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CONTEXT ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SERBIA 1989-2009

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# List of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Security-Information Agency <em>(Bezbednosno-informativna agencija)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Democratic Oposition of Serbia <em>(Demokratska opozicija Srbije)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party <em>(Demokratska stranka)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia <em>(Demokratska Stranka Srbije)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpol</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav People's Army <em>(Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>Special Operations Unit <em>(Jedinica za specijalne operacije)</em></td>
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<td>MUP</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior <em>(Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDB</td>
<td>Directorate of State Security <em>(Resor državne bezbednosti)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>State Union of Serbia and Montenegro <em>(Državna Zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Security Service <em>(Služba bezbednosti)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SDB</td>
<td>Služba državne bezbednost <em>(State Security Service)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SID</td>
<td>Service for inquiry and documentation <em>(Služba za dokumentaciju i istraživanje)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>Serbian Communist Party <em>(Savez Komunista Srbija)</em></td>
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<td>SRJ</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia <em>(Savezna Republika Jugoslavija)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBA</td>
<td>Military Security Agency <em>(Vojnobezbednosna agencija)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>VJ</td>
<td>Army of Yugoslavia <em>(Vojska Jugoslavije)</em></td>
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<td>VOA</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Agency <em>(Vojnoobaveštajna agencija)</em></td>
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Preface

The first part of this publication presents a study of a broader social and political context in Serbia, in which the security sector transformed. The analysis encompass the period since the demise of communism in 1989 until 2010, as well as an examination of main political and security actors that influenced the process of SSR.

The second part of the publication presents the chronological overview of main events that marked and shaped the context in which the process of SSR took place in Serbia, in the period 1990-2009. The events listed in the Chronology are chosen based on the impact they had on the political system and the security sector, as well as on social and economic development.
Introduction

Serbia has passed a turbulent period in the past twenty years. This was the period of wars, economic breakdown, international sanctions, massive violations of basic human rights, and political assassinations. But this was also the period of democratic change, the period of return to the international scene, and most importantly, the period marking the beginning of social and political reforms. Together, the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century were also crucial for security sector reform in Serbia. This sector, in many ways, influenced the course of democratisation, but its actors were also instrumentalised by the political elites in the mentioned period. This is the reason why the reform of the security sector is one of the most important tasks but also one of the biggest challenges in the process of democratisation in Serbia.

In order to map and monitor the achievements and obstacles of security sector reform in Serbia, it is of utmost importance to understand the socio-political context within which this reform has been carried out. Therefore, it is our intention in this paper to analyse in an objective and systematic way, precisely the context that influenced the security sector and its reform, as well as the main course, obstacles, and the scope of security sector reform in Serbia during this period of time.

There are two almost equal periods that we will be analysing in this paper. The first is the period of Milošević’s rule from 1989 till 2000, and the second is the period after democratic changes from 2000 till 2010. The reason for a division into two large periods of time is the diametrically different character of political order developing through time, from authoritarian to pro-democratic, and paving the road to a fully-consolidated democracy.

The first period is characterised by the breakup of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the bloody wars which were consequence of this breakup. Another important part of this period is the time just after the Dayton Agreement and the end of the war, when Milošević tried to improve relations with Western countries playing the role of peace-maker. This period, unfortunately, did not last long and it ends with the Kosovo conflict, which pushed the country into war with NATO Alliance and re-
resulted in almost complete destruction of the country’s economy and infrastructure.

For the whole period of the first ten years of our analysis, the dominant context is authoritarian or if we want to define it more precisely – illiberal. Another constant of this period is the context of conflict, which only had a short break in the years after the Dayton agreement. The key actors in this period in Serbian socio-political life are ex-communist elites gathered around Milošević and his family, the state security forces, the gradually emerging opposition, and the international community. In the security sector, the military held the leading role, which it had to give back to secret services and police after a while. This period is also characterised by low public confidence in the security apparatus (except paradoxically in the military which always enjoyed great public confidence due to its connection to the people which resulted from the obligatory military service), state-centric concept of security, a weak state, infringement of human rights, pressure on the independent media, a weak opposition, and low levels of economic development, which put the population of Serbia on the brink of survival. All these factors resulted in the need for changes, which happened in 2000 - the starting year of our second period of analysis.

The period after the fall of Milošević is no less turbulent than the previous decade. It is characterised by the start of comprehensive reforms in Serbian society, the return of the country to international organisations after many years of isolation, and the proclamation of democratisation as the paramount goal of the new political elites. Unfortunately, some of the reforms were conducted inconsistently, since the battle for power among political actors dominated the political process. This led to the breakup of the ruling coalition that defeated Milošević. In 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated by a coalition of members of organised crime and intelligence services, which may have looked unnatural, but represented the necessary outcome of the previous times of war. That resulted in a shift in the focus of reforms towards combating organised crime. In 2006, Serbia unwillingly renewed its sovereignty after the breakup of the State Union with Montenegro. The issue of European integration then got the highest priority among the political elite. In 2008, Kosovo proclaimed independence, which put the preservation of territorial sovereignty into first place on the nation’s priority list. The constant problem throughout this whole period is the cooperation with the International Crime Tribunal for
Yugoslavia, and this issue became a condition for further European integration. The cooperation with the ICTY has also had a significant influence on security sector reform in Serbia. The reason for this is the constant accusation on the side of the ICTY prosecutor that parts of the security sector in Serbia are involved in protection of persons wanted for war crimes.¹

It is very difficult to determine what the dominant context is in the period after Milošević. Although the post-authoritarian and post-conflict context can be said to be dominant, a decade of sanctions and wars, and the necessity of the recovery of Serbia’s economy gave significant place for the developmental context as well. In addition, the context of European integration has highest importance since Serbian government proclaimed EU integration as the most important foreign policy goal. The key actors are political parties, underground intelligence – informal groups consisted of members of security services and criminals, tycoons who acquired vast sources in the Milošević period, and organised crime groups. In the security sector, the police play the leading role, civil society is much stronger in relation to earlier periods, private security companies are flourishing, and new oversight institutions and bodies are being formed. This period is also characterised by the lack of consensus among the political elites on the major strategic orientation of the country. Perhaps the most important consequence of security sector reform in Serbia in the mentioned period is the fact that a comprehensive security sector is being developed for the first time, and we can say that the first generation of security sector reform is finished.

¹ One of many statements given by the chief prosecutor of ICTY Carla Del Ponte in which she accuses Serbian military for protecting Mladić - http://www.b92.co.rs/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=04&nav_category=64&nav_id=177832 (accessed on September 7, 2010.).
PERIOD 1: **THE MILOSEVIC ERA**

**Social-political context**

For understanding the context within which the country can be located the period in question, it is necessary to analyse the main events in the political scene, the main political actors, and finally, the position of the security sector - which is the object of our analysis and which had one of the key roles in political life in Milošević’s Serbia. In this part of the world, the security sector, and particularly the state apparatus of force, has always occupied a very important place in society, history, and people’s minds. The interdependence between the key security actors and the state (ruling elites) is crucial for understanding the events that took place in the recent past and for understanding the difficulties which the reforms in this country are being faced with.

The main characteristic of this period is the personal rule of one man - Slobodan Milošević and a few people around him, especially his family. The character of his rule was constantly being questioned, since its guiding ideology changed diametrically from communist to nationalist. It even had some elements of peace-making in the period after the Dayton agreement, until the beginning of the Kosovo conflict. Having all this in mind, it is very difficult to explain how Milošević succeeded to preserve his power in spite of his many changes in ideology which resulted in changes to his brand of politics.

Milošević became the head of Serbian Communist Party (SKS) in 1986. In that period, the machinery of the Communist Party was starting to fall apart. He cultivated an image of a politician who could solve problems, making a clear break with the old communist elite by sending them into retirement, and presented himself as a modern politician to the public. He tried to establish a new identity for the Party by rejecting the old values that the previous leadership had cherished until that moment. He also tried to implement something that he considered to be a modern version of socialism – without old Bolshevik ideas and implementing some ideas of modern
social democracy (Hadžić: 2001, 65-66). That was one of the crucial factors in his gaining popular support.

The Serbian people did not follow Milošević because of his ideology but because of his ability to come out of an internal political conflict as the winner. This can maybe explain why the people continued to follow him even when he rejected communist ideology and exchanged it for nationalist one. Milošević’s ability to defeat all his political rivals was stronger than both his communism and his nationalism, paving the road of his success and his popularity (Pavlović: 2001, 81-82). This is why we can say that Milošević only used ideology to confirm his ability to defeat his political opponents exploiting different roles in order to gain legitimacy for his personal rule.

When the role of the unbeatable leader started to fade after several lost wars and a destroyed economy, Milošević’s popularity started to diminish. The Opposition movement, until than weak and divided, started to gain importance and strength. The culmination of this change happened in November 1996, when the Opposition coalition Zajedno won the local elections in the biggest Serbian cities and towns. The Milošević regime refused to accept the results of these elections, which led to three-month long public demonstrations. But this was not enough for Milošević to accept defeat. It was only after pressure from the international community that he was forced to withdraw and leave the cities to the opposition. This was his first political defeat within Serbia and it became obvious that he was not unbeatable any more, that he was not completely in control of political life, and that his popularity among the people was decreasing rapidly.

The same pattern with stolen elections was repeated in 2000, when Milošević also did not want to accept the results of the Presidential elections. He could not believe that he had lost an election that he himself had called for, under the impression that he was still a beloved leader. This led to another large scale set of demonstrations resulting in protesters taking over the Parliament building and the Serbian Broadcasting Company (RTS). Realising that he had lost support not only among the citizens but also within the security sector (when decision-makers decided not to defend the fallen regime), Milošević had to give the reins of power to the Opposition.

The authoritarian nature of Milošević’s rule left many consequences in Serbia’s social and economic life. Besides the devastation of war, the Serbian economy was ruined as a consequence of the economic policies
of the regime. This policy was directed mainly to preservation of the status quo, which led to deterioration of the position of the working class. Unfortunately, Serbia during the nineties was the country dominated by symbolic and not distributive conflicts, which created difficulties for the workers to put socio-economic issues on the political agenda (Thomas: 1999, 1-10). Milošević's economic policy had a great impact upon the period after his fall. Serious economic reforms started in 2001 with the first democratic government, and they last even today.

Security sector

The security sector, or state apparatus of force, had one of the biggest roles in the collapse of the Yugoslav state and the war that followed. It was one of the actors that could interfere and influence the way of resolving any crisis. As we can see today, that interference was totally wrong and it caused the most damaging consequences - destroying its own country and its own people. The reasons for such a position of the security sector can be found in its heritage from the Yugoslav period. The security sector in SFR Yugoslavia developed from the Partisan units after the Second World War, under the strong influence of the Communist Party and the great personal influence of Josip Broz Tito - the supreme commander of all armed forces and life-time president of Yugoslavia.

The Party's influence on the security sector could be seen through its total subordination to the political system. Political (communist) organisations existed in every sphere of the security sector. All strategic documents of the time were based on the ideas of the Communist Party and the Constitution, which was also created by the Party (Hadžić: 2001, 54-58). The strategic documents and doctrines were created under the assumption that the citizens of Yugoslavia had a positive relation towards this ideology. The communist ideologists were convinced that socialism was the highest form of social organisation and that all the people would stand up to defend it. This is one of the reasons why they were so amazed when the conflict started. They couldn’t believe that someone wanted to destroy this perfect system and that not only were the people were failing to protect it, moreover the people actually took part in it. Another one of the political illusions of these documents was its judgment that the modern world is characterised by the strong division between socialist and capitalist forces.
Its belief of the socialist victory over the capitalism in the world was ruthlessly destroyed by the breakup.

All security sector officials had to be Party members, they were educated in the Marxist and Leninist tradition, and they had to show their communist credentials before any kind of promotion. The possibility that someone was promoted without the recommendation of the Party didn’t even exist. So when the Party disappeared from the public scene, those people were left with nothing more to believe in.

The disappearance of the Party and the old SFR Yugoslavia was a crucial influential factor for the very beginning of the period we are writing in this analysis. Its consequence was maybe mostly felt in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) which was the guardian of this ideology and the state created upon it. The army leaders realised that they were losing power. They were afraid of losing their influence in the politics of the country. They could not imagine the position of the army as no longer being the pillar of the socialist system, but instead being reduced to the service of the state (Hadžić: 2001, 65-66).

Until the very beginning of the conflict, the army tried to preserve an anti-nationalist position. Not only was that an impossible task, but it also made some crucial mistakes which put it in an inferior position at the later stage of the war. The army did not want to give up socialism at any cost. The army leadership was not implementing the policy of the state but the policy of the Party. They were speaking about something that everybody else had rejected and in that sense it was a lost battle. When it became clear that the war was inevitable, they were dragged into the conflict totally unprepared, and naturally got out of it as the losing side. In addition, that made it possible for the Serbian leadership to find a scapegoat for all the defeats in the later stages of the war (Hadžić: 2001, 142-146).

When the Yugoslav state collapsed, the Yugoslav People’s Army de facto became a Serbian army. The generals saw a Serbian leadership as an escape from the defeat they experienced in the conflict, and the Serbian leadership welcomed the new, well equipped army. But, the formation of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) brought neither the necessary ideological catharsis nor a necessary removal of the military elite from the ruling political elite. The military leadership, used to securing cults for themselves and celebrating dubious leaders, quickly renounced the communist dogma and immedi-
ately accepted the national myth as a substitute. It was an unproductive change, but only on the surface. In the essence, such an army was formed on the basis of two illusions: the first was that the army would be the basis of the national state, and the second was that it was an opportunity to break with the old ideology (Stojadinović: 2004). The “new” Yugoslav army actually functioned without any kind of strategic or doctrinary framework, which created a conceptual vacuum. Milošević’s political control was additionally secured through its constitutional and system status. The new Yugoslav constitution from 1992 onwards, kept the obligation of the military to defend the constitutional order, which opened a window of opportunity for internal and political abuse (Hadžić: 2001, 26).

Although the military leadership turned completely to Milošević, who after being a communist bureaucrat became the leader of the Serbian nationalistic wave, they could not completely regain the position they enjoyed in the former SFR Yugoslavia. Milošević, being the president of Serbia, never trusted the military completely. One of the reasons for that was the fact that the military was a federal institution over which he did not have immediate control. Although he was the most powerful person in Yugoslavia, he did not want to allow any formal possibility which would endanger his power. He needed only a few generals to keep the military under his rule. But even they were often replaced.

When Milošević became president of Yugoslavia in July 1997 and gained official control over the military, his interest for it increased. He found among the generals some loyal and ready to confront the world not only because of the nationalistic ideology, but also because of personal motivations. Milošević needed the generals in order to conduct his plan of eternal rule, and the generals needed him to enable them to climb the hierarchy ladders. They would take part in political rallies, give political statements to the press, and sometimes they would even threaten not to allow the government to change. But when they saw that Milosevic had lost any kind of support among the people, they let him go, hoping that in that way they would preserve their positions.

Milošević had greater confidence in the police and secret services, so he gave them priority. He could perhaps buy the loyalty of the generals, but not the loyalty of the ordinary soldiers. As the consequence of that, the police and the state security service soon became better equipped and trained than the military. For the reasons already mentioned, Milošević had very
little confidence in the military, so he needed an armed force that would be able to secure his personal power. He found the solution in changing the role of police. The police gradually got a military appearance, even with the external symbols, including mask-uniforms and military ranks. A typical military structure was introduced into police units, and that ended the existence of normal police in Serbia. Within the Ministry of the Interior (MUP), classical military units were formed which had nothing to do with police work. The final act of the militarisation was creation of the Police Academy, which was, according to its plan and programs, a classical military school that only had a different name (Dragišić: 2004).

The police in the Milošević period was a strong lever of the authoritarian regime. The Serbian police in that period practically became a gendarmerie, and was even equipped with armed vehicles and mortars. Some analyses stated that Serbia had the biggest police force in relation to number of citizens in Europe. The predictions were that in Serbia in that period were from 40,000 to 150,000 policemen (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 124-125).

However, after the fall of Milošević, it was evident that the real strong pillar of the regime was not the regular police, but the secret services and their underground structures. The State Security Service (SDB) had an especially important role in the preservation of the regime. This secret police was, until 2002, one of two sectors of the Ministry of Interior, headed by Special Assistant Ministers. They were only nominally attached to the Minister of Police, and in fact, only answered to the most powerful person in the country - Milošević himself. From 1945 till 2002, no law existed which would refer to certain security-intelligence services. In fact, the head persons of secret services decided themselves upon establishment of a service, its tasks, authorities, organisation, modus operandi, and accountability (Milosavljević: 2003, 98). This way of operation created a habit within the service to act independently from law and according to self-proclaimed rules.

Milošević brought this exemption of security service from other institutions and its full non-transparency to perfection. The service was totally exempted from any kind of democratic control. He controlled the service himself, no matter what his official position was, and the Parliament did not even bother to deal with anything that had to do with security services (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 126). Moreover, the Unit for Special Operations (JSO) or the Red Berets, a specially armed unit of 1,200 war veterans, was formed within
the State Security Service. This unit was Milošević’s Praetorian Guard whose financial sources were kept top secret, since they mostly came from crime.

In the middle of the 1990s, Milošević actually started to develop a whole system of an underground criminal economy. This system was based on the interconnection between the government, economy, and crime, with the main link in this system being the State Security Service (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 127). The Service was the backbone of the organised crime and trafficking, and was involved in everything from trafficking oil, drugs, and cigarettes to the export of luxurious goods (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 127). Members of the Service were engaged not only in crime, but they also recruited criminals, giving them official badges of the Service providing them with protection from police and prosecution (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 127).

In this period, the service was especially used for oversight over political opponent. A whole network of informers from the communist times and an archive of around 400,000 files were kept (Milosavljević: 2003, 97). In the last period of Milošević’s rule, the Service was also used for political assassinations. The secret police was involved in two assassination attempts on Vuk Drašković, one of the opposition leaders in 1999 and 2000, the assassination of Slavko Ćuruvija (a prominent opposition journalist) in 1999, and they were also involved in assassination of the former Serbian president Ivan Stambolić, one of Milošević’s rivals from communist times, in 2000.

It can be concluded that the dominant political context during the 1990s in Serbia was characterised by strong elements of authoritarian rule under Slobodan Milošević and the political elite around him, as well as by the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars that broke out in the former Yugoslav republics as its consequence. The key political actors in this period in Serbia were ex-communist elite who exchanged their communist ideology with a new one – nationalism, and the state security apparatus which was omnipotent, indeed with the right question being whether it was under any kind of control at all. The opposition in Serbia was emerging and showed all the weaknesses characteristic to similar movements in all authoritarian societies. Its strength was rising throughout this period and it culminated in the year 2000, when they took over the power in the country.


Social-political context

After the change in power in October 2000, Serbia gained the opportunity to make the initial step away from the authoritarian order of the state, its quasi-market economic system (essentially of a command type), and patriarchal political culture, and to start a transition to a liberal-democratic society. One of the first reform tasks to be made was concerned with the normalisation of relations with Serbia’s neighbouring countries, as well as with the West and international organisations. So, this period is marked by the return of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the world. Thus, FRY become a member of the UN2 and Interpol3, and an OSCE mission in FRY was established4. Moreover, at the EU – Western Balkan Summit held in Zagreb (Croatia), the EU invited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to join the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)5. The “Closing declaration” was adopted at the meeting, which presents one of the important turnovers for further development of political and economic relations of states included in SAP and the EU. Also, the FRY started normalising relations with NATO. Thus, the Federal government adopted the policy that FRY would join the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP)6 and an agreement between NATO and FRY was achieved, for the use of Yugoslav airspace for the needs of NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo7. In order to implement this,

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2 November 1, 2000.
3 September 24, 2001.
6 April 23, 2002.
7 December 20, 2002.
the NATO/FRY Technical Committee was founded. Finally, Serbia started fulfilling its obligations towards the Hague Tribunal, which is best exemplified by the extradition of many high-ranking officials.  

Due to the wars of the 1990s, and the nature of the previous regime, Serbia was brought into a developmental halt. The new political elite inherited a robbed and destroyed society and economy. Hence, another task on DOS’ reform agenda was development. Indeed, in the field of the economy, successful initial reform steps had been achieved. The key reform tasks in this respect included transformation of state- and publicly-owned companies, decreasing inflation, improving tax collection, and combating gray economy. Initial reform successes in the economic sphere, supplemented by the termination of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions had created a better investment environment for foreign companies, which started investing in Serbia. The most visible indicator of initial successes in economy was a better standard of living of common people, who could barely survive during the 1990s (Begović, Mijatović: 2005, Boarov: 2005).

But all of these initial reform successes had not been followed and sustained by reform in the security sector. The new political elite had not recognised the link between SSR and the overall development of society.

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8 Following officials are good examples: Slobodan Milošević, former President of Serbia and FRY; Milan Milutinović then president of Republic of Serbia, Nikola Šainović, vice-president of Government of FRY; Dragoljub Ojdanić then Chief of General Staff, Milan Mile Mrkšić, Commander of 1st Motorized Guard Brigade, Miodrag Jokić, commander of 9th Navy Sector, Vojislav Šešelj, leader of then the biggest opposition party in Serbia, Milan Martić, during existence of Autonomous Region of Serbian Krajina served as Secretary of Internal Affairs and Minister of Defence.

