ACCORD

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a non-governmental institute working throughout Africa to bring creative solutions to the challenges posed by conflict on the continent. ACCORD's primary aim is to influence political developments by bringing conflict resolution, dialogue and institutional development to the forefront as an alternative to armed violence and protracted conflict.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force</td>
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<td>CMAP</td>
<td>Coordination des Mouvements Armes et Politiques de l’Opposition (Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMMRD</td>
<td>Commission Nationale de Démobilisation, Désarmament et Réintégration</td>
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<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Higher Council of Transition (Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armes Rwandas (Rwandan Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARF</td>
<td>Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces Nationals pour la Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frodebu</td>
<td>Burundian Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice Equality Movement (Sudan)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
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<td>MRND</td>
<td>Movement Republican National pour la Development</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Provisional Ruling Council (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>PALIPEHUTU</td>
<td>Parti pour la Liberation des Peoples Hutu</td>
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<td>POP</td>
<td>Protocol of Principles</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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Executive Summary

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) held a workshop in Durban, South Africa on 14 and 15 September 2009. The theme of the workshop was ‘Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa’. The aim of the workshop was to evaluate the democratisation and developmental components of African peace agreements in the light of objectives for ‘durable’ or ‘positive’ peace. Among the questions posed were: which components of peace agreements further the goals of democratisation and development, and do these components facilitate or impair possibilities for ‘durable’ peace?

Nine peace agreements were presented at the workshop, under five broad themes. The 2003 Liberia Accra Agreement and the 2003 DRC Inter-Congolese Dialogue presenters, under the first theme, focused on components of peace agreements for good governance such as power sharing, building state institutions, political parties and elections. The second theme, dealt with by the 1999 Sierra Leone Lomé Agreement and the 2005 Sudan Comprehensive Agreement presenters, focused on components for the management of resources. Presenters of the 2000 Burundi Arusha Agreement and the 1994 Angola Lusaka Protocol examined the third theme, namely components of peace agreements contributing to durable peace, with an emphasis on civil society and reconstruction, development and reconciliation. The 2002 Chad Tripoli II Agreement presenter, focusing on the fourth theme, examined the role of rebel forces and leadership within peace agreements. The fifth theme dealt with components of peace agreements contributing to durable peace, with an emphasis on the role of regional and/or international organisations, and was focused on by the presenters of the 2004 Côte d’Ivoire Accra III Agreement and the 1993 Rwanda Arusha Agreement.
Introduction

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) held a workshop in Durban, South Africa on 14 and 15 September 2009. The theme of the workshop was ‘Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa’. The aim of the workshop was to evaluate the democratisation and developmental components of African peace agreements in the light of objectives for ‘durable’ or ‘positive’ peace. Among the questions posed were: which components of peace agreements further the goals of democratisation and development, and do these components facilitate or impair possibilities for ‘durable’ peace?

The peace agreements focused on were selected from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program data set on peace agreements 1989–2005. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program is one of the most well used and accurate data sources on global armed conflicts. The data is derived from theoretically and empirically based analyses of armed conflict, prevention and resolution. It therefore provides an authoritative means to categorise peace agreements. The agreements were selected from the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘full’ category. Agreements were then classified as ‘successful’ or ‘failed’ according to the Uppsala variables for agreements, which either ‘ended’ or ‘failed’, and agreements ‘where violence with the same parties restarted within five years’. All the peace agreements selected make some provision for furthering the goals of democratisation and/or development. These include provisions for elections, power sharing, inclusion of civil society, inclusion of all political parties, and the setting up of institutions such as human rights commissions, as well as commissions for reconciliation, national reconstruction and development and provisions for resource management.

The Nine peace agreements presented at the workshop include the following:

- The 1994 Lusaka Protocol – Angola
- The 2000 Arusha Agreement – Burundi
- The 2002 Tripoli II Agreement – Chad
- The 2004 Accra III Agreement – Côte d’Ivoire
- The 2003 Inter-Congolese Dialogue – Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
- The 2003 Accra Agreement – Liberia
- The 1993 Arusha Agreement – Rwanda
- The 1999 Lomé Agreement – Sierra Leone
- The 2005 Comprehensive Agreement – Sudan.

2 Variable ‘K’.
3 Variable ‘P’.
4 Variable ‘AV’ – ‘Vi05’.
The peace agreements were discussed under the themes of: democratic governance, management of resources, civil society, leadership/spoilers and the role of regional and/or international bodies.

Participants at the workshop ranged from development agency practitioners and researchers to academics, all of whom have vast experience in the area of peace and conflict resolution. They reflected on the multidimensionality of peacemaking processes in Africa, with a view to producing knowledge and producing knowledge on peace agreements and peacemaking.

This workshop follows from earlier work on peace agreements at ACCORD – namely the Peace Processes Experts Workshop in 2006 and the Peace Agreements Experts Forum in 2007. Participants at the workshop and the forum suggested that the failure of peace agreements can be explained by the general lack of a culture of democracy and a culture of respect for human rights. It was also argued that, in terms of factors contributing to the success of peace agreements, it is a state's responsibility to provide for the socio-economic needs of its citizens, which would include development and the redistribution of wealth. Indeed, often the state's incapacity to deliver has been directly linked to the failure of a peace agreement (ACCORD, 2007:5). It is discussions such as the above that motivate the ACCORD study's focus on democracy and development within the framework of peace agreements in Africa.
Background and Context

Defining Peace Agreements

Peace agreements are defined as “arrangements entered into by warring parties to explicitly regulate or resolve their basic incompatibility” (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1997). Christine Bell distinguishes among three types of peace agreements: pre-negotiation, framework/substantive and implementation (Bell, 2000:25). Following Johan Galtung’s distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace, where negative peace is the “absence of violence (and) war” and positive peace is the “integration of human society” (Galtung, 1964), a peace agreement can be considered ‘successful’ if it has been ‘sustainable’ or ‘durable’. Emphasis can, therefore, be placed on negative dimensions of peace, focusing on the conflict behaviour of belligerents in an effort to explain conditions under which violence can be terminated. It can also be placed on positive dimensions of peace, focusing beyond the absence of armed conflict and taking into account aspects such as the degree of democratisation and the provision of public goods (Nilsson, forthcoming).

Theories of Peace Agreements and Peace Processes

Various theories have been put forward to explain the adoption of peace agreements. These include war fatigue, the search for durable peace, a declaration of a no winner and no loser outcome, military versus peace settlement victory, and recognition of the effects of war on the social, political and cultural life of the community (Pratt, 2009). The advent of peace is also associated with a process and culture of democratisation. The Democratic Peace Theory – which suggests that “democracies do not fight each other” – emphasises development and, specifically, improvements to socio-economic conditions of citizens (Xenias, 2005). It assumes that if there are more democracies, then there would be less conflict. A logical recast of the core argument of the Democratic Peace Theory would produce the following syllogism:

Democracies do not engage in physical violence,
Violence hinders development,
Therefore, having more democratic states leads to enhanced economic development.5

The connection between peace and democracy is possible because democracy encourages the establishment of effective ‘dialogic mechanisms’ (Bohman, 1996:34). The notions of negotiation and mediation suggest that peace emanates from certain deliberate and deliberative processes (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985:7-16). Managing the peace process, therefore, requires empowering the conflicting actors with appropriate skills and establishing deliberative structures that can help maintain enduring peace. The role of the mediators and negotiators, and the engagement between the mediators and the conflicting parties, require a high level of persuasion. However, persuasion occurs in varying degrees of competencies – the total lack of which often results in parties seeking other symbolic means to enhance their bargaining influence, such as resorting to the use of violence to

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5 Author’s syllogism for the logic of the Democratic Peace Theory.
secure re-negotiation. Democratisation, therefore, is a process that commences with inclusive peace negotiations.

Hampson (1996:217) suggests the following as necessary preconditions to achieve a successful peace settlement:

First, peace agreements should include all parties involved in the conflict, secondly, they need to be well crafted and precise especially as regards details over transitional arrangements, thirdly, they should offer clear commitments and flexibility, fourthly, they should offer incentives for parties to sustain the process and to participate in politics, fifthly, they should provide for dispute settlement, mediation if necessary, renegotiation in the case of disagreement, and lastly, they should deal with core issues in the conflict and bring about a real transformation incorporating norms and principles to which parties subscribe, such as equity in democracy and they should be consistent with standards of human rights, justice and respect for individuals and groups.

