




# Reinventing NATO

Does the Alliance reflect the changing nature of transatlantic security?



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## Reinventing NATO:

Does the Alliance reflect the changing nature of transatlantic security?

An international conference organised by the **New Defence Agenda** and the **Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)**, with the support of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)**, **Lockheed Martin**, **TIPS** and the **Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)**

24 May 2005

Palais d'Egmont

Brussels

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## Introduction

The NDA is proud to present this summary of debates at the May 24 high-level international conference 'Reinventing NATO: Does the Alliance reflect the changing nature of transatlantic security?' we organised with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), and with the support of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Lockheed Martin, TIPS and Belgium's Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB).

The major question addressed by the conference was whether NATO has enough political vision and clout to maintain its position as the primary forum for transatlantic security dialogue when the European Union is also forging a stronger defence and security identity.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told the conference that NATO is both setting the political agenda and setting the pace as an "institutionalised forum for transatlantic security consultation, coordination and common action." Recognising there is need for change, General Kujat, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee urged a "slimmer, tougher and faster" alliance, supported by a rationalised defence industry.

Not all conference speakers and participants agreed. There was also concern that NATO has not adapted fully to the post-9/11 environment and that NATO-EU cooperation is not sufficient for effective coordinated responses. The Darfur crisis was cited as a prime example of when earlier consultation should have taken place.

While there may be room for disagreement over whether NATO is displaying enough political leadership, it seems clear that for the United States NATO will remain the primary forum for dialogue at a time when Europeans and Americans need to build a stronger transatlantic agenda.

We at the NDA would like to thank our partners and both speakers and participants for contributing to the success of this event.

**Giles Merritt**

Director, New Defence Agenda

## About the conference

The conference **Reinventing NATO: Does the Alliance reflect the changing nature of Transatlantic Security?** attracted an audience of three hundred industry leaders, government & EU officials, members of the European Parliament, representatives from think tanks & media, and NATO officials. Held in Brussels at the Palais d'Egmont, on May 24, 2005, the New Defence Agenda and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) organised the event with the support of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Lockheed Martin, TIPS and the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI – KIIB).

**Peter Weilemann**, Director of the EU Office, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, introduced the conference and **Vicomte Etienne Davignon**, President of IRRI-KIIB, gave the opening address.

NATO Secretary General **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer**, Turkey's Minister of National Defence, **Vecdi Gönül**, and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee General **Harald Kujat** delivered the keynote addresses.

Three sessions were on the agenda and these were moderated, respectively, by **Jamie Shea**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO, **Stefan Zoller**, CEO of Defence and Communications Systems, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and **Giles Merritt**, Director, New Defence Agenda.

## The conference programme

### Session I:

#### First Session: Should NATO be reinvented, reinvigorated or revamped?

The question marks over NATO's future date right back to the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, yet the alliance's credibility with the public has not waned very much, either in its long-time member countries or in the former communist states that have flocked to join. How deep should any future reforms of NATO penetrate? Does NATO suffer from real shortcomings, or are its problems more of image and perception? With a growing role in confronting international terrorism, how far will NATO's reach stretch? Can it play a significant role in Middle Eastern or Central Asian security?

#### Moderator:

**Jamie Shea**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO

#### Speakers:

**Ronald Asmus**, Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, Brussels, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

**John Colston**, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, NATO

**Luc Frieden**, Minister of Defence and Justice, Luxembourg

**Romuald Ratajczak**, Minister Counsellor & Defence Adviser, Poland's Delegation to NATO (replacing **Andrzej Karkoszka**, Under-Secretary of State for Defence Policy, Poland)

#### Keynote Address:

**Jaap de Hoop Scheffer**, Secretary General of NATO

## Session 2:

### NATO's role in transatlantic defence industry cooperation

NATO has been a driver for transformation forces for a good number of European armies. What is its contribution to transatlantic defence industries cooperation and to the development of new capabilities? With NATO's new 'out of area' activities, in Afghanistan, and to some extent in Iraq, apparently pointing to a new direction for the alliance, what are the chief characteristics of new generation equipment needed? What implication does this have on the American and European defence transformations, network enabled defence and industrial alliances? Is NATO transforming the European armies rapidly enough?

#### Moderator:

**Stefan Zoller**, CEO of Defence and Communications Systems, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

#### Keynote Address:

**General Harald Kujat**, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

#### Speakers:

**Marshall Billingslea**, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO

**Scott Harris**, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin

**Ion-Mircea Plangu**, Secretary of State for Defence Policy, Romania

## Session 3:

### What does NATO do for Europe that the EU still can't do for itself?

If NATO didn't exist, would the alliance's European members need to invent it? In light of today's post-Cold War security threats, what are the Command & Control functions that NATO provides, and to what extent are these functions being replicated within the European Union's newly created ESDP? Will NATO's chief raison d'être for some years to come be the slowness of EU decision-making, and the political difficulties of creating the EU institutional structures needed to give teeth to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)? Do NATO governments, including the new Bush Administration, need to place fresh emphasis on the alliance's value as a forum for re-building consensus on security and defence issues?

#### Moderator:

**Giles Merritt**, Director, New Defence Agenda

#### Speakers:

**Anton Buteiko**, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ukraine

**Seppo Kääriäinen**, Minister of Defence, Finland

**Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting**, Deputy Director of the Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham, UK

**Leo Michel**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, US

## The European Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brussels – A Hub for International Foundation Work

Brussels as a European metropolis is becoming increasingly important for the decision-makers behind national policy in the EU Member States. Today, some 70 percent of the provisions adopted in Brussels determine the legislative processes in the individual EU Member States. At the forefront of such political processes, Brussels has become far and away the most important location for international lobbying organisations, outstripping even New York and Washington.

It is already several years since the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung decided to expand the European Office that was opened in Brussels in 1978. Recently, the traditional central foreign and security policy component of the office's activities was complemented by the establishment of a development policy unit. Since June 2003 the Director of the European Office has been Dr. Peter R. Weilemann who previously worked as Head of the International Department for Industrialised Countries at the Headquarters of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in St. Augustin, Germany. Furthermore, the office is supported by a project assistant and four local staff members who are working on the political implementation of the Foundation's extensive programmes and activities.

Since setting up its office in Brussels the KAS has managed to establish a considerable network of personal and institutional contacts with decision-makers and multipliers from the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, NATO, and the lobbying organisations representing European industry as well as with the diplomatic representations accredited in Brussels. In this regard, the European Office's database contains more than 4.000 entries. Besides providing services and know-how on European policy issues for target groups from the world of politics, economics, and science, the KAS European Office is an increasingly important promoter of interests for the social policy partners in Central and Eastern Europe and, beginning quite recently, for the respective partners in Asia, Africa and Latin America, too. The "Eastern Europe platforms and Country Conferences" in the European Parliament enjoy a very keen interest by the public.

Take for example the conference "Business in the Balkans", organised in the summer of 2001 or the forum "EU Enlargement – The Key Questions", organised in co-operation with Forum Europe in spring 2002, attracting more than 300 participants from the European Parliament, the Commission and European industry. The main goal of these conferences, which are implemented in close co-operation with the relevant international offices of the KAS, is to bring these countries closer to EU and NATO structures and to provide an opportunity to bring together decision-makers from both East and West. A similarly structured series of conferences has also been implemented, aimed at promoting the EU's regional co-operation with ASEAN and Mercosur countries, as well as with nations in the Mediterranean/Middle Eastern region and in Africa. In addition to this, the Foundation also serves as a forum for current European political debates in Brussels. Topics such as "institutional reform", "eastward enlargement", "fiscal policy in Europe", "pensions systems in Europe", and "the social market economy as a model for a future European economic and financial policy" will be discussed at a series of "European conferences" attended by an array of international delegates. In this context the European Office is also organising two monthly high ranked "luncheon and dinner round tables" at which German and international VIP's are going to express their views on contemporary topics in front of a hand-picked audience. These events are particularly popular amongst the large number of Brussels-based correspondents representing various European publications, because it is at events of this type that they can secure first-hand information.

## The calm before the storm

At the close of the NDA's annual conference, NDA Director **Giles Merritt** congratulated the EU and NATO communities on what he described as a feeling of openness to the need to establish complementary roles. But Merritt had a warning. Speaking ahead of the French and Dutch referenda, he said that defence could be the first sector to bear the brunt of the problems facing the EU's Constitutional Treaty. Merritt saw difficult times ahead and forecast that everyone's efforts would have to be redoubled in order for progress to be maintained.

Making the conference's keynote speech, NATO's Secretary General **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer** described the Alliance as an "agenda setter". Transformation was ongoing but it would only continue if nations held common views.

After a comprehensive review of NATO's current global missions, de Hoop Scheffer argued that the programme demonstrated that NATO was no longer Eurocentric. He argued that the Alliance's military transformation was on-track.

Overall, there was general agreement that NATO had to be transformed, with NATO's **John Colston** placing the responsibility firmly in the hands of the member states. He argued that the Alliance was well-placed to contribute

to international security and stability, while acknowledging that it had shortfalls in availability, common funding and intelligence.

The German Marshall Fund's **Ronald Asmus** was one of the few voices to speak out against NATO's current position. He argued that NATO was no longer a major player and was being left out of important discussions in Washington and Brussels. Asmus wanted some "big and bold thinking" from the Alliance's leaders. They were not tackling the big issues.

On defence industry support, NATO Military Committee Chairman **Harald Kujat** wanted NATO to be better aligned with individual nations' thinking. He wanted a "slimmer, tougher and faster" Alliance, supported by a rationalised defence industry. There was a lack of interoperability due to a deficiency in funding and Kujat wanted harmonised procurement and coordinated R&D. One improvement could come via the adoption of open standards and he recommended a move towards "collectively owned assets".

