebel leaders say the list might have included a further ten leaders (Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum and Paris, December 2010).
- 59 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 60 Author interview with National Mediator Abderahman Moussa, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 61 Author interview with National Mediator Abderahman Moussa, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 62 Author interviews with Western diplomats, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 63 Author interviews with former Chadian rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 64 Author interview with a Chadian official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 65 Author telephone interview with a Chadian rebel leader, January 2011.
- 66 Author interview with a former Chadian rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 67 Author interviews with Chadian National Mediator Abderahman Moussa and with a Chadian former rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010. Most of the men who came with Soubiane were Sudanese combatants, notably Arab 'janjaweed' who integrated into the FSR—a clear sign that Soubiane and his men were expecting a significant reward from the Chadian government (Author interview with a former Chadian rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010).
- 68 Author interviews with Chadian rebels, Khartoum, December 2010, and ex-rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 69 Author interview with a former Chadian rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 70 Author interview with a former Chadian rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 71 Between 500 and 600 ex-rebels took flights from Sudan to Chad, chartered by N'Djaména and Khartoum (Author interview with Chadian foreign affairs minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, N'Djaména, November 2010).

72 Author interviews with Chadian officials and a Western diplomat, N'Djaména, November 2010.
73 Author interviews with Chadian officials and Western diplomats, N'Djaména, November 2010,
and UFR interim president Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
74 Author interviews with Chadian rebels, Khartoum, December 2010, and ex-rebels, N'Djaména,
November 2010.
75 Author interviews with Chadian presidency officials, November 2010.
76 See <http://www.presidencetchad.org/Decrets/decret_013_2011.html>.
77 Author interview with a Chadian ex-rebel leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
78 Author interview with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
79 Author interviews with UFR delegates to the talks, Paris and Khartoum, December 2010.
80 Author interview with Chadian foreign affairs minister Moussa Faki Mahamat and the in-
tervention of Moussa Faki at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the
Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010. See
Sudan Tribune (2010h).
81 Author interview with National Mediator Abderahman Moussa, N'Djaména, November 2010.
82 Author interviews with Western diplomats, N'Djaména, November 2010.
83 Author interviews with National Mediator Abderahman Moussa, N'Djaména, November 2010,
and with UFR interim president Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
84 Author interviews with Tibesti governor Wardogou Bollou, National Mediator Abderahman
Moussa, and Foreign Affairs Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, N'Djaména, November 2010.
85 Author interviews with Chadian rebels, Khartoum, December 2010, and ex-rebels, N'Djaména,
November 2010; see also Tubiana (2008a, p. 52; 2009).
86 Author interviews with ex-Chadian rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
87 Author interviews with ex-Chadian rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
88 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
89 Author interview with a Chadian official, N'Djaména, March 2010. See Tubiana (2010b,
pp. 217–18, 222).
90 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
91 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
92 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
93 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
94 Author interviews with North Darfur SLA leaders, Doha, July 2010.
95 Author e-mail and telephone calls with non-Arab Chadian rebel leaders, January 2011.
96 From the group of Missiriya Jebel leader Nureddin (Addin) Mohamed Mahir, who defected
from JEM during the May 2010 government attack on his Jebel Mun base.
97 Author interview with JEM leaders, Paris, January 2011, and telephone call with a non-Arab
Chadian rebel leader, January 2011.
98 JEM claims it received this information through one of its prisoners from the Sudanese army
(Author interview with JEM leaders, Paris, January 2011).
99 Author interview with UFR secretary-general Abakar Tollimi, Khartoum, December 2009.
100 Author interviews with an SLA-Ain Siro commander, Doha, July 2010, and Abdul Wahid
Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010. See Tubiana (2010c, pp. 231–36).
101 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010. See Tanner
and Tubiana (2010, p. 30).

