

## IS MARITIME SECURITY EUROPE'S ACHILLES HEEL?



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Moderated by **Michael Berendt**, Senior Policy Advisor, Government Policy Consultants (GPC)

Rapporteur: **John Chapman**



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## Programme for the day:

### Session 1

#### WHAT SHOULD BE EUROPE'S NAVAL CAPABILITIES?

How does maritime security fit into current developments of the European Security Strategy? With the days of sea battles long gone, what are Europe's main maritime security concerns and what capabilities are needed? What role do defence planners see for the navies of EU Member States, and what levels of investment are needed to achieve it? Is naval capability seen as central to the development of both rapid reaction and peacekeeping forces, or is it considered a leftover from the Cold War's emphasis on safeguarding the Atlantic and world shipping routes? What role should NATO play?

**Moderator: Michael Berendt**, Senior Policy Advisor, Government Policy Consultants (GPC)

#### Introductory Speakers:

- **Lars Wedin**, Policy Director, Forum for Security, National Defence College, Sweden
- **Jean-Francois Cot**, Deputy Secretary General, Maritime Directorate General, Office of the Prime Minister, France
- **Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz**, Chief of Strategy and Treaties Department, Naval Forces, Turkey

### Session II

#### IS EUROPE RESPONDING TO THE MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGE?

How can industry respond to current threats such as drug and migrant smuggling, piracy and terrorism? After 9/11, maritime authorities responded to the terrorism threat with such measures as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code<sup>1</sup>. How can these and other new regulations balance the interception of illegal cargoes against ensuring the free movement of trade? What should be the respective roles played by governments, port authorities and business?

**Moderator: Michael Berendt**, Senior Policy Advisor, Government Policy Consultants (GPC)

#### Introductory Speakers:

- **Captain Carmen Dewilde**, Nautical Institute, Belgium
- **Christian Dupont**, Head on Unit Maritime Security, DG Energy and Transport, European Commission
- **James Moseman**, Director, Europe and NATO, Northrop Grumman
- **Adnan Rahman**, Director of Surface Transport and Aviation Programme, RAND Europe

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<sup>1</sup> The "ISPS requirements form a framework through which ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts which pose a threat to maritime security". See [http://www.lr.org/market\\_sector/marine/maritime-security/what\\_is\\_ISPS\\_code.htm](http://www.lr.org/market_sector/marine/maritime-security/what_is_ISPS_code.htm) for a full explanation of the ISPS code.

## A CALL FOR COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION: KEY POINTS

If maritime security was indeed the EU security policy's Achilles heel, there was complete agreement on how to respond – it was through more effective cooperation between all parties. Not all questions were answered but there was complete harmony in several areas – this was a policy where only global solutions would be effective, all actors had to be involved and the political will to succeed was paramount.

However, the seas were not totally calm. Topics that remained in choppy waters included the effectiveness of the ISPS code, the lack of attention being paid by the European institutions to maritime security, the potential costs of implementing new technology, the need for a new way of thinking and the problems that could be caused by (newly accessible) information falling into the wrong hands.

**Lars Wedin** of Sweden's National Defence College, was the first speaker to call for more cooperation between the various players. His views were echoed by **Jean-Francois Cot** of the French Prime Minister's Office, by the Turkish Embassy's **Ergam Camözü** and by the European Commission's **Ronald Vopel**. A similar view was taken by the Commission's **Christian Dupont** who outlined its maritime strategy, one that focussed on establishing a secure transport chain "from factory gate to consumers' premises".

It sounded positive, but as soon as an example - the call for a European coastguard service - was placed on the table for discussion, voices were raised in opposition. Wedin said that the Swedish coastguard would not want to lose its independence, while Cot claimed that the timing was not right. Broadening the discussion, he argued that enhanced cooperation could only be effectively conducted within the context of a common European foreign and security policy.

As for solutions, the ISPS code was stoutly defended by the ECSA's **Alfons Guinier** but criticised by Belgium's Nautical Institute's **Captain Carmen Dewilde** (as it had given the industry a false sense of security) and by RAND Europe's **Adnan Rahman** ("not the finest piece of legislation"). Nevertheless, it remained a cornerstone of the European Commission's strategy and was set to be extended and integrated into EU law.

