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CORRECTION

In PRISM 1, no. 2 (3/2010), the article “Not in Our Image: The Challenges of Effective Peacebuilding,” by James Stephenson, Richard McCall, and Alexandra Simonians, contained a typographical error on page 132, line 9: “imam compliant” should have read “Inman compliant.”
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s January 6 address at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, called for the “elevation” of the development mission and an end to the old debates that have divided the diplomatic and development communities. She urged a new “mindset” to “replace dogmatic attitudes with clear reasoning and common sense.” Her remarks were a welcome reflection of this approach; they were based on sound development thinking and set forth a serious challenge for her State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) colleagues.

What remains for Secretary Clinton and the administration of Barack Obama is to transform this articulate commitment into an operational reality. Two major studies, the Presidential Study Directive and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, presumably will address the difficult issues of strategy, means, and organization that remain. These more mundane but vital bureaucratic challenges must be addressed if the Secretary’s worthy vision is to become a reality.

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How does the administration define the word *elevate* in terms of resources, structure, and policy? At this writing, we can only guess. As someone who has held executive positions in both State and USAID, I want Secretary Clinton’s vision to be realized. However, there are hurdles to overcome.

USAID, from its beginning in the Kennedy administration, has been seen as the premier development agency within the international donor community. It led that community toward highly innovative interventions in economic reform, health, education, democracy/governance, agriculture, and the environment. These interventions and the evolution of a comprehensive, internationally accepted development strategy, backed by financial commitment, formed the basis of American leadership in development.

Over the past 20 years, that leadership capacity has eroded significantly, though not entirely. Overwhelmed by earmarks and intrusive oversight, USAID has become risk averse and less innovative than in the past. Administrations and congresses of both parties have viewed development as less important in the post–Cold War world, and they deemphasized and defunded USAID. Meanwhile, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, development resources were dispersed to domestic departments, creating serious policy and program disconnects and a huge coordination problem while at the same time weakening USAID.

The perceived importance of development has changed of late as political leaders have begun to relate our security challenges directly or indirectly to the condition of poverty. It helped to have a conservative President introduce the concept of the “3Ds”—defense, diplomacy, and development—as integral to our national security strategy.

Our defense and diplomacy missions are overwhelmed with crises. Yet we devote few resources to prevention, which is what development is all about. The challenge today is to organize the 3Ds to more effectively address the crises while investing meaningful resources in an effective and focused prevention institution centered at USAID and State.

Secretary Clinton also stated in her January 6 address that mention of the word *integration* “sets off alarm bells.” Many, she said, interpret this as “giving up our long-term development goals to achieve short-term objectives.” This will not happen, she asserts. Rather, we will “leverage the expertise of our diplomats and military on behalf of development.”

I believe that a degree of integration can and should occur. However, it must be undertaken with care and respect for the primary functions of each of the Ds. The culture of each institution is different, though global challenges have forced more convergence than ever before. It is now likely that Secretary Clinton can achieve significant integration in crisis management and create a “culture of prevention” at State and USAID by elevating long-term development goals and aligning diplomatic objectives with them.

**Diplomatic Mission**

To accomplish these goals and objectives, diplomats, always strapped for resources to influence behavior or leverage international agreements, will have to gain an appreciation for investments in long-term development.
Diplomats tend to work with shorter time frames, and much of their work is done with counterparts from foreign ministries or other embassies, not with civil society (though State officers working on human rights issues are an exception). They will have to become better advocates for effective development by becoming better acquainted with long-evolved development thought.

Effective diplomats learn the language, culture, and political and economic factors that form the interests of the host country. Their task is to explain and promote U.S. interests while informing the policy process through analyzing and reporting on the host country. The relationship developed in this exchange need not be adversarial, but will always require the management of some tension. The national interests of two nations never are fully compatible, even on an issue where both agree on a common goal. There are other aspects of the diplomatic role, but the essence is successfully managing this tension.

The diplomatic mission clearly is aided when there are resources available to smooth over differences or to create a better climate. Promoting U.S. interests in trade, finance, security, and cultural exchange, and, increasingly, supporting common efforts to confront global problems are not achieved by goodwill alone. A negotiation over a dispute can often be facilitated by the provision of some form of compensation.

As former career diplomat Chas Freeman has written, “The joining of will to strength and potential produces power.” The power of the United States has been heavily weighted toward political, economic, and military factors. Now, a consensus is emerging that leadership in development—the effort to mitigate the effects of poverty by helping poor nations help themselves—both promotes American power and serves American security interests.

**Development Mission**

The development professional’s relationship with a foreign counterpart is different from that of a diplomat. Ideally, the relationship should be devoid of tension in that it involves a cooperative partnership to achieve a common goal. Strategies are developed with governmental ministries and civil society partners, and projects are designed and implemented after agreement has been reached as to the endstate. A good development professional, like a good diplomat, understands the historical, cultural, political, economic, and sectoral factors of the partner. Yet the goal is mutual trust. The idea is to develop a long-term, enduring relationship that will produce development change and results over time. The success of the host country equals the success of the development mission.

Political environments in developing countries are complex, however; they are often characterized by power struggles, weak institutions, and social tensions created in part by poverty. Development results mean positive change, at least theoretically, but not all parties in a host nation welcome change. Gaining the acquiescence of a government to work with segments of society to achieve development goals often is an obstacle requiring diplomatic skill to surmount.
Outside pressure may even be needed, though excessive pressure can undermine the partnership essential to achieve development results and, in the worst case, can even put a private group or an individual at risk.

Diplomats and development professionals have to work out these issues. Usually this is done at the Country Team level—a good forum for discussing the broad range of U.S. interests in a country. Yet it is not always easy to decide that long-term reform should be promoted and leveraged when short-term objectives involving a particular U.S. interest might be negatively affected. A case in point is Egypt, where the U.S. Government has important geostrategic interests at stake, yet the Egyptian government does not want USAID to fund organizations that promote democratic change. (Egyptian government restrictions on USAID funding have been somewhat circumvented by the State Department’s Middle East Peace Initiative program, which funds local organizations directly.)

There are other more nuanced tensions between diplomatic needs and development objectives, but work in the democratic/governance area arguably produces the most strain. The best way to resolve this situation is to make clear to diplomats and development professionals alike that supporting human rights and democratic reform is the default position for U.S. foreign policy. It is an overriding value, though its pursuit always must take other factors into account.

Better coordination and effective integration require development professionals to yield and change their culture as well. Too many want to focus on the field project and are unwilling to appreciate the broader policy challenge. They tend to be excellent technocrats, though many have become superb program managers and a few have become strong development policy advocates. Yet the USAID voice is not often heard in policy circles in Washington. A strong administrator will help, and Dr. Rajiv Shah will be that, but he will need an effective policy staff. When the State Department created the position of Director of Foreign Assistance, the USAID policy bureau was eliminated. This badly debilitated the leadership capacity of USAID among donors and virtually eliminated its policy role within the U.S. Government. Administrator Shah will restore this vital office.

Development assistance is an essential part of the solution, but coherent, reinforcing policies in the international trade, finance, agriculture, and environmental areas are equally important. If development is to be truly elevated, its professionals will need to step up and lend their voices and professional expertise to the policy debate. This has to happen at all levels, from the Embassy to the White House. Too often, major decisions affecting the developing world have been made without hearing the positions of those who understand the impact on developing countries.

There is a strong correlation between conditions of underdevelopment and various forms of violent conflict. A 1997 study examined race and class segregation in poor Chicago neighborhoods and concluded that poverty was an obstacle to “collective efficacy,” or social cohesion among citizens.1 Paul Collier’s research for his book The Bottom Billion confirms the existence of a “conflict trap” in areas...
inflicted with extreme poverty. The conclusion drawn is that the greater the effect of resource deprivation, the stronger the correlation to the level of violence. This linkage should not be ignored by military personnel, diplomats, or development professionals.

USAID officers are sometimes reluctant to see their contribution in the context of crisis prevention. Overall, what they do contributes to progress and stability, but too often a crisis dismantles the development objective. In a poor, developing country, these breakdowns occur often, but some are avoidable. Being more effective crisis prevention agents means having a better appreciation of a society’s fault lines and fragilities. Where, for example, over the span of a coming decade, are weaknesses most likely to cause civil unrest? What are the antidotes to a future crisis? Stronger governmental institutions? Reduced child mortality rates? Micro-economic systems that support higher growth rates?

Development missions with stronger ties to civil society and a better appreciation of the relationship between institutions and citizens have the information they need to do this kind of analysis. However, their priorities are more often dictated by earmarks and, more narrowly, sector-based country strategies. Analysis of a society’s fault lines is discouraged, sometimes by diplomats afraid of offending the sitting government, and sometimes by risk-averse development professionals.

Finally, USAID must develop the capacity to measure results and to evaluate its programs. The agency’s evaluation office was eliminated during the George W. Bush administration. This staff was able to look into projects and approaches to development with a constructively critical eye. Often their reports created consternation on the part of the implementers, but they invariably revealed weaknesses and recommended changes in approach. USAID cannot perform its role as a leader in development if it is not self-critical. The agency should demand intellectual honesty and urge both the Executive and Congress to hold it accountable for achieving results. This applies as well at the mission level, where some percentage of resources should be devoted to evaluation.

**Defense Mission**

Generally speaking, military personnel have made greater strides in understanding development than have diplomats because they have had to try their hand at it. The acceptance of “stability operations” as part of mainstream military doctrine and the availability of abundant resources have encouraged the military to take on projects that have fallen more typically within the USAID mission. While many retired military commanders—and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates himself—have raised serious doubts about the merit of these kinds of operations becoming military missions, it is quickly becoming a part of the personal constitution of modern military officers. Young West Point graduates are in some cases more enthusiastic about “doing good” in this way than they are about fighting traditional wars (of which there are few any more). They have embraced the mission, and they have a difficult time seeing the downside in terms of broader U.S. interests.

The military contributes to development in postconflict societies by providing security, assisting relief efforts, and reconstructing infrastructure (when this activity can be rationalized as part of the security mission). These activities can enhance the image of the Armed Forces and facilitate interactions with civil society. However, military members’ involvement in
longer term institution-building is inhibited by several factors:

- they are a conspicuous extension of American policy, which in these instances is based on a need to use force at some level
- they are not trained to work with foreign cultures and languages, especially at the civil society level (despite the good efforts of generals such as David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal to prepare them for counterinsurgency missions)
- they are not civilians and thus have a harder time relating to civil society
- regardless of training, their knowledge of the long-term development mission is limited.

**Elevating Development**

Development thought has evolved over the past 50 years, and development professionals are a special breed. They are the only group of professionals in the U.S. Government whose success is measured by the success of their foreign partners. Their timeline for an exit strategy is much longer. A great deal can be done to increase appreciation of development by military and diplomatic officers, but expecting that this type of expertise will be interchangeable among the 3Ds is unrealistic.

The elevation of development requires not only a deeper respect for the mission, but also a significant degree of management autonomy. The best way to think of this is to imagine the needs of an organization whose success or failure will be measured by results. Secretary Clinton was correct when she stated, “We must not simply add up the dollars we spend or the number of programs we run, but measure the results—the lasting changes that those dollars and programs have helped achieve.” Today, unlike when I started my tenure at USAID, results—measurement matrices and sector indicators are much more sophisticated. To achieve tangible results, an aid agency needs a strong program management orientation and a command and control structure that assures responsiveness throughout. The agency needs long-term budgets it can count on, as well as strong strategic thinking that connects projects to programs to country strategies (owned by host governments) to the people of the host country.

USAID can be innovative, but in recent years it has become risk averse. The revitalization of the agency requires leadership to encourage new policy and programmatic approaches and share those approaches in the field and with other donors. As Secretary Clinton stated, there is a need not just for project implementers, but also for development diplomats—individuals who have deep development knowledge and the capacity to work with others to pursue what is in their best interest.

Dr. Shah possesses these qualities. His technical expertise is beyond question, and he combines it with a passion for development that comes from personal experience. He cannot do it alone, but his obvious commitment and energy are a good start in returning the United States to its previous leadership role.

**Integration**

Where does this leave us with regard to the issue of integration? Secretary Clinton has argued it well. She refers to two missions operating more in sync than before. She expects diplomats to take up the cause of development by letting their counterparts know that the U.S. Government is going to lead in poverty
eradication. She expects development professionals to promote innovative thinking, to be development advocates, and to encourage other donors to work with the United States on the new global challenges.

I was impressed recently, for example, by the work of a USAID officer in Beijing who helped organize a meeting between representatives of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and Chinese aid officials. More USAID presence is needed in countries that can contribute as donors. In addition, the DAC, the institution that gave the world the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), should be a primary vehicle for promoting innovation in development. The DAC should be reinvigorated and elevated. The MDGs will soon reach the 2015 deadlines. A new mandate on development is needed, and the best results matrices should be applied, so the world knows what has been done and where efforts have fallen short.

Even more integration, joint training, and coordination must take place in transitional situations and in postconflict, postdisaster, or postauthoritarian rule. Each of the 3Ds plays a crucial role in these scenarios, though the responsibilities vary according to circumstance. We have made considerable progress in handling postconflict transitions, but both the international community and U.S. Government could do more.

If there is such a thing as a “normal” transition from a conflict environment, it generally unfolds as a continuum, with one primary mission overlapping another, each one predominant for a period of time. The initial phase involves a diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict. While diplomacy is the preoccupation in this phase, planning to prepare for the succeeding stage should already be under way. This involves a combination of security in the form of a peacekeeping military contingent and humanitarian relief carried out by relief agencies. In the U.S. Government, this task falls to the Department of Defense (DOD) and USAID (and its offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace). These humanitarian operations traditionally have been well coordinated with DOD, and often military officers and personnel from other agencies are seconded to USAID to help. The recent Haiti relief operation illustrates this cooperation well.

The next phase involves initiatives to bring about reconciliation and efforts to reconstruct the society physically, socially, and politically. Here, development professionals should work hand in glove with diplomats familiar with the terms of the peace agreement and with the political entities that negotiated them. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives has gained a great deal of expertise in programming to bring about reconciliation within previously conflicted societies and in implementing aspects of the peace agreement.

The final phase, which should also be planned well in advance, involves the development of the social, economic, and political systems. Here, once again, USAID should be in the lead on the program side, working closely
with diplomats who are working the political evolution under the terms of the peace agreement and its subsequent iterations.

These transitional situations now occur often enough to warrant far more training and preparation than commonly occur within the U.S. Government. DOD and USAID have held joint exercises in the past, but more collaboration is needed. Moreover, State’s training facility should get involved. Ideally, the United States should have certified cadres ready to deploy from each of the 3Ds.

As the concept of enhanced integration is pursued, architects should keep in mind the need to strengthen each of the three missions. Requirements to expand the core need not detract from the central missions of defense, diplomacy, and development. Several considerations come to mind:

- Standards for promotion to which career aspirations are tied are different in each of the three cultures. Modifications can and have been made to encourage the development of different competencies, but over the years, none of these has changed the primary motivations of individual military, diplomatic, or development officers. Soldiers get ahead by leading combat units. Diplomats are promoted when they manage a major crisis or participate in a key negotiation. Development professionals get to the top by managing programs well and comprehending the linkages among sectors in the context of a local partnership.

- The institutions within which each mission resides have their own “DNA.” They are either hierarchical or flat in structure. They either exercise great control from Washington, or they
delegate to the field. These tendencies are not just the result of bureaucratic culture; to a great extent, their core mission dictates how they operate.

The structural and operational changes that emerge from the Presidential Study Directive and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review must be sustainable over time. Future leaders may have different priorities based on politics and ideology. The risk is that a change made now may take an entirely different form in a future administration. An example was the creation of the International Development and Cooperation Administration (IDCA) to coordinate all development activities in the Carter administration. IDCA was abandoned in the Reagan years. Yet its continued existence in law later created strains in the State-USAID relationship, as its statutory director reported directly to the President (the administrator of USAID served as director of IDCA in the absence of a Presidential appointee).

In her January 6 address, Secretary Clinton once again demonstrated her strong commitment to elevating the development mission. The time is right for a major reform of our foreign aid delivery system. Her speech acknowledged the criticisms of poverty reduction efforts that have been heard from foreign aid opponents. These critical views cover a spectrum from a recommendation to eliminate all assistance, to concerns about dependency, to a reading of data that indicates that aid has not, in fact, made an impact on either growth rates or poverty. The antidote to this criticism is results that can be measured, evaluated, and then advertised, especially by recipient governments and donor agencies.

The absence of coordination and policy coherence within the U.S. Government, as acknowledged by the Secretary, has made it impossible to pursue a viable overall development strategy. Our political culture, which rewards immediate gratification and effective crisis management, mitigates the creation of a long-term strategy. We tend to direct our passion toward the various elements of development rather than the broader goal of poverty mitigation, a goal that requires the appropriate integration of sector interventions. While there are certainly key initiatives whose advancement by high-level leaders can sensitize the international community—such as the empowerment of women—development results are best achieved by responding to host country needs, achieving local buy-in, and creating trust in local partners that their goals are our goals.

Secretary Clinton made all these points, and she made them well. She has created great expectations that the means, structures, and operational details of her vision will fit well with her philosophy and commitment. It is now up to the dedicated professionals in all three of the Ds to make this concept work. Congress can provide an important impetus for reform by enacting a new mandate for development that sets forth broad goals and requires results-reporting and objective evaluation. If Secretary Clinton achieves the right mix of
integration, alignment, and operational independence—if she reinvigorates the effort to prevent crisis through development and proactive diplomacy—she will leave a legacy as important as a signed peace agreement. PRISM

Notes


Past and current administrations have called for whole-of-government efforts designed to bring all instruments of power to bear on issues of national security. This approach includes a greatly expanded role for domestic departments and agencies. Once considered “stationary,” domestic agency employees are now being asked to become “expeditionary” in order to deploy to a wide range of operations from postconflict recovery to domestic disaster relief.

This article notes that while these past and current initiatives improve whole-of-government approaches to contingency operations, they focus on preparing the forward-deploying elements. Although critically important, a forward element is only a fraction of the overall requirements of a successful support concept. True whole-of-government efforts can only be fully realized if equal emphasis is placed on preparing and mobilizing entire departments in the rear as well as the relatively few individuals sent forward. Complete departments as well as deploying individuals must accept that both represent parts of the whole.

This article also suggests that beyond the “3Ds” of defense, diplomacy, and development, there is a 4th D (that is, the entirety of the U.S. Government’s domestic departments and agencies) that should adopt an approach to the future by preparing itself to respond to any contingency with standard processes that can be easily tweaked but not reinvented for each mission situation. For example, optimizing one group only for reconstruction and stabilization and another for domestic contingencies serves the U.S. Government badly by prescribing different processes for different mission profiles when basic planning and operating steps can apply equally to any situation.

Looking to the future and to those charged with carrying out further expansion of a civilian cadre to support national and international contingencies, we offer the following suggestions:

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Provide new, congressionally mandated, dedicated resources, authorities, and, most importantly, leadership to produce a cultural shift in domestic agencies to accept contingency support (to more than just reconstruction and stabilization missions) as a core mission area. This could be accomplished by convincing all players that support to foreign as well as domestic contingencies is equally important and is value added to the traditional steady-state domestic missions currently mandated and expected by the taxpayer.

Provide new funding for personnel to permanently staff home base support capability in the 4th D. Current funding only contemplates the “forward” personnel.

Design programs that create whole-of-department processes, not only individual expeditionary personnel.

Change the mindset across government by understanding that forward-deployed personnel are few in number and thus cannot possibly be expected to speak on behalf of all the potential contributors of an entire department. Therefore, the true value of a domestic agency effort is the ability of the few forward to reach back to home agencies for assistance.

Provide support to the 4th-D organizations from a small traveling team of contingency support and organizational design experts to work with domestic agencies on their turf to build the following capacity:

- inter- and intradepartmental planning and operational support
- effective reachback to answer questions from the field rapidly and comprehensively
- ability to prepare for and conduct deployments, redeployments, and reintegration of expeditionary personnel
- continuous education, training, and exercising to build and maintain capabilities, and a lessons learned analysis and transformation process to hone those capabilities
- incentive structures for expeditionary staff.

**Shifting the Paradigm**

To say all this another way, the current U.S. Government paradigm must shift from merely preparing individuals for expeditionary operations to preparing departments and agencies for the full range of contemporary foreign and domestic challenges the Nation faces. Think of a spear; the forward personnel are at the tip, deployed to accomplish the task. The home base departments and agencies provide the supporting mechanisms—the guidance and muscle—from the rear to direct the spear to the target with sufficient force to achieve the objective (see figure).

It is noteworthy to point out that traditionally, domestic departments and agencies do not think in terms of continuous department-wide processes to prepare for and respond to nonroutine or contingency missions. Instead, nonroutine tasks are often managed on an ad hoc, office-by-office basis. However, in today’s environment, new whole-of-department paradigms will be necessary for departments and agencies to respond rapidly and effectively to either foreign or domestic challenges.
A More Detailed Explanation

In this environment, without an encompassing mandate with funding, domestic departments and agencies of the 4th D struggle to identify and commit the right people and resources to meet the contemporary challenges of expeditionary contingency support, whether domestic or foreign. The evidence is overwhelming that no domestic department or agency is fully prepared to meet whole-of-department requirements either at home or abroad without significant shifts. The following expands on those most valuable characteristics of a home base support capability.

**Continuous Inter- and Intradepartmental Planning.** Intradepartmental planning requires collaboration among the bureaus and offices of a department or agency. Although a great deal of progress has been made recently toward interdepartmental planning or collaborative planning across multiple departments and agencies, planning within departments and agencies themselves must improve to meet the complexities of contemporary operations.

Today, when called to participate in national planning efforts, most departments struggle to provide whole-of-department contributions because there are rarely any processes to guide them. Continuous planning should encompass preparedness for the following universal steps of any contingency:

- continuous departmental and agency assessment of the mission and its requirements
- continuous mobilization and deployment of its expeditionary capabilities
- initial and sustained forward operations with reachback support to the home base
- transition out direct mission responsibilities both forward and in the home base
- redeployment and reintegration of the expeditionary personnel back to the home base
continuous, comprehensive review of lessons identified and appropriate modification of standard operating procedures to ensure lessons are learned.

The steps listed above are so universal in their value that, with proper training, they will prepare any department to become exceptional participants in any “higher” national level processes or framework, no matter the mission profile.

**Persistent Capability to Answer Technical Questions from the Field.** The forward element from any department or agency will be small but must represent the entire organization and its capabilities. This small staff will always face significant challenges in representing its whole department without support from its home base, where a myriad of technical experts reside to develop world-class solutions. For example, a forward-deployed Department of Commerce international trade expert would need the help of regulators, lawyers, customs officials, and private sector and regional market experts to develop comprehensive and effective solutions in-country. Every domestic department is diverse and consists of a multitude of specialized knowledge and skill sets. It would be necessary in our example, then, for the forward representatives to reach back into this complexity to generate the best possible official positions for the National Mission Director forward. Without a single home base coordination office to reach back to, this could become quite difficult. Such a reachback “hub” must be created in every domestic agency.

**Continuous Deployment and Redeployment Support.** The process of deploying personnel and replacing them periodically across the multiple missions of the U.S. Government both
at home and abroad is a full-time business. Only a full-time persistent home base support management headquarters in each department could hope to keep up with these demands. The domestic agencies might learn from the continuity of operations and continuity of government programs with their congressionally mandated permanent Emergency Operations Center, which could offer, in coordination with the new U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Deployment Center, a great one-two punch for the management of deploying and redeploying personnel across the government.

**Continuous Education, Training, and Exercising.** Classroom education usually precedes training and exercising because it is more theoretical and broadening. Training and exercising, on the other hand, are oriented toward providing hands-on processes to act out the ideas discussed in the classroom. Yet most contingency education offered to deploying civilians today focuses on the general skills needed for whole-of-government operations, not on whole-of-department skill sets. Each department, therefore, must have a continuous education process to keep its home base support and expeditionary cadres current and active in the programs.

For example, in December 2009, the Department of Commerce conducted internal training for 35 members of its 45-member Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which is a congressionally mandated and funded corps under the auspices of the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The CRC includes both an active component of “first responders” and a standby component of additional personnel trained and available to support reconstruction and stabilization missions around the world.

The training involved entire Commerce Department subunits teaching each other how they can work together during contingency operations. The training consisted of bureaus’ missions, roles, responsibilities, and current activities challenging participants to think beyond their area of technical expertise to thinking “whole-of-Commerce.” The purpose of the training was to equip CRC members during their deployments with the knowledge to speak confidently with senior leadership in the field on how Commerce as a whole can contribute to a reconstruction and stabilization mission.

As shown above, only departments and agencies themselves can provide whole-of-department education and training. For example, only the Department of Agriculture can train an employee to accomplish the full range of tasks associated with agricultural issues. This means that more resources must be dedicated to each department or agency home base for this purpose. Finally, domestic agencies must conduct periodic exercises in order to socialize new participants and to refine existing processes and policies in the forward and home base. Every department will need to have the budget, time, and skills to conduct low-tech tabletop exercises each year and for emergencies to evaluate, train on, and improve these concepts.

**Continuous Career Administration Support.** This may be the most underrated responsibility of the home base support concept, yet it is extremely
important because tangible personnel incentives are fundamental to making the expeditionary system take root. In addition to taking care of their many personal administrative requirements to include life and health insurance in covering conflict zones, pay, and personnel evaluation standards, expeditionary employees need the guarantee that they will be supported before, during, and after their deployment with a career path that will be enhanced as a result of taking on such difficult missions, often at personal risk.

**Continuous Lessons Learned and Concept Refinement.** Finally, while conducting routine governmental duties and engaging in multiple domestic and foreign contingencies, every organization must carve out the time to learn from its experiences. The military made this a cornerstone of its organizational concept refinement process to keep up with the constant pace of change. Its leadership continues to understand that its adversaries will never cease advancing their own capabilities, and if the U.S. military were to remain static in its thinking, it would soon become obsolete, leaving the Nation at great risk. Now, because most departments and agencies have an increasing role in national security, they too must keep pace with the dynamic challenges and transform to remain relevant. Only a strong learning culture driven and sustained by the home base support processes can produce quality long-term results.

**A Way Forward**

Finally, domestic agencies can create a discovery process to develop these common standards for themselves. We recommend that any discovery process should at least include the following two basic goals: develop a simple universal contingency planning and operating capacity in the home base that brings together the whole of a department, and develop a capacity to support those few personnel sent forward with the full breadth and depth of the home base through a reach-back process. These goals would guide the program, but the steps to achieve these goals would be tailored to each department’s differing needs and starting points. In other words, some agencies already have varying degrees of expertise that can simply be adjusted rather than remade. Other departments may be starting from scratch.

The following recommendations could be taken immediately to begin the process of helping departments create this capacity:

- Set up an outreach program to socialize the issues discussed herein with select personnel from each 4th-D department and agency at the mid to high leader levels in order to receive feedback on questions and/or concerns.
- Highlight what a comprehensive capacity-building program might look like in terms of milestones on a calendar to accomplish the two primary goals listed earlier but in a form tailored to each agency. This would help leadership better understand the potential benefits and the scope of the commitment to such a program.
- If agreed, designate a senior department champion, director for the program, and internal working group composed of a representative from each of the departments’ internal bureaus or offices.
Ask this departmental working group to begin the program by mapping the existing capacity of every bureau/office that can support contingency operations both at home and abroad to establish a baseline for change or improvements.

Simultaneously discuss and debate the universal steps of contingency support listed herein to gain common understanding of what is needed, and then develop processes that tap the unique contributions of the department in accomplishing these steps.

These initial steps, based on our experience, would require at least 6 to 8 months to accomplish. They are the most important steps, however, because they begin the processes of building a common understanding, buy-in, and the team. The emphasis in this initial stage is on listening, discovering, learning, and adapting.

In the follow-on months, the program should include documenting the proposed concepts and then evaluating them in low-tech tabletop exercises. These exercises should include all department officials who will be leading the program.

**Critic’s Corner**

In writing this article, we encountered five strong criticisms.

**Criticism:** Empowering domestic agencies to assist other nations strays too far from their traditional mission and risks doing great harm to the overall U.S. strategies for development and foreign assistance. Other dedicated agencies such as USAID and the Director for Foreign Assistance (DFA) already have these programs well in hand.

**Response:** Foreign assistance professionals have become rightfully concerned about the coherence of their overall mission. The creation of the DFA and the S/CRS were attempts to resolve this issue. These State offices along with USAID have struggled over the past few years to get their arms around the entire foreign assistance community. They have also had to deal with the reality of employing contracted support in place of career government professionals to get the job done. We believe that the 4th D does not compete with these concepts; it simply offers complementary resources by employing resident government professionals to provide other nations’ ministries with official government-to-government assistance where necessary. Furthermore, the overall U.S. strategy on foreign assistance will continue to determine what, how, and where the 4th D can contribute. The 4th D does not supplant or lead, but rather augments and follows during contingencies.

**Criticism:** Creating a “home base support echelon” complete with reachback capabilities amounts to a full endorsement of the “5,000-mile screwdriver.”

**Response:** The home base support echelon as envisaged operates through reachback and does not supplant or interfere with any National Mission Director forward in the field such as the Chief of Mission at the Embassy. The military encountered these same reservations in the early days of its conceptualization of reachback, but in the end they were unwarranted. The home base support echelon does not seek to block, veto, or contend with decisions made by the leaders on the ground who have ultimate responsibilities. It only seeks to amplify departmental advice as offered through its forward personnel to enhance the National Mission
Director's options for timely and effective implementation. Reachback simply provides a capability that no single forward agency representative could hope to achieve alone. Reachback draws on the resident expertise of an entire department or agency and contributes to comprehensive solutions to challenges. The key is that the home base personnel must operate with the same sense of urgency and tempo as the forward representative in the field to make their contributions relevant. The first time a forward-deployed agent makes a request of the home base in short order, and the home base responds with the same old deliberate procedures, will also be the last time. The forward personnel simply will not use the home base again.

Criticism: Research shows that interagency coordination in the field is actually better than in Washington, so why try to fix something that is not broken?

Response: Some of the greatest skeptics of a stronger role for domestic agencies are found in the 4th D community itself. As we now know, most domestic agencies lack the full legal authority to operate unfettered in expeditionary environments abroad unless Congress specifically grants exceptions. Therefore, working toward such a goal is daunting to many domestic agencies. To minimize a further drain on resources, some believe that the foreign contingency domain is just a bridge too far. We strongly agree with these observations but do not believe that they constitute a good enough reason to give up. Furthermore, the ideas presented in this article will help agencies to better support any contingency, foreign or domestic. On a side note, real progress has already been made by some departments (with our help) to pilot the very ideas in this article with very little outside funding.

Criticism: Teaching one prescriptive way of planning and operating will simply add to the already confused landscape of niche planning frameworks proliferating around Washington.

Response: We are fully aware of this important insight and have developed a set of basic steps that are as far as possible from being prescriptive or particular in nature. The approach is to apply a no-frills planning and operating process and structure that allow each department to understand itself and bring that self-awareness to any national level process.
In Washington, clever turns of phrase can be easily confused with deep analysis. One such phrase that has entered the Beltway’s intellectual echo chamber is the “3Ds” of defense, diplomacy, and development. But despite the numerous speeches and policy papers written on this topic, a simple question has been left dangling: does anyone really know what the phrase means in terms of the formulation and execution of U.S. national security policy?

On its surface, the notion of joining the 3Ds into a more comprehensive whole-of-government strategy toward the world’s trouble spots is more than enticing; it seems downright obvious. After all, did the United States not match the Soviet threat in postwar Europe through the purposeful employment of all three tools, as exemplified by the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? Why, we may ask, are we not executing a similarly holistic approach toward the challenges we face in such places as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen?

Unfortunately, the idea that the arrows of defense, diplomacy, and development can be joined into one missile, much less hit a single target, may be misleading. To the extent that this concept seeks to replicate the contours of American foreign policy in the late 1940s, it suggests the limits of historical knowledge in the U.S. Government, for it is solely with the benefit of hindsight that a narrative of a seamless and coherent U.S. approach to the bipolar world can be constructed.

More instructive, perhaps, is the American experience in Vietnam. There, the Johnson administration announced grandiose plans to transform the Mekong Delta into a new Tennessee Valley.

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Authority, while making endless diplomatic overtures to the regime in Saigon—and to America’s allies—in the hope of bolstering the Saigon government’s credibility, legitimacy, competence, and authority. Needless to say, there was little absorptive capacity in South Vietnam for these diplomatic and developmental initiatives, which in any case were not integrated with the American military strategy of fighting a conventional war rather than a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign.

Rather than promoting the comforting hope that defense, diplomacy, and development can be unified, the Obama administration would better advance its foreign policy objectives if it spoke the hard language of priorities, requirements, tradeoffs, and limitations. Such language, for example, is sadly missing from the Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which states that “America’s leadership in this world requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power” but nowhere acknowledges America’s myriad deterrence failures since the end of the Cold War and the reasons for them. As we will see, each of the 3Ds operates with its own objectives, incentive systems, and time horizons.

**Conflicting Objectives**

Since the 3Ds sound as if they should go together, it is worth recalling what each tool seeks to accomplish. A bit of reflection should help clarify why bringing them together is much harder than it seems.

Briefly, the purpose of American military power is to deter and, if necessary, defeat our nation’s enemies. That the United States has failed to deter—much less defeat—at least some of its enemies since the Vietnam War (including, inter alia, such adversaries as Somali warlords and pirates, drug runners and international criminal gangs, and al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations) is a disturbing point that should nonetheless remain at the forefront of our minds. Why is that the case? Is it because the United States has failed to use the appropriate diplomatic and economic tools, or is it because the Nation has failed to understand the new enemies it is facing and their objectives and systems of motivation? These may seem like straightforward questions, but they get to the heart of a most crucial issue: why has the United States failed to achieve its security objectives in several prominent cases?

Unlike defense, diplomacy requires engaging with friends (and in many cases foes as well) in negotiations aimed at finding common ground over shared interests. Basically, diplomacy is about dividing a pie in such a way as to make each consumer believe there is no way he will get more, even through the use of violence. But the problem here is that the presence of American military power in a given setting—say, in Afghanistan or Iraq—can undermine rather than support a given set of negotiations, such as those aimed at promoting “postconflict” resolution. It is obvious that each party to a set of talks will seek to manipulate the American military presence to its benefit, as the Shia did with some success in Iraq. This, of course, increased Sunni distrust of the settlement process, fueling the insurgency.

Finally, development is fundamentally concerned with establishing the conditions that bolster long-term economic growth.
Unfortunately, nobody knows precisely what those conditions are; it is commonly agreed, however, that development is the result of many decades of institution-building and human capital formation that promote the kinds of investments that raise labor productivity.

These institutions can certainly be supported by the international community through some combination of aid and trade. There is little doubt, for example, that a friendlier trade regime would bolster the economies of many developing nations. But a moment’s reflection reminds us that such a regime is politically infeasible, since American and European farmers have proved quite adept at protecting their agriculture sector from developing world imports of cotton and grain.

As a consequence, the industrial world’s development policies resemble the benefactor who endows a scholarship to Harvard but then refuses to hire the recipient upon graduation because of race or gender. Even more pernicious, the use of “tariff escalation” (meaning tariffs are higher on finished products than on raw materials—for example, on instant coffee versus coffee beans) by the United States and European Union (EU) creates disincentives for many developing nations to make value-added investments. Through such policies, we limit the creation of a moderate business class that views sustained economic growth as a promising and feasible policy objective.

Some readers will undoubtedly assert that the picture being painted is deliberately gloomy for the sake of provocation. After all, did the United States not succeed in uniting the 3Ds in postwar Europe? Who could deny that American policies encouraged the birth of a united, secure, and prosperous European community? And what about the combined efforts of the United States and European Union to bring former Warsaw Pact countries into the EU and NATO? Indeed, is the sweep of postwar history not a great testimony to Western policy coherence?

To be sure, America’s heroic accomplishments during the Cold War era and its aftermath cannot and should not be denied. But it would be a mistake to argue that they were the result of a coherent grand strategy. Instead, the United States emphasized economic statecraft during the postwar era because the other tools at its disposal—diplomacy and defense—were either ineffective or unavailable. Joseph Stalin had shown soon after Yalta that he had no intention of keeping the agreements he reached with his wartime allies, while the American people showed the White House that they would not support keeping millions of troops on European soil after the war’s end. Rather than reflecting a grand strategy, the Marshall Plan was pretty much all the United States had left to offer in 1947—and even that was hotly contested. In fact, had Stalin not overthrown the government of Czechoslovakia in 1948, it is quite likely that Congress would have rejected Secretary of State George Marshall’s call for increased foreign aid!

The United States was similarly hamstrung with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Europeans were unwilling to move quickly to expand the EU, leaving a policy vacuum that had to be filled by NATO lest the former Soviet colonies adopt potentially ugly forms of
governance. On the foreign aid front, Russia was encouraged by the West to engage in the “mass privatization” that created today’s oligarchy, seriously retarding broad-based economic development. In many Eastern European countries, problems of corruption and poor governance remain pervasive.

**Whither the 3Ds?**

If the idea of defense, diplomacy, and development rests on shaky foundations, how should the United States advance its objectives in such places as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen? In all these cases, America’s enemies will only be defeated through some combination of military power, state-building, and the deepening of diplomatic and economic relations. Should these policies be pursued separately and sequentially? Is there any hope of a coherent strategy that can focus all of America’s tremendous resources on the problem at hand?

In most cases, the answer (surely a tough one to swallow) is: probably not. The United States has a poor record of state-building, and that should come as no surprise; nations must be built and maintained by the people who call a certain place “home.” There will undoubtedly be disputes about the nation’s new or rebuilt architecture, but these will only be resolved peacefully when each party recognizes that it is better off inside rather than outside the tent. Again it must be emphasized that the incentives America provides to this process, be they economic or military, could easily be misinterpreted as a sign of favor to one party over another, undermining rather than supporting conflict resolution. As difficult as it may be to accept, superpowers are sometimes better off when they devote their militaries strictly to the killing and/or containing of the nation’s enemies rather than as
mediators or balancers in internal conflicts. The United States, for example, painfully learned this lesson in Lebanon during the administration of Ronald Reagan.