- 102 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 103 Author interviews with Saleh Adam Ishag, N'Djaména, March 2010, and Doha, July 2010.
- 104 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Paris, June 2010.
- 105 Author interview with Saleh Adam Ishag, N'Djaména, March 2010.
- 106 Author interview with Saleh Adam Ishag, N'Djaména, March 2010.
- 107 Author interview with Saleh Adam Ishag, N'Djaména, March 2010. See above.
- 108 Author interview with a UN official, location withheld, April 2010.
- 109 Author interview with Saleh Adam Ishag, Doha, July 2010.
- 110 Letter by the Council of Sayah authorities on the Chadian rebels present in the area, dated 6 January 2010.
- 111 Author interviews with JEM leaders, Abéché, April 2010, and UFR leaders, Khartoum, December 2009. See Tanner and Tubiana (2007, pp. 40–45).
- 112 Author interviews and telephone interviews with Chadian rebels, Khartoum, December 2010, and ex-rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010. JEM denies recruiting among ex-Chadian rebels and having connections with the UFR (Author interview with JEM leaders, Paris, January 2011).
- 113 Author interview with a JEM leader, Abéché, April 2010.
- 114 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 115 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Paris, June–September 2010.
- 116 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Paris, September 2010, and Khartoum, December 2010.
- 117 Author interview with a Chadian official, Paris, March 2010. President Déby granted Dasset an amnesty in January 2011, together with Tahir Guinassou and Tahir Wodji. See <http://www.presidentchad.org/Decrets/decret_013_2011.html>.
- 118 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Khartoum, December 2010, and telephone call and e-mails with Adoum Yacoub 'Kougou', January 2011.
- 119 Author interview with UFR politician Sheikh Mahamat Jarma, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 120 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 121 Author interviews with Chadian rebels, Khartoum, December 2010, and ex-rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 122 Author telephone interview with a Chadian rebel leader, January 2011.
- 123 Author interview with UFR leaders, Paris, November 2010, and Khartoum, December 2010. President Déby granted Jibrin Azzain amnesty in January 2011, together with Tahir Guinassou, Tahir Wodji, and Djibrine Dasset. See <http://www.presidentchad.org/Decrets/decret_013_2011.html>.
- 124 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 125 Author interviews with Chadian rebels, Khartoum, December 2010, and ex-rebels, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 126 Author interview with Timan Erdimi, Doha, December 2010.
- 127 Author telephone interview with an RFC leader and interview with JEM leaders, Paris, January 2011.
- 128 Author interview with UFR leaders, Paris, November 2010, and Khartoum, December 2010. See UNSC (2010, p. 8).

- 129 Adoum Yacoub 'Kougou' said he 'preferred for the moment neither to confirm nor deny the rumour of Chadian rebel presence in South Sudan' (Author e-mail and telephone interviews with Adoum Yacoub 'Kougou', January 2011).
- 130 See Communiqué du Comité d'investigation et de libération D'Adouma Hassaballah Djadalrab (2011).
- 131 Author telephone interview with Adoum Yacoub 'Kougou', January 2011.
- 132 Telephone interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, January 2011.
- 133 Sometimes called MINURCAT 2 to distinguish it from MINURCAT 1, the UN mission that was already serving as an umbrella for EUFOR, but was mostly training the *Détachement intégré de sécurité*, a new Chadian force composed of 850 police and gendarmes in charge of providing security in and around the 12 Darfur refugee camps in Chad.
- 134 'I went to Chad and Sudan to negotiate with Presidents Idriss Déby and Omar al Bashir the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Chad. They accepted it. The vote, at the initiative of France and the UK, of Security Council Resolution 1769 deciding the deployment in Darfur of this force [UNAMID] was the realization of this struggle for a greater security' (Kouchner, 2010; author's translation).
- 135 See also UNSC (2010, p. 13).
- 136 Interventions at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010. A December 2010 report by the UN secretary-general states that 43,000 IDPs had returned to their villages prior to the 2010 rainy season (July–September), with 137,500 IDPs remaining in the camps. See UNSC (2010, p. 1).
- 137 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 138 Intervention of General Dagache at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 139 Author interview with a Chadian official, Paris, March 2010.
- 140 Author interview with a EUFOR official, Paris, January 2009.
- 141 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 142 Intervention of General Dagache at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 143 Author interview with Abdul Wahid Aboud Makaye, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 144 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 145 Intervention of General Dagache at the Conference on Peace and Security in Chad organized by the Comité de suivi de l'appel à la paix et la réconciliation, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 146 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 147 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 148 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 149 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 150 Author interview with a MINURCAT official, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 151 Author interview with JEM leaders, Paris, January 2011.
- 152 Author interviews with an ex-JEM leader, N'Djaména, November 2010, and with UFR leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.

