The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends

Benedetta Berti
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends

Benedetta Berti
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006.

The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. Second, the Institute aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel’s national security agenda.

INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in Israel and abroad, and the general public.

INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in this publication are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organization and individuals that support its research.
Benedetta Berti

The Ongoing Battle for Beirut:
Old Dynamics and New Trends

Memorandum No. 111
December 2011
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary 7

Introduction  Lebanon: The Wildcard of the Middle East 11

Chapter 1  The Usual Suspect: Syrian Involvement in Lebanon 15

From the Civil War through the Tutelage (1976-2005) 18

After the Revolution: A New (Syrian) Order (2005-2011) 26

Chapter 2  Engineering a “Resistance Axis”: The Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon 41

Iran in Lebanon before Hizbollah (1943-1982) 43

Involvement Redefined: The Rise of the Partnership with Hizbollah (1982-2005) 46

Challenges and Opportunities: A New Chapter for Iran in Lebanon? (2005-2011) 50

Chapter 3  “Discretely” Seeking Power and Influence: Beyond Syrian and Iranian Involvement in Lebanon 61

Saudi Arabia in Lebanon: A Counterweight to the “Resistance Axis”? 61

Assessing Western Influence: The US and France in Lebanon 72

The State of Israel and Lebanon: A Difficult Conversation 83

Conclusion  The Battle for Beirut and the New Middle East 89

Endnotes 99
Executive Summary

Internally divided along sectarian lines and with an inherently weak government, Lebanon has traditionally been a playground for regional and international actors alike, often acting as a surrogate for inter-state conflicts. Competing for power and influence over Lebanon, the major regional powers have consistently considered the country important in their efforts to adjust the regional balance of power in their favor. As such, battling for Beirut has become a key feature of contemporary Middle Eastern politics.

The present study looks at the role and influence of foreign intervention in Lebanese domestic affairs, focusing on the shifts in the dynamics of power following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Specifically, the research explores old trends and new dynamics characterizing the involvement of several major regional powers (Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) and international actors (the United States and France) that historically have wielded the most power and influence over domestic Lebanese politics.

First and foremost on this list is Syria. Looking at Lebanon through the lens of the concept of “Greater Syria,” the Assad regimes have always asserted a special prerogative over Lebanon. Although many analysts interpreted the end of the Syrian “tutelage” in 2005 as a sign of the imminent end of Syrian control over Lebanon, the role of Damascus in the post-Rafiq Hariri Lebanon tells a radically different story. Syria has in fact survived the shock of its 2005 military redeployment, and the undue delays in the UN-led investigation of the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri, combined with the inability to create an effective regional or international strategy to isolate and contain Syria, have given the Assad regime time to regroup and develop a new strategy for Lebanon. Since 2005, Damascus has repositioned itself at the center of the Lebanese political arena by playing on the internal divisions among the anti-Syrian movement, and by capitalizing on the political alliance with the Hizbollah-led March 8 forces. Current Syrian
influence in Lebanon is particularly strong, thanks to the rise to power of the Hizbollah-backed Mikati government and the political marginalization of the forces that orchestrated the anti-Syrian revolution.

While Syrian power within Lebanon remains solid, the end of Syria’s tutelage reshuffled the cards in Lebanese politics somewhat, paving the way for the increased influence of other foreign powers such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran was already heavily invested in Lebanon, first through the relationship between the Lebanese and Iranian Shiite communities, and after 1982, through its strategic partnership with Hizbollah. However, when the Syrian tanks withdrew from Lebanon, the Iranians stepped up their direct involvement in Lebanese affairs in order to protect their local proxy, Hizbollah. This process, in place since 2005, has led to continued Iranian support for Hizbollah, the gradual enhancement of ties with the March 8 political coalition, and strengthened diplomatic, political, and economic relations between Beirut and Tehran. At the same time, Damascus insists on preserving its “Lebanese prerogative.”

The Islamic Republic would ideally like to swing Lebanon away from its Western alliances, and bring it closer to the region’s “axis of resistance.” However, the battle from Beirut is far from over, as other powers have also been at work within Lebanon to counter the rise of the Iranian and Syrian alliance.

Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in Lebanese domestic politics, partly responding to prior connections between the Kingdom and the Lebanese Sunni community and the Hariri family, and partly in an effort to oppose the rise of the “Shiite crescent.” In this context, Riyadh moved from a traditionally friendly policy toward the Assad regime and its tutelage of Lebanon to one of progressive confrontation, assuming an important role in driving Syria out of Lebanon after the Hariri assassination. Since the withdrawal, however, Saudi involvement in Lebanon has failed to curb Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, and the Saudis have modulated their overall strategy and begun a rapprochement with the Assad regime, hoping to establish their influence in Lebanon by engaging with Damascus to the exclusion of Tehran.

American and French attempts to rein in Syrian and Iranian involvement in Lebanon have been equally unsuccessful. France eyes Lebanon through the prism of its colonial past and its connections with the Maronite Christians.
The US, on the other hand, seeing Lebanon through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict, has considered the country as a bargaining chip in the context of negotiations with the Assad regime. Despite these different outlooks, the alliance between France and the US was vital in creating the international pressure between 2003 and 2005 that ultimately forced the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Since then, however, the two countries adopted very different strategies with respect to Lebanon. Between 2005 and 2008, the US relied on a strategy of isolation of the Syrian regime, while the French government never abandoned direct engagement. In the end, both efforts failed to reverse the reestablishment of Syrian influence, and overall, the US lacks a clear and consistent strategy to counter the local rise of the Iranian-Syrian axis.

Thus Lebanon is pulled simultaneously in opposite directions by two powerful and antagonistic political blocs. Although the Syrian-Iranian bloc presently has the upper hand, Lebanon has not fully transitioned to the “resistance axis.” It maintains tight economic and political ties with Saudi Arabia and appears keen on continuing its relationship with the US. These intricate relations have also had their share of influence over the fragile and volatile dynamics between Lebanon and Israel.

The future of Lebanon is precarious, especially as the political fate of the country is linked to factors that reside entirely beyond its control, including the outgrowth of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the ongoing unrest within Syria. Specifically, prolonged strife within Syria, not to mention the collapse of the Assad regime, would represent a true game changer, heightening Sunni-Shiite tensions, delivering a strong blow against Hizbollah and its political allies, and renewing the strength of the March 14 coalition.

Given the current sweeping political and social changes, the emerging Middle Eastern order is still very much in the making. However, even in the “new Middle East,” Lebanon will continue to play a crucial role in influencing the regional balance of power, and as such, regional powers will continue their battle for influence over Beirut.
Lebanon: The Wildcard of the Middle East

Lebanon is a country with multiple and at times conflicting identities, and as such it is often misunderstood by outsiders who lose their way in its “Byzantine” politics and struggle to make sense of the frequently blurred lines between domestic and foreign policy.

At the same time, the small Mediterranean country is often mentioned as a possible model for the Arab Middle East. With its multicultural and pluralist society, a fundamentally liberal outlook, both culturally and economically, and a strong “outward orientation,” Lebanon stands out as a unique experiment in the region.

However, all the attributes that contribute to making the country one of a kind also create obstacles to Lebanon’s political and social development. In particular, far from being a harmonious experiment in multiculturalism, the Lebanese society is extremely fragile and fragmented along ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines. In the absence of strong common foundations and social cohesion, outbursts of ethnic and religious violence within Lebanon have been a recurrent pattern in the country’s history. Despite the numerous settlements and ad hoc agreements signed in the aftermath of the civil war (1975-89), Lebanon has never achieved a stable resolution of its sectarian conflicts and a subsequent normalization of inter-community relations.

Lebanon’s divided and fragile society has strongly impacted on the country’s political system and the government’s capacity to exercise control and authority over all of its citizens and territory. Because identity politics are still very much the basis of Lebanon’s political system, political parties tend to function according to a community-based, rather than a nation-based, platform. Thus, far from rejecting the divided and sectarian basis of its society, the Lebanese political system reproduces and enhances existing
divisions by working on the basis of confessionalism. Furthermore, lacking a national political identity and vision, most political parties invest enormous capital in preserving both their own political power as well as the current balance of power with respect to other sectarian groups. As such, parties tend to be inherently resistant to change, which only strengthens the static tendency of confessional politics. Consequently, the government and the political system as a whole suffer from institutional weakness and are often ineffective and dysfunctional.

The reluctance to move beyond confessional politics in the institutional arena is matched by similar distrust at the society and community level. In turn, because of this lack of a common political project and reciprocal trust, the political power of each community needs to be at least partially backed by military strength, thereby creating an ongoing internal security dilemma and causing perennial instability.

This unique combination of inter-sectarian tensions, societal divisions, clientelism, and institutional weakness makes Lebanon particularly vulnerable to the influence of foreign powers. As such, both direct and indirect foreign intervention has been a key element in Lebanese political life since the foundation of the modern state, contributing to the blurred lines between domestic and foreign matters.

Lebanon’s more than 17 sectarian, religious, and ethnic groups have all developed ties with foreign actors as a way to improve their domestic position with respect to the other sects. This relationship between Lebanese political and sectarian groups and foreign actors can range from sporadic contact to tactical cooperation to full strategic alliance, and it can be fixed or shift over time. Similarly, the type of foreign support varies and may include political, diplomatic, economic, and military backing.

An important consequence of the ongoing relations between domestic sectarian and political groups and their foreign “patrons” is that despite Lebanon’s small size and lack of crucial natural resources or wealth, a myriad of foreign powers have been invested in the country, often with profoundly conflicting agendas. There are of course other reasons why each regional power, from Syria to Iran to Israel to Saudi Arabia, has been strongly involved in Lebanese politics. For one, Lebanon is geo-strategically important, and exercising local influence has been deemed a key to shifting the regional balance of power. Over the past decades, this geo-strategic
relevance, combined with Lebanon’s institutional weakness and its internal divisions, has led the country to become a playing field for regional and global actors to compete for regional power, through both political and military means.

The relationship between foreign patronage and state weakness is at once entrenched in Lebanese modern history and self-perpetuating. Foreign intervention is enabled by the state’s weakness, but it also further contributes to weakening the state, creating a vicious cycle. For one, foreign interventions challenge and question the government’s sovereignty and its ability to exercise control, while de facto making its foreign policy intrinsically connected to that of its foreign patrons. This was of course especially true during the long years of Syrian so-called tutelage (1990-2005) when the Lebanese government’s foreign policy was shaped entirely by Damascus.

Furthermore, by making Lebanon an arena where foreign competition is played out by proxy, the system becomes even more unstable and prone to periodical outbursts of violence, further eroding the state’s ability to function. In fact, it is possible to find foreign and regional roots for most Lebanese political and military crises, confirming Lebanon’s unfortunate role as a surrogate for regional and international conflicts and linking its fate to larger regional and international geo-strategic developments.

Beginning with this premise, the present study looks at the role and influence of foreign intervention in Lebanese domestic affairs, focusing in particular on understanding the shifts in the power dynamics following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Specifically, the research explores old trends and new dynamics behind the involvement of several major regional powers (Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia), as well as international actors (the United States and France). This list is by no means comprehensive, as other countries that also have extensive relations with Lebanon are not included in the analysis (e.g., Qatar, Bahrain, Turkey). Rather, the focus of the study is to understand the relations between Lebanon and the countries that historically have wielded the most power and influence over domestic Lebanese politics. In this context, the role of Israel as a prominent regional actor is also mentioned, albeit briefly, as the main thrust of the study is to track both indirect and direct government-to-government political and diplomatic relations.
For each of the principal international actors analyzed, the study looks specifically at their role in attempting to influence and shape both domestic and foreign Lebanese policy. In doing so, the research describes both institutional, government-to-government relations, as well as the links that each foreign country has with specific domestic ethnic-religious communities and political parties. Indeed, although it is important to understand the Lebanese government’s official foreign relations, solely focusing on these institutional links may draw a misleading picture. In the context of the deeply fragmented Lebanese society, non-state actors have in fact a high amount of domestic power and influence, and extra-institutional, behind-the-scenes relations between foreign powers and Lebanese political actors are just as important as official diplomatic relations in determining the country’s political trajectory.

The overall objective of the study that follows is to track the shifts in the Lebanese balance of power, first, by analyzing the internal changes that occurred following the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, and second, by looking at the new trends arising since early 2011 with the events known as the “Arab spring.” In turn, this understanding of internal shifts in the balance of power is related to wider regional dynamics, with the study charting the military, political, and diplomatic significance of such shifts both for the Middle East in general and for the State of Israel in particular.
Chapter 1

The Usual Suspect: Syrian Involvement in Lebanon

Understanding Syrian foreign policy is not a straightforward matter. Ambiguity, double-speak, rapid shifts in interests and alliances, and contradictory gestures can leave international observers speculating as to what the regime actually wants and what its core strategic interests actually are.

Nevertheless, even in this situation of ambivalence and uncertainty there are a number of core political interests that have remained unchanged and that characterize the regime, its identity, and its political strategy. Among this list of strategic priorities is the Alawite minority’s interest in its self-preservation, the perpetuation of the Alawite regime, and the maintenance of internal stability. The preservation of a strategic relationship and a high degree of political influence in Lebanon are also prominent among Damascus’ strategic interests.

Syrian attention to Lebanese affairs and its deep involvement in Lebanon has characterized Syria’s foreign policy since the creation of an independent Republic of Lebanon in 1943. Moreover, the Syrian interest in Lebanese affairs differs from that of all other foreign powers active in Lebanon, because Syria is the only country that de facto sees Lebanese politics as both a matter of foreign as well as domestic policy. This Syrian “exceptionalism,” which prompts the country to claim “distinctive relations” (alaqat mumayyaza), has both historical and ideological roots. Historically, the relationship between the two countries has always been extremely strong, starting with the Lebanese-Syrian cooperation towards ending French occupation preceding the declaration of independence in the early 1940s.
Ideologically, Syrian interest in Lebanon was backed by the belief in the notion of a “Greater Syria,” an idea that was summarized by Hafez al-Assad who said, “Throughout history, Syria and Lebanon have been one country and one people.”

This belief was originally grounded in the idea that the creation of an independent Lebanon was simply an aberration and a direct result of foreign interference, contrary to the history of the Lebanese and Syrian people. Modern day Lebanon was in fact created by the French mandate in the aftermath of World War I. France divided the area of “Greater Syria” mostly to protect the Christian minority of Mount Lebanon by granting this group a state. However, to make the new Christian protectorate viable and to ensure its independence, the French administration expanded the territory, incorporating the traditionally Shiite areas of Jebel Amal and Bekaa, further eroding “Greater Syria.”

In the years preceding the 1943 independence of Lebanon, those who believed in the concept of Greater Syria harshly opposed the partition and demanded the reunification of the two countries. However, after the Lebanese independence the idea of territorial reintegration began to decline and was gradually replaced by the idea of preserving a special relationship between the two countries, one where Syria could act as a “guardian.” In this vein, Syria continued to assert its strategic interest in maintaining a special relationship with Lebanon, for example by refusing to establish diplomatic relations or setting up an embassy in Beirut (which was first opened after the 2008 “normalization”), and maintaining an open border allowing for the free flow of people between the two states.