However, there will undoubtedly be occasions in which the United States is determined to utilize the 3Ds more holistically to advance its interests. In all such cases, the deployment of these instruments must be guided by some causal theory that links inputs to outcomes. In Afghanistan, for example, NATO forces are combining military power with Provincial Reconstruction Teams and foreign aid in the hope of fusing counterinsurgency with economic development. These teams and aid agencies are building schools and hospitals in the hope of demonstrating to the Afghan people that a better, post-Taliban future is possible. But do we have any sound way of judging whether we are succeeding in that endeavor?

Unfortunately, the one thing that is lacking in America’s 3Ds approach to Afghanistan is any indication that the Afghans themselves are investing in their future. Surely, one significant proxy measure of how a people perceive their fate is the amount of investment they are putting into their country. The level and type of investment are suggestive of the time horizons people have: lumpy capital investments demonstrate that people are committed to their country or region for the long run. The question then arises: is NATO’s counterinsurgency strategy motivating greater investment on the part of the Afghan people, or is it displacing such investment? To date, we have little hard data with which to answer that question, but the anecdotal evidence is not promising. As a recent World Bank report puts it, “Investment has been limited relative to Afghanistan’s potential.”

With the end of the Cold War, the United States has found itself in one mess after the other: Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, just to name the most prominent. Many more likely await the international community as weak states fall prey to warring divisions. Rising to the challenge of these conflicts will require something deeper than phrases such as “defense, diplomacy, and development.” Instead, American policy must be guided by a clear-eyed recognition of what is truly at stake in a given crisis, and deploying only those resources that are best suited to the problem at hand.

Concretely, this means analyzing who the enemy is in a given conflict, what it is fighting for, why the United States is involved, and what the endgame requires. For example, in Afghanistan, the United States is now at war with at least two distinct enemies—the Taliban and al Qaeda—which may have different motivations for fighting the United States and two very different endgames. With al Qaeda, it is quite possible that we are in for a long-haul military struggle that simply will not be resolved through diplomacy and development in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast or Southwest Asia, or the other regions where that organization has found refuge (and, indeed, it is quite possible that military and intelligence support to those nations that contain al Qaeda elements could be more useful in this war than development assistance). With
the Taliban, in contrast, it is possible that a “deal” exists that could curb their interest in pro-
longed conflict.

The nature of the emerging international system, with its many weak states, terrorist and crimi-
nal organizations, and transnational economic and environmental shocks, also poses any number of challenges that the United States will not be able to solve on its own, much less with the coopera-
tion of friends and allies, each of whom will undoubtedly have its own preferences and interests with respect to each issue area. Instead, the best the United States can hope for may be some form of managed containment. Facing this new environment, it is useful to remember that realism dic-
tates not only the careful application of power, but also its stewardship over the long run. PRISM
Given the large number of U.S. forces deployed around the world and the casualties sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easy to miss that the Services do much more than engage in combat. On any given day, military engineers dig wells in East Africa, medical personnel provide vaccinations in Latin America, and special operations forces (SOF) mentor militaries in Southeast Asia. Through these activities, the United States seeks to improve its international image, strengthen the state sovereignty system by training and equipping security forces, preempt localized violence from escalating into regional crises, and protect national security by addressing underlying conditions that inspire and sustain violent extremism.

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Far from preparation for major war, these activities rely on a unique blend of charitable American political culture, latent civil-military capacity within the Department of Defense (DOD), and ambitious military officers who see the strategic landscape characterized by weak states and nonstate actors. In short, the new strategic assumption sees U.S. security as inextricably bound to the security of every country in the world. To be effective in this environment, a new cooperative strategic approach is replacing traditional notions of national defense, which is based on security assistance. The implications of this are profound; what was once the province of SOF is now a core capability for conventional forces.

While this article does not directly address operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, important lessons are emerging from those conflicts that are reshaping the military outside of counterinsurgency operations. First is the impact of intervention itself; forced democratization tends to produce semidemocratic governments with political instability and internal conflict. Second, to bring stability to postconflict zones requires new ways of using military forces. For example, General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), noted that success in Afghanistan would be achieved when there are Afghan police units in every district, a greatly expanded Afghan National Army, and significant agricultural reform. Finally, combat operations have taught the military that lethality cannot solve security problems. Instead, training and equipping indigenous forces to protect and control their territory are essential for long-term stability. These lessons have gained traction and have been extended to weak states in more permissive environments. Paul Collier argues that the role for advanced militaries of the world is “to supply the global public good of peace in territories that otherwise have the potential for nightmare.” Implicit in Collier’s assertion is the importance of weak states to international security.

Priority of Weak States

At least since the early 1990s, state failure has been identified as a risk to international peace and security. In spite of objections to nationbuilding by the military, this view continued throughout the 2000s, when policymakers saw a direct connection between weak states and international terrorism. For Secretary of Defense Robert Gates:

*The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. The most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland, for example, that of a U.S. city being poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack, are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.*

This assessment moved formerly subnational or regional crises to the international level, where it was assumed that failed states or states at risk pose an acute danger to national security. It produced external intervention into weak states in the name of human security (for example, the United States and Philippines, United Kingdom
and Sierra Leone, France and Ivory Coast, or Australia and East Timor). And it expanded the number of recipients of security assistance.

Prioritizing weak or failing states represents a profound shift in strategic thinking. Historically, countering the Soviet Union or promoting economic interests drove U.S. foreign policy decisions and military deployments. Yet since the 1990s, weak states have captured the attention of the world, which struggles with bringing stability to countries such as Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, and Somalia. At a time when populations are less vulnerable to nuclear annihilation or traditional war, transnational forces have instilled a pervasive sense of insecurity. Consequently, it is important for the United States to understand what threatens friends, adversaries, and those countries in between. With few exceptions, the United States willingly forms security assistance agreements with almost every country in the world and supports those governments through security cooperation.

**Security Cooperation**

As DOD civil-military capabilities (for instance, the Navy’s 16,000 Seabees) are used around the world, conventional forces are assisting partners through security cooperation. Formally, security cooperation is:

> the ability for DOD to interact with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, including allied transformation, improve information exchange and intelligence sharing to help harmonize views on security challenges, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure. 

Security cooperation falls under the purview of the overall geographic combatant commander, but his strategy and activities are executed at the country level through his security assistance officer, who is a member of the Country Team working for the U.S. Ambassador.

Too easily forgotten, the Department of State is the lead foreign policy organization in the United States and plays a critical role in security assistance through the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which is a direct link to DOD. With a broad mandate in international security affairs, active cooperation with DOD is required. If done well, security assistance activities are coordinated with other interagency activities beginning at the national level where both the State Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the National Security Strategy, which in turn drives the military’s theater campaign plans and Embassies’ mission strategic plans. Since programs always take place in particular countries, Ambassadors are at the forefront of security assistance. Under National Security Decision Directive 38, the U.S. Ambassador has absolute authority over all U.S. personnel and operations within a country, which means that all military programs are subject to ambassadorial approval and are critical to promoting U.S. objectives in a particular country.

The overall goals of security assistance include creating favorable military balances of power (for example, selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied
and friendly military capabilities for self-defense (providing equipment and funding to Israel), supporting multinational operations (training and equipping the Georgian military, which was the third largest troop contributor in Iraq in 2008), and preventing crisis and conflict (facilitating Colombia’s success against a decades-old insurgency). As noted in doctrine, there are six categories of security cooperation activity:

- military contacts, including senior official visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs
- nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities
- multinational training
- multinational exercises
- multinational education
- arms control and treaty monitoring activities.

Underlying all of these activities is the clear intent to achieve U.S. national security objectives. It is important to remember that states must manage both the risks of abandonment and entrapment by their friends and allies. The United States does this by building a partner country’s military and developing professional relationships across militaries.

These activities are increasingly enshrined in doctrine and are defined as “the ability to improve the military capabilities of our allies and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional security, disaster preparedness and niche capabilities in a coalition.” For example, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CNE) has been developing a capability for maritime domain awareness throughout Europe and Africa. CNE has been working with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and African partners to develop a regional capability to protect trade, natural resources, and economic development. This includes establishing maritime domain awareness through the automated identification system, an array of coastal radar systems, and improved command and control of a naval reaction force. Inherent in these activities is developing enduring relationships. In the Near East, for example, long-term relationships have produced trust and access for the United States to have forward operating bases in Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Additionally, weapons are prepositioned in other countries, to include Oman. While partners benefit from these programs, such initiatives also support broader U.S. foreign policy objectives of global influence.

Security cooperation also includes security sector reform, which is an area of increasing importance. It focuses on improving civil-military relations, promoting collaboration among regional partners, and fostering cooperation within partners’ governments. The United States has learned that contemporary security challenges often require whole-of-government solutions and regional cooperation. Consequently, it seeks to foster this same
approach around the world. Programs support legislative reform (for example, seizing assets from drug traffickers in Colombia), enhancing cooperation between police and defense forces (building bridges among bureaucratic rivals in Jamaica), and managing the legacy of past human rights abuses by militaries (integrating human rights training in programs in Latin America and Africa). Furthermore, it considers the internal health and welfare of partners’ military forces by combating HIV/AIDS in militaries, promoting noncommissioned officer development, and providing educational opportunities for officers.

The legislative authorities for these programs primarily reside in the Department of State, but DOD has the capacity and expertise to implement military assistance programs. Financed under Title 22 (Account 150), the international assistance budget was $27.4 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2009 (see table 1). Fifteen different programs are included in Account 150, but only six can be considered security related: foreign military financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), international narcotics control and law enforcement, peacekeeping operations, Andean Counterdrug Program, and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs. While security assistance programs are substantial, nonsecurity assistance programs exceed them by at least two to one. There are considerable differences across regions as well. In Africa, for example, nonsecurity programs are the dominant approach to international assistance. In the Near East, however, the opposite is true.

Though the United States has security assistance programs with over 150 countries, it does privilege several (see table 2). Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of security assistance,
and its neighbor Egypt benefited from its recognition of Israel and its control of the Suez Canal. Given its proximity to the United States and challenges with drug trafficking organizations, Mexico has recently emerged as a top recipient of security assistance. Given the history of American military interventions in Mexico, this has required new efforts to build trust to reassure the government that Washington seeks to strengthen and not undermine it. One reason the United States focuses assistance on just a few countries is to promote particular countries as regional leaders. In practice, this means that Jordan hosts an international SOF exercise, peace operations training center, and an international police training center. Or in Latin America, Colombia provides helicopter training for regional militaries and El Salvador hosts a regional peacekeeping institute attracting military personnel from countries throughout the Western Hemisphere. This approach not only strengthens key partners, but it also reduces the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates. Over the past five decades, security assistance has evolved from a program designed to buy influence and access to one that is now intended to build capacity meant to obviate U.S. military presence. Recipients are expected to “graduate” from assistance and become capable of filling national and regional security deficits.

**Engagement Tools**

In total, security assistance comprises about 27 percent of normal international assistance, which is implemented by a variety of governmental and nongovernmental actors. (Excluded from “normal assistance” are those activities funded by supplemental budgets that largely benefit Iraq and Afghanistan.) From the DOD perspective, combatant commanders have a broad array of security
assistance tools at their disposal. For its part of the 150 Account, security assistance often takes the form of IMET and FMF. Additionally, DOD directly funds security assistance through Section 1206/7 and other command funds, but this only makes up about $1 billion annually, which is less than 15 percent of security assistance funded by the State Department. Thus, State exerts considerable control of programs at both budgetary and implementation levels.

**IMET Program**

Created by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Congress intended for IMET to accomplish three principal goals: to foster increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in order to enhance international peace and security, to help participating countries to become more self-reliant by improving their ability to utilize defense resources obtained through FMF, and to increase the awareness of internationally recognized human rights issues. Thirty years later, the objectives of the program remain fundamentally unchanged. Through the IMET programs, combatant commands train about 8,000 international military of officers from 125 countries a year. By comparison, the Fulbright program awards grants to about 4,000 international participants per year. When other programs are included, DOD reaches an international audience of at least 55,000 annually. Programs include English-language training at the Defense Language Institute, training activities such as the basic infantry officer’s course, and attendance at U.S. professional military education institutions such as the Naval War College. Regarding the last, attendance by officers from other countries is increasing, with foreign officers currently composing about 15 percent of the graduating class, and it is a priority to increase international participation in U.S. schools.

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</table>
While the training and education are often well received, that is difficult to measure. One major impact of IMET programs is building personal and professional relationships with people likely to rise to senior levels within their countries. In Botswana, for example, 11 of 14 serving general officers are graduates of IMET programs. Moreover, having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with first-hand knowledge of the United States contributes to the professionalization of armed forces, winning access and influence for diplomatic and military representatives. As a testament to the quality of selections for the Naval War College’s Naval Staff College, for example, 236 participants have attained flag rank, 102 later served as chiefs of service, 5 became cabinet ministers, and 1 became his nation’s president. Thus, in theory, the United States is training and educating its partners to facilitate future collaboration.

In FY00, IMET programs were budgeted at $49.8 million, which nearly doubled to $90.5 million by the end of the Bush years in FY09. As table 3 shows, countries in Europe and Eurasia received the most funding, while Pacific and East Asian countries received the least. Underlying the preference for training and educating military personnel from Europe and Eurasia is NATO integration. Since NATO expanded from 16 countries in 1999 to 28 countries in 2009, it was essential for the United States to train its new allies to facilitate the integration process. This also ensures that European officers network with other NATO officers. Much as U.S. officers interact with officers from Estonia, IMET affords opportunities for Estonian officers to interact with Spaniards.

Taken by region, IMET has global impact. In Africa, every country but Somalia and Zimbabwe received some type of IMET assistance in 2009. Although it is a relatively modest program in terms of cost, both the President and Congress attach considerable importance to the IMET program. Recipient countries are likewise heavily reliant on these grants. In many cases, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>12,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>36,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Eurasia</td>
<td>125,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>4,187,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and Central Asia</td>
<td>305,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>92,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>59,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,819,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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program serves as the only method by which partner militaries receive advanced training from their U.S. counterparts. Without opportunities from countries such as the United States, there is little indigenous capacity to professionalize militaries through military colleges and training programs. To foster independence and sustainability of these programs, the United States also helps many countries develop their own professional military education networks and educational programs through exchanging faculty, sharing curriculum ideas, and providing books and professional journals.

**FMF Program**

Augmenting military education and training is foreign military financing, which supplies grants and loans to finance purchases of American weapons and military equipment. The State Department oversees the program, but DOD manages it on a day-to-day basis. In FY09, the FMF budget was the largest program in the State Department’s international assistance account, consuming over $4.8 billion (see table 4). Countries in the Near East are the top recipients, while countries in Africa receive the least amount of U.S. weaponry and equipment. Because of the high cost of U.S. weapons and different needs by region, FMF is unevenly distributed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY1950–2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,715,289</td>
<td>70,597,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>485,067</td>
<td>28,988,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,065,541</td>
<td>28,909,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18,266,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,033,629</td>
<td>17,349,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3,058,947</td>
<td>16,742,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>839,831</td>
<td>16,732,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>315,433</td>
<td>16,087,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>375,383</td>
<td>16,054,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>165,037</td>
<td>15,097,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>222,422</td>
<td>12,715,634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By country, nearly 80 percent of FMF goes to Israel ($2.55 billion) and Egypt ($1.3 billion). Of the remaining 20 percent, just a few countries receive substantial assistance: Pakistan ($300 million), Jordan ($235 million), and Colombia ($66 million). Seventy countries share the remaining $300 million. Of note, only 9 countries in Africa received FMF in 2009 compared to 45 African countries that received IMET. This suggests a deliberate policy to focus on professionalizing militaries instead of arming them, which is a contrast from the past. (Through its 1206 funding, however, DOD is providing weapons for countries in Africa.) In contrast to Africa, nearly every country in Europe and Eurasia receives FMF. The top recipients are Poland ($27 million), Romania ($15 million), Turkey ($12 million), Georgia ($11 million), and Bulgaria ($9 million). In fact, Poland receives more than twice the amount of all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa combined. NATO integration and U.S. missile defense programs largely explain this.

A program such as FMF advances U.S. interests in many ways. When countries buy U.S. military equipment through FMF (and direct commercial sales), the basis for a relationship is formed. There are typically secure long-term commitments for training on how to maintain and operate the equipment. As table 5 illustrates, the top recipients are long-time U.S. allies and partners to include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. The relationships are sustained through military sales using FMF and direct commercial sales. Additionally, providing spare and replacement parts ensures competitor countries do not interfere with the relationship. Finally, combined exercises build personal bonds between U.S. and partner countries’ personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Peacekeepers Trained</th>
<th>Trainers Trained</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>49,254</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>52,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>2,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Eurasia</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and Central Asia</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1,872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative

Outside of IMET and FMF, the Department of State operates integrated security assistance programs such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI). The precursor programs to GPOI were created to respond to the demand for peacekeepers in Africa, which increased during the 1990s. With a shortage of peacekeepers, the United Nations (UN) Security Council found it difficult to separate former warring parties or deploy as a buffer to prevent the outbreak of war. The demand for trained peacekeepers rose from 10,000 in the 1980s to nearly 100,000 by early 2007 and is expected to grow by at least 50,000 in the coming years.

Though the United States does not provide troops for peacekeeping missions, it is responsible for about 25 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget and has many bilateral programs to train, equip, and deploy peacekeepers. In FY09, these efforts were valued at $395 million. In 2010, the peacekeeping program focuses on supporting African Union operations in Somalia, transforming the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army into a conventional military force, and supporting militaries in Liberia, the Trans-Sahara, and East Africa. While substantial, General William Ward, commander of U.S. Africa Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the equipment needs of troop contributing countries for peace support operations in Darfur and other anticipated operations dwarfs GPOI’s ability to provide the magnitude of equipment required to satisfy United Nations Contingent Owned Equipment requirements.”

GPOI now includes 51 partner countries and organizations throughout the world, although the emphasis is still on Africa (see table 6). With increased capacity gained through GPOI, Africa’s military contribution to UN peacekeeping doubled from 2000 to 2004.

While the number of available African peacekeepers has increased, current efforts fall short of the goal of Africans providing for African security. Of the seven UN peacekeeping missions in Africa in 2009, only the hybrid UN–African Union mission in Darfur is composed of an African majority. Non-Africans primarily compose the other six UN operations. In addition to the shortfall on UN missions, there are open billets on African Union peacekeeping missions as well. In sum, there is a shortage of at least 45,000 African peacekeepers for meeting the African Union objective of Africans providing for their own security. Given standard deployment cycles, the number can be multiplied by three to account for forces that are training to deploy, are deployed, and are recovering from deployment.

Initially, the GPOI training was conducted by the U.S. military, but demand for military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan largely shifted responsibility to government contractors. Yet a major goal is to reduce dependency on external actors such as the United States, so GPOI supports peace operations training centers in dozens of countries, including Albania, Bangladesh, Belize, Bosnia, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, and Uruguay.
When the program concludes, it will be critical to see how well partners sustain momentum and participate in peacekeeping operations.

**Game Changer? 1206 Funding**

Created during the Cold War, IMET and FMF are long-term programs and are slow to respond to changes in the security environment. Thus, when the United States wanted to help Kosovo formalize its military structures or Afghanistan build an army, it could not proceed under traditional foreign assistance programs. On average, it takes 3 to 4 years from concept to execution. In an effort to overcome lengthy program delays, Congress granted DOD “global train and equip” authority under Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. This was a departure from vesting security assistance authorities in the Department of State and led to charges of a militarized foreign policy.

The law provides funds to build the capacity of partners’ military forces. This is used primarily for counterterrorism, but also gives the military unprecedented levels of discretion and streamlines project development. For example, many countries received assistance to upgrade their maritime surveillance capabilities, obtain new patrol craft, and improve communications systems. In terms of fiscal scope, the train and equip program is limited to $350 million annually, but it has taken 4 years for it to develop at this level, partly due to an expansive definition of counterterrorism. Out of the approximately $1 billion expended over that period, the greatest beneficiaries of 1206 funding are Pakistan ($210 million), Lebanon ($107 million), Yemen ($98 million), Indonesia ($57.5 million), and Bahrain ($50.4 million).

In addition to 1206 funding, DOD gained authority to support stability operations in U.S.-led coalitions under Section 1207. Congress limited this assistance to a country’s military forces (excluding police forces) and stipulated that no nation should receive assistance if otherwise prohibited from receiving foreign military assistance through other sources. This caveat was included to ensure that DOD did not undermine State. As DOD has gained legislative authority to execute security assistance programs, oversight has been a key concern. To ensure that foreign policy was not being militarized, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act delegated approval authority for Section 1206 spending from the President to the Secretary of Defense, but stipulated the Secretary of State must concur for the approval of all programs.

To be sure, 1206/1207 are expedient authorities for military commanders to fund programs, but they are not without oversight. The law requires that any services, defense articles, or funds provided or transferred to the Secretary of State comply with the authorities and limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, or any law making appropriations to carry out such acts. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense must notify congressional committees when the authority is exercised, and the notification must be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. At the time the change in law occurred, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, “In 1206, we have provided a dual key approach of delivering resources for emergent short-term military assistance needs...
and counterterrorism activities.” Finally, all military personnel entering a country to conduct security assistance programs must be granted country clearance by the U.S. Embassy there. With few exceptions, U.S. Ambassadors approve and are well aware of security assistance programs occurring in their countries. 

With that said, there are limits to oversight. For example, Chad received $6 million to establish a light infantry rapid reaction force in FY07. But in the same year, the Department of State criticized Chad’s security forces for “engaging in extrajudicial killing, torture, beatings, rapes and human rights abuses.” When investigated, it appeared that U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) did not brief Embassy personnel until after the proposal received 1206 funding, at which time the Embassy expressed concern. Additional research is needed to understand the limits of oversight, but at least in the FY06 request, USEUCOM coordinated with only 4 of 14 Embassy staffs prior to submitting its global train and equip requests. The Government Accountability Office did note that coordination improved in FY07, and a program with Thailand was canceled after a coup occurred there in 2006. Such instances as these give rise to fears about the militarization of foreign policy.

Fundamentally, the fear stems from the question of who is in charge. On the one hand, the State Department oversees the security assistance programs that DOD implements. Yet new models such as 1206/1207 and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program create coordination challenges. In principle, coordination should occur through the Country Team, which has the best situational awareness of the country where programs occur. However, with multiple staffs involved across the region and in Washington, DC, there are bound to be missteps. Congress noted, “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism.” Yet Congress acknowledged that the problem can be solved in the field: “It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.” While combatant commands trumpet regional approaches and Washington-based bureaucracies herald interagency approaches, all programs, regardless of funding source, take place in defined geographic territories where U.S. Ambassadors serve as the whole-of-government representatives. As the Obama administration attempts to improve interagency coordination, it will be well served to study U.S. Embassies as a model instead of focusing on battles across the Potomac.

**Conclusion**

While preparation for war is the military’s traditional mission, security assistance has emerged as a key task. As Title 10 makes clear, “The Secretary of Defense may conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.” Because the United States is relatively secure from interstate rivalry, it is now focused on intrastate security deficits. The Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) reaffirmed this: “preventing conflict, stabilizing crises, and building security sector capacity are essential elements of America’s national security approach.” Consequently, preparations for war are giving way to military operations that focus on humanitarian assistance, stability operations, and security assistance. This is not new. At least since World War II, it has been the interest of the United States to guarantee American security by reducing threats from abroad and encouraging a system of global trade to promote American prosperity and create global interdependence. Security assistance has been a key plank of this U.S. foreign policy throughout. What is different today, however, is that partners’ security challenges now impact U.S. national security. As made clear in the failed airline attack on Christmas Day in 2009, poor counterterrorism in Yemen or the lack of intelligence-sharing in Nigeria can threaten the United States.

With weak governments unable to control territory or channel social frustration in nonviolent ways, once-local conflicts are now international. This places security assistance programs at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy to help allies, friends, and partners. With few exceptions, partners’ security forces are too small, poorly equipped, and ill trained to effectively monitor and secure their borders and prevent transnational actors from exploiting security deficits. Consequently, the United States has stepped up its security assistance efforts and finds its military forces in more countries than ever. The forces seldom engage in direct combat operations but are training, equipping, and mentoring partner countries’ militaries. Through State Department and Defense Department programs, these efforts total more than $7 billion annually. Overall, these programs are a part of U.S. grand strategy, which emphasizes military-to-military relations to strengthen weak states and confront nonstate actors.

Given the size of security assistance and fears of a militarized foreign policy, the Obama administration is attempting to rebalance U.S. foreign policy. Made clear in the 2010 QDR, security assistance is an invaluable tool. Almost every country in the world demands it, and it has the long-term potential to alleviate the stress on the U.S. national security bureaucracy by creating viable partners. This goal is shared by the Department of State and Department of Defense, which seek to combat irregular threats and prevent future conflicts. With this in mind, security assistance should not fall victim to reorganization or fiscal limits. Instead, the U.S. Government should strengthen the Chief of Mission authority of the Ambassadors in countries where these programs take place to ensure that its goals are met, partners develop capacity, and countries graduate from assistance programs. PRISM

Notes


“Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon.”

All data for tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 are derived from Department of State, FY2009 International Assistance Summary Tables. Data do not include supplemental funds or programs funded outside the Department of State. Regional designations are based on Department of State regional boundaries that vary slightly from Department of Defense boundaries.


In fiscal year 2007, the Fulbright program was $198.8 million. Of the 7,000 participants a year, slightly more than half are not American. This includes 1,650 foreign graduate students, 850 foreign scholars, 175 Humphrey fellows, and several hundred others. For more information, see <http://fulbright.state.gov>.


Department of State, “Foreign Military Financing Account Tables,” available at <www.state.gov>. It is important to note that military assistance for Iraq and Afghanistan is not included in this account data.


Ibid.

Nina M. Serafino, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces, RS22855 (Washington, DC: CRS, updated June 3, 2008), 1. Authorities provided to DOD under Title 10, USC, cannot generally be used for training or equipment programs, whereas Title 22 funds, controlled by the State Department, but which include some DOD-implemented programs such as FMF and IMET, cannot be used to fund military operations.


Serafino, Section 1206, 4.


27 Ibid.; Serafino, Section 1206.

28 GAO.


30 Ibid.

31 U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 6, Section 168.

To borrow from Mark Twain, reports of Yemen’s demise are greatly exaggerated. Decisions and commitments that the international community and Yemenis make this coming year, affirmed at the London Conference, and the sustainability of those commitments over the long term will determine whether the reports become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Yemen is not a failed state. It is fragile and faces challenges—economic, demographic, political, and security—that would sunder other states. There are those who would write it off as a lost cause,
dismiss it as a sinkhole of assistance, outsource the solutions to the neighbors, or turn it into a “Third Front” even though we have not yet completed or been unquestioningly successful in the first two fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To write it off is premature. To declare it a sinkhole overstates the quality and consistency of our assistance to date. To outsource to the neighbors is abdication, and a counterproductive one at that, and to open a Third Front is pure folly. The United States, along with international partners, has the ability to help Yemen walk back from a precipice if it is willing to commit sufficient resources—financial and political—to a broad, sustained, coordinated, and strategic engagement that learns the right lessons of the first two fronts, understands the challenges that Yemen faces and the historical context that is still at play, and suppresses the impulse to apply the false templates of other fragile and failed states.

- The fundamental challenges Yemen faces are the lack of critical natural resources—energy and water—and insufficient state and human capacity, not will. The Yemen government is not unmindful of the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but it is not its sole threat, it is not (yet) an existential threat, and it is not on a par with the inherent threats that resources and capacity pose.
- A security-centric approach will not be sufficient or successful in addressing our immediate security interests or Yemen’s medium- and long-term stability challenges. Efforts at security that do not address stability based on legitimacy ignore a basic lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan.
- A partnership with Yemen to deny AQAP sanctuary on Yemeni soil or the capability to operate with impunity against Yemeni or international interests must understand that Yemen operates within the context of two equal if not greater security challenges to state survival: the rebellion in the north, and persistent secessionist sentiments in the south.
- The northern and southern threats are economic- and state infrastructure–driven more than ideological. They cannot be resolved militarily but require more than a “humanitarian” response or new power-sharing arrangements. Mediated efforts are best left to regional partners with no direct agenda or checkered history in the country, such as the United Arab Emirates.
- To the extent the Yemeni people see our presence and efforts in their country as an American Third Front against al Qaeda with Yemen little more than the battleground, and see no corresponding commitment to Yemen or its people, resentment toward the United States and its allies will increase. Anti-Americanism does exist, but it reflects frustration and disillusionment with American policy in and toward Yemen, including widely erratic assistance levels over the past few years, as much as general antipathy toward American military operations in the region.
- Our announced economic and development strategy is an improvement but is still woefully inadequate. To be effective and credible, it needs the profile, funding, and sustained commitment of the security package. It must work on governance, state, and human capacity at the national and local levels.
Broad and sustained engagement cannot and need not be a U.S.-only endeavor. In fact, the United States is a minor donor to Yemen. We need to be mindful, however, of the limits and consequences of channeling our policy and efforts through a third capital.

Many years ago, when I was the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, a senior European Union (EU) official came to visit. At dinner with the ambassadors and directors from major donor states and organizations, he asked if we were optimistic or pessimistic about Yemen’s future. After we rattled off the litany of glum statistics, he concluded we were all pessimists. Yemen is large, perhaps the size of France or Texas. It is rugged and forbidding—mountainous highlands and plateaus in the north and desert in the interior. Its population of 20 to 25 million, equal to or exceeding the population of the rest of the peninsula combined, is overwhelmingly young, uneducated, and growing at a staggering rate. It is bereft of enough natural resources to support its population, provide sufficient government revenue, or export meaningful products. It lacks adequate arable land, surface water, and oil. And finally, as both a reflection and consequence of these factors, its governmental structures are underfunded, undeveloped, and unable to provide basic services or infrastructure to the majority of the population. Moreover, the government is prone to corruption at both the lowest transactional and senior contractual levels, especially within the military.

Add to those chronic problems three serious security challenges—the Houthi in the north, the southerners, and al Qaeda (all having antecedents that go back decades)—and it sounds like a failed state, but it is not. Our response to the EU director was that while pessimism is warranted, fatalism is not.

Simple Templates, Simplistic Solutions

Each failed state fails in its own way. Simple templates from other states lead to simplistic solutions.

Iraq. Yemen lacks the sectarian divides that exploded in Iraq. Yemenis are neither Sunni nor Shia and most certainly not Wahhabi. They are in the north Zaydi, a branch of Shia Islam closer in theology and practice to traditional Sunni than traditional Shia, and, in the south from Ibb and Taiz southward, Shafii, a branch of Sunni Islam with characteristics closer to Shia’ism. Unlike much of the rest of the Arab world, Zaydi is the establishment religion, and Zaydi have been dominant politically and intellectually from the days of the last Imamate to the current government. It would be a mistake to view the Houthi violence in the north solely through a sectarian prism or respond as if it were a Saudi-Iranian proxy war. This potential exists, but that is neither the proximate cause nor the inevitable outcome. It would be similarly distorting to view southern secession tensions as a Zaydi/Shafii battle.

Afghanistan. Yemen lacks the ethnic/linguistic cleavages of Afghanistan or Iraq. Despite regional distinctions and unique political histories, expanded upon below, there is a strong sense of Yemeni identity and tradition of inclusiveness. Contrary to the new conventional
wisdom, the writ of the state extends beyond
the capital.

Somalia. Yemen lacks the tradition of
clan violence found in Somalia or of warlords
in Afghanistan. Yemen is often described as
a tribal society, but it would be misleading to
understand these tribes as hierarchical with
strong leadership authority rather than hori-
zontal familial structures. Furthermore, the
combination of British colonialism and 25
years of Marxism gutted the southern tribal
structure. We should not go looking for a “Sons
of Yemen” partner. There is far more fluidity to
the society than the label “tribal” implies and
far greater traditional but effective participation
and accountability.

Yemen is politically more developed than
the three template states. The U.S. Congress,
the past and current administrations, and
major democracy-support organizations recog-
nize Yemen as an emerging democracy. With
20 years experience in reasonably free, fair, and
contested elections, including the last presi-
dential election, nationally based multiparty,
universal suffrage, and a strong civil society, its
democratic experience is fragile and flawed but
real and, most importantly, indigenous.

History Matters: The Land of Cain
and Abel

When I worked in Iraq in 2003, I was
informed by one senior U.S. official, after
I attempted to inject a little Iraqi history in
the discussions, that “we are smarter than his-
tory.” We are not. History is not a substitute
for analysis, but policy made absent an under-
standing of history is fatally flawed—and even
more so in a complex and ancient society such as Yemen.

Although its international borders with
Saudi Arabia were finally negotiated only 10
years ago, Yemen is not an artificial construct of
the colonial era. It calculates its past in millen-
nia, not decades or centuries, with a significant
and proud pre-Islamic history. It is the land of
the Queen of Sheba, the Three Wise Men of
the Nativity, and a number of Jewish kingdoms;
and, according to some, it is the burial place of
Cain and Abel.

Aden Port has been a prize for nearly as
long. There is evidence of a brief and unsuc-
cessful Roman presence near the port, and, as
one of the jewels in the British crown, it served
as a major coaling station for over a century.
The eastern portion, primarily the Hadramaut,
however, was under protectorate status only,
and attempts by the Ottomans to control the
North ended in repeated failure.

Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of
North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) in
1978 following the assassination of two pre-
decessors, one by South Yemeni agents and
the other by agents of another state, in the
space of 9 months. (A South Yemeni presi-
dent was assassinated in the same timeframe
by his hard-line rival responsible for the death
of Ali Abdullah’s immediate predecessor.)
Eight months later, in early 1979, the South,
backed by the Soviets and its allies, including
the Cubans, invaded the North, prompting a
massive U.S. military airlift to the North and
support from a broad number of Arab states,
including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
From 1976 to 1982, the South also backed
a northern insurgency. What Ali Abdullah inherited in 1978 and struggled with into the 1980s was a state that essentially existed along the Sana’a-Ta’izz-Hodeidah roads and was economically dependent on remittances from over a million migrant workers. The southern border with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was volatile; the 2,000-mile border with Saudi Arabia was contested and undemarcated.

To compound the challenges of political histories, the union in 1990—an article of faith and negotiated by the leaders of the two states—was not between equals. North Yemen, impoverished and underdeveloped, had approximately 15 million people and the South less than 2 million. Abandoned by its patron and benefactor, the Soviet Union, its status as a major port had been decimated by the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, its British infrastructure had been allowed to rot, and its bureaucracy was bloated to 300,000 in the final days before unity. Moreover, it was an international pariah with its formal designation as the first state sponsor of international terrorism based largely on the network of Marxist and alphabet-soup terrorist group training camps. Unity meant a near tripling in land size, but the South brought few assets and a number of liabilities, as well as great expectations, into the union.

Unification was more than the stapling together of an antimonarchical Yemen Arab Republic and the lapsed Marxist-Leninist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to create the Republic of Yemen. It was the unification of at least three distinct political cultures and historical memories.

First, the rugged highlands of North Yemen were a hereditary Zaydi theocracy closed to the outside world until the 1962 Republican Revolution. A vast majority of Yemenis live in the highlands and plateaus on subsistence agriculture in small, scattered villages. The republic’s early history was marred by assassinations, Marxist insurgencies, coup attempts, and invasions—and that was just from the neighbors. Saudi Arabia backed the monarchists while Nasser’s Egypt supported the Republicans. The revolution remains the defining moment in modern Yemeni history.

Second, a Crown Colony and capital of Marxist South Yemen, Aden was relatively modern, densely populated, and directly governed by the British for over 100 years. Aden Port, one of the best natural harbors in the world, sits astride the Bab al-Mandeb at the foot of the Red Sea and is about equidistant from Singapore, Durban, and Gibraltar. Well into the 20th century, Aden was one of the 10 busiest harbors in the world. By 1990, the port’s insignificance was hard to overstate.

Third, 10 or so tribes, sultanates, and emirates to the east of Aden Port were under protectorate status from the 1880s–1890s until the early 1960s. Sparsely populated, politically traditional, and socially conservative, they were allowed a considerable degree of political autonomy under the British and were an awkward fit with Aden in the events leading up to and following independence in 1967. There remain unsettled scores between the scions of protectorate families and deposed remnants of the Marxist government that played out in the 1994 civil war and cast a shadow today.
The United States and Yemen

Given the self-isolation of the Imamate and British control of Aden, the United States essentially ignored the two Yemens for most of their modern history. There was one major exception: a U.S. scholarship program in the late 1940s and early 1950s for 40 young men, mostly Zaydi, to study in the United States. Nearly all returned to Yemen, none cast their lot with the royalists, and many went on to serve Yemen as technocrats, government ministers, and the core of Yemen’s political evolution over the next 50 years, a tradition that a number have passed to successive generations. President John F. Kennedy recognized the republican government in the North in 1962, barely 3 months after the revolt, over the objections of the British, French, and Saudis. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tiananmen Square in China, unification of Germany, and a host of other events in 1989 and 1990, the United States barely noticed the quiet unification of North and South Yemen, but strongly, publicly, and decisively backed Yemeni unity against the machinations of its neighbors during the brief 1994 civil war.

Since 9/11, the United States has looked to Yemen as a constructive counterterrorism partner, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen and others have given Yemen good marks. The dip in the mid-2000s was in part a U.S. failure to maintain focus following the invasion of Iraq, and, within Yemen, the beginnings of the Houthi revolt in 2005 and the influx of Saudi al Qaeda operatives after Riyadh’s crackdown in response to a spike in terrorism in the Kingdom.

Yemen’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, including a number of Yemeni fighters on the frontlines and Yemeni mujahideen battling the Soviets in Afghanistan (a disproportionate number of whom came from the South), was coincident with U.S. and regional policies at the time and became liabilities in the relationship only in retrospect.