Wedin expressed surprise that the European Security Strategy (ESS) made no mention of Europe's dependency on secure global sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and bemoaned that fact that there was insufficient coverage on this vital topic in either the ESDP or in the Headline Goal 2010. The need for secure trade routes in order to ensure global prosperity was picked up by the Turkish Navy's **Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz**, who wanted a strategy that went out to 2025 at least.

Any strategy must of course contain answers to problems and both Rahman and Northrop Grumman's **James Moseman** argued that solutions existed to improve information exchange. Unfortunately, as soon as technology appeared on the radar, alarm bells rang about the possible cost. Dupont went as far as saying that if the price of enhancing security had a significant impact on trade, then the terrorists would have won.

The European Defence Agency's **Paul Nicholas Collins** could not see much light on the horizon. He saw a current maritime strategy that was overly influenced by Cold War thinking and member states that were not adapting to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Collins wanted the Headline Goals to be redefined and improved clarification of the threats.

These threats were multiple (piracy, terrorism, drug and migrant smuggling, disruption of trade, etc.) and these could arise in a port, on the seas, against the cruise industry, against freight carriers (oil & gas), ferries, etc. Moderator **Michael Berendt** could not see where the lines of responsibility had been drawn. He wanted the EU to decide on its objectives – anti-terrorism, peace-keeping, emergency support, defence, stopping drug trafficking, etc..., and he concluded that it would be hard to find techniques that could be universally afforded and accepted by industry.

There were perhaps too many players, unclear requirements and a lack of existing and affordable capabilities. Perhaps this was an Achilles Heel.

## SESSION 1: WHAT SHOULD BE EUROPE'S NAVAL CAPABILITIES?

Launching the debate, GPC's **Michael Berendt** described the various aspects of maritime security and acknowledged the dramatic changes that had been seen in the last 20 years. Scanning the agenda, Berendt noted that while it was split into capabilities (the first session) and requirements (the second session), it was apparent that these two areas were inextricably linked.

**First speaker: Lars Wedin, Policy Director, Forum for Security, National Defence College, Sweden**

Lars Wedin declared that *maritime security* could cover threats that included terrorism, piracy, armed robbery against ships, smuggling of goods (including illicit arms and WMD), people & drug trafficking and environmental pollution. He surmised that the possibilities for action were often dependent on where the situation occurred: on territorial waters, in the contiguous zone or on the high seas, etc...

Stressing the interlinking nature of these threats, Wedin called for the creation of an EU Maritime Strategy that identified issues to be handled either by individual member states or by the EU as a whole – to include the co-operation of police, coastguards and navies.

Turning to the threats themselves, Wedin noted that piracy and terrorism were seen as increasing threats, while Europe was dependent on the import of energy, which implied extensive sea transport. Referring to the European Security Strategy (ESS), he expressed surprise that it made no mention of Europe's dependency on secure global sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Describing the attacks from pirates and terrorists as threats to prosperity and democracy, he gave the example of the attack on the French tanker *Limburg*<sup>2</sup>.



Emphasising the need for a holistic view to be taken, Wedin was unhappy that the new EU Constitution ignored maritime security. Warming to his theme, Wedin highlighted the lack of sufficient coverage on this vital topic in either the ESDP or in the Headline Goal 2010.

Wedin concluded that the EU needed a maritime strategy built on international law to provide guidance for how security could be enhanced at both national and Community levels. Offering a complete overview of naval capabilities, Wedin split these into three categories:

- *Deterrence*: a national (i.e. British and French) issue, where all European states benefited from their capabilities
- *Presence & Sea Control*: national issues except for missions within the scope of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)<sup>3</sup>
- *Power Projection*: the main naval mission in an ESDP context, as power required access, "this means secure SLOCs *en route* as well as in the area of operations".

Wedin's final conclusion was that the EU needed naval capabilities for both power projection and maritime security operations encompassing presence and sea control. Overall, he saw the need for much closer coordination, cooperation and pooling.

