TRANSFORMING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

Including chapters on lessons learned, force sizing, organization, active and Reserve components, military culture, technological support, interagency coordination, and international capabilities.

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Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

edited by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson

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This volume reports conclusions and recommendations on military requirements for the stabilization and reconstruction phase of military operations. It is based on numerous studies, internal discussions, external briefings, and scholarly research. As always with a collaborative product, so many colleagues helped in large and small ways that acknowledging all of them by name is impractical. Suffice it to say here that their help was unstinting and invaluable.

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Executive Summary

Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by the rapid defeat of enemy military forces, by relatively small deployments of American forces, and by a very limited destruction of the critical civilian infrastructure. This success can be credited in large part to the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military evident in its effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield.

The Armed Forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the reins to a representative Iraqi government. Moreover, the failure to establish security concurrently with the defeat of the Iraqi military may well have emboldened those who oppose the United States, United Kingdom, and even United Nations presence.

It is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the United States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly—ideally concurrently—with the end of major combat. This can only be done if planning for the stabilization and reconstruction operations is integrated into planning for the conflict from the beginning and if the right skills are in theater to begin operations concurrently with the surrender or collapse of the enemy military.

The changed operational environment that U.S. forces face when combat ceases are illustrated by figures 1–3. They indicate a need to close the gap between the end of major combat operations and the point at which the nation-building mission is up and running.

Traditional military operations have been characterized by planning for combat and a relatively long buildup of forces, as illustrated in figure 1.
When the United States had assembled sizable forces in the theater, then, and only then, would it launch offensive operations. The conflict would typically last for months or years and end with the negotiation of enemy surrender or an extended ceasefire. Because conflict was protracted and involved large forces, enemy resistance was pretty much eliminated, and there were sizable U.S. and allied forces in theater at the end of the conflict. Moreover, the relatively long duration of major combat operations allowed time to plan for stabilization and reconstruction operations and to begin them as the conflict wound down.

In the past decade the United States has been transforming its military forces and adopting new concepts of combat operations that have led to a pattern of conflict illustrated by figure 2. The focus has been on rapid and decisive operations and, more recently, on preemption. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples. The United States did not wait until it had deployed large forces to the theater before beginning combat. The time spent planning the operation and deploying forces was compressed. In lieu of overwhelming forces in theater, the military employed a variety of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and Special Forces to gain an accurate, real- or near-real time picture of enemy force deployments. It used this information to strike high leverage targets with precision and in a timely fashion. The result was a collapse of the enemy military much more quickly than had been typical of combat operations.
operations. But the United States was caught without a mature plan for post-conflict operations and without an adequate complement of the skills needed to begin reconstruction promptly. The resultant gap left U.S. forces without an adequate response to the disorder that followed the defeat of enemy forces.

Figure 3 illustrates a new concept of operations that is described in detail in this study, which proposes a way to plan and organize for stabilization and reconstruction operations that targets the gap between the end of major combat operations and the beginning of nation-building. It illustrates the proposal that planning for the S&R mission begin concurrently with planning for major combat, and that S&R operations begin concurrently with the defeat of the enemy military. With stability established and reconstruction underway, the important process of nation-building can proceed. It also proposes steps to enhance civilian nation-building capabilities, which should shorten the duration of the S&R phase of operations. Without this process in place, the United States may win the war, but lose the peace.

The capability to provide stabilization and reconstruction must not be relegated only to post-conflict situations. Indeed, the nature of the world and the tasks ahead may dictate that the United States and its allies prevent rather than preempt whenever possible. The capabilities discussed in this study are equally applicable to conflict prevention and resolution.
The following chapters examine the various elements of the stabilization and reconstruction capabilities needed by the U.S. military. They address systematically the range of issues that must be resolved to transform S&R operations, including military strategy, organization, technology, personnel, and education. A brief précis of the findings of each chapter is presented below.

Chapter 1 reviews recent cases in which the United States has participated in S&R operations, sometimes with allies, sometimes alone. Insights from that review include:

- Successive post-Cold War U.S. interventions have become increasingly more ambitious.
- Regime change and S&R missions can be successful in different cultures.
- But the risks and costs are high.
- Previous political and economic conditions are key uncontrollable factors.
- Controllable factors include level and duration of effort in terms of troop levels and financial resources.
- Five to seven years is the historic duration of successful nation-building.
- Rapid and decisive military victory does not guarantee a peaceful post-conflict stabilization environment.
A secure environment is a necessary, but not sufficient criterion for success.

Multilateral involvement contributes to legitimacy and burden sharing, but does not guarantee success.

Chapter 2 proposes strategic concepts to guide the United States in planning S&R operations. These include an integrated war-winning and peace-winning strategy, unity of effort, a compelling and consistent strategic message, integrated planning of combat and S&R operations, concurrent combat and S&R operations, precision targeting of rejectionist elements, good understanding of the indigenous culture, early and demonstrable success, early introduction of local capabilities, and modular, adaptive S&R capabilities.

Chapter 3 analyzes the range of potential conflict scenarios in which the United States might be involved that would require a competent S&R capability. Examination of the trade space between size (and therefore cost) of the S&R capability and risk yields the conclusion that:

- DOD needs to establish analytical standards for determining the size and design of S&R forces.
- S&R forces should be sized to cope with one large S&R operation or two medium-size operations. Preliminary analysis indicates that DOD should aspire to field two S&R division-equivalents with joint assets.
- S&R forces will need substantial assets in such key categories as military police, construction engineers, and civil affairs, and in most cases will need associated combat forces.

Chapter 4 proposes an organizational model for these two S&R Joint Commands. One would be composed primarily of units on active duty from both the active and reserve components. The second could consist mostly of forces from the reserve component. Both headquarters would be staffed by personnel on active duty either from the active component or activated reservists. During peacetime, the headquarters would plan for S&R operations, monitor the status of S&R forces, develop doctrine, oversee training, and conduct exercises. These would be mainline units, not combat service support units that are embedded in division or corps combat units. The S&R Joint Commands are organized to ensure that they are flexible, modular, and scalable force multipliers. They should be organized to ensure that S&R forces are available to deploy concurrently with combat units. Light combat units could be attached to the S&R force to provide it the capability to operate autonomously in a hostile environment.
The S&R force, or elements of it, could also be attached to larger combat forces if the situation demanded it.

Chapter 5 analyzes the units in the current force that are needed for S&R operations and concludes that the problem is not a serious lack of the required skills, but that those skills reside in units that are scattered throughout the force. The units need to be pulled together and organized systematically. This in turn would create synergies and training opportunities that should dramatically improve performance. In addition, rebalancing will be needed between the active and reserve components to ensure the prompt availability of S&R units to deploy concurrently with the combat units. Some civil affairs, military police, medical, and engineering units now in the reserve component would have to be shifted from the reserve to the active component.

Chapter 6 explores the need for a shift in military culture that may be needed to make the proposed S&R forces successful and recommends changes in professional military education to help bring about cultural changes. Specifically:

- PME institutions should incorporate more courses and lectures on stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil-military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations.
- Instructors from the interagency community with a background in sociology, law, history, and experience in S&R operations should be added to the faculties.
- The personnel system must reward language and negotiations skills and interagency experience.
- S&R groups should train as a unit. The training should include personnel from key agencies that will be in the field with it (for example, State, Justice, Treasury).

Chapter 7 identifies key technologies that could enhance the capabilities of S&R forces. The technologies cited are either mature and could be deployed promptly or need more research but promise a high impact payoff if the research succeeds. They are grouped into three categories:

- Security technology, including non-lethal weapons, biometrics, communications, and body armor.
- Infrastructure technology, including training packages and collaborative planning tools.
- Technology for human relations, including language translators, and record generation and storage management tools.
Chapter 8 reviews interagency contributions to S&R capabilities and concludes that a much greater level of interagency cooperation will be required both in Washington and in the field to assure policy success. It also proposes organizational changes to enhance civilian capability in the stabilization and reconstruction mission:

- Creating a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group (NIACCG) as a planning component of the National Security Council structure. Responsibilities of the NIACCG would include planning for post-conflict operations.
- Resourcing the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to embed interagency capabilities at the combatant command and S&R headquarters levels.

Chapter 9 discusses the pros and cons of a U.S.-supported International Peacekeeping Force and highlights the imperative to plan extensively during peacetime and then early on with coalition members as a conflict emerges. The U.S. should look first to the well equipped and well trained forces for the more demanding job of stabilization and reconstruction. These will mostly be forces from NATO allies. A reorganization of NATO forces similar to that proposed for U.S. forces in chapter 4 would be necessary to optimize NATO ability to execute S&R missions. Forces from less advanced countries would benefit from a U.S. role in training and equipping an International Peacekeeping Force. This effort could include the establishment of regional training centers, involving both U.S. active duty and reserve forces.

A concluding section distills this analysis into ten recommendations that establish a framework for reorganizing and planning for transformed stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
American involvement in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations has grown in frequency and scope. During the Cold War, the United States averaged one major intervention about every 10 years. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, there was an intervention about every two years. Within the last 18 months, there have been two—Afghanistan and Iraq. The current operation in Iraq is the most complex and challenging stabilization and reconstruction operation undertaken by the United States since the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan. Improvements in the U.S. ability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations have not been commensurate with this experience, however. While dramatic improvements have been made in U.S. warfighting capabilities over the past decade, there have not been comparable improvements in post-conflict S&R capabilities of either the military or civilian elements.

Historical case studies ranging from the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan to the present operation in Iraq were examined to identify common factors that contribute to success in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The studies were also helpful in understanding the implications of possible capability gaps for rapid, decisive, and preemptive military operations in the future. The RAND publication America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace policy brief “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation-Building” were important sources for the lessons described in this chapter. Other studies, articles, reports, and interviews with experts were used as well.1

Background

Various terms have been used to describe post-conflict operations. Germany and Japan were called occupations. Somalia, Haiti, and the
Balkans were called peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are called stabilization and reconstruction. In each of these cases, the military instrument of national power was used to underpin a process of building a stable peace. Using Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq as historical case studies, this chapter examines factors that influence the relative ease or difficulty of conducting post-conflict operations and contribute to the success or failure of an operation. The results are summarized in table 1.

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan were America’s first experiences with the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to support rapid societal change. These efforts set the standards for successful post-conflict nation-building. During the Cold War, U.S. military power was employed to preserve the status quo, not to alter it, and to manage crises, not to resolve underlying problems. American interventions usually were undertaken to overthrow hostile regimes and reinstall friendly ones. Following a rash of nation-state failures after the end

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Historical Case Studies Post-Conflict Assessment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous State of Society/Economy/Political Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage Caused by Military Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing Hostile Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Conflict Duration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop Strength Per Capita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid/Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Success</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
of the Cold War, the United States intervened not simply to police cease-
fires or restore the status quo, but to try to bring about more fundamental
transformation of war-torn or oppressed societies. In most of these cases,
the United States was able to secure broad international support.

Each successive post-Cold War intervention has generally been
more ambitious than its predecessor. Somalia started as a humanitarian
operation and expanded to an attempt to establish democracy. In Haiti,
forces restored a democratically elected president and built security insti-
tutions. The mission in Bosnia was creation of a multiethnic state. In
Kosovo the international community has worked toward the establish-
ment of a democratic polity and market economy. In Afghanistan, the
United States and its allies focused on the removal of the Taliban and es-
tablishment of a democratic government. The operation in Iraq has taken
on a scope comparable to the transformational attempts still underway in
Bosnia and Kosovo and on a scale comparable to the occupations of Ger-
many and Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Impact on Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change,</td>
<td>Stop Ethnic</td>
<td>Regime Change,</td>
<td>Regime Change,</td>
<td>Regime Change can be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization,</td>
<td>Cleansing,</td>
<td>Stabilization,</td>
<td>Stabilization,</td>
<td>successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Stabilization,</td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragile</td>
<td>Unstable to Dysfunctional</td>
<td>Dysfunctional</td>
<td>Totalitarian,</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>Moderate, Mostly warring</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Limited, Most due to</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>factions</td>
<td></td>
<td>neglect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Bosnia: 7 + years,</td>
<td>2 + years</td>
<td>6 + months</td>
<td>Needs at least</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kosovo: 3 + years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
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There are clear examples of successes in these case studies in different cultural environments. However, the costs and risks associated with reconstruction and nation-building remain high, and the overall low success rate is a reminder of the difficulties of such operations. The post-Cold War efforts have not matched the success of the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan. Efforts by the United States to win the peace have been problematic, as evidenced by failures in Somalia and Haiti, moderate success in the Balkans, and yet to be determined outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Discussion

The following lessons emerge from these case studies.

**Lesson 1: Controllable factors for success are the level and duration of effort of the United States and its coalition partners as measured in terms of manpower, time, and money invested.**

A strong correlation can be seen between resources committed and success. Considerable resources were invested in ensuring stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building in Germany and the Balkans. By contrast, a thin deployment of forces for limited time and a lack of resource investments contributed to the failures in Somalia and Haiti. In Afghanistan, the low investment of money and multinational forces has resulted so far in limited improvement in overall security, slow progress in democratization and limited economic growth. The correlation is not perfect, however. Reconstruction of Japan succeeded with a modest commitment of occupying forces and a relatively low level of foreign aid.

The RAND report on nation-building suggests that higher force levels for longer durations promote success. It notes that where large numbers of U.S. forces were deployed for long periods of time, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, operations have been successful or are making progress. This was not the case in the Somalia and Haiti operations, which were not successful. The report also describes a correlation between levels of casualties and level of U.S. troops per capita. Only when the number of stabilization troops has been low in comparison to the population, such as, in Somalia, Afghanistan, and now Iraq, have U.S. forces suffered significant casualties. In Somalia, increased combat deaths prompted the early withdrawal of U.S. forces that contributed to the failure of the overall mission. By contrast, in Germany, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where troop levels were high, U.S. forces suffered few post-conflict combat-related deaths. Supplementing military forces with U.S. and international civilian police (CIVPOL) to
provide civil security, as was done in the Balkans, also contributes to success. It should be noted that it could take a year or more to build up and deploy a CIVPOL force once combat has ended.

The remaining factor that can be controlled is the time the United States and its partners devote to stabilization and reconstruction and then to nation-building. The cases studied differed in duration and expectations for departure. Haiti began with clear departure deadlines that were adhered to. Germany, Japan, Somalia, and Bosnia began with short time lines but saw them extended. Iraq started with expectations for a short duration but is now viewed as a longer-term effort. Kosovo and Afghanistan began without any expectations of an early exit. Staying around for a long time does not guarantee success, but leaving early ensures failure, such as in Somalia and Haiti.

History suggests that about five years is the minimum time needed to cultivate an enduring transition to democracy. The transitions in Germany and Japan, for example, took seven years. Setting departure deadlines can unintentionally create expectations of imminent withdrawal or of a shallow commitment. In Bosnia, IFOR’s one-year timetable and political discussions surrounding SFOR’s end date made stabilization and reconstruction difficult, because belligerents planned to wait out the international community’s intervention. Greater progress was made after the United States announced that military forces would stay in Bosnia as long as needed to ensure a successful transition.

Other important but uncontrollable factors for success are the target nation’s internal characteristics and the convergence of the geopolitical interests of outside powers and the target nation. These were contributing factors to the successes in Germany, Japan, and the Balkans.

Lesson 2: A rapid and decisive conventional military victory does not guarantee a peaceful post-conflict stabilization environment and indeed could make the S & R mission more challenging.

The U.S. military transformation effort, which is focused on enhanced military capabilities to conduct rapid decisive warfighting operations with speed, precision, and smaller force packages on the ground, could have unintended consequences for S&R operations. As combat subsided in past operations, the larger combat force transitioned to support resource-intensive S&R operations. It was augmented with additional military police, civil affairs, PSYOP, engineers, and medical capabilities. This arrangement worked reasonably well for slow transitions from combat to stability operations. Under the improved force package arrangements, there are fewer forces and
capabilities available on the ground to conduct these operations. The transition is also much quicker.

The S&R operations studied in this chapter experienced varying levels of violence following the end of combat, depending on how the conflict concluded and the intervening troop strength. Germany, Japan, and the Balkans did not experience major post-conflict hostilities. Germany and Japan surrendered. Formal ceasefire agreements such as the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and the Military Technical Agreement in Kosovo set the initial conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In the Balkans, the security challenge was difficult, but it was related to ethnic revenge and not directed at U.S. military forces, whose security effort was largely focused on protecting ethnic minorities and enclaves. In Somalia, UN and U.S. forces were unable to cope with urban warfare. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States did achieve a rapid and decisive victory in the conventional phase of conflict, but soon those victories morphed into guerrilla wars. In the end, the situations in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq had more in common with each other than with the other cases—a most challenging security environment.

Lesson 3: A secure environment is a necessary precondition for successful nation-building.

Establishing a safe and secure environment is the primary mission of the military in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Security is a precondition for economic development, building democratic institutions, and the rule of law. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Post-conflict Reconstruction project, “security as a concept addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions.”4 Civil unrest and the willingness of militants to continue fighting were concerns for intervening forces in each of the case studies.

Military police played an important role in helping maintain law and order and in training civilian police to assume these responsibilities, but in many cases there were not enough to perform the mission needs. In Germany, a U.S. military-led constabulary force was created to fill the law and order gap. In the Balkans, the United Nations provided international police to train the local police force. A constabulary force composed of Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie bridged the civil and military security activities and provided crowd control capabilities.
Augmentation of the military force by civilian law enforcement (including forensics) became increasingly important in addressing civil security needs. In recent operations, organized crime was a major challenge that had to be addressed as part of the security operation. In the Balkans, the United Nations provided a multinational specialized police capability to address organized crime. Terrorism has also emerged as an important area of concern. Afghanistan and Iraq have experienced more terrorist related incidents than the Balkans. Specialized civil-military counter-terrorism Joint Task Force capabilities have been employed as part of the global war on terrorism. These capabilities are an additional capability to force packages normally used to support combat and S&R operations.

A legitimate and functioning penal system is also an important part of the security equation. In several case studies, judicial teams of prosecutors, lawyers, judges and corrections officers were used to establish court and prison systems. In Haiti, the inability to develop sustainable security institutions led to the eventual failure of the international operation.

Without a safe and secure environment, humanitarian relief, assistance to refugees and displaced persons, restoration of basic services, and reconstruction of institutions and infrastructure are more difficult. It has become increasingly important for these activities to begin concurrently with the establishment of a safe and secure environment. In recent case studies, the military was required to provide security and humanitarian relief, governance and other assistance until a permissive environment could be created to allow a transition to civilians. The military, in particular MPs, civil affairs, engineers, and medical teams, facilitated the transition to civilian authorities and became important players in these activities.

**Lesson 4: Combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction operations must be planned concurrently and as interdependent elements within an overall strategy for winning the peace.**

The ability of the U.S. military to defeat enemy forces rapidly and decisively with a reduced combat presence on the ground has significantly reduced planning time for the post-conflict phase. Thus, planning for stabilization and reconstruction must take place concurrently with planning for the war. Both combat and S&R are critical for success. Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the local population and the international community at large have grown less tolerant of delays in reconstruction.

Because of the complex nature of stabilization and reconstruction, an integrated approach to winning the peace is needed. The civil-military
planning process builds trust among key players, clarifies and establishes roles and responsibilities, helps identify and resolve inconsistencies and gaps, and helps to synchronize overall civil-military activities. History suggests that a comprehensive integrated plan spanning the continuum from war to combat termination to a transition to civilian control to a well-defined end state seldom exists. In Afghanistan coordination between civil, economic, and military functions was fragmented, resulting in limited economic and civil progress. In Bosnia these functions were initially fragmented, while in Kosovo they were reasonably well coordinated. Iraq policy was heavily focused on combat operations, with S&R operations taking a backseat. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance/Coalition Provisional Authority (ORHA/CPA) has been slow to produce results, in large part because of the delay in planning and execution and a lack of adequate field authority, personnel, and resources. Strong U.S. leadership and a policy focused on managing civil, economic, and political change and maintaining a military presence over a long period of time were fundamental to success in Germany and Japan.

Lesson 5: Multilateral operations contribute to legitimacy, burden sharing, and staying power. They are more difficult than unilateral operations but cheaper for any one nation and more durable. Multilateral operations do not, however, guarantee success.

History suggests that multilateral stabilization and reconstruction operations and nation-building are more complex and time-consuming than unilateral efforts; however, they can be considerably less expensive and can produce more thorough societal transformations. Multilateralism has drawbacks, such as complexity in coordination and burdensome bureaucracy, yet history suggests that multilateralism helps manage risk while unilateralism invites it. In spite of the limitations, international involvement is important for helping achieve success. For example, UN-sanctioned operations garner more international legitimacy, help distribute the costs (manpower and money) more widely, and provide a hedge against the huge risks of failure. They also provide a means to encourage staying power to see operations through to a successful outcome.

International involvement has been mixed for the case studies examined and, though a useful contributor, does not guarantee success. Somalia was the first post-Cold War attempt by the United States to support a multinational nation-building effort. The effort failed due to the inability to establish and staff an international structure to fill the governance gap and begin reconstruction. In Haiti, the U.S.-led multinational military
effort successfully restored President Aristide to power, but U.S. and interna-
tional elements departed before a competent administration could be
created, self-sustaining democratic structures could be put in place, and
lasting economic reforms could be instituted.

Other multilateral S&R operations experienced varying levels of suc-
cess. Since the occupation of Germany, the largest international effort has
occurred in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO led a multinational
military effort of forces from member nations and non-NATO countries.
There was also significant participation by the UN, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union
(EU), which were responsible for such nation-building tasks as civil ad-
ministration and policing, elections monitoring, and economic develop-
ment. While military unity of command was achieved through NATO,
civilian unity of command was established under UN auspices in Kosovo.
In Bosnia, civilian unity of command was more difficult to achieve be-
cause international responsibilities were more fragmented. As a result,
Bosnia has made political and economic progress but is not yet a self-sus-
taining political and economic entity. Kosovo has been somewhat more
successful because of the high degree of collaboration and burden sharing
among the multilateral participants, though progress has been hindered
because its final status in the international community has not been re-
solved. With the exception of Germany, Kosovo has enjoyed the most rapid
economic recovery among the cases studied. Multilateral involvement has
been considered a major factor in the relative ongoing successes in Bosnia
and Kosovo in particular.

Involvement and support of regional players is also important be-
cause neighboring states can exert significant influence to help achieve the
desired outcome, as was the case in Germany. Neighboring states also can
work at odds, as was the case in Bosnia. Consequently, it is necessary to
both constrain and engage neighboring states. International participation
can contribute to producing greater regional reconciliation, as was the case
in Germany, Bosnia and Kosovo.

Lesson 6: Embedding civilians with reconstruction specialties into the
warfighting force can facilitate planning and coordination.

Experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq suggest that it may
be appropriate to embed civilians in the deploying force to address plan-
ning for civil security and administration, restoring essential services and
other reconstruction needs, and facilitating the transition to the civilian
authority responsible for conducting the longer-term nation-building
effort. This was the intended role of Task Force IV and the ORHA in Iraq. The overall effectiveness has been slow in maturing because planning for this capability started late, and staffs were not deployed soon enough, given proper field authority, or adequately resourced to do the jobs they needed to do upon arrival in country.

Lesson 7: Unity of effort depends heavily on a shared vision and the ability to shape the response of multilateral participants.

Diverse players are involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations—international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, U.S. government and other foreign government agencies, and coalition militaries. Broad multilateral participation is compatible with unity of effort if the major participants share a common vision and can shape international institutions accordingly, as in Kosovo with the UN, OSCE, EU, NATO and contributing nations. Close coordination built on this shared vision and unity of effort is important in building a stable peace and for preventing partners from unintentionally working at cross purposes. In multinational operations, the U.S. military can find itself in a lead nation role or in a support role, where U.S. military units report to a non-U.S. commander (for example, KFOR in Kosovo) or multinational units report to a U.S. commander (for example, the U.S. led MND–North in Bosnia and MNB–East in Kosovo). In these circumstances unity of command becomes critical.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO was effective in ensuring broad multinational military participation and unity of command. On the civilian side the record was mixed. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia was fragmented among competing civil agencies, and there was little coordination between OHR and NATO at the beginning of the operation. In Kosovo, on the other hand, multinational unity of effort was achieved under UN auspices, and there was good coordination between NATO and the UN.

Lesson 8: Information operations require a comprehensive and integrated strategy from the inception of the operation through stabilization and reconstruction and nation-building to the desired end state. IO needs to shape and influence the information environment.

Information operations (IO) are more than leaflet drops and Commando Solo broadcasts, especially in the new world of global information and the 24/7 international media cycle. They can help to establish legitimacy for the operation, win the hearts and minds of the local population, gain regional and international support, and influence an adversary’s
decisions. Communication with the local population is critical for managing expectations, allaying fears and suspicions, helping establish legitimacy and support for the operation, and minimizing public unrest and possible interference with the operation.

The United States has not done that well in understanding its target audience and waging the information war. For example, the IO campaign in Iraq was inadequately integrated with the overall political-military effort. It was also slow to respond to threats and failed to utilize the most common venue accessible to Iraqis—the printed word. In many of the case studies, the product development, testing, and approval cycle was cumbersome and lacked timeliness. In the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it also proved difficult to measure the effectiveness of the information campaign and to make definitive judgments because there were no agreed measures of performance or effectiveness to support planning and assessment.