Thus while the conventional narrative stresses the role of Syria after its 1976 intervention in the Lebanese civil war, in the decades preceding the outbreak of sectarian hostilities Syrian influence was already strong in Lebanon. Damascus in fact financed the Arab nationalist groups responsible for the 1958 uprising and used its leverage within Lebanon over the presidency to stir domestic policies in a pro-Syrian direction. In addition, from the 1960s Syria established partnerships with groups outside the traditional power establishment composed predominantly of Christian Maronites and Sunnis, for example, by supporting the Palestinian resistance movement through the PLO and by supporting the Lebanese Shiite community.
In addition to the historical and ideological connections between Syria and Lebanon, Syria has also claimed the right to “monitor” its neighbor’s domestic politics based on geo-strategic considerations. In the Syrian narrative, for example, Lebanon is seen as crucial for Syria’s defense, especially in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as Lebanon’s southern mountains create a natural defense line. The country’s historical position has been that “it is difficult to draw a line between Lebanon’s security in its broadest sense and Syria’s security.”11 This stance partly accounts for Syria’s interest in maintaining a strong foothold in Lebanon, especially given the Syrian regime’s fear that either Israeli or Western influence could become dominant in the absence of strong Syrian involvement – a scenario that is perceived as threatening to both the security and the internal stability of the regime in Damascus.

Indeed, it is difficult to disentangle Syria’s involvement in Lebanon from Syrian interests in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Over the past decades, Lebanon, as an intermediate geographic arena between Syria and Israel, has been a critical site of political and at times military competition with Israel. Syria has also taken advantage of Lebanon’s institutional weakness and internal divisions both to support and rely on proxy groups to wage war against Israel. In turn, this has served an important interest of the Syrian government: to gain legitimacy, both internally and regionally, by strengthening its role as the main military and political foe of the State of Israel, and by stressing its position as the sole Arab regime continuing to confront it (through its activities in Lebanon). Leveraging Pan-Arab and anti-Israeli sentiments is especially important for Damascus, ruled by an Alawite minority with a constant need to legitimize its power and role, both internally and among the region’s Sunni regimes.

Finally, Syria has always had strong economic interests in Lebanon. Until the 1970s, Syria largely depended on Beirut’s port for foreign imports. Syrian foreign workers in Lebanon have always comprised a substantial and remittance-generating community,12 and Lebanon has served as an outlet to diffuse internal economic pressure.

Thus due to historical, ideological, military, political, and economic reasons, Syria’s interest in maintaining a strong role in Lebanon has remained constant over the past decades, although the means and strategies it has employed to attain this goal have shifted over time.
From the Civil War through the Tutelage (1976-2005)

From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: The Road to Taif (1976-89)

Syrian military and political involvement in Lebanon is in part a function of the inherently weak and factionalized nature of the Lebanese government. Sharply divided along religious and sectarian lines, Lebanon has never been able to move beyond the confessional-based mindset of its principal religious groups (while the Constitution recognizes more than 17 groups, the main established communities are the Christian Maronites, the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Druze).

In turn, this lack of a strong and cohesive national consensus about the nature and identity of the country, combined with a socially fragmented society, has laid the foundations for constant internal turmoil. Indeed, outbursts of ethnic and religious violence have been a recurrent pattern in Lebanese history. In addition, the country’s sectarian political system – first ratified in the 1943 National Pact and allocating a fixed quota of high posts and Parliament seats to each confessional group – perpetuates and exacerbates societal divisions and conflict dynamics, further fueling the already delicate and unstable internal balance of power among the different ethnic and religious communities.

The outbreak of Lebanon’s main civil war (1975-89) was in this sense a byproduct of preexisting internal tensions combined with an unsatisfactory political system, which was generally perceived as sharply favoring the Christian community. In this context, the rise of an alliance in the 1970s between the increasingly active Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, led by the PLO, and the local Muslim communities, who largely felt underrepresented and marginalized by the Maronite Christians, was met by a Christian counter-reaction and mobilization. This quickly led to the rise of confessional militias and escalated the political conflict to a full-fledged armed confrontation.

Syria first intervened in the civil war in May 1976, at the peak of sectarian hostilities, when the rapid advance of the Muslim National Front and the PLO started to resemble a victory, relegating the Maronite Christians to a defensive position and threatening to result in a partition of the country. Under these circumstances and following a Christian “invitation,” Damascus intervened on behalf of the Christian community, reversing its traditionally friendly policy toward the PLO leadership. This decision, at the time quite
unpopular within the rest of the Arab world, was strategically in line with Damascus’ historical and ideological connections with Lebanon, as well as with its core strategic interests in maintaining its influence in the Lebanese Republic, while preventing partition and a large scale Israeli intervention.

Syria’s first objective in intervening was to prevent a total collapse of the Lebanese state, as such profound instability within Lebanon could potentially have spread to Syria. In addition, both the collapse of the government as well as a partition of the country would have made it more difficult for Syria to continue in its role as Lebanon’s “protector.” Damascus particularly feared a potential partition, seeing it both as fatal for the Arab nationalist cause and an almost inevitable precursor to massive Israeli intervention to “stabilize” the south of the country. In contrast, by intervening to restore a measure of stability, Syria further demonstrated the importance of its role as “keeper” or “guarantor” of Lebanese affairs.

Second, the rise of a radical PLO-led regime operating from within Lebanon was deemed a threat to Syrian security, given its ability to drag Damascus into a renewed state of hostility with Israel. Third, Syria feared that if it did not intervene in support of the Lebanese Christians, Israel would step in. In that case, Syria would become directly involved in the conflict on behalf of the losing side, further strengthening the Christian-Israeli alliance as well as its direct role in the Lebanese civil war. Finally, Syria had a core interest in preventing a clear victory by any of the sides involved in the civil war, as the creation of a stable internal order within Lebanon would also have inevitably led to a demise of the Syrian role in domestic politics. Instead, thriving on the local internal divisions and factionalism, Syria could strengthen its role as guarantor of peace and stability, an argument that would become paramount during the post-civil war years of the Syrian tutelage (1990-2005).

This last consideration partially explains one of Syria’s distinctive patterns of involvement during the civil war, namely, its ability to enter and dissolve alliances and change sides rapidly whenever the Lebanese balance of power started to shift in a way that was unfavorable for Damascus, irrespective of previous ideological considerations or commitments. This accounts, for instance, for Syria’s gradual cooling of its relations with Lebanon’s Christians after its initial intervention on their behalf. In fact, after having successfully prevented their defeat, Syria became interested in ensuring
that the Maronites would not be able to gain the upper hand in the war, growing increasingly suspicious of the relationship between the Lebanese Christians and Israel. In turn, the demise of the Christian-Syrian marriage of convenience led Damascus once again closer to the Sunni and Palestinian side, a move facilitated by the “mysterious” death of key anti-Syrian leader of the National Movement, Kamal Jumblatt. Political assassinations soon became a trademark of Syrian involvement in Lebanon, continuing far beyond the end of the civil war. Another important trend characterizing Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war was its reliance on proxies: supporting and employing local militias to challenge both Israel and the presence of international troops within Lebanon. An example of this was Syria’s support for both the Shiite Amal and Hizbollah, after its creation in the early 1980s.

Whether through shifting alliances, assassinations, proxies, diplomatic pressure, or direct military and political intervention, Syrian involvement in the civil war was characterized by a precise strategy: to maintain hegemony within Lebanon and frustrate the ambitions of other foreign powers, especially Israel following its second invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Indeed, with respect to its principal enemy, Israel, Syria’s strategy focused specifically on three main objectives: first, to prevent enlargement of the territory under Israeli influence and confine it to the “security zone”; second, to rely on proxies to wage war against the IDF within the security zone; and third, to use all means to prevent the upgrade of relationships between Lebanon and Israel.

While the civil war years allowed Syria to impose its military presence and political influence on Lebanon and to frustrate the goals of other foreign powers, the termination of the conflict and the national reconciliation process that followed allowed Syria to better consolidate its role in the Lebanese Republic. In this sense, the way it engineered its political role in post-civil war Lebanon represents Syria’s political masterpiece.

The process that led the belligerents to meet in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in the fall of 1989 and to ratify the Taif Accord (officially known as the Document of National Accord) was headed by both Saudi Arabia and the Arab League, highlighting Syria’s failure to act as mediator and end the conflict. However, even if Syria was somewhat marginal in the process that led to the Taif agreement, which officially sanctioned the end of the civil strife, Assad
successfully managed to turn the situation on its head and obtain a favorable agreement.

First, Taif recognized that “between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests,” asserting that Lebanon would not “allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria’s security.” Furthermore, the agreement recognized Lebanon’s national “responsibility” to “confront the Israeli aggression,” ensure Israel’s withdrawal, and “liberate” the country. In addition, the agreement recognized the role of Syrian troops to “thankfully assist” the Lebanese government to reassert its sovereignty, stressing that the issue of “Syrian redeployment” (withdrawal, in this case) would be decided jointly at a later date. Finally, the new political arrangement established by the Taif Accord, which equalized the ratio of seats allocated to Muslim and Christian representatives in the Parliament, had the primary effect of checking the political power of the Maronite Christians, a move that was also seen favorably by Syria.

With these provisions, Syria de facto obtained a legal basis to maintain a military presence in Lebanon, together with the recognition of its special relationship with Lebanon and its role as “guarantor” of Taif. This served as an ideological reassurance that Lebanon would be part of Syria’s “resistance” against Israel and provided legal justification for treating perceived security threats within Lebanon as a matter of domestic concern, thus blurring the sovereignty lines between the two countries.

*The Syrian Tutelage: Consolidating Power and Influence (1990-2005)*

In the years following the end of the civil war and the signing of the Taif Accord, Syria worked to consolidate its military and political influence within Lebanon. This process of institutionalization of the Syrian role in Lebanese affairs took place largely undisturbed, as foreign powers generally accepted Syria’s limited hegemony in Lebanon as a fait accompli. For instance, in the early 1990s the United States rewarded Syria for its cooperation during the Gulf War and its willingness to enter negotiations with Israel by turning a blind eye to the country’s strategy and tactics in Lebanon. In the following years, the international community at large maintained a similar acceptance of Syria’s role in Lebanon, at times even
hinting at Syria’s positive “stabilizing” presence in a country perceived as too weak and divided to function autonomously.

Taking advantage of this positive laissez-faire attitude, Syria developed an intricate strategy to preserve its hegemony in Lebanon, in a system grounded in military presence, intelligence infiltration of the Lebanese government, political control of key posts within the government, electoral manipulation, and silencing of political opposition.

First, after having expanded its military presence in Lebanon in the period preceding the Taif agreement, while the international community’s attention was focused on the Gulf crisis, Syria retained approximately 30,000 soldiers deployed in Lebanon.\(^{28}\) The purpose of this presence was officially to facilitate the implementation of the Taif agreement and assist the Lebanese government and its armed forces in extending its control over the country. In practice, the military deployment was a guarantee of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon; the troops did little more than provide symbolic assistance in the course of the military confrontations between Israel and Lebanon in 1993 and 1996.\(^ {29}\)

At the same time as it was consolidating its military presence, Syria also developed a large cadre of Syrian intelligence agents within Lebanon, who through infiltration of the Lebanese state and their political and economic ties with important political and economic players within Lebanon, de facto guaranteed that no major national decision would be carried out without Damascus’ knowledge and approval. The intelligence apparatus was also in charge of a second, equally vital, role: monitoring and silencing internal opposition to the Syrian tutelage. As such, this involved continuing the proven method of political assassinations already employed in the civil war years. Another tactic to neutralize serious political opponents permanently was to arrest, detain, and transfer political dissidents to Syria, where they would be imprisoned and held incommunicado, often for an indefinite period.\(^ {30}\) In addition, Syrian intelligence worked to monitor and check the activities of any group not perceived as pro-Syrian. For example, the intelligence apparatus scrutinized the activities of Salafist-Islamist groups within Lebanon, preventing them from criticizing the government and the occupation, and thereby reducing these groups’ political status and rendering them politically ineffective.\(^ {31}\)
Both the military and the intelligence presence strongly contributed to institutionalizing Syrian influence in Lebanon through the development of military and economic alliances with local clans, militias, politicians, and businessmen, and the development of a complex network of pro-Syrian clients and allies. These ties were also strengthened by the existence of a strong Syrian community of roughly 300,000-500,000 workers living and working in Lebanon, a trend that continues to this day.32

Second, while controlling Lebanon militarily, Syria invested heavily in boosting its bilateral relations through a series of cooperation agreements signed throughout the 1990s aiming to improve the political, security, cultural, scientific, and economic ties between the two countries, while asserting Syria’s role as “senior partner” in the Lebanese-Syrian alliance.33

Third, Syria’s strategy to maintain influence over Lebanon rested upon preserving control of the political system. To this end, Syria took measures to fill the key political offices in Lebanon with loyalist politicians, while working to empower its political allies and marginalize its potential opponents. This strategy led them to ostracize the main Christian parties, at times by detaining its activists and leaders – for instance, the arrest of Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and the outlawing of his party in 1994.34 Moreover, the Syrians promoted the ratification of new electoral laws that systematically gerrymandered districts in a way unfavorable to Christians, resulting in a large proportion of Christian seats being delegated to non-Christian districts.35 While marginalizing Christian leaders within the political arena, Syria invested heavily in the election of a pro-Syrian president, vetoing the Christian candidates for the post who were not perceived as aligned with Damascus’ interests, and settling first on Elias Hrawi (1989-98) and then on General Émile Lahoud (1998-2007). Along with the disempowerment of the Maronite Christians, the Syrian strategy also aimed to protect and strengthen parties and communities perceived as “loyal,” such as the Shiite community. However, even in cases of strong political alliances, such as between the Shiite groups Amal and Hizbollah and Damascus, Syria never ceased to act as the “senior partner,” while occasionally intervening in its protégés’ decisions.36

The relationship between Syria and the Sunni community was also rather amicable in the years following the end of the civil war. In the early 1990s the Sunni community found a new leader in Rafiq Hariri and his
Future Movement (Tayyar al-Mustaqbal). Hariri, a self-made billionaire who amassed his fortune in Saudi Arabia, had no preexisting strong ties with Syria, but during his first term as prime minister (1992-98) managed to attain some measure of equilibrium and preserve a working relationship with Damascus, as well as the Saudi backing of his political rise.\textsuperscript{37}

However, even if by the end of the 1990s Syria seemed to have found a perfect recipe for preserving its hegemonic influence over Lebanon, this pax Syriana did not continue in the new millennium, as new domestic, regional, and global dynamics gradually started shaking the foundations of Syrian power within Lebanon.

The year 2000 represented a watershed for the Syrians. Hafez al-Assad died and was succeeded by his son Bashar, opening a new chapter in Syrian domestic and foreign policy. Overall, Bashar evinced far less astuteness in his handling of the “Lebanese file” and generally took Lebanon and its politicians for granted, an attitude that likely contributed to the rise in tension between the two countries.

The year 2000 also saw the unilateral redeployment of the IDF behind the Blue Line in Lebanon, an internationally recognized border, in compliance with UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) that called for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{38} Following the withdrawal, voices from both the international community, as well as from within Lebanon, started to question the purpose of Syria’s presence more openly.