<sup>2</sup> See [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story\\_29-8-2004\\_pg7\\_42](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_29-8-2004_pg7_42) for a report on the verdicts delivered by a Yemini court.

<sup>3</sup> The PSI was developed to "allow the US and its allies to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies". See (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm>) for a description.

**Second speaker: Jean-Francois Cot, Deputy Secretary General, Maritime Directorate General, Office of the Prime Minister, France**



Jean-Francois Cot stressed that maritime security had become a priority for France following the attack on the Limburg. Acknowledging the risk of being too late in the fight against terrorism, Cot expressed his satisfaction in France's ability to meet the requirements of the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) code. However, he asked the meeting if that was enough. For Cot, the real challenge was the need for a new way of thinking – “a doctrine” so that each threat was met by the right level of response.

Cot argued that the ISPS was simply a toolbox to be used in the production of a framework that could be integrated within national requirements and each member state's evaluation of the threat.

Cot concluded that security was a responsibility for all, not just for the military authorities. It impacted coastguards, customs, border police and the gendarmerie / national police – as such it needed a high level of coordination at both the national and European levels.

**Final speaker: Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Chief of Strategy and Treaties Department, Naval Forces, Turkey**

Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz looked at both the threats and the capabilities required to combat them. He described a world that was constantly changing and where the outcome of military action was often unpredictable, as in the current Iraq conflict. Rear Admiral Gürdeniz was another speaker to link global prosperity to the necessity for secure trade routes that were to a great extent (80% according to Rear Admiral Gürdeniz) conducted over seas.



After describing the responsibilities of the EU's various navies, Rear Admiral Gürdeniz argued the case for two pillars – one to face hard threats (where the response was of a military nature) and one to combat soft threats (where the coastguard services would be on the front line). Highlighting the need for the free flow of energy to keep the EU competitive, Rear Admiral Gürdeniz listed naval tasks that included: peace keeping, search & rescue, disaster relief, power projection, SLOCs protection, sea control, sea denial, embargo operations, etc.

Rear Admiral Gürdeniz noted that an annual forum was soon to be held. Maritime issues were on the agenda and Rear Admiral Gürdeniz hoped for one outcome to be the development of a long-term maritime strategy that covered the 2005 – 2025 timeframe.

**THE EU'S STRATEGY: THE DEBATE**

In response to Wedin's opening remarks, the ECSA's **Alfons Guinier** representing the European shipping sector, insisted that the EU did have a maritime strategy to oppose terrorism. It had three strands:

- *The ISPS code*: a key part of the strategy, with its application within the EU being overseen by the European Commission
- *Movement of cargo*: With the thousands of containers moving in and out of Europe on a daily basis, the ECSA was calling for the application of a 24-hour rule<sup>4</sup>, similar to the one introduced in the US
- *Intermodal shipping*: whereby all cargoes must be sealed at the shippers' premises and remain secure and intact at all subsequent handover points.

<sup>4</sup> In December 2002, the US introduced the "24 Hour Rule", whereby ocean carriers had to provide complete manifest information for all cargo bound for the U.S. 24 hours prior to loading aboard a vessel in a foreign port.



Guinier argued that the combination of these actions would give the EU a maritime strategy that would go some way to meeting the threats. He called for improved intelligence to combat the problems relating to suspicious containers and cargoes.

The European Defence Agency's **Paul Nicholas Collins** argued that the current maritime strategy was still overly influenced by Cold War thinking. He added that most member states were not adapting sufficiently to 21<sup>st</sup> century circumstances. For Collins, the question was straightforward - "what can the sea do for the land battle?".

#### TOWARDS FURTHER EU COOPERATION AND A EUROPEAN COASTGUARD SERVICE

Looking at the big picture of maritime security, the Turkish Embassy's **Ergam Camözü** bemoaned the lack of cooperation within the EU and added that it should be conducted within a global context. This meant concerted naval and coastguard assistance on the basis of real-time information exchange (for both the civil and military sectors).



This was the first mention of the need for a European coastguard service and it led **Jean-Francois Cot** to declare that the time was not right, as there was no clear line of authority. He could, however, agree that more cooperation was needed and that efforts should continue along those lines.