- 153 Author interviews with UFR leaders, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 154 See <http://www.presidencetchad.org/Decrets/decret_1093_2010.html> and <http://www.presidencetchad.org/Decrets/decret_1094_2010.html>.
- 155 Together with the rapprochement with Sudan, President Déby had increasingly sought support from his own mother's clan, the Gerikaura, as opposed to the Kolyala, Timan's mother's and their common father's clan.
- 156 Author interviews among the Beri diaspora, Paris, December 2010.
- 157 <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/darfur/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf>>.
- 158 Author interview with JEM leaders, Paris, January 2011. See Tanner and Tubiana (2007, p. 52).
- 159 Author interviews with JEM leaders, N'Djaména, March 2010. Hilal had been in contact with JEM through the Déby family at least since 2006 (see above). In the summer of 2010 there were rumours that Hilal was hoping to join JEM with several thousand troops. But according to JEM leaders, the Arab chief was only securing an agreement to allow his tribe's camels to reach the *jizzu* pastures in North Darfur, an area under rebel control. The 2010 rainy season was very good, allowing the greening of the desert after several years without *jizzu* (Author telephone interview with a JEM leader, January 2011).
- 160 See Flint (2010, p. 38); Marchal (2010, p. 88).
- 161 Author interview with a EUFOR official, Paris, January 2009.
- 162 E-mail from a Government of Sudan source, December 2011.
- 163 <<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/darfur/HSBA-Armed-Groups-JEM.pdf>>.
- 164 See Reuters (2011).
- 165 Among Darfur rebels, both JEM and SLA-MM have publicly expressed this concern.
- 166 Author interview with JEM leaders, Paris, January 2011.
- 167 Author interview with an SLA-Juba leader, Juba, June 2010. See HSBA (n.d.a).
- 168 Author interviews with SLA-Juba leaders, Juba, June 2010. See GoS (2010).
- 169 These were the Libyan-sponsored 'Tripoli Group' or Sudan Liberation Revolutionary Forces, and the Roadmap Group or Addis Ababa Group formed by the US special envoy with Ethiopian support.
- 170 Who died in Juba in early 2011.
- 171 Author interviews with SLA-AW splinter groups, Doha, July 2010, and telephone interviews with SLA-AW splinter groups in Juba, October–November 2010. See GoS (2010); Jibril (2010, p. 20).
- 172 Author telephone calls to Juba, October–December 2010, and interview with SLA-Unity chairman Abdallah Yahya, location withheld, November 2010. See GoS (2010).
- 173 Author interview with a former SLA-MM official, Khartoum, December 2010.
- 174 E-mail correspondence with a French diplomat, January 2011.
- 175 See also *Sudan Tribune* (2010h; 2010i).
- 176 On the Kafia Kingi enclave, see Thomas (2010).
- 177 E-mail from international observer in Darfur, March 2011.
- 178 Author interviews, Khartoum, December 2010.

- 179 Author interview with a former JEM leader, N'Djaména, November 2010.
- 180 Author e-mails and telephone interviews with Western diplomats, January 2011. See *Sudan Tribune* (2011b).
- 181 President Kiir notably told this to former US president Jimmy Carter, whose Carter Center sent observers for the referendum. See Carter Center (2011). See also *Sudan Tribune* (2011a; 2011c).
- 182 Author telephone interviews with Darfur rebel leaders based in Juba and Kampala, January and March 2011.
- 183 On these areas, see Johnson (2010).
- 184 Author interviews with JEM Kordofan leaders and combatants, Kornoy area, North Darfur. See Tanner and Tubiana (2007, p. 35); Fontrier (2009, p. 213); HSBA (n.d.b).

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