Lockheed Martin's **Scott Harris** saw a growing US-EU capability gap. He supported Kujat's call for greater funding and added a demand for an open European defence market (via the EDA). NATO's **Marshall Billingslea** bemoaned the disparity in the US and European investment

in equipment and R&D, and he was supported by Thales' **Edgar Buckley** who wanted an open European market. In agreement, EADS' **Stefan Zoller** called for harmonised requirements across Europe and a greater strategic dialogue between the EU and NATO.

The third session looked at how NATO and the EU could live together. Finland's Minister of Defence, **Seppo Kääriäinen** made a strong call for the EU to benefit from NATO's experience, a demand made earlier by Turkey's Minister of Defence **Vecdi Gönül** in his keynote speech. He called for NATO's assets to be used to support the EU without the latter organisation's independence being compromised.

**Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting** painted a positive picture of NATO's

position vis-à-vis the EU and argued that the actual mode of cooperative operation would be worked out at the time of any particular crisis. The US National Defense University's **Leo Michel** was not totally convinced. He wanted a "more flexible and closer relationship" between the EU and NATO. Taking the Darfur crisis as an example, Michel said NATO and the EU might have been better prepared to respond if they had been discussing this issue together months ago, and if permanent military liaison arrangements had been in place to consider practical requirements of assisting the African Union.

Perhaps **Romuald Ratajczak**, from Poland's Delegation to NATO, best summed up the feelings of the conference when he proclaimed, "the wind of change is blowing and getting stronger".

## Keynote Address

### Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General

From the outset, the Secretary General tackled the question of whether NATO should be reinvented, reinvigorated or simply revamped. He insisted that the Alliance's transformation was making good progress, delivering concrete results and effective multilateralism in difficult circumstances.

However, de Hoop Scheffer argued that the progress would only continue if nations held common views. NATO instilled in its members a sense of corporate identity. Arguing that NATO was acting as an "agenda-setter", de Hoop Scheffer said it was setting the pace as an "institutionalised forum for transatlantic security consultation, coordination and common action." To demonstrate how NATO was acting in this way, de Hoop Scheffer looked at the intellectual, military, institutional, geographic and political dimensions of the Alliance and drew the following conclusions:

#### Intellectual:

- A large-scale invasion of NATO's territory is no longer the main concern.
- In relation to the kind of terrorism that was allowed to breed in Afghanistan and



Jaap de Hoop Scheffer  
NATO Secretary General

to combat WMD proliferation, "a passive, reactive approach will not do". These threats must be confronted when and where they emerge.

- NATO is no longer a "eurocentric" alliance, as shown by the operation in Afghanistan, the training mission in Iraq and the possible peacekeeping mission in Darfur.
- NATO is an instrument that can be used whenever common security interests of the allies so demand.

#### Military

- No country can afford to maintain forces just for its own national territorial defence.



NDA Director Giles Merritt with (from left) Kari Kahliluoto, Peter Weitemann, Seppo Kääriäinen and Stefan Zoller.



- Forces must be flexible and be able to conduct the full spectrum of operations (long distance deployability, sustainability) including combat and post-conflict reconstruction work.
- The military transformation is on track, but future missions require improved planning, equipment and funding.

*“NATO is no longer Eurocentric, but it is not the world’s policeman”*

*Jaap de Hoop Scheffer*

## Institutional

- NATO has to work with other institutions in order to co-ordinate military, political and economic policies.
- The current good cooperation on the ground must be complemented by strategic relationships, especially with the UN, the OSCE and, above all, with the EU.
- A new NATO-EU relationship must cover all aspects of modern security policy: combating terrorism, preventing the spread of WMD and dealing with “failed states”.

## Geographic

- Certain regions, for example the Caucasus, Central Asia and the broader Middle East, should be viewed through “a common transatlantic lens”.
- NATO has a role as an agenda-setter, not just for its transatlantic allies but also for the entire Euro-Atlantic community of nations.

## Political

- NATO must be a forum for effective multilateral debate as well as a forum for action.
- During the Iraq crisis, NATO was under-utilised as a consultative forum.
- NATO is the forum where Europe and North America meet to shape a common approach to new challenges, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed states and discuss new approaches to the broader Middle East, the Caucasus, etc.

The Secretary General added that NATO was no longer a solo-player. He saw the cultivation of political dialogue as the crown jewel in NATO’s transformation. This would allow the development of a broad strategic consensus as to how the great challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century could be tackled.

## Q&A:

### The transatlantic relationship

The WEU’s **Paulo Brito** looked at the evolution of the transatlantic relationship (e.g. the embargo of defence equipment to China, the interoperability gap, etc.) and asked if it would have an impact on NATO’s future. Brito also reasoned that the US Defence Strategy did not give NATO a prominent role and asked for comments.

#### Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer

did not agree and quoted President Bush’s comment that “NATO remained the key forum to discuss transatlantic security issues.” On the subject of transatlantic communication, de Hoop Scheffer said that while the EU-US dialogue was important, there was space for an interchange between NATO and the EU. An obvious example was the need to discuss the relationship between the EU’s battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (NRF).

Thales’ **Edgar Buckley** asked de Hoop Scheffer if he thought the idea of “caucusing” (i.e. the EU member states speaking with one voice within NATO) was an interesting approach. The Secretary General was against caucusing, as NATO was an alliance of 26 nations and they all had a right to be heard.

United Technologies’ **Clemens Betzel** asked how “homeland security” could be integrated within NATO. In response, the

Secretary General said that while NATO was involved across the board, it could not do everything. He did not see the Alliance playing a role in “homeland security”, but he did see its transformation leading to NATO concentrating on its known strengths. NATO had values and those values were worth fighting for – “it would operate in the high-end of the military spectrum and not just in peacekeeping”.

*“We need to look at certain regions through a common transatlantic lens.”*

*Jaap de Hoop Scheffer*



The **Royal Institute for International Relations** (IRRI-KIIB) is a Brussels-based non-partisan think-tank that works in close cooperation with the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As a study centre, IRRI-KIIB carries out research in a number of fields that constitute a priority for Belgian diplomacy. The two main themes of research are security & global governance and European integration. Other subjects are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the dialogue between civilisations, and the Forum on economic diplomacy in partnership with the employers' federation FEB-VBO.

As a forum for lectures, debates and seminars, IRRI-KIIB is a meeting place for ideas and opinions as well as a real interface between diplomatic circles and civil society.

As a diplomatic Academy, IRRI-KIIB offers a range of specific training to Belgian and foreign diplomats and other officials in charge of international affairs.

#### Recent publications in IRRI-KIIB's Egmont Papers include:

- No. 5:** Rik Coolsaet, *Between al-Andalus and a failing integration – Europe's pursuit of a long-term counterterrorism strategy in the post-al-Qaeda era.*
- No. 6:** Tania Zgajewski and Kalila Hajjar, *The Lisbon Strategy: Which failure? Whose failure? And why?*
- No. 7:** Sven Biscop (ed.), *E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union.*
- No. 8:** Irene Menendez Gonzalez, *Arab Reform: what role for the EU?*

All Egmont Papers are available free of charge at the institute's website.

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## Keynote Address

### Vecdi Gönül, Minister of National Defence, Turkey

Looking at the question of whether NATO should be reinvented, Vecdi Gönül listed the changes that had been seen in the Alliance, including the partnership for peace program, the developments with Russia, the Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and the Istanbul Cooperation Agreement. These had led to a European zone of peace and stability.

Turning to the EU-NATO strategic partnership, the Minister applauded the use of NATO assets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which represented a successful implementation of the operational aspect of this partnership. However, he saw the need for improvement in areas that fell outside of the Berlin Plus agreement.

#### Reasons for cooperation

To support his arguments, Minister Gönül described the various reasons why the EU and NATO should strengthen their strategic cooperation:

- The current security environment is becoming more complex and requires a more comprehensive approach.



Vecdi Gönül  
Minister of National Defence,  
Turkey

- The strategies of the EU and NATO show significant overlap.
- NATO is being transformed from a “static, reactive defence organisation” into a “flexible proactive security-projecting structure”.
- The EU is developing a military dimension alongside its “soft power” capabilities.

#### NATO's role

Minister Gönül said that Turkey was a strong advocate of this NATO-EU strategic partnership and an active supporter of the EU's CFSP. He did not want NATO to be reinvented, rather the Minister wanted NATO's existing assets to be strengthened. Minister Gönül therefore called for:

- NATO's status as a unique transatlantic forum to be fully utilised
- NATO's assets and capabilities to be used in support of the EU without compromising the latter organisation's independence

This cooperation would not only prove to be essential in transatlantic terms but also improve the security environment on a global basis.



Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Vicome Etienne Davignon.

## Keynote Address

### Harald Kujat, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

#### Beyond Europe

General Kujat focused on the military dimension of NATO's transformation. With the understanding that NATO had to project stability beyond its territory (to Afghanistan and the Mediterranean for example), he argued that this would be done less by attacking enemy forces and more by targeting high-value assets and capabilities.

With a backward glance, General Kujat emphasised the importance of the 2002 Prague Summit, which had led to key decisions about the Alliance's transformation. NATO's forces had to operate flexibly between war fighting and peacekeeping, and within an increasingly networked environment<sup>1</sup>.

Looking at the geographical spread of operations, Kujat said that NATO's operational commitments stretched from the Western end of the Mediterranean to Eastern Afghanistan, bordering on China. He insisted that Afghanistan remained NATO's main area of focus and that the ISAF mission had been successful using NATO-agreed tactics and techniques.



Harald Kujat  
Chairman of the NATO  
Military Committee

#### A call for greater collaboration and coordination

After describing NATO's involvement in Operation Active Endeavour, Iraq and the Balkans, General Kujat stressed the importance of sharing information, not only between armed forces and government departments,

*"If you want to send young men and women into harm's way ... it is necessary to invest in technology and rationalise the defence industry."*

General Harald Kujat

<sup>1</sup> 26,000 personnel were being deployed on NATO operations, together with 3,000 personnel from non-NATO nations.

but also between nations. Kujat backed his Secretary General by calling for co-ordinated military, political and economic instruments and here he saw a role for the defence industry. Products had to be interoperable and he called on industry to develop and adopt open standards. To support NATO's forces, Kujat argued it was necessary to invest in technology and rationalise the defence industry.