Later in the debate, Defense News' **Brooks Tigner** pressed for more information about the options for such a service. What were the problems? Was it a case of national sovereignty issues overriding progress? Cot responded that it was too soon to discuss command structures. Speaking personally, he suggested that such a system could be tested in the realm of environmental protection – mainly in the context of information exchange. Once that had been concluded, options such as a European coastguard service could be examined – preferably in the context of the common European foreign and security policy.

On the same subject, **Lars Wedin** agreed that it was too soon. He thought the Swedish coastguard would be reluctant to give up its independence.

AeroStrategies' **Robert Draper** looked at US-EU relations and pointed out that the US found it difficult to deal with the EU on military matters and noted that perhaps the previous discussion had shown why this was the case. Draper thought that for good reasons European nations were not ready to cede military power and asked why the EU did not look at the situation 50 years out. He foresaw the possibility of having, say, Dutch equipment on a French aircraft carrier. Draper would have seen that as progress.

#### DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEED FOR A COST / BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The European Commission's **Ronald Vopel** introduced the need for cost-effective solutions, as money was tight and vessels were becoming more complex and more expensive. He also wanted to remind the meeting that the EU's views (and actions) were currently limited (to its borders) and would not be of an "all-singing, all-dancing" nature.

Vopel also argued for more cooperation and warned about terrorists targeting the cruise industry (a heavy US influence, highly visible). He wanted more analysis of the threats and a review to see if the technology and the intelligence gathering were up to the job.

Looking at the military side, **Michael Berendt** wanted to know if the current naval capabilities were sufficient to be used beyond the shores of Europe (to carry troops, etc.). Collins thought that military operations had ceased to exist in the traditional sense. He argued that political aspects were always paramount and agreed threats needed more precise definition. Collins was somewhat pessimistic about the outcome of the current thinking and added that there was an urgent need to redefine the Headline Goals.

Berendt returned to the issue of territorial boundaries and asked if the approach to European security should be broadened to include the Mediterranean and the Baltic sea. Vopel admitted that European

territorial waters were being extended in regard to environmental issues (no emissions, etc.), so it should be legally possible to take action. However, he wanted to see clear benefits linked to taking such actions. Rear Admiral Gürdeniz took this further by suggesting that the EU might want to follow the US approach of expanding its boundaries - in order to protect its economic interests - over the seas.

### Industrial solutions

Lockheed Martin's **Jean-François Bedin** looked at harmonisation over the past decades and, moving forward, described the situation whereby all vessels must now have the Automatic Identification system (AIS)<sup>5</sup> fitted. He saw this as the first step towards real-time information exchange. Berendt commented that such tracking systems were the result of civilian research programs and showed the benefit of dual-use research.



BIMCO's **Thomas Timlen** intervened to offer a clarification and a concern. He saw the PSI, as described by Wedin, as a tool to avoid problems before containers were loaded on ships. It would not involve the use of military force. Timlen's concern related to the use of AIS: although this was generally supported by industry, there were concerns that if the information fell into the wrong hands, it could develop into another case of, not so much long-range tracking as, "long-range targeting".

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<sup>5</sup> "The AIS is a shipboard broadcast system that acts like a transponder, operating in the VHF maritime band, that is capable of handling well over 4,500 reports per minute and updates as often as every two seconds." See <http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/default.htm> for a description of AIS.



## SESSION 2: IS EUROPE RESPONDING TO THE MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGE?

### First speaker: Captain Carmen Dewilde, Nautical Institute, Belgium

Captain Carmen Dewilde argued that the ISPS was simply the latest in a long line of measures designed to improve national security. However, she argued that such measures could only be effective if all the links in the transport chain (e.g., ports, terminals, etc.) were fully involved. She stressed the need to protect ships and seafarers as it was not the responsibility of a ship's crew to avoid being attacked by pirates or terrorists.

Agreeing with Cot, Captain Dewilde said the ISPS did not contain all the answers. Indeed, with piracy increasing by 80% in the last six months, the implementation of ISPS had given the industry a false sense of security. Pointing out the defects in current systems, Captain Dewilde noted that Ship Security Alert Systems (SSASs) gave information to the shore about a ship's identification and position, but not the nature of the threat. As for the AIS, she was another speaker to air concerns about the related information falling into the wrong hands.