Two theories inform the peacemaking process with reference to achieving durable peace. The first is Christopher Mitchell’s Three Phase Model and the second is the theory of Mutually Enticing Opportunities. While Mitchell’s model emphasises agency as key to achieving durable peace, the Mutually Enticing Opportunities theory gives precedence to the issues. Given the complex nature of peace agreements and the multiplicity of mediators that are required to achieve successful peace negotiations, Mitchell (2003:84) proposed the following model around peace agreements and the tasks of core mediators:

Mitchell’s Three Phase Model: Tasks of Core Mediators (2003:84)

**Phase One – Pre-negotiation**

*Explorer*: Determines the adversaries’ readiness for contact; sketches range of possible solutions

*Reassurer*: Reassures adversaries that the other party is not wholly bent on victory

*Decoupler*: Assists external patrons to withdraw from core conflict; enlists patrons in other positive tasks

*Unifier*: Repairs intraparty cleavages and encourages consensus on interests, core values and concessions

*Enskiller*: Develops skills and competencies needed to enable adversaries to reach a durable solution

*Convener*: Initiates processes of talks, provides venue and legitimate contacts and meetings.
Phase Two – During Talks and Negotiations

**Facilitator:** Fulfils functions within meetings to enable a fruitful exchange of versions, aims and visions

**Envisioner:** Provides new data, ideas, theories and options for adversaries to adapt; creates fresh thinking

**Enhancer:** Provides additional resources to assist in search for positive sum solution

**Guarantor:** Provides insurance against talks breaking down and offers to guarantee any durable solutions

**Legitimiser:** Adds prestige and legitimacy to any agreed solution.

Phase Three – Post-agreement

**Verifier:** Reassures the adversaries that terms of the agreement are being fulfilled

**Implementer:** Imposes sanctions for non-performance of agreement

**Reconciler:** Assists in long-term action to build new relationships among and within adversaries.

Mitchell’s model places the idea of durable peace on three of the actors mentioned at the three different phases of an agreement process – namely the Enskiller, the Guarantor and the Reconciler. The Enskiller needs to understand the cultural and socio-political context within which the conflict is located, and then design capacity programmes that can best help the different actors to maintain durable peace – even when there are no longer external forces to monitor the arrangement. Moral guarantors are another key group of participants in the peace process. Peace in many contexts in Africa hinges on the calibre of eminent personalities that mediate and stand as its moral guarantor. A case in point is Nelson Mandela acting as mediator in the Burundi conflict (Mthembu-Salter, 2002:21-35). The identification of moral guarantors with durable peace process has been questioned by the emerging discourse on Mutually Enticing Opportunities (Zartman, 2004). This discourse focuses attention on the bargaining chip of the settlement process, rather than on the main actors. The basis of its argument is that conflicting parties see incentives for peace as preferable to a continuation of war. In Africa, negotiations cannot be sustained outside of the culturally entrenched politeness framework. At least, for now, it seems evident that Africa’s ‘revered voices’ still have a role to play in maintaining durable peace. The third actor in Mitchell’s model is the Reconciler, who has the task of building ‘relationships among and within adversaries’.

Implementing Peace Agreements

Following the peacemaking process, durable peace is only guaranteed by a successful implementation of the peace agreement. Peace agreements are not necessarily rigid documents to which warring factions must legalistically adhere. Peace agreements often
demonstrate certain values, grievances, negotiation capability and commitments of parties to peace. They are arrangements, therefore, to which individual parties seek to commit themselves with a view to realising peace – even if, in some cases, their grievances may not have been met. Often resurgence of conflict may result, requiring re-negotiation processes. Also, renewed armed conflicts risk plunging a democratic state into anarchy, resulting in what has been termed ‘the collapsed state’ (Rotberge, 2003). Factors that may hinder the due implementation of a peace agreement or the ability to re-negotiate include: the number of warring parties; the presence of a peace agreement signed by all parties before implementation; the likelihood of spoilers; whether or not the state has collapsed; the numbers of armed soldiers and warring factions; disposable natural resources; and the presence of hostile neighbouring states (Pratt, 2009).

Peace Agreements and Good Governance

The first area under the theme of peace agreements and durable peace that was examined at the workshop was the component of good governance. Issues arising in relation to good governance included provisions made in peace agreements for power sharing, building state institutions, political parties and elections. The two peace agreements examined in this context were Liberia’s 2003 Accra Agreement, presented by Dr Comfort Ero, and the DRC’s 2003 Inter-Congolese Dialogue, presented by Dr Kasaija Phillip Apuuli.

Existing literature shows that power sharing is a delicate and controversial method of resolving conflict. Power sharing was originally advocated to garner the commitment of local actors in signing peace agreements, which would invariably reduce the involvement of international actors (Mehler, 2009:2). It includes the sharing of economic, military and political resources in the state. This concept of ending violent conflict is, however, problematic (cf. Jarstad, 2006a). It has been observed that the discourse on power sharing has not been integrated for the debate around its pros and cons (cf. Jarstad, 2006a). Power sharing falls short of expectation, particularly when negative power dynamics are set in motion. This might cause the oppression of one party by the other, or stall the process entirely. Because of the crisis associated with political power sharing, Jarstad has suggested ‘joint rule’ – but this kind of arrangement should hold only through the transition to a more democratically elected government. Mehler (2009:27) asserts: ‘For the sake of democratisation, power sharing is to be preferred.’ Likewise, transition election processes and the constitution of political parties come with their own discontents. There are a number of situations where, even after elections have been held, there is either a recurrence of war or rigging of results that leads to other forms of civil unrest. If the situation escalates, there is bound to be a divided state where ‘power sharing’ or ‘joint rule’ becomes a plausible option. Although elections in themselves do not necessarily guarantee good governance, elections constitute the first step toward entrenching democracy or democratisation processes. This singular act helps citizens to exercise their rights, which may have been suspended during war. Ottaway (2007:603) has reiterated the idea that ‘coercive democracy’ undermines democratisation, which should help a nation transit from conflict to democracy. Ottaway further reiterates the threat that majoritarian politics poses
to minority groups in situations of transition to democracy. However legitimate Ottaway’s concerns are, the foreknowledge of the possibility of majoritarian hegemony or any other kind of problem in specific locations should lead peacemakers to set up a framework that would later enhance and sustain the values of positive consocialisation that may have occurred during the conflict resolution phases (cf. Mitchell’s Three Phase Model above).

**Liberia: The 2003 Accra Agreement – Dr Comfort Ero**

Conflicts generally accentuate the total collapse of already fragile and weak political institutions. This is due to the presence of spoilers and different state actors, who may have contributed to the ruin of the state. Tribalism, resource control, ethnicity and undue external interference are some of the factors that contribute to the emergence of conflict in most African states. The Liberian example shows clearly how a state that has been on the brink of collapse can exercise its political will to effect change on the polity. Characteristically, there are a number of issues that either enhance or impinge on the consummation of the peace agreements that could lead to the building of state institutions. Such factors include resources and resource control, compromise and logrolling, the rebel factor, the role of civil society, the role of external players, the nature of the conflict, corruption, understanding or lack thereof of the peace process, and free and fair elections. There were two manifestations of power sharing in Liberia: the first relates to how internal warring parties conceded and negotiated leadership arrangements between and among each other, and the second concerned the way multilateral institutions related to each other in facilitating the peace process.

**Liberia**

Liberia has suffered a succession of two brutal civil wars. The first civil war began in 1999 when Samuel Doe, then president of Liberia, had taken power in a popular coup of 1980, but opposition from abroad to his undemocratic regime led to economic collapse. At first, Doe crushed internal opposition, but after his Krahn ethnic group began attacking other ethnic groups – particularly in Nimba County – conflict seemed inevitable. Then, Charles Taylor, who had left Doe’s government, assembled a group of rebels in Côte d’Ivoire, who later became known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). They invaded Nimba County on 24 December 1989. The Liberian Army retaliated against the whole population of the region, attacking unarmed civilians and burning villages. Many left as refugees for Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, but opposition to Doe was inflamed. Prince Johnson, an NPFL fighter, split to form his own guerrilla force soon after crossing the border – based on the Gio tribe and named the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). Over the next 10 years NPFL, INPFL and Doe’s last remaining supporters (who united to form the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy, known as ULIMO) engaged in a bitter struggle for power and control of the country’s vast diamond deposits and power. Various attempts were made to broker peace and form coalition governments that would bring some cessation of violence. However, only with the assistance of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the dedicated Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia – with
the support of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) – were the warring factions able to agree to a ceasefire and, simultaneously, host elections for the presidency and national assembly in July 1997. Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party won an overwhelming victory, and were believed to hold the power to bring some stability and end the bloodshed in the country.

