

Monthly Roundtable

Monday, 26 April 2004
Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels

ASSESSING THE MILITARY THREATS OF THE FUTURE



Moderated by **Giles Merritt**,
Director, New Defence Agenda

and

Peter Spiegel,
Defence Correspondent, Financial Times

Rapporteur: John Chapman



Participants 26th April

Massimo Amadei Concepts Branch	European Union Military Committee
Luis Balsells-Traver Executive Officer	Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)
Judith Bank Counsellor	Delegation of Hungary to NATO
Martin Banks Reporter	European Voice
Magda Baraka Counsellor	Mission of Egypt to the EU
Robert Bell Vice President for European Business	SAIC
Frederick Bonnard Editorial Director	Nato's Nations
Geert Cami Managing Director	New Defence Agenda
Luc Carbonez Director European Security	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium
George C. Cass Area Vice President, France & Benelux	Lockheed Martin Global, Inc
John Chapman Journalist	New Defence Agenda
Anda Catlaka First Secretary, Political & Economic Affairs	Embassy of Latvia to Belgium
Fernando Davara Rodriguez Director	European Union Satellite Centre
Stéphane Delétang CIS Advisor	Delegation of France to NATO
Eishad Dawily Ahmed Third Secretary	Mission of Egypt to the EU
Nicholas Fiorenza Journalist	Armed Forces Journal
Mark Fischer Assistant Director	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)
Leonore Frame Senior Executive, New Technologies Team	Scottish Development International
Sebastian Gerlach Senior Consultant	Kreab Consultants
Michael Grimes Consultant	Forum Europe

Jessica Henderson Project Assistant	New Defence Agenda
Volker Hertlein Counsellor	Embassy of Germany to Belgium
Nikolay Ivanov Counsellor	Mission of Russian Federation to the EU
Vassilis Kapetanyannis Press Counsellor	Embassy of Greece to Belgium
Linda Karvinen Project Manager	New Defence Agenda
Paul Koedijk Chairman	Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NiSA)
Marc Laplasse Adviser	VLD Studiedienst
Pawel Lesiak Counsellor	Delegation of Poland to NATO
Vasyl Liebidiev National Armament Representative	Mission of Ukraine to NATO
Tjien-Khoen Liem Principal Scientific Officer	European Commission
Daniel Markic First Secretary	Mision of Croatia to the EU
Gwen McClure Assistant Director of Public Safety and Terrorism/Chief of Fusion Task Force	Interpol
Giles Merritt Director	New Defence Agenda
Paul Millan Sales Director	Memex Technologies, Ltd.
Antonio Missiroli Research Fellow	European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS- EU)
Ernst Muller Global Account Manager	T-Systems International GmbH
Peter Müller Correspondent for NATO & EU	European Security and Defence
Milica Neacsu First Secretary	Mission of Romania to the EU
Peggy O'Donnell EU Liaison Officer	Brinks
Mehmet Poroy Defence Counsellor	Delegation of Turkey to NATO
Julang Pujianto Counsellor, Political Affairs	Embassy of Indonesia to Belgium

Christophe Raab Parliamentarian Assistant	European Parliament: Committee for Foreign Affairs
James Richards Director of EU Relations	Rolls -Royce International
Rudolphe Rothe Branch Chief of Intelligence Policy, German Air Force	European Union Military Committee
Michael C. Ryan Defense Advisor	US Mission to the European Union
Gennady Savostyuk Counsellor on military questions	Mission of Russian Federation to the EU
Ergin Saygun Military Representative	Delegation of Turkey to NATO
Soenke Schmidt Head of Unit, Fight Against economic, financial and cyber crime	European Commission
Evelyne Schuurmans Policy Advisor	Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)
Guy Servolle Corporate Vice President, EU & NATO	Dassault Aviation
Ariel Shafransky First Secretary	Mission of Israel to the EU
Rina Soemarno Yuwono First Secretary	Embassy of Indonesia to Belgium
Peter Spiegel Defence Correspondent	Financial Times
Magdalena Stepien Information Officer	Kent and West Sussex Brussels Office
Ronald Sullivan NATO Business Development Manager	SAIC
Zhiweu Tang Third Secretary	Mission of China to the EU
Steven Tebre Attache for General and External Affairs	European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA)
Paul Thonon President	CMI Defence
Brooks Tigner EU Correspondent	Defense News
Mieczyslaw Usydus Senior Officer	Delegation of Poland to NATO
Karel Van Hecke Assistant	New Defence Agenda



Amelie Vanwissen
Collaborator

Ministère de la Défense, Belgium

Zdenek M. Werner

Delegation of Prague to the EU

Maja Wessels

Senior Vice President, Government Relations

Honeywell

Programme for the day:

Session 1

Where does European Security begin and end?