### Second speaker: Christian Dupont, Head on Unit Maritime Security, DG Energy and Transport, European Commission

The European Commission's Christian Dupont focussed on the EU's strategy as outlined in the document headed "Communication from the European Commission on enhancing maritime transport security (COM-2003, 229 Final)<sup>6</sup>". Dupont described its three-pronged approach:

1. *Extending the ISPS code*: introducing regulations to enhance ship & port security: linking the ISPS to EU law and adding extensions that made certain aspects compulsory
2. *Enhancing port security*: proposing a directive that would enhance port security effect – extending the ISPS code to the complete port area (that could be defined by individual member states)
3. *Controlling the complete supply chain*: adding a directive to extend security would ensure that the complete supply chain "from factory gate to consumers' premises" was secure.

Dupont emphasised the need for civil-military cooperation and hoped that the Constitution would clarify the situation in regard to piracy, as it was currently outside of the European Commission's brief. In conclusion, he looked forward to extended collaboration via the neighbourhood policy and perhaps the creation of a real maritime online monitoring system – which took the meeting back to the possibility of a European coastguard service.

### Third speaker: James Moseman, Director, Europe and NATO, Northrop Grumman



James Moseman declared that navies were being asked to take up heavier demands (i.e., broad areas of surveillance, close scrutiny of suspect vessels), with the same tools that they used to defend against warships, submarines and air attacks. Radar systems, for example, could detect ships and target them for destruction, but today's tasks were more related to law enforcement – tasks that demanded individual ship identification and continuous tracking. At this point, Moseman – speaking from personal experience – called for closer cooperation between the civil and military authorities in the area of the coastguard services and the fight against drug smuggling.

He brought good news, however, in that new systems were available (possibly from Northrop Grumman) using radar, infrared and electro-optical

<sup>6</sup> See [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/lip/latest/doc/2003/com2003\\_0229en01.doc](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/lip/latest/doc/2003/com2003_0229en01.doc) for this document in full.

technologies for detection and tracking. Tracking systems could be augmented with electronic "tagging" devices to identify ships at sea in the same manner as aircraft were currently identified.

Moving to network-centric or network-enabled capabilities, he called for such networks to be extended to share information from national, Alliance and EU authorities. Moseman saw them all as collaborators, concerned with the broadest definitions of defence and security. In response to a question from the moderator, Moseman confirmed that no US governmental systems covered all aspects of civil and military responsibilities.

### Final speaker: Adnan Rahman, Director of Surface Transport and Aviation Programme, RAND Europe

Adnan Rahman opened on a controversial note, arguing that maritime security was not only the Achilles heel of Europe but of the entire world. Looking at the actions taken by the US, he asked if such steps had really been effective. Rahman looked at each measure in turn:

- *The ISPS code*: described as "not the finest piece of legislation", Rahman called for it to be extended to cover shippers, shipping companies, freight forwarders, cargo-handling companies, ports, terminal operators and insurance companies
- *An over-emphasis on technology*: Rahman recommended combining technology with "softer measures" such as modelling techniques.



Taking another controversial stance, Rahman argued that no procedures were in place to cater for a situation where someone said, for example, that a nuclear device had been planted in a container stored in the port of Rotterdam. In his words, "no one knows what is in each container".

Rahman also called for the digitisation of the data that accompanied vessels, so that information concerning cargoes would be freely available. Another concern was the legal responsibility for cargoes, as ships' manifestos currently stated that the contents were described as being "to the best of the captain's knowledge". He called for the European Commission to take a lead, agreeing with other speakers that no legislation would be useful unless the total transport chain, with all the players, was covered.

## THE HUMAN FACTOR: THE DEBATE

**Christian Dupont** opened up the debate by adding the "human factor". He argued that people performing security duties at airports, and elsewhere, were undervalued and being requested to perform duties of a too-repetitive nature. Extending this argument to the maritime industry, and in answer to Rahman's comments about responsibility, Dupont said that responsibility only came when people were treated with respect and paid as such.