However just two years later, in 1999, Liberia’s second civil war erupted when Liberian dissidents – under the banner of the Organisation of Displaced Liberians – attacked Liberia from Guinea. Guinea had, over the years, become an important military and financial source of support for various groups opposed to the Taylor regime and the Liberian government. The dissident groups in Guinea had coalesced as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), led by Sekou Conneh – whose movement had also gained support from an alliance brokered by ECOMOG and the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Accordingly, LURD forces engaged in simultaneous attacks and counterattacks against Taylor, who deployed irregular ex-NPFL fighters with his more privileged units – such as the Anti-Terrorist Unit – to counter the incursions being made from both Guinea and (later) Sierra Leone. Thus, by 2002, Liberia was engaged in a complex three-way conflict with Sierra Leone and the Guinea Republic. The situation was further complicated by the involvement of the United States and United Kingdom, which mounted international pressure against Taylor’s regime and awarded financial and other support to various opposition groups (mainly based in Guinea). Moreover, Taylor supported the creation of the Sierra Leonean rebel group, the RUF, and thereby encouraged the emergence of even more rebel groups and the development of an Ivorian-backed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Accordingly, between 2002 and 2003, Taylor lost control of two thirds of Liberia, and due to mounting regional pressure (specifically from ECOWAS) and dedicated support in the form of the United States Joint Task Force Liberia, Taylor eventually resigned in August 2003. Taylor then led fled into exile in Nigeria, and Liberia began the negotiations to end the war, which would become the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

The Liberian example has often been described as the exemplary peace agreement, because of the high-level transactions that took place. What is likely to aid an understanding of this peace agreement is to locate it within context. The conflict started in 1989 and ended in 1997, re-emerged in 1999 and ended altogether in 2003. This particular peace agreement seems to have betrayed the reality on the ground. The credit is due to the people of Liberia as much as it is to the diplomatic and the international community, in seeking to put an end to the conflict and ensure that a ‘credible’ person was elected into office.

One of the major problems encountered in the arrangements toward resolving this conflict was the personhood of Charles Taylor, who was indicted in 2003 for crimes against humanity. As much as it was crucial to de-legitimise Taylor’s person and deter him from participating in the elections, rebel forces saw an opportunity to continue their atrocities and would later consider themselves liberators. This, by default, gave further legitimacy to Taylor to pursue his political ambitions further. The intensification of the conflict
compelled the international community to view the Liberian situation with required urgency. Attendance problems, coupled with a lack of faith on the side of the rebels, delayed the Accra Peace Agreement for 76 days.

Furthermore, civil society organisations and politicians converged to deliberate on the possibility of a peace agreement under the aegis of the international community. The United Nations (UN) played a significant role in bringing the warring parties together, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was given due recognition by the international community in facilitating the peace process. Power sharing in the manner that the peace agreement unfolded was more about how the multilateral organisations negotiated their way through the peace process, than how the warring parties chose to rule the state. In terms of state governance, the Liberian people had the last say – through a free, but dubitably fair, election – in selecting a candidate of their own choice.

A number of issues run through the Liberian case. First, insufficient knowledge of what the issues really were hampered the response of the international community regarding the nature and approach to dealing with the conflict. Second, some individual actors, such as rebel leaders, become the nerve centre of the conflict and would require a special strategy. Third, delayed intervention caused an extended period of negotiation. Fourth, corruption was already endemic within the different groups, which caused further debilitation of the country. Fifth, there was a lack of understanding of what peace agreement existed among the warring parties; and last, civil society actors and politicians who had contributed to the ruining of the state were now part of the peace process. Significant also is the role of external actors – namely ECOWAS and the UN – and the deep lack of understanding of the geopolitical terrain by the UN Missions. One last crucial point is the transformational use of the power of elections by the Liberians, who exercised their rights in choosing a candidate of their choice.

**Highlights**

- Contextual understanding of conflict is important.
- Peace agreements should address the reality of the conflict location.
- Inordinate political ambition of protagonists can be a major setback to the timely conclusion of peace agreements.
- Competence in peace talks should determine the choice of negotiators.
- Efforts should be made to curtail the activities of warlords during agreement processes.
- Every party needs to be sincerely committed to the peace process.
- Power-sharing deals should not be about external actors, but emanate from a genuine concern for the citizens of the conflict region.

_DRC: The 2003 Inter-Congolese Dialogue – Dr Kasaija Phillip Apuulid_ 

The Democratic Republic of the Congo presented a somewhat different scenario. One of the main reasons for the conflict in the Congo is that of identity politics. This, of course,
shows that the peace process is a series of unfolding events, which mutates with each prevailing culture (Ohlson & Soderberg, 2002). The important aspects of the peace process are the conclusion, implementation and consolidation of a signed peace agreement.

Three hypotheses emerged from the Congolese experience:

1. Durable peace will not be realised if third parties impose a settlement on the parties – agreements signed voluntarily have more potential to endure than those concluded under duress.

2. Agreements that address the key conflict issues and concerns of the parties are more likely to hold.

3. Agreements that include all parties with potential to resume hostilities are more likely to hold.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Since independence in 1960, the DRC (formerly Zaire) has been torn apart by intrastate conflicts on five occasions. The first conflict was soon after independence, when two mineral-rich provinces declared themselves sovereign. Then, in 1965, army general Mobutu seized power and hailed the start of a 31-year rule marked by widespread human rights abuses, endemic corruption, economic ruin, rebellions and various intermittent wars. Despite internal resistance to the Mobutu regime, Mobutu was backed by Western nations as a bulwark against communist movements in central Africa until the late 1980s – and so the country remained under the tyrannical leadership of Mobutu until the global landscape of politics and power changed at the end of the Cold War.

In 1996, Mobutu drove out the Banyamulenge from then-Zaire – and, in doing so, enraged the Congolese army, which resulted in an armed rebellion led by Laurent Kabila (and supported by Rwanda and Uganda) to carry out a coup and topple the Mobutu regime.

Then, in 1998, foreign troops supporting President Kabila’s regime refused to leave the country, and sparked what was to become a ‘war of liberation’ for the Congo. The foreign troops (represented by Namibian, Angolan and Zimbabwean nationals) accused Rwandans and Ugandans of exploiting the DRC’s mineral resources and wealth. As a result, an all-out war broke out between the Congolese army, foreign troops, Ugandans, Rwandans and numerous opportunistic rebels groups that emerged and further destabilised the situation.

After a failure to fully implement the provisions of the 1999 Lusaka Accord, as well as eliminate rebel forces – or even pose a formidable challenge to the growing Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), led by Professor Mwamba dia Wamba (who had gained the support of both Rwandan and Ugandan forces) – Kabila’s regime faced mounting opposition. On 16 January 2001, Kabila was assassinated during a failed coup attempt.
Laurent Kabila was then succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila.

In 2002, conflict resurgted with ethnic tensions in north-east Uganda as well as in the DRC between Ugandan, Rwandan and Congolese rebel groups and national armies, who continued to compete for resources and power. In 2003, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue outlined a power-sharing deal that saw Joseph Kabila share leadership with rebel leaders until an election could be held. Finally, in 2006, the DRC held its first multiparty elections since independence – in which Joseph Kabila was confirmed as president of the DRC.

The Inter-Congolese Peace Agreement can be said to have taken a rather clinical approach to dealing with main issues of conflict. The different components of the peace agreement systematically dealt with the problems relating to the conflict. The politics of identity and exclusion that Mobutu had entrenched was managed through multiple offices of the newly instituted vice president. Under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki as chief mediator, the Conseil Superior de la Republique was established, which consisted of five vice presidents from different warring factions. The mandate of the Council was to unify the country and to ensure the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops. Later, when the election was held, this model of executive arrangement was contested and, in October 2002, the 4+1 formula was established, based on the negotiations entered into by the Congolese parties during the Pretoria talks. Furthermore, in order to deal with the dilapidated democratic system, different structures were established: Cabinet, a 500-member Parliament, a Special Court, an Appeals Court (to deal with legal transitional issues), an Electoral Commission and a Media Commission. Noteworthy, however, is that pre-election arrangements were modified after elections, and the quest for power seemed to be the goal of all differing parties. The outcome of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue showed that:

1) an all-inclusive peace agreement is likely to hold, given the example of the DRC;

2) pressure is required from the international community to maintain the interest of the parties.