Beyond that, Yemen figured as a secondary player in broader Cold War and regional politics. Nasser’s Egypt squared off against the Saudi monarchy over the Republican Revolution. The Egyptians threw in the towel in 1967 following their defeat in the war with Israel (at that stage, the Republicans had essentially defeated the monarchists). South Yemeni meddling in the North reflected tensions along the international East-West divide as much as any inherent tensions along the North-South Yemeni divide. The U.S. decision to provide massive military assistance to the North in 1979 to repel the South’s invasion reflected events in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa as much as any intrinsic interest in North Yemen. (The decision to send military equipment, training, intelligence support, and other aid was a wise step back from an ill-conceived and hyperbolic proposal circulating at the highest levels in Washington at the time to send the 82d Airborne and friends to “stop Communist expansion here.”)

U.S. economic development assistance and security cooperation with Yemen have been erratic and episodic. After the 1979 airlift, the United States walked away from the Yemeni military. Some of that equipment was still in the Yemeni inventory when I arrived almost 20 years later as Ambassador. Economic assistance waxed and waned. In the best of times, it included a vibrant and still-well-remembered Peace Corps program, major agricultural development assistance, and an active scholarship program. At other times, it was virtually zeroed out.

By the late 1990s, the United States had essentially no development program, no U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel, no Peace Corps, and no offer of scholarships. The Yemeni decision to vote against the 1990 United Nations Security Council Resolution on Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the 1994 civil war are often cited as the reasons for this precipitous drop. However, Yemen was not alone among Arab states in opposing non-Arab military action to liberate Kuwait—Jordan and Tunisia took the same position—and the civil war lasted barely 2 months. It hardly represented a significant, direct, or continuous threat to U.S. personnel. Yemen just slipped quietly off our radar screen. There was no major economic interest and no apparent security interest. It was neither malicious nor benign neglect—just indifference.

By 2001, U.S. assistance was in the neighborhood of $50 million. USAID officially returned in 2003, but by 2005 assistance was only $14.8 million and by 2006 a paltry $9 million, crabbing its way back to $20 million and now $40 million and a 3-year commitment. No one—donor, nongovernmental organization (NGO), or host government—can plan and execute a viable program with that much swing in its budget.

The mandate of my tenure as Ambassador, with the full backing of the Department of State and General Anthony Zinni at U.S. Central Command, was to rebuild the relationship on as broad a front as possible, including enhanced security cooperation, expanded democracy support, re instituted scholarships, economic development, and ultimately the creation of a coast guard. To the Yemenis, the attack on USS Cole was not only an attack on the United States but also an attack on them—and an attack on the changing relationship.

**Yemenis considered the October 2000 bombing of USS Cole to be as much an attack on them as as the United States**
Yemen’s Challenges, U.S. Options

It is not difficult to curb one’s enthusiasm over the U.S. announced doubling of annual economic assistance to $40 million along with $120 million in military assistance. If we accept that there are somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 to 200 AQAP members in Yemen, and approximately 20 to 25 million Yemenis not affiliated with AQAP, we have upped our assistance to the non-AQAP Yemenis from less than $1/year/Yemeni to about a buck-sixty per and have committed over $500,000/AQAP/year. (To put it into another context, NBC paid Conan O’Brien $45 million to go away.)

There is not a direct dollar-to-dollar correlation between an effective level of governance and development assistance and military assistance, but this is not good, it is not smart, and it will not be effective.

Yemen faces four inherent challenges:

- Water: finite, inadequate, and diminishing rapidly
- Energy: finite, inadequate, and diminishing rapidly
- Population: apparently infinite, abundant, and expanding rapidly
- Political infrastructure: finite, inadequate, and vulnerable.

Water. Reports that Yemen, or at least the Sana’a Basin, will run out of aquifer water imminently have been circulating for decades and will become true at some point. No one knows when. Wells are dug at ever greater depths. Demand far exceeds the monsoons’ ability to replenish and antiquated irrigation methods and subsidized fuel for pumps exacerbate the problem. Desalination plans are hampered by the exorbitant cost of piping water over several mountain ranges to the populated and agricultural highlands at roughly 4,000 to 8,000 feet. Swiftian proposals to relocate the entire Yemeni population to the coasts do not warrant discussion; the financial costs and the social and political upheaval would be catastrophic.

Pressure on water resources would be mitigated by a lifting of fuel subsidies, but repeated efforts over the past 15 years have met with stiff and sometimes violent public reaction and equally effective opposition from those who profit—some illicitly—from the import of fuel.

Improved irrigation will also allow some savings but will only postpone the day of reckoning. Debates on crop substitution for qat¹ are informed more by moralizing than by calculations of water demand for the new crop or the potential economic dislocation that ill-conceived qat eradication could cause.

Energy. Yemen does not share its neighbors’ blessings in oil or gas. What they have is diminishing, lies in remote and inaccessible regions, or will be offset by rising domestic demand. To put it in perspective, Yemen’s oil reserves are calculated at 3 billion barrels (bbl). That is roughly half of Oman’s reserves; Oman’s population, however, is one-tenth of Yemen’s. Iraq, with approximately the same size population, has reserves of approximately 115 billion bbl, plus water and arable land. Yet the oil sector provides 90 percent of export earnings and 75 percent of government revenues. The World Bank has estimated that state revenues from oil and gas will fall to zero by 2017, but the crunch point will come sooner.

Yemen does not share its neighbors’ blessings in oil or gas
Yemen LNO Company revenue will not make up the shortfall from the impending decline in oil exports. Yemen has expressed interest in nuclear power, but the cost of construction, concerns about security, and need for a distribution system do not make this a viable option in the foreseeable future.

**Population.** Yemen has one of the highest population growth rates in the world. With a majority under the age of 15, an early marriage age, and a fertility rate that hovers between 6.7 and 7.2, a sonic baby boom is in the offing. A government- and clerical-supported child spacing program in the late 1990s and beyond has been hampered by lack of a good distribution network and rural clinics, not cultural or religious opposition. As the trajectory climbs steeply, the pressures on water and energy will only increase as those resources decrease.

More importantly, this is a largely uneducated population. Less than half of the girls attend primary school; perhaps 15 percent attend secondary school. Literacy for males over 15 is 70 percent. Girls’ education is hampered again not so much by culture, tradition, or religion but by access. Sometimes the solution is as simple as adding a bathroom to a school or a well to a village so young girls need not spend the day fetching water over long distances.

The low level of education is a significant drag on the development of the country. Schools are few and far between and teachers often are imported to supplement Yemeni teachers, while too many Yemenis are unemployed. Prospects for foreign investment are hampered by a work force that lacks the necessary skills.

**Political Structure.** Despite the conventional theories of political science, Yemen has created a fragile, flawed, but very real democratic structure and process that reflect the Yemeni libertarian character and traditions. Its flaws should be a focus of assistance, not an excuse to disengage or not engage. On the contrary, until its flaws are addressed, the legitimacy of the government and the stability of the state could hang in the balance. Economic development assistance and security cooperation without commitment to the third leg of the stool—governance—will not be stable.

This is not an unattainable goal. President Ali Abdullah and a circle of enlightened advisors crafted the elements of a democratic state as part of the unification bargain in 1990. Their efforts lacked the micro(mis)management of international scrutiny and were largely successful as a result. Organizations such as the National Democratic Institute have worked with Yemen for nearly 20 years on enhancing the basic structures and providing desperately needed training and support (primarily with U.S. Government dollars), but the underlying commitment and understanding that this was necessary, prudent, and wise came from the Yemenis.

Regrettably, that commitment and progress have wobbled the past few years, despite the contested presidential elections of 2006. The wobble reflects a number of factors coming together: a narrowing circle of advisors, disproportionately corrupt cronies within the military, the state’s increasing inability to provide basic services, and diverted political attention and state resources to security concerns in the north and south. The core values and aspirations are still there, the traditional structures that buttress democratic processes remain, and, while there is a predictable jockeying for position in a post–Ali Abdullah Yemen, there is still room for engagement on the governance front.

It is important to note here that Yemen has a robust civil society estimated at 7,000 local
NGOs and a number of international NGOs headed by Yemenis. Many are run by women. They operate in both political advocacy and social services. Civil society is an amorphous concept anywhere and can be overvalued as a precursor or guarantor of democratic governance. It does, however, fulfill one pragmatic function, especially in Yemen. Civil society provides a training ground—a farm team—for the future leadership of the country. In fact, it already has. The Minister of Water headed an NGO focused on water issues, for example, while the current Minister of Planning established and ran the extraordinary parastatal Social Fund for Development.

### Governing Yemen

Governing Yemen is no easy undertaking. To say that the political integration is not yet complete and the infrastructure of governance is insufficient is an understatement few Yemenis would argue with. Any Yemeni government must balance the competing needs and demands of a disparate and deeply politically engaged population.

Yemenis have been accused of the politics of muddling through, and there is some truth to that. Yemen’s history for the last 50 years has been one of external meddling, internal bickering, and poverty, yet it has not only survived but has also expanded several times over, avoided direct military intervention, and dodged an economic meltdown or famine. Part of its political survival is the extraordinary lengths taken to keep all factions, elements, wings, and strong personalities inside the tent, a very large tent. Those who stray too far and risk upsetting the delicate equilibrium are chastised but rarely marginalized.

“Big Tentism” tends to impede progress on any one front at any one time at optimum speed. Compromises and concessions are necessary as efforts are taken to ensure that there is maximum buy-in or at least minimal opposition. On occasion, tactical retreats and regroupings are required. To an outsider—and to many Yemenis—this looks a lot like a muddle. It works only if there is a core vision and nimble leadership. Big Tentism also implies a belief among all factions, elements, and parties that there is an avenue for their views and concerns to reach into the government deliberations. The qat chew is a traditional mechanism; the Parliament provides another. It explains the selection of the late Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar as Speaker of the Parliament, despite his Islah party’s minority status and the convention that speakerships go to the majority.

Perhaps the best analogy is a juggler with plates on a stick. Each plate must be given its due attention or it, and perhaps all of them, will come crashing down. The question is whether there are now too many plates—too many pressures on the state, too many security and economic challenges, and too few resources—and whether the juggler is still agile enough.

There are two emergent threats to this arrangement: corruption and cronyism on the one hand, and the generational shift on the other. Patronage is a given in the best of political systems, and corruption may be an inevitable feature of the human condition. All leaders prefer to surround themselves with advisors and aides they trust. Smart leaders may also practice the dictum to “keep your friends
close and your enemies closer.” That is reality, and observers of Yemeni politics would do well to refrain from sniffing in horror. Supporters of sustained engagement must also candidly assess whether prudent inclusiveness has slipped to cronyism—that is, the appointment of friends or relatives because of ties and irrespective of qualifications (until we disqualify our friends in the Gulf with pervasive familial ties throughout their governments, bloodlines in and of themselves cannot be the standard). They must also determine whether corruption has become so pervasive and able to distort allocation of state resources that it affects the legitimacy of the state, and then whether governmental and nongovernmental institutions exist with the power and credibility to identify and act against the corruption.

Ali Abdullah has always had cronies; they were once called The Bowling League. He has also had enlightened advisors and a multigenerational pool of talented technocrats. A wider circle of Yemenis acts as influence peddlers to the outside, often with less influence to peddle than advertised. There are nephews in key security positions (by all accounts well qualified), and other relatives, broadly defined, are given sinecures. However, reports of pervasive corruption, land grabs by senior military officers, contract diversions, and other irregularities have become persistent and are corrosive.

Concerns over cronyism are directly linked to issues of succession (“elite competition” as one often-quoted observer calls it). Ali Abdullah has been in power over 30 years and many of his best advisors are considerably older than he. The President has said he will not run in 2013. It is not clear who, either within the narrow family or more broadly, can succeed him. There is most certainly jockeying for position throughout the next generation—tribal, merchant, and technocrats. The late Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar has been succeeded by a coalition of sons. The Famous Forty are rapidly leaving the scene, as are those from the Republican Revolution and the independence fight in the South. It would be presumptuous for us to declare the winner, and facile to assume it will be the president’s son. We have no idea. Yemeni politics are more kaleidoscope than mosaic. It would equally be unwise for us to insert ourselves into the process directly or indirectly. Whoever succeeds President Ali Abdullah will need the affirmation of the nascent democratic structures as well as the blessings of the multiple power elites. Yemen’s republican credentials are a point of pride for most Yemenis, and primogeniture succession is not a given in Yemeni society. We can support the institutions, structures, and processes; we cannot assume or pick the winners.

Cronyism and corruption reflect and feed a major challenge that touches on all four of the core challenges and the three major security threats—the inability of the state to provide basic services to the broad population. Yemen lacks the bureaucratic institutions to manage resources and deliver basic services in a credible way. It remains a bloated entity that cushions many from utter unemployment but lacks the training and the tools to be efficient, let alone effective. The technocratic talent at the top of agencies and in NGOs is stymied by the lack of local implementers. Pay is inadequate (a government minister makes approximately $300/month), fueling petty transactional
corruption. Competency reflects an insufficient education system. In both the northern rebellion and among the southern secessionists, a fundamental issue is the perception and the reality of inadequate provision of governmental services. Each movement is a demand for a more effective, efficient, and responsive government (but not necessarily tighter government control) that provides resources through credible support to the local administration system and to the citizens. To compound the problem, to the extent the three major security concerns pose an existential threat to the survival of the government and the state, where the concern is not the movements’ political agenda but their ability to distract and divert attention and resources. Neither this government nor any foreseeable successor will find it easy to manage all three adequately and still provide the basics in services. The juggler can only move so fast.

**Where Should the United States Focus?**

To focus disproportionately on immediate military and security capacity-building is shortsighted. If our concerns about the threats from Yemen are sufficient to fund $120 million in security assistance and an implicit understanding that development of credible security structures is a long-term investment, then our interest in keeping Yemen on the good side of the failure curve (recognizing that it may never be wholly prosperous) warrants an equal commitment to civilian capacity-building over a similar long haul. We need to do more than invest in extending the authority of the state. We must invest as well in the legitimacy and capacity of the state and society. We cannot grant “legitimacy,” but we can assist in the development of those elements of the state that provide services to the citizens, and the development of a society strong enough to be partners to its state. The “we” here is the U.S. Government, the international community, and the regional neighbors. The 2006 donors’ conference was generous, but its pledges remain unfulfilled. The 2010 London Conference made all the right noises about coordination and sustained engagement, but it will take more than a conference to convince the average Yemeni that there has been a credible shift in resources, philosophy, or commitment to governance and development, to a preconflict whole-of-government, and to governments plural. And Yemenis will have to be convinced that this will not all evaporate in the face of excuses and other priorities.

The perception of many Yemenis, including our friends, is that in recent years the U.S. policy aperture has narrowed to security only or security first—and to security as we define it. We need to reopen that aperture. We learned that lesson in Iraq late in the game. We are attempting to apply those lessons in Afghanistan. We have progressed from conventional military to counterinsurgency to the “3Ds” (defense, diplomacy, and development) to manage postconflict situations. We have the opportunity to apply the basics of those lessons preconflict and pre-failure in Yemen.
A sustained, comprehensive, and coordinated strategy must be based on civilian-led and civilian-focused diplomacy and development upfront, early, and long term. Our involvement in state and human capacity development needs to equal if not exceed our commitment to building a military and police capability.

There are five main areas of state legitimacy and human capacity-building beyond the more immediate of state authority and security.
1. Civil Service. State capacity (for example, civilian capacity) at all levels, not the least being the development of a competent civil service as well as a strong civil society, is fundamental. The focus on development of local capacity needs to happen in concert with the development of central governing capacity. To tilt too far in either direction risks unbalancing the state and creating a vacuum in the center or at the local level. Similarly, overreliance on military or security service capacity delegitimizes the civilian governing structure, especially those within the civilian structure who offer the best hope of building enduring state institutions—political, economic, and social. Strengthening civilian capacity includes strengthening the management of the juridical system, not simply the police.

2. Education is critical to the long-term survival of the state and economic development. Any effort to help Yemen walk back from the abyss of failure is predicated on support for a strong education system. Building schools is not the issue; providing qualified Yemeni teachers at the elementary and secondary school level is. Employment, health care, successful child spacing programs, and all the other elements of sustainable development require the establishment of an education system that is universal and relevant to the skills needed.

3. Control of corruption must be a core element of broader engagement, but not a precondition or sidebar to it. Corruption is a symptom of a governing structure in crisis. Support for, not hectoring on, Yemeni efforts to mitigate opportunities for diversion and corruption by the development of viable governmental and nongovernmental accountability structures is required. The government and the Parliament have responded with a phalanx of organizations—the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption, the Higher Tender Board, and the Central Organization for Control and Audit—each of which will have to prove itself competent to act against malfeasance or risk dismissal as window dressing by Yemenis and a sop to donors. The international community must do more than tut-tut and work with those organizations and actors most involved and committed to reform as a top priority.

4. A coast guard is critical to the economic health of Yemen. The decision to establish a coast guard was driven by economics more than security, and its long-term value to the country remains economic. There is the immediate need to guard against smugglers, extremists, and illegal aliens and to counter the prospect of Somali pirates forming a band of brothers with Yemenis. At the same time, Yemen’s coastal waters are home to rich fisheries that could provide a renewable source of exports and food if properly managed. As with the Somali coast, those fisheries have suffered the depredations of factory ships from around the world and toxic dumping.

5. Aden Port needs to be revitalized as a major entrepôt for the Indian Ocean rim. This is Yemen’s major natural resource. Aden has the potential to be another Singapore. Development of the port would provide employment and government revenues, and help integrate the south and the north as more equal partners.
The 2010–2012 USAID Country Strategy recognizes many of the core challenges and, as a 3-year program, attempts to address many in a coherent and systematic manner. It is a significant improvement over past approaches, but it is not nearly sufficient:

- Designed to be implemented over 3 years at increasing funding levels, it remains dependent upon annual congressional appropriations and thus vulnerable to the vagaries of our budget process, competing new demands, and abrupt disruptions due to non-development assistance policy disagreements between the United States and Yemen.

- It states that eight governorates are of greatest priority to USAID (and presumably the U.S. Government) but, citing resource limitations, targets only five—al-Jawf, Mareb, Sa’ada, Amran, and Shabwa—described as “most at risk.” This triaging risks perceptions of rewards for bad behavior and could fuel competition and rivalries from districts and governorates not selected, perceptions of corruption and cronyism, and thus disruptions in implementation. A broader distribution of smaller projects may not create as much “bang for the buck” but may avoid negative political fallout from an over-concentration in high risk areas.

- It is heavy on data collection that may be available through other sources, such as the World Bank or the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD). Data collection efforts delay project delivery.

- It is overly dependent upon Beltway contractors. The outcome should not be an increase in employment and the quality of life in Rockville, Maryland, or Tysons Corner, Virginia.

- There is insufficient coordination with the U.S. Special Operations Command Civil Affairs and community outreach. Yemen is difficult and can be dangerous, but it is not a war zone. Military-run programs must be supporting to, not parallel with, efforts by State and USAID.

If we accept that a core goal is to develop effective, efficient, and self-sustaining local capacity, perhaps the greatest gap in the strategy is the underutilization of Yemeni partners. The strategy lauds the SFD as “a particularly strong and well-funded development agency [that] provides an example of an effective, efficient and transparent institutional mechanism for providing social services [that] empowers local communities [and] is considered one of the most effective branches of the Yemeni government in the areas of community development, capacity building, and small and micro-enterprise development.” But the strategy states that the SFD is not a partner institution. During my tenure as Ambassador, the U.S. Embassy worked closely with the SFD to design and implement many of our development assistance projects throughout Yemen—without a large official presence or overhead, with sufficient credit given to the United States, but a light American footprint and full transparency and accountability. There is a wheel in Yemen that is sufficiently round and rolling that we do not need to and should not seek to reinvent.

**Perils of Outsourcing**

This is an ambitious program and one beyond the ability of any one government to support,
especially one as fickle as ours. International partners are critical, and they are there. As the United States has danced in and out of Yemen for decades, a number of European partners and Japan, along with the World Bank and the EU, have been there—as have some Gulf states, specifically Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The level of their support dwarfs ours. Welcoming their participation is not an excuse for the United States to abdicate. Our interests are parallel but not the same. This is particularly true of Saudi Arabia, which shared a long border and a difficult history with Yemen. A policy and programs that run through Riyadh on their way to Sana’a will suffer a distortion effect that will not serve Yemeni, Saudi, or our own interests. We do not need the filter, the affirmation, and certainly not the military involvement of another state in crafting our relations and programs with Yemen.

Final Thoughts

In shaping a U.S. strategy going forward, we need to bear a few lessons in mind from both our own recent history and Yemen’s long history. We are not smarter than our history or theirs.

- We are dealing with a sovereign state, not a failed one, and a state that has proven to be a credible if not always capable partner. We need to work with the whole of government, not await some date or some benchmark of standards, without providing the assistance and support the government needs to reach those benchmarks. This is not carte blanche by any means; rather, it is recognition that purity in a partner is rarely an option and that time is on no one’s side.

- The Yemeni government will undertake those actions that are in its own best national interest. We have shared priorities, but perhaps not in the same priority order. U.S. policy should not be predicated on convincing the Yemeni government to adopt our priorities but should seek out areas of common interest and understand interconnectedness.

None of this guarantees success, however defined. None of this promises to eliminate al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, end extremism, placate every tribe, or bring the birth rate down. However, a short-sighted, security-centric, and episodic engagement with Yemen could create the very failed state neither we nor the Yemenis want or can afford. However failure is defined, it includes the chaos that provides AQAP space to operate, fuels frustration and anger that leads to extremism, exacerbates internal tensions, and undermines further the nascent democracy, and ensures an enduring spiral down into poverty. If these prescriptions look costly, time consuming, and labor intensive, they are. The far greater cost of dealing with the ramifications of state failure can be guaranteed.

Note

1 Qat is a mildly addictive substance close in chemical composition to coffee. Its green leaves are chewed at hours-long “qat chews” in Yemen and a few of its neighbors in the Horn of Africa. Qat production has squeezed out other crops, and qat chews can eat up hours each day, a significant portion of a family’s funds, water, and fuel to run pumps. Efforts by the government to restrict its use have been half-hearted. There are no meaningful crop-substitution programs, and any program would have to consider what, if any crop, would use less water (and thus less fuel for pumps), provide as high and as immediate circulation of currency from rural to urban areas, and fill qat’s unique and politically critical niche in the social fabric.
one are the days of soldiers facing off across large battlefields, tanks shelling tanks, and fighter jets engaging in dogfights. Armed conflict now takes place everywhere—in cities, refugee camps, and other historically nonmilitary areas—and involves or impacts nearly everyone in the area. The law of armed conflict (LOAC)—codified in times of more traditional state-state conflicts—must now adapt to these new and infinitely more complicated conflicts, which we call new warfare. More important, we need to recategorize the ever-expanding variety of individuals who now participate in and are affected by hostilities, posing great challenges to the implementation of LOAC on the ground.

LOAC, otherwise known as the laws of war or international humanitarian law (IHL), governs the conduct of states and individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by protecting persons not participating in hostilities and restricting the means and methods of warfare. We will use the term LOAC because it is favored by militaries—the key players here—and when referring to IHL, we will do so interchangeably with LOAC.

New warfare poses extraordinary dilemmas for the application of two key principles. The principle of distinction requires soldiers to differentiate between people they can target and people they are obligated to protect. The principle of proportionality requires soldiers not to attack a target if the expected innocent casualties are excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.

The essence of new warfare is that states engage with nonstate actors. In traditional conflicts between states, pitting soldier against soldier, the categories were clear; in what we call new warfare, however, the categories are—at best—blurred. In the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, for
example, military forces face a disturbing and potentially tragic lack of clarity regarding both the operational mission and identification of the enemy.

When those who are fighting (insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists) melt into the civilian population and persons who appear to be civilians periodically engage in hostilities, determining who is a legitimate target becomes nearly impossible. Even if commanders respect the law, they will be hard pressed to apply it in new warfare if it is not relevant—and if it is exacerbating challenges rather than facilitating solutions. We therefore examine how to distinguish between innocent civilians and legitimate targets and develop more relevant and specific categories to define the many varieties of the latter. With these tools, commanders can train troops to make the critical determination of whom and when they can shoot and whom they have to protect.

Commanders view the zone of combat in terms of friend or foe, innocent civilians or legitimate targets. An innocent civilian takes no part in hostilities and is immune from attack. A legitimate target is a person or object that can be lawfully targeted. In new warfare, the range of persons in this latter category has expanded rapidly. This expansion requires two critical adjustments in approaching “open fire” determinations: greater sensitivity to new subcategories of hostile persons, and a more conduct-specific checklist of factors for determining if an individual can be targeted. We define and analyze each of the following key subcategories:

- **Legitimate subjects of detention** provide some assistance to those who are fighting but do not participate directly in hostilities. They cannot be targeted.
- **Transitory targets** participate in hostilities one or two times or with no regularity. They can only be targeted when directly participating in hostilities.
- **Recurring targets** follow a recurring and frequent pattern of participation in hostilities, returning to civilian pursuits in between their hostile acts. They can only be targeted when directly participating in hostilities, unless the frequency and regularity of their participation rises to the level of more continuous participation.
- **Permanent targets** participate in hostilities on a continuous basis. They can be targeted at all times.

Our purpose is to operationalize LOAC to give commanders the tools to meet twin goals: fulfilling operational missions while protecting soldiers and innocent civilians alike. This two-fold objective is extraordinarily complicated; it is also an absolute necessity.

In the first section, we highlight the challenges new warfare creates for the implementation of LOAC on the ground. The second section analyzes how to operationalize LOAC, focusing on a new framework for identifying and distinguishing among legitimate targets. The last section offers recommendations for the application of LOAC to new and as yet unforeseen challenges from newer and ever more complex conflicts.

although LOAC was codified before the onset of new warfare, its fundamental principles are more important than ever precisely because of the increased danger to participants and nonparticipants alike
Challenges of New Warfare

Concerns about the applicability of LOAC to new warfare have recently grown into a steady drumbeat, ranging from serious concern about implementing and enforcing critical LOAC principles to claims that the Geneva Conventions are “quaint” and “obsolete.” Although LOAC was indeed codified before the onset of new warfare, its fundamental principles are more important than ever precisely because of the increased danger to participants and nonparticipants alike.

Defining terms relevant to conflict and analyzing the rules applicable in new warfare are helpful but do not address the commander’s needs. We take a more practical approach. LOAC simply must be flexible and adaptable enough to be effective in new warfare. Otherwise, entire conflicts will go unregulated and entire categories of individuals will be left unprotected, a choice neither LOAC nor commanders can countenance.

Humanitarian law is a living, breathing body of statutes, not a static set of concepts, and it has repeatedly been adapted to uncertainties and changing circumstances. LOAC principles are the “bone structure in a living body, providing guidelines in unforeseen cases and constituting a complete summary of the whole, easy to understand and indispensable for the purposes of dissemination.” Examining the challenges commanders and soldiers face demonstrates that overly technical reliance on conventional legal prescriptions handicaps the decisionmaker and undermines civilian protections.

International courts and tribunals have used this approach when confronted with new issues. In the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the International Court of Justice emphasized that new means of combat do not “call into question the longstanding principles and rules of international law,” and found that humanitarian law does apply to the use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia relied on the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions and fundamental principles of IHL to find that allegiance, not nationality, was the crucial test for determining protected person status. In new warfare, the blurring of civilian and fighter, of military objective and protected object, does make LOAC’s application difficult. But that difficulty does not justify abandoning the law and its key principles.

Key Concepts

New warfare generally involves states in combat with nonstate forces and fighting in highly populated areas with a blurring of the lines between military forces and civilian persons and objects. As one article recently reported on Afghanistan:

> the elusive insurgents blend easily into the population, invisible to Marines until they pick up a weapon. They use villagers to spot and warn of U.S. troop movements, take up positions in farmers’ homes and fields, and attack Marines from spots with ready escape routes. The Marines, under strict rules to protect civilians, must wait for insurgents to attack and then attempt to ensnare them. Limited in their use of airstrikes and artillery—because of the danger to civilians and because aircraft often frighten the Taliban away—Marine riflemen must use themselves as bait and then engage in the riskier task of pursuing insurgents on foot.

Although civilians have historically been the victims of war, new warfare is fundamentally different because of their active
involvement—in fact, engagement—in hostilities. Understanding when these individuals cross the line from innocent civilians deserving protection to hostile persons justifying the application of force is the key question new warfare poses for commanders on the ground.

Operationalizing international law requires that we adapt LOAC to the realities of new warfare through new training regimes and different operational guidelines; otherwise, the commander will be in the “twilight zone,” which poses extraordinary dangers to soldiers, innocent civilians, and others. In the classic military paradigm, the conflict—from a command perspective—was easily explained. The objective—to defeat a clearly identified enemy—was easily articulated; the means—military hardware—were obvious; and the outcome, from a military perspective, was black and white: one side surrendered. Opposing soldiers carrying weapons posed dangers leading to precise “open fire” orders. The rules of engagement (ROEs) were uncontroversial and simple to interpret: soldiers killed soldiers and protected innocent civilians. In that sense, the rules of yesterday’s battles were “obvious.”

In the contemporary and future paradigm, the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts involve soldiers operationally engaged with non-state actors. The commander is legally required to distinguish between an innocent civilian and an individual who, although dressed in civilian attire, poses an immediate threat and is therefore a legitimate target. The commander must also assess whether and when to target hostile persons deliberately hiding among the civilian population. In a word, both sets of persons appear to be innocent civilians, so the rules produce controversy and uncertainty. Operationalizing LOAC gives commanders the tools to distinguish between innocent and hostile persons, knowledge that is key to protecting their own soldiers and innocent civilians.

The fundamental principle of distinction requires that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are fighting and those who are not, and direct attacks only at the former. The purpose of distinction—to protect civilians—is emphasized in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that the “civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” Article 51 also prohibits indiscriminate attacks, extending the obligation beyond a prohibition on directly targeting innocent civilians. The Statute of the International Criminal Court criminalizes attacks on civilians in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals also emphasizes that the principle of distinction is customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

Proportionality is the primary mechanism for implementing distinction in practice. To protect innocent civilians from the effects of war and minimize undue suffering, LOAC prohibits disproportionate attacks in two ways. First, before launching an attack, commanders must examine whether the expected loss of civilian life would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. If the attack would likely have a disproportionate effect, it must be
canceled.\textsuperscript{15} International courts and national military manuals use a “reasonable commander” standard based on the circumstances at the time to determine proportionality.\textsuperscript{16} Second, commanders must seek to minimize civilian losses when targeting a military objective. Even if a target is legitimate according to the laws of war, failure to take the requisite precautions would make the attack unlawful.\textsuperscript{17}

**Commander’s Perspective**

In early 2006, the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) began compiling statistics about escalation of force incidents in Iraq,\textsuperscript{18} primarily situations in which civilians “unwittingly drove too close to convoys or checkpoints and triggered a reaction in gunners who considered them a threat.”\textsuperscript{19} MNC–I recorded 10 escalation of force incidents per day in January and February 2006, with 5 percent resulting in civilian deaths and 11 percent in civilian injuries,\textsuperscript{20} and estimated that over 1,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in such incidents between 2003 and early 2006.\textsuperscript{21} Preplanned attacks can also result in significant civilian deaths when the lines between legitimate target and innocent civilian are blurred. In Pakistan, where U.S. drones attack al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, it is estimated that “more than 600 civilians are likely to have died,” or 10 civilians for every militant killed.\textsuperscript{22} These statistics illustrate the fundamental question commanders confront in combat—whether and when to give an open fire order.

Distinguishing hostile from innocent persons requires new training methods and understandings of operational dilemmas. Military training for new warfare is extraordinarily complex: we train soldiers to shoot (and if necessary, to kill), but at the same time, we require them to wait an additional second precisely to verify that the individual they face poses an immediate threat and is therefore a legitimate target. In the zone of combat—which replaces the traditional battlefield—an extra second can literally be the difference between life and death. If the soldier waits that extra second, he will likely be killed if the individual is not an “innocent.” Conversely, if the soldier does not wait and, failing to evaluate the threat presented sufficiently, fires at an innocent individual, the never-ending cycle of violence and human tragedy may escalate. Training 19-year-old soldiers to wait is counterintuitive, but new warfare makes it essential from a command perspective.

Commanders also face the basic operational reality of 19-year-old soldiers: they are scared, sometimes actively dislike what they are doing, and possess fully loaded weapons. If the requirement to wait is unclear in training, operational realities make it infinitely more complex and dangerous. The following examples illustrate these dilemmas:

- A battalion commander ordered to target three suspected terrorists plans a military operation that will minimize damage to innocent civilians while engaging the suspected terrorists. Approaching the zone of combat, the commander receives reliable and credible intelligence that hundreds of children are in the immediate vicinity. Although the mission is legal, the
children raise significant operational dilemmas for the commander. If he decides to go forward, there is a reasonable chance of greater than minimal collateral damage. If he aborts, the unit’s retreat in full view of the local community may negatively impact the state’s deterrent effect. The commander must decide whether to adopt a tactical approach (predicated on the here and now) or a strategic perspective (target the terrorists in the future if they are not planning an immediate attack).

- A commander reports an attack from a particular position and requests air support against the individual he has identified as the shooter. The helicopter pilot responds that he cannot determine with sufficient certainty that the individual the commander identified is indeed the shooter. The commander and the pilot share a similar goal (to kill the actual shooter), but their differing perspectives on how to use the available information (what they saw/believed they saw) lead them to different conclusions directly affecting how they carry out their legal obligations and operational missions.

- A commander receives a single-source report regarding individuals presenting an immediate threat to his unit but concealed in a crowd of civilians. The commander conveys that report to air support but lacks specific identifying information and cannot pinpoint the individuals’ location within the crowd. Although the pilots cannot positively identify the individuals, they nevertheless fire into the crowd, killing numerous civilians. They may have killed the reported suspects—but they cannot confirm if they did.

The presence of individuals dressed in civilian clothing is the complicating variable. Some are hostile persons disguised as civilians; others are innocent civilians in the wrong place. But the immediate dangers the former pose and the obligations created by the latter are unclear. Without more focused guidelines for commanders, new warfare’s inherent ambiguousness will result in the continued tragic loss of innocent lives.

**Limitations of the Traditional Framework**

**The Combatant-civilian Paradigm.** LOAC traditionally classifies individuals as either combatants or civilians and fits all persons within one of these two categories. The Geneva Conventions use the term *combatant* to denote a particular status in international armed conflicts. All members of the regular armed forces of a state involved in an international armed conflict are combatants. In addition, members of armed groups or militias belonging to a state party in an international armed conflict qualify as combatants if, as a group, they fulfill four conditions: operate under a responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign, carry arms openly, and respect the laws of war. Combatants have a right to participate in hostilities and have immunity from prosecution—combatant immunity—for lawful acts taken during combat. In addition, combatants are lawful targets at all times except when they are *hors de combat* because of sickness, wounds, detention, or other causes. All combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian population; failure results in forfeiture of combatant immunity for acts taken during such time.

LOAC defines civilians as all persons in an international armed conflict who are not combatants. In non-international armed conflict, civilians are all persons who are not members of armed forces.
or armed groups. When there is doubt about a person’s status, he is considered a civilian. As discussed above, civilians are immune from attack and must be protected as much as possible from the effects of conflict. Civilians who take up arms, however, lose their immunity from attack during the time they participate in hostilities—whether permanently, intermittently, or only once—and become legitimate targets. Even though they are fighting, they retain their civilian status in the traditional framework because they do not fit the definition of combatant. The term civilian is therefore confusing because it includes persons who are legitimate targets and persons who are protected.

This traditional approach falters in the face of new warfare’s complexities. Most persons in new warfare fit into the traditional category of civilians because they are not members of nonstate armed forces or the regular armed forces of a state. Many of these individuals engage regularly in hostile acts but—because they are traditionally categorized as civilians—are legitimate targets only when meeting the specific test for directly participating in hostilities; that is, they attack at will but can only be attacked at specific and limited times. As a result, they gain a measure of protection they otherwise would not have, and the law’s traditional mandate that any doubts be resolved in favor of civilian status effectively acts as a “free pass.”

The many terms used to describe individuals participating in hostilities—unlawful combatant, unprivileged belligerent, enemy combatant, to name a few—do not help commanders make effective and lawful operational decisions regarding their treatment (that is, target, detain, protect). Tarring all hostile persons with the same brush ignores the critical distinctions that impact operational decisionmaking and leaves commanders lacking specific and relevant guidelines for action.

**Distinction and Proportionality: Principles under Fire.** The great fluidity between hostile persons and innocent civilians, and the conscious blending of hostile persons into the civilian population, makes a soldier’s task nearly impossible. For example, a soldier manning a checkpoint sees a jeep speeding toward him—is it friend or foe? It could be civilians seeking aid or fleeing from danger or insurgents using the vehicle as a suicide bomb. The soldier who reacts too soon and fires on the vehicle risks killing innocent civilians; the soldier who waits to make a positive identification risks dying in a fiery explosion. Neither choice is acceptable from a tactical or legal standpoint. Insurgents take advantage of this dilemma to gain an edge over the superior fighting capabilities of state forces. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban regularly “use a tactic of engaging coalition forces from positions that expose Afghan civilians to danger,” forcing U.S. troops either to hold their fire in the face of an attack or endanger innocent civilians—a lose-lose situation.

The expanding range of persons involved in new warfare and the great difficulty in identifying and distinguishing among individuals have also complicated the application of proportionality. Persons who participate in hostilities are legitimate collateral damage, even if they could not be targeted directly at the moment of an attack. If a commander cannot determine who is a legitimate target, who constitutes legitimate
collateral damage, and who is an innocent civilian, however, his ability to fulfill his legal obligations is severely handicapped.