9 In the US State Department ‘USIA (United States Information Agency) Wireless File’, issued on 23 November 1995, it was made public, for the first time, the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions concept. It contained the following message: “A resolution will be introduced in the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo against all of the states of former Yugoslavia. Trade sanctions against Serbia will be suspended, but may be re-imposed if Serbia or any other Serb authorities fail significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement. An outer wall’ of sanctions will remain in place until Serbia addresses a number of other areas of concern, including Kosovo and cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal.” The ‘outer wall’ of sanctions concept affects, first and foremost, FRY’s membership of international organisations and access to international financial institutions, the latter being a key source for financial assistance in economic reconstruction. Hasani, E., 1998. THE ‘OUTER WALL’ OF SANCTIONS AND THE KOSOVO ISSUE. Perceptions - Journal of International Affairs September - November 1998 Vol. III - No. 3. http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume3/ September-November1998/hasani.PDF accessed: 23.11.2010.
In the period under discussion, instead of being the main arena of democratic transformation, the security sector\textsuperscript{10} served as a playground not only for the dreaded power struggle between the DOS and the remnants of the old regime, but also between two main political factions within the DOS - Democratic Party (DS - Demokratska stranka) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS -Demokratska Stranka Srbije). The struggle for power opened the window of opportunity to many other players to take part in it. Other than political elites, the main actors in this power game were also individuals and parts of security sector, in particular intelligence, \textit{nouveau riche}, and organised crime groups. Common and vested interests of different kinds bonded some actors into relatively firm groups, which consequently acted as autonomous and single actors. They were among the main spoilers of SSR, and at one moment, when Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated, they were even close to stopping and reversing the democratic changes in Serbia. The nature and role of this actor has made us to reclassify it as a separate actor and to dub this phenomenon as \textit{underground intelligence}.

On the following pages, we will give the overview and explanations of the key political and social events, processes and actors, and their relations and interactions, which influenced the course and reach of SSR in Serbia. Special emphasis will be placed on intelligence services, since they played major role in power games. By applying this approach, we will be able to show to reader that the power struggle among political elites and underground intelligence structures and groups were the main factors that delayed and abated SSR in Serbia.

\textbf{Security Sector}

As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the urgent tasks of the new democratic authorities was the reform of the security sector, and in particular of intelligence services. They were rightly considered an open threat to the society’s democratisation by the victorious DOS

\textsuperscript{10} Some changes in security sector did happen, but they were symbolic. These changes are as follow: Military of Yugoslavia was reorganised - the new organisational scheme was introduced- Corps/Brigade type of organisation, giving the Yugoslav Army nine Army Corps commands. A new police unit - \textit{Gendarmerie} was formed. Conscientious objection to military service was introduced and compulsory military service was shortened.
coalition and the democratic public, and were seen as a source of fear and mistrust in the security sector by the majority of citizens.

That is why the tasks of the new authorities in the reform of state institutions, proclaimed in the Contract with the People (DOS election platform)\(^{11}\) include: to enable the competent Parliamentary Committees access to all secret police files within a period of 100 days and to form an independent expert commission to examine and publish all relevant documents, audio and video records related to Serbia and Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign policy in the 1987-2000 period, kept secret by the former authorities. Other extremely important tasks were: to define national interests, to prepare and adopt key documents in the security sphere (National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and Doctrine), and to adopt new laws governing the operation and organisation of the national security system and lustration.

But, the initial political will for reforms soon abated. That was the outcome of a series of factors that delayed the implementation of serious reform measures for a year and a half. In addition to the expected difficulties, otherwise characteristic for security sector reforms (resistance of security structures themselves and political forces of the former regime, as well as a part of the public inclined to look upon national security as the unquestionable category of alienated power), the postponement and politicisation of reforms were, in the case of Serbia, additionally influenced by a specific mixture of objective and subjective factors.

On the one hand, after the October change, the DOS coalition was in a position to start the reform of the Federal level-intelligence services within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^{12}\) and the Military Intelligence\(^{13}\), as well as in the Military of Yugoslavia itself, but needed to win the support of the Montenegrin political elite who were more concerned with securing independence for Montenegro than with improving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s central institutions. A transitory government formed in Serbia operated until the Parliamentary elections of 23 December that year and

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\(^{12}\) Security Service (Služba bezbednosti) and Service for inquiry and documentation (Služba za dokumentaciju i istraživanje).

\(^{13}\) Counterintelligence Agency (Kontraobaveštajna služba) and Intelligence Directorate (Obaveštajna uprava)
the formation of the National Parliament and government in January the following year. However, that government did not have the capacity for reform. It so happened that on the basis of an agreement with the FRY president Vojislav Koštunica, Milošević’s man Radomir Marković remained at the head of the RDB (ser. Resor državne bezbednosti, Directorate of State Security)\(^{14}\) for the next four months, which bought the RDB leaders time to destroy part of the service’s files, and consolidate their positions with the new political decision-makers in Serbia. The DOS coalition, on its part, failed to make use of that time to prepare appropriate personnel and plans for the reform of security sector, or for that matter for the reform of the military and the police. Instead, the parties of the victorious DOS coalition manifested increasing discord concerning the course and pace of reforms in the society and state, and generated inter-party scandals and affairs involving the intelligence services.\(^{15}\) Actually, later events related to the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic would show that a mixture of individuals from intelligence, politicians, and organised crime groups were the actors who played the paramount role in power politics.

On the other side, the unfavourable security situation in the Ground Safety Zone towards Kosovo and Metohija and on the Serbian south, weakened the initial resolve for fast and thorough reforms of security sector, and in particular intelligence services. Notwithstanding the actual gravity of the situation, it was continuously used by the services and other security forces, as well as the highest authorities to argue against any measures for any substantial security sector reform. The same argument was employed to justify the postponement in the opening of files kept by the services for political or ideological motives (ostensibly not to endanger the network of the services’ collaborators and thus negatively impact their effectiveness), as well as resistance to the lustration of the security apparatus’ members who violated human rights, or for implementation of any other measure that would go deeper into the structure or personnel composition of the Armed Forces.

Another factor which, although of a different nature, had similar effects on the postponement and slowdown of security sector reforms, was the

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\(^{15}\) Scandalous affairs will be listed further in the text.
burden of the legacy of the war, and the resulting divisions in a large part of Serbian society on the issue of cooperation with the Hague tribunal for war crimes on the territories of the former Yugoslavia and extradition of the accused for those crimes. This is best exemplified when former president of Serbia and FRY Slobodan Milošević was extradited to the Hague tribunal (June 2001), which was interpreted by Vojislav Koštunica, leader of DSS (at the time the largest party of DOS), as a “grave violation of constitutional order of country”, adding that “cooperation with Hague Tribunal, although undoubtedly necessary, was nothing more than sheer extradition of indicted without any proper protection of citizens and, more importantly, the state.” 16 Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was a very important bone of contention between the two parties leading the two DOS factions.

The following paragraphs give examples of the effects of certain factors on the postponement of reforms. All of these events, in the first place, point out that the absence of a political consensus for the reform of the intelligence services among the key political actors was the main obstacle for their reform. Only in that context can we understand the fundamental controversy between the statement of Goran Petrović, the first RDB head appointed by the Serbian Government on 27 January 2001, who claimed that the situation in the RDB was “in mildest terms disastrous”17, and the fact that the badly needed reforms in that service, discounting minor personnel changes, actually had been missing throughout 2001 and the first half of the next year.

A good illustration of the initial reform inconsistency and the Serbian government’s unreadiness for substantial intelligence services’ reforms is the inadequate attempt to open the services’ secret files. Namely, under powerful public pressure to finally make good on its pre-election promises, the government passed an Ordinance Declassifying Serbian Citizens’ Files Kept by the State Security Service. 18 Soon after (on its next session) the Government changed the title of this document into Ordinance Allowing

18 Uredba o stavljanju na uvid određenih dosijea vođenih o građanima Republike Srbije u službi državne bezbednosti, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 30/01.
Insight into Certain Files on Serbian Citizens kept by the State Security Service. The Ordinance obliged the RDB to identify the citizens with files categorised as "internal enemies". Therefore, this list apparently does not include those classified as "cominformists", "civil right wing", "liberals", "anarcho-liberals", "opposition leaders", and "supporters of change". Also, files could be read by citizens only under the supervision of the security services officers. That is why the "ordinance gave the citizens incomplete insight into the SDB files" (Trkulja: 2003). The opening of secret services' files should have marked the end of a non-democratic and dictatorial era, and the reason for the partial declassification of files should be sought in the fact that “this period (1945-2000) was neither dictatorial nor undemocratic for many within the DOS”. In addition to being an inappropriate instrument for the attainment of the set objective, this Ordinance was legally deficient since its provisions contravened the Constitution, and it was, in 2003, proclaimed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.

Inconsistencies of the same kind were again manifested in late-2003, with the adoption of the long-awaited Law on the Responsibility for Violation of Human Rights (Lustration). Although Serbia is the only country in the region that has a law regulating this matter, the lustration has never been carried out, in the absence of the required parliamentary majority to select the members of the lustration commission and provide other conditions for its work. Implementation of this particular law also required insight into intelligence services' files.

The best example of the politicisation of reforms are the numerous affairs implicating individual members and parts of intelligence services, e.g. “Gavrilović affair” (assassination of a high-ranking RDB member Momir Gavrilović), “Perišić affair” (arrest of the former chief of General Staff, then vice-president of the Serbian government Momčilo Perišić) and “Pavković affair” (an attempt to use Special Yugoslav Armed Forces Units for a raid on the Serbian Government Communications Bureau in June 2001, alleg-

19 Uredba o stavljanju na uvid određenih dosijea vođenih o građanima Republike Srbije u službi državne bezbednosti, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 31/01.
20 "Uvid u dosijea SDB regulisati zakonom,"[Insight into SDB Files Requires Legal Regulation] Danas, Jul 5-6, 2003. On the need to open the secret files and the related dilemmas and problems, see Boguljub Milosavljević and Đorđe Pavičević, Tajni dosije: otvaranje dosijea službi državne bezbednosti [Secret Files: Opening of State Security Service Files] (Beograd: Centar za antiratnu akciju, 2001).
21 Zakon o odgovornosti za kršenje ljudskih prava, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 58/03 and 61/03.
edly for wiretapping). In all these affairs, the two key DOS coalition parties - Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia – exchanged accusations of abuse of the intelligence services for the attainment of their narrow party interests.

The third example is an event which drastically revealed the danger of postponing security sector reforms and the gravity of the inherited situation. That was the rebellion of the Special Operations Unit\textsuperscript{22}, whose members, armed and in full gear, blocked the traffic communications in Kula and the highway near the Sava Conference Centre in Belgrade, demanding the replacement of Police Minister Dušan Mihajlović and the RDB leaders. They also publicly manifested their disagreement with the arrest and extradition of the ICTY indictees. In a whole series of inter-party conflicts within the DOS, the FRY president Koštunica defined that event as no more than a “protest of workers”, people who instead of workers’ overalls wore uniforms and carried arms.

However, the situation was very grave. The rebels managed to force out the replacement of the RDB head Goran Petrović and his deputy Zoran Mijatović. In response to the situation so created, the Serbian Government set up a State Security Council. Its president was the Serbian Prime Minister Dr. Zoran Đinđić\textsuperscript{23}, and the Council was supposed to monitor RDB operations pending the establishment of parliamentary control.\textsuperscript{24} The government, furthermore, verified the act\textsuperscript{25} separating the JSO (Jedinica za specijalne operacije, Special Operations Unit) from the RDB, to become a unit of the Interior Ministry, whose purpose and use were decided by the Minister, subject to a previous agreement by the government. The Government thus sought to establish control over the JSO. At the same time, an attempt of the FRY President to establish a National Security Council at the federal level fell through, faced with the opposition of Serbian government members who considered him unauthorised to establish a body of that kind (Anastasijević: 2006).

\textsuperscript{22} Special Operations Unit (Jedinica za specijalne operacije) was rapid reaction armed force within the State Security Service.


\textsuperscript{24} This body was dissolved after the constitution of Vojislav Koštunica’s government in the spring of 2004.

Despite the highly politicised reforms and the sharp political conflict of the two ruling political parties, two laws were adopted in early summer 2002, one of which- Law on the FRY Security Services, regulated the operations of civilian and military services at the federal level, while the other - Law on Security Information Agency, transformed the Serbian RDB into a Security Information Agency. Thus, almost two years after the democratic change, in early June 2002, the Law on the FRY Security Services was adopted. The speed in preparing this legislation was due to the “Perišić affair” which clearly revealed the absence of civilian control of military intelligence services and the armed forces. The law regulated the positions, functions, authorities, and control of intelligence services on the federal level: Military Security Service and Military Intelligence Service\(^{26}\), as well as the Security Service, and Service for Research and Documentation attached to the Foreign Ministry. The most important changes instituted by this law were related to military intelligence services that were, for the first time, defined by one law and bound to obtain court approval for the use of special procedures and methods which temporarily limit the constitutionally and legally guaranteed human rights and freedoms. In addition, military police was separated from military intelligence services.

“The result is that the service that uses secret methods for the collection of data does not have the military police as its executive body, which is one of democratic standards.” (Horvat: 2007, 123)

An important contribution of this law was the establishment of the mechanism for democratic civilian control. Military services were subordinated to the Defence Minister and the Federal government – an important step leading towards the institution of civilian control of military services previously subordinated to the chief of the General Staff, or Unit Commanders on lower levels. The law introduced Parliamentary mechanisms for monitoring the services’ operations. A Parliamentary Commission for the Control of the FRY Intelligence Services was set up, but did not function due to the numerous difficulties in the work of the Federal Parliament.

The above-mentioned law was, merely two weeks later, followed by the adoption of the Law on the Security Information Agency in the Serbian

\(^{26}\) These services were subsequently renamed VBA and VOA.
National Assembly. This legislation separated the RDB from the Ministry of the Interior and transformed it into a Security Information Agency (BIA), directly subordinated to the Serbian Government and under its control. In terms of its functions, this service was of a “mixed type”, since it simultaneously had intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks, and functioned as a security service (protection of the constitutionally established order). However, although it welcomed the adoption of this long-awaited piece of legislation, the public sharply criticised both the Law as a whole and some of its provisions. The following are only the most important examples.

In the first place, the law has only 28 articles, which incompletely and imprecisely regulate the subject matter. The intelligence and counter-intelligence components have not been clearly divided, and the same goes for the security service functions (Milosavljević: 2004, 54). Furthermore, in contrast to the Law on the FRY Security Services, this legal act does not precisely list and define the methods of the Agency’s work, saying that it, acting within its jurisdiction, applies “appropriate operational methods, measures and acts and uses appropriate operational-technical means”, but without specifying the methods, measures, acts, and means. In consequence, the control of procedures and methods for a temporary limitation of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and law (Art. 13) has not been sufficiently elaborated (Milosavljević: 2003, 102). Another disputable provision prescribes that the Agency members with specific jobs (fairly broadly defined) have the traditional police powers. Thus, Agency employees who are working within the organisational units designed for fighting organised crime, the worst forms of crimes against humanity and international law, domestic and international terrorism, as well as crimes against constitution and security of Republic of Serbia have all police competences (e.g. arrest rights).

A look at the basic solutions of these two laws inevitably makes us wonder how it could be possible that of the two laws, adopted almost at the same time, and with such widely different contents, one meets the essential

27 By comparison, the Law on the Security-Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia (2006) has 126 articles which comprehensively and in detail regulate all issues related to the operations of security services.
28 Zakon o Bezbednosnoj-informativnoj agenciji [Law on Security Information Agency], čl. 9 [Article 9.], Službeni glasnik RS, br. 42/02 [Official Gazette RS, no. 42/02].
29 Ibid,
standards of democratic control over the secret services, and the other does not. One could rightly assume that the decisive influence in this case was one of political developments. Namely, some members of the ruling elite who, at that moment, did not control military intelligence services, fearing the possibility of finding themselves within its compass, adopted a modern legislation (Law on the FRY Security Services) regulating the work of security services in the military and the foreign ministry. But, the same political elite also adopted the Law on BIA which does not meet modern standards for the regulation of security-intelligence services’ operations. The reasons for that should be sought in the fact that the political elite (nominally) controlled the operations of the civilian intelligence service at the Republic level and did not wish to legally diminish the power of that service, and thereby probably weaken its own grip on power.

The Sobering Truth

In spite of these reform steps pertaining to intelligence services, one event showed that it was still a far cry from the real reform of security sector. Namely, on 12 March 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated. This tragic event showed that the creation of a legal framework for the functioning of intelligence services and organisational changes are insufficient for a successful reform. Namely, the assassination was carried out by a group consisting of certain members of the JSO and an organised criminal group known as the Zemun clan, even including a number of BIA members. It turned out that the first priority was to remove from the service all involved in serious violations of human rights or linked with criminal groups, i.e. to renew the cadre and undertake a series of other reforms that would enable the services to function in a way befitting a democratic society. In a word, it was clear that proper reforms had been lacking and that a genuine change should be devised and carried out, but the plans for such an effort, once again, were missing.

Political instability, the uncertainty that surrounded the future of the Federal state and the absence of consensus among the Serbian political elite on their reform priorities resulted in reluctance and thus the slow pace of security sector reform in this period. Nevertheless, this period can be marked as the beginning of the first generation of SSR in Serbia\textsuperscript{30}. The civilian and democratic control of the armed forces was introduced for the first time, after the General Staff and military intelligence services were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense (Djurdjevic-Lukic: 2007, 179). Adoption of the new Law on the Police in 2005 brought changes in organisational structure, thus making possible its depoliticisation and professionalisation. Reform of the intelligence services through adoption of laws and regulations continued, but there was a lack of political will to perform thorough reform. Through adoption of new laws, independent oversight bodies and institutions were created, but implementation of these laws was incomplete, resulting in a delay in the start of these institutions’ work.\textsuperscript{31} Initial success in the process of EU integration resulted with the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) entering the first official round of the negotiations on Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in November 2005. Despite the fact that several police and army Generals, as well as other lower ranking officers, were sent to the Hague Tribunal during this period, the EU cancelled the negotiations on SAA with Serbia in May 2006, stating that Serbia was insufficiently cooperating with the ICTY. Two weeks later, a referendum on independence of Montenegro was held, resulting in the break-up of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.


\textsuperscript{31} The Law on the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest was passed in April 2004; the Law on Free Access to Information in November 2004; the Law on the State Auditing Institution, at the end of 2005; the Law on the Protection of Competition – the “Anti-Monopoly law,” September 2005; while the Ombudsman Law, and the Anti-corruption Strategy were passed by Parliament in December 2005.
Social–political context

The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic on 12 March 2003 was immediately followed by the introduction of a state of emergency in Serbia, with the aim of finding and arresting the persons responsible for the assassination. The Ministry of Interior started the action “Saber”, the largest and fiercest campaign against organised crime witnessed so far in any post-socialist country (Shentov, Todorov, Stoyanov: 2004, 61). The complexity and depth of connections between organised crime and the security sector were revealed. Police, judiciary, intelligence services, and the military were infiltrated and compromised by organised crime, and together with corrupt government officials, hindered efforts at reform. The fight against organised crime was strongly supported, both within the country and internationally. In order to give impetus to continuation of the reforms, the EU approved full membership of the SCG in the Council of Europe32, although the state of emergency was still active and the improvement in the reform scenario was limited. The impression was that Serbia is firmly set on its way to democratisation and genuine reforms (Shentov, Todorov, Stoyanov: 2004, 67).

Soon after the state of emergency ended, the public was overwhelmed with numerous scandals and accusations of corruption against the ruling DOS coalition, cooperating with “shadowy businessman” and organised crime groups. The government was forced to resign, and a new one was formed in March 2004, composed of nationalist parties and headed by the Democratic Party of Serbia, with Vojislav Kostunica as the Prime Minister. This newly formed minority government was supported by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), marking the return of old cadres from the SPS regime under Milošević to positions in government institutions. Political control of the police, intelligence service, and judiciary continued. The highest priority in the government policy was given to the future solution of the status of Kosovo, and the future of the Federal state. The reformist and pro-European policy orientation of the previous government started to decline notably. The tension between nationalist, self-proclaimed “patriots” and pro-European parties, often proclaimed as “traitors”, was the indicator of the deep ideological cleavage in Serbian society that slowed down the reforms (Pavlovic, Antonic: 2007).

Security sector

Other spoilers of the change were the intelligence services, primarily the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA), and tycoons who dominated the economy through monopoly and corruption, thus creating two “reserved domains” that proved to be the most resistant to reforms. Instead of continuing the reform of BIA, the new government allowed the return of old cadres to the agency, who continued to abuse their positions in order to regain the power they once had over the political process. The agency continued to be resilient to reform and one of the biggest opponents of Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, together with the military.

These tycoons, whose wealth was created during Milosevic era and increased during first few years of transition, were in search of new “partners”, in exchange often offering politicians money, compromising information on their political opponents, and other services. This created the situation of a “captured state” in which political parties (ab)use state institutions to protect and promote interests of these groups, against the public good (Pešić: 2007, 1). This meant stalling and partial implementation of the political and economic reforms that allowed tycoons to keep their monopoly in certain areas of economy. This resulted in Serbia being one of the most corrupt countries in the region in this period.