*“It is not a question of downsizing, but of rightsizing.”*

*General Harald Kujat*

To this end, General Kujat welcomed the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA). He also called for small countries to continue moving ahead to show that multinational solutions (to capability deficiencies) could close the capability gap with the US. To improve the situation, Kujat wanted to break down the artificial barriers imposed by nations. He described this as a major challenge, as NATO's transformation was dependent on the efforts of member states. It was necessary to go down the route of collectively owned assets.

## A recipe for the member states

As NATO's focus had shifted from being a deterrent force to one that operates on the

ground, Kujat argued that this had increased the member states' reluctance to provide forces. It was necessary to align NATO's thinking with national decision-making processes. Barriers to cooperation had been identified and one of these was the heavy and cumbersome planning system that could not deliver forces on a timely basis. In addition, the funding mechanism was not adequate for the increasing operational requirements.

In conclusion, General Kujat said it was necessary to convince the governments of the member states to do four things:

- Harmonise their equipment requirements
- Develop a culture of long-term thinking on defence R&D
- Open up the European defence market
- Accelerate the achievement of “Final Operational Capability” of the EDA

General Kujat wanted forces that were slimmer, tougher and faster. The new security environment meant that there was a need for more wide-bodied aircraft and fewer tanks, more precision-guided weapons, deployable logistic support troops, ground-surveillance systems and CNB protection. It was not a question of downsizing, but of rightsizing.

## Q & A

### Supporting the troops

In regard to the EU and NATO using “one set of forces”, the WEU's **Paulo Brito** asked the General how military shortfalls could be met. **General Kujat** agreed that the deficiencies were the same for the EU and NATO, adding that this was because the nations were not prepared to provide the necessary funding. His main concern was that the Prague Capabilities Commitment (which was supposed to support the NRF) was no longer harmonised with the timing of the Response Force, which would be operational by 2006<sup>2</sup>. NATO's plans were not being underpinned by the necessary funding.

### The capability gap

Thales' **Edgar Buckley** explained that US defence expenditure had increased by 25% in the past 10 years while European spending was flat. Buckley wanted to know for how long the NATO military operation could survive with such a gap.

General Kujat said that joint operations had to be seamless, in order to be successful and also to avoid putting the lives of soldiers at risk. However, it was difficult to explain this to the citizens. As for the US, they were

investing in the future (in R&D) whereas European nations were investing only in day-to-day operations. The technology gap was growing exponentially, and risks were therefore increasing.

### Industrial cooperation

**Ernst Guelcher** from the European Parliament agreed that the process was slow but he wanted to know what the General expected from the defence industry and what was meant by “national barriers”.

As for expectations from industry, Kujat said that money was wasted due to parallel developments in the UK, France and Germany. He wanted coordinated R&D and joint procurement for the armed forces.

Warming to this subject, Kujat said the US was moving extremely quickly and the lack of technology transfer meant that money was wasted (due to duplicated European effort). He wanted industry to work on the basis of the correct political decisions. Otherwise money would be wasted on both sides of the Atlantic.

<sup>1</sup> The TIPS surveillance system will not be operational until 2010.

# I am EADS

My name is Reiner Marschlich. I'm Project Manager for the EuroHawk system, a High Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or HALE UAV. EuroHawk flies at 60,000 feet for 24 hours or more, reconnoitering communications in the area concerned, detecting radar emitters and continuously reporting back to base. We're teaming on the project with our American partner, Northrop Grumman. I love being part of an international team. I relish our shared passion for aerospace. I'm making my personal contribution to global security. I am EADS.

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## Session I

# Should NATO be reinvented, reinvigorated or revamped?

The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung's **Peter Weilemann** opened the conference by looking forward to a future where the NATO Alliance would be a forum for debate of the main strategic issues of the day, including the defence and security strategies of the EU and of the Alliance itself. In calling for more direction and more substance, Weilemann handed the floor to IRRI-KIIB President **Vicome Etienne Davignon**.

Davignon saw the need to debate NATO's future role as being a sign of vitality as all international organisations had to adapt to meet changing priorities and challenges. Looking at how NATO had changed since the Cold War, he asked a series of questions: *continued on next page*



NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer delivering the conference keynote speech.

- How could NATO act more efficiently?
- What are the issues involved and what are NATO's capabilities?
- With whom should NATO act?
- What is the future relationship with the USA (and is it an accepted structural relationship or simply "another instrument in the toolbox")?
- How should NATO relate to the EU?

On this final point, Davignon saw the EU's evolution as being entirely natural and not linked to a wish to act as a counter-weight to the US. He suggested that both institutions (the EU and NATO) should overcome their reluctance to share and collaborate as they had much to gain by working together.

NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations Jamie Shea then assumed control of the conference and asked, in passing, if the speed of transformation was actually fast enough.



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## Luc Frieden, Minister of Defence and Justice, Luxembourg

Minister Frieden's recent deliberations had shown that while a reinvention of NATO was not required, Nato needed to redefine its role within a European perspective. He saw this as being closely linked with the current debate on the EU's draft Constitution.

The Minister also underlined the necessity to develop a transatlantic framework based on common values. This would ensure peace and security, and the discussion should centre on how this could be achieved. Minister Frieden saw two ways in which the EU could work with its North American allies:

- Via separate actions: in certain geographic areas, where the EU or the US might wish to operate alone
- Working closely together: either via occasional meetings or via an organisational forum such as NATO

### The EU's role in defence and security

Overall, Frieden saw the need for stability as a global issue and he argued that the EU's recent enlargement ensured international stability. Making a case for the EU's military wing, the Minister said it was necessary in order to give credibility to the EU's foreign policy. He added that a strong and flexible military structure



Luc Frieden  
Minister of Defence and Justice,  
Luxembourg

would strengthen the European pillar in the transatlantic dialogue.

Stressing the need for collaboration at all levels, Frieden said that NATO was the only structure that allowed parties outside of the EU to be included in discussions on military and security issues. However, he wanted both sides (Europe and North America) to use NATO as a platform to discuss key issues of the day.

Minister Frieden wanted to see an end to competition and he concluded by arguing that it was possible to be both a strong and proud European and an Atlanticist.

*“There needs to be some reflection on the role of NATO in a European perspective”*

Luc Frieden

## John Colston, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, NATO



John Colston  
Assistant Secretary General for  
Defence Policy and Planning, NATO

- Expansion of its roles and missions
- Varied scope, nature and location of its operations
- Expanding relationship with other institutions, especially the EU
- Comprehensive agenda to combat terrorism

### Military and political transformation

However, Colston insisted that more change was necessary, both political and military. The transformation had to be led by the politicians and the resulting military transformation was indispensable to NATO's future operations. Expanding on the need for military transformation, Colston reminded the conference that this meant transformation of the nations' forces. The actual responsibility belonged to individual nations and this would require time and consistent financial support.

Colston saw NATO's role as being that of a catalyst for military transformation by ensuring that nations had a common understanding of military requirements and that they adopted common military standards. The Usability Targets and the Comprehensive Political Guidance documents were cited as steps in this direction.

John Colston argued that NATO would only need to be reinvented if the Washington Treaty (1949) was irrelevant. That was plainly not the case as nations were continually seeking to join NATO as they saw the Treaty as being important and appropriate in today's world. Colston argued that NATO was uniquely well-placed to contribute to international security and stability (Afghanistan, Balkans and Iraq) but he acknowledged that the Alliance had to adapt to changing circumstances. That's why it had been reforming since the end of the Cold War in terms of its:

*“The responsibility for NATO's military transformation lies with individual nations”*

John Colston

### A call for reinforcement

As for changes in the approach taken by the nations themselves, Colston was not pessimistic as conscription was being phased out almost everywhere, expenditure was increasing in many nations and NATO had agreed a new streamlined command

structure. He agreed that there were capability shortfalls (availability, common funding, intelligence) but they needed to be set against the Alliance's collective strength. Colston argued that NATO's transformation was on the right track and did not need to be reinvented, reinvigorated or revamped – merely reinforced!

## Ronald Asmus, Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, Brussels, The German Marshall Fund of the United States



Ronald Asmus  
Executive Director,  
Transatlantic Center, Brussels,  
The German Marshall Fund of  
the United States

Ronald Asmus did not agree. He argued that NATO did need to be reinvented as it was no longer central to the discussions held in Washington or Brussels. NATO staff members were certainly busy but the Alliance was not focused on the main issues of the day.

### A stalled process

Asmus reasoned that although NATO had adapted its raison d'être following the Cold War (and had acted in new areas such as the Balkans, developed a new partnership with Russia, etc.), the process had stalled at the turn of the century. With the problems of the Middle East and the 9/11 attacks, it was clear that NATO had not adapted sufficiently to the new situation.

### A second phase was required

Asmus therefore argued for a second reinvention of the Alliance, which would address the following key issues:

*“There is a basic problem. Today, people do not know what NATO is doing.”*

Ronald Asmus

- **The Balkans:** “finishing the job”
- **NATO enlargement:** it should take in Ukraine and Georgia (from the Baltic to the Black Sea was not enough)
- **Russia:** the whole question of the “Eastern Agenda”
- **The Middle East:** e.g. Greater, Broader, etc., as greatest threats would undoubtedly come from the Middle East, either directly or indirectly

## On NATO's importance

Asmus then turned to the issue of “reorganising the west”, or rather, achieving a balance between the US and Europe. He added that perhaps there was insufficient room for NATO in the political space between the EU and the US. Acknowledging this new era, Asmus commented that Michael Chertoff, Chief of the US Department of Homeland Security, was as important as anyone else in the transatlantic relationship.