Current strategy in Afghanistan starkly illustrates how these challenges affect strategic and tactical approaches. Revised U.S. tactical doctrine in Afghanistan now identifies the protection of civilians—from both Taliban attacks and U.S. counterinsurgency operations—rather than the number of enemies killed as the mission’s primary goal. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Supreme Commander General Stanley McChrystal announced that:

*bombs could be dropped only when solid intelligence showed that high level militants were present or U.S. forces were in imminent danger [and] made it clear he would rather allow a few rank-and-file Taliban fighters to get away than to flatten a house whose occupants might include women and children.*
The following description of two primary types of airstrikes U.S. forces employ emphasizes the dilemmas they encounter:

Largely due to increased intelligence, strikes planned in advance have caused zero civilian casualties in the past two years. . . . The daily activities of suspected militants are tracked and analyzed to ensure that civilians are not mistakenly targeted.

The second type of air strike is a result of “troops-in-contact.” . . . During impromptu strikes, there is not sufficient time to complete a formal collateral damage assessment, resulting in property damage, injury, and death of innocent Afghans. In 2006 and 2007, almost every civilian casualty caused by NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] was a result of this type of incident. The increase of insurgent
tactics that include firing from homes and other populated areas has significantly boosted civilian casualties. Instead of calling in troops-in-contact air strikes, soldiers are increasingly being encouraged to withdraw and disengage when confronted by overwhelming force.  

To provide relevant and focused guidelines for commanders and troops on the ground, the only important distinction is between those who can be attacked and those who cannot.

Tactical goals of reducing or eliminating civilian casualties in Afghanistan have led the United States to forego the balancing inherent in a proportionality assessment in favor of a mandate to protect civilians at all costs.

Operationalizing LOAC: Targeting Parameters

Soldiers can no longer simply distinguish between combatants and civilians because that leaves open the question of which civilians are targets and which are innocent. They must also distinguish between innocent civilians who take no part in hostilities—and deserve protection from attack—and hostile persons who participate directly in hostilities and are therefore legitimate targets. Existing applications of LOAC do not help, however. To make LOAC effective, the key is to identify several new categories of hostile persons, each requiring unique operational assessments and responses. Commanders then need a checklist of conduct-specific factors to guide decisionmaking.

A New Framework for New Warfare

At first glance, categorizing individuals in conflict as either innocent civilians or legitimate targets may seem unorthodox; after all, LOAC provides detailed prescriptions for identifying persons as combatants, volunteer militia, protected persons, and others. When assessing rights and obligations, these traditional categories and the distinctions among them are crucial. However, to provide relevant and focused guidelines for commanders and troops on the ground, the only important distinction is between those who can be attacked and those who cannot.

We use the term innocent civilians to refer to only those persons who retain their immunity from attack at all times. Persons who actively participate in hostilities are legitimate targets and therefore do not belong in the same category as innocent civilians even though LOAC traditionally places both groups within the same civilian category. Here we depart fundamentally from the traditional LOAC approach: we divide the traditional category of civilians into those who are immune from attack and those whose conduct makes them a legitimate target. Most importantly, we redefine the category of legitimate targets and emphasize the need for a narrower, conduct-specific analysis of such persons, thus reconfiguring the classification of individuals in conflict.

A legitimate target is an individual who can be lawfully attacked during hostilities. We must differentiate among the numerous categories of these individuals because not all can be targeted at all times. One category of legitimate target is combatants and members of organized armed groups, who can be targeted at all times. The latter primarily includes individuals who fight on a regular and recurring basis on behalf of a nonstate party. Commanders can sometimes identify these targets by evidence of their status, such as a distinctive sign or other identification. In new warfare, however, members of organized armed groups often purposely intermingle with civilians and disguise themselves by hiding within the civilian...
population. In these situations, commanders cannot distinguish by status, but must analyze conduct instead to determine whether these persons present a threat. As one U.S. Marine in Afghanistan asked, “What does a Taliban or Al Qaida fighter look like? Can you determine the enemy’s identity by the equipment they use?”

We focus here primarily on other hostile persons, those who traditionally fall within the category of civilians but are taking part in hostilities. However, the factors commanders use to identify and distinguish among the four subcategories below will be equally useful when identifying members of armed groups using conduct-specific factors as well.

**A New Understanding of Who Is a Legitimate Target**

Direct participation in hostilities separates persons who can be lawfully targeted from innocent civilians. Courts and commentators have struggled to define the parameters of direct participation, but we will not engage in a thorough analysis of these efforts here. Rather, we define direct participation in hostilities as acts intended to harm the enemy or the civilian population in a direct or immediate manner. We also address persons providing lesser assistance to those who are fighting: although their acts do not constitute direct participation in hostilities, these individuals are no longer innocent civilians and must fit within the commander’s operational decisionmaking framework.

Using new subcategories to define these persons, we operationalize LOAC for new warfare by giving commanders effective tools to distinguish among persons in the zone of combat. Commanders can then determine whom (and how) to target, whom to detain, and whom to protect—the only way to meet the twin goals of mission success and protection of innocents.

**Legitimate Subject of Detention.** An emerging and prevalent actor in new warfare is the individual providing some assistance or support to those who are fighting, such as a farmer in Afghanistan who allows Taliban militants to fire missiles from his land a single time. The commander will certainly want to question him about others providing assistance or engaging in hostilities. This person is not participating in hostilities because he is not directly engaging in acts causing harm to the enemy or the civilian population and is therefore not a legitimate target. However, by providing support to the militants, he is no longer an innocent meriting protection. If U.S. forces open fire on the Taliban militants and the farmer is killed, he is therefore legitimate collateral damage. Operationally, the commander must recognize the conduct of persons in this category for three reasons: first, this person is not a legitimate target and cannot be the subject of an open fire order; second, this person does not need to be protected from the effects of military operations to neutralize the militants using his property; and third, this person is a legitimate subject of detention and interrogation.

**Transitory Target.** Persons directly participating in hostilities a single time or intermittently are legitimate targets only when preparing for, engaged in, or returning from hostilities. When not engaged in hostilities, these transitory targets can be detained and prosecuted for their acts. Suicide bombers and persons who plant roadside bombs are transitory targets—they are legitimate targets only when they are engaged in or on their way to or from their mission—as are those who provide logistical support to these bombers. Another type of transitory target is the financier of terrorist attacks—wiring funds for the attack is the direct participation in hostilities justifying a targeting decision.
Recurring Target. Some transitory targets participate in hostilities with sufficient frequency and regularity that they become recurring targets. Whereas transitory targets engage in hostilities one or two times with no pattern or regularity, recurring targets participate on a regular and frequent basis. An example is the mailman who picks up his gun every Tuesday and Friday night to go out and shoot at U.S. patrols. Similarly, the farmer who allows his property to be used for launching attacks on a regular and frequent basis could, over time, be directly participating in hostilities as a result and would therefore become a recurring target. In these circumstances, before acting to detain or neutralize this target, the commander would need to determine whether the farmer is voluntarily providing this regular assistance or is being coerced. Like transitory targets, recurring targets are only legitimate targets when directly engaged in hostilities and only if no other viable alternatives exist, such as detention.

Permanent Target. In new warfare, a variety of persons play a continuous role in hostilities and are therefore permanent targets, meaning that they are legitimate targets at all times. Operationally, however, commanders should consider viable alternatives before issuing an open fire order, targeting these permanent targets when they are engaged in hostilities but detaining them if feasible at other times. Examples of permanent targets include makers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suppliers and makers of suicide bomber belts, and planners of terrorist attacks. In certain circumstances, recurring targets may participate with such regularity and frequency that their level of engagement makes them more akin to a permanent target, an analysis that will be fact-specific and dependent on intelligence.

Checklist of Conduct-specific Factors. Understanding how to distinguish among these subcategories is one of the most important tools a commander needs in new warfare—and a key skill that he must impart to his troops. The following questions provide a checklist of conduct-specific factors for determining whether a person is a legitimate target and, more important, in which subcategory he belongs:

The Act:
- Is it direct?
- Is it mere assistance?
- If yes, is it voluntary or coerced?

Regularity:
- Is the act or assistance occurring on a regular or recurring basis?
- Have the quality and nature of the act or assistance escalated?
- Has the person done the act or provided the assistance before?
- Is there information about future plans to repeat the act?

Source/Intelligence:
- Is the source (if human intelligence) defined as reliable by the Intelligence Community?
- Is the information valid, viable, credible, and corroborated?
- Did the commander or soldiers positively identify the target “in the act”?
If there was prior intelligence, does the unit’s visual identification “match” the intelligence?

**Intelligence Value:** Is the person acting or providing assistance considered an important intelligence asset if detained and questioned?

**Guidelines for New Warfare**

The Commander’s Top 10 gives the commander additional tools to apply LOAC effectively in new warfare. These tools were not in his predecessor’s toolbox, a toolbox that has proven inadequate to new warfare’s challenges. The “commandments” below are key to understanding and respecting LOAC and are necessary for commanders and their troops to fully operationalize IHL. Without them, tragedy is just around the corner.

1. **Demand clear mission articulation from senior command, including conditions for aborting or altering the mission.** If they fail to provide clearly articulated mission objectives, senior command and national policymakers do junior commanders a fundamental disservice. Changing the mission’s purpose confuses and endangers soldiers and commanders alike. While missions invariably change—an operational reality—the core purpose must be consistent. A commander must demand this clarity and consistency from his superiors; without it, both his leadership and his unit’s discipline will be at significant risk.

2. **Provide clear mission articulation to soldiers.** From a practical perspective, each operational mission—from targeting a specific individual to a regular foot patrol—needs an articulated purpose. For missions targeting a specific individual, commanders must brief soldiers regarding who the target is and why he is a target; how they can identify him; when and whether they are to detain or open fire; and any circumstances that would change the ROEs. Patrols, the most routine of duties, require a different approach because their numbing routine makes them inherently dangerous. Commanders must brief soldiers regarding potential targets that they may encounter and the ROEs relevant to each of those targets. Unlike a specific targeting mission, a patrol does not seek to engage a particular individual; however, the range of legitimate targets the patrol may encounter necessitates that each soldier understand how to identify these distinct threats, how to distinguish among them, and how different operational responses are required.

3. **Train soldiers to be “operational” for the mission.** Training a soldier to identify a legitimate target is an extraordinarily difficult aspect of new warfare—particularly when that target is dressed no differently from an innocent civilian. Training must emphasize to soldiers the fundamental requirement to avoid generalizations, profiling, and collective punishment. Any operational response—particularly in the context of new warfare—must be person-specific in both targeting missions and routine patrols.

- the individual’s specific behavior, including dress, body language, activity, and verbal communications
- intelligence about that individual
- intelligence about a broader threat when the individual fits the intelligence.

Training must emphasize to soldiers the
To maximize operational impact on nonstate actors while minimizing collateral damage, future military training for new warfare must focus on the four subcategories of legitimate targets we define. Discerning the threat—and acting neither too soon nor too late—depends on minimizing ambiguity by training soldiers to develop and use a checklist for distinguishing between innocent civilians and legitimate targets and differentiating among the various types of legitimate targets.

4. Demand ROEs specifying when to issue open fire orders for previously and individually identified legitimate targets. A previously identified target is an individual, such as a bomb maker, identified as a legitimate target based on intelligence. An operational plan to target this individual requires clear ROEs specifying when soldiers can and cannot open fire. Soldiers undoubtedly prefer concise and precise ROEs, but these rules must reflect operational reality. If the warfare is ambiguous, ROEs will, unfortunately, not be precise and concise. The key to operationalizing LOAC effectively in new warfare is to provide useful guidelines for soldiers in the midst of this ambiguity.

5. Demand clear ROEs defining legitimate targets. Soldiers also need clear ROEs for identifying when and whether persons they encounter, such as a suicide bomber or IED planter, are legitimate targets. ROEs for these individuals are person- and conduct-specific and subject to greater interpretation than those for a previously identified target. Determining whether an individual is a threat at a specific moment (and therefore a legitimate target) depends on discretion and a number of situation-dependent variables, including field conditions, the threat presented, number and type of people in the vicinity, and events of the previous few days. Clear ROEs specifying who is a legitimate target and how to react will minimize the need for on-the-ground discretion and, in ambiguous situations, give soldiers the tools to exercise their discretion in accordance with both LOAC and the mission’s purpose.

6. Include soldiers who speak the local language and are experts on the local culture in each unit. A soldier who speaks the relevant local language and understands the culture greatly enhances a patrol commander’s ability to communicate with local populations and can help the commander collect information about the community directly. With these skills and an understanding of the different types of legitimate targets, this soldier can give the commander information otherwise unavailable through indirect communication. For example, in the immediate aftermath of an attack on the unit, the commander needs the most accurate information possible to make critical operational decisions. In real time and in the “fog of war,” commanders need to identify and distinguish between targets and innocent civilians and give effective warnings to the latter before taking action. When locals do not understand soldiers’ warnings, language and cultural skills in the unit give the commander the tools to fulfill these legal and operational obligations.

7. For international forces, ensure full integration of ROEs and mission articulation and, if possible, conduct joint training sessions. International and multinational operations add another layer of complexity to new warfare’s inherent ambiguities. Although part of a unified command, each country’s forces have different military and political cultures and considerations informing their operational choices. The September 4, 2009, airstrike on the Taliban-hijacked fuel tankers near Kunduz, Afghanistan, is an instructive example. After receiving reports that the tankers were hijacked and stuck in the riverbed, the commander of the German army base nearby ordered an airstrike by two American F–15 fighter jets that killed over 30 civilians.
Subsequent reports and investigations raised questions about the German commander’s ability to determine who was present at the scene and the decision to use airpower instead of a ground operation given those uncertainties.47 At a systemic level, the incident unearthed confusion about the appropriate use of force as part of the larger mission. In the past, U.S. and other coalition forces in Afghanistan had urged the German forces to take a more aggressive approach.48 Now, in the aftermath of ISAF’s new tactical directive placing protection of civilians as the mission’s highest priority and drastically limiting the use of airstrikes, the German action appears far too aggressive.

This example demonstrates the need for greater integration of mission articulation among international and multinational forces—both the broader mission purpose and the objectives of specific missions. Each national component of an international force must not only share the same broader mission goals, but—most importantly—must also share the same operational plan for achieving those goals. Different understandings of specific mission objectives lead to different definitions of legitimate targets, which can only create confusion and inconsistency in targeting and engagement decisions. To achieve better operational consistency, international and multinational forces must incorporate integrated training in identifying and reacting to legitimate targets and distinguishing among the various categories of legitimate targets for operational purposes. Otherwise, coordination at the highest levels will lose out to confusion and ambiguity on the ground.

8. Request establishment of field detention centers. Planning detention centers before an operation begins is an integral aspect of new warfare. Otherwise, commanders on the ground—whose primary mission is engaging the enemy and protecting civilians—will face scenarios for which they are not operationally trained, including issues of detainee rights, interrogation, and detention conditions. Commanders need
commanders need a detention center nearby to take any detainees as quickly as possible, minimizing soldiers’ contact with the detainees and maximizing unit energies for the core operational mission.

units, for example, receive training in the five S’s of detainee handling—search, silence, segregate, safeguard, and speed to the rear.49

The Israel Defense Forces’ March 2002 Operation Defensive Wall highlighted the problems that arise when detention centers are not an integral aspect of operation planning. Thousands of Palestinians were arrested daily without adequate advance arrangements. The initial screening was done in temporary, and not suitably prepared, facilities at brigade headquarters.50 Criticizing the last minute arrangements, the Israeli Supreme Court stated that:

the need for minimal detention conditions was a natural result of the operation. There was no surprise in the matter. There was the possibility of preparing appropriate divisions with suitable detention conditions. What was done a number of days after the beginning of the operation should have been done several days before it began.51

9. Reduce unknown variables. To minimize losses among soldiers and innocent civilians, commanders need comprehensive intelligence about both the innocent civilian population and potential legitimate targets. In particular, commanders need real-time information about

meeting places, transportation, gathering locations, religious observance patterns, cultural celebrations, school locations and hours, hospital and health facility locations, and special needs facilities. By minimizing the unknown, this knowledge enhances target-specific military action, protects innocent civilians from mistaken targeting, and limits collateral damage. Without it, commanders will be unable to identify legitimate targets accurately and protect the innocent civilian community.

10. Articulate distinctions between detainable targets and legitimate targets. Distinguishing among persons using intelligence-, threat-, and category-dependent criteria for deciding when to detain and when to engage is the essence of LOAC and of effective military command. Failure to distinguish violates LOAC and—tragically—is too “easy” when under fire, a reality in new warfare. Commanders are under enormous strain to engage while also under extreme pressure to ensure person-specific engagement. The four subcategories we identify specifically address the tension between these pressures.

The previously mentioned dilemma regarding “waiting an additional second” is—operationally—the manifestation of distinguishing between legitimate subjects of detention and the other three subcategories of targets. A permanent target (bomb maker) or transitory target (suicide bomber) is a legitimate target; a farmer infrequently allowing his land to be used for firing weapons is not, even though he is unquestionably detainable. This approach meets LOAC’s requirements and is equally important from an operational perspective because a detainee can provide—through lawful interrogation—important information that might otherwise be unavailable to the commander and his superiors. Using this information, the commander can more accurately determine which
other targets are targetable, which are detainable, and when changing operational circumstances make a detainable person targetable.

**Future Recommendations and Analysis**

Our new framework and guidelines operationalize LOAC for new warfare, but cannot necessarily tackle unforeseen challenges from future conflicts. To deal with the unknown, LOAC needs more agility, which means the law can adapt to changing circumstances and meet the needs of policymakers and commanders alike. It also means the law must allow for new ways of thinking that uphold the law’s goals and principles precisely when they are under fire.

As new warfare became prevalent, and then predominant, the law did not adapt appropriately to its complications. The international community continued to focus on traditional visions of combatants and civilians, notwithstanding the disconnect between that framework and the reality on the ground. Critics argued that the law could no longer apply, when, in fact, they simply did not examine how it could apply in a more agile way.

We focus on maximizing that agility so LOAC can meet new warfare’s demands while still preserving the principles and goals that form the law’s foundation. The steps we take here are precisely the steps to take in future situations posing existential challenges to LOAC.

First, we analyze why new warfare creates grave difficulties for LOAC as traditionally applied. LOAC requires that commanders distinguish between those who are fighting and those who are not, but the traditional legal framework offers few clues for how to do so in new warfare. Future conflicts will almost certainly involve significantly greater use of cyber-warfare and technological capabilities that we cannot predict. In these situations, delineating between military and civilian objectives may prove almost impossible without new understandings of these legal terms relevant to future conflicts.

Second, we identify the key legal principles at risk in new warfare—distinction and proportionality. When new warfare makes distinguishing between persons extraordinarily complicated, fulfilling the obligations of distinction and proportionality becomes equally difficult. Future conflicts may pose unforeseen challenges for other legal obligations and principles whose application seems straightforward today; only by zeroing in on the specific principles can we maximize LOAC’s adaptability in the future.

Third, we use the basic goals of the legal principles at issue to create a new, more workable framework. Distinction and proportionality rely on the ability to classify and distinguish among persons in conflict, so we created new subcategories to sharpen commanders’ ability to distinguish and respond accordingly. This step is critical to making LOAC agile; if we cannot find ways to adapt how we apply the law, we will be left only with the claims that the law can no longer work—an unacceptable result.

Fourth, we turn the new framework into operational, on-the-ground guidelines that make LOAC relevant and useful for commanders and policymakers. The conduct-specific checklist and the Commander’s Top 10 above offer concrete steps to use the law effectively in training troops, preparing for missions,
fulfilling these missions. With these new tools, commanders can distinguish between innocent civilians and legitimate targets and, just as important, distinguish among the various types of legitimate targets to find the best and most appropriate operational response for each situation.

**Notes**


5 Ibid., 86.


9 AP I, Art. 48.

10 Ibid., Art. 51. See also AP II, Art. 13, emphasizing the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict.

11 AP I, Art. 51(2).


14 AP I, Art. 51(5)(b).
15 Ibid., Art. 57(2)(b).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
23 International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts.
24 GC III, Art. 4(1).
25 Ibid., Art. 4(2).
29 AP I, Art. 50. See also Protocol Commentary (1920).
30 AP I, Art. 51(3). See also Protocol Commentary (1942); HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel (December 11, 2005); Kupreskic, 522–523.
31 Simply stated, LOAC does not contemplate a category of persons who can fight but not be attacked, or who can be attacked but may not fight back—such a category of “quasi-combatants” would undermine the entire fabric of humanitarian law. See also Delalic, 269.
32 See Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel, 40.


35 Garamone, emphasis added.


37 See Protocol Commentary (4789).


40 AP I, Art. 51(3).

41 These permanent targets should only be operationally targeted at all times if there is intelligence suggesting that they are planning for or engaged in future attacks.


44 AP I, Art. 57(2)(c).


50 Center for the Defense of the Individual v. IDF Commander in the West Bank (HCJ 3278/02) ¶ 26.

51 Ibid., see also Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank (HCJ 3239/02); Amos N. Guiora and Erin M. Page, “Going Toe to Toe: President Barak’s and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Theories of Judicial Activism,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 29, no. 1 (2006), 51–61.
Getting the Next War Right

Beyond Population-centric Warfare

BY THOMAS A. MARKS, SEBASTIAN L.v. GORKA, AND ROBERT SHARP

As the famous Prussian general once warned, the first priority is to ascertain what type of conflict is to be fought. Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal writings laid the foundation of thinking for modern warfare defined around the needs of the nascent Westphalian nation-state. His prioritization, his “wonderful trinity,” and his recognition that war is but “politics by other means” have served both strategist and statesman well during the conventional wars of the post-Napoleonic age.

The Cold War that followed would make the separation of policy and war more difficult as the advent of nuclear weapons blurred the line between military necessity and political reality. With the end of the Cold War—and especially since 9/11—we have been faced with a still more complex world. From Afghanistan to Mexico, irregular threats have replaced the classic nation-on-nation or bloc-on-bloc confrontations we had grown comfortable with. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia catapulted the United States and its allies back to irregular efforts spanning the gamut from the high tempo operations inherent to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to the seemingly more sedate but often no less intense commitments required for whole-of-government stability operations and nationbuilding.

Ironically, despite efforts to push forward in our “full spectrum” capabilities, we remain hampered by legacy attitudes of compartmentalization and linear thinking. Even more problematic

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and disturbing is our willingness to engage in operations and deploy forces without fully grappling with the implications of the shift to population-centric warfare as prominently assessed by General Sir Rupert Smith in *The Utility of Force*. As a result, our leaders can place the military in harm’s way without knowing what it is they should achieve and whether it is in fact achievable through military means. This constitutes a denial of strategic thought and results in a subsequent disjunction between the operational level of force employment and the national interests of the country.

In Iraq, the vacuum thus created has been partially filled by enterprising officers—but in ways that simply reinforce Clausewitz’s warning. In Afghanistan, exploration into the nature of the challenge by the political leadership appears driven as much by a desperate search for a “silver bullet” as an actual estimate of the situation, yet it also drives home the rectitude of the Clausewitzian dictum. By contrast, in Colombia, correct local assessment served as the basis for a refusal to acquiesce to American efforts to foster strategic distortion during the Clinton administration, leading to a turning point in the conflict.

More significantly it can be shown that Colombian success came only after the rejection of the flawed American model of war. As stated flatly by General Carlos Ospina, a key field commander who rose to become head of the Colombian military, “We were using American doctrine, where we conceptualized the continuum as ‘war’ and ‘other than war.’ This was absolutely incorrect. There is only war, with the enemy fielding different mixes of the elements of war.”

Ironically, Ospina’s understanding of strategy was developed—as he freely observes—during his year in the National War College at the National Defense University. It was there, he states, that he learned the critical importance of the ends-ways-means approach, with all of these contingent on correct assessment of the armed challenge. It is this assessment that is missing from our growing library of new models devoted to irregular warfare (IW). Our “ways” hang alone as if but one side in a football game, with lip service paid to the nature of “the other team.” Yet how else can we begin to assess necessary “means,” much less “ways,” to achieve “ends”—as we have recently been reminded in Afghanistan?

In the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University, we propose an analytical approach derived from social movement theorists but incorporating and modifying the work of particular scholars who were acting as forces in the field long before irregular warfare leaped to new prominence. The approach, as will be seen, is universal, in the sense that it identifies a particular threat as a product of a particular contextual moment. Strategic choice is the driver for any organization (social science’s meso level), but bigger picture context (macro level) and individual particulars (micro level) influence threat emergence in a predictable fashion. It is this reality that our IW students/fellows must address, regardless of the precise label given the IW challenge.

**Search for an IW Approach**

Use of the term *irregular warfare* within the U.S. Government has been driven by the threat conceptualization contained in the Department of Defense 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, wherein threats are seen as posed by four
“challenges”: irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and traditional. Terrorism and insurgency fall within the irregular challenge, as do stability operations and whole-of-government stabilization and reconstruction. In some offices of government, it has been forgotten that IW must be capable of covering a full range of threats and offer a full range of solution tools (ways and means). Whether to use the “police approach” or the “military approach” is a false choice. As the premier world power, Washington must be able to do it all. Within America, for instance, we must be able to ferret out al Qaeda operatives (police approach). Yet simultaneously, we must be able to “take down” an entire country harboring terrorists (for example, Afghanistan)—and then conduct counterinsurgency within it, with stability operations and stabilization and reconstruction ongoing. Likewise, the United States must address both radical left wing and Islamist challenges.

America is thus fighting terrorism both as a tactic that is a part of insurgency, and as a more stand-alone entity that was once called “pure terrorism.” Yet another way, these are, respectively, terrorism as a method and terrorism as a logic. They require different approaches, one meeting terror used as a tool in support of a larger armed political campaign, and the other making terror itself a conflation of ends, ways, and means.

The current battlespace was conceptualized early in the struggle as global insurgency. The present effort to adopt new terminology, which is confusing and at times quite dysfunctional, has not altered the essential rectitude of the approach because al Qaeda is a neo-Guevarist insurgent enterprise, and the various theaters of the globe see us engaging its local allies and manifestations (hence the use of the term AQAM—Al Qaeda and Associated Movements). Simultaneously, in return for their assistance, our partners and allies draw from us in meeting their own terrorist or insurgent threats.

This requires commitment to multiple battles using a variety of responses. Foreign internal defense, including stability operations, may dominate in one theater, full-blown counterinsurgency in another, counterterrorism in still another, issues of the criminal-terrorist nexus in yet another, and stabilization and reconstruction in still another. AQAM may well be, as is often stated, the primary threat, but this does not mean the others, whether FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) or the international gunrunner Viktor Bout (presently awaiting extradition in Bangkok), can be ignored.

How to proceed? General Saiyud Kerdphol, who led a successful effort against the Communist Party of Thailand, correctly observed: “Two things were obvious: there was nothing worse than to fight the wrong way, and the key is the people. We had to ask ourselves, why do the people have a problem, why are they taking up arms?” It would be hard to find a more operational statement of Clausewitz’s famous dictum.

Specifically, then, as the legendary Sir Robert Thompson put it: “Get in place that which is correct. Get in place that which is sustainable. Play for the breaks.” Of these, the critical element is to assess the essence of the problem so it may be countered. This involves, as Saiyud states, going to the roots of the conflict so that the symptom, the armed threat, can be cut off from its life force.

It All Begins with Social Movements

Prior to 9/11, studies of terrorism had arrived at a point where it was fairly well understood how terrorism came about. Insurgency was considered in a separate body of work. The former studies on terrorism were applicable to
insurgency if taken to their logical end, which they seldom were.

Though there were numerous explanations in pre-9/11 terrorism research, ranging from psychological to political to economic, the best analysis stemmed from the study of social movements. Scholars such as Michel Wieviorka and Donatella Della Porta built upon social movement theory to explain terrorism. The framework they advanced is fairly simple in concept. Social movements emerge for particular reasons. Rodney Stark—long recognized as being in the forefront of his particular specialty, emerging religions, and the author of an excellent basic text—has done as fine a job as any in outlining the specifics. By definition, he observes, a social movement seeks change. The American civil rights movement sought change; the upheaval throughout the Muslim world today seeks change. Such demand for redress of grievances is largely peaceful (even if accompanied by sharp elbows). Yet change is not always possible to the extent and in the form desired by all participants in the given social movement. Consequently, there will be splinters. Most often, these take the form of breakaway groups that continue to participate peacefully in the quest for change. But some splinters turn violent.

The first requirement in threat evolution is that “some members of the society must share a grievance which they want to correct, either by changing society or by preventing a change they oppose.” Grievances can take the form of hopes and aspirations, and so might well be bundled as “unfulfilled needs.” Grievances need not be reasonable to be felt; they can be unreasonable yet still drive people forward. Grievances do not have to be legitimate, either. What matters is what is in the minds of the people. What analysts should know is where to look for grievances that are going to lead to trouble.

Entire careers have been built around such explorations. What is necessary is to engage the vast body of literature that explains why people do the things they do. Why, for instance, did Salem have witch trials? Why are there “cargo cults” in the Pacific islands? Why did the last resistance of the American Plains Indians take the form of a millennial cult (the Ghost Dance)? Why did millennial and messianic cults sweep the Plains as the Indian way of life ended? Why did a messiah appear among the Hmong during and after the Vietnam War? Why did the logging town of Wenatchee in the eastern Cascades repeat the Salem phenomenon in 1994–1995, arresting at least 60 adults on 29,726 charges of child sex abuse involving 43 children and sending 16 individuals to prison, only to have all charges proven false? Why the witch crazes of Europe “way back then”? Why the Renaissance, for that matter? Or why the Protestant Reformation?

When dealing with the individual level (the “who”), it is imperative to follow the lead of James C. Scott in his seminal “Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars.” As Scott points out, one must distinguish between leaders, who invariably seek big-picture solutions, and followers, who generally are after more immediate redress of grievances.

Indeed, wanting to change things is not terrorism—or even violence. By definition, social movements are the “basically peaceful” complex
waves of demand for change. The demand of labor for a greater say in the economic shape of things was a social movement. The desire for a greater say in the way Christianity should be considered—the Reformation—was a social movement. Clearly, Islam would not have spread so rapidly were there not underlying grievances in society that needed to be addressed. The same can be said of the turmoil in the Islamic world today.

Splintering Drives the Process

Any such movement cannot hope to satisfy all who get swept up in the message of change. The specific political opportunity structure (POS) will have a great deal to do with whether grievances, hopes, and aspirations can be “mediated” (that is, dealt with). POS concerns the interaction of the movement with the government. How a government reacts—either negatively or positively—plays a significant role in how the group evolves. Regardless, any large-scale movement will splinter.

As splintering occurs, strategic choice becomes an issue. How should we approach those who break away from peaceful demands? What course of action should we take? What next? What about our initial intentions?

The study of religion is useful because new religions have historically grown out of what was before—that is, they have normally been sects—somewhat the same yet different. Christianity began as a sect of Judaism. The early fundamental debate within the religion was whether one had to be first Jewish and then Christian, or could one just “believe” (in the Messiah) and become Christian. As sects become institutionalized, they transform into cults. As they gain adherents, they become fully institutionalized religions. The terminology is standard sociology.

Politically, the use of an alternative ideology will produce a cult of sorts rather than “just a splinter.” Indeed, radical splinters frequently mirror religious cults in their dynamics. This is important because it highlights the various paths that present themselves to such a body.

Della Porta explores the manner in which the desire for change in Italy during the 1960s produced widespread upheaval, especially in certain strata such as labor and academia. This was the social movement. Out of it came the Red Brigades. This resulted only from a process as relevant today as in the case study. The nature of the POS in post–World War II Italy—the capacity of the system to absorb new demands—meant that not all the demands for change could be accommodated. Consequently, there was an escalation of protestors “knocking heads” with the forces of the state—a classic POS issue.

Della Porta observes that in any society, the first such contact occurs between the protestors and police. Protestors are the foot soldiers of the larger social movement, and the police are the foot soldiers of the existing order (frequently called, in French Revolution terminology, the old order, or ancien régime). It is the relationship between these two groups, more than any other factor, that many find central to the strategic choices made. State repression (violence used by the state to put down challenges) is a key intervening variable that can set in motion further splintering that may ultimately lead to violence (and terrorism or insurgency as forms of violence).

If we follow events through Della Porta’s framework (see figure 1), radical ideologies
that preach violence can socialize participants to accept its use, creating a second key intervening variable. Most such groups, even while accepting the use of violence in principle, use it irregularly. Organized labor resorted to such violence in Della Porta’s Italian case study. Those who slide into using it regularly do so for a combination of internal (ideology) and external (what the state does) reasons. Marxist and anarchist groups in Italy preached violence as self-defense, sounding remarkably like Johann Most and the other figures of the first great wave of terrorism, which surfaced as the Industrial Revolution transformed first Europe, then the world.\textsuperscript{14} Self-defense, in fact, emerges as the most potent force there is for mobilizing individuals to use violence regularly. Thus, the conduct of the police (and ultimately the larger security forces and intelligence arms) is of central importance in our analytical framework.
Terrorism

The need to engage in self-defense is subjective, even if the “threat” can in some sense be judged as objective. The decision to strike back can be made on an individual basis. If one is serious about the cause, though, as were the young radicals who formed the Red Brigades in Italy, the organization created is going to be illegal. And if it is illegal, it is going to be hunted. One can take refuge in the open, so to speak. One has to enter the literature of insurgency for a discussion of “clandestine infrastructure” (also termed the counter-state). Or one can go completely underground (make the “strategic choice of clandestinity”).

The use of the terms clandestine and counter-state can be confusing but highlights an essential point. Being a clandestine organization is a relative term. Critical is the degree to which being “underground” cuts one off from the rest of society/the target community. An illegal and clandestine group that seeks to form a counter-state in the framework explicated here—that is, an armed political movement that mobilizes a mass base—is an insurgency.

Being clandestine and having decided to strike back, the organization must make strategic choices: How to fight? Whom to target? How to recruit? How to sustain the organization? Clandestinity drives certain modes of thinking and behavior and makes groups function the way we tell our children not to function when out with their friends: “mutually reinforcing each other” in negative ways. In particular, “enemies” take on ever larger, more salient dimensions.

From individuals, enemies become “categories.” Discrimination (“just guilty individuals”) gives way to targeting “them,” with “them” being an ever expanding circle. “Causes” recede, and “the struggle” becomes more salient. Even the purported mass base (that is, those for whom “the struggle” is being waged) gives way to Angkar (as the Khmer Rouge termed it) or al Qaeda (as Osama bin Laden calls it), the organization. Primary group dynamics take over (that is, those shaped by face-to-face interaction; secondary groups must operate through a chain of command, however defined). Thus does “striking out” mobilize rage, and it makes no discrimination in its targets. And so we have what we call terrorism.

Such analytic clarity is in stark contrast to much that we encounter in the marketplace today. A theme of virtually all “current events” texts on the subject is that terrorism is a slippery term. It is defined by society, which means its precise definition changes over time and space. As a consequence, in this same literature are found definitions that, in aggregate, are truly “the good, the bad, and the ugly.” Some authors simply “give it a miss”; others do a reasonable job.

For our purposes, though, we may dismiss the category of state terrorism. To do otherwise would leave us studying everything from Hiroshima, to the Holocaust, to the H Blocks in Belfast and alleged crimes against prisoners, to troops violating their rules of engagement. Furthermore, what states do is not what most people mean when they examine terrorism. What they do have in mind is precisely what was visible in the Red Brigades case: substate actors targeting the innocent (persons and property traditionally thought of as protected by the laws of war) to communicate and achieve political goals.
Many sources follow the methodology set forth by Most—“propaganda by the deed.” They recognize that “propagandistic effect” is the single greatest weapon available to “the revolutionaries” in their position of asymmetry (our favorite term these days). One could thus expand the earlier definition to read: *Terrorism is substate actors targeting the innocent for propagandistic effect by ways intended to achieve political goals.*

This is what has come to be termed “pure terrorism” because analysts recognize immediately that all terms are relative. If an insurgency, for instance, seeks to form a counter-state, how do we know if the group has a mass base? How many supporters constitute a mass base? Does it matter? Certainly, in their early days, all organizations look very much alike, whether they target the innocent or not. They all tend to kill “the innocent” (whom they declare “guilty”).

But who is innocent? Is not a minor official part of the “structure of oppression” (for example, a village headman in South Vietnam)? And isn’t killing someone in a tactical action (*terrorism as a method of action*) different from the same sort of killing as a strategic imperative (*terrorism as a logic of action*)? Is attacking only the security forces of a state (the police, as was done at one point in some struggles in 19th-century Europe) different from targeting the innocent?

What about collateral damage? If one does not mean to kill the innocent, but is still a sub-state actor who has no right to throw a bomb at anyone (according to international law, states give people the right to kill others), should one be held to a different standard than soldiers at a roadblock, who accidentally (so it was determined) kill an Italian intelligence agent?

We can cut through all this by drawing on Michel Wieviorka, whose words we have adopted. It was he who distinguished between the two forms of terrorism: *terrorism as a method of action* (which is invariably found in insurgency), and *terrorism as a logic of action*.16 As seen in figure 2, it indeed is essential for a proper counter to understand whether the target is terrorists or insurgents because the two threats require pressure at different points in the process of threat evolution and different emphasis on elements of our specific response.

Counterinsurgents, for instance, must endeavor to “win the hearts and minds” so as to cut off the insurgents from their mass base. Counterterrorists, while they do not want to alienate the populace and produce a mass base (for example, examine the Sri Lankan case for a state miscue providing insurgents with manpower17), are often able to put greater emphasis on the lethal aspects of the campaign (informed always by intelligence). The more a group illustrates “pure terrorism,” the less political the state response is likely to be.

**Transferring Theory to Operational Reality**

It is the specific group, then, that emerges as a threat of a particular type from the analytical process above. At any point in the process, the state may counter, but that counter must take situational realities into account. If the emerging threat is at the upper ends of the diagram in figure 2, stability operations and/or reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) are appropriate. If a group is at the lower end and is a terrorist body divorced from a mass base, more
robust kinetic operations informed by intelligence can lead; if the group is an insurgency, emphasis must be on “roots of conflict.”