Unlike the Security Intelligence Agency, the police showed less resistance to reform. Conditions for its professionalisation and putting it under civilian and democratic control were created in 2005 with the adoption of the Law on Police. An important step in this process was demilitarisation of the police, by abrogating military ranks and introducing standard police ranks. External and internal oversight of the police was also introduced, while the Chief of Police was to be civilian - elected by the Government.

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33 These are domains in which certain groups want to stop and obstruct reforms in order to preserve their power and privileged position. This is one of the characteristic of “electoral democracy” that existed in Serbia in this period. See: Pavlović, D., Antonic, S. (2007) Konoslidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji posle 2000. godine. Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

34 Vice-president of the Serbian Government resigned after SAA negotiations were cancelled. He blamed security services on obstruction of finding the accused war criminals and helping them in hiding. http://www.vesti.rs/Politika/Labus-podneo-ostavku.html

on public competition, exclusively according to the criteria of competence. These efforts resulted in creation of a more efficient police force, capable of fighting organised crime. The fight against organised crime remained high on the list of proclaimed priorities of the new government. In reality, this fight lost the intensity it had after Djindjics’ assassination. Legality of the Saber action was questioned through several Supreme Court decisions stating that detention of the suspects was longer than what was legally allowed. This created a public perception that the judiciary was protecting organised crime groups. Additional confusion on the political background of Djindjic’s assassination was brought to public during the trial by the accused and certain political groups (which openly supported the former Milosevic regime and strongly opposed the reforms and cooperation with the ICTY). Organised crime didn’t regain the power it had before 2003, but the discovery of a “road mafia”, “customs mafia”, and “bankruptcy mafia” showed that the high level of corruption and links between representatives of state institutions and organised crime continued to exist.

The loose federal arrangement of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) and conflicting respective stances of Montenegro and Serbia on the future of the union resulted in a slow pace of military reform, since the military was under Federal authorities who showed little will for its reform, while the blockade of the Federal institutions slowed down the pace of reform additionally. Soon after the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was formed, military reform and membership in Partnership for Peace Program were announced as priorities. General Staff and military intelligence agencies were subordinated to the Ministry of Defence in 200336, thus introducing the civilian and democratic control of the armed forces. Several high ranking officers who were close to the Milosevic regime were either retired or arrested and sent to Hague. However, changes in federal arrangements were not followed with the adoption of strategic documents and laws that should have created conditions for systematic military reform37. Moreover, the Constitutional Charter of SCG did not offer basic grounds for defence reform and left many strategic questions unanswered (Hadzic: 2003). Persistent polarisation and the politicisation of defence re-

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36 The General Staff became subordinate to the Ministry of Defence and the Intelligence Administration was restructured into the Military Intelligence Agency and both agencies worked for the Ministry of Defence (Djurdjevic-Lukic:2007, 179).
37 National Security Strategy did not exist, while the Defence Strategy (2004) and the White Paper of Defence (2005) were adopted.
lated issues among the political elite (such as the size of the Armed Forces, pro-NATO or anti-NATO stance, professional or conscripted army personnel, etc.) did not leave adequate room for a sound assessment of real national interests in the area of defence (Djurdjevic-Lukic: 2007, 181).

It can be concluded that this period was strongly marked with elements of the post-authoritarian context of security sector reform. The key actors that shaped the course of the reform were political parties. Tensions that existed on the Federal level, between the Serbian and Montenegrin elite, and within Serbia among nationalist and pro-European parties, often resulted in deficiencies in implementation of SSR. The new economic elite, namely the tycoons, shifted from their initial support for liberalisation of the economy and now advocated for status quo, aiming to preserve their monopoly. Widespread corruption among political parties and government institutions resulted in weak state institutions, incapable of performing democratisation and any broad reform of the society.


Social–political context

The context within which SSR in Serbia has taken place in the period 2006 – 2009 could be characterised as developmental since the main priority remained to be a transition towards a developed economy and consolidated democracy. Within that context, organised crime, corruption, and to less extent, lack of transparency in conduct of state affairs, are considered to be the main threats. At the same time, reforms are mostly being justified by compliance with international criteria, which in the case of Serbia are benchmarks set by the European Union. The self-declared independence of Kosovo threatened to be the turning point which could have shifted the discourse from integration towards protection of state territorial integrity and sovereignty which, after all, did not happen.

After Montenegro declared independence and withdrawal from the State Union in May 2006, Serbia was given an opportunity to define its own system of national security. The first prerequisite was the adaptation
of core strategic documents which would outline the state's foreign policy orientation and define missions, tasks, and responsibilities of its security sector actors. The first and basic document adopted in Serbia was a new Constitution, which Parliament adopted in November 2006. The process of adaptation of a new Constitution certified a lack of a national consensus on the state’s foreign policy orientation, which remained to be one of the basic determinants of a context within which security sector reform in Serbia has been conducted till today. Lack of consensus on state’s foreign and a security policy is being reflected in the most recent strategic document that the Serbian Parliament adopted in April 2009 – the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy. Long-awaited documents, which were supposed to provide clear guidelines for conduct of affairs in the security domain have disappointed the Serbian public as well as experts involved in security issues, in terms of their vagueness and incoherence. The vagueness of these documents are, officially and non–officially, explained by a need to reach a political consensus among ideologically diverse political parties, which were at the time forming a government. Government instability, caused by the distinctiveness of political parties in power, was a common feature of the two governments Serbia had in this three-year period. A need to reach political consensus is being reflected into how, and under what conditions, reforms in security sector are being agreed and executed.

The declaration of Montenegrin independence and the fact that Serbia regained independent statehood itself has not, surprisingly or not, significantly affected the political context and political processes in the state. Although the position towards continuation of the State Union was an unavoidable element of political parties’ pre–election campaigns, dissolution of the State Union has not significantly affected the position of key political figures and political parties. Instead of that, political life in Serbia was, even immediately after the May referendum as well afterwards, much more affected by ongoing negotiations on the future status of Serbia’s province, Kosovo and Metohija. Thus, the event which proved to be the most significant marker of Serbia’s political life till today was the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008. That event has threatened to bring in the prevalence of state–centric discourse within which emphasis is put on the

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The most important implication of Kosovo’s independence is certainly the profound changes in the direction of Serbian foreign policy, and the rhetoric used in the international arena. Since Kosovo’s independence was soon recognised by the majority of the EU and NATO member states, Serbia withdraw its diplomatic representatives in respective states for a period of a few months. Even before the declaration of independence took place, since it was anticipated by domestic and international actors, Serbia’s parliament adopted a resolution on 26 December 2007, which is commonly recognised as a declaration of military neutrality. That document declared that Serbia will refrain from joining any existing military Alliances in the future. Although not directly mentioned, the declaration is widely recognised as a rhetoric action aimed at removing the possibility of Serbia joining NATO for the foreseeable future. The document was adopted exactly one year after Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace programme. Although considered to be entry point for full-fledged NATO membership, PfP membership proved not to have significant consequences neither for Serbia’s security policy nor for SSR process. Adaptation of the declaration of neutrality, although it does not have any legal obligatory power, is serving as an exit strategy for decision-makers if they are confronted with the need to explain Serbian security policies and the future of state’s relations with the Alliance. At the
same time, the vagueness of the document, which has not defined what Serbian security policy is, is confronting decision-makers with a need to explain what kind of neutrality, under what terms and with what costs, Serbia is going to have. One of the main SSR-related issues arising from this neutrality discourse is the size of the armed forces Serbia will need in a case of opting for neutrality. Although the Serbian MoD denied that any significant organisational changes had been undertaken as a consequence of the declaration of neutrality, occasionally the Minister himself used neutrality as a proper explanation for an abandonment of plans on downsizing number of civilian and military servants in the MoD which were stipulated in Strategic Defence Review from June 2006, and were made according NATO recommendations (Rose-Roth Seminar, Belgrade, Serbia, 25-27 October 2007).

Integration processes undergoing in this period of time put in the spotlight the capacities and capabilities of the Serbian police forces more than any others security sector institution. The Euro-Atlantic integration process related to security sector, for the respective period of time, could be brought down to the issue of Schengen process and visa liberalisation. The process of visa liberalisation, as one of the most palpable benefits Serbia could expect to gain in the near future in respect of the EU accession process, has confronted the MoI with a series of tasks, from the adoption of strategic documents, to signing and implementing documents on regional cooperation (Group 484, “Towards White Schengen List: Serbia Progress Report on Visa Liberalisation Process”, 11 September 2009). The MoI thus was, and still is, the most visible element of the state administration and the most visible security institution in the process of EU integration. This could be explained by an emerging, but still inconsistent EU agenda for SSR which would involve a more comprehensive approach. Instead of that, cooperation in criminal and justice affairs is the most visible part of the SSR on the EU agenda.

The role of the Ministry of Interior but also of the Ministry of Justice, is in the focus of public attention, also owing to the process of securitisation of organised crime and corruption which is constantly present in Serbian

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39 Securitization is the discourse driven process when securitizing actor makes effort to convince the auditorium in necessity of a adoption of special measures. It is a process through which an object or a value becomes signified as a threat and as such an issue of high importance for which defence is justifiable to use means that otherwise couldn’t be legitimated had the securitization discourse not taken place. According to: Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap De Wild. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Pub 1997.
discourse on security since 2003. But this same discourse, within which organised crime and corruption are being prioritised, has turned the attention towards financial frauds and corruption within security institutions themselves. This is proved by numerous affairs, which were revealed and prosecuted, related to processes of public procurement in the MoD.\footnote{On “Mile Dragić” affair: http://www.rtv.rs/sr/vesti/hronika/sudska_hronika/2009_09_03/ vest_149518.jsp (accessed on 11 September 2009). On “Satelite” affair see: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=01&dd=12&nav_category=120&nav_id=338865 (accessed on 10 September 2009).}

Intelligence, on the other hand, still remained in the focus of public attention. This is mainly due to the cooperation with the ICTY which is one of the basic requirements Serbia is being faced with by the EU. On account of its non-compliance with the Court Serbia is experiencing a form of silent sanctions, at least by a few of the EU member-states, because of that the work of the Security Intelligence Agency more than the other security institutions is being questioned. But while commenting on the work of this agency, the EU and ICTY representatives usually make distinctions between the BIA’s capacities to work efficiently, and political willingness of Serbian decision-makers to comply with the condition of Ratko Mladić being arrested. In other words, it is the lack of political willingness of the current Serbian establishment that is being blamed for inefficiency in cooperation with the ICTY, rather than the capability of the agencies which are supposed to deal with technical part of the task.\footnote{The exact distinction between political will to act and capacity to act was officially made by the foreign representatives on the occasion of attacks on embassies’ building during public protests against Kosovo independence on 21 February 2008 in Belgrade. Police was believed to be able to protect each building, but also was believed not to be given an order to protect them. “U.S. to evacuate embassy from Serbia”, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=22&nav_id=47906 (accessed on 9 September 2009).}

The conclusion, which could be drawn from the previous comments on how particular security sector institutions appeared on the agenda, is that there is no systematic and comprehensive approach to SSR in Serbia in general, and that SSR as a policy has not been ranked high on the political agenda. Different institutions of Serbia’s security sector are appearing on the political agenda on different occasions, provoked either by EU conditionality, which is a case of police- and intelligence-related issues, or purchase of new equipment, or affairs connected to public procurement or corruption, which was the case in the reform of the Armed Forces. Thus, we
have no proof that SSR is understood in its complexity and inseparability nor that Serbian decision-makers are prioritising the reform of these institutions in the context of the overall reform process going on in the state. If we are thinking in terms of the 1st and 2nd generation of reforms, then certainly the 1st generation was taken forward in the 2006 – 2009 period, by adopting basic laws defining missions and tasks of the Armed Forces and a law on intelligence services, but reforms belonging to 2nd generation of reforms have not been profound. The context of SSR in Serbia in the 2006 – 2009 period has mostly been free from treats of the security establishment’s involvement in political life. The exception to this general observation is an episode of a publicly-revealed dispute between Minister Dragan Šutanovac and Chief of the General Staff Zdravko Ponoš in January-February 2009 (“Miletić novi načelnik Generalštaba”, B92, 13 June 2009). Although this episode, which was resolved by the President’s decision to discharge the Chief of the General Staff, proved the supremacy of civilian decision makers and confirmed principles of civilian command, it also questioned transparency of decision-making and governance in the security sector, since general Ponoš pointed part of his critique to non-transparency and non-accountability of financial management within the MoD (“Tadić razio Ponoša funkcije načelnika Generalštaba”, Politika, 3 September 2009).

Conclusion

The ten years of Milošević’s rule during the 1990s were marked by wars, economic breakdown, isolation from the international community, massive violations of human rights, and political assassinations. Milošević’s authoritarian regime held the security sector under tight political control, making the introduction of democratic and civilian control impossible. The police and security services were ab(used) for securing personal power of Milošević, as well as for a crackdown upon his political opponents. The opposition was at the time weak and divided, and only in the second half of the ’90s did it start to consolidate. The police and security services were a strong lever of the regime, although in the first few years, the military had a leading role in the security sector, before being sidelined by the police. After the fall of Milošević, it became evident that the real strong pillar of the regime had been the State Security Service (SDB), which, in the final stage of Milošević’s regime, was even used for political assassinations.
All this left a heavy ‘heritage’ to the new, democratically-elected government in the autumn of 2000. The priorities of the new government were to bring the country back from the isolation and to start reforms, with the goal of transforming Serbia into liberal-democratic society. Unfortunately, the initial success of the reforms, primarily in the area of the economy, was not followed with thorough and effective reforms in the security sector, and in particular of security services. Discord in the ruling coalition (DOS) hampered the reform process, while the pace of the reforms was additionally slowed down by several other factors. Firstly, the federal arrangement of the country that resulted in the competences over the military and military security services being in the hands of the Federal government, where the support for reforms from the Montenegrin political elite was lacking. Secondly, the security services (primarily the State Security Service) were strongly opposed to lustration and opening of secret files, seeking (and finding) support in the police, judiciary, intelligence services, military, and organised crime. The depth and strength of these connections became evident after the assassination of the Prime Minister Djindjic in the spring of 2003.

The assassination of Djindjic showed that that proper reforms had been lacking, leaving a significant part of the security sector unreformed and out of the reach of democratic and civilian control. Numerous scandals and accusations against the ruling DOS coalition, of being corrupt and cooperating with “shadowy businessmen” and organised crime groups, in the months that followed the assassination of Djindjic, resulted in the Government resigning. The new Government was formed in the spring of 2004, with the support of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), marking the return of old cadres from the Milosevic regime to positions in government institutions. Priority of the Government policy was put on the future solution of Kosovo status, while the reforms lost their intensity. Nevertheless, the Police and the Military were put under the democratic and civilian control, marking the beginning of the first generation of security sector reform. Although the fight against organised crime was set as one of the state priorities, it actually lost the intensity it had shortly after the assassination of the Prime Minister. Corruption became widespread among political parties and government institutions, resulting in weak state institutions, incapable of attempting the democratisation and broad reform of the society.

The loose federal arrangement of the country ended in May 2006, when
Montenegro declared independence and Serbia was given a chance to (re) define its own system of national security. Soon, it became evident that there was still a lack of consensus on the state’s foreign policy orientation, resulting in often-confusing policies and strategic documents. In 2007, in the light of a possible declaration of independence by Kosovo, a declaration on military neutrality was adopted. Declaration of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008 threatened for a while that a discourse emphasising the protection of the territory and state’s capacities to respond to immediate threats from the outside, would prevail over the ‘reforms’ discourse. The process of reforms, however, continued, resulting with the completion of the legal framework of the security sector in October 2009. This has marked the completion of the first generation of SSR in Serbia.
Annex 1: Analysis of Key Political Actors in Serbia for the Period 1990–2009