- Do European voters continue to believe that the threat posed by nuclear weapons ended at the same time as the Cold War, or is the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD forcing them to re-think the EU's global security role?
- How high a priority should Europe give to space, both as a potential defence and security issue and also as a market for new technologies?
- Does Europe need to define its changing security interests and commitments, perhaps in the form of a new "Security Doctrine"?

Moderator: Giles Merritt, Director, New Defence Agenda

- **Luc Carbonez**, Director European Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium
- **Peter Spiegel**, Defence Correspondent, *Financial Times*
- **Michael C. Ryan**, Defense Advisor, US Mission to the European Union

Session 2

How good is intelligence gathering in Europe?

Different intelligence assessments of the Saddam regime's access to WMDs did much to shape the Iraq crisis and create the divisions between NATO allies.

- Looking forward, how much importance is being given in Europe to strengthening intelligence-gathering capabilities?
- What levels of improved intelligence and surveillance are needed to underpin the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and what information sharing mechanisms are being put in place?

Moderator: Peter Spiegel, Correspondent, *Financial Times*

- **Gwen McClure**, Assistant Director of Public Safety and Terrorism/Chief of Fusion Task Force, Interpol
- **Paul Millan**, Sales Director, Memex
- **Fernando Davara Rodriguez**, Director, European Union Satellite Centre
- **Antonio Missiroli**, Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS-EU)

Key points of the debates:

The latest New Defence Agenda roundtable set out to assess future military threats and in particular, how Europe should react to them. The first session, focusing on European security, developed into a power struggle between the US, with its “act now” approach, and a Europe, that wanted to give more thought to the root causes of terrorism and, in parallel, to avoid total dependence on the US. The afternoon session looked at intelligence, where a majority of speakers felt confident about the efficiency of data gathering and processing and a vocal minority warned of complacency in that area. Everyone, however, was in no doubt about the need for improved intelligence sharing across the board.

In the morning debate, the US Mission to the EU’s **Michael C. Ryan** was critical of Europe, saying that it sometimes lacked political will. As an example, Ryan quoted Afghanistan, where the EU had publicly supported action but had not lived up to its commitments. The FT’s **Peter Spiegel** dismissed the idea of a separate European “Security Doctrine” and argued strongly that this matter was best discussed in NATO and nowhere else. Spiegel also spoke against European projects that duplicated US capabilities, i.e. the Galileo project where the US already had its GPS system in place. The NDA’s **Giles Merritt** reminded Spiegel that such projects existed precisely because Europe wanted a measure of independence.

NATO’s Nations **Frederick Bonnart** and Turkish Military Representative to NATO **Ergin Saygun** were just two speakers who called for a more in-depth look at the root causes of terrorism. Spiegel would have none of this, arguing that while everyone agreed in principle with such sentiments, no one ever suggested a resulting course of action. In response, Bonnart put forward the idea of increasing the amount spent on aid, while decreasing global defence budgets. Spiegel did not concur, saying money was not the problem.

As for the voters concerns, Ryan spoke of the “necessary evil of democracy”, whereby the electorate wanted immediate action taken against the threat of WMDs but could see no benefit in long-term actions to combat poverty and despair. Ryan also reminded the audience that when action was eventually needed, everyone inevitably turned to the US as it had both the capability and the political will.

This was not accepted blindly however, with several speakers – including the Egyptian Mission to the EU’s **Magda Baraka** and Rolls-Royce International’s **James Richards** - unwilling to see the effectiveness of force against non-state terrorists. Spiegel agreed that this was a crucial point and backed force as a deterrent against states acting as safe havens and as sponsors of non-state actors.

