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Conference Report

DEFENDING GLOBAL SECURITY: The New Politics of Transatlantic Defence Co-operation.

MAY 17, 2004

NEW DEFENCE AGENDA

3rd Annual Security & Defence Conference
Palais d'Egmont, Brussels



DEFENDING GLOBAL SECURITY:
THE NEW POLITICS OF TRANSATLANTIC
DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

Rapporteur: John Chapman

17 May 2004

PALAIS D'EGMONT, BRUSSELS

Conference Report

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Table of Contents

About the Conference	5
The Conference Programme	5
Executive Summary	7
Keynote Address - Jaap de Hoop Scheffer	11
Session I Will the EU and NATO enlargements reshape Europe's Defence Policy?	15
Session II When does peacekeeping become "pre-emption"?	19
Session III Could Europe's new defence agency herald an EU-US industries pact?	25
List of Participants	21
About the New Defence Agenda	37
Coming Events 2004	38
Partners and Members	41

About the conference

The conference *Defending Global Security – The New Politics of Transatlantic Defence Co-operation* was held in Brussels on May 17, 2004 at the Palais d'Egmont. The event was organised by the New Defence Agenda, in partnership with TIPS, Lockheed Martin, NATO and EurActiv.com, and was attended by senior business leaders, ministers, officials from governments, EU institutions, NATO and by journalists.



From left: **Vecdi Gönül** Minister of National Defence, Turkey, **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer** Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) & **Giles Merritt** Director, New Defence Agenda

The conference programme

First Session:

Will the EU and NATO enlargements reshape Europe's Defence Policy?

NATO and EU membership have been twin goals of many of the formerly Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

- With their accession ambitions satisfied, what will be the newcomers' impact on the re-shaping of security and defence policies?
- At the same time, what are the implications for smaller European countries of the increasingly close working relationship on defence issues that now exists between London, Paris and Berlin?

The moderators were **Giles Merritt**, Director, New Defence Agenda and **Jamie Shea**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO. **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer**, Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) gave the keynote address.

Speakers: **Vecdi Gönül**, Minister of National Defence, Turkey, **George Cristian Maior**, State Secretary for Defence Policy, Romania, **Lars-Erik Lundin**, Head of Unit, Security Policy, European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations, **Robert Ondrejcsák**, Director of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies, Ministry of Defence, Slovak Republic and **Jan Winkler**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic.

Second Session:

When does peacekeeping become “pre-emption”?

The speed with which a number of European governments responded with troop reinforcements to renewed ethnic conflict in Kosovo has underlined the importance not only of a strong military peacekeeping presence in the Balkans but also of a readiness to intervene at short notice.

- Does the rapid deployment of military peacekeepers to head-off security threats take Europe a step towards the Bush Administration's doctrine of “pre-emptive action”, and how well developed are the political mechanisms in Europe for giving the green light for future emergency actions?
- To be operationally effective, what levels of “Network Enabled Capabilities” (e.g. Air Ground Surveillance) will future EU-badged contingents need to attain under the aspect of the Berlin Plus Agreement?

Moderated by **Hartmut Bühl**, Vice President and Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), with **John Colston**, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, NATO, **Ginte Damušis**, Permanent Representative of Lithuania to NATO, **Christoph Heusgen**, Director for Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, Council of the European Union and **Michael C. Ryan**, Representative of the US Secretary of Defense, Mission of the United States of America to the EU.

Third Session:

Could Europe's new defence agency herald an EU-US industries pact?

EU policymakers are under few illusions that European industries' aerospace and defence equipment shortcomings result mainly from national policies in Europe rather than from American competition. Hopes are high that the embryonic European Defence Agency will help to pull EU defence companies out of their nosedive.

- But should the agency be given a wider remit to become a focus of US-EU co-operation on new weapons and defence-related technologies?
- What could be NATO's role in improving transatlantic co-operation?

Moderated by **Scott A. Harris**, President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global Inc., the speakers were: **Marshall Billingslea**, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO, **Hilmar Linnenkamp**, Director General of Armaments, International Affairs, German MoD. Currently European Defence Agency (EDA) Establishment Team, **Alexander Nicoll**, Assistant Director and Senior Fellow for Defence Industry and Procurement, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK, **Paulo Portas**, Minister of State and Defence, Portugal and **Sir Peter Ricketts**, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to NATO.



“Defending Global Security”

- Summary of Debates

The highlight of the third New Defence Agenda (NDA) Annual Conference was undoubtedly NATO Secretary General **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's** speech in which he outlined NATO's agenda for the forthcoming Istanbul summit. Stressing the need to adapt to a changing world, de Hoop Scheffer said that “business as usual” was not an option. Ahead of the Istanbul Summit, he detailed NATO's plans to “**project stability**” in order to tackle problems wherever and whenever they emerged.

The Secretary General also named Afghanistan as a high summit priority, as a successful mission in that country was vital for Europe's security. Focusing on the importance of Russia, de Hoop Scheffer repeated his hope that President Putin would be present at the Istanbul Summit. The Secretary General also looked for closer links with the EU, via a partnership guided by “pragmatism, close consultation and transparency”. Throughout a wide-ranging speech, de Hoop Scheffer kept returning to the need for NATO to deliver results by improving the deployability and usability of its forces. Emphasising the gap between the well-accepted political commitment and the ability to generate NATO forces when required, de Hoop Scheffer said the Alliance must adapt to new developments “not only politically but also militarily”.

The need for partnerships

The Secretary General issued a *cri de coeur* for the wider international community to stay involved in Afghanistan and other areas of the world. Calling for holistic solutions, de Hoop Scheffer said that while NATO could ensure stability and security, it could not enable long-term goals (better education, improved housing, defeating drug-related problems, etc.) to be reached without effective long-term partnerships. His speech could also be viewed in the context of NATO and EU enlargements. Examining the transatlantic relationship, **Robert Ondrejcsák**, Director of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies, Ministry of Defence, Slovak Republic, argued that Slovakia and its regional partners supported the development of the

ESDP because “only a strong Europe capable of action can be an adequate partner of the US”. Like **George Cristian Maior**, State Secretary for Defence Policy, Romania, Ondrejcsák supported both a strong Europe and the ESDP, and a vibrant transatlantic relationship. Taking a practical stance, **Jan Winkler**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, called for the ESDP to have teeth and avoid being just about “means and capabilities”.

Prevention or pre-emption?

In the second session, **Ginte Damušis**, Ambassador, Mission of Lithuania to NATO, saw a world of difference between the thinking of Europe and the US. The Ambassador could not see Europe moving in the direction of pre-emptive military strikes, but she saw political and economic ‘strikes’ as being within the strategic plan. **Christoph Heusgen**, Director for Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, Council of the European Union gave an emphatic no to pre-emptive strikes not covered by the UN, and agreed with Ambassador Damušis that there was little common ground on each side of the Atlantic. Heusgen did admit though that Europe had no fixed policy yet on what to do if the UN failed to resolve a problem, such as the threat of genocide or if there was a necessity to act to save EU citizens' lives.