Asmus concluded that the issues on the table (the “Eastern Agenda”, the Middle East, rebalancing the US-Europe relationship, etc.) meant that there was a huge agenda. Asmus reasoned that no one was sure if they wanted to take the risk of addressing this formidable task. Asmus wanted “big and bold thinking” that would take on board not only the risks of addressing the agenda, but also the risks of ignoring it.

*“We need big and bold thinking, not to look at the risks of (addressing the new agenda) but to look at the risks of not (addressing it)”*

Ronald Asmus

## Romuald Ratajczak, Minister Counsellor & Defence Adviser, Poland's Delegation to NATO

Looking back at NATO's role during the Cold War, Romuald Ratajczak noted that once the common external threat had vanished, the Alliance had continually adapted and redefined its role. However in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, he saw many unpredictable outcomes that raised questions about the usability of the Alliance:

- What was NATO's role in the fight against terrorism?
- Were the Alliance's internal processes still relevant and effective?
- Is NATO still a comprehensive platform for pursuing a transatlantic agenda?
- Is the Alliance an effective forum for member states to harmonise their security interests and defence cooperation?
- What will be the EU and NATO divisions of labour?
- How can NATO achieve an effective role in the policy of effective multilateralism (with UN, OSCE, the EU, the AU, etc.)?



Romuald Ratajczak  
Minister Counsellor & Defence  
Adviser, Poland's Delegation to  
NATO

Ratajczak argued that business as usual was not a viable option. He saw a wind of change that could bring a clear vision of a new NATO. The Alliance had to be gradually transformed militarily and politically, while its fundamental values had to be maintained. He did not want NATO to be reinvented, simply transformed to improve its coherence.

*“The wind of change is blowing and getting stronger”.*

Romuald Ratajczak



## Q&A

### Transformation – how?

Defense News' **Nicholas Fiorenza** wanted the panel's comments on some ideas contained in a recent speech by General Klaus Naumann. He had suggested:

- speeding-up decision-making in NATO committees (by ending consensus)
- that member states form "coalitions of the willing"
- the transformation process be performed bottom-up

*"It is impossible to pierce through the wall of indifference that is being shown towards NATO."*

*Frederick Bonnart*

In response, **John Colston** argued that transformation had to be top-down in order to gain the support of senior ministers. On coalitions of the willing, Colston said this already happened. In regard to decision-making, he said consensus was vital as NATO had to act with the backing of all 26 sovereign nations. He did, though, agree that some of

the committees might be able to work in a different way in order to speed-up internal processes.

**Luc Frieden** agreed with Colston but added that decision-making would be improved if the EU "spoke with one voice" on more occasions. As a follow-up question, Carleton University's **Robert Cutler** asked if NATO's policy of consensual decision-making was in need of review, similar to the one being undertaken in the EU (vis-à-vis the Constitution).

**Ronald Asmus** saw similar directions being taken within the EU and NATO, a process he described as "creatively reinterpreting consensus". He wanted a practical approach so that those countries that wanted to do more, could (do more).

### NATO's accountability

**Ernst Guelcher** from the European Parliament wanted to identify where NATO's democratic accountability was stationed. If the EU planned a mission, a representative would come to the European Parliament – was there a similar process for NATO? Colston said the situation was clear. The decision-making process belonged to the 26 member states and those nations were accountable to their individual parliaments.

### NATO's image in the 21<sup>st</sup> century

Former NATO's *Nations* journalist **Frederick Bonnart** had heard the panellists provide an excellent analysis on NATO's future role, but he could not see them "piercing the wall of indifference" that was shown towards the Alliance. Did the panel agree it was off the radar?

Asmus saw a paradox. If NATO said it would tackle to major issues of the day, no one would believe it. He saw the Alliance's power drifting away - either to the EU or to nowhere in particular. There was a basic problem, i.e. people did not know what NATO was doing.

### NATO and conflict prevention

EuropeAid's **Bernhard Jarzynka** asked how the coordination of conflict prevention could be improved in areas like Darfur. Colston referred to NATO's political transformation. It was always linked to potential military operations, and he wanted an "early and broader dialogue" so that NATO could get involved in preventing conflicts. A strong relationship between NATO and the EU would help in conflict prevention. As for **Romuald Ratajczak**, he wanted NATO to improve its intelligence gathering, as this could help to prevent such conflicts.





## Session 2

# NATO's role in transatlantic defence industry cooperation

*Stefan Zoller, CEO of Defence and Communications Systems, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) opened the second session, which looked at NATO's role in transatlantic cooperation. Zoller looked forward to the session examining how industry could be developed and transformed to support NATO in meeting its challenges.*

*Looking at the transatlantic relationship, Zoller said that the forces of both sides must be co-operable (politically, militarily and technologically) and interoperable. He wanted better cooperation between the fragmented European scene and the single US market. Zoller wanted to know if the EU or NATO would drive the transformation of European forces.*



EADS' Stefan Zoller opened the second session.

## Scott Harris, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin



Scott Harris  
President, Continental Europe,  
Lockheed Martin

Scott Harris argued that NATO was one of the main driving forces behind industrial cooperation. However, Harris observed that interoperability concerns, critical to the transformed capabilities of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, were still being discussed. Such issues had been on the table for decades.

Harris contended that NATO was not becoming less relevant. Without NATO, he argued, there would be fewer forces and they would not be so interoperable – certainly not in transatlantic terms.

### The defence industry and NATO

Turning to the main topic, the importance of transatlantic industry defence cooperation to NATO's transformation, Harris said it was all a question of budgets. The US-Europe capability gap was growing relentlessly<sup>3</sup> and, ironically, that was driving transatlantic industry defence

cooperation because industry tended to follow the money. Factors such as “network centric warfare” were also, by their very nature, leading to greater cooperation.

But Harris also saw new factors that increased the need for cooperation. NATO activity “out of area” was now an accepted fact. This had led to new requirements such as mobility and lift, greater need for communications, increased logistics complexity and a greater need to support deployed forces. This was all being underlined by industrial support. Harris argued that industrial interaction with forces was almost seamless. For all of these reasons increased transatlantic industrial cooperation is an essential element of NATO's transformation.

### The challenge

Harris concluded with a final challenge for the defence industry – could it provide the needed capabilities for the transformed NATO forces? To do that, he argued, the transatlantic defence industry had to co-operate to ensure effective procurement (to leverage the capabilities and investments on both sides of the Atlantic). No one wanted to spend more than was absolutely necessary. With “Buy America” campaigns in the background, he acknowledged that this could be problematic. But that was the challenge.

<sup>3</sup> Harris said that the annual rate of US:Europe equipment procurement was in the ratio 2:1, while US:Europe R&D was proceeding at the rate of 6:1.

## Ion-Mircea Plangu, Secretary of State for Defence Policy, Romania



Ion-Mircea Plangu  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Policy, Romania

Putting himself in the role of an industrial spokesman, Ion-Mircea Plangu reviewed the challenges facing the defence industry and associated researchers. The first was that the NATO planning process faced a moving target as the types of missions changed at high-speed. There were no rigid assumptions any longer.

### Planning difficulties

Plangu saw the possible NATO missions as a matrix of probabilities; there was a toolbox and each tool had a probability of how often it would be used and under what circumstances. This made it extremely difficult for the defence industry to adapt its production capabilities, especially as forecasts were dependent, to some extent, on market studies. Plangu also saw a handicap for industry in that it still had classical equipment for sale – it was a major challenge.

Plangu also saw the need to “think the unimaginable”. Post 9/11 security was no longer a classical exercise and intelligence services were in the front line. Industry needed a good prognosis and the need for excellent counter-terrorist planners was high. But Plangu also saw the cost side. With feelings of insecurity everywhere in the world, political decisions were increasing the need for more security systems and greater control

of borders. Conflicts were now routine, and governments were “using equipment, no longer buying it for training purposes”.

### A national view

On the subject of cooperation, Plangu said it was happening “bottom-up”. National requirements tended to prevail, whilst nations attempted to see things from a European viewpoint. That contradiction had to be dealt with. As an aside, he looked at the transatlantic market and suggested that an increased role for multinationals might be an answer to the probability matrix that he had introduced earlier.

*“Industry has a handicap – it still has classical equipment for sale. It is a major challenge.”*

*Ion-Mircea Plangu*

## Marshall Billingslea, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO

Marshall Billingslea  
Assistant Secretary General for  
Defence Investment, NATO



Marshall Billingslea examined three issues: a) the nature of the threat, b) NATO's expanding operations, and c) the need for collaborative funding to support those operations.

*“We need to invest in capabilities that will make the military forces more usable”.*

*Marshall Billingslea*

### The nature of the threat

In an uncertain world, the threat was evident but the actual nature (time, place, character) was becoming increasingly hard to predict (especially in 10, 15 or 20 years time). Billingslea saw this as a major challenge as threat perception was driving the ability of NATO to articulate its requirements to the defence industry.

Billingslea hoped that the planning documents currently being drafted under the title, “Comprehensive Political Guidance”, would keep in mind this uncertainty and focus on the capabilities that adversaries might possess in the future, and thus the capabilities NATO nations would need to protect themselves.

Capabilities-based planning is crucial, and Billingslea gave several examples where non-Service oriented solutions were already being pursued: “Joint and combined fire”, “Trial Hammer” and the “defence against terrorism initiative”. Not only was there an evolution towards digital interoperability (aka Network-Enabled Capability) but there also needed to be a change of mindset in the way that operations were being conducted.

### NATO's expanding operations

Touching on current NATO operations, Billingslea said there were 26,000 operational personnel engaged on several continents on a variety of missions. These operations were providing the Alliance with valuable insight into necessary future capabilities and current deficiencies, all revealed during the conduct of missions. The conclusion drawn was that NATO needed to invest in capabilities that would make military forces more usable. Giving examples

of what being “more usable” meant, Billingslea listed things such as “strategic lift”, the need for “agile and flexible forces”, more “actionable intelligence” and network-centric solutions.