Lesson 9: Collaborative information environments facilitate civil-military coordination and information sharing.

Communications and information systems supporting past S&R operations were stove-piped and had limited coverage and capacity and little connection between military and civilian systems. This contributed to problems in civil-military coordination and information sharing in several cases. Tactical military systems primarily supported the warfighting military command and control needs and provided only limited service to deployed national government agency elements. Deployed government agencies, IOs, and NGOs used indigenous commercial telecommunications systems or contractor provided capabilities that were not directly linked with the military networks. Some progress has been made in developing collaborative information environments for military operations, but none exist for civil-military operations in S&R environments.

Conclusions

- History teaches that regime change operations can be successful in various cultural settings, but the record is mixed and the price high.
- There are numerous uncontrollable factors that affect the outcome, especially the nation’s political, social and economic past.
- But there are controllable factors that can help determine the outcome, such as the level of effort and time the United States will contribute.
- A stable security environment is a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient for success.
• Another necessary ingredient is broad unity of effort within the U.S. government.
• Taken together, the case histories studied make a strong argument for creating a standing stabilization and reconstruction force as part of the U.S. military.

Notes
1 Sources included interviews of senior personnel such as Ambassadors Robert B. Oakley and James Dobbins, literature searches, and review of findings from studies by the National Defense University, U.S. Army War College, U.S. Institute of Peace, ASD C’l Command and Control Research Program, Institute of Defense Analyses, RAND, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Association of the United States Army, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Government Accounting Office, Open Society Institute, and UN Foundation.
2 James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq, RAND, 2003.
Chapter 2

New Strategic Concepts

Securing the peace in the aftermath of conflict depends on many factors: how much damage is inflicted on a region’s infrastructure, how many civilians unconnected to the local regime are killed or injured, and how much regional instability a long military campaign creates all shape the prospects for success in the post-conflict environment. Consequently, planning for military operations must begin with a clear, attainable, political-military objective that includes an understanding of what the postwar setting must look like when combat operations end and post-conflict operations begin.

In 1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden concluded that Egypt’s new president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, was a dangerous fascist riding the wave of Arab nationalism to greater and greater heights of power. When Egypt took over the Suez Canal from Britain, Eden saw Nasser as another Hitler and decided that any policy but direct military action would amount to appeasement. French Premier Guy Mollet shared this opinion and agreed to join Britain in an attack on Egypt to remove Nasser. For Eden, the removal of Nasser seemed to be enough to rationalize the use of British military power, but Eden’s military commanders needed more, as Geoffrey Regan recounts:

Field Marshal Montgomery, soon after he heard that Eden planned a strike against Egypt, asked him what was his object. Eden apparently replied that it was to “knock Nasser off his perch.” Montgomery says that he told Eden this was not good enough and that his generals would need to know what the political aim was after Nasser was toppled, in order to plan the right kind of operation.¹

¹ Thanks to Dr. James Kurtz, Institute for Defense Analysis, for sharing his work on the British Army experience and its application to the U.S. Army in the new strategic environment.
The rest of the story is too well known to repeat here. Suffice it to say that Nasser’s influence in the Arab world was enhanced by Britain’s muddled intervention. In the end, it was Eden who was removed from office, and British prestige was severely damaged.

Eden’s failure to answer the question of what came after Nasser was partly responsible for the operation’s disastrous outcome. If the effect Eden wanted was the removal of Nasser, what were the steps that had to be taken, and did those steps promise to achieve the political goals without unnecessary risk or without other, unintended consequences in the aftermath of conflict? Was the cause-effect chain clear and logical to others (for example, Montgomery)? The answers to these questions indicate serious flaws in Eden’s planning.

Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq once again have plunged Western armies into the chaos and disorder of the Islamic World, a region where the problems of maintaining order and creating prosperity seem intractable. In the Islamic World, as in many parts of the developing world, long-established social structures and belief systems are crumbling under the crushing weight of global change, and the people whose lives depended upon the old structures are seeing their worlds disintegrate. The challenge to America and her allies is gradually to bring such areas of the world that exist beyond the pale of the globalized world into the modern, integrated structure of planetary civilization.

Understanding this aspect of stabilization and reconstruction operations is important; some of America’s adversaries in the non-globalized world may conclude that it is possible to sap America to the point where it allows the world to be changed for the worse. That is certainly the goal of the smartest of these adversaries. Sadly, America’s ignominious withdrawal from Somalia confirmed them in their judgment of American weakness. Thus, military power is crucial to the maintenance of American self-confidence in conflict and post-conflict operations. If conflict and post-conflict operations look hard, America may deter itself from taking action in its own interest. Indeed, self-deterrence is one of the greatest dangers America faces today. Deciding whether to take military action that includes post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations should be based not on whether the operations look easy or hard, but on whether they are essential to the security interests of the United States and its allies.

Keeping in mind that conflict and post-conflict periods overlap, this chapter examines what needs to happen in the broader context of strategic planning before, during, and after the conduct of military operations
in conflict or crisis. The key to success in post-conflict settings is understanding two interrelated points: that no military solution is possible absent a political and economic solution, and that persistent conditions of insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and economic development. For the American and British Armies, addressing the range of difficulties that can obstruct post-conflict stability and grasping the strategic imperatives of post-conflict planning are essential to the creation of conditions conducive to the emergence of a new, prosperous, and more humane society.

**Background**

Today, most of the tensions in the international arena stem from the impact of globalization and the resulting forces of ethnic, tribal and religious hatred. Terrorism is the latest manifestation of the intersection of these forces and signals that the international system is in a period of re-adjustment as much of the developing world copes with the forces of uneven change. American military action will occasionally be unavoidable as states and regions of the world that fail to integrate into or fall out of the global economy threaten American and allied access to vital resources or create refugee flows. In some cases like, such as Afghanistan, countries can become sanctuaries for terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking. In nearly every case, they become catalysts for regional conflict and instability.

At the same time, most of the social, economic, and military structures in the areas where U.S. and allied forces are likely to operate are weakened from years of economic stagnation, internal corruption, and, in some cases, international sanctions. These fragile structures can be expected to break relatively quickly under resolute American military assault. This means that American military operations will almost certainly result in some form of power vacuum that American forces will have to fill. In other words, if the United States and its allies disarm a country and remove its government from power, the United States and its allies take on the obligation to defend it.

The effect of these events on the Armed Forces is that they confront more complex tasks; they will be employed more often, more quickly, and in a greater diversity of strategic settings than ever before. The leading force in land warfare, the U.S. Army, must be ready to perform tasks from humanitarian aid to regime removal and post-conflict reconstruction. Fulfilling this role, however, requires a fresh analytical approach.
Discussion

With these points in mind, a more coherent framework to guide planning and thinking must emerge. This suggests the need for some limited, but useful generalizations that can be developed to serve as the conceptual basis for thinking and planning future military operations with post-conflict requirements in mind. The point of this approach is simple: Once the right questions are asked, answers can be provided and action can be taken to address the identified requirements.

Coherent War-Winning and Peace-Winning Strategy

No one doubts the importance to the success of a military campaign of a viable political strategy with attainable political-military objectives, but devising such a strategy is harder than is generally recognized. In conflict and post-conflict settings, strategy involves the art of controlling and managing all the resources of a nation or a coalition of nations, including armed forces, to the end that vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. This approach is in fact the highest form of strategy, because it integrates military power with diplomacy, economic development, and political interests and results in policies that operate for decades or even centuries. In post-conflict planning, a strategy that does not spread American and allied military resources too thinly but instead links military capabilities to other governmental and non-governmental agencies is essential.

Of course, agreement on political-military goals is always difficult to reach, but agreement on what counts constitutes the foundation for strategy in military operations. Non-governmental actors are usually very knowledgeable about an area and its inhabitants. They can help refine approaches that require military attention. However difficult it may be to articulate them, understanding the interests of all actors involved in the conduct of conflict and post-conflict operations is the true wellspring of valid objectives that define what a nation or coalition of nations is trying to do. As always, the most compelling interests relate to survival, but no interest exists in a vacuum. Hardly anyone is neutral. Even seemingly innocuous interests can cause conflict.

These observations suggest that regardless of how much American military commanders know about their opponents and their military objectives, given the unstructured nature of U.S. national strategy since the end of the Cold War, it is almost certain that military operations will develop in parallel with evolving policy goals. This means that commanders must exercise initiative and think through the consequences of their
actions, whether or not they are told specifically what to do in varying circumstances. Inevitably, this recognition imposes the minimal requirement to plan for the use of facilities that are specifically excluded from destruction and for rules of engagement, humanitarian assistance, power generation, if needed, and local law and order in the aftermath of conflict.

As the Russians discovered in Chechnya, military occupation does not automatically equal a political solution. Augmenting and staffing land component command headquarters with the expertise and talent to compensate for what the commander does not know or has not studied in the context of stabilization and reconstruction operations is crucial. Planning ahead will never be enough. Unanticipated requirements will always develop. Military leaders charged with executing military action need to understand the limits of what they can accomplish while reacting to the sometimes open-ended missions that they are occasionally instructed to execute. In post-conflict settings, commanders must anticipate the need for a different mix of capabilities and incorporate them into force planning. If disaffected enemy military formations are inclined to cooperate, this too must be considered as a means of maximizing resources in the conflict region to shorten warfighting operations and improve the prospects for stability in the post-conflict environment. In sum, by asking the right questions in the context of post-conflict needs, it is possible for commanders to discern what is essential to link tactical actions directly to strategic goals and to discard what is unimportant or counterproductive before, during, and after combat operations.

Unity of Effort

Integrating the diverse military and civilian agencies operating in the post-conflict environment is important but not easy. Without a shared strategic vision, there is always a real danger that various actors—civilian and military—will cling tenaciously to their own policy views and strategic orientations, unwilling or unable to integrate their perceptions with the perceptions of others. Unity of command and broad participation may occasionally be at odds if the lead nation adopts a policy position that other participants cannot accept. Thus, the need to balance institutional and local interests in the context of policy making and implementation is critical.

The effective use of military capabilities in conflict and post-conflict environments demands the reconciliation of political ends and military/civilian means. Without this reconciliation, clear attainable objectives based on a sound political vision will not emerge and unity of effort will
be sacrificed. Somalia demonstrated conclusively the importance of unity of effort. At one point, there were three separate command arrangements in Somalia. Often this resulted in at least one organization not knowing what the others were doing. Somalia also showed the need to realistically match the political mandate for intervention to the existing capabilities—in Somalia the mandate actually grew as the force structure declined.

Ideally, all lines of authority would lead unambiguously and directly to and through a single headquarters combining civilian and military expertise in a clearing-house for decisionmaking. The authority of the individual in charge, whether civilian or military, over civil and military organizations of power and influence is essential to the establishment of an integrated, interagency response in support of a coherent strategy for stabilization and reconstruction.

Compelling and Consistent Strategic Message

Knowledge of the historical record should teach us “how to think, not what to do.” Clearly, post-conflict planning and implementation strategies demand an understanding of more than the right weapon for the right target set. What general insights can we draw from experience?

When Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer arrived in Malaya to assume command of all British military and civilian elements of the on-going counter-insurgency campaign, he focused intently on the message that he wanted insurgents, soldiers, and civilians to hear and understand. Knowing that he was addressing a diverse audience of Chinese, Malay, Indian, and British citizens, he was particularly interested in disarming his opposition while reassuring Britain’s supporters. Ultimately, he composed his essential strategic message along the following lines: First, Britain would leave Malaya; Britain had no intention of colonizing Malaya in the postwar period or keeping forces in Malaya. Second, although there was no timetable for British military withdrawal, the removal of British forces would depend on specific conditions. These conditions entailed, for example, the establishment of local law and order, a functioning judiciary and penal system to support law and order, unimpeded movement of all people and goods across the country, and the creation of a national army that would be the guarantor of Malaya’s independence and freedom. Faced with the constraints that a diminished British Empire imposed on his operations, Field Marshal Templer insisted that he would make do with the 33 British infantry battalions in the brigade battlegroups he had on hand and told British authorities, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”
British authorities made clear their intention to depart Malaya once conditions of political and economic stability returned to the peninsula. *Conditions* was the operative term. In time, because the Malayan populace took seriously British public statements expressing Britain’s intention to leave Malaya once internal stability existed, the resulting misery that terrorism inflicted on the population actually undermined the communist insurgency. Malayans, Chinese, and Indians who sympathized in any way with the insurgency saw no reason to support it when it became clear that the British had no intention of remaining indefinitely. Coupled with the inability of communist insurgents to move from opportunistic terrorism to a sustained and effective military campaign against the British, terrorist actions built support in the population for the British-led military campaign against the communists.8

Britain’s success against the insurgency in Malaya is not a perfect analogy for American and allied operations today in Southwest Asia, but it does provide evidence that a uniform, consistent message that supports a political strategy with attainable political-military objectives is vital. In addition, Field Marshal Templer’s message was no less important to the British military authorities. Thanks to the clarity of the message, they, too, understood as clearly as their Malayan counterparts what had to be done to facilitate Britain’s withdrawal from the region. Today, what American and allied soldiers and civilians say and do make a difference. The Sergeant on patrol must understand and convey the same message that the Joint Force Commander or his civilian counterparts disseminate.

**Full Spectrum Planning**

Post-conflict planning evolves in parallel with the war plan. It equates to planning backward from victory.9 This kind of thinking requires that the joint force keep the final objective in mind while following promising intermediate paths to the final objective before, during, and after the conflict ends.

Entailed in reaching this objective is the systematic calculation of the value, as well as the risk and cost, of attacking specific enemy vulnerabili- ties or strengths based on the effect produced by their physical or func- tional destruction, neutralization, denial, exploitation, or manipulation through all available means, direct and indirect.10 Facilities that offer cap- abilities in the post-conflict environment to advancing American and allied forces need to be spared. For instance, Yugoslav military barracks were nearly all destroyed during the Kosovo air campaign, with the result that entirely new facilities had to be built for arriving NATO troops when the
Yugoslav forces withdrew. In addition, the decision to destroy the communications infrastructure made it very tough in the first few weeks of NATO’s occupation to disseminate critical information to all of the region’s inhabitants.

Operations necessary to sustain American influence when the fighting ends are no less important than the combat operations themselves are to victory. Having won the war, it is vital to win the peace. In strategic terms, this requires the coherent and continuous application of national and alliance elements of power through effects-based processes to accomplish strategic objectives. In practice, this may involve the need to front-load critical civil order and humanitarian assistance capabilities immediately behind advancing combat troops. This was done in Kosovo, with the result that the civilian population suffered minimally. In some settings, the need to incorporate disaffected enemy civil and military authorities and their supporting elements should be considered early in the post-conflict process.11

This recognition implies early planning for the combination of American and allied military forces with U.S., allied, and international civilian capabilities, including governmental, international, and non-governmental organizations and private contractors. This planning process should include identification and development of these resources and planning for their initial combined utilization and the subsequent devolution from military to civilian operations. This is a very important consideration, whether the activity is relief, stabilization, or reconstruction. It is essential, even in the early stages with a weak initial civilian capability. It can be much more effective if the civilian capability to influence reconstruction is better developed early in the planning process.

Concurrency of Operations

As noted earlier, the American political goal in post-conflict settings is to create the conditions conducive to the emergence of a more humane government on the local and national levels that is democratic in character. The operative word here is conditions, because the strength and presence of U.S. and allied military power is really dependent on specific conditions, not on timetables for withdrawal devised in isolation from developments in the post-war region. Success in stabilization and reconstruction operations depends on the mobilization of capabilities during and after conflict that are essential to the maintenance of order and the restoration of normal economic activity. All of these points suggest straightforward military tasks that ultimately drive conditions in the post-conflict environment.
Task 1. Suppress, defeat, or destroy those elements that resist the emergence of a new society or simply promote anarchy. As will be seen, these operations involve much more than conventional military power. They require the tight integration of small, effectively led conventional army and marine units with Army Special Forces, intelligence, counter-terrorist, and local police elements.

Task 2. Establish law and order. These activities require a mix of specialized military and police units with the skills and the judicial authority to impose a new, effective, and legitimate political order.

Task 3. On an emergency basis, repair damage to infrastructure that is essential to the emergence of a new social and political order. Army engineer units working with civil and indigenous authorities target critical infrastructure for power regeneration, transportation, sanitation, communication, and education.

Task 4. Rapidly establish an effective interim government constituted from the indigenous population. U.S. and allied military and civil authority must simultaneously create the conditions for the growth of local self-rule and economic prosperity, often in the context of serious internal ethnic and sectarian tensions.

All four tasks must be tackled simultaneously because they are interdependent. U.S. Joint Forces Command argues that for any current or future joint force to discharge the tasks of stabilization and reconstruction with success requires significant coordination across service and governmental boundaries. No doubt this is true, but the force mix that is deployed to the warfight must already contain some of the capabilities that will be needed in those areas where fighting has ended and reconstruction has begun.

Precision-targeting of Rejectionist Elements

As Sir Winston Churchill said of Field Marshal Montgomery’s lethargic and ponderous advance against the out-gunned and out-manned combined German and Italian force at El Alamein: “When you are winning a war almost everything that happens can be claimed to be right and wise.” The opposite also holds true in post-conflict settings. If the perception grows that security is poor, that law and order are unenforceable, then almost everything that happens is criticized. If security degrades, the pressure to withdraw U.S. and allied forces grows, as the American experience in Somalia demonstrated. Among those who resist American military intervention and the forces of globalization that intervention brings with it, the hope is that, like the Soviet military in
Afghanistan, the American military will respond with indiscriminate crackdowns and violence. Terrorist or insurgent elements are always engaged in obtaining popular support on their home ground and abroad by attacking American military targets in areas where Americans are intensely unpopular.

This was true in Somalia and it is likely to be the case wherever American soldiers and marines serve. It is the unavoidable price of superpower status. Terrorists know that the people most likely to render aid and assistance to them will be those who lose friends, relatives, and parents to American military action. In Afghanistan, for instance, the code of conduct known as the *Pushtunwaldi* stresses, besides other things, blood vengeance (*badal*). As a result, finding and defeating or co-opting rejectionist elements that violently oppose U.S. and allied intervention is critical to mission success. Success in this arena is critical if military problems are to be converted to police problems—the real purpose of counter-insurgency operations.

In exclusively military terms, this means that the best way to inflict serious losses on the terrorists is to locate them without being seen, to deploy ambush parties and launch small, but deadly assaults with standoff attack weapons in support. With dramatic improvements in precision, advanced command and control systems, and the growing transparency provided by an evolving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance grid, the tactical use of small Army and Marine elements against discrete targets is more achievable today than ever before. But to be effective the civilian, military, and intelligence resources must be interconnected or netted, as well as jointly commanded. Ideally, what one part of this integrated organization sees, all parts must see; what one part thinks, all parts must think.

The collection, processing, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of timely information and intelligence must be addressed in an integrative setting. Feedback to every level, civilian and military, is critical. Soldiers who apprehend suspects who are subsequently transported to higher headquarters for more thorough interrogation must know the results of the interrogation to more effectively target suspects in the future.

This tactic necessitates the use of small detachments of American and allied soldiers that are not much larger than the enemy concentration they are attacking. For one thing, most enemies in the post-conflict environment will deliberately avoid direct combat with regular Army and Marine combat forces, preferring instead to emphasize offensive action
against smaller, lightly protected and equipped U.S. ground elements, particu-
larly at night. To avoid losses to superior American firepower, terrorists and insurgents must remain dispersed and strike unexpectedly. In the post-conflict environments of today’s world, there is no distinction be-
tween front and rear, with the added disadvantage that American artillery is of limited utility in a setting where fighting is close and sudden. As a re-
sult, accurate, devastating direct fire from close range and from standoff distances is the key in these encounters. But the real ingredient for success is initiative, and initiative requires freedom of action.

If American ground forces are subject to attack when and where they are unprepared for terrorist action, they will lose the initiative. Tactical in-
dependence of small units along with the use of reaction forces that in-
clude AH64Ds on routine patrol overhead or on strip alert, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles are part of the answer, but surveillance platforms with the capacity for sustained coverage in areas where terrorist activity is highest are vital if American military power is to be selectively and effectively applied against the armed enemy.

Accurate, devastating firepower is not the only variable in this com-
plex equation. Education of officers to understand and perform these tasks is equally, if not more critical. Military force is credible only to the extent that the will that uses it is credible. However, military power employed in isolation from a psychological program designed to undermine the rejectionists’ legitimacy will not work. Sporadic acts of terror or violence persist as long as there is a support base within the population that tolerates or accepts the legitimacy of the insurgent cause.14

**Improved Cultural Intelligence**

What is required for the difficult and complex job of winning hearts and minds is something General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Central Command, calls cultural intelligence. Zinni has his own short list of questions to this end: “What I need to understand is how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the de-
cisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?”15

Geared to fight traditional wars against conventional enemies, sol-
diers must now make significant and, in some cases, radical changes in the way they think about warfare and the conduct of stabilization and re-
construction operations in the post-conflict environment. The Army is experiencing major changes in size, composition, mission, and technol-
ogy. The number and variety of operations are increasing with far greater
emphasis on joint and multinational operations, while new technology is simultaneously changing the nature of warfare. Box-to-box connectivity is worthless without brain-to-brain connectivity, and the required intellectual connectivity comes with education and experience. Brigadier General David Grange, USA (Ret.), summed up the challenge very well:

A transformed mindset is one that can handle the chaotic and uncertain situations created by the collapse of political, economic, and security systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have no effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not easily identifiable, and rules of engagement are conflicting. Our forces are expected to deal with terrorists, drug traffickers, warlords, militant fundamentalists, and paramilitary units—and still be able to overcome large maneuver formations and formidable defense systems.

Military educational institutions, however, lost their monopoly as providers of knowledge and understanding long ago. A good plan for officer development that emphasizes the criticality of teaching leaders how—as opposed to what—to think is the first step. To cope with the complex challenge of joint expeditionary warfare and stabilization and reconstruction operations, officers will increasingly need the educational background found only in major universities. Thus, the second step involves selecting officers willing to participate in rigorous graduate education programs.

Assuming the background for stabilization and reconstruction exists, the analytical framework for understanding the adversary in the field begins with the overarching concept of foreign internal defense (FID), which is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. These activities include the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion as it develops. FID focuses specifically on building viable institutions (political, economic, social and military) that respond to the needs of a developing society.

The use of incentives—including actions ranging from the provision of specific human services and the repair of damaged infrastructure by Army engineers and technical units to the targeted delivery of hard cash into the right hands—must animate the behavior of military leaders at every level. This low-level excursion by U.S. and allied forces into the post-conflict society is critical to the development of a sophisticated capability to conduct military operations based on human intelligence (HUMINT). Black and White Special Forces operatives armed with good HUMINT
operating from within the communities themselves can help guide and shape the actions of conventional Army ground forces. In time, this approach will produce critical information that can be used quickly and effectively to destroy the terrorist or insurgent. In time, the insurgent’s fear of betrayal from within his small group becomes a paranoia that dissolves the group and leads to defeat of the larger insurgency.

**Early Demonstrable Success in Key Areas**

Early success in three key areas—security, power, and jobs—is essential in any post-conflict setting. Where local law and order have disintegrated, security is immediately at risk. Where water and energy services are interrupted, daily life for the inhabitants quickly becomes intolerable. And, where jobs have vanished with the regime that created them, thousands of disgruntled former employees provide fertile recruiting ground for insurgency and terrorism. Presumptions of American success in conflict or post-conflict environments should not ignore these facts.

Consider the security problem first. If striking at small, local enemy concentrations and fixed targets becomes the sole objective, future stabilization and reconstruction operations will soon falter. Appropriately organized, equipped and trained ground combat forces drawn from the local population or the cooperative elements in the existing military establishment must be on hand to work closely with U.S and allied forces to pursue insurgents into their sanctuaries and destroy them in detail. Thus, friendly indigenous forces must be given the opportunity to demonstrate that they are professionally trained as police or soldiers and that they can move quickly and decisively against any resisting enemy. This means adequately arming the local police and giving them the authority to arrest and, if necessary, kill their opponents.

Organized crime always flourishes in post-conflict settings where local order has collapsed. Only armed policemen who speak the local language, know the inhabitants, and are familiar with the area can cope with the challenge of organized crime. The military can support and reinforce their activity, but the investigative capabilities of the American and allied military establishments to root out and destroy organized crime are limited. All too frequently, criminal elements and organized political opposition are linked. Finding ways to separate the two sides of this equation is important, because political opposition feeds on the illicit funds provided by organized criminality.

During the planning for the introduction of NATO forces into Kosovo, teams of military police and engineers were assembled and
incorporated into the force packages that entered Kosovo immediately after Yugoslav forces withdrew. This action ensured that both local security concerns and the need for the rapid regeneration of electric power would be addressed in the first days of NATO occupation. NATO forces were lucky insofar as power was concerned. In most cases, connectivity to power sources in surrounding countries could be restored with relatively little difficulty. However, in some cases, military units provided large generators with the capacity to provide power for local clinics and hospitals until connections to better sources were restored.

