We are the companies of United Technologies. We employ nearly 66,000 people across 32 European countries. From Ireland to Turkey and from Finland to Portugal, our products and technologies power modern life – at home, at work and everywhere in between. We develop security and defense capabilities to protect you from harm and ensure that our ever-changing world runs better, faster, and more efficiently. We are United Technologies.
GOING GLOBAL:
EUROPE’S SECURITY POLICY CHALLENGE

CONFERENCE REPORT
The economic and financial outlook in Europe may render both more complex, their urgency is also no less real. As the 2003 European Security Strategy put it: “in an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand.” It goes on to say that the EU “should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” Yet there can be no mission without means: just as the Lisbon Treaty gives the EU the institutional means to move forward, so too must the EU’s 2014-2020 budget strengthen Europe’s ability to ensure its own security and contribute more significantly to that of the world.

We thank the Belgian EU Presidency and the Belgian Ministry of Defence for their support. Along with that of the French Presidency in 2008 and that of Sweden in 2009, the Belgian Presidency gave its support to this event from the outset, and naturally we hope that this will be the case with the Polish Presidency.

Our thanks go out to our many distinguished speakers for their contributions, and first and foremost to Pieter De Crem, the Belgian Minister of Defence, and Kristalina Georgieva, European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response.

We should also like to extend our warmest thanks to the partners who made this event possible and contributed to its success: Raytheon Company, United Technologies Corporation, and the VIRTUOSO project financed by the 7th European Security Research Programme.

We extend a warm invitation for you to join us later this year for the next edition of the Security & Defence Day at which we will continue to reflect upon, discuss and address the future challenges to European security and how best to meet them.
Contents

Foreword .................................................................................................................................. 4
Programme ................................................................................................................................ 6
Institutional challenges for the EU's growing political power ......................................................... 14
Securing long-term resources ....................................................................................................... 21
Dissuasion and non-proliferation .................................................................................................. 26
Solidarity and the management of migration flows ........................................................................ 30
Can the EU become a global emergency response team? ............................................................... 34
Aerial defence systems: Giving Europe a strategic autonomy ....................................................... 38
The EU as a maritime power ......................................................................................................... 43
Speaker biographies ..................................................................................................................... 92
List of participants ......................................................................................................................... 108

The views expressed in this report by speakers and members of the audience are personal opinions and not necessarily the views of the organisations they represent, nor of the SDA and CEIS, their members or sponsors.

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted, provided that full attribution is made to the co-organisers and to the source(s) in question, and provided that any such reproduction, whether in full or in part, is not sold unless incorporated in other works.

Publisher: Geert Cami
Text: Europolitics
Photos: David Plas
Design: Europolitics
Print: Identic
Co-organised by:

Security & Defence Day

Going global:
Europe’s security policy challenge

30 November 2010
Palais d’Egmont, Brussels
WELCOME REMARKS
09:10-09:15

Gen. Jean Rannou, Director of Security and Defence, CEIS

KEYNOTE SPEECH
09:15- 09:30

Pieter De Crem, Belgian Minister of Defence

PLENARY SESSION
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR THE EU’S GROWING POLITICAL POWER
09:30-10:30

The institutional architecture behind the EU’s global outreach is set to look very different now the Lisbon treaty is in place. How will increased parliamentary oversight at national and European level affect CSDP? Beyond the obvious challenges of determining the EEAS’s eventual institutional shape, how will the next EU budget and financial instruments (2014-2020) affect European foreign and security policy? Is there a roadmap for implementing Permanent Structured Cooperation? How well do the EU’s increasingly determined crisis response efforts fit into its overall foreign and security policies?

Speakers
Kristalina Georgieva, European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response
Karel Kovanda, Deputy Director General for External Relations, European Commission
Geoffrey van Orden, MEP, Member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament
H.E. Mr. Jean-Louis Falconi, PSC Ambassador, French Permanent Representation to the EU

Moderated by
Giles Merritt, Director of the Security & Defence Agenda

COFFEE BREAK
10:30 - 11:00
PARALLEL SESSIONS I - Assessing the challenges

11:00-12:30

SECURING LONG-TERM RESOURCES

Strategic resources such as food, water, energy and industrial raw materials will become increasingly important in the coming decades. What instruments does the EU have for securing supply routes to Europe? To what extent should delivering key resources to Europeans be left up to the private sector? Will the European Union have to make a choice between a humanitarian or an interest-guided agenda?

Speakers
Christian Ehler, MEP, Member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament
Gwenole Cozigou, Director for Chemicals, Metals, Mechanical, Electrical and Construction industries; Raw materials, European Commission
Michel Rademaker, Deputy Director of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO

Moderated by Willy De Backer, Head of the Greening Europe Forum, Friends of Europe

DISSUASION AND NON-PROLIFERATION

The lack of a clear nuclear dissuasion policy has been a feature of security thinking in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Are EU member states ready to take the tough decisions in response to the change in US missile defence policy? As only two EU member states have a nuclear dissuasion capability, can Europe react with one voice to the Obama administration’s disarmament initiative? Is non-proliferation even on the EU’s agenda?

Speakers
Didier Gambier, Advisor for strategic issues relating to industrial technologies, Directorate General for Research, European Commission
Maurizio Martellini, Secretary General, Landau Network- Centro Volta

Moderated by Michel de Gliniasty, Senior Advisor, CEIS
SOLIDARITY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION FLOWS

What should the EU do to reconcile growing migratory pressures to the South with maintaining relations with strategic neighbours? The political groundswell in Europe suggests that unlimited immigration may be increasingly controversial, especially in light of the financial crisis. How can national immigration policies be better coordinated at European level and how should the collective impact of these policies be assessed? Would new European development tools allow for a rethink of European migration policies?

Speakers
Simon Busuttil, MEP, Member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament
Michael T. Dougherty, Director of Immigration Control, Raytheon Homeland Security
Brig. Gen. Ilkka Laitinen, Executive Director, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation (Frontex)

Moderated by Giles Merritt, Director of the Security & Defence Agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LUNCH</th>
<th>12:30-13:30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAN THE EU BECOME A GLOBAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM?</td>
<td>Salle Arenberg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enhancing its crisis management capabilities is crucial to strengthening the EU’s role as a global actor. How should ‘civ-mil’ synergies be further developed, and what tools does the Lisbon treaty offer to allow the EU to act more cohesively and with greater flexibility? What strategic capabilities need to be developed and how can the EU ensure better crisis management? Does the EU need to work more effectively with other international organisations, and is there scope for the creation of EU “humanitarian battle groups”?

Speakers
Col. Jorge Esteves, Commander, European Gendarmerie Force
Florika Fink-Hooijer, Head of Cabinet of Kristalina Georgieva, European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response
Brig. Gen. Giovanni Manione, Deputy Director-General for Crisis Management, Council of the European Union
Lt. Col. René Wagemans, Former Head of CIMIC/Humanitarian Crisis Response Branch, Belgian First Aid & Support Team (B-FAST), Belgian Defence for the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Moderated by Axel Dyevre, Director of the European Office, CEIS
**AERIAL SYSTEMS: GIVING EUROPE STRATEGIC AUTONOMY**  
Salle orange

Air power ranges from reconnaissance to combat, airlift and logistics, and is a key research and development driver. From Chad to Afghanistan, recent operations have once again highlighted the importance of helicopters and UAVs, but also the EU’s weaknesses in these areas. What are Europe’s strengths and weaknesses and what developments lie just over the horizon? How best could Europe achieve strategic autonomy in the field, and should future development work be brought back into the fold of the European Defence Technological Industrial Base? What new cooperation possibilities are there within European security research and innovation for the EDA and the European Commission?

**Speakers**  
Col. (Ret.) Michael S. Francis, Chief Advanced Programs, United Technologies Research Center  
Maj. Gen. Jochen Both, Commander, European Air Transport Command  
Peter M. Wagner, Head of Unit for Defence, Aeronautic and Maritime Industries, Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry, European Commission

**Moderated by Giles Merritt**, Director of the Security & Defence Agenda

---

**THE EU AS A MARITIME POWER**  
Salle bleue

Piracy has re-focused attention on Europe’s naval capabilities, and on its limitations. What lessons have been learnt from the EU-led Atalanta mission off the coast of Somalia, and could this serve as a “test-run” for future maritime operations? What do the Western Sahara, the Levant, the Aegean and the Balkans have in common that might suggest a shared “Mediterranean” approach to maritime security? How realistic is the idea of a collective EU naval strategy?

**Speakers**  
Adm. Lutz Feldt, Former Chief of Staff of the German Navy and Member of the Group of “Wise Pens”  
Ana Maria Gomes, MEP, Member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament  
Rear Adm. António Silva Ribeiro, Deputy Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Portuguese Navy

**Moderated by Olivier Zajec**, Deputy Director, Strategic Forecasting Department, CEIS
SECURITY & DEFENCE DAY 10

Salle Arenberg

Institutional challenges for the EU’s growing political power

09:15 – 10:30
The Lisbon Treaty has given the European Union much needed tools to help it gain a stronger position on the world stage, said Belgium’s Defence Minister Pieter De Crem, but in an era of shrinking budgets he acknowledged that EU nations have to increase cooperation to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by the Treaty.

“Europe needs additional efforts to become stronger, to become a respected and major player on the international stage,” De Crem said in his keynote speech opening the 2010 Security and Defence Day. “It is clear that we have to go beyond our current level of cooperation. With the instruments of Lisbon we have to find ways to achieve what we declare to be our objectives.”
General Jean Rannou, Director of Security and Defence at CEIS, also raised the question of Europe’s capability to live up to the expectations created by the Lisbon Treaty.

“There are many consequences to the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty, but if we want to evolve to become an actor at a global level, we Europeans must ask ourselves if we have the means,” Rannou said in his opening remarks.

De Crem’s speech was followed by a debate on the challenges facing the EU’s political power which revealed some sharply differing views. British Conservative MEP Geoffrey van Orden cast doubt on the very idea of the EU taking on a defence role, whilst senior European Commission official Karel Kovanda stated that the EU foreign policy remained hostage to the competing ambitions of its member states and therefore “has managed to do no big things.”

Kristalina Georgieva, the European Commissioner for International Co-operation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, outlined how her department will work with the new EU Foreign Service and examined the relationship between military and humanitarian aid. France’s Ambassador to the EU’s Political and Security Committee, Jean-Louis Falconi, took the debate back to the interface between the EU’s new post-Lisbon institutional setup and the challenges created by the current economic squeeze and the global security situation. He pointed to the recent Franco-British defence agreement as an example for wider European cooperation.

De Crem said the “welcome rapprochement” between France and Britain showed that the economic crisis could be a catalyst for greater defence cooperation by forcing EU nations to work closer together to save money.

“Almost all EU member states will be faced with the same problem of more substantial decreases in defence budgets,” De Crem said. “Without a new approach to our security challenges, a lot of member states will be forced to reduce their military capabilities.”
He added that this recognition among EU defence ministers at their informal meeting in Ghent back in September, and their agreement on study areas would help the EU take the pooling and sharing of resources forward. This was a major achievement of the Belgium’s EU Presidency, De Crem said.

Moderator Giles Merritt, Director of the Security & Defence Agenda, took up the theme, suggesting that the budget crisis “may well turn out to be a blessing in disguise” for European defence.

Europe’s ability to increase the pooling and sharing of military capabilities along with the need to develop a common vision in the face of new global challenges will be key to deciding how post-Lisbon EU can bring added value to foreign and security policy, said Falconi. The role of the new European External Action Service (EEAS) would be crucial, he added, pointing to the difficulties in forging the new diplomatic service from the varying political cultures of the Commission, Council and member states.

“It’s a challenge, let’s be clear. I don’t think any of our national administrations have undergone such an ambitious reform. There’s work to be done,” Falconi told the conference. “All the member states need to be involved, we need a variety of outlooks … we have to build a common culture.”

Commissioner Georgieva underlined the necessity of cooperation to make the Lisbon Treaty work. She warned against too much institutional navel-gazing rather than dealing with real issues and illustrated her point by looking at the interaction between humanitarian aid and EU foreign and security policy. Humanitarian aid is driven by needs and principles of neutrality and impartiality. For this reason it is not part of EU foreign policy or of the EEAS. But humanitarian aspects need to be factored into EU foreign policy especially in complex crises where issues of humanitarian access and protection are crucial.
That cooperation should also be widened to the role of the military in contributing to the provision of relief and security. Georgieva said there are occasions when military engagement is needed to help with emergency assistance, such as the Asian tsunami or the Pakistani earthquake; times when the military is needed to provide a secure environment which facilitates aid efforts such as the EU mission in Chad; and events where the military can do both, such as the earthquake in Haiti. In other cases humanitarian assistance does not need military support.

The EU will keep humanitarian assistance separate from the EEAS in order to protect its independence and impartiality, Georgieva explained. However, she gave assurances that her department will “work hand-in-hand” with the foreign service to ensure a coherent response to crises.

Van Orden backed the commissioner’s views on the EU’s important role in humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction, but he saw no added value in the EU’s defence ambitions.

“I would like to see a genuine complementarily between the European Union and for example NATO, with the European Union focusing on its civil tasks and the military tasks being left to the organisation best equipped to do that, which is NATO,” said Van Orden.
“NATO has the enormous strength of binding the US and Canada to the security of our continent. That is our most important strategic objective. Anything we do to in any way undermine that, I think, is detrimental.”

Van Orden raised a series of concerns about the Lisbon Treaty, including the lack of parliamentary oversight on EU defence activities and concern that the “permanent structured cooperation” clauses in the treaty could lead to the development of an EU army.

“The greatest danger to my mind would be if the UK and France were to decide that their bilateral agreement could form the basis for permanent structured cooperation within the context of the European Union,” he said.

In response to a question from Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, from the Praesidium of Friends of Europe, Falconi pointed out that the Franco-British agreement included a commitment to work for more efficient EU military capacities, and that President Nicolas Sarkozy had called it a starting point for more European cooperation.

Van Orden’s sceptical views on EU defence are well known, and sparked a too personal focus on him from France’s former Ambassador to NATO, Benoît d’Aboville, who stressed the need for the EU to have its own military head-
quarters to better cooperate with NATO. More surprising was the downbeat assessment of EU foreign policy from Karel Kovanda, the European Commission’s Deputy Director-General for External Relations.

“Europe’s foreign policy is still as the mercy of the member states,” Kovanda said. “What we can do are relatively small things on the periphery of world affairs … Europe as big as it is has managed to do almost no big thing really.”

He characterized EU achievements in Kosovo and Bosnia as “medium-sized” and bemoaned failings in Russia, Turkey, China and the Middle East. After his comments were questioned by Thomas Schneider of the German Atlantic Association, Kovanda acknowledged that the EU had played a crucial role in ending the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and in ensuring a peaceful outcome to Orange Revolution which followed Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election.

Kovanda, who resigned after a long Brussels career at both NATO and the EU, said it was too early to evaluate the impact of the Lisbon Treaty in improving the EU’s foreign policy response. However, he complained that the year-long process of putting together the EEAS has been “very long and very painful with not much to show for it yet.”
While there has been much focus in recent years on the threats to energy routes from Russia and the Middle East or the danger from pirate disruption to maritime trade routes, Michel Rademaker chose to open this debate by focusing on Europe’s dependency on rare earths from China.

**Securing long-term resources**

Deputy Director of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, Rademaker pointed out that China owns 97 percent of production of rare earths – 17 elements that are essential for the production of mobile phones, flat screen TVs, wind turbines, hybrid cars and a range of other high-tech products.

“Future demand will grow exponentially still and supply can’t meet demand in the
short term and probably not in the long run, so there is a gap,” Rademaker told the conference.

Rademaker explained that Western companies were initially happy to allow China to take over production since costs were lower and there were fewer concerns about the environmental impact of rare earth production.

Now, however, there are concerns that China is using export restrictions to favour the development of its own production of high-tech goods. The alleged freeze in rare earth exports to Japan after the detention of a Chinese trawler captain by the Japanese coast guard was an indication of China’s willingness to use its control of the production of the raw material for political reasons, Rademaker contended. From the floor, Thomas Schneider, of the German Atlantic Association, also raised the importance of rare earths in the production of modern military equipment.

The European Commission has identified 14 critical raw materials where the EU’s need for imports is likely to present economic and geo-political risk over the next ten years. The list is expected to be revised on a regular basis in the future.

“We are heavily dependent on imports and on top of that, the situation is such that we have emerging countries for which demand is increasing,” cautioned Gwenole Cozigou, Director for chemicals, metals, mechanical, electrical, construction industries and raw materials at the European Commission’s Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry.
The United States and Australia are planning to open major new rare earth mines over the next five years, but rising demand means there will still be a shortage, with the EU remaining almost 100 percent dependent on imports.

Rademaker said the EU needs to combine energy, security and foreign policy with intensified research and development to deal with the potential shortfall, striking investment deals with countries outside China which have rare earth deposits. They should also step up domestic “reduce, reuse and replace policies” to lower dependence on imported rare earths, for example through recycling mobile phones and other material containing the products.

Given the security implications, the EU should also open cooperation with NATO on the question, including through research in developing alternative products.

Cozigou said the EU is already working on multinational and bilateral tracks to secure stable supplies of critical raw materials, notably by cooperating with the United States and Mexico in the request for a World Trade Organisation panel on Chinese trade restrictions on eight raw materials. The EU is also making open trade in such products an important factor in WTO accession negotiations with countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan.

On another level, the EU is talking with developing nations about improving their geological awareness, infrastructure and technical abilities to seek alternative sources of key resources. Cozigou stressed that EU environment authorities were closely involved to ensure extraction
complies with anti-pollution policies.

Although the applications of rare earth materials may be new, German MEP Christian Ehler said concern over the security of supply for critical resources was not. During the Cold War, the question was which mines were owned by Russia, China or the United States, he said. "It's not a new game," said the EPP member of the Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence. “We depended on the Americans in the past and now we depend on a much more differentiated rest of the world, because it’s not just the Americans and the Russians any more.”

Ehler contended, however, that the sheer scale of China’s growing predominance in raw materials was a cause for concern. The EU needed a strategy to bring the trade in key resources into multinational agreements despite opposition from China. “We can’t organise, even for the EU, the world in bilateral agreements,” he said.

Recycling can play a part, Ehler stressed, pointing out that 20 tonnes of mobile phone waste containing valuable coltan and other materials, were not being treated in Europe. "It would make some sense to set up a regime for recycling,” he said.

Ehler also launched a debate over how much the public authorities should get involved, and how much should be left to the market. Jamie Shea from NATO argued that both sides needed to cooperate more, for example in preparing public-private responses to energy safety and security risks such as pirate attacks or disasters such as the Deep Water Horizon blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico.

Shea was recently appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary General for emerging challenges at NATO with a brief to identify new threats and ways to deal with
them. He broadened the debate to look at the diplomatic and security dilemmas raised by Europe’s continued reliance on imported oil and gas.

“The geopolitics of resources and energy is back,” Shea concluded. “In the 21st century we are going to be confronted in the European Union and NATO with some difficult diplomatic dilemmas.”

In particular, he focused on the threats to supply routes whose vulnerability has been demonstrated by the Somali piracy problem. Given that 90 percent of the world’s trade is carried by sea, more investment should be made in maritime protection resources, but in fact, allied nations are cutting back their navies. International cooperation is needed to deal with common threats – for example by engaging more with China and India, given the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean as a trade hub.

There was considerable debate about how the West should respond to China’s investment in African raw materials. Speakers asked if the EU should relax its stance on promoting good governance and human rights in Africa to better compete with China.

The general view was that such a move would be short-sighted and that the Chinese policy had its own limitations. “We have to have a more robust strategy although I’m not convinced that this very single issue development policy of China will work, there is a lot of scepticism in Africa about that and in many Third World countries,” said Ehler. “We don’t have to clone the China policy.”
The European Union will play no more than a minor role in nuclear dissuasion and non-proliferation policy in the foreseeable future, with only atomic armed powers Britain and France having any real say, said the experts in the dissuasion and non-proliferation panel.

As US President Barack Obama urges nations to move towards a world without nuclear weapons, the EU has almost no way to respond, they said, except in the unlikely event that its member states ask it for action, for example in negotiations with Iran.

“Dissuasion is a subject in the European Union that is rarely addressed, and I don’t think we could come up with anything substantial,” said Didier Gambier, Advi-
sor on strategic issues relating to industrial technologies at the European Commission.

“The only thing we can do is to watch and to help create a consensus one day, if one begins to emerge,” he told the panel.

Gambier noted that the EU, where the power for decision making in defence matters lies in the hands of the member states, is not mentioned at all as a forum for cooperation in non-proliferation documents at NATO, although it has 21 member countries in common with the EU.

Of the EU's two nuclear powers, Britain believes that NATO must be the only forum in which nuclear arms are discussed, while France insists the weapons are for its protection alone. Neither is prepared to consider any cuts. With their arms stockpile in the low hundreds, the cross-channel neighbours are waiting for the United States and Russia to slash their munitions down to similar levels as those in Western Europe.

As well as pushing for massive reductions, Obama has also pledged to reject the first use of nuclear weapons even if the United States came under attack from biological or chemical weapons or from large-scale conventional forces.

Britain and France consider their arsenals strategic weapons only to be used if they come under attack and even then, only in extreme circumstances, but at the moment France would not even contemplate following Washington's lead.

“France does not agree with the no-first-use posture,” the Commander of France’s Strategic Air Force, Lieutenant General Paul Fouilland, told the audience. “If we accept that a nuclear weapon can only be used against a nuclear weapon, then we are giving a green light to the use of con-
ventional weapons, or biological weapons, or chemical weapons and other kinds of arms in the future,” he said.