### The need for collaborative funding to support those operations

Billingslea noted that the old doctrines among nations of self-sufficiency and self-reliance in military research and development were no longer sustainable. Collaboration was “the name of the game”, as nations were currently spending so much that they needed to pool their resources money on operations rather than on R&T. Stressing that a number of multinational

and multilateral initiatives were already ongoing (e.g. sealift agreement, airlift initiative, the “NATO intelligence network”, etc.), Billingslea underlined the important role of the defence industry in all of these programmes, and the likelihood that the trend would continue.

*“We face a tremendous challenge in recognising our uncertainties and in determining how to manage the risk that these uncertainties pose to our nations.”*

*Marshall Billingslea*

## Q&A

### The capability gap and the need for collaboration

The WEU's **Paulo Brito** was the first to the microphone. He explained the US-Europe capability gap by listing two factors: a) the US had a single defence budget, and b) the US was at war. That took him to NATO's role as a facilitator and Brito asked how the issue of (compatible) technology was being addressed, especially in relation to network-centric capabilities.

**Marshall Billingslea** said there was a significant amount of collaboration (know-

how, best practices, standards) that was ongoing. And this was a two-way street.

Billingslea agreed with Brito's comment that the US saw itself as a nation at war, and added that some European nations also understood that they were under the same threat. That said, there remains a disparity in investment in both equipment and R&D that was worrisome.

Thales' **Edgar Buckley** agreed with the remarks of Harris and General Kujat as transatlantic cooperation was essential to support NATO. He saw an open European market as a key step,

as it would immediately improve the efficiency of the procurement activities. As an example, Buckley said that 13,000 applications for defence equipment transfers (within the EU) had been made, with only 15 being rejected ("they were mainly mistakes"). In Buckley's eyes, it was a completely useless bureaucratic process that cost an enormous amount of money.

Billingslea had not seen export controls as a major barrier to the cooperative transatlantic relationship.

**Stefan Zoller** was very realistic. He saw a Europe that had no open markets, not yet harmonized requirements, ongoing fragmented procurement policies, slow decision-making

due to their complexity and an urgent need for new programmes. That meant that a competitive European industry could not exist and European taxpayers' money was being spent inefficiently. There were only a few transatlantic programmes and a new strategic dialogue was required in order to align the European and US defence industries and forces.

Using the TIPS programme as an example, Zoller said it had actually been generated by industry, after 10 years of deadlock in NATO. It was collaborative from the beginning, guaranteed interoperability and reduced risk. However, it was complex and there was much work to be done. That was a comment that could equally be applied to the transatlantic industrial relationship.

## Session 3

# What does NATO do for Europe that the EU can't do for itself?

*Giles Merritt, Director, New Defence Agenda, was in charge for the final session, which looked at what NATO was doing for Europe that the EU could not do on its own.*



Giles Merritt moderating the 3rd session which focussed on NATO-EU relations.

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## Anton Buteiko, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ukraine

Anton Buteiko  
First Deputy Minister  
for Foreign Affairs, Ukraine



Anton Buteiko stressed the importance of both NATO and the EU in Ukrainian eyes. He stated that Ukraine wanted the two organisations

to promote stability and peace in the region surrounding his country. Buteiko called for the resources of the two institutions to be used to resolve “frozen conflicts”, including Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan). Of these, the Minister referred to Transnistria as the most pressing problem. The new government, under President Viktor Yushchenko, had produced a seven-step programme to transform the situation through democracy and he called for EU involvement in this process.

## Seppo Kääriäinen, Minister of Defence, Finland

Seppo Kääriäinen  
Minister of Defence, Finland



Seppo Kääriäinen gave the view from a EU member; non-NATO country. He explained that Finland fully supported ESDP, while it wanted to reinforce the transatlantic relationship via a partnership with NATO. The two objectives were not mutually exclusive.

Kääriäinen argued that the EU-NATO partnership was useful in the development of ESDP and that the Alliance had a vital role to play in Europe's defence. He focused his remarks on one issue - the need for complementarity between NATO's defence planning and the EU's capabilities. This was seen to be particularly relevant as Finland was about to put its forces into the field as part of the EU's Battlegroups concept.

Kääriäinen explained that as well as the battlegroup forces, Finland was also involved in various NATO-led operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc.) and in EU-led operations.

So coordination of NATO's defence planning and the EU's capabilities was highly relevant.

### Complementary forces

Given that the NRF and the EU's Battlegroups were based on the same forces, they had to be complementary and that meant dealing with several issues:

- The need for **commonly-defined standards** (of availability, deployability, flexibility, sustainability and interoperability); the EU could benefit from NATO's earlier work
- Kääriäinen asked for special attention to be paid to the contributions of non-NATO EU member states; Finland planned to provide battlegroups forces via the NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP) and

the Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PFP Operations (OCC)

- The need for **regular and realistic training** on a multinational basis; the NRF training programmes could be utilised as appropriate
- The need to **streamline certification procedures**: as member states would commit forces to both the NRF and the battlegroups; Kääriäinen called for the NATO certification process to be available for non-NATO EU member states

Overall, Kääriäinen stated that Finland's military goal was to develop the right kind of forces with the right capabilities in the right place in the most economical way possible. To do that, the military planning processes of the two organisations had to be compatible.

## Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting, Deputy Director of the Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham, UK

Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting  
Deputy Director of the Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham, UK



Major General Messervy-Whiting examined each agenda question in turn:

*Will NATO's chief raison d'être be the slowness of EU decision-making, and the political difficulties of creating the EU institutional structures needed to give teeth to the CFSP?*

Messervy-Whiting did not agree that the EU had been slow to make decisions when it had the political will. He had not seen show-stopping difficulties in creating structures. Messervy-Whiting also argued that NATO's raison d'être lay in the transatlantic relationship rather than its link with the EU.

*In light of today's post-Cold War security threats, what are the Command & Control functions that NATO provides, and to what extent are these functions being replicated within the European Union's newly created ESDP?*

Messervy-Whiting argued that NATO brought an element of "common defence" to the US and Europe, especially in terms of providing a nuclear deterrent capability.

In terms of what NATO could do for ESDP, he argued there were four strands:

- Capability: in terms of communications, computerised networks, etc.
- Operations: EU-NATO links should continue to grow; a de-facto division of labour might be NATO (for robust missions at long-range) and the EU (for neighbourhood and "less muscular" global missions)
- Policy: it should be possible to build on existing policies to combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs
- Strategic culture: early, rapid and robust interventions are required – hence doctrines of interoperability and standardisation; Messervy-Whiting added that the EU had not attempted to act in this area as NATO does it so well

*If NATO didn't exist, would the alliance's European members need to invent it?*

Possibly, mused Messervy-Whiting, but not in the same form. However, there would need to be a transatlantic link in some shape or other.

*Do NATO governments, including the new Bush Administration, need to place fresh emphasis on the alliance's value as a forum for re-building consensus on security and defence issues?*

Messervy-Whiting was certain about this one. If NATO was to be maintained as a primary forum of communication, the answer was yes!

## Leo Michel, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, US

Giving his view of the EU-US relationship from an American perspective, Leo Michel said it was too excessively formal and too restrictive. He agreed that cooperation made sense given the overlapping membership of the EU and NATO. More and more, added Michel, the forces were involved in common operations, the nature of which changed over time.

A NATO-led-mission had become EU-led in Macedonia and different models existed in Afghanistan and in Bosnia. With military operations becoming difficult to predict, it was possible, said Michel, that EU-led missions might well need NATO support in the future.

As for the actual status of collaboration, politicians had got the rhetoric right, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) met periodically and there was some coordination of battlegroups and the NRF – although



Leo Michel  
Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, US

at too low a level. The best examples of cooperation were "on the ground", via the EU-NATO cooperation in Bosnia.

### More strategic collaboration required

However, Michel saw many problems. There was a significant lag in establishing effective multi-level contacts between the two organisations. Meetings between NATO's NAC and the EU's PSC and their respective

military committees have focussed on the implementation of Berlin Plus in Bosnia. While important, this is too narrow an agenda. Where are discussions between the two organisations on topics such as Russia, Ukraine, Africa, or the Caucasus and the Broader Middle East that would give meaning to the concept of "strategic partnership" endorsed by NATO and EU heads of state and government? The NATO Secretary General mentioned earlier that, at their recent meeting in Vilnius, NATO foreign ministers considered an idea of informal discussions on strategic issues at meetings among foreign ministers representing all 32-member states of NATO and the EU. This is a step in the right direction, but not a substitute for the broader range of contacts needed. For example, we have yet to see established permanent military liaison arrangements, with an EU cell at SHAPE and a NATO cell at the EU, able to work on a broad array of strategic issues in line with the "strategic partnership" concept.

As an example, Michel took Darfur where NATO and the EU could have developed an approach months ago if the correct liaison arrangements had been in place. Michel wanted the two organisations to be collaborating well ahead of any crisis.

### A fear that Europe would not do enough

Turning to ESDP, Michel said that most US observers could see real benefits in such a productive and close approach. The US was much more supportive of ESDP than it had been but most Americans (in the defence arena) felt that Europe would actually do too little to improve European capabilities. Those same observers felt that, when it comes to defence and security affairs, the US-Europe relationship should pass through the Alliance.

## Q&A

### A round of questions for the panel

The WEU's **Paulo Brito** had questions for all four speakers.

For Buteiko: what were Ukraine's priorities on internal reforms ahead of an EU application?

For Kääriäinen: did he agree with transferring some of the work of ECAP to the EDA?

For Major General Messervy-Whiting: should the EU speak with one voice in NATO?

For Michel, what was stopping the closer collaboration between the institutions?

**Anton Buteiko** insisted that the new Ukrainian government was instigating reforms not only for the EU or NATO but also for its citizens. He argued that there had already been much progress; there were no longer any threats to journalists and independent TV and radio stations were being re-established.