Providing jobs is a much tougher challenge. For example, the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have created false economies of dependency by hiring local national labor to support a variety of UN initiatives. But far too little attention has been focused on the introduction of commercial firms through the loosening of restrictions in customs and cross-border traffic. Nascent capitalism often is lumped together with organized crime, particularly in countries where there is little or no history of a viable free market. Distinguishing one from the other is essential, however, if a new economic structure is to emerge that does not depend on foreign donors for survival. Developing internal markets linked to food, shelter, and clothing are attainable near-term goals, but not enough to sustain long-term economic growth. Because no one country can develop in isolation from its surroundings, true economic development always requires a regional strategy that links development to the larger market forces of the region.

When conditions are not secure, it is always difficult to entice capital investment. Despite the violence in Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian Arab private sector—spearheaded by the Palestinian diaspora and the support of the European Union—has had some success in creating new banking systems, venture capital funds, and a mechanism for the privatization of telecommunication and other industries. American business, however, has been understandably reluctant to invest in the area, and the continuous breakdown of civil order in the Palestinian areas makes it unlikely that this condition will change soon.20

Early Introduction of Indigenous Capabilities

In the complex environment of postwar stabilization and reconstruction, legitimacy, consent, and the use of force are inextricably intertwined. Without the help of the people who already live in the region where the conflict occurred, it is simply not possible to restore normalcy in public order or economic terms. It is important to understand that
there are large numbers of targets for insurgents or terrorists to choose from and that defending them all demands infinite U.S. and coalition resources that will not be provided. Nearly one-third of occupying forces are normally engaged in protecting specific sites, lines of communication, and strong points. These static guard missions should be the first tasks to pass rapidly over to local citizens.

As noted earlier, the first place to start is to create local police and military establishments staffed by indigenous people. Making the training and formation of local citizens as police a top priority in any post-conflict environment. The faster this process occurs, the more successful the larger stabilization and reconstruction operation is likely to be and the sooner U.S. and allied military forces can withdraw. As the British Army discovered the hard way in Ulster, it was a serious mistake for British troops to conduct house-to-house searches of Irish homes. Local police drawn from the population were much better at the job and they evoked a much less hostile response from the Irish population than the British Army did.

Identifying American citizens with skills of importance to the operation and linking them through the Internet to operations on the ground is another way to encourage greater local participation. During the early phases of American military operations in Afghanistan, Afghans living in the United States provided enormously important insights and support to U.S. and allied forces trying to establish a rapport with the indigenous population. Bringing former citizens of a country ravaged by war and under U.S. and allied occupation to the county in question can be helpful—if they are not inserted immediately into positions of authority, but used instead as a kind of positive fifth column to build support for the larger reconstruction effort.

These points notwithstanding, there can be serious obstacles to cooperation with the people whom soldiers and marines are trying to help in the post-conflict environment. In a very different strategic setting, General Sherman made similar observations in the context of southern reconstruction after America’s Civil War:

No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of the people of the South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain there an army large enough to hold them in subjugation. All we can, or should attempt is to give them rope, to develop in an honest way if possible, preserving in reserve enough military power to check any excesses if they attempt any.
Lego-like S&R Capabilities

The use of force must be agile, responsive, and suited to the specific environment. For instance, soldiers with small arms in soft-skinned vehicles are not capable of coping with terrorists or insurgents armed with armor-piercing weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades or command-detoned anti-tank mines. At the same time, tanks are not well suited for crowd control or urban policing. This means that different types and levels of force will be required within the post-conflict region depending on local conditions. Understanding this point influences the development of force packages that contain capabilities both for warfighting and for provision of humanitarian assistance and civil order.

What is required is the ability to organize core military capabilities into specialized modules of mission-focused combat power for integration as needed into post-conflict operations. Transforming ground forces into mission-focused force packages—the military equivalent of “Legos” that can be assembled into larger joint operational forces—is applicable to post-conflict operations as well as to combat. In practice, this scheme depends on evolving joint systems and a technical architecture (a set of building codes) for successful aggregation. The U.S. Army already has most of the capabilities needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations, if it is willing to organize them appropriately.

Military organizations for stabilization and reconstruction operations should bring specific capabilities to the post-conflict environment ranging from bridge reconstruction to water purification. However, these modular organizations should be self-contained both tactically and in regard to command systems to ensure they can be independently deployed for long periods. This feature of self-containment reduces the need for communication and information processes both within the modular formations and between them and their higher joint headquarters.

It is vital to apply limited U.S. and coalition military resources when and where they will have the greatest effect. The key step involves constituting Army formations from the capabilities that are required for the mission. One way to create the Lego-like capability is to view Army forces as capability packages organized for mission effectiveness. Regardless of the scale of the contingency, Army forces will be required to provide some level of support to U.S. government agencies, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and host-nation agencies. The Army should organize to fulfill the mission.
As in other military operations, standards of training, readiness, and discipline must be very high. Soldiers must understand that whatever tactic or operational technique worked 10 years ago, 2 days ago, or even 50 miles away may not work again, and they must be prepared to adopt whatever tactic does work. In this sense, the creation, and the regular employment, of superior joint tactical forms ought to be the Army goal.

Conclusions

- The importance of establishing attainable political-military objectives to the successful implementation of a war and peace winning strategy cannot be overstated. It is dangerous for American military or civilian leaders to entertain dreams of social and political structures in any country that cannot be sustained because the cultural and economic conditions will not support it.
- Grand designs for nation-building fail when they are conceived in isolation from conditions in societies that Americans do not understand. Whatever emerges in the post-conflict environment of American and allied military intervention must reflect the preferences and ideas of the people that live there.
- What the Army and Marine Corps can do in the post-conflict environment is no less important than what they do in war. What soldiers and marines say and do matters to the people under occupation. Their message must be consistent with the guidelines established at the highest levels. A failure of understanding makes a coherent strategic message ineffective. The British experience in Malaya is instructive.
- Advanced technologies are enablers in achieving success, but ultimately it is military organization, training, and thinking on the ground that will make the difference. Soldiers and marines have the skills, and both services already have a high percentage of the capabilities that are needed. What is needed is a new philosophy of military leadership and education designed to prepare officers and soldiers for post-conflict operations.
- One way to address the diversity of capabilities required in stabilization and reconstruction is to consider the bulk of Army forces as inherently capable of meeting some or most of the post-conflict operational requirements. In practice, Army forces should be viewed as capability packages organized for mission effectiveness. Army forces have responded with agility to unanticipated missions before. The use of field artillery units from Fort Sill, Oklahoma is one example. That said, a policy of reorienting non-infantry units to perform light and motorized infantry-type missions...
entails some risk if a joint rotational readiness system is not adopted by the U.S. Army. Without rotational readiness and unit replacement, formations become very difficult to retrain and refocus on warfighting missions after long periods of employment in missions other than war.

- The global war on terrorism presents the Army, in particular, with the opportunity to reevaluate its role in stabilization and reconstruction missions in a way that will guide Army transformation along new paths to future operational success. As Field Marshal Rommel said: “Mortal danger is an effective antidote for fixed ideas.” This necessitates the transformation of Army thinking and culture into a force organized, trained, and postured for global joint expeditionary warfare that will include post-conflict activities, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Notes


2 James Webb, “Heading for Trouble,” *The Washington Post*, September 4, 2002, D7. Webb’s comments on the nature of an Iraqi operation are insightful: “The connotations of ‘a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad’ show how inapt the comparison is. Our occupation forces never set foot inside Japan until the emperor had formally surrendered and prepared Japanese citizens for our arrival. Nor did MacArthur destroy the Japanese government when he took over as proconsul after World War II. Instead, he took pains to preserve the integrity of the Japanese imperial family and to work his changes through the government. Nor is Japanese culture in any way similar to Iraq’s. The Japanese are a homogeneous people who place a high premium on respect, and they cooperated fully with MacArthur’s forces by order of the emperor.”


4 Brink Lindsey, *Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2002), 211.


6 Malaya commonly is confused with Malaysia. On July 9, 1963, Malaya joined with North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore to form the Federation of Malaysia. Singapore withdrew August 9, 1965, and the federation became simply Malaysia.


9 Again, according to U.S. Joint Forces Command, *effects-based planning* (EBP) is an operational planning process to conduct EBO within rapid decisive operations (RDO). EBP is results-based vice attrition-based. EBP closely mirrors the current joint planning process yet focuses upon the linkage of actions to effects to objectives. EBP changes the way we view the enemy, ourselves, and what is included and emphasized in the planning process. EBP uses a flexibly structured battle rhythm that leverages a collaborative knowledge environment and capitalizes on the use of fewer formal joint boards. It employs virtual, near-simultaneous planning at all echelons of command.


Bard E. O’Neill, 81.


Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Picador, 2001), 203.


Clayton Christensen makes this same point about businesses in The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), 209.


See U.S. Special Operations Command Web site, “Terms and Definitions,” for the definition of Foreign Internal Defense from which this paragraph was extracted.


General William T. Sherman, on the subject of reconstruction in the South after the American Civil War, 1861–1865.

Joint Operations Concept, JROC draft, March 7, 2003, final draft, 27.

William Donohue Ellis and Thomas J. Cunningham, Jr., Clark of St. Vith, The Sergeants’ General (Cleveland: Dillon/Liederbach, 1974), 56, 57, 166, 167.
Chapter 3

Scenarios for Force Sizing

How many military forces should the United States possess in order to perform post-war S&R missions? More fundamentally, how should it go about making calculated decisions in this arena? What analytical standard should DOD employ to size its S&R forces for this purpose? Likewise, what analytical standards should DOD employ to design its S&R forces in ways that shape their internal characteristics and performance capabilities? This paper addresses these questions in preliminary ways that can help set the stage for further research and analysis.

With S&R missions now gaining greater urgency, these thorny issues demand careful attention. S&R forces start functioning after U.S. combat forces have succeeded in occupying enemy territory. Their purpose is to carry out S&R missions that arise during war-termination and in the often-difficult stages that follow before lasting peace is established. For the most part, forces in the form of major S&R units do not now exist as organized entities, but many of the components for them are scattered throughout the force. The recent Iraq experience suggests that U.S. strategy will need them in the years ahead. DOD will not be able to make sensible decisions about how to prepare S&R forces until it has analytical standards for sizing and designing them. But what should these standards be? Because these major S&R formations do not now exist, they will have to be assembled.

Background

This chapter examines scenarios in which U.S. forces might have to perform S&R missions. The analysis of scenarios and related force planning considerations is preliminary. It is intended to establish a strategic framework that will be used to conduct further investigation and does not pretend to report final results of thorough deliberation. Even so, it offers suggestive insights on the force planning calculus for S&R missions and
how scenario analysis fits into this calculus. Basically, the scenarios con-
sidered here support the judgment that the U.S. military needs significant
S&R forces. Determining the exact size and composition of these forces is
a complex enterprise that is best approached by considering multiple op-
tions and weighing their effectiveness in the S&R mission.

As experience shows, scenarios are notoriously bad at predicting
events. Typically the events that they foresee never happen, and they fail to
forecast the surprising contingencies that actually occur. But when used as
analytical tools rather than crystal balls, scenarios can shed light on force
sizing and designing in a generic sense. This chapter takes an initial look
at twelve illustrative S&R scenarios that address the key regions of the
world and help cover the spectrum of future events in terms of size, diffi-
culty, and unique features. The results put forth here are tentative, and will
be developed further as additional research is performed.

Discussion

Clearly the U.S. military needs forces for performing S&R duties. The
Iraq experience has cast a bright spotlight on this new reality. But how
many such forces will be enough? Will DOD need a small S&R force, a
medium-size force, or a large force? This question demands a sensible an-
swer. Today, S&R forces are in great demand. Their responsiveness and ca-
pabilities need to be enhanced, and some argue that they need to be in-
creased in size as well.

Determining how many S&R forces to deploy for a particular con-
tingency is not the same as determining how many forces to deploy for the
purpose of war-termination and post-war occupation. The latter function
typically is performed by combat forces, whose missions and tasks are dif-
ferent from those of S&R. Thus, S&R forces are normally a subset of total
deployments, and they perform missions within their bailiwick. The size
of S&R forces, however, might be large if their missions are demanding.
Depending upon the situation, S&R forces might match or even outnum-
ber occupation combat forces. Moreover, they remain in the occupied
country for a considerable period after most occupation forces have been
withdrawn.

Addressing the S&R force-sizing issue is anything but an exercise in
the obvious. When the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 and the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG) were published, they created a “4–2–1” standard
for sizing the overall conventional posture. This standard implied that the
U.S. military should have enough forces to occupy an enemy country the
size of Iraq or North Korea after an MTW conflict. Today, however, the United States finds itself actually occupying Iraq while also performing two small-but-demanding S&R missions in the Balkans (Kosovo and Bosnia) and Afghanistan. To the extent the current situation is prologue, the implication is that DOD will need enough S&R forces to handle more than one concurrent contingency.

Maybe the 4–2–1 standard should be applied to the S&R posture. The 4–2–1 standard addresses concurrent requirements in flexible ways. It says that U.S. combat forces should always be prepared for two MTWs, but in ways that permit them to wage a single MTW while using the remainder to handle lesser conflicts and carry out smaller crisis interventions. If this standard were applied to sizing S&R forces, DOD presumably would create enough forces for two-MTW-size S&R missions. But it would enjoy the flexibility to use them for a wide range of lesser contingencies, while always holding an S&R capability for a single MTW in reserve.

Would this amount of forces be about right, or too much, or too little? Nobody knows the answer because nobody can predict the future. Ten years ago, few people could have imagined U.S. military forces performing S&R duties in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq at the same time. What can be said is that no analytical standard will be able to identify a single point of requirements above which safety and success are ensured, and below which insecurity and failure are guaranteed. Compared to today’s minimal posture, more S&R forces will always be better, and fewer forces, always worse. The real issue is one of confidence levels: How much capability and insurance does the United States want to possess in an uncertain world where S&R situations seem to be proliferating?

In the past, DOD has normally tried to answer this question by investing in additional assets to the point where the so-called “knee of curve” is reached on a curve of diminishing marginal returns. This is the point where additional investments provide only small incremental returns that presumably are not worth the added expenses, and where the marginal costs thus exceed the marginal benefits. If the knee-of-curve standard is applied to S&R sizing, it might suffice as a general yardstick. But finding where the knee of the curve resides in the S&R world is a complicated matter. Will a two-MTW S&R force fall at the knee of the curve? Will creating it be worth the possible tradeoff of having to sacrifice some combat forces? These are questions for analysts to address and decision-makers to contemplate.
The issue of force-design is no less important. Even if the U.S. military possess enough S&R forces in aggregate, it can fail to perform key S&R missions if these forces do not possess the proper assets and capabilities. S&R missions typically require that a number of different tasks be performed. The U.S. forces deployed must have enough assets in each category to perform all of these tasks at the required level of intensity. S&R situations, moreover, do not come in a single mode. Indeed, they can generate a wide range of differing force requirements. Whereas one mission might place a premium on disarming a defeated enemy military as part of war-termination, another mission may call for controlling massive immigration and feeding a desperate population. Still another situation might call for U.S. forces to suppress looters, rebuild bridges and buildings, restore electrical power and plumbing, and reconstitute a local police force. The great variety of such situations suggests that S&R forces should have a wide range of assets, and should possess the flexible capacity to be packaged and repackaged in different ways attuned to the shifting needs at hand.

This need for flexibility and diversity can have an elevating effect on force requirements because of the requirement for multiple modular packages, each of which itself must be sized for adequacy. For example, the U.S. military must possess enough military police, construction engineers, and civil affairs experts. The act of adding up potential needs in each of these categories can elevate total force requirements above what normally might seem adequate. In any event, a more fundamental truth applies: The United States likely will be better off with a medium-size S&R posture that has a sensible internal mix of assets than with a large S&R posture that lacks the necessary array of diverse, well-prepared, and properly balanced assets. The bottom line is that effective force sizing and force design both matter in equally important ways that affect each other. If they are to be performed properly, both require well-construed analytical standards of the sort that an appraisal of potential scenarios can help bring to life.

**Strategic Sources of S&R Scenarios**

S&R scenarios may gain frequency owing to changes taking place in global security and economic affairs. As many observers have noted, globalization and other information-era dynamics are altering the modern world and creating fast-paced transformations toward unclear destinations. A decade ago, a common hope was that an era of growing prosperity and tranquility lay ahead, but the post-Cold War world has proven to be chaotic and dangerous in surprising ways. The result has been a growing
number of situations requiring the use of U.S. military forces. Today’s world can be divided into three separate zones, as visualized in figure 4.

The first zone is the “democratic core,” which includes the wealthy democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia plus parts of Latin America. For the most part, this zone is not only democratic, but also prosperous and secure. Composed of about 1.8 billion people and possessing about 70 percent of the world’s wealth, this zone is a major beneficiary of globalization, new-era regional security affairs, and other positive trends. The second zone is the “transitional zone.” Numbering over 2 billion people, this zone includes China, India, Russia, and other key parts of Central Asia and Asia. While this zone is not wealthy or fully democratic, many of its countries are making steady progress toward prosperous market economies and representative governments.

Figure 4. Today’s World
The third zone is the outlying “endangered zone,” which is profiting from neither globalization nor new-era security affairs. Straddling the “southern strategic arc of instability” from the Balkans to the East Asia littoral, this zone includes much of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa plus pockets of instability elsewhere. It totals about 2 billion people. While countries and regions there differ appreciably from each other, they have in common great chaos, turbulence, and instability. Many countries there pose no military threats to their neighbors, but this zone houses most of today’s failing states, ethnic rivalries, rogue states, tyrants, terrorists and WMD proliferators. Future S&R scenarios come from this zone.

**Preliminary Insights from Twelve Illustrative Scenarios**

Obviously the continuing occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, which could last for some time, will have implications for U.S. force needs in the S&R arena. But other contingencies also could erupt as the future unfolds. Total requirements for S&R forces will depend upon decisions regarding whether and to what degree the United States should be prepared for simultaneous contingencies. But in equally important ways, they also will depend upon the requirements posed by individual contingencies. Scenario analysis can help shed insights on such demands. The twelve scenarios considered here include S&R missions in the Middle East (Iran, Syria, and Yemen), Asia (North Korea and Indonesia), South Asia (Pakistan), the Caucasus (Georgia), North Africa (Libya), Sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia and Sudan), and Latin America (Colombia and Cuba). These are not the only countries that could be considered, but they form a representative sample of the total. Key features of these countries are noted in table 2.

By comparison, Iraq has 22 million people, a per capita income (PCI) of about $2,500, a desert climate, and 375,000 troops under arms. Afghanistan has 23 million people, and Bosnia about 4 million people. At its peak, the operation in Bosnia required commitment of approximately 20,000 U.S. personnel, supplemented by 40,000 troops from our NATO allies. Over time, it settled down to become a brigade-size operation for the United States. Iraq turned out to be a large S&R operation. But it is a country of only 22 million, and if a special S&R force had been deployed there, it likely would be division-size. For these reasons, Iraq is best interpreted as a medium-size S&R operation: for example, smaller than what could be needed in Iran or other large countries.

S&R scenarios in these countries are purely hypothetical and have been chosen to illustrate the wide range of geographic diversity and unique
characteristics that would be encountered. While Syria and Yemen are smaller than Iraq, Iran is three times as populous. Its combination of a large population and an Islamic culture could make an S&R mission there highly demanding. An S&R mission in North Korea, after state failure, presumably would be aided by South Korean troops, yet would be demanding for reasons of its own: a large military to be disarmed, a destitute economy, and a stultified society. An intervention in Indonesia most likely would be conducted for humanitarian purposes at the request of the government, but could encounter local resistance, and the large size of the population could create sizable demands on S&R forces if large portions of the country required American assistance. An S&R mission in Pakistan presumably would be a byproduct of chaos caused by collapse of governmental control or an outgrowth of an Indo-Pakistani war.

An S&R mission in Georgia—a small country—is a surrogate for a larger number of scenarios that could take place in the Caucasus or Central Asia. For Africa, Liberia serves as a surrogate for S&R scenarios in a number of small West African countries that can be accessed by the sea. By contrast, Sudan is an East African country that is far harder to access, and it has more people than Iraq. In the western hemisphere, the scenarios of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Terrain</th>
<th>Military Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>$6,200</td>
<td>Jungle/Mountains</td>
<td>158,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>Mountains/Plains</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Jungle/Forests</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Jungle</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Mountains/Plains</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>112,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
S&R missions in Colombia and Cuba presumably would occur for different reasons. Intervention in Colombia, a large country of 48 million, presumably would be an outgrowth of drug-trafficking issues and at the request of the Colombian government. A Cuban S&R mission might take place if the communist government collapses.

The exact degree of difficulty encountered by U.S. forces is a variable, not a constant, and would depend upon the situation of the moment. S&R missions in Islamic countries (that is, seven of the countries on this list) could be quite difficult for reasons of culture and religion alone. Interventions in small countries outside the Middle East (for example, Georgia or Colombia) could be easier because the culture is more receptive to Western values. Intervention in a chaotic Pakistan could be extremely difficult. But even this scenario would be less demanding than two much larger scenarios not considered here because they are so implausible: a big S&R mission in South Asia after an Indo-Pakistan nuclear war, or an S&R mission in China. In any event, none of these scenarios would be pushovers: all would require serious force preparations.

The countries range in size: three are large, five are medium-size, and four are small. Their economies are mostly poor, but vary from Middle Eastern countries with PCIs of $6,000 or so to poverty-stricken countries with PCIs of $2,000 or less. Their terrain conditions also vary greatly, ranging from deserts to jungles, with few offering established infrastructures of roads and rail similar to Europe. Their military forces also vary considerably in size, but North Korea aside, none are modern powerhouses. Yet most of them possess ample weapons and trained military people to carry out guerrilla warfare against U.S. forces.

Thus, a key judgment advanced here is that there is no standard model of an S&R scenario upon which to base U.S. force planning. Instead, U.S. force plans will need to consider a wide spectrum of scenarios that vary greatly in the environments that they create. Moreover, there is no standard model of how an S&R scenario might unfold in its operational characteristics. In each of these countries, an S&R mission could range from a relatively short and simple enterprise to one that is long and difficult. Much would depend upon the situation that gave rise to war and intervention and on the political-military conditions when U.S. S&R forces arrive. For example, it is possible to imagine U.S. forces intervening in Cuba to restore order following collapse of Castro’s government, and being welcomed as liberators. It also is possible to imagine U.S. forces encountering a hotly unstable situation and being treated as hated invaders. The same
applies to most of these countries. This observation reinforces the judgment that U.S. forces for S&R missions should be highly flexible and adaptable, capable of handling a broad spectrum of challenges and operating environments. The United States should not only be prepared for S&R missions in a wide variety of countries of differing sizes and conditions, but should also be prepared to intervene in each country in a variety of different ways, depending upon the conditions of the moment.

Together, these scenarios suggest that requirements are heavily a function of two primary variables: 1) The magnitude of the S&R operation that must be mounted, which is largely determined by the size of the country being occupied, and 2) The difficulties encountered in carrying out the operation. As figure 5 shows, targeted countries come in small, medium, and large sizes. Likewise, operations can be easy, or moderately difficult, or very difficult. Force requirements will grow as the size of the country and the difficulty of occupying it increase. Conversely, the capability of any given posture will decline as the degree of difficulty grows. The distance between requirements and capabilities measures a gap in U.S. preparations.

Operating conditions can vary widely not only from country to country, but within a single country. Operating conditions among and within many countries are products of multiple contributing variables.

Figure 5. **Key Determinants of Force Requirements for S&R Missions**
that interact. Their effect is to reinforce the judgment that operating conditions can vary across a wide spectrum:

The characteristics of the country can matter. An occupied country with a prosperous economy, an integrated society, and a functioning administrative structure will be easier to stabilize and reconstruct than a country that is poverty-stricken, socially chaotic, and poorly governed. Likewise, a country that has been only moderately damaged by the war will be easier to handle than a country that has been badly damaged. A well-off country will require fewer U.S. forces than a weak, destroyed country.

The degree to which peace and security already exist also matters. A country that is already peaceful and accepting of U.S. occupation will be easier to handle than a country in which wartime fighting is ongoing, anti-American violence is endemic, and the entire population faces fears about safety and security. Ethnic strife is a key factor determining security. If ethnic groups or rival factions are waging war against each other, this will create very difficult conditions for U.S. forces. A secure setting reduces U.S. force requirements; an insecure setting elevates them.

The ambitiousness of U.S. goals is a key consideration. An S&R operation can be relatively easy to carry out if U.S. goals are modest: for example, only to restore peace and a functioning government. But if the goal is to reconstruct a badly damaged economy and to replace authoritarian rule with a functioning democracy, the S&R mission can be considerably more demanding. The more ambitious the U.S. goals, the greater will be S&R force requirements.