**Highlights**

- Regional actors shape the nature and scale of war.
- Men of disreputable character can sometimes be useful for establishing the peace process.
- Cohabitation with rebel forces can be both a catalyst to war recurrence as well as a major setback for war termination.
- There are existing institutionalised mechanisms for the production of war (the school that trained Bemba in diplomacy and warfare).
Peace Agreements and the Management of Resources

The second area under the theme of peace agreements and durable peace that was examined at the workshop was the component of the management of resources. The two peace agreements examined in this context were Sierra Leone’s 1999 Lomé Agreement, presented by Ms Memunatu Pratt, and Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Agreement, presented by Dr Alfred Sebit Lokuji.

Resources may, in some cases, serve as a catalyst to conflict. Scholars have developed a ‘greed vs grievance theory’ to explain how war can develop and engender rebel activity, based on the mismanagement of resources. Research has shown that, in most conflict locations, economic factors underline the armed conflicts into which governments and rebel groups enter. Ganesan and Vines (2004) have shown that Liberia’s Charles Taylor had economic motives for deposing Samuel Doe, while in Angola, trade and tariffs on export and import goods were used to fund the war. They further argue that control over resources reinforces political power. This often contributes to war recurrence and exacerbates corruption, as economically resourced governments can easily create channels through which to divert funds. According to Ganesan and Vines, such governments are unaccountable and generally collude with external actors, who help them to consolidate their war project. All these factors create an enabling environment for the festering of war economies and the activities of warlords. The management of resources is thus a vital component of peace processes and peace agreements.

Sierra Leone: The 1999 Lomé Agreement – Ms Memunatu Pratt

Consistent with the previous case study is the notion of power sharing: two parties agree to benefit mutually from either the political or economic capital of the state. This case study deals with the notion of wealth sharing. Some conflicts on the African continent, which are economic in nature, deviate from the primordial causes of conflict – namely tribalism, religion and land. The Sierra Leonean conflict is a classic example. In dealing with this example, the following assumptions will prevail:

- Good settlements should not only bridge opposing interests, but should also represent the wider interest of public goods in which the conflict is situated.
- Justice and fairness are crucial attributes for negotiations;
- Some negotiated settlements are more robust than others.
- Even when settlements are reached, the best-engineered political arrangements can collapse and be resurrected by conflicting parties (Pratt, 2009).

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone’s eight-year conflict is a complex one that has its roots in years of poverty, corruption, misrule, unrest in neighbouring Liberia, and the exploitation of diamond
and other resource mines in the region. Although Sierra Leone was not stable or entirely peaceful up until 1991, the war only really began in March 1991 when the RUF – under the leadership of a former corporal, Fouday Saybana Sankoh – began to attack villages in eastern Sierra Leone on the Liberian border. The RUF, with support from Liberian Charles Taylor, launched a brutal campaign for power and destabilisation that included mass killings, strategic yet senseless amputation and mutilation of civilians and the recruitment of child soldiers – that would come to plague the country forever. A military coup, led by Captain Valentine Strasser in April 1992, sent the then-president of Sierra Leone, Joseph Saidu Momoh, into exile in Guinea. Once in power, Strasser established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).

However, the NPRC proved to be nearly as ineffectual as the Momoh government in repelling the RUF, and more of the country fell to RUF fighters. By 1995, the RUF held much of the countryside and were on the doorstep of Freetown. To rectify the situation, the government hired several thousand mercenaries from a private South African mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes. Within a month, the mercenaries had driven RUF fighters back to enclaves along Sierra Leone’s borders. The retreat of RUF forces to the borders meant that all towns across the country had been almost decimated and hundreds of thousands of people were killed, raped, mutilated and/or co-opted into the RUF forces. Accordingly, a major popular uprising and mounting international pressure forced the NPRC to hand over power to a civilian government, via presidential and parliamentary elections that were held in April 1996. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah won the presidential election and, in 1996, saw through the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord in November 1996.

Within months, the agreement collapsed, as the RUF could not agree on disarmament and the creation of a monitoring force, which essentially led to disaffected Sierra Leone Army (SLA) soldiers seeking the support of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) to stage a coup. On 25 May 1997, the AFRC, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, overthrew President Kabbah. In an effort to halt further challenges, Koroma invited the RUF to join him in government. Koroma’s military junta failed to attract international support and was shunned by the people of Sierra Leone. Accordingly, the Nigerian-led ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), aided by the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force (CDF), led by Sam Hinga Norman, removed the military junta in February 1998 – and President Kabbah, whose government had sought refuge in neighbouring Guinea – returned to Freetown on 10 March that year. Rebel groups – mainly AFRC and ex-SLA – attacked again in January 1999, occupying most of Freetown. However, ECOMOG forces eventually expelled them and liberated Freetown. During the rebel action, over 5 000 people were killed and most of the eastern suburbs of Freetown were destroyed. Both the rebels and ECOMOG forces reportedly committed widespread human rights abuses.

Finally, a ceasefire was agreed in May 1999, which led to the development of further talks and, ultimately, the Lomé Peace Agreement – which was signed in Togo on 7 July 1999.
The Lomé Accord ended the conflict altogether, but had some major challenges. However, even with the Lomé Accord there was no consensus and the RUF resumed fighting. Article 5 of the peace agreement granted Sankoh total amnesty and the position of vice president, who would only be accountable to the president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Under Sankoh’s chairmanship, the Commission Nationale de Démobilisation, Désarmement et Réintégration (CMRRD) was then mandated to manage the production, purchases and revenue from mineral resources toward the development of the Sierra Leonians. In addition, since the power-sharing deal was based on certain economic considerations, and while the state was supposed to be the primary buyer of gold and diamonds, there was really no government in place and no infrastructure to manage the economy of the country. The RUF’s belligerent posture further undermined the integrity of the peace agreement thereafter.

The Sierra Leonean case study presents an ambiguity, which raises the question whether the arrangement was power sharing, or wealth sharing, or perhaps an overlap. The negotiation and re-negotiation processes changed the focus, and Sankoh’s attitude to the peace agreement raised some doubts about his intentions. The flexibility of the peace agreement could also perhaps be the Achilles’ heel of the power-sharing arrangement.

Areas for future policy implications would include:

- devising new approaches for future mediations and negotiations
- reviewing the process and outcome of past accords
- in attempting to implement a peace agreement where there are valuable resources, the implementer should have the strategy, resources and commitment to regulate such commodities
- the UN having better strategic assessment concerning peace implementation missions
- the need for intelligence gathering and assessment concerning motives, intentions and capabilities of parties that sign peace agreements
- the importance of contingency planning, as there is usually unanticipated eruption of violence
- emphasis being given to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (Pratt, 2009).

Highlights

- The war in Sierra Leone had a strong connection with one in Liberia.
- War emanated from the politics of difference and exclusionism.
- Successive governments are actors in the war.
- Numerous accords were signed.
- All parties sought solution that would not include a military option.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is a collection of basic peace agreements that were instituted over a period of five years between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The Sudan situation has been that of poverty in the midst of plenty. Southern Sudan, in particular, is rich in oil and arable land, and geographically, is located within a flourishing regional international trade context. There were numerous agreements that were entered into, but the ones relevant to this study are those that emanated from the Kenyan talks. The Peace Agreement initiative started in 2002 and reached completion on 9 January 2005 in Naivasha, Kenya.
leadership of the country is also a controversial issue. In March 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for the arrest of President Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. This decision has been opposed by the African Union – and seemingly by the peoples of Sudan because, in April 2010, President al-Bashir won 68% of the votes in the country’s first democratic elections. Finally, the people of Southern Sudan are yet to vote in a referendum that will allow them to choose whether or not Southern Sudan should remain part of Sudan (and overseen by the government in Khartoum), or secede and become independent. This referendum was one of the conditions of the CPA (specifically the Naivasha Agreement, signed as part of the CPA in 2005), and is scheduled for January 2011.