Buteiko reminded the conference that Ukraine's first democratic constitution was passed in 1710. It was a forerunner of democracy (elected leaders including the judiciary). The "Orange Revolution" had not been an accident! The EU-Ukraine Action Plan had been approved and meetings were

ongoing. As for NATO, a plan had been agreed and measures had been taken (including the situation on human rights within the Ukraine).

**Seppo Kääriäinen** said that more and more functions had to be moved under the umbrella of the EDA. The Agency had made a promising start and Finland was fully supportive of its objectives – it should have more responsibilities.

**Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting** agreed that in the case where the new EU Constitution was approved, the EU member states could speak (legally) with one voice within NATO. In fact, that situation was true under the current treaty. However, he doubted if that would happen, especially as not all EU member states were members of NATO.

**Leo Michel** looked at the prevention of cooperation. He agreed that his views about ESDP had evolved, but he had underestimated the different views (and hence the multitude of problems) within the member states as regard to the membership of the EU and NATO. There was a ménage a trois between the US and its bilateral relationships, its NATO relationship and its bilateral relationship with the EU. It was a difficult mix.



EADS' Admiral Pierre Sabatié-Garat enquires about EDA's and ACT's cooperation.



## Towards a more strategic collaboration

EADS' **Pierre Sabatié-Garat** wanted to know how the EDA and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) could cooperate, as suggested by Major General Messervy-Whiting. How could the EU-NATO dialogue be improved in a practical way?

Michel was not happy with the lack of genuine strategic dialogue between NATO and the EU. He suggested that the two organisations (senior staff and representatives of the member states) meet to discuss capabilities together in advance of taking decisions on specific operations. He respected the fact that the organisations will take autonomous decisions, but said this should be done with a fuller knowledge of the capabilities and assessments of both. Michel wanted the cards to be clearly placed on the table (e.g. in relation to Berlin Plus arrangements, Darfur, etc.).

## Divisions of labour?

**Ernst Guelcher** had heard about flexibility between the EU and NATO, but he could not understand the division of labour between NATO and the EU. And for the EU Battlegroups and the NRF, who was accountable (as the forces were the same in both groups)?

New Defence Agenda Director **Giles Merritt** was also concerned about divisions of

labour – would they be flexible or structured (with perhaps EU being more political and NATO more humanitarian)? Given Messervy-Whiting's breakdown of responsibilities, Merritt wanted to understand if that meant a differentiation between projection (peacekeeping etc.) and protection (homeland defence, etc.) so that responsibilities could be clearly understood.

Messervy-Whiting did not see an easy way of formally agreeing the divisions of labour. He saw this being decided at the time of a crisis via informal meetings. However, he added that the EU's preferred direction was indicated in the draft EU Constitution (e.g. conflict prevention, post conflict reconstruction, civil-military collaboration, etc.).

On the subject of there being too much flexibility in the battlegroups/ NRF concepts, they were the same troops but the political control would be dependent on the mission and whether the troops were deployed under a NATO or an EU umbrella. Regardless of that, the training and the doctrines had to be the same.

On divisions of labour, Michel said one often-discussed option would be to have NATO doing the high-end operations and the EU looking after the low-end. However, he did not see this working in the long-term (politically) as there was the possibility that a small number of nations would always feel they were doing too much and taking too many of the risks.

Kääriäinen did not see NATO and the EU as competitors. He felt that the Berlin Plus arrangements and NATO-EU transparency were the key enablers of success (examples of this including Concordia, the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.).

## Who's in charge?

**Frederick Bonnart** came back to his earlier point about the (lack of) importance of NATO. He agreed that a pragmatic division of labour would be NATO conducting the heavy operations and the EU performing (primarily) peacekeeping. However, taking Afghanistan as an example, Bonnart argued that if NATO led the mission it would be under the command of the North Atlantic Council, whereas the US would only allow NATO to lead if reported in to the Pentagon. That was the issue, and until NATO had a higher profile, it would be a permanent problem.

Michel did not endorse Bonnart's reading of the situation. NATO would have to work out

necessary command and control arrangements covering both the peacekeeping and combat aspects of operations in Afghanistan. Several Allies have been participating alongside the US in combat operations and they share a strong interest in devising effective command and control arrangements. However, he felt that NATO (and the EU) could not afford to fail. That was true for all missions. And he added that within NATO, there was almost always consensus in the end on the need to use good military judgment.

## Bringing it to an end

**Giles Merritt** brought the conference to a close, adding that he had heard many people saying it was all about cooperation and not competition. This was a major shift compared with the situation of two years ago. Merritt had noticed a real sense of progress and openness between two institutions.

## Keynote address by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General

I want to start by thanking the New Defence Agenda for inviting me. I also want to commend them for putting together a programme that raises a number of very pertinent questions about NATO – about where the Alliance is, and about where it should be heading. It is sometimes said that asking the right questions is the first step towards answering them. And that bodes very well for the success of this meeting.

Let me immediately tackle what has been posted as the main question for this morning's session – Should NATO be reinvented, reinvigorated or just revamped? I do not wish to dwell on semantics here. It is clear that the new, 21st century security environment requires the Alliance to transform. We are on the job already, delivering concrete results, and determined to push ahead.

NATO has been around for more than half a century. It is perceived wisdom that you cannot teach an old dog new tricks. But I submit that the main reason for NATO's resilience and durability is that it has been able to adjust its repertoire. Indeed, the Alliance has been able to deliver effective multilateralism through very different – and sometimes very difficult – circumstances.

Of course, institutions don't have a life of their own. They can help deliver effective multilateralism only if nations hold common



Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General

views on a problem. But institutions can be "agenda-setters". In other words, they can instil in their members a certain sense of group discipline – a sense of "corporate identity", if you will. And that will often make consensus on new challenges easier to achieve.

This sense of identity is clearly present in the European Union -- a project that relies on member nations to surrender a degree of sovereignty for the sake of the common good. The current debate on the EU constitution – whatever your position may be on the document itself -- underlines the extent to which the Union has become an "agenda-setter" for its member states.

But I believe that NATO has a "corporate identity" too. Of course, NATO nations remain fully sovereign, and the range of issues that the Alliance covers is more focussed than the agenda of the EU. NATO remains unique as a permanent, institutionalised forum for

transatlantic security consultation, coordination and common action. It thus plays a key role in bolstering the broader transatlantic partnership. And since this partnership remains the foundation of global stability, NATO remains a very powerful "agenda-setter".

I want to demonstrate this agenda-setting function of NATO by addressing five dimensions of the Alliance's current transformation. One dimension is intellectual; another is military; a third is institutional; a fourth is geographic, and a fifth is political.

The first area of transformation is, as I said, intellectual. It concerns the way we think about security challenges, and about how we use NATO to address them. Clearly, a large-scale invasion of our territory is no longer our dominant concern. Today, as Henry Kissinger has put it so aptly, the survival of our countries can be put at risk by developments that happen entirely within the borders of another country. This is as true for the kind of terrorism that was allowed to breed in Afghanistan as it is for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In light of such challenges, a passive, reactive approach will not do. These threats need to be confronted when and where they emerge.

NATO has drawn the right conclusion from this new reality. Simply put, we have moved away from the narrow, geographical approach to security that characterised NATO for almost five decades. We demonstrate this with our operation in Afghanistan, and with our training mission

in Iraq. And we may demonstrate it again soon by offering logistic support – not troops on the ground – to the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Darfur. President Konaré, the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, met with the NATO Council last week. And I will be in Addis Ababa later this week to discuss how NATO can add value to the assistance offered by the United Nations, the European Union, as well as by a number of individual nations.

All these are clear demonstrations that NATO is no longer a "eurocentric" Alliance. But we are not turning into a world policeman – NATO has neither the ambition nor the capability to deal with emergencies all over the globe. However we do now all look at NATO as an instrument that we can use wherever our common security interests demand it. This is a sea change in the way we think about – and employ – the Alliance. And it offers new, unprecedented opportunities for transatlantic security cooperation well beyond this continent.

The second area of transformation is military. I think the fundamental point to make here is that no country can still afford to maintain forces just for national territorial defence. Each NATO member must be able to make a contribution to the full spectrum of operations. What we need, therefore, are forces that can react quickly, that can be deployed over long distances, and then sustained over extended periods of time. And we need a mix of forces capable of performing high intensity combat tasks and post-conflict reconstruction work.

Within NATO, we have made good progress in developing such capabilities. We have streamlined our military command structure and stood up the NATO Response Force. We have moved away from purely individual national efforts and achieved much greater coordination across the Alliance. There have been significant improvements to our capabilities, and we are looking to make sure that future missions can be better planned, equipped, and paid for. In sum, while we still have work to do, the Alliance's military transformation is well on track.

In today's security environment, however, military competence is not enough. The real challenge is to apply military, political and economic instruments in a well-coordinated way, and that means that NATO will increasingly act in concert with other institutions. That is why the third area of NATO's transformation is to reach out and develop closer relations with other institutions. On the ground, this cooperation is already a reality. In the Balkans, NATO cooperates with the UN, the OSCE and the European Union. Similar links have been established in Afghanistan.

However, we need to raise our sights beyond ad hoc cooperation on the ground. We need structured relationships at the institutional level as well – to coordinate strategically, not just cooperate tactically. We need to establish such relationships with the UN – and the opportunity I had to address the UN Security Council last year was an important step in this regard. Kofi Annan's recent proposals for UN reform provide further opportunities for fresh thinking.

We also need closer institutional relations with the OSCE.

Above all, however, we need to strengthen the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. The entire transatlantic community must come to terms with the reality of the European Union as a genuine security actor. Our American friends understand that this is about making the Union a stronger partner, not a counterweight, as demonstrated by President Bush's visit to the European Union institutions in February following our NATO Summit meeting. Here in Europe, we understand that we must be realistic about our security role, and aware of what NATO already offers.