The nature of the S&R tasks to be performed is important. One security task is to disarm an enemy military and take possession of WMD; another is to suppress local opposition and guerilla attacks; a third is to establish policing and law-enforcement functions. Economic tasks include rebuilding damaged roads, rail lines, bridges, buildings and telecommunications; restoring electrical power grids, health services, and sewage; and creating the conditions under which markets can function in ways that permit a country-wide flow of goods and services. Political tasks include dismantling authoritarian institutions, restoring normal administrative functions (such as schools, welfare payments, and public information), writing a new constitution, organizing elections, and creating new or reconfigured government departments. As the number of tasks to be performed grows, and as the demanding nature of each of them rises, U.S. force requirements also grow.
The nature of the terrain and communications infrastructure matter in the force calculus. Desert climates with existing roads (for example, Iraq) mean that U.S. military forces can travel by truck and other ground vehicles. Jungle terrain (for example, Colombia) with few roads means that U.S. forces will need to use helicopters and boats on rivers. This has implications for the type of S&R forces deployed to a country, especially the need for military aviation units.

The presence or absence of competent allies is a key consideration. When competent allied military forces are deployed to perform S&R functions, U.S. force requirements decrease. Also important is whether the occupied country’s own military forces can be used for S&R missions. After the United States occupied Iraq, it promptly dissolved the professional Iraqi Army. The decision was made necessary by exigent circumstances, but it meant that units of that army could not be used in the S&R mission. The same applied to Iraqi police forces, which dissolved on their own. The effect was to confront the United States with a lengthy process of rebuilding.

Accompaniment by U.S. combat forces may be necessary. If sizable combat forces are present, they can perform key security functions. If not, S&R forces will have to perform them, thereby elevating requirements. The duration of the intervention is a key factor in determining U.S. force requirements. A brief occupation of three to six months can be performed by the forces sent in the initial stages. But longer durations are the rule and will require rotation of forces by individual or unit replacement policies. A two-year occupation, for example, could require rotating forces fully four times. Some units might have to deploy to the country twice.

Other variables can enter the equation directly or indirectly. These factors include: the motivations of neighboring states, the presence or absence of internal ethnic or tribal conflict, local attitudes toward the U.S. military, and the presence or absence of strategic consent to the S&R process. These variables can make an S&R operation either more or less difficult.

Using Decision Trees to Gauge Force Requirements

Requirements for S&R missions thus must take into account the unique features of each individual country. Because so many variables must be considered, moreover, the act of gauging force requirements is not an exercise in single-point calculations. For any single country, requirements could range across a wide spectrum depending upon the situation encountered. Decision trees that employ branches and sequels can help scope the range of potential requirements. Figure 6, for example, employs one chance
node (the degree of difficulty facing the operation) and one decision node (ambitiousness of U.S. goals and multiplicity of S&R tasks) to display nine different branches, and a resulting range of requirements from 2,000 to 20,000 troops.

An analysis of potential requirements for all twelve countries could get quite complicated. It could require filling in fully 108 cells of a matrix (twelve countries multiplied by nine branches for each country). Once requirements for individual countries are calculated, multiple contingencies must then be considered. For these twelve countries, two concurrent contingencies could occur in fully 132 different ways, and three contingencies could happen in 1,320 ways.

Complex, full-spectrum calculations of this sort are best left to the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders. Some simplifying observations, however, can be offered. Figure 7 provides an initial best-estimate portrayal of the size and likely conditions for each scenario. Together, these scenarios cover the strategic space with clustering in the middle: medium-sized countries presenting moderately difficult or worse conditions.

As a general rule, concurrent S&R contingencies are likely to come in varying doses, requiring either a brigade-size S&R team of joint forces...
(4,000–5,000 troops) for a small contingency in moderately difficult conditions, or a division-size team (12,000–15,000) for a medium-size contingency, or two division-equivalents (20,000–30,000) for a large contingency, or a full corps of three to four divisions (45,000–90,000) for a very large contingency. Using these planning factors, table 3 shows how aggregate force requirements for multiple contingencies can vary greatly as a function of the number of contingencies and the characteristics of each.

Table 3: **Dedicated S&R Force Requirements for Multiple Contingencies (Illustrative)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contingency</th>
<th>Personnel Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two small contingencies</td>
<td>5,000 + 5,000 = 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three small contingencies</td>
<td>5,000 + 5,000 + 5,000 = 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One small, one medium contingency</td>
<td>5,000 + 15,000 = 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two medium contingencies</td>
<td>15,000 + 15,000 = 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One small, two medium contingencies</td>
<td>5,000 +15,000 + 15,000 = 35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One medium, one large contingency</td>
<td>15,000 + 30,000 = 45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two large contingencies</td>
<td>30,000 + 30,000 = 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two very large contingencies</td>
<td>60,000 + 60,000 = 120,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Employing Force Structure Options to Gauge Capabilities

A simplified approach to gauging requirements and priorities is first to identify a spectrum of options for S&R force-sizing, then to determine what aggregate capabilities each option would provide, and then to offer judgments about the level of confidence that each option would provide. While all options should be posed in terms of joint forces involving some air and naval assets, most S&R missions will be dominated by ground forces (Army and Marine Corps). The following four options employ ground units as the measure of merit to arrive at aggregate capabilities:

- Brigade-size S&R Force: Can handle one small contingency.
- Division-size Force: One medium event or three small events.
- Two division-equivalents: One large event, or two medium events.
- Corps of 3–4 division-equivalents: One very large event or two large events.

Given the complexity of the subject, it is impossible to judge any of these options adequate or inadequate. What these options provide are ascending levels of capability, and thus a growing capacity to cover the “strategic space” of potential requirements. Figure 8 helps illuminate this relationship by showing, illustratively, how much coverage of strategic space is provided by each option. The force performance line measures the capability of each option; above the line is a remaining zone of risk, which shrinks as the postures grow larger. In essence, all options leave a measure of risk, but progressively bigger options enlarge the coverage of strategic requirements and reduce the remaining risk.

For example, if the U.S. military can field a single S&R division-equivalent, as opposed to one brigade, this will enlarge its capacity to cover the strategic space by providing a capacity to handle a single medium-size contingency at moderate difficulty (for example, Iraq) or a number of smaller events. By comparison, a second division-equivalent would further enlarge the zone of coverage by providing a capacity to handle two medium-size events at moderate difficulty (see dashed lines to this force and associated capability). Two division-equivalents would ensure that U.S. capabilities could not be overpowered by concurrent contingencies. A corps-size force of three to four division-equivalents would yield greater coverage: for example, the capacity to handle three medium-size (with three division-equivalents) or two large events (with division-equivalents). The result is an even smaller zone of risk. The central issue is this: how much confidence does the United States want in its S&R forces? How much of a price in money and manpower is it willing to pay?
risk is it willing to run in order to avoid the opportunity cost of investing in ever-larger S&R forces?

How do these options stack up in terms of national defense priorities? The circled area on the chart helps answer this question by suggesting a program target for DOD planning that focuses on concurrent contingencies and moderately difficult conditions. In this context, a brigade-size force is a bare minimum but will be too small if tomorrow’s world is as turbulent as today’s. A corps-size force is close to ideal, but may be more than the traffic will bear. A two division-equivalent force would provide a solid range of capabilities and a relatively high level of insurance, including a capacity for medium S&R missions following two MTWs. A force of one division-equivalent could handle a single MTW under moderately demanding conditions and would provide moderate insurance.

The bottom line is this: if the traffic will bear two division-equivalent S&R commands, fine. If not, one division-equivalent S&R command is a good place to start. Major new capabilities are not created overnight, but instead evolve in phases. DOD could start by seeking to create a brigade-size S&R force quickly in the near-term, then field a full S&R command within the Future Years Defense Plan or sooner. In the longer term, it could
field a second S&R command if the initial effort proved successful, requirements remained high, and the necessary resources were available.

**Designing S&R Capabilities**

Because future contingencies could impose such a diverse array of conditions and unique requirements for capabilities, U.S. forces should have a diverse set of assets capable of performing a wide variety of S&R functions. They should also be modular, flexible, and adaptable so that they can be combined and recombined to create different packages tailored to each situation. While creating such forces is a complicated task that requires detailed planning, table 4 illustrates a notional S&R command that would provide a healthy portfolio of assets for most situations. It contains some combat forces (a Stryker brigade augmented with an attack helicopter battalion) for demanding security tasks. The core forces for the S&R mission are four battalions of military police, construction engineers, civil affairs, medical support, psychological operations, and other assets that commonly are needed for S&R tasks. Total manpower for the S&R forces of the command would be about 11,300 personnel, but combat and logistics combat service support (CSS) assets could elevate the total deployed force to more than 18,000 personnel. This is merely one idea to be taken as a reference point in designing future S&R structures, but it is suggestive of the type of capabilities that often will be needed.

Such an S&R joint command might be organized into three or four brigade-size task forces for S&R missions, a combat brigade, and divisional-level CSS assets. Its S&R brigades could be detached to assist combat divisions or be kept under the S&R command. The command and its brigade-size sub-elements would be equipped with employment concepts tailored to the goals and operations of the S&R mission. A main advantage of this S&R command is that it could perform demanding S&R missions at far less manpower than a force of combat formations that would lack the appropriate numbers and combinations of S&R units. This S&R command is a natural complement to transformed Army forces that focus on high-tech strike operations in expeditionary warfare and whose lean support structures may lack some traditional CSS assets.

Two S&R joint commands not only would double the total assets for S&R missions, they would create additional flexibility and adaptability for tailored commitments. For example, a scenario might call for commitment of only one S&R command, but with six construction engineer battalions. The relevant engineer battalion from the second command could be cross-attached to the first S&R command. Such flexibility would apply
across-the-board for all specific capabilities. A second S&R command also would provide a rotational base when one command is deployed. These S&R commands would be manned mostly by Army troops, but, to the extent they are joint, the Marines could contribute sizable numbers, and the Navy and Air Force could contribute in niche areas. Joint formations, of course, would help add further flexibility and adaptability to S&R forces.

If only one command is deployed, a strong case can be made for having it entirely or mostly composed of active-duty troops in order to ensure prompt deployability. If a second command is deployed, consideration can be given to have it partly structured with RC forces. What should be avoided, however, is an RC S&R command of low readiness, similar to that of today’s National Guard combat divisions. A cadred approach to the second S&R command might provide a workable solution.
For example, 33 percent of its personnel could be active-duty, the other 67 percent, reserve component, but trained at high readiness and legally capable of being called to active duty and deployed quickly. A better model, of course, would be 67 percent active and only 33 percent reserve. But this may be more than the traffic will bear. Regardless of the exact AC/RC mix chosen, the Army’s two fill-out divisions (7th and 24th) could provide active-duty headquarters and developable foundations for one or two S&R commands. The effect would be to elevate the Army to eleven to twelve active division-equivalents: ten combat divisions and one to two S&R commands.

How can such S&R assets be created? While some S&R assets that do not now exist would have to be created, many relevant assets already exist in the Army. Reorganization and reassignment of those assets could help meet emerging S&R requirements. In today’s active Army, many of these units are standard issue in varying amounts to the ten active divisions and four corps. If some assets could be transferred from their parent units, they could be assigned to S&R commands. Whether such a transfer (up to 20 percent of existing assets) can safely take place without unduly damaging the combat readiness of the parent unit is unclear. If this step is prohibited, reserve component formations are an obvious source of assets: Army reserve CS/CSS units and Guard divisions possess sizable numbers of these units. But would they possess adequate readiness? If not, they may have to receive added funds for extra training and equipment, or even be transferred to the active structure, a step that would require funds and manpower.

**Conclusion**

- DOD needs stronger S&R forces, but it also needs analytical standards for determining their size and design.
- Scenario analysis suggests that multiple, different S&R contingencies could occur in future years in all regions and can vary greatly in size and difficulty.
- S&R forces for one medium-size contingency similar to Iraq likely will not be enough. Bigger contingencies than Iraq could occur. Also, multiple contingencies could occur—in fact, are occurring now.
Chapter 4
Organizing for Stabilization and Reconstruction

This chapter describes how DOD can organize to plan and train for stabilization and reconstruction operations to ensure they begin promptly as U.S. forces rout or destroy enemy military capacity. The resultant capability will fill a gap in post-conflict operations that is critical to the new U.S. strategy of preemption and rapid decisive operations. The following proposal builds on the preceding chapters that described past U.S. S&R operations and projected operations that U.S. forces could face in the future.

Under its new transformed strategy, the United States will employ smaller joint force packages equipped with advanced technology weaponry and organized for combat operations that lead to rapid defeat of enemy forces. However, this strategy results in far fewer forces in theater for the critical, labor-intensive business of post-conflict stabilization. To ensure a smooth—ideally, rolling—transition to stabilization and reconstruction, the United States needs to have better capabilities to plan and conduct comprehensive post-conflict operations concurrent with the new style of combat operations. The two operations, combat and post-conflict, are equally important to strategic victory and must be closely integrated, especially in terms of planning, exercising, and adequate resource allocation. In order to execute the post-conflict plan successfully, combatant commanders need a new capability embodied in another joint force specifically tailored and equipped with the requisite technologies to succeed at post-conflict operations.

Background

Recent U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by rapid success in deposing the enemy’s standing military forces.
However, in both theaters U.S. combat forces were required to pursue substantial enemy forces that remained at large at significant cost in terms of local and regional stability. In both cases, a relatively modest-size force, backed by the latest military technology, gained dominant battlefield knowledge and defeated the enemy by bringing lethal firepower to bear promptly on high leverage targets. But when the enemy dispersed, the deployed U.S. force was not prepared to prevent widespread looting, lawlessness, and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, particularly in Iraq. Failure to establish area security concurrent with destruction of enemy control set back plans to restore essential services and emboldened opponents of U.S. occupation.

Current doctrine calls for combat commands to turn to S&R operations once combat operations have subsided. Even in Iraq, S&R operations are performed by combat units augmented with additional civil affairs, military police, engineers, medical, and other critical capabilities. However, these capabilities are brought to the fore only after combat missions are on the ebb or over. That clear-cut operational sequence worked in conflicts that progressed less rapidly and where a much larger force was employed and available for stabilization as combat subsided. It does not work today, because the S&R task has become more critical and the forces and time available to execute it are much constrained.

The requirement to master post-conflict operations, to provide stability, and lay the groundwork for reconstruction of a defeated country, calls for transforming how we organize, plan, and conduct S&R operations. They cannot be deferred until combat operations have been concluded. Plans to defeat the enemy and to initiate S&R operations must be addressed simultaneously as interdependent parts of the overall campaign. Demarcating between combat and post-conflict phases does not reflect what takes place on the ground, where both capabilities are needed simultaneously. The combatant commander needs a distinct post-conflict planning and executing capability, organized to plan and conduct S&R operations alongside combat forces. That organization should be composed of S&R capabilities and not be part of a combat corps or division. It should be a brigade- or division-size unit capable of planning, developing doctrine, and exercising. It should have some combat power so that it can operate autonomously in a post-conflict environment marked by residual, low-level hostilities.
Discussion

The doctrine of relying on combat units for S&R operations as they complete their combat missions served us well in the past, but for rapid decisive operations it is an unsatisfactorily sequential and largely ad hoc approach, too disconnected from combat operations. Combatant commands need a dedicated command, tailored specifically for post-conflict operations, that is readily deployable and available for planning, training and exercising. The operational concept for such a force would be to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently with combat units, moving in to establish control and security as combat units move forward, foreclosing the emergence of lawlessness and anarchy. The most ready forces should be in the active component to overcome the longer lead times required to mobilize and deploy reserve component units. Organizing such a force should not be a major end strength issue, as almost all the capabilities required are present within the existing force structures, either active or reserve.

The new force should be joint. All services have some of the required capabilities in their force structure. However, most of the assets are in the Army, and in some deployment schemes all the elements could be Army. Still, it would be neither practical nor wise to place the entire post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mission on the Army. In light of the long-term rotational requirements, it will be imperative to draw on the resources of all services.

Ideally the new command would be co-located on a single base so that it could engage in frequent integrated training and develop strong, cohesive capabilities. This may be a long-term goal given the cost of relocation. However, to the extent possible, the brigade- or division-level joint command should be located as close as possible to its initial ready forces, and at least one integrated subordinate command should be located close to the joint command.

The proposal is for a flexible but standing high readiness joint force of modular design that is scalable and addresses two key transformational imperatives:

- Integration from the outset of planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into exercise plans and war plans.
- Ensuring that the requisite forces are in place to initiate stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently with the collapse of enemy authority in any locale, a concept we call “rolling stabilization.”
Based on the analysis in previous chapters, two S&R Joint Command (JCOM) forces should be organized to conduct core stabilization and reconstruction operations across a theater of operations. One would be composed primarily of active component (AC) units. The second would be in the Reserve components (RC), but with an active headquarters and active key cadre at the next lower commands (S&R Group).

The S&R JCOM would not require permanently assigned sub-units (at least not initially), except for its immediate subordinate S&R Group headquarters and its special staff. However, specific battalion-equivalent units of each type would be designated as S&R units by priority mission and in operational plans (OPLANS) and must be ready for immediate deployment. Additional units from all services would participate in subsequent rotations and be maintained at appropriate readiness levels for S&R missions.

**Two Alternative Models**

The S&R JCOM could be designed in either of two ways. The first design focuses on theaters where U.S. forces are already present as a result of U.S. combat operations. In such theaters a mature logistics support system and a large number of U.S. combat forces would be in place as the operational-strategic context for post-conflict operations. An S&R JCOM designed for these scenarios would be tailored to current doctrinal methods of logistics support and security protection for rear area operations. That means that the S&R JCOM would rely primarily on external area logistics support, as other non-combat forces do. It could also be given operational control of a modest-size combat force provided by the combatant command, should security remain a concern. This would be typical of deployment following combat operations similar to those in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The second design relates to S&R operations in theaters where U.S. forces are not deployed, as in the case of Haiti in 1994. The S&R JCOM would require its own tailored logistics and combat capability, similar to a combat division, but needing no more than a brigade-size combat force within its organic structure. Unlike other non-combat units, this force would not rely on area support logistics or require attachment of combat forces from the combatant commander, in most situations.

Other factors also bear on which design is appropriate to the particular situation.

Logistical support for the S&R JCOM is a special consideration. Should it be like a combat division with its own organic support command, or like a non-combat unit, plugging into area support groups positioned
across the area of operations? Including organic logistics would make the command less of a burden on the host combat unit. It also would allow more freedom of action in situations where area support is sparse or unreliable. However, adding a logistics command to the S&R JCOM design significantly increases strength requirements (a typical division support command is almost 3,000), adds cost, increases lift requirements, and slows deployment times. Moreover, with many other units still reliant on area support, no economy of effort would be realized by investing in a support command for the S&R JCOM.

The Army will also have to decide whether combat forces should be organic to the S&R JCOM. A full brigade of approximately 3,500 may be required only when deploying as a separate task force, yet having some organic force always available may be wise. Current doctrine calls for a Tactical Combat Force (TCF) to be to placed (usually under operational control or OPCON) with rear area commands only as required and sized appropriately to the mission. In most scenarios the JCOM can expect to have a combat force readily available from in-theater forces. Such a force would be provided to the JCOM by the combatant commander as necessary. If the JCOM has its own TCF it need not worry about availability or responsiveness. However, like the support command, a TCF will increase the JCOM’s cost and deployment times. Perhaps a larger issue will be the steady diversion of staff and commander from S&R matters as the JCOM tends to manning, training, and equipping its TCF.

The need to establish a rotation pattern is another factor in determining whether to invest in dedicated organic combat formations that are necessary only in limited scenarios. If an S&R mission were to last a year or more, sub-units would be subject to unit rotation within six to twelve months. Hence, the S&R JCOM staff must be able to maintain operational effectiveness supported by a system of rotating sub-units, including combat and logistical forces.

The S&R JCOM also must be capable of deploying as a separate Joint Task Force to theaters where conflict has not broken out, or where conflict between combatants other than the United States has taken place. In these scenarios a theater support command would not be in place, and U.S. combat forces would not be present. Therefore, the S&R JCOM commander and staff must be capable of command and control of combat operations as well as logistics operations. When deployed as a separate task force, the S&R JCOM would need to be augmented with a combat force as well as a tailored Area Support Group. The responsible combatant commander
would provide both these assets under current Joint doctrine. The Tactical Combat Force (TCF) included in the task force could be a Marine or Army ground force, or a joint-combined force, supported by Navy and Air Force firepower and all-service special operations forces.

In a combat theater where American forces are present, they would still engage in S&R operations as they do now. Combat forces would provide security and continue combat operations while coordinating S&R operations with S&R JCOM operations within their areas of operation. This could be through direct interface as well as by coordination at the combatant command or Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) level. Although combat forces focus first on combat operations and the S&R JCOM on stabilization and reconstruction operations, they would work in tandem, especially as combat operations begin to subside and stabilization and reconstruction becomes the primary goal. Ultimately, S&R JCOM operations should emerge as the main effort, allowing for earlier redeployment of combat forces.

A notional organization of an S&R JCOM is at figure 10. As the diagram illustrates, the command could deploy with up to four multi-capable S&R Groups and other specialized units. Although scalable, the notional size of the S&R JCOMs would be approximately 11,300 personnel, not including combat forces or support units that would be attached for independent operations as a separately deployed S&R Joint Task Force. In such scenarios the overall S&R force could be as high as 18,200.

S&R JCOM Characteristics

The main characteristics that the proposed S&R JCOM organization adds to U.S. capabilities are:

- Modular in design; scalable in size
- Tailorable to mission requirements
- Digital in C4ISR
- Capable of controlling limited combat operations
- Joint and potentially multinational
- Trained in regional and linguistic expertise
- Embedded with interagency, civil-military, and contractor capabilities
- Responsible to combatant commands for peacetime planning and exercises
- Organized for functionally integrated S&R operations
- Capable of C2 over independent theater operations
The active component S&R JCOM must achieve and sustain a readiness posture equivalent to early-deploying combat forces. The RC S&R JCOM should be deployable within three months of mobilization. The RC command could relieve the AC command on a planned rotation cycle or be employed in a second contingency operation. These requirements justify an AC headquarters for the RC S&R JCOM as well as an active cadre in S&R Group command and staff positions.

Most subordinate S&R units exist in the active and reserve components of the services but must be mission designated and ready to deploy. These units will have other missions as well (most units do); however, when required for training, exercises, or operations, the S&R mission must have priority. As sub-units rotate, the S&R Group headquarters provides for continuity of operations and the integration of efforts across all S&R functions—MPs, CA, medical, engineers, information operations, and other areas. All services, especially the Army, must review mission requirements of existing units and determine if additional units are required in the active structure to meet the S&R requirement. In most cases, current forces should be adequate; these same units are performing the S&R mission in Iraq today, albeit under an ad hoc concept of operations belatedly executed. However, some rebalancing to the AC–RC mix would be necessary.
The S&R JCOM is responsible for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations in coordination with the regional combatant commands, CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM. One S&R JCOM has a representative team embedded at each combatant commander’s headquarters. This team participates in contingency planning and provides the combatant commander’s staff with information on the capabilities and availability of forces for S&R operations. The team feeds back information on requirements to its home headquarters. Subordinate Joint S&R Groups specialize in a particular region and sustain skills in a secondary region to give the JCOM added employment flexibility.

During exercises or preparation for operations, the S&R JCOM commander supports the combatant commander and staff in the development of war plans. He augments his planning team at the combatant command headquarters and participates fully in OPLAN development. He consults the combatant commander on tailoring the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) or other deployment plans so that S&R forces arrive in theater as needed to fit the combatant commander’s overall plan.

The S&R JCOM commander deploys with the combatant commander to the theater of operations with appropriate staff. He is responsible to the combatant commander for employment of Joint S&R Groups or allocation of Groups to subordinate combat commands of the CFLCC, usually at the Army division or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level. He also ensures continuous S&R planning, civil-military interface, force debarkation, acclimatization, operational readiness, coordination with support and security forces, and ultimate employment of S&R Groups. In short, the S&R JCOM commander wears a second hat as the principal advisor on stabilization and reconstruction to the combatant commander, as well as his primary responsibilities as overall commander of S&R forces in theater and source of theater-wide S&R plans. The responsibilities that fall to this joint headquarters require that the commander be a general/flag officer, depending on the force composition and theater, of one to three-star rank.

The S&R JCOM headquarters develops joint and combined doctrine and training standards and is responsible for the training, Manning, and readiness of the force. On a regular basis, the headquarters brings together forces from all services, both active and Reserve components, including the forces needed for initial S&R operations. In addition to interagency partners and representatives from allied militaries, and international and nongovernmental organizations, exercises should include a mix of force capabilities:
- Military Police (Combat Support, Internment/Relocation Units and Criminal Investigators)
- Civil Affairs
- Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
- Medical
- Engineer (Combat Support and Construction)
- Training and Security Assistance
- Intelligence and Surveillance
- Transport and Support units
- Combat forces of all services and selected Allies
- Interagency Representatives
- EOD and De-mining Units
- WMD detection teams
- Sensitive Site Exploitation teams
- Mortuary Affairs
- Logisticians

Stabilization and reconstruction exercises should be conducted within the context of broader combat exercises to accustom staffs at the theater, joint, service, and interagency levels to devoting resources to post-conflict operations concurrent with the conduct of combat operations. Regular exercises ensure that a basic S&R force capability package always is ready to deploy as part of a contingency operation. Just as important, they ensure that commanders and staffs at all echelons of participation plan for and critically examine post-conflict requirements alongside combat planning.