On the subject of intelligence, it was generally accepted that everyone had been wrong about Iraq and its possession of WMDs. Even so, the panellists – primarily Interpol’s **Gwen McClure** and Memex’s **Paul Millan** - gave the thumbs-up to the current methods for the capture and processing of intelligence data. Sharing of this intelligence was a different matter, with speakers queuing up to talk of problems in this domain. Millan spoke of Europe’s “corner shop mentality” and “constant bickering”, McClure talked of black holes within the EU, the EU Military Committee’s **Rudolphe Rothe** wanted better cooperation between the EU’s three pillars and the EU Satellite Centre’s **Fernando Davara Rodriguez** spoke about a chronic inability to share knowledge effectively.

The ISS-EU’s **Antonio Missiroli** accepted that the EU had been blamed for its relative inactivity, prior to the Madrid bombings, but insisted that it had received no support from individual member states. As for the EU’s new anti-terror czar Gijs de Vries, the title was totally “misleading” and he would be no more than a co-ordinator with little power.

Richards agreed that information sharing had to be improved but brought the discussion back to intelligence gathering and processing. He warned against complacency in that area and cast serious doubts on the ability of individual agencies within the EU to fight the obstacles (cultural, linguistic and structural) in their path. For Richards, the answer should be the creation of a European CIA. This was not discussed, but given the nature of the morning’s debate, it might possibly be opposed by transatlantic allies preferring to leave intelligence gathering to the Department of Homeland Security.

Session 1: Where does European Security begin and end?

Opening the debate, the NDA's **Giles Merritt** noted that the meaning of the word "security" had changed along with the times. It had once referred to the "geopolitical aspect of defence" and existed only at the higher end of the political discussion. But now, concluded Merritt, it was all about the real nitty-gritty and covered such hot topics as anti-terrorism and homeland defence. Providing the panellists with further food for thought, Merritt also asked them to consider whether Europe needed a new security doctrine to replace the "Harmel Doctrine"¹ which was now almost 40 years old.

First speaker: Peter Spiegel, Defence Correspondent, *Financial Times*

The FT's **Peter Spiegel** took a look at the questions set by the NDA.

- Is the proliferation of WMD forcing voters to re-think the EU's global security role?

Spiegel felt that "global security" was not a particularly high priority for voters and their actual views were hard to identify. He preferred to look at national government policies (which sometimes reflected voters' opinions). In this regard, Spiegel identified a major difference between the US (where President Bush had "driven the people into a panic") and Europe (where the majority of countries are fairly sanguine about security, with the possible exception of the UK where Tony Blair had turned up the heat by frequently talking about terrorism).

- How high a priority should Europe give to space, both as a potential defence and security issue and also as a market for new technologies?

Here, Spiegel stressed the importance of Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), especially in terms of investment as there will be many technological breakthroughs. However, Spiegel chose to speak out against Galileo (the European Satellite Navigation System)² as it basically duplicated capabilities that already existed in the US, with its own GPS (Global Positioning System). He preferred European investment to be directed towards space-based sensors and the use of data processing to get information to the soldier in the field, as and when required.

- Does Europe need to define its changing security interests and commitments, perhaps in the form of a new "Security Doctrine"?

Spiegel dismissed the need for a separate European "Security Doctrine", as the issue of European security should be handled by NATO and NATO alone. His logic was that the risks are the same for everyone, "NATO should remain the place where security doctrines are developed, discussed and implemented".

Merritt reacted immediately to Spiegel's comments, arguing that the Galileo project was duplicating existing US capabilities precisely because Europe did not want to rely on its transatlantic ally. Expanding on his theme, Merritt backed research on new technologies as the possible driving force of Europe's new agenda. With the European Commission's Framework Programme being increased to 1 billion euros in the next seven-year financial perspective, Merritt was backing duplication.

¹ As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Harmel submitted a report titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance" to the NATO Council of Ministers. The report, which was approved by the council in 1967, contained the so-called "Harmel Doctrine". It advocated a strong defence combined with good diplomatic relations with the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The Harmel Doctrine helped to pave the way for the East-West détente of the early 1970s which led to the 1975 Helsinki Summit and the creation of the OSCE.

² See http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/index_en.htm for details of Galileo.

Second speaker: Michael C. Ryan, Defense Advisor, US Mission to the European Union

Michael C. Ryan looked at the intelligence sector and argued that it needed to be comprehensive and encompass not only the enemies' activities, but also the "friendly side", so that one could understand why "they" are doing something. In essence, he argued that we needed to look at .. and be aware of ... our weaknesses.

Ryan then looked at the challenges facing European security and focussed on: a) failure and b) ineffectiveness.