Key Political Actors

Key actors which defined paces and direction of SSR related issues in the respective period of time were parliamentary political parties and political establishment, while significant pressure from international actors, apart from above mentioned Schengen related processes, was absent. Demand for reforms was provided either by non-governmental institution dealing with security issues or good governance in general or by state's independent control institutions, such as Ombudsperson and Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, who have pointed to particular examples of either human rights violations or have provided inputs on security related legislature. Increased and more visible involvement of these actors in SSR is one of the qualitative changes compared to the previous periods.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
<th>Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA (SPS)</td>
<td>Successor of the Communist Party. Socialist political orientation but also highly nationalistic</td>
<td>Authoritative in political action. Highly oppressive to the opposition. Led by a strong leader.</td>
<td>High support within the citizens at the beginning which decreased with time.</td>
<td>Main allies during 1990s were Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in certain periods, also individuals from Intelligence services Organised crime groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruling party during 1990s</td>
<td>Main motivation is preservation of power</td>
<td>Total lack of respect of human rights during 1990s</td>
<td>Highly cohesive, uniform party.</td>
<td>Main opponents during 1990s were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) and later Coalition DOS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In ruling coalition in 2009.</td>
<td>Successor of the Communist Party. Socialist political orientation but also highly nationalistic</td>
<td>No democratic credentials, although it tried to maintain the appearance of democratic political life.</td>
<td>Took over the material resources of the Communist Party.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Main motivation is preservation of power</td>
<td>After 2000, did not have broad popular support; oriented toward survival. Divided among different fractions</td>
<td>Decisive force for stopping and delaying reforms during 1990s.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Successor of the Communist Party. Socialist political orientation but also highly nationalistic</td>
<td>Strong support in <em>ancient regime</em> elements within the state institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Main motivation is preservation of power</td>
<td>Does not have influence on reforms after 2000.</td>
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<td><strong>YUGOSLAV LEFT (JUL)</strong></td>
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<td>Extremely leftist party, radical in its views.</td>
<td>Main coalition partner of SPS during 1990s.</td>
<td>Radical in political action. Highly oppressive to the opposition, sometimes even life-threatening. Total lack of respect of human rights. No democratic credentials.</td>
<td>Low support among the citizens but greater within the economic elite. Highly cohesive, uniform party. Unlimited state resources at its disposal. One of the decisive forces for stopping and delaying reforms during 1990s.</td>
<td>Main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in certain periods. Main opponents were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) and later Coalition DOS.</td>
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<td><strong>SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY (SRS)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely right-wing party, highly nationalistic and radical in its views. Coalition partner of SPS in certain periods during 1990s.</td>
<td>Main motivation is gaining popular support. Organizer of paramilitary units during the wars.</td>
<td>Radical in political action. Highly oppressive to the opposition. Total lack of respect of human rights. No democratic credentials. In 2003 – 2006 period anti-system oriented; aims to stop the process of reforms and Euro-Atlantic integrations.</td>
<td>High support within the citizens during 1990s, limited but rising popular support in 2000 – 2003. Highly cohesive, uniformed party with strong discipline, organisation and cohesion. Had some material support. (SMEs) Unknown material resources. One of the decisive forces for stopping and delaying reforms. In 2003-2006 period the strongest opposition party that gained popularity and support after the break-up of DOS coalition. Well developed organisational network and membership.</td>
<td>During 1990s main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Yugoslav Left (JUL). Main opponents were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) and later Coalition DOS. In 2003 – 2006 period main allies: ultra nationalist and conservatives, remnants of old regime in security sector and economy. Main opponents: all democratic parties, both in power and in opposition, media, civil society.</td>
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<td>Type of actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERBIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT (SPO)</td>
<td>Main motivation: gaining power.</td>
<td>Leader of the opposition at the beginning of the 90s but also organiser of paramilitary units during the wars.</td>
<td>High support within the nationalist opposition.</td>
<td>Main allies: Democratic Party of Serbia (DS) and Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS). Main opponents: Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Main motivation: gaining power.</td>
<td>Main motivation: gaining power.</td>
<td>Human rights becoming more important with time.</td>
<td>Not very influential on refs.</td>
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<td>LIBERAL – DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)</td>
<td>Motivation: access to power.</td>
<td>Democratic and institutional means of politics; advocates more radical changes and reforms.</td>
<td>Supported by pro-European voters that were disappointed with slow pace of reforms that resulted with delayed integration in the EU.</td>
<td>Main allies: some civil society organisations and media, liberals. Main opponents: Democratic Party of Serbia, Radical Party, anti-democratic parties. Recently, LDP is more cooperative with the DS, supporting government in critical situations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DS)</td>
<td>Political orientation: social-democratic</td>
<td>Main motivation is gaining power / remaining in power.</td>
<td>Democratic and institutional means of politics.</td>
<td>Main allies: main allies during 1990s were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS).</td>
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<td>Respects human rights and democracy, advocates faster pace of reforms and EU membership as the primary strategic goal.</td>
<td>Even though leading party in ruling coalition (DOS), did not have broad popular support in 2000 – 2003 period.</td>
<td>In 2000 – 2003 period G17, Liberally-oriented and progressive forces of society CSOs</td>
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<td>Strategy: using anti – Milosevic image and achievements, Djindjic legacies, pro-EU rhetoric, from 2008 onwards building catch-all politics</td>
<td>DS was managing reforms but with strong opposition and obstruction within the ruling coalition.</td>
<td>They have been in coalition with the almost all relevant political parties, together with G17+ and minority parties going for elections</td>
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<td>Significant material bases (SMEs, big businesses, foreign companies)</td>
<td>Civil society, some private media, international actors.</td>
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<td>The strongest party in DOS coalition; later became the strongest democratic opposition party to Government formed and led by Democratic Party of Serbia 2004-2007.</td>
<td>Main opponents:</td>
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<td>Today wide social base of supporters (44%), charismatic president, key political figures in current establishment, governing experience, currently dominance in a government and local administrations</td>
<td>DSS Parts and individuals from Intelligence services Organised crime groups Radical Party Democratic Party of Serbia and their coalition partners</td>
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<td>From 2006 and onwards wide social base of supporters (44%), charismatic president, key political figures in current establishment, governing experience, currently dominance in a government and local administrations</td>
<td>From 2006 radical party and DSS.</td>
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<td>Type of actor</td>
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<td><strong>SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (civilian and military)</strong></td>
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<td>Well developed organisational structures and mechanisms of influence that were created during the 90s. No support within the citizens. Very cohesive. Material resources from organized crime and corruption. Decisive for stopping and delaying reforms.</td>
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<td>Despite the personal changes that were conducted after the assassination of the Prime Minister Djindjic, some members that are supporting the old regime remained in the agency. Very radical in political action. Highly oppressive towards the opposition even life threatening. No respect of human rights. No democratic credentials. Seeks influence on political processes and reforms by demising the reputation of some politicians by launching unverified compromising stories on them in tabloids that are suspected to be financially supported by the agency itself. Limited respect of human rights due to illegal phone-tapping and other illegal use of special powers.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Main allies: during 1990s Main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Main opponents are opposition and civil society. During 2000-2003 supporters of old regime inside the security sector; nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups and parties, “anti-Hague” groups.</td>
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<td>Political orientation: During 1990s and after 2000, affiliated to old regime and organised crime groups; opposing democratic reforms Motivation: preservation of power and influence on political process Close to the regime (power within the state).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TYCOONS</strong></td>
<td>Political orientation: various, mostly financially supporting both the ruling parties and opposition</td>
<td>Corruption (bribing) and political corruption (influence on making laws) Lobbying Don’t care for democratic and human rights values Financing political parties in order to promote their interests and get preferential position once the party gets on power.</td>
<td>Through corruption they demise the capacity of state institutions to perform reforms, and often slow them down. They have no popular support, but have a great material and financial resources. Tycoons are actually several groups which are in the nature clusters of nouveau riche/new rich&quot;. Anti-Corruption Council of Serbia reported that tycoons had strong influence on the process of making anticorruption laws and the very content of these laws (after 2000)</td>
<td>Main allies: political parties and government officials, gatekeepers (high ranking bureaucrats) Main opponents: few civil society organisations, but no major opponent in political parties, other tycoons</td>
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<td>Type of actor</td>
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<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>Political orientation: promoting democracy, human rights protection and reforms that lead to EU membership. During 1990s opposition to the regime with pro-democratic orientation. Motivation: influence on political processes and public in order to promote the values they are advocating, reforms.</td>
<td>Advocating certain issues through mobilisation of popular support; networking with other organisations. Action with peaceful means. Human rights on top of the agenda. Promoting democracy and human rights protection. Using almost the same list of methods: organisation of public events (conferences, discussions, round tables), conducting education activities (seminars, trainings), advocating certain solutions, keeping good relations with the occupants of the most relevant posts, providing advises and analyses</td>
<td>During 1990s lacking popular support. Material resources from foreign donors. Today, support base is located among the democratically oriented part of the population, while the conservative and nationalist oriented part of the population is sometimes opposing their work and existence. Financial resources are mainly coming from foreign donors; human and material resources vary. Some capacity to influence the pace of reforms, by influencing primarily public, less the state institutions. Recognised persons representing some of CSOs (recognised either for the expertise and professional and – or academic career or for political activism especially during Milosevic regime); Limited capabilities to act as agenda setter</td>
<td>Main allies: pro-European democratic political parties, media, academia, during 1990s opposition parties. Main opponents: Main opponents were ruling Parties and secret services during 1990s, after 2000 conservative and nationalist parties, old regime parties and parts of the security apparatus. Some of the most prominent CSOs have good relations with the ruling parties; there are strong ties between some of the CSOs and certain party. Usually not well perceived by the public. Some of them good relations with the most prominent media</td>
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<td>Type of actor</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES</strong>&lt;br&gt;(physical and technical protection and security, detectives)&lt;br&gt;Since 2000. Start gaining importance; impetus came from liberalisation of economy</td>
<td>Economic gain&lt;br&gt;Political power (instrumental)</td>
<td>Legal and market means (competition on the open market)&lt;br&gt;Corruption (bribery) and political corruption (influence on the process of making laws)</td>
<td>Have capacity to slow down reform.&lt;br&gt;Due to intervention of one of the security manager of PSC Draft Law on Private Security was withdrawn from the procedure of adoption before Serbian parliament.&lt;br&gt;They are not a coherent group of actors</td>
<td>Allies: Other PSC, Political parties, politicians, businesses&lt;br&gt;Opponents: Other PSC, Political parties, politicians,</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIA</strong>&lt;br&gt;State Media (either owned by the state or the ones that are openly supporting the Government)&lt;br&gt;Independent media (TV stations, daily and weekly newspapers)</td>
<td>Political orientation: depending on the ruling coalition in power; democratic but conservative.&lt;br&gt;Motivation: Main motivation during 1990s was preservation of the regime, promotion of the Government’s interest and gaining state funds.&lt;br&gt;Political orientation: democratic&lt;br&gt;Motivation: popular trust and economic gain</td>
<td>During the 1990s no human rights on the regime media agenda.&lt;br&gt;Informing the public and spreading Government propaganda.&lt;br&gt;Due to strong affiliation with ruling elites, democratic credentials are not high.&lt;br&gt;Independent journalism, promotion of certain issues of public interest, investigating corruption and other affairs, democratic credentials.&lt;br&gt;Criticising both the regime and opposition.</td>
<td>During 1990s had strong support of the regime.&lt;br&gt;Public trust and influence varies, mostly they are trusted by conservative part of the population.&lt;br&gt;During 1990s received material resources from the regime.&lt;br&gt;Trusted by the pro-European oriented population, during 1990s received material resources from foreign donors.&lt;br&gt;Market-oriented, aiming to gain as much as possible of the media market.</td>
<td>Main allies: during 1990s regime parties and secret services, from 2000 political parties, Government&lt;br&gt;Main opponents: during 1990s; opposition parties and civil society.&lt;br&gt;After 2000: opposition parties, private media&lt;br&gt;Main allies: opposition parties (during 1990s) and civil society.&lt;br&gt;Main opponents: nationalist and conservative groups and political parties.</td>
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<td>Type of actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>During 1990s very close to the regime. Main motivation was preservation of Yugoslavia and later preservation of power within the state.</td>
<td>During 1990s radical in its action but indecisive in critical moments.</td>
<td>During 1990s high support within the citizens. Very cohesive. Lack of material resources. Not important for stopping and delaying reforms.</td>
<td>During 1990s main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Main opponents are opposition and civil society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL ACTORS</td>
<td>International organizations (European Union, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe)</td>
<td>Conditionality and pressure on political parties. Promotion of democracy through cooperation and support of civil society organisations working in a field on specific targeted issues (OSCE), monitoring and providing reports</td>
<td>Most of these actors (EU, NATO, OSCE) have their missions in Belgrade, thus monitoring situation and having access to data on daily basis; though some of them lack staff with deep knowledge about the region and political history of the country; Also, some of these missions are too small to be able to monitor every particular issue thoroughly</td>
<td>Main allies: civil society, political parties oriented towards Euro-Atlantic integrations, some media runners. Main opponents: supporters of the old regime, nationalist and conservatives, ultra-nationalist organisations and political parties They are perceived as relevant actor and their reports/statements have broad media coverage, especially in a case of the EU (membership in it is Serbia’s top political priority)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Private Security Companies in Serbia - Neglected Security Actor

Private security companies (PSCs) in Serbia have been active from early 1990s. During the wars of the 1990s, international sanctions, social and economic decline, high level of criminality and violence, and abolishment of the communist-era laws that regulated these services, influenced PSCs in a way that they did their job using a high level of violence and in an arbitrary manner. There is no systematised data about the number and type of PSCs during the period 1990 - 2000. But it was after October 5, 2000 that PSC flourished in Serbia. Democratic changes and the subsequent liberalisation of the Serbian economy opened the door for foreign investments. A large number of foreign companies were now coming to the Serbian market since they reckoned the investment risk to be much less than at the time of non-democratic rule. Most important for the development of PSCs, however, was the arrival of foreign banks in Serbia. The banks needed physical-technical protection (physical and technical security) and they were not willing to provide it from companies that had connections with paramilitary formations and criminal groups as it happened in the 1990s, but rather from lawfully operating entities, namely PSCs.

That fact contributed to the self-transformation of the private security sector. Thus, the Association of Companies for Physical-Technical Security within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce was set and many PSCs established training courses for their employees. Also, the Association made a law on PSCs in an effort to put their activities under strict legal framework. Positive transformation of PSCs was acknowledged by clients who were very sensitive and demanding in regard to security, especially embassies, who were no longer reluctant to contract out their services to local companies.
But these positive reform steps have not been met by state institutions, who are neglecting the importance of regulating private security sector for (too) many years. Thus, the draft law on PSC, which was in parliamentary procedure, was withdrawn from the process of adoption without any official explanation. One explanation suggests that vested interests of different players are the main cause for that. Today, 3000 security companies which employ between 20 and 60 thousand people in Serbia, base their work on ten laws and regulations, the most important of which are the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, Labour Law, and Law on Fire Protection. These laws consider the PSCs to be economic operators, but the specific nature of their operations, such as the use of weapons, application of special investigative techniques, and control and oversight of these companies, are still not regulated. Basically, PSCs currently operate in some sort of legal limbo.
Bibliography:


CHRONOLOGY OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SERBIA (1990–2009)

1990

March

08 The first release of newspaper “Demokratija” (Democracy) - official bulletin of the Serbian opposition.

June

13 The first anti-government protests take place in front of the state TV building. Borislav Pekić, famous Serbian writer and co-founder of the Democratic Party, is injured in police violence against protesters.

July

05 The Serbian parliament passes the “Law Terminating the Work of the Parliament and the Executive Council of SAP Kosovo.” “Termination” is in fact a euphemism for the abolition of these institutions. Article 3 decrees that the “rights and duties” of the provincial authorities be taken over by the Parliament and Executive Council of Serbia. Article 5 dismisses the civil servants of the affected institutions as well as the officials heading the provincial organs of administration. A regulation for the implementation of this Law, passed on 13th July, regulates the details for the new organisation and activity of the administrative organs of the province, now taken over by officials of the republic. A complaint is made to the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, but no ruling is made before the dissolution of the SFRY.
1991

March

09 The first opposition demonstrations take place in Belgrade’s public square, led by the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Democratic Party. Protesters demand fair elections and the immediate liberation of RTS (National TV station) from state control. The police respond violently. One protester and a policeman lose their lives in street fighting. The country’s establishment urges military intervention. By late in the evening the army has “restored order” in the streets of the capital city, Belgrade.

10 Belgrade students take part in a non-violent protest on Terazije Square. More than 10,000 students, led by the “Terazije Students’ Parliament”, perform a “nonviolent occupation”, blocking Belgrade’s central streets with a 24-hour sit in. They do move until the army has been withdrawn from the streets of the capital.

April

01 The “Plitvice Bloody Easter” (Krvavi Uskrs na Plitvicama) incident of late March/early April 1991, takes place at the outset of the Croatian war of Independence. This is a clash between heavily armed Croatian policemen and special police (the Croatian army still being formed and organized at the time) aiming to create an independent Republic of Croatia, on one side, and lightly armed Serbs, supported by Belgrade and the Yugoslav People’s Army, on the other. This results in two deaths – one on each side – contributing significantly to worsening ethnic tensions that are to be at the heart of the subsequent war.

June

25 The Slovenian Parliament passes a constitutional law implementing the Basic Charter of the Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia, the Declaration of Independence and several additional laws enabling Slovenia to take over the authority previously held by the federal government on Slovenian territory. Yugoslav signs and flags at border crossings are replaced with Slovenian ones, and border crossings with Croatia are set
up. The evening of the same day, the Federal Executive Council convenes in Belgrade, issuing a decree for the protection of the national borders in Slovenia, thus giving the JNA and federal police forces the green light for an armed attack on Slovenia.

26 The first armoured units of the Rijeka corps set off towards the border crossings with Italy.

27 The JNA begins military operations in Slovenia, mobilizing to secure the international borders of the SFRY and bombing Ljubljana airport. Fighting continues intermittently over the next few weeks, despite European Community (EC) efforts to negotiate a cease-fire.

July

03 In various parts of Slovenia, fierce fighting takes place between the JNA and the republican territorial defines. The federal government makes accusations against the leadership in Ljubljana of violations of the ceasefire agreement.

07 On 7th July, representatives of Slovenia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the European Community meet on the Brioni islands. The Brioni Declaration is accepted, establishing a three-month moratorium on Slovenian independence activities. However, Slovenian police and armed forces retain full sovereignty over Slovenian territory. As a result, on 18th July the SFRY Presidency reaches a decision to withdraw JNA arms and equipment from Slovenia within three months. The last soldiers leave Slovenia from the port of Koper on the night of 25th October.

1992

January

09 The Bosnian Serb Assembly adopts a declaration on the Proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska Bosne i Hercegovine).
The European Union issues a statement stating that the Member States have decided to “open the process of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia”.

**February**

03 Agreement on the acceptance of the concept of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia is reached.

**March**

19 The Coordinator of the European Union, José Cutileiro, confirms that an agreement has been reached on future arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina according to which it would be a state composed of three nationally defined parts.

**May**

31 The United Nations Security Council decides to impose an economic embargo on Serbia.

**June**

16 Dobrica Ćosić becomes the first president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

28 More than 100,000 people, led by opposition parties, organize a two-week demonstration in front of the Federal Parliament building (the “Vidovdanski Sabor”) demanding better electoral conditions.

**July**

15 Milan Panić becomes the first Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

**August**

08 US President George H. W. Bush makes a statement on how to resolve the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bush confirms his earlier statement that the U.S. will do everything in its power to help vulnerable populations
in BiH, to enable the delivery of necessary assistance and simultaneously find a solution to the Yugoslav crisis.

October

20 A dispute occurs between federal and Serbian police. The Serbian special police’s entry into the federal building at 92 Knez Miloš Street intensifies speculation about the relationship between federal and republican authorities.

December

19 Early parliamentary and local elections are held. For the first time the opposition wins a majority of seats in eleven municipal assemblies, including parts of Belgrade, although Milosevic’s Socialist Party wins a majority in the Serbian Parliament.

24 According to the Republican Electoral Commission’s report, Milošević remains President of Serbia while opposition parties will have significantly more seats in the republican and federal parliaments.

30 The federal parliament removes Milan Panić from his post. Radoje Kontić becomes the new federal Prime Minister.

1993

January

23 The Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia attack the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Dobrica Ćosić sends a letter asking the UN to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council and saying that the Croatian attack is a violation of the Vance plan.

February

23 UN Security Council establishes the International Crime Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.
April

19 The UN Security Council passes a new resolution tightening sanctions against the FRY, taking effect from 26th April if the Bosnian Serbs do not sign the Vance-Owen peace plan by that date and stop the fighting in Bosnia.

27 The assembly of the Republika Srpska refuses the Vance-Owen plan.

June

01 Dobrica Ćosić is removed from his post by the federal parliament.

02 Following a violent incident between MP Branislav Vakić, an ally of the Serbian ruling party, and one of the opposition leaders, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) organizes an overnight protest in support of their injured MP, attempting to blockade the Parliament building. After a violent conflict with the police at the entrance to the Parliament, a policeman is shot, and dies the same night. Hours later, police break into the premises of the Serbian Renewal Movement, arresting and beating their leader Vuk Drašković.

October

21 Serbian President Slobodan Milošević signs a decree dissolving the National Assembly. In accordance with the Constitution, the speaker calls new parliamentary elections to be held on 18th December.

1994

January

22 France announces it has launched a new round of consultations with the United States, Germany and Britain to consider an alternative to the withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia.
February

01 The supreme command of the Republika Srpska adopts a series of decisions and measures within its competence, aimed at mobilizing all the available forces of the Republika Srpska.

05 In Sarajevo, an explosion occurs at “Merkale”, the largest open market, killing fifty people and injuring 84.

March

11 NATO aircraft bomb Bosnian Serb positions deemed to have advanced towards the eastern Bosnian town of Goražde, denoted a safe area according to UN Security Council resolution 836.

April

11 NATO bombs Serbian positions near Goražde.

August

03 The Serbian government, under threat of blockade of the border between the FRY and Republika Srpska demands that the RS leadership accepts the Contact Group peace plan.

06 NATO airplanes bombs positions of the Bosnian Serb military.

December

10 A session of the Supreme Defence Council is held at which it is decided to increase the Yugoslav Army’s budget.
1995

May

03 Following armed attacks in western Slavonia, the military-political situation in the region is discussed at a meeting attended by Zoran Lilić, Slobodan Milošević, Momir Bulatović, Radoje Kontić, Vladislav Jovanović, Pavle Bulatović and Momčilo Perišić. The attacks are deemed a criminal act against civilians and the bombing of cities is condemned. The meeting concludes that there is no military solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

August

04 Croatian armed forces use artillery, aviation and infantry during operation „Storm“. The Serbian Government strongly condemns the aggression of the Croatian Army at an extraordinary meeting held on 4 August 1995 under the presidency of Mirko Marjanović.

November

21 The peace conference at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio on ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ends with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia (the Dayton Agreement).

December

05 EU sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are lifted.

14 The Dayton Peace Agreement is formally signed in Paris.

1996

March

09 Two major opposition parties, the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Democratic Party, supported by the Civic Alliance of Serbia form a broad-
based coalition, “Together” (“Zajedno”). The coalition announcement is made at a huge rally organized to mark the fifth anniversary of the first opposition demonstration in Serbia.

August

08 The FRY and Croatia mutually recognize each other.

24 Croatia recognizes the continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

September

03 The President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, and the President of the Democratic League of Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, sign an agreement on the return of Albanian students and teachers to schools and their integration into a unified educational system.

October

02 Sanctions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, previously under suspension, are terminated by UN Security Council resolution 1074.

November

17 Elections are held for the Yugoslav National Parliament. The opposition coalition, Zajedno (“Together”) wins power in 32 municipalities, including Belgrade.

20 The Electoral Commission calls for a recount in most areas won by the opposition. Citizens’ demonstrations begin in Belgrade and other urban cities in Serbia.

24 Protests in Belgrade for the annulment of the results of local elections enter a fourth day. It is estimated that it 50,000 people are involved.

25 Milošević cancels the election results, prompting massive, mostly non-violent, demonstrations.
27 Milošević holds new elections, boycotted by the opposition. The protests grow in size.

December

24 A rally in support of Slobodan Milošević is held.

27 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe sends a message demanding that the winners of the original elections must be reinstated, or Serbia will face international isolation.

1997

February

04 Milošević announces he will restore the victories won by the opposition in the 17th November elections. Demonstrations continue, with protestors demanding electoral reform and press freedom.

05 The president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, accepts the election results.

March

26 Conflicts begin at the highest level of Montenegrin politics as Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović, both belonging to the Democratic Socialist Party of Montenegro (DPS), run against each other in the presidential elections. Đukanovic wins by a small margin and Bulatović and his followers form a new party – the Socialist People’s Party (SNP). The underlying cause of this crisis is the electoral fraud in the Serbian local elections.

April

11 Rade Marković is appointed Chief of the Department of Public Safety of the Ministry of Interior and Acting Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia. Marković is infamous for being Slobodan Milošević’s ‘right hand man’.
July

15 Constitutionally barred from serving another term as president of Serbia, Milošević is elected president of Yugoslavia.

October

07 The second round of the Serbian presidential elections is organized.

November

04 The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, and the Prime Minister of Albania, Fatos Nano, meet in Crete to discuss the normalization of bilateral relations and to talk about the dispute regarding the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. Milošević refers to an Albanian “minority”, indicating that “their problem will be resolved in the framework of international law” and on the basis of Yugoslavia’s policy promoting the equality of ethnic groups, while Nano spoke of an “Albanian community” and underlined that the problem should be dealt with in the same European framework as other communities.

December

02 In a contested election, Milošević’s ally, Milan Milutinović, is declared the winner of a five-year term as a president of Serbia.

1998

January

15 Clashes take place at a rally in Podgorica following negotiations the previous day, in which Đukanovic’s group reject a proposed resolution to the crisis.
February

28 In the armed conflict in Kosovo several Serbian police officers and Albanians are killed, while a large number of Albanians are arrested.

April

24 Results of a referendum on the issue of foreign intervention in the Kosovo crisis are announced, showing that 94.7% of Serbian voters are against foreign involvement.

August

10 Serbian army offensives against the KLA (OVK in Serbian, UÇK in Albanian) displace a large number of ethnic Albanians and killing hundreds, bringing the conflict to the attention of the world.