Moreover, Syria’s position within the international community deteriorated sharply in the aftermath of 9/11, as the country became more isolated internationally. In fact, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US, Syria’s ambiguous position with regard to financing and otherwise supporting terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hizbollah came under stricter scrutiny and criticism from the international community. Furthermore, de facto Syrian support for insurgent activities in Iraq following the American invasion in 2003, combined with the Bush administration’s policy of promoting democracy in the Middle East, led the US to reverse its traditional “appeasement” of the Damascus regime and position itself on the offensive, pressing Assad to withdraw from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{39}

Damascus’ response to the mounting international pressure was to tighten its grip on Lebanon by cracking down on political dissent\textsuperscript{40} and preparing to extend President Lahoud’s term following its official expiration in 2004.\textsuperscript{41}
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends

The latter was a decision made against France’s advice to Syria to avoid meddling excessively in Lebanese internal affairs. The decision subsequently led to the deterioration of Syria’s relations with France, historically Syria’s closet ally in the West.

In turn, this led Paris and Washington, supported by regional powers like Saudi Arabia, to press the UN Security Council to address the issue of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon directly, which led to passage of UN Resolution 1559 in September 2004. With this historic resolution the international community’s former legitimization of Syrian tutelage ended abruptly, replaced by the call for an immediate redeployment of “foreign forces” (Syria) and the disarming of all existing militias (Hizbollah). In reference to the presidential elections, the resolution was keen on “underlining the importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence” (a clear objection to extending Lahoud’s term).

Ultimately, Syria ignored the international pressure and pushed Lebanon’s pro-Syrian Parliament to renew Lahoud’s presidency, which damaged the relationship between Damascus and Rafiq Hariri, who at the time was serving his second term as prime minister. The combination of international criticism of the Damascus regime, together with the gradual shifting of prominent political figures like Hariri to the anti-Syrian camp, led to the rise of serious political opposition to Damascus’ presence.

Cornered by the international community and facing the concrete rise of a Christian, Druze, and Sunni alliance against the pro-Syrian and pro-Lahoud members of government, the days of Syrian tutelage were numbered. Against this background, the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005 greatly accelerated this process by leading to mass protests organized by a new political coalition, originally including main parties like Hariri’s Future Movement, the Christian Lebanese Forces, and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) as well as smaller groups and civil society organizations. Even though Syria’s political allies and clients within Lebanon – mostly the Shiite community represented by Amal and Hizbollah and the pro-Syrian parties – reacted to this wave of anti-Syrian activism by mobilizing to show their support for the Assad regime, in the end their efforts failed to silence the anti-Damascus sentiments. The new “March 14 Coalition” (the broad anti-Syrian coalition, named for the day of their largest anti-Syrian march),
backed by the international community was responsible for pressuring the Syrian regime, leading to its withdrawal from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. With the anti-Syria demonstrations known as the Cedar Revolution and the end of Syrian tutelage, Lebanon effectively opened a new chapter of its history. However, did the revolution in fact lead to a decline in Syrian influence in Lebanon?

After the Revolution: A New (Syrian) Order (2005-2011)
The New Political Climate and the Role of the Opposition (2005-2008)
The common interpretation of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, in particular among Western analysts and commentators, is that Syria was highly involved in the murder and the Assad regime miscalculated its potential backlash. This narrative carries some weight, as before 2005 it would have been impossible to anticipate the strength of the Cedar Revolution and the determination of the Lebanese people to oust Syria. As such, it is likely that whatever element orchestrated the murder did not fully predict the backlash that unfolded in the months following the attack. However, when it comes to assessing the actual degree of “success” of such an operation and whether Syria shot itself in the foot, Syria’s perspective on the subject might differ from the mainstream analysis of the events.

In the period preceding February 2005, Damascus faced the most severe challenge to its power and influence within Lebanon, with the rise of a solid, broad, and truly cross-sectarian anti-Syrian opposition movement. This movement would have been strengthened by the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister Hariri. This possibility was seen as a serious strategic threat to Damascus, which had always centered its Lebanese strategy on a “divide and conquer” approach, taking advantage of Lebanon’s internal fragmentation and sectarian divisions to advance its own political agenda and interests. In other words, the Assad regime had reason to fear the rise of a solid opposition bloc (representing the potential demise of Syrian political influence on Lebanon) more than the end of its physical military occupation of the country.

From this perspective, the assassination of Rafiq Hariri could be seen as a last resort to stop the rise of such political opposition by depriving the nascent movement of a strong leadership figure. The hope was that without
him, preexisting rivalries and sectarian concerns would reemerge, leading to the dissolution of the opposition movement from within.

Indeed, within a few months after the murder of Hariri and the ousting of the Syrians, old divisions resurfaced and undermined the March 14 coalition. More specifically, in the period leading up to and immediately following the spring 2005 parliamentary elections, the anti-Syrian coalition started to collapse under the pressure of a rift between a sector of the Christian community and the rest of the March 14 forces.

The divorce between March 14 and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) not only managed to split the Christian community into two political constituencies, but most importantly, it denied the newly elected March 14 government the possibility of enjoying an absolute majority. Therefore, a first consequence of the internal split within the anti-Syrian forces was that even upon its election, the new government lacked the capacity to truly revolutionize the Lebanese political system in a way that could undermine Syria (for example by taking steps to disarm Hizbollah, or by deposing Lahoud as president).

In addition, regardless of the rift in the anti-Syrian bloc, the new cabinet, in order to comply with the Lebanese constitution and represent all main sectarian groups as well as not alienate a powerful political coalition, required the newly elected majority to enter into a pact with the Shiite Amal and Hizbollah and invite them to join the executive cabinet. Naturally, Shiite participation did not come for free. As leading members of the “March 8” pro-Syrian political opposition, these groups insisted on insurance from the elected majority not to enter any separate Lebanese agreement with Israel, not to take steps to disarm Hizbollah, and to publicly vow to defend the “resistance.” Thus, while protecting its own political interests, the newly formed March 8 opposition was also representing Damascus’ interests, thereby acting as the new “guarantors” of Syrian interests in Lebanon. Moreover, the tight links between the Shiite-led opposition and Damascus put Syria once again at the center of the political stage, as it was clear that without Syrian backing the March 8 forces could at any time resign from the cabinet and propel the government into a political crisis.

Influence by proxy was hence strongly reinstated by breaking up the anti-Syrian forces. Newly elected Prime Minister Fouad Siniora recognized this reality as early as July 2005 when as one of his first acts as prime minister,
he visited Damascus after Parliament passed a resolution vowing to defend Hizbollah’s right to bear arms.\textsuperscript{47}

In the post-2005 political environment, Syria relied even more on its local political allies, including pro-Syrian President Lahoud, Amal Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri, and the political opposition forces led by Hizbollah. A consequence of this new prominence of the Lebanese-Shiite militia was that the group stepped up its political activism, and for the first time since its initial participation in electoral politics in 1992 decided to join the country’s executive cabinet. Until then, Hizbollah had in fact acted solely as an opposition party, taking part in the legislative activities of the government but refusing to be a member of the executive branch. However, when Syria exited Lebanon, leaving the organization more vulnerable once the historic “defender of the resistance” was no longer directly meddling in domestic Lebanese politics, Hizbollah decided it was time to become more involved in the country’s executive cabinet. Therefore, the group decided to join the executive, first in the interim government of Najib Mikati, from April to July 2005, and then in the government of Fouad Siniora.\textsuperscript{48}

An increasingly politically active Hizbollah was a favorable development for Syria, which could count on the group to effectively represent Damascus’ interests in the political arena. This is not to say that Hizbollah was a mere puppet or proxy of Syria; that would be an exaggeration and an underestimation of both the Iranian influence on Hizbollah and the organization’s autonomy. However, the preexisting strategic alliance between Syria and Hizbollah became even more central for Damascus in the aftermath of its withdrawal from Lebanon, and the Assad regime made it a greater priority to work to safeguard the group’s political power and weapons arsenal. By strongly championing Hizbollah’s cause and by actively facilitating the transfer of weapons to the Lebanese-Shiite militia, Syria made sure that each party needed the other. Thus only a few months following the military withdrawal of Syria, Lebanon was already starting to grasp that gaining independence of Damascus’ political influence would prove a complex and daunting task.

To be sure, in this early stage the March 14 coalition’s attitude with respect to Syria was one of confrontation, albeit more on the rhetorical level than in its actual policy. This sentiment among the March 14 forces can be eloquently summed by a December 2005 statement by the Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Walid Jumblatt, where he openly
condemned Damascus’ “criminal” regime, declaring: “Let it [the Syrian regime] handle the poor Syrian people’s affairs as it wishes but let it leave us our freedom.” However, despite the rhetoric, the new parliamentary majority was not in a position to translate its calls against Syrian interference into action, as its attempts to rein in Damascus were consistently frustrated by the opposition forces led by Hizbollah and Amal. Moreover, by late 2005, General Michel Aoun and his FPM had started to drift towards the opposition, a move that led the two parties in early 2006 to enter into a “memorandum of understanding,” establishing a permanent political alliance and significantly increasing the political power and strength of the Hizbollah-led March 8 forces.

Despite facing a stronger and better organized opposition, March 14 still attempted to take concrete steps to check Syrian control and interference in Lebanon. Practically this translated into renewed calls to discuss the disarmament of all existing militias in Lebanon (Hizbollah) and a campaign to bring to justice those responsible for the Hariri assassination. With respect to the former, the March 14 forces lacked sufficient political backing to even begin to take steps to fully enforce UNSC Resolution 1559; however, with respect to investigating the Hariri assassination, March 14 scored a political victory in December 2005 by passing a cabinet resolution that asked the UN to establish an ad hoc tribunal to look into the assassination of the former prime minister. In turn, the Shiite political parties organized a two-month boycott of the cabinet to protest the resolution establishing the tribunal. Nonetheless, the March 14 forces survived the political crisis, after providing Hizbollah with renewed assurance that the government would not attempt to disarm them.

The actual degree of authority and control of the elected government was put to the test in 2006: first with the July 2006 war between Hizbollah and Israel and then with the opposition’s boycott of the cabinet beginning in the fall of 2006.

With the Second Lebanon War in July 2006, the elected March 14 government was dragged into a conventional military confrontation with the most powerful army in the region, without having been previously consulted or even informed in any way. The confrontation constituted a powerful reminder of Hizbollah’s military strength and its consistent refusal to bring its resistance agenda under a national umbrella. Syria also played a role in
the conflict by politically backing Hizbollah’s actions, providing logistical assistance to the organization through weaponry supplies, and using its leverage over Hizbollah and Lebanese affairs as a means to strengthen its position internationally.

After the war, despite the official declarations praising Hizbollah’s “steadfastness,” there was widespread irritation among the March 14 forces regarding Hizbollah’s defiance of the government. Taking advantage of the terms set forth in UNSC Resolution 1701, which brought an end to the conflict and urged Lebanon to assert full control over its territory while disarming its militias, numerous voices from the March 14 coalition started to ask for the group’s disarmament with renewed vigor and sense of urgency. For example, March 14 Industry Minister Pierre Amine Gemayel (assassinated a few months after giving this statement) said: “Hizbollah has to deliver its weapons to the Lebanese army, and its light weapons to the police. . . . Its fighters are welcome to join the military force and the state will then quickly regain control of all Lebanese territories.”

However, empowered by the popular support won by its “divine victory” against Israel and the new political alliance with the FPM, Hizbollah and its Syrian ally had no intention of complying with the government’s requests. Instead, from the fall of 2006, the March 8 opposition forces attempted to reassert their political influence by demanding that PM Siniora create a new national unity cabinet with March 8 forces (including FPM) that would grant them at least one third plus one of the cabinet seats. Being awarded two-thirds of the seats in the executive cabinet is extremely crucial in Lebanon, as the Lebanese constitution requires this absolute majority in order to pass any substantial reforms of national interest. In other words, starting in late 2006, the opposition began to demand veto power as a condition for participation in the cabinet. These calls, rejected by the elected majority and by PM Siniora, led the opposition ministers in November 2006 to resign from the cabinet, dragging Lebanon into de facto political paralysis for 18 months, until May 2008. Interestingly, the resignation from the cabinet and boycott of the government originated not so much over the question of obtaining veto power in the cabinet, but rather as a measure to stop the government from approving a protocol for the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).

From Damascus’ perspective, this political crisis was useful in at least three important ways. First, it managed to stall and challenge the process
of establishing the tribunal, which clearly represented a threat to the Assad regime. Second, it profoundly weakened the anti-Syrian government while de facto neutralizing its ability to act against Damascus. Third, it showed the international community that Syria, through its strategic partnership with the opposition forces in Lebanon, was still very much calling the shots. Simply by neutralizing the political process and not openly intervening in order to mediate, Syria was by inaction making its power and influence clear. Not surprisingly, in the months following the crisis and only two years following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the international community resumed its visits to Damascus to discuss the Lebanese crisis.\textsuperscript{56} It was Syria’s show, all over again.

Within Lebanon, the political paralysis of the cabinet also resulted in the inability of the government to elect a successor to President Lahoud, whose term had expired in 2007. On this issue, March 8 and March 14 groups failed to agree on a mutually satisfactory nominee, as the groups had mutually opposing interests regarding the office of the president (seen respectively as an opportunity to increase Lebanon’s autonomy from Syria by the March 14 coalition and as a way to ensure continuity and nominate a pro-Syrian politician by the opposition). For the majority parties, electing a president would represent a unique opportunity to consolidate their power within Lebanese politics, as well as strongly diminish pro-Syrian influences within the Lebanese arena. However, severe internal tensions and political crises prevented them from electing a pro-March 14 candidate, as the coalition lacked the two-thirds of the necessary votes in the chamber of deputies.\textsuperscript{57}

In the meantime, as the pro-Syrian forces stalled the political process, an old tactic historically used by Syria to keep its political opponents in check resurfaced to increase the pressure on the March 14 forces: a renewed wave of political assassinations. In November 2006 Industry Minister Pierre Amine Gemayel was shot dead in Beirut. In September 2007, only a week before the scheduled date for the first round of presidential elections, parliamentary member of the March 14 coalition and member of the Maronite Phalange Party, Antoine Ghanem, was killed in a truck bombing.\textsuperscript{58} Ghanem was the eighth anti-Syrian politician to be killed since 2004 and the sixth victim of political assassinations of March 14 members since February 2005.\textsuperscript{59} In all, this indicated that Damascus was feeling increasingly stronger, and that it was thereby growing more defiant both within Lebanon as well as
internationally, ignoring Saudi or US attempts to convince it to “mediate” in the ongoing crisis. An example of such defiance was President Assad’s declarations during UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s visit to Damascus in April 2007, which reiterated that stability in Lebanon was basically conditional upon Syria’s involvement, while threatening further instability and “divisions between the Sunni and the Shias” in the event of the continued UN investigations on Hariri.\textsuperscript{60}

This statement reflected Assad’s confidence in Syria’s role and position in Lebanon, which allowed him to threaten the international community even while receiving the UN Secretary General. This remark was also interesting on another level: because at that time in the investigations the only suspects for the Hariri murder were Syrians nationals and pro-Syrian (non-Shiite) politicians, the warning that the tribunal would cause Sunni-Shiite strife made little sense. Two years later, as the STL began directly implicating Hizbollah in the assassination, Assad’s declaration would – retroactively – take on a different, more disconcerting meaning.