Failure: Ryan emphasised the need to avoid failure at all costs as this would be catastrophic for the Alliance. Underlining this, Ryan said that action was necessary if enemies could not be deterred (e.g. Milosevic in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia) and if actions were then taken, the aims must be pursued until they have been achieved (e.g. the prolonged Kosovo air campaign).

Ineffectiveness: However, a bigger problem to the Alliance was said to be ineffectiveness. Ryan gave a number of reasons for this:

- lack of consensus due to political competition
- lack of political will, e.g. Ryan argued that although EU member states publicly supported action in Afghanistan, they rarely met their commitments
- lack of capability due to low defence expenditure, here Ryan backed NATO's wish to keep defence savings within the house in order to push through the transformation programme

Ryan summed up his comments by noting that while everyone believed in "effective multilateralism". However, he believed that the US tended to emphasise "effective" while its European allies and partners stressed "multilateralism".

Third speaker: Luc Carbonez, Director European Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium

Luc Carbonez used the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana's European Security Strategy document (A Secure Europe in a Better World)³ as background to his remarks. Noting that it outlined Europe's strategic objectives to combat threats via "effective multilateralism". Carbonez stressed that there was "no pure military answer to threats". He underlined the need for conflict prevention to "start early" and covered the main points of the action plan:

- a) strengthening the International Atomic Agency
- b) tightening export controls
- c) dealing with illegal shipments
- d) strengthening international treaties

Carbonez insisted that the strategic document stressed the importance of Europe's links with the US, Russia and NATO, while highlighting a fundamental difference in approach between Europe and the US, with the former placing more importance on identifying and remedying the root causes of terrorism.

He added that the document called for Europe to be "more active, more coherent and more capable" so that it could meet its obligations, both when NATO was involved and when it was not. This implied a more effective pooling and sharing of resources.

³ See <http://ue.eu.int/solana/securityStrategy.asp> for a copy of the document.

As for co-operation in space, Carbonez argued that the importance of scientific programmes could not be underestimated. Different strands, both national and international, had to be brought together so that Europe could be a truly global payer.

First session – Q&A

Merritt could not resist pressing Carbonez for his view as to whether the “Harmel Doctrine” needed to be replaced. Carbonez was reluctant to comment directly, preferring to state that Europeans preferred a “sophisticated non-military approach” in order for the transatlantic relationship to be maintained.

NATO’s Nations’ **Frederick Bonnart** noted that all the panellists had used the traditional definition of the threats to European security, i.e. the proliferation of WMDs. He argued that the real threat was the existence of “poverty, hopelessness and superstition”. Bonnart therefore concluded that “effective multilateralism” could only be achieved once decisions had been taken as to where resources were best placed, i.e. more resources should be used to combat poverty and hopelessness. As for most terrorist attacks, Bonnart said they were usually carried out by home-made bombs rather than by WMD.

Bonnart’s message was supported by CMI Defence’s **Paul Thonon** and the Turkish Military Representative to NATO **Ergin Saygun**. The latter suggested widening the discussion to include not just the physical side of security, but also the political, economic and social aspects. Focussing on the social aspects, Saygun said there were 450 million people living in Europe, with the majority not having to worry about the need to feed and clothe themselves. However, on the periphery there were thousands of people concerned about their future. These outsiders could see the “wealth and security” inside the EU, with all the attendant problems that caused.

For Saygun, “joint operations” in the future had to include a civilian aspect, i.e. the participation of NGOs, as well as military input. Admitting it was becoming more complex, Saygun acknowledged that expenditures were being duplicated. However, he welcomed these moves if they led to a stronger European security pillar. Saygun merely warned against a subsequent de-coupling of the US from Europe.

Spiegel addressed the issue of whether “economic and social problems” were the real cause of terrorism. He argued that while both sides agreed with that notion, he had always failed to get officials on either side of the Atlantic to translate feelings into actions.

In response, Bonnart called for a redistribution of resources, as there would be a difference, for example, if the current expenditure patterns (900 \$ billion spent on defence, 50\$ billion on aid) were reversed. Spiegel could not accept that, as he did not see it as a problem of resources, giving Saudi Arabia as an example of money not solving the problem.