“Dissuasion must be a certainty for us, backed by the will and the capacity to act, and uncertain for any potential adversaries,” he said, adding that Paris and London were focused on protecting their vital interests and promoting the notion of uncertainty to de-stabilise would-be aggressors.

France is expected to have around 300 nuclear weapons by next year, including operational and maintenance warheads, launched from the air or submarines, while Britain, with its Trident submarine capability, has around 120 operational arms, and a total stock of some 180. In terms of disarmament, France has a standard of “strict sufficiency,” under which the size of its arsenal must be big enough to present a credible force for dissuasion and to be able to respond to “international conditions”.

Politically at least, Paris would be willing to cut weapon numbers under certain conditions.

“France favours disarmament. It wants the world to be safer, more stable and in peace, and if that happens there will be less need for nuclear deterrence,” said Fouil-land. But he added: “We are waiting for the United States’ and Russia’s arsenals to fall to roughly the same level. That is, in the hundreds, rather than in the thousands. It’s the balance between the United States and Russia that is going to count.”

He estimated that the United States has a total of 8,000 warheads, around 2,000 less than Russia.

France relies heavily on nuclear energy to supply its electricity grid, and some speakers argued that the real risks lay in civil use of nuclear power, as exemplified by Iran’s ambitions to enrich uranium to fuel its nuclear reactors. At highly refined levels, enriched uranium can be used to make the core of an atomic bomb.

Maurizio Martellini, scientist and Head of the Landau Network-Centro Volta global security organisation, noted that nuclear weapons proliferation prevention is an area in which Europe is able to play an important role, for instance by leading negotiations with Iran on behalf of major world powers.

He said the EU had used “the proper inducement, confidence building and
soft measures” in an effort to persuade the Islamic Republic of Iran to give up enrichment in exchange for economic and political incentives.

The negotiation efforts were also aimed at finding a way to allow uranium to be enriched abroad, perhaps at a common IAEA-managed facility, but Martellini underlined that attempts to “internationalise the fuel cycle are a long-term challenge”.

The major powers involved were the five veto-holding members of the UN Security Council – Britain, France and fellow nuclear powers China, Russia and the United States – plus Germany, with the EU’s then foreign policy chief Javier Solana leading most of the negotiations.

Speakers at the conference suggested that because the European Union is not a member of the Council, and has not been able to become one, it would have to rely on Britain and France, possibly with help from Germany, to act when it comes to atomic matters.

“Nuclear deterrence is only a state-owned force, and the EU is not a state,” concluded Michel de Gliniasty, a Senior Advisor at CEIS.
The debate on the security aspects of migration flow management gave speakers an opportunity to share their thoughts on a key topic: setting up an integrated management system for the EU’s external borders in the post-Lisbon context.

Brigadier General Ilkka Laitinen, Executive Director of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex), reminded participants of the close link between surveillance of the EU’s external borders and the creation of Schengen: the create a secure Europe where people can move freely, it was necessary to adopt compensatory steps that required “common efforts”.

Solidarity and the management of migration flows
For Laitinen, integrating the management system for the European Union’s external borders is the new challenge. “We should start thinking about cross-border activities as encompassing, on the one hand, legitimate activities such as legal migration and, on the other, combating and controlling irregular activities,” he said.

As far as cross-border crime is concerned, “we need knowledge, we need response and once again because of Schengen, we need interoperability” between all the parties involved, Laitinen said.

By scrapping the pillar structure, the Lisbon Treaty has brought about a “remarkable change,” Laitinen insisted. Criminal cross-border activities, which before fell within the remit of intergovernmental policy on police cooperation and criminal justice, are now covered by EU powers along with migration policy. Acknowledging that strengthening policing at external borders is not in itself the solution, Laitinen was keen for all ideas to be put on the table that may help contribute towards the integration of the border management system. Above all, he said the EU had to see “what we can do with our third-country partners and only then what we can do at the borders”.

Bringing a more politicised view to the debate, Maltese MEP Simon Busuttil (EPP) focused his thoughts on the principle of solidarity between member states on immigration and asylum. While this principle was consecrated by the treaty, its application is, in reality, clearly lacking, he noted. Busuttil therefore deemed it useful to define the term. “We are not talking about goods moving from one country to another but we are talking about human beings,” he stressed. Moreover, solidarity only involves “a few member states that are particularly exposed to large migration flows”.

Citing the example of Greece, where 90% of illegal migrants currently transit, Busuttil stressed the need to resolve the
problem at European level, pointing out that “people who are going to Greece do not want to stay in Greece but want to go to another member state”.

With regard to controlling external borders, Busuttil resolutely defended the role of Frontex. Nevertheless, he said the agency “should be more competent and more efficient”. Busuttil referred to the amendments put forward in his new report. One of the key measures mentioned in his proposal is to increase Frontex’s visibility and to stop referring to Frontex missions by obscure titles such as ‘RABITs’ (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) but as missions of the ‘European Union’s Border Guard System’, underlining that it would be a strong political act. He also expressed his support for the European Commission’s proposal on the possibility of Frontex having its own equipment. Expressing astonishment that the agency cannot deal with personal data, Busuttil said that had to change despite possible opposition from MEPs concerned about data protection issues.

Michael T. Dougherty, Director of immigration control at the US defence company Raytheon, contributed to the debate by presenting ‘Future Border’. This new modelling and simulation software is aimed at providing risk analysis on illegal migration flows into the European Union. “I think that it is difficult to find a consensus in order to proceed to a credible risk analysis and to inform those inside and between the different agencies,” said Dougherty. The system mainly aims to encourage dialogue between all the main players involved, governments, academics or even NGOs, and explore the dynamics that underlie illegal immigration. The list of ‘Future Border’ functions that Dougherty spelled out contained identification of European countries of destination and the definition of the different actions that the governments could take. The system also has a forecasting element where it assesses the impact of European migration policies over a period of more than ten years.

During the question and answer session, clarifications on the revision of the Frontex mandate were given. On the delicate question of Frontex handling personal data, Laitinen replied that “on this point, we have to be clear”. The Executive Director of Frontex set out the two main reasons
justifying the use of information that also contains personal data. “The first, and this is our primary objective, is to have better targeted operations” and for that Frontex must be able to use all the information that it receives. The second reason ties in directly with the criminal justice enquiry powers of Europol. Laitinen insisted here that Frontex has at its disposal a large amount of information deemed extremely useful for enquiries and criminal proceedings. The RABITS operation, activated for the first time on the Greek-Turkish border, is an excellent example of this. “The teams on the ground receive so much information that one of my colleagues, a German, said that if this information were to fall in the hands of the investigating officers they would go mad,” the Director said. Busuttil, for his part, warned “that it would be criminal if we had to prevent Frontex from doing that”.

Answering SDA Director Giles Merritt, who moderated the session, the speakers also specified a few points on the link between security and migration. “This is a conference on security and defence and we haven’t really talked about the security risks posed by immigration,” said Merritt. The question is knowing to what extent illegal immigration is a security problem in the strict sense of the word and not a political problem.

For Laitinen, it was clear: “There are always criminal aspects and we all understand how illegal immigration, traffic in human beings, human smuggling, even money laundering, and other types of crimes are linked. So we cannot separate it, as I said at the beginning”.

At the end of the session, a broader consideration of the definition of illegal immigration took place. Is it a criminal phenomenon? Is it a social, political or even economic phenomenon? “That is a very difficult question”, admitted Busuttil, underlining that “it is very difficult to say that someone who has crossed your external borders is a criminal”. However, Laitinen and Busuttil agreed that facilitators, smugglers and organisations behind illegal immigration are clearly criminals and they are the ones the EU needs to combat. This is the reason why it is crucial to encourage cooperation between agencies, Busuttil concluded.
The European Union wants to act as a global emergency response team, has the means to do so and is already making a significant impact as a force for stability, peace and emergency relief. However, delegates agreed that the institutions and member states within the Union could do much better if they learned to better communicate and coordinate their efforts.

Regardless of their backgrounds in humanitarian assistance, speakers agreed unanimously that to be truly effective, crisis responses needed stronger central coordination. There was a sense of frustration that member states and the European Commission are duplicating efforts, despite holding similar values and priorities for responding to natural and man-made disasters, because the actors are not talking to each other properly before deploying their individual responses.

“In the end, we always get what we need, but
we would like not to have these hours of uncertainty before we know what resources we’re getting,” said Florika Fink-Hooijer, Head of Cabinet of Kristalina Georgieva, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response. She added that: “In emergency response, coordination and interaction are essential from an early stage, while respecting the leadership role of the UN and the responsibilities of the host country vis-a-vis its citizens”.

Her point resonated in a wider sense with Brigadier-General Giovanni Manione, Deputy Director-General for Crisis Management at the Council of the European Union, who pointed out that the whole spectrum of responses, including from Europe’s NGOs, needed to be better coordinated. “Many humanitarian organisations act without any political control, they just go,” he considered. The conclusion from both Fink-Hooijer and Manione was that in each crisis there were inevitably services provided twice by fellow EU actors and other areas where no response at all was provided.

“Coordination is paramount because planning means efficient and effective action,” said Axel Dyèvre, Director of the European Office at CEIS. “We cannot have any of this without effective common training,” he added.

The trick to coordinating an effective overall crisis response, the debate suggested, rests on the ability to choose the right combination of tools for the job in different phases. This includes balancing the use of civilian and military instruments, as well as taking into account contributions made by non-governmental organisations.

Fink-Hooijer, with a background in humanitarian aid, expressed concern about habitually involving the military in civilian humanitarian responses without due caution. “In some circumstances, blurring the lines (between civilian and military responses) can be very dangerous because we know that actually more humanitarian workers are killed than peacekeepers”. The idea was broadly supported by Lieutenant Colonel René Wagemans, the former Head of
CIMIC/Humanitarian Crisis Response Branch of the Belgian First Aid and Support Team B-FAST, who recognised that “the military should be aware that their presence can jeopardise the humanitarian space needed by both the humanitarian organisations and the affected population.”

There was no doubt, however, that the military was an essential part of many humanitarian responses, and indeed one that was well-valued by non-military actors. “The reality is that we want to have civil-military relations because they can really be key for security. Securing the humanitarian space is a key concern for which we need the military to help,” said Fink-Hooijer.

Wagemans added that even in cases where security initially appeared stable, the military could later be needed. “Security can deteriorate rapidly, as seen in the Haiti crisis,” he said, explaining the case for keeping armed forces on standby even when they were not necessarily going to be deployed.

“It is generally agreed that in large disasters, the military is the only one which can be deployed rapidly to fill urgent needs gaps such as transportation, logistical support, engineering and medical support, so needed by the humanitarian community,” Wagemans said.

He added, however, that this should only be done in cases where the local population requested their presence, making their role essential and not adding significant risk for humanitarian workers.

Taking the debate beyond the standard civil-military dichotomy, Manione argued that deciding on a combination of instruments used to respond to a crisis should also take into account changing needs over time. “The issue is not whether to have the military there as well as the police or the humanitarian actors. The issue is how long these forces should each stay in the theatre,” he said.

Again, Manione argued, this was a case for better coordination. “We have a lot of instruments but the EU is often criticised for not being effective enough. Why? Because we don’t coordinate the deployment of all of these means,” he said.
He suggested better coordination and a disciplined timetable when deploying different types of responses. “My dream is to see plenty of humanitarian personnel go in, then the military go in, build the force, run an operation, then go away as soon as possible maintaining a small presence for training, and then the police come in and the development starts,” he explained.

For Colonel Jorge Esteves, Commander of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), making more use of the European police overseas could provide a more nuanced solution to the traditional civil-military debate. “We have a rapid deployment capability including a force headquarters, the ability to operate under a military or a civilian chain of command and the ability to operate in a range of environments,” he said. Esteves reported that the EGF had played a prominent role in Bosnia-Herzegovina where, as in many long-term, transitional, post-conflict situations, its contribution to law and order was more subtle and effective.

The ever-present theme of the global financial crisis also entered the debate as part of the argument for efficiency through improved coordination. Wagemans argued that there could be no justification at present for the waste involved in doubling up on efforts among EU actors. “Taking into account the current budgetary pressures, attention should be paid to efficiently deploying the scarce resources we have,” he commented.

As well as causing unnecessary and wasteful doubling-up of efforts, a lack of coordination could also lead to dangerous gaps in provision of vital responses, delegates argued. Yet, Fink-Hooijer argued against a politicisation of emergency aid. “We need a more strategic debate before deployment so as to ensure that rehabilitation and reconstruction follow after relief,” said Fink-Hooijer.

Manione was sceptical that member states could be relied on to act in areas that were traditionally a lower priority for their own country, noting a greater political will to act on higher-profile emergencies. Despite the European Commission’s pledge to work on ‘forgotten crises’, he feared serious gaps would still be left in the global response without a clear, unified commitment to putting assistance where it is most needed. “I look at my maps of Goma and the Eastern areas of Congo in my office every morning and think what we could have done, with some political will, to avoid women being raped and children killed. So we need political will,” he said.
Europe suffers from “a strategic deficiency” in its aerial defence systems, and industry on the continent must get ahead of the curve rather than try to imitate competitors abroad, defence officials and industry experts said in the aerial defence systems session.

Transport planes and helicopters able to speed troops to and around the combat zone have been in short supply for years, and their numbers are still not close to meeting current requirements, especially in light of the budget crisis.

The European Union also notably lacks pilotless surveillance aircraft capable of monitoring terrain and installations, or
drones that can strike at targets unseen and unheard from high above, speakers said.

Stories of Reaper and Predator drones flying thousands of kilometres to surgically take out Al-Qaeda militants in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas have captured the imagination, and drawn attention to unmanned aerial vehicles, but UAVs remain a serious capability gap for Europe.

“There is no operation conducted in Afghanistan where you don’t have UAVs on top which provide you with 24/7 ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capability,” said Major-General Jochen Both, Commander of the European Air Transport Command.

“If you want to engage in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan), you have to have a clear assessment of the situation with respect to the enemy, with respect to the ultimate requirement of avoiding civilian casualties and with IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices),” he said.

Pilotless planes have several advantages. They do not endanger aircrew, and they do not need to be designed for comfort or survival, or even to have instrumentation. They can also be made much smaller.

“There is a big difference between a machine and a man,” Major General Carlo Magrassi from the European Defence Agency (EDA) told the panel.

“The problem with pilots is that every generation must relearn everything again. It is not only learning to fly. It is learning prudence, it is learning that kind of feeling that will somehow help you to survive in the air,” he said.

“Machines don’t have this kind of problem. Once they learn something, they learn it forever, and once you fix a problem, it’s fixed. Plus machines perform more and more in a way that people cannot perform,” he said.

However, one of the biggest problems facing the Europeans – and their American allies – is access to airspace. With the skies full of civilian aircraft, safety and also security are keys issues when thinking about introducing UAVs into the airspace.
“They want to inject three times more aircraft into European airspace. For sure, they will have to rely more and more on machines, for calculation, for flying, for everything related to coordination and air traffic management. There will probably be still for some time pilots sitting in cockpits, but more and more they will just observe what is happening,” said Magrassi.

“The biggest problem is access to airspace,” underlined Colonel Michael S. Francis, Chief of Advanced Programs at the United Technologies Research Center.

Yet working out safe ways to get drones into Europe’s skies could be worth the effort.

UAVs can bring big cost savings, something all EU nations are acutely aware of in the midst of the current budget crisis. This is where European industry could look to set new standards, rather than copy what their rivals across the Atlantic are doing.

“The strategic question now is: is the European industrial base good enough to jump across the Reaper and the Predator capabilities? I would rather buy a Predator than support something that can do the same job, and by the way, five or ten years later,” said Both.

“We are late with the UAV vis-à-vis the larger platforms. We have to step forward, not to think about copying a Predator or a Reaper, which is a weaponised system, but we have to go into the area of UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), which is something where our American friends are in the development phase. There is an opportunity, you have to exploit opportunities,” he said.
Francis said that if it is technically feasible, good opportunities lie in sizing down pilotless aircraft.

“If we can produce less expensive unmanned systems, the combination of capability and cost is going to be really hard to beat,” he said. “A small UAS (Unmanned Aerial System) can cost a fraction of what a large Predator does and can go within 1,000 feet of its target and get imagery that’s every bit as good but at a fraction of the price.”

One of the chief problems remains the reluctance of industry to venture into the domain.

“All industry areas are late to see the challenges ahead, to develop something, to get the military customer side to be able support development and procurement. That is a strategic deficiency that we have in Europe,” Both complained.

**Peter Wagner**, Head of Unit for Defence, Aeronautic and Maritime Industries at the European Commission, said that the military aura surrounding UAVs is one of the reasons why it is difficult to attract civil users, in spite of the obvious benefits such aircraft could have for security issues as border surveillance, police work and many other civil applications.

“Communication on UAVs is not easy. They all have an Afghanistan-Pakistan connotation, and that probably risks closing doors and slowing down the discussion of civilian use,” he told the discussants. The concerns of citizens, namely that drones could be abused to secretly control their movements need to be taken very seriously.”

A number of speakers agreed that the onus is probably on the military industrial base to be the driver, as it was with computers and satellite navigation.

“You need to get into advanced military technologies because that is how you prime the pump of industrial research,” said SDA Director **Giles Merritt**.

Francis noted: “The Pentagon supported IBM. We created a monster that migrated to the commercial world, and interestingly it’s the dog that wags our tail now.”
The Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) is the only specialist Brussels-based think-tank where EU institutions, NATO, national governments, industry, specialised and international media, think tanks, academia and NGOs gather to discuss the future of European and transatlantic security and defence policies in Europe and worldwide.

Building on the combined expertise and authority of those involved in our meetings, the SDA focuses on how EU and NATO policies can complement one another, in areas as varied as missile defence, cybersecurity and transatlantic defence industry. By offering a high-level and neutral platform for debate, the SDA sets out to clarify policy positions, stimulate discussion and ensure a wider understanding of defence and security issues by the press and public opinion.

SDA activities include roundtables, evening debates, press dinners and lunches, international conferences, discussion papers and special events.
The upsurge in piracy off the coast of Somalia has given the world a warning of the dangers facing shipping lanes which carry 90% of the EU’s trade, and Operation Atalanta has shown that the EU can mount an effective response to the threat, panellists agreed. However, there was widespread concern that recent cuts in naval resources show that governments continue to underestimate the importance of maritime security.

“The schools of strategic thinking are not ruled by naval officers,” said Rear Admiral António Silva Ribeiro, Deputy Vice Chief of the Portuguese Naval Staff. “We are making great mistakes by dismantling naval power in Europe. See what Britain has done. See what other countries are doing to their forces. One day they will need these forces and they won’t have them. This will be a problem.” Those concerns were taken up by
others on the panel and experts around the table. Vice-Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany’s former Chief of Naval Staff, complained that strategic thinking was “dominated by continental” ideas and military staff often suffered from “sea blindness”. “People aren’t really aware of what is happening at sea,” he said, adding that maritime planning could be a cornerstone of military planning under the Lisbon Treaty-era EU, due both to the pressing importance of the issue and the relative ease of setting up a maritime strategy which could serve as an example for planning in other areas.

However, speakers were far from optimistic that policy makers were prepared to make the necessary investments in maritime capabilities. “It will take a crisis for people to recognise the necessity to do something,” said Lieutenant Commander Kurt Engelen, of the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium.

MEP Ana Maria Gomes said the EU had to take its responsibility as a naval power to confront the full range of maritime problems, which include the spread of piracy to other areas of the Indian Ocean and into the Atlantic; the potential for conflict over natural resources and sea lanes in the Arctic; energy security; trafficking in humans, weapons and drugs, and sea-borne terrorism.

However, she said the recent closure of the EU’s security sector reform mission in Guinea Bissau despite the West African nation’s continued role as a hub for narcotics smugglers and the lack of EU action to tackle the spread of terrorism from the Sahel region showed that Brussels was failing to confront key maritime issues.

The Portuguese Socialist Member of the EP’s SubCommittee on Security and Defence joined Feldt in urging the EU to develop a common maritime space with integrated communications, information sharing and maritime surveillance. Gomes also suggested the creation of a common coast guard platform and greater naval cooperation orchestrated by the European Defence Agency.
Feldt pointed out that the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy had started with the civilian side looking at management of resources and environmental protection and only later branched out to the military. In the beginning, the military had trouble accepting that, he said. “It is much easier to start out with a civilian approach and then integrate the military, rather than the other way round,” Feldt went on. “In the wake of the European Security Strategy, there is a need for a ‘European Maritime Security Strategy’ as well. The process needed to achieve this strategy, as well as the Security Strategy itself would promote a high degree of awareness and would clarify the different levels of responsibility.”

Silva Ribeiro gave an overview of the working of the EUROMARFOR multinational force as an example of cooperation between EU naval units.

There was considerable discussion of Operation Atalanta with speakers agreeing that the mission has been successful in limiting the impact of piracy, but there were complaints about the limitations on the mandate, and concern about the need to back up naval action with action on land to tackle the roots of the problem.

Rear Admiral Denis Trioulaire, from the European Defence Agency, was one of several naval officers who intervened to suggest that the EU needed more naval assets, not least because of the risk of piracy becoming a threat to shipping in other parts of Africa.

Feldt said the mandate of EUNAVFOR should be toughened to enable EU ships and planes to take more proactive action against the pirate skiffs and their mother vessels.