I sincerely hope that greater realism will translate in a much closer NATO-EU relationship – one that goes well beyond crisis management in the Balkans. We need a partnership that covers all aspects of modern security policy: combating terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and dealing with "failed states". And we need to better coordinate our policies for dealing with the world's pivotal regions.

And this brings me to the fourth area of NATO's transformation, the geopolitical dimension. Simply put, we need to look at certain regions of the world through a common transatlantic lens. This is true for the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as for the Broader Middle East. Finding ways to influence positive developments in these regions has to be a joint transatlantic effort – or it will not stand much chance of success.

Again, we are using NATO to promote this transatlantic approach. We are deepening relations with our Partners in the Caucasus and Central Asia. We are enhancing our dialogue with countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East, and building new ties of cooperation with interested countries from the Gulf region. And I will get on the plane in just a few hours to chair the first EAPC Security Forum in Sweden. This is a new initiative to engage our Partners in free-flowing discussion of the many common challenges before us. And a further demonstration of NATO's role as an "agenda-setter" not just for the transatlantic Allies, but the entire Euro-Atlantic community of nations.

These key areas of NATO's transformation – intellectual, military, institutional, geographic – all underscore the comprehensive approach to security that NATO has adopted. But there is a fifth, essential aspect of NATO's transformation that I wish to highlight before you this morning. It is an aspect that in fact cuts across all other areas of NATO's evolution: The challenge of making NATO more political.

Simply put, we need to understand NATO not only as a forum for action. We must also understand it as a forum for debate. During the Iraq controversy, NATO was manifestly under-utilised as a consultative forum. (Not only NATO by the way). And we paid a high price for that. I am confident that we learned our lesson. If we want to preserve and strengthen NATO as a central framework for effective multilateralism, we must engage in multilateral debate.

Let us be honest. If the members of the EU argue about a certain course of action, or if the United Nations becomes the stage of a major policy debate, people accept this as a sign of the vitality of these institutions. Try the same at NATO, and you'll get a string of headlines saying NATO is "in turmoil" or even "terminal decline". Somehow, people look at debate in NATO differently. It must have to do with the Cold War; when the Alliance had to demonstrate unity at any cost.

But what was perhaps logical during the Cold War may no longer be opportune today. Today, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation and "failed states" pose new challenges. New security players, such as the EU, are finding their role. Other parts of the world are growing in relevance. We must adapt deterrence and established non-proliferation regimes to the new circumstances. And we must discuss new approaches to the broader Middle East, the Caucasus and other regions.

In the face of such enormous challenges, how could we avoid debate – and more importantly, why would we? NATO is the forum where Europe and North America come together to shape a common approach to these new challenges, including, yes, through the occasional disagreement. That is an essential role – one that we should encourage, not shy away from. Because it will ultimately strengthen our political cohesion, reinforce our operational effectiveness, and enhance our credibility in the eyes of our publics.

I believe that this is what Chancellor Schroeder was getting at in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February. It is something that I have been saying almost since I took over this post in January of last year. I am pleased that the Allies now underscore the need for greater political dialogue in NATO. I am encouraged by the very good debates that we have recently had on such issues as the Middle East, Darfur, the Balkans and NATO-EU relations. And I am confident, and NATO leaders are committed, to further enhance this vital political role of NATO in the future. The serious security challenges before us demand nothing less.

Today, NATO is no longer a solo-player in security. Ever since our engagement in the Balkans, we have

been acting in concert with other actors – with our Partners, as well as with other international organisations. We have worked hard to reflect the lessons of those critical years in NATO's policies and structures. And we are working hard now to make NATO even more relevant to the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment.

Cultivating political dialogue will be the crown jewel in NATO's transformation – a transformation that will enable the transatlantic allies to make an even more effective contribution to the international community's efforts to protect and to promote security and stability. Because a "culture of dialogue" will underpin this transformation with a broad strategic consensus on how to tackle the great challenges of our age.

## Keynote address by **Harald Kujat**, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

You just heard earlier this morning from the Secretary General about the five dimensions of the Alliance transformation. What I would like to do is to present my views, as Chairman of the Military Committee, about the military dimension of NATO's transformation and try to add my perspective to what the Secretary General has said.

What we strive for is to develop the means and ways by which NATO can be successful in its strategy. Regarding the means, I will talk about military expeditionary capabilities to enable the Alliance to project stability beyond its territory, because we have to understand that Homeland Security does not start at one country's port of entry or borders. It starts in the mountains of Afghanistan and the waters of the Mediterranean.

This is where the Alliance can bring its power to bear in order to influence security at home. Concerning the ways, I will talk about the mindset of transformation, innovative programmes and ongoing initiatives.

The so-called Revolution in Military Affairs brought about significant evolution in the conduct of warfare. The means by which war can be prosecuted no longer rely on the stand-alone notion of weapons that break, pierce, poison, burn or irritate.



Harald Kujat  
Chairman of the NATO  
Military Committee

We are increasingly approaching operations with a view to target high value assets and capabilities as opposed to targeting enemy forces.

The decade following the Cold War was a period of adjustment that, for NATO, culminated with the Prague Summit of 2002 from which we drew most of our transformational political guidance.

Among the major deductions were that Alliance command and force structures must be expeditionary in character and design and capable of conducting a higher number of smaller, concurrent operations over long periods of time. A greater proportion of Alliance forces need to be deployable well away from their territory and have the flexibility to transition rapidly between warfighting and peacekeeping, the so-called three-blocks war. As a result, forces must be capable of operating within a networked environment.

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There is greater call on specialist skills in areas such as engineering, communications, special operations, civil/military cooperation, logistics, medical services and intelligence.

The Prague decisions (enlargement, streamlining of the command structure, establishing the Prague Capabilities Commitment and creating the NATO Response Force) were instrumental in defining our military transformational agenda for the foreseeable future.

## Part I – NATO Transformation: Expeditionary Engagements

Operationally, NATO's engagements have, since the Prague Summit of 2002, truly become expeditionary in scope. We have some 26,000 personnel from member nations deployed on NATO operations, joined by an additional 3,000 personnel from 16 non-NATO nations. Indeed, the tempo of operational activities has done anything but decrease over the past few years.

Some partner nations have opened Lines of Communication for our transit or provided other facilities that help the accomplishment of our missions. More than 4,000 personnel from our permanent command structure support these forces. Our operational commitments stretch from the Western end of the Mediterranean to Eastern Afghanistan, bordering on China. This area of operations covers some 7,000 kilometres, which is strategically very significant.

Afghanistan remains our point of main effort. Since its start in 2002, ISAF has been very successful. It has been successful because the contributing nations, providing the core of this mission, had a habit of working together and used NATO-agreed tactics, techniques and procedures as well as the know-how required to make a coalition work, even though NATO itself did not assume command until August 2003.

Increasing border security for those Partners sharing a common border with Afghanistan would be a welcome way to assist the efforts of NATO and the International Community to bring peace and stability in that country. The illegal drug trade is a source of insecurity and corruption that can spread far beyond its country of origin and our societies pay three times the cost of this blight. The first time is when our youth contribute less to a productive society by abusing.

The second time, when our governments support the health costs associated with abuse and the third time, when our governments have to deploy expensive resources in failed states that cannot eradicate the problem.

While Afghanistan is NATO's top priority, it is not the only place where we fight terrorism. To date, Operation Active Endeavour forces, currently under Italian command, have hailed more than 63,000 vessels and conducted close to 90 boardings in the Mediterranean. An added, yet unforeseen,

benefit of Operation Active Endeavour is that it helps curtail illegal immigration and smuggling from North Africa into mainland Europe. Here too our Partners provide a helping hand and some of them will soon join us in support of this Operation.

Iraq is our newest mission. The NATO Training Mission in Iraq continues to develop programme for the Iraqi Security Forces and its commander is focusing on mentoring at the Iraq Joint Headquarters and National Joint Operations Centre.

Alongside national commitments, NATO's collective assets are being put into use for this mission. After having trained Iraqi officials at the NATO Joint Warfare Centre in Norway, we are putting plans into place for positions at the NATO Defense College's Senior Course in Rome, and NATO School Oberammergau's Operational Staff Course.

Let us not forget the Balkans, where NATO transformed its very successful operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and remains firmly committed in Kosovo. In Bosnia, the current collaborative effort between NATO Headquarters Sarajevo and EUFOR has again proved the viability of the Berlin Plus NATO-European Union arrangements.

In Kosovo, we recognize that the key to containing future violence will be improved Situational Awareness associated with more flexible, pro-active and rapidly deployable

forces. Hence, we are focusing our efforts in making sure KFOR is properly structured and equipped to remain flexible.

## Part II – NATO Transformation: The Means

What I just said about the key of success in Kosovo highlights the rising importance of having a knowledge advantage over adversaries.

Information, before it can become knowledge, has to be gathered, exploited and shared seamlessly, not only between national armed forces services and other government departments such as transportation, civil protection and police but also between nations. Hence, forces will need to be multidisciplinary and integrated while retaining the legitimate monopoly over the use of ultimate force and violence to achieve objectives assigned by governments. As the Secretary General said, the real challenge is to apply military, political and economic instruments in a well-coordinated way.

Defence industries have an important role to play in helping us cultivate this concept.

Developed products must be interoperable, particularly in the domain of communications and information systems. This requires a willingness on industry to adopt open standards, and where the standards do not exist, to collaborate in producing them.

In the end, if you want to send your young men and women in harm's way and give them every advantage to come out alive as well as successful, then you have to be prepared to invest in technology and you have to rationalise your defence industry.

Discussions on cooperation to acquire capabilities invariably lead to industrial cooperation. We all know and understand that, because resources are finite, Europe should find ways to save money and energy by combining efforts, including planning as well as cooperative procurement of armaments.

The establishment of the European Defence Agency is obviously a very good innovation in this regard and the NATO community applauds its efforts to augment the capabilities of European Armed Forces because nations do rely on a single set of forces, either for NATO and/or for the European Union.