**Alfons Guinier** responded by saying that seafarers were well paid and had to be qualified. He added that the shipper was responsible for the contents of containers. In response to Rahman's concerns, Guinier returned to his call for the implementation of the 24-hour rule so that container contents would be secure and understood.

He also called for full cooperation between civil and military authorities (to combat situations such as the Limburg attack) and – thinking about the human factor – the use of biometric ID cards so that seafarers could go on land without the need to continually apply for visas. **Captain Carmen Dewilde** gave her full support for Guinier's suggestion concerning biometric ID cards, but noted that it had again been rejected by the US authorities.

## COST / BENEFIT ANALYSIS - PART II

At this point, **Michael Berendt** changed tack and re-introduced the topic of cost / benefit analysis. He wanted to know what kind of expenditure would be accepted by the member states, especially if significant salary increases impacted trade. For example, had the US noted an impact on its trading since the introduction of new rules?

**Adnan Rahman** agreed that cost was important, as measures to improve security that were too expensive would not be implemented. However, he argued that techniques such as the digitalisation of data could actually save money. As a result of such an implementation, people would not be required to manually compare numbers and lists. A true cost / benefit analysis was the key.

Guinier had mixed views on what he had heard. While the 24-hour rule could improve trade, Guinier wanted proven solutions. He illustrated this viewpoint by saying there was no standard agreement on electronic seals, so he still had to advocate mechanical seals in today's environment.

Guinier also argued that Europe was ahead of the US in its experience of opposing terrorism, a point accepted by Dupont, who said that Europe took security seriously but did not always talk about it. On the subject of cost / benefit analysis, Dupont argued that if an inordinate amount of money was spent on security measures, the terrorists would have won as they would have destabilised trade.

## THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S ROLE

Looking at Iraq, Dupont said that some EU member states were in greater danger than others, due to their participation in the current military activity. He said this situation would continue until Europe had a coordinated foreign and security policy. Dupont reminded the meeting that one of the fundamental parts of the ISPS code was security assessment, i.e. the need for the detection of security threats within an international framework.

Rahman agreed that no one should become "hysterical" but he could not agree that the ISPS code was enough. He wanted a more transparent supply chain and argued that the European Commission could play a role in introducing standards (for electronic seals, RFIDs, data exchange, etc.) that were "desperately needed". Dupont commented that he no problem with more transparency in the transport chain and, following reactions from the floor, clarified his earlier comments; he had said that some member states were more threatened than others – but that all were threatened.

Dupont added that the European Commission's 2005 Work Programme did contain ideas for further standardisation but argued that these had to be developed in a global context. As an example, the Container Security Initiative (CSI<sup>7</sup>) was a good example of such cooperation as the European Commission, member states and the US were all involved. Dupont saw similar cooperation at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for maritime security issues. However, a legal framework was needed and, above all, global approaches had to be adopted that were feasible today (as not all countries could afford to install the latest techniques).



Prompted by Berendt, Captain Dewilde said that EU authorities must get involved in combating piracy, an increasing problem, even if events took place outside of European coastal waters.

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<sup>7</sup> "The CSI can be summarised as a response to US concerns involving potential terrorist threats to the international maritime container trade system and those who use it.  
([http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation\\_customs/customs/information\\_notes/containers\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/customs/information_notes/containers_en.htm))

Dupont argued that it was a foreign policy matter. He said an international instrument existed, i.e. boarding by naval forces was allowed in case of illegal piracy. As for coastal waters, he asked where responsibilities began and ended. Dupont admitted that the European Commission needed to have further discussions with all parties. However, he added that most cases of piracy took place at anchorage and suggested that this was really armed robbery.

## A EUROPEAN COASTGUARD SERVICE - PART II

EADS' **Julien Feugier** returned the meeting to the prospects for a European coastguard service and asked for clarification on the role of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). Dupont confirmed that a study conducted by the EMSA was ongoing to determine how coastguard tasks were currently conducted in each member state. He knew that there was some duplication of activities; however, Dupont had no problem with that as long as individual bodies exchanged information in a well-defined legal framework.