Regardless, it is critical for IW professionals to discern the distinction between terrorism as a method of action and terrorism as a logic of action. There is a world of difference between dealing with an armed group mobilizing the masses directly as opposed to an armed group that has no mass base—no substantial following organized as part of the movement. The challenge for analysts is that most groups fall somewhere between and are in a dynamic state wherein the balance between proselytizing and coercion is constantly in flux. Fierce debates often break out within movements over the correct “balance,” just as they erupt among analysts seeking to discern motives behind the movement’s realities as they play themselves out. Correct assessment is imperative because it is the basis for correct response.

Terror, to be clear, is always integral to the mass mobilization of insurgency. Insurgency is not a social movement. It is the result of particular strategic choices by a splinter from that movement. Likewise, different strategic choices produce terrorist groups. Those splinters that adopt violence against the innocent—as a consequence of both ideological persuasion and strategic choice, particularly to counter the state response—are well on their way.
It is the group’s mode of seeking safety that is ultimately the determining factor. It is the splinter seeking safety through isolation—in a series of safe houses, we might say—that makes its members become terrorists. It has cut off its links from the population it claims to represent. In contrast, a splinter seeking safety by mobilizing a new world within which to exist, a “clandestine infrastructure” or a “counter-state” to use the correct terminology, becomes an insurgency that uses terror as but one tool of many. The implications for response are evident.

Significantly, nothing in what we have said is dependent on any particular cause for which a group is fighting. Whether it is communism, animal rights, or religious fundamentalism that inspires our violent substate actors, the principles remain the same. These are used by the threat group, whatever its precise form and whatever its ultimate goal. “Particulars” will certainly influence how the process occurs, especially the ease with which substate actors can execute their designs. A population that shares certain economic, social, or political (ESP) attributes is from the point of view of mobilization different from one characterized by division and faultlines, for it is the population that is both the target and the battlespace.

Terrorists are galvanized by ESP grievances, but ultimately, because they are divorced from the people, they come to see the people as part of the enemy. In contrast, mass mobilization actors—insurgents—attempt to exploit ESP grievances to bring people into the movement. Leaders are the ones who look at what is wrong with society and come up with the big-picture solutions. Followers are mobilized by the desire to have their own grievances (and hopes and aspirations) addressed. A leader can talk to followers about ideological or religious particulars, but followers generally want a better way of life. This distinction is critical for programs of deradicalization or intercepting someone before radicalization.

The key here is that objective reality is assessed subjectively. If mass mobilization is how a group proceeds, then the group will use societal “avenues of approach” to produce its new, alternative society to challenge the old order. In each case, the particulars will be unique, but the parameters will be consistent. When we talk about ESP grievances, the critical point is that in any society there will be political actors trying to gain power by appealing to a popular desire for a solution. If this is done peacefully, a transfer of power occurs without violence. But if a group demands power by proclaiming, “We will address grievances, just give us the reins of power,” and the system resists, violence is likely.

In examining the shape this violence ultimately takes, as noted above, there are three angles—perhaps lenses—of possible perspectives. The first, the big picture (or the macro) level, is context. The fact that we live in the age of globalization, for example, dramatically alters the course any political trajectory takes. Agency is bound up not only in traditional tangible structure but also in intangible structure created by the flow of information and images. We have moved beyond domains to multiple dimensions, with the tangible and intangible intertwined to such an extent that seeing is no longer believing, and believing may indeed become seeing. In such context, contingency (chance) is often magnified beyond imagination, to the extent that even extraneous tactical action can have profound strategic effect.18

The second way to look at this process (especially for intelligence) is the meso or middle perspective, the organizational level. How did an organization break away from a demand simply for redress of grievances? How
did we go from a larger demand for respect in the Islamic world, say, to a group, al Qaeda, that has abused religion and mobilized it in the name of violence? We can seek the answer by exploring group dynamics even while keeping mindful of context.

The third way of looking at the process, the micro view, is to study individuals. Who joins, who stays, and who leaves? How, for example, did a multimillionaire become the most wanted “terrorist” in the world?

In this example, it can readily be seen how the different perspectives are relevant. Bin Laden’s life trajectory has occurred within international, regional, national, and local contexts. He has been influenced by group processes, becoming both an inspiration to and captive of the organization he created. Finally, the particulars of bin Laden as an individual have impacted his course every step of the way. Another man might have chosen to become a Gandhi. Likewise, choice, influenced centrally by ideological input and actions of the state response, has dictated that a particular strategy and attendant operational art be adopted and implemented. That this strategy seeks mass mobilization—even if via neo-Guevarist, foco-like action, as opposed to patient construction of infrastructure using Maoist people’s war—is why it may be called “global insurgency” and met potentially by “global counterinsurgency.”

The key intervening variable, ideology, is central to this strategic choice. Even the choice of violence follows logically from what is believed. If one as a Muslim actually believes what is in Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, for instance, one will use violence for redress of grievances. Likewise, if one believes Marx and Lenin, one will also use violence to pursue totalitarian secular ends. Ironically, many of those we face in today’s challenge combine elements of Marx and Lenin with selections from Islam.

Though the goal sought by irregular challenges, the “ends” of ends-ways-means, is often “justice,” this is a subjective category. It results from a subjective interpretation of reality by marginalized elites. How do we tell whether grievances are legitimate? There is no magic formula, but if 17 percent of the population wants something, as was the case with the Tamils in Sri Lanka, it is best to treat their desires as having some basis that would qualify as legitimate. A substantial slice of a population in any representative system cannot be alienated and have the whole remain viable.

If a quest for justice, however poorly conceived, is what is going on in the countries, theaters, and regions of the “global war on terror,” what has dramatically changed is that which was once localized now becomes global. India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, for instance, not only have become one theater but also have a global impact. This is why we find North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces deployed in the defense of their homelands in such a far-off area.

How did the United States end up in Afghanistan? “Because an attack was launched from there” might be one answer. Using the three perspectives, we could answer more comprehensively. International context certainly played a role in turning backwater Afghanistan into a frontline state of the Cold War. Regional context led to the deeper involvement of Pakistan. Pakistan’s own national context led
to the particular elements of Islamabad’s participation, such as use of the Inter-Services Intelligence as the control medium for resistance against the Soviet Union. Local context intertwined tribal dynamics with religious and ideological struggle. Within this context, as we move through time, we see the emergence of an organization, al Qaeda, linked to another, the Taliban, which ultimately attacks the United States. At the micro level, we can assess the attributes and motivations that led every member of al Qaeda, or even the Taliban, to become part of the movement.

If we move to the present, the same perspectives are necessary to gain a complete picture, with every act also assessed in tangible and intangible dimensions, in two intertwined, symbiotic worlds. On the ground, we find individuals with ties to any number of fights ranging from local (the “Near Enemy”) all the way over to the West (the “Far Enemy”). Assailants, who had staged from Afghanistan, attacked New York City, but waged an extensive international campaign against us, as did the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front of El Salvador. Yet imagine that instead of delegations and agents of influence, witting and unwitting, the Vietnamese sent suitcases of money to pay for explosions in the United States. Or suppose they sent sappers directly. It is this element that has made the present different from the past.

Nevertheless, within this globalized world it is still true that “all politics is local.” It is local grievances, objective and/or subjective, as well as the second-order consequences of state response to those demanding redress of grievances, that produce a threat group. Threat-leaders look at grievances and propose solutions. Threat-followers simply want resolution of grievances. Reasons why individuals “sign up” are as varied as the individuals themselves. What ultimately matters strategically is to discern the particular dynamic in the conflict concerned—and to determine whether one faces an organization comprised only of leaders or an organization of leaders with a mass base of followers.

If the threat is insurgency, a mass-based movement, there are two basic ways to mobilize followers: from the top, by example or demonstration, or from the bottom, by local construction of political organization. As noted already, these two ways have been associated with their most famous advocates, respectively: Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung.

Che’s foco theory, as we have discussed, advocates mobilizing from the top. The armed challenger chooses an appropriate moment, when demand for resolution of grievances permeates the human terrain, and carries out attacks on the structure of oppression. The people are inspired and rise up and join the organization (in theory). This is why bin Laden is a neo-Guevarist. He is (unconsciously) using
Che’s methodology. The difference between the two is that Guevara desired to mobilize the people and thus emphasized guerrilla action against state authorities and their security forces. In contrast, bin Laden has defined a large slice of humanity as “the Other,” as the enemy, and therefore as legitimate targets. He seeks to mobilize but a portion of the theoretical target population. Though his logic is internally consistent, no unbiased audience outside his closed system would accept the rectitude of his famous speech wherein he claimed all Americans—every man, woman, and child—were legitimate targets because they had been “warned” and had failed to alter their behavior.23

In contrast to Che, Mao advocated patient, time-consuming construction of political apparatus (clandestine infrastructure, a counter-state) by organizing in local space, with higher organs stitching together local upheaval into the overall effort. “Guerrillas” did not lead but enabled political mobilization. This is the basic approach used by virtually all successful insurgencies even if they do not explicitly follow Mao—though there are few if any insurgencies today that have not heard of him and studied his works. These works remain the most available of all insurgent “manuals.”4 Their use varies, but even in Field Manual (FM) 3–24, Counterinsurgency,25 room is found for the famous quotation from Colonel David Galula that revolutionary war is 80 percent political and 20 percent military.26 Within FM 3–24, Mao’s theory of protracted war is considered to be “more than just of historical interest. Knowledge of it can be a powerful aid to understanding some insurgent movements.”27

What Mao has provided in these lines of effort, then, is the inspiration for five questions that must be asked of any irregular challenge:

- What is its political content?
- Who are its allies outside the movement?
- How does it use violence?
- How does it use nonviolence?
- What is it doing internationally?

Analytically, the five questions reflect that the IW challenge will begin the contest by advancing in this manner. It will simultaneously do so by mobilizing population and resources through political action, winning domestic allies, using violence as appropriate to circumstances, using nonviolence to make violence more effective, and exploiting the opportunities available in the international arena. It will do so tangibly
on the ground, and intangibly in the mind (that is, in terms of influence, and absence of any line is as important as its presence.

Too often, IW practitioners say, “But our group isn’t communist, Mao was a communist.” Asking the five questions above to assess how a threat is advancing has nothing to do with whether one is a communist or violent radical Islamist; it is simply asking how the threat evolves according to the basic principles of IW. Of critical importance, as mentioned above, is that the analyst must consider how to assess and display the threat group’s advance. It is easy enough to do on a map as tangible activities are plotted (whether a propaganda team or an assassination). The more difficult challenge is to determine how to measure and portray intangible advance.

**Assessment as Basis for Action**

We are not about teaching a kitbag of techniques. What we are advancing is a way of thinking, a way of conceptualizing, and a way of stepping back and asking how the threat can be assessed both as it emerges and, once it exists as an organization, as it uses its strategy and operational art. This assessment of the threat group—an IW Estimate of the Situation—is carried out for the purpose of constructing a strategy of response—an IW Course of Action. Discerning a threat group’s “advances”—its lines of effort—is central to crafting the counter. It must also inform all facets of planning to “get in front of the curve.” In this, irregular warfare is no different from warfare.

The use of lines of operations to implement a strategy is a product of the Napoleonic age, when Jomini and Clausewitz, particularly the former, sought to explain what the master, Napoleon, was about in his thinking about military advance. What they discerned was that battles were links in a chain, with each battle moving Napoleon closer to his ultimate goal, with the entire linked effort having direction and magnitude—a vector or line of operation. However, it is necessary to repeat that despite the language used to describe what is happening, the concept is not a linear one.

Entirely accurate as far as it went, the concept of strategy implemented by lines of operations was conceived militarily and applied on the map. It would take Mao to highlight the obvious: there were not only different, nonmilitary ways of advancing on a map (our lines of effort), but there also were different “maps,” one tangible (the normal Napoleonic representation) and the other intangible (a map of influence, will, fear, and hope—all the elements of war that were not physical). This was a logical or conceptual way of thinking, hence the leap into a conceptual dimension with logical/conceptual lines of effort.

If for Napoleon lines of operations consisted of battles strung together to reach an end, for Mao these were struggles. Since, from our analytical vantage point, a struggle is actually an ongoing series of discrete efforts, or battles, we have substituted the term campaign. This can be confusing because it applies regular war terminology to irregular war according to the actual meaning of terms rather than according to their common use in “major combat” planning courses.

Campaigns, then, comprise the lines of effort. The lines can be visualized as strings of...
pearls, with each pearl a dynamic entity changing size, shape, and color. For example, violence according to Mao, speaking from the insurgent point of view, comes in four forms. Terror is a form of violence. Small unit hit-and-run warfare (that is, guerrilla warfare) is a form of violence. Using big units, as the Vietnamese did and the Taliban is starting to do, is a form of violence—maneuver warfare, mobile warfare, and main force warfare are all terms that have been applied. Holding territory (that is, “liberated areas”)—war of position—is a form of violence. As they occur as numerous battles or struggles, these forms of warfare happen as campaigns. Thus, we may speak of a campaign of terror, or a campaign of guerrilla warfare. These, in turn, play themselves out not only in the traditional, tangible fashion, but also in a nontraditional, intangible fashion—on the ground and in the mind.

There can be confusion when armed action occurring within an irregular effort unfolds in regular fashion requiring conventional use of terminology within an unconventional effort. The three major enemy offensives in South Vietnam (Tet in 1968, the Easter Offensive of 1972, and the Spring Offensive of 1975) were huge undertakings, with the latter two featuring division-sized units advancing in the same manner as the blitzkrieg across France in 1940. Battles were fought along Napoleonic lines of operations to achieve objectives. Considered within the irregular war framework, however, these were but constituent efforts of a campaign along a particular line of effort.

There is no need to go into further details. Suffice to say that the point of conceptualizing threat in terms of strategy and its implementing lines of effort is to inform and drive the counter. Terrorism as a method, when used as a campaign by an insurgency, for example, is rarely mindless commission of violence. Rather, targets are picked for a reason. Furthermore, two types of targets normally emerge, local civilian points of resistance and the structure of the state. The efforts may each be represented as subcampaigns within the terrorism campaign.

The reason for the above should be immediately clear: in the counter, there must minimally be two negating subcampaigns. The subcampaign attacking human “critical nodes” must be met with a subcampaign that protects those targets. This, in turn, is normally divided in two (sub-subcampaigns): protection of VIPs and protection of the masses. The first requires as means some form of bodyguards (think of Blackwater’s most prominent role in Iraq), the second requires some form of local forces. The same analysis may be done for the threat subcampaign to eliminate the structure of the state. This must be met by some form of critical infrastructure protection but may also include separate sub-subcampaigns devoted to, say, protection of roads or maritime assets (for example, ports).

There is no model or template involved here, only a way of thinking. Rather than seeing the challenge as but a welter of tactical acts, war college–level thinking must consider threat strategy and its implementation to craft the counter or neutralization effort. Such analysis is not bounded within any particular battlespace. What is true of a national effort can just as well be true of a global effort. The critical metric is whether the threat is terrorist or insurgent; that is, whether it is building a counter-state or only prosecuting “the struggle.”

The counter-state itself, whether in its local or global manifestation, is a dynamic entity. It may exist only in the minds of several would-be insurgents at one point in time. It may be a clandestine infrastructure in government-dominated territory at another point in time. It may be a full-fledged liberated area at another. Indeed, it
may be a vast sphere of influence that commands the first loyalty of an international following that desires but does not yet have a tangible “new order” to match the intangible new order that has already taken hold of their minds.

In fact, it is this intangible dimension that is key in the global struggle today. The recent fight in Gaza illustrates this well, providing, perhaps even better than the Zapatista case, evidence of how the intangible dimension can trump facts on the ground. What was noteworthy was the apparent planned effort by Hamas to use its own kinetic action nearly solely for the purpose of provoking an Israeli kinetic response that would necessarily produce collateral damage. Capturing evidence of this damage through images of human suffering was a planned, competently executed effort linked to another effort designed to disseminate that evidence. The result, as in the original netwar, was tangible pressure on Israel from abroad that ultimately proved irresistible. As a consequence, even as Israel claimed victory, Hamas emerged stronger within Gaza, and Israel found its international position compromised to the extent of ongoing war crimes investigations which (given the parties involved) will likely lead to an indictment of sorts.

This is now a reality confronting any state facing a similar challenge in the age of globalization. Sri Lanka provides the most salient post-Gaza example. If anything, the pressure brought to bear on Colombo has served to illustrate even more prominently the conundrum created for state actors who find themselves under attack by mobilized global networks of those supporting substate challengers. These networks include actors, such as international nongovernmental organizations (notably human rights organizations), that not only function as para-states but are also all but immune to even reasonable challenge (the so-called halo effect). In that case, it is significant that the closer Sri Lanka drew to victory, the more shrill became the attacks of both states and para-states, which had interests at variance with those of Colombo.

The conclusion is that no irregular war effort is any longer—if ever it were—a two-sided affair between state and challenger. Instead, all are struggles between energized networks, with many participants being single-issue bodies whose goals and motivations have little to do with the core issues being contested. Instead, as in the Spanish Civil War, external actors, notably para-states, use conflicts to test their weapons systems and to further their own strategies and power. Thus, the international line of effort looms large for any irregular threat group but especially for insurgencies. In the Sri Lankan case, only skillful mobilization of a countercoalition of both states and para-states allowed Colombo to persevere and end the menace that was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

This leads us to something fundamental: every threat group has an idea of what it is doing. We wasted many years in our present effort because powerful voices claimed the threat had no plans, had no conception of how to proceed, and did not coordinate or communicate—they “just did it,” violating all the principles of war. By now, there are few who cling to such views. It is understood that “they” think they are doing something. We call that “something” doctrine. Increasingly, we are reading

the counter-state, whether in its local or global manifestation, may exist only in the minds of several would-be insurgents at one point in time
their doctrine in translation. What is clear is that they have also read our doctrine.

If our irregular challengers are using ends, ways, and means, we must use the same strategic approach. Our effort must endeavor to prevent the emergence of a threat organization, neutralize threat strategy and operational art once an organizational challenge has taken the field, and then remain on the offensive (strategically through societal reform). In crafting our approach, everything we do is dependent on our assessment of the threat—that is, our irregular warfare Estimate of the Situation. We must know the challenge as well as the challengers know us and themselves, which is why intelligence is the lifeblood of irregular warfare.

In assessing the foe, it is fundamental to establish exactly just what it is. A group such as FARC, for instance, can be assessed as the leading force in the drug trade. One can also assess that it attempts to an extent to engage in mass mobilization. Furthermore, FARC claims to be Marxist-Leninist and certainly, at one point, put some effort into cultivating Marxist vocabulary and thought among its membership. Most dangerously, people’s war is FARC’s strategy, and its lines of effort are found in its warfighting manuals. All of this means that FARC is a complex threat that must be attacked for what it is. Focusing too closely on any single element, such as counternarcotics, risks strategic distortion.

FARC thus serves to highlight a point already touched upon, that of subjectivity. Objectively, Colombia has flaws. Yet polls consistently show that FARC’s subjective reaction to those flaws—an assessment that the state is so horrible and brutal that it must be overthrown by armed political action—is rejected by nearly the entire population. Therefore, in seeking to determine the roots of conflict, we ignore exploration of ESP flaws at our peril; yet we should not mindlessly confront flaws in the state with an armed reaction. We need to know why “the people have taken up arms, why they have a problem.” Yet we also recognize that not all grievances are legitimate, any more than any chosen mode of response is legitimate. Insurgents and terrorists are as flawed as we are, and they make every mistake we make. In implementing our counter, it is necessary to exploit threat imperfections even as we address our own imperfections. This means:

- At the strategic level, the goal is always legitimacy. An IW threat fights for a political goal, even if, as with “pure terrorists,” the struggle supersedes the original objective. Hence, it is never enough for us to simply be against their goal. We must stand for something. What are we fighting for? If that fundamental question cannot be answered, the state is in trouble.

- At the operational art level, the key target is always the organization, the clandestine infrastructure, the counter-state. It may be tangible or only a state of mind (intangible). Regardless, it must be neutralized. The key is to fight an idea with another idea.

- At the tactical level, the goal of the challenger is always local political domination. Consequently, the goal of a state is to have authority and
legitimacy within its own boundaries and its own population. If a state is not even present in certain areas, it “doesn’t play.” It leaves the human terrain to the challenger. If the state is present but dysfunctional, corrupt, and brutal, it is probably better that it is absent.

In the end, the essence of what we do in counterterrorism (now combating terrorism), counterinsurgency, stability operations, or reconstruction and stabilization is to enable effective, representative governance. That is what the present conflict is all about—the “art of war in the modern world” of Rupert Smith. PRISM

Notes

1 Smith states that “six basic trends . . . make up the paradigm of war amongst the people”:

(1) The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may not be decided; (2) We fight amongst the people, not the battlefield; (3) Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending; (4) We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective; (5) On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of industrial war; (6) The sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multi-national grouping against some non-state party or parties.


2 Carlos Ospina Ovalle, “Insights from Colombia’s ‘Long War’: Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned,” Counterterrorism 12, no. 3 (Fall 2006), 29.


5 These approaches are discussed in Thomas A. Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2007), passim. Che’s theory posits mobilization from the top, while that of Mao advocates mobilization from the bottom. Che holds that a committed group of rebels (guerrilla), the foco, carrying out actions in a propitious environment, will inspire the masses to rise up and overthrow the system (carry out a revolution). For his key work, see Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997). The single best work on the evolution of guerrilla war from tactic to operational art and strategy is Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002). For a discussion of the unanswered issues related to the concept of global counterinsurgency, see Stephen Sloan and Sebastian L.v. Gorka, “Contextualizing Counterinsurgency,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 16 (Spring 2009), 41–48.

6 Saiyud Kerdphol, quoted in Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia, 71.


10 Ibid.
14 For the logic, see Johann Most, “Advice for Terrorists,” in *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages*, ed. Walter Laqueur (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 104–112.
15 The most recent contribution to this subject by author Thomas A. Marks is *Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia*, which builds upon his earlier *Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam* (London: Frank Cass, 1996). The “Vietnam” reference in both titles allows for temporal bounding of the discussion, which actually is quite far ranging.
16 Wieviorka, 597–606.
19 Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia*.
25 Available at <www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf>. However, the authors recommend the commercial version that contains important additional material by Sarah Sewall and John Nagl in *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).
It may be noted that as originally used by Mao’s opponent in China, the Kuomintang, the slogan was “Three Parts Military and Seven Parts Politics.” See William Wei, “The Guomindang’s Three Parts Military and Seven Parts Politics Policy,” *Asian Profile* 10, no. 2 (April 1982), 111–127. Use of the slogan is discussed in detail in Thomas A. Marks, *Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), especially chapter 2, “Jiangxi: The Making of a Counterrevolutionary,” 13–76. Galula is likely to have studied Mao in English. With the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, he has been drawn into the limelight recently and labeled an intellectual “forgotten founder” of counterinsurgency who espoused, as a consequence of his service in Algeria, what is now called population-centric warfare. See Ann Marlowe, “Forgotten Founder: The French Colonel Who Wrote the Book(s) on Counterinsurgency,” *The Weekly Standard*, October 19, 2009, 32–36. Galula’s thought indeed merits study. Still, there is considerable irony in current U.S. interest in him, since it is driven as much by ignorance of other contemporaneous theorists, especially American, as by the excellence of his work. If one consults the list of those present with Galula at the April 16–20, 1962, RAND “Counterinsurgency Symposium,” for instance, a veritable “who’s who” of legendary names appears. Noteworthy as a true “forgotten founder,” who at the time arguably had considerable influence on American counterinsurgency development, was Edward Lansdale’s right-hand man, Charles T.R. “Bo” Bohannan, who “co-authored,” with Napoleon D. Valeriano (Bohannan actually did the writing), the superb, now reprinted *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006). It is significant that prior to World War II, Lansdale was an advertising executive, while Bohannan was an anthropologist. Their approach to irregular warfare, it can be argued, stemmed directly from these nonmilitary backgrounds.


Kerdphol.
ON September 21, 2009, the Washington Post published an article entitled “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure.’” The basis for the piece was a leaked copy of General Stanley McChrystal’s “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” dated August 30, 2009. In asking for additional forces for Afghanistan, General McChrystal stated that his conclusions were supported by a rigorous multidisciplinary assessment by a team of civilian and military personnel and by his personal experience and core beliefs. A week before the Washington Post article appeared, Senators Lindsey Graham, Joseph Lieberman, and John McCain made a similar call for more forces in the Wall Street Journal. In an editorial labeled “Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan,” the senators argued that General McChrystal was an exceptional commander and that he, the new Ambassador,
and a new deputy commander composed a team that could win the war.³

Nevertheless, many hold a different view. Senator John Kerry, for instance, has warned against repeating the mistakes of the Vietnam War. Vice President Joe Biden has advocated an alternative strategy to a force buildup. Former Secretary of State and retired General Colin Powell has expressed skepticism that more troops would guarantee success because, in his opinion, the military mission cannot be clearly defined.⁴ President Barack Obama probably asked whom he should rely on or, more precisely, who really understands the situation. If he read General McChrystal’s report thoroughly, he would have had even more reason to wonder. In Section V, “Assessments: Measuring Progress,” the President would have read: “[the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)] must develop effective assessment architectures . . . to measure the effects of the strategy, assess progress toward key objectives, and make necessary adjustments.”⁵ If these measures did not exist, how did General McChrystal know that the current strategy was not working and, more importantly, that his proposed change would work?

Killing EBO

The militaries of the United States and its allies have been puzzling for more than 10 years over how to plan and assess military operations in the 21st century. Most contemporary discussions of the security environment and military planning begin by noting that warfare is now more complex. The complexity may be described as a network of interconnected, adaptive systems.⁶ Alternatively, using General Rupert Smith’s term war among the people, the complexity may be manifest in the number and variety of participants, their relationships, their cultural differences, and their various and shifting political and social goals.⁷ Commanders everywhere have been urged to approach operational problems from a holistic systems perspective and to engage in an iterative cognitive process that is variously named design, the adaptation cycle, and the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO).⁸

At the core of the endeavor to develop an effective contemporary campaign planning system, however, was the (now despised) U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) planning system labeled effects-based operations (EBO). In 2008, General James Mattis, USMC, assumed command of USJFCOM and directed, “Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the concepts related to EBO, ONA [operational net assessment], and SoSA [system of systems analysis] in our training, doctrine development, and support of JPME [joint professional military education].”⁹ For the present, EBO is dead. Nevertheless, EBO animated the development of the new planning systems either directly, as with EBAO, or indirectly, as with the various forms of design. Only by understanding the various attacks on EBO is it possible to explain why General McChrystal has no measures and the United States has not yet created an adequate planning system. Before its U.S. demise in 2008, EBO had undergone a rather long period of development and had been subject to a number of different critiques, many of which can only be
understood in the context in which they arose. In the first instance, EBO was an outgrowth of U.S. Air Force efforts to go beyond the Service’s narrow focus on an air-delivered weapon’s effect on a target and to think in terms of attacking a system. The intent was to use precision weapons to target specific elements of an enemy’s military complex and to thereby achieve the same effect as an attack on every weapon or element of that system.10 Thus, because of the association with precision weapons, EBO became associated with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs and network-centric warfare and was abused accordingly.

In the next major phase of development, the EBO concept was extended to provide a basis for general operational planning. Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), calls this phase the most egregious variety and the one that most damaged operational thinking within the military.11 Nevertheless, it is important to examine EBO’s component planning elements before turning to the manifold critiques. The effects-based approach had four primary components: knowledge superiority, an effects-based planning process, dynamic execution, and accurate, timely effects assessment.12

A process called operational net assessment provided knowledge superiority. ONA, in turn, was supported by system of systems analysis, which was research directed toward an adversary system. Presumably, SoSA required understanding the adversary’s political, military, economic, social, and information systems and the associated infrastructure.13 Hence, the acronym PMESII was spawned. The goal of this research was to identify key points or persons in these systems (that is, nodes) against which action could be taken to influence behavior in the system to promote achievement of desired U.S. outcomes (that is, effects). The actions were not strictly military and were to involve all the elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. In theory, armed with knowledge of the workings of an adversary system, desired effects could be achieved by using the appropriate resource to direct action against a key node: effect-node-action-resource. The ONA process formed the knowledge base for planning.

The introduction of EBO did not significantly modify the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). However, the steps in the process were to benefit from the knowledge provided by ONA. Thus, campaign objectives and strategic goals were to be understood as effects and the knowledge of the adversary nodes related to those effects were to indicate what actions were needed. Added to the JOPP was renewed attention to mission success criteria, measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance. JOPP had consistently required guidance for developing courses of action linked to desired endstates. An effect differs from an endstate only in the fact that the final condition (the endstate) must be the result of direct or indirect actions. Consequently, greater attention must be paid to: how well specified actions are performed; measures of performance, and whether those actions actually produced the condition sought; and measures of effectiveness.

Unfortunately, in common parlance, it is far too easy to refer to a desired condition as an effect without identifying the actions associated with creating the new condition. Thus, introducing the language of effects into a planning system accustomed to endstates and objectives produced confusion, if not outright hostility.14 From the perspective of a political scientist, EBO, along with ONA and SoSA, has much to offer, especially if the mission under consideration deals with stability operations,
nationbuilding, and counterinsurgency. However, coming as it did out of the Air Force effort to use precision weapons better and to make air attack more efficient, EBO was immediately associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs and then with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s concept of military transformation. More importantly, the initial advocates and manifold critics of EBO chose to identify the process with operational research and the hard sciences, not the social sciences. Thus, the opponents of EBO were able to undermine the process by discussing philosophy, not fact.

Brigadier Justin Kelly and Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen opened their argument against EBO by citing Carl von Clausewitz: “War is a free and creative act resting on a clash of wills.” They went on to present their account of the development of EBO theory, ending in the observation that EBO reflects the desire to analyze situations sufficiently to enable the successful application of kinetic and nonkinetic means to manage the perceptions and reactions of the target group. Their response to EBO is drawn from Clausewitz—namely, that war is highly complex, verging on chaos, and is a phenomenon not amendable to reductive scientific deduction. In their mind, it is reasonable to approach the conduct of armed conflict as “a system of expedients.” Milan Vego in his critique disparages the effects-based approach use of mathematical methods for predicting and measuring effects. He argues that the trend toward using metrics to assess the essentially unquantifiable aspects of warfare reinforces the unrealistic view that warfare is a science rather than an art and a science. General Van Riper considers ONA and SoSA to be pseudoscience. He further argues that SoSA relies on formal systems analysis and that it should be recognized as the same analytical method foisted on the military by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara with disastrous results. (The merits of these criticisms are analyzed later in the current discussion.) It is sufficient here to note only that the criticisms were either thoughtlessly or deliberately included in the developing planning doctrine.

Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, is the capstone publication for all U.S. joint doctrine. The document provides fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is a bridge between policy and doctrine. It begins by stating, “War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. In its essence, war is a violent clash of wills. War is a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules. Clausewitz described it as ‘the continuation of politics by other means’ [book 1, chapter 1, section 24 heading].” The joint publication emphasizes the same portion of On War that has been relied upon in the critique of EBO. In the chapter dealing with analysis in the United Kingdom’s Joint Doctrinal Publication 5–00, Campaign Planning, there is an inset labeled “McNamara: Paralysis by Analysis.” The inset discusses Secretary
McNamara’s use of numerical data and systems analysis during the Vietnam War and warns of the need to keep numerical assessments in perspective and to recognize the importance of the commander’s subjective analysis. While the United Kingdom’s doctrine takes note of one of the criticisms of EBO, it does not take the same strident positions as General Van Riper and Professor Vego. This is perhaps because the United Kingdom considers effects as part of its planning doctrine, which, through Britain’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), informs the Alliance’s EBAO planning process.

Away from Science

The debate about EBO is a philosophical one about the nature of war. Since the publication in 1981 of On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA, the discussion of strategy and war within the military has been dominated by references to Clausewitz. The failures of Vietnam are thought by some to have spurred an intellectual renaissance during which the military built a deep appreciation of history and a thorough understanding of the nature of war. The emphasis on deterministic rules manifest in JP 1 reflects the criticism of EBO that grew out of the Revolution in Military Affairs. The advent of precision weapons and development of networked information systems led to claims that the fog and friction of war would be overcome and permit deployment of smaller but extremely effective forces. This idea compelled proponents of land forces to find within Clausewitz arguments against that vision. Thus, it was necessary in JP 1 to cite Clausewitz on page I–1, as if invoking the Prussian theorist would imbue the guidance with greater wisdom. Secretary Rumsfeld’s commitment to transformation and his insistence that Operation Iraqi Freedom did not require a massive land force served to make the critics more strident. Arguments over U.S. Army General Eric Shinseki’s congressional testimony prior to the invasion of Iraq are, in part, a manifestation of the dispute about systems analysis and precision.

However, the attack against notions of determinism (that is, the ability to predict with certainty the reaction of an enemy to a specific action or attack) was only one dimension of the criticism. The military had moved from conventional warfare to fighting insurgency and civil wars, and thus, irregular warfare had to be brought into the Clausewitzian framework. Advocates of EBO had contended that SoSA could identify key nodes in the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. The nodes could in turn be physically attacked or acted against to influence achievement of desired effects. The counter-observation was that human activity is so complex that it operates outside the physical domain and that the human response to an attack is not predictable. The intangibles of war pertain mostly to the human elements and thus are most amendable to the traditional way of military thinking, which is far more comprehensive, realistic, dynamic, and flexible than systems thinking.
consists of a combination of rational intelligence and subrational intellectual and emotional faculties that make up intuition. Intuition is the agent of decision in the face of difficult circumstances such as inadequate information.\textsuperscript{27} Vego finds the solution in the commander’s ability to think operationally.\textsuperscript{28} General McChrystal’s solution might be his core beliefs and his personal experiences. In every case, the answer is greater reliance on the commander to make the right decision.

Because of the insurgency in Iraq and the acrimonious political debate over U.S. policy, the effort to end development of EBO began to focus attention on alternative approaches, one of which was an Israeli idea called Systemic Operational Design (SOD). The U.S. Army initially championed SOD as a counter to EBO. Given that SOD’s proponents are hard pressed to show its successes, the Army likely was attracted to SOD by the ability of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to engage the Israeli political leadership directly in a dialogue and to dominate national policy.\textsuperscript{29} SOD offered the military the potential to control the policy discussion. It also highlighted the importance of the military commander. Colonel Robert C. Johnson, director of the Futures Directorate of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), launched the study of SOD, and the study was championed by retired Army officers such as Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, USA (Ret.).\textsuperscript{30} General Wass de Czege was the first director of the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and participated in writing the 1986 version of Field Manual (FM) 100–5, \textit{Operations}. The SOD experiments have produced a series of other approaches, many of which General Mattis listed in his memo on EBO.\textsuperscript{31} All approaches are labeled “design,” which makes discussing design a bit confusing. However, understanding design and how it tries
to improve the military commander’s influence over policy and planning must wait. The empirical issues associated with understanding EBO need to be addressed because they are central to understanding why SOD and design are not truly alternatives to EBO.

In his response to General Mattis’s memo, Colonel Tomislav Z. Ruby observed that the EBO approach was developed because many in the Department of Defense recognized that the classic campaign planning processes were not resulting in successful operations. That was true “because the void between the commander’s intent and tactical objectives was not only too great, but one way. The application of strategy to task evaluation produced campaign plans and objectives that were executed without continual review of tactical success versus strategic effects.”32 To accomplish such a review requires some understanding of causality, a concept that has long been excluded from the physical sciences. The laws of physical science are all symmetrical. Consider Newton’s law \( f = ma \). In ordinary discourse, we would say that force causes acceleration, not that acceleration causes force, or, if the equation were rewritten \( f/a = m \), that force causes mass.33 When critics of EBO assert that the “inherent logic of effects-based planning assumes a mechanistic understanding of causal chains,”34 they create a straw man to tie EBO to the attack of physical targets and the early Air Force conception of EBO.

The social sciences, however, have long sought to discover causes for civil war, social revolutions, political violence, and insurgencies. None of the theories of the social sciences establish a sufficiently strong relationship that they can be deemed laws similar to the laws of physics. Consequently, assessing cause and effect in political-military endeavors, such as counterinsurgency warfare, will never produce certitude. With that said, the social sciences have developed a complex of methods with which to collect data and discern patterns in human affairs. Not the least is the concept of viewing politics, economics, or societies as a system.

Determining cause and effect in a political or social system requires the definition of a problem. The definition of a political or social system is intended to isolate certain relationships and variables from the manifold details of the world. Thus, if the intent is to discover what military actions to take against pirates off the coast of Somalia, piracy might be understood as a symptom of the Somali political or economic system. Bounding the problem in that manner means that initially no attention will be paid to other aspects of Somalia’s difficulties, such as elementary education or illiteracy. The importance of defining the problem before beginning a system analysis was part of ONA and SoSA. For instance, Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Pamphlet 4 stated, “The ONA baseline process begins when the [combatant commander] designates a focus area (a specific nation, region, contingency, or entity) within the [area of responsibility].” Unfortunately, setting the problem was overlooked. Thus, initial examples of SoSA were merely collections of facts. In contrast, SOD and design pay a good deal of attention to defining the problem—but all levels of command are urged to define the problem. The assertion is that understanding the

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**assessing cause and effect in political-military endeavors, such as counterinsurgency warfare, will never produce certitude**
problem depends on the perspective of the problem solver rather than objective truth. Consequently, whatever systems analysis occurs in design will be ideographic, structured by the peculiarity of the command or the commander defining the problem. This fact has important implications for assessing cause and effect.

As observed earlier, physical laws are symmetric, with the relationship going either way. Causality goes in one direction. In scientific terms, causal relationships show, first, temporal priority. Next, the link between what is named the cause and what is designated the effect must be connected in space and time; they must be located in reasonable proximity. Lastly, whenever the action is performed, the same effect is observed. This outcome is called constant conjunction. However, in the social world, the last requirement is never met. For example, the political phenomenon called civil war is not always conjoined with such factors as unequal distribution of wealth or general poverty. In particular contexts, poverty could be named the effect and civil war the cause rather than the reverse. Thus, political-military planning for contingencies will always deal with some level of uncertainty depending on how the problem is defined.