“With the experience we have now with the ongoing operation, we need more than deterrence, we need a mandate which can be preventive as well,” he said.
“This has nothing to do with money, this has nothing to do with funding or with the lack of funding. It’s a lack of political will. Even if we had double the number of ships we would not be much more successful with the mandate which is in place and this is something we need to tell our political masters again and again,” said the President of the German Maritime Institute.

Feldt praised the EU’s linking of the naval mission with a wider approach to the problems in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, such as capacity building for maritime authorities in Yemen and Djibouti, training the Somali military, aid to the Somalia federal government and contacts with local authorities in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as the judicial arrangements for Kenya, the Seychelles and perhaps others in the region to try and incarcerate captured pirates.

“It’s a very good operation, and in addition it applies what everybody is calling the comprehensive approach. The EU is, from my experience, the only institution able to combine military and civilian responsibility in one mission,” he said. “The problem of piracy can only be solved on shore. It will never be solved at sea.”

There was wide agreement on the need for such a comprehensive approach, but some expressed reservations about the effectiveness of the EU’s methods.

“We don’t have a political comprehensive approach, or the one we have is actually counter-productive,” said Gomes. “We haven’t really supported the African Union force in Mogadishu. There is a lot to be done in terms of state-building because without that we won’t have law and order and we’ll keep having piracy.”

She also expressed concern that the EU mission training Somali troops in Uganda could prove counter-productive unless the soldiers are given sufficient support when they return to Mogadishu to ensure they do not switch sides and join the Al-Shabaab militants.

Rear Admiral Jacques Rosiers, President of the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium, was concerned that unless the EU or other international players provide sufficiently robust protection for shipping off the Somali coast or elsewhere, owners will be tempted to make more use of private security firms. That prospect was overwhelmingly rejected by the panellists.

“I don’t think the solution is private security companies either on the seas or elsewhere. I’m very, very negative about the way private security firms have developed,” said Gomes. “This is going to get even worse if we go that way.”

George Vlad Niculescu, former Staff Officer at NATO headquarters, asked about the financial implications of the EU as a naval power and the EU’s eventual role in the Black Sea.
GLOBAL SECURITY

To stay on top of the security challenges that face the world – and Europe’s role in it – stay tuned to the SDA’s groundbreaking debates

“We must be careful to not allow the capability gap to become a credibility gap”
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General at the SDA’s “NATO’s European Dimension” conference in June 2010

“We can no longer hide behind a Maginot line”
William J. Lynn, III, US Deputy Secretary of Defence at the SDA’s debate on cybersecurity in September 2010

“The real security danger of the next decade is regional instability on Afghanistan’s borders”
Javier Solana, Co-President of the Security & Defence Agenda and former EU High Representative at the SDA Advisory Board lunch in September 2010

“There is a growing disconnect between political elites and the people”
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Co-President of the Security & Defence Agenda and former NATO Secretary General at the SDA Advisory Board lunch in June 2010

The Security & Defence Agenda is Brussels’ only specialist defence and security think-tank. Its activities span debates, roundtables and reports.

The SDA embraces new communication channels such as the Security Jam, bringing more than 4,000 defence and security experts together in a five-day discussion on the threats facing the world today.

Visit our website www.securitydefenceagenda.org to download our reports and see our upcoming activities.
From Information to Intelligence

Negotiating a contract, forming a partnership, developing international business, launching a new product, taking over a competitor... these activities all involve risks. But they also present tremendous opportunities if the specific risks of each situation are properly assessed beforehand.

Information is a vital part of this assessment. Whether an organization needs to be forewarned of upcoming technology disruptions, defend its assets from hostile intentions or promote its competitive edge on world markets, its success always depends on its ability to gather, secure and process strategic information and put it to the best use.

This is the service that CEIS, the European Company for Strategic Intelligence, has been offering its clients in both the public and private sectors since 1997. With a clear agenda: to find imaginative, concrete, operational solutions to guarantee success.

Olivier Darrason
Chairman

CEIS • Compagnie Européenne d'Intelligence Stratégique
280, boulevard Saint-Germain • 75007 Paris • France
Tel.: (+33) 1 45 55 00 20 • Fax: (+33) 1 45 55 00 60
Email: ceis@ceis-strat.com • Web site: www.ceis-strat.com
Great minds don’t think alike

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Carl Bildt, Peter Sutherland, Javier Solana, José María Aznar, Connie Hedegaard, James Wolfensohn, Anna Diamatopoulou, Nicolas Sarkozy, Guy Verhofstadt... Find out what the key decision-makers are saying in Europe’s World - and join the online debate yourself at europeworld.org
Designing the Next-Generation Decision-Support Toolkit

VIRTUOSO, an end-user centric project

VIRTUOSO is an EU FP7 co-funded project, that will provide a technical framework for the integration of tools for collection, processing, analysis and communication of open source information.

This middleware framework will enable "plug and play" functionalities that improve the ability of border control, security and law enforcement professionals to use data from across the source / format spectrum in support of the decision making process.

As a proof of concept and to highlight the efficiency of this open-source code framework, a prototype will be built and demonstrated using operational scenarios.

The project will comply with legal considerations and enforce the principles of privacy and data protection to ensure the interests of citizens within the European Union.
Designing the Next-Generation Decision-Support Toolkit

The project aims at providing European security stakeholders with a toolkit based on an open-source-software framework, which is able to integrate advanced information processing tools. The aim of this "open-source-software framework" is to ensure greater interoperability among information and technology providers and to allow end-users to easily plug-in different technological solutions.

Key advantage for end-users

✓ To drive the development of a platform that meets their needs.
✓ To exchange best practises, needs and requirements with other European end-users and with the partners of the consortium.
✓ To improve the know-how of their organisation at technical and operational levels.
✓ To have the possibility to implement the open-source-software framework developed during of after the project in their own information system.
✓ To test during the project the solutions developed by the partners of the Consortium.

The End-User Community is open to all European security stakeholders

CONSORTIUM:

Further Information:

Virtuoso Project Website: www.virtuoso.eu
Grant Agreement n°: FP7-SEC-GA-2009-242352
Starting date: 01/05/10
Duration: 36 months
Total cost: 11,518,542,25 €
EU Contribution: 7,999,076,70 €

Coordinator:

CEA List
18 route du Panorama
F-92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex
www-list.cea.fr/

Contact:

Géraud Canet
Tel: +33 1 46 54 82 59
E-mail: geraud.canet@cea.fr
Avant-propos

Pour la troisième année consécutive, le SDA et CEIS ont organisé la conférence « Security & Defence Day ».

Il nous semble important de porter annuellement un tel événement de haut niveau qui permet à des responsables politiques et opérationnels des institutions européennes, des États membres et du secteur privé de s’exprimer sans tabous sur les sujets clés des temps à venir dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense.


Si le contexte économique et financier tendu rend d’autant plus complexe leur exploration, il nous semblait néanmoins important de les aborder. En effet, comme le rappelait dès 2003 la Stratégie européenne de sécurité, « dans le contexte de la mondialisation croissante, les aspects internes et externes de la sécurité sont indissolublement liés ». Et ce même document stipulait également que « l’Union européenne doit être prête à assumer sa part de responsabilité dans la sécurité internationale ». Or il n’est de mission sans moyens : avec le traité de Lisbonne, l’Union européenne a maintenant les moyens institutionnels d’avancer. Les perspectives financières 2014-2020 devraient aussi, c’est à espérer, donner les moyens de renforcer les capacités de l’Union européenne à assurer sa sécurité et à contribuer plus largement à celle du monde.


Nous remercions tous les orateurs pour leurs contributions, au premier rang desquels bien sûr le ministre belge de la Défense, M. Pieter De Crem, ainsi que la commissaire européenne à la Coopération internationale, à l’Aide humanitaire et à la Gestion des crises, Mme Kristalina Georgieva.

Et puis nous tenons à remercier chaleureusement nos partenaires qui ont permis l’organisation de cet événement et contribué à sa réussite : la société Raytheon, la société United Technologies Corporation, et le projet Virtuoso, financé dans le cadre du FP7 Sécurité.

Enfin, nous vous donnons bien sûr rendez-vous l’année prochaine pour une nouvelle édition de « Security & Defence Day » qui permettra de continuer à réfléchir et discuter ensemble des défis à relever pour la sécurité de l’Europe et des moyens à y consacrer.
Table des matières

Avant-propos ............................................................................................................................54
Programme .................................................................................................................................6
Rivalités institutionnelles et montée en puissance politique de l’UE ...........................................56
Assurer la pérennité à long terme des ressources .................................................................62
Dissuasion et non-prolifération ........................................................................................68
Solidarité et gestion des flux migratoires ...............................................................................72
L’UE peut-elle devenir une instance de réaction globale face aux urgences ? .......................77
Systèmes de défense aérienne : doter l’Europe d’une autonomie stratégique ...............82
L’UE, une puissance maritime ...............................................................................................88
Speaker CVs .............................................................................................................................92
Liste des participants ..............................................................................................................108

The views expressed in this report by speakers are personal opinions and not necessarily the views of the organisations they represent, nor of the SDA and CEIS, their members or sponsors.

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted, provided that full attribution is made to the co-organisers and to the source(s) in question, and provided that any such reproduction, whether in full or in part, is not sold unless incorporated in other works.

Publisher: Geert Cami
Text: Europolitics
Photos: David Plas
Design: Europolitics
Print: Identic
Selon le ministre belge de la Défense Pieter De Crem, le traité de Lisbonne a doté l'Union européenne d'outils dont le besoin se faisait pressant, qui pourront l'aider à conforter sa position dans le monde ; mais, en ces temps de restrictions budgétaires, il a reconnu que les pays membres de l'UE doivent renforcer leur coopération afin de tirer avantage des nouvelles opportunités offertes par le traité.

« L'Europe doit consentir davantage d'efforts pour affirmer sa puissance et s'affirmer comme acteur de premier plan, respecté sur la scène internationale. Il est clair que notre degré actuel de coopération est insuffisant. Avec les instru-

Rivalités institutionnelles et montée en puissance politique de l’UE
ments de Lisbonne, il nous faut trouver des moyens d’atteindre ce que nous désignons comme nos objectifs », a déclaré M. De Crem dans son intervention à l’ouverture du Security and Defence Day 2010.

Le général Jean Rannou, responsable de la sécurité et de la défense au sein de la Compagnie européenne d’intelligence stratégique (CEIS), s’est également interrogé sur la capacité de l’Europe à se montrer à la hauteur des attentes créées par le traité de Lisbonne. Celui-ci « est entré en vigueur, ses conséquences sont nombreuses, mais si nous voulons évoluter pour devenir un acteur au niveau mondial, nous Européens, la question se pose [de savoir] si nous [en] avons les moyens », a observé le général Rannou à l’ouverture de la conférence, dont le thème était cette année « Passer à l’échelle mondiale : le défi de la politique européenne de sécurité ».

L’allocution de M. De Crem fut suivie par un débat sur les défis qui se posent aux dirigeants politiques de l’UE, lors duquel de nettes divergences de points de vue sont apparues : l’eurodéputé conservateur britannique Geoffrey Van Orden a ainsi exprimé son scepticisme sur la capacité même de l’UE à assumer sa défense, tandis que Karel Kovanda, directeur général adjoint chargé de la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune à la Direction générale des relations extérieures de la Commission européenne, affirmait que la politique étrangère de l’UE restait prisonnière des ambitions concurrentes de ses États membres et par conséquent « n’a réussi à accomplir rien de remarquable ».

Kristalina Georgieva, la commissaire européenne chargée de la Coopération internationale, de l’Aide humanitaire et de la Gestion des crises, a brièvement expliqué comment son administration allait travailler avec le nouveau service diplomatique de l’UE. Elle a aussi abordé les relations entre l’assistance humanitaire et militaire. Jean-Louis Falconi, représentant permanent de la France auprès du Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS) de l’Union européenne, a recentré le débat sur l’interface entre la nouvelle organisation institutionnelle post-Lisbonne de l’UE, d’une part, et les défis issus de la crise économique actuelle et du contexte sécuritaire mondial, d’autre part. Il a cité le récent pacte de défense franco-britannique comme un exemple de coopération renforcée en Europe.

M. De Crem a signalé que le « rapprochement bienvenu » entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne montrait que la crise économique peut agir comme catalyseur pour une plus
grande coopération militaire, en incitant les pays de l’UE à travailler de plus en plus collectivement, aux fins de réduire les coûts.

« Presque tous les États de l’UE vont se trouver confrontés au même problème de baisses plus ou moins importantes des budgets de défense, a déclaré M. De Crem. Sans une nouvelle approche de nos défis en matière de sécurité, de nombreux États membres seront contraints de réduire leurs capacités militaires ». Il a ajouté que la reconnaissance de ce fait par les ministres de la Défense en septembre dernier, lors de leur rencontre informelle à Gand, et l’accord qu’ils ont conclu pour recenser les secteurs où la mise en commun et le partage des ressources peuvent progresser, ont constitué une réussite majeure de la présidence belge de l’UE.

Le modérateur Giles Merritt, directeur du Security and Defence Agenda (SDA), a rebondi sur ce sujet, suggérant que la crise financière « pourrait bien se révéler un bienfait caché » pour la défense européenne.

La capacité de l’Europe à accroître « la mise en commun et le partage » des moyens militaires, jointe à la nécessité de développer une vision commune face aux nouveaux défis mondiaux, seront des facteurs clés pour déterminer dans quelle mesure l’entrée en vigueur du traité peut apporter de la valeur ajoutée à la politique étrangère et de sécurité de l’UE,

a déclaré M. Falconi. Le rôle du nouveau Service européen pour l’action extérieure (SEAE) sera crucial, a-t-il ajouté, soulignant la difficile gestation du nouveau service diplomatique, forgé à partir des cultures politiques variées de la Commission, du Conseil et des États membres.

« Soyons clairs, la création du SEAE est un défi, qui n’a pas eu d’équivalent aussi ambitieux parmi les réformes que nous avons accomplies dans nos administrations nationales. Il y a du travail à faire […]. Il faut que tous les États membres y soient impliqués, qu’il y ait une variété d’horizons […] Nous devons créer une culture commune », a déclaré M. Falconi à la conférence.

La commissaire Georgieva a insisté sur la nécessité de coopérer pleinement pour un bon fonctionnement de l’Europe post-Lisbonne.
Elle a mis en garde contre la tendance des institutions à se regarder trop le nombril au lieu de s’occuper des problèmes réels, et illustré son propos en évoquant l’interaction entre la politique étrangère et de sécurité de l'UE, et l’aide humanitaire. Cette dernière est régie par des besoins et des principes de neutralité et d’impartialité ; c’est la raison pour laquelle elle n’est pas du ressort de la politique étrangère de l’UE ou du SEAE. Mais les aspects humanitaires doivent être pris en compte dans la politique étrangère de l’UE, surtout lors de crises complexes où la question de la circulation des travailleurs humanitaires et de leur protection est cruciale.

Cette coopération doit aussi être élargie au rôle des armées dans la contribution aux dispositifs d’aide et de sécurité. Selon Mme Georgieva, il arrive que l’engagement militaire soit requis pour appuyer l’assistance d’urgence, comme au moment du tsunami en Asie ou du séisme au Pakistan ; le recours à l’armée peut être nécessaire pour sécuriser l’environnement aux fins de faciliter l’acheminement de l’aide, comme pendant la mission de l’UE au Tchad ; et, dans certaines situations à l’image du tremblement de terre en Haïti, l’armée peut assumer ces deux tâches. Dans d’autres cas, l’assistance humanitaire ne requiert pas de soutien militaire.

Mme Georgieva a expliqué que l’UE maintiendrait celle-ci en dehors du SEAE, afin de préserver son indépendance et son impartialité. Elle a toutefois promis que son administration allait « travailler main dans la main » avec le service diplomatique pour assurer une cohérence dans la gestion des crises.

M. Van Orden s’est rangé aux côtés de la commissaire à propos du rôle important joué par l’UE en matière d’aide humanitaire et de reconstruction post-conflit, mais il a déclaré ne voir aucune valeur ajoutée dans les ambi-
tions militaires de l’UE.

« J’aimerais constater une authentique complémentarité entre l’Union européenne et par exemple l’OTAN, où la première se concentrerait sur l’aspect civil et laisserait l’aspect militaire à l’organisation la mieux équipée pour cela, à savoir l’OTAN », a déclaré le Britannique, membre du groupe des conservateurs et réformistes au Parlement européen.

« L’OTAN possède le pouvoir énorme de lier les États-Unis et le Canada à la sécurité de notre continent. C’est notre objectif stratégique le plus important. Tout ce qui pourrait porter atteinte à cela, de notre fait, serait à mon avis préjudiciable. »

M. Van Orden a fait part d’un certain nombre de préoccupations à propos du traité de Lisbonne, parmi lesquelles le défaut de contrôle parlementaire sur les activités de défense de l’UE, et une inquiétude portant sur la « coopération structurée permanente » créée par le traité, qui pourrait mener à la mise sur pied d’une armée européenne. « Le plus grand danger, à mon sens, serait que le Royaume-Uni et la France décident que leur pacte bilatéral forme le point de départ d’une coopération structurée permanente dans le cadre de l’Union européenne », a-t-il déclaré.

En réponse à une question de Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, du présidium des Amis de l’Europe, M. Falconi a fait remarquer que le pacte franco-britannique comportait l’engagement d’œuvrer pour renforcer l’efficacité des capacités militaires de l’UE, et que le président Nicolas Sarkozy avait parlé à cette occasion de premier pas vers une plus grande coopération européenne.

Le scepticisme de M. Van Orden en matière de défense européenne est bien connu, et n’a
pas manqué de provoquer les protestations de Benoît d’Aboville, ancien représentant de la France auprès de l’OTAN, qui a insisté sur la nécessité pour l’UE de posséder son propre état-major militaire, de façon à optimiser sa coopération avec l’OTAN. Plus surprenant fut le jugement négatif porté sur la politique étrangère de l’UE par Karel Kovanda, le directeur général adjoint pour les relations extérieures de la Commission européenne.

« La politique étrangère de l’Europe est toujours à la merci des États membres. Ce que nous pouvons faire n’est que peu de chose, à la marge des affaires du monde […] L’Europe, aussi grande soit-elle, n’a en fait presque rien réussi de grand », a déclaré M. Kovanda. Il a qualifié l’action de l’UE au Kosovo et en Bosnie de réussite « de taille moyenne » et déploré les échecs en Russie, Turquie, Chine et au Moyen Orient.

Après que ses positions eurent été contestées par Thomas Schneider de l’Association atlantique allemande, M. Kovanda a concédé que l’UE avait joué un rôle crucial pour mettre fin à la guerre de 2008 entre la Russie et la Géorgie et pour assurer une issue pacifique à la révolution orange consécutive à l’élection présidentielle de 2004 en Ukraine.

M. Kovanda, qui doit prochainement quitter ses fonctions après une longue carrière à Bruxelles, tant auprès de l’OTAN que de l’UE, a déclaré qu’il était trop tôt pour évaluer l’impact du traité de Lisbonne sur l’amélioration de la gestion de la politique étrangère de l’Union. Cependant, il a déploré que la mise sur pied du SEAE, qui a pris une année, ait été un processus « très long et très pénible, qui n’a jusqu’à présent pas donné beaucoup de résultats ».

Assurer la pérennité à long terme des ressources
M. Rademaker a observé que la Chine couvre quatre-vingt-dix-sept pour cent de la production de terres rares. « À l’avenir, la demande va connaître une croissance exponentielle ; l’offre ne parviendra plus à satisfaire la demande à court terme, ni sans doute à long terme ; il y a donc un déficit », a-t-il dit à la conférence. Il a expliqué que les entreprises occidentales, au départ, ont volontiers laissé la Chine prendre en charge cette production, puisque les coûts y étaient plus bas et qu’on s’y préoccupait moins de l’impact de l’exploitation des minerais de terres rares sur l’environnement.

Aujourd’hui, cependant, l’on s’inquiète de voir la Chine mettre à profit les limitations à l’exportation pour favoriser sa propre production de marchandises hitech. Le gel des exportations de terres rares vers le Japon, décrété à la suite de l’arrestation d’un capitaine de chalutier chinois par les garde-côtes japonais, constitue un indice de la volonté chinoise d’instrumentaliser à des fins politiques le contrôle que Pékin exerce sur la production de matière première, a soutenu M. Rademaker.

Dans l’assistance, Thomas Schneider, de l’Association atlantique allemande, a aussi évoqué l’importance des terres rares dans la production d’équipements militaires modernes.

La Commission européenne a identifié quatorze matières premières d’importance capitale, pour lesquelles les besoins d’importation de l’UE risquent de poser un problème économique et géopolitique dans les dix prochaines années. La liste doit être mise à jour de manière régulière à l’avenir.

« Nous sommes lourdement dépendants des importations, et surtout nous en sommes au point où la demande explose dans certains pays émergents », a averti Gwenole Cozigou, directeur des matières premières, métaux, produits chimiques, industries mécaniques, électriques et du bâtiment à la Commission européenne.

Les États-Unis et l’Australie envisagent d’ouvrir plusieurs grandes mines de terres rares dans les cinq années qui viennent, mais la hausse de la demande signifie que la pénurie guette, alors que l’UE demeure dépendante à presque cent pour cent des importations.

Selon M. Rademaker, il faut que l’UE combine sa politique étrangère, de sécur...
rité et énergétique avec une intensification des efforts de recherche et de développement pour être en mesure de gérer le problème, tout en concluant des accords d’investissement avec des pays autres que la Chine qui possèdent des gisements de terres rares et en accélérant sur son propre sol les « politiques de réduction, de recyclage et de substitution » afin de réduire sa dépendance aux terres rares importées, par exemple en recyclant les téléphones mobiles et autres produits qui contiennent ce genre de composants.