The war that ensued in 1983 led to the development of the Protocol of Principles (POP), which includes the following provisions:

- equitable sharing of wealth [1.2]
- recognition that the warring areas need to catch up in development – "shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public services standard as the northern states" [1.7]
- revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to the devolution of power and decentralisation in decision making [1.8]
- community (not government) ownership of land
- petroleum resources constituting the major item of wealth sharing. (Lokuji, 2009)

This is perhaps one of the few protocols where guidelines for wealth sharing are clearly stated. The protocol also has identifiable strengths and weaknesses. The strength of the protocol lies in the fact that it caters for equal (50/50) sharing of oil wealth from the sale of oil in the South, and this is equally distributed between the North and the South. The protocol also allocates 2% of the wealth to the communities where the oil is found. As commendable as these strengths are, they are undermined by procedural irregularities that could be construed as weaknesses – such as the lack of an established system of reporting and a system for verifying production, sales and accounts. Furthermore, the protocol does not specify in economic terms what should be shared – for example, gross sales proceeds or net profits – and, since there are no reliable records, the protocol does not give any indication of the structure responsible for accounting processes relating to the sale and sharing of oil wealth in Southern Sudan.

Sudan is not the only country in Africa that has suffered significantly from what has been regarded as the “curse of oil” (Utomi, 2003). Other forms of wealth that should be shared, according to the CPA, include land, revenue from excise duties and airport taxes. Oil has taken a prominent position in most discourses, because the immediate gratification that the proceeds of oil give to its managers often results in the mortgaging of the country’s future through corrupt and fraudulent practices. The Sudanese situation has proved that, as long as leaders allow themselves to be led by economic interest, there are likely to be recurrent incidences of conflicts and abuses. Wealth sharing appears to be a noble concept that does not manifest during the implementation process.
Highlights

- Multiple regional forces were involved in the war.
- Division is rife, in spite of the call for dialogue.
- The CPA dates back to 1947.
- Recognition of Southern Sudan as a separate entity did not guarantee a separate status.
- There was need for further division of Sudan.
- The war was for a “new secular, non-Arab Sudan”.
Peace Agreements and Civil Society

The third area under the theme of peace agreements and durable peace that was examined at the workshop included the components of civil society, reconstruction, development and reconciliation. The two peace agreements examined in this context were Burundi’s 2000 Arusha Agreement, presented by Mr Gregory Mthembu-Salter, and Angola’s 1994 Lusaka Protocol, presented by Mr Carlos Figueiredo.

Civil society remains a key player in the democratisation processes of states that have experienced conflict. Civil society organisations have themselves often been instrumental in the processes leading to transformation. Indeed, consequent reconstruction requires the positive participation of all stakeholders in democratisation and development. The level of public deliberation in some countries, however, along with various social inequalities, often led to a marginalisation of civil society.

Since 1945, civil society has been involved in playing a major role in international development matters, including conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Civil society, in conventional terms, constitutes non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which may complement the activities of government, as well as international organisations (Sorenson, 2002). The UN, in particular, is reported to have an enormous budget for employing the expertise of NGOs (Sorenson, 2002). It is established that NGOs possess expertise that is not readily available in diplomatic circles, and the potential infrastructure to reach areas inaccessible to the UN and government. The established character of civil society makes it a crucial mechanism for international peace operations and democratisation processes. It should be noted that civil society in conflict situations has been involved in peacebuilding but, in some instances, has also been the cause of conflict – in the sense that violence is utilised as a tool of expression and drawing attention to a cause. Indeed, some civil society organisations have metamorphosed either into armed groups or political parties.

**Burundi: The 2000 Arusha Agreement – Mr Gregory Mthembu-Salter**

The 2000 Arusha Agreement underscores the importance of external actors such as eminent personalities, international organisations and goodwill to ensure a successful agreement process. The 2000 Arusha Agreement was one of the agreements emerging from the effort of international and regional organisations, specifically the UN and the AU.

Included in the agreement are the following provisions:

- a process of pre-transition and then transition to culminate in the holding of elections
- the creation of a senate, and amendments to the existing make-up of the National Assembly
- judicial reform, designed in part to decrease Tutsi dominance and include measures to integrate rebel armed forces
- a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, similar to that of South Africa, which may have the power to grant amnesty for politically motivated crimes
• an international military force to assist with the management of the transition
• an independent investigation into alleged crimes of genocide. (Mthembu-Salter, 2002:31)

Burundi

From independence in 1962 until 1993, Burundi was controlled first by a Tutsi monarchy (that was abolished by a coup in 1966), then by a series of military regimes imposed by the Tutsi-dominated army. The small central African country inherited various social, political and economic constructions of identity from its colonial administration, which demarcated between the Tutsi, Hutu and the smallest minority, the Twa. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, large numbers of Hutus were massacred as ethnicity became increasingly politicised and a series of dictators violently suppressed their dissent. The military regimes, meanwhile, attempted to maintain the structure of power and privilege in Burundi – and the Tutsi minority held almost all positions of importance and influence.

Although Burundi embarked on a process of democratisation in 1990, this process was thwarted by an intrastate conflict between 1991 and 1992 between the Parti pour la Liberation des Peoples Hutu (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) (PALIPEHUTU) and the government. Elections were eventually held in 1993, which saw Melchoir Ndadaye – a Hutu of the Frodebu (Burundian Democratic Front) – become president. However, Ndadaye was assassinated by the Tutsi-dominated army, and violence engulfed the country once again. A Tanzanian delegation, led by former president of the Republic of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, then became involved in mediating between the warring parties, in an attempt to bring some semblance of peace and stability to Burundi (and even to his own country, which was receiving and hosting thousands of refugees). Thus, although the conflict continued from 1994 and 2008 before the last rebel group (of any notable size) agreed to enter the peace process in 2008, there were periods of intermittent ‘calm’ that were brokered by Nyerere.

However, Nyerere’s role and progress in mediating the conflict parties came to a sudden end in 1999, when he passed away from leukaemia. A South African delegation, led by the former president of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, assumed the role of mediator in the conflict. Like Nyerere, Mandela also had difficulty in getting the main militia to participate in the dialogue. The Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (FDD), Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD), PALIPEHUTU and Forces Nationals pour la Liberation (FNL) refused to cooperate and engage in talks with rival parties and groups. Over time, and with varying degrees of compromise and the application of unconventional strategy, Mandela eventually saw through the signing of the Arusha Agreement in August 2000.

The military and judicial reforms that were proposed were targeted at weakening Tutsi hegemony. In the power-sharing arrangement, it was proposed that the senate had a 60/40 formation. The ethnic quota was expected to be 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi, with three seats allotted to the Twa ethnic group. This ethnic formula met with some resistance from the broad spectrum of the Burundian population. The 60/40 proposal lacked clear definition
in terms of both political and military components. Furthermore, the agreement did not clearly articulate the role of civil society participation. Although civil society participation was agreed upon in principle, it was not fully implemented. The only remedy was the allocation of key offices to civil society practitioners during the Electoral Commission.

The UN pushed hard for a truth and reconciliation process, but met with some resistance. Given the ethnically sensitive nature of the conflict, the truth and reconciliation project has been suspended. Due to the economic location of Burundi, there seems to be little prospect for economic development. The affirmative action policy that has informed the deployment of people into public office has encouraged the mismatch of skills with jobs, which has led to incompetence. This problem has had a backlash on public service delivery.

The political situation in Burundi is not very stable, due to a lack of maturity among the politicians in terms of accepting election results. The victory of the CNDD did not necessarily herald development for the country. Mandela agreed that the Tutsis required some guarantees, and the 50/50 arrangement between the Hutu and Tutsi's regarding the closing of the campe did not succeed in subverting the leadership of the Hutus. It is not easy to be optimistic about development in Burundi, given that its total economic dependence on tea and coffee export is unhealthy. The leadership of the country also shows dictatorial tendencies and the Burundians are still involved in warfare in Eastern DRC, which is escalating the war economy. Eternal vigilance is, therefore, necessary in order for the Arusha Agreement to be fully implemented towards durable peace.

**Highlights**

- The peace process was initiated by regional forces.
- Strategic engagement is required in complex situations, and not necessarily a regime of sanctions.
- Eminent personalities are important in mediation efforts in Africa.
- Civil society needs to be strengthened to allow for rational interaction with ethnic militia from within.

**Angola: The 1994 Lusaka Protocol – Mr Carlos Figueiredo**

Similar to other conflict situations in Africa, Angola's peace accords are numerous. As good as some of these agreements were on the surface, they did not really reflect the undercurrents that characterise the reality of the Angolan situation. One of these accords is the Lusaka Protocol, the signing of which saw a recurrence in the outbreak of conflict. Although, presently, the war is over and the economy is enjoying a tremendous boom, civil society has not yet discovered its voice in the new political dispensation. Violence has, in fact, become a shaping force.