Taking a pragmatic stance, **Michael C. Ryan** agreed with Carbonez’s call for a more coherent approach that took account of social issues but reminded his audience that the electorate were concerned with more immediate threats to their way of life. If the voters’ attention was not captured, there would be no funding for programmes. Ryan argued that WMD might be remote, but they had certainly attracted the attention of the electorate.

Noting that paying attention to “poverty, hopelessness and ignorance” had to be addressed in the long-term as it not immediately impact the voting public, Ryan said it was a “necessary evil of democracy”. He did remind the audience that although the phrase “there are those who cannot be deterred” had been dropped from the draft European Security Strategy document, there would be cases when this would be true. Ryan’s answer was straightforward, the US would be asked to take the necessary actions. This was because it had the capability as it had taken a “long-term view” since the second world war. For Ryan, action was the key word – “doing nothing cannot be the right answer”.

The Egyptian Mission to the EU's **Magda Baraka** asked for clarification of the phrase "military confrontation of terrorism" as this was often debated within NATO. Baraka acknowledged that this had succeeded in Afghanistan but she cast doubts on its possible success elsewhere as it meant moving forces into another country – with all the problems that that entailed.

Giles Merritt took Baraka's question as a further request for Europe to "get the balance right" between combating conventional weapons (now seen to include WMDs) and the actions of "non-state actors", i.e. "people who do not like us". This implied shifting expenditure from the conventional categories to those areas more able to cope with the unorthodox enemies. Giving this necessary change in emphasis, Merritt asked Carbonez to explain how Solana's European Strategy Document could ever become anything more than just another piece of paper.

Carbonez said that Solana's European Strategy Document had a political purpose, i.e. to take Europe closer to the US in terms of facing security threats. He argued that, in the past, Europeans had generally acted in such a way that military conflict was avoided. Carbonez did though admit that in certain cases, military action was justified. Therefore, a European defence was required to react to European priorities, which may imply some unavoidable duplication with US capabilities, as "sometimes the US will give priority to homeland defence".

Referring to potential problems being caused within NATO, Carbonez called for all sides (NATO, EU member states, the US) to listen to each other so that a consensus could be reached in a genuine decision-making process that could be explained by individual governments to the electorate.

Rolls-Royce International's **James Richards** brought the discussion back to Baraka's point and asked if force really was useful against non-state terrorists. He stressed the need for good intelligence and noted that this was a problem following Europe's cut-backs since the end of the Cold War. Raising the temperature of the discussion, Richards asked if it would be more appropriate to look at the use of techniques such as disruption, the interception of funds, detention and even assassination in order to fight non-state terrorists.

Ryan took up the cudgels and agreed that military action could not achieve much in these circumstances, except perhaps in two areas: consequence management (rapid deployment of forces to establish a sense of security; coping with disasters, etc.) and reacting in emergencies (such as in Afghanistan where the politicians had taken their eye off the ball). Returning to the need for military intervention, Ryan said this would not be needed in an ideal world but was required "when all else fails". Unfortunately, added Ryan, the military could never change people's attitudes – especially when "the few took up arms against the majority".

Spiegel intervened to say that this was "the key question". He agreed that military capability was limited, perhaps to the use of intelligence and special operations, when faced by non-state actors. However, Spiegel noted that non-state actors needed state-sponsors and safe havens, and that in these cases, force could be used as a deterrent. In other words, the threat of force could be as effective as force itself⁴ – "not in Madrid but in cases like Syria and Iran, who do supply quasi-state sponsorship".

Interpol's **Gwen McClure** chipped in to add that her organisation and other national law enforcement agencies were keen to work closely with the military in joint operations. She added that Interpol wanted to share information with the military but had hit a brick wall as a lot of information was "classified".

Merritt wrapped up the session by arguing that there was a "lack of choice" in terms of whether or not to fight terrorism – "it involves everyone". Even so, Merritt argued that Europe was probably getting it right in terms of facing terrorism and its use of "soft power" and NGOs

⁴ Spiegel quoted retired senator Malcolm Wallop who said "diplomacy without military power is but a prayer."

where necessary. He concluded that his recent experiences showed that the US was acting like an “embattled giant” who was confused as to how it could best defend its homeland.

Session 2: How good is intelligence gathering in Europe?

First speaker: Paul Millan, Sales Director, Memex

Paul Millan focused on counter-terrorism and the role of intelligence gathering. As background, Millan listed three steps – “universal in the intelligence cycle”.