More importantly, it is arguable that notions of causality in the social world are learned. Given the absence of universal social laws and the complexity of the social world, inferring from observations that one condition is the cause and another the effect may simply be an artifact of the observer’s previous education or an expression of the observer’s political culture. If cause and effect are learned through individual experience, it is likely that the observer will have considered too few variables and there may be no confidence in those inferences when they are applied in new conditions. The purpose of ONA and the emphasis on measures of performance and effectiveness in EBO were to develop a larger set of data from which to draw inferences and establish greater confidence in the actions to be taken.

There is one additional aspect of causality that planners and policymakers must consider. David Hume observed, “Formal reasoning cannot reveal causation because we cannot deduce the nature of an effect from the description of the cause or the nature of the cause from a description of an effect.” A simple example provided by Wesley Salmon is that of a ceiling light going out. Sitting in the darkened room, it is possible to hypothesize that the bulb burned out. It is equally possible that someone turned the light off at the wall switch, or the circuit breaker was tripped, or an accident at the power station has darkened the area. It is impossible to deduce the actual cause simply by formal reasoning. Some action must be taken to narrow the range of possibilities. The same is true in military planning. The development and maintenance of an ONA and associated measures of effectiveness and performance would have provided a knowledge base from which to develop potential courses of action. However, until actions are taken and results are observed, the effect remains uncertain. That is why in the Australian Adaptation Cycle, actions are taken to stimulate a response to permit assessment of the adversary system before becoming fully committed to a particular course of action. Deterministic causal chains were not part of the EBO concept, but they were a major element of the EBO critique.

Policy and Discourse

All extant versions of design and certainly SOD eschew formal methods and analysis.
There is no simple description of SOD. It claims to find its theoretical underpinnings in systems theory, Soviet operational art, postmodern French philosophy, Chinese military thinking, and a number of other fields.\textsuperscript{40} Advocates claim the SOD concept is based on epistemology—on learning. They assert that SOD differs from the classical Western military approach in that it is based on teleology—action focused on a purpose or objective. The argument is that Western military operational planning focuses too much on achieving a defined endstate. General Wass de Czege argues that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should be understood as a perpetual security campaign in pursuit of desirable change: “There is no beginning and no end state. The idea of an ‘end state’ makes little sense in this context.”\textsuperscript{41} Instead, there is effective learning and adapting. However, in the postmodern world, learning does not lead to knowing. The postmodern “ontology” is the belief that the world appears through language and is situated in discourse. What is spoken exists but knowledge is not possible because meanings cannot be fixed. There are no facts, only interpretations.\textsuperscript{42} In SOD, “making sense of [system] relationships requires hypothetical synthesis in the form of maps and narratives.”\textsuperscript{43} TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5–500 notes that designing is creative and best accomplished through discourse.\textsuperscript{44} While it is questionable that discourse is a reasonable way to develop situational understanding in a military context, it is safe to note that the emphasis on discourse stands contrary to the methods of both physical and social science. It also means that any measures used in sensing the effect of action are likely to be limited to the command and the commander and reflect the general distaste for quantifiable measures.

Despite some enthusiasm for its concepts, the postmodern vocabulary and the military’s professional commitment to action made SOD difficult to sell. Its emphasis on learning and discourse did not easily link with the military planning system’s need to generate products to guide action. This can be seen in FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency. In the chapter entitled “Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations,” contrary to SOD’s emphasis on discourse and interpretation, the text observes, “Design begins with identification of the end state.”\textsuperscript{45} The text refers to rigorous and structured critical discussions as opportunities for interactive learning but observes that the need for continual assessment requires establishing measures of effectiveness during planning.\textsuperscript{46} Unfortunately, the manual is content to leave the definition of the measures to the command.

The Army has moved further away from the original interest in SOD. TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5–500 has been rescinded, as has the Art of Design, Student Text, Version 1.0. Instead of taking the form of a field manual, the concept of design will be addressed in a chapter in the next version of FM 5–0, Army Planning and Orders. However, the SOD focus on problem definition has proven difficult to merge with campaign planning. As alluded to earlier, the Israel Defense Forces used SOD to create a substitute for the Estimate of the Situation and to control the policy dialogue. The discussion of design and SOD in the U.S.
Army has also focused on defining the problem. According to the latest expression of design, it occurs in the context of situations, not problems.47 In the Israeli case, General Moshe Ya'alon observed that the politicians avoided direct, clear, compelling wording. They came to discussion without insights and without basis. It was the military's role to bring the political echelon to understand what was achievable.48 In the words of General Wass de Czege, “Designing wisdom is to initially think two mission levels up to frame the problem context.”49 In the U.S. military command structure, two mission levels up from a combatant command, such as U.S. Central Command, is the National Security Council. If design is applied, the combatant commander will be defining the problem for the Nation.

**Wicked Problems**

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, U.S. combatant commanders have had a role in shaping strategic guidance. This is no surprise. What is different in the case of design is that design intends to address human and social problems. The design literature frequently refers to wicked problems, a term coined in 1973 by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber in an article on general planning theory. At that time, Rittel and Webber were commenting on the dissatisfaction within the policy science community about the lack of success in social and urban planning efforts. They noted, among other things, the difficulty of problem definition; there is no definitive formulation of the problem because problem understanding and problem solution are concomitant.50 For example, if a problem within an insurgency is high youth unemployment that provides a pool of recruits for the insurgents, then the solution is also a problem. Is the problem an unproductive economy, a poor school system, or a corrupt system of land tenure? Coupled with this issue is the fact that solutions are judged by advocates as good or bad.51 Thus, providing aid directly to provinces in Afghanistan might improve efficiency and reduce corruption. However, it would also lessen the importance of the central government whose strengthening is a goal of the United States and the international community. Either course of action is a political value choice, not a technical matter. Interestingly, the Art of Design rephrased this aspect of a wicked problem, stating that solutions are better or worse.52 Substituting better and worse for good and bad may have been an attempt to avoid the appearance of military commanders advocating policy preferences. Unfortunately, the substitution only obscures the inherent normative dimension of wicked problems. FM 3–07, Stability Operations, states that planning for stability operations uses friendly actions to shape a better future,53 leaving the definition of a “better future” to the military planner. Therefore, in many ways, the introduction of design in the Army planning process seems intended to shape the policy preferences of civilian decisionmakers rather than to provide direction for military forces.

The discussion of design in the policy sciences occurred long ago and did not suffer from...
postmodern formulations. Design gives form to some concrete response to a problem, a building (architectural design), a product (product design), or a machine or structure (engineering design). Likewise, policy analysis cannot exist apart from a proposed solution. In each example, design is associated with a field of endeavor. The field has a body of knowledge that informs the search for solutions. The question is whether the definition of solutions or courses of action results from a mix between search and creativity. According to Ernst Alexander, most proposed design methods for problemsolving offer only systematic search approaches or rules of thumb to simplify complex problems. There is a role for creativity in the design process, but a critical element is access to, and utilization of, an information-rich environment. Military commanders generally do not possess a wealth of experience dealing with social and economic policy, nor are they accustomed to thinking in those terms. It is therefore extremely unlikely that the introduction of design in U.S. Army planning doctrine will lead to greater military influence in policymaking. Unfortunately, it seems hardly likely to improve military campaign planning.

The conventional military planning system was built on a base of knowledge. Those who criticized EBO as a departure from the classical approach to warfare saw no need to move from the military domain of knowledge to address contemporary uses of military force. Therefore, EBO’s critics attacked the efforts to create a scientific base of knowledge about cause and effect related to the use of military force. The critics, like General Van Riper, concluded that EBO, ONA, and SoSA were pseudoscientific approaches that degraded professional military thought and operational planning. In defending the classical approach to warfare, these critics undermined efforts to collect information through a process such as ONA and, more importantly, hindered the development of methods needed to analyze the effects of military action in complex contingencies. Had the U.S. military attended to developing measures of performance and effectiveness for counterinsurgencies and stability operations, it might now be possible to extend the experiences in the villages and provinces in Iraq and Afghanistan to formulate courses of action with a good probability of success.

The supporters of SOD latched on to a process that promised to improve the Army’s understanding of “war among the people” without running into the charge that they were trying to apply science to human systems. Unfortunately, the process is better for defining policy than directing military action. Design properly focuses attention on the political-military issues that shape counterinsurgency warfare, but the emphasis on discourse and interpretation is not likely to permit the identification of general lessons or the discovery of cause and effect. Despite the fact that design emphasizes iterative learning, it leaves the development of measures of effectiveness and assessment to the individual command and provides no methods with which to guide the collection of evidence or the interpretation of results. Design does succeed in putting the commander in the center of the discourse process where he can
use experience and intuition to interpret the complex operating environment.

Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen assert in *Harnessing Complexity: The Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* that the key aspect in dealing with complexity is the issue of selection. Choosing a course of action requires selection of either a strategy or an agent, someone whose past performance argues that he will develop a successful strategy. However, whether selecting a strategy or an agent, the organization must define measures of success and methods by which to determine whether success is a result of the strategy or the insight of the agent.\(^5^6\) Attributing success to either a strategy or an agent requires insight into cause and effect. The drive for design and the argument against scientific measures have ensured that the military offers the President only one option, the selection of an agent. In the case of Afghanistan, the agent is General McChrystal. Either his education and experiences inform his intuition or they do not, but there is little else to rely on. Unfortunately, as President Barack Obama demonstrated, U.S. Presidents seldom rely solely on their military commander’s judgments. Presidents want insights into the strategy and some evidence that the proposed strategy will work. One purpose of a military planning system is to enable a commander to present his recommended course of action based upon evidence, not simply his warrant.

Joseph Soeters of the Netherlands Defense Academy, along with others, visited ISAF in Kabul in January 2009 to observe how NATO was implementing EBAO. He found that many commanders were not fully convinced of the usefulness of thinking in terms of effects.\(^5^7\) Nevertheless, he observed, “The military will have to abandon its mindset, because it should be well understood that quantitative data, provided they are reliable, valid, timely, and adequately analyzed, and provided that they have been carefully assessed on these merits, are indispensable.”\(^5^8\) Unfortunately, Soeters learned from Army Colonel Bobby Claflin, director of the Afghan Assessment Group, that, in his words, “our metrics suck.”\(^5^9\)

The truth of Colonel Claflin’s statement was validated soon after President Obama announced his strategy for Afghanistan on December 1, 2009. On December 21, in a *Wall Street Journal* editorial entitled “Fighting a Smarter War in Afghanistan,” Ann Marlowe observed that the valuable data collected by Army platoons and companies during numerous deployments in Afghanistan were neither properly stored nor analyzed, “so most of our soldiers are operating with bare guesses about where the leverage points are in their local populations.”\(^6^0\) She reported that the Army had begun to develop a database with which to support the generals who make policy and a model with which to evaluate whether the Afghan National Army can achieve its growth objective. She also observed, “It seems odd that this model would follow, rather than precede, this fall’s announcements by General Stanley McChrystal about the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces. But data management gaps permeate the Afghan war.”\(^6^1\) In January 2010, Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, along with Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul Batchelor, observed that U.S. intelligence officers and analysts could “do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful campaign.”\(^6^2\) They noted, “In a recent project ordered by the White House, analysts could barely scrape
together enough information to formulate rudimentary assessments of pivotal Afghan districts.” The problem, they concluded, was the tendency to overemphasize detailed information about the enemy at the expense of the political, economic, and cultural environment that supports it. Such data are not terribly relevant in a conventional war, but contextual data are essential in a complex contingency.

The relationship between cause and effect, action and response, in stability operations is not inscrutable. However, the methods and data needed for dealing with complex contingencies differ greatly from those of conventional military operations. Greater attention must be paid to the political, social, economic, and cultural context of the operation because those conditions have a serious impact on how military actions work and how those actions are perceived. Because the effect of any action is conditioned by the environment, it is important to develop confidence in the anticipated effect by observing patterns in a large body of data collected over a long period. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States should already have that data. Regrettably, it does not. In their strident opposition to EBO, ONA, and SoSA, the American military in general and the U.S. Army in particular chose to ignore the assessment of strategies and the need to capture a record of action and response in a complex environment. The military has instead decided to pursue a planning process that avoids the serious study of complex contingencies and substitutes a dialogue with the commander, leaving him to use his experience and intuition to define or discover the right strategy. The President’s strategy review for Afghanistan and recent proposals to reform intelligence indicate that national security decisionmakers place a greater emphasis on data than dialogue. Currently, there are no consistent measures of effectiveness and only a small body of data with which to judge the likelihood of success. Thus, military experience cannot be generalized, and the views of generals are ideographic. Tomislav Z. Ruby, in his response to General Mattis’s memorandum, argued, “Rather than abandoning the concept of EBO, USJFCOM should move to create a change in the U.S. military culture away from accepting inefficiency as long as there is overwhelming power.” General Flynn and his coauthors also call for a change in the military culture. It is past time to incorporate knowledge of the dynamics of complex contingencies into the body of military knowledge.

Notes


5 “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” 2–20.

7 Art of Design, Student Text, Version 1.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, September 24, 2004), 10.

8 The process labeled design has taken various forms in a number of U.S. Army manuals but originated in Israel under the label systemic operational design. The adaptation cycle is that portion of the Australian Adaptive Campaigning–Future Land Operating Concept dealing with the complexities of the modern battlespace. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s effects-based approach to operations applies a systems perspective and the concept of effects in a comprehensive, or whole-of-government, approach to modern campaign planning needs.


11 Ibid.


13 Ibid., 10–11.


16 Ibid., 91.

17 Ibid.


19 Van Riper, 83.


22 Van Riper, 85.


24 JP 1, I–1.


26 Ibid., 44.


31 Mattis, 22.
34 Wass de Czege, 2.
37 Ibid., 13.
38 Ibid., 13–14.
40 Milan N. Vego, “A Case Against Systemic Operational Design,” Joint Force Quarterly 53 (2d Quarter, April 2009), 70.
41 Wass de Czege, 4.
43 Wass de Czege, 3.
44 TRADOC Pam 525–5–500, 15.
46 Ibid., 4–6.
48 Michael, 439–442.
49 Wass de Czege, 8.
51 Ibid., 162–163.
52 Art of Design, 15.
55 Ibid., 283.
58 Ibid., 9.
59 Ibid., 6.
61 Ibid.


63 Ibid., 9.

64 Ruby, 26.
Unlike Caesar’s Gaul, this article consists not of three parts but of five. The first explains how advancing military technology has contributed to military stalemate among the world’s most important states. The second deals with the progress of military technology from 1945 on. The third argues that, in the kind of “complex” wars that have been most common since that date, the technology in question has been largely useless. The fourth focuses on the type of technology that can be used and has proved useful in that kind of war, as well as some of the ways in which it should be used. Finally, the fifth part summarizes conclusions.

Martin van Creveld, formerly of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, is one of the world’s leading writers on military history and strategy, with a special interest in the future of war.
Under the Shadow of the Mushroom Cloud

The first atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. With a yield of 14,000 tons of TNT, it was 1,000 times as powerful as any previous weapon, yet in less than 10 years, advancing technology made it possible to build weapons more powerful than all the arms ever used in all wars since the beginning of history. The race toward greater destructive power peaked in 1961, when the Soviet Union exploded a device with an estimated yield of 58 million tons of TNT—the equivalent of over 4,000 Hiroshima-type bombs. By that time, research into the development of even larger weapons had practically come to a halt—not because it could not be done, but because, in Winston Churchill’s words, all they would do was make the rubble bounce.

During the years immediately after 1945, statesmen, soldiers, and the scientists who worked for them and provided them with ideas could still delude themselves that the next war would be like the previous one—give or take a few cities turned into smoking, radiating ruins. However, after 1955 or so, the arrival of so-called nuclear plenty caused that belief to fade. Most people now understood the fact that, should all-out nuclear war break out, there would be neither victory nor economic and demographic recovery in the previously accepted sense of those terms. Possibly there would not even remain a livable world for humanity—including future generations—to enjoy.

The decades since Hiroshima have not witnessed the most powerful weapons ever devised being used in war. On the contrary, as far as the superpowers were concerned, those weapons helped create a balance of terror that proved remarkably stable and enduring. By the mid-1950s at the latest, both superpowers were fully aware that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, from any attempt at annihilating each other. From that point on, whatever confrontations that still took place between them were increasingly limited to relatively unimportant issues in places far away from Washington, DC, and Moscow. From this point on, the effect spread like ink stains.

The first to feel the impact were the superpowers’ close allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. These countries received nuclear guarantees, often bolstered by a physical presence of troops on the ground. It is true that those guarantees could never be made entirely credible; when it came to the clinch, would the United States really sacrifice Washington and New York in order to save Munich and Hamburg? Still, in practice nobody ever dared put them to the test, leaving the allies almost as safe against all-out attack as the superpowers themselves. In the end, the demise of the Cold War made the issue more or less irrelevant. It created a situation where the President of France, for example, could declare that his country no longer had an enemy within a thousand miles—and where several other NATO members wondered why they still needed armed forces at all.

To the east of the Iron Curtain, countries such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland could have built nuclear weapons from the mid-1960s on. However,
any thoughts that they may have had in that direction were smothered by the Soviet Union, which did not favor such shows of independence on the part of its satellites. Now that the Soviet Union is gone and buried, they apparently still do not feel sufficiently threatened to make the effort. Instead, they have contented themselves by joining NATO. Similarly in the West, virtually all “old” NATO members (and, on the other side of the world, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) could have built nuclear weapons from about 1960 on, yet again, the majority have refrained. Whatever the precise reasons behind their decisions, the fact that most of these countries have everything needed to build nuclear weapons within a matter of months if not weeks is important in itself. It reflects the reality that, whatever may happen in the future, almost certainly they, too, will continue to be safe from all-out external attack even if, and when, the alliances which used to give them protection are dissolved.

Finally, two important NATO members did go ahead and build their own nuclear weapons, Great Britain in 1953 and France in 1960. Both have since constructed technically advanced arsenals. Yet both found that those arsenals were completely overshadowed—by those of, first, the United States and then the Soviet Union/Russia. Except insofar as they afforded some doubtful protection in case the United States failed to live up to its obligations, as long as NATO confronted the Warsaw Pact, the existence of the British and French nuclear arsenals made only little difference to the overall balance between West and East. Now that the Cold War is over, those arsenals, while costing billions to maintain, probably signify even less. Whether their existence means that Britain and France are more “secure” or more “influential” than, say, nonnuclear states such as Germany or Japan is moot. Be that as it may, the fact is that, in all the decades since 1945, not one of these potentially powerful nations has fought a single large-scale war against any other even remotely as strong. Nor does it look as if this situation is going to change.

Though nuclear developments outside the areas covered by NATO and the Warsaw Pact were much more interesting, broadly speaking, they too moved in the same direction. The first developing country that, amid much fear of impending doom, acquired nuclear weapons was China. At the time, its leader was Mao Tse-tung, a man committed to world revolution whose declarations concerning the need to destroy imperialism even at the cost of nuclear war and the death of hundreds of millions were perhaps the most hair-raising ever made. And yet in practice, the possession of the bomb seems to have caused Mao, let alone his more pragmatic successors, to bare his teeth less often, rather than more. During the 15 years from the revolution of 1949 to the acquisition of the bomb, China was involved in no fewer than four armed conflicts, two of them large: Korea, 1950–1953; Taiwan, 1954; Quemoy, 1958; and India, 1962. Since then, there has only been one: Vietnam, 1979. Even that campaign lasted only a week or so. Picking on a small, weak country, Chinese forces penetrated to a depth of about 15 miles before they withdrew.

India has probably been capable of building nuclear weapons from the late 1960s on. In 1974, the country launched a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion. In 1998, it conducted three nuclear tests. As in the case of China, the overall effect has been to make India less trigger-happy. Between 1947 and 1971, India fought three major wars. Since then, its largest military effort was the so-called Cargill War of 1999, when a semiregular, battalion-sized infantry
force coming from Pakistan advanced a few hundred meters into Indian territory and had to be expelled. Like the Chinese, the Indians now probably possess every type of nuclear weapon from the strategic to the tactical. As in every other case so far, the outcome of nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been peace—or, at the very least, the disappearance of the kind of large-scale military operations that used to take place on the subcontinent until 1971.

Following the Indian tests, Pakistan too exploded three nuclear devices. Torn out of India’s rib, Pakistan’s very raison d’etre is to present a counterweight to that country. As one of its prime ministers, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, once put it, no dispute in the world is as bitter as the one between Muslims and Hindus.

Another country widely believed to own nuclear weapons, as well as highly sophisticated delivery vehicles for putting them on target, is Israel. Unlike the rest, Israel, perhaps in fear of triggering an arms race and/or angering the United States, has neither admitted the existence of the bomb nor conducted a test when it was first assembled (probably in 1967). One could argue that, by permitting Egypt and Syria to behave as if their adversary did not have nuclear weapons and launch the October 1973 war, this policy of “ambiguity” has been enormously damaging to Israel. Be this as it may, the fact remains that, since then, there have been no more wars of the same kind; even the 1982 invasion of Lebanon fell far short of its predecessors. Two of Israel’s neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, are now formally at peace with it. A third, Syria, has lost so much of its military clout that another war between it and Israel seems extremely unlikely. In view of what has been taking place in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories, nobody would call the Middle East peaceful. Still, things are much better than they were before 1973, when major hostilities broke out every few years, leading to thousands of dead and, at one point, raising the specter of a world war.

North Korea already has nuclear weapons whereas Iran is almost certainly doing what it can to acquire them as soon as possible. Neither of these countries is nice and democratic and neither is exactly open about the reasons behind its nuclear program. Yet in the case of North Korea, a few nuclear bombs have done nothing to disturb the peace of the peninsula and may have strengthened it. A very good argument could also be made that a nuclear Iran, provided it is wisely deterred, will result in fewer wars, not more. This, of course, is guesswork. Yet the fact that we do not yet know the consequences...
that ownership of nuclear weapons by these two countries may bring is no reason for ignoring the global experience of 60 years. This experience indicates that, wherever the weapons in question appeared—even in small numbers, even when their delivery vehicles were primitive, and even when their owners were as mad as Joseph Stalin is said to have been in his latter days—the outcome was peace. Or, if not peace, then stalemate.

The Decline of Conventional Warfare

When the first nuclear weapons were introduced, it looked as if they would make the military of the countries that possessed them more powerful than ever. In fact, the opposite has happened; faced with devices that could literally blow the world apart, politicians everywhere looked at Georges Clemenceau's dictum—that war was too serious a business to be left to generals—with new eyes. As far as we know, in every country that built the bomb, the existing military chain of command was bypassed or modified in favor of direct control by heads of state. The nuclear arsenal might be entrusted to a separate organization considered politically reliable, as was done in the Soviet Union. Alternatively, technical arrangements were made to ensure that the military could not fire them on their own initiative even if they wanted to. Either way, to the soldiers was left the less responsible task of playing with conventional (read second-class) weapons.

Spurred by an unlimited confidence in its power that was the product of World War II, as well as by competition between the superpowers, military technology grew and blossomed. The most important countries competed among themselves by building successive generations of ships, aircraft, missiles, and land-fighting machines—each one larger, more powerful, and, of course, much more expensive than all its predecessors. Even as existing weapons grew larger, they were joined by some that were entirely new. Among the earliest were helicopters, some of which had been tested even before World War II and which started entering the inventories around the time of the Korean War. Small and light, the first helicopters were used mainly for observation, liaison, and casualty evacuation. As larger and better ones entered service, they were used as flying command posts and for the transportation of troops and of logistic loads. By the early 1970s, helicopters began to be armed with missiles, which gave them a formidable air-to-ground capability. As a result, the balance between land forces—armored ones above all—and flying ones began to shift.

The second important technical advance that changed the face of conventional warfare consisted of guided missiles. The very first guided missiles, intended for antiaircraft and antitank use, were on the drawing boards when World War II ended. By the mid-1950s, some of them had entered service, but their operational impact remained limited. This, however, changed from about 1967 on. Entire
warfare much more lethal than ever. Whereas originally radar- and laser-guided missiles were very expensive, the introduction of the Global Positioning System made them much cheaper. Particularly in the air and at sea, and to a lesser extent on land, they are now well on the way to replacing all but the smallest unguided (that is, ballistic) projectiles.

Probably the third most important post-1945 development in military technology has been unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). First introduced during Vietnam, and assisted by the advent of microelectronics that permitted improved capabilities without a corresponding growth in size and weight, they have undergone tremendous development. Both on land and at sea, UASs are now used for communication, electronic warfare, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, damage assessment, air defense suppression, and many similar functions. At the time of writing, the first experiments are under way in equipping UASs with air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles. Should these experiments be crowned with success, as is likely sooner or later, the days of manned aircraft clearly will be numbered.

Coming on top of all these developments, the 1990s witnessed what many commentators called the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The proliferation of precision-guided weapons apart, at the heart of the RMA were vastly improved systems of command, control, communications, computers (that serve to store, process, and display the vast amounts of data generated), and intelligence (that is, sensors of every kind, from ground radar to infrared). Some of the systems are based on the ground, at sea, and in the air. Others are carried by satellites. Between them, they promised vastly improved surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and damage assessment, as well as much greater speed, flexibility, and lethality in orchestrating the operations of the above mentioned weapons and delivering ordnance to target.

Whereas preparations for conventional war went on much as before, in practice such wars as actually took place were fought exclusively between, or against, smaller and smaller opponents that, for one reason or another, had not yet acquired nuclear weapons. Though everybody talked about RMA, in practice large parts of it were confined to the United States and Israel. The former was spending more on defense than the next 14 countries combined; the latter was spending proportionally more than twice as much on defense as the United States. In addition, Israel received an annual sum of over $3 billion in American military aid, which had to be spent regardless of whether it made military sense or not. While these two nations raced ahead, most other developed countries kept cutting their armed forces until, by the first decade of the 21st century, they had been reduced to a shadow of their former selves. The situation of many others, particularly in the former Eastern Bloc, was much worse still. Their old, Soviet-era weapons are now only fit for the junkyards. Unable to afford up-to-date weapons, their military capabilities often have been reduced almost to zero.

To sum up, in the developed world since 1945, and in most of the developing nations since 1970 or 1980, the history of conventional war is one of constant, though uneven, shrinkage. True, large-scale instances of conventional war still took place here and there. In some cases, the balance of forces was so skewed that little could be learned from the clashes, as when the United States fought Iraq and, unsurprisingly, crushed it. In others, such as the Iran-Iraq war, so far behind were the belligerents in
respect to modern technology that the conflict in many ways resembled not World War II but World War I (including the use of poison gas, a weapon well suited for stationary positions). While other factors also played a role in the process, the decisive factor was that the more powerful a country, the more likely it was to acquire nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Far from representing progress, as RMA advocates and others claim, much of this was best understood as degeneration. Since the basic security of developed countries is provided by nuclear weapons or the ability to build them quickly, and since cost, even in the United States, only amounted to about 4 percent of gross domestic product, it did not matter. The process might even have gone on indefinitely without disturbing anyone in particular. This, however, did not happen.

**From Conventional War to Complex Warfare**

While the armed forces of the most important countries—and, increasingly, those of some developing ones as well—talked of an RMA and tried to implement it by buying high-tech weapons, war did not stand still. Instead of fighting each other, more of those forces found themselves trying to oppose others of a completely different kind. A worldwide survey of the 65 years since 1945 confirms that, out of about 120 armed conflicts, some 80 percent were waged by, or against, entities that were not states. Some of those entities at least had a political aim of sorts. A growing number, though, were private—a good example is the Abu Sayyaf organization that has been infesting the southern Philippines—and could barely be distinguished from bands of criminals. Whether or not this was true, few were sufficiently large, sophisticated, or well organized to be called armies. Even fewer possessed many, if any, of the modern weapons systems just described.

As many episodes remind us—the best known of which are the uprising against Louis XIV in the Palatinate, the Vendée uprising of 1793, and the Spanish guerrilla campaign against Napoleon—even in Europe conventional interstate war was never the only kind. Moreover, between 1700 and 1939, Europeans themselves often fought in America, Asia, and Africa. However, what took place in those campaigns could not be compared to European warfare either in terms of size or (unless it was a question of European forces clashing with each other) technological sophistication. Very often, the issues were decided in Madrid, Amsterdam, Paris, or London. By the last years of the 19th century, European (including, honoris causa, American and Japanese) military superiority had grown to the point where borders in Africa, for instance, were being drawn by means of a ruler on a blank map without any reference to the local population.

Insofar as the Germans had lost their colonies in 1918, the fact that the Wehrmacht was one of the first 20th-century armies to learn that it did not have the field entirely to itself was paradoxical. As they moved into the countries of southeastern and eastern Europe, the Nazis, on Hitler’s explicit orders, deliberately set out to uproot the law of war that for 300
years had sought to offer protection to civilians. As a result, those civilians in turn did not acquiesce in their lot but engaged in guerrilla operations against the invaders. First in Yugoslavia, Russia, Greece, and Poland, then in other countries such as Italy, France, and even peaceful Holland, Belgium, and Scandinavia, the Germans were faced by armed opposition that disrupted their rule, tied down resources, and inflicted casualties. As the number of victims shows, they were perhaps the most ruthless conquerors in history. Yet the more brutal the operations of such organizations as the SS (Schutzstaffel), SD (Sicherheitsdienst), Gestapo, and Einsatzgruppen, the stronger the resistance and the greater the readiness, even eagerness, of people who initially had been prepared to tolerate occupation or even assist it to now oppose it instead.

Whether, had the war lasted 30 years instead of 6, Churchill’s 1940 demand that Europe be “set ablaze” from end to end could have been met and the continent liberated even without large-scale operations can never be known. I think the answer is yes. As it was, the resistance in most German- (and Japanese-) occupied countries was cut short, but not before it had shown other people what could be done. The war was scarcely over when, all over colonized Asia and Africa, leaders started claiming that they, too, were subject to unlawful occupation, and that, unless the occupiers withdrew, they too would resort to armed resistance. This logic quickly led to a whole series of wars of national liberation in places such as Palestine (1946–1948), Indonesia (1947–1949), Indochina (1947–1953, 1964–1975), Malaysia (1948–1960), Kenya (1953–1958), Algeria (1955–1962), Cyprus (1959–1960), and Aden (1967–1969). By 1960, the majority of European colonies either had achieved their independence or were well on their way. Fifteen years later, when the Portuguese finally gave up Angola and Mozambique, scarcely a colony remained.

The colonial heritage of three centuries dictated that most wars of this kind were initially fought against armed forces fielded by Western European countries. After 1975, though, this changed. The Cubans in Angola, Soviets in Afghanistan, Ethiopians in Eritrea, and Israelis in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories (where 16 years’ effort ended in a decision to withdraw from Gaza) all tried their hand at counterinsurgency and failed. The same fate overcame the Vietnamese in Cambodia, South Africans in Namibia, Indians in Sri Lanka, and Indonesians in East Timor. Since many of these wars led to millions of deaths, clearly the failures were not due, as has been claimed, to excessive scruples. To the contrary, the campaign that was arguably the most successful of all—the British effort in Northern Ireland—was also among the most restrained and law-abiding. Some of the things the British did were not pretty. Still, they never brought in heavy weapons, opened fire indiscriminately, took hostages, or imposed collective punishments.

How can one explain the victories of people—call them bandits, terrorists, guerrillas, or freedom fighters—who, often so poor that they did not even have proper shoes, took on some of the mightiest armed forces in history and won? While circumstances differed from one theater of war to another, at bottom the answer was always the same. Almost by definition, the more modern an army is, the more advanced the military technology at its disposal and the more specialized that technology for combating and quickly defeating forces with similar, if less well developed, equipment. That technology, though, was
much less useful in fighting an enemy who did not represent a territorial state, did not have permanent bases or lines of communications, did not possess heavy weapons whose “signature” sensors could pick up, and, most importantly, could not be distinguished from the surrounding population. As far back
As 1941, this rule applied to the Germans trying to combat Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s partisans. As of early 2010, it applied equally well to the

**during the first 40 years after 1945, practically all nonstate conflicts—ranging from subconventional war to terrorism and from wars of national liberation to ordinary crime—took place in the developing world**

Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. The jury on these campaigns is still out. Whatever the outcome, in both countries, coping with postcombat resistance has been considerably more difficult, and has led to considerably more casualties, than occupying them in the first place.

At bottom, there are two reasons why much modern military technology is unsuitable to this kind of warfare. First, from time immemorial, most of the campaigns in question took place in theaters where extensive networks of roads, supply depots, communications, and so forth have been unavailable. Since such facilities are vital to the operations of modern armies, however, they must be built from scratch and, having been built, defended. As the American experience in Vietnam and the Israeli effort in Southern Lebanon showed, the result can be the creation of a financial black hole as well as a situation where a lot of the forces, tied down to defensive missions, lose their morale and will to fight. Indeed, often the majority of them hardly fire a shot. Nevertheless, feeling vulnerable at each step, they tend to collapse under their own weight.

The second reason why so much modern military technology is unsuitable for the purpose at hand is just the opposite from the first. Practically all subconventional conflicts and terrorism campaigns take place in extremely complicated environments. Either they have been created by nature, such as mountains, forests, and swamps, or they are made up of people, their dwellings, roads, vehicles, communications, and means of production. In such cluttered environments, the sensors on which modern weapons rely tend to work less well than in open spaces. Often the latter’s range and power are translated into indiscriminateness, which in turn becomes counterproductive and, instead of dousing the flames, fans them.

During the first 40 years after 1945, practically all nonstate conflicts—ranging from subconventional war to terrorism and from wars of national liberation to ordinary crime—took place in the developing world. Since then, however, they have started spreading to developed countries as well—as the events of 9/11, when about 3,000 people in the most powerful country of all lost their lives, amply showed. The results are there for all to see. Even as the USA PATRIOT Act took away some of the liberties that civilized people have been taking for granted, Washington, DC, is being turned into a fortress; where antiaircraft missiles used to accompany America’s forces in the field, now they provide cover to the White House. From Australia to the United Kingdom, other countries are taking similar measures. For example, to defend the 2004 Olympic Games against possible terrorist acts, the Greek government spent $1.5 billion, equal to about 40 percent of the country’s annual defense budget; however much many people may regret the fact, armed conflict has indeed entered a brave new world.

**Technology in Complex Warfare**

The above should not be understood to mean that, when it comes to fighting war
“among the people” and in extremely complex environments, technology is entirely helpless; what it does mean is that we need the appropriate technology to be used by the appropriate organization in the appropriate way.

To start with the basics, the most important advantage that guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents, and the like enjoy over their opponents is stealth. To resort to Mao’s celebrated if worn dictum, guerrillas operate like fish in the sea. The sea feeds them and provides them with cover. By enabling them to compensate for their weakness in fields such as numbers, organization, and equipment, stealth also acts as a true force multiplier. Yet this equation has an obverse side: To remain hidden, insurgents must disperse—the more of them there are at any one place, the more easily they are found. They must also avoid movement as much as possible. If insurgents stay in one place, their ability to mobilize and operate will be reduced to a minimum. Even worse for them (but better for their opponents), their location eventually will be betrayed or otherwise discovered, and an immobilized insurgent is a dead insurgent. To survive and operate, they must communicate and move. Yet movements and communications are precisely the points that render them vulnerable.

Since prehistoric times, the most effective means to prevent movement have always been physical obstacles. Among them are walls, fences, ditches, swept areas, and the like. Some obstacles consist of roadblocks and are mobile and temporary; others are stationary and permanent. Nowadays, the latter can also be supplemented by mines. Except for the addition of mines, until recently such obstacles were relatively crude and had remained almost unchanged for millennia. However, over the last few decades, technological advances made it possible to supplement obstacles with a variety of what are often extremely sophisticated sensors. Among them are entire families of closed-circuit television cameras; infrared devices that greatly improve night vision; various X-ray–based machines that can make it difficult to smuggle weapons, equipment, or explosives through gates of every kind; pressure transducers that translate mechanical force into electricity, thus making it possible to detect attempts to cut through fences or climb over them; and UASs that can stay in the air for hours or even days while constantly surveilling.

The correct use of such devices demands that several principles be followed. First, the country should be carved into relatively small segments. In other words, the technology in use must be relatively dense on the ground or else it will simply be bypassed or ignored. Second, since no sensor can do everything under any set of conditions or is impossible to outwit, it is important to combine as many sensors of as many different kinds as possible. Careful planning and design must be applied to ensure that they complement, not cancel out, one another. Depending on conditions and on what we are trying to achieve, the presence of some sensors may be revealed by way of a deterrent measure. Others, though, will have to remain secret and their exact nature and modus operandi carefully guarded. Third, surveillance must be both continuous and temporary. Continuity is needed to make the insurgents’ life as difficult as possible at all times, putting restrictions on what they can do, whereas temporary surveillance, suddenly applied at selected times and places, is intended to respond to intelligence about them or else take them by surprise and keep them off balance.

Until the first half of the 19th century inclusive, practically all communications were dependent on messengers of various kinds, that
is, on physical movement. To that extent, they could be dealt with by means of the mobility-impeding measures and technologies just described. Nowadays, the need for movement has been much reduced, though not eliminated, by electronic communications. To their users, such communications provide tremendous advantages in terms of cost, speed, range, and, above all, flexibility. Often, they permit instant contact regardless of time of day, weather, position, distance, movement, and obstacles of every kind. Yet electronic communications also have vulnerabilities that can be exploited. All kinds of equipment can be used to determine their place of origin and their destination. They may also be jammed or intercepted. Once intercepted, the messages’ contents may be deciphered and then either be spoofed or used against its originators and recipients alike. By no means is any of this simple. It requires technological devices of the most sophisticated kind, including, above all, computers to mine, store, sort, and fuse data.

While sensors can identify insurgents, they cannot counter them or fight them once they have been discovered. Hence, it is essential to have at hand various forms of armed forces that can respond to alerts. Some of the forces will be permanently assigned to patrol walls, man roadblocks, and so forth. Others will be highly mobile, consisting of commandoes with appropriate air or ground transportation; helicopters; small, relatively slow aircraft with the appropriate mix of weapons; and, most recently, weapon-carrying UASs such as the American Predator and others. To cut observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA) loops, the entire complex must be firmly commanded by a single hand. Yet unity of command also creates problems; overcentralization can be as bad as overdecentralization. It is indispensable that subordinate elements in the system be granted a degree of independence to ensure quick responses and relieve central headquarters of the need to make many trivial decisions.