Compte tenu des implications en termes de sécurité, l’UE doit également coopérer avec l’OTAN sur la question, y compris par la recherche sur d’éventuels produits alternatifs.

M. Cozigou a précisé que l’UE travaille d’ores et déjà aux échelons bilatéral et multinational pour assurer des approvisionnements stables de matières premières stratégiques, notamment en coopérant avec les États-Unis et le Mexique, à la demande d’une commission de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) sur les restrictions commerciales imposées par la Chine sur huit matières premières. L’UE fait aussi, du libre commerce de ces produits, un élément important dans les négociations d’adhésion à l’OMC avec des nations comme la Russie et le Kazakhstan.

Sur un autre plan, l’UE mène un dialogue avec des pays en voie de développement pour les sensibiliser aux enjeux géologiques, les aider à améliorer leurs infrastructures et leurs compétences techniques, afin de rechercher des gisements alternatifs de ressources essentielles. M. Cozigou a souligné que les autorités
Environnementales de l’UE étaient très impliquées pour garantir des méthodes d’extraction non polluantes.

Bien que les applications de ces minéraux rares soient récentes, l’eurodéputé allemand Christian Ehler a rappelé que l’inquiétude concernant la sécurité d’approvisionnement en ressources critiques ne date pas d’hier. Durant la Guerre froide, la question était de savoir qui, de la Russie, de la Chine ou des États-Unis, possédait quelles mines.

« La situation actuelle n’est pas inédite. Nous dépendions des Américains dans le passé, et maintenant nous dépendons d’autres régions du monde, bien plus variées, parce qu’on n’est plus à l’époque où il n’y avait que les Américains et les Russes », a déclaré le membre de la sous-commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité au Parlement de Bruxelles, sous l’étiquette du Parti populaire européen (PPE).

Toutefois, M. Ehler soutient que l’hégémonie croissante de la Chine sur les matières premières constitue à elle seule un sujet d’inquiétude. L’UE doit se doter d’une stratégie pour inclure le commerce des ressources stratégiques dans les accords multinationaux, quelle que soit l’opposition de la Chine. « Même pour l’UE, nous ne pouvons organiser le monde via des accords bilatéraux », a-t-il déclaré. Le recyclage est une des pistes possibles, a exposé M. Ehler. Et de souligner que vingt tonnes de déchets de téléphones mobiles qui contiennent du précieux coltan, entre autres matériaux, n’étaient pas traitées en Europe. « Il serait judicieux de mettre en place une filière de recyclage », a-t-il dit. M. Ehler a par ailleurs lancé un débat sur l’équilibre souhaitable entre l’implication des autorités et la place qui doit être laissée au marché.

Pour Jamie Shea, de l’OTAN, la coopération doit être renforcée entre ces deux pôles, par exemple en élaborant des stratégies conjointes public-privé en matière de sûreté énergétique, de menaces de sécurité telles que les attaques de pirates ou de catastrophes comme l’explosion de la plateforme pétrolière Deep Water Horizon dans le golfe de Mexique.
du Mexique. M. Shea a récemment été nommé secrétaire général adjoint en charge des menaces émergentes à l’OTAN avec la mission d’identifier les nouveaux défis et les moyens d’y faire face. Il a élargi le débat de manière à prendre en compte les casse-tête diplomatiques et sécuritaires que crée la dépendance continue de l’UE en matière de gaz et de pétrole d’importation. « On assiste au retour de la géopolitique des ressources et de l’énergie. Au cours du XXIe siècle, nous commerce mondial transite par voie maritime, il convient d’investir davantage dans les dispositifs de protection en mer; mais dans les faits les pays alliés s’emploient au contraire à dégraisser leurs marines. Il y a lieu de stimuler la coopération internationale pour contrer les menaces communes – par exemple, en affermissant les relations avec la Chine et l’Inde, étant donné la montée en puissance de l’océan Indien en tant que carrefour commercial.

Il y a eu une vive polémique autour de l’attitude que l’Europe doit adopter face aux investissements chinois dans les matières premières en Afrique. Certaines personnes ont demandé si l’UE devait assouplir sa position sur la promotion de la bonne gouvernance et des droits humains en Afrique, dans le but de mieux rivaliser avec la Chine.

Un consensus s’est fait jour pour conclure qu’une telle évolution serait hasardeuse, et que la stratégie chinoise avait, elle aussi, ses limites. « Il nous faut avoir une stratégie plus ferme, même si je ne suis pas convaincu que, prise isolément, cette question de la politique chinoise de développement fonctionnera. Il y a beaucoup de scepticisme à ce sujet en Afrique, et dans de nombreux autres pays du tiers monde. Nous n’avons pas à cloner la politique de la Chine », a dit M. Ehler.

– l’Union européenne et l’OTAN – allons être confrontés à des dilemmes diplomatiques complexes », a conclu M. Shea. Il a évoqué en particulier les menaces planant sur les itinéraires d’approvisionnement, dont la vulnérabilité a été établie par le problème de piraterie somalienne. Si l’on tient compte du fait que quatre-vingt-dix pour cent du
D’après les experts intervenus dans ce débat, l’Union européenne ne jouera dans les années qui viennent qu’un rôle mineur dans la politique de non-prolifération et de dissuasion nucléaires, et seules les puissances disposant de l’arme atomique, Grande-Bretagne et France, auront véritablement leur mot à dire.

Alors que le président Barack Obama incite les nations à construire un monde sans armes nucléaires, l’UE en tant que telle ne dispose selon eux quasiment d’aucune réponse, hormis dans le cas improbable où ses États membres lui demanderaient d’intervenir, par exemple, dans les négociations avec l’Iran.

« La dissuasion nucléaire est un sujet rarement abordé au sein de l’Union européenne, et je ne pense pas que nous soyons en mesure d’arriver à quoi que ce soit de consistant », a estimé Didier
Gambier, conseiller auprès de la Commission européenne pour les questions stratégiques liées aux technologies industrielles. « La seule chose que nous puissions faire est d’observer pour contribuer un jour à bâtir un consensus, s’il commence à se dessiner », a-t-il exposé aux participants.

M. Gambier a remarqué que l’UE, où le pouvoir décisionnaire en matière de défense repose entre les mains des États membres, ne figure pas en tant qu’espace de coopération dans les documents de l’OTAN sur la non-prolifération, bien que cette organisation ait vingt et un pays membres en commun avec l’UE.

Sur les deux puissances nucléaires de l’UE, la Grande-Bretagne considère que l’alliance militaire de l’OTAN doit être l’unique lieu où aborder la question des armes nucléaires, tandis que la France insiste sur le fait que son armement est uniquement destiné à assurer sa protection. Ni l’une ni l’autre n’est prête à envisager une réduction de son arsenal. Alors que leurs stocks d’armes additionnés ne dépassent guère les quelques centaines d’ogives, les deux riverains de la Manche attendent que les États-Unis et la Russie réduisent drastiquement leurs propres arsenaux à des niveaux comparables à ceux de l’Europe occidentale.

En plus de plaida pour des réductions massives, M. Obama a également promis de renoncer à appuyer en premier sur le bouton des armes nucléaires, quand bien même les États-Unis seraient la cible d’une attaque biologique, chimique ou encore conventionnelle de grande ampleur.

Certes, la Grande-Bretagne et la France considèrent leurs arsenaux comme des armes stratégiques auxquelles il s’agit de ne recourir que pour répondre à une attaque – et encore faudrait-il que les circonstances en soient exceptionnelles –, mais à l’heure actuelle la France n’envisage pas un instant de suivre l’exemple de Washington.

Le général de corps d’armée Paul Fouilland, qui commande les Forces aériennes stratégiques françaises, a déclaré lors de la rencontre de Bruxelles : « La France n’est pas d’accord avec la position...
« ne pas tirer en premier ». Si nous acceptons qu’une arme nucléaire ne soit utilisée que contre une autre arme nucléaire, alors nous ouvrons la porte à l’usage des armes conventionnelles, biologiques ou chimiques, ou d’autres types d’armes à venir ».

« La dissuasion doit être pour nous une certitude, adossée à la volonté et à la capacité d’agir, et pour tous nos adversaires potentiels une incertitude », a-t-il dit, ajoutant que Paris et Londres se concentraient sur la protection de leurs intérêts vitaux et la défense de la notion d’incertitude comme facteur de déstabilisation d’éventuels agresseurs.

L’on estime que l’arsenal nucléaire français atteindra l’année prochaine trois cents unités à lancement aérien ou sous-marin, en comptant les ogives opérationnelles comme celles qui sont en maintenance. De son côté, avec ses sous-marins nucléaires Trident, la Grande-Bretagne détient environ cent vingt têtes opérationnelles, sur un stock total de quelque cent quatre-vingts. Sur la question du désarmement, la France a établi un principe de « stricte suffisance », selon lequel son arsenal doit être assez important pour constituer une force de dissuasion crédible et capable de faire face aux « circonstances internationales ».

Sur le plan politique tout au moins, Paris serait par ailleurs disposé à réduire son stock d’armes, à certaines conditions. « La France est favorable au désarmement. Elle aspire à un monde plus sûr, plus stable et pacifique, et si cela advient la dissuasion nucléaire sera moins nécessaire », a déclaré le général Fouilland. Non sans ajouter toutefois : « Nous attendons des États-Unis et de la Russie qu’ils réduisent leurs arsenaux pour atteindre à peu près le même niveau d’équipement. C’est-à-dire de l’ordre de quelques centaines d’ogives, plutôt que des milliers. C’est l’équilibre entre les États-Unis et la Russie qui comptera ».

Selon ses estimations, les États-Unis possèdent environ huit mille têtes nucléaires au total, et quelque deux mille de moins que la Russie. La France s’appuie largement sur l’énergie nucléaire pour sa consommation électrique, et certains intervenants ont soutenu que le véritable péril réside dans l’usage civil de la force nucléaire, comme en témoignent les ambitions de l’Iran en matière d’enrichissement de l’uranium aux fins d’alimenter ses réacteurs nucléaires. À de très hauts niveaux de raffinements, l’uranium enrichi peut servir à fabriquer le noyau d’une bombe atomique.

Le scientifique Maurizio Martellini, secrétaire général du Landau Network-Centro Michel de Gliniasty
Volta, spécialiste de la sécurité mondiale, a observé que la prévention de la prolifération des armes nucléaires est un domaine dans lequel l’Europe a un rôle important à jouer, par exemple en menant les négociations avec l'Iran pour le compte des grandes puissances mondiales.

Selon lui, dans ses efforts pour convaincre la République islamique d'Iran d'abandonner l’enrichissement en échange d’avantages économiques et politiques, l’UE a eu recours à « la politique incitative appropriée, faite de confiance et de mesures douces ».

Les initiatives de négociation avaient également pour but de monter une filière pour enrichir l’uranium iranien à l’étranger, par exemple au sein d’une installation commune gérée par l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA), mais M. Martellini a souligné que les tentatives pour « internationaliser le cycle du combustible sont un défi à long terme ».

Les grandes puissances impliquées étaient les cinq membres du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU qui y disposent d'un droit de veto – la Grande-Bretagne, la France et leurs homologues nucléaires que sont la Russie, la Chine et les États-Unis – ainsi que l’Allemagne, les négociations étant pour l’essentiel menées par celui qui dirigeait alors la diplomatie européenne, Javier Solana.

Selon les intervenants à la conférence, puisque l’Union européenne n’est pas membre du Conseil de sécurité, et qu’elle n’a jusqu’à présent pas été en mesure d’y obtenir un siège, il lui faudra s’en remettre à la Grande-Bretagne et à la France, avec l’aide éventuelle de l’Allemagne, pour agir quand il sera question du nucléaire.

« La dissuasion nucléaire est une force qui n’appartient qu’aux États, or l’UE n’est pas un État », a conclu Michel de Gliniasty, haut conseiller à la Compagnie européenne d’intelligence stratégique (CEIS).
Le débat sur les aspects sécuritaires de la gestion des flux migratoires a donné aux intervenants l’occasion de partager leurs vues sur une question clé : la mise en place d’un système de gestion intégrée des frontières extérieures de l’UE, dans le contexte d’une Europe post-Lisbonne.

Ilkka Laitinen, directeur exécutif de l’Agence européenne pour la gestion de la coopération opérationnelle aux frontières extérieures (Frontex), a rappelé aux participants le lien étroit qui existe entre la surveillance des frontières extérieures de l’UE et la création de l’espace Schengen : pour mettre en place un espace européen sûr, à l’intérieur duquel les gens peuvent se déplacer en toute liberté, il a été nécessaire d’avancer par étapes compensatoires qui requéraient des « efforts concertés ».

Pour M. Laitinen, le défi consiste maintenant à coordonner le système de gestion des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne. « Il nous faut commencer à concevoir les mouvements trans-

**Solidarité et gestion des flux migratoires**
frontaliers comme une entité qui englobe d’une part des activités autorisées comme les migrations légales, et d’autre part des activités irrégulières qu’il s’agit de surveiller et d’empêcher », a-t-il déclaré.

En ce qui concerne la criminalité transfrontalière, « nous avons besoin d’informations, de capacité à réagir, et – toujours à cause de Schengen – nous avons besoin d’interopérabilité » entre toutes les parties concernées, a plaidé M. Laitinen.

Selon lui, en dépassant la structure en piliers de l’UE, le traité de Lisbonne a apporté un « changement remarquable ». Les activités criminelles transfrontalières, qui auparavant étaient du ressort de la politique intergouvernementale en matière de coopération policière et de justice pénale, sont maintenant couvertes par les pouvoirs de l’Union européenne, de même que la politique migratoire. Reconnaissant que le renforcement de la surveillance des frontières extérieures ne constitue pas en soi la solution, M. Laitinen a souligné son impatience de voir mises sur la table toutes les idées susceptibles de contribuer à l’intégration du système de gestion des frontières. Plus important, il a déclaré que l’UE devait étudier « ce que nous pouvons faire avec nos partenaires extérieurs, et alors seulement nous devrons examiner les possibilités d’action à nos frontières ».

Imprimant au débat un tour plus politique, l’eurodéputé maltais Simon Busuttil (PPE) a concentré sa réflexion sur le principe de solidarité entre les États membres en matière d’immigration et d’asile. Alors que ce principe a été consacré par le traité, dans les faits son application est clairement défaillante, a-t-il observé. M. Busuttil a toutefois estimé utile de définir l’expression « principe de solidarité » en préambule à son intervention. « Ce dont il s’agit, ce n’est pas des marchandises transportées d’un pays à un autre : nous parlons d’êtres humains », a-t-il insisté. En outre, la solidarité n’implique que « quelques États membres particulièrement exposés à des flux migratoires de grande ampleur ».

Citant l’exemple de la Grèce, par où transitent à l’heure actuelle quatre-vingt-dix pour cent des migrants clandestins, M. Busuttil a souligné le besoin de résoudre le problème à l’échelon européen, relevant que « les personnes qui se rendent en Grèce ne comptent pas y rester mais souhaitent aller dans un autre État membre ». 
Au sujet du contrôle des frontières extérieures, M. Busuttil a vigoureusement défendu le rôle de Frontex. Cependant, l’agence doit à ses yeux « faire des progrès en termes de compétence et d’efficacité ». Il a esquisse un scénario pour revoir la réglementation qui règit Frontex, faisant référence aux propositions d’amendements contenues dans son récent rapport. L’une des mesures phares consisterait, selon M. Busuttil, à améliorer la visibilité de Frontex, à abandonner les noms sibyllins par lesquels on désigne les missions de l’agence, tels que « Rabits » (acronyme anglais pour « équipes frontalières d’intervention rapide »), et à leur préférer l’appellation de « Système douanier de l’Union européenne », soulignant que cela constituerait un acte politique fort. M. Busuttil a aussi apporté son soutien à la proposition de la Commission européenne visant à doter Frontex de son propre équipement. Se déclarant étonné que l’agence ne soit pas habilitée à gérer de données personnelles, il a déclaré que cela devait changer en dépit de l’opposition prévisible de certains eurodéputés préoccupés par les questions de protection des données.

Michael T. Dougherty, directeur du service des affaires intérieures de la compagnie américaine de défense Raytheon, a apporté sa contribution au débat en présentant « Frontière du futur ». Il s’agit d’un nouveau logiciel de modélisation et de simulation, conçu pour fournir une analyse des risques liés aux flux migratoires illégaux à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne. « Je sais qu’il est difficile d’établir un consensus permettant d’élaborer une analyse crédible des risques et de faire circuler l’information, à l’intérieur des agences et entre elles », a déclaré M. Dougherty, convaincu que cela pourrait être possible avec le nouveau logiciel. L’objectif principal est de favoriser le dialogue entre les différents acteurs concernés – gouvernements, universités et même ONG –, et d’explorer la dynamique qui sous-tend l’immigration clandestine. Parmi la liste des tâches de « Frontière du futur » énumérées par M. Dougherty, figure l’identification des pays européens de destination et la définition des diverses mesures que les gouvernements pourraient prendre. Le programme informatique possède également un outil prévisionnel permettant d’évaluer l’impact des politiques migratoires en Europe sur une période de plus de dix ans.

La séance de questions-réponses a apporté un certain nombre de précisions quant à la révision du mandat de Frontex. Sur la question délicate du traitement des données personnelles par cette agence, M. Laitinen a répondu que « sur ce point, nous sommes tenus à la clarté ». Le directeur exécutif de Frontex a exposé les deux raisons principales...
qui justifient le travail sur des données contenant des informations personnelles. « La première – et c’est aussi notre objectif premier – est de mieux cibler les opérations », et dans ce but Frontex doit être à même de traiter toutes les informations qu’elle reçoit. La seconde raison est directement liée aux pouvoirs dont dispose l’agence Europol en matière d’enquête et de justice pénale. Ici, M. Laitinen a insisté sur le fait que Frontex dispose d’un large éventail d’informations jugées extrêmement utiles pour les enquêtes et les procédures criminelles. Le dispositif Rabit, qui a été inauguré sur la frontière entre la Grèce et la Turquie, en fournit un excellent exemple. « Les équipes sur le terrain reçoivent tellement d’informations qu’un de mes collègues, un Allemand, dit que si ces renseignements devaient tomber entre les mains des enquêteurs de police, ils en deviendraient fous », a déclaré le directeur exécutif de Frontex. M. Busuttil, pour sa part, a mis en garde : « il serait criminel de notre part d’empêcher Frontex de faire cela ».

Interrogés par Giles Merritt, directeur du Security and Defence Agenda (SDA), qui animait les débats, les intervenants ont également précisé quelques points concernant le rapport entre sécurité et migration. « Ceci est une conférence sur la sécurité et la défense, et nous n’avons pas réellement évoqué les risques que l’immigration fait courir à la sécurité », a déclaré M. Merritt. La question est de savoir dans quelle mesure l’immigration clandestine constitue un problème de sécurité au sens strict du terme, et non un problème politique.

Pour M. Laitinen, les choses sont simples : « Il y a toujours des aspects criminels, et chacun conçoit sans peine les liens qui existent entre l’immigration illégale, le trafic d’êtres humains, le rôle des passeurs, et même le blanchiment d’argent voire d’autres types de crimes. Nous ne pouvons donc pas les traiter séparément, comme je l’ai dit au début. »

En fin de séance, l’on a procédé à un examen élargi de la définition de l’immigration illégale. S’agit-il d’un phénomène criminel ? Ou bien d’un phénomène social, politique ou même économique ? « C’est une question des plus délicates », a admis M. Busuttil, soulignant qu’« il est très difficile de dire que quelqu’un qui a passé nos frontières extérieures est un criminel ».

Quoi qu’il en soit, MM. Laitinen et Busuttil sont tombés d’accord sur le fait que tous ceux qui aident l’immigration clandestine – individus, passeurs et organisations – sont clairement des criminels, et que ce sont eux que l’UE doit combattre. C’est la raison pour laquelle il est crucial d’encourager la coopération entre agences, a conclu M. Busuttil.
L’Union européenne est déterminée à agir en tant qu’instance de réaction globale face aux urgences, elle a les moyens d’y parvenir et elle exerce déjà une influence significative en tant que force de stabilité, de paix et d’aide d’urgence. Cependant, les délégués sont convenus que les institutions et les États membres de l’Union pourraient obtenir de bien meilleurs résultats s’ils apprenaient à mieux communiquer et à coordonner leurs efforts.

Par-delà leurs parcours variés dans l’assistance humanitaire, l’armée ou la police, les intervenants ont unanimement affirmé que la gestion des crises, pour être réellement efficace, nécessitait une coordination puissante et centralisée. Ils ont fait état d’un certain sentiment de frustration car, selon eux, même si les États membres et la Commission européenne partagent les mêmes valeurs et priorités en matière de réaction face aux catastrophes, qu’elles soient naturelles ou créées par l’homme, les
démarches de ces deux acteurs font souvent — et inutilement — double emploi, pour la simple raison qu’ils ne se concertent pas suffisamment entre eux avant d’intervenir chacun de son côté.

« Au bout du compte, on atteint toujours les objectifs, mais il serait préférable de s’épargner ces heures d’incertitude avant d’agir, sans savoir de quels moyens nous disposons », a déclaré Florika Fink-Hooijer, chef du cabinet de Kristalina Georgieva, la commissaire européenne chargée de la Coopération internationale, de l’Aide humanitaire et de la Gestion des crises.