**Adjustments by Combatant Command and Joint Staffs**

This concept will require some realignment of the combatant command staff. The S&R joint commander would appoint a staff representative to each of the combatant command’s principal staff to plan and coordinate S&R operational requirements. This would be particularly important in the J-2, where the S&R command would have essential elements of information (EEI) in, for example, the area of cultural intelligence. The J-3 would be the logical staff to include the S&R commander’s personal representative as the combatant commander’s principal advisor for S&R operations. The broader J-5 policy focus is another area where the S&R staff would have to invest in personnel capable of planning and coordinating joint staff actions. Other adjustments should be considered.
Combatant commanders and subordinate combat commanders will also have to think differently about war planning and the integration of S&R planners into their headquarters teams. In particular, planners will have to accommodate the flow of troops for S&R operations within a deployment plan that typically is focused on combat forces in the opening weeks of a deployment.

S&R JCOM Headquarters Staffs

As depicted in figure 10, the S&R JCOM headquarters is similar to an Army divisional echelon. Creating them, however, would not require additional divisions. As noted above, most of the required units already exist in either the AC or the RC. Two active S&R JCOM headquarters could be created by reconfiguring existing headquarters or activating new headquarters. One option would be to create the JCOMs by reorganizing the Army’s two active component/Reserve integrated divisions, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as S&R JCOMs; one would be a rapidly deployable active force and the other a fully active headquarters with cadred subordinate commands.

Principal Staff. The principal staff sections of the S&R JCOM would be doctrinal joint staff elements, J-1 through J-6 and J-SOF. The responsibilities for each section would relate to new doctrine for joint S&R operations. A crucial feature of the principal staff is that it must have the normal skills to plan and conduct multifaceted operations, including combat operations of limited size. This means that the J-3 (Operations) staff must include a fire support section. Moreover, all principal staffs should have officers experienced in combat operations, as well as sufficient officers specialized in all stabilization and reconstruction areas of expertise. The J-2 will have not only typical intelligence expertise but unique capabilities to gather and analyze intelligence peculiar to S&R operations: political, ethnic, cultural, religious, social, and economic. Due to this requirement, the J-2 staff should be larger than that of a combat command, and the intelligence battalion will have added capabilities.

Civil-Military Action Cell. The Civil-Military Actions Cell (C–MAC) is envisioned to be especially robust. It will coordinate for the JCOM commander with personnel from international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local and national civilian governments as necessary. Even when the JCOM is not the senior U.S. military command in theater, or when the S&R JCOM is subordinate to a U.S. government civilian representative (for example, a U.S. ambassador), the C–MAC responsibilities for coordinating U.S. military stabilization and
reconstruction support will be far-reaching, multifunctional, and continuous. The C–MAC will also coordinate with other U.S. government agencies operating in theater, serving as the S&R link to interagency support and requirements. Interagency liaisons will be a part of the C–MAC, except for intelligence agency liaisons, which will coordinate directly with the J-2.

**Special Staff Sections.** The special staff section may be as large as the C–MAC. Special staff representatives must include a legal counsel staff, including international law and war crimes counselors. Another special staff will be a Political Advisor (POLAD) section capable of advising the commander on religious and cultural issues as well as political factors. The command will also have appropriate translation technologies and capabilities (oral and written)—not only at the JCOM level but all the way down to front line elements. Other special staffs are those typical of civil affairs operations, such as experts in power plant operations, postal systems, local government administration, judicial affairs, water/waste management, and nuclear energy, among other specialties.

A contracting office and a budgeting section will be particularly critical to S&R JCOM mission duration. These staff sections must have
personnel, funding, and authorization to get permanent reconstruction underway rapidly and decisively. The JCOM can reestablish only immediate and temporary services and infrastructure. Commercial contractors accomplish permanent reconstruction of power grids, road networks, telecommunications, and other infrastructure. For that reason the linkages and staff coordination with civilian contractors is especially crucial. The S&R JCOM must optimize as well as expedite the employment of civilian contractors for reconstruction. Post-conflict S&R operations should be planned and conducted so as to initiate a handoff to civilian agencies in charge of nation-building, commercial reconstruction operations, and local government administration (especially police and judicial functions) as soon as possible. This handoff should mirror the handoff that occurs between combat and S&R forces and should lead to the drawdown of the S&R force as expeditiously as possible.

**Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) Team.** S&R missions might involve the search for weapons of mass destruction or the investigation of war crimes. The SSE team will have to work closely with the command’s intelligence and security forces to locate, secure, and investigate suspect and sensitive sites. The team includes weapons, scientific, or criminal investigators and works closely with other special units, such as Chem/Bio detection teams and military police.

**S&R JCOM Sub-Units**

**The Four S&R Groups.** The core capability of the S&R JCOM resides in four multi-functional S&R Groups composed of: military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical services, and information operations elements. Commanded at the colonel or brigadier level, S&R Groups will conduct operations in sector so as to effect stabilization and reconstruction over an assigned area of responsibility. If that area coincides with the combat AOR of a larger unit (for example, an Army division or Marine Corps MEF), the S&R Group would probably be in direct support of that command. S&R Groups are scaleable and can command all or part of any type unit, depending on the situation. For small-scale operations, an S&R Group can be task organized to deploy by itself as an S&R Task Force.

**Regional and linguistic expertise.** Regional and linguistic skills are most important for the S&R Group headquarters staffs. In addition, translation technologies will be critical to training, and equipment investment, and readiness criterion. Each of the four subordinate S&R Group headquarters of a JCOM will specialize in a geographical region, similar to the practice of U.S. Army Special Forces Groups, with each S&R
Group being designated as having one primary and one back-up region of expertise. Regional expertise must also be closely integrated with cultural intelligence gathering so that regional knowledge grows over time to form a sound basis for informed planning and operations.

**Group Headquarters.** The Joint S&R Group HQ is organized around the basic structure of a brigade-level headquarters staff, with primary staff sections capable of planning and executing operations for all types of subordinate units, including logistics support, force protection, intelligence, and personnel management. One option for organizing four Joint S&R Group HQs from existing resources is to select an MP, Engineer, Medical and CA brigade headquarters to transform into a Joint S&R Group HQs. This would afford the JCOM commander a senior officer in each functional area who can advise the JCOM on matters such as training, personnel readiness, logistics, and equipment that are particular to each function. Each Group must have integrated capabilities across all S&R missions and functions.

**Composite MP Battalion.** The MP battalion is a composite battalion consisting primarily of combat support MPs, plus some internment and resettlement MPs. In addition, each battalion includes criminal investigation teams to deal with the potential for criminalized power structures and organized crime.

**CA Battalion.** The CA battalion provides general CA expertise at the local level, such as government administration and services plus basic infrastructure operations expertise. Although these missions are analogous to current CA missions the battalion’s future operations will be more closely integrated with other units and new operational concepts for CA will be needed.

**Construction Engineer Battalion.** The Engineer battalion’s primary mission is reconstruction of basic infrastructure. These missions call for construction engineers. Combat engineers also have capabilities that could be utilized. Engineer battalions could be composites of existing units.

**Area Medical Battalion.** The medical battalion is similar to a U.S. Army Area Support Medical Battalion. Its primary missions are humanitarian assistance, indigenous emergency/first responder medical training, food and water decontamination, and other health services.

**Training and Security Assistance (TSA) Battalion.** This is a new unit concept with a unique and crucial mission: to work with local security authorities to rebuild the national and local police forces and to train and operationalize a reconstituted national military. In these missions the
TSA battalion will work closely with the SF battalion, but its tasks would last longer. Ideally, the TSA battalion will contain a large cohort of senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), junior officers, and qualified police instructors.

**Combat Support Aviation and Medium Truck Battalions.** These units will afford the JCOM with the means to transport needed supplies and equipment quickly throughout the operational area without vying for assets needed by combat units. In theaters where U.S. forces are already deployed, resources from combat units might augment these assets. In environments where roads are poor or insecure, helicopter transportation may have to be increased or augmented by larger medium helicopters.

**Signal Communications Battalion.** The model for these units is the 4th Infantry Division (Mech), the Army’s first digitized division. Its digital communications are highly capable internally but have to communicate with many external analog systems. The solution is to employ a “digital bridge” automation suite to link digital and analog systems. Given the importance of the S&R mission to overall success, it is imperative that it be built from the beginning with the most modern communications capabilities. To realize this objective the S&R JCOM will also require a digital bridge element.

**Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Battalion.** The ISR battalion is another unit with unique S&R missions. It should include a counter-intelligence company and robust human intelligence (HUMINT) resources that focus on detection and identification of resistance groups, guerilla operations, and organized criminal elements. It will also need a significant ground, airborne, and communications surveillance capability. Because the operating concept for the S&R JCOM is to employ its relatively small force to maximum effectiveness, knowing where enemy elements and potential risks are emerging is crucial. Technology will offer force multipliers in UAVs, communications intercept, and advanced unattended sensors. These systems will afford early detection of threats to pipelines or power stations, for example, without the need for a large security force. Sophisticated all-weather cameras should also be in the battalion equipment list.

The most unique capability of the ISR battalion will be its focus on “cultural intelligence” issues—religious, political, ethnic—as much as overt security risks. The ISR battalion will also work closely with the MP battalion’s criminal investigators as well as Group and JCOM staffs to analyze information in the area of criminal intelligence.
**Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Battalion.** A battalion-size EOD unit is recommended for the S&R JCOM because it may be responsible for overseeing rapid and multifaceted EOD operations. EOD teams will work closely with other JCOM forces, especially the MPs and engineer elements, to advise and conduct EOD operations. These will include bomb disposal, unexploded ordnance removal, weapons collection and disposal, and mine clearing (roads, ports, etc.) and minefield removal. In some geographical areas, such as where opening harbors is critical to reconstruction, the EOD battalion may need augmentation by Navy underwater EOD teams.

**Special Forces Battalion.** An Army Special Forces battalion or comparable Marine unit should be under the operational control of the S&R JCOM in order to develop the local situation and begin to rebuild selected indigenous security capabilities. The SF battalion will have special cultural and language skills that will help them embed their teams in the local population, determine their security force potential, and take steps to reestablish order. In longer-term S&R operations, the continuous inclusion of an SF battalion in the JCOM may not be necessary.

**Tactical Combat Force (TCF).** When deployed as a separate joint task force, the S&R JCOM will include a TCF to provide military security beyond the capabilities of the assigned MP battalions. The TCF would be tailored to the operational environment. It could be a Stryker brigade or a light or heavy infantry brigade task force. The size of the TCF will depend on the enemy situation. In some situations the TCF could be a division or larger size force. In those cases, a higher JTF headquarters could be deployed, with the S&R JCOM as one subordinate command and the TCF as a separate command.

**Area Support Group (ASG).** The ASG’s tailorable organization and support concept is consistent with prevailing Army doctrine. It includes an Area Support Battalion (ASB) for each S&R Group capable of providing supplies and services. The medical battalion (including an air ambulance detachment) mission is to support the medical needs of the command while the medical battalions of the S&R Groups provide civilian medical support. The transport battalion mission is to provide all transport needs of the JCOM, including fuel, water, and bulk cargo. Other units are tailored under the ASG as required.

**S&R Stockage Requirements.** The S&R JCOM logistics concept should encompass the establishment of pre-packed and/or pre-positioned stocks of emergency equipment, in particular, a requisite fleet of power
generators, water purifiers, pipeline, fuel storage, bridging, shelters, and other stocks that will be in urgent demand as conflict abates. These stocks must be readily transportable and either pre-positioned or sent forward early to be available to lead S&R forces.

**S&R JCOM Concepts of Employment**

The S&R JCOM employment context and concepts are summarized below.

**Strategic Employment Context.** The United States deploys highly flexible, maneuverable JTFs composed of smaller, lighter but, more lethal high-tech combat forces to conduct counterforce operations rapidly. The JTF’s area occupation capabilities are limited. Therefore, an S&R JCOM deploys with the combat forces and operates in close coordination to take over rapidly from advancing combat forces as the battle progresses.

**S&R JCOM Ops Employment Concept.** U.S. combatant commands integrate S&R JCOM elements in the combat force deployment flow so they are in position to take immediate control of liberated areas. S&R JCOM establishes stability and begins initial infrastructure reconstruction under the JTF or its land component command. An S&R JCOM is supported and sustained by the JTF Theater Support Command. S&R JCOM security needs are met by main JTF combat forces. S&R JCOM can also deploy as a separate JTF, with its own security and support force augmentation.

**S&R JCOM Tactical Employment Concept.** An S&R JCOM is organized with four subordinate JTF commands—combined capabilities teams capable of area/sector stabilization and reconstruction—supported by S&R JCOM and JTF assets. Subordinate Joint S&R Groups are normally OPCON to combat commands in assigned sectors, but may operate under overall S&R JCOM control, depending on the combatant commander’s scheme of maneuver.

**Conclusions**

- There is a pressing need for transforming the way the U.S. military organizes for stabilization and reconstruction operations from a secondary, separate, and ad hoc operation into a co-equal operation in tandem with combat.
- The concept described above provides the outline of an urgently needed capability. It ensures that there is a capable staff that can integrate into the combatant commander’s headquarters to plan stabilization and reconstruction operations and to manage the training and readiness of the forces. It also ensures that a significant pool of forces needed for S&R
operations is well-trained, appropriately organized, and ready to deploy on timelines similar to combat forces.

- The modular nature of the proposed joint organization provides the flexibility to generate virtually any S&R force package with the scale, configuration, and readiness posture appropriate to any contingency.
Post-conflict operations require specialized forces that are just as ready to deploy as combat forces. If the United States has been engaged in combat, the security and support required for S&R operations will already be in theater as components of the fighting forces. These forces would shift to providing security and support to post-conflict missions and work with other forces (for example, civil affairs units) specialized in post-conflict operations. If U.S. forces are not present, a post-conflict joint task force must be constituted and must include its own sustainment and security forces.

Although S&R operations will include forces from all services in operational, critical support, or security enforcement roles, the predominant force requirements are for land component forces and fall on the Army. Based on recent experience and the expected duration of future missions, several critical Army capabilities are insufficient in the active component. The most salient active force shortfall has been in civil affairs, followed by military police, engineers, medical, and psychological operations units. In rebalancing the force, more of these capabilities should be in the active force, and should be organized in a structure specially designed for S&R operations.

This chapter identifies current units of the four services that constitute specific capabilities for S&R operations. Almost all of the core S&R forces are in the Army. However, all services are examined to address the full support capability of the U.S. military for these operations. Typically, S&R operations last months or even years longer than combat operations. That fact increases the demand for these units in terms of rotation policies commensurate with an all-volunteer force, as well as the reality that these
units are not solely for S&R operations but have essential combat support and combat service support roles as well.

**Background**

Immediate post-conflict requirements in any scenario include both stabilization operations and reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure. Stabilization involves the immediate establishment of positive control over activities in areas occupied by U.S. forces. Law and order is the most important requirement, including the prevention of looting and other crimes against population and property.

Without reconstruction there will be no enduring stability. Military units must be able to engage simultaneously in restoration of order and limited immediate reconstruction of essential infrastructure. For example, military resources can rapidly restore power generation to key facilities, such as hospitals, using military generators. Military engineers can rebuild selected roads and maintain them for basic use for a limited time. However, it is important to emphasize that these measures are only expedient fixes both in quantity and quality. Permanent reconstruction of roads, pipelines, power grids, and other infrastructure requires expert contractors. Construction contractors should come in on the heels of the S&R force and begin work in a coordinated fashion towards permanent reconstruction.

Stabilization and reconstruction tasks have historically been performed by combat forces in theater when major combat operations ended. But combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were carried out with smaller, high-tech forces in rapid counterforce operations against an enemy that was modest in size but difficult to fix and destroy. Smaller U.S. combat forces have fewer troops to divert from combat to immediate S&R operations. Without that capability, unrest and disorder are inevitable. The United States needs to consider reorganizing military forces to address the gap in capabilities that has opened with the move toward expeditionary warfare. One analytical step is to identify what types of units are needed to perform S&R missions and determine where these units are in the AC/RC structure.

**Discussion**

**Two Types of Stabilization and Reconstruction Scenarios**

There are two broad classes of scenarios under which the United States might deploy S&R forces.
One scenario occurs when the United States has been engaged in
combat operations and needs S&R forces to flow in immediately, even be-
fore combat operations completely subside.

In this environment the S&R force would be slimmed down, com-
prising only those assets needed to conduct stabilization operations. The
reason for this is that the military theater logistics and security infrastruc-
ture will already be in place. The Theater Support Command can readily
include support for stabilization forces alongside combat forces in its the-
ater concept of area support logistics operations. As operations transition
from combat to post-conflict, theater support and services are maintained
and tailored to the requirements of the post-conflict forces, increasingly
stabilization forces but with requisite combat forces. Operation Iraqi Free-
dom is an example of this scenario.

The second scenario occurs when the United States deploys for S&R
operations to a theater where either hostilities have not broken out or an
earlier conflict did not involve U.S. combat forces and no U.S. logistics
support forces or combat forces are on the ground.

In this scenario the deploying S&R force must be further task or-
ganized to include requisite support elements to provide all classes of
supply, service and transport. It will also require an appropriate security
force composed of at least light combat forces beyond its organic military
police units. Depending on the situation, either the S&R force com-
mander or the combat force commander would be designated the overall
task force commander.

These two basic scenarios drive the following inventory groups and
methodology.

**Inventory of U.S. Forces Available for S&R Operations**

The inventory below is broken into three force groups indicated by
unit type. The first group lists core S&R units. The second identifies serv-
ice/support units required for S&R operations. The third shows combat
forces that might be needed to ensure security for an S&R operation when
U.S. combat forces are not already in theater. Each group is divided into
active and Reserve component assets.

Assets that are organic to a larger committed unit (truck companies,
lift helicopters, etc.) are not listed separately from the parent organization.
These assets are not really available for external missions but are essential
to the unit’s ability to perform its own mission. Hence, there will be a lot
of equipment in theater dedicated to support of U.S. (and sometimes al-
lied) forces that is suited to S&R operations.
Unit Types

Core Stabilization and Reconstruction Force Units
- Civil Affairs Battalions
- Engineer Battalions
- Military Police Battalions
- PSYOP Groups
- Medical Battalions

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Support and Services Units
- Joint/Combined Command and Control HQs
- Aviation Brigades (Lift)
- Theater Support Commands
- Sealift
- Corps Support Groups/Commands
- Airlift
- Transportation Groups/Commands
- Airborne ISR (including UAVs)
- Quartermaster Groups
- Security Force Units
- Signal Brigades/Commands

Combat Units
- Combat Divisions
- Attack Aviation Brigades
- Infantry Stryker Brigades
- Air Defense Brigades
- Separate Combat Brigades
- Military Intelligence Brigades
- Heavy/Light Armored Cavalry Regiments
- Air Force Close Air Support
- Artillery Brigades
- Naval Air/Surface Fire Support

Core Units Required for S&R JCOM

The left-hand column of table 4 shows the numbers and types of units required to constitute the two S&R JCOM sub-units, one composed of active and one of RC units, as proposed in chapter 4. The right-hand column shows the number of units in the Army AC/RC structure above division level. Similar units in the other services should also be considered, especially for multiple rotations.

The comparison between units in the structure and what is required to organize the proposed structure is important for several reasons. First, numbers alone do not tell us if there are ample units available to populate the proposed commands.

All units, active and reserve, have specific missions within approved national security OPLANS. The services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress have reviewed these requirements. Whether current assets are adequate to create S&R JCOM capabilities can only be determined by an analysis of the impact on existing missions, some of which are exactly the S&R missions being proposed for the new commands. More forces of some types may be needed, even though adding force structure and increasing end strength is recognized as costly and must be closely examined. Although current forces are stretched thin now, bringing more...
units into the active structure has to be justified based on future requirements. Prominent among them will be long running S&R operations, from small scale contingencies, such as Panama, to large operations, such as Iraq. In short, the S&R mission may warrant more active S&R forces of some types than are now available.

Finally, most relevant units from both the active and Reserve components have performed S&R operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as one of their current missions. Therefore, reorganizing them under an S&R JCOM is both a force management issue and an end strength and force structure issue of rebalancing the active and reserve forces. The Army and the other services need to examine whether, if this concept is adopted, the units to be mission-tasked to the S&R Command constitute a realignment of existing resources, additional resource requirements, or some of both. Some metrics for examining the adequacy of the on-hand unit types listed above are:

**Military Police.** The requirement is shown for four active and four reserve composite combat support/internment and resettlement battalions augmented with criminal investigation teams (a different organization than exists now—see chapter 4). Far more MP resources than these eight battalions are already in Iraq and Afghanistan, which speaks to the scalability required for planning and conducting large operations. Although the Army has many non-divisional MP battalions in the force (12/14), many deployments other than S&R operations (homeland security, etc.) have increased the demands on these units. MPs from the reserve components are not the most frequently activated units but in recent years

Table 5: **Required and Existing S&R Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proposed AC/RC Bns</th>
<th>Proposed (above division level) AC/RC Bns</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>12/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>1/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Engineers</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>7/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Medical</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>4/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>5/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Security Assistance</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
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</table>
they have been consistently among those in high demand, indicating more are needed in the active force.

Does the United States need a new type of military police capability? The question is outside the scope of this study but deserves serious consideration. Other countries field national police forces (French Gendarmerie, Spanish Guardia Civil, Italian Carabinieri, Dutch Royal Marechaussee) that bridge a gap between their civilian police and their military forces. The United States fills that gap with military police that are organized, trained, and equipped to accompany military units to establish security in environments that range from quiet to hostile. However, they do not focus mainly on civil law enforcement missions, as do the Gendarmerie.

**Civil Affairs Battalions.** The one area where the Army clearly has significant AC limitations is civil affairs. Moreover, experience going back to the Gulf War indicates that civil affairs are an enduring high demand requirement. Moreover, surge requirements are getting longer while periods of low utilizations are shrinking. There is little doubt the trend will continue. Not only does the Army need more active CA units for operations, they also need to be integrated fully with other S&R forces and combat forces during training, exercises, and operations.

**Construction Engineers.** Another group subject to high RC activation rates in recent operations is construction engineers. The Army has a significant number of these units in the RC. However, unless rotation management is a problem, there may be no need to increase the AC contingent of engineers. This is an area where both the Navy and Air Force have units that should be considered as part of the rotation mix for longer-term operations.

**Area Medical Battalion.** As with construction engineers, RC medical units are more in demand than military police in terms of activation for deployment. The numbers above (4/6) indicate that this will be an area of concern for which rotation planning has to be considered. The first recourse should be to draw on other service assets. Another place to look for these types of units is in allied forces, especially those with extensive humanitarian operations experience. Ultimately, the United States may find the best strategy is to employ U.S. medical units early in the post-conflict phase and move quickly to allied or even contractor units.

**Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion.** Indications are these units have the highest recent deployment tempo of all Army units. This is a likely unit type to consider for rebalancing by moving some additional
capability into the active force. A broader issue for analysis is whether DOD needs more of these units overall.

**Training and Security Assistance Battalion.** The mission of this new unit, to train a new indigenous military and police force, is essential to the eventual draw down of U.S. security forces and should begin immediately as combat operations subside. In the past this has been a typical Army Special Forces mission. However, the high demand on SOF units and the greatly increased need for police and military training both argue for creation of a distinctly different capability, one that can gather the remnants of indigenous capabilities and achieve momentum quickly toward a new force. As noted elsewhere, this mission may ultimately be a candidate for contractual solutions. However, that cannot be assumed as either the immediate or the long-term answer without more rigorous analysis of the alternatives. This should be a military unit in the S&R JCOM and a new force structure requirement.

**Foreign Area Officer Expertise Among the Services.** Each of the four services maintains a cohort of officer personnel trained as regional and linguistic experts. The Air Force and Navy programs are developmental and focus on identifying officers who already possess some level of foreign area expertise. The Army program is the oldest and most advanced. The Army program, begun in the 1940s, has been overhauled several times. Since 1996, officers have been able to specialize as Foreign Area Officers (FAO) as a single career track. At present, four years are needed to complete the three-phase FAO qualification regime, which includes language training, an advanced degree in regional studies, and a regional tour. The Marine Corps program is a smaller version of the Army program, as Marine FAO requirements are far fewer.

Army FAOs are organized into nine regions. The regional distribution of FAOs (see table 6) does not reflect a changed security environment. A rebalancing is needed to develop more FAOs with North Africa/Middle East expertise. As with other capabilities, regional expertise should be pursued in all services and not limited to the Army alone. At present there is a serious shortfall across all services, although the Army program provides a good model for the other services to follow.

**Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces in Iraq.** Early data from Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates the availability of S&R force types within current force inventories. U.S. Army data regarding forces in theater on May 1, 2003, the date generally regarded as the transition from major combat operations to post-conflict operations, reveals the Army
forces available for stabilization and reconstruction operations shown in figure 12.