September

20 Germany announces the possibility of foreign intervention in the event that attacks on civilians do not cease.

28 The Serbian Parliament votes for a solution to the Kosovo crisis, deciding to form an Interim Executive Council in Kosovo.

October

13 The “Holbrooke-Milošević” agreement on a ceasefire in Kosovo and peaceful resolution of problems in Kosovo and Metohija by political means is signed.

27 A presidential decree removes Serbian State Security Service Chief Jovica Stanišić from his post, and appoints Radomir Marković in his place.
1999

January

15 Fighting takes place in the village of Račak, in which 40 Albanians are killed. The Serbian government claims they are terrorists, while the Albanians claim they are civilians. In the aftermath, NATO issues an ultimatum to the government of Slobodan Milošević demanding that military operations in Kosovo cease and security forces are withdrawn or Serbia will face international military action.

February

06 The Rambouillet talks on ending the Kosovo crisis begin.

22 Peace negotiations in Rambouillet fail. The OSCE's international monitors withdraw from Kosovo.

23 The Serbian parliament accepts the principle of autonomy for Kosovo and the non-military part of the Rambouillet agreement.

March

24 NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, Operation Allied Force, begin.

June

09 The Kumanovo Treaty (Military Technical Agreement) is signed, bringing an end to the bombing of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo war.

10 Resolution 1244 of UN Security Council, authorizing an international civil and military presence in Kosovo, is passed.

September

21 Rallies begin in 20 cities urging Milošević to resign. At the same time, the opposition begins to fragment, and the number of demonstrators dwindles.
2000

September

24 Elections are held for president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The DOS coalition announces that Vojislav Koštunica has won over half of the votes. Yugoslavia’s regime-controlled Federal Election Commission calls for a second ballot, saying that neither candidate has won an outright majority. It claims Mr Koštunica has won 48% of the vote compared to Mr Milošević’s 40%. The vote is largely boycotted in Montenegro and by Kosovo Albanians, yet Milošević is officially declared to have won by a large margin in these parts of the country. This obvious discrepancy, along with numerous irregularities, strengthens accusations of systematic electoral fraud and lead DOS to call for peaceful protests to topple the regime.

October

05 From 24th September to 5th October the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) organises large-scale demonstrations in Belgrade and other Serbian cities protesting against electoral fraud. Following these demonstrations president Slobodan Milošević leaves power and transfers it to the legally elected president Vojislav Koštunica.

06 After the Constitutional Court approves Koštunica’s victory Slobodan Milošević congratulates his rival on winning the elections.

07 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia parliament is constituted. Vojislav Koštunica swears an oath before both houses of Parliament. In the following days Koštunica meets many foreign statesmen and the EU and the USA lift their economic sanctions against the FRY. The process of reconciliation and normalisation with the West and neighbouring countries thus begins.

09 The parties represented in the Serbian parliament agree on a vote of no confidence in the government, to form a transitional government of experts, and to call early elections for the Serbian parliament. This government is formed according to an agreement signed on October 16 by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). This agreement prescribes col-
lective government until early elections take place. The leader of the transitional government is to be Milomir Minić, a top official of the Socialist Party of Serbia, while Nebojša Čović (DOS) i Spasoje Krurić (SPO) are chosen as deputy prime ministers. The Interior Ministry is headed by Slobodan Tomović from the SPS, Stevan Nikčević from the SPO and Božidar Prelević from DOS. The Ministry of Finance is governed by Borislav Milačić (SPS), Ljubiša Jovanović (DOS) and Bojan Dimitrijević (SPO).

15 An intervention by Vojislav Koštunica leads to Vladan Begović, a member of the Democratic Alternative, being appointed head of the Federal Customs Directorate. This follows accusations of a conflict of interest levelled against the man he is replacing, Dušan Zabunović, owner of the private company MPS, due to his links with the son of the former president, Marko Milošević, and his company, Tref. Zabunović was put in the post temporarily on 6th October, as demanded by Mihalj Kertes who had occupied the post under Milošević.

22 President of FRY Vojislav Koštunica designates Zoran Žižić, vice-president of the Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro, as the new Prime Minister of the FRY.

25 The FRY is officially admitted as a full member of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in Bucharest.

31 Following an SPO demand, Balša Govedarica, president of the Supreme Court of Serbia, and State Prosecutor Dragiša Krismanović are deposed. Radomir Marković remains head of the State Security Department (RDB) despite demands for his removal. This brings the transitional government to crisis point as SPO and DOS ministers have set Marković’s removal as a condition for their participation in government. Vojislav Koštunica strongly opposes Marković’s removal.

**November**

01 A session of the UN General Assembly unanimously admits the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a new member state.

04 Both houses of the Yugoslav parliament elect a new Federal government composed of ministers from DOS, the Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro
(SNP), the Serbian People's Party of Montenegro and the G17 Plus group. Zoran Žižić from the SNP is chosen as Prime Minister, while his deputy is Miroljub Labus (G17+) who is also minister for foreign economic relations.

05 Slobodan Krapović from the SNP is elected as Minister of Defence.

06 The new Serbian government is tested by prison riots, with prisoners demanding better conditions, an amnesty and a change of prison management. One person dies, several are injured and significant damage is done during the protest, which is ended on 11th November, when government representatives promise to meet all the prisoners’ demands.

09 FRY president Vojislav Koštunica makes an official request to the headquarters of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, asking for Yugoslavia to be admitted as a member of this institution.

10 By consensus of all member-states, the Permanent Council of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) admits the FRY as a member.

15 In an address to the European Parliament FRY president Vojislav Koštunica says that the FRY wants to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU as soon as possible.

16 The popular movement Otpor receives the MTV award “Free your mind”.

17 The FRY restores full diplomatic relations with France, Germany, Great Britain and the USA.

19-22 Five policemen are wounded and three are missing after a three-day conflict between the police and the so called Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa in the south of Serbia.

23 Albanian terrorists in the area around Bujanovac open fire sporadically at the administrative line with Kosovo.

24 At the EU – Western Balkan Summit held in Zagreb, Croatia, the EU invites the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to join the Stabilisation and Association
Process (SAP). The “Closing Declaration” adopted at this meeting represents an important step in the further development of political and economic relations between the EU and states included in the SAP. The police assess that the situation in Bujanovac has stabilised.

27 In Vienna, FRY president Vojislav Koštunica signs documents relating to the OSCE and asks NATO and the UN for a change in the Military-Technical Agreement on Kosovo concerning the presence of Serbian police forces in the security zone between Serbia and Kosovo. Koštunica then hurries from Vienna to the south of Serbia where the conflict between armed Albanians and the Serbian police has restarted.

**December**

05 The State Security Directorate (RDB) proclaims that its Special Operations Unit (JSO) has not entered the Ground Security Zone on the administrative border between Serbia and Kosovo.

06 Mihalj Kertes, director of the Federal Customs Directorate during the Milošević period, is arrested and charged with abuse of office. Under Milošević, corruption in the customs service was institutionalised, serving as a way to control money flows outside the state budget and for the personal gain of persons close to the regime.

- The Interior Ministry forms a special squad for fighting organised crime and corruption. One of its main tasks is the investigation of unsolved murders.

09 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia establishes diplomatic relations with Slovenia. Diplomatic relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina are established on 15th December 2000.

13 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia becomes a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

14 The FRY government establishes the Council for Defence and Security headed by federal Prime Minister Zoran Žižić. Minister of Defence Slobodan Krappović is a member of the Council. Federal Minister of finance Dragiša Pešić explains that the Council has been established as a government working body, that it has an advisory role and that it will not interfere with the
authority of the Supreme Defence Council (VSO).

20 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia becomes a member of the International Monetary Fund which grants it a credit of 151 million dollars.

23 At the first parliamentary elections in post-Milošević Serbia, DOS claims victory, winning 176 of 250 parliamentary mandates. Seats are also won by the erstwhile ruling party, the SPS (37), the SRS (23) and the Party of Serbian Unity – SSJ (14).

26 Both houses of the Yugoslav parliament pass the budget of 65.9 billion dinars for the year 2002. Of that sum, 43.5 billion is intended for the defence of the country. At the same time the parliament makes changes to the Law on the Military of Yugoslavia, shortening military service to nine months.

28 The FRY parliament issues a Declaration on the situation in Kosovo and south Serbia in which Albanian extremism and terrorism in Kosovo and the Ground Security Zone are condemned. Parliament demands that the international community respects all documents concerning Kosovo.

2001

January

11 An OSCE Mission to FRY is established by a decision of the Permanent Council.

13 FRY president Vojislav Koštunica meets SPS president Slobodan Milošević who asks for guarantees of his personal safety and that of his family.

19 FRY and Albania re-establish diplomatic relations, broken since 17th April 1999 during the NATO bombing.

22 The new Serbian parliament is constituted.
  • The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approves a special guest status for the FRY.
25 The Serbian parliament elects a new Serbian government headed by Zoran Đinđić.
- Radomir Marković, head of the Department for State Security (RDB) resigns. Goran Petrović, ousted from service on 20th May 1999 on charges of leaking state secrets, is appointed in his place. Zoran Mijatović is appointed as Petrović’s deputy.

30 After removing General Vlastimir Đorđević, head of the Department for Public Security (RJB) and Obrad Stevanović, head of the Police Directorate, from their posts, the Serbian Government appoints General Sreten Lukić (head of the Kosovo and Metohija Interior Ministry since 1998 and assistant head of the Department for Public Security and Head of the Border Police Directorate since June 1999) as the new head of the Department for Public Security (RJB) and assistant Interior Minister. Sreten Lukić and Vlastimir Đorđević are later indicted by the Hague Tribunal for war crimes committed in Kosovo.

February

08 The FRY is granted observer status at the World Trade Organisation in Geneva.

13 Former Radio Television Serbia (RTS) director Dragoljub Milanović is arrested on charges of responsibility for the deaths of 16 workers during the NATO bombing of the media outlet on 23rd April 1999.

15 Diplomatic relations between the FRY and the USA are formally normalised by an exchange of ambassadors.

23 In Skopje, the presidents of the FRY and Macedonia, Vojislav Koštunica and Boris Trajkovski, sign an agreement on mutual borders at a summit of heads of states and governments of members of the South-East Cooperation Process.

24 Radomir Marković, the Former head of the State Security department (RDB), is arrested along with two more persons involved in the October 1999 Ibarska Highway incident in which four SPO officials were killed and party leader Vuk Drašković was injured in a car crash.
26 The council of EU foreign ministers decides to lift all sanctions imposed on the FRY after 1998 except sanctions on former president Slobodan Milošević and his closest associates.

March

01 The FRY government adopts an agreement establishing special parallel relations between the FRY and Republika Srpska previously agreed by FRY president Vojislav Koštunica and High Representative of the International Community for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Wolfgang Petritsch. The presidents of the FRY and Republika Srpska, Vojislav Koštunica and Mirko Šarović sign the agreement in Banja Luka on 5th March 2001.

16 The OSCE and the Council of Europe open their offices in Belgrade. Stefano Sannino is appointed head of the OSCE mission to the FRY.

April

01 The former president of Serbia and the FRY, Slobodan Milošević, is arrested on charges of abuse of power. He is taken into custody for 30 days, later extended for a further two months. Following two days and seven hours of negotiations with the new government, the attempt to arrest Milošević begins on 30th March. His supporters hold a non-stop vigil in front of his house. Police arrest Siniša Vučinić, an official of the Yugoslav Left (JUL), three more members of the SPS and JUL and members of Milošević’s private security for resisting and causing two police officers and one photo-reporter to be injured. Vučinić is released after three months. Following the arrest, Milošević’s daughter Marija fires several shots from her revolver.

03 Milan Milutinović, the vice president of the SPS and the president of Serbia, resigns from all party duties. He claims he was considering resigning earlier particularly after direct and indirect criticism was aimed against him for his agreement to call early elections.

04 The directorate for fighting organised crime is established within the Interior Ministry. Radovan Knežević is appointed head of the directorate with Captain Dragan Karleuša as his deputy.
22 Parliamentary elections are held in Montenegro. The coalition “Victory is Montenegro’s” consisting of the Democratic Party of Socialists and the Social Democratic Party wins 36 of 77 seats. The Coalition “Together for Yugoslavia” consisting of the Socialist People’s Party, the People’s Party and the Serbian People’s Party wins 33 seats, the Liberal Alliance six seats, and the Democratic Union of Albanians and the Democratic Alliance one seat each.

24 Proceedings begin against 245 members of the Military of Yugoslavia, 183 of them charged with war crimes committed in Kosovo between 1st March 1998 and 26th June 1999.

May

08 The FRY becomes a full member of the World Bank.

22 and 30 Following pressure from the electorate reminding them of their electoral promises, the government of Serbia adopts a decree opening access to State Security Service files on citizens. At the next government session the name of decree is changed so that files dealing with “internal enemies” remain state secrets, meaning that citizens cannot copy them, take them away or talk freely about their content.

June

14 General Ninoslav Krstić is removed from his post as commander of the joint Yugoslav forces in the south of Serbia, according to a decision by FRY president Vojislav Koštunica. It is considered that Koštunica’s decision is made on the demand of the Chief of General Staff, General Nebojša Pavković.

20 The commander of the State Security Department Special Operations Unit (JSO), Milorad “Legija” Luković resigns from duty and ends his employment at the Interior Ministry. This is due to an incident in Kula in which he set fire to a discotheque, following the arrest of his “protégées” Dušan Spasojević and other members of the “Zemun clan” for the kidnapping of wealthy businessman Miroslav Mišković. Milorad “Legija” Luković has been protecting their illegal activities in return for a share of their profits, and has
also been involved in fights and shooting at Belgrade’s Stupica nightclub.

28 Former FRY president Slobodan Milošević is transferred to the Hague Tribunal by Serbian government decree. Milošević and four other high officials have been under indictment by the tribunal for crimes against humanity and violation of humanitarian law against the Kosovo Albanians in the first half of 1999 since 24th May 1999. FRY president Vojislav Koštunica says that Milošević’s transfer to the Hague cannot be legal and adds that this action is premature and humiliating. The president and prime minister of Montenegro Milo Đukanović and Filip Vujanović express their satisfaction that Milošević has been transferred.

29 Yugoslav Prime Minister Zoran Žižić resigns because of the Serbian government’s decision to transfer former FRY president Slobodan Milošević to the Hague Tribunal. According to Žižić this decision breaks the coalition agreement between the Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro and DOS.

30 The Military of Yugoslavia denies any involvement in the extradition of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević to the Hague Tribunal, claiming that they have no knowledge of how the Serbian government carried out the operation. In an official statement, the Military says that Milošević was not transported from Belgrade to Tuzla by military helicopter and that at the time the only active helicopters were those of the Interior Ministry which was in charge of the extradition. In an interview with the New York Times, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić says that he feared the Military of Yugoslavia would stop Milošević’s transfer to the Hague and that the police was ready to confront the military.

July

02 The parliament of Montenegro elects a new government. Filip Vujanović from the Democratic Party of Socialists is re-elected as Prime Minister.

04 The Serbian government appoints vice premier Nebojša Ćović as president of the FRY and Serbia Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija.

14 The Serbian government declares that between 50 and 60 bodies have been found in a refrigerated truck found in Lake Perućac.
General Milan Đaković, head of the Security Directorate of the Military of Yugoslavia is replaced by General Aco Tomić.

The FRY parliament elects a new federal government headed by Dragiša Pešić, an official of the Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro.

August

Former high ranking member of the Directorate of State Security, Momir Gavrilović, is killed in Belgrade. His murder causes a political crisis in relations between FRY president Vojislav Koštunica and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đindić, as well as relations between the two leading DOS parties – the DS and the DSS. The falling-out is triggered by a statement issued by Koštunica’s cabinet claiming that shortly before his murder Gavrilović informed Koštunica’s advisers about links between Đindić’s officials in government and organised crime.

The DSS decides to withdraw from Serbia’s government and announces that it will raise the question of governmental responsibility both within DOS and in parliament as it is not satisfied with the government’s work, in particular with the work of the Ministry of Justice and the Interior Ministry. The DSS claims that the government is not capable of fighting organised crime and corruption. This is the beginning of the crisis in the ruling coalition which will still be on-going at the end of the year.

The Interior Ministry announces that more than 340 corpses have been excavated to date in mass graves discovered in Serbia.

September

The Belgrade District Court announces that at least 269 human corpses, mostly Albanians, have been excavated from a mass grave in Batajnica near Belgrade.

FRY is readmitted to Interpol by a majority decision of its general assembly. Yugoslavia was expelled from this organisation in 1993 as it was considered it did not automatically inherit the membership previously held by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
**October**

01 Serbian parliament passes a law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.

02 The Serbian government forms a council for the fight against corruption – an expert advisory body consisting of 15 members elected by the government.

09 The indictment against former FRY president Slobodan Milošević for war crimes in Croatia between August 1991 and June 1992 is approved.

**November**

05 The federal parliament adopts the Criminal Proceedings Act which allows extradition of Yugoslav citizens to international tribunals under certain conditions.

09 Members of the Department for State Security Special Operations Unit (JSO) block the road leading to their training centre in Kula in protest at being “tricked” into arresting the Banović brothers who were then transferred to the Hague Tribunal. The mutiny is based on their fear that this case implies similar arrests within their unit. After unsuccessful negotiations with Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić at the JSO base near Kula, on 12th November the protests lead to a complete blockade of the whole training centre and part of the motorway in Belgrade. This coincides with the date set for Milorad “Legija” Luković’s appearance as a witness at the County Court in the “Ibarska Highway” case. The protestors demand the resignations of Interior Minister Dušan Mihajlović and State Security Department head, Goran Petrović. Mihajlović’s offer to resign is not accepted by the government. Legija, who has retained a large degree of influence within the unit following his voluntary resignation in 2001, under pressure from the authorities, has a key role in organising this mutiny. New Serbia party leader, Velimir Ilić, supports the JSO protest and concludes that their protest is justified. FRY president Vojislav Koštunica does not condemn the protest and indirectly approves it by claiming that the security of citizens has not been endangered.
14 The Serbian government accepts the resignation of the head of the Interior Ministry State Security Department, Goran Petrović and his deputy Zoran Mijatović while the resignation of the Interior Minister Dušan Mihajlović is rejected. It is also decided to put the Special Operations Unit under the control of the Department for Public Security.

17 Parliamentary elections are held in Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo wins 45.6% of the vote, giving them 47 seats. The Serbian coalition “Return” wins 11.34% of the vote.

27 After the forced resignations of the head of the State Security Department and his deputy, a compromise solution is found that calms the JSO mutiny. Andrija Savić is appointed as the new Department head with Milorad Bracanović, former assistant to the commander of the JSO as his deputy. The former department head Goran Petrović is appointed head of the Investigation and Documentation Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bracanović was JSO head of security and Legija’s deputy in 1999 and 2000 when Ivan Stambolić, Slavko Ćuruvija and several members of the SPO were murdered and an assassination attempt made on Vuk Drašković in Budva. The JSO mutineers set Bracanović’s appointment, as a condition for ending their protest, and following this move they do so. Later, the Unit is transferred from the Department for State Security to the direct control of the Interior Minister. After agreeing to these concessions the government loses control over the Directorate for State Security and through Bracanović’s appointment, Legija and other members of the “Zemun clan” secure access to information from the highest levels.

December

06 The president of the Serbian parliament, Dragan Maršićanin, resigns. Parliament elects Nataša Mičić from the Civic Alliance of Serbia, previously vice president of the parliament, as the new president.

19 The European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg dismisses a complaint against 17 NATO countries filed by families of victims and one survivor of the bombing of the Radio Television Serbia building with the explanation that the FRY was not a member of the Council of Europe at the time.
2002

February

12 The trial of former FRY president Slobodan Milošević starts at the Hague Tribunal. He is accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan confirms the validity of the agreement between Macedonia and the FRY on mutual borders. Three days later the Security Council supports the agreement whose validity has been questioned by representatives of KFOR and UNMIK.

26 The Serbian parliament adopts changes to the Criminal Code abolishing the death sentence and replacing it with 40 years in prison.

27 FRY president Vojislav Koštunica’s decision rationalizes and partially reorganizes the Military of Yugoslavia’s command structure for the air force, anti-aircraft defence and navy, as well as abolishing the Second Army Command in Niš. Corps-brigade organisation is introduced, giving the Military of Yugoslavia nine corps, consisting of six army corps (Novi Sad, Belgrade, Užice, Podgorica, Niš and Priština), an air force corps, an anti-aircraft corps and a navy corps, plus a guard brigade and a service corps. The reorganisation of the military is carried out according to a Supreme Defence Council decision dated 27th December 2001.

March

14 An agreement on the starting point for rearrangement of relations between Serbia and Montenegro is signed in Belgrade. The agreement is signed by FRY president Vojislav Koštunica, president of Montenegro Milo Đukanović, vice president of the federal government Miroljub Labus, the prime ministers of the two republics, Zoran Đinđić and Filip Vujanović, and the EU High Representative Javier Solana. According the agreement the name of the state union will become Serbia and Montenegro (SCG).