Son propos entrait en résonance avec le point de vue du général de brigade Giovanni Manione, directeur adjoint à la direction de gestion et de planification des crises (CPMD) du Conseil de l’Union européenne, qui a souligné la nécessité de mieux coordonner l’ensemble des réactions, y compris celles des ONG européennes. « De nombreuses organisations humanitaires agissent tête à tête, sans aucun contrôle politique », a-t-il estimé. En désaccord avec cette dernière remarque, Mme Fink-Hooijer considérait que, du point de vue des réponses d’urgence, il est essentiel de privilégier la coordination et l’interaction dès le départ, tout en respectant le rôle de leadership de l’ONU et les responsabilités du pays hôte vis-à-vis de ses citoyens.

« La coordination est d’une importance capitale, parce que la planification signifie des actions effectives et efficaces », a souligné le modérateur Axel Dyèvre, directeur du bureau européen de CEIS. « Tout cela restera hors de notre portée tant que nous n’aurons pas mis en place un véritable entraînement en commun », a-t-il ajouté.

La coordination d’une réponse globale et efficace aux crises contient un piège qui repose, comme le débat l’a
suggéré, sur l’aptitude à doser de manière judicieuse le rôle dévolu à chaque intervenant aux différentes phases. Cela inclut d’équilibrer le recours à des instruments civils et militaires, ainsi que de prendre en compte l’apport des organisations non-gouvernementales.

Forte de son expérience dans l’aide humanitaire, Mme Fink-Hooijer s’est déclarée préoccupée par l’implication habituelle de l’armée dans les réactions humanitaires civiles, en l’absence des précautions nécessaires. « Dans certaines circonstances, brouiller les lignes [entre réactions civile et militaire] peut s’avérer très dangereux, car nous savons qu’en réalité il y a davantage de tués parmi les travailleurs humanitaires que parmi les casques bleus. »

Cette idée a reçu le soutien franc du lieutenant-colonel René Wagemans du B-Fast, dispositif belge d’intervention humanitaire rapide, qui a reconnu que « les militaires doivent être conscients que leur présence est susceptible de menacer l’espace humanitaire dont ont besoin à la fois les organisations humanitaires et la population touchée ».

Aucun doute, toutefois, sur un point : l’armée est une composante essentielle de nombreuses actions humanitaires, l’une des plus appréciée par les acteurs non-militaires. « En réalité, nous souhaitons développer les relations entre civils et militaires, car elles peuvent se révéler déterminantes pour la sécurité. En effet, la sécurisation de l’espace humanitaire est un enjeu capital, et l’armée a dans ce contexte un rôle incontournable à jouer », a dit Mme Fink-Hooijer.

Il peut s’avérer nécessaire de s’appuyer sur les militaires à un moment donné, y compris dans les cas où la sécurité semble ne poser aucun problème au départ, a affirmé le lieutenant-colonel Wagemans : « Comme l’a montré la crise haïtienne, la sécurité peut se détériorer rapidement », et c’est la raison pour laquelle il faut maintenir les forces armées prêtes à intervenir même si elles ne doivent pas nécessairement être déployées.

« Tout le monde ou presque en convient : dans les grandes catastrophes, l’armée est seule à pouvoir être déployée rapidement pour faire face aux urgences comme le
transport, le soutien logistique, l’ingénierie et les premiers secours, qui recouvrent les besoins les plus criants de la communauté humanitaire », a dit le lieutenant-colonel Wagemans.

Il est clair, a-t-il néanmoins ajouté, que cela ne doit être fait que dans les cas où la population locale demande l’intervention de l’armée, où le rôle de cette dernière est essentiel et ne crée pas de dangers significatifs pour les travailleurs humanitaires.

Cherchant à dépasser la traditionnelle dichotomie entre domaines civil et militaire, le général Manione a soutenu que, pour décider quels instruments combiner dans la réponse à une crise, il fallait aussi prendre en compte l’évolution des besoins dans le temps. « La question, ce n’est pas de savoir si l’armée doit être sur place, en plus de la police ou des acteurs humanitaires. Ce qu’il faut, c’est savoir combien de temps chacune de ces forces doit demeurer sur le terrain », a-t-il déclaré.

Et le général Manione d’insister : tout cela constitue un plaidoyer pour une meilleure coordination. « Nous disposons de nombreux instruments, mais l’UE est souvent critiquée pour son manque d’efficacité. Pourquoi ? Parce que nous ne coordonnons pas le déploiement de tous ces moyens », a-t-il martelé.

La meilleure coordination qu’il appelle de ses vœux, a-t-il précisé, doit être comprise ainsi : un sens plus aigu du rythme de déploiement des divers éléments de réaction. « Je rêve de voir plein de personnel humanitaire [arriver sur le terrain], puis les soldats, qui montent la force, mènent une opération, et repartent dès que possible en ne maintenant qu’une présence légère pour l’entraînement, enfin la police entre en scène et le développement commence », a-t-il confié.

Pour le colonel Jorge Esteves, qui commande la Force de gendarmerie européenne (FGE), une plus forte implication de la police européenne à l’étranger pourrait fournir une solution plus nuancée au vieux débat sur le civil et le militaire. « Nous avons
une capacité de déploiement rapide qui inclut un état-major spécifique, l’aptitude à opérer sous chaîne de commandement civil ou militaire, et celle d’intervenir dans toute une série d’environnements », a-t-il énuméré. Avant de signaler que la FGE avait joué avec succès un rôle de premier plan en Bosnie-Herzégovine où, comme dans de nombreuses autres situations de transition post-conflit, sa contribution au maintien de l’ordre fut plutôt subtile et efficace.

Dans le cadre de ce plaidoyer pour une coordination améliorée, vue comme facteur d’efficacité, le thème omniprésent de la crise financière mondiale s’est également invité dans les échanges. Le lieutenant-colonel Wagemans a rappelé que rien ne pouvait justifier aujourd’hui le gaspillage dû aux actions non concertées des acteurs de l’UE. « Compte tenu des pressions budgétaires actuelles, il nous faut veiller à déployer avec efficacité les maigres ressources dont nous disposons », a-t-il commenté.

En plus de causer des doublons inutiles et coûteux entre les initiatives, ont argumenté les délégués, l’absence de coordination risque également de créer des brèches entre les réponses vitales que l’on apporte. Pour autant, Mme Fink-Hooijer a plaidé contre la politisation de l’aide d’urgence : « Il nous faut quoi qu’il en soit un débat plus stratégique avant tout déploiement, de façon à garantir que la remise en état et la reconstruction suivront après les secours. »

Le général Manione a'affiché son scepticisme sur la possibilité de s’en remettre aux États membres pour agir dans des régions auxquelles ils accordent traditionnellement une moindre priorité, et noté l’existence d’une volonté politique plus forte d’intervenir sur des urgences plus visibles. Malgré l’appel de la Commission européenne à travailler sur les « crises oubliées », il redoute que des lacunes significatives subsistent dans la réponse globale tant que l’on n’aura pas pris l’engagement clair et uniifié de fournir notre assistance partout où il y en a le plus besoin. « Tous les matins dans mon bureau, je regarde sur la carte Goma et les régions orientales du Congo, et je pense à ce que nous aurions pu faire avec un peu de volonté politique, pour éviter que des femmes soient violées et des enfants tués. Nous manquons de volonté politique », a-t-il conclu.
Systèmes de défense aérienne : doter l’Europe d’une autonomie stratégique

Les systèmes de défense aérienne de l’Europe pâtissent d’une « insuffisance stratégique », et l’industrie du continent doit consacrer ses efforts à innover plutôt qu’à imiter ses concurrents étrangers, selon les officiels de la défense et les experts industriels qui ont pris la parole au cours de cette session.

Depuis des années, il est difficile d’obtenir des avions de transport et des hélicoptères capables de convoyer en urgence des troupes vers les zones de combat et aux alentours. Le nombre d’appareils disponibles est toujours loin de pouvoir faire face aux besoins actuels, surtout à la lumière de la crise budgétaire.
Il est par ailleurs notoire, selon les intervenants, que l’Union européenne manque d’engins de surveillance aérienne sans pilote, capables de contrôler terrain et installations, ou de drones qui puissent frapper des cibles invisibles et indécelables depuis de hautes altitudes.

Les histoires de Reaper et Predator, ces mystérieux drones volant sur des milliers de kilomètres pour procéder à des frappes chirurgicales contre les militants d’Al-Qaïda dans les zones tribales et sans loi du Pakistan, ont frappé les esprits et attiré l’attention sur les aéronefs automates (drones), mais ceux-ci constituent encore une sérieuse lacune dans les capacités opérationnelles de l’Europe.

« Il n’y a pas une opération conduite en Afghanistan qui ne soit couverte par des drones qui assurent vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre et sept jours sur sept les missions RSR (renseignements, surveillance et reconnaissance) », a dit le général de division Jochen Both, qui dirige le Commandement du transport aérien européen (CTAE), tout juste de retour de Kaboul.

« Pour déclencher un engagement dans le cadre de la FIAS (Force internationale d’assistance et de sécurité en Afghanistan), l’on doit pouvoir disposer d’une évaluation claire de la situation en ce qui concerne l’ennemi, eu égard à l’impératif catégorique d’éviter les victimes civiles et compte tenu du risque que représentent les engins explosifs improvisés (EEI) », a-t-il dit.

Les avions sans pilote ont plusieurs avantages. Ils ne mettent pas d’équipage en danger, et il n’est pas nécessaire de les concevoir spécialement pour le confort ou la survie, ni de les équiper d’instruments de navigation. De plus, ils peuvent être de taille bien plus réduite que les avions avec pilote.

« Il existe une grande différence entre une machine et un homme », a affirmé le général dedivision Carlo Magrassi, directeur adjoint de l’Agence européenne pour
la défense (AED), au détour du débat sur l’avenir des systèmes de défense aérienne en Europe.

« Le problème avec les pilotes, c’est que chaque génération de pilotes doit tout réapprendre. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’apprendre à voler. Il s’agit d’apprendre la prudence, ce genre de sentiment qui d’une manière ou d’une autre aide à survivre dans les airs », a-t-il expliqué.

« Les machines n’ont pas ce genre de problème. Quand elles apprennent quelque chose, c’est pour toujours, et quand vous résolvez un problème, il est résolu. Sans compter que les machines en viennent à atteindre de tels niveaux de performance, que les êtres humains ne sont plus en mesure de les concurrencer », a-t-il poursuivi.

Quoi qu’il en soit, l’un des principaux problèmes pour les Européens – et leurs alliés américains – est l’accès à l’espace. Avec tous les appareils civils qui sillonnent le ciel, la sûreté ainsi que la sécurité sont des enjeux majeurs à prendre en compte dans la réflexion sur l’introduction éventuelle de drones dans l’espace aérien.

« Il est question d’autoriser trois fois plus d’appareils à circuler dans l’espace aérien européen. Une chose est sûre : il faudra faire de plus en plus confiance aux machines, pour les calculs, les trajectoires, tout ce qui est lié à la coordination et à la gestion du trafic aérien. Il y aura sans doute encore pendant quelque temps des pilotes assis dans les cockpits, mais ils vont peu à peu se contenter d’observer ce qui se passe », a dit le général Magrassi.

« Le problème fondamental, c’est l’accès à l’espace aérien », a souligné le colonel Michael Francis, à la tête des programmes avancés de l’United Technologies Research Center américain. De fait, cela pourrait valoir la peine de s’employer à sécuriser la circulation des drones dans l’espace aérien de l’Europe. Grâce aux drones, il est possible de réa-
liser d’importantes économies, ce qui ne peut qu’intéresser tous les pays de l’UE, en pleine crise budgétaire. C’est pourquoi l’industrie européenne pourrait chercher à établir de nouveaux standards, plutôt que de copier ce que font ses rivaux d’outre-Atlantique.

« Aujourd’hui, la question stratégique est : la base industrielle européenne est-elle capable de faire mieux que le Reaper et le Predator ? Je préfère acheter un Predator que de soutenir quelque chose qui sera tout juste capable de faire le même boulot, et encore, pas avant cinq ou dix ans », a argumenté le général Both.

Selon lui, « nous sommes en retard sur les drones, par rapport à d’autres programmes plus vastes. Au lieu de nous efforcer de copier le Predator ou le Reaper, qui sont des systèmes transformés pour servir d’armes, il faut qu’on avance, qu’on se lance directement dans les drones de combat, secteur où nos amis américains n’en sont qu’à la phase de développement. Il y a une opportunité, il faut exploiter les opportunités ».

De son côté, le colonel Francis a estimé que, dans la mesure où c’est réalisable, la réduction de la taille des appareils sans pilote offre des perspectives intéressantes.

« Si nous arrivons à produire des systèmes automatiques moins chers, le rapport capacité-coût va devenir difficile à battre. Un drone de petite taille ne coûterait pas grand-chose par rapport au prix d’un gros Predator ; il serait capable d’approcher à moins de trois cents mètres de sa cible et de recueillir des images aussi bonnes que lui, mais pour un prix nettement moindre », a-t-il fait valoir.

L’un des problèmes principaux demeure la réticence de l’industrie à se hasarder dans ce domaine. « Cerner les défis qui nous attendent, développer des programmes, faire en sorte que la clientèle militaire soit à même de soutenir le développement et la passation de marchés : tous les secteurs de l’industrie sont en retard.
En Europe, c’est à une insuffisance stratégique que nous sommes confrontés », déplore le général Both.

Peter Wagner, chef du service Industries de défense, aéronautiques et maritimes à la Commission européenne, a déclaré que le prestige militaire dont jouissent les drones explique en partie la difficulté d’attirer des clients civils, en dépit des bénéfices évidents que ce type d’appareils pourrait apporter sur des questions de sécurité civile comme la surveillance des frontières ou le travail de police, entre autres applications.

« Il n’est pas facile de communiquer sur les drones. Ils ont tous une connotation afghano-pakistanaise, ce qui risque fort de fermer des portes et de freiner les discussions sur l’usage civil qu’on peut en faire. L’inquiétude des citoyens, qui craignent que l’emploi des drones donne lieu à des abus destinés à contrôler secrètement leurs mouvements, doit être prise très au sérieux », a-t-il déclaré à la conférence.

De nombreux intervenants sont tombés d’accord pour dire qu’il incombe à la base industrielle militaire de s’emparer du dossier, comme cela a été le cas pour l’informatique et la navigation par satellite.

« Il faut se faire une place dans les technologies militaires avancées, parce que c’est de cette manière qu’on peut amorcer la pompe de la recherche industrielle », a dit Giles Merritt, directeur du SDA, qui animait le débat.

Et le colonel Francis de noter : « Le Pentagone a soutenu IBM. Nous avons créé un monstre qui a évolué vers l’univers commercial, et il est intéressant de constater que cette évolution bénéficie à nous aussi, c’est un juste retour des choses. »
EUROPOLITIQUE

Sécurité - Défense

Quelle Europe après le pacte franco-britannique
La multiplication des actes de piraterie au large des côtes de Somalie a donné au monde une idée des dangers qui menacent les voies de navigation mondiales, par lesquelles transitent quatre-vingt-dix pour cent du commerce de l'UE, et l'opération Atalanta a démontré que l'UE peut apporter une réponse efficace à cette menace, selon les participants. Cependant l'inquiétude prédomine : les récentes restrictions, qui affectent notamment les budgets des marines nationales, montrent que les gouvernements persistent à sous-estimer l'importance de la sécurité en mer.


Ces préoccupations ont été reprises par les experts réunis autour de la table et les autres participants à la rencontre. Le vice-amiral Lutz Feldt, ancien chef d’état-major naval de l’Allemagne, a déploré que la réflexion stratégique soit « domi-
née par [des idées] continentales » et que les états-majors navals souffrent souvent d’« aveuglement maritime ».

« Les gens n’ont pas vraiment idée de ce qui se passe en mer », a-t-il dit, ajoutant que la planification maritime pouvait constituer une pierre angulaire de la planification militaire dans l’Europe régie par le traité de Lisbonne, à la fois parce que cette question revêt une importance croissante, et parce qu’il est relativement facile de mettre sur pied une stratégie maritime qui constitue un exemple pour la planification dans d’autres domaines.

Cependant, l’optimisme ne régnait pas vraiment chez les intervenants sur la question de savoir si les décideurs politiques sont prêts à consentir aux investissements nécessaires dans les forces navales. « Il faudra une crise pour que les gens admettent la nécessité de faire quelque chose », a dit le capitaine de corvette Kurt Engelen, de l’Association euro-atlantique de Belgique.

L’eurodéputée Ana Maria Gomes a déclaré que l’UE devait prendre ses responsabilités en tant que puissance navale pour affronter le déferlement des problèmes maritimes, qui incluent la propagation de la piraterie à d’autres régions de l’océan Indien et vers l’Atlantique, l’éventualité de voir des conflits éclater autour des ressources naturelles et des voies navigables en Arctique, la sécurité énergétique, le trafic d’êtres humains, d’armes et de drogues, et le terrorisme en mer.

La récente fermeture par l’UE de sa mission de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Guinée-Bissau, alors même que les pays d’Afrique occidentale continuent de servir de plaque tournante pour les trafiquants de drogue, et l’inaction de l’UE pour maîtriser le risque de propagation du terrorisme depuis la région du Sahel, montrent que Bruxelles échoue à faire face aux enjeux maritimes cruciaux, a reconnu la socialiste portugaise.

Membre de la sous-commission en charge de la sécurité et de la défense au Parlement européen, Mme Gomes s’est jointe au vice-amiral Feldt pour presser l’UE de se doter d’un espace maritime unifié, avec un système intégré de communications, de partage d’informations et de surveillance. Elle a également proposé la création d’une plateforme commune de gardes-côtes et une meilleure coopération navale sous pavillon de l’Agence européenne pour la défense (AED).

Le vice-amiral Feldt a souligné que la politique maritime intégrée avait démarré par le versant civil – gestion des ressources et protection de l’environnement –, pour n’étendre ses activités au domaine militaire que plus tard. Au début, l’armée a eu du mal à accepter d’être ainsi tenue de prendre en charge ces responsabilités maritimes.
à l’Écart, a-t-il rappelé. « J’ai compris ces dernières années […] en tirant les leçons de tout cela, qu’il est beaucoup plus facile de procéder en commençant par une approche civile pour ensuite y intégrer le militaire, plutôt que l’inverse. Dans le sillage de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité, il y a aussi besoin d’une « stratégie européenne de sécurité en mer ». Le processus nécessaire pour mettre en œuvre cette dernière, tout comme la Stratégie de sécurité […] elle-même, promouvrait un haut degré de sensibilisation et clarifierait les différents niveaux de responsabilité », a-t-il poursuivi.

L’amiral Silva Ribeiro a présenté les rouages de la Force maritime européenne (Euromarfor) qui regroupe plusieurs pays, à titre d’exemple de coopération entre unités navales de l’UE. La Force maritime européenne est actuellement commandée par le Portugal.

Une discussion animée s’est tenue autour de l’opération Atalanta ; les intervenants sont tombés d’accord pour dire que la mission avait été couronnée de succès en neutralisant partiellement la piraterie, mais certains ont déploré les limitations de son mandat, et insisté sur la nécessité de soutenir les manœuvres navales par une action terrestre afin de s’attaquer aux racines du problème.

Parmi les quelques officiers de marine qui sont intervenus, le vice-amiral Denis Trioulaire, de l’Agence européenne de défense (AED), a exposé que l’UE doit renforcer son arsenal d’équipements navals, notamment parce que le risque de piraterie menace la circulation au large des côtes d’autres régions d’Afrique.

Selon le vice-amiral Feldt, le mandat de l’Eunavfor (Force navale de l’UE) doit être renforcé pour permettre aux avions et aux navires européens d’agir de manière plus proactive contre toutes les embarcations, de grande mais aussi de petite taille, des pirates.

« Avec l’expérience dont nous disposons aujourd’hui, dans le cadre de l’opération en cours, il nous faut plus que de la simple dissuasion […] il nous faut un mandat qui puisse porter aussi sur la prévention », a-t-il dit.

« Cela n’a rien à voir avec l’argent, cela n’a rien à voir avec la présence ou l’absence de financement. Ce qui fait défaut, c’est la volonté politique. Même si nous avions deux fois plus de navires, nous ne remporterions pas beaucoup plus de succès avec le mandat qui est le nôtre à
l’heure actuelle, et c’est là un élément qu’il nous faut rappeler en toute occasion à nos dirigeants politiques », a dit le président de l’Institut maritime allemand.

Le vice-amiral Feldt a fait l’éloge de l’articulation opérée par l’UE entre la mission navale et une approche plus large des problèmes en Somalie et dans la Corne de l’Afrique, incluant le renforcement des compétences des autorités maritimes au Yémen et à Djibouti, l’entraînement des soldats somaliens, l’aide au gouvernement fédéral de la Somalie jointe à des contacts avec les autorités locales au Somaliland et dans le Punt, ainsi que les accords juridiques grâce auxquels le Kenya, les Seychelles et peut-être d’autres dans la région pourront tenter d’incarcérer les pirates capturés.

« C’est une très bonne opération ; qui plus est, elle s’inscrit dans ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler l’approche globale. De mon point de vue, l’UE est la seule institution capable de combiner les responsabilités civile et militaire au sein d’une même mission. Le problème de la piraterie ne pourra être résolu qu’à terre. Il ne sera jamais réglé en mer », a-t-il dit.

Un large consensus s’est fait sur la nécessité d’adopter une approche globale de ce genre, mais quelques personnes ont émis des réserves sur l’efficacité des méthodes de l’UE.