1. Gathering information on the street; at this point information can be in a raw format and comes from a myriad of different sources.
2. Processing this information into intelligence, into a meaningful format.
3. Sharing this intelligence within the community – “this is where Europe is weak”.

Millan stated that the recent terrorist bombings in Madrid had highlighted the weakness in this process. He concluded that either Europe was not gathering the right information, or was not processing the raw information into intelligence or Europe was doing both of these steps correctly, but was not sharing the resulting intelligence with the appropriate authorities.

Searching for an answer, Millan surmised that each of the member states was gathering and processing the information relatively well and that the problem lay in an inability to share intelligence across the community.

Millan used McClure’s comment of the morning session as an example of poor information sharing between the military and law enforcement organisations. He added that, disappointingly, the UK probably shared more intelligence with the US than it did with its European neighbours. But it is was not just a UK issue, as Millan added that national barriers to intelligence sharing existed within many EU member states.

Describing terrorists as “civilians during the day”, Millan argued that traditional defence policies would never capture such perpetrators of violence. He therefore called for the barriers between defence-level intelligence and street-level law enforcement intelligence to be removed in order to produce a level playing field for the intelligence agencies.

Second speaker: Gwen McClure, Assistant Director of Public Safety and Terrorism / Chief of Fusion Task Force, Interpol

Gwen McClure looked at the effectiveness of Europe’s intelligence gathering, e.g. are European countries gathering the right information that shows logistic support for a bombing in Indonesia and are African nations recognising intelligence that shows a potential bomb attack in Europe? She argued that intelligence gathering was effective, in agreement with Millan, but argued that current laws did not allow arrests to be made before a criminal act had been committed – even though local police regarded suspects as “radical fundamentalists”.

McClure also agreed with Millan that sharing information was a major problem for a myriad of reasons. This even existed within certain countries, where individual agencies were still not sharing data. Speaking personally, she also targeted the EU by stating that some member states were “safe havens” – no bombs would be exploding in those countries as they “funded bombing in other nations”.

McClure then focused on Interpol’s Fusion Task Force, set up to combat the links between organised crime and terrorism, and also to improve the links between law enforcement organisations (border police, security services, military, etc.). In this respect,

McClure repeated her request for better information sharing between military and law enforcement groups so that potential terrorist leaders could be identified, perhaps based on their attendance at terrorist training camps in the seventies.

Third speaker: Antonio Missiroli, Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS-EU)

Antonio Missiroli opened his remarks with a warning – “do not expect too much from the EU in this (security) field”. Acknowledging that the EU had been severely criticised for its lack of action, especially since the Madrid bombings, Missiroli was quick to point out that individual member states did not want to give the EU the power to act effectively.

Missiroli summed up the position of the EU and its member states by saying they “reacted to shocks”, such as 9/11 and 3/11, but lacked consistency and staying power. Giving examples, Missiroli said that Eurojus (the European Judicial Cooperation Unit) and Europol (The European Police Office) were “under staffed and under funded”, while the common Arrest Warrant had not been ratified by five of the 15 member states (“slowness in parliamentary procedures” – Germany, Austria, Greece; “the individual position of the Prime Minister” – Italy; “possibly legitimate concerns about citizens’ rights” – The Netherlands), with doubts existing about the willingness of the 10 accession countries to join the party.

Continuing on this theme, Missiroli could see little joy for the EU's new anti-terror czar Gijs de Vries. The title was totally “misleading”, according to Missiroli, as de Vries would have no powers to enforce actions across member states and would at best be a co-ordinator.

Turning to the thorny subject of intelligence sharing, Missiroli saw this as a genuine bottleneck. He said this worked best in bilateral terms, as even enemies could have a short-term common interest. As for multilateral intelligence sharing, this would only work if there was a long-term goal, as existed during the Cold War. Looking at the EU in particular, Missiroli pointed to the strong imbalances between nations, e.g. smaller countries could support the call for European CIA as they would lose nothing.

Missiroli concluded by stating that these problems were not an excuse for inactivity as the “fight against terrorism forces (the EU) to overcome the barriers that have existed ... to move towards pooling and sharing (intelligence data)”.