Amid renewed assassinations and political paralysis, the situation in Lebanon in 2007 was in a downward spiral. Eventually, the escalating crisis peaked in May 2008 in a watershed event that redefined the political landscape within Lebanon and ultimately strengthened Syria’s influence and its role as main powerbroker.

**Political Ascent: It’s All about Syria, Again (2008-2011)**

In the months preceding the violent May 2008 clashes between the March 14 and the March 8 forces, the international community, and Saudi Arabia in particular, tried to persuade Syria to “convince” its Lebanese allies to end the crisis and resume normal political activities, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{61} Syria had in fact emerged strengthened by the ongoing political paralysis and had no intention of pressuring its allies to replace the government with a “more cooperative” unity government.

Syria’s perseverance paid off. In May 2008, Hizbollah reacted to attempts by the Siniora cabinet to remove Hizbollah sympathizer Wafiq Shkeir from his post as security chief at the Hariri International Airport and shut down the organization’s communication network.\textsuperscript{62} Hizbollah felt that the March 14 government had crossed a red line in an effort to defy the organization by attempting to regulate Hizbollah’s military activities. In response, the
Lebanese-Shiite militia turned its weapons inwards, against its Lebanese political foes, and quickly showed the March 14 alliance its notably superior military strength. Indeed, military power has historically been Lebanon’s strongest political currency. In this case, taking to the streets of west Beirut resulted in a political victory for Hizbollah. The clashes led the parties in May 2008 to meet in Doha, where they signed a reconciliation agreement that de facto granted the March 8 forces its main demands: veto power in the cabinet, representation of Aoun’s FMP, electoral reforms, and the election of Michel Suleiman as Lebanon’s next president.\(^63\)

The Doha agreement represented a double victory for Syria. Internationally, it helped boost the country’s position and dramatized to the world the potency of its political alliance with the opposition forces. Within Lebanon, the picture once again indicated major Syrian influence and the tides of the Cedar Revolution began to turn, further eroding the strength of the March 14 coalition. In August 2008, to mark the favorable situation and to indicate a rapprochement in Syrian-Lebanese relations, Damascus established full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Lebanon.\(^64\)

Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Doha agreement, a new tendency from within the March 14 coalition seemed to emerge to mend relations – at least somewhat – with Damascus. Druze leader Jumblatt was the first member of the coalition to demonstrate such intentions, eventually achieving a full “reconciliation” with Damascus and drifting away from the March 14 camp in the period following the June 2009 parliamentary elections.\(^65\) Jumblatt’s exit proved a hard blow to March 14, especially since the results of the June 2009 elections had once again failed to provide the anti-Syrian forces with an absolute majority. The incumbent coalition, led by Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, won 71 of the 128 available seats, but obtained only roughly 45 percent of the total electoral votes, while the Hizbollah-led March 8 coalition received the remaining 55 percent of the vote and 57 seats.\(^66\) These results confirmed the sharp split among the Christian electorate, divided between March 14 and March 8, and strengthened the demands of the opposition to once again be awarded veto power in the upcoming executive cabinet. This demand was further validated by Jumblatt’s decision to abandon the anti-Syrian coalition and reposition himself ambiguously in the “center” with President Suleiman, himself a friend of Damascus.
In November 2009, the political influence of the pro-Syrian bloc once again achieved its demands, with the creation of yet another “unity” cabinet composed of 15 members of the March 14 coalition, ten members from the Hizbollah-led opposition, and five independent candidates appointed by President Michel Suleiman (perceived as loyal to Damascus).\(^67\)

As the new cabinet was representative of Lebanon’s political reality and the strong influence that Syria and its domestic political allies held, the new government and its prime minister, Saad Hariri, recalibrated their attitude with respect to Syria to reflect the existing balance of power. Accordingly, Hariri went to Damascus in December 2009, pledging to create a “strategic partnership” with Syria in the interest of “Arabism” and “resistance against Israel.”\(^68\) Similarly, the new government increased its diplomatic visits to Syria, while investing in renewed cooperation initiatives.\(^69\) The culmination of this trend was PM Hariri’s “apology” for having prematurely accused Damascus of orchestrating the assassination of his father, Rafiq Hariri.\(^70\)

Numerous commentators, particularly in the West, were quite puzzled by this statement and failed to understand how, before the final conclusions of the UN tribunal investigations were published, Saad Hariri could bring himself to apologize to Assad’s regime. However, when looking closely at the progressive rise of power and influence of the March 8 opposition forces and the parallel rise of Syrian influence in Lebanon since its ousting in 2005, Hariri’s statement looks less surprising and more an act of *realpolitik*. The statement made even more sense when read in the context of the ongoing mediation process between Saudi Arabia and Syria over Lebanon’s response to the UN Special Tribunal.

In fact, since having been formally established in May 2007, following the Lebanese government’s request for the UN Security Council’s unilateral endorsement of its constitutive protocol,\(^71\) the UN tribunal had been working on Hariri’s assassination case, and as of the summer of 2010, rumors spread that the STL was preparing to issue its first indictments. More specifically, reliable leaks asserted that the investigations implicated Hizbollah, not Syria, in the murder, a rumor that seemed further validated when Daniel Bellamare of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon recommended that Lebanon free four pro-Syria Lebanese intelligence officials that had been detained in connection with the murder in 2005.\(^72\)
Predictably, the alleged Hizbollah involvement (later confirmed in July 2011 with the public disclosure of the indictments) only contributed to the rising tones of confrontation between March 14 and the opposition forces. Hizbollah, which from the outset was opposed to the STL, significantly intensified its campaign against the UN tribunal. First, the Lebanese-Shiite organization began to openly dismiss the STL as an “Israeli project,”73 with the group’s Deputy Walid Sukkaryieh declaring: “The credibility of the international tribunal is seriously in doubt as it has proven over time that it was politicized.”74 Second, while questioning the reliability of the STL and dismissing its records and evidence, Hizbollah also began to claim to have acquired information that directly implicated Israel in the Hariri murders, an allegation first advanced in August 2010.75

In addition to discrediting the STL, Hizbollah began preparing for the indictments, by declaring that such documents would be a “war declaration” and that the organization would refuse to hand over its members to the tribunal.76 On October 28, 2010, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said: “Copies of whatever the international investigators collect are transferred to Israel…what is taking place is a violation. The investigation is over. The indictment they say will be issued has been written since 2006. The issue is over.” Furthermore, the Secretary General argued it was incumbent on “every official in Lebanon and on every citizen in Lebanon to boycott these investigations and not to cooperate with them,”77 marking the peak of the anti-STL campaign.

While Hizbollah and its political allies were mounting this campaign against the tribunal, the March 14 forces began to increase their criticism of Hizbollah, while maintaining their support for the STL. Specifically, March 14 forces began to frame Hizbollah’s refusal to respect the STL as part of a subversive project to ultimately take over Lebanon through a coup.78 For instance, on November 3, 2010, an official March 14 statement defined Hizbollah’s anti-STL stance as part of an “anti-Lebanese intimidation campaign,” adding that “disastrous scenarios are also pumped on a daily basis with the aim of taking possession of the country for good. Hizbollah, a totalitarian party which is leading the campaign, is mistaken if it believes its conditions and its campaign will force the Lebanese to go back on their constant principles. No one has the ability to turn the clock back or cancel the national achievements made by the independence uprising.”79 In addition,
March 14 Christian leaders stressed their perspective on the potential Hizbollah takeover, adding that Lebanon is at present in “grave danger”.

Against this background of high political tensions, Saudi Arabia and Syria decided to intervene to broker a settlement between the parties and avoid the escalation of violence. From August 2010, Syria and Saudi Arabia became involved in a series of bilateral and trilateral meetings aimed at preventing the escalation of violence within Lebanon and at agreeing on a common approach regarding the STL and how to deal with the indictments once they were finally issued. At the same time, as a result of its role as “mediator,” in the same period Syria increased contact with the members of the March 14 forces, allegedly to broker a deal that would allow them to continue cooperation with the STL, while finding a loophole to shield Hizbollah from responsibility.

The Hariri “apology,” therefore, should be read in the context of the ongoing negotiating process between the government, the opposition forces, and Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Syria’s role as mediator with respect to the UN STL is especially interesting, and in part sheds light on Syria’s political victory with respect to its former protectorate. Even in the months preceding its establishment, Syria was highly critical of the idea of creating an ad hoc international tribunal to investigate the political assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Seen from Damascus, the upcoming STL seemed like a sophisticated method that the international community sought to employ to target its regime. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination, it was no secret that the international community supported creating an international tribunal as a way to finally deal with the elephant in the room: Syria’s long and unpunished history of political assassinations as a way to eliminate political adversaries.

However, as the investigations began to point at Hizbollah as the main suspect in the Hariri murder, Damascus could start to breathe a sigh of relief. To be sure, the indictments do not exculpate Syria. Quite the contrary: Hizbollah’s involvement implicates Syria by default, given both the strength of the relationship between the two parties and the extent to which Damascus controlled Lebanon during its tutelage period, elements that ridicule the possibility that a large scale operation such as the Hariri assassination could have been orchestrated behind Syria’s back.
Nonetheless, in the absence of hard evidence, Assad and his regime were at least temporarily off the hook. Without a smoking gun implicating Syria in the Hariri murder, the regime effectively avoided international sanctions and condemnation. In addition, within Lebanon it led the anti-Syrian forces to focus their efforts on singling out and criticizing Hizbollah as the main culprit and “foreign agent” attempting to take over the country, at least temporarily diminishing their public criticism of the Assad regime.

Furthermore, Syria could now freely intervene to help anchor Lebanon’s position on the tribunal by acting as mediator. The mediating role of Syria with respect to the STL clearly highlighted Syria’s solid grip on Lebanese politics through its cooperation with the opposition forces. It also represented an opportunity for Damascus to support the process of derailing the course of the investigations. In fact, even if for the time being no Syrian national has been indicted for the Hariri murder, the best insurance against any future indictments would be to undermine or obstruct the STL and its work. In this sense, although at the moment Hizbollah is the only organization implicated for its alleged role in the Hariri murder, it is likely that Assad still wants the investigation tabled just as much as does Nasrallah, if not more.

This explains why Syria’s role with respect to the STL has been far from neutral, and how Damascus has been highly supportive of the opposition’s campaign against the UN. For example, in September 2010, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem requested that the STL be replaced by an exclusively Lebanese investigative team, echoing the desire expressed by Hizbollah and the opposition forces. Even more interesting, only a week after these statements were released, a Syrian judge issued arrest warrants for 33 Syrian and Lebanese citizens, accusing them of tampering with evidence and giving false testimony in relation to the Hariri murder. Although the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon Ali Abdul Karim was adamant in explaining that the indictments were a purely judicial act with no political implications, it is easy to interpret them as part of Syria’s campaign to discredit the tribunal and the Lebanese government’s efforts to stand by it. This theory acquires particular credibility when considering that the Syrian indictments directly played into Hizbollah’s campaign to undermine the STL based on the prosecution’s alleged reliance on false testimony. Subsequent to these developments, Syrian distress over the STL and the Lebanese government’s renewed support for its work was expressed even more directly. In October
2010 Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Itri openly stated how his country views the elected government. He said: “We do not take into consideration 14, 15 or 16 since those are a house of cards.”

In the end, probably because of the strong (and mutually exclusive) interests of the mediators, the mediation efforts did not succeed. Consequently, Lebanon again found itself in the eye of the political storm in early 2011, when the prolonged disagreements over how to handle the investigations of the death of Rafiq Hariri eventually led to the official resignation from the executive cabinet of the ten ministers of the Hizbollah-led March 8 coalition and an “independent” minister who had been appointed by President Suleiman.

In turn, this caused the collapse of the national unity government led by Saad Hariri. The end of the Hariri government was followed by the rise of a new parliamentary majority dominated by the March 8 forces and the FPM, in alliance with Jumblatt’s PSP and led by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, an “independent” candidate with strong and amicable ties with Damascus. In turn and in typical Lebanese fashion, the new prime minister, after five months of internal consultations and political bargaining, finally announced the creation of a new cabinet, comprising 18 ministers from the March 8 camp, 12 independent candidates, and no members of the March 14 coalition.

With the rise of the new government, a few trends emerge with regard to Syrian involvement in Lebanon. First, the new government, despite its official declarations pledging to stand by existing international commitments, essentially guarantees that Lebanon will not enthusiastically endorse the STL and its findings, definitely a positive development for Syria. More significantly, the fall of the March 14 government and the rise of a new pro-Syrian majority and prime minister bring the country back to the pre-Cedar Revolution era, strengthening the influence of Syria on Lebanese domestic politics. In fact, Bashar al-Assad’s regime was heavily involved in the process that led to the formation of the Hizbollah-dominated executive cabinet, and Syria has been highly supportive of the new direction of Lebanese politics.

In other words, less than a decade after its initial withdrawal in 2005, Damascus has managed to reposition itself in Lebanon, obtaining a high degree of influence in the country’s domestic politics while de facto marginalizing its political opponents. Significantly, it has found a way to reach this level of political tutelage without having to redeploy a single tank.
in Lebanon. Or, as put simply by Jumblatt in January 2011: “Geopolitics dictated that we choose between the sea or going to the Arab depth: Syria.”

The return of Lebanon to Syria’s sphere of influence is a particularly valuable asset for Damascus, especially given the internal turmoil and the mounting international pressure against the Assad regime. In fact, only a few months following the collapse of the Hariri government and the reestablishment of a strongly pro-Syrian government in Lebanon, Damascus’ political ascent was brusquely stopped by the onset of the “Arab spring.” By March 2011, the immense wave of social and political unrest that brought down the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt spread to Syria, leading to massive anti-government demonstrations, first demanding substantial reforms and then explicitly calling for Assad’s resignation.

In turn, these protests were met by the regime with a combination of a (small) carrot and a (big) stick. The Assad regime reacted to the protests mostly by openly and brutally cracking down on political dissent, waging an all-out war against the protesters, refusing to relinquish control yet promising some (minimal) degree of reform. The clashes within Syria, taking the form of sectarian strife between the Alawite-dominated regime and the mostly Sunni opposition (other ethnic-religious minorities within Syria such as the Christians and the Kurds have been deliberately at the margins of the protests, fearing a backlash against their communities) have also had a strong impact on Lebanon.