« Nous n’avons pas d’approche politique globale, ou plutôt la seule que nous ayons est en réalité contreproductive. [Quant à la force de l’Union africaine à Mogadiscio,] nous ne l’avons pas vraiment soutenue, il y a beaucoup à faire en termes de construction d’un État, parce que sans cela l’ordre public continuera d’être menacé, et la piraterie perdurera », a dit Mme Gomes.

Par ailleurs, l’eurodéputée portugaise a fait part de son inquiétude au sujet de la mission européenne d’entraînement des troupes somaliennes en Ouganda, qui pourrait se révéler contreproductive si les soldats ne bénéficient pas d’un soutien suffisant lorsqu’ils retournent à Mogadiscio, afin de s’assurer qu’ils ne changent pas de camp pour rejoindre les militants du groupe islamiste Al-Chabab.

Le vice-amiral Jacques Rosiers, président de l’Association euro-atlantique de Belgique, s’est montré inquiet : selon lui, à moins que l’UE ou d’autres acteurs internationaux fournissent une protection suffisamment fiable à la navigation, au large des côtes somaliennes et ailleurs, les armateurs seront tentés de faire davantage appel à des sociétés de sécurité privées. Une perspective que les invités ont rejetée sans détours.

« Je ne crois pas que la solution passe par les sociétés de sécurité privées, que ce soit en mer ou ailleurs. Mon opinion sur la manière dont ces compagnies de sécurité privées se sont développées est très, très négative. Si nous choisissons de nous engager dans cette voie, cela ne pourra aller qu’en s’empirant », a dit Mme Gomes.
Speaker biographies

Maj. Gen. Jochen Both

Major General Jochen Both is the First Commander of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) in Eindhoven. As Commander of the EATC, he has been tasked by the four participating nations (Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands) to take operational control over their military airlift assets including planning, tasking, mission controlling and reporting. This means that the EATC will be in command of more than 170 aircrafts of various aircraft types and will manage more than 70,000 flying hours. In parallel, the EATC works on matters such as harmonisation and standardisation of procedures as well as on operational doctrines, concepts and regulations. Initial operating capability is expected to be achieved by the end of 2010, when the EATC will exercise operational control and defined levels of authority in the area of force generation over all participating nations’ air transport assets.

Both joined the German Air Force in 1972. He was trained as Fighter Pilot on F104G “Starfighter” and posted to the Fighter Bomber Wing 31 “Boeleke” in Kerpen/Nörvenich. There, he also served as Weapons Officer and Squadron Operations Officer. After attending the 31st General Staff Course, he was assigned to different posts at the Military Staff of the Ministry of Defence. He was the spokesperson for air force affairs of the MoD and kept the flying group command in Cochem/Büchel. Following that, he was Base and Wing Commander of the Reconnaissance Wing 51 “Immelmann”. During that time he was deployed as Commander of the Combat Wing 1 in Piacenza, Italy during the Allied Force operation in 1999. He participated in the 97th Senior Course at the NATO Defence College in Rome, and was eventually promoted to Brigadier General as commander of the Air Force Academy in Fürstenfeldbruck. From 2005 to 2009 he was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for concepts and operations at the MoD. In 2009 both was nominated Chief of Staff of the German Air force Command at Köln, from where he was deployed to the ISAF Joint Command as Deputy Chief of Staff Air in Kabul from November 2009 to July 2010.

Simon Busuttil

Dr. Simon Busuttil, MEP, is a Member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in the European Parliament.

A lawyer by profession, Busuttil has specialised in European Affairs and followed EU affairs on a professional basis since 1994.

In 1999 he set up the Malta-EU Information Centre and led the public communications campaign ahead of Malta’s referendum on EU membership. During the EU accession negotiations, Busuttil was a member of Malta’s Core Negotiating Group.

In July 2004, Busuttil was elected to the European Parliament and has since followed dossiers of particular interest to Malta, notably budgetary affairs, immigration policy, justice and home affairs and Euro-Mediterranean policy. As an MEP, Busuttil is also an active campaigner for citizens' EU rights. In June 2009, he was re-elected to the European Parliament with a record 68,792 votes or 28% of the national vote, the highest percentage score in the EU.

Gwenole Cozigou


An economist by training, he
has been an official in the European Commission since 1985 in the fields of Enterprise and Industrial Policy and of External Relations.

A former Deputy Head of Cabinet of Commissioner Liikanen in charge of enterprise and industrial policy, he has occupied several management positions in services dealing with food industry and biotechnology, coordination of the internal market legislation for goods, enterprise and industrial police and defence, aerospace and maritime industries.

**Willy De Backer**

Willy De Backer is Head of the Greening Europe Forum of EU think tank Friends of Europe.

He previously worked as an independent journalist and consultant specialised in global energy, environment and sustainability policies. De Backer co-funded the EU online policy portal Euractiv.com in 1999 and was editor-in-chief until the end of May 2007.

De Backer is a frequent speaker and moderator for conferences on EU policies (especially energy, environment, climate change, sustainable development, transport and CSR) and on internet media and citizens’ journalism.

Before getting into journalism and becoming an internet entrepreneur, he worked for nearly ten years as a parliamentary assistant and later staff member of the Green group in the European Parliament. From 1984 until 1989, he was one of the Secretary-Generals of the Federation of European Green Parties.

In 2008 and 2009, De Backer was European director of the US-based Global Footprint Network (GFN), the think tank behind the concept of the ecological footprint. He is still a senior policy advisor for this organisation.

**Pieter De Crem**

Pieter De Crem was appointed Belgian Minister of Defence in 2007. He began his political career in 1989 when he became Chairman of the youth branch of the Christian People's Party (CVP).

Between May 2003 and December 2007, De Crem was Chairman of the Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CD&V) in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. From June to December 2007, he also served as Chairman of the CD&V-NVA parliamentary party in the Chamber of Representatives, and as Chairman of the Commission for the Interior.

De Crem became a Member of the Belgian Parliament in 1995, when he was elected in the constituency of Ghent-Eeklo. He was re-elected in 1999. In 2003, De Crem represented the CD&V in the constituency of Oost-Vlaanderen, where he was again re-elected in 2007.

Following posts in the office of the Prime Minister, the office of the Minister of Defence, and in the private sector, De Crem was elected Mayor of Aalter in 1995. He was subsequently re-elected in 2000 and 2006.

De Crem has also served as a Member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and is an Officer of the Order of Leopold.

De Crem obtained a degree in Roman Philology at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) followed by a degree in European and International Law at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB).

**Michel Hugues de Gliniasty**

Michel Hugues de Gliniasty is Senior Advisor at the European Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS).

Prior to joining CEIS, he was General Scientific Director at the French Aerospace Lab (ONERA) where he was in charge of the long term
research programme.

De Gliniasty has had a long career with the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). He started as Head of experiment in 1981 where he conducted research on the implementation and operation of heavy means or large pulsed power generators and non-nuclear experiments. From 1985 to 1987, he was Deputy Head of the weapons design department. He then became Project Manager designing and developing studies on new materials. Between 1992 and 1996, de Gliniasty was Research Programme Manager responsible for the CEA Military Applications Division research programme. In 1996, he assumed the role of Operational Manager and in 1998 became its Director, in charge of engineering activities, non-proliferation and radiation protection.

Before joining the CEA, between 1974 and 1981, de Gliniasty was Research Engineer at the Directorate General for Armaments of the Gramat Research Centre, where he researched reactive flows and armour-plating.

De Gliniasty is a graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole Nationale Supérieure, specialised in engineering and advanced techniques.

Michael T. Dougherty

Michael T. Dougherty is Director of Immigration Control for Raytheon Homeland Security.

Before joining Raytheon, Dougherty served with the Department of Homeland Security, where he was appointed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman in March 2008. In that office, Dougherty generated independent, formal studies to Congress that analysed systemic problems in the Department’s delivery of immigration benefits and services to businesses and individuals, and recommended solutions to mitigate those problems. His numerous studies across the bandwidth of immigration services included transformation of case management systems; surge workforce strategies; employment verification; IT enhancements; foreign professional workers; and best practices in customer service and outreach.

Dougherty previously served as Legislative Counsel on the personal staff of Senator Jon Kyl and on the staff of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security within the Senate Judiciary Committee. His portfolio included border security technologies and strategies, interior enforcement, identity/travel documents, fraud prevention, employment verification, and guest worker programmes. Dougherty was among the team of senior staff who drafted and negotiated the 2007 bipartisan immigration reform effort in the Senate.

Before joining the Senate staff, Dougherty served as Senior Policy Advisor for Immigration with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate at Department of Homeland Security headquarters. While there, Dougherty led efforts to expand the Department’s legal authorities to curb illegal immigration on the southern border of the United States.

Dougherty has also served at the Department of Justice as Trial Attorney for the Office of Immigration Litigation, where he litigated 100 immigration cases in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal. He also has litigation experience in immigration fraud cases as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia. Dougherty initiated his immigration career at the Department of Justice as an Attorney Advisor to the Board of Immigration Appeals within the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

Dougherty earned a Juris Doctor degree and a Bachelor of Arts degree in English Literature at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.

Axel Dyèvre

Axel Dyèvre has been Director of CEIS’s European Office, the Brussels-based subsidiary of European Company for Strategic Intelligence since 2006. He has managed and contributed to projects in the fields of intelligence, security and defence for the EU institutions and member state ministries (reorganisation, capabilities analysis, technical and operational studies,
threat analysis, etc) as well as for the private sector.

He is a co-founder and board member of the European Open Source Intelligence (EUROSINT) Forum, a not-for-profit association dedicated to fostering European cooperation and use of open source intelligence aimed at mitigating threats to peace and security. As a former senior partner with an intelligence software company, he spent ten years defining, managing and controlling projects on behalf of public and private sector organisations. Prior to joining CEIS, he served as an officer in the French Army for seven years.

Christian Ehler

Dr. Christian Ehler has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2004 and is a Member of the Bureau of the German CDU/CSU Group in the European Parliament.

He is a member of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and a substitute member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). Since 2009 he is also Chairman of the Delegation for relations with the Korean Peninsula (DKOR).

Ehler is the EP’s rapporteur on the Security Research Programme (within the framework of FP7) and the rapporteur of the AFET/SEDE Initiative report on “Civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities”.

He has served as a parliamentary member of the European Security Research Advisory Board and as parliamentary observer of the European Security Research and Innovation Forum.

Col. Jorge Esteves

Colonel Jorge Esteves became the third Commander of the European Gendarmerie Force on June 26th 2009, and will cover this position until 2011.

He began his military career in 1979 at the Cavalry Army School. He attended the Guarda Nacional Republicana Officer’s Training Course in 1984, the Captain Promotional Course in 1990, and the Superior Officer Promotional Course in 1998. As a low-ranking officer he served as Cavalry Platoon Commander at the GNR Cavalry Regiment between 1986 and 1990.

As a Captain, he was Company Commander of GNR enlisted soldiers, Deputy Territorial Group Commander and Territorial Detachment Commander from 1991 until 1999.

As a high-ranking Officer he was Territorial Group Commander, Head of the 3rd Territorial Brigade Operations and Information’s Office, Head of the 3rd Territorial Brigade Criminal Investigation Office, 3rd Territorial Brigade Chief of Staff and 3rd Territorial Brigade Deputy Commander from 2000 to 2007. During 2006 he integrated the Working Group for the Reform of the Portuguese Internal Security System.

From 2004 to 2007 he was Assistant Lecturer of Military Sociology at the Military Academy in Lisbon. Between 2007 till 2009 he was Chief of Staff of the European Gendarmerie Force.

He has attended several courses related to Crisis Management Operations among them the United Nations Police Commander Course, the Strategic Planning for European Union Police Mission Course, the European Security and Defence Policy Orientation Course, the NATO Staff Officer Force Planning Course and the NATO Partnership for Peace Staff Officer Course.

He holds a University degree and Master’s degree in Sociology.
H.E. Mr. Jean-Louis Falconi

Jean-Louis Falconi was nominated French Ambassador and Representative to the political and security committee of the European Union (PSC) in November 2009.

He started his career at the French Foreign Ministry in 1991, working on European and international economic law.

In 1995 he joined the Ministry of Economy and Finance, where he worked on the third phase of the monetary union and introduction of the euro in the Europe department. He then moved to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Monetary Affairs as counsellor of the Director until 1999, before heading to the French Permanent Representation to the EU, where he worked on the French presidency and on relations with the European Parliament, amongst others.

In 2002 Falconi was nominated Deputy Director for European foreign relations in the French Foreign Ministry, in charge of enlargement, relations with the Balkans, Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, the Barcelona process, Asia, Latin America, ACP and the World Trade Organisation.

He became Head of the foreign and security policy department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005, before moving to the Foreign Minister’s cabinet as his Counsellor for European affairs in 2007.

Falconi holds a degree in finance and economics from the Ecole supérieure des sciences économiques et commerciales (ESSEC). He then graduated from the Institut d'études politiques de Paris and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA). He lectures at both on European questions since 2001 and 2003 respectively.

Vice Adm. (ret.) Lutz Feldt

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt’s initial sea duty assignment was in the Mine Countermeasure Force as an Officer of the Watch and as a Commanding Officer of FGS Weilheim. Subsequent squadron and sea duty assignments included FGS Braunschweig, a frigate; Executive Officer of FGS Braunschweig and Commanding Officer, FGS Hessen, a destroyer; Communication, Command and Control Staff Officer in the 2nd Escort Squadron; Commander 2nd Frigate Squadron.

Shore duty assignments included the 23rd Command and General Staff Officer Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg, Assistant Branch Chief for Personnel during the unification process of the two German Armed Forces; Branch Chief for Personnel Policy Matters in the Naval Staff; Chief of Division, Naval Officers.

Feldt was selected for flag rank in April 1993. His initial flag assignment was as Commander of the Destroyer Flotilla in 1995. In October 1996 he reported as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Logistic, NATO Headquarters Allied Forces North West Europe, where he served until September 1998. In October 1998 he reported as Commander Military District I, Coast, until March 2000. Feldt assumed command of the German Fleet in April 2000, and became the Chief of German Naval Staff.

Since retiring in April 2006, Feldt has taken over several different posts of honour: he is President of the German Maritime Institute; Spokesman of the Bonner Forum of the German Atlantic Association; from 2005 until March 2010 he was a member of the advisory board of the “Evangelische Mütterecolsorge” and he is still a member of the advisory board of the publication “Schiff und Hafen”, an international publication for shipping and marine technology.

From May 2008 to March 2009 he was contracted by the European Commission as Advisor for the “Instrument for Stability”, specifically “Critical Maritime Routes”. From July 2009 to March 2010 he again took over a task as a maritime expert, dealing with Maritime Surveillance as Coordinator.
of a European “Wise Pens” group contracted by the European Defence Agency. The mandate has been extended with the focus of the implementation of recommendations until December 2010.

**Lt. Gen. Paul Fouilland**

Lieutenant General Paul Fouilland was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French Strategic Air Forces in 2007 and was then promoted to Lieutenant General in 2008.

He joined the Air Force in 1975 upon entering the École de l’Air (French Air Force College). After flight training, he was posted to the "Touraine" Squadron in Orléans flying the C160. In 1982, he chose to serve in the Strategic Air Forces as a tanker pilot. Following his conversion to the C135F, he undertook two tours on the aircraft, "Aunis" Squadron in Istres and "Sologne" Squadron in Avord. In 1987, he commanded the "Landes" Squadron in Mont de Marsan. In 1991, he commanded 93 Air-to-Air Refuelling Wing in Istres. Operational tours included many detachments in Africa: Chad, Gabon, the Central African Republic and in the Middle East.

He graduated from the Collège interarmées de défense (Joint Staff College) in 1994. From 1994 to 1998, he held staff appointments in the Central Staff and in the Air Force Staff dealing with both nuclear forces and programmes. He attended the 1999 Royal College of Defence Studies course. In 2000, he was posted for three years to the French Embassy in London as Air Attaché. In 2003, he went back to the Central Staff in Paris serving as deputy chief of the Nuclear Forces division. Promoted to Brigadier General in June 2005, he was appointed as chief of the Nuclear Forces division (Central Staff Paris).

**Florika Fink-Hooijer**

Dr. Florika Fink-Hooijer became Head of Cabinet of Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response in February 2010.

She was previously Head for Unit of Strategic Objective Security and Justice in the Secretariat General responsible for “Strategic Objective Security and External Responsibility” between 2006 and 2010. The unit's portfolio covered overall policy formulation for the Commission and upstream coordination of the Relex family (RELEX/TRADE/ECHO/AIDCO/DEV) and DG JLS as well as the secretariats for the relevant Commissioners' Groups and the Kosovo Steering Group. Her unit also assumed upstream coordination for Health and Consumer policy and managed the Commission's cooperate Inter-service system.

Before joining the Secretariat General she was Head of Unit in DG External Relations responsible for Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand. Between 2000 and 2006 Fink-Hooijer set up the managerial and financial structures inside the Commission for CFSP and crisis management: Fink-Hooijer was Head of Unit in DG External Relations responsible for institutional and legal matters, sanctions and the authorising officer for the CFSP-Budget. Her team was responsible inside the Commission for CFSP-project identification/management and the creation and implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (EU certification instrument for trade in rough diamonds). She also acted as Relex Counsellor for the Commission and EC-spokesperson/negotiator for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

Between 1999 and 2000 she was a Member of Cabinet of Frits Bolkestein, Commissioner for Internal Market and Financial Services. She was responsible for the free movement of goods and regulated professions, industrial and intellectual property, e-commerce, data protection, enlargement of the EU, development and humanitarian aid, Justice and Home affairs, health and consumer protection, budget, financial control and fraud.

From 1995 until 1999 she was a Member of Cabinet of Dr. M. Wulf-Mathies, Commissioner for Re-
gional Policy and Cohesion. Fink-Hooijer was responsible for external political relations with third countries, human rights, CFSP, Common Commercial Policy, OECD, WTO, TACIS, PHARE, Agenda 2000 (enlargement, pre-accession instruments, ISPA) Intergovernmental Conference, legal and institutional questions, Justice and Home affairs, infringements, intellectual and commercial property, e-commerce.

Fink-Hooijer started her career in the Commission in 1990 as an Administrator in DG Market, then as an Administrator in the Secretariat General from 1992 until 1995. She is a lawyer by training, specialised in Intellectual Property Rights and Public International Law.

Col. (ret.) Michael S. Francis

Colonel Michael S. Francis is Chief of Advanced Programs and a Senior Fellow at the United Technologies Research Center. He joined the organisation in February 2009. His current focus is on developing capabilities and major programme initiatives in autonomous and intelligent systems and providing strategic planning guidance and support to United Technologies Corporation businesses such as Sikorsky Aircraft, Pratt & Whitney Engines and Hamilton Sundstrand.

Prior to joining UTRC, Francis was the Chief Operating Officer, Photonics Division of General Atomics in San Diego. He also served as the company’s Program Director for the High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense (HELLADS) advanced solid state laser programme. Francis joined General Atomics in October 2006.

Francis was appointed Director of the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) Office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in October 2003. He led the $4B DARPA-Air Force-Navy effort to demonstrate the technology, feasibility, utility and operational value of a networked joined Lockheed Martin at its Corporate Headquarters and led an executive team that developed cross-corporation initiatives oriented toward horizontal integration, as well as other strategic technical planning efforts.

Francis holds BSc, MSc and Ph.D. degrees in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Colorado, as well as an honorary doctoral degree. He has authored or co-authored more than 40 open literature publications and is an experienced public speaker. He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA).

Didier Gambier

Dr. Didier Gambier is Advisor for strategic issues relating to industrial technologies at the Directorate General of Research at the European Commission.

Gambier, a French national, joined the non-proliferation community in the 90’s through his involvement in the International Science and Technology centres in Moscow and Kiev. A physicist and servant of the European Commission, he managed the EU contribution to those centres and momentarily held the function of Executive Director of the ISTC. With many others he organised the evolution of the ISTC from a science centre to a science innovation centre through a partnership with industries and laboratories in the donor Parties of ISTC, including Russia.

In addition, Gambier is well established in the management of very large science projects, among which ITER, to which he contributed substantially, negotiating the terms of the International agreement establishing ITER and managing the European contribution to ITER as Director of the European agency in Barcelona.

Kristalina Georgieva

Kristalina Georgieva is European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response.

Prior to joining the Commission, Georgieva worked at the World Bank Group. She held several positions within the Environment division, including Sector Manager for environmental projects and programmes in East Asia and the Pacific region between 1997 and 1998, Sector Director for Environment and Social Development responsible for social devel-
opment operations and Director of the Environment Department between 2000 and 2004. She was subsequently appointed Director and Resident Representative to the Russian Federation in 2004, a role she held until 2007 when she became Director of Strategy and Operations, Sustainable Development. She was then appointed Vice President and Corporate Secretary from 2008 to 2010.

Georgieva also has extensive experience in teaching, she started as Assistant Professor/Associate Professor at the Department of Economics at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia in 1977, and later became a Research Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1987.

She has written more than 100 publications, including a textbook on Microeconomics, and is a Member of the Board of Trustees of the University of National and World Economy in Sofia, where she obtained her Ph.D. in 1986.

Ana Maria Gomes

Ana Maria Gomes, MEP, is a member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence and of the Foreign Affairs Committee; and she is also a member of the Delegation with Iraq relations, and substitute member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Delegation for relations with the United States and the Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. She was a member of the Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners.