Fourth speaker: Fernando Davara Rodriguez, Director, European Union Satellite Centre

Explaining the role of the EU Satellite Centre, its director, **Fernando Davara Rodriguez**, spoke of his utopian dream whereby information was generated by a common European satellite system. But Davara Rodriguez had his feet firmly on the ground and described the current pragmatic approach to information gathering, whereby the centre aimed to integrate existing systems maintained by individual member states. Recommending a move to dual use systems, for civil and military purposes, Davara Rodriguez put forward the Centre itself as a model for the future as it had staff with both those backgrounds working to support the EU's security and defence needs.

In addition to supporting the Petersberg Tasks, the responsibilities of the Satellite Centre were described as: general security surveillance, maritime surveillance, the fight against terrorism, controlling arms proliferation, etc. But Davara Rodriguez looked to a future where the Centre's operational users would want data and added-value products, implying that the Centre would have to strengthen its role in training, analysis and research. Speaking personally, Davara Rodriguez stated that the Centre had sufficient data and an increasing fund of knowledge. However, he focussed on a problem – the Centre's inability to share that knowledge.

Davara Rodriguez's solution was to build on existing systems rather than to create new institutions, this meant improving the links between the various national agencies as each one had specific knowledge in a individual areas of intelligence gathering.

Second session – Q&A

Acting as the session moderator, **Peter Spiegel** kicked off the debate by asking the panel to choose between more integrated intelligence gathering at the EU level or leaving the responsibility at the national level. In response, **Paul Millan** looked at Europe and saw an EU that “spent too much time bickering” due to its “corner shop mentality”. He said this had to change and called for everyone to get round the table and start talking, otherwise “terrorism will run over us”.

Gwen McClure called for stronger regional cooperation within the EU and in greater Europe. Speaking frankly, McClure said that certain NGOs that “financed terrorism” had been shut down in the Balkans and had simply crossed borders and continued to operate. McClure criticised Europe and quoted examples of reports coming in from areas such as North Africa, where reports had been received (in Europe) in the nineties – concerning people possibly aiding terrorist activities – and had been ignored.

Antonio Missiroli recommended a ‘mix-and-match’ line of attack: money laundering could be countered most effectively by a multilateral approach whereby other problems were better tackled on a bilateral basis. He added that the EU culture, traditionally based on transparency and openness, did not correspond to the demands of intelligence gathering. Missiroli saw this as a reason why some member states were reluctant to share secrets.

The panel had generally been in agreement that data sharing, rather than data gathering, was the problem area. The EU Military Committee's **Rudolphe Rothe** agreed and put the focus on dealing with the intelligence. Rothe called for all types of intelligence to be brought together – covering criminal, law enforcement, security and military matters. This implied bringing together the three pillars and defining what nations were willing to provide. For Rothe, that was the “crucial question” as a better balance was needed between transparency and security.

He said that there was room for improvement – better cooperation between the three pillars – and that was the role of the counter-terror czar. Likening the intelligence community to an orchestra, Rothe said that the soloists were ready but the conductor was needed to bring them together, hopefully with the right choice of music (from the member states). But with a touch of realism, Rothe said it was unrealistic to be present too often at a perfect concert.

Spiegel was surprised that an orchestra could actually exist – given that member states might not even want to play together. Rolls-Royce's **James Richards** supported Spiegel and warned of complacency. He argued that transnational terrorism could only be combated by the use of transnational intelligence sharing. Describing the many barriers to efficient intelligence sharing (linguistic, cultural, structural), he cast doubt on the ability of today's organisations to gather the right (accurate and timely) intelligence. This led him to call for the creation of a type of European CIA to be created to face the enormous challenges.

Fernando Davara Rodriguez insisted that the data was available but the problem lay with the national agencies and the lack of agreement to share information within the EU member states. Millan acknowledged that Europe could do better and warned of another problem, whereby the intelligence services (in the UK) could not keep data unless a crime had been committed – “use it or lose it” – as this went against the European Convention on Human Rights.

Given this rather depressing scenario, Defense News' **Brookes Tigner** was moved to ask the panel how long it would take for the various agencies within the EU to be brought

together in an effective way. Declining to answer directly, Missiroli returned to his comment that the EU's actions had been driven by shocks. He did though remind the audience that NGOs also played a role in intelligence gathering and gave Sudan as a perfect example (state failure, ethnic cleansing, terrorist cells, safe havens, possibly WMDs). Picking up on Rothe's theme, Missiroli argued that the orchestra was in place and ready to play but lacked the music (and possibly a conductor).