On the subject of EMSA, Dupont said it had relatively little power as its role was to provide technical assistance to the European Commission in the field of inspections. He did though note that the Commission and EMSA were jointly developing the SafeSeaNet<sup>8</sup> system that collected data concerning maritime safety issues from member states. Dupont acknowledged that the future was probably going to rest in the development of a real maritime monitoring system that implied civilian authorities having access to military information.

## A SECURE FACTORY-TO-PORT TRANSPORT CHAIN

**Brooks Tigner** intervened to ask Dupont for more information on the secure "factory-to-port" transport chain that had been announced as part of the European Commission's strategy. How would this be done? Would it be mandatory? Would it be linked to the ISPS code system?

Dupont agreed that these were good questions and confirmed that the ongoing consultative process would cover all of those aspects. He did explain that Customs Authorities were likely to take over more responsibility for (export) security as well as tax issue, and described his current thinking on the introduction of a "known shipper system" to reduce the efforts needed to control all shippers. In essence, Dupont said the consultative process (on the secure "factory-to-port" transport chain) would look at all the options.

## FINAL THOUGHTS FROM THE PANEL

**Michael Berendt** commented that any solutions would be difficult to implement if they meant significant cost implications for business. He also asked if the technology was available, did it work and how would the introduction of standards impact the final outcome.

**Adnan Rahman** insisted that political will was needed to aid the successful introduction of technology in a new marketplace. On the subject of cost, he was ambivalent, it depended on how the subject was approached (i.e. it could be chicken or egg). **James Moseman** agreed, the technology existed – but political will was essential, and there were privacy issues to be addressed, both to combat terrorism and within the business world.

**Captain Carmen Dewilde** concurred and added that ship owners had introduced many measures in the past years. Berendt reminded the panel that a key question remained unanswered; who was responsible (the European Commission, customs, coastguard, military, naval authorities, etc.) for implementation of any agreed measures. On the subject of cost, he noted that it would be hard to find techniques that could be universally afforded.

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<sup>8</sup> SAFESEANET aims to provide the means to do so, allowing rapid and efficient exchange of maritime information, so helping to keep Europe's seas clean and safe. See <http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ida/jsps/index.jsp?fuseAction=showDocument&documentID=2282&parent=chapter&preChapterID=0-16>



Berendt concluded that the maritime security area was multifaceted; capabilities had to be linked to (complex) requirements and the EU had to decide about its objectives – anti-terrorism, peace-keeping, emergency support, defence, stopping drug trafficking, etc. Overall, it was obvious that close cooperation was needed between the institutions, the US, with non-member states and across industry and the shippers themselves. Challenges did indeed abound!

### **Next NDA meeting**

The next roundtable will be held on December 6 – *Space and Security in Europe*



## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 18 OCTOBER 2004

<b>Ali Al-Bsoul</b>	Embassy of Jordan to Belgium
<b>Teodolinda Banegas de Makris</b> Ambassador	Mission of Honduras to the EU
<b>Jean-François Bedin</b> Director of Strategic Initiatives	Lockheed Martin Global
<b>Michael Berendt</b> Senior Policy Advisor	Government Policy Consultants International (GPC)
<b>Hans Joerg Brandenburger</b> Director	Thales
<b>Andrey Brichev</b> First Secretary	Mission of Russian Federation to the EU
<b>Heather Cameron</b> Operational Intelligence	OLAF
<b>Geert Cami</b> Managing Director	New Defence Agenda
<b>Ergam Camözü</b> Adviser to the WEU and WEAG NADREP	Embassy of Turkey to Belgium
<b>Helene Champagne</b> Project Assistant	New Defence Agenda
<b>John Chapman</b> Rapporetur	New Defence Agenda
<b>John Chapman</b> Rapporteur	New Defence Agenda
<b>David Chico Zamanillo</b> Parliamentary Assistant of the President	European Parliament
<b>Paul Nicholas Collins</b> Capability Development	Council of the European Union
<b>Jean-François Cot</b> Secrétaire général adjoint de la mer	Cabinet of the Prime Minister, France
<b>Peter Crawley</b> Official	European Commission DG Research
<b>Niels Dahlmann</b> Honorary Consul	Consulate of the Republic of Latvia
<b>Gaul De Rotalier</b> Member of Commission Staff	European Commission DG Fisheries
<b>Carmen Dewilde</b> Expert	The Nautical Institute