First, the rising inter-sectarian tensions in Syria have resonated in Lebanon, where the March 14 and the March 8 forces have been engaged in a domestic conflict over the social and political protests in Damascus. On the one hand, Hizbollah and its political allies have stood up in defense of the Assad regime. The Lebanese Shiite organization in fact immediately showed solidarity with the Syrian regime, with the Hizbollah-controlled media waging campaigns to discredit the protest movement, for example by downplaying its size or by accusing the protesters of having been paid to take part in the anti-regime demonstrations. In addition, since February 2011, there were also reports of Hizbollah units deployed along the Lebanese-Syrian border to monitor the situation and assist Assad’s regime. However, in parallel with the progressive escalation of the violence within Syria and the seeming erosion of the regime’s capacity to put an end to the protests, Hizbollah began to adopt a slightly more nuanced stance with respect to the
Assad regime. By late August 2011, Hizbollah, while continuing to praise Syria for its role in fighting Israel, had in fact begun to publicly support the idea of implementing wide reforms in Syria, quite a change from its initially intransigent posture.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite this pragmatic change in discourse, Hizbollah still remains firmly allied with the Assad regime. For their part, the March 14 forces, and specifically the Sunni Future movement, have expended significant political capital to support the protests, while criticizing Hizbollah for its pro-Assad stance. On this matter, Saad Hariri explained the growing frustration against Hizbollah by stating: “Is there in history any resistance movement that supported an oppressive ruler against oppressed people or supported despotic regimes against peoples demanding freedom?” And, “it is shameful that Hizbollah views the Syrian uprising from the perspective of the Iranian interest, not the will of the Arab peoples.”\textsuperscript{91}

Second, in addition to heightening the internal tensions between Shiites and Sunnis within Lebanon, the crisis of the Syrian regime has led Damascus to attempt to rely on its influence within Lebanon to restore both its domestic and regional standing, as well as to project its power and influence. The growing number of violent clashes at the border between the two countries, the attacks on UNIFIL troops in May and July 2011, and the kidnapping of Estonian tourists in southern Lebanon in March 2011 are indeed seen by many analysts within Lebanon as an example of this trend.\textsuperscript{92} Accordingly, aside from a spillover of Syrian civil unrest into Lebanon, these episodes would serve Syria’s broader strategy to encourage instability in Lebanon as a way to remind the international community of the consequences of both targeting the Damascus regime or even encouraging its demise. “If Syria falls, so will Lebanon,” seems to be the message.

With the Syrian protests still unfolding and the regime in crisis, it is extremely difficult to understand the long term impact of this dynamic on Lebanon. However, if the Assad regime were indeed to fall, this would presumably mean the end of Syrian involvement in Lebanon as we know it. A new chapter in Lebanese-Syrian relations would be written. The fall of the Alawite-dominated regime and the rise of a Sunni-led new government would likely empower the Sunni community within Lebanon, while a demise of the Hizbollah-Syrian-Iranian alliance would give new life to both the March 14 forces and the Cedar Revolution.
Chapter 2

Engineering a “Resistance Axis”: The Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon

Iranian involvement in Lebanon is at once unexceptional and unique: unexceptional because in the context of domestic Lebanese politics, the direct involvement of external actors – regional as well as global – is hardly a surprising or unusual phenomenon. On the contrary, by mapping some of the most prominent partnerships between Lebanese and foreign players, this study demonstrates that Lebanon has historically been a regional playground for third parties to both intervene and compete for power and influence. Under these parameters, the Islamic Republic’s interest in the Lebanese political arena is hardly exceptional, and in fact matches the role and interests of the other major regional powers.

At the same time, Iranian involvement in Lebanon differs from that of other foreign powers in at least one important way: no other state can claim an equally solid and longstanding alliance, both ideologically and politically, with a local political actor. The relationship between Iran and Hizbollah is in this sense unique. While all major political parties in Lebanon depend to a certain degree on other regional and global actors for sponsorship and funding, none has an external relationship as pervasive or pivotal as Hizbollah’s with Iran. Similarly, no state has invested as much in local Lebanese actors as Iran has invested in the Lebanese-Shiite militia. As discussed in the previous chapter, Syria’s alliances with local actors have been characterized by an opportunistic approach; the country has shifted its support according to changing domestic and geopolitical considerations. In contrast, other alliances, such as the alliance between the Christian Maronites and Israel during the civil war, or between Saudi Arabia and the
Sunni community, have not developed as much as the Iranian-Hizbollah partnership.

This solid and special relationship, which began in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, builds upon the preexisting ties between the Shiite community of Lebanon and its Iranian counterpart. Such ties date as far back as the sixteenth century when the new rulers of Iran, the Safavid dynasty, adopted Shiism as the new official religion of their empire, moving away from the traditional version of Sunni Islam previously practiced in the area corresponding to modern day Iran. To this end, the new Safavid rulers brought Shiite clerics to their new empire to help them educate their subjects on Shiite Islam, turning to Lebanon (the Jamal Abel area), where a Shiite community was already established since the eleventh century. In the following centuries, contact between the Iranian and Lebanese Shiite communities continued, although the Lebanese community always maintained its own separate identity and over the years established stronger bonds with Iraq than with Persian-speaking Iran. Nonetheless, the common Shiite identity and the historic ties between the Lebanese and Iranian Shiites constituted the basis for the modern partnership between Iran and Hizbollah. At the same time, such a relationship, as well as Iranian interests in Lebanon, far exceeds the links created by the shared Shiite identity.

First, the connection between the Lebanese Hizbollah and Iran is ideological, and the Lebanese organization’s belief system is strongly grounded in the teachings of the Iranian Revolution. Moreover, the Iranian interest in supporting the creation of Hizbollah reflected the Islamic Republic’s early drive to export Khomeini’s revolution outside its own borders. To achieve this political and ideological objective, Iran looked very closely at Lebanon, where the fact that the Shiite community was the largest religious minority within the country, combined with the structural weakness of the Lebanese state and the vacuum of power created by the civil war, offered a particularly fertile environment for attempting to export the revolution. Indeed, within Iran, support for Hizbollah has been used to show the regime’s “purity” and adherence to the teaching of the Islamic Revolution, which suits the more conservative hardliners within the regime.

In addition, since its initial establishment Hizbollah has become strategically important for Iran, and Iranian involvement in Lebanon has focused on protecting and promoting the Lebanese-Shiite organization.
Hizbollah has served as a poster child for the Iranian Revolution, while Tehran has used the group’s resistance against Israel as a means to earn political leverage within the region, as well as to foster concepts like “pan-Islamic unity” to gain popularity in the largely Arab and Sunni region. As such, in a regional perspective, Iranian interest in Lebanon through its alliance with Hizbollah is aimed at increasing the country’s leverage when it comes to shaping regional dynamics, especially the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Finally, Tehran’s assessment of Lebanon as a proxy theater of confrontation with Israel reflects another main reason behind the Islamic Republic’s involvement in Lebanon. Along with ideological and political considerations, Iran, through Hizbollah, looks at Lebanon from a security perspective. Accordingly, Hizbollah can act not only to increase Iranian leverage with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it can also serve for power projection and deterrence against the country’s enemies.

Thus even if Iranian ties with Lebanon are not as established or extensive as those between Lebanon and Syria, Iranian interest in Lebanon, and especially in its local strategic partner, Hizbollah, is nonetheless solidly grounded in ideology, politics, and security. As such, since its creation in 1979 the Islamic Republic has taken an active role in the Lebanese political arena.

**Iran in Lebanon before Hizbollah (1943-1982)**

A common perception especially among Western analysts portrays Hizbollah as a “foreign actor” created ad hoc by the Islamic Republic to advance its objectives and impose them upon Lebanon. In fact, however, the process that led to the rise of Hizbollah should be viewed as a confluence of the ideals of the Iranian Revolution with the culmination of an internal Lebanese process of communal and religious politicization of the Lebanese Shiite population.

Since the establishment of modern day Lebanon, the Lebanese Shiites, historically concentrated in the peripheral areas of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, have been second class citizens, politically underrepresented, marginalized, economically underdeveloped, and lacking a communal ethos. It was only when these conditions slowly began to change in the 1950s that the community gradually began to join together to assert its socio-political rights. This process was triggered by the introduction of wide economic and
social reforms, which led both to the gradual improvement of the general economic conditions, and to an accelerated process of immigration and urbanization. This resulted in the internal migration of part of the Shiite community to the suburbs of Beirut. Away from their native villages and far from the overbearing authority of their local political bosses (zuama), these Shiite immigrants began to come together as a community, not motivated by religion as much as by concrete economic and social grievances. As such, the new Shiite political activism of the 1950s was mostly channeled through non-Shiite organizations like the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party.

At this stage, under the rule of the Shah, the relationship between the Lebanese Shiite community and the Iranian state was minimal and limited to the funding of a number of Shiite social institutions (such as schools). In fact, Iran was involved in Lebanon mostly to counter the appeal of ideologies deemed as radical, like Nasserism, and to ensure the regional status quo. Accordingly, the Shah was mostly allied with the Maronite Christians.

The pattern of involvement gradually started to change by the end of the decade and intensified in the 1960s, coinciding with a shift in the political mobilization of the Lebanese Shiites. This change was possible due to the rise of Musa al-Sadr as charismatic leader of the Shiite community and his distinctively Shiite political movement. Musa al-Sadr, born in Qom, Iran, arrived in Lebanon in 1957, where he became the religious leader of Tyre in southern Lebanon. Although an Iranian national, his agenda was consistently Lebanese, and although a cleric, his campaigns were directed at secular goals. His objective was to unite and empower the Shiite community, as well as increase the community’s political and social rights. Toward these aims, he did not hesitate to enter into alliances with powerful local and regional powers. For example, he solidified ties with the Assad regime in Syria by issuing a fatwa that declared the Alawites a legitimate sect within Shiism.

In this context, Sadr also engaged with the Shah of Iran, accepting Iranian funding of Lebanese Shiite social institutions, but refusing both direct payments as well as attempts to recruit him. The relationship with the Shah, however, began to deteriorate during the 1970s, with Sadr gradually becoming more critical of the Iranian government and with numerous Iranian
dissenters finding their way to Lebanon to spread their anti-Shah message and to receive military training (mostly through the PLO).16

During the early 1970s, as Lebanon gradually started to drift into civil war, the Shiite community became increasingly organized under Sadr’s leadership. This started with the creation of the first Lebanese-Shiite sociopolitical movement, the Movement of the Dispossessed, Harakat al-Mahrumim, and continued with the establishment of the movement’s armed wing in 1974, Harakat Amal. 17

The civil war, which had a disproportionately heavy impact upon the local Shiite community, and the trauma of the first Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1978 had a powerful effect upon Shiite politicization and militancy. This process was heightened in 1978 with the “disappearance” of Musa al-Sadr, who never returned from a trip to Libya, where he was likely murdered by Qaddafi’s regime. This episode fueled religious fervor among the local Shiites and was compared by some of his followers to the occultation of the twelfth Imam.18 With the disappearance of Sadr, the Shiite community found itself internally divided, with a rising group of clerics, led by mujtahid Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, criticizing Amal’s secular and moderate orientation. In contrast with Amal’s Lebanese, secular, and reformist agenda, this group – comprising mostly people returning from Iraq, where they had been active in the revivalist Shiite movement, Hizb al-Dawa19 – proposed a new stage of political activism, based on an ideology of self-empowerment grounded in a collective and transnational Islamic identity.

Although until this point the process of political mobilization was mostly a Lebanese affair, the transition from these two separate stages of political activism and the rise of Hizbollah as a transnational and revolutionary Shiite organization in Lebanon could not have developed without the Iranian Revolution. In fact, it was the message of liberation and Shiite empowerment of the Iranian Revolution and its ideological legacy and repercussions across the region that constituted the foundation for the rise of an alternative Lebanese Shiite movement.

In turn, the ideological affinity between the nascent Lebanese movement and revolutionary Iran, especially with its focus on exporting the revolution, ensured that Iranian involvement and assistance would be present from the outset. Moreover, Iranian involvement in the domestic Shiite community’s
affairs was largely seen in a positive light by the Lebanese Shiites: they understood that all the other major parties in the civil war were already backed strongly by foreign powers, and they therefore believed that Iranian involvement would help them address the imbalance. Bolstered by Iranian support, this initially loose coalition of clerics and militants eventually coalesced to form what today is known as Hizbollah, intended as a response to the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in 1982.

**Involvement Redefined: The Rise of the Partnership with Hizbollah (1982-2005)**

This brief analysis of the internal process of mobilization of the Lebanese Shiite community dispels the notion of Hizbollah as an entirely “foreign” actor. At the same time, the role and influence of Iran in facilitating the convergence of the group of revolutionary clerics and militants within Lebanon cannot be underestimated. First, the Iranian Revolution had a profound cultural impact on the Lebanese Shiites. Scholars note the “Iranization” of Lebanese communities in the early 1980s, manifested by the adoption of more Islamic mores (for instance by promoting the wearing of Iranian-styled hijabs) and generally becoming a more religiously mobilized community.

Second, the newly created Islamic Republic, by investing in the creation of Hizbollah, made sure that in addition to ideological influence the new Islamic state would have concrete leverage in Lebanon. To this end, Iran sent between 1,000 and 2,000 Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley in the early 1980s to provide the nascent militia with logistical support and training. This presence was maintained for several years, creating what is still today a strong bond between the Lebanese militia and Iran’s revolutionary elites. Short of this logistical support and generous funding, it is doubtful that Hizbollah would have risen to become Lebanon’s most powerful militia so quickly. In turn, it is most probable that in the early 1980s Iranian direct intervention was facilitated by the support of the Syrian regime. Motivated by a confluence of interests, first and foremost finding a powerful proxy to confront Israel and deny it any gains in Lebanon, Syria and Iran had a common interest in promoting the rise of Hizbollah within Lebanon.
In addition to Iran’s facilitating the creation of Hizbollah and providing training and weapons, other factors ensured that the initial partnership would be preserved over time. Ideology plays a huge role in the relationship between Hizbollah and Iran. The Lebanese organization’s core identity is Shiite, revolutionary, and Khomeini-inspired. As such, Hizbollah subscribes to Khomeini’s formulation of the Wilayat al-Faqih (rule of the jurisconsult), as unambiguously expressed in Hizbollah’s 1985 “Open Letter,” the group’s constitutive public manifesto: “We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih [jurist] who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini….Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih).” The group’s belief in this concept did not change upon Khomeini’s death; Hizbollah immediately recognized Khomeini’s successor, Ali Khamenei, as its new Supreme Leader.

Practically, this means that the Islamic Republic’s degree of influence on the organization, and specifically the role of Iran’s Supreme Leader as final internal arbiter, is both institutionalized and justified theologically by the Wilayat al-Faqih, and as such represents one of the group’s constitutive values. Two examples can illustrate this point further. When the group first wrote its ideological platform, it submitted it to Ayatollah Khomeini for approval before finally adopting it as the foundational document of the organization. Years later, when the civil war ended Hizbollah began to debate whether the group should form a political wing to compete in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections. The ad hoc twelve-member committee of leaders created to deliberate this crucial question requested the final approval of the Supreme Leader in Tehran before determining that the group was indeed allowed to join the Lebanese political system. In both cases, the final approval of the Supreme Leader made the adopted decisions binding upon both the party as well as its members. Overall, Hizbollah’s ideology is grounded in Khomeini’s teachings; the group still sees the Islamic Republic as a model of an Islamic state on earth, and the two actors share a remarkably similar view of the world and their enemies.