14-16 Members of the intelligence service of the Military of Yugoslavia arrest vice premier of the Serbian government and president of the Movement for Democratic Serbia Momčilo Perišić, lieutenant-colonel Miodrag Sekulić,
Vladimir Vlajković, a member of the federal Interior Ministry and John David Neighbour, an official at the American embassy in Belgrade on charges of espionage and revealing military secrets. In the days following the arrest a meeting of the highest state and military officials is held. Yugoslav president Vojislav Koštunica says that the legality of the action against Perišić is not problematic while Zoran Đinđić has the opposite opinion. He not only questions the existence of civilian control over the Military Intelligence Service but also military control, bearing in mind that military and state authorities have not been informed about these events. The United States of America sends strong protest to the Yugoslav authorities about the arrest of their diplomat. As federal and republican officials have not been informed about the arrest it is considered that the “Perišić Affair” shows that there is no civilian control over the armed forces. This impedes the drafting of a Law on the security services. Apart from party and personal conflict, federal institutions and the military were drawn into the conflict with the Serbian government.

25 The Supreme Defence Council supports the FRY federal government’s initiative on accession to the Partnership for Peace.

April

10 The federal parliament adopts a law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, making possible the extradition to the tribunal of Yugoslav citizens accused of war crimes.

19 Montenegrin Prime Minster Filip Vujanović resigns.

25 Retired Military of Yugoslavia general Dragoljub Ojdanić voluntarily surrenders to the Hague Tribunal where he has been indicted for crimes against humanity committed against Kosovo Albanians between January and June 1999.

May

02 Nikola Šainović, former vice president of the federal government, accused of war crimes in Kosovo, and Bosnian Serb Momčilo Gruban arrive at the Hague Tribunal after surrendering voluntarily.
31 The federal parliament adopts an agreement on future relations between Serbia and Montenegro, signed on March 14, and appoints representatives to the committee for writing the constitutional charter.

June

10 Interior Ministry Public Security Department (RJB) deputy head, General Boško Buha, is killed in Belgrade.

11 The Serbian parliament’s administrative committee accepts the resignations of thirteen DOS MPs and decides that twenty one DSS mandates should be rescinded due to irregular attendance at parliamentary sessions. FRY and DSS president Vojislav Koštunica says that this decision is illegal and against substantive law. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić says that this decision is of a moral rather than a party-political nature and adds that he does not see any problem in the decision, claiming that those who are paid must do their job.

21 The Belgrade County Court sentences former Radio Television Serbia (RTS) director Dragoljub Milanović to ten years in prison for crimes against public security with deadly consequences for sixteen people, as well as the abuse of office. The RTS employees were killed during the NATO bombing on 23rd April 1999. Milanović is released pending the completion of his appeal to the Supreme Court, and he uses the opportunity to escape from the country. He is later arrested in Montenegro during “Operation Sabre”. The Interior Ministry later announces that Milanović was aided in his escape by the “Zemun clan” in 2002. Nine years on he remains in prison.

24 Military of Yugoslavia Chief of General Staff Nebojša Pavković is removed from his post by decision of FRY president Vojislav Koštunica. Pavković is indicted by the Hague Tribunal on 20th October 2003 for crimes against humanity and violations of humanitarian law during the Kosovo conflict in the spring and summer of 1999. General Branko Krta is appointed as the new Chief of General Staff. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić says that president Koštunica should not have removed Pavković from his post without a decision from the Supreme Defence Council, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs Goran Svilanović says that Koštunica has made a good decision which he should have made much earlier.
Chronology of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia (1990-2009)

July

02 A Law on federal security intelligence services is adopted by the federal parliament. It regulates the work of the Military Security Service, the Military Intelligence Service, as well as the Investigation and Documentation Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With this law security intelligence services are institutionally structured and put under democratic and civilian control for the first time.

18 A law on the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) is adopted by the Serbian parliament removing the Department for State Security (RDB) from the control of the Interior Ministry, renaming it the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) and making it an autonomous and central security intelligence institution subordinated to the Serbian government.
• The Serbian parliament adopts a law on broadcasting and a law on fighting organised crime and the mafia.

August

12 Hague Tribunal indictee and SPS president Slobodan Milošević suggests Vojislav Šešelj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), as the opposition-sponsored candidate for president of Serbia. The General Board of the SPS rejects this suggestion and decides that its candidate for the presidential elections should be actor Velimir Bata Živojinović.

17 Most DOS members support Miroljub Labus’s candidacy for Serbian president.

September

29 Presidential elections are held in Serbia. DSS candidate Vojislav Koštunica and citizens’ group candidate Miroljub Labus proceed to the second round. Koštunica wins a majority of votes in Belgrade and central Serbia while Labus triumphs in Vojvodina.

October

13 The second round of the Serbian presidential election is held. The election fails because the turnout does not surpass the legally-prescribed threshold.
DSS candidate Vojislav Koštunica wins 1,991,947 votes or 66.86%, while citizens’ group candidate Miroljub Labus wins 921,094 votes or 30.92%.

16 The FRY officially takes over the co-presidency of the first working table of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

20 At early parliamentary elections in Montenegro the coalition Democratic List for a European Montenegro - Milo Đukanović wins an absolute majority with 39 of 75 seats in the Montenegrin parliament. The coalition Together for Changes wins 30 seats, the Liberal Alliance four seats and the Albanians Together list two seats.

November

06 Federal Constitutional Court judge Momčilo Grubač is elected as president of the court.

25 Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović resigns from office. The next day the acting president of Montenegro Filip Vujanović gives him a mandate for forming a new Montenegrin government.

December

06 After many months of discussion the Constitutional Committee unanimously adopts the Constitutional Charter of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro.

08 The repeated presidential elections in Serbia fail once more as only 45.17% of citizens vote. DSS candidate Vojislav Koštunica wins most votes – 1,699,089 or 57.66%. SRS candidate Vojislav Šešelj wins 1,063,296 votes or 36.08%. SSJ candidate Borislav Pelević wins 103,926 votes or 3.53%. DSS do not recognise the election results due to “fake voting lists” but their claims are rejected by the authorised institutions.

15 The third Assembly of G17 plus transforms the nongovernmental organisation into a political party. Miroljub Labus is elected as its president.

17 The federal parliament ratifies the Dayton Agreement, signed in 1995, which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the failed presidential elections in Montenegro the Democratic Party of Socialists candidate Filip Vujanović wins over 80% of the vote. Only 45.9% of the citizens vote, which does not surpass the legally prescribed threshold.

Serbian parliament President Nataša Mićić takes over the duties of Serbian president as the mandate of the former holder of this post, Milan Milutinović, has ended due to the failure of two rounds of elections to elect a new president.

2003

January

The federal Constitutional Court starts the procedure to assess whether certain articles of the law on the BIA are in accordance with the Constitution since some of the stipulations of that Law were against the principle of privacy of correspondence. This process is never completed as the Federal Constitutional Court ceases to exist.

Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) Director Andreja Savić and his deputy Milorad Bracanović are removed from their posts. It is considered that the Serbian Prime Minister is focussing his attention on the security sector because he is unsatisfied with the changes in the BIA and the police, and particularly due to the lack of results in the search for war criminals wanted by the Hague Tribunal and in the fight against organised crime. Miša Milićević is appointed as the new BIA Director with Goran Živaljević as his deputy.

February

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) is officially established with the adoption of the Constitutional Charter by the federal parliament.

An assassination attempt is made on Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đindić near Belgrade’s “Limes Hall”. Truck driver Dejan “Bugsy” Milenković, a member of the Zemun clan, tries to escape from the crime scene but is
arrested. He is given 8 days detention but is released from prison as early as 24th February 24 according to a decision by the Fourth Municipal Court which states that there are no reasons for his further detainment.

**24** Vojislav Šešelj, president of the Serbian Radical Party, goes to The Hague by his own volition where he is charged by the Tribunal for crimes against humanity and violations of humanitarian law. Apart from his personal responsibility he is also charged with taking part in a joint criminal enterprise between August 1991 and September 1993 when he came into conflict with Slobodan Milošević.

**March**

**05** Jovan Prijić is appointed as Special Prosecutor for fighting organised crime.

**12** Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đindić is killed. Nataša Mićić, acting president of Serbia, declares a state of emergency. An order is also issued bringing in special measures to be applied during the state of emergency. The Serbian Interior Ministry raises the level of readiness of all services and initiates “Operation Sabre”.

**13** The government announces that by 5pm that day, 56 people suspected of involvement in the assassination of the Prime Minister have been arrested. The Democratic Party of Serbia seeks to form a government.

**15** Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đindić, assassinated three days previously, is buried in Belgrade’s New Cemetery with full state honours. Aside from family members, officials and members of the Democratic Party and top state officials, the funeral is attended by a large number of foreign officials and representatives of diplomatic corps. Hundreds of thousands of citizens go out onto the streets of Belgrade to honour the late Prime Minister.

- Members of the Gendarmerie, in the presence of the representatives of the Serbian government, seal the offices of weekly journal “Identitet” and forbid the publication of this journal during the state of emergency. According to the statements of top state officials, “Identitet” is financed by the Zemun clan.
18 Zoran Živković, deputy president of the Democratic Party, is elected as the new Serbian Prime Minister.

- Milan Sarajlić, the deputy Public Prosecutor, is arrested for connections with organised crime and for being one of the Zemun clan’s key associates.
- Publication of newspaper “Nacional” is forbidden.

23 A building in Belgrade’s Šikerova Street, owned by Dušan Spasojević and Mile Luković, leaders of the Zemun clan and accused of involvement in Zoran Đindić’s assassination, is demolished at the second attempt.

25 A Decision is made to disband the Interior Ministry Special Operations Unit (JSO) as investigation of the Prime Minister’s murder proves that the command of this unit and many of its members are directly responsible for this crime.

- Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Živković announces that the Interior Ministry has arrested persons responsible for the assassination of Zoran Đindić.
- Police arrest Zvezdan Jovanović, deputy commander of the Special Operations Unit (JSO), on suspicion that he killed Prime Minister Zoran Đindić with a sniper rifle.

27 After fighting with police and resisting arrest, Dušan Spasojević and Mile Luković are killed.

28 The body of Ivan Stambolić is found in the Fruška Gora hills. He has been kidnapped, killed, thrown into whitewash and buried.

- Mirjana Marković, the wife of former president Slobodan Milošević, leaves the country soon after Đindić’s assassination.

April

03 Serbia and Montenegro becomes a full member of the Council of Europe.

- Čedomir Jovanović is appointed vice premier of the Serbian government in charge of European integration.
- Amnesty International raises concerns due to certain aspects of the state of emergency which could lead to human rights violations.
06 Milorad Bracanović, the former deputy Director of the BIA, is arrested. Bracanović became deputy Director after the mutiny of the Special Operations Unit (JSO).

07 Zvezdan Jovanović admits that he killed Zoran Đindić.

08 General Aco Tomić, former Head of the Military Security Service, and Rade Bulatović, security adviser to former FRY president Vojislav Koštunica, are arrested on suspicion of meeting with members of the Zemun clan. Vojislav Koštunica says that Bulatović is a political prisoner.

09 The Summit of the South East Europe Cooperation Process opens in Belgrade. It is the largest meeting of statesmen organised in Serbia in more than ten years.

22 The state of emergency is ended in Serbia. Since its introduction, more than ten thousand people have been arrested and four and a half thousand detained.

**June**

11 Jovica Stanišić is transferred to the Hague Tribunal. Stanišić participated in the organisation of Slobodan Milošević's trip to Gazimestan in 1989 and then within three months was appointed head of the Service for State Security, a post he held until 1998 when he was removed. After this, Milošević appointed him as his security adviser.

12 After almost two and a half years of hiding, Hague indictee Veselin Šljivančanin is arrested in Belgrade in a police operation lasting ten hours. Šljivančanin is accused of crimes committed at the "Ovčara" farm in November 1991 when 200 Croatian citizens who had been removed from Vukovar hospital were killed.

**July**

04 Rade Bulatović, arrested in Operation Sabre for his connections with the Zemun clan, is released from custody.

17 General Nebojša Pavković, former Chief of General Staff, arrested for
helping the organisers of the attempted assassination of Vuk Drašković in Budva, is released from custody.

22 The Serbian parliament elects Vladimir Vukčević as Special Prosecutor for war crimes.
• The Serbian parliament elects Kori Udovički as governor of the National Bank of Serbia.

23 Milorad Bracanović, former deputy Director of the BIA, is released from custody.

August

13 In Goraždevac, Kosovo, two Serbian children are killed and five injured while bathing in a river.
• Harri Holkeri, the new chief of UNMIK, arrives in Priština.

September

22 Lieutenant-colonel of the Military of Serbia and Montenegro Dragoljub Živković is arrested on suspicion of espionage, false representation and falsification of documents. Živković gathered secret military information without authorisation, possessed false identity documents which he abused and falsely presented himself as a member of the Service for State Security and the Military Security Service although he never worked for these services.

November

16 Presidential elections are held in Serbia. For the third time in fourteen months no president is elected, as only 38.6% of citizens vote. SRS candidate Tomislav Nikolić wins most votes with 46.9%, while DOS candidate Dragoljub Mićunović wins 35.3%.

December

22 The trial of those responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đindić begins.

28 Parliamentary elections are held in Serbia.
According to the Serbian Electoral Committee six parties and coalitions win parliamentary representation: the SRS wins 81 seats, the DSS 53, the DS 37, G17 plus 34, the SPO 23 and the SPS 22.

2004

February

04 The parliament of the Republic of Serbia elects a speaker at the third attempt - Dračan Maršićanin, the candidate of the DSS, G17+ and the SPO – New Serbia coalition, supported by the votes of the SPS. Parliament is finally constituted on 6th February by the election of parliamentary committees and five deputy speakers.

29 By order of UNMIK head Harri Holkeri, Agim Çeku, commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps, is realised from custody in Budapest. The Hungarian police uses its right to disobey an Interpol warrant as Çeku also holds a Croatian passport.

March

02 Prospective Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica presents Parliament with the programme and priorities for a new government.

03 The Serbian Parliament elects a new government with Vojislav Koštunica as Prime Minister. 130 MPs vote for, 113 against, one abstains and one MP does not vote. G17+ leader Miroljub Labus is deputy Prime Minister.

04 As Dragan Maršićanin has been given a ministerial post, parliament elects a new speaker - Predrag Marković of G17+ who also acts as President of Serbia pending the next presidential elections. Emiliija Krstić (DSS) and Dušan Petrović (DS) are deputy speakers. The new Government removes deputy Interior Minister Sreten Lukić from his post.

05 The Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro acknowledges Dragoljub Mićunović’s resignation and verifies the mandates of the new MPs from
Serbia: the SRS with 30 MPs, the DSS 20, the DS 13, G17 12, and the SPS and SPO – NS Coalition with 8 MPs each.

06 The Government removes BIA director Miša Milićević and his deputy Goran Živaljević. Rade Bulatović, who previously served as Koštunica’s adviser for security issues and was arrested during Operation Sabre in April 2003, is appointed as the new director.

17–19 The coordination centre states that Albanian terrorists have killed 28 people in Kosovo, eight Serbs among them. According to UNMIK, 851 people have been injured and 286 Serbian houses and thirty churches and monasteries burnt, while eleven churches, eighty houses and 25 other objects have been damaged. More than 3700 Serbs and other non-Albanians have been internally displaced while 600 people, among them 61 KFOR soldiers, have been injured. Protests motivated by violence against Serbs in Kosovska Mitrovica and other places in Kosovo are held in Serbia. Mosques in Belgrade and Niš are burnt and in the capital seventeen citizens and policemen are injured. During the night emergency meetings of the Serbian Government and the Supreme Defence Council are held. The next day, a march led by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica and Patriarch Pavle proceeds from Government offices to St Sava Cathedral. NATO refuses Serbia and Montenegro’s offer of help but decides to strengthen its capacities and activities in the province.

19 The UN Security Council, with General Secretary Kofi Annan in attendance, expresses its disapproval of the “large scale multi ethnic violence in Kosovo” and calls for an end to the violence. Goran Svilanović, Minister of Foreign Affairs, addresses the Council on behalf of Serbia and Montenegro.

23 The Parliament of the Republic of Serbia passes the budget for 2004 according to which Serbia will have a 45.3 billion dinar deficit. The SRS’s representatives do not vote for the budget and leave the meeting because their demand to hold an immediate parliamentary discussion on Kosovo and Metohija is rejected.

26 DSS MP Zoran Šami is elected speaker of the Serbia and Montenegro Parliament.
• The Serbian Parliament adopts a resolution on Kosovo and Metohija. On 1st April the Kosovo Parliament seriously criticizes the resolution and
declares it “an unconstitutional and destructive move aimed at desta-
bilising Kosovo and the whole region.”

- The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1534 urging the ICTY in The
  Hague to do everything it can to complete its work by 2010.

**April**

01 The Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro, without SRS MPs, passes a
Resolution on Kosovo and Metohija in an emergency procedure.

14 Minister of Foreign Affairs Goran Svilanović resigns from his post.

15 Defence Minister Boris Tadić also resigns from his post as he is expect-
ing to lose his job due to the fact that the Democratic Party, who he repre-
sented in the Serbia and Montenegro parliament, is in a minority following
December’s early elections.

16 The Serbia and Montenegro Parliament appoints Prvoslav Davinić as
new Defence Minister and Vuk Drašković as Minister of Foreign Affairs as a
part of a reconstruction of the State Union’s Council of ministers.

19 At the ICTY in The Hague, preliminary discussion of Serbia and
Montenegro’s case against eight NATO countries for genocide during the
1999 aggression opens. Serbia and Montenegro’s legal counsel is Tibor
Váradi.

**May**

05 One year after the deadline the Court of Serbia and Montenegro is es-
established. It consists of eight judges. At the court’s first assembly, Slobodan
Perović, a professor at Belgrade’s Law Faculty, is elected president.

14 The Supreme Military Court reinstates former chief of the military secu-
ri ty service General Aco Tomić. He was removed from his post by the same
court on 20th March 2003.

21 The Serbia and Montenegro Council of Ministers appoints the Minister
for Human and Minority Rights Rasim Ljajić, the Minister of Defence Prvoslav
Davinić and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Vuk Drašković as members of the National Council for cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague.

25 Two months before the end of his mandate, UNMIK head Harri Holkeri decides to leave his post “for health reasons”. Many see this move as connected with UNMIK’s failure to prevent the events of 17th March 2004.

26 The Supreme Defence Council dismisses Military – Security Agency director Colonel Momir Stojanović due to a “media appearance” in which he stated that the Military – Security Agency is operationally present on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. At a Supreme Defence Council meeting the Defence Strategy of Serbia and Montenegro is approved alongside a proposal to reorganize the Serbia and Montenegro Defence Ministry.

June

04 The Serbian Government adopts a draft constitution and sends it to parliament. The draft is supported by all members of the governing coalition.

13 The first round of presidential elections is held in Serbia. SRS vice president Tomislav Nikolić and DS president Boris Tadić proceed to the second round. Bogoljub Karić, president of a newly formed political party, the Power of Serbia Movement, takes third place.

14 The EU Council adopts a “Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions of European partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo according to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10th June 1999” (or “European partnership for SM for 2004”). This document contains a list of short-term and long-term priorities Serbia and Montenegro needs to fulfil to achieve further association with the EU. “European Partnership” advises continuation of the process of military reorganisation, meaning continuing staff reduction and transformation of the armed forces. It is also suggested that police professionalization in everyday tasks is boosted and that a Defence Strategy, a Military Doctrine and a Law on the Police are adopted. The fight against corruption, organized crime, human trafficking, the drugs trade and money laundering are emphasized as priorities.
27 The second round of the presidential elections is held. Boris Tadić claims victory with 53.24% of the votes against Tomislav Nikolić who wins 45.40%.

July

09 The Serbian Constitutional Court declares that the introduction of the state of the emergency in Serbia in 2003 was not against the State Constitution. However, it rules that the compulsory detention of persons by police for up to 30 days without a court decision and without right to defence, as well as measures on the press, the judiciary and taping of conversations by the BIA without the approval of the authorities, was unconstitutional and illegal.

11 Newly elected President Boris Tadić swears an oath in parliament, and parliamentary speaker Predrag Marković installs him in office. Tadić holds an audience with over forty foreign delegations. The anthem “Bože pravde” is officially performed for the first time.

16 Rasim Ljajić, Minister of Human and Minority Rights, is chosen as president of the National Council for cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague.

August

6 New head of UNMIK Søren Jessen-Petersen is officially installed in office. He claims that the development and definition of Kosovo’s status are issues of key importance for regional stability. On the same day, the new head of the American Office in Kosovo, Philip Goldberg, begins a two-year mandate.

17 The Serbian parliament adopts new state symbols: the anthem “Bože pravde” and a two headed white eagle with the Nemanjić crown as the coat of arms. The new flag consists of red, blue and white horizontal stripes. Only the SRS MPs do not vote for the symbols.

- Goran “Guri” Radosavljević is dismissed from his position as Gendarmerie Commander and appointed as an advisor at the Police Directorate within the Interior Ministry. In December 2006 the MoI of the Republic of Serbia issues a warrant for his arrest, on ICTY charges holding him responsible for killing the Bitići brothers, American citizens of Albanian
nationality. He is also investigated for other matters. General Borivoje Tešić is appointed as the new Gendarmerie Commander.