Michael C. Ryan, Representative of the US Secretary of Defense, Mission of the United States of America to the EU, had the answer – he declared that “the capable” would intervene. In his view, that meant those who had “the force and the willingness to act” and were most likely to suffer the consequences. In the follow-up debate, **John Colston**, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, NATO, said it was not possible for the EU and NATO to define “rules” for pre-emptive action or to exclude such actions, as they may act as a deterrent. Reacting to Colston's comments, Michael C. Ryan commented that the US generally stood alone ... or with its strong and capable partners.

The Agency

The final session saw a wide-ranging debate about the pros and cons of the envisaged European Defence Agency. Looking at the agency from a NATO viewpoint, **Marshall Billingslea**, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, waxed lyrical about the benefits of having “robustly networked forces”, such as improved information sharing and collaboration, greater awareness and improved synchronisation of forces in the field. He argued that the benefits of network centric warfare had been seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Billingslea’s message was clear – there was a need to invest in network centric warfare now! Stressing the importance of IT systems, he foresaw improved networked solutions producing a major shift in NATO’s organisational structure and a change in priorities. Noting that Europe would also need to transform, Billingslea saw a role for the Agency to smooth the way for potential suppliers of new technology. But **Alexander Nicoll**, Assistant Director and Senior Fellow for Defence Industry and Procurement, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK, said Europe had to define its own role in the world and hence its own view of transformation.

Paulo Portas, Minister of State and Defence, Portugal, gave his full backing to the agency, saying it would do more for European defence policy than thousands of speeches. Nicoll was more circumspect, declaring that despite the existence of the political will to succeed, national capabilities and requirements played an important role. He warned that no one should expect too much, too quickly. This was supported to some degree, by **Hilmar Linnenkamp**¹, Director General of Armaments, International Affairs, German MoD, who examined the current gaps in transatlantic cooperation in some depth. **Sir Peter Ricketts**, UK Ambassador to NATO, was more positive. He agreed that the agency could be a new (badly-needed) focal point across the EU and felt it could inject a new sense of dynamism within the armaments domain. In practice, he looked forward to a more-integrated defence market, better cross-border co-operation and the need to work closely with industry and with NATO.

¹ Currently a member of the European Defence Agency (EDA) Establishment Team.





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Keynote Address -

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General, NATO

Highlighting the importance of the NATO Summit meeting in Istanbul, de Hoop Scheffer acknowledged that the world's attention would also be focused on the G-8 meeting, the US-EU Summit and the Normandy commemoration. He therefore saw the summit as part of a wider picture, with NATO acting in concert with its partners to defend against new threats. Introducing the concept of "projecting stability", the Secretary General said it was essential to address risks and threats far away from NATO's homelands. In his words, "either we tackle these problems when and where they emerge, or they will end up on our doorstep."

Secretary General **de Hoop Scheffer** then outlined how the new NATO could tackle stability,

- By strengthening relationships with partners, from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from Central Asia to the Mediterranean countries and the wider region.
- Through military operations in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and through the operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea.
- By modernising NATO's organisation and processes, and by deploying its forces for the new operations, far from home.

Priorities and scope

The Secretary General's main priority for the summit was Afghanistan. After outlining ISAF's achievements, he gave notice that he would announce a further expansion of NATO's presence in Afghanistan, to support the elections that the UN was organising later in 2004.

As well as military operations, de Hoop Scheffer described NATO's plans in the political arena, where he insisted that projecting stability meant "building partnerships to maximise our collective ability to defend the peace". As examples of a successful policy, de Hoop Scheffer listed Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.



Putting the focus on defence reform, the Secretary General looked to increased co-operation with the Caucasus and Central Asia regions, areas essential to NATO's security. This took de Hoop Scheffer on to Russia, where he described a number of joint NATO-Russia projects (in the areas of counter-terrorism, proliferation, civil emergency planning and military-to-military co-operation). To cement this relationship, he hoped that President Putin would be present at the Istanbul summit.

Reviewing the ever-widening scope of NATO's activity, de Hoop Scheffer described the Alliance's plans for increased cooperation in the Ukraine, the Mediterranean countries and the Middle East, where he said "the time has come to build new bridges to this pivotal region". On Iraq, it would certainly be on the Istanbul agenda, but with the pace of events in that country, de Hoop Scheffer could not predict possible decisions by the Alliance.

The NATO – EU relationship

The Secretary General welcomed the ESDP as a means for Europe to contribute to global security. As an example, he looked forward to the EU's assignment in Bosnia and saw the EU-NATO relationship as being about "pragmatism, close consultation and transparency". Looking to the long-term, the Secretary General stated that the goal was to welcome both Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Serbia and Montenegro in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.

The new NATO

The Secretary General then turned to the results of NATO's military transformation:

- The NATO Response Force was up and running.
- The Prague Summit initiatives had been completed (enhanced airlift and sealift capabilities and a package of counter terrorism and missile defence measures).
- The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence battalion was operational.

But for de Hoop Scheffer, transformation also meant deployability and usability. He wanted NATO to have the forces to meet its commitments and this implied "better force generation and force planning procedures". In conclusion, the Secretary General described a NATO that was building security wherever it was needed, as business as usual was not an option.

Q & A session - de Hoop Scheffer

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer answered a number of questions from the floor, with subjects ranging from out of area operations to the need for greater political will, and from NATO's links with the EU to its long term goals.

NATO and the EU

Defense News's **Brooks Tigner** asked what it would take to get EU and NATO to move forward together, as if there were no institutional walls. For the Secretary General, it was a matter of "ambition and time". In terms of ambition, he insisted that the partnership must be built so that all actions were complementary. Using intelligence as an example, de Hoop Scheffer called for nations to share information as the new threats affected everyone. Overall, de Hoop Scheffer admitted that NATO needed a greater degree of co-operation with the EU.

Out of area

Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs' **Jan Winkler** wanted to know how NATO's wish to get involved in tackling problems "where they arise" was reflected in the necessity to follow the UN Charter. Adding Africa to the potential areas of operation, the European Parliament's **Ernst Gülicher** asked if NATO's brief extended to preventing future genocides.

Tackling Winkler's question, de Hoop Scheffer stressed the importance of the UN and remarked that NATO's relationship there could indeed be stronger. Looking at the bigger picture, he argued that today's NATO needed close contact with both the UN and the EU. On Africa, de Hoop Scheffer said he could not see NATO "projecting stability" to that continent but he added that action there could not always be excluded. For the Secretary General, the subject of NATO's global reach

was still being debated. It was too early to say if NATO was ready to intervene wherever troubles flared up in the world.

This led **Magda Baraka**, Egypt's Mission to the EU, to ask why NATO needed more forces if it did not intend to get involved wherever problems occurred. She also wanted to know more about any potential intervention in the Middle East and how NATO's defence reform could impact: a) the threat to NATO's nations and b) stability in the Middle East.

The Secretary General did not want more troops, but rather the right forces - trained, equipped and deployable at short notice. Providing statistics, de Hoop Scheffer said that NATO had only 55,000 forces on the ground out of a potential force (including reservists but excluding the US) of 2 million. However, he highlighted the problem of sustaining even that number and called for more effective forces rather than troops in greater numbers.

As for the Greater Middle East, de Hoop Scheffer explained that it was a pivotal region where NATO had two tracks:

- the "Mediterranean Dialogue"² launched in 1994 which needed to be strengthened.
- further consultation in the wider region at the request of NATO foreign ministers (April, 2004); to see if "joint ownership" of a new dialogue could be achieved "if the nations so wish".

Iraq and the need for greater political will

NATO's Nations' **Frederick Bonnart** was concerned about the ability of NATO to provide forces if it also became involved in Iraq. The BBC World Service's **Oana Lungescu** referred to "embarrassing" problems in regard to furnishing NATO troops with helicopters in Afghanistan and asked if the Alliance had the necessary political will to work "out of area". Given such problems, Lungescu wanted to know if NATO was ever likely to go to Iraq.

The Secretary General said that whether or not NATO played "a more structured role" in Iraq would depend on future circumstances. However, he did agree with Bonnart that there was a "single set of forces" and that deployment could impact NATO's actions elsewhere. While giving his full support to the battle group concept, the Secretary General stated he was "an Atlanticist at

heart and a European by vocation". To improve the situation, he called for a stronger link between political commitment and force planning & generation.

Admitting later that this problem could not be solved quickly, de Hoop Scheffer said its resolution depended on how individual nations financed their military operations. The Secretary General added that he wanted heads of state and governments, in Istanbul, to task NATO to improve its internal systems to improve the overall effectiveness of the Alliance.

The Secretary General did not agree with the BBC World Service's correspondent that the problems with equipping NATO troops in Afghanistan were embarrassing, as they were an indication of expensive logistical problems. He re-emphasised the need to improve the link between political commitment and getting forces on the ground. However, de Hoop Scheffer argued that the necessary political will would be demonstrated in Istanbul.

Long term goals

The European Commission's **Bernhard Jarzynka** wanted to know who were the possible candidates for further entry to NATO. To this, the Secretary General simply commented that NATO had an "open door" policy. Describing the process of gaining entry as a "long and winding road", de Hoop Scheffer listed several countries from the Balkans, the Ukraine and candidates from the Caucasus who had all expressed an interest in joining the Alliance. Russia, however, had no intention in gaining membership.

A cri de coeur

The Secretary General brought the debate to a close by issuing a *cri de coeur* for the wider international community to stay involved in Afghanistan and other areas of the world. Calling for holistic solutions, de Hoop Scheffer said that while NATO could ensure stability and security, it could not enable long-term goals (better education, improved housing, defeating drug-related problems, etc.) to be reached without effective partnerships existing over a long period.

² NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated (1994) by the North Atlantic Council. It involves seven non-NATO countries of the region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. It reflects the view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.

³ The Secretary General gave the example of the need to improve airlift capability following problems getting helicopters to Afghanistan.

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Session 1:

Will the EU and NATO enlargements reshape Europe's Defence Policy?

Vecdi Gönül, Minister of National Defence, Turkey

Gönül saw the EU as a major player and partner for NATO. Welcoming EU enlargement, Gönül added that NATO's partnership with the EU would be a key part of the ESDP – a process that Turkey fully supported. Backing transatlantic cooperation, he referred to the 'Berlin Plus' agreement and the 'Nice Implementation document' as the two pillars of EU-NATO cooperation. Highlighting EU's involvement in Bosnia as a test case for Berlin Plus, he stressed the importance of the 'Nice Implementation document' in ensuring the effective participation of non-EU allies in operations.

Turning to the Defence Agency, Gönül said it could be a useful framework in this regard. However, he called for its scope to be expanded with the rights and responsibilities of WEAG and WEAO being preserved. Also highlighting the importance of the Istanbul summit in terms of EU and NATO cooperation, Gönül called for NATO's "open door" policy to be continued to enhance security in a wider region. He concluded by declaring that Turkey's expenditure on defence was above the EU average and that Turkey's membership of the EU and a role in the ESDP would be of benefit for all.

George Cristian Maior, State Secretary for Defence Policy, Romania

George Cristian Maior referred to both recent enlargements, describing them as part of a "whole and free" strategy for Europe. Maior said that all new member states and candidates for accession had played their part, by transforming their societies and processes. But the strategy did not end in Europe, as he saw the need for a new transatlantic vision. Maior therefore argued that Europe should be part of the transatlantic project while retaining its own defence and security policy.



Vecdi Gönül
Minister of National Defence, Turkey

Maior emphasised the importance of the new members of both the EU and NATO as they had an historical perception of the key security threats. He therefore suggested a shift of emphasis to those areas bordering the new Europe, for example the Black Sea region which faced many threats, including those relating to so-called "frozen conflicts".

Arguing that the new member states had the same objectives, Maior called for continuity in the strategic transatlantic policy. But he stressed the necessity for Europe to define its own "defence acquis" within the overall framework. In this regard, he said that Romania would continue to support NATO via Berlin Plus and continue to support closer cooperation within the strategic transatlantic policy.



George Cristian Maior
State Secretary for Defence Policy, Romania

Robert Ondrejcsák, Director of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies, Ministry of Defence, Slovak Republic

Looking at the significant impact of recent enlargements, Robert Ondrejcsák argued that Central European countries had become “more sensitive to non-democratic regimes”. He gave this as the reason for the strong support, from those countries, for US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Taking another historical perspective, Ondrejcsák referred to the “Munich Syndrome”, whereby Central European countries had turned to NATO as the “only organisation capable of guaranteeing effective security to its members”. Stressing the importance of the transatlantic alliance, Ondrejcsák said that all new member states (EU and NATO) considered NATO to be irreplaceable and was “the most important element of security for both the Euro-Atlantic area and individual Central European countries”.

However, Ondrejcsák argued that Slovakia and its regional partners also supported the development of the ESDP because “only a strong Europe capable of action can be an adequate partner of the US”. And he also supported further enlargements (eastwards and south-eastwards), as Central European countries did not want to be permanently on the geographical periphery.

As for the future, Ondrejcsák acknowledged that the Balkans and Eastern Europe (namely Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Moldova) were regions of vital interest to Slovakia. Reviewing current participation in peace-stabilising missions and NGOs’ role in the development and strengthening of democratic values, Ondrejcsák

added that Central European countries were also willing to get involved in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa. This would be assistance of a “more or less political nature”, given the limited material, economy and human resources.

Warning against the creation of exclusive members-only clubs within the EU, Ondrejcsák concluded with an overview of what the two enlargements would bring in the future: more emphasis on regions such as the Balkans and the Ukraine, greater international co-operation and a stronger transatlantic relationship.

Jan Winkler, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic

Jan Winkler reviewed the ESDP and declared it was a dynamic process that needed just a slight adjustment – aided by Czech Republic input - rather than drastic reshaping. He emphasised the need for the ESDP to be complementary to a transatlantic alliance, driven by “the big three” – Berlin, Paris and London. Winkler argued that other member states could only take up their positions once the “big three” had reached a compromise – however, he argued that this sometimes caused problems, for example, in the case of battle groups. The role of the smaller member states was to keep the ESDP “dynamic and realistic”.

Looking at the ESDP and the transatlantic alliance, Winkler saw them as mutually strengthening. Acknowledging 9/11’s role in US thinking, Winkler said the new member states did not feel that they were in a war to the same extent as the US. However, he stressed that they did see the need for unity within the transatlantic community. Although the unity of purpose had diminished in recent times, he called for both sides to find agreement, possibly in joint operations – in Kabul and Baghdad.

His final point dealt with importance of the ESDP having the “will to act”, as it had to be more than just “means and capabilities”. Noting that Berlin Plus was an excellent base for future actions, Winkler argued for the “single set of forces” concept, as anything else would waste resources. He argued strongly for a political will that would ensure “rapid and robust responses” in the face of threats, as in Bosnia, Macedonia and the Congo. In short, Winkler called for concrete proposals that could only follow an open dialogue involving all partners.

Lars-Erik Lundin, Head of Unit, Security Policy, European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations

Lars-Erik Lundin hoped that the enlarged NATO and EU communities had a reinforced capacity to push forward with their neighbourhood policies. Lundin noted that Prodi's "Ring of Friends" included future candidates and some countries who would never become member states, but he said that the EU's values would continue to attract countries and develop a force for reform.

Using Bosnia as a case in point, he argued it showed the synergies between the EU and NATO both in general terms and in the detailed work necessary for EU to follow on from SFOR. Lundin argued that defence reform in Bosnia went hand-in-hand with other reforms and could spill over to countries such as Croatia. Furthermore, he looked forward to Bosnia – and other Balkan states – to become a candidate for EU membership. Pointing to the 5 billion euro pledge to the Western Balkans (Security Charter, 1999) Lundin said there was a clear link between security and aid.

Lundin added two other aspects of enlargement – 'new borders' and 'new member states'. He argued that borders were extremely important but he spoke against "Fortress Europe". Rather he said there would be financial aid in terms of cross-border cooperation. Looking forward to a broader "Border Management System", he highlighted the problems of heroin reaching the EU from Afghanistan and the need to tackle WMD proliferation. Turning to the new member states, Lundin said they had a wealth of experience and he felt sure they would enhance Europe's security strategy.



First session – Q&A

The European Parliament's Green Group's **Ernst Gülcher** asked if the "big three" did take decisions, wouldn't that mean that the smaller countries would be ignored.

Winkler used "battle groups" to illustrate his answer. Noting that the Czech Republic was initially against the concept as it was in contradiction to the 'single set of forces' concept, Winkler said that its points of concern had been answered in the latest proposals. He did add, however, that while the Czech Republic's voice was always heard within NATO, that was not the case within the EU.

Nils Jansons, Latvian Mission to NATO, wanted to know how the desired "will to act" could be guaranteed. Winkler replied that this was the most difficult part of the strategy as it depended on those who had the most resources. He spoke against appeasement and in favour of the Czech Republic making their own contribution where possible – even when public opinion was not always totally in favour of action.



Lars-Erik Lundin
Head of Unit, Security Policy,
European Commission,
Directorate General for External Relations

Jan Winkler
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Czech Republic

Session 2

From left: **Christoph Heusgen** Director for Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, Council of the European Union, **John Colston** Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, NATO, **Hartmut Bühl** Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), **Ginte Damušis** Ambassador, Delegation of Lithuania to NATO & **Michael C. Ryan** Representative of the US Secretary of Defense, Mission of the United States of America to the EU



Session 2:

When does peacekeeping become “pre-emption”?

Ginte Damušis, Ambassador, Delegation of Lithuania to NATO

Ambassador Damušis saw “a world of difference in political terms” between peace-keeping and pre-emptive actions. For example, Kosovo was a reaction to a deteriorating situation rather than a pre-emptive engagement. Looking at the US’s policy of pre-emptive action, Ambassador Damušis said it had “extremely heavy political implications”. She could not see Europe moving it that direction as there was a major gap in the two sides’ thinking. As for Lithuania, the Ambassador expected it to be involved in robust peace-keeping missions but not in pre-emptive actions.

Although Ambassador Damušis agreed that the EU’s Rapid Response Force was limited to lower intensity missions, she argued that the EU’s strategy allowed it to break out of that mode. And while ruling out military pre-emptive strikes, the Ambassador saw political and economic ‘strikes’ as being within the strategic plan.

Addressing the rights and wrongs of pre-emptive military strikes, Ambassador Damušis said that most observers could accept the concept if they came under a UN banner. However, one problem remained, i.e. what was the trigger mechanism to fire-off such pre-emptive strikes? The Ambassador called for a serious transatlantic dialogue, to discuss questions such as – when is intelligence persuasive enough to act and when is diplomacy exhausted?

Concluding with Lithuania’s view of EU-NATO cooperation (vital to meet the goal of effective multilateralism), Ambassador Damušis said it backed a single set of forces, supplementary force planning and synchronised decision-making and actions. The Ambassador said the EU had to achieve its objectives in an effective manner without replicating NATO, adding that EU member states had considerable skills in crisis management.



Ginte Damušis
Ambassador, Delegation of Lithuania
to NATO

John Colston, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, NATO

John Colston focused his remarks on the rapid reaction forces, both in the EU and NATO, and asked whether that would lead to a pre-emptive doctrine. From a NATO viewpoint, he clarified three points:

- *The available instruments should not impact decision-making:* Colston argued that the mere existence of rapid reaction forces must not impact the decision-making process itself.



John Colston
Assistant Secretary General for Defence
Planning and Operations, NATO

- *Circumstances must impact concepts and doctrines:* Here, he argued that the threats from terrorists and the proliferation of WMDs should not change underlying doctrines. Colston added that you never legislate for when force should be used, however, he backed the need for forces to be rapidly deployable to avert crises if necessary.
- *Not pre-emptive but...:* Colston explained that NATO had prepared a concept for defence against terrorism, such that NATO forces could disrupt and prevent terrorist attacks.

Colston argued that conflict prevention was better than conflict resolution, adding that partnerships were required in such cases to encourage reform and maintain the capacity to act. The EU and NATO needed to work together to ensure a coherent and consistent approach.

On the subject of the green light, Heusgen explained that EU's decision-making had improved dramatically in recent years, with the unit of time (to make a decision) being reduced from one month to one day - due to the introduction of the EU's Political Security Committee. In parallel, he added, the EU foreign ministers were discussing a new headline goal – that included a rapid reaction element - that reflected the EU's increased global importance.

But on the question of whether recent events marked a move towards an EU policy of pre-emption, Heusgen gave an emphatic “no”. He commented that there had been long discussions on the subject, but commented that the two strategies (the EU's and the US's) were far apart. Heusgen defined the two approaches in some detail:

- **Pre-emption (the US policy):** meant that the US would act pre-emptively in order to forestall hostile acts by adversaries and would not hesitate to act alone in self-defence
- **Prevention (the EU's option):** the EU was bound by article 11 of the Treaty of Rome which aimed to safeguard common values in accordance with the principles of the UN charter

Heusgen also noted that Iraq had somewhat changed the US's position, or had at least led to some opinions being changed. On the European side, there was still an ongoing debate about what to do if the UN failed to resolve a problem, such as the threat of genocide or if there was a necessity to act to save EU citizens' lives. Overall, Heusgen was positive about the situation and saw light at the end of the transatlantic tunnel.

Christoph Heusgen
Director for Policy Planning and
Early Warning Unit,
Council of the European Union



Christoph Heusgen, Director for Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, Council of the European Union

Christoph Heusgen directly addressed the two questions set by the New Defence Agenda:

- how well developed were the political mechanisms in Europe for giving the green light for future emergency actions? and:
- did the rapid deployment of military peacekeepers to head-off security threats take Europe a step towards the Bush Administration's doctrine of “pre-emptive action”?

Michael C. Ryan, Representative of the US Secretary of Defense, Mission of the United States of America to the EU

After announcing that he would be provocative, Michael C. Ryan made a pre-emptive strike, saying that the crisis itself determined the correct timing for, and the correct type of, military intervention – “everything else is politics”.

Describing a crisis timeline that included instability, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction and “hopefully” the development of

democratic institutions, Ryan declared that military intervention was a sign that the international community had failed to address the root causes of a problem.

But in circumstances where the international community had failed to avert a crisis, Ryan held a clear view. In that case, he declared, “the capable intervene”. Defining “the capable” as those who had “the force and the willingness to act”, Ryan added that those who were not capable, defended their interests.

This led Ryan to ask a series of searching questions:

- Did having the capability to act mean that one was responsible to act?
- If the capable were indeed responsible and did not act, were they guilty?
- If they were guilty for any consequences of not acting, how could that be reinforced?

Ryan saw the difficulty in developing a legal structure to support such circumstances but concluded it was for “the capable” to decide what should be done, while those that were “not capable” had nothing to decide.

Ryan argued that those most likely to suffer consequences were most likely to act while those who did nothing were free to pursue their own (political) agendas. He added that the process leading to UN Security Council resolutions was all too predictable, a fact that could be used by those with aggressive tendencies. Ryan noted that President Milosevic had expected NATO to go to the UN after the Rambouillet talks had failed and had been surprised by its “pre-emptive action” (March 1999).

In short, Ryan said that principles could not be abandoned and listed five courses of action:

- Get involved early to eliminate the root causes of instability
- Gather, share and analyse intelligence data so that decisions are informed ones
- Support the UN’s involvement in crisis prevention
- Understand that everyone shares the consequences of global instability

- Everyone needs to contribute to building capability to act swiftly and effectively if an aggressor defies the international community

His final plea was for the international community to develop a real conflict prevention strategy and the associated political will.



Michael C. Ryan
Representative of the US Secretary of
Defense, Mission of the United States of
America to the EU

Second session – Q&A

As the session moderator, EADS’ **Hartmut Bühl** suggested that questions be centred on the use of pre-emptive actions and the resolution of problems when no UN mandate existed.

What does the pre-emptive option mean?

The European Parliament’s Green Group’s **Ernst Gülcher** wanted to know, if the type of pre-emptive actions proposed by Ryan were allowed, why hadn’t the genocide in Rwanda been prevented. So, he asked, wasn’t the US policy more likely to consist of bombing targets such as Iran or North Korea if they did not comply with its requests. That, for Gülcher, should never be an option for the international community.

John Colston said it was not possible for the EU and NATO to define “rules” for pre-emptive action or to exclude such actions, as they may act as a deterrent. Using Iran as a “good example” of preventive actions being taken, Colston went on to add that – in response to Ryan – all nations should act together, including the “capable” and the “not capable”. He stressed the need for political strength and declared it to be more important than military capability. Ambassador **Ginte Damušis** reiterated her point that the European capacity to act was not limited to military actions, as there was a “basket of capabilities”.



Reacting to Colston's comments, **Michael C. Ryan** agreed that nations should act together, but asked what would happen if the international community could not solve the problem. He argued, in that case, "the US stands alone... and with its strong and capable partners". Thus the "coalition of the willing" often found itself opposed by those partners who had not found their interests being served - no international decision-making was possible.

EU – speed of decision-making

Defense News's **Brooks Tigner** asked if it was correct that a "pool of money" had made decisions on missions easier within the Council and, if so, wouldn't that be a good model for the Defence Agency? **Christoph Heusgen** agreed that there was a financing problem in the EU, in comparison to NATO, as to how missions might be funded, perhaps from a "common EU budget". He thought it was too early to say how decision-making would take place in the Defence Agency, as the rules were under discussion.

Taking the long-term view

The Foreign Policy Centre's **Richard Gowan** insisted it was necessary to pre-empt not only actions but also the effects of those actions. This, in his view, had not happened since Kosovo, and had not been totally implemented in that case either, i.e. the sporadic anti-Serb violence. He argued that more money might go to "other" capabilities such as post-conflict stabilisation and police operations. Gowan wanted to know how Ryan saw this affecting funding and thinking, if there was a greater focus on the long-term.

Ryan reminded Gowan that military interventions were just points on a long timescale and you should always examine the origins of a crisis. However, he couldn't agree the cost of post-conflict stabilisation, as it was generally unaffordable. Ryan's solution was to get to grips with problems and "integrate nations more quickly and robustly into the community". He saw involvements in places such as Africa and Afghanistan as being long-term activities.

Colston saw the need for NATO, and the EU, to develop capabilities to bridge a transitional period (post-conflict) and to be prepared for a long period of stabilisation. Thus, military planning cycles had to be realistic and plan for a number of years to be set aside for post-conflict responsibilities.

The European Commission's **Spyros Konidakis** echoed the point made by Ambassador Damušis, stating that "capabilities" were not limited to military ones, as they had to be used in extremely complex situations, both pre-and post-intervention. Heusgen added that these thoughts had been echoed in the European Security Strategy, he saw the EU as being "uniquely prepared to act in crisis management".

Ryan stuck to his guns. He agreed that capabilities were not only of a military kind, but added that if a crisis did have global repercussions, the US preferred the "post-conflict mess", described by Konidakis, to be in the target country rather than in the US. Then post-conflict, Ryan agreed that someone had to pick up the pieces. Here, he opined that the good things – done by the coalition in Iraq for example – never made it into the press (as the media only saw difficulties).

International consensus – likely or not?

The press responded immediately in the form of NATO's Nations' **Frederick Bonnart**, who said the media's job was to highlight problems. He then remarked that there would always be differences of opinion along Ryan's described timeline. Bonnart therefore asked if international consensus was ever likely to be possible.

Colston was positive about the international community being able to reach agreement as it had only failed to do so in Iraq, whereas it had succeeded in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Backing up Bonnart's point, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's **Mark Fischer** asked what

constituted a crisis and if nations had different views on the matter, what forum could be used to resolve the issue? Would it be NATO, the UN, EU-US Summits or a new forum altogether?

Heusgen picked up the ball and saw it clearly from an EU viewpoint. Problems had to be resolved within the framework of the UN charter and it therefore had to be strengthened – “multilateralism has to be more effective”.

Magda Baraka, Egypt's Mission to the EU, also supported Bonnard's view but, paraphrasing Ryan, did not like the US's statement that if anyone is not “capable”, they should get out of the way. Baraka said that Ryan had asked for “new ideas”, but noted that in Iraq, where there had been a groundswell of opinion against military intervention, those voices had been ignored.

Closing remarks from the panel

Co-moderator **Jamie Shea** wanted to ask some questions before the wrap:

- Intelligence was vital but how could its margin for error be reduced?
- How could the timing of the post-conflict intervention be improved, e.g. in Kosovo and in Iraq (forced migration, looting, etc.)?

- Wasn't there a danger of EU and NATO massively duplicating operations, e.g. in Bosnia.

Taking Shea's questions on intelligence and EU-NATO duplication, Colston agreed that (tactical) intelligence was important but gave equal weight to the need to share information about the motivations of terrorism. As for the EU-NATO relationship, this made sense for Colston as NATO had the military strength while the EU, as well as conducting military and defence activities, could bring the full range of political and economic instruments.

Heusgen agreed that reluctance to share intelligence had to be overcome. On the subject of the EU-NATO relationship, he was not convinced that the way forward in Bosnia (the SFOR take-over) was the right way to go. He could see too many people (NATO, the EU and the US) involved and he saw danger signs looming. Heusgen wanted a better division of labour, based on which organisation was the better placed to solve a particular problem.

Ryan noted that intelligence was an “inexact art” with the resulting information being somewhat bureaucratic. He agreed with Shea that the timing of transition was difficult, as in Kosovo, where he put the blame on too much risk being accepted. Concluding on the NATO-EU, he suggested that the urgent needs be addressed first. And on that note, Bühl thanked the panel and closed the second session. Lunch was waiting.

Session 3

From left: **Marshall Billingslea** Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO, **Paulo Portas** Minister of State and Defence, Portugal, **Scott A. Harris** President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global Inc., **Sir Peter Ricketts** UK Ambassador to NATO & **Hilmar Linnenkamp** Director General of Armaments, International Affairs, German MoD



Session 3:

Could Europe's new defence agency herald an EU-US industries pact?

Lockheed Martin Global Inc.'s **Scott A. Harris** moderated the final session, introducing it as a move "from context to content". Without more ado, he gave the floor to Marshall Billingslea.

Marshall Billingslea, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO.

Describing the NATO transatlantic armaments cooperation as "being re-energised", Billingslea focused on two key areas: the defence against terrorism and network centric warfare.

The defence against terrorism

Billingslea came straight to the point – the armaments community had a vital role to play. Describing the fight against terrorism as "leading-edge", he announced that the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) had recently agreed a package of measures. Specialist NATO committees would work to build anti-terrorist capabilities in eight areas, including shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and improved harbour infrastructures.

Network Centric Warfare

Billingslea waxed lyrical about the benefits of having "robustly networked forces", listing benefits that included improved information sharing and collaboration, greater awareness and improved synchronisation of forces in the field. He argued that the benefits of network centric warfare had been seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they had been combined with conventional weaponry. His message was clear – there was a need to invest in network centric warfare now!

Building on this, Billingslea stressed the need to pursue NATO network-enabled capability through a systems-engineering approach (examine national needs and



Marshall Billingslea
Assistant Secretary General for Defence
Investment, NATO


develop a transatlantic capability), to release the huge potential. He emphasised that the future of defence lay in the IT domain though the implementation of better networked solutions that would produce a big shift in the organisational structure of NATO forces and a change in priorities. This would result in smaller, more modular units and troops with "plug-and-fight" capabilities. Billingslea added that forces would be lighter, more lethal, completely networked and, at the HQ level, completely digital.

Cooperation is the key

Billingslea argued that enhanced transatlantic cooperation was vital as a "transformed US and an untransformed Europe would be detrimental to both sides". He also called for more integration between military requirements, R&D and logistics which could lead to what Billingslea described as "the core of the NATO warfighter's toolkit for the foreseeable future": This would encompass a meaningful capacity to conduct counter-terrorist operations, and defend against and destroy WMDs, backed by intelligence reconnaissance & surveillance capability. But challenges remained, and Billingslea listed a raft of problems:

- The procurement process was too slow and too expensive, more cooperation was needed to reduce prices, allow longer production runs and bring greater interoperability (the key to success in the field)

Hilmar Linnenkamp
Director General of Armaments, International Affairs, German MoD.
Currently a member of the European Defence Agency (EDA) Establishment Team



Hilmar Linnenkamp, Director General of Armaments, International Affairs, German MoD

With the discussions concerning the Agency ongoing, Hilmar Linnenkamp used his remarks to examine the current gaps in transatlantic cooperation:

- *The gap in military capabilities:* Linnenkamp pointed to a “huge opportunity in Europe” to enforce defence planning – but only if demand could be consolidated; he added that there was both a need for “clarity of demand and clarity of supply”.
- *The technology gap:* The Agency could play an executive role with existing technology bodies, so

- Acquisitions needed to be innovatively resourced, e.g. by pooling and leasing equipment
- New systems were required to make forces “more usable and capable”
- Restrictions on defence trade had to be lifted
- Armaments work had to be prioritised to avoid wastage on low priority tasks
- Defence & security spending had to be reinvigorated and budgets increased

Overall, Billingslea stressed the need to reinforce transatlantic defence cooperation in order to make things happen, but that did not take away the necessity for Europe to improve intra-European cooperation.

that a focus on key technologies could be used to improve European capabilities.

- *The industry gap:* The agency would probably be the place where governments came together, with the European Commission, to discuss industrial policy in order to reduce fragmentation.
- *The finance gap:* As this gap (with the US) would not change dramatically, Linnenkamp argued there was pressure to get more “bang for the euro” and that this would be more difficult in an enlarged EU. He saw a potentially vital role for the Agency here.
- *The conceptual gap:* This implied the gap in the US and EU defence strategies, where Linnenkamp said the Agency should improve the level of debate to help the EU become (or remain) a more important transatlantic partner. And he added that NATO was the place for such a EU-US dialogue.

Paulo Portas, Minister of State and Defence, Portugal

Paulo Portas initially focused on the Defence Agency, saying it would do more for European defence policy than thousands of speeches. Bemoaning the reduction in defence and security budgets in recent years, and an incoherency between political speech and actions. Portas nevertheless saw positive signs: the completed EU operations, the battle groups concept and the birth of the agency. Minister Portas insisted that Europe had discovered its realism and reality in defence and applauded the fact that defence had not been *the* problem in the Constitution. Minister Portas argued that the EU had found complementarity with NATO - pragmatism had replaced ideology.

Turning to the defence agency, he said there was a need to get it right from the beginning, via simple principles promoting real transformation, real competence, a degree of harmonisation, transparency, opportunities, clear political guidance and inclusiveness within the criteria. Portas saw the agency as an ambitious exercise, which Portugal fully supported. His only doubt lay in the ability of the agency to bring about harmonisation if the agency ignored the significant technological and industrial bases of the member states. Portas saw the agency as a cooperative process where the member states had to

modernise and cope with a fast-moving situation. But the minister ended with some “provocative” questions:

- Could we afford to have an agency that tried to move faster than the ESDP?
- Could the agency start without an increase in defence budgets?
- Should we try and become fully interoperable with NATO, given resources?

His answer to his own final question was a resounding “yes”.

Alexander Nicoll, Assistant Director and Senior Fellow for Defence Industry and Procurement, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK

Alexander Nicoll followed a three-pronged approach. He took a realistic look at the agency’s objectives, examined how Europe could develop its own capabilities and finally reviewed developments in the defence industry.

The Agency’s realistic objectives

Nicoll declared that despite the political will to succeed existing, national capabilities and requirements played an important role, as did “complex relationships” with the US. His conclusion was that we should not expect too much, too quickly.

How Europe could develop its own capabilities

Nicoll saw companies as being trans-national, while their customers remained national. Attempts to change this had met with mixed success, but Nicoll said that Europe should not get “bogged down” with defining how it should have dealt with past situations, but should look to the future – to see if it could meet new threats and to see what deployable and fundable assets existed today.

Nicoll called for Europe to assess the type of missions it would undertake and saw a key role for the agency in that regard. He explained that Europe was under heavy

pressure to transform its forces in line with the US’s programme, with an emphasis on combat. But Nicoll said Europe had to define its own role in the world and hence its own view of transformation.

Developments in the defence industry

Leading on from that, Nicoll suggested that industry itself be viewed in transformational terms, e.g. it should how everything was organised – from its forces to the supply chain. Seeing the need for major changes in the defence industry, Nicoll argued that the market could take care of itself, i.e. industry would reshape itself dependent on government requirements.



Alexander Nicoll
Assistant Director and Senior Fellow
for Defence Industry and Procurement,
International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS), UK

Looking to the future, he did not see many new platforms but he saw new technologies being developed by companies who were not currently part of the defence industry. For example, the US has identified hundreds of companies (in the US and Europe) who could supply the US armed forces in the future. Nicoll’s conclusion – everything was changing. The concept of “prime contractor” was no longer to be taken for granted, and there was a shift to a situation where systems could change several times in the lifetime of a platform. Something for the agency to bear in mind.



Paulo Portas
Minister of State and Defence, Portugal

Sir Peter Ricketts, UK Ambassador to NATO

Sir Peter Ricketts opened by expressing his lack of surprise that the US defence market was more effective than the European one, given the difference in expenditure and the US's integrated customer and supply bases. As for Europe, its customer base was fragmented, its rules for procurement were incoherent and national policies dominated.



Sir Peter Ricketts
UK Ambassador to NATO

Ricketts saw no short-term solution but echoed the UK's view that the European market could be improved (via the development of an effective supplier base, improved R&T prioritisation, etc.). The Ambassador saw a key role for the agency in that area, and highlighted the fact that the UK was visibly promoting EU defence industrial policy! He called for an emphasis on delivering military capability, which meant more harmonised requirements and a more effective capability process.

Ricketts agreed that the agency could be a new (badly-needed) focal point across the EU and inject a new sense of dynamism in the armaments domain. In practice, he looked forward to a more-integrated defence market, better cross-border co-operation and the need to work closely with industry. He did not support, however, a move to compulsory regulation. In conclusion, Ricketts supported Billingslea's call for the agency having a close working relationship with NATO but added that it was too soon to think about a full US-EU industrial pact. It was a case of one step at a time, with enhanced trade being one of the ultimate goals.

Third session – Q&A

The agency's scope

The European Commission's **Bernhard Jarzynka** asked if technology developed by the agency could be used for peaceful means. **Sir Peter Ricketts** explained that the agency was "an enabler" and as such, created the circumstances for technologies to be invented. **Hilmar Linnenkamp** agreed, adding that the developers would retain ownership. He noted, though, that the military might pick up on civil innovations.

Flight International's **Justin Wastnage** was more concerned as to how the agency would handle joint procurement on projects such as the problem-ridden A400M and Joint StarFighter. Linnenkamp said the agency would not run large projects but would identify the most promising areas of cooperation and develop joint requirements. Ricketts added that the agency would aim to resolve problems and harmonise requirements, but budgets would remain dependent on the nations' political will.

The European Parliament's Green Group's **Ernst Gülcher** remarked that the agency's aim to bring greater efficiency and its requirement for "more money" seemed to be contradictory. But he also wanted to know if the agency had a role to play in ensuring weapons and technologies stayed in the right hands. As a supplementary, **Scott A. Harris** asked for a view on how NATO funded defence procurement.

Billingslea said that funding was national, but some flexibility existed. Replying to Gülcher, on NATO's behalf, he said efficiency and expenditure were not inconsistent with each other and both needed to be accomplished. Agreeing that legacy systems had to go, he saw an opportunity for the defence agency to play a key role, especially in bringing new companies (in the IT sector) into the defence arena. But, Billingslea warned that the level of ambition was far greater than current budgets would allow. Efficiencies would help but they would not help enough.

Linnenkamp responded to Gülcher's proliferation question by commenting that the agency would have a role but warned that some countries wanted export control policy to be a national prerogative.

Defense News's **Brooks Tigner** wondered what the agency would actually do in terms of taking a lead, if it did not want to see compulsory regulation. Ricketts just wanted to clear away regulatory burdens and obstacles to an effective market. He wanted the agency to provide mechanisms so that requirements could be harmonised with a view to more efficient delivery of capabilities ... via industry.

Volker Malisius, Delegation of Germany to NATO, wanted to know what happened to the idea of an EU-NATO forum for improving transatlantic co-operation. Billingslea said EU and US industries were already intertwined, everyone had joint ventures – TIPS for example. This was the way of the future, and Billingslea saw the agency helping companies to come together – resulting in lower costs and the development of leading-edge technology. Harris handed over to **Jamie Shea**, who thanked the conference organisers and closed the conference on a sunny Brussels afternoon.



Scott A. Harris
President, Continental Europe,
Lockheed Martin Global Inc.