The depth of the ties between Iran and Hizbollah is also clear from the personal connections between the group’s leadership and the Islamic Republic’s political and military elites. Hizbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah’s personal political career and ascent to power is closely related to this solid bond with Iran. Nasrallah was elected to his current post in 1992, following the Israeli assassination of then-Secretary General Abbas al-Musawi (who was also Nasrallah’s political mentor). Following Mousawi’s death, Nasrallah assumed the post, despite being the youngest member of Hizbollah’s Shura Council and despite the existence of a religious hierarchy within the council that would have placed him at the bottom, rather than at the top. Many saw his appointment as advanced by the Iranians, who had an interest in choosing someone from the “outside” – someone who was neither an established Lebanese religious or political figure nor a member of a traditionally influential clan. In turn, this would ensure that the new secretary would develop a closer bond as well as a primary, unshakable loyalty to his Tehran “patrons.” Indeed, even after his initial election, Nasrallah’s relationship with Iran, especially with Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, was crucial in allowing him to stay in power, as it was Ayatollah Khamenei’s changing of the election rules that allowed Nasrallah to be reelected and to remain the group’s leader since 1992.

Finally, in addition to these strong personal and ideological connections, the relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Lebanese Shiite militia is also based on Iranian financial and logistic assistance to Hizbollah’s political, social, and military activities. Although the exact amount that Hizbollah currently receives from Iran is unknown, credible estimates range from $200 million to $1 billion a year, not including military assistance. Unquestionably, however, the sum is impressive, and aside from a temporary decline in the level of funding in the early 1990s, following the death of Khomeini and under the Rafsanjani presidency, assistance for Hizbollah has remained a constant priority for Iran.

Although analysts in the West focus on the military component of Iranian financial assistance to Hizbollah, just as important is Tehran’s support for the group’s social and political activities, which are in turn crucial to maintain Hizbollah’s popularity and legitimacy among the Lebanese Shiites. Indeed, Iranian help is essential to Hizbollah’s extensive social network, which encompasses educational institutions of all levels, hospitals, charities, and religious institutions, and water sanitation, construction, and agricultural programs. In addition, the Iranian government maintains a strong presence in Lebanon, with all the principal Iranian ministries having offices in Beirut.
and with the government sponsoring scholarships for hundreds of Lebanese Shiites to study for free in Iran, especially in Qom. In parallel to these social and political programs, Hizbollah has also received extensive military assistance and training from Iran, with the country being Hizbollah’s number one provider of weaponry.

Based on this mix of ideological proximity and financial dependence, the partnership between Tehran and Hizbollah continued in the decades past the organization’s initial establishment and the end of the civil war. Following the Taif agreement and the beginning of the fifteen years of Syrian tutelage, Iranian involvement in Lebanon was primarily channeled through its support for Hizbollah and its support of the resistance. This assistance was monitored and approved by Damascus, which shared with Iran an interest in promoting Hizbollah’s war against Israel, albeit for different reasons. At the same time, throughout the years of Syrian occupation of Lebanon, it was Damascus, not Tehran, that called the final shots as to how much leverage Hizbollah would have in its day-to-day activities. In fact, although Syria supported and defended Hizbollah’s armed campaigns against Israel, it also sought to curtail all other military operations, whether to contain Amal or to increase its own control over the Shiite territory and thus preserve its limited hegemony in Lebanon. Outside Lebanon, Hizbollah and Iran also maintained a similar level of strategic partnership, exemplified by the joint Iranian-Hizbollah role in plotting and executing the 1992 and 1994 attacks against the Israeli embassy and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

In other words, the 1982 to 2005 patterns of Iranian involvement in Lebanon can be easily analyzed through Tehran’s support for Hizbollah, which acted within Lebanon in a way consistent with both Syrian and Iranian foreign policy interests. Is it fair, then, to describe Hizbollah as Iran’s Trojan horse within the Lebanese system, or as an Iranian proxy?

The answer to this question is not unequivocal. On the one hand, the Iran-Hizbollah partnership is extremely solid, and Iran has a very important role in guiding Hizbollah’s long term strategy and its military and political choices. On the other hand, over the years Hizbollah has developed a large degree of autonomy in managing its day-to-day activities within Lebanon. It has invested in improving its ability to create self-sustaining and profitable enterprises, thereby increasing its autonomous financial revenues. As such,
the group has grown more independent, and while it is clear that it would by no means act against Iranian interests or that it would not begin a major shift short of Tehran’s approval, the idea that regardless of Lebanese considerations and in disregard of its own interests the group would automatically be drawn into the battlefield at Iran’s command is probably an exaggeration espoused by many political analysts in the West.

With this notion in mind, it is interesting to take a closer look at the dynamics of the Iranian-Hizbollah partnership, as well as Tehran’s involvement in Lebanon, in the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal and the Cedar Revolution.

Challenges and Opportunities: A New Chapter for Iran in Lebanon? (2005-2011)

The Iranians were not at all excited by the prospects of a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The pullout was seen as a potential threat to Hizbollah and its arsenal, as well as a way to strengthen the anti-Syrian and pro-Western domestic political forces, thus distancing Lebanon from Iran and its “axis of resistance.” In March 2005, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asef said: “It should be noted that the pressures on Syria, using the pretext of pulling out of Lebanon, is [sic] apparently a predetermined plan by the Zionist regime in order to guarantee the expansionist policies of Israel,” with Iranian government spokesman Abdollah Ramazanzadeh adding that the anti-Syrian protests were “foreign provocations that have always caused trouble in Lebanon.”

In other words, without the Syrians to back Hizbollah, Iran assessed that the resistance in Lebanon would be in danger, and therefore considered the pullout a challenge. At the same time, however, this potential threat presented the Iranians with the opportunity to take advantage of the temporary vacuum of power left by the Syrians and exploit it to increase Tehran’s influence within Lebanon.

Therefore, even though Syria and Iran have been close strategic allies since the Islamic Revolution, and despite their common outlook on most foreign policy matters, especially with respect to Lebanon, the two countries have in the past few years also competed for influence in Lebanon. Before the withdrawal, Syrian direct occupation of the country made it clear who carried the most weight in Lebanon, relegating Tehran to a supporting role.
However, following the 2005 pullout, it became in Iran’s interest to labor to increase its involvement, even if the competition with Syria is far from confrontational, and even if Iran generally coordinates and consults with Syria on Lebanese affairs, partly recognizing the Syrian prerogative over Lebanon.

Thus since the Syrian withdrawal Tehran’s strategy in Lebanon has been simple: to support the growth and rise of Hizbollah and its political allies and to seek to further institutionalize both Hizbollah’s resistance within Lebanon, as well as official Iranian-Lebanese government relations. In this context, it is easy to see how Hizbollah’s operations against Israel in July 2006, which dragged Lebanon into yet another round of military confrontations, were not part of Tehran’s plan. Hizbollah’s “miscalculation” of Israel’s reaction was not well-received in Tehran, and it is widely believed that it led the Islamic Republic to consolidate its control over the Lebanese Shiite militia.

Even so, Iran stood by its local ally in the course of the 2006 war – both at the rhetorical as well as at the practical level, for example by conducting a media campaign praising the group’s resistance and criticizing other Middle East countries for failing to rally around and help Hizbollah. In addition, Iran continued with its usual military assistance programs, providing the Lebanese Shiites with weaponry and going so far as relying on the Iranian Red Crescent to smuggle weapons and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards into Lebanon.

Similarly, Iranian military aid to Hizbollah has not ceased since the conflict; on the contrary, the Islamic Republic has invested heavily in assisting the rearming and regrouping of its Lebanese ally. First, Iran has continued to send Hizbollah funds to finance its rearmament, including increasing the amount of money transferred to the organization and creating special ad hoc funds for post-conflict military reconstruction projects. Second, Iranian military assistance since 2006 has also focused on transferring new weaponry and technology. One prominent example of the results of Iranian-Hizbollah military collaboration is the creation an alternative telecommunications network installed by Iran for the Lebanese-Shiite militia, completely outside the realm of control of the Lebanese government.

In addition, there have been a number of reports regarding the nature and extent of the new military equipment delivered to Hizbollah by the Iranians, and although it is nearly impossible to present a fully accurate account...
of Hizbollah’s current arsenal, what is certain is the reality of Tehran’s relentless efforts to provide its allies with new weapons for future military operations against Israel. Finally, the current military relationship between Iran and Hizbollah also includes logistical assistance and training, with credible reports indicating that as many as 300 fighters receive training in Iran every month, in a program launched in the aftermath of the July 2006 war.

In addition to this stable military partnership between Hizbollah and Iran, the Islamic Republic’s strategy after 2005 to increase its role and influence within Lebanon has also focused on continuing to support Hizbollah’s social and political agenda. One example is the investment of substantial funds to assist Hizbollah with the post-war reconstruction of public and social infrastructure, mostly (but not exclusively) in Shiite-dominated areas, and by publicly praising the Shiite group’s political actions.

While maintaining its direct support of Hizbollah, Iran has also gradually strengthened its relationship with Hizbollah’s political allies within the March 8 coalition. One example is the gradual rapprochement with former anti-Syrian, anti-Iranian-turned-pro-Hizbollah leader of the FPM General Michel Aoun. After solidifying his political alliance with Hizbollah and obtaining the creation of a unity government in May 2008, Aoun traveled to Tehran in October 2008. He declared that Iran was “especially helping Lebanon today in confronting its problems and achieving national unity,” and praised its positive influence on Lebanon – a posture that left members of the March 14 forces particularly puzzled. On that same visit, Aoun added that “Iran never helped one Lebanese party against the others,” not resisting the temptation to praise his new patron while taking a stab at Hariri’s Future Movement’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Similar warmth towards Iran is found in Amal’s leader and Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, who in his institutional capacity has paid a few visits to Tehran since 2005. On each occasion he urged Lebanon to upgrade its ties with the Islamic Republic. Berri’s outlook on Lebanon’s role within the Middle East was further clarified in May 2008, when he invited the Syrian and Iranian foreign ministers to take part in the parliamentary meeting appointing Michel Suleiman as Lebanon’s new president. President Suleiman himself expanded his preexisting ties with Syria and made sure to create amicable ties with the Iranian establishment. This was exemplified by his congratulatory
message in the aftermath of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s contested reelection, where he expressed his wishes to improve bilateral relations and declaring that his country was “thrilled” by Ahmadinejad’s reelection.55

In contrast, the relationship that the March 14 forces developed with Iran in the years following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is far more complex. From the March 14 perspective, the Iranian-Hizbollah partnership is problematic and the political coalition has on several occasions accused the Shiite organization of being controlled by Iran and of putting the Islamic Republic’s interests above Lebanon’s.56 Moreover, March 14 forces have repeatedly spoken against Iranian interference, manifested primarily through Hizbollah in Lebanon.57

These accusations were especially common in the period preceding the May 2008 Doha agreement and the creation of the national unity government. Indeed, after accepting the agreement (which, as shown in the previous chapter, represented a political triumph for Syria and its local allies), the March 14 forces were forced to deal with a new political environment where both Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon was de facto stronger. In this context, for example, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri agreed to discuss with Iran how to expand Lebanese-Iranian ties.58 Even after his appointment as prime minister following the June 2009 parliamentary elections, when Hariri visited Iran in his official capacity, he reiterated the strength of the bilateral ties, while having to listen to requests by Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei to improve the relations between March 14 and Hizbollah.59

However, while the institutional ties between March 14 members and Iran increased between 2008 and 2011, this did not amount to a substantial change in the political coalition’s overall suspicion of the Islamic Republic and its plans for Lebanon. Furthermore, the accusations against Iran resurfaced in the months preceding and following what the March 14 forces saw as a Hizbollah coup, resulting in the fall of the Hariri government and the rise of a March 8 government under a new prime minister, Najib Mikati. In this context, explicitly linking Hizbollah to Iran, Saad Hariri stated in early 2011: Hizbollah’s “decision, the decision of their weapons, is not in their hands, but in the hands of the external forces that provide them with arms, finance them and press on them to make the weapons dominate our lives and to control our country, its resources and its future.”60
Yet notwithstanding the shaky relationship between Iran and the March 14 coalition, the post-Syrian withdrawal years have unquestionably allowed Iran to better position itself within Lebanon. This is especially true in the aftermath of the Doha agreement when, in addition to strengthening its ties with Hizbollah’s political allies, Iran also sought to upgrade its role within Lebanon by investing in government-to-government official relations. With this in mind, Iran focused on both its diplomatic relations with Lebanon and on improving the economic partnership. Since 2006, bilateral trade between Iran and Lebanon has increased, from $78.4 million in 2006 to roughly $180 million in 2009. Although the figure is not particularly high, there has been a steady growth in bilateral trade. Similarly, the governments of Lebanon and Iran have made concerted efforts to upgrade economic ties. They adopted an economic memorandum of understanding in June 2010, paving the way for future cooperation and deciding to set joint commercial councils and a permanent government committee to monitor the growth of the economic partnership.

While upgrading economic ties, Iran and its Lebanese political allies have also promoted the idea of increasing the level of military cooperation and assistance between the Islamic Republic and Lebanon. This idea was initially raised by President Suleiman in his first visit to Tehran after the presidential election in the fall of 2008, when he reportedly asked Tehran for military assistance to better equip the Lebanese Armed Forces. Since then, the idea has been raised on several occasions by other domestic actors. Hizbollah’s Secretary General Nasrallah, on the eve of the June 2009 parliamentary elections declared: “The Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular Ayatollah Khamanei, will not hold back on anything that will help Lebanon be a strong and dignified state, and without conditions.”

The issue assumed even more prominence the following year, following the August 2010 decision by Chairman of US House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Berman to place $100 million of military aid on hold over the suspected (or at least ambiguous) relationship between Hizbollah and the Lebanese army. In response, Hizbollah immediately looked to Iranian aid and guaranteed that Hizbollah “will work fervently and capitalize on its friendship with Iran to ensure it helps arm the Lebanese military in any way it can.” Hizbollah did not have to work that fervently however, as
just a day after Nasrallah’s pledge, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmed Vahidi publicly stated that Iran was fully committed to Hizbollah.

Despite being consistently dismissed by the March 14 forces, Hizbollah’s calls for Iranian military assistance continued past the summer of 2010, with Nasrallah stating in October 2010: “The brethrens in Iran are ready to participate in projects and in financing projects [to help] in equipping the Lebanese army… We have [a] lack of equipment and armament. Well there is a country which is affectionate to Lebanon which is saying I am ready [to] help.” Following the collapse of the Saad Hariri government and the rise of the Iran-friendly Mikati government, Iranian Defense Minister Vahidi reiterated that Iran has the “full potential” to equip Lebanon’s army. Although it appears unlikely that Lebanon, at least given the current political environment, would completely turn its back on the US by accepting substantial military aid from Iran, it is significant that the Islamic Republic is presenting itself as the regional alternative for Lebanon.

Thus in the post-Syrian withdrawal era, Iran worked to increase its role in Lebanon both by continuing to support its local ally-client, Hizbollah, solidifying its ties with the rest of the pro-Syrian camp in Lebanon, and upgrading its diplomatic and economic relations with the institutional Lebanese government. The culmination of this trend was Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s October 2010 two-day trip to Lebanon. The official motive behind Ahmadinejad’s first official trip since 2005 was to sign seventeen documents on bilateral cooperation, which strengthened the Lebanese-Iranian economic partnership in several areas including energy, gas and oil policy, commerce, agriculture, and joint investments.