**Angola**

The civil war in Angola began after the end of the war for independence from Portugal in 1975. The war featured conflict between two primary Angolan factions: the communist
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) (MPLA) and the anti-communist União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) (UNITA). A third movement, the Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) (FLEC) – an association of separatist militant groups – fought for the independence of Cabinda. In addition to the war’s two primary factions (the MPLA and UNITA), several other factions also were engaged in the conflict. Although the conflict was primarily about competition for power and a scramble for the control of natural resources – namely oil and diamonds – the dynamics were fundamentally shaped by the Cold War power politics between the Soviet Union and the United States, and their corollary investment into opposing sides. The MPLA, whose base is among the Kimbundu people and the multiracial intelligentsia of Luanda, was supported by Cuba, the Soviet Union and countries of the Eastern bloc. The MPLA fought against the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola) (FNLA), an organisation based in the Bakongo region of the north and allied with the United States, the People’s Republic of China and the Mobutu government in Zaire (now the DRC). The United States, apartheid South Africa and several other African governments also supported Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, whose ethnic and regional base lies in the Ovimbundu heartland of central Angola.
From 1975 until 2002, various attempts were made to negotiate settlements, sign ceasefire agreements and host elections that would encourage the cessation of violence. However, various shortcomings and challenges related to consulting and negotiating with all parties to the conflict meant that the civil war continued for 27 years – killing an estimated 500,000 people, devastating Angola’s infrastructure and economy, and displacing thousands of people as refugees. The most significant attempt to broker peace during the war was made in 1994, when the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, and the then-president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, met on 15 November in Lusaka in a symbolic move to boost support for what was to become the Lusaka Protocol. Present at the signing ceremony were representatives from the newly formed United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), and representatives from the USA, Russia and Portugal. The Lusaka Agreement made provision for military disarmament, power sharing, an electoral process, monitoring processes and amnesty.

What emerged as the military formation that constituted the formidable force against the Portuguese occupation in Angola was constituted through civil society resistance. To further reinforce the militaristic tendencies of the Angolan political processes, some of these civil society-born organisations were fighting within and among themselves, and these internal struggles led to the elimination of a number of their members. Ever since then, civil society formations have metamorphosed into military forces and the influence of civil society in Angola diminished in the political arena. Furthermore, the protracted period of war has led to deep-seated poverty among the Angolan people, with civil society unable to play much of a defining role. This is mostly due to the fact that it has always been kept outside of the process, as negotiations were based on military force. Furthermore, there seemed to be a low priority for deep reconciliation based on truth, justice and inclusiveness. Also, political and economic power has always been concentrated. Possibilities for change are, however, emerging. This can be seen in the cessation of war, the opening up of the political process in terms of the holding of elections and the advent of administrative deconcentration, as seen at local levels (Figueiredo, 2009).

The economic boom in the country is yet to be enjoyed by the majority of Angolans. Present social inequalities portend dangers of the future resurgence of violence. Although civil society is becoming stronger, it still lacks participation and does not serve as a counter force to the excesses of the government in the area of elections, media control and constitutional drafting. Social inequalities, therefore, still need to be addressed.

**Highlights**

- Colonisation contributed to the spate of war in Africa.
- Ideological warfare often degenerates into economic warfare.
- Military victories are not always guaranteed and they may bring a permanent termination to armed conflict.
- Warring parties need to consider the good of all in order to make concessions.
- Agreements should make adequate provision for democratic principles.
Peace Agreements, Rebels and Leadership

The fourth area under the theme peace of agreements and durable peace that was examined at the workshop included a discussion on the impact of leadership and rebels. The peace agreement focused on in this context was the Chad 2002 Tripoli II Agreement, presented by Dr Siphamandla Zondi.

Desiree Nilsson (2008) has argued that all-inclusive peace deals signed by the government and all rebel groups may not be the ultimate panacea for peace. Contrary to the view that peace is more likely to be durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement, Nilsson advocates that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, it does not affect the signatories’ commitment to peace – indeed, the possibility of conflict may be anticipated by the peace agreement. There is a possibility, therefore, for partial peace (Nilsson, 2008). Issues of inclusion and methods for transforming would-be spoilers into key actors through peace processes are important components of peace agreements.

Chad: The 2002 Tripoli II Agreement – Dr Siphamandla Zondi

Various Chad peace accords have proved problematic, given that their signing failed to achieve any meaningful outcome – the result of the nature of leadership as well as internal and external forces. Chad has been a trouble spot on the continent – it has signed no less than 30 peace accords, with only intermittent respite within multiple recurrences of conflict. The political apparatuses and infrastructures are, therefore, weak – and the resilience of the Chadian people commendable. Peace accords for Chad have proved passing phases; fluid transactions that propose a better reality but lack the wherewithal to ground themselves in the Chadian reality in order to be sustained. Hence, there is a perpetual production of negative peace. Chad’s very location is problematic – positioned among nations that are either riddled with conflicts (and these conflicts spill over into Chad), or which capitalise on the conflicts to pursue their imperialist agenda through interference in Chad’s local politics.

Chad

Chad has been embroiled in internal intermittent armed conflict since its independence from France in 1965. Chad was considered a source of cheap labour and raw cotton and, due to its superior natural resources, the colonial government privileged the south over the north. This essentially led to the outbreak of conflict and the emergence of various rebel groups and factions aiming to gain power and dominance over the other. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, France and Libya played significant roles in the internal politics of Chad through their support for opposing warring factions.

In the 1990s, the main fighting was between the government of President Idriss Déby and southern factions – the most important of which has been the Movement for Democracy and Development, linked to deposed president Hissene Habre. Other rebel groups – including the Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (FARF) and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) – joined the fighting more recently.
In 1993, the country began moving slowly towards a representative government and was establishing an interim legislative body, the Higher Council of Transition (CST). Following earlier delayed polls, 1996 saw the adoption of a constitution in a March referendum, and the election of Idriss Déby for a five-year presidential term. Although the election was marred by reports of fraud, vote-rigging and irregularities by local officials, no major incidents of violence were reported. During 1997, elections were held to replace the CST with a National Legislative Assembly, and those were followed by confirmation of a presidentially nominated prime minister by the new Assembly. An April 1997 peace agreement between the government and FARF to integrate FARF forces into the state army broke down, resulting in renewed fighting in October 1997.

Then, in December 1999, 13 armed political movements formed a new alliance – the CMAP (Coordination des Mouvements Armes et Politiques de l’Opposition) – against the government. This development effectively shifted most of the fighting between government and rebel forces into the north of the country – and allowed the more ‘moderate elements’ of the MDJT to enter into peace talks. In 2002, the warring parties met in Tripoli to sign an agreement that would provide for the demobilisation of the rebels and their reintegration into the political system – as well as amnesty to rebel fighters.

Although the details and analysis of that agreement is the subject of this section, it is important to note that a faction of the MDJT rejected the peace agreement and continued fighting in the north. Moreover, since 2003, unrest in neighbouring Sudan’s Darfur region spilled across the border, along with hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees. They have been joined by thousands of Chadians, who are fleeing rebel fighting as well as violence between ethnic Arab and ethnic African Chadians. Chad and Sudan accuse each other of backing and harbouring rebels, and the dispute led to the severing of relations in 2006. However, since then, progress has been made towards normalising ties, with the two countries’ presidents meeting for the first time in six years in 2010.

The Tripoli Agreement has various strengths and weaknesses. Among its strengths are, first, that the agreement offered the people of Chad some level of political stability. Second, it transformed spoilers into key ‘actors in democratisation’, which offered some hope for inclusivity. Last, external actors became more responsible in their involvement with the process – for instance, Libya offered assistance in terms of mediation, while France offered security. The Chadians were entrusted with creating the right environment for the consummation of the agreement. In terms of weaknesses, first, the agreement failed to cater for all relevant matters. Second, the agreement was formulated based on Derby’s personal relationship with France and Libya, and the terms were dictated by the USA.

The Tripoli Agreement marks a temporary end to the conflict, and signals hope to many Chadians and international observers. The ability of this agreement to achieve temporary peace provides an opportunity for the consolidation of democracy and development. Civil society participation is, however, still non-existent. Furthermore, external actors – who had been major contributors to military instability – are now partners in the democratic process.
Highlights

- Natural and human resources created problems for Chad, which in effect may be linked to poverty.
- Incorrect balance of power engendered rebel activities.
- Countries that appear to be protecting a country might overtly or covertly be contributing to the destruction of the country through rebel financing.
Peace Agreements and the Role of Regional and International Organisations

The fifth area under the theme of peace agreements and durable peace that was examined at the workshop included a discussion of the role of regional and international organisations. The peace agreements focused on in this context were the Côte d'Ivoire 2004 Accra III Agreement, presented by Professor Osita Agbu, and the Rwanda 1993 Arusha Agreement, presented by Mr Gregory Mthembu-Salter.