Stabilization and reconstruction forces from the U.S. Army alone were nearly 25 percent of the overall U.S. strength of 150,000, and deployments continued through late June/early July. Other American services and the British contingent also included S&R forces. Planners had seen to it that these forces were in theater or on their way early on. What was lacking was dedicated command and control for the post-conflict mission and plans for the rapid, integrated employment of such forces at likely points of instability. A rolling application of stabilization forces needed to unfold as combat forces removed the control of the Iraqi regime. The immediacy of the stabilization mission meant it could not be handed to combat commanders still engaged in major operations, as had been done in traditional large force operations.

Another important feature of the Army’s S&R in-theater force profile in May 2004 was the large RC contingent, as shown in table 7.

The active component of these resources, in particular engineers, medical, and military police, were organic to combat formations, such as divisions. Following doctrine, they were assigned stabilization missions as secondary to their primary combat support role. Therefore, the major tasks of stabilization and reconstruction were carried primarily by the Reserve component.

This does not necessarily suggest the need for greater troop strength to add S&R forces to the inventory, though force planners may

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>184</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>189</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Africa/Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northeast Asia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
conclude that some adjustment is warranted. Rather, early indications from Operation Iraqi Freedom experience buttress the two main arguments of this paper. First, that dedicated command and control of S&R forces and missions has emerged as an imperative of rapid decisive operations called for by U.S. military strategy. Second, that there is a need to reexamine the balance of active and reserve S&R forces for the future. These are twin arguments to better organize available resources to serve

Figure 11: **U.S. Army S&R Force Types In Theater at the End of Major Combat Operations** (May 1, 2003) Total: 37,350

Table 7: **Reserve Component Contribution to S&R Force Types in Iraq** (May 1, 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percent RC</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Information derived from the Army Mobilization Deployment Information System.
the combatant commander at the point where major combat operations transition into post-conflict operations, when instability threatens success even while commanders continue their focus on combat mission. Organizing, planning, and conducting integrated post-conflict operations for the future require a different approach to the employment of S&R forces already being deployed.

**Conclusions**

This preliminary analysis suggests several conclusions:

- Substantial S&R forces exist in the active and reserve forces, but there are too few active CA and PSYOP units based on the high demand the United States experienced in the 1990s.

- The demand for additional active component medical, intelligence, engineer, mortuary affairs, air traffic control, and military police forces became clear in recent operations. Sustained future demands in all these areas should be examined.

- Rebalancing AC/RC forces is primarily but not exclusively an Army issue. In particular, the Marine Corps which relies on Army CA assets in Iraq has identified the need for more CA and MP units. Making S&R forces truly joint and addressing the issue of long-term operations also requires the Navy and Air Force to examine their assets, particularly in force protection (Shore Police and Air Police), construction engineers, and medical specialties.

- The Army conducted a service-wide trimming of its administrative (non-operational organizations) structure in 1999 and moved many spaces into operational units to bring them up to full strength. Another review may be warranted.

- Some Army support functions or even whole units could be considered for transfer to RC status, conversion to DOD civilian manning, or contracting out to minimize growth in active strength.

- The Army FAO program is well established but needs to be realigned. The other services have not invested adequately in regional expertise.
### Appendix I: Inventory of Core S&R Units

#### Army

**Civil Affairs Battalions/Groups**
- Active Component — 1 CA Battalion
- Reserve — 6 CA Brigades

**Engineer Groups/Brigades**
- Active Component — 5 Combat Engineer Groups/Brigades
- Reserve — 3 Engineer Brigades/Commands
- National Guard — 5 Engineer Brigades/Groups

**Military Police Brigades**
- Active Component — 5 MP Brigades (CBT SUPT)
- Reserve — 2 MP Brigades (I&R), 1 MP Brigade (CBT SUPT)
- National Guard — 3 MP Brigades (CBT SUPT)

**Psychological Operation Groups**
- Active Component — 1 PSYOP Group
- Reserve — 2 PSYOP Groups

**Medical Brigades**
- Active Component — 4 Medical Brigades/Commands
- Reserve — 7 Medical Brigades/Commands

#### Marine Corps
- Two Reserve Civil Affairs Groups; four Reserve Military Police Companies

#### Navy

**Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB)**
- Active Component — 8
- Reserve — 12

**Naval Construction Regiments (NCR)**
- Active Component — 2
- Reserve — 4

#### Air Force

**Air Force Security Forces**
- Many units beyond those organic to active Wings exist in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard

**Air Force Engineer Units**
- Active Component Red Horse Squadrons
- Reserve Component Red Horse Squadrons
Appendix II: S&R Support and Services Units

Army

Theater Support Commands
  Active Component—3 TSC (all at reduced manning)
  Reserve—1 TSC, 3 TSC Augmentations (for Active TSCs)

Corps Support Group/Command
  Active Component—3
  Reserve—1

Transportation Groups/Commands
  Active Component—2 Commands
  Reserve—1 Command/3 Groups
  National Guard—1 Brigade

Quartermaster Groups
  Active Component—1
  Reserve—1
  National Guard—1

Signal Brigades/Commands
  Active Component—11
  Reserve—3
  National Guard—3

Explosive Ordnance Groups
  Active Component—1
  National Guard—1

Aviation Brigades (Lift)
  Active Component—3
  Reserve—1
  National Guard—3

Navy

Sealift
  Active Component—8 Fast Sealift ships and 3 Cargo ships
  Naval Reserve Fleet

Afloat Force Cargo/Prepositioning Ships
  Active Component—39 (supporting all services)
  Reserve—Ready Reserve Force transport ships

Marine Corps

Force Service Support Groups
  Active Component—3 FSSG
  Reserve—1 FSSG
**Air Force**

Support forces include mission support for airlift and airborne platforms for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (including UAVs). The Air Force also must provide Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) personnel to ground units and Airlift Control Element (ALCE) personnel for terminal airport control. Airfield operations, including air traffic and instrumented airspace control, also are required. Finally, the service will have to provide Medical Evacuation aircraft to the operation. Through the Air Force Component of U.S. Transportation Command, Military Airlift Command, the Air Force also is responsible for commercial contract air support.
Appendix III: Combat Units

Army

Combat Divisions
    Active Component—10
    National Guard—8 [Note: under reorganization—new mix of 5 divisions by 2010]

Infantry Stryker Brigades
    Active Component—1 operational ready, 4 others proposed
    National Guard—1 proposed

Separate Combat Brigades
    Active Component—2 INF
    National Guard—1 ARM, 1 INF, 1 Scout Brigade
    Enhanced Readiness NG Brigades—7 LGT INF, 5 MECH INF, 1 ARM, 1 CAV

Heavy/Light Armored Cavalry Regiments
    Component—1 ACR, 1 ACR (LGT)
    National Guard—1 Enhanced Readiness ACR

Artillery Brigades (155mm, MLRS)
    Active Component—6
    National Guard—17

Attack Aviation
    Active Component—3 Brigades (2 battalions each)
    National Guard—2 (3 battalions total)

Air Defense Brigades
    Active Component—5
    National Guard—1

Military Intelligence Brigades
    Component—3
    Reserve—1
    National Guard—1 (linguist)

Navy

Aircraft Carriers (CAS)
    Active Component—13
    Reserve—none

Surface Combatants: cruisers/frigates/destroyers (Naval Gunfire ashore)
    Active Component—27/35/59
    Reserve—none

Patrol Craft (Coastal Security Operations)
    Active Component—13
    Reserve—none [Note: the Navy also operates numerous harbor security boats]
**Marine Corps**

**Marine Divisions**
- Active Component—3 (operationally organized into 3 MEFs and 2 MEBs)
- Reserve—1

**Marine Special Operations Forces**
- Active Component—4 MEB (Anti-Terrorism); 2 Force Reconnaissance Companies; Marine Contingent U.S. Special Operations Command
- Reserve—2 Force Reconnaissance Companies

**Air Force**

Combat units provide close air support to ground security forces and to the stabilization force as required, including suppression of enemy air defense. Platforms that may be called upon include all fighter/attack aircraft, fighter/bomber aircraft, and bombers with PGM capability.
Appendix IV: Two Active Component/National Guard Integrated Divisions
(Activated in June 1999)

7th Infantry Division (Light)
Fort Carson, CO (Forward Element at Fort Polk, LA)

Active Component. Division Headquarters Company (-), about 150 personnel. These personnel are responsible for planning and for coordination of training for subordinate units. Most are also dual slotted in garrison support positions at Fort Carson. For example, the Division Commander is also the installation commander of Fort Carson, and the Division Operations Officer (G-3) is also the post Director of Plans and Training (responsible for range/training area management, budgeting, etc.). Supported Fort Carson AC units include the 3rd ACR, 3rd Brigade, 4th ID, and a battalion of the 10th SF Group.

The AC 7th ID HQ (-) is regarded by subordinate National Guard brigades as a major source of assistance in planning and executing their Enhanced Light Infantry Brigade training.

National Guard. All other division units, including three Enhanced Light Infantry Brigades. [Note: two of these brigades—the 30th and 39th—will deploy to Iraq in 2004 for a year.]

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Fort Riley, KS (Forward Element at Fort Jackson, SC)

Active Component. Division Headquarters Company (-), about 150 personnel. These personnel are responsible for planning and for coordination of training for subordinate units. Most are also dual slotted in garrison support positions at Fort Riley. For example, the Division Commander is also the installation commander of Fort Riley, and the Division Operations Officer (G-3) is also the post Director of Plans and Training (responsible for range/training area management, budgeting, etc.). Supported Fort Riley active units include the 3rd Brigades of both the 1st Armored Division and the 1st ID in Germany.

The AC 24th ID HQ (-) is regarded by subordinate NG brigades as a major source of assistance in planning and executing their Enhanced Mechanized Infantry Brigade training.

National Guard. All other division units, including three Enhanced Mechanized Infantry Brigades.
Chapter 6

Broadening Military Culture

Despite a long history of involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations, the U.S. military has more recently viewed these activities as separate and detracting from its primary warfighting mission. When it has engaged in stabilization and reconstruction operations, the U.S. military often has raised concerns about a prolonged engagement and focused on an exit strategy and on working in parallel with civilian organizations. The result has been an inability to train, equip, and plan for these operations properly. This cultural mindset could reduce the military’s effectiveness in addressing complexity on the battlefield and in adapting to changing situations. Recognizing that any cultural change requires training, education, and clear intent from the leadership, this chapter will focus on the role professional military education can play in adapting military culture and how training can better prepare military personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Background

Since the early 1990s, the U.S. military has resisted prolonged involvement in S&R operations for reasons ranging from concern for the degradation of combat readiness and diversion of limited resources to a belief that these operations are not the role of the military. Military leaders feared that training, equipping, and planning for S&R operations would detract from warfighting capabilities. These concerns stem from Vietnam and were reinforced by problems with peace operations in the 1990s, especially Somalia.

Failure in Somalia had a profound impact on the American military and political psyche: no longer would the United States use the military to do nation-building. In the future, the United States would require clearly stated, achievable objectives before conducting any peace or humanitarian operation, and its role would only be to provide security. Another side
effect of the U.S. experience in Somalia was the growing notion that the military’s primary mission should always be to fight and win the Nation’s wars, rather than become embroiled in difficult, prolonged peace and stability operations. Despite a cultural reluctance to participate in peace and stability operations, the U.S. military found itself doing just that throughout the 1990s, which reinforced antipathy to such operations.

An example of this cultural resistance is the Army’s 2003 decision to close the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, the only DOD organization dedicated to the study of these types of operations, as part of a money-saving initiative. In the wake of the Iraqi operation the decision drew criticism and the institute was reconstituted.

The U.S. military focuses financial and human resources on training and equipping for the warfighting mission. Participation in S&R operations often is seen as diverting limited resources and degrading combat readiness. A unit is required to train to mission essential task lists (METLs).1 Because no METL exists for peace operations, units are prevented from training for these missions until three to four months before deployment. Training, therefore, focuses on core competencies, such as patrolling and crowd control, leaving little time to acquire negotiating skills or learn the cultural or historical context of a missions. For crises that arise rapidly, even less time is available to train troops in the skills needed for stabilization and reconstruction.

In 1999, the Army reported that two of its ten divisions were no longer combat ready to fight in a major theater war because of deployments to peace operations. Unit readiness is in part measured by the number of training hours flown, miles driven, or hours steamed. When a unit is deployed or is training in preparation for deployment to a peace operation, it is unable to hone its combat skills. These measures of readiness do not take into account enhancement of other important skills—small unit action, working with local populations, increased unit cohesion—many of which are important for future S&R and/or major combat operations.

The United States has a long history of conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations, from the Indian Wars in the 19th century to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 21st, and the new strategic environment ensures more such commitments. Military personnel must be properly trained and equipped to engage effectively in these operations. This will require cultural change to overcome resistance to S&R operations. It also will require increased understanding of and ability to adapt
to a highly complex and constantly changing strategic environment. Professional military education can play a central role in both.

Discussion

Not only did Iraq demonstrate the capabilities of a transforming U.S. military, it revealed the need for a new cognitive paradigm for engaging in S&R operations. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have driven home the national security and international political imperatives that became evident after September 11 to build a stable peace in countries torn by conflict and have underscored the importance of establishing security as a prerequisite for political and economic development. More important, it has heralded a new strategic era in which the lines between conflict and peace are blurred and complexity rules the battlefield. Across the board integration of these concepts into professional military education will help prepare military personnel for the new strategic environment while at the same time adapting its military culture for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

New strategic environment

The new strategic environment in which the U.S. military finds itself is simultaneously complex and highly constrained. Any future use of military force will likely occur within a limited war or a military operation other than war, and winning the peace will be as important as winning the war.2 Because S&R operations will likely take place in a politically charged environment, victory on the battlefield could end in strategic failure if political objectives are not achieved. Building a stable peace means addressing the underlying sources of a conflict, not just its symptoms. Complexity will increase with the presence of an array of partners including coalition forces, interagency players, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and local officials. Operations probably will occur in populated urban areas, resulting in greater interaction with local populations and increased demand for interpreters. For local populations and the media, U.S. servicemen will be the face of U.S. policy, so tactical decisions and individual actions can have strategic implications. Current efforts in transforming the U.S. military will further shape this strategic environment. With more agile and dispersed forces, small, independent operations will become the rule rather than the exception.
Concepts of conflict and post-conflict

Traditionally, the United States has considered combat and post-conflict operations as two distinct phases, conceptualized as a linear progression from conflict to post-conflict to peace. As the U.S. experience in Iraq illustrates, however, stabilization and reconstruction operations will likely occur in environments where the mix between conflict and peace shifts back and forth. As one U.S. officer with experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations put it, “it’s not post-conflict when you’re getting shot at.” A more fluid, non-linear concept of conflict must be articulated and incorporated into professional military education.

Interdependence of reconstruction tasks

A stable peace is built on four pillars: security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. Although success in each area depends on the effective integration and interaction across them, security (encompassing both collective and individual security) is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars.3 A country plagued by internally or externally imposed conflict often lacks the mechanisms or institutions to provide for its own security, uphold the rule of law, or address human rights abuses; its government may be nonexistent or too weak to provide services to its citizenry or improve their socio-economic livelihoods. The U.S. leadership must approach stabilization and reconstruction as a national, governmental mission, rather than as solely military or civilian, to enable the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to be harnessed and integrated effectively.

Critical skills set for stabilization and reconstruction

Stabilization and reconstruction operations typically take place in complex, fluid environments that require not only physical stamina, but also mental agility, intellectual capability, and a skill set different from that of conventional warfighting. The following list of skills needed to be effective in these environments was derived from a United States Institute of Peace report based on interviews from senior leaders in Bosnia.4 Professional military education should develop each of these skills, with greater emphasis on the last six.

- Warfighting skills in the event conflict escalates and to avert potential conflict
- Courage to take risks
- Confidence to delegate authority and the need for trust
- Confidence in crisis decisionmaking and in doing things that have never been done before
- Increased decisionmaking skills
- Ability to adapt or adjust to a new environment
- Adherence to principle and the ability to maintain fairness and evenhandedness for all parties
- Vision of the politico-military environment
- Ability to interact with those outside the military and build consensus
- A broad intellectual background
- Interpersonal skills
- Understanding historical and cultural contexts

Probably the two most critical skills needed in S&R operations are knowledge and understanding of historical and cultural contexts and the interpersonal skills to exploit that understanding. Insensitivity to cultural differences can contribute to tensions between locals and military forces and reduce the effectiveness of the operation. Moreover, understanding the cultural context of a country aids in formulating effective strategies for addressing the underlying sources of a conflict. Interpersonal skills are essential for building cooperation among disparate partners and trust among the local population. They can make the difference between progress and stalemate or, worse, regression.

Negotiating skills have been cited as critical in recent U.S. military interventions, and for the future. General Anthony Zinni once said, “always consider negotiations as a great alternative to violence.” Down to the platoon level, officers and troops will engage in direct negotiations to quell angry crowds, determine how to distribute relief supplies, or settle quarrels between warring factions with local leaders, belligerent parties, and the general population.

The employment of smaller, more dispersed units calls for improved decisionmaking skills. “Junior leaders must be confident and competent to make quick, hard decisions ... [The] decisions had to be made while operating relatively independently and out of communication range with their superiors.” Based on their own experiences in peace operations, commanders recognize that the success of an S&R operation depends on the vigilance, mental alertness, and responses of the most junior soldier and his noncommissioned officer.

Mission requirements and political objectives for S&R operations are tough to define and may change often. This puts military commanders in
a difficult position as they try to translate strategic objectives into opera-
tional and tactical tasks. An understanding of the larger strategic envi-
ronment and an ability to adapt as it changes are keys to success in any
military operation; they are particularly important in the complex envi-
ronments in which S&R operations take place. As an operation matures
and the security situation on the ground stabilizes, an ability to adjust to
the new environment is critical to success.

Role of Professional Military Education

Professional military education can play a central role in changing
the military’s cultural mindset and in developing the broad intellectual
framework necessary for these demanding, complex, and multidiscipli-
nary situations. The first step in achieving a change in culture is to demon-
strate the importance of S&R operations in American national security
strategy through courses or lectures and by emphasizing these themes
throughout the curricula. While the content of courses certainly con-
tributes to a student’s knowledge base, the structure and the composition
of the faculties and student bodies also shape the intellectual development
of the military professional.

Because stabilization and reconstruction operations have often been
viewed as separate and detracting from the military’s primary warfighting
mission, PME curricula have dedicated limited time to its study, even
though peace operations have been identified as a “special area of empha-
sis.” An independent study conducted in 2001 at the National Defense
University found that many core courses included peace operations as one
two-hour lecture that focused on service or joint doctrine. Elective courses,
on the other hand, spent 24 to more than 30 hours on peace operations, but
these had limited participation due to class size constraints. At the U.S.
Army War College, for example, only 14 percent of the Class of 2001 was
enrolled in the elective “Peace Operations Issues: Policy and Practice.” For
the most part, electives focused on the role and policy of the United States,
the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations. They had less in-
struction on sources of conflict or post-conflict reconstruction.

Since September 11 and the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in-
struction on nation-building and the new strategic environment has been
added to the PME curriculum. For example, the National War College now
offers a core course lecture titled “Peacekeeping and Nation-building.” The
Marine Corps has done an excellent job in providing the cultural capacity
to adapt to a complex and changing environment. The Expeditionary
Warfare School (formerly the Amphibious Warfare School) offers a 10-day
course on military operations other than war (MOOTW). In 2001 approximately 90 percent of all captains received instruction in MOOTW.

These are important first steps, in recognizing the importance of these operations, but more courses and lectures are needed to effect real change. Further instruction is also needed in civil-military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations. Additional classes are not enough, however, if few students are enrolled in them. Instruction related to stabilization and reconstruction operations should be incorporated at all levels of PME, from officer basic courses through senior-level war colleges, as well as noncommissioned officer education, service academies, and ROTC programs. Students need to be exposed to these topics from the beginning of their careers to build the appropriate mindset and necessary skills.

The structure of a course or academic program can impact the preparation of military personnel as much as content. As described above, interpersonal skills to work with those outside the military, the broad intellectual background to understand cultural and strategic contexts, and the mental agility to adapt to a constantly changing environment are critical skills for effective engagement in S&R operations. Working with coalition forces, interagency partners, and international and nongovernmental organizations requires an ability to understand perspectives different from the military’s. One easy step to bring different perspectives into the classroom is to invite guest speakers to describe their roles and unique cultures. Interacting with students from other countries or other federal agencies in class discussions, assignments, and exercises also helps build interpersonal skills. Students reported that the participation of international students and guest speakers were critical to their better understanding and appreciating civilian and international partners.

Tabletop exercises and computer simulations are excellent tools in sharpening decisionmaking skills and illustrating complex situations or concepts. Students in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces stated that one of the most valuable aspects of their elective was the final exercise, which illustrated the complexities of a peace operation. Most, if not all, PME schools include small- and large-scale exercises in the curricula; using scenarios that reflect an S&R environment can further illustrate and integrate complex concepts. Computer simulations can also enhance decisionmaking skills by demonstrating to students how certain decisions may impact a situation or produce unintended consequences. Also, exercises and simulations provide indirect experience in stabilization and
reconstruction operations and are essential to sound analysis, planning, and action in the future.\textsuperscript{11}

To operate effectively in the new strategic environment, the United States needs military and civilian professionals who understand the historical and strategic contexts of areas throughout the world, the cultural and religious influences that guide popular thinking, and the nature of human conflict, past and present. The U.S. military will continue to be called on to engage in combat, so honing warfighting skills and other core competencies must not be neglected. The model of an applied liberal arts education would supplement instruction in doctrine and core competencies with culture, sociology, psychology, history, language, international and domestic law, ethics, and media and negotiations skills—all important subjects for developing the intellectual skills and capability to deal with a complex and changing strategic environment.

Professional military education, however, is often considered a zero sum game. Per the law of diminishing returns, there is a point beyond which there will be only incremental improvements in core competencies for the amount of training invested, but investment in cultural understanding, however modest, will yield significant returns. A debate on the level of proficiency required for this strategic environment should take place, and an appropriate investment in other “liberal arts” made. Ideally, this would include all subject areas listed above, but sociology, law, and negotiations should be emphasized.

**Training S&R Forces**

Training also has an important role to play in adapting military culture and in preparing military personnel for operations. Current peace operations training can provide some insight into the military’s approach to training. Cultural reluctance to peace operations has created a “just-in-time” philosophy for training for these missions. A unit switches from training for war to training for peace operations only three to four months before deployment. Training occurs at the individual, unit, and leader levels. Unit training culminates in a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk or the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. MREs are scenario-driven, replicating a spectrum of contingencies a unit might encounter, including situations involving civilians, hostile crowds, and adversarial forces.

Several studies and after action reviews have concluded that just-in-time training provides inadequate preparation for the political-military
and civil-military aspects of peace operations. Although no units failed to carry out their mission in the Balkans, units and staffs needed several weeks to achieve a level of proficiency once deployed in theater. PKI’s after-action review on Kosovo acknowledged that more peacetime training in peace operations requirements was necessary. Peacetime training can develop a baseline understanding of missions, tasks, and the complex operating environment so that units can become more proficient faster.

Future requirements for rapid deployment and the synergies required for stabilization and reconstruction necessitates regular peacetime training for the S&R forces described in chapter 4. All elements of an S&R unit must train and exercise together periodically to build important linkages and relationships. Individual, unit, and leader training should highlight critical stabilization and reconstruction skills, such as negotiations, small unit decisionmaking, and interaction with U.S. interagency players, NGOs, foreign militaries, and the local population. It is therefore important that representatives from these communities participate in training exercises. Facilities should be made available in the near term for training for S&R Groups, building toward the capability to host an exercise involving a full S&R JCOM exercise in the future. Training technologies like those described in chapter 7 could also be utilized.

**Conclusion**

- Because of its cultural ethos, the U.S. military believed throughout the 1990s that it should not engage in prolonged S&R activities because they degraded its ability to fight and win the Nation’s wars.
- Given our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq and the new strategic environment, operations have become a national security and international political imperative for the U.S. military.
- Professional military education and training must now adapt military culture and prepare military personnel to engage in S&R operations effectively.
- S&R operations will require greater understanding of local historical and cultural contexts, interpersonal skills to work with partners and local populations, and an ability to adapt to rapidly changing and complex environments.
- All elements of S&R forces, including representatives from the interagency community, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition militaries, should train and exercise together periodically.
Notes

1 Mission essential tasks are those tasks that must be performed with the utmost effectiveness to succeed on the battlefield.


7 Hardesty and Ellis, 15.

8 Ibid, 12.

9 Ibid, 9.

10 Special Areas of Emphasis highlight the concerns of OSD, the services, combatant commands, defense agencies, and Joint Staff regarding coverage of specific joint subject matters in the PME colleges. Colleges will evaluate each SAE for inclusion in their curricula; however, inclusion is not required.


The abrupt transition from active combat to post-combat stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq has resulted in a problem filled transition period for U.S. and coalition forces. The military has been thrust into non-traditional roles for which it has been neither trained nor equipped. In addition, it appears that the military will continue to be called upon to deal with an environment in which the transition between war, stabilization and reconstruction, peacekeeping, and renewed conflict will be fast, localized, and unpredictable. Thus, the military, particularly the Army, will of necessity be engaged in S&R until an orderly transition to civilian leadership is achieved. In addition, globalization has opened world markets for a wide variety of lethal weapons and information technology that are available to insurgent, guerrilla, terrorist, and criminal forces. American forces will continue to confront rocket propelled grenades (RPG), mines, mortars, and even artillery and anti-tank weapons, as well as small arms wielded by assailants connected by the Internet. New technologies and equipment are needed for military operations in the post-conflict state.