Gomes has been a career diplomat since 1980. She served as diplomatic counsellor to the President of the Republic between 1982 and 1986, as First Secretary at Portugal's Permanent Mission at the UN in Geneva from 1986 until 1989 and as Counsellor in Portugal's embassies in Tokyo and London between 1989 and 1994. She was a member of the Portuguese delegation for the Middle East peace process during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 1992, and director of the office of the Secretary of State for European Affairs in Lisbon from 1995 to 1996. She coordinated Portugal's delegation at the UN Security Council in New York between 1997 and 1998. In 1999, Gomes was posted to Jakarta, where she played a role both in the process leading up to the independence of East Timor and in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Portugal and Indonesia. She was Ambassador to Indonesia from 1999 to 2003.

From 2003 to 2004, Gomes was Secretary for International Relations of the Portuguese Socialist Party. She has also been a member of its National Committee since 2002.

After having run for local elections in 2009 in Sintra, Portugal, Ana Gomes took up her seat in the town's Municipal Council.

Gomes has a degree in Law.

Karel Kovanda

Karel Kovanda has been Deputy Director General for External Relations in the European Commission since April 2005. This was his last day on the job. As of December 1, Kovanda left the European Commission for a very active retirement.

His areas of responsibility included the Commission's contribution to the development of a European common foreign and security policy; multilateral relations, human rights and relations with North America, East Asia, Australia and New Zealand. Kovanda was also the Political Director for the European Commission in bilateral relations and the G8 process.

From 1991 to 2005, Kovanda worked in senior positions for the Czechoslovak and Czech foreign services. He served, among other, as the Czech Ambassador to NATO from 1998 to 2005 and to the UN 1993 to 1997, including a stint on its Security Council in 1994.

During the previous 20 years, from 1970 to 1990, Kovanda lived as an exile, mostly in the US. He taught political science in Southern California and from 1980 to 1990 worked as a manager with international responsibilities in the US private sec-
Kovanda was active in the Czech student movement opposing the Communist regime from 1964 to 1969 when the national students’ union, of which he was president at the time, was banned.

Kovanda holds an undergraduate degree from the Prague School of Agriculture (1969), a Ph.D. in political science from MIT (1975) and an MBA from Pepperdine U., California (1985).

Brig. Gen. Ilkka Laitinen

Brigade General Ilkka Laitinen has been a long-standing figure within the border security departments of Finland, as well as contributing extensively to EU border control initiatives. He is currently the Executive Director of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX).

Obtaining a General Staff Officer’s Diploma in 1995, Laitinen’s national responsibilities included the leadership of several regional border posts before becoming Co-ordinator of the Frontier Guard Headquarters on Schengen and EU affairs in 1998. Between 2000 and 2002, he was Counsellor for Justice and Home Affairs at the Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union. His last national appointment was as Deputy Head of Division for the Frontier Guard HQ, a post he occupied until 2005.

Laitinen has sat on numerous EU border relations panels. These posts include Finnish Representative in the Nordic Schengen Steering Group between 1999 and 2003, the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum from 1999 to 2002 and the Common Unit of External Border Practitioners from 2002 to 2005. He was also an advisor to the Belgian EU Presidency on the “EU/Schengen Catalogue” project in 2001.

Other important roles include Co-chairman of the Council Working Party Frontiers, co-managing the joint Austrian, Belgian and Finnish project “Police and Border Security” and acting as Director of the EU Risk Analysis Centre from 2003 to 2005. He has also sat on the Finnish EU subcommittee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum on two separate occasions.

Maj. Gen. Carlo Magrassi

Major General Carlo Magrassi was Deputy Chief Executive for Strategy of the European Defence Agency in Brussels until December 2010. He is currently General of the Aeronautic Division at the Italian Ministry of Defence.

He enlisted in the Air Force Academy in 1974. During his early career he undertook operational duties as a fighter pilot and later as a Test Pilot in the Italian “Study, Research and Test Centre”. In these duties he was deeply involved in the Research & Development and production phases of the European aircraft Eurofighter and Tornado, and the EH 101 and NH 90 helicopters, amongst other projects.

Later, as Aide de Camp of the Italian Defence Secretary General/National Armaments Director, he participated in the full spectrum of international relations and activities pertaining to the Italian National Armaments Directorate.

In 1993 he moved to the Air Force Staff as manager of the Plans, Policy and Doctrine area where he was in charge of defining the future operational structure and planning the capabilities of the Air Force. In this position he was also responsible for the Italian Air Force contribution to the NATO planning process. During this period he was heavily involved in the restructuring of the Italian Joint military structure.

In 1996 he was appointed Commander of the Italian Flight Test Centre. After this, he led the Air Force International Cooperation Branch dealing with international cooperation with NATO and non-NATO Nations.

Magrassi became Deputy Chief of the Defence Armaments Policy Department in 2003; he was in charge of developing the policy on armaments acquisition and coordinating the governmental and industrial relations in national and international projects.
During that time he was also appointed as the Italian Representative to the Future Tasks & Policy Committee of the European procurement organization (OCCAR) and, additionally, chairman of the Executive Committee of the 6 Nations.

Between 2004 and 2007 he was Armaments Director of the European Defence Agency (EDA), responsible for defining the strategy and initiating the activities of this Directorate in the newly created Agency.

Since 2007, as Deputy Chief Executive for Strategy he is responsible for the strategic initiatives of the Agency. He is in charge of the EDA’s relations with NATO, European Commission, LoI, OCCAR and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Additionally he follows several EDA programmes which have an inter-institutional or inter-organisation dimension. He oversees activities on the standardisation of European armaments and on education in armaments cooperation which aims to create a new generation of experts with a common understanding and awareness to tackle future European initiatives more effectively. He is also the EDA representative in the Strategic Steering Committee of the industrial consortium EURONEC, which provides expertise to the EDA initiative on Network Enabled Capability (NEC), the key tool that will enable information exchange between defence, security and civil actors in CSDP operations.

Magrassi is a graduate of Aeronautical Sciences for Security and Defence and of Diplomacy and International Sciences. He also holds a Master of Sciences in National Security Strategy from the National War College in Washington.

Brig. Gen. Giovanni Manione

Brigade General Giovanni Manione is Deputy Director of Crisis Management and Planning Directorate at the Council of the European Union.

He joined the Italian Army in 1979, and graduated as a Doctor in Strategic Sciences in 1984, after which started his active career as an infantry (mountain) lieutenant.

In 1993 he attended the Italian Army war college, in 1995 the Command and Staff College and in 1996 the Italian Joint Defence Staff College; he graduated Doctor in International and Diplomatic Sciences in 2005.

His appointment encompasses, inter alia: Commanding posts at Company, Battalion and Regimental level and staff duties as branch Chief in the Army General Staff (Force Planning) and in the Italian Military Representation to EU (Plans and Policy). In particular, concerning the EU Military Capabilities he has been the Italian delegate to the EU Headline Goal Task Force (HTF) in which he followed the development of the Headline Goal from the beginning of the process until his appointment as designed HTF chairman in 2002 and then Officer in charge for all PolMil issues of the Italian Delegation until November 2005.


In October 2007 he was appointed Director of the Civil Military Cell and in January 2010 he was appointed Deputy Director of Crisis Management and Planning Directorate.

Maurizio Martellini

Dr. Maurizio Martellini is Secretary General of the Landau Network-Centro Volta and Scientific Director at the Insbrria Center on International Security at the University of Insbrria.

Prior to this, Martellini was Team Leader of the European Commission Instrument for Stability Expert Group, which before that, he elaborated a case study on the “Future direction for ISTC/STCU and other activities for redirection of WMD scientists in the framework of the IFS 2009-2013” European Co-operation Office (AidCo).

Beyond his work at the Landau Network-Centro Volta and the university, he has been an advisor to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1999.
He is also an Associate Professor in Theoretical Physics at the University of Insubria.

Martellini has been a visiting Professor at numerous universities. He has written more than two hundred publications in the fields of fundamental physics in national and international specialised journals and has co-edited several books and reports.

He is also Executive Secretary of the International Working Group for the European Nuclear Cities Initiative on behalf of the International Science and Technology Centre of Moscow, of the International Security and Non-proliferation Bureau of the US Department of State.

Giles Merritt

Giles Merritt is the Director of the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA), the only Brussels-based security and defence think-tank.

With defence and security now critical issues in Brussels, the SDA raises awareness by anticipating the political agenda and focusing attention on European and transatlantic security and defence policies and challenges. The SDA’s Co-Presidents are Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, former Secretary General of NATO, and Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

A former Brussels Correspondent of the Financial Times (FT), Giles Merritt is a journalist, author and broadcaster who has specialised in the study and analysis of public policy issues since 1978. He was named one of the 30 most influential “Eurostars” by the Financial Times, together with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and European Commissioner Neelie Kroes.

Merritt is also head of the SDA’s sister think-tank Friends of Europe, whose debates and reports cover the whole spectrum of non-defence topics, and Editor-in-Chief of the policy journal Europe’s World. Published three times a year, Europe’s World is the only pan-European publication that offers policymakers and opinion-formers across Europe a platform for presenting ideas and forging consensus on key issues. It is published in partnership with a coalition of over 150 think-tanks and universities worldwide, and has a readership of 120,000 senior decision-makers and opinion-formers.

Merritt joined the Financial Times in 1968. From 1972 he was successively FT correspondent in Paris, Dublin, Belfast, and Brussels, until leaving the newspaper in 1983. Since 1984 he has been a columnist for the International Herald Tribune (IHT), and his articles on the editorial page of the IHT range widely across EU political and economic issues.

Michel Rademaker

Michel Rademaker is Deputy Director for market and operations at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, which he established together with Rob de Wijk.

Rademaker has a wide experience in defence and security research, ranging from strategy development to focused phenomena analyses. He is deeply involved in the design and realisation of the Netherlands National Security Strategy. He also chairs the Netherlands platform on materials scarcity and is currently participating in the EU project Polinaris (Policy on Natural Resources).

As study Director for the NATO RTO Task Group on Disruptive Technology Assessment he leads an international research group developing assessment games. He is also Co-founder and Organiser of the World Foresight Forum.

Rademaker was an officer in the Royal Netherlands Army for 15 years and worked for 10 years at TNO Defence Security and Safety. He was also, from 2003 until 2006, the secretary of the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies.
Gen. Jean Rannou

General Jean Rannou is Director of Security and Defence at CEIS.

He entered the French Air Force Academy in 1963. At the end of his studies and flight training, he received his jet fighter pilot wings at the Tour air base in 1966. He was then posted to the Vosges 2/11 squadron in Brengarten, Germany, before moving to Toul, where from 1971 to 1973, he was responsible for training young pilots on the Supersabre F100D and F100F. It was during this period that Rannou participated in the first air refueling exercises over Africa. In 1973, he returned to the Air Force Academy ‘Salon de Provence’ as an officer, then moved to the Creil air force base in 1975. Serving as second commander of the fighter squadron Seine equipped with the Mirage III, after one year he was promoted to commander, before being appointed Chief of Operations for the 2nd Fighter Squadron of the French Air Force.

In 1980, he took command of the 2nd Squadron in Dijon and two years later, entered the Superior School of Air Warfare in Paris. Rannou worked in the General Planning Office (BPG) of the Air Force Military Staff from 1983 to 1986, where he headed the General Plans Division.

In 1986, he was briefly appointed commander of the air force base at Colmar-Meyenheim, before returning to Paris as Director of the BPG where he oversaw studies, planning, organisation and infrastructure of the Air Force.

In 1990, he was promoted to Brigadier General and headed the Nuclear Forces Division of the French Military Staff. He directed the military cabinet of the Minister of Defence from 1991 to 1994, before being appointed Major General of the Army Military Staff. In September 1995, he was promoted to General and was appointed the same day Chief of the French Air Force. He retired from this position on July 1, 2000.

Rannou is President of the Security Committee of Thales Raytheon Systems’ Advisory Board, Member of the Franco British Council, Member of the Forum du futur, and of the French National Academy of Air and Space. He is a member of the administrative boards of the French Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and the Aéroclub de France.

He has published numerous articles on strategy and the evolution of military doctrine.

Jamie Shea

Dr. Jamie Shea is Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO.

Prior to taking up this position, he was Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General from 2005 to 2010.

He was Director of the Office of Information and Press of NATO from 2000 to 2003 and in May 2003 was appointed to the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations in the new Public Diplomacy Division. He was also NATO Spokesman from 1993 to 2000.

In addition to his NATO responsibilities, Shea also holds a number of academic positions, most notably with the Collège d’Europe in Bruges, the Brussels School of International Studies of the University of Kent, and Sussex University where he is a visiting lecturer.

Shea completed his doctoral studies in Philosophy at Oxford University in 1981. He also holds a Bachelor of Art from Sussex University in History and French.

Rear Adm. António Silva Ribeiro

Rear Admiral António Silva Ribeiro was promoted to his current rank and appointed as Deputy Vice-Chief of the Portuguese Naval Staff in September 2008.

In addition to his current role in the Naval Staff, he is also a Professor at the Naval Academy, the Political and Social Sciences Institute at the Technical University of Lisbon and at the In-
formation and Administration Sciences Institute. He is member of several military, scientific and cultural bodies, including the Strategic Research and Reflection Team advising the Portuguese Navy Chief of Staff, the Observatory for Security, Organized Crime and Terrorism; the Observatory for Maritime Security; the Portuguese Geopolitics Centre, the journals “Nação e Defesa”; and “Segurança e Defesa”.

As a senior officer, Silva Ribeiro was Head of Planning and Policy Division of the Navy Staff and Coordinator and Professor in Strategic Studies at the Naval War College. He was commanding officer of the Fleet of Hydrographical Ships, having also commanded two hydrographic ships, N.R.P. “Almeida Carvalho” and N.R.P. “Andrômeda”. Whilst on shore duties, he was seconded as Operations Director with the Portuguese Strategic Defence and Military Intelligence Services and as an Advisor to the National Defence Institute.

As a junior officer, his assignments at sea included the roles of Deputy Head of the Navigation Service in the fleet tanker “São Gabriel” and Head of the Navigation Service in “João Belo” frigate. He also served as an expert in side-scanning sonar in the Coastal Dynamics Division of the Portuguese Navy Hydrographical Institute.

Throughout his career, Silva Ribeiro received several military awards, including four Distinguished Military Service Medals (silver), a Military Merit Medal, two Exemplary Behaviour Medals (gold and silver) and two Naval Cross Medals.

Silva Ribeiro has also received several cultural awards. He has published ten books, delivered more than 120 lectures and published over 300 articles, in national and international publications, on the topics of Strategy, Military and Maritime History, Hydrograph, International Politics and Military Sociology.

He graduated in Military-Naval Sciences from the Portuguese Naval Academy and specialised in Hydrograph and Coastal Oceanography from the US Naval Oceanographic Office and Louisiana State University. He has a Ph.D. in Political Science and a Masters in Strategy from the Technical University of Lisbon. He has also completed the Senior Staff Course, the Complementary Naval Warfare Course and the General Naval Warfare Course.

Geoffrey Van Orden

Geoffrey Van Orden has been Conservative Member of European Parliament for the East of England since 1999. He previously had a wide-ranging career as a British Army officer on operational duties in many parts of the world starting in Borneo in 1965. His last appointment, as a Brigadier, was at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, from 1991 to 1994. His specialisation in counter-terrorism, which he continues from a political standpoint, began during his years in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.

He spent many years in Germany, including five in Berlin where in 1989 he was Chief of Staff and Chief G2 of the British Sector. He attended the Indian Defence Services Staff College and was a member of the Directing Staff at the German General Staff College (Führungskademie der Bundeswehr) from 1985 to 1988. He was a member of the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff in 1990. While seeking a parliamentary seat, he was a senior official in the European Commission (External Relations) dealing with foreign policy, security and defence issues. This included delivering counter-terrorist assistance to Arafat’s Palestine Authority in 1996 and establishing the Commission as the leading provider of assistance for anti-personnel landmine clearance and for landmine victims.

He is a former Vice Chairman and now member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, and of its Security and Defence subcommittee as well as its Delegations to Iran, to India, to Turkey, and to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He chairs the Parliament’s Friends of Sri Lanka and is a Founder Member of Friends of India and Friends of Turkey. He is Conservative Spokesman on Defence and Security Policy. He has led opposition in the European Parliament to EU defence policy, which he believes detrimental to NATO, and has spearheaded the Parliament’s action against the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. He was the Parliament’s rapporteur for Bulgaria until its EU accession in 2007. As part of his defence and security brief, he takes a close interest in defence and security industries and issues of energy security.
He read politics at the University of Sussex (1966-69), was a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Service Fellow of King’s College, University of London. He travels to the United States, Middle East and South Asia. He speaks and writes on defence and security policy issues as well as opposition to EU political integration, including articles in the Wall Street Journal, Turkish Policy Quarterly, The European Journal and Europe’s World. He was instrumental in the creation of the new political group in the European Parliament, the European Conservatives and Reformists, and is a member of its Bureau, and is Founding President of its new think-tank, New Direction; The Foundation for European Reform.

**Lt. Col. (ret.) René Wagemans**

Lieutenant Colonel René Wagemans retired on November 1st 2010 as Head of the Civil Military Cooperation/ Humanitarian Crisis Response Branch within the Division Plans of the Belgian Defence Staff.

He joined the Belgian First Aid and Support Team (B-FAST) in 2003 and participated in the rescue operation after the earthquake in Bam, Iran and co-ordinated operations in Morocco after the earthquake in 2004. That same year, he was seconded to the European Military Staff as a liaison officer towards OCHA (Office for Co-Ordination of Humanitarian affairs-Thailand) and UNJLC (United Nation Joint Logistic Centre - Indonesia/Djakarta) during the tsunami. In 2008 he participated in the B-FAST mission to Myanmar in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis. In 2010 he was co-responsible for the B-FAST deployment to Haiti.

In 2007 he participated as UNDAC team member during the floods in Pakistan and in 2008 as UNDAC team leader during the hurricane season in Haiti.

He has participated in peace support operations in former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

He is also qualified as UN Civil-Military Staff Coordinator, United Nation's Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Expert, EU High Level Coordinator and WFP Logistics Response Team.

**Peter M. Wagner**

Since September 2010, Dr. Peter M. Wagner has been Head of Unit in charge of defence, aeronautic and maritime industries as well the European Commission’s relations with the European Defence Agency.

In May 2005 he was appointed Head of Unit in the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry for General coordination, where he was in charge of general policy coordination, relations with Member States and the Council, the Community Lisbon Programme and the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework programme. Responsibilities also included the setting up of the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation.

Before being appointed Assistant to the Secretary General in 2003, he worked in the European Commission's Directorate General for Industry on regulatory and policy coordination.

Between 1982 and 1986 he followed a trainee programme in journalism, worked as a journalist and completed his military service. Following graduation from university in 1991 and work as an editor for several German newspapers, he joined the Centre for Applied Policy Research (CAP) in Mainz in 1993 (as of 1995 in Munich). Where he worked on international affairs.

He is the author and editor of four books and many articles on issues such as international politics, foreign policy, and EU industrial policy.

Wagner was educated at the Universities of Freiburg and Mainz (Germany) and Vienna (Austria). He holds an M.A and a Ph.D. in political science, history and psychology from Freiburg University.
Olivier Zajec

Olivier Zajec is Deputy Director of the Strategic Forecasting Department at the European Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS) since 2002. He is a specialist in defence forecasting work and strategic studies.

Before joining CEIS, he served as an Officer in the French Army.

Zajec obtained a Master’s degree in History from Paris-IV Sorbonne in 1999 and a Master’s from Sciences-Po Paris (IEP) in 2004. He started his Ph.D. studies in 2009 at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE) in history of strategic doctrines.

In 2008, he published his first book “Les secrets de la Géopolitiques”.
Négocier un contrat, nouer un partenariat, se développer à l’international, lancer un nouveau produit, racheter un concurrent... Toutes ces actions présentent des dangers. Mais elles constituent aussi de formidables opportunités si elles sont précédées, en amont, par une perception adéquate des risques liés à chaque situation.

Au cœur de cette analyse, l’information joue un rôle capital : qu’il s’agisse de détecter des signes annonciateurs de rupture, de défendre son patrimoine face à des visées hostiles, de promouvoir ses intérêts dans la compétition mondiale, le succès de la capacité de chaque organisation à collecter, protéger, exploiter et valoriser l’information stratégique.