**September**

08 The movement “Otpor”, excluding its Čačak membership, collectively joins DS.

16 The Serbian government adopts a decree on the establishment of the Republic of Serbia Council for National Minorities. This body is intended to improve and protect the national, religious, ethnic and cultural characteristics of all Serbia’s national minorities. The Council is composed of eleven representatives of minorities and of governmental ministries.

19 Local elections are held in Serbia. Nenad Bogdanović (DS) and Aleksandar Vučić (SRS) proceed to the second round of the election for Belgrade’s mayor. In the second round on 3rd October, Bogdanović wins with 50.3%. Smiljko Kostić (ND) wins in Niš, Maja Gojković (SRS) in Novi Sad, while Veroljub Stevanović (SPO) wins in Kragujevac.

**October**

05 In spite of the disagreement expressed by Prime Minister Koštunica, the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija and Patriarch Pavle, President Boris Tadić invites Kosovo Serbs to vote in the elections being organized in the province as he claims a boycott is not a solution.

08 Goran Svilanović, president of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) resigns, while several members of the presidency withdraw from membership: Vojin Dimitrijević, Dragor Hiber, Gašo Knežević, Radmila Hrustanović, Đorđe Staničić and Vladimir Đerić. Nataša Mičić is elected GSS president on 16th October.

13 The Parliament of the Republic of Serbia adopts a “resolution on accession to the European Union”. The Resolution “confirms that faster accession of the Republic of Serbia, as well as of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, into full membership in the European Union and accession to the Partnership for Peace, is a strategic and national goal for which achieve-
ment the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia will give full and constant support in its future work.”

27 Four ships from NATO’s Mediterranean Forces enter the port of Bar.

30 MPs in the Parliament of Vojvodina elect Bojan Kostreš, Secretary General of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, as speaker. After his election, SRS MPs leave the assembly.

November

02 The Serbian parliament adopts a “Law on free access to information of public importance”.

03 The Supreme Defence Council agrees a basis for the future organization of the Serbian and Montenegrin Armed Forces and decides that the Republic of Serbia Interior Ministry will take over border control of Serbia and Montenegro borders on the territory of Serbia.

28 President of Serbia and Montenegro Svetozar Marović issues a media statement referring to relations between Serbia and Montenegro and accusing the Serbian Government of undermining the State Union.

December

03 Čedomir Jovanović, former vice president of the DS and former deputy prime minister, is expelled from the DS “because of lack of discipline and undermining of party dignity”. Having already formed a Liberal Democratic faction within the DS, Jovanović now decides to establish a new party – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – on 5th November 2005.

22 The Parliament adopts a Draft Law on participation of members of the Military of Serbia and Montenegro in peacekeeping operations abroad. Parliament, with SRS and DS MPs absent, adopts the government’s proposal that responsibility for prosecution of military trials be transferred to the civilian courts. Rodoljub Šabić is elected as Commissioner for Information of Public Interest.
The Serbian Government decides to establish a Council for Kosovo and Metohija to be headed by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica.

2005

January

02 According to the anti-corruption council, the government has failed to engage in public discussion of problems highlighted by the council. The council’s report on its activities in 2004 contains an estimation that “it is not possible to establish democratic institutions in Serbia with this level of corruption.”

13 At a cabinet meeting, Serbian deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus is appointed as head of the team for negotiating the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.

14 General Dragan Paskaš officially replaces General Branko Krga as Chief of General Staff of the Military of Serbia and Montenegro. General Branko Krga and eleven other generals are made to retire.

February

02 Dejan “Bugsy” Milenković, accused of involvement in Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić’s assassination on 12th March 2003, is escorted from Athens to Belgrade by the Serbia and Montenegro branch of Interpol, and taken to prison.

04 Retired military general, Vladimir Lazarević, indicted by the ICTY for war crimes committed in Kosovo in 1999, goes to The Hague.

14 Serbian President Boris Tadić makes a two day official visit to Kosovo and Metohija. Boris Tadić is the first Serbian President to visit Kosovo and Metohija since the United Nations took control of the province in 1999.

23 Minister of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro Prvoslav Davinić and
the Republic of Serbia Interior Minister Dragan Jočić have signed an agreement on the transfer of border control from the military to the police. The Republic of Serbia Interior Ministry estimates that the process of transfer of authority will take two and half years, during which time the border units of the Military of Serbia and Montenegro will be disbanded. It is decided that the transfer of authority will take place first on the border with Hungary.

March

08 Ramush Haradinaj resigns as Prime Minister at a meeting of the Kosovo government a few hours after he is indicted by the ICTY. On 9th March he leaves for The Hague. Slaviša Petković, a minister in the Kosovo Government, says that the indictment was served to Haradinaj by UNMIK head Søren Jessen-Petersen.

12 -13 The Supreme Defence Council nominates commanders for several newly established units as a result of military reorganization and the creation of new organizations which until now the military has lacked.

April

01 Retired General Aleksandar Dimitrijević is appointed assistant minister for the intelligence-security domain by the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro. Former assistant General Milan Zarić is discharged and then appointed as Serbia and Montenegro’s representative for cooperation with NATO in Brussels. Dimitrijević is appointed as civilian rather than military personnel.

04 Police general and ICTY indictee Sreten Lukić leaves for The Hague.

07 EU High Representative Javier Solana and top state officials sign an Agreement on amendments to the Constitutional Charter, ending the constitutional crisis and the blockade of Serbia and Montenegro’s Parliament. This also enabled the extension of MPs’ mandates.

08 General Dragan Paskaš, Chief of General Staff of the Military of Serbia and Montenegro presents a new organizational structure for the Military with a General Staff with four deputies and seven directorates. Paskaš emphasizes that complete military professionalization is planned for 2010.
12 Following a European Commission meeting in Strasbourg, enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn declares that the feasibility study for Serbia and Montenegro has returned a positive evaluation, giving the green light to the initiation of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and a beginning of the “European road” for Serbia and Montenegro.

25 Former Military of Yugoslavia Chief of General Staff Nebojša Pavković, accused of command responsibility for war crimes in Kosovo in 1999, is accommodated in Scheveningen in The Hague.

- In Luxembourg, EU foreign ministers confirm the European Commission’s positive report on Serbia and Montenegro’s readiness to begin negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and urge the Commission to prepare for the start of these negotiations.

May

20 The Parliamentary Committee on defence and security concludes that torture by the police and violations of human rights occurred during “Operation Sabre” and asks all relevant institutions to clarify the individual responsibility of all those responsible for abuses of office and violations of rules during the state of emergency.

27 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan states that Kosovo has not fulfilled any of the eight standards of democratic societies, fulfilment of which was a prerequisite set by the UN for the initiation of talks on Kosovo’s status.

June

01 During cross-examination of police general Obrad Stevanović, as part of Slobodan Milošević’s trial at the ICTY in The Hague, the prosecution shows a video of the execution of six Srebrenica Muslims. The video is also shown on Serbia’s B92 television channel.

15 Contrary to earlier announcements, the Serbian parliament does not issue a declaration condemning war crimes committed in ex-Yugoslavia, as representatives of the parliamentary parties fail to reach an agreement on the text of the declaration.
The Serbian government adopts the “National Strategy of Serbia for Serbia and Montenegro’s accession to the European Union”. According the Strategy, association with and accession to the EU is Serbia’s strategic orientation and its general goal. The Strategy provides guidance for the activities of all actors in the process of association with and accession to the EU. It also defines the steps which must be taken in order for Serbia to meet the set conditions. Military reform and a new basis for the definition of security policies are given as the highest priorities for the democratization process. In the area of police reform, the strategy calls for decentralisation. Terrorism, organized crime, the trade in narcotics and weapons and human trafficking are recognized as the main security challenges for Serbia.

**July**

**11** The ten year anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre is commemorated in Potočari. The event is attended by Serbian president Boris Tadić who pays his respects to the victims.

**12** The European Commission asks for a mandate to open negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro in order “to foster integration of the State Union into the programmes and structures of the EU”.

**18** Foreign Affairs Minister Vuk Drašković and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sign the „Transit Agreement for Support of Peace Keeping Operations” between Serbia and NATO, aimed at improving the logistics of NATO operations in the Western Balkans. The Agreement envisages free transfer of NATO troops by land, air and water lines, as well as of all kinds of equipment and material, full and free of charge use of NATO troops’ telecommunication systems, exemption from passport and visa regulations of the host country and immunity from arrest and detention for NATO personnel. NATO signs this type of agreement with the all Partnership for Peace member states whose territory is used for the transfer of its troops. The Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro ratifies this agreement on 4th November.

- The Special Court judiciary council, headed by Dragoljub Albijanić, convicts Milorad “Legija” Luković and three other members of the Special Operations Unit of the assassination of Ivan Stambolić and the assas-
sination attempt on Vuk Drašković in Budva. They are sentenced to 40 years in prison, while Radomir Marković receives 15 years. The total sentence is 209 years.

28 Slobodan Radovanović, previously district attorney in Kragujevac, is appointed as the new Special Prosecutor, while Jovan Prijić, the previous occupant of the post, becomes his deputy in the District Court Office for organized crime in Belgrade. This change is a political decision, bringing into question the independence of the prosecution and the prosecutor from the Government.

September

10 The office of the President of the State Union issues a statement that Prvoslav Davinić has officially resigned as Minister of Defence.


29 In Brussels, the ambassadors of EU member states give the “green light” for beginning negotiations on the SAA with Serbia and Montenegro.

October

03 EU Foreign Ministers approve the initiation of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro, giving the state union the higher, agreement-type relationship with the 25-member EU.

04 UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Kosovo Kai Eide submits his report to Kofi Annan.

05 The DS General Board decides that the party will withdraw from the work of the Serbian Parliament and its committees.
12 The ICTY approves limited and controlled political engagement for Ramush Haradinaj while he awaits the beginning of his trial.

21 Members of Parliament choose retired general Zoran Stanković as the new Minister of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro. 46 MPs from Serbia vote in favour of this decision (33 vote against, 2 abstain), while 26 Montenegrin MPs vote in favour (4 vote against). Before this, the Parliament accepts the resignation of the previous minister Prvoslav Davinić, offered on 9th September.

24 The UN Security Council discusses Kosovo. UN Special Envoy Kai Eide recommends the start of talks on Kosovo’s future status.

November

07 Serbia and Montenegro enters the first official round of negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. The State Union enters negotiations with three teams – one at the level of the state union and two on the level of the member states.

09 The European Commission publishes its Annual Report for 2005 on Serbia and Montenegro’s progress in the Process of Stabilisation and Association. It highlights that the state union has achieved great progress in the process of European integration but that it still has work to do in order to increase the functionality of the state union and to foster cooperation with the Hague tribunal. Huge success has been achieved in legislation, judicial reform and reform of the banking sector. It also highlights that the priorities for the next year should include the establishment of full control over the armed forces and inflation.

14 The Serbian parliament adopts a law on the police bringing significant organizational changes to the Interior Ministry. One of the main organizational changes brought by this law is that the director of police rather than the minister will now be the operational head of police. He will be selected by public competition for a five-year term exclusively according to criteria of competence. The law envisages the abandonment of the rank system and replaces the reserve police force with an additional police force which will be introduced and recruited voluntarily.
President Boris Tadić and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica are nominated as co-presidents of the negotiating team for political talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija. The third main negotiator is Vuk Drašković, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro.

December

The war crimes Council of the District Court in Belgrade, headed by Vesko Krstajić, convicts fourteen of the sixteen charged with war crimes committed at Ovčara near Vukovar, sentencing them with a total of 231 years of prison for the execution of Croatian prisoners in November 1991.

2006

January

In its second meeting at Serbian government headquarters, the negotiating team for political negotiations on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija adopts a platform for talks on decentralization of the province. A delegation is also appointed to lead these discussions, due to be conducted in Vienna in late January.

Deputy governor of the National Bank of Serbia Dejan Simić is arrested at his home on suspicion of accepting bribes. SPS director Vladan Zagrađanin is arrested along with him. Radovan Jelašić, Governor of the National Bank of Serbia, who is also interrogated as part of the "suitcase affair", deprives vice governor Simić of his authority on 13th January. Police are given access to all documentation they require.

The Serbian government establishes a National Security Council composed of representatives of all governmental security sector organizations. The Council is intended to be headed by President Boris Tadić or Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica. President Tadić immediately complains about this stipulation and demands its redefinition, claiming that it contradicts the constitutional authority of the president. The Government replies that the decision will not be changed and it comes into force on 13th January.
23 Serbia and Montenegro Foreign Minister Vuk Drašković and the commander of EU troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gian-Marco Chiarini, sign an agreement on technical cooperation which allows the transit of EUFOR troops on their way to Kosovo.

26 The Serbian MoI arrest Jovo Đogo, colonel of the Republika Srpska Military, in Belgrade on suspicion of helping hide Ratko Mladić. Đogo was previously head of Mladić’s private security.

**February**

17 An International Crisis Group report directly advocates that the international community should impose Kosovo’s independence on Serbia.

18 The Serbian MoI charges Bogoljub Karić with abuse of office and with misappropriating state funds amounting to over 20 million dollars together with four “Mobtel” employees. Two days later a warrant is issued.

27 Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica submits a report to Parliament on the first round of negotiations in Vienna on Kosovo’s status. His report is endorsed by all parliamentary groups.

**March**

01 After nine hours of heated discussions in the Montenegrin parliament, with 60 votes “for” and 10 “against”, the law on an independence referendum is passed. Under this law, at least 55% must vote for independence in order for the vote to be binding.

02 The Serbia and Montenegro Council of Ministers of accepts the ICTY Prosecution’s suggestion on the opening of state and military archives, subsequently made completely accessible to ICTY prosecutors.

10 Former Kosovo Liberation Army commander Agim Çeku is elected Prime Minister in the Kosovo Parliament in spite of strong objections raised by the Serbian authorities and public.

11 Slobodan Milošević dies in a detention unit in The Hague.
16 The Supreme Defence Council adopts the doctrine of the Military of Serbia and Montenegro at its 16th March meeting. The doctrine reflects organizational changes to the Military which have already been made and reflects the current orientation towards European integration. Pending the fulfilment of complete professionalization of the Military it is decided that it will consist of professionals, conscripts and a reserve. The doctrine is prepared in consultation with international military experts and is in compliance with standards of European and regional integration. It is decided that pending the completion of the Republic of Montenegro independence referendum this document will not be apply to commands, troops and institutions located on its territory.

17 Montenegrin President Filip Vujanović declares that the Serbia and Montenegro military units on Montenegrin territory are under his command, provoking objections from President Boris Tadić and Minister of Defence Zoran Stanković.

**April**

06 The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Slovenia reveals footage shot by Austrian broadcaster ORF showing the first war crime in former Yugoslavia which took place on 28th June 1991 at the Holmec border crossing. The footage shows three Yugoslav People’s Army soldiers being shot while they were surrendering. Serbia and Montenegro Minister of Defence Zoran Stanković says on 26th April that the soldiers have been identified and are alive. On 18th May, the president of the Helsinki Committee, Neva Miklavčič Preden, reveals documents issued in Slovenia about the death of these soldiers.

07–20 The Serbian Government decides to dissolve local parliaments and to introduce provisional authorities in the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Blace and Žitište. On 20th April, the government introduces emergency powers in Novi Pazar. The same day, the Party for Sandžak and the Sandžak Democratic Party ask the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of that decision.

12 In the widest action against corruption ever seen in state administration, UBPOK arrest Commercial Court president Goran Kljajević, judge Delinka
Đurđević and seven others. A warrant is issued for the arrest of “C market” director Slobodan Radulović. Forty one members of the “bankruptcy mafia” are charged with depriving the state of fifty million Euros in 2006.

25 The Serbian War crimes prosecution charges eight former policemen with committing war crimes against civilians in Suva Reka on 26th March 1999 when 48 Albanians were killed.

May

03 Negotiations on the SAA between Serbia and the EU are halted due to the European Commission’s assessment that Serbia is not cooperating sufficiently with the ICTY. Serbian deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus blames this situation on the security services. The services are also criticized by State Union Ministers Vuk Drašković and Rasim Ljajić, and also EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and the coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe Erhard Busek. G17+ ministers Mlađan Dinkić, Ivana Dulić-Marković and Tomica Milosavljević do not resign although they have previously announced that they will.

21 The independence referendum in Montenegro claims a turnout of 86.3% of registered voters. The same night, the independence bloc declares and celebrates victory marking the end of the state union’s existence. According to the final results, made public on 31st March, 55.5% voted in favour of independence. The leader of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, Nenad Čanak, states that the victory of the independence option is proof that no one wants to live in union with Serbia and that in this way Serbia has undeservedly regained independence.

27 Serbian President Boris Tadić visits Podgorica and states in talks with the political establishment that Belgrade will respect citizens’ decision on Montenegrin independence.

30 The Action Plan of the state negotiating team on future Kosovo status is revealed. According the Plan, Kosovo and Metohija would enjoy essential autonomy and full demilitarization, while Serbia would retain authority over foreign policy, border control, human rights protection, monetary and custody policy and protection of religious and cultural heritage.
31 In Belgrade County Court’s Military Department, former Serbia and Montenegro Defence Minister Prvoslav Davinić Ministry goes on trial. He is accused of abuse of office in providing flats for eight members of the “Cobras” special military unit.

**June**

03 The Montenegrin Parliament formally approves the results of the 21st May referendum and declares the independence of Europe’s youngest state.

07 The Republic of Serbia Strategic Defence Review is issued. This is the most important document for planning, programming and execution of defence system reform. It outlines the political framework for reforms, presents a plan for the Serbian Military until 2015 and reviews the current state of the defence system and military capabilities. The document also outlines what capabilities for the defence system and priorities in its development are necessary until 2010.

15 The Government of the Republic of Serbia recognises Montenegrin independence and allows Montenegrin citizens with residency in Serbia to apply for Serbian citizenship. On the same day the government dismisses Montenegrin members from the State Union’s diplomatic service and appoints Milorad Veljović as director of police at the Republic of Serbia Interior Ministry.

**July**

07 Serbian Supreme Court Judge Ljubomir Vučković is sentenced to eight years in prison for accepting bribes to release Zoran “Jotka” Jotić, leader of the Kruševac clan, and for unlawful interference and abuse of power. Jotić is sentenced to four years for abetting bribery. As he has already been sentenced to twelve years in prison, he receives a single sentence of fifteen years.

18 War crimes prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević and head of the National Council for Cooperation with ICTY Rasim Ljajić are appointed coordinators of the Serbian Government Plan for Cooperation with the Tribunal. The implementation of this plan begins on 24th July 2004.
September

01 Special Court Judge Marko Kljajević, head of the Council of Judges for the Zoran Đinđić assassination trial, resigns. The trial is restarted from the beginning with Nata Mesarević as the new head of the Council.

07 The President of the Republic of Serbia, Boris Tadić, and the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sign the Status of Forces (SOFA) Agreement. This is an agreement between Serbia and the USA defining the legal status of American military personnel (regarding rights and duties in matters of criminal and civil authorities, taxes and customs service) and American property currently on Serbian soil. The agreement also facilitates planning and execution of bilateral military activities, joint exercises, visits and staff exchanges.

12 The Serbian Parliament endorses a report on the activities of the state negotiation team on Kosovo’s future status and unanimously decides to insert a clause into the preamble of the new constitution stating that Kosovo and Metohija is a province of the Republic of Serbia.

21 At Belgrade’s “Nikola Tesla” Airport, General Marko Lugonja is arrested on suspicion of helping hide Ratko Mladić. He is on his way to Moscow despite a court order the previous day, prohibiting him from leaving the country.

29 A Special Brigade of the Military of Serbia is formed in the “Rastko Nemanjić” military barracks in Pančevo.

30 Parliament approves the draft of the new Serbian Constitution, with the votes of 242 MPs. The following day, speaker Predrag Marković calls a referendum for 28th and 29th October in order for voters to confirm the state’s highest legal act.

October

11 Prosecutors indict 34 members of the “bankruptcy mafia”, led by former Belgrade Commercial Court President, Goran Kljajević. The indictment will later cover seven more people. This 200 page indictment, the longest in the history of the Serbian prosecutor’s office, charges those accused with
embezzling 50 million euros from the state budget.

16 A summit of South-east European heads of states and governments, held in Belgrade and headed by Serbian President Boris Tadić, signs a declaration on the fight against organized crime and terrorism.

28–29 The referendum on the new Constitution is held in Serbia. The referendum question is worded, “Do you support the adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia?” 3 521 724 voters, or 53.04% of the total number of registered voters, vote yes while 97 497 voters, or 1.47%, vote no. High turnout in the final hours significantly contributes to the referendum’s success.

November

08 In the chamber of parliament, the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia is declared in the presence of 240 MPs, the political leadership, guests and the diplomatic corps.

• The European Commission presents its “Progress Reports” for 2006 and the “Enlargement Strategy and its main challenges 2006-2007”. Regarding Serbia, both documents state that military reform is being conducted successfully but with obvious resistance from particular elements of the system (the security services), that civilian democratic control is insufficient and that more efficient civilian oversight of the armed forces is needed, especially parliamentary oversight. Implementation of the Law on the Police is assessed as insufficient regarding professionalization and transparency. It is stated that the border police has not still taken over border control from the military. Two main challenges were emphasized: the position of Serbia on the drug trade transit route and the unsatisfactory level of cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The European Commission also assesses that there has been no progress in cooperation with the ICTY and that implementation of the Action Plan is burdened with many difficulties, especially regarding coordination of military and civilian security services.