Provided all this is done correctly, modern technology can indeed go a long way toward dealing with complex war, or war among the people, or whatever else it may be called. No better proof of this fact can be obtained than the following document, originating with the Hamas leadership in Gaza. It was kindly provided to me by General (Ret.) Professor Yitzhak Ben Israel, former chief of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for technology and logistics:

- The Zionist enemy has successfully killed many of our fighting brethren, and this at a time when we dearly need every pure fighter.
- Without a doubt, negligence is one of the main reason[s] why the enemy has succeeded, for his electronic espionage aircraft never leave the skies of Gaza. The multiple eyes involved in the mission never sleep, and standing in readiness behind them, waiting for an opportunity, are the Apache helicopters with their missiles.
- You are being closely observed 24 hours per day. Each and every day and hour, you are a candidate for targeted killing.
- All fighters must consider themselves potential targets, and nobody should delude himself by thinking he is not.
- All brothers must avoid using telephones to determine the timing of their trips and the routes to be used, for all the frequencies on which the
telephones work are being intercepted. You are being followed and pursued.

- No brother should use a car to move from one place to another, since you do not know who is following you. It may be the owner of the local grocery store, or a friend whose house overlooks yours, or a peddler, or somebody in a vehicle who is observing your house 24 hours a day.

- In case the brethren have no alternative but using a car, they should drive alone, so as to make sure there are no other activists in it.

- All the brethren must move only if doing so is really necessary, and if possible do so only in alleyways. Driving along, they must mislead the enemy by wearing certain clothes, changing direction, and so on.

According to Professor Ben Israel, perhaps 90 percent of the successes the IDF obtained in combating the Second Intifada between 2000 and 2003 were due to technology.

Four caveats are needed here. First, as the document itself makes clear, technology, however sophisticated and however well adapted to the purpose at hand, is not enough. Equally important is human intelligence, which in turn can only be based on an excellent understanding of the society in which the insurgents operate and its history, traditions, culture, and, above all, language. All these are fields in which technology can only be of limited assistance.

Second, the technology used for waging war in complex environments, while hardly cheap, is not nearly as expensive as that used in regular interstate warfare. We are not talking of hundreds or even of tens of millions of dollars.

Furthermore, many of the skills it demands are not unique to the military but are widely available in the civilian world. This means that given time, the technology will almost certainly be available to the insurgents, too. It is therefore essential for those who wage complex warfare to engage in a continuous process of research and development in order to ensure that the available means not be turned against them and that they retain their technological edge.

Third, it is essential to use the technology, the information it makes available, and the firepower it provides in the most discriminating manner possible. Every effort must be made to ensure that those members of the population who want nothing more than to continue with their lives as best they can are not hurt either by accident or by design. The worst thing a belligerent engaged in complex warfare against insurgents can do is to hit indiscriminately. Not only will such a policy generate new enemies faster than old enemies can be eliminated, but it will also lead to the progressive demoralization of one’s own forces.

Finally, as already said, to be effective the technology needs to be dense on the ground. If the country is too large to allow this—means, after all, are always limited—then choices will have to be made as to where it is best used. In doing so, geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and military factors will have to be
taken into account. There is no substitute for a thorough understanding of all of those, and the only rule is that there is no rule.

**Conclusion**

Ever since 1945, technology, meaning nuclear technology, has been turning large-scale war between important countries into an extinct species. Not only has nuclear war not broken out but conventional war, for fear of escalation, has been getting swept under the carpet as well. Yet unfortunately the result has not been peace on Earth; instead, conventional war has been increasingly replaced by what, in this journal, is known as complex war. As countless conflicts from the late 1940s to the early 2000s prove, in this kind of war, much conventional military technology is practically useless. To the extent that it is unable to discriminate, it may even be counterproductive.

To fight and win complex wars, entirely different technologies are needed. Broadly speaking, the goal should be to exploit the insurgents’ most important vulnerability—namely, their need to move from place to place and communicate with each other. The means employed, as briefly described above, should range from the crudest walls to the most sophisticated sensors and computers. As in all warfare, great care should be taken to shorten the OODA loop (or the “killing chain,” as it is sometimes called) by finding the happy medium between centralization and decentralization. Since the technologies used are often widely available, and since it is only a matter of time before the terrorists will have them as well, continuous research and development are needed. Last but not least, the available technological means will only be of use provided those who use them are intimately familiar with every aspect of the society in the midst of which they operate.

Tall orders, no doubt. But they are also the only way finally to halt the nearly endless series of defeats that the world’s most powerful armed forces have suffered in complex wars. **PRISM**
Over the past several years, U.S. Government agencies have been revising their thinking on counterinsurgency and stability operations. Despite recent doctrine and guidance about better ways to end conflict and promote lasting peace, however, something has been missing from the dialogue: a successful model of reintegration and economic growth in an Islamic insurgency that has taken combatants off the battlefield permanently. One of the best places to look for such a case study of fighting and winning “smart” is in Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

Since the U.S. incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq, scholars, strategists, and policymakers seem interested in discovering how to fight smarter or, preferably, how to win without fighting. Americans have been rediscovering writers such as David Galula, author of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, whose experiences in the Algerian civil war helped guide counterinsurgency thinking during the Vietnam War. They have also unearthed long-forgotten publications such as the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual and issued a plethora of new doctrines, manuals, joint publications, and directives. More recently, David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One offered an indirect approach to counterinsurgency that emphasizes local relationships and capacity-building in light of efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach, he asserts, is most effective in complex environments that include accidental guerrillas—individuals who enter into conflict not as an existential threat to another nation-state but as defenders of their own space.

As if designed with Kilcullen’s policy prescriptions in mind, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) program began in 1995 and will run through 2012 in its current phase (GEM 3), helping to accelerate broad-based economic growth and supporting the peace process in Mindanao.¹ This article responds to a call by James Kunder, USAID’s former acting Deputy Administrator, to tell the stories of successful responses
to complex situations. It explains the success of the peace process undertaken by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), particularly the key role played by the USAID/GEM program. These USAID/GEM lessons might be applied to other conflicts, such as those in Colombia, Afghanistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan that now affect national security and have proven so costly to the United States in blood and treasure.

**Background**

Mindanao is the second largest of the 7,000 islands that make up the Republic of the Philippines. It contains one-fourth of the national population and one-third of the land area. It is home to the country’s Muslim minority—about 4.5 million of Mindanao’s 22 million people are Muslim. Islamic communities are primarily in central Mindanao and in the chain of islands stretching south and southwest, the Sulu Archipelago. Although Mindanao as a whole has lagged behind much of the rest of the Philippines in development, the Muslim population has long felt especially neglected, believing they have been discriminated against politically and economically, which has led to calls for secession and autonomy over the past century. This sentiment was as pronounced when American Soldiers and Marines fought there at the dawn of the 20th century as it is today; but, thanks to the success of an economic growth strategy, this view is changing.

The counterinsurgency remains a complex operation in every sense. Mindanao is awash in noninsurgent armed groups comprising the private militias of local politicians, criminal gangs, and village (or barangay) self-defense organizations. Furthermore, the social environment includes a longstanding gun culture as pervasive as that in the United States, which requires an unusual approach to disarmament.

After decades of violent conflict and almost 20 years of on-and-off peace negotiations, enlightened leaders in the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) came together in the mid-1990s to forge a peace agreement. Before this agreement was signed with the MNLF, the government was also facing combat in Mindanao against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); New People’s Army (NPA), a communist group; and Abu Sayyaf, an affiliate of al Qaeda. By taking more than 40,000 active combatants of the MNLF out of the fight, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and MNLF was the Philippine equivalent of the Camp David Accords that took Egyptian forces out of the military confrontation with Israel.

**Case Study**

The MNLF fighters who confronted the Philippine government for decades before the 1996 Final Peace Agreement almost exactly meet Kilcullen’s definition of the accidental guerrilla. They did not represent an existential threat to the GRP; rather, they saw the encroachment of the largely Roman Catholic Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) into their ancestral territory as an existential threat to their religion and way of life. This situation is analogous to the current situation in the FATA of Pakistan, where a Punjabi-led Pakistani army is fighting Pashtun tribes and clans. Although there the adversaries...
are all Muslim, in the eyes of many Pashtuns, the Punjabis are as foreign to their culture and more conservative sect of Islam as the American, Russian, or British soldiers they have confronted over the past century or more. In the case of the MNLF, although they were surrounded and outnumbered by non-Muslims, their fight was based on cultural identity and survival. Thus, the keys to defusing their violent resistance were to include them, increase their autonomy, and ensure their security from government forces and other armed actors, including additional Muslims who were set on more radical paths.

Although it did not begin with Kilcullen’s doctrine as a script, the USAID/GEM program invoked strategies to help the MNLF preserve Moro cultural identity and promoted long-term peace through sustainable economic growth. Kilcullen prescribes five facilitating strategies to create an environment that wins over a disaffected population:

❖ a political strategy that builds government effectiveness and legitimacy
❖ a comprehensive approach that closely integrates civilian and military efforts
❖ continuity of key personnel and policies
❖ population-centric security founded on presence, local community partnerships, and self-defending populations
❖ close and genuine partnerships that put the host-nation government in the lead.

Using this framework, we detail the successes of the USAID/GEM program, which further validate his points.

**Political Strategy**

The peace agreement mandated that in its first or transitional phase of implementation, a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) be established. In the second phase, following a plebiscite, areas within the SZOPAD that elected to join the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a region with its own government composed of all the Philippines’ predominantly Muslim provinces, would do so.

Although the agreement included many political and diplomatic provisions, the U.S. Government through USAID/GEM focused its initial investments following peace with the MNLF on facilitating sustainable economic growth primarily through agriculture-related activities; reintegrating former combatants; and investing in community infrastructure, business development, workforce preparation, computer literacy, and local governance improvement. The United States also plays a military role in Mindanao through a highly regarded and effective Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) that is training the AFP as it fights insurgents who have not joined the peace process and who are located in the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, which overlap the ARMM. Also, all USAID mission programming increasingly focused on the conflict-affected areas over time.

Explicit in the document was a promise of economic and sociopolitical development for MNLF fighters who agreed to abide by the peace process. Security provisions included that 5,750 MNLF fighters be integrated into the AFP and the Philippine National Police, and this provision has expanded to include the integration of up to 7,500 former insurgents.

All development activities have local participation leveraged by substantial government investment in infrastructure, education, and workforce preparation targeted to meet community needs. Operating under the oversight of the GRP Mindanao Economic Development Council, USAID/GEM has collaborated with
national government line agencies, provincial and local governments, business support organizations (chambers of commerce and producer associations), educational institutions, and district engineers. This local investment and cost sharing by the community help ensure long-term sustainability of investments in community infrastructure, programs for schools, and computer literacy expansion. These counterpart contributions range from 25 to 50 percent of the cost and are ensured by intensive on-site monitoring. Where communities do not fulfill their agreements to operate and maintain facilities correctly, additional assistance is withheld until problems are corrected. The result is observable progress for stakeholders on the ground and increased credibility and legitimacy of the government and its leadership.

Public diplomacy surrounding the USAID/GEM projects demonstrates the resolve of both the Philippine and U.S. governments to bring the benefits of peace to stakeholders and provides reasons for residents not to pursue insurgency. American Ambassadors and their deputies travel often from Manila to Mindanao or to Jolo and the outer islands for USAID/GEM ribbon-cutting ceremonies, sometimes attending multiple ceremonies on the same day. Additionally, local leaders proudly proclaim these USAID projects as their own, due in large part to local counterpart investments and ongoing operations and maintenance responsibilities. In turn, former MNLF combatants see their leaders and former commanders making decisions that affect their lives and interacting with foreign dignitaries.

In his case study on Afghanistan, Kilcullen makes a strong case that a road, done right, is more than a road. With local input, local labor, and genuine cooperation between the recipients and their leaders, roads connect not only places but also people and their governments. All USAID/GEM infrastructure projects, including roads, have been carried out in exactly this manner, and the results in government legitimization have been palpable.

**Comprehensive Approach**

USAID/GEM is accepted into conflict-affected communities by wary residents because it is a civilian development program carried out by noncombatant civilians. It has developed into a comprehensive, multidisciplinary program that addresses a wide range of livelihood, infrastructure, education, and governance needs, complementing strategic objectives by helping stabilize communities and focusing stakeholder attention on economic growth and not insurgency. Taken holistically, USAID/GEM contributes to the creation of an enabling environment required for sustainable economic growth. All the components of USAID/GEM contribute to the development of business opportunities and trade.

USAID/GEM personnel interact regularly with local government units, cooperatives and firms, and civil society organizations, and periodically work with the AFP civil-military officers at the battalion, brigade, and division levels. They discuss security concerns and identify the need for village-level infrastructure projects such as boat landings, farm-to-market roads, irrigation systems, matching grants, and computer Internet centers in schools, which are sometimes constructed by the AFP. Field commanders also take every opportunity to encourage USAID/GEM personnel to initiate needed projects in their areas of operations.

Although the AFP is a capable fighting force that constantly keeps the pressure on non-MNLF insurgents and other perpetrators of violence in Mindanao, its senior officers and
field commanders have become experts in winning without fighting. Civil-military cooperation began in 1997 with a general exchange of security-related information between the USAID/GEM staff and AFP and the provision of site, convoy, and route security during visits of U.S. officials. Its role, however, has deepened and diversified greatly over the years.

As an example, an infantry battalion commander took the USAID/GEM team to a village where an important farm-to-market road had been severed by a flash flood and asked team members to make its repair a priority. In a briefing at his battalion headquarters, he also revealed that every USAID/GEM project in his area of operation was plotted prominently on his tactical briefing maps. He referred to these sites as “key terrain,” signaling the strategic importance of these civilian projects to his military operations.

USAID/GEM personnel also closely interact with members of the GRP–MILF Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities, which includes the AFP co-chairman. USAID has wisely included an
option in the current GEM 3 contract to implement a Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) combatant reintegration program for the MILF following a peace agreement. Such an agreement would provide the second largest group of insurgents (estimated at 12,000 armed fighters) with improved economic opportunity and benefit their communities with the same kind of programs that assisted their cousins in the MNLF.1

**Continuity**

Continuity is perhaps the area in which USAID/GEM best validates the Kilcullen argument. Since its inception in 1997, USAID/GEM has been consistently applied and improved to help make the promises of the peace agreement become reality. For more than 12 years, through various U.S. and Philippine administrations as well as several American Ambassadors, support for the program has never wavered. Now in its third iteration, USAID/GEM continues to help integrate MNLF members and their communities into the mainstream Philippine economy. By the time USAID/GEM 3 ends in 2012, the program will have recorded a remarkable 15 years of continuity, consistency, and dedication to the peace process.

The Economic Growth Advisor of the USAID Mission, Robert Barnes, who is the USAID/GEM Cognizant Technical Officer, was the original conceptualizer and designer of the GEM program and has remained as its chief architect and long-term champion. Formerly a career USAID officer, Barnes stayed on after his retirement as a personal services contractor to USAID to provide institutional memory. Consequently, adjustments and improvements have been guided by someone who thoroughly understands the complexity of the holistic approach and Mindanao’s difficult political, cultural, and economic environment.

At the same time, the general contractor, The Louis Berger Group, Inc., has won three separate full and open competitions to manage the program. The result is that the key managers involved in carrying out USAID plans have been in position since the beginning. They have decades of experience in the Philippines and more than 14 years with USAID/GEM. Key Philippine staff members, who represent the backbone of the effort, also have long tenures with the program and extensive field experience in the impact area.

Continuity among AFP officers has also played an important role. Before the culmination of the peace process with the MNLF, many of the older officers who had fought in the long, bitter conflict were replaced. Since 1997, however, many younger officers who understand and support the community-based economic growth strategy have served repeated assignments in Mindanao both as combatants and agents of negotiated settlement.

**Population-centric Security**

Although the AFP certainly conducts offensive operations against violent groups such as Abu Sayyaf, and at times elements of the MILF or the NPA, much of its operational mission involves protection and support. As mentioned, Mindanao is awash in weapons and seeded with every imaginable kind of armed
group from terrorists to private political militias to outright criminal gangs. Often the distinction between them is blurred, and because local police are controlled by local leaders, the rule of law is at times not applied appropriately.

Some recent incidents are examples. In November 2009, an individual planning to run for governor of Maguindanao Province sent his wife and several other women supporters to file the papers for his candidacy. He believed he would be killed or kidnapped if he went himself but that the women would not be harmed because that would be “against Islam,” and even his Muslim enemies would not do that. He was wrong. A group of 100 armed men murdered the women and more than 30 journalists accompanying them—57 individuals. Local paramilitary units allegedly served as lookouts or conspired with the perpetrators. The army had to move in to arrest the perpetrators because local police could not, and for a time martial law was declared. Also, in December, a criminal gang that had formally been a government-armed militia that was ostensibly organized to defend the communities against threats by the communist-influenced New People’s Army took dozens of civilian hostages and agreed to release them only after they were promised there would be no attempt to arrest gang members.

Because of such incidents, the AFP must often assume roles normally reserved for police units. Consequently, its population-centric defensive efforts go far beyond defending the people from intimidation by insurgents. AFP officers recognize that their protection efforts will never be successful until the Philippine government has a monopoly on firearms and the use of deadly force, but disarming Mindanao would be problematic.

Because of the extremely confused and dangerous security situation, negotiators of the peace treaty recognized that demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the MNLF would have to occur without demobilization or disarmament. The GRP could not expect the MNLF leadership to give up its ability to defend itself and its people, so it instead took the path of helping most become farmers while integrating thousands into the army and police and organizing some of the others into village defense militias. Whereas these kinds of militias have been problematic in many areas, as in the preceding examples, overall the MNLF record has been good. From 1998 through 2000, when armed groups under the MILF planned to move into communities in North Cotabato Province in Central Mindanao, forces belonging to the MNLF, which had signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government but had neither demobilized nor surrendered their weapons, confronted the MILF, forcing the latter to withdraw. An overstretched AFP is largely relieved of the responsibility for protecting the population in MNLF-controlled areas because anyone who attempts to attack or intimidate its members will likely not survive the resulting confrontation or might need rescuing themselves. The current MNLF chairman, Datu Muslimin Sema, likes to remind visitors that his organization retains the capability to return to war if necessary, but no one expects that to happen without extreme provocation, which now seems largely unthinkable.

As the MILF (the second-largest insurgent group) moves toward peace, it will insist on the same kind of self-protection and integration into the AFP enjoyed by the MNLF. If anything, it will be even more insistent on continuing to bear arms because its members tend to be more “Islamic” and more influenced by the events of the post-9/11 world than MNLF followers. They believe it is a religious requirement that they
maintain their weapons in case circumstances ever require them to engage in jihad in defense of their religion. If, however, the reintegration of the MILF turns out to be as successful as that of the MNLF, widespread insurgency and instability in Mindanao will be much closer to becoming a thing of the past.

As Kilcullen argues, self-protecting populations supported by organized government forces is a model than can work for accidental guerrillas. This phenomenon has certainly been the case with the MNLF, and its experience can be taken as a validation of his argument and an example for less incorrigible insurgent elements in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

**Partnerships**

USAID/GEM is the result of interagency cooperation and coordination among Filipinos and Americans. USAID/GEM’s Steering and Management Committees are chaired by the Philippine government. The U.S. Government has consistently and sincerely accepted this model as necessary for success.

Perhaps this cooperation is easier in Mindanao, and especially in the case of the MNLF, since the United States was not a direct combatant. It may be more difficult if the MILF stands down because of the perceived role of the JSOTF in support of AFP combat operations, although in fact JSOTF is limited to training and civil action projects. The JSOTF has always been mindful and respectful of the preeminence of the Philippine government and its armed forces and has not been directly involved in combat operations.

USAID has adopted GEM-like strategies in other conflict and postconflict environments, and this is especially noteworthy in the case of Colombia. There, new regional USAID-funded projects will have a Colombian face from the beginning, and the entire approach will be comprehensive, holistic, and interagency. The Colombian authorities have recognized the similarities between their situation and that of the Philippine government and have already hosted senior AFP officers to meet with their Colombian counterparts in Bogota to discuss best practices and strategy. The next step in this South-South dialogue should be discussions between tactical combat commanders to create greater understanding of winning without fighting. Perhaps the Colombian and Philippine armed forces could even exchange liaison officers, which could be facilitated by the responsible U.S. combatant commands.

Finally, USAID/GEM has always had a Filipino face, even at the contractor level, reinforcing the perception that Filipinos are providing leadership in their own communities. Currently, the USAID/GEM staff is made up of only 5 expatriates and 250 Filipinos. When projects such as road or bridge construction are initiated, Filipino companies compete for the contracts, and the USAID/GEM engineers and contracting officers they deal with are generally Filipinos.

**Communications and the Information Battle**

In *The Accidental Guerrilla*, Kilcullen argues unequivocally that the United States has lost the information war in Iraq and Afghanistan because the public information effort was always seen as subsidiary—almost an afterthought.
Public information officers in the military have long complained that their contributions to the fight have never been taken seriously. When combat commanders talk “move, shoot, and communicate,” the “c word” is all about operational communications between units and headquarters, not about using public relations and communications to help win the war.

Helping the public understand what is going on (that is, public diplomacy) is in many ways as important as the physical accomplishments. Much of Mindanao is mountainous, and people in remote rural areas often do not know what is happening in the next valley, let alone on the rest of the island and beyond. To change attitudes about the future and relevance of the government, stakeholders must be knowledgeable about progress they can see and feel on the ground as having an impact on their lives.

USAID/GEM’s public diplomacy program is designed to:

- counter the impression that Mindanao is a battleground, thus keeping businesspeople interested in doing business there
- generate public support for the adoption of policies more conducive to Mindanao’s sustained economic progress (for example, increasing infrastructure budget and moving toward more openness in decisionmaking)
- generate public awareness, understanding, and support of the Philippine government and USAID activities and investments in Mindanao through high-profile visits of the U.S. Ambassador and USAID leadership to project sites.

Both the MNLF chairman and senior AFP officers have repeatedly told official visitors that it is their hope that the widespread awareness of USAID-created progress will entice other groups, especially the MILF, to demand peace so the same benefits would accrue to them and their children. Whether this has indeed played a role in the MILF decision to declare a ceasefire and return to peace talks remains to be studied.

One can wonder about the effects of constant reporting of USAID/GEM results in the broadcast and print media; the impact of town hall meetings to discuss local project priorities; the experience of walking or driving on new roads and bridges to get one’s produce to market; and the joy of seeing children in schools not only learning basic subjects but also having a whole new world opened to them through 900 Internet centers. But there can be no doubt that through this concerted effort almost everyone in Mindanao, indeed many throughout the Philippines, knows about how USAID has helped to keep the promises of the Philippine government to members of the MNLF and how they, in return, are becoming active and productive members of Philippine society. If a focused public information effort in mountainous Mindanao can have such a salutary effect, could not a similar campaign be just as important in countries such as Afghanistan and Colombia?

**Conclusion**

The total cost to the American taxpayer of the LEAP/GEM programs from 1995 through the projected end date for USAID/GEM 3 in 2012 will be approximately $250 million. If the MILF fully joins in the peace process and
performs as well as the MNLF, the total number of combatants taken out of the fight since 1996 will be more than 50,000. Because about one-fourth of USAID investment in GEM has been directly focused on MNLF combatants and their communities, this investment amounts to about $1,250 per fighter. What would it have cost to neutralize and/or eliminate that number of tough, experienced guerrillas through military means, even if that were remotely possible in the mountains and jungles of Mindanao?

Of course, the fighting prowess and sacrifice of AFP soldiers and marines have also been important in convincing Mindanao’s accidental guerrillas to stop fighting. On the other hand, one should not forget to tally up the value of 7,000 former MNLF insurgents who have been added to AFP ranks and however many more may be added from the MILF. Other considerations are the benefits of infrastructure added rather than destroyed; youth being educated rather than stagnating and adding to the problem; and men and women becoming productive participants in the economy and dynamic members of a democratic body politic rather than spending their lives in poverty and alienation.

Violence in Mindanao will not end when the MILF joins with the MNLF in the peace process. There will always be incorrigibles, such as members of Abu Sayyaf, who will have to be dealt with by force. But their numbers do not total more than a few hundred, and the expansion of USAID assistance to the communities in which they function will vastly reduce their ability to move and operate. The NPA also continues as a threat, but its numbers are fewer than half the total of current MILF fighters, and many of them may yet be won over through an expansion of USAID/GEM-like programs into their areas. Although a completely nonviolent Mindanao may not be a realistic goal in the near term, reducing the situation to a police rather than a military problem may be in sight.

The experience of the governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States working together in Mindanao has been one of steady progress toward sustainable peace. The precepts of David Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla have largely been validated, as have those of his intellectual predecessor of the 1960s, David Galula. Although one size does not fit all and every national situation is different, the lessons of Mindanao and USAID/GEM are worth further study and application in other complex operational environments. PRISM

Notes

1 For a detailed explanation of the background and progress of USAID/GEM, see the “Growth with Equity in Mindanao 2 Program: Completion Report, October 2002 to December 2007,” available at <www.mindanao.org>.

2 The complete agreement can be found in the Peace Agreements Digital Collection on the U.S. Institute of Peace Web site at <www.usip.org>.

3 In September 2009, the Philippine government and MILF announced a breakthrough agreement on a panel of international peace brokers for the resumption of stalled talks. Hopes are high that a final agreement will be reached after the national election in 2010.
In July 2009, the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) facilitated a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to capture the experiences of USDA agricultural advisors deployed to ministries and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The discussions yielded numerous individual observations, insights, and potential lessons from the work of these advisors on PRTs in these countries. This article presents a broad overview of the challenges identified by the conference participants and highlights key recommendations generated as a result of suggestions and comments made at the workshop.

The workshop was intended to capture insights and lessons from the field to develop recommendations for improvements in PRT operations, with a particular focus on agricultural development. The 30 participants came from a broad spectrum of USDA: the National Resources Conservation Service, Food Safety and Inspection Service, Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Agricultural Marketing Service, and the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration.

To focus the agenda, CCO and USDA designed a preworkshop survey administered to the 30 USDA returnees (22 from Iraq and 8 from Afghanistan). After receiving 24 responses, CCO and USDA used the results to develop an agenda built around facilitated group discussions in four areas: doctrine and guidance, civil-military cooperation and command and control relationships, projects and their impact on the host nation, and administrative issues.

This article, edited by Bernard Carreau, Deputy Director for Lessons Learned and Training Support in the Center for Complex Operations, is based on “Lessons Learned Workshop for USDA Personnel Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan,” a report issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in July 2009.
Doctrine and Guidance

Absence of Overall U.S. Government Agriculture Strategy. Numerous participants noted the absence of an overarching agriculture strategy for either Iraq or Afghanistan. This deficiency at the national level precluded a potential source of guidance for activities at the provincial level and unified effort among the various agriculture projects in theater. PRTs are responsible for design and implementation of projects at the district level to fit into the local mission, but they do not necessarily support a national agricultural program that addresses critical areas, such as irrigation, seed control, output distribution, agricultural law, agricultural credit, and land management issues.

Several advisors noted that a national agriculture strategy for Afghanistan had circulated among PRTs and that there was an awareness of the Afghan National Development Strategy and Provincial Development Plans, but there were no clear linkages between these strategies and concrete project goals. Some advisors noted that several U.S. agencies have developed their own strategies for country-wide agriculture programs, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Agricultural Reconstruction and Development Program for Iraq, but these individual agency strategies were not consistently disseminated.

To address this issue, many participants argued that USDA should take the lead in developing or reviewing all U.S. agriculture strategies at the national and local levels in conjunction with host nation agricultural authorities.\(^1\) The overall strategy should aim to identify inefficiencies, duplication, and mutually exclusive goals, and incoming advisors should use these strategies as the starting points for project planning at the local level. Agricultural advisors noted that such a strategy must
clearly articulate the importance of tailoring agriculture projects to local traditions, knowledge, and capacity. Finally, doctrine and guidance should pay more attention to familiarizing USDA staff with the notion that agriculture projects will vary depending on whether they take place during a combat, stabilization, or reconstruction phase of an operation.

Unrealistic Expectations for Agricultural Development. Some participants expressed concern that current expectations of what agricultural development can achieve in Iraq—and especially in Afghanistan—are inflated. Many U.S. programs favor multimillion-dollar projects involving major infrastructure and modern heavy machinery, attempting to apply American-style, 21st-century agricultural technologies and methodologies to the local agricultural context. Smaller scale projects are more sustainable, appropriate, and relevant to local needs and capabilities. The U.S. Government should recognize that agriculture in Iraq is equivalent to U.S. agriculture in the 1950s, and the agriculture sector in Afghanistan is even more primitive by U.S. standards. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect the same level of output for either Iraq or Afghanistan even with the introduction of the modern systems and technologies. While new techniques can be introduced to increase efficiencies, program administrators need to think long and hard about how sustainable the new systems will be given the state of local tradition, knowledge, and capacity. Several participants told stories about U.S. programs that provided John Deere tractors or other industrial machinery to local farmers in Afghanistan and Iraq, which fell into disuse or were stripped for parts as soon as routine maintenance was required. Many remarked that instead of a John Deere tractor, oxen and simple tools such as hoes or shovels may be more appropriate to achieve sustainable progress.

Future advisors need to understand that it is neither possible nor feasible to replicate the U.S. agriculture sector in these countries. Instead, the key to successful agricultural development lies in supporting the host nation as it pursues its own development strategies for improving the indigenous agriculture sector. All agricultural actors (particularly contractors and USAID personnel) need to tailor their projects to local conditions and provide tools and technologies appropriate to local skill levels and traditions. This recognition should be a guiding principle of any overall agriculture strategy and incorporated in doctrine and guidance.

Tension Between Mentoring Role and Project Promotion. USDA advisors are sometimes torn between their role as advisors to Iraqis and Afghans on how to establish their own agriculture programs and pressures to independently resource and select specific agriculture projects to implement. Direct selection and funding of agriculture projects mean that locals do not solve agricultural problems through their own means and mechanisms. Yet, as many advisors pointed out, Iraqis and Afghans have considerable agricultural expertise based on centuries of tradition, even if they do not meet modern U.S. standards. One participant stated that Afghans can make anything grow, and pointed out their irrigation prowess by saying that they “can make water flow up a mountain.”

In Iraq, provincial and district agriculture plans were generally more advanced, and often
there were sufficient central and provincial government funds available to support most agricultural initiatives. Therefore, participants generally agreed that it was best for the United States to primarily provide mentoring and advice. When promoting projects, Washington should require at least some Iraqi funding. Some advisors went so far as to say that the United States should give only advice and no funding in Iraq. In Afghanistan, where government coffers are more threadbare, there is still a need to provide some program funding. The challenge for American advisors is to identify which elements of the U.S. system can be translated into the local context and which elements should be overlooked in favor of local agricultural traditions.

Advisors should review doctrine and guidance documents and identify programs that only replicate the U.S. agriculture sector in Afghanistan or Iraq without taking account of local traditions and capabilities. Programs should draw from U.S. expertise and technologies only to the extent that they mesh with local traditions and capacity. The emerging agriculture strategies should encourage the development of local solutions with partners to build sustainable capacity in conjunction with local stakeholders. Similarly, the USDA PRT handbooks should be revised to emphasize this dynamic.

**Need for Agriculture Strategy Modification.** Operational planners must recognize that the rehabilitation of Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s agriculture sectors involves at least three phases of operation: major combat, stabilization, and reconstruction. The combat phase may include prolonged counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. It is difficult to recognize which stage of operations advisors may find themselves in at any given time as stages may overlap, progress rapidly, or even regress. For instance, if an area is not completely stabilized, it may be unwise to presume that the operation has reached the reconstruction phase and pursue a long-term development strategy.

Some participants believed that USDA should develop guidance on the types of programs that may be appropriate for different phases of an operation in each country and region. Local agricultural advisors should have enough leeway and flexibility to design suitable programs. In addition, USDA advisors need to build closer relationships with the military to learn more about the security situation, and military commanders need to find a way to share security information with these advisors so they can plan their projects accordingly. For example, it may be advisable in a high-threat environment to focus on training and mentoring, rather than building potentially vulnerable infrastructure.

**Interagency Cooperation**

**Different Approaches to Agricultural Development.** In general, civilian-military cooperation was good, and USDA advisors had high regard for their military counterparts. However, the military and USDA have different approaches to agricultural development, and cultural misunderstandings often marred civil-military relations. USDA’s agriculture projects are generally smaller scale, target specific, and long term, while the military generally supports large-scale, high-impact, and high-profile projects. Participants noted that the military routinely made incorrect assumptions about civilian operations and overestimated the pace.
at which agricultural development could be completed and the difficulties in obtaining funding. USDA advisors recognized that officers did not understand the advisors’ role and that the officers often had difficulty reporting agriculture activities up the military chain of command. While Civil Affairs teams were generally more helpful, they were not always present, and some advisors devoted an inordinate amount of their time explaining to commanders what they can do.

Workshop participants believed that part of the problem can be addressed through education. Military personnel working with civilian reconstruction teams and their superiors should be acclimatized to civilian development operations in predeployment training. PRT leaders without an agricultural background should understand that it is not always easy to show results for agriculture projects in a short time frame. Yet it is also critical that commanders and agricultural experts take an “equal seat at the table,” so both groups can excel at their areas of expertise and maintain a good, cooperative relationship. One measure discussed at the workshop was to set up a mechanism for USDA PRT members to evaluate their commanders or team leaders.

**Tension Between Internal Agency Priorities and Local Needs.** Many participants were critical of the pressure on military staff to spend significant amounts of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) money on large projects with a completion time frame of 6 months to a year. Commanders often favored projects such as roads, schools, and district centers even if these projects were not sustainable or desired by the local population, because such projects were very visible, measurable in terms of resources, and quick. This was important to commanders so they could show progress during their tours. But agriculture programs often require at least 3 years to be developed, and frequently there is no measurable result within the time of a commander’s tour. Whereas Department of Defense (DOD) and USAID agriculture projects were often in the million-dollar range, smaller projects in the range of $25,000 to $50,000 were consistently more effective and responsive to local needs. For their part, State Department Foreign Service Officers were often unwilling to take risks or alter previous programs for fear of a negative effect on their next assignment.

Many workshop participants believed that an integrated command team with military commanders and civilian experts on equal footing (except when security issues are involved) should determine agricultural development priorities. Other participants noted that integrated command teams nominally already exist in Afghan PRTs. However, advisors shared many examples in which this arrangement did not work in practice. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, commanders and senior officers need training on the importance of agriculture to the national and local economies. In theater, the commanding general should issue a directive regarding the importance of assisting the agriculture sector and revise measures of effectiveness and guidelines on project evaluation. Instead of counting buildings completed, measurement should include the number of agriculture projects and initiatives begun or enhanced.

**Relatively Low Grades of USDA Advisors.** The relatively low grades of some agricultural advisors caused them to lose influence and prestige in the eyes of some commanders and civilians from other agencies. This especially affected USDA advisors from rural areas, who might be at the GS–12 or GS–13 levels, even though they have many years of experience. While these grades are relatively high in relation to the cost of living in rural communities, they are considered
midlevel by Washington standards and of lesser rank in the eyes of military commanders and some Foreign Service Officers. This often made a significant difference in terms of access to officers

and commanders, resources, escorts, accommodations, favors, and, most importantly, the weight and seriousness accorded to their opinions. One participant remarked that the commander paid attention to the State representative because of State’s Chief of Mission authority; he listened to USAID officers because they had funding; but he just tolerated USDA advisors. Participants floated several ideas to improve the perceived status (grade) of USDA advisors within the PRT. A directive from the PRT team leader’s home agency (DOD/State) aimed at reinforcing the equal status of the PRT agricultural expert would be useful. Providing USDA with its own stabilization and reconstruction funding (see below) would give the advisors more independence and prestige in the eyes of military commanders and other civilian agency officials. Temporary promotions for USDA personnel deployed to PRTs would be an additional way to mitigate the problem of their undermined authority vis-à-vis interagency colleagues. So three possible remedies were suggested:

- inclusion of civil development operations in military training
- temporary promotions of USDA personnel to GS grades that match their interagency colleagues
- allocation of dedicated USDA funding sources for PRT projects.

**Importance of Interpersonal Relationships.** USDA advisors asserted that their ability to work effectively with interagency partners depended almost entirely on developing positive interpersonal relationships. While many participants said they had good experiences with the military in terms of cooperation and support, others had negative experiences. Some advisors, especially those who had spent their whole careers in regional U.S. offices, had no prior work experience with partner agencies. Even where good working relationships existed, the constant rotation of PRT personnel threatened the continuity of programs and progress.

To reduce tension in the field, it would be helpful for USDA advisors to train with the military members of the PRT, or at the very least meet them before deployment. Incoming PRT advisors should recognize that developing good interpersonal relationships in the field is critical to the success of the PRT advisor regardless of the team’s structure, command relationships, or funding sources. PRT members should train together to promote these working relationships at the outset and familiarize themselves with the missions of partnering agencies before deployment. Furthermore, all elements of the team should ideally deploy at the same time to aid unit cohesion. Some advisors suggested that personnel across all agencies—even those who do not deploy—should participate in cross-training and exercises with their PRT partner agencies.

**PRT Organization and Command and Control**

**Unclear and Overlapping Military Chains of Command.** Advisors discussed at length the numerous chains of command in the military, including the roles and reporting chains of the
task force, brigade, and regional commanders, and how these competing power centers sometimes caused confusion and lack of coordination among USDA and civilian agency officials. The multiple military chains of command added to the challenges for USDA advisors to get their voices heard.

Under the Integrated Campaign Plan issued in August 2009, the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan are currently working to consolidate military command and control lines for the Afghan theater. For future agricultural advisors, it would be advantageous to have an explanation of military command and control relationships included in the relevant USDA PRT handbooks.