<b>Robert Draper</b> President	AeroStrategies
<b>Christian Dupont</b> Head of Maritime Security	European Commission DG Energy and Transport
<b>Ayoub Fathi</b> Economic counsellor	Mission of Libya to the EU
<b>Karen Ferris</b> Political Affairs Advisor	Korean Mission to the EU
<b>Julien Feugier</b> European Affairs Manager	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)
<b>Nicholas Fiorenza</b> Journalist	Armed Forces Journal
<b>Bill Giles</b> Director General Europe	BAE Systems
<b>Alfons Guinier</b> Secretary General	European Community Shipowners' Association (ECSA)
<b>Cem Gürdeniz</b> Chief of Strategy and Agreements Department	Turkish Navy
<b>Liselotte Hallen</b> Director	Kangaroo Group
<b>Rainer Hellmann</b> Journalist	Europäische Zeitung
<b>Jessica Henderson</b> Project Assistant	New Defence Agenda
<b>Arnauld Hibon</b> Vice-President, Director EU Affairs	Eurocopter
<b>Martin Hill</b> Vice President, Defence	Thales
<b>Tomasz Husak</b> Head of Mission	Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU
<b>Nikolay Ivanov</b> Counselor	Mission of Russian Federation to the EU
<b>Gordana Jaksic</b> First Secretary	Mission of Serbia and Montenegro to the EU
<b>Bernhard Jarzynka</b> Principal Administrator	European Commission Europeaid
<b>Andrzej Kopytko</b> Senior Specialist of Department of Defence Affairs	Ministry of Infrastructure of Poland

<b>Thierry Legrand</b> Project Manager	Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN)
<b>Michael Lund</b> General Manager	Danish Shipowners' Association
<b>Giles Merritt</b> Director	New Defence Agenda
<b>Loic Michel</b> European Affairs Manager	Thales
<b>James Moseman</b> Director, Europe and NATO	Northrop Grumman International
<b>Mircea Mudura</b> Counsellor	Mission of Romania to the EU
<b>José Perdigao</b> Research officer	European Commission
<b>Jean-Yves Petit</b> Military Representative	Permanent Representation of France to the EU
<b>Kristo Pollu</b> Attaché for Home Affairs	Permanent Representation of Estonia to the EU
<b>Adnan Rahman</b> Director of Surface Transport and Aviation Programme	Rand Europe - Leiden
<b>Demet Sekergioğlu</b> First Secretary	Embassy of Turkey to Belgium
<b>Rimants Strimaitis</b> Naval Representative	Mission of Latvia to NATO
<b>Brooks Tigner</b> EU Correspondent	Defense News
<b>Thomas Timlen</b> Manager and Representative to IMO and WCO	The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
<b>Ronald Vopel</b> Principal Administrator	European Commission DG Enterprise
<b>Lars Wedin</b> Policy Director, Forum for Security Studies	Swedish National Defence College (SNDC)



## Monthly Roundtable

Monday, 6 December 2004, Bibliothèque Solvay, 12:00-16:00

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# SPACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

Session I:  
12:00-13:30

## WHAT WILL BE THE DEFENCE APPLICATIONS OF EUROPE'S SPACE EFFORT?

At the EU and national level, Europe is embarking on an ambitious drive to develop new space technologies. What military capabilities could be derived from these R&D efforts, and how widely will their scientific findings be available? Is there yet a clearcut plan for harnessing the space drive to Europe's security and defence needs, including crisis management and intelligence gathering?

Lunch for NDA Members:

**13:30-14:30**

Session II:  
14:30 – 16:00

## WHAT FUTURE FOR EU-US SPACE COOPERATION

Europe's space research drive is a catch-up effort, given that US space capabilities are now far ahead technologically. What is the outlook for transatlantic cooperation on space research, and to what degree will it be driven by NATO efforts on interoperability and force transformation? Does the Galileo-GPS relationship auger well or badly for EU-US space research partnerships?

## NEW DEFENCE AGENDA

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