This report has, thus far, shown that different components of peace agreements have the potential to contribute to durable peace. This section deals with the role of regional and international organisations in peace processes. Osler Hampson (1996), in an explanation as to why some peace agreements succeed and others fail, argues that successful implementation of a peace agreement depends upon the presence of a third party that can "proffer carrots or wield sticks" to ensure that the process does not become derailed. These third parties would include international or regional organisations, as well as groupings of states (Hampson, 1996:8). Indeed, these organisations have been helpful in maintaining peace in troubled regions, in many cases. It should also be noted that many regional organisations function mostly to maintain economic development and interstate relations in their regions. Therefore, they often constitute major stakeholders in some of the negative political developments of conflict/post-conflict countries in Africa.

Côte d'Ivoire: The 2004 Accra III Agreement – Professor Osita Agbu

From the African crises experience lack of quality and mature leadership has contributed significantly to the emergence of conflicts in a number of African states. Côte d'Ivoire is no exception. It has also been affected by corruption, abuse of power, identity politics, rivalry among the ruling elite, the cumulative effect of protracted political crises, the execution of minorities, economic decline and an absence of democracy.

Côte d'Ivoire

Once one of Africa's most stable countries, Côte d'Ivoire plummeted into civil war in September 2002 when mutinous soldiers attempted to overthrow President Gbagbo. Although the coup failed, it led to the outbreak of wide-scale civil conflict, with roots in the decades-old tension that has existed between the mainly Muslim population of the north and the Christian and animist southern population. A major source of this tension is the perceived discrimination of northerners, who argue that they have been politically marginalised for years. Moreover, the presence of large numbers of immigrants within Côte d'Ivoire – largely due to the employment opportunities available in the cocoa industry – have escalated inter-ethnic tensions and placed further strain on natural resources and the competition for wealth and employment. The involvement of France, and the regional instability caused by conflicts in neighbouring Liberia (and Sierra Leone), further complicated the situation, as they all seemingly took advantage of the crisis to seize western parts of the country and access to the rich cocoa, coffee and palm-growing areas. The
political instability of the last decade was also closely linked to the struggle for power after the 1993 death of long-time leader President Félix Houphouët-Boigny – who had been president for 33 years and whose political system – and national stability – had been tightly bound to his myth, charisma, and political and economic competence. As a result, the political system was forced to deal with open, competitive elections without Houphouët-Boigny for the first time in 1995, which effectively started the competition for power and laid the foundations for civil war.

Between 1995 and 1999, President Henri Konan Bédié employed various exclusionary political tactics that enraged many people – and, in 1999, a group of dissatisfied officers staged a military coup, putting General Robert Guéï in power. Although Guéï’s leadership did bring some semblance of calm to the country, it did not last for long. In October 2000, an election was held to elect a new president. In addition to Guéï attempting to rig the election, Allassane Ouattara – a popular northern politician – was deliberately excluded from the election due to his ethnicity. This led to a public uprising, resulting in around 180 deaths and Guéï’s swift replacement by the election’s likely winner, Laurent Gbagbo.

On 19 September 2002, while the president was in Italy, there was an armed uprising. Troops who were to be demobilised mutinied, launching attacks in several cities, and the rebels seized the northern half of the country while the government maintained control of the south. Over the year, the country was engulfed in a bitter civil war that was only partially quashed by the supportive presence of UN-mandated French troops, who were placed between the belligerents on a ‘peace line’. Although the other elements of the Accra III Agreement (agreed in 2003) are the subject of this report, it is important to note here that the agreement collapsed in 2004. After five years of civil unrest and unimplemented peace agreements, President Gbagbo and rebel leader Guillaume Soro signed the Ouagadougou peace accords in March 2007. Over the course of 2007 and 2008, these accords began to be implemented and have been largely successful in bringing peace to the country. However, elections – which were a condition of the agreement – have been rescheduled twice by Gbagbo’s government, due to technical problems registering voters and organisational capacity issues in the country.

The Accra III talks were held following an invitation from the then-president of Ghana, John Kufor. The meeting was held between 29 and 30 July 2004, and was well represented. The delegation included relevant African presidents and representatives of regional organisations – namely the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan; ECOWAS; and the African Union (AU). Also present were political parties that had been part of talks at Linas Marcoussis. The meeting deliberated on the pitfalls of the Linas Marcoussis agreement and the Accra I and II agreements. Fundamentally, participants attempted to uphold these previous accords. In the meeting, President Gbagbo was advised to consolidate the democratic structure in Côte d’Ivoire.

The regional actors that were most visible included the AU, the UN, ECOWAS and France. Nigeria also played a background role in the talks, as it had been previously accused of acting unilaterally. At the meeting, West African governments agreed to change through
the ballot box and uphold the creed that democratic government should not be removed violently. At the fifth ordinary session in Accra, deep concern was expressed over the escalation of the conflict.

Ripeness theory underpins the unravelling of the peace agreement in Côte d’Ivoire. The level of pronouncements and peace accords were high and the period of conflict was very short in comparison to other prolonged conflicts on the continent. Furthermore, the involvement of third-party mediators, ECOWAS, the AU and France was commendable in terms of stemming the spate of killings and suffering, as well as in sustaining the peace process.

**Highlights**

- Leaders have a primary role in uniting their people.
- Identity politics can be volatile.
- Causes of conflicts are multifarious and, in essence, require multiple strategies.

**Rwanda: The 1993 Arusha Agreement – Mr Gregory Mthembu-Salter**

The aim of the Arusha Agreement in 1993 was to end the conflict in Rwanda. A civil war had ensued between the Forces Armes Rwandas (Rwandan Armed Forces) (FAR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Following talks over the ending of the conflict, the Arusha Agreement was signed. The agreement collapsed by default on 6 April, 1994, when President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, killing him and the president of Burundi, Cyprian Ntayamira. The war recommenced, which led to the victory of the RPF over the FAR. This victory was marred by the genocide, in which about 1 million Tutsis were killed. Following the outbreak of the war, the RPF made a clarion call to the Tanzanian government for mediation assistance. The Arusha talks were facilitated by the Tanzanian government in 1993.

The Rwandan conflict was clearly ethnically motivated. This ethnicity factor dates back to colonial days, and later incited even catechists to engage in ethnically motivated killings, because of the alleged claim that they had been denied promotion owing to their Hutu lineage.

**Rwanda**

The Arusha Accords were a set of five accords (or protocols) signed in Arusha, Tanzania on 4 August 1993 by the government of Rwanda and the rebel RPF, under mediation, to end a three-year Rwandan civil war. This war was a conflict within the central African nation of Rwanda between the government of Juvenal Habyarimana and the Tutsi RPF. Whilst the conflict only actually began on 2 October 1990, when the RPF invaded Rwanda in an attempt to take control from the Habyarimana regime, the ethnic tensions that caused the RPF to form and eventually invade Rwanda had their roots in colonial practices and resultant ethnic power structures. The ruling Belgian colonial authorities had deliberately empowered the Tutsi aristocracy and cemented the second-class status
of Hutus, in what had previously been a moderately fluid social dynamic. Then, upon leaving Rwanda, Belgian diplomats created a power struggle by reversing their favouritism, encouraging nationalist Hutu uprisings in the name of democracy. Consequently, episodes of violent attacks and reprisals between Hutus and Tutsis flared up in the first two decades of Rwanda’s independence, which led to many Tutsis being killed, displaced and made to seek refuge outside of the country.

The level of ethnic and political tension increased in 1990, following pressure from France (among other nations) for Rwanda to move toward democratisation and adopt a more representative and inclusive form of governance. The propensity for conflict was further exacerbated by a slumping economy and food shortages and, throughout the year, the country had to endure bad weather and falling coffee prices. Meanwhile, the Tutsi diaspora – some of whom had been exiled for 30 years in Uganda – began to protest and gain popular support for the RPF. Many Hutus in Rwanda considered these Tutsis to be an evil aristocracy, who had rightly been exiled and had no right to power or opportunity in the country. However, due to pressure on the Hutu regime to stop adopting xenophobic practices and promoting exclusionary policies against the Tutsi, Habyarimana was eventually compelled to negotiate and engage in dialogue about democratisation. At the same time, Ugandan support for the RPF came to an abrupt end and xenophobia against non-Ugandan nationals arose, which essentially pressured the RPF to return to Rwanda and challenge the Habyarimana regime.