However, the visit should also be read as Iran’s way of emphasizing Tehran’s continued interest in playing a leading role in domestic Lebanese politics, as well as its support for Hizbollah. During his visit, Ahmadinejad was indeed adamant in declaring his support for Hizbollah and in praising the group’s “resistance” against Israel and the other “bullying countries” attempting to dominate the region. In turn, this message strengthened the idea that Iran aims to portray Lebanon as part of the “resistance axis,” which includes both the Islamic Republic and Syria, sending a message within Lebanon and regionally. Domestically, Ahmadinejad’s proclamation played directly into the hands of the March 8 camp, with Amal and Hizbollah
quickly declaring that the visit was “reinforcing resistance in the Middle East.”  

The Iranian president’s message was not lost on the March 14 forces, which all along feared that Ahmadinejad’s visit would become a platform to glorify Hizbollah and its “resistance” while undermining the anti-Syrian forces. As such, even before the arrival of the Iranian president, the March 14 coalition labeled the visit a “provocation.” Members of the political coalition elaborated on the point, explaining: “The message is that Iran is at the border with Israel…Ahmadinejad through this visit is saying that Beirut is under Iranian influence and that Lebanon is an Iranian base on the Mediterranean.”

Moreover, while Tehran’s support for Hizbollah has been a central part of Iranian foreign policy since the group’s founding, the Iranian president’s visit and his declarations nevertheless acquired much greater significance given the timing chosen to deliver this message. Ahmadinejad’s visit came only weeks before the expected release of the findings of the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon, tasked with investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. In this context, Ahmadinejad’s presence in Lebanon and his declared support for Hizbollah, along with his open questioning of the international tribunal, also constituted a warning to the March 14 government to refrain from continuing their support of the STL.

The Islamic Republic’s position with respect to the STL has been one of unequivocal condemnation, with Iran’s supreme leader referring to the tribunal as a “rubber stamp court” and adding that “any verdict it may issue is null and void…I hope the influential parties involved in Lebanon will act based on wisdom and logic so that this issue doesn’t turn into a problem.” Iran’s vitriolic attacks against the tribunal partly reflect the fact that the Islamic Republic has a direct stake in this issue: the STL’s indictments of Hizbollah members are a direct threat to Iranian interests and to its foreign policy. Iran definitely fears the discrediting or weakening of Hizbollah, which in turn would mean a decline in Iran’s political and military leverage, in Lebanon and regionally. Furthermore, the direct implication of Tehran’s protégé in the Hariri assassination casts a shadow over the Iranian establishment. Following the indictments, in fact, many have wondered: given the extensive ties between Iran and Hizbollah, is it realistic to assume
that the Shiite group would undertake such an extensive operation without consulting both Damascus and Tehran?

Under these premises, it is easy to see how Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon in October 2010 served as a clear reminder of Iran’s stand on the issue. Moreover, the visit came at a time when Saudi Arabia and Syria were the two most involved regional actors in the STL-Lebanese crisis, attempting to find a compromise between the parties on the issue of the UN Special Tribunal. The Iranian visit thus served to highlight Tehran and its stance on this issue, defusing any speculation that Iranian influence in Lebanon would decline. It is therefore not surprising that in the weeks following the president’s visit, the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon met with Syrian and Saudi envoys in Lebanon to involve Iran more prominently in the Syrian-Saudi mediation efforts.76

In sum, Ahmadinejad’s visit represented the culmination of Iran’s trend of increasing direct involvement in Lebanese political affairs. Despite the Iranian president’s conciliatory and diplomatic tone during his meetings with members of the Lebanese government, his statements and attitude when addressing Hizbollah, Iran’s local ally, revealed a different and much less nuanced agenda aimed at criticizing the UN investigations, promoting Hizbollah’s resistance, pressuring the Lebanese government to forego the option of acting against the Lebanese-Shiite group, and boosting the notion of Lebanon as part of the resistance axis.

A few months later, after the failure of the Syrian-Saudi mediation and the subsequent collapse of the Saad Hariri government, Iran saw the rise of the Mikati government as an indication that the wind was indeed blowing in Tehran’s favor. The Islamic Republic was undoubtedly pleased with the new Hizbollah-led parliamentary majority, which it also read as a sign of increased Iranian influence within Lebanon. In turn, the new Lebanese government has adopted a decidedly friendly attitude towards Iran, with Prime Minister Mikati rushing to ensure Tehran that all existing bilateral agreements would be implemented immediately,77 and with the newly appointed foreign minister declaring that Iran holds an essential role in ensuring peace and security in the region.78 Even more recently, in the summer of 2011, Lebanon reached out to Iran to help the country develop its oil and gas fields.79
With the onset of the “Arab spring,” both Hizbollah and Iran rejoiced in the demise of one of their main regional foes, Egypt under Mubarak, and with the Lebanese Shiite organization leading the way to criticize Bahrain and its government’s treatment of the Shiite protesters. This in turn prompted the March 14 forces to become increasingly worried about the consolidation of Iranian and Syrian influences on Lebanon, as well as Hizbollah’s stances on the regional developments. On this matter, in March 2011 Saad Hariri expressed concern about Hizbollah’s role and its reliance on Lebanon “as a base to fuel internal conflicts in the Arab countries.”

He explained his fears by saying: “The campaign targeting Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and all the GCC states is – to say the least – the implementation of a foreign operations order, trying to implicate Lebanon in useless regional courses that only aim at harming the interests of the Lebanese and their historical relations with their Arab brothers.” In other words, with the demise of the March 14 government, Hizbollah’s vocal declarations against Tehran’s enemies (Bahrain, Egypt) and in defense of its ally (Syria) were read as an attempt by the Lebanese Shiite organization to use Lebanon as a platform to conduct essentially Iranian foreign policy.

Are Hariri’s fears justified? Partly. It is indeed clear that with the present government, Hizbollah’s role has been strengthened and as such, Iranian influence on Lebanon is heightened. However, at the moment, this consolidation of influence is not enough to achieve a strategic realignment of Lebanon under Iran’s direct sphere of influence. This is partly a function of the pluralistic nature of Lebanese politics and the number of other foreign actors that together with Iran are competing for power and influence on the small Mediterranean country, perforce limiting Hizbollah’s leverage to impose its will on the rest of Lebanon. In addition, although it is true that Hizbollah’s rise reflects positively on the role and influence of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon, the process that led to this phenomenon has been largely directed and monitored by Damascus, rather than Tehran. In the past years Syria has asserted its strong power in Lebanon, and despite the current difficulties of the Assad regime, Syria has no intention of relinquishing its grip on Lebanon to let Iran acquire greater control.

This concept was clearly explained by Bashar al-Assad himself in October 2010, in an interview released only a few weeks after Ahmadinejad’s triumphant visit to Lebanon. In the interview he explained that the Iranian
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends

The president’s visit made him wary of a new Middle East where the Iranian and Turkish rise were matched by a general Arab weakness. Reading between the lines, Assad was responding to a perceived marginalization of Syria and asserting the importance of strengthening the role of the Arabs – led by Damascus – in the new Middle East. This role, in Assad’s view, was nowhere as important as in Lebanon. Indeed, he insisted on the importance of Lebanese-Syrian ties and asserted that Iranian involvement in Lebanon was centered on macro issues like the resistance, but that the country was not concerned with the fine points of Lebanese reality. In contrast, Syria, thanks to its deep knowledge of the Lebanese context and to its decades spent in Lebanon, was better equipped than Iran to deal with the “micro level.” In other words, Assad was intent on conveying to Tehran that continued support of Hizbollah is all well and good, but when it comes to running the show in Lebanon and on working on the day-to-day functioning of the country, nothing should stir without Syria’s approval. In the short term, Syria will act as a constraining force to the rise of Iran, although the competition between the two actors should not be overestimated, as both Tehran and Damascus share a similar outlook on most foreign policy matters, including Lebanon.
Although a large portion of the relevant academic literature focuses on the role and influence exercised by Iran, Syria, and Israel on Lebanon, the reality of Lebanese politics is more complex. Specifically, Lebanon, as a regional bridge within the Arab world and as a result of its multi-faceted identity, has always attracted the attention of a large number of international actors. In other words, even beyond the more obvious activism of the “usual suspects,” other regional and global powers have been equally involved in Lebanese domestic politics, trying to influence its course and gain a place under the Lebanese sun. As such, it is possible to trace important links between virtually every country in the region – from Libya to Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain – and at least one specific Lebanese political or ethnic group.

This chapter’s focus is on the regional and global actors other than Syria and Iran that have, especially in the post-Syrian withdrawal era, played the most prominent role within Lebanon: Saudi Arabia, the United States, and France. Finally, the chapter will devote some attention to the dynamic relationship between Lebanon and the State of Israel, looking more specifically at the role the latter has been played since the 2005 Syrian withdrawal.

**Saudi Arabia in Lebanon: A Counterweight to the “Resistance Axis”?**

*The Beginning: Saudi Involvement in Lebanon (1976-2005)*

Saudi Arabia’s interest and involvement in Lebanon – much like in the cases of Syria and Iran – is grounded on a number of ideological, political,
and geo-strategic factors. First, the regime feels a sense of kinship with the Lebanese Sunni community, a link that has been strengthened, especially in the aftermath of the civil war, by the ongoing ties between the local Sunni community and the Kingdom, where Lebanese Sunni elites and members of the middle class have studied, worked, and developed personal and professional relations. A particularly significant example of how a shared religious identity combined with businesses relationships and personal ties has contributed to solidifying the bond between the Saudis and the Lebanese Sunnis is the case of the Hariri family. The ties between the Hariris and the Saudis developed since the early 1990s and became an important element in the dynamics of Saudi involvement in Lebanon. In other words, identity politics and strong personal ties are important factors in accounting for Saudi Arabia’s direct involvement in Lebanese domestic politics, as well as in explaining the patterns of such involvement (i.e., the Saudis’ role as supporters of the Sunni community in general and the Hariri family and its Future Movement, in particular).

Second, Lebanon has come to represent something of a proxy for the Saudis as it faces its biggest regional competitors, both Iran and Syria, and it is impossible to understand Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the small Mediterranean country short of grasping this geo-strategic dimension. Accordingly, the Kingdom’s strategy in Lebanon has been shaped by its political and security perception of the regional challenges and by the policies devised to tackle them. This is why in order to understand the shifts in Saudi Arabia’s Lebanon policy, it is important to look at them through the prism of the changing relations between the Kingdom and other regional actors, especially Syria and Iran. In addition, it is crucial to keep in mind the Kingdom’s persistent sense of its own vulnerability and its related strategic concern to preserve a favorable regional balance of power, while preventing both regional instability and the spread of revolutionary movements.

Saudi Arabia’s role as an essentially reactionary regional power influenced its role in the Lebanese civil war, where Riyadh disregarded its natural allies – the Palestinians and the Lebanese Muslims – to offer behind-the-scenes support to the “forces of restoration” led by the Christian militias. Although this alliance seems quite surprising given the Kingdom’s self-portrait of its regime as the primary defender of Islam, it was indeed perfectly in line with the Saudis’ core interest of preventing both the creation of a radical regime
led by the PLO and its Lebanese allies, as well as the collapse of Lebanon, as the spreading radicalism and instability was perceived as a threat to the regime and its survival.

Following this initial posture, the country was mostly involved in the Lebanese civil war through the Arab League, serving in the role of mediator. It was a strong supporter of the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF), created by the League in Riyadh and deployed in Lebanon from 1976. However, this involvement did not translate into a concrete increase in the Saudis’ direct power and influence over Lebanon. The Syrians in fact used the ADF as a tool to consolidate their role in Lebanon, and through a combination of political assassinations, reliance on proxies, diplomatic pressure, and direct military and political intervention, they easily eclipsed any other foreign power, including Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis did not challenge the rise of Damascus’ hegemony in Lebanon outright; on the contrary, they were careful not to rally against the Syrians, and even to endorse their role and presence publicly. This reaction was in line with Riyadh’s strategy with respect to Damascus, which focused on creating a working relationship with the Syrians, an objective that it sought to achieve by providing substantial financial assistance to the Assad regime ($1.6 billion annually by the late 1970s). In turn, this relationship, which was not based on any shared political ideology or mutual respect, rather on Riyadh’s desire to appease a potential enemy, had a direct impact on Lebanon, as the Saudis’ endorsement of the Syrians became an important source of Pan-Arab legitimacy for the Assad regime.

This Saudi-Syrian entente over Lebanon bore fruit in Taif, where the Arab League and the Saudi mediation efforts to end the civil war led to the signing of the agreement. This allowed Lebanon to emerge from its bloody civil war, but at the same time prepared the terrain and institutionalized Damascus’ presence in the country.

The years of the Syrian tutelage between 1990 and 2005 continued to elicit the same pattern of Saudi Arabia’s tacit (and at times public) endorsement of Damascus’ role in Syria. In addition, the Saudis continued their unlikely cooperation with the Syrians in Lebanon by generously assisting the post-civil war reconstruction of Lebanon. This included investing more money in Lebanon than did any other Arab state and diversifying the economic assistance through loans, grants, investments, and a number of other types
of economic assistance. The Syrian economy also benefited from Saudi assistance, both by direct monetary aid and by taking advantage of Lebanon’s development: for instance, one million Syrian workers were allowed into Lebanon after the civil war, guaranteeing a strong influx of remittances.

This massive amount of economic assistance and public endorsement was not cost-free for Syria: in return, the Kingdom expected Damascus to guarantee basic Saudi interests within Lebanon and allow for the rise of the Sunni prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Hariri, a self-made billionaire, had made his fortune in Saudi Arabia while developing strong personal connections to the Saudi elites. Hariri returned to Lebanon after the end of the civil war, armed with a Saudi passport, strong political backing in Riyadh, and a new political outlook on Lebanon, based on economic liberalism and reform. The political ascent of Hariri during the 1990s was strongly backed by the Saudis, who saw him as a crucial ally in Lebanon. He was also able to develop a working relationship with the Syrians, one that was further strengthened by the creation of an ad hoc economic partnership between the Sunni magnate and members of the Syrian intelligence and defense apparatus in Lebanon.

During his first term as prime minister, between 1992 and 1998, Hariri was able to maintain a relatively balanced relationship with Damascus, preserving the status quo agreement between Syria and Saudi Arabia. However, this Saudi-Syrian relationship began to disintegrate slowly in the following decade, in tandem with the progressive deterioration of the relationship between Damascus and Hariri during his second term as prime minister (2000-2004).

The year 2000 redefined Lebanese and Syrian politics due to at least two critical developments: the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, which encouraged domestic voices against the continuation of the Syrian occupation; and the death of Hafez al-Assad and the rise of his son Bashar. Bashar lacked the diplomatic skills of his father and he succeeded in damaging Syria’s relationship with part of the Lebanese elite – at the same time that Syria’s position internationally was also more precarious in the aftermath of 9/11 and given Syria’s involvement in assisting Iraqi insurgency in 2003.