Olivier Darrason
Président
List of participants

Sharon Abbas  
Business Development Manager; EU  
Raytheon International

Naser Abdallah  
Policy Officer  
Permanent Representation of the African Union to the EU

Gerhard Ahlbrecht  
Secretary General  
European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL)

Lt. Col. Saad Al-Huraiti  
Military Officer, Defence Attaché  
Embassy of Kuwait to Belgium

Paul Ames  
 Freelance Journalist

Col. Johan Andries  
Head of EU Presidency Task Force  
Ministry of Defence, Belgium

Marie-Charlotte Annez  
Advisor  
Ministry of Defence, Belgium

Frank Asbeck  
Principle Counsellor for Security and Space Policy  
European Commission  
Directorate General for External Relations

Pozdnyakova Axana  
President  
Young EU- Russia

Sebastien Babaud  
EU Advocacy Coordinator  
Saferworld

Paul Baes  
Former Official, Council of the European Union

Elfa Balina  
Communications and Programming Officer  
European Commission  
Directorate General for Home Affairs

Martin Banks  
Journalist  
The Parliament Magazine, DODS EU

Mohamed-Raja’il Barakat  
Expert

Tomas Baum  
Director  
Flemish Parliament  
Flemish Peace Institute

Julien Béclard  	FNRS Research Fellow  
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)  
Institut d’Etudes Européennes (IEE)

Sebastian Blochinger  
Programme Officer  
International Security Information Service Europe (ISIS Europe)

Alain Bloedt  
Head of Office  
Fondation Robert Schuman

Danila Bochkarev  
Senior Fellow, Energy and Global Security  
EastWest Institute

Maj. Gen. Jochen Both  
Commander  
European Air Transport Command (EATC)

Thilo Botzenhardt  
National Expert  
European External Action Service (EEAS)  
Joint Situation Centre

Christian Bréant  
Director, R&T  
European Defence Agency (EDA)

Laurens Jan Brinkhorst  
Member of the Præsidium  
Friends of Europe

Laura Brunelli  
Assistant  
Global Governance Institute

Hartmut Bühl  
Publisher  
The European Security and Defence Union

Simon Busuttil  
Member  
European Parliament  
Committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Lt. Col. Leo Buzzero
Assistant Army Attaché
Embassy of the United States of America to Belgium

Geert Cami
Co-Founder & Director
Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Patrice Cardot
Conseiller
Ministry of Defence, France
Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA)

Marco Castagneto
Assistant
Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU

Alina Christova
Researcher, E-learning and Training
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)
Institute for European Studies (IES)

Col. Cyrille Claver
Deputy Director for Euro-Atlantic Affairs
Ministry of Defence, France
Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques

Brig. Gen. Jo Coelmont
Senior Associate Fellow, Security and Global Governance
EGMONT, Royal Institute for International Relations

Lorne Cook
Defence Correspondent
Europolitics

Robert Cox
Trustee
Friends of Europe

Gwenole Cozigou
Director, Chemicals, Metals, Medimical, Electrical and Construction Industries; Raw materials
European Commission
Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry

Marcin Dabkowski
Assistant to Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, MEP
European Parliament

H.E. Mr. Benoît d’Aboville
Conseil de Politique Étrangère Min. Affaires Etrangères
Cour des Comptes

Niels Dahlmann
Honorary Consul
Consulate of the Republic of Latvia to Belgium

Oliver Dahms
Armaments Counsellor
Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU

Lt. Gen. Arne Bård Dalhaug
Military Representative
Delegation of Norway to NATO

Geoffroy d’Aspremont Lynden
Project Manager
European Institute for Research on Mediterranean & Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA)

Willy De Backer
Head of Greening Europe Forum
Friends of Europe

Cdr. (N) Philippe De Cock
Military Representative
Delegation of Belgium to NATO

Pieter De Crem
Minister
Ministry of Defence, Belgium

Michel de Gliniasty
Senior Advisor
European Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS)

Pierre De Luca
Defence Networks Architect
Cisco

Kristin de Peyron
Head of Unit, Multilateral relations: UN, OSCE, Council of Europe
European Commission
Directorate General for External Relations

Pierre De Solages
Representative to the EUMC
Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Patrick de Vries
Policy Advisor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands

Hélène Debure
Assistant
CEIS European Office
Lt. Col. Manfred Delaere
Assistant to the Military Representative
Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU

Joan Delaney
Independent Consultant

Hervé Delphin
Deputy Head of Cabinet, Humanitarian Assistance,
Development Policy Fisheries & Maritime Policy,
Agriculture & Rural Development
Cabinet of EU Commissioner for International
Cooperation & Humanitarian Aid Kristalina
Georgieva

Andrew B. Denison
Director
Transatlantic Networks

Sara Depauw
Researcher
Flemish Parliament
Flemish Peace Institute

Ekaterina Svetoslavova Doncheva
Assistant to Evgeni Kirilov, MEP
European Parliament

Michael T. Dougherty
Director of Immigration Control
Raytheon

Jonathan Dowdall
Project Assistant
Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Col. Jeremy Drage
Defence Adviser
Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom
to the EU

Robert Draper
President
AeroStrategies

H.E. Mr. Dumitru Sorin Ducaru
Ambassador
Delegation of Romania to NATO

Axel Dyëvre
Director
CEIS European Office

Catherine Ebah-Moussa
Policy Desk Officer for the Aerospace and Defence Industries
European Commission
Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry

Marianne Ebertowski
Director Common Foreign and Security Policy
Heinrich Böll Stiftung
European Union Office

Radka Edererova
Counsellor
Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to
the EU

Pavlos Efthymiou
MPHil Candidate, International Relations
University of Cambridge

Christian Ehler
Member
European Parliament
Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Estelle Emeriau
Indépendant Consultant
EEE

Lt. Cdr. Kurt Engelen
Member
Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium

Andrei Enghis
Former Official, European Commission Directorate General
for Trade

Col. Jorge Esteves
Commander
European Gendarmerie Force

Capt. Sandro Fabiani Latin
Chief, NATO Permanent Liaison Team to the EU
Military Staff
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

H.E. Mr. Jean-Louis Falconi
PSC Ambassador
Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Col. Corinne Faut
Director General
Royal High Institute for Defence, Belgium

Patsy Faynsztein
Manager, EU Business Development
Raytheon International, Europe

Vice Adm. Lutz Feldt
President
German Maritime Institute (DMI)
Andrea Filipova  
Programme Assistant  
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

Tsolmon Finch  
Assistant to Peter Stastny, MEP  
European Parliament

Florika Fink-Hooijer  
Head of Cabinet  
Cabinet of EU Commissioner for International Cooperation & Humanitarian Aid Kristalina Georgieva

Commodore Mike Finney  
Deputy UK Military Representative  
Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU

Lt. Col. Connor Fitzsimons  
Deputy Military Representative  
Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU

Gen. Paul Fouillard  
Commander, Strategic Air Force  
Ministry of Defence, France

Jean Fournet  
Former Assistant Secretary General, NATO

Col. Michael S. Francis  
Chief Advanced Programs, United Technologies Research Center  
United Technologies Corporation (UTC)

Yoshinori Fukushima  
Bureau Chief  
Mainichi Shimbun Brussels Office

Cristina Gallach  
Head of Unit, Communications  
Council of the European Union  
Directorate General for Press, Communication & Transparency

Didier Gambier  
Adviser for strategic issues relating to industrial technologies  
European Commission  
Directorate General for Research

Michel Gari  
Manager  
DMG Consult

Gérard Gaudin  
Journalist  
Belgian News Agency (BELGA)

Kristalina Georgieva  
Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid & Crisis Response  
European Commission

Andrea Ghianda  
Project Manager  
Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Daniel Giorev  
Member of Cabinet  
Cabinet of EU Commissioner for International Cooperation & Humanitarian Aid Kristalina Georgieva

Laurent Giquello  
French National Expert  
NATO - Air Command and Control System Management Agency (NACMA)

Annette Godart-van der Kroon  
President  
Ludwig von Mises Institute Europe

Pierre Goetz  
Consultant  
European Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS)

Ana Maria Gomes  
Member  
European Parliament  
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Thomas Gottschild  
Director for EU & NATO Policies  
Cassidian

Lucie Goubert  
Officer  
Médecins Sans Frontières

Elvira Grassi  
Programme Assistant, Promotion of Agricultural Products  
European Commission  
Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development

Nicolas Gros-Verheyde  
Editor  
Bruxelles2

Julius Grubliauskas  
Officer, Emerging Security Challenges Division  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Peter Grundt
Brigadier (retired), Swedish Armed Forces

Anne Guichard
Deputy Director
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA)

Tatiana Hachimi
Freelance Journalist

Edward Hanlon
President
Raytheon International, Europe

Beatrice Hasani
Project Assistant
Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Robert Havas
V.P. Strategy & Business Development Security
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Louis Haynes
Communications Assistant
Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Jessica Henderson
Senior Account Manager
Fleishman-Hillard

Caroline Henrion
Liaison Officer, Belgian EU Presidency
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium

Ernest J. Herold
Account Manager, NATO
IBM Belgium

Henna Hopia
Brussels Correspondent
Nykgøynivæ

Brig. Gen. Gabor Horvath
Director, Concepts and Capabilities
European External Action Service (EEAS)
European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

Kanako Ida
Chief Correspondent
Asahi Shimbun

Begoña Iñarra
Executive Secretary
Africa-Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN)

Farzana Islam
Communications and policy assistant
Save the Children, Belgium

David Itier
Public Affairs
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA)

Olivier Jehin
Head of Office
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)

Karli Johnston
Strategic Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence Unit of the Office of Security
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Nick Jones
Communication Associate
The World Bank

Ana Cristina Jorge
Liaison Officer
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX)

Gideon Joubert
First Secretary
Mission of South Africa to the EU

Jana Kalimonova
First Secretary, CFSP, CSDP
Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU

Capt. Oguz Karaman
Staff Officer, Plans and Policy Division
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
International Military Staff (IMS)

Toshi Kawaguchi
Second Secretary
Embassy of Australia to Italy

Gabriela Keseberg Davalos
Senior Communication Officer
International Crisis Group (ICG)

Albert W. Klein Jr.
Attorney Advisor
United States Mission to NATO

Lina Kolesnikova
Advisory Board
Crisis Response Journal
Joachim Koops
*Academic Director, European Peace and Security Studies*
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

H.E. Mrs. Nata Koridze
*Counsellor*
Embassy of Georgia to Belgium

Karel Kovanda
*Consultant*

Maj. Gen. Borys Kremenetskyi
*Defence and Military Adviser*
Mission of Ukraine to the EU

Peter Christian Krogsgaard
*Assistant Defence Advisor*
Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU

Marek Kuberski
*Minister Counsellor*
Embassy of Poland to Belgium

Oleksii Kuropiatnyk
*Counsellor*
Mission of Ukraine to the EU

Eric Labourdette
*Chief of Staff, Military Representation*
Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Jean Labrique
*Secretary General*
Western Defense Studies Institute

Yves Lagoude
*European Affairs Director for Transport and Civil Security, Thales Security Solutions and Services* 
Thales

Karen Laino
*Director Intelligence Division, IMS*
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Brig. Gen. Ilkka Laitinen
*Executive Director*
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX)

Marc Laplasse
*Advisor*
VLD Studiedienst, Belgium

Maj. Jose Latorre
*Director, Technical Office SEGENPOL*
Ministry of Defence, Spain

Alix Leclainche
*Assistant*
Ministry of Defence, France
Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques

Suvi Leinonen
*Assistant to MEP Anneli Jääteenmäki*
European Parliament

Mika-Markus Leinonen
*Director*
Council of the European Union
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)

Pierre Lemoine
*Editor-in-Chief*
Europologies

Bartosz Lercel
*Administrator*
Council of the European Union
Civil Protection Office

Bruno Lele
*Program Associate*
The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Ioana Lung
*Project Officer*
Centre for European Studies (CES)

Isabelle Maelcamp d'Opstaele
*Commercial Specialist*
Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Maj. Gen. Carlo Magrassi
*Deputy Chief Executive for Strategy*
European Defence Agency (EDA)

Sami Makki
*Senior Researcher and Lecturer*
Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lille

Jacques Malache
*Senior Director*
International Press Agency

Manon Malhère
*Journalist*
Europologies

Pascal Mallet
*NATO and EU Defence Correspondent*
Agence France Presse (AFP)
Petya Mandyazhieva  
*Assistant*  
European Commission  
Directorate General for Home Affairs

Brig. Gen. Giovanni Manione  
*Deputy Director-General for Crisis Management*  
Council of the European Union

Lorenzo Marchese  
*Reporter*  
CafeBabel.com Bruxelles

Maurizio Martellini  
*Secretary General*  
Landau Network - Centro Volta

John Martin  
*Independent Health and Development Consultant*

Jean-Youri Marty  
*Deputy Armament Counselor*  
Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Pauline Massart  
*Senior Manager*  
Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Alexander Mattelaer  
*Researcher*  
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)  
Institute for European Studies (IES)

John Mattiussi  
*Principal Officer, Industry and Market Directorate*  
European Defence Agency (EDA)

Col. Michael McLaughlin  
*Air Attaché*  
Embassy of the United States of America to Belgium

Giles Merrit  
*Director*  
Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Vincent Mertiens de Wilmars  
*Head of Cabinet of the Minister*  
Ministry of Defence, Belgium

Capt. Alain Messager  
*Deputy Chief of Staff, Military Representation*  
Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Ignace Michaux  
*Secretary*  
Ministry of Defence, Belgium

Arnaud Migoux  
*Desk Officer*  
Ministry of Defence, France  
Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques

Andrea Mogni  
*Policy Officer, Coordination and Analysis*  
European Commission  
Directorate General for External Relations

Gabriel Moldoveanu  
*Counsellor*  
Delegation of Romania to NATO

Georgina Mombo Rasero  
*Journalist*  
Periodismo Humano

Tom Monballiu  
*Public Affairs Officer*  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Valentina Morcelli  
*PhD Candidate, Teaching Assistant*  
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)  
Institut d'Etudes Européennes (IEE)

Denis Moskalenko  
*Second Secretary*  
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO

Isabelle Muller  
*Secretary General*  
European Petroleum Industry Association (EUROPIA)

Sergiy Muzychenko  
*Defence Attaché*  
Mission of Ukraine to the EU

Jennifer Navarro  
*Civil Crisis Management Assistant, Military Representation*  
Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Milica Neacsu  
*First Secretary*  
Permanent Representation of Romania to the EU

George Vlad Niculescu  
*Former NATO staff officer*

Kasper Borg Nielsen  
*Counsellor*  
Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU
Antonio Nogueras  
*Air Traffic Management Security Unit*  
EUROCONTROL

Adam Nyman  
*Publication Director*  
Europe’s World

Chiade O’Shea  
*Journalist*  
Europolitics

James O’Dowd  
*Political Assistant*  
European Parliament

Navy Capt. Gustav Oller  
*Chief of Intelligence Branch*  
European External Action Service (EEAS)  
European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

Alia Papageorgiou  
*European Affairs Editor*  
New Europe

Col. Philippe Percier  
*Africa Desk Coordinator, OPS/MAP*  
European External Action Service (EEAS)  
European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

Isabelle Pernot du Breuil  
*Associate*  
Conseil Clime Developpement

Jasmina Petrovic  
*First Secretary*  
Mission of Serbia to the EU

Jérôme Piodi  
*Research Fellow*  
Institut de Recherche et Strategie de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM)

Victoria Pirker  
*Assistant*  
Council of the European Union

David Plas  
*Photographer*

Iulia Platona  
*President Chief Executive Officer*  
Pivex Platform Black Sea Forum

Rudy Priem  
*Senior Government Affairs Manager for Security and Defense, Europe*  
United Technologies Corporation (UTC)

Christoph Prössl  
*Correspondent*  
German Radio WDR/NDR Studio Brüssel

Rebecca Pugh  
*Desk Officer, U.S.A, Canada*  
European Commission  
Directorate General for External Relations

Michel Rademaker  
*Deputy Director, market and operations*  
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Gen. Jean Rannou  
*Director of Security & Defence*  
European Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS)

Mariin Ratnik  
*Ambassador*  
Embassy of Estonia to Belgium

Giulia Reccardini  
*Policy Assistant*  
Open Society Institute (OSI)

Pierre Reuland  
*Special Representative of Interpol to the EU*  
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

Delphine Reuter  
*Freelance Journalist*  
CafeBabel.com Bruxelles

Thomas Reynaert  
*President, International Operations, Europe*  
United Technologies Corporation (UTC)

H.E. Mr. Magnus Robach  
*Ambassador*  
Embassy of Sweden to Belgium

Rear Adm. Jacques Rosiers  
*President*  
Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium

Lt. Col. Fernand Rouvroi  
*R&T Domain Manager*  
Royal High Institute for Defence, Belgium
Laszlo Salgo  
*Assistant Director, Operations*  
European Police Office (Europol)

Margarite Sandler  
*Correspondent in Europe*  
IMA Press News Agency

Donatella Scatamacchia  
*Journalist*  
Greennews

Kai Schaefer  
*Programme Manager*  
European Commission  
EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO)

Martin Schmidt  
*Counsellor*  
Delegation of Germany to NATO

Col. (res) Thomas H. A. Schneider  
*Head of International Affairs*  
European Association for Coal and Lignite (EURACOAL)

H.E. Mr. Karl Schramek  
*Ambassador*  
Mission of Austria to NATO

Frederik Schumann  
*Consultant*  
CEIS European Office

Pierre Seailles  
*Desk officer for CSDP*  
European Commission  
Directorate General for External Relations

Asinetta Serban  
*Consultant*  
CEIS European Office

Emanuele Sgherri  
*Former European Commission official, DG Budget and Financial Affairs*

Jamie Shea  
*Deputy Assistant Secretary General*  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)  
Emerging Security Challenges Division

Apar Sidhu  
*Political-Military Affairs Officer*  
Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Alexander Siedschlag  
*Director*  
Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna

Capt. Matthias Siegemund  
*Military Assistant to the Commander*  
European Air Transport Command (EATC)

Rear Adm. António Silva Ribeiro  
*Deputy Vice Chief of Portuguese Naval Staff, Portuguese Navy*  
Ministry of Defence, Portugal

Zhigniew Skrzyński  
*Senior specialist*  
Ministry of Economy and Labour, Poland

Lt. Col. Roger Solli  
*Liaison Officer*  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Lt. Col. Alain Spoiden  
*Military Advisor*  
Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU

Mircea Stana  
*Senior IT Manager*  
Pivex Platform Black Sea Forum

Matus Stankovic  
*Engineering student (Security Management)*  
Zilinska University

Bart Stoevinga  
*Senior Officer for Maritime Programmes, Armaments Directorate*  
European Defence Agency (EDA)

Martin Stoussavljevitsch  
*Principal Officer Armaments*  
European Defence Agency (EDA)

Paul Sturm  
*Programme Officer*  
International Security Information Service Europe (ISIS Europe)

Christof Tatsch  
*Chief of Staff and Military Counselor*  
Mission of Austria to NATO
Bryony Taylor  
*Action Officer*  
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)  
Public Diplomacy Division

Dilarde Teilane  
*Policy Officer - Co-desk military ESDP - END, Security Policy*  
European Commission  
Directorate General for External Relations

Hafsa Temsamani  
*Assistant Defence Attaché, Military Office*  
Embassy of Kuwait to Belgium

Olivia ten Horn  
*Assistant, Unit for the Subcommittee on Security and Defence*  
European Parliament

Pierre Thibaudat  
*Liaison Officer*  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium

Barbara Thomas  
*First Secretary, Migration Policy and Refugee Affairs*  
Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Irina Tica-Diaconu  
*Second Secretary*  
Permanent Representation of Romania to the EU

John Tod  
*Retired Officer*  
British Council

Col. Branko Toman  
*Branch Chief, Intelligence Production*  
NATO International Military Staff (IMS)

Oana Topala  
*Programme Associate*  
International Security Information Service Europe (ISIS Europe)

Shogo Toyota  
*First Secretary*  
Mission of Japan to the EU

Denis Triouaire  
*Cap Manager*  
European Defence Agency (EDA)

David A. Trissell  
*Attaché, Federal Emergency Management Agency/DHS*  
Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Irini Tseminidou  
*Program Assistant, Energy & Climate Security*  
EastWest Institute

Leendert Van Bochoven  
*Global Business Services, NATO Account Executive, Defence Leader Europe/Network Centric Operations*  
IBM Nederland B.V.

Maj. Serge Van Camp  
*Military Advisor, EU Presidency Task Force*  
Ministry of Defence, Belgium

Geoffrey Van Orden  
*Member*  
European Parliament  
Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Karim Van Overmeire  
*Member*  
Flemish Parliament

Jelena Von Helldorff  
*Vice-President*  
Institute for International Assistance and Solidarity (IFIAS)

Wolf-Heinrich von Leipzig  
*Foreign News and Defence Editor*  
Das Luxemburger Wort

Alexander von Lingen  
*Chair*  
EquipEuropa asbl

Kostyantyn Voytovsky  
*Counsellor*  
Mission of Ukraine to NATO

Anna Vvedenskaia  
*Correspondent*  
Voice of America

Lt. Col. René Wagemans  
*Former Head of CIMIC/Humanitarian Crisis Response Branch*  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium  
Belgian First Aid & Support Team (B-FAST)

Peter Wagner  
*Head of Unit for Defence, Aeronautic and Maritime Industries*  
European Commission  
Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry

Natasha Waksman  
*Former Executive Assistant to Claude-France Arnould*
Mike Walpole
Director
Global Governance Institute

Yiwei Wang
Special Advisor to the Ambassador
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the EU

Clément Williamson
Policy Officer, GMES
European Commission
Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry

Maj. Gen. Wolfgang Wosolsobe
Austrian Military Representative to EUMC and EAPMC
Mission of Austria to NATO

Paul Yuzapavik
Senior Executive Cross Functional Political Advisor for European Engagement
NATO - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

Olivier Zajec
Defence and Security Consultant
European Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS)

Julia Zalutskaja
Assistant to the Secretary for External Relations
European People's Party (EPP)

Wei Zhang
Correspondent
Xinhua News Agency
European Regional Bureau
Threats to our homeland can come from anywhere. Raytheon’s innovative, comprehensive, modeling- and simulation-based approach is designed to help customers address current and emerging threats across every front, including cybersecurity, identity management, border security, transportation security, and critical infrastructure protection. Customers count on Raytheon to deliver proven, integrated solutions that meet the broadest range of potential threats — protecting our infrastructures, economies and way of life.

INNOVATION IN ALL DOMAINS
Visit www.raytheon.com
Keyword: HLS-ENT

© 2010 Raytheon Company. All rights reserved.
“Customer Success Is Our Mission” is a registered trademark of Raytheon Company.
Going global:
Europe’s security policy challenge
Security and Defence Day– 30 November 2010
Palais d’Egmont, Brussels

Co-organised by:

Institutional Partners:

Partners:

Media Partners: