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WHAT POLICIES WILL CREATE EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING?



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PEACEKEEPING – IN AND OUT OF AFRICA

Peacekeeping was the topic of the day and it raised a multitude of questions. How should it be defined, where did it begin and end, and crucially, how did it vary in different regions of the world. A variety of views were expressed, disagreements surfaced and strong opinions were declared. On two subjects, however, there was universal agreement:

- peacekeeping in all its forms was a growth industry
- interoperability between the various players was an absolute must

There was much room for improvement and, as usual, eyes turned towards the international institutions. This time, however, it was not just the EU who was expected to provide all of the answers. The UN and NATO were also seen as key players – but policy reform was necessary if they were to meet the new world order.

Definitions of peacekeeping were plentiful but these were often conflicting and some attendees preferred to add peacemaking and peace building to the mix. NATO's **Daniel Speckhard** argued that the situation was becoming more complex than ever, while the Commission's **Andreas Fischer-Barnicol** said it was not realistic to differentiate between military operations and peacekeeping (in Africa).

Africa featured high on the day's agenda with both South Africa's Ambassador to the EU **Jeremy Matjila** and Kenya's Ambassador to Belgium **Marx Kahende** arguing that the continent did not need peacekeeping forces from the EU. Rather, it needed funding, logistics support (transport facilities, equipment) and planning assistance.

Ambassadors Matjila and Kahende were both keen to see African nations stand on their own feet and to use its regional players to solve conflicts within the continent. This brought in CMI's **Antje Herrberg** who could not foresee a time when the problems in countries like Georgia could be settled by calling in neighbouring countries to act as mediators.

With peacekeeping becoming a global industry, everyone agreed that greater coordination was required. This stretched

from integrated policymaking between the various institutions to total interoperability in the field – including links between military and civilian units.

There was some disagreement about the willingness of the NGOs to be coordinated but that view was countered by Herrberg's call for greater "protection for the protectors". On the subject of future interoperability, only UK Permanent Representation's **Sandy Johnston** commented on future plans, saying that an integrated EU-wide communications system had to be in place to meet the 2010 Headline Goal.

As for other problems facing the peacekeepers, the ICG's **Nicholas Whyte** identified the failure to impose the rule of law and gave Bosnia as a prime example. FLAG's **Karel Vervoort** bemoaned the diminishing role of the smaller EU member states, despite the stated policy of developing a common EU framework. Brigadier-General **Jo Coelmont**, Belgium's Permanent Military Representation to the EU, did not agree, as he saw Belgium playing a significant role in peacekeeping throughout the world.



That was partly the key to this NDA session. No single country could dominate the proceedings and institutions like the UN had to adapt to changing circumstances, and they had to do so quickly. A reformed UN could decide on a different "peacekeeping" approach depending on the circumstances: location, judicial situation, funding, logistics etc.

This was too big a problem for any individual nation. As General Coelmont said during the session, "There are two kinds of EU member states, those that are small and those that don't yet realise that they are small." Someone had to see the bigger picture.

SESSION 1 – IS PEACEKEEPING A SOFTER OPTION FOR EU DEFENCE POLICYMAKERS?

NDA Director **Giles Merritt** took the chair for March's roundtable. The topic was peacekeeping in all its forms. Setting the scene, Merritt argued that public opinion was fully supportive of Europe playing a peacekeeping role in the world's troublespots. He added that the Petersberg tasks were "a matter of duty and honour" and that political support was massing behind the use of Battle Groups. However, Merritt commented that there was no consensus as to when Europe should get involved, and importantly, how it should exit from conflict arenas. He was also concerned about the costs related to peacekeeping activities and just how far Europe's (post colonial) responsibilities extended.

Andreas Fischer-Barnicol, Policy Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and APC Countries, DG External Relations, European Commission



In his current position at the Commission, Fischer-Barnicol was focusing on African crises. He was therefore insistent that peacekeeping was not a "soft option" as mentioned in the day's agenda. In Africa, he explained, it was not realistic to differentiate artificially between military operations peacekeeping and post conflict/reconstruction work. Fischer-Barnicol added that in many conflicts, African states were characterized by weak or non-existent public institutions, that there was less a question of inter-state conflicts than of often long-standing internal conflicts and that any solution had to be embedded in a long term strategy.

"It is not realistic to differentiate between military operations and peacekeeping".

Fischer-Barnicol argued that peacekeeping could not be discussed outside of a UN framework. There were currently six major UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, including Kinshasa ("not out of the woods after five years of transition"), the Ivory Coast (where the UN was "relatively helpless") and Sudan (where Africa was "about to assume its responsibilities" for peace and security).

He referred to the *African Peace Facility* (€ 250 million for African-led peacekeeping at the request of African heads of state) and the *ESDP for Africa framework* (support from EU member states in terms of logistics and planning support) as "new and important" elements.

In conclusion, Fischer-Barnicol saw the main challenges for the future to be: a) making the UN more effective, and b) fostering greater involvement from the African institutions themselves. Both were important but they had to be handled in a complementary fashion for further progress to be made.

Jeremy Matjila, Ambassador, Mission of South Africa to the EU



Ambassador Matjila was insistent. His message was that EU peacekeeping forces were not required in Africa! That was certain. Having gained the attention of the audience, he added a rider. Africa did want the EU to make a contribution. This could be done in several ways:

"EU peacekeeping forces are not required in Africa! But Africa does want the EU to make a contribution (to its future)".

Ambassador Jeremy Matjila

1. *New “doctrines” (approaches) were required* to face the difficult problems that existed. To support that statement, Matjila recounted how Nelson Mandela had requested help from the EU in the nineties (in Burundi “to prevent a massacre”) but it had been refused as no UN mandate (that depended on a ceasefire) existed.
2. *Regional ownership was required:* The EU could help Africa to build on the “political will” that existed, by promoting the regional ownership of initiatives. “A sufficient number of trained peacekeepers” existed, and they should be supplemented by help in the logistics arena, where transport (planes, vehicles, etc.) were either in short supply or obsolete.
3. *Institutional reform in West Africa:* the *African institutions* themselves had to be strengthened continent-wide.
4. *UN reform:* There had to be a debate on the reform of the UN Charter, especially in regard to chapter 8. This related to having UN mandates that allowed resources to be utilised from regional organisations in peacekeeping situations.
5. There had to be *genuine joint management of the African Peace Facility*. Africa needed to be given more responsibility and resource planning had to be jointly managed.
6. There had to be *an increased focus on DDRR* (Disengagement, Demobilisation, Repatriation and Reintegration of former combatants). Matjila explained that ceasefires were often relatively easy to arrange, but there was still a real need to improve the planning of post-conflict scenarios that avoided a possible reversion to the original situation.

“The womens’ movement is one of the biggest movements for peace (in Africa)”.

Ambassador Jeremy Matjila

Maurizio Melani, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Italy to
the EU’s PSC



Ambassador Melani returned the discussion to a more familiar European setting. Referring to Solana’s security strategy, Melani noted that it called for stable and secure neighbourhood regions. Thus threats had to be identified and that meant investing in crisis management (both peacekeeping and peacemaking, the latter in cases where there was no ceasefire).

The EU’s answer was, among others, the Battle Group concept, which implied a potential “robust use of force when absolutely necessary, and civilian instruments”. In response to Ambassador Matjila’s earlier comments, Ambassador Melani declared that Battle Group operations could only be utilised within an approved UN framework.

The Ambassador agreed that there was a need to enhance and empower regional capacities (in Africa and in other parts of the world) and that the use of EU forces would be exceptional. The EU could supply planning assistance & logistics and offer support in the conduct of operations (within the Action Plan for ESDP support to peace and security in Africa).

In regard to crisis management, Ambassador Melani argued that the EU also supports post-conflict situations. The EU had the Action Plan for ESDP on Africa and this was not a purely military one. It could also involve the European Gendarmerie and civilian instruments which can have a good interaction with people and civil society on the ground.

Daniel Speckhard, Director for Policy and Planning, NATO

Speckhard agreed with Fischer-Barnicol that peacekeeping was not a soft option. In recent years, he had seen fundamental changes. Peacekeeping operations were more complex than ever and were often conducted in parallel with reconstruction and conflict management situations. Speckhard explained that this had given rise to new training requirements, and indeed the need for new “doctrines”. Today, troops had to interface with NGOs, support reconstruction activity, etc. Speckhard concluded that the military had to work more closely with civilian groups, as often the former found themselves in situations that they were patently not trained for (policing, law enforcement, etc.).



Focusing on NATO coordination, Speckhard observed that it could work in a complementary way with the EU and the OSCE. For example, it might put a smaller number of troops in the field backed-up by thousands of troops in the barracks. These techniques could be useful in Africa and elsewhere.

“Peacekeeping operations are more complex than ever and are often conducted in parallel with reconstruction and conflict management situations.”

Daniel Speckhard

In a related area, Speckhard referred to Berlin Plus (whereby the EU could call in NATO forces for support) as an “excellent initiative” that should be used both “more and more robustly”. Concluding his remarks with some observations on practical cooperation, Speckhard commented:

1. *The EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force:* the former could be used as building blocks within the NRF, if they were appropriately trained
2. *Training & defence:* NATO had interoperable forces and their experience could be useful in terms of training other forces with the same needs
3. *Civil-military cooperation:* NATO should find a way to include civil planning requirements within NATO’s overall planning cycle
4. *Beyond EU-NATO cooperation:* Speckhard saw an enormous opportunity for NATO to assist the UN as it adapted for the 21st century. Although NATO could not respond to all conflicts, there was a need to define how it could work with the UN and other regional organisations – in the same way that it worked with the EU today (assistance with planning and logistics, etc.).

FIRST SESSION – THE Q&A DEBATE

USING REGIONAL ASSISTANCE ... TOWARDS A LONG-TERM LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The ICG’s **Nicholas Whyte** focused on the civilian side of post-conflict reconstruction, commenting that the international community could do many things (military stabilisation, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, etc.). However, he saw a vacuum as there was a lack of expertise as to how to impose “the rule of law”. That was why a resolution of the Bosnian conflict was ongoing after 10 years. White stressed the need to create the correct legal environment (police training, construction of legal systems, installation of the judiciary) to avoid the recurrence of failed states.

Andreas Fischer-Barnicol agreed but insisted that it could only come from within (the region in conflict). As an example he cited the EU cooperation in the DRC and Liberia where there were major concerns about the transition processes. Post-conflict resolutions could easily be reversed without the right expertise and Fischer-Barnicol argued that the situation would only change if Africa’s own capacities were strengthened.

Ambassador Matjila was on the same wavelength. He had seen complex situations in places like Burundi, where ethnic conflicts had

existed for over 40 years. The AU had attempted to stop the fighting and introduce law and order (in collaboration with the EU). However, the Ambassador wanted to look at fresh initiatives and he had an interesting answer – the “women in dialogue” concept. He wanted to encourage women to get involved in peacekeeping in places like the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda. Ambassador Matjila declared that the women’s movement would be one of the “biggest movement for peace”. That’s where future resources could come from, as the Ambassador had seen too many male-dominated peace talks.

Ambassador Melani agreed that civilian involvement was a key aspect of prevention and post conflict (as seen in Bosnia, Georgia and Iraq) so that a sometimes fragile peace could be strengthened. Ambassador Melani also gave the example of Afghanistan where the EU was not involved, but the international community was acting in an integrated way. He added that the EU’s capacities were growing in this area.

Daniel Speckhard had three points: he felt that:

1. *Progress was being made out in the field*, but a lot depended on the governance of each individual country. It was important to get everyone working in the same direction (top-down approach) with improved planning between central HQs and those in the field.
2. *The military was good at getting itself in line* (well coordinated from the top), but the civilian groups tended to be extremely fragmented; getting those civilian organisations in line (internationally) would not be an easy task.
3. *There was too much churn on the military side of operations*, with people moving in and out too quickly.

Kenya’s Ambassador to Belgium **Marx Kahende** was in total support with Ambassador Matjila, Africa did not need peacekeeping troops. It was much more in need of funding, together with planning and logistics support (e.g. transport, equipment, etc.). Referring back to previous policy failures, as with the UN in the Congo in the sixties, (described as a “total disaster”), Ambassador Kahende argued that more recent operations in Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and Liberia had been more successful due to the mobilisation of regional players (to resolve African conflicts). There had been some teething troubles in some regions but the

Ambassador’s call was loud and clear, “Let Africa be in the forefront of operations”.



He also spotlighted the need for trust to be developed, so that people from the region where the conflict was situated could be involved in “peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction”. The Ambassador welcomed the Africa Peace Facility as a funding mechanism and as a forum for dialogue, but there needed to be a greater focus on what happened next. He wanted a dialogue that led to countries being able to stand on their own feet.

“People from the (African) regions in conflict need to be involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Those countries have to stand on their own feet.”

Marx Kahende

RESOURCES – WHAT’S ON OFFER?

Giles Merritt wanted to know if, given Europe’s track record, the EU would be providing sufficient resources to address the problems on the African continent. Defense News’ **Brooks Tigner** wanted clarification on the kind of support that Africa expected from the various EU funds, and wondered if Fischer-Barnicol thought that such requests might be seen as reasonable.

Ambassador Matjila reminded the meeting that Africa was “ready to shed blood and sacrifice its sons” to make peace in the Continent. He therefore asked, how could it be helped? The Ambassador explained that the AU had decided to send a policing force to Darfur (from Rwanda and Nigeria) but it had had to wait for American planes to transport the troops. There was an urgent need for continent-wide capacities across Africa. Ambassador Matjila called for the EU to build a “continuous funding contribution”

within the next financial perspective so that a robust policy (for standby forces, Africa-wide support) could be built over the long-term.

Andreas Fischer-Barnicol spotlighted the need to develop public opinion so that additional resources could be mobilized in support of African Peace Keeping Capacities. He underlined that the budget of the African Peace Facility remained modest (€250 million) in comparison to the amounts being spent in Liberia (850m \$ US) and the DRC (750m of \$ US) by the UN. Given the rather successful launch of the Peace Facility in 2004, Fischer-Barnicol hinted at the possibility that the Peace Facility budget might need to be replenished ahead of schedule.

Regarding the Peace Facility, he stressed the African ownership of this approach where African countries had asked for re-allocating development funds in order to build up African Peacekeeping capacities. Referring to current G8 discussions and the enormous financial resources mobilized in the Iraq crisis, Fischer-Barnicol expressed the hope that additional momentum can be created.

Ambassador Melani agreed that regional ownership was the aim but he recognized the need to give support especially in the fields of planning, security of forces, mobility and communications.

Daniel Speckhard looked at funding and said it was a big issue for NATO, especially when it included “planning for the unexpected”. Budgets had to be increased especially when the theatres of operations were much further from Europe.

Alois Preinerder elaborated on the fact the peacekeepers should not do the tasks of NGOs but when NGOs leave the crises area for another crisis which draws more public attention the soldiers have no choice but take over the NGOs tasks and by this staying longer in the crises area than wanted.

WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING AND HOW MANY APPROACHES ARE REQUIRED?

Antje Herrberg, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), also wanted clarification – on what the group meant by peacekeeping. She wanted a clearer definition – was it peacekeeping or peacemaking? Herrberg was also concerned about the preference for regional cooperation in the resolution of disputes (in Africa where 40% of the world’s disputes were said to be

focused). Taking the debate back to Europe, she had grave misgivings about such a regional policy being successful in areas, such as for example, Georgia, and even Indonesia. She reasoned that different rules might be needed for different regions of the world and asked the panel for their opinions.



In response, Fischer-Barnicol said he did not want to see the peacekeeping wheel being continually reinvented, better planning and coordination was required (the integrated mission concept) and the principle of subsidiarity (increased local and regional capacities) had to be applied. However, he added that sometimes a more “continental” view might be required in cases where regional players might be a little too close to the conflict in question.

Later, Ambassador Melani argued that peacekeeping was just one factor of a total spectrum that also included prevention, peacemaking and peace building.

SESSION 2: DOES EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING NEED BETTER TECHNOLOGY OR TOUGHER TRAINING?

Opening the afternoon session, NATO's **Jamie Shea** referred to peacekeeping as a "growth industry". He observed that the UN currently had 17 missions in place and over 50,000 peacekeepers in the field. He suggested that the afternoon's panel might like to work out what could be done to improve the situation and determine how a ready supply of peacemakers could be found?

Ken Eyre, Vice President, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada



Eyre argued that there were fundamental differences between peacekeeping and warfare, and he wanted to focus on those variations. He reasoned that peacekeeping had changed since the Cold War and that a complete range of specialist skills was now required. Taking the differences in some detail, Eyre argued that:

- *During wartime*: key military relationships were vertical between various superior and subordinate headquarters
 - *In peacekeeping operations* the most complex relationships were lateral between the military and the many other groups concerned - internationally, with various levels of government, the international organisations, the NGOs, etc.
- legal advisors, political advisors and diplomatic voices were often heard and were essential players in peacekeeping arenas

- the enemy was often "the violence itself"

For Eyre, the key question was: How was the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect to be applied.

Sandy Johnston, First Secretary, Defence, Permanent Representation of the UK to the EU



Johnston referred to the questions on the agenda:


The Petersberg tasks: he noted that peacekeeping was only one aspect of the Petersberg Tasks, and that multi-talented troops were required. Noting the agenda reference to the EU's "Rapid Reaction Force", Johnston pointed out the common misconception that there was any sort of standing EU force. He explained that a pool of forces existed that could be made available for EU-led operations by the Member States (rather than a Force *per se*) whether in the context of the Battle Groups initiative or in a lower-readiness deployment.

Interoperable communications: Johnston explained that the UK was basing its future armed forces communications infrastructure on BOWMAN (procurement costs €2.7 billion, total costs €3.5 billion) – to create "joined up forces for the 21st century". Noting that interoperability across the EU was the target of the Headline Goal 2010, Johnston wanted the EDA to play a key role in helping partners to decide on the way ahead for their own communications needs as the financial burden had to met as effectively as possible.

Training and skills: Johnston believed that a well-trained soldier should be able to conduct peacekeeping duties, as well as to respond effectively if a situation deteriorated and led to peace enforcement. For Johnston, policing was a totally different matter but he added that the UK had considerable experience of armed forces supporting civil police in riot control, etc. in Northern Ireland.

The EU Civil-Military Cell: Johnston dismissed the idea that this could be the prime coordinator of peace operations. Its position at the strategic level indicated that its primary role was to coordinate planning for civil and military components of EU-led operations, but he agreed that it could generate an operations centre to run certain types of operation in cases where no national operation headquarters was available.

Rory Keane, Consultant, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR)



Keane provided “macro” ideas in the peacekeeping policy arena and “micro” ideas in relation to effective peacekeeping and the “challenge for human resources”, as “people make good peacekeepers”.

Macro policy ideas

Keane agreed that the need for interoperability was extremely urgent. As examples, he wanted more effective use of the Berlin Plus agreement also in the civilian crisis management sector. In regard to the UN High-Level Panel, he noted the recommendation for a UN Peace-building Commission. Keane saw “blue helmet peacekeeping” becoming more proactive in the form of peace-building. Turning to Africa, Keane observed that the Commission for Africa report (March 18, 2005) had spoken about building “capacity and accountability”.

“We have to find a balance between human rights and the rule of law once and for all. Where does international law start and the rule of law stop, and how do they relate?”

Rory Keane

“Micro-ideas” towards effective peacekeeping (via civilian crisis management)

1. *Training budgets for peacekeepers:* funded by the EU in a modest way
2. Keane wanted the “do no harm” concept to be integrated in all training
3. *A balance between human rights and the rule of law* had to be found “once and for all” – where did international law start and rule of law stop (and how did they relate)?
4. *More emphasis was needed on the R of “DDR”,* so that the focus was on “re-integration”
5. *EUMM had to be further integrated into the ESDP,* it had to be used as a “proper monitoring mechanism” and perhaps integrated into future proposed EU civilian response teams.

Karel Vervoort, Managing Director, Flemish Aerospace Group (FLAG)



Jamie Shea and Karel Vervoort

Vervoort looked at the changes in EU policy-making in recent years. He argued that the smaller member states (of which Belgium was one) were no longer involved in (defence) decision-making. He felt that Belgium was now only involved in humanitarian aid and he saw a national budget that was being constantly eroded. Vervoort added that military skills were no longer being used and that Belgium was no longer involved in several key projects (the JSF Consortium, A400 order reduced, etc.). He saw this as a danger for all of the smaller member states.

Moving on to the agenda questions, he argued that *interoperability* was valuable in all kinds of missions (including peacekeeping). As for training, he argued that the main requirement in operations was “leadership”. Vervoort saw military organisations as naturally well-coordinated but he was not impressed by coordination within the NGOs, for example after the recent Tsunami disaster. Vervoort was also one of the speakers to comment that “specialist knowledge and skills” were required in peacekeeping operations rather than forces.

SECOND SESSION – Q&A DEBATE

As session moderator, **Jamie Shea** had four questions for the panel and the roundtable attendees:

- ? Was the EU on the right track towards achieving an *integrated peacekeeping mechanism*?
- ? How could the EU avoid depending on the *three main defence contributors*?
- ? *Should NATO and the EU do more to assist Africa and other regions?*
- ? *How could the UN's reform be facilitated by NATO and the EU?*

HELP FROM THE RED CROSS, THE USE OF LOCAL FORCES AND THE NEED FOR “PEACE” TRAINING

Ken Eyre was convinced that training for peace was another growth industry, with 39 peacekeeping training centres across the globe (mostly military organisations, some with military and police forces being trained together).

Sandy Johnston argued that the need to involve local people on the ground was obvious (as Africans had to be empowered), but only if the correct training had been conducted. Until then it was not an option.

The UN's **Gary Littlechild** (“a specialist in civil-military coordination”) said that local forces (who brought advantages) could only be used if they had the necessary training and expertise.

PROTECTING THE PROTECTORS

CMI's **Antje Herrberg** had heard the panel and she had more concerns. In regard to the EU's Action Plan on Crisis Management (the plan to engage more with civil sectors), she stressed the need to improve the policy to “protect

the protectors”. **Rory Keane** argued that if the problem was “protecting the protectors”, then the mission was more likely to be one of stabilisation rather than peacekeeping. **Karel Vervoort** thought that the NGOs usually wanted to be seen as the “good guys” and did not want to be protected.

IMPROVED INFORMATION SHARING AND INTEGRATED MISSIONS

As for the use of sophisticated ICT systems in crisis management, Herrberg said there was a total lack of information sharing between the different institutions.

In regard to Vervoort's earlier comment about the NGOs lack of coordination after the Tsunami disaster, Herrberg had been more surprised by the EU's member states, lack of unity. Johnston agreed that governments had to do better in the field of “joined-up crisis management”. As this was a growth industry, everyone on the ground had to work together to avoid total confusion.

Vervoort reminded the group that the UN had looked at how the military could work together with NGOs (the Oslo guidelines) but the rules had never been applied. He wanted greater information sharing that protected sensitive information while ensuring that people in the field (both military and NGOs) were aware of the essential facts.

Commenting on “integrated missions”, Littlechild stressed the need for joint planning and joint training before the mission actually started. In conclusion, he reasoned that the most important players were the people and the personal relationships they developed.

Keane commented that integrated field missions were a long way off as there were intense discussions as to whether the various players (the Council, DG External Relations, etc.) should be brought together under an umbrella unit, i.e. “the securitisation of development”. He could not see integrated missions until this issue was resolved.

The European Commission's **Tjien-Khoen Liem** had a simple question; would the EU's role in peacekeeping likely to be an inter-governmental responsibility or would it be more of a community action?

Keane saw the community – intergovernmental discussion as being confused. For example, policing came under intergovernmental responsibility whereas

police training was often regarded as a community competency. He added that the African Peace Facility could provide capacity building and training whereas equipment had to come from the intergovernmental ESDP for Africa.

PEACEKEEPING - A GROWTH INDUSTRY

The European Voice's **Ilana Bet-El** saw an explosion of interest in "peacekeeping" with hundreds of NGOs and many private military companies (PMCs) and wondered if the international organisations had lost the plot (or at least the leadership). That meant there was an obvious need for improved coordination.

"Peacekeeping is being justified as a reason for military intervention".

Ilana Bet-El

Johnston agreed that peacekeeping was a growth industry, but he insisted that the increasing numbers of people on the ground had to work together to avoid total confusion for the people trapped within a conflict.

Keane also concurred that it was a growth industry, but he saw the (promising) development of a "lead agency doctrine", e.g. the EU prioritising the Western Balkans activities, the UN leading the African response and the OSCE heading up activities in the Caucasus.

WHAT IS MEANT BY PEACEKEEPING?

Going back to Herrberg's question in the first panel, Bet-El was not clear about what was meant by peacekeeping. She saw it being justified (at least at this NDA session) as a reason for military intervention. As for "crisis management", Bet-El was not convinced that the military were the right people for the job.

Eyre was not happy with the term peacekeeping as it was usually associated with "UN blue helmets". He preferred to describe the work as peace operations (prevent or end the fighting, help a region recover from violent conduct, etc.). Johnston said peacekeeping was primarily "stopping people killing each other". He saw the Petersberg Tasks as being an attempt to address peacekeeping in the round.

Aois Preinerder, from the Austrian Permanent Representation to the EU, had heard everything before in the 90s, when "modern

peacekeeping" had first been suggested. He defined peacekeeping as "stopping people re-starting killing each other".

Vicomte Georges Vilain XIII, Vice President of Royal Institute of International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), had heard the confusion between peacekeeping and peacemaking, and said it impacted UN mandates. He argued that the UN had sometimes mandated peacekeeping when peacemaking was required, e.g. in Bosnia and (dramatically) in Rwanda. He recommended that the UN had to issue clearer mandates, as the UN people in the field were often unsure of their responsibilities.

THE ROLE FOR SMALLER MEMBER STATES

Brigadier-General **Jo Coelmont**, Belgian Permanent Military Representation to the EU, gave an opposing view to Vervoort. He argued that Belgian forces were active in peacekeeping operations all over the world. Coelmont also saw a significant role for smaller EU member states, for example the Civil-Military Cell had been initiated partly as a result of the Belgian government's recommendations.

This led him to argue that within the EU there were two types of member states, small ones and ones that did not yet know that they were small. General Coelmont saw the Headline Goals, the EDA and the Battle Groups as "building blocks" that could be used to enhance cooperation with the UN and, for example, the African Union. He said that there was room for improvement, with the need for the will and resources being at the top of the agenda.

"There are two types of EU member states, small ones and ones that do not yet know that they are small".

Jo Coelmont

Eyre gave some priorities – first stop the fighting, then establish the rule of law (police, courts, penal systems) and finally introduce justice (that brought democracy and human rights).

END OF THE SESSION

Shea brought the session to a close and suggested topics that the NDA could examine in the future:

- Successes and failures in the field, reasons and conclusions to be drawn
- The military – civilian interface
- The NGO picture (coordination, protection, objectives)
- A possible Partnership for Peace for Africa and / or a Berlin Plus for the UN.

Forthcoming NDA Events

18 APRIL

Monthly Roundtable

WILL THE EU GET TOUGH ON OPENING-UP NATIONAL DEFENCE PROCUREMENTS?

25 APRIL

NDA BIOTERRORISM REPORTING GROUP – TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

24 MAY

Conference

'REINVENTING NATO: DOES THE ALLIANCE REFLECT THE CHANGING NATURE OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY?'

20 JUNE

Monthly Roundtable

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR PROTECTING EUROPE'S INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST TERRORISM



Programme:

SESSION 1

IS PEACEKEEPING A SOFTER OPTION FOR EU DEFENCE POLICYMAKERS?

The public perception of peacekeeping is sometimes that it is a softer and less expensive option than training and equipping combat-ready forces. Questions for the panel to consider included:

- What are the likely costs of preparing and maintaining a European Battle Groups that are capable of intervening in major trouble spots around the world?
- What lessons are being drawn from the peacekeeping challenges of Iraq that confront policymakers at national and European levels?
- The problem confronting EU member states is to ensure rapid yet transparent decision making and closer cooperation with the UN despite a limited number of peacekeepers.
- What mechanisms could ensure more effective cooperation between the EU, the UN, NATO, the US and African Union, and what conditions need to be met so the EU can lay out a coherent policy on the use of force?

Moderator: **Giles Merritt**, Director, New Defence Agenda, with following panellists:

- **Andreas Fischer-Barnicol**, Policy Desk Officer, Conflict prevention, Crisis management and APC Countries, DG External Relations, European Commission
- **Jeremy Matjila**, Ambassador, Mission of South Africa to the EU
- **Maurizio Melani**, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy to the EU's PSC
- **Daniel Speckhard**, Director for Policy and Planning, NATO

SESSION 2

DOES EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING NEED BETTER TECHNOLOGY, OR TOUGHER TRAINING?

Peacekeeping and the carrying out of the Petersberg tasks, usually in support of humanitarian relief operations, are to be the main role of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force.

- What national efforts are now under way to equip designated troops with interoperable advanced communications and networked battlefield technologies?
- How much priority should be given to raising training levels to produce many more SAS-type units, given that Britain's elite SAS has reportedly shrunk to just 500 men?
- How can peacekeepers be trained to perform the variety of missions now required from them, ranging from peacemaking to policing?
- Will the new EU Civil-Military Cell be the prime coordinator of such operations?

Moderator: **Jamie Shea**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO, with introductory Speakers:

- **Ken Eyre**, Vice President, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada
- **Sandy Johnston**, First Secretary, Defence, Permanent Representation of the UK to the EU
- **Rory Keane**, Consultant, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR)
- **Karel Vervoort**, Managing Director, Flemish Aerospace Group (FLAG)



List of Participants 14 March 2005

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ABOUT THE NEW DEFENCE AGENDA

The **New Defence Agenda** (NDA) has become established as the only regular Brussels-based forum where political figures and journalists gather to discuss the future of European and transatlantic defence and security policies.

The aim of the NDA is not to replicate more academic research-based projects but to give greater prominence to the complex questions of how EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and how transatlantic challenges such as terrorism and WMD can be met.

Bringing clarity and new ideas to the rapidly-changing defence and security policy scene has been the NDA's aim from its beginning. NDA's activities range from monthly roundtables and international conferences to reports and discussion papers, all of which attract high-level speakers and authors and institutional, governmental and industry support.

One of our prime objectives is to raise the profile of defence and security issues among the Brussels-based international press. To encourage more in-depth coverage of these topics, the NDA holds regular, informal dinners for journalists with high profile decision makers.



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Recent speakers and participants include

Benoit d'Aboville, Ambassador, Permanent Delegation of France to NATO; **Gijs de Vries**, Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Council of the EU; **Richard Falkenrath**, Research Fellow, Brookings Institution and former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the US President; **Franco Frattini**, Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission; **Bill Giles**, Director General, Europe, BAe Systems; **Vecdi Gönül**, National Defence Minister, Turkey; **Scott A. Harris**, President, Lockheed Martin International; **Patrick Hennessey**, Director, DG Enterprise, European Commission; **Hilmar Linnenkamp**, Deputy Chief Executive, European Defence Agency; **Alessandro Minuto Rizzo**, Deputy Secretary General, NATO; **Sergei Ordzhonikidze**, Director General of the United Nations Office in Geneva; **Zonghuai Qiao**, Vice Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China; **George Robertson**, Former Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; **Gary Tittle**, MEP, Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy, European Parliament; **Michel Troubetzkoy**, Senior Vice President, Director for Relations with European Institutions, EADS; **Günter Verheugen**, Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, European Commission; **Antonio Vitorino**, former Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, European Commission; **Karl von Wogau**, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defence and Security, European Parliament,



"[NATO] An Alliance in which Europe and North America are consulting every day on the key security issues before them. Acting together, in the field, to defend our shared security... Because in a dangerous world, business as usual is not an option"

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NDA Conference 17 May 2004

"Homeland Security = a concerted, comprehensive and nationwide effort to prevent future terrorist attacks, to protect the most vulnerable targets against future terrorist attacks and to be ready to respond against possible attacks and minimize loss of life and damage if such attacks occur" **Richard Falkenrath**, former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, 17 November 2003 NDA Conference



"The agency should generate ideas and speak the truth to defence ministers."
Nick Witney, Chief Executive, European Defence Agency 28 April 2004 NDA Press Dinner



"There is an opportunity for Europe to take advantage of the US's investment by issuing collaborative programmes – paid for to a certain extent by the US taxpayer. The European Defence Agency could foster transatlantic cooperation rather than follow more traditional approaches"

Scott Harris, President Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin, 28 April 2004 NDA Press Dinner



THE NEW DEFENCE AGENDA WOULD LIKE TO THANK ITS PARTNERS AND MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN MAKING THE NDA A SUCCESS



Ministry of National Defence,
Turkey



Ministry of National Defence,
Romania



Mission of the Russian Federation
to EU

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