With the progressive deterioration of both Syria’s role internationally and its relationship with Hariri and his political entourage in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia slowly abandoned its traditional policy of endorsement of Syrian tutelage, and gradually began to pressure Damascus to allow greater
freedom within Lebanon. When Syria continued to ignore Saudi calls to allow for internal reforms and to refrain from extending the presidential term of General Émile Lahoud, the Saudis decided to back the United States and France in pushing the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1559.11

This cooling of relations between Damascus and Riyadh continued when the Syrians, irrespective of the UN resolution and international pressure, extended Lahoud’s presidency, triggering the creation of a powerful anti-Syrian domestic coalition. With Damascus making little to no effort to repair the rift between its regime and the Sunni Lebanese community – led by Hariri – following the extension of Lahoud’s presidency, it was inevitable that Syria-Saudi relations would deteriorate further and undermine the Saudi endorsement of Syrian tutelage. This shift in Saudi Arabia’s strategy with respect to Lebanon became obvious following the assassination of Saudi Arabia’s longtime protégé Rafiq Hariri. Hariri’s murder was read by Riyadh as a hostile act undertaken by Syria: it fundamentally changed the Saudis’ view of Damascus’ presence in Lebanon, and undermined the unwritten Syrian-Saudi agreement over Lebanon and the traditionally friendly approach by the Saudis to Assad’s regime. In other words, the gauntlet was thrown – or were they?

**Saudi Involvement in Post-Hariri Lebanon: Missed Opportunities? (2005-2011)**

In the short term, the answer to the question of emergent hostilities is definitely affirmative. The Saudis were both infuriated and shocked by the killing of their closest Lebanese ally and were determined to expose the perpetrators. This meant urging the Lebanese authorities to find those behind the murder, while strongly pushing for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Clearly, these two objectives were interrelated in the Saudis’ mind, as despite the lack of formal accusations12 there was little doubt among the Saudis that Syria was behind or at least involved with assassinating Hariri. Therefore, in the months between the Hariri assassination and the Syrian withdrawal in April 2005, Riyadh assumed a resolute stance in demanding Syria’s complete withdrawal from Lebanon.13 This in turn provided the nascent March 14 movement and the Sunni community an additional level of legitimacy to continue their political demonstrations against the Syrians, further eroding Assad’s regional backing. Even following the Syrian withdrawal, the
Saudis were not ready to resume their cordial relationship with Damascus: in fact, the Saudis continued to endorse the idea of political change within Lebanon, both by refusing to take steps against the establishment of the UN Independent Investigation Commission tasked to look into the Hariri murder,\textsuperscript{14} and by supporting the March 14 coalition.

In the aftermath of the murder, the relationship between the Saudis and the Hariri family continued unaltered. The bonds with the emerging leader of the Future Movement Saad Hariri were quite strong, as Saad, himself a Saudi citizen, enjoyed virtually the same level of closeness with Riyadh as did his father. Similarly, the March 14 government elected in the spring 2005 elections and headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora had an especially good relationship with Saudi Arabia. Siniora explained that “there are unique relations between Lebanon and Syria and also unique relations between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.”\textsuperscript{15}

Keeping these close ties in mind, it is possible to see how in the period following the Hariri assassination, the Saudis continued to put pressure on Damascus both to change their ways with respect to Lebanon (i.e., end their campaigns of political assassinations) and to cooperate with the ongoing UN investigations of the Hariri murder. The latter involved in part not obstructing March 14 hostile feelings with respect to the Assad regime. An example of this strategy was in Saad Hariri’s declarations praising the preliminary results of the UN investigation, which were released in October 2005 and which implicated several high-ranking Syrian officials in the murder.\textsuperscript{16} Although the Saudis did not publicly endorse the report, Saad Hariri, while on a diplomatic trip to Saudi Arabia, openly praised it and reiterated his commitment to finding all the perpetrators, suggesting that he had the Saudis’ blessing (if not encouragement) to take such a stand.

At the same time as standing behind the March 14 forces and their anti-Syrian declarations, however, the Saudis also remained directly engaged with Damascus. For example, they attempted to increase Damascus’ cooperation with the UN\textsuperscript{17} by seeking to broker a “normalization” of relationships between Beirut and Damascus.\textsuperscript{18} These efforts had several aims: the Saudis wanted to establish their power and influence regionally, reinforce the country’s relationship with Lebanon and its leaders, and at the same time, pressure the Assad regime while still preserving a working relationship with it. The reason behind this “moderate” approach with respect to Syria
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends

was twofold: on the one hand, Riyadh has a strong distaste for revolutions and instability, and as such, preferred to “reform” Assad rather than see a regime change within Syria. In addition, Syria’s increasing international and regional isolation in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination pushed Damascus directly into the arms of the Iranians, a development that the Saudis did not particularly welcome.

In the end, however, the Saudi efforts and their middle-of-the-road approach did not succeed. The Syrians were not cornered into pledging to collaborate with the UN investigations, nor did they feel the need to cede their growing ties with Iran while continuing to engage with Saudi Arabia; concomitantly, they maintained their aggressive strategy with respect to Lebanon. Moreover, by the spring of 2006 the regional momentum to pressure Assad was beginning to dissolve, with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia holding “conciliatory” meetings with Damascus and with the Arab League pledging “solidarity with Syria.”

In this context, the beginning of a new round of hostilities between Hizbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006 served to rekindle the Saudi efforts both to support the Lebanese government and the March 14 forces, and to contain the role and impact of Iran and Syria in Lebanon, wielded through Hizbollah and its local pro-Syrian allies. Therefore, the Kingdom was quite firm in its condemnation of Hizbollah, declaring, “It is necessary to make a distinction between legitimate resistance [to occupation] and irresponsible adventurism adopted by certain elements within the state.” Understandably, the Saudis were keen on distinguishing between their stance and that of the US and other traditional Israeli allies. Meanwhile, other voices from the Gulf conveyed a similar attitude toward the “axis of resistance”: “People of Arab countries…have been held hostage for a long time in the name of ‘resisting Israel’…This war was inevitable as the Lebanese government couldn’t bring Hizbollah within its authority and make it work for the interests of Lebanon.” Furthermore, a leaked cable from the summer of 2010 suggests that the Saudis had proposed the creation of an ad hoc Arab force, backed by NATO and the US, to be dispatched to Beirut to restore order and curb Hizbollah.

The March 14 government was highly appreciative of the Saudi position, especially after the passage of UNSC Resolution 1701, which promised to facilitate the government’s attempts to limit Hizbollah and reestablish
control of southern Lebanon. However, the momentum for eroding Hizbollah legitimacy, along with the legitimacy of its Syrian and Iranian patrons, never materialized in Lebanon. Far from being politically weakened by the war, Hizbollah mounted an offensive against the Lebanese government in the months following the summer 2006 hostilities, which eventually led to the November 2006 political boycott of the Siniora government, precipitating Lebanon into 18 months of political paralysis.\(^{25}\)

Saudi Arabia displayed renewed activism in this period: the Saudis in fact began stepping up their role in Lebanon in August 2006, following the Syrian president’s speech, which characterized those rulers who criticized the “resistance” in Lebanon as “half men.”\(^{26}\) On the one hand, this activism translated into renewed support for the government and into renewed economic assistance to the country.\(^{27}\) On the other hand, the Saudis attempted to increase their direct dealings with both the Iranians and the Syrians, with the objective of breaking the political impasse caused by the political boycott orchestrated by the Hizbollah-led March 8 coalition. As early as January 2007, Saudi Arabia held meetings with Hizbollah in Riyadh and conferred with members of the Iranian government over the Lebanese situation;\(^{28}\) this was in the hope of achieving a settlement that in turn would also help Riyadh stop the rise of the Syrian-Iranian axis within Lebanon. However, short of Syrian agreement,\(^{29}\) the deal was never brokered, leaving the Saudis with the challenge of yet again having to bring Damascus on board and have the Syrians persuade their domestic allies to end the crisis. However, such an endeavor was fruitless, as the Syrians had little incentive to stop the protest, which served as a powerful tool to demonstrate the renewed grip of the Assad regime on Lebanon. Ultimately, the negotiations went nowhere, leading to a deterioration of relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia and prompting the Saudis to pledge to organize a boycott of the Arab League’s meeting, scheduled to be held in Damascus in March 2008, short of Syrian collaboration on ending the Lebanese crisis.\(^{30}\) This move was also the result of a joint US-Saudi push in March 2008 to end the Lebanese crisis, by attempting to persuade the Syrians to agree elect a new president for Lebanon.\(^{31}\)

However, once again, the failure to obtain a true mobilization against the Syrian strategy in Lebanon at the regional level, combined with the solid grip by Damascus (and Tehran, through its local ally, Hizbollah) on
Lebanon’s political destiny through control of opposition forces ensured that the Saudis returned to Riyadh empty handed.

In this context, Hizbollah’s temporary takeover of West Beirut in May 2008 and the subsequent ratification of the Doha agreement served as powerful reminders of where the power in Lebanon truly lay. Moreover, Hizbollah’s military operations showed the Saudis that in the past few years, the Iranians and their local ally had indeed become a quasi-army – certainly a seriously powerful force to be reckoned with. Riyadh was profoundly displeased with the Iranian rise in Lebanon; it reacted to the May 2008 events by condemning Hizbollah and stating, “For Iran to back the coup that happened in Lebanon and support it will have an impact on its relations with all Arab countries.”

Therefore, following May 2008 and recognizing the existing balance of power within Lebanon, the Saudis decided it was time to redefine their strategy with respect to Lebanon. Most importantly, this change occurred following the ratification of the Doha agreement, which the Saudis helped broker. Ultimately the agreement was finalized under the auspices of Qatar (perceived by all parties, and specifically by Iran and Syria, as more neutral than Riyadh), a development that was not entirely pleasing to Saudi Arabia, which would have preferred to continue with the role of mediator. In the months following Doha and the subsequent creation of a national unity government (which in practice further institutionalized the role and influence of Iran and Syria through their domestic allies), the Saudis moved away from their previous strategy aimed at isolating and pressuring the Syrians. Implemented since 2006, it seemed that the efforts to curtail Damascus’ influence in Lebanon had not been successful. They had failed to lead to a regional mobilization against Assad; in fact, they had only resulted in strengthening the Syrian-Iranian axis and the role of Tehran in Lebanon.

To reverse this trend, the post-Doha Saudi strategy was aimed increasingly at engaging the Syrians, trying to bring them closer to Riyadh, and in doing so, taking a stab at their main regional enemy, Iran.

In the Saudi mindset, the potential rise of a Shiite-crescent encompassing Iran, Lebanon, and possibly Iraq presented a nightmarish scenario, especially if combined with the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program. In this context, the Saudis gradually started to invest in their relationship with the Assad
regime, a move that would also lead to the gradual rapprochement between the Syrians and prominent members of the March 14 coalition.

These reconciliation efforts began to become especially pronounced in the months following Israel’s war in Gaza (December 2008-January 2009) and led to increased contact with the Syrians, the Lebanese opposition forces, and Hizbollah. This reconciliation process peaked in October 2009 with King Abdullah’s trip to Damascus, a visit that also led to the issuing of a joint Saudi-Syrian statement calling on Lebanon to break its domestic political impasse over the creation of an executive cabinet. Not surprisingly, only a few weeks after this declaration, which signaled that Damascus and Riyadh had managed to find an agreement over the future composition of the Lebanese executive cabinet, a new prime minister, Saad Hariri, announced the formation of the cabinet, five months after the June 2009 parliamentary elections.

The Syrian-Saudi cooperation seemed mutually convenient: on the one hand the Saudis were satisfied with the resumption of normal political life within Lebanon, boosting both internal stability as well as the role of the March 14 forces, the country’s closet local political allies. However, the deal was even more advantageous for the Syrians, as it allowed them to remain at the center of the Lebanese political stage – through its local political allies and veto power in the cabinet – while de facto obtaining Saudi recognition of their Lebanese prerogative. Furthermore, Syria did not have to disengage from Iran or Hizbollah in order to enjoy the Saudi rapprochement, enjoying the best of both worlds. Syrian-Saudi relations continued on this track in early 2010, additionally boosted by the two countries’ cooperation during the March 2010 elections in Iraq, and reaching another important stage in the summer of 2010. During this period, rumors regarding the alleged implication of Hizbollah in the Rafiq Hariri murder started to circulate, bringing the STL to the center of the Lebanese political stage once again. This time, however, despite the previous Syrian-Saudi animosity over this issue, the two countries immediately stepped in to mediate the issue, reclaiming their self-appointed roles as Lebanon’s powerbrokers.

In the fall of 2010, Damascus and Riyadh held a number of meetings regarding the STL question. The Saudis were reportedly trying to broker a behind-the-scenes deal that would have allowed the Special Tribunal to continue to function, in exchange for the prime minister’s assistance in...
exonerating Hizbollah as an organization (for example, by validating the far-fetched thesis that the perpetrators were rogue elements without institutional backing). It was in this context that PM Hariri allegedly agreed to issue the infamous “Syrian apology;” while admitting that the investigation initially had been compromised by “false witnesses.” This issue was later used by the opposition to paralyze the cabinet and eventually bring down his government. However, with Syrian-Saudi negotiations underway, Iran, the excluded party, raised its public involvement in Lebanon, for example, through Ahmadinejad’s visit in October 2010, de facto demanding to be included in the “mediation.” Therefore, in early November, the Iranian, Syrian, and Saudi ambassadors met in Beirut to discuss the implications of the STL indictments, a move that was also meant to acknowledge that Tehran wanted to be a part of any agreement reached on the issue. This process reportedly led to the creation of a Saudi-Syrian “paper” that would have guaranteed the continuation of the Hariri government, in exchange for the formal cessation of any cooperation between Lebanon and the STL, along with a formal request to halt the judiciary process and with a guarantee of the prime minister’s public backing of Hizbollah. If reached, this deal would have been a decisive victory for the Syrian-Iranian axis and a very modest accomplishment for the Saudis.

However, in the end the Syrian-Saudi deal was never formalized, according to some reports in part because of direct US pressure on both the Saudis and the March 14 forces to continue in their complete commitment to the STL. With the fall of Saad Hariri as prime minister and the rise of the Mikati-Hizbollah government, the Saudis saw Damascus and Tehran’s influence on Lebanon soar – a worrisome development for Riyadh. This is true even if it is unlikely that the new government could have been approved short of minimal guarantees to the Saudis. In addition, the Saudis already had a preexisting relationship with Prime Minister Mikati, himself a Sunni businessman who had no particular interest in alienating the Saudis.

In the months following the creation of the Mikati government, relations between the Syrians the Saudis also began to deteriorate. This process was exacerbated as civil unrest broke out in Syria and the Assad regime reacted by accusing both March 14 and Saudi “agitators.” In turn, both March 14 forces as well as the Saudi media have adopted an increasingly critical stance with respect to the Assad regime, arguing in favor of internal change in Syria.
Similarly, the relations between Syrian and Iranian domestic allies were strained over the issue of the protests in Bahrain. In fact, Hizbollah sharply condemned what the group saw as “excessive” use of violence against the protestors in the tiny Gulf state, eventually prompting Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid Bin-Hamad al-Khalifa to declare that they would hold Lebanon responsible for such statements and that if the criticism continued, it would directly affect the bilateral relations. Understandably Saudi Arabia, which both politically and militarily was heavily invested in stopping the protests in Bahrain, was not pleased by the Iranian protégé’s campaign in favor of the Bahraini Shiites. Saudi Arabia might also have feared a spillover to the Saudi Shiite community, which although numerically less