• Republic of Serbia Defence Minister, Zoran Stanković, and General William Ward, deputy commander US forces in Europe, sign the “Agreement on Supply and Reciprocal Services” in Topčider. The aim of this agreement is to facilitate bilateral military cooperation between
Serbia and the USA, particularly bilateral military cooperation in peace-keeping operations. Before this agreement, an agreement on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) are signed.

10 President Boris Tadić calls parliamentary elections to be held on 21st January the following year.

29 At a NATO Summit in Riga, Serbia is invited to join the Partnership for Peace Programme. Invitations are simultaneously extended to Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**December**

18 Republic of Serbia Defence Minister Zoran Stanković and NATO Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo open the NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade. This office is opened in order to establish communications with Serbia’s military and political establishment so as to support the practical execution of the Transit Agreement signed on 18th July 2005. The aim is also to support the work of the Serbia – NATO Defence Reform Group, to facilitate Serbia-NATO cooperation within the PfP Programme and also to support NATO’s public diplomacy efforts in the region. The MLO is located in the premises of Serbia’s Defence Ministry. Its staff consists of nine military personnel from different NATO member states and several employees from Serbia. Jannick Asset, a Brigadier General from the French Armed Forces, is appointed as head of the Office.

- Foreign Minister Vuk Drašković authorises the opening of secret files on employees, collected by the Ministry’s security service since 1945.

19 The South-eastern Europe Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) is signed in Bucharest. The agreement comes into force on 22nd August 2007 in Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, Moldova, Macedonia and Kosovo. BiH and Serbia also sign the agreement which is later ratified in their parliaments.
2007

January

21 In parliamentary elections, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) wins 81 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DS) with 64, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) – New Serbia (NS) coalition with 47, G17+ with 19, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) with 16 and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with 15.

February

01 Border protection and control are officially transferred to police authority, marking the end of the demilitarisation process of Serbia’s borders lasting a year and half. This is symbolically marked with the exchange of charters between the Defence Minister Zoran Stanković and Interior Minister Dragan Jočić. Demilitarisation of borders and the establishment of border police is considered to be an important condition which the EU requires that Serbia fulfils.

March

13 The Special prosecution for the fight against organized crime charges Mihalj Kertes, former director of the customs service, Slobodan Milošević, former president of the Republic of Yugoslavia, and Nikola Šainović and Jovan Zebić, former vice presidents of the government. As Milošević and Zebić are dead and Šainović on trial in The Hague, trying them is not possible.

May

15 The Republic of Serbia Parliament elects Vojislav Koštunica’s new government on 15th May, half an hour before the midnight deadline set by the constitution.

23 The deputy commander of the Special Operations Unit, Zvezdan
Jovanović, and the former commander of the Unit, Milorad “Legija” Luković, are convicted to 40 years each for organizing and carrying out the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić. The Special Court finds twelve members of the “Red Berets”, the secret service and the “Zemun clan” guilty. Besides Jovanović and Luković, other members of the “Red Berets” convicted include Željko Tojaga, given thirty years, and Saša Pejaković, given eight. Branislav Bezarević from the Security Information Agency is sentenced to thirty years in prison.

31 The Serbian Government establishes the National Security Council of the Republic of Serbia. Members of the Council include the President and Prime Minister, the Ministers of Justice, Defence and the Police, the Chief of General Staff, the director of the BIA and the heads of the VOA and the VBA. Also, a bureau for the coordination of all security services is established.

September

27 The President, vice president and members of the board of the State Auditing Agency swear an oath in Parliament. This institution is established according to constitutional stipulations and according to a law passed in November 2005.

October

01 The trial of Mile Đragić, the owner of a firm producing military equipment, Prvoslav Davinić, the former Minister of Defence, General Milun Kokanović and Colonel Jovica Vučković begins in Belgrade. They are charged with embezzling 176 million Euros from state funds.

November

07 Serbian President Boris Tadić initials the SAA with the EU at a ceremony in Brussels.
2008

February

03 Democratic Party candidate Boris Tadić is re-elected as President of the Republic of Serbia, winning 100 000 votes, around 2% more than Serbian Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolić. This is Tadić’s second mandate, but the first according to the new Constitution.

15 Newly-elected President Boris Tadić is sworn in before members of the Serbian Parliament, beginning his five year term.

16 The EU officially approves the deployment of 2000 members of the legal-police mission EULEX to Kosovo on the eve of Kosovo’s expected independence declaration. The mission will be composed of 1400 policemen and gendarmes and hundreds of judges, prosecutors and other staff. It is envisaged that the mission will take over all of UNMIK’s responsibilities within 120 days.

17 The Kosovo Assembly passes the independence declaration by acclamation. Serbia’s authorities state that they reject this act. One day later Kosovo is recognized by eight states – Afghanistan, the USA, France, Albania, Turkey, the UK, Australia and Senegal.

19 Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić orders the immediate withdrawal of ambassadors from countries which have already recognized Kosovo’s independence. Instructions about the withdrawal in accordance with the government’s Action Plan are sent to ambassadors in the USA, France, Turkey and Australia. The Foreign Ministry sends notes of protest to the governments of France, the UK, Costa Rica, Australia and Albania.

21 Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica and SRS deputy president Tomislav Nikolić address a rally of several hundred thousand of people in Belgrade. In incidents following the protest, the US embassy is set on fire, several embassies are damaged, and some shops ransacked.
March

07 Riots triggered by a dispute between two Muslim communities over the right to run madrasahs in Tutin are halted by police following the shooting of one person.

17 Riots take place in northern Mitrovica following the arrest of Serbs on court premises. More than one hundred people are injured and one Ukrainian UNMIK policeman is killed.

April

29 In spite of Vojislav Koštunica’s disagreement, deputy Prime Minister Božidar Đelić signs the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and Interim Trade Agreement between Serbia and the EU.

May

11 In early parliamentary elections, the “List for a European Serbia - Boris Tadić” wins 1 590 200 votes and 102 seats in parliament. The Serbian Radical Party wins 1 219 436 votes and 78 seats, the Democratic Party of Serbia – New Serbia list wins 480 987 votes and 30 seats, the Socialist Party of Serbia – Party of United Pensioners – United Serbia coalition wins 313 896 votes and twenty seats, the Liberal Democratic Party wins thirteen seats, the Hungarian Coalition wins four seats, the Bosniak List for a European Sandžak wins two seats, while the Coalition of Preševo Valley Albanians wins one seat.

July


11 BIA director Rade Bulatović resigns from his post.

17 The Government appoints Saša Vukadinović as the new director of the Security – Information Agency.
21 The former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić is arrested in Belgrade. He has been living under an assumed identity as doctor Dragan Dabić and has been attending public events. Karadžić is surrendered to the Hague Tribunal on 30th July.

22 Karadžić’s arrest triggers protests by his supporters in central Belgrade. On the first day of protests reporters are attacked and a B92 cameraman is injured.

24 The Serbian government decides to allow the return of ambassadors of EU countries who were expelled following those countries’ recognition of Kosovo’s independence (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, Germany, Slovenia, Sweden and Great Britain).

28 During protests against Radovan Karadžić’s arrest, organized by the SRS, fighting takes place between protestors and the police. It is reported that eighty people have been injured, including protestors, policemen and two reporters.

September

05 SRS deputy president Tomislav Nikolić resigns from all party duties. Six days later he is excluded from party membership. Nikolić gathers 21 of the eighty SRS MPs in Parliament and registers the Serbian Progressive Party in October.

09 The newly formed parliamentary majority ratifies the SAA. The Agreement is not implemented because of the Netherlands’ requirement that Serbia cooperates fully with the ICTY and arrests Ratko Mladić. Despite this, Belgrade decides to unilaterally implement the Provisional Agreement from 1st January 2009.

18 Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Ivica Dačić and Europol director Max-Peter Ratzel sign an agreement on strategic cooperation between the Serbian Government and Europol. The agreement is a legal framework for strengthening cooperation with Europol in the areas of the fight against terrorism, human trafficking, illegal migration and serious cross-border crime.
October

01 Defence Minister Dragan Šutanovac signs a security agreement with NATO on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Serbia. This agreement, signed by Minister Šutanovac and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is a standard agreement aimed at regulating security and the distribution and exchange of classified information. NATO has previously signed such an agreement with 90 countries and international organizations. Minister Šutanovac announces that Belgrade will initiate the opening of Serbian Office at NATO.

08 At Serbia’s request, the UN General Assembly passes a resolution asking the International Court of Justice to give its opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s proclamation of independence.

09 The Serbian Foreign Ministry declares the Montenegrin and Macedonian ambassadors to Serbia ‘persona non grata’ due to those countries’ recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

10 The Serbian Progressive Party is officially registered.

18 Boris Tadić and Ivica Dačić sign a Declaration on Reconciliation claiming “common responsibility for the fulfilment of the vision of Serbia as a democratic, free, economically, socially and culturally developed country on the basis of overcoming past disputes.”


November

14 Vojvodina’s parliament passes a draft Statute for the province. According to the draft, Vojvodina is an autonomous province and a European region, with its own flag and coat of arms. Vojvodina’s budget “is at least seven percent of the Republic of Serbia’s budget”. The statute also regulates the province’s government.
The government’s conclusions on the deployment of the EULEX mission on the whole territory of Kosovo and Metohija confirms the UN Secretary General’s six point plan and also confirms the protection of the Republic of Serbia’s interests. The Government thus endorses the UN Secretary General’s Report according to which EULEX will respect Resolution 1244, will not implement Martti Ahtisaari’s plan, will act under UN authority in Kosovo and Metohija and will remain status neutral.

Serbian President Boris Tadić states that it is time to change the Kumanovo Agreement on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police from Kosovo. He also expresses his disapproval of the establishment of the Kosovo Security Forces.

**December**

Minister of Defence Dragan Šutanovac declares that the initiative to change the Kumanovo Agreement does not mean the return of the Military of Serbia to Kosovo and that this type of initiative would not contribute to regional stability at the moment.

The EULEX mission enters Kosovo with its initial operational capability. Its members are deployed in northern Kosovska Mitrovica, inhabited mainly by Serbs.

Serbia and Russia sign a contract according to which the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) will be bought by Gasprom for 400 million euros, and also an agreement on the ‘South Stream’ gas route. Presidents Boris Tadić and Dmitry Medvedev sign the agreement as a political guarantee that Serbia will be part of the ‘South Stream’ gas route and that the underground gas storage facility in Banatski Dvor will be finished.

On the initiative of a group of non-governmental organizations led by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, the Ministry of Defence approves a one-month extension of the deadline for public discussion of drafts of the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy. The previous deadline set by the Ministry was fourteen days for discussion of strategic documents being introduced in Serbia for the first time after independence.
30 President of the Republic of Serbia Boris Tadić removes Chief of General Staff Zdravko Ponoš from his post. This puts an end to a public exchange of serious accusations between the Chief of General Staff and the Minister of Defence. The Chief of General Staff accused the ministry’s establishment of not having a defence policy and of inadequate reform of the defence system, while the minister accused him of violating the principles of subordination and civilian control of the military.

2009

January

30 Serbia unilaterally begins implementation of the Provisional Trade Agreement with the EU following the coming into force of changes to the Law on customs rates. The Agreement prescribes a gradual decrease and abolition of customs rates on imports of almost all products from the EU over the next six years. The agreement was signed together with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in Brussels on 29th April and was ratified in the Serbian parliament on 9th September 9 2008. It has still not been implemented as the European Council has not ratified it (due to objections from the Netherlands) but it was recommended that Serbia begins unilateral implementation.

February

02 The European Commission mission to monitor Serbia’s readiness to be added to the “White Schengen List” makes the first of four planned visits to Belgrade. The mission’s goal is to prepare a report, scheduled for May, when the issue of visa liberalisation is expected to be transferred to the political level. The task of the first visit is to verify the extent of Serbia’s improvement in fighting organised crime and corruption and cooperation between the police and the judiciary in criminal procedures.

05 The Serbian government endorses the Report on the Implementation of the National Program for EU Integration (NPI). The NPI is a precise plan for achieving all criteria necessary for a country to gain EU membership. The
plan is created with the aim of setting a clear measurable method of monitoring improvements in state institutions in the process of EU integration. The report covers the legislative activities of the government and parliament in the period from July until the end of December 2008. According to the report, during that period, 29% of the National Program was completed, representing an improvement of 5% in comparison with the period 2003 – 2007.

06 The European Parliament passes a non-binding resolution, proposed by Dutch MEP Joost Lagendijk, the European Parliament rapporteur for Kosovo, encouraging member-states which have not recognised Kosovo to do so. Serbia and Kosovo are invited to engage in constructive dialogue on issues of common interest and to improve regional cooperation.

15 Serbian president Boris Tadić resolves the conflict between Defence Minister Dragan Šutanovac and Chief of General Staff, General Zdravko Ponoš by replacing the chief of Serbia’s Military. Ponoš is replaced by his deputy general Milojko Miletić.

16 The European Commission mission makes a second visit to Belgrade in order to verify that standards for the security of personal documents have been met.

19 An Intensified Structured Dialogue sector meeting is held in Belgrade covering traffic, regional development and energy.

24 EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana appoints Peter Sørensen as his personal representative in Belgrade. It is announced that Sørensen’s task will be coordination of the office which, alongside a political component, will serve as liaison with the mission in Kosovo.

**March**

12 The European Commission mission for verification that the conditions for Serbia’s accession to the “White Schengen List” are being met makes its third visit to Belgrade. The mission’s agenda is to verify that Serbia is dealing with illegal migration and border control.
20 A Protocol on Cooperation in EU integration issues is signed between Serbia and Croatia.

24 An Intensified Structured Dialogue sector meeting is held in Brussels covering the internal market, competition, protection of customers and health protection.

April

09 The foreign ministers of eight EU member-states ask the European Commission to make a decision without delay on abolishing visas for West Balkan countries. This is stated in letters from the foreign ministers of Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland Slovakia and Slovenia sent to the vice president of the European Commission Jacques Barrot, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg.

21 The Serbian government approves information on the preparation of the acquis communautaire in the Serbian language, thus establishing a permanent process of translation of the acquis communautaire. The adaptation of legislation to the acquis communautaire is an obligation set in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement but it is also a precondition of further EU integration. The number of pages to be translated is 207,000.

24 The Serbian government endorses the Report on the Implementation of the National Program for EU Integration for the period January – March 2009. According to the Report from the EU Integration Office, 53% of the National Program was completed in the first three months of 2009, as of 68 planned regulations, 36 were passed.

May

08 Serbian deputy Prime Minister Božidar Đelić announces that Serbia will receive 100 million euros of budget aid from the European Commission. He is informed of that decision by EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn. Đelić says that this aid will not be rescinded, that it is part of a one billion euro EU pre-accession aid package for Serbia, and that the conditions for this aid will be known in July.
13 An Intensified Structured Dialogue sector meeting is held in Brussels covering audio-visual services, the information society, research and technological development.

19 Discussions on visa liberalisation for West Balkan countries begins and the European Commission’s preliminary report is sent to member-states. Unofficial reports suggest that the report gives a completely positive assessment of only Macedonia while Serbia and Montenegro have fulfilled most, but not all, of the conditions set by the “Road Map”. A decision on liberalisation can be made at the European Council meeting in Luxembourg on 15th June or at the meeting of the EU Council of Ministers of Internal Affairs on 4th and 5th July.

26 The third regional conference on war crime begins on the Croatian island of Brioni with the main focus on better regional cooperation between countries in the West Balkan region and the establishment of regional databases for better sharing of information.

June

3 The ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz submits a UN Security Council regular semi-annual report on West Balkan countries’ cooperation with the ICTY. The report says that Serbia must make intensive efforts to provide the necessary support to the professional work of the Prosecutor’s Office at the operational level.

08 A summit of countries participating in the Cooperation Process in South-eastern Europe is opened in Kishinev by the President of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin. The summit results in the “Kishinev Declaration” and a “Joint Statement” which gives full support to the Regional Cooperation Council based in Sarajevo. The Kishinev Declaration and Joint Statement call for better partnership of countries in order to achieve strategic objectives and to resolve old and new economic and social needs of the region, to provide the necessary platform for accelerating development through stability and to pave the way for integration. Serbian President Boris Tadić attends the summit.

09 Defence Minister Dragan Šutanovac opens the third Conference of chiefs of staff of Balkan countries in Belgrade. Chiefs of Staff of Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Serbia take part. Special guests were the chairman of the European Union Military Committee and the Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples.

- Members of the Serbia’s parliament approve the participation of professional members of the Ministry of Defence and Military of Serbia medical services as part of the Norwegian contingent in the UN peace-keeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic.
- In Ljubljana, the Internal Affairs Ministers of Serbia and Slovenia, Ivica Dačić and Katarina Kresal, sign a protocol between the governments of the two countries on the implementation of the Treaty of the European Union and Serbia’s re-admission of persons residing in another country without permission.

10 At Serbian government headquarters, the Minister for Science and Technological Development, Božidar Đelic, and the director of the Russian Agency for Atomic Energy (ROSATO), Sergei Kiriyenko, sign an agreement on cooperation in the export of spent nuclear fuel from the reactor at Vinča to the Russian Federation.

16 At a meeting in Luxembourg, EU foreign ministers agree that visas will be abolished for citizens of Serbia by the end of 2009. It is the first time that a consensus has been reached on the case of Serbia. All that remains on Serbia’s road to the white Schengen list remained is the practical application of the road map for visa liberalization.

17 The UN Security Council considers the regular quarterly report of Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the situation in Kosovo. Ban’s report says that Priština has had only minimal contact with his Special Representative Lamberto Zannier, that UNMIK’s mission needs to be completed, that the general security situation is relatively calm, and that the number of returnees is a little disappointing.

July

15 The European Commission unanimously decides to liberalize the visa regime for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro from 1st January 2009. According to procedure, the proposal will be forwarded to the EU Council of Ministers and the European parliament.
August

27 On the initiative of Serbian Defence Minister Dragan Šutanovac, “Jugoimport SDPR” signs a contract to export arms and military equipment worth 100 million dollars to Iraq. Coalition forces, led by the United States, have given consent to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence to deal with Serbia. Agreement with Iraq is the largest single export deal for Serbia in 2009.

September

07 Minister of Interior Affairs Ivica Dačić and the head of the OSCE mission in Serbia, Hans Ola Urstad, sign an agreement on strategic partnership and police reform priorities. A revised Memorandum of Understanding between the Interior Ministry and the OSCE provides professional assistance and advice in the areas of police responsibility, the fight against organized crime, policing in the local community, training, strategic planning and development, the work of border police and public relations. The mission will provide expert assistance and advice, including assistance in drafting laws and regulations, capacity building and training, as well as organizing workshops, seminars and conferences.

11 EULEX police department head Rainer Kühn and Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dačić sign a protocol on technical cooperation. The United States welcomes the agreement the same day, noting that “it would not have been possible without the support of Kosovo as a sovereign country in the fight against cross-border crime.” Washington congratulates the EULEX mission on its manner of implementation, adding that the agreement with the Serbian police fully respects the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kosovo. Pieter Feith, EU Special Representative and International Civilian Representative in Kosovo, confirms that the protocol on cooperation between EULEX and the Serbian police does not violate the sovereignty of Kosovo.

October

6 On the first day of the Serbian Parliament’s autumn session, members of parliament discuss the proposal for the National Security and Defence Strategy. The deputies discuss changes to the Law on Defence and the Law
on the Military of Serbia and a Law on the Military, Labour and Material Required.

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina is elected non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the period 2010-2011. Lebanon, Nigeria, Gabon and Brazil are also elected.

26 The Serbian parliament passes a set of laws in the field of security and defence: the Law on Amendments to the Law on the Military and the Law Amending the Law on Defence, the Law on the Military-Intelligence agency and the Military-security agency, the Law on Serbian Participation in Multinational Military Operations, the Law on Military, Labour and Material Required, and the Law on the Civil service. The same day parliament approves the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia.

November

24 The largest military base in Serbia is opened on Cepotina hill near Bujanovac in the presence of state and military leadership, and six years after the decision to start building. “South Base” is about five miles south of Bujanovac, near the ground safety zone and the administrative border with Kosovo, and is located about ninety kilometres from the border with Bulgaria and thirty kilometres from the border with Macedonia.

26 The European Parliament adopts a resolution on the European Union’s enlargement strategy in which the European Union Council of Ministers recommends the implementation of a transitional trade agreement with Serbia. The resolution encompasses the West Balkan countries, Iceland and Turkey.

30 The European Union Council of Ministers officially decides to put Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro on the white Schengen list, with implementation beginning on 19th December this year. After seventeen years of waiting, citizens holding the new passport will be able to travel freely in the 29 Schengen countries, and in countries that recognize the agreement.
December

07 Following a positive report from The Hague’s Chief Prosecutor, European Union foreign ministers, and the Netherlands in particular, are persuaded to unfreeze the Interim Trade Agreement with Serbia.

11 The Serbian Parliament passes a Law on the confidentiality of data.

19 The European Union begins implementation of the visa-free regime with Schengen states.

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