**Background**

During the interval between stabilization and reconstruction and nation-building, the military could be required to perform the roles of civil government. The primary S&R role is security, which includes the protection not only of our own troops but of the civilian population, along with other law enforcement responsibilities. A second military S&R role is the maintenance of the civilian infrastructure both for subsistence and basic services. Finally, the military must maintain positive human relations with the indigenous population and our own troops in an environment of danger, economic dislocation, cultural differences and mistrust. Perhaps most importantly, the military force—as the surrogate for civilian authority—
must demonstrate concern for the indigenous population while still facing personal dangers. As in diplomacy, the primary agent of positive change is built upon a foundation of trust.

While the issues clearly transcend technological solution, we must adapt current military technology and develop new technologies to promote successful civil-military operations during the post-direct-combat phase of the joint campaign. This chapter will describe some of the technology solutions that could augment military capability for expanded responsibilities during stabilization and reconstruction. The technologies are discussed in the framework of post-conflict military roles and needs. Four overarching areas where technology can play an important role in military S&R are training (including pre-packaged expert tool sets), communications, specialized offensive and defensive weapons systems, and modeling and analysis. For the military, deployed, focused mission-training packages are required for personnel to acquire the required skill sets they need for security, infrastructure maintenance, and human relations they have not received before being deployed. While the military is developing networked communications for intra-military operations, the ability to couple the military network with the civilian communications system is essential for S&R operations. Weapons systems, such as non-lethal weapons for crowd control, are needed to augment combat systems. Finally, the military needs specialized software tool kits to prioritize work in reestablishing civilian infrastructure functionality. While opposition and criminal threats remain, vital infrastructure must be protected.

**Discussion**

**Security**

During the period of post-conflict stabilization, the military provides for its own security and is responsible for civilian security and for reconstituting a civilian police force and national military. The most challenging and resource intensive security environment is within population centers.

**Security needs**

*Counter-guerrilla/sniper.* A sniper attack in an urban environment is nearly impossible to prevent, as evidenced by the sniper killings in Washington, D.C. during the fall of 2002 and the current attacks in Iraq. As also witnessed in Iraq, the attacker has the advantage of initiative, unpredictably choosing the time and place of an attack. It is impossible for U.S. troops to be on full alert always and everywhere. Technology is needed to correlate
intelligence information and rapidly identify and neutralize threats; technologies are also needed to harden vehicles, buildings, and individuals against attack. The population will lose confidence in the authority of the military force if this force appears vulnerable.

**Ordnance/mine detection and neutralization.** Mines or bombs can be triggered autonomously with sensors or by remote control. For combat operations, military organizations use very heavy equipment such as flails to clear safe paths in minefields. Individual mine detection is a very slow step-by-step procedure with short-range detectors. These approaches have limited utility in an urban environment where freedom of movement is paramount.

**Crowd control.** Military weaponry is optimized for maximum lethality and, therefore, is inappropriate for crowd control. Leading combat organizations, the first into population centers, are not equipped or trained sufficiently in crowd control. These operations are made much more difficult when language and cultural barriers exist. Crowd control requires specialized communications, defensive equipment, and non-lethal weapons. A new area for work is intelligence for “preventive crowd control.” This is similar to civilian police intelligence to identify leadership in agitation groups.

**Border/perimeter security.** Local civil security demands security from external threats to both the civilian population and military formations. Secure international borders must be established and maintained to prevent entry of foreign insurgents and the flow of weapons. To reduce military logistics burdens, border security requires surveillance and intelligence.

**Survivable transport vehicles.** A large number of combat casualties in Iraq have been in Humvees. The proliferation of such weapons as RPGs makes these vehicles vulnerable. They are also vulnerable to the mine threat. Transport vehicles need to be made more survivable with enhanced armor and improved sensors with embedded networked intelligence.

**Intelligence.** Local intelligence, from multiple sources, is the key enabler to security. In particular, intelligence is required to detect and track hostile individuals and organizations, find arms caches, and track down criminals. Tools are required to speed processing and assessment of field HUMINT. Included is the need to predict actions, conduct profiles, and identify key leaders or influence agents. Efficient and relevant intelligence requires distributed and networked surveillance sensors to augment HUMINT.
Technology for Security

*Distributed mission training for security.* Conventional classroom and facility training is giving way to distributed training utilizing interactive software packages and virtual training facilities with model-based simulations. Group training is also possible by networked systems. Networking permits the linking of multiple distributed training sites in the United States to distributed sites in an occupied country. As the skill demands for the military shifts from combat to providing security, the training packages must be provided immediately after hostilities subside. Technologies include public security mission training packages, portable simulation centers, and equipment.

*Civil-military communications interoperability.* While still incomplete, military communications technology has provided considerable capability for joint service interoperability. However, little if any priority has been given to the need for connectivity to and within civilian communications networks. To operate effectively with an indigenous communications infrastructure, bridges such as analog to digital converters will need to be developed as deployable sets. In some cases the military may even need to have analog radio stocks if the military-civilian interfaces cannot be handled by software. Technologies include wireless and wired networks, software protocols for network management, and civil-military interfaces. Antennas, both mobile and quick-erecting, are needed as replacements for losses and breakdowns.

*Distributed and networked surveillance sensors.* Security is heavily dependent on knowledge of the location and movement of individuals and vehicles of interest. The urban environment is a particular challenge due to the concealment provided by buildings, underground utility tunnels, and other infrastructure “terrain features.” Sensors can be mounted on buildings, fly in UAVs, be in unattended ground systems, or be carried by people. Some level of sensor coverage already exists, such as security cameras in banks. Technology is needed to network dissimilar sensors to provide a broad area of coverage and to provide an integrated picture. In some cases, tasking tools are required to direct overhead sensors to fill in holes in coverage. A particular need is for sensors to detect mines and remotely fired explosives while on the move. Technologies include cameras, infrared detectors, acoustic detectors, radars, metal detectors, and chemical detectors.

*Network counter-terrorist analysis tools.* Networks are used by terrorist and insurgent groups to establish organizational cohesion while remaining physically dispersed until a decisive point in time and action.
Technologies including network monitoring, intercept and analysis software tools, and intelligent agents are needed to probe networks and databases to permit decisionmaking relative to insurgent planning and location.

**Counter-sniper system.** Counter-sniper systems fall into two categories. Detection of the sniper prior to firing and response systems that immediately return fire guided by the sniper weapon signature. Optical detectors are needed that can distinguish between sniper sighting technologies and media or private camera lenses. Other technologies include optical augmentation from the sniper weapon, electromagnetic detection, flash detectors, acoustic arrays, and automated cueing of a response weapon.

**Lightweight and flexible body armor.** More improvements are needed to provide greater body area coverage while retaining freedom of movement for the wearer. Body armors are needed that provide protection and can be concealed to promote confidence of security in the protected populations. Technologies include lighter weight, flexible ballistic clothing ensembles. Future developments will incorporate embedded sensors, antennas and “Combat ID” and will reduce signatures.

**Vehicle tagging and tracking.** Approximately 2,500 U.S. vehicles in Iraq were provided with the Cobra Blue Force Tracking system, which transmits ID and position information at less than a watt of transmitted power. Comprehensive tracking of civilian as well as military vehicles would require many more systems that are easy to install. Information from the tags transmitted to the intelligence network would provide a comprehensive tactical picture.

**Biometrics.** Biometrics is an emerging technology that uses unique human characteristics, such as retinal patterns, facial recognition, and even characteristic walking patterns to identify wanted individuals in groups or as individuals passing through a checkpoint. In order to be operationally effective, biometric identification must be done remotely and rapidly in a cluttered background and against camouflage and disguise. The technology requires specialized sensors and processing algorithms. Biometrics can be used to confirm individual identity as well as be a reliable independent source of identification, such as when fingerprints at a crime scene identify the criminals. In this later case the FBI fingerprint file is also a good example of how biometric databases can be used globally through networking databases.

**Penetrating radar.** Military and civil law enforcers need to “see through walls” when searching a building. Instead of x-rays, the most promising technology is low frequency radar. Current systems have limited
range and resolution but still provide useful capability at close range. Higher power transmitters and advanced signal processing technologies will improve these systems.

**Non-lethal weapons.** While the military has maintained a joint office with the Marine Corps as executive agent, little priority has been given to non-lethal weapons within service development programs because of limited utility in major combat operations. Law enforcement authorities as well have not developed a cohesive program to develop these weapons. However, for S&R operations, non-lethal weapons have significant potential utility for riot and crowd control and in situations where combatants and civilians are intermingled. Directed energy systems such as lasers and millimeter radio frequency weapons could play a significant non-lethal role in crowd dispersal. Two systems under investigation are the Airborne Tactical Laser ACTD and the Air Force developed millimeter wave Active Denial System.

**Unmanned vehicles for surveillance and threat neutralization.** In Iraq two levels of UAV systems were used to advantage, the high altitude Global Hawk and the medium-altitude Predator. Further deployment of distributed low-level UAVs is required for detailed local surveillance. This class of unmanned systems includes small UAVs, such as Dragon Eye, and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) yet to be developed. Forces need to go into buildings and caves using on-board sensors for immediate intelligence as well as employment of leave behind unattended sensors. Wide area coverage is also needed that can reduce manpower requirements. The systems can be armed to defeat threats while reducing risks to friendly personnel. Technologies include electro-optic and infrared cameras and acoustic detectors, networked into the intelligence grid. Long dwell medium- and high-altitude UAVs and airships will add to an integrated sensor grid.

**Defensive information operations.** A major insurgent tool is the spreading of misinformation to damage the credibility of the stabilization and reconstruction or enforcement powers. An additional threat is the corruption of our friendly information systems and the possible clandestine introduction of false information into our own networks. Technologies include network intrusion detection, mitigation and damage assessment software, user authentication techniques, and encryption technologies and methodologies.

**Infrastructure**

In the period following conflict and occupation the military has the immediate responsibility for providing the basic services necessary to
start the process of reconstruction. The military needs the tools to assess which elements of the infrastructure are most essential for reconstruction and protection based upon the politico-military situation. User friendly, portable planning tools are needed to enable soldiers with limited civil engineering background knowledge such as restoring power plants to some limited capability before permanent repairs can be made. Professional Army Civil Engineering training needs to include skills in large city utility operations.

Infrastructure needs

**Collaborative planning tools.** Netcentric warfare planning tools for distributed decisionmaking have been under development for military planning and operations. In stabilization and reconstruction, collaborative planning tools are needed by the military to collaborate with civilian organizations, including U.S., international/foreign, and indigenous.

**Civil Engineering.** The S&R force must have the tailored equipment sets with technology to manage civil functions with the fewest number of people to reduce our logistics and political footprint. However, there is a non-synergistic issue created by inserting modern technology in countries that have relied upon low cost manpower—the most efficient solutions can create high unemployment and contribute to instability.

**Food and Health Services.** Military field hospitals and medical support should augment and support local medical facilities until they can be supported with indigenous capabilities. Bare-bones, in-theater medical support requires information and physical “reach-back” capability to U.S. facilities for corrective care and databases for diagnostic and treatment support.

**Civil government.** Civil functions, such as fire fighting, law enforcement, and social services, need to be reestablished and in some cases created. These essential functions will have to be protected to promote trust and confidence in U.S. goals for post-combat operations.

Infrastructure technologies

**Civil infrastructure simulations.** The military employs simulations and decisionmaking tools for combat in mission planning and target selection. In rebuilding infrastructure it is necessary to do mission planning and select which parts of the infrastructure or which facilities need to be addressed first for reconstitution and protection. This is somewhat the inverse of target planning, in which the target is now the element of critical infrastructure. Simulation tools for this prioritization planning need to be
developed or modified from existing planning tools such that targeting assets could be transformed from “find it and destroy it” to “find it and understand it.”

**Education and training packages.** Software training packages and mobile or virtual training centers are required for tailored training in engineering, services, and civil administration. Training must be sensitive to the significant religious, cultural, historical, and environmental factors that define a country.

**Infrastructure equipment.** Construction, water purification, and sanitation equipment is required to repair and maintain systems that may be archaic or incompatible with existing repair parts. Deployable equipment is required to provide water and sanitation while the permanent infrastructure is being renewed. High-density, lightweight electric power supplies such as fuel cells and compact fuel oil generators can supply emergency power during power interruptions. Emergency medical treatment equipment and transportable field hospitals may be required to support both the military and civilian populations.

**Human Relations**

Human relations are key to winning the peace. To be successful the United States must gain trust and create a state in which the citizens of an occupied nation feel that their condition is improved and that they have hope for the future. Rebuilding the infrastructure is a large part of this objective but other human relations aspects, such as communications and job creation also build morale. Technology can also contribute to the well being of our own troops, mostly through connectivity to the continental United States.

**Human relations needs**

**Civilian communications.** Communications between coalition forces and the local population are required to bridge cultural differences, establish trust, deliver our message, and counter disinformation about our intent.

**Civilian job creation and training.** Long-term self-viability for an occupied country is the ability to take over and manage their own affairs. The United States needs to further this with job creation and training at both the blue-collar and white-collar levels.

**Record generation, storage, and management.** It is significant that insurgent efforts to destabilize Iraq have focused on the destruction of records that are essential for stabilization, which requires accurate records
of property, contracts and general information. Records are also needed to track the demobilized military and refugees.

*Troop morale and welfare for extended tours.* Extended tours appear to be inevitable in such operations as Iraq. U.S. troops are currently operating in a harsh and threatening environment with few of the amenities associated with deployments at home or in Europe.

**Technology for human relations**

*Public information sources.* Public information, including television, radio and newspapers, needs to be utilized to advantage U.S. goals. The United States should develop tailored messages for the local population on such topics as “this week’s progress in providing reliable electrical power,” or “the interim government’s weekly message on free vaccinations,” which would provide a continuous flow of public service announcements.

*Training tools for culture, linguistics.* Skills in culture and language are not quickly acquired. However, software, pamphlets, and videos can be tailored to specific topics such as cultural dos and don’ts in everyday life or roles of religious leaders in secular life.

*Mobile, real-time language translators.* The long-term goal of a machine translator is to match the capability of a human translator. This requires not only vocabulary and syntax but also sensitivity to inflection, idiom, and nuance for oral translation. Machine translation has progressed significantly in translating text but is in its infancy in rapid accurate oral translation.

*Elite modeling.* The United States needs to develop the set of characteristics of indigenous potential leaders to determine whom it can work with and who are the leadership’s friends and enemies. Modeling based on human factors and required skills needs to be developed to augment this profiling.

**Conclusions**

- While a high level of technology characterizes the U.S. military, gaps exist in its capabilities and equipment to perform stabilization and reconstruction in a post-conflict environment such as in Iraq.
- Most of this technology and equipment was optimized for professional military formations. However, since nations are controlled from cities, our military technology for S&R operations needs to be optimized for urban terrain.
- In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the lack of a functioning civil infrastructure frustrates our ability to achieve a satisfactory S&R end state.
• As in combat operations, success depends on knowledge of the enemy. Technology to identify, track, and eliminate threats to civil authority is fundamental to S&R success. At the same time, conventional military power must be visible enough to deter organized military resistance.

• Such military systems as communications devices, vehicles, weapons, surveillance systems, and planning tools should be enhanced to operate in a civilian environment.

• In addition, the military should directly use or modify equipment, such as body armor and non-lethal weapons, originally developed for police, SWAT teams, and riot control.

• Finally, there are areas where new technologies such as robotics, non-lethal weapons, and language translators can provide high-payoff results to both the military and to civilian police forces.
Chapter 8
Interagency Capabilities

The evolving nature of conflict is such that no one department or agency has sufficient resources, expertise, or authority to respond unilaterally to all of the requirements for a return to stability when the fighting stops. The reconstitution of the infrastructure of a society following extensive military conflict requires the involvement of multiple actors due to the confluence of a variety of considerations—including governance, economic growth, essential services, and security. During conflict, the Department of Defense is responsible for the establishment of a secure environment to facilitate the restoration of civil order. However, there are many tasks required to rebuild the national infrastructure and society for which executive departments other than DOD have the necessary expertise. The deeper the interagency cooperation during planning and execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations, the sooner the military will be able to pass responsibility to civilian agencies to begin the nation-building mission.

Many non-DOD departments and agencies possess the knowledge and skill sets, if not resources, necessary to supplant or augment military capabilities in situations where DOD resources are already sufficiently engaged or security related concerns are of a higher priority. These situations include humanitarian and refugee assistance, establishment of new political institutions, reconstitution of a national financial system, reformation of the judicial process and component elements, and introduction of economic recovery initiatives, including significant rebuilding of national commercial, transportation, and sanitation/health infrastructures. The involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) is also necessary to ensure that the full spectrum of requirements for post-conflict reconstruction efforts is addressed. More than ever, interagency cooperation, within the USG as well as between the USG and other actors, is critical for effective post-conflict reconstruction.
Two different initiatives are needed to accomplish this task. First, significant improvements must be made to the interagency decisionmaking process. Second, civilian agencies need new structures and programs to harness and deliver their capabilities better.

**Background**

The tragic deaths of U.S. military personnel in Somalia was a watershed event in uncovering the failure of the interagency community to plan effectively and share information. These lapses in marshalling the power of the Executive Branch were recognized at the highest levels, and the National Security Council (NSC) staff initiated steps toward corrective action. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD–56) attempted to institutionalize a procedure for interagency planning and management of complex contingency operations. The intent was to achieve unity of effort within departments and agencies and to develop realistic missions and tasks. Under PDD–56, the Deputies Committee (DC) would establish an Executive Committee (ExComm), to oversee the efforts of an Interagency Working Group (IWG) in developing a political-military plan, supervising its rehearsal, and completing an after-action review to institutionalize the lessons learned for future planning.

While PDD–56 increased awareness of the need for interagency coordination, it fell short of its original intent and was rarely invoked other than as an internal tool by the NSC staff. There was no enforcement mechanism to ensure that departments and agencies adopted a planning process for complex crisis operations or institutionalized lessons learned. Regrettably, PDD–56 did not have the powerful impact on the interagency planning process that it might have due to the absence of assertive NSC staff oversight and resistance from various federal departments. Nevertheless, the desire to achieve a more comprehensive level of integration in the planning for complex crises was shared by the majority of those Federal officials who underwent the training and education programs developed and executed by the National Defense University, the U.S. Foreign Service Institute, and the U.S. Army War College. This troika of academic institutions established a program of Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review (ITEA) which conducted six large-scale educational events for Deputy Assistant and subordinate level officials over three years and measurably enhanced the understanding of the planning process required to integrate interagency operations at strategic levels.
A complicating factor in this equation is that the number of players has multiplied substantially since the end of the Cold War. What had been a fairly simple organizational structure to manage before (Defense, State and NSC) became a far more difficult maze of competing and conflicting entities, each with its own culture, organization, orientation and desire to shepherd their resources in fulfillment of their parochial needs. As the number of players has grown, so has the complexity of coordinating and managing their capabilities. The absence of efficient and integrated planning only compounds this situation.

The Bush Administration revisited the issue of interagency coordination in its first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD). NSPD–1 revised the structure of the National Security Council System. While it does not apply directly to crisis situations, NSPD–1 is intended to improve the interagency structure, thereby addressing some of the shortcomings of previous attempts to institutionalize interagency coordination. Regrettably, the structural aspects of interagency coordination were not matched by a procedural directive resulting in a situation where there was form but little management application within which the elements of execution could effect realistic planning. An attempt was made to correct this oversight by the drafting of what became known as “NSPD XX,” but this directive was shelved.

The inclusion of a dedicated unit in S&R JCOM headquarters to develop strong liaison with civilian agencies can provide an important complement to military capabilities, which are more focused on combat operations and post-conflict security. This is an important issue to resolve. Civilian agencies bring critical skill to the field that the military cannot duplicate. Hence, the need for a well-staffed C-MAC within the S&R JCOM to develop and maintain strong liaison with civilian agencies as they arrive in theater. Many civilian departments have the functional expertise necessary for a comprehensive USG response in a post-conflict environment. Inclusion of these agencies helps to ensure that military accomplishments are not jeopardized by the lack of an integrated plan that addresses the difficulties of post-conflict reconstruction, such as the collapse of the political system, the loss of law enforcement capabilities, the breakdown of basic infrastructure, and the emergence of a humanitarian crisis. While the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the most prominent partner in stabilization and reconstruction, other agencies with critical expertise include:
Forward deployed elements of the Department of State, which can provide timely assistance to local leadership on the reestablishment of a basic political framework for a stable government and also work with their military counterparts as counsel on various political-military issues that must be immediately addressed.

The Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), which has unique capabilities for international training and criminal justice development.

The Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) can provide much valued assistance based upon its extensive experience in supporting foreign governments in the establishment of civilian law enforcement capabilities.

The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the Department of Agriculture, which is equipped to increase income and food availability by mobilizing expertise for agriculturally led economic growth.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) field office team should also be part of the proposed S&R JCOMs, because of the urgency for making funds available to operational elements.

Discussion

Improving Interagency Coordination

While both PDD–56 and NSPD–1 address the issue of interagency coordination at the strategic level, more needs to be done. The creation of a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group (NIACCG) has been suggested to fill the need for a national level group to plan and coordinate post-conflict operations. The group would be chaired by the NSC and consist of representatives from the departments that are critical to the mission, including Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture. The body would meet on a regular basis to review lessons learned from past operations and develop strategic guidance for agencies that have a role in post-conflict operations. When planning begins for major combat, this group would be responsible for providing strategic guidance and coordinating planning among the departments involved in post-conflict operations.

The guidance from the NIACCG would be implemented at the operational level by chiefs of mission and by combatant commanders. To establish the same unity of effort at this level, a vehicle for coordinating
and managing interagency planning is required. The linkage between these two levels of engagement has been bridged by the development and deployment of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to each of the regional commands, and funding initiatives are currently under consideration to institutionalize this experiment as a permanent component on command staffs. These coordinating mechanisms, once formally established and manned, will provide combatant commands in-house counsel and expertise of civilian agencies. The concept for this novel organization provides for a broader advisory capacity to enable a threefold mission: to reach forward to other departments and agencies that are represented on country teams, to reach back to parent agencies to facilitate coordination and provide additional explanation of national policy guidance to the commands, and to reach horizontally across the combatant command staffs to educate these military elements on the capabilities, resources, and limitations of the civil departments and agencies. JIACGs, however, are not policymaking bodies and do not have the direct authority to commit their agencies to forward deployed operations.

Due to the complexity of tasks in a post-conflict environment, a greater depth of planning and coordination is needed, even below the combatant command level. Personnel from key civilian agencies need to be forward deployed with stabilization and reconstruction units so that operations are enhanced by the full range of capabilities resident in the USG. While there are inherent dangers and incurred risks associated with any deployed force, whether civilian or military, capabilities for operations within major deployed forces should be linked to capabilities that exist within the strategic and theater strategic levels. In order to accomplish this objective, civilian agency representation should be a part of the select S&R units.

**Strengthening Civilian S&R Capabilities**

The key goal of stabilization and reconstruction operations is to establish stable conditions in theater so that civilian agencies of the U.S. government or a multinational organization can take control and begin the process of nation-building.

This is illustrated by figure 3 of the Executive Summary. As major combat operations end, control could pass to the commander of the S&R forces. The combat forces would swing into a supporting role in the S&R operations. As stability takes root, combat forces could begin to be withdrawn. When the theater is stable enough, control could pass from the military S&R commander to civilian authorities from the State Department.
or to a UN representative responsible for the nation-building mission. The sooner this handoff takes place, the sooner the military can begin to draw down its forces in theater, and civilian personnel with skills appropriate to nation-building tasks can take over the evolving mission.

With this in mind, the United States should focus on ways to ensure that the handoff of control takes place as soon as feasible and therefore that the expertise for the nation-building mission is in place as promptly as possible. A two-step process to achieve this is described below.

- **Create a standing interagency S&R team that could deploy to the theater promptly with the skills needed to prepare for nation-building.**

  This would be a standing team of several hundred people at most. They would be deployed to the theater as soon as major combat operations had ended and stabilization and reconstruction operations had begun. They would lay the groundwork for the nation-building mission, including preparing for the arrival of additional personnel from federal government agencies, contractors, and others involved in nation-building. When in theater, they could deploy with the C–MAC.

  The interagency team would include, at a minimum, personnel from the State Department, the Agency for International Development, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture. A commitment to be “on call” to deploy to the theater on relatively short notice would be part of their job responsibilities. During peacetime they would meet periodically with planners from the S&R JCOM to review and update plans for the integration of the S&R mission with the initiation of the nation-building mission. When deployed to theater, they would typically work with the J-10 in the combatant commander’s headquarters to plan for the transfer of authority from the military to the State Department.