But expeditionary capabilities do not come cheap, nor do they come free of political caveats on their use.

That is why we need small groups of countries to continue moving ahead to show multinational solutions to capability deficiencies are the solution to our capability gap with the United States. The Alliance Ground Surveillance system is an excellent example of what can be achieved when industries cooperate with each other across national boundaries. This project symbolizes transformation in action

whilst providing a much needed operational and force multiplying capability for enhanced battlefield awareness.

My only regret however is that its development is not progressing fast enough, after having been in the works for over a decade now. This kind of asset would be tremendously useful today in theatres like Kosovo and Afghanistan. Although a significant milestone was reached on 28 April when the 20 Millions Euros Risk Reduction Contract was signed between NATO and the TIPS consortium, we have to find ways to break the artificial barriers imposed by nations.

All of this is a very tall order, because NATO transformation relies heavily on the transformation efforts of our member states. That is why we must go down the route of collectively owned assets as much as possible. These assets are cheaper to acquire at 26 nations. They have the benefit that even the smallest of our Allies can have access to high value capabilities when the need arises.

Furthermore, it allows sovereign governments the opportunity not to have their nations directly associated with an operation if they do not wish to do so as there are no national flags associated with them.

To be sure, NATO already has an extraordinary capability in the field of planning and synchronizing operations. At the request

of the Council last Wednesday, the Military Committee developed its initial advice on the possible assistance NATO could provide to the African Union's Assistance Mission in Sudan. This advice was delivered to the Council this morning and was immediately agreed. This showed again that NATO can turn around very quickly when needed. Regarding the African Union's mission in Sudan, logistics and operational planning are two areas where NATO could bring a much added value to any international force deployed with a United Nations' mandate.

### Part III – NATO Transformation: The Ways

So far, I have focussed my remarks on the means by which NATO can and should accomplish its missions.

As I said previously, Transformation in its largest sense is as much an affair of mindset and I would like to spend a few minutes discussing this.

As the utility of forces declared by NATO nations has shifted from deterrence to usage in the past decade, nations are much more careful when putting their men and women at NATO's disposal. That is why the ways by which we do business must also transform in order to keep pace with the potential offered by expeditionary capabilities and to be better aligned with the national decision-making processes.

To support this effort, the NATO Chiefs of Defence in the Military Committee are working towards adopting a comprehensive approach to planning for operations.

We identified, as long ago as last year, the causes and symptoms of what was preventing us from improving our ability to turn political decisions into concrete contributions to our operations on the ground.

We knew that it was more than simply a force generation problem and that other major factors were critical.

The first of these factors was that our planning system became too heavy and cumbersome to provide forces on a timely basis for the types of operations in which NATO is now engaged.

The second one is that our funding regime did not match the increasing operational requirements we are facing, and which, therefore, did not provide solutions to better share the burden of operations and commitments between Allies.

This comprehensive approach to improve NATO's ability to plan for, commit and conduct military operations will provide more visibility and predictability at the political level before a decision for an operation is taken on the nature, availability and costs associated with the deployment of our assets.

In the end, however, we have to convince our governments to do four things.

First, harmonize their equipment requirements. Second, develop a culture of long-term thinking on defence Research and Development. Third, open up the European defence market. Fourth, accelerate the achievement of 'Final Operational Capability' of the European Defence Agency.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, military capability translates into political credibility and is the crucial underpinning of our safety and security.

From dealing with regional conflicts to terrorism, from Kosovo to Afghanistan, today's security environment places new demands on our military forces and requires us to put stronger emphasis on the long-range application of force, deployability, sustainability and effective engagement.

These in turn improve the expeditionary capability our forces must have. The Alliance needs capabilities for the future, not for the past. We need more wide-bodied aircraft, and fewer heavy tanks. We need more precision-guided weapons, deployable logistic support troops, ground-surveillance systems, and protection against chemical and biological weapons.

We need forces that are slimmer, tougher and faster, forces that reach further, and can stay in the field longer. Such capabilities cost. It is not a question of downsizing, it is a question of rightsizing.

Stating the obvious, harmonization and coherency of resource planning with all the other planning disciplines will be fundamental to NATO Transformation and our collaborative processes with the European Union will continue.

## Address by **Stefan Zoller**, CEO of Defence and Communications Systems, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Without any doubt, NATO as a strong transatlantic system will remain the most important peace stabilising factor in Europe and its adjacent areas.

A global world with its asymmetric dangers for our security will need NATO and its transformed capabilities also far away from our continent.

Strong common political interests on both sides of the Atlantic should guarantee a coherent security policy, well coordinated between the United States, NATO and the European Union. Forces of the European Union, NATO and the United States have at least in some volume and some extent to be co-operable and interoperable. Co-operability means more than simple military interoperability. It means to be politically, militarily and technologically capable to collaborate with United States Forces and so to assure a minimum of European interests in the decision making process.

Certainly among other common interests, major EU and NATO armament projects are one of the most important ingredients for maintaining the links between European and American armament industries and for increasing ties across the Atlantic. Yet, such paths shall not



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CEO of Defence and  
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be taken for granted. On both sides of the Atlantic much efforts will have to be carried out to get armament co-operation between the fragmented European Market and the single US Market into a normal co-operative process without administrative obstacles.

European Forces (most part of NATO's Forces) need military capabilities -far beyond those to assure Petersberg missions. Who could be the driver for this transformation of those European Forces which should have the most skilled capabilities? Could this be NATO setting the benchmarks or shouldn't it be the EU with its Defence Agency?

I will briefly mention the points I view as most important.

The European Security and Defence Policy is not only a positive development for Europe

and its security but also for the North Atlantic Alliance. ESDP is in principal welcomed by the US, because it seems evident that if the European Union can take over responsibilities in worldwide crisis management by reinforcing its own capabilities and ability to master these kinds of operations, it will allow its US and Canadian allies to focus on other threats of their own and of world wide security.

In turn, if the United States wants Europeans to share the responsibilities and risks of dealing with today's threats, it must be prepared to consider the exchange of technology as a normal procedure, and as a two way street, which is a difficult procedure in itself. Indeed, US high technology is far away from being accessible to European companies.

With greater European defence budgets and less US barriers, more co-operative programmes in defence for the EU and NATO are to come. I would argue that Europe would benefit from increased transatlantic co-operative programmes. Not only because this would make ties stronger than ever, but also because these could deliver the most cost-effective solutions to those in European Forces' crucially needed capabilities.

## But how to proceed?

In recent years, positive steps have been made to make the European Armament industry a solid partner of American industry.

My company EADS but also, BAE Systems, Finmeccanica and Thales (to mention only a few) have supported all political initiatives (e.g. LOI, OCCAR, WEAG) and have been proposing combined competitive solutions even when the dissimilarity to the US armament market is as great as it is currently. It is not fortuitous that American industries are interested in cooperating with Europeans. For EADS, it is essential that the ESDP is strengthened on the one hand and on the other hand, that transatlantic co-operation is revitalized without any complex. To be an equal and reliable partner of the US, Europe has to strengthen its position.

We need political discussions and a strategic dialogue and agreements between Europe and the US to bring transatlantic cooperation and armament cooperation ahead. We need projects, which are interesting to the US, NATO and Europeans by volume and technology.

We have to finish with the question of balanced cooperation and no longer give a chance to the so-called "buy on the shelf".

EADS for example has among others created cooperation in the big projects such as the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) with Boeing and Lockheed Martin, MEADS a project which demonstrates that technology exchange even on the most sensitive issues is possible and a sort of breakthrough in the transatlantic co-operation on high technology as well as the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) with

Galileo Avionica, Northrop Grumman, Indra of Spain, General Dynamics Canada and Thales.

The AGS project which will procure NATO with an owned and operated Airborne Ground Surveillance seems to me the example for future European – American cooperation. The curious thing is that it was the industry of both sides of the Atlantic which overcame a nearly 10 years blockage within NATO. This project should be of major interest for the European Union to get those assets needed within the Berlin Plus Agreement for any engagement of European Forces.

The AGS Systems is exemplary because it:

- Is collaborative ab initio with the integrated project approach
- Offers a noble work share for industry of all 19 participating Member States
- Permits re-use of High Technology for national programs
- Guarantees interoperability with European and Canadian national Reconnaissance and surveillance systems
- Reduces risks by experienced integration prime contractors of legacy systems

## Conclusion

EADS is supporting the need for European transnational customer consolidation. European Armament cooperation is also essential.

Europe needs:

- Unified and open markets
- Harmonization of requirements
- Integration of operational forces
- No unnecessary duplication and no continued fragmentation
- Rapid and smooth decision making processes
- Launch of new programmes

A competitive European Industrial Base is the condition "sine-qua-non" of an indispensable co-operation with the United States, with all the things that such an approach encapsulates.



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## About the New Defence Agenda (NDA)

At the suggestion of NATO's Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, Forum Europe established the New Defence Agenda in early 2002 to provide a common meeting ground for defence and security specialists from NATO and the EU that would meet on a regular basis.



Now the only Brussels-based platform for debate devoted solely to defence and security issues, NDA's International Conferences, Press Dinners and Monthly Roundtables bring top EU and NATO officials together with senior figures from governments, defence industries, the military, academia and press. The NDA also serves as a networking centre of defence-related think tanks and experts around Europe.

The aim of the NDA is not to replicate more academic research-based projects but to give greater prominence to the complex questions of how the EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and to stimulate reaction within the international press.

One of our prime objectives is to raise the profile of defence and security issues among the Brussels-based international press. To encourage more in-depth coverage of these topics, the NDA holds regular, informal dinners for journalists.

The NDA's Advisory Board is made of some 20 prominent defence experts drawn from a cross-section of government, politics and industry and is patroned by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Javier Solana, Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Franco Frattini.

The New Defence Agenda would like to thank its partners and members for their support in making the NDA a success



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