Agriculture as Separate Pillar. Most advisors believed that agriculture should be treated as a separate sector, or pillar, in addition to such traditional areas as governance, rule of law, and economic development. Right now, agriculture tends to get lumped into the broader pillar of economic development, which is often led by persons with little agricultural background. Advisors from Afghanistan suggested that agriculture should be represented as a separate activity during the commander’s morning briefings.

Inappropriate Expertise of Agricultural Advisors for Particular PRTs. Advisors perceived that PRTs were not put together with any prior analysis of the goals and projects for the particular regions. PRT members often did not know what expertise members of their own team possessed, and agricultural advisors expressed a desire to know what expertise their counterparts in other PRTs had. Some agricultural advisors lamented that often advisors in other regions would have been better suited to the PRT in which they were stationed.

As an initial matter, it would be helpful to create a database showing where people are located, their expertise, and current projects in order to coordinate efforts in the field. Access to this information would enable greater coordination among PRTs to prevent duplication of tasks and promote more efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, a mobile team with the ability to respond to requests for aid in project completion or monitoring where needed would be useful. Moreover, when recruiting advisors, the hiring manager needs to look for candidates with a variety of experiences, who have done different jobs, shown ingenuity, and know they may be called upon to do just about anything. Increased overlap between rotations (see below) might also help to mitigate this problem.

Poor Coordination Between Incoming and Outgoing Personnel. The level of coordination between incoming and outgoing personnel was insufficient to facilitate a smooth transition and maximize information-sharing. Several advisors noted that it is not possible to prepare for everything that can happen in the field and that after the initial acclimation period, new advisors should reassess their goals and identify the most urgent issues in the area of operation. In addition, many expressed concern that their projects would not be continued at the end of their assignment.

Hand-off procedures between incoming and outgoing teams need to be standardized and information dissemination improved regarding new advisors and their areas of expertise. An overlap of 2 months would be ideal to preserve established relationships and allow for the introduction of the advisor to local contacts. However, the new agricultural advisor should not blindly follow the path of the previous advisor; some reassessment of current projects may be needed. An alternative model, suggested by USDA, would be to have two agricultural advisors per PRT with a 6-month overlap.
Unreliable Email Communication Between PRT Members. Advisors expressed the importance of being on the right email lists in order to stay current on new projects, procedures, and meetings. Many advisors maintained up to five email accounts, including their home agency accounts, which were sometimes unreliable. As a result, they resorted to Google and Hotmail accounts as the most reliable means of sending email. In addition, some advisors did not like using their DOD email accounts when communicating with locals because of the potential impression that they were part of the military.

One participant recommended creating an online SharePoint server that would allow PRT members to post their schedules, as well as any other vital information, to help coordinate activities and ensure that everyone was kept abreast of programs, meetings, and new procedures. The server could be used to post information on PRT members, their areas of expertise, and current projects, and could also serve as a useful tool when advisors rotate out and new advisors arrive.

Agribusiness Development Teams

Many advisors in Afghanistan highlighted the insufficient coordination between the U.S. Army National Guard’s Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) activities and PRT agriculture projects. Several state National Guards have begun to form such teams, and there are now five ADTs in Afghanistan. ADTs do not come under the PRT command structure. According to most participants, the quality of the teams in Afghanistan and their individual members varied—some were good and some were not. In general, ADTs work under 3- to 5-year plans and have some distinct advantages over USDA advisors, including their own funding. ADTs have combat training and the transport and logistical support necessary to move around the region and confer with farmers and ministry officials with far greater ease.

ADTs are often staffed with experienced farmers, agribusiness owners, and sometimes USDA staff. The ADTs often consider their staffs to be more experienced than the USDA advisors and believed that they have sufficient expertise to manage the agriculture sector programming without additional assistance from USDA. Frequently, the ADT commander is at a higher grade than the PRT commander, resulting in less influence for the USDA advisor over decisions affecting the agriculture sector.

Workshop participants believed that USDA and ADTs need to jointly identify issues that limit their effective coordination on agricultural issues and programs. They recommended incorporating USDA advisors into the ADTs. The Civil-Military Integrating Instructions contained in the Integrated Campaign Plan issued in August 2009 foresee both USDA and ADT representation on Provincial Integrated Teams.

Projects

Advisors reported that successful agriculture projects depend on having in place critical infrastructure such as energy, water, transportation, and communications. These areas are typically handled by members of the economic development teams, but often there is no coordination of strategies with agricultural advisors. The work of the advisors should complement the development strategies and work of other PRT members. Surveys of the district reflecting the limitations of the current infrastructure should be provided to agricultural advisors before deployment so they can assess the feasibility of agricultural development projects.

USDA advisors were unhappy with certain agribusiness efforts used for short-term
Counterinsurgency objectives. Advisors attributed these actions both to the military (through CERP funding) and to USAID. Short-term employment threatened to distort the local labor market, artificially increasing pay and stripping farms of laborers. Workshop participants recommended that agricultural advisors be included in operational planning for counterinsurgency operations.

Finally, agricultural advisors found themselves entangled with issues pertaining to property, water, conservation, and agricultural laws. Sometimes agricultural advisors were unintentionally aiding illegal activity through projects that violated local government procedures and local law. Workshop participants recommended that relevant legal issues be included in the interagency planning and that USDA advisors be trained in local law and have access to PRT legal support.

Host Nation Relations

Importance of Local Buy-in and Understanding Local Culture. PRTs attempting to achieve buy-in from local governance and community leaders found themselves vulnerable to the political concerns of local power players. Projects could stall at any point if one group thought it was working against its interest or too much to the advantage of another group. Farmers’ unions in particular would compete along ethnic lines, and many advisors found that working through local councils, rather than directly with sheikhs and local leaders, neutralized some of the maneuvering. Agricultural advisors should receive training on dealing with local power politics and information on local power structures before deployment. Moreover, as suggested above, some significant overlap between advisors’ tours would facilitate much more rapid on-the-job learning about local conditions.

Local involvement was a key leading indicator of project success. In Iraq, U.S. funding was most effective when matched with Iraqi government time, money, and other resources. Advisors found that when there was true local support for a project, the Iraqis were extremely skillful at obtaining their own money. Projects proposed by Iraqis to the PRT were also more likely to flourish. Workshop participants advised that development projects must achieve local buy-in at the outset and recommended that agricultural advisors be instructed how to look for local demand signals. The extent of local buy-in should feature prominently in project evaluations.

Need for Understanding Corruption and Kickbacks in Context. Advisors were often unprepared to deal with local corruption. Conflicting objectives of achieving local buy-in and promoting good governance forced advisors to choose between “greasing the wheel” and not getting the cooperation of local officials. USDA advisors were unsure of the extent to which corruption was a function of “a few bad apples” or a part of local culture that could not be changed. Workshop participants recommended more pre-deployment training on corruption and cultural familiarity. Improved institutional knowledge about local actors would also prepare advisors for working with host nation governments. In addition, the USDA report suggests that the department could explore ways of tapping into current U.S. efforts to improve sociocultural awareness such as the Human Terrain System, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Human Factors Analysis Center.
**Need for Reliable Interpreters.** Advisors complained that most of the well-trained and reliable interpreters were retained by Embassy staff and other high-level organizations. Workshop participants suggested training educated interpreters in agriculture and employing them as replacement advisors. In addition, commanders should ensure that a sufficient number of skilled interpreters are delegated to tactical operations and not held by higher officials, and interpreters should receive assignments consistent with their skills and background.

**Funding and Oversight**

**Control of Money Equals Control of Policy.** Workshop participants noted that because USAID and DOD controlled the funding, they also controlled the development agenda, which allowed them to act without consulting other PRT members and with little oversight of their activities. Because agricultural advisors did not bring any money to the table, they had to rely primarily on the military for funding. Many felt as though they had to constantly sell their ideas. According to the agricultural advisors, the projects most likely to be funded and supported by the military were not necessarily the most useful ones. USDA advisors were seen as a burden and a nuisance because they did not bring funding to the table.9 Most advisors thought it would be helpful for the USDA advisors to have access to their agency’s seed money in order to set their own agendas, jumpstart small-scale agriculture projects, and gain the respect of other PRT members.

**Poor Oversight and Management of Projects.** The three-bid process of contracting was slow and ineffective. Many projects were lost because it took money so long to filter through the system. USAID only allocated money for large-scale projects and rarely gave the small amounts of money that most agriculture projects required. Advisors complained that once USAID gave money to contractors, there would be no followup, and many cited the need for greater accountability of USAID funds. Another problem was that the bidding process did not account for the agricultural year, which meant that by the time the bidding process was complete, the planting season for crops might have already passed. Furthermore, it can be difficult to know at what point U.S. funding assistance becomes counterproductive as each province and district has its own leadership and priorities.

Many workshop participants believed that USDA advisors should have some authority over funding either by direct control or through some type of signoff mechanism. An approval committee for granting funds could yield effective input from all areas along with greater oversight of USAID funding and projects.

**Training and Personnel**

**Inadequate Predeployment Training and Intelligence.** Many agricultural advisors described difficulty adjusting to Iraqi/Afghan culture and noted that successful interaction with locals required an in-depth understanding of the nuances and cultural sensitivities of the people. The right temperament for work in the field is a crucial aspect of successful interaction, and some advisors suggested the use of personality tests during training. Advisors should receive
training on Iraqi or Afghan culture and history and on how to negotiate and work with tribal leaders, host government officials, extension agents, farmers, and other agricultural stakeholders.

Many PRT members are ill informed about local conditions before arrival. The broad economic situation of the countries and their relevant agricultural issues need to be introduced prior to deployment. Also, many documents such as DOD country reports, USAID reports, soil reports, and weather reports would have been helpful had the advisors known they were available to them. In addition, PRT members need access to detailed sociocultural and economic information and intelligence for their area, either through each home agency or through the PRT support structure.

**Difficulty in Extending Tours.** Some agricultural advisors were willing to extend their tours, but their home bureaus often could not backfill behind the deployed staff. Therefore, the home agency is reluctant to give permission for extensions, and career employees are reluctant to take an initial position or extend without guarantee of having their position held. The Agriculture Secretary should encourage USDA bureaus to support the U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq by accommodating employees’ requested extensions beyond 1 year and by guaranteeing their position upon their return. PRISM
Notes

1 USAID has a central role in agricultural development strategies, as do other U.S. Government participants, including the Services. Some observers argue that USAID should take the lead in agriculture strategy in consultation with USDA. With respect to Afghanistan, the USDA report notes that the Department of State, under the auspices of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, has developed the Agricultural Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan, which is a coordinated effort among State, USAID, USDA, the Services, and other agencies to provide agriculture assistance to Afghanistan’s national and regional governments. The USDA report also cites the United States Government Integrated Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (August 10, 2009), which was issued after the tours of the workshop participants.

2 The USDA report notes that “it remains to be seen whether the Civil-Military Integrating Instructions contained in the Integrated Campaign Plan for Afghanistan will help to address this issue." The instructions create a civilian-military integrated decisionmaking structure to enhance coordination and unity of effort at the national, regional, and district levels. USDA is one of the participating agencies.

3 The USDA report notes, “Potentially, this could be accommodated within the Interagency Quarterly Assessments proposed in the Integrated Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, and the Office of Provincial Affairs performance assessment system in Iraq.”

4 The Center for Complex Operations survey showed that over half of the respondents were either GS–12s or GS–13s, and no agricultural advisor was above a GS–14.

5 In Afghanistan, there were several chains of command in the military. First is the battalion or task force (TF) commander, who is an O–5 representing the maneuver element in the provincial area of responsibility. The TF commander reports to an O–6 brigade commander (regional commander). The PRT commander is an O–5 and also reports to the regional commander but, because of tradition and military culture, generally does not have the same status as the TF (maneuver) commander, even though they share the same rank. Finally, there is the Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) commander, who is generally an O–6 and thus outranks the PRT commander. The ADT commander reports directly to the regional commander, thus bypassing the PRT commander.

6 The USDA report notes that currently USDA is developing a SharePoint site for its Iraq PRT members.

7 The Center for Army Lessons Learned issued the Agribusiness Development Team Handbook in November 2009, after the workshop took place. See <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-10/toc.asp>. The command and control structure of the ADTs calls for USDA and USAID advisors to the ADT commander.

8 USDA notes in the report that this could be done through the civil-military mechanisms proposed in the Integrated Campaign Plan.

9 According to several workshop participants, USDA funding was in fact available to them, but no one knew how to procure it.
An Interview with Peter Pace

The whole-of-government concept, so popular only a few years ago, seems to have lagged a bit. The sense of urgency for national security reform seems to have dissipated, perhaps particularly on Capitol Hill. Do you believe there should be more urgency about national security reform?

PP: There’s a lot on everyone’s plate, and it takes leaders of stature to help focus people with limited energy on which problem to solve.

If we think about the interagency process, here is how it works in my opinion, and this is not about any administration; this is about how our government functions, not any particular flavor of government.

If the Nation has a problem that it is facing, the National Security Council [NSC] comes together. For lack of the right terminology, the one-star level gets together, then the two-star, the three-star, and the four-star. Finally, we have an NSC meeting with the President and with all the heads of the agencies. In the process of going through the dialogue and the discussion of what the problem is and the various courses of action are, the cooperation in the room is excellent. Everybody is sharing ideas; everybody is trying to find the right courses that will be successful—great Americans working together trying to do the right thing.

Either during that meeting or some subsequent meeting, the President makes a decision, and that’s where the system starts to malfunction. Why? Because the Secretary of Defense takes his piece, the Secretary of State takes her piece, the Secretary of the Treasury takes his. These Cabinet secretaries take their respective pieces of what’s supposed to be done and go back to their respective agencies, and they start working on it. The problem is that there is nobody below the President with “Choke Con” over this system. So if a problem starts between DOD [Department of Defense] and
State—unless it is so significant that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense want to bring it to the President—it just does not get solved. People try to work around it and it just bubbles along. There are great people trying to do the right thing, but nobody is tagged with the responsibility of keeping all of this tied together. The bottom line is if any agency says no, unless it goes to the President, there is no way to move that “no” off center.

Let’s consider Goldwater-Nichols [Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986]. I believe you can take every piece of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and apply it to the interagency [community]. Maybe not right away, but we should certainly look at it. First, how would it function? Before 1986, we had the best Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in the world, but they didn’t share their toys with one another. Along comes Congress and they say that’s not good enough. None of the Service chiefs wanted Goldwater-Nichols legislation to pass because they did not want to give up authority. As it turned out, once they were forced into it, what they gave up as Service chiefs they picked up in spades as joint chiefs. Now each of them had a chance to discuss the other Services’ issues in the tank. Most importantly, there was a single person in charge. It took almost 20 years to get where we had worked with each other enough, understood each other enough, gone through enough problems together, all of which builds trust—and we stumbled over everything possible to get to the point where we understood each other. The only way to get there was to go through it.

So if you take a look at the interagency, my belief is that a way forward might be to have somebody in charge immediately below the President, so it would work something like this: the President makes a decision and says the Secretary of State is in charge. Or Treasury is in charge. Or DOD is in charge. Bottom line: the President both makes a decision and decides which department is going to lead.

In DC, all follow-on meetings are run by State if they are the lead. In the regions, the combatant commanders have the facilities, so you meet at the combatant commanders’ table, but whoever is the designated lead runs the meeting using the facilities of DOD. In the country, the Embassy is a great facility. You have the meeting in the Embassy, but whoever in DC has been designated as the lead runs the meeting. Now is it going to go smoothly the first couple of times? Of course not. If there is a problem and the State Department person in any of those locations says something that the military guy does not feel comfortable with, you take it to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense takes it to the NSC and they discuss it. It will take years to work through all those problems, but if we don’t get started, if it’s a 10-year process, it’s 10 years from when we start. If we wait 2 more, it’s 12. Initiating this change requires a Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State to really push this process because they are the ones who, in my opinion, have to start giving up the most. If we do not have individuals who are willing to give up some authority to improve the interagency, it is not going to happen.

You need people of stature to stand up and say, “This is something that needs to be done.” You need people on both sides of the aisle in Congress and one or more Cabinet officials to become seized with the idea that we can have the same impact on interagency effectiveness and efficiency with a Goldwater-Nichols–like approach to the interagency process that was the result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that forced the U.S. military to operate jointly.
How would you characterize the evolution of civilian-military collaboration over the last 10 years?

PP: This is just my own personal experience, so others may have a different view based on where they operated. When I was in the J3 as a lieutenant general around 1996–1997, when there was an NSC meeting at the White House, the Joint Staff put together its own position. We may or may not have coordinated it with DOD staff. If the meeting was at the White House, we would go sit next to each other but really not know what the other guy was going to say. The civilian representing the Secretary of Defense and I, if I were representing the Chairman, did not necessarily know what the other was going to say.

Fast forward to 2001 through 2007. Very purposefully, both on the civilian leadership side and the military side, all of the war planning meetings were run with the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman, and Vice Chairman all in the room together. We heard briefings from both civilian DOD and military Joint Staff. And VTCs [video teleconferences] were always in one room with all of us sitting in that room. When going to the White House for NSC meetings, typically the Chairman or Vice Chairman rode in the same vehicle with the Secretary, talking about what topics were going to be covered and who might say what when. So when we got to the White House, there was absolute clarity on what everybody's position was. If there were any problems, they had all been worked through before we even left the Pentagon. So from my limited experiences as a three-star and then as a four-star, there is a night-and-day difference as far as sharing information among civilian leaders and military leaders in preparation for meetings about the way forward.

Do you believe we face new and unprecedented threats?

PP: To the extent that any nation is dependent on computers, it is vulnerable. I am talking about cyber attack and cyber defense. There are 1.1 billion computers globally hooked into the Internet, and it’s estimated that about 10 percent of these are zombie computers, co-opted by someone other than the owner. That means that there are over 100 million computers available to those who would want to use them for reasons other than what the owner intended.

Fundamentally, I believe that the dawn of cyber attacks and cyber defense is going to have the same impact on relations between nations that the dawn of nuclear weapons had. Nuclear weapons were used and—thank God—have been put on the shelf. Cyber weapons are being used literally thousands of times a day. Nation-to-nation, there is still some hope that the old nuclear philosophy of mutually assured destruction will help deter, but it is hard to determine where attacks come from.

The threat of cyber attack is very real and it is available not only to nations but to groups of individuals who may or may not be sanctioned by nations, and to criminals, and to terrorists. So the whole spectrum of possible people you need to defend yourself against has exploded.

All that the national government can do, in my opinion, is understand how to protect itself at the agency level and help set standards to let businesses protect themselves at their levels. Cyber attack and cyber defense are here to stay. We as a nation are ill prepared for it, as is every other nation. We, collectively, are going to have to figure out how to deal with this.

Do you think we need a new concept of war to respond successfully to cyber warfare?
And if so, how does a nation get to a new concept of war?

PP: I’m not prescient enough to know whether at the end of the process we end up with a new concept of war because the pieces that we have had to deal with for the last couple hundred years as a nation will still be fundamental to what the U.S. military will provide to the Nation. This is additive. Will the solution that we come up with on how to defeat this new threat be so significantly different that it requires a whole new concept of war, or is this another chapter in the current concept? Not perfectly clear to me. My gut tells me that we’re adding a new, very important chapter alongside land, sea, air, and space. We’ve now added cyber. That to me makes sense, but I’d like to have time to work through the problem as a nation and then understand where we are.

In retrospect, do you believe our initial approach in Iraq was the right approach? Or was General [Eric] Shinseki right—we needed more people from the get-go and we have been catching up ever since?

PP: You’ve asked a question based on a faulty premise. Eric Shinseki was a member of the Joint Chiefs, he’s a National War College classmate of mine, we played soccer together, and I consider him a friend. In the process of working up for the attack into Iraq, not once did he say that we needed more troops. What happened was that we had a plan that was wrong in a couple of aspects. And I’d rather point fingers at myself than anybody else. I was Vice Chairman then, and I will just simply tell you where I was wrong. First, based on intelligence and historical precedent, we believed that there were weapons of mass destruction—at least chemical weapons. We believed that so sincerely that we made sure all of our troops had chemical protective gear, and we fully expected that chemical weapons would be used against us when we got close to Baghdad. And the historical precedent for that belief was that Iraq had used them on their neighbors in Iran. Therefore, they still had them and therefore having used it before in war, they would use it again. Thank God that turned out to be wrong in the case of their using them.

We also believed, based on intelligence, that there were whole Iraqi divisions that, once we started to attack, would surrender en masse and become part of the liberating forces. Those divisions not only did not surrender en masse, they did not fight; they simply disintegrated and went home. So we got to Baghdad with about 150,000 troops, give or take—it was more than that, but I think that number is about right. It was not that we did not have a plan for securing Baghdad and for securing the country. It’s that the plan was based on a false assumption, which was that the Iraqi army, all 400,000, would be intact. That it would serve as the Iraqi nation’s army, and that we as liberating forces could turn over the responsibility of the security of their own nation to the new Iraqi government and the Iraqi armed forces. When they disintegrated, there were only U.S. and coalition troops and not enough to prevent the looting. So everyone understood—that is, the Joint Chiefs and General [Tommy] Franks understood—that U.S. troops alone were not sufficient. But the assumption was that Iraqi troops would be sufficient and therein was the problem. So again, I am not pointing a finger at General Shinseki because none of us believed that we needed more U.S. troops because of that assumption. In testimony, when asked, “How many troops more would it take?” General Shinseki gave
his answer. But the assumption that General Shinseki had been recommending more troops all along is incorrect.

_In Afghanistan, do you think that the increase in troops is going to bring us at least a reduction in the violence and possibly victory? What does victory look like in Afghanistan at this point in time?_

_PP: Victory anywhere on the planet, with regard to terrorism, looks like average citizens getting to live their lives the way they want to. Here in Washington, DC, is there crime? Yes. But the police keep the crime below a level at which most citizens can live their lives as they see fit. Around the world, in Afghanistan, will there be terrorist attacks? Yes. But will we be able to collectively help the Afghan government keep those terrorist attacks below the level at which most Afghans can live their lives, the way they want to? When you get to that point, then, that in my mind is the definition of victory. It is what has been happening over time in Iraq. It is what can happen over time in Afghanistan. We have to go back to fundamentals when we talk about Afghanistan and the addition of troops._

_In March of 2003, when we went into Iraq, we knew that we did not have enough troops to occupy Iraq and pursue everything we wanted to do in Afghanistan. In military parlance, Iraq became the “primary theater” and Afghanistan became the “economy of force theater.” Economy of force means you apply enough resources to win local battles, but you don’t have enough resources to prevail. And you accept that based on the resources you have. So in World War II, for instance, Europe and Germany were the first objective and Japan and the Pacific were the economy of force missions until we won in Europe. So that was the intent. It took longer in Iraq than any of us would have wanted. But now that troops are available from Iraq, the question then becomes, “Now that we have the resources, should we apply the additional resources?”_

_I think it is absolutely right that the additional troops will provide additional stability and additional time for the Afghan government to build its own army. During the 2004 to 2007 timeframe, General [Abdul Rahim] Wardak, who is the Minister of Defense for Afghanistan, and President [Hamid] Karzai wanted to build an army that was significantly bigger than what the international community was building. They wanted to build an army/police force of about 400,000. There were two things that worked against that._

_One, there’s a European agreement, I believe it is called the London Compact, which establishes the proper size force we would want to build for the Afghan army—about 70,000. And there was certainly agreement inside our own government that we did not want to build an army bigger than Afghanistan could afford to sustain. About 70,000 troops for a country that had a GDP [gross domestic product] of between $6 and $8 billion—$2 billion of which was drug money—was about as much as we could see them being able to afford._

_Over time, other math comes into play. For every 10,000 U.S. Servicemembers, just to have them on our rolls, costs $1 billion a year. To employ them overseas, it gets closer to $1 billion a month. So when you look at recommending 40,000 more troops, and you’re looking at a ratio of 1 year over and 2 years back, to have 40,000 more troops, you’re looking at where you’re going to find another 120,000 more troops—which is billions and billions of dollars just to have them on the rolls and even more billions to employ them. When you look_
at it that way, you say to yourself, okay, would it not be smarter to help the Afghan government build their army, and understanding that they cannot afford to maintain it, perhaps we as a nation would, as part of our support, provide them with $1 billion or $2 billion a year to sustain their army, inside their country, doing their work, allowing us to bring our troops home and saving all those other billions and billions of dollars that we’re spending right now. So the math works pretty quickly in that regard.

It takes time. It will take years to help them build whatever size army it is, but if it’s a six-figure army, a six-digit army with 200,000; 300,000; 400,000; whatever that number is, it’s going to take years to build. Significantly, the Afghan government wants us there. The Afghan people want us there, which is different than Iraq. So to the extent that adding U.S. troops now buys for the international community, and especially for the Afghan people, time to build their own armed forces to take over their own work, I think that’s a good investment.

That begs one final question: do we have the time? Do you think that we have the staying power to do what’s necessary to fight a counterinsurgency, to build a nation, or even its army?

PP: We have the time and the resources to do whatever we think is important to our nation.

PRISM
Climate change has reemerged in the mainstream of U.S. Government policy as a central issue and a national security concern. President Barack Obama, addressing an audience at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology in October 2009, identified climate change and fossil fuel dependence as a national security threat needing innovative, science-based solutions to “prevent the worst consequences of climate change.” President Obama asserted that “the naysayers, the folks who would pretend that this is not an issue . . . are being marginalized.”

The climate change debate—the existence, underlying sources, and need for mitigation—has met with controversy in the United States for more than a decade and a half. U.S. policy has evolved from the Clinton administration’s active support in 1997 and signing—but not submitting for ratification—the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to President George W. Bush withdrawing support in 2001. The pendulum quietly swung back with President Bush later acknowledging climate change as a security matter in 2007, issuing a climate change mitigation policy strategy, and signing America’s Climate Security Act. Over the past several years, former Vice President Al Gore has heightened domestic and international public awareness of climate change, and in testimony before Congress in April 2009, Gore identified climate change mitigation as a “moral imperative.” Complicating matters, in November 2009, leading up to the quadrennial meeting of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), questions about the transparency of data behind certain United Kingdom scientific reports informing work of the panel led some in the U.S. media to dub the climate change debate as “Climate-gate whitewash.”

U.S. military and intelligence planners have examined the challenges posed by climate change for years. Last year, the National Intelligence Council completed its first assessment of the national security implications of climate change, the potential geopolitical impacts, and military and humanitarian responses. The assessment concluded that resulting storms, droughts, and food shortages would increase humanitarian relief demands, which “may significantly tax U.S. military transportation and support force structures, resulting in a strained readiness posture and decreased strategic depth for combat operations.”

Climate change has gained prominence in the Pentagon as well, and the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) identifies climate change as a national security threat in three ways. First, it is a force-multiplying driver of conflict, as changes in temperature, precipitation levels, and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events "contribute to food and water scarcity . . . increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration." Second, climate change impacts national security as a wildcard variable skewing military plans. Third, climate change burdens military and civilian resources by creating additional humanitarian response obligations. As the QDR states, "While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world."

Following the lead of the Pentagon, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development are drafting the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), modeled on the QDR and expected to be released in the fall of this year. Like the QDR, the QDDR will incorporate climate change issues.

A wicked problem, as coined by Horst Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, is one that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to identify, and the solution is not true or false, but better or worse options. Climate change is said to be a super wicked problem, which has the added complications of a time imperative, no central authority to resolve the problem, and the fact that the entities seeking to solve the problem are also involved in causing it, thus creating a deepening cycle of complications.

At this critical juncture in the climate change and national security debate, the Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution book series has published Climate Change and Armed Conflict: Hot and Cold Wars, by James R. Lee. Professor Lee, of American University’s School of International Service, is an international relations expert with a geography background. His treatment of climate change is exceptional among contemporary analyses in that it essentially sets aside the debate over the underlying causes—natural versus human induced—and focuses on mapping a path for understanding the climate change phenomenon based on historical cases, extrapolating conflict trends, predicting alternative outcomes, and suggesting practical options.

Lee begins by tracing the history from the prehistoric period, beginning with the relative adaptive abilities of and territorial competitions between Cro-Magnon and Neanderthal man through the present. Lee intervolves periodic variations and dramatic changes in climate, with corresponding human factors: social, political, and economic development; population growth; human migration; competition for scarce resources; and territorial-induced conflicts. He thereby demonstrates linkages between climate change, social growth, and conflict.

Building on these links, Lee then juxtaposes the climate change predictions of the IPCC with the Fund for Peace Index of Failed States and the U.S. Department of Defense conflict forecasting tool, ACTOR (Analyzing Complex Threats for Operations and Readiness). Through this study, he extrapolates conflict trends—"projections of unhealthy convergences between climate change and conflict" (p. 118).

Given that conflict arose even where climate change was mostly slow and periodic, if climate change is accelerated, then the ability
to adapt to such changes may be stretched beyond sustainable limits, particularly in those regions already politically fragile, resource-deprived, and experiencing population, ethnic, and other stresses.

Significantly, the regions subject to greatest stress from climate change lie along the “Equatorial Tension Belt,” which includes Mexico, Central America, and the northern portion of South America, North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Lee predicts that climate change in these regions will exacerbate internal conflict and competition for scarce natural resources—water, food, and sustenance agriculture economic livelihoods—and result in “Hot Wars” of internal strife.

Paradoxically, climate change warming may enhance natural resource abundance in polar areas previously unfit for human habitation. Such changes too can lead to conflict, characterized by Lee as “Cold Wars” of interstate conflict, resulting from competition for the exploitation of the new natural resources and competing territorial and sovereignty claims made acute by new human migration patterns.

Lee predicts that climate change also will impact the comparatively politically stable territories of the United States and Northern and Central Europe, despite their greater resource abundance, aggravated by territorial competition from mass migrations and increased demands for humanitarian relief responses. The adaptive capacity of these regions may stave off conflict initially, but likely not indefinitely.

Lee notes that the rate of climate change for the first half of the 21st century is predicted by the IPCC and other scientists to be highly accelerated, regardless of intervening mitigation measures—essentially, for the immediate future, the damage has been done and the course set. This suggests a corresponding accelerated rate of struggle and instability. The second half of the 21st century remains malleable, depending on the measures taken and outcomes of the first half. Lee discusses various possible scenarios based on “realists and pessimists” contrasted with “idealists and optimists” models. Lee concludes with a series of long-term suggestions to mitigate conflicts, uncouple climate change and violence, and preventative measures that reduce human contribution to climate change. He asks “whether the goal of good global policy or the goal of national interests will win out in shaping human impacts on future climates” (p. 162).

Lee’s treatment of climate change and conflict is simultaneously technical and historical, primarily utilizing political science methodology. He draws on a diversity of disciplines from a distinctive wide range of sources from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe. This is a significant work, illuminating and instructive, and not encumbered by political underpinnings, which can be useful in objectively informing the climate change and national security policy discussion. PRISM
In his introduction to this new edition of *War of Necessity, War of Choice*, Richard Haass states that the “book’s core is a distinction with a difference. There are wars of necessity and wars of choice. Confusing the two runs the danger of ill-advised decisions to go to war.” He might have added “or to continue a war.”

The new edition comes at a time when Americans are considering the rationale behind continuing one war (Afghanistan) and perhaps initiating another (Iran). The public debate includes strong voices concerning the appropriate U.S. action in both countries. That makes this edition both timely and important.

In the Bush 41 administration, Haass was “special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council.” He was responsible for North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. He notes that at the beginning of the administration, his focus was on Israel-Palestine, post-Soviet Afghanistan, and India-Pakistan, as well as responding to congressional investigations of previously approved Commodity Credit Corporation loans to Iraq. Otherwise, Iraq simply was not a priority. Key decisionmakers were even busier. Thus, like many crises, the potential Iraqi invasion of Kuwait did not get the full attention of these decisionmakers until very late. Even when the administration’s focus turned to the crisis, it failed to understand that Saddam Hussein was serious about invading Kuwait and thus missed the opportunity to prevent the invasion.

As a close inside observer of the decision-making process that led to Operation Desert Storm, Haass argues that it was a war of necessity. He writes:

*The United States had vital national interests at stake. A Saddam who controlled Kuwait would dominate the oil-rich Middle East, given the value of Kuwait’s oil and the likelihood that other Arab states would fear standing up to him lest they suffer Kuwait’s fate. It would only be a short while before he gained nuclear weapons. Israel’s security would be badly compromised. At the same time, there is little in the history of sanctions that suggested that they alone would provide enough leverage. . . . This was a war of necessity if ever there was one. The stakes were enormous, and we had tried and exhausted the alternative to employing military force.*

Interestingly, Haass weakens his own argument that Desert Storm was a war of choice. He states, “A different president and set of advisors

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might have tolerated Iraqi control of Kuwait and limited the U.S. response to sanctions so long as Saddam did not attack Saudi Arabia.” In short, another administration might not have seen this as a war of necessity.

After leaving during the Clinton administration, Haass returned to Government service with the Bush 43 administration as director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. While admittedly more distant from the decisionmaking process, he argues that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a war of choice rather than a war of necessity. Haass believes that “wars of choice tend to involve stakes or interests that are less clearly ‘vital,’ along with the existence of viable alternative policies.”

While Haass provides interesting views of the decisionmaking process as seen from his post at State, he is not totally convincing in calling the 2003 invasion of Iraq a war of choice. In fact, the Bush 43 administration used some of the same reasons that Haass lists above for Bush 41 to justify action against Iraq, such as the fear of Iraqi nuclear weapons and the weakness of sanctions as a deterrent.

Later, he concedes that “not once in all my meetings in my years in government did an intelligence analyst or anyone else for that matter argue openly or take me aside and say privately that Iraq possessed nothing in the way of weapons of mass destruction.” This statement weakens his argument that the invasion of Iraq was a war of choice since the key justification for the war was the “fact” that Iraq was working to obtain nuclear weapons.

Haass’s narrative and honest opinions indicate that, except in the case of responding to an attack, the difference between necessity and choice is primarily one of judgment. While not the intention of the book, his statement that different people using essentially the same facts will arrive at different conclusions about the necessity of an action does seem to point to judgment rather than to indisputable facts as the determining factor. This should not be surprising. The problems that lead to war are inherently “wicked problems,” and, by definition, experts will strongly disagree about both the definition of the problem and its potential solutions.

While the title of the book focuses the reader on determining whether a war is necessary, the author provides thought-provoking observations on two other topics. First, he notes the importance of proper process in developing a solid understanding of the potential conflict and in particular its costs and benefits. Second, he highlights the critical role assumptions play in the decision process and how failure to ensure a common understanding of those assumptions can lead to misunderstanding—and poor decisions.

His narratives highlight the wide difference between the approaches taken by Bush 41 and 43. He clearly describes the way Bush 41 used the formal National Security Council (NSC) process and included the key executive branch departments in a thorough, effective cost/benefit analysis of the decision to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Just as important, the process ensured an effective analysis of the probable cost of continuing the war into Iraq. He makes the point that once Saddam was ejected from Iraq (his war of necessity), any decision to continue to Baghdad would represent a war of choice. Thus, Desert Storm achieved its goals at a reasonable strategic cost.

In contrast, in the run-up to invading Iraq, Bush 43 short-circuited the process and moved the bulk of the cost/benefit evaluation to a close circle of trusted advisors who were predisposed to invade Iraq and highly optimistic about the outcome. Thus, Bush was never
confronted with the potential costs of his decision. Compounding the problems created by the poor decision, Haass notes, “The lack of any meaningful interagency process or oversight of the aftermath made it all too easy for the Defense Department (which was essentially left by the NSC to oversee itself) to ignore advice from the outside” (p. 228) in its planning for the invasion of Iraq. The end result was a massively costly effort in Iraq for strategic results that are dubious at best.

Another issue Haass explores is the vital importance of clearly articulating the assumptions upon which a plan is based. He notes that the assumptions underpinning the first Gulf War were clearly stated and thoroughly vetted. In contrast, the 2003 assumptions were deeply flawed—in particular the ideas that all Iraqis would see U.S. forces as liberators and that the Iraqi government would continue to function and rapidly evolve into a democracy. The failure to use the process to develop and examine these assumptions led to massive failures in establishing security and reconstructing Iraq.

This caution has particular applicability as we begin to execute the new strategy in Afghanistan. Neither the Obama administration nor the commanders have ever publicly stated the assumptions upon which our population-centric approach is based. How can the American people evaluate whether they should continue to support the effort if they have no idea what assumptions underpin it? The Senate clearly failed to demand a serious discussion of assumptions prior to acquiescing to invading Iraq, and it has not questioned the assumptions underpinning our new approach in Afghanistan. If we lean toward military action against Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the Senate must demand that the administration state clearly the assumptions upon which they based their plans.

In summary, Haass’s book remains both useful and relevant. He focuses on the idea that a nation should know whether it is embarking on a war of necessity or of choice. However, he also highlights how devilishly difficult it is to determine to which category a conflict belongs. His narrative shows how honest people, even experts, can disagree based on their interpretations of the situation. However, Haass makes it clear that it is essential to effectively use the process to truly understand the nature of the problem and the potential costs/benefits of each course of action. Part of that examination must be a careful vetting of the assumptions behind the proposed actions. While the leaders may still decide to go to war, they will at least be aware of the range of potential costs as well as benefits.

A final caution may be appropriate. Wars of choice usually do not turn out well for those who start them. In the last couple of centuries, only the Germans under Bismarck and the Japanese against the Russians in 1905 seem to have achieved their aims when they chose to go to war—and the Japanese paid a high price. Looking at others who chose to go to war—the Germans twice in the 20th century, the Japanese against the United States, the North Koreans, the United States when it chose to enter Vietnam and Iraq, the Argentines in the Falklands, the Chinese against the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the French attempt to reassert control over Vietnam and Algeria, and even the Israelis in 1967—indicates that those starting a war rarely achieved the results expected and usually suffered significant strategic losses. Perhaps the major point of Haass’s work is that wars of choice should be avoided.
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“As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people... We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists. So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future... To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy.”

—President Barack Obama
March 27, 2009