- **Develop an on-call civilian crisis management corps that has a reservoir of expertise for the nation-building mission.**

  The key cause of delay in transferring control from the military to civilian authorities is likely to be the time it takes to get personnel with the skills needed for the nation-building mission into theater. It would be prohibitively expensive to have an organization staffed with skilled personnel full-time during peace, but this is not necessary. Considerable untapped skills needed for nation-building exist in the private sector, particularly in the medical, legal, language, and law enforcement fields. The U.S. government, with State Department in the lead, could establish a civilian crisis management corps. The corps would contract with personnel or organizations to commit to deploying to a theater promptly upon being notified.
This cadre could be drawn from state and local governments as well as the private sector. They, along with additional personnel from the federal government and from contractors, could join the early deploying interagency team to begin the nation-building mission promptly.

**Conclusions**

- During post-conflict S&R operations, when chaos, ambiguity, and uncertainty dominate the environment, the failure to appreciate the need for interagency cooperation can lead to duplication of effort, gaps in the provision of goods and services, and added tension among stakeholders.

- Even while DOD works to accomplish its primary goal of establishing basic security, there are a number of issues that must be addressed simultaneously for successful post-conflict reconstruction. These issues include the alleviation of suffering through humanitarian assistance, the establishment of a stable political system, the maintenance of law and order, including the training of law enforcement personnel, the promotion of economic growth, and the reestablishment of basic infrastructure and services.

- While DOD may still have a role in these issues, the bulk of these tasks will fall upon their civilian counterparts, such as the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy and USAID. Although these agencies do not have the resources and personnel that are found within Defense, they possess a refined knowledge of specific functions that fall outside the scope of security operations.

- In order to achieve objectives in post-conflict reconstruction, departments and agencies need to work in conjunction with one another, including the ambassador/country team, and with NGOs and IOs.

- Achieving this degree of coordination requires a planning capability that is initiated early, developed in a coordinated manner, and continued throughout the multiple phases of the operation. This multi-agency engagement is important at the strategic and operational levels, but is even more vital in its implementation, where minor setbacks can have an immediate and lasting impact on the entire operation.

- If specially equipped and trained S&R units are tasked with key responsibilities for post-conflict reconstruction, civilian departments and agencies should be represented in these organizations to bring about more effective planning and implementation. New governmental structures will be needed to accomplish this.
Recent events in Iraq have highlighted the need for stabilization and reconstruction operations to solidify the military gains U.S. forces have achieved. While much discussed, achieving a stable environment has proved difficult, not only because of the conditions encountered, but because combat operations and S&R operations are different, requiring different types of forces, with different training and equipment, and even different mindsets. American combat forces have proven to be very good at combat, but have come up short in S&R operations. Though U.S. forces have been gaining experience in peace operations and missions other than war, these types of operations traditionally have been shunned and seen as detracting from combat readiness. Major General William Nash, USA (Ret.), former commander of U.S. forces in Bosnia, once said that the U.S. military, in their heart of hearts, feels very strongly that they do not want to be peacekeepers, and who can blame them, because fighting is what they do.

Still, because failure to secure the peace negates gains made through combat, new attention is being paid to S&R operations. Senior defense officials are considering the creation of some type of international peacekeeping force that the United States would train and equip. This force would be a mix of American troops and foreign/regional forces. Though originally conceived for peace operations, this force should also contain personnel appropriately trained for S&R operations. American personnel committed to this force might be assigned on a long-term basis, thus allowing them to develop institutional expertise in the unique nature of these types of missions, and in working with the associated foreign members. Training and equipping such a force in advance of deployment would reduce problems with coordination and interoperability that have plagued other multinational peacekeeping efforts. With proper preparation and advanced planning, such a force would be able to react quickly to situations,
such as the recent crisis in Liberia, by minimizing the problems that have slowed other such deployments.

The viability of this concept depends on several factors, a critical one being the willingness of foreign nations to contribute to such a force. Even if donors can be found, could such a force truly be effective? What steps would have to be taken to create it? What would be its status under international law? The underlying question is, is it realistic for the United States to rely on the international community to provide forces in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations?

Background

Recent Nation-building Efforts

The history of American involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations, followed by nation-building, is one of mixed success as illustrated by table 8. An examination of these efforts indicates the value of involving the international community. In a recent study, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that multinational participation leads to a higher probability that democracy will take root. Whether the presence of multinational forces is a key determinant for success may be debated, but there can be little question that the involvement of foreign peacekeeping/stability forces decreases the burden on American forces.

Afghanistan offers an example of how a multinational effort can be used to bolster S&R operations following a conflict. The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) is composed of 33 countries operating pursuant to a UN mandate. NATO assumed control of the force in August 2003. In what must still be considered a hostile environment, security has been established in and around Kabul. Since that time, the UN has expanded the ISAF mandate to provide security to areas outside Kabul and its environs. Though reports from the field have cited difficulties in coordinating what, in many ways, had initially been an ad hoc force, they also have emphasized the contributions that coalition forces continue to make toward improving the situation in the country.

Operations in Iraq have cast into sharp relief some of the problems of putting together a multinational S&R force after the fact. Without a firm commitment based on a broad consensus of an alliance or the UN, the United States has encountered difficulties lining up foreign forces to take over some of the burdens in post-conflict Iraq. Aside from Britain, foreign contributions have been minimal, with only three nations contributing over 1,000 troops. (As of summer 2003, Poland had committed 2,300,
Ukraine 1,800 and Spain 1,300, with Bulgaria, The Philippines, Romania, Latvia, Nicaragua, Slovakia, and Lithuania all contributing substantially less.) Many nations have been unwilling to participate without a UN mandate in what is viewed as a conflict initiated by America. Other nations have indicated a willingness to participate, but have attached unacceptable conditions; as an example, Fiji has said it would send 700 troops, but refuses to have them serve under the Polish general who commands the foreign contingent in Iraq.

The Need for an Organizing Principle

Though it is apparent that multinational peacekeeping/stability operations have certain advantages, involving many nations in these efforts is no guarantee of success. While the United Nations has conducted 56 peacekeeping missions since its inception (13 of which are currently active), its record is mixed. The reasons for failure are many and varied. However, commonly cited difficulties include disagreements among the participating members as to the mission and how it is to be accomplished and difficulties in integrating diverse units with varying capabilities. The

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* Though not examined in the Carnegie Study, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are both multilateral efforts that are ongoing.
UN has achieved greater success in places where it has partnered with regional organizations, such as with NATO in Kosovo. In such cases, the UN has focused its efforts on political or reconstruction tasks while a regional organization or lead nation has provided security.

NATO has fared better, primarily because participation was viewed as being in the best interest of the alliance and its members. Member nations are accustomed to working together and already share common doctrine, procedures, and equipment. In Afghanistan, NATO assumption of ISAF responsibilities has been hailed as an example of how an alliance can be used in this type of role. Still, it cannot be assumed that an alliance with the competence of NATO will exist in all cases or, if one did exist, that the member states would be willing to support a specific mission.

What is apparent is that there must be a reason, or an organizing principle, for the participating nations to band together in these efforts. The legitimacy given by a UN mandate is critical to gaining support from most nations, but even that may not suffice to convince members of the international community to participate. National interest is a strong motivating factor, but care must be taken in offering this incentive, lest such interests override the nature of the mission. Thomas Barrett argues that, because of the benefits to be had from stability in a region, all of the developed and many of the developing nations of the world should be willing to participate in these types of operations. In a globalized world, it is in the interests of both developed and developing states to bring about conditions that will encourage further development and a stable security environment. Failure has too many consequences, from the dangers posed by rogue states with access to weapons of mass destruction, to the adverse consequences of migration and refugee flows, to the creation of fertile ground for terrorist activities. Thus, nations that do not believe so already must be convinced that the benefits of a safe and secure global environment far outweigh the costs involved in achieving it.

This is not to say that every nation will be willing to participate in every case. It may be far easier to recruit countries to participate where they see a direct impact on their own region, or where they have cultural or economic ties. The EU assumption of duties from NATO in Macedonia is a case in point. There, the desire for regional security caused the EU to take on its first such mission. A feeling of involvement or ownership is essential if these types of missions are to succeed, and this can only be achieved where the member nations feel that they are an integral part of
the process. According to James Dobbins, former U.S. envoy to Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, it is necessary that member states feel they have a stake in the management, as well as the risks and the costs.

Discussion

The Nature of an International Peacekeeping Force

The problem in Iraq, and to varying degrees elsewhere, is that multinational S&R operations have been more or less an afterthought and not organized or coordinated in advance. As described by one senior government official just returned from Iraq, the United States failed to line up potential coalition members for post-conflict S&R operations, failed to determine the size or makeup of such a force, and failed even to specify how long the donor nations might expect their forces to serve. Many countries were unwilling to sign up for an open-ended commitment. With the lack of a UN mandate, still others were concerned with the domestic backlash they might face for supporting what was perceived by many as an unjustified exercise in American adventurism.

To address these types of concerns, an International Peacekeeping Force is envisioned that would call on nations to commit to providing forces, when needed, for future stability operations. Troops so designated would receive special training in these types of operations. Training prior to deployment would be tailored to specific conditions, while maintaining a pool of units to choose from would allow organizers to customize the force to meet the nature of the mission. Deployment of this force ideally would have a UN mandate, though, depending on the situation, this might not be a necessary precondition. In return for committing to support such efforts, the donor nations could receive equipment and training for the designated units, logistics support, and financial assistance.

While the exact U.S. role in this effort is currently under discussion, indications are that DOD would be willing to establish and support several training centers for these forces in the United States or elsewhere. Standardizing training and equipment would reduce problems with command, control, and interoperability that have plagued previous multinational operations. American involvement would insure that certain standards of training would be met, especially in such areas as civil-military affairs and human rights. The United States also could provide logistics support to deploy this force and maintain it in the field. Finally, the United States probably would be a major contributor to such a force, because, as
noted by one senior DOD official, the United States can only expect to maintain its credibility as leader in such situations if it demonstrates the willingness to commit its own forces. This does not exclude the possibility of other nations taking the lead role in a specific situation, as Australia did in East Timor. However, even when the United States plays the leading role, as in Iraq, the existence of a viable international peacekeeping force would do much to reduce the burden on American resources.

**Donor Populations**

For an international peacekeeping force to be viable, there must be enough other countries willing to contribute to it. Historically, countries have contributed forces to international peacekeeping efforts for reasons ranging from altruism to regional self-interest and expectation of material gain. In August 2003, 89 UN members contributed over 36,000 military and civilian police to ongoing UN peacekeeping operations (See table 9 for major contributors). Whether countries would be willing to commit to a pool that would support future peacekeeping or stabilization and reconstruction operations as part of an international force, and under what circumstances, would have to be determined. However, based on experience, some projections can be made.

European militaries, especially NATO members, often make significant contributions to multinational peacekeeping operations (see table 10). These troops pay their own way, tend to be well trained and well equipped, and maintain a degree of autonomy. Though these countries sometimes have interests that preclude contributing, they can still be counted on where they have regional concerns, or where their interests and those of the United States coincide.

A second group of poorer and less developed nations has traditionally provided willing contributors to S&R operations. These nations see participation in these operations as a means of financing and obtaining equipment and training for their militaries. Their forces typically require training, transportation to the theater, and substantial logistical and technical support, once deployed. Still, once trained and deployed, these forces have performed acceptably.

A third group, falling somewhere between the first two, has taken on new significance in the post-Cold War world. These are nations, primarily from the old Eastern Bloc, that have small yet capable militaries and do not really require extensive training and equipment. However, they lack the logistics and technical means required to support long-term or distant deployments. Examples of this group are the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Romania, all of which have deployed forces to Afghanistan and Iraq. Countries such as Argentina and Brazil might also be considered to be in this category. These countries are sufficiently large and technologically advanced to provide substantial contingents of relatively skilled forces, with U.S. or other assistance, for participation in out-of-sector deployments. At least in the immediate future, these countries are less likely to have policy interests that would conflict with U.S. goals or adversely affect their ability to participate.

### Table 9: Leading Foreign Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations

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<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Civilian Police</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</table>

Niche Capabilities

As noted earlier, in addition to manpower, foreign militaries can provide unique capabilities that enhance the likelihood of success of S&R operations. Multinational units, like the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), have been created specifically for peacekeeping operations and have been equipped and trained in the skills needed for these types of missions. Other skills important for success in these operations can be found in national forces and represent capabilities U.S. forces lack. This is especially the case in constabulary and domestic police forces, such as the French Gendarmerie and Italian Carabinieri. Other

Table 10: Contributions to Major Multinational Peace Operations*

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<th>Country</th>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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</table>

* Data includes forces committed to United Nations and other multilateral peace operations.
skills or niche capabilities could include linguist support, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) detection and decontamination units, civil and public affairs detachments, engineer support, medical, and intelligence and informational assets.

A partial list of potential contributors, based on current deployments or offers of support, indicates that there is a wide range of countries and skills that can be drawn upon (see table 11). Difficulties that arise in bringing together and integrating forces from various nations can be alleviated to a large degree through careful planning, coordination, and training. The key to success, as seen in Kosovo, is to anticipate the use of these forces far enough in advance of deployment that the difficulties inherent in such multinational operations do not detract from the mission itself. As seen in the example of NATO, multinational training and operational experience can overcome differences in language and national orientation. In sum, the advantages to having a wide range of forces, with unique skills and capabilities, far outweighs the difficulties involved in managing such a force.

A NATO S&R Capability

As NATO allies transform their combat forces and focus increasingly on operations beyond Europe, they too will need to transform their force structures to achieve strengthened, deployable S&R forces. The reorganization will have to be done in concert with two other major force development projects underway in Europe: the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). These forces and the S&R contingents could relate to one another as illustrated in figure 13.

NATO is in the process of standing up the NATO Response Force, about 21,000 troops, which will focus on demanding expeditionary operations. Concurrently, the European Union is developing a European Rapid Reaction Force that, when fully assembled, could number up to 100,000 troops to address peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, primarily in and on the periphery of Europe.

In addition to the NRF and ERRF, NATO should create a new S&R capability that mirrors the American S&R force proposed in chapters 4 and 5. This would build upon NATO’s already significant peace operations experience. As with the NRF, the NATO S&R Force would gain from reorganization and focused training and equipment. The proposed NATO S&R Force could deploy behind the NRF and pick up the stabilization and reconstruction missions in the wake of successful NRF action. The NATO S&R Force would draw from the same pool of European forces to be used
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Source: Compiled from the KFOR website and interviews with senior defense analysts.
for the ERRF, but its missions would not necessarily be the same. The NRF and S&R Force would give Europe the full spectrum of capabilities to wage modern war and win modern peace. It would also give Europe a stronger and more versatile ERRF over time, plus the choice to use NATO or the EU as a policy instrument.

Many will question whether NATO can create a new S&R Force so soon after the birth of the NRF. Two arguments favor the proposition. First, NATO now has considerable peace operations experience on which to base this reorganization. Second, NATO officials estimate that existing European force structure can be cut by thirty to forty percent because of its Cold War orientation. Savings from these reductions could be spent to improve the NRF and create a new NATO S&R Force.

**Pros, Cons, and a Caveat**

Aside from the obvious benefit of sharing the burden of such deployments with members of the international community, there are other advantages to an international peacekeeping force. Based on the niche capabilities of national forces, organizers could customize an S&R operations package. The use of international forces would lessen the U.S. footprint in deployments and give them greater legitimacy. Training and deploying such forces would build cooperation and understanding between U.S. and participating forces, as well as develop an experience factor that might be of use in the future. Finally, use of international forces would help ameliorate the lack of U.S. sensitivity to foreign cultures and religions, and could even be of benefit when the countries

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**Figure 12: A Full-Spectrum NATO Force**

![Diagram showing NATO and European Union forces relationships](image-url)
participating share a common language, background, or heritage with the area to which they are deployed.

At the same time, some of these perceived advantages could become disadvantages, depending on the situation and circumstances. The participation of certain members of a peacekeeping force in a region where there are existing national or cultural animosities could increase regional tensions. Sunni Muslims being deployed into a predominantly Shi’a area is one example. Even though trained and equipped by the United States, national forces can be expected to remain loyal to their country, which might have interests that conflict with those of the United States. In such cases, the United States may find itself at odds with the nations themselves, creating frictions that otherwise might not exist. Just as the United States disagreed with other members of NATO over Iraq, membership in an international peacekeeping force is no guarantee that there will not be disagreements between the United States and other members.

Finally, there are legal issues that must be addressed. Deployment of a peacekeeping force under UN auspices carries the weight of the backing of a majority of the international community, but will deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force without UN sanction carry the same weight? If major powers are at odds over the use of the force, will there be an arbitration mechanism, or do members of the force, and by extension their nations, put themselves at risk of being caught in a great power dispute? Who bears responsibility for damages or injuries suffered during such deployments? How does the use of such a force coincide with international law? Such questions must be addressed if such a force is to become a reality.

Conclusions

- The past has proven the value of coalition warfare, and a strong argument can be made for the value of coalitions in stabilization and reconstruction operations.
- The United States stands to gain through international burden sharing, in terms of the costs involved and the commitment needed, both of which would be greater if the United States chose to go it alone.
- However, there are other, less tangible benefits to be had, not the least of which might be the lessening of the negative perception of the United States as a unitary actor that tends to go its own way without taking into consideration the concerns of other nations.
The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its military prowess in war but has yet to establish a winning record in maintaining the peace. Enlisting the aid and experience of other nations may be a way of improving that record. As one commentator has noted, “Winning the peace is as important as winning the war, only harder.”

Much work will have to go into the development of an international peacekeeping force or a new NATO S&R force. The costs involved may be high, but far less than the cost of failing to establish a lasting peace in places such as Iraq.

Notes

Recommendations

This report lays out a framework for reorganizing and planning for transformed stabilization and reconstruction operations. Under this framework, we recommend that the Administration:

- Create two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to the S&R mission (S&R JCOMs). The headquarters would be responsible for monitoring the status of the units, overseeing training and exercising, developing doctrine, and planning for S&R operations.
- Field two S&R division-equivalents with joint assets. The first division-equivalent should be mostly active personnel; the second division-equivalent can include a large component of reserve personnel.
- Organize each division-equivalent to be flexible, modular, scalable, and rapidly deployable with four brigade-size S&R Groups that include Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical, and PSYOP supported by a tactical combat capability.
- Develop new strategic concepts for future S&R missions. Key examples are concurrent planning for major combat and S&R missions and concurrent deployment of combat and S&R forces.
- Designate an adequate number of ready units for S&R missions by rebalancing the AC/RC mix. Enough units are needed in the overall S&R force to sustain a rotation basis.
- Revise PME curricula to include more instruction in stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil-military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations. Add instructors with a background in sociology, law, and psychology; and especially with experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations.
- Develop systems and technologies to support S&R operations. High-priority examples are wireless and land-based communications for civilian/military interoperability, expert S&R-tailored mission-training packages for security and infrastructure, unmanned systems, non-lethal weapons, detection devices for urban operations, and course-of-action analysis and planning tools.
• Establish a process for more efficient multi-agency planning, coordination and engagement for S&R operations. Create a National Inter-agency Contingency Coordination Group (NIACCG) under the National Security Council with responsibility for planning. Create Joint Inter-agency Coordination Groups (JIACG), counterpart organizations in the combatant commands and the S&R JCOMs, with representatives from other federal agencies embedded in a J-10 directorate and C–MAC.

• Establish a multi-agency civilian rapid response capability to deploy with S&R forces and prepare for the transition from S&R operations (military control) to the nation-building mission (civilian control).

• Strengthen international stabilization and reconstruction efforts by identifying countries with niche capabilities, training and equipping an international peacekeeping force, and encouraging NATO to develop an independent S&R force that mirrors the proposed U.S. force.
About the Contributors

Michael J. Baranick (chapter 1) is Executive Director of CTNSP and a senior research scientist for modeling and simulation technology. Previously, he was chief of the Modeling and Simulation Branch at the NDU War Gaming and Simulation Center (now the National Strategic Gaming Center [NSGC]) and held policy and technical advisory appointments in the Army. He earned a doctorate in systems planning and development from The Pennsylvania State University.

Charles L. Barry (chapters 4 and 5) is a Washington-area consultant specializing in information technologies, strategic management, transatlantic relations, and defense transformation. He has lectured and published extensively on these topics since 1984 as an editor, contributing author, and author of numerous books, articles, and monographs.

Hans Binnendijk (executive summary) holds the Roosevelt Chair of National Security Policy at NDU and is Director of CTNSP. He has served on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control (1999–2001), and as Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (1994–1999) and Principal Deputy Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff (1993–1994). Dr. Binnendijk is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and received a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (1972). He is author or co-author of about 100 publications and reports.

Jonas L. Blank (chapter 8) is a senior analyst in the National Strategic Gaming Center. Before joining the NSGC, Mr. Blank, he was the chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College. Previously, he was assigned to the Joint Staff as Chief of the Strategy Division (J–5) where he was involved with national
security strategy formulation and other interagency working group issues, particularly those related to operations other than war. His combat experience includes special operations flying units in Vietnam and F–111F operations in Desert Storm.

Daniel L. Burghart (chapter 9) is a specialist in Russian and Central European affairs who joined CTNSP as a senior research fellow upon retirement from the United States Army. He has extensive experience in the former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. He holds a B.A. in political science from Illinois, a dual Masters degree in political science and Russian area studies from University of Wisconsin, and a Ph.D. in Russian and international studies from the University of Surrey. His publications include Red Microchip: Technology Transfer, Export Control and Economic Restructuring in the Soviet Union (Dartmouth, 1992).

Leigh C. Caraher (chapter 6) worked at the Atlantic Council of the United States, a foreign policy research institute in Washington, D.C., before joining CTNSP as a research associate. Her research areas include peace operations, professional military education, and military transformation. Ms. Caraher is a graduate of the University of Virginia.

Joseph J. Eash, III (chapter 7) is a CTNSP distinguished fellow on an Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) detail from Georgia Tech Research Institute. He is the program manager for the Pre-Conflict Management Tools project. Before joining CTNSP, he was Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts, in which capacity he was responsible for oversight of advanced concept technology demonstrations. He has 45 years of experience in managing high technology programs in the military and industry.

Dr. Stuart E. Johnson (chapter 4) is a CTNSP distinguished research professor. He has extensive experience in DOD and at NATO Headquar ters as a defense planner and policy analyst. He earned a B.S. degree in chemistry from Amherst College (1966) and a Ph.D. in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1971) and did post-doctoral work in physics at the University of Leiden, Netherlands, 1971–72. His most recent book is New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking (RAND 2003).
L. Erik Kjonnerod (chapter 8) is a senior fellow and supervisory chief of the NSGC Security Strategy and Policy Division and Director of the NDU Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review Program. An adjunct professor at George Washington University and the Foreign Service Institute, he lectures frequently on politico-military affairs and crisis decision-making processes. He is a noted Latin American civil-military specialist who has served in military and diplomatic postings throughout the Americas. He earned a B.A. degree from Rutgers (1967), an M.A. from the University of Illinois (1974), and will receive a doctorate in education from George Mason University at the end of his current academic program.

Richard L. Kugler (chapter 3) is a distinguished research professor in CTNSP. A former senior executive in OSD and director of the DOD Strategic Concepts and Development Center in the 1980s, he is a defense planner and strategic analyst with over 30 years of experience in DOD and RAND. His specialties are U.S. defense strategy, global security affairs, and NATO. An operations research analyst and political scientist, he holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of many studies and journal articles and 15 books on defense and security issues, including *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, Vol. 1 and 2 (National Defense University Press, 2001), co-edited with Ellen Frost.

Douglas A. Macgregor (chapter 2) is a colonel in the U.S. Army and a senior research fellow in CTNSP. He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments, including command of a division cavalry squadron in the 1st Infantry Division (Mech). During Desert Storm, Colonel Macgregor was awarded the bronze star with "V" device for valor while leading combat troops of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in the battle of the 73 Easting. He was commissioned in the U.S. Army in 1976 upon graduation from West Point and holds an M.A. in comparative politics and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Virginia. His publications include *The Soviet-East German Military Alliance* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (Praeger, 1997), and *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Praeger, 2003).
Larry K. Wentz (chapter 1) is a research scientist at the George Mason University (GMU) Center of Excellence in C3I and an independent consultant. Before joining GMU, he was the director of the lessons from Kosovo study sponsored by the ASD (C3I) Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). Mr. Wentz has extensive experience in civil-military support to peace operations and U.S., Coalition JTF, and NATO C$^2$ and C3ISR research, architectures, systems, operations and exercises, and training. Mr. Wentz has a B.S.E.E from Monmouth College (1965) and an M.S. in systems engineering and operations research from the University of Pennsylvania Moore School of Engineering (1968). His publications include Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (CCRP, 1997) and Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience (CCRP, 2002).

Elihu Zimet (chapter 7) is a CTNSP distinguished research professor on an IPA detail from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. He has directed basic research, applied research, and advanced development programs in missile, gun, and directed energy weapons, aircraft avionics and propulsion, and low observable and counter low observable technologies. He holds a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn (1962) and a Ph.D. from Yale University (1969).
TRANSFORMING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

Including chapters on lessons learned, force sizing, organization, active and Reserve components, military culture, technological support, interagency coordination, and international capabilities.