McClure joined the discussion and added that Interpol was a volunteer organisation (with 180 countries). Looking for a weakness, she agreed that Interpol had not been doing a good job in soliciting information and this had been the rationale behind the creation of the Fusion Task Force. McClure said that all countries were included, regardless of any existing concerns about human rights, as "new ways of cooperating are needed".

Looking at the EU in particular, Davara Rodriguez could only agree. He reiterated that individual member states had many capabilities but the EU had so far failed to bring the parts together. For him, the sum of the parts was not greater than the sum of the individual contributions.

Rothe put forward an optimistic example within the EU and the "possible ESDP mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a military component". He explained that the region had a police mission, a commission delegation and a special representative. From December 2004 onwards, there would be a military component – and the police were eager to share intelligence with the military. For Rothe, "sharing information was top of the military agenda in Bosnia-Herzegovina".

WEAG's **Luis Balsells-Traver** changed the focus by asking if the media had an adverse impact on the situation by the way in which they referred to protagonists (e.g. ETA were terrorists in Spain whereas they were a Basque Separatist organisation in the FT and the Economist). Balsells-Traver added that one newspaper's Coalition Forces were another's Occupation Forces.

Spiegel admitted that there was an ongoing debate within the FT, and many other publications, and concluded that the topic was a hard one to grapple with. **Frederick Bonnart** added that this problem was not restricted to the media. Millan stayed with the media and argued that they, for instance CNN, were often at the leading edge of intelligence gathering.

The Egyptian Mission to the EU's **Magda Baraka** had listened patiently and understood that the panel was saying that all was well in the world of intelligence gathering. Therefore, she asked, what had happened in Iraq – where did things go wrong? In the gathering, processing or in the political use of the data?

Missiroli took up the baton and commented that everyone was wrong about the existence of WMDs in Iraq, as even the French "were almost sure that biological and chemical weapons existed". He added that observers had also misread the information coming from defectors from Iraq to the West and had misinterpreted the behaviour of Saddam Hussain himself, who had boasted of having WMDs.

McClure agreed that everyone thought that Iraq had WMDs and opined that the defectors had probably not been vetted correctly and were "probably saying what the community wanted to hear". Speaking personally, **Paul Thonon** disagreed with that notion. He argued that "too many people wanted to find WMDs" in Iraq and called for more effective cross-checking of information.

Closing remarks from the panel

Spiegel took the conference away from Iraq and returned the discussion to McClure's earlier remarks about black holes in Europe, where attacks were unlikely to happen as cells were active in those countries.

McClure did not want to name names and defended Germany, Spain, France and the UK – who had all done good police work. She argued that this meant there was a bigger danger from terrorists in those countries. The ones who were doing nothing were more likely to be ignored by terrorists and McClure hinted that they could be safe havens for certain players. She added that law changes may be needed, especially in the realm of data retention. McClure also argued that some countries were not actively investigating terrorist cells. From the floor, Richards noted that he found Carbonez's comment, "We have found ways of keeping the threat low" to be of interest.

Missiroli looked at the way in which citizens viewed the terrorist situation in Europe. He pointed to the many arrests in the wake of the Madrid bombings and said this meant the European citizens felt good about the situation. However, he added that many people were concerned about the new US regulations affecting air travel as this could impact them personally.

In the light of the Madrid atrocities, Tigner suggested that the EU had perhaps "bitten off more than it could chew" even though some of the initiatives could be described as a PR-exercise. Millan agreed and gave the example of the UK where the Home Secretary had announced the creation of the (British FBI) Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) – an amalgamation of the Immigration Service, Customs & Excise, the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. It was planned for the end of 2006, although Millan thought this would never happen in this time frame.

Overall Millan said he would be delighted to see any nation merge the control of its military and civil intelligence organisations, so that an appropriate response to terrorism could be generated. He said if this happened "within a single nation", within five years, it would be a cause for celebration.

Missiroli said this was the paradox of EU policy-making; i.e., the necessity to set long-term goals where progress may not be swift (due to a lack of political will, etc.) but where the mere existence of a plan was important.

Future NDA events

The NDA's 3rd Annual Security and Defence Conference will be held on May 17 – **Defending Global Security** - The New Politics of Transatlantic Defence Co-operation

The next roundtable will be held on June 21– **On the eve of Istanbul: Can NATO become a motor for reform?**