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in Europe



The European Union is beginning to develop an increasingly orchestrated set of approaches to European security and defence – a Strategic Concept, new missions, new Headline Goals 2010, Battle Groups, a new European Defence Agenda and, with the Commission as agent, Preparatory Action with the aim to launch a European Security Research Program in 2007.

Support in analysis, experimentation and concept development is so far largely coming from member states. It will increasingly be needed on a European level, although EU capacity will be limited for the years to come. The EU thus needs external support.

Leading national security and defence analysis organizations in Europe have thus reached an agreement to co-operate in support of European developments: This *European Security and Defence Analysis Group (ESDAG)* has DGA/CHEAR (France), FOI (Sweden), IABG (Germany), QinetiQ (Great Britain) and TNO (The Netherlands) as founding members. It is open to others with commensurate capacity and it is building special networks with associate members – SMEs, organizations from accession countries, multinational organizations (like JRC/ISPC).

ESDAG co-operates in joint projects with one member as leader on a rotating basis. The chair is currently held by IABG.

ESDAG is co-ordinated through a joint Steering Committee and plans to have a high-level International Advisory Group.

About the NDA

The New Defence Agenda (NDA) offers a platform for political leaders, officials, industry executives and policy analysts to discuss European defence and security issues on a regular basis, and to contribute to a series of Discussion Papers that reflect key points raised in these debates.

The aim of the NDA is not to replicate more academic research-based projects but to give greater prominence to the complex questions of how the EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and to stimulate reaction within the international press.

Bringing clarity and new ideas to the fast-changing defence policy scene has been the NDA's aim from the start. We see ourselves as a builder of partnerships with nationally-based defence think-tanks whose expertise needs to be more widely shared with other analysts and with European-level decision-takers.

NDA brings together a wide range of actors in the security and defence world and its activities range from monthly roundtables, international conferences, press dinners, reports and discussion papers, which attract high-level speakers and industry support.

One of our prime objectives is to raise the profile of defence and security issues among the Brussels-based international press. To encourage more in-depth coverage of defence and security topics the NDA holds regular, informal dinners for journalists.

Its patrons Javier Solana and Chris Patten have backed the initiative from the start along with NDA's president, Eduardo Serra, former Spanish defence minister. The NDA's Advisory Board is made up of some 20 prominent defence experts drawn from a cross-section of government, politics and industry.



NDA
Bibliothèque Solvay

The NDA's meetings are attended by:

- Ambassadors and senior diplomats
- Defence Ministers and top officials
- EU Commissioners and Officials from various DGs
- EU Council civil and military staff
- Senior defence industry executives
- Security and defence policy analysts
- Senior-level diplomatic and defence journalists

Coming Events 2004

SEPTEMBER 2004

Monthly Roundtable at Bibliothèque Solvay **Monday September 20**
Does Europe need a Black Sea Security Policy?

OCTOBER 2004

Monthly Roundtable at Bibliothèque Solvay **Monday October 18**
Is Maritime Security Europe's Achilles Heel?

NOVEMBER 2004

Homeland Security and Terrorism Conference **4 November (tbc)**
"Towards an EU Strategy for Collective Defence"

DECEMBER 2004

Monthly Roundtable at Bibliothèque Solvay **Monday December 6**
Is airlift Capability Europe's major challenge?



From left to right; **M. Vecdi Gönül** Minister of National Defence, Turkey, **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer** Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), **Giles Merritt** Director, New Defence Agenda & **George Cristian Maior** Secretary of State for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Romania



Towards an EU Strategy for Collective Security

An international conference organised by the NEW DEFENCE AGENDA, KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG and EADS.

Keynote Address by Gijs de Vries, Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Council of the European Union

Session 1 9:30-11:00

What are the threats and how should the EU be tackling them?

The level of national responses around Europe to the security threats posed first by 9/11 and then by the Madrid bombings has been mixed. But there is a growing awareness that the EU's Justice and Home Affairs mechanisms and its steps towards common defence policies offer the best chance of strengthening European citizens' collective security. What are the areas of greatest vulnerability to terrorist attack, and what political measures are now being introduced to tighten security across the EU? How best can European policymakers reconcile new counter-terrorism measures with the open frontiers and civil liberties that the EU stands for?

Session 2 11:30-13:00

Case Studies: Protecting Europe's Airways and Frontiers

Case Study No 1: Air Travel Security

European companies are in the forefront of the development of such technologies as anti-missile devices and airport security systems. At the same time, as the EU is increasing the emphasis on security aspects in aeronautics research, the EU is proposing that a European Security Research Programme is launched with a budget of 1bn per year. What is being done to ensure air travellers' safety, and what financial supports may be needed from government to ensure that new technologies are deployed as rapidly as possible?

Brussels, November 4, 2004

Coffee break 11:00-11:30

Case study No 2: Border Control Surveillance

The price of the EU's Schengen Agreement on more open frontiers between most Member States has been a lessening of controls and the risk of reduced security. What is being done to boost police coordination and the pooling of intelligence within the EU? And is the newly enlarged EU of 25 countries more vulnerable than before? What technologies are being developed to increase surveillance of the Union's external and internal frontiers?

Lunch 13:00-14:30

Session 3 14:30-16:00

Can governments respond to global terrorism with a collective policy?

Transatlantic differences over sharing information about air travellers are being resolved, but they underline the difficulties of agreeing global rules. Can the EU's collective policymaking process contribute substantially to stronger international agreements on how to confront and defeat terrorist organisations? What role should NATO be playing in improving the transatlantic counter-terrorist response? In the aftermath of the Iraq conflict, could Europe and the U.S. fashion a new security doctrine that addresses not just terrorism but also the causes of terrorism?

Does Europe need a Black Sea security policy?

This is part of the NDA's series of Monthly Roundtables attended by some 50 defence and security experts who play an active role in the debates. Their discussions are summarised in concise reports that are circulated to policymakers and press and that can be found on the NDA's website.

Session 1

12:00-13:30

What should be Europe's post-Iraq security concerns?

The Iraq crisis has arguably done more than any other post-Cold War event to convince Europeans that their security is no longer a reflection of intra-European issues. But where are the potential flashpoints, and what range of responses may be required of European military forces? From the Balkans to the Black Sea region, what are Europe's economic and political interests, and how can protecting them be reconciled with the concerns of both the U.S. and Russia?

Light Lunch

13:00-14:30

Monthly Roundtable, Monday, 20 September 2004
Bibliothèque Solvay, 12:00-16:00

Session 2

14:30-16:00

Does Europe's 'near abroad' now extend to Central Asia?

The EU and NATO enlargements have brought into much sharper focus potential trouble spots like Moldova or the Caucasus region. What are the chief security concerns of EU candidates like Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, and what influence should they have on the formulation of the CFSP? To what degree will Europe's rising imports of oil and gas determine its interest in the stability of Central Asia?

The New Defence Agenda would like to acknowledge its partners and members for their support in making the NDA a success



Romanian MoD



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