Consequently, on 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) – the armed wing of the RPF – deserted their posts in the Ugandan army and invaded northern Rwanda. After initial gains in threatening Kigali, the offensive was turned back by Zairian and French troops sent to reinforce the Habyarimana regime. The RPF suffered a major setback when their general, Rwigema, was killed in the second day of the war – and the RPA was forced to retreat in disarray into the mountainous border region. There it regrouped under Paul Kagame and began a classic insurgency campaign.

The war eventually reached a stalemate and the two sides entered into peace negotiations. These talks resulted in the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993 to create a power-sharing government.

The ‘failure’ of the Arusha Accords became clear quite soon after the agreement was signed – the assassination of Habyarimana in April 1994 was effectively the proximate cause of the genocide that killed an estimated 800 000 people in 100 days, and (arguably) subsequently led to regional instability with two wars resulting in the DRC and even in neighbouring Uganda and Burundi.

There were a number of reasons for the failure of the Arusha Peace Accord: first, the Tanzanian and UN implementation of the agreement was not intensive; second, the retention of Hutu supremacy heightened the discontent in both camps; third, the maintenance of Movement Republican National pour la Development (MRND)
hegemony; and last, the limitation of mediation to efforts of regional power and external forces. In conclusion, “mediation fails when one side is plotting the solution.”

Highlights

- Democracy and multipartyism offer prospects for peace.
- Any conflict requires urgent attention before it claims too many lives.
- Leadership requires detachment from any ethnic or racial biases that lend authority to criminal elements in the state to commit the crime of genocide.
- International allies should be wary of escalating internal conflicts.
- There is need for political and cultural tolerance among African people.
Conclusion

The nine peace agreements presented under the theme of peace agreements and durable peace indicate that a further examination of African peace agreements, in the context of goals for democratisation and development in Africa, is warranted. Given that workshop participants included development agency practitioners, researchers and academics, their input regarding the way forward is critical.

Among the suggestions made by participants for future research and knowledge production in the domain of peace agreements in Africa is the need to define peace agreements in a way that research can take a multidisciplinary and multidimensional approach. A comprehensive source of peace agreements in Africa is also required, as is better articulation of existing case studies for advocacy purposes. Participants also suggested that key questions used to profile peace agreements be crystallised for policy purposes. Furthermore, approaches to peace accord implementing need to be clarified and should include a study of the role of political parties and other stakeholders present during conflict and peacemaking periods. This study should ideally include a review of actor dynamics, external players, the nature of the state and economy, and how all of these variables interact to impact on possibilities for consolidating peace. Issues of gender and the role of women in conflict and conflict resolution should also be prioritised. Participants also argued that there should exist a capacity-building institute for mediators in Africa, and the development of a strategy with a view to working with both African researchers and policymakers. Participants argued that, within the realm of peace processes and the drawing up of peace agreements, the following critical questions should be considered:

a) What are the debates around countervailing forces: internal or external?

b) Who are the mediators and what are their interests?

c) Why are peace processes faulty?

d) How can there be a move beyond formal agreements? Are there less formal peace negotiation processes?

Participants further argued that studies around peace agreements should set different parameters for categorising peace agreements and capture the contextual causes of conflict such as funding, regional actors, geopolitics and regional actors. Workshop participants also pointed out that it is time for Africans themselves to produce knowledge on peace agreements in Africa.
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ANNEX I: Agenda

Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa Workshop

Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa
ACCORD Workshop
14-15 September 2009
Royal Palm Conference Centre
Gateway
Durban

Workshop Agenda

DAY ONE

9:00 – 9:05  Introduction – Ms Angela Ndinga Muvumba, Manager, Knowledge Production Department, ACCORD
9:05 - 9:15  Welcome – Mr Jerome Sachane, Deputy Director, ACCORD
9:15 - 9:25  Background to ACCORD’s work on peace agreements in Africa – Mr Karanja Mbugua, Analyst, ACCORD
9:25 - 9:40  Peace agreements in the context of African democratisation and development goals – Dr Shauna Mottiar, Senior Researcher, ACCORD

9:40 – 10:40  Session One:
Facilitator – Dr Kwame Owusu-Ampomah, Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Case Studies (2):
Liberia (Accra 2003) – Dr Comfort Ero, Director, International Centre for Transitional Justice
DRC (Inter-Congolese 2003) – Dr Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University
Components of peace agreements contributing to durable peace, with an emphasis on good governance – power sharing, building state institutions, political parties and elections.

10:40 - 11:10  Discussion
11:10 – 11:30  Tea
11:30 – 12:30  
**Session Two:**
Facilitator – Dr Monica Juma, Africa Institute of South Africa 
Case Studies (2):
*Sierra Leone (Lomé 1999)* – Ms Memunatu Pratt, Head of Department, Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sierra Leone  
*Sudan (Comprehensive 2005)* – Dr Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Independent Researcher  
Components of peace agreements contributing to durable peace, with an emphasis on the management of resources.

12:30 – 13:00  Discussion

13:00 – 14:30  Lunch

14:30 – 15:30  **Session Three:**
Facilitator – Dr Shauna Mottiar, ACCORD  
Case Studies (2):
*Burundi (Arusha Agreement 2000)* – Mr Gregory Mthembu-Salter, Independent Researcher  
*Angola (Lusaka Protocol 1994)* – Mr Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Country Director, UNDP Angola  
Components of peace agreements contributing to durable peace, with an emphasis on civil society and reconstruction, development and reconciliation.

15:30 – 16:00  Discussion

19:00  Dinner at Plaka, Gateway

**DAY TWO**  
8:30 - 9:30  **Session Four:**
Facilitator – Ms Angela Ndinga Muvumba, ACCORD  
Case Studies (2):
*Chad (Tripoli II)* – Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Programme Director, Institute for Global Dialogue  
*Mozambique (Accordo General 1992)* – Mr Miguel de Brito, Country Director, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa  
Components of peace agreements contributing to durable peace, with an emphasis on leadership/spoilers.

9:30 - 10:00  Discussion

10:00 - 10:30  Tea

10:30 - 11:30  **Session Five:**
Facilitator – Dr John Akokpari, University of Cape Town  
Case Studies (2):
Côte d’Ivoire (Accra III 2004) – Professor Osita Agbu, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Rwanda (Arusha 1993) – Mr Irenee Bugingo, Researcher, Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace

Components of peace agreements contributing to durable peace, with an emphasis on the role of regional and/or international organisations.

11:30 - 12:00 Discussion

12:00 - 14:00 Lunch at Marco Paulo and visit to ACCORD

14:00 - 15:30 Draw Out Session:
Facilitator – Mr Tor Sellstrom, Senior Advisor, Knowledge Production Department, ACCORD

1) Which components of peace agreements further the goals of a) democratisation and b) development?

2) Have these components in any way impacted on agreements’ success or failure?

3) Do these components facilitate or impair possibilities for ‘durable’ peace?

15:30 - 15:45 Conclusion and Thanks – Ms Angela Ndinga Muvumba, ACCORD

15:45 - 16:00 Administrative/Logistics Announcements – Ms Nonjabulo Mathonsi, ACCORD
ANNEX II: List of Participants – Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa Workshop

14-15 September 2009
Royal Palm Conference Centre
Gateway
Durban

Mr Carlos Figueiredo, Assistant Country Director, United Nations Development Programme Angola

Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Programme Director, Institute for Global Dialogue

Mr Gregory Mthembu-Salter, Independent Researcher

Professor Osita Agbu, Associate Professor, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

Dr Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University

Dr Comfort Ero, Director, International Centre for Transitional Justice

Ms Memunatu Pratt, Head of Department, Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sierra Leone

Dr Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Independent Researcher

Facilitators

Ms Angela Ndinga Muvumba, Manager, Knowledge Production Department, ACCORD

Dr Kwame Owusu-Ampomah, Senior Researcher, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Dr Monica Juma, Executive Director, Research, African Institute of South Africa

Dr John Akokpari, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town

Dr Erik Melander, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Dr Shauna Mottiar, Senior Researcher, Knowledge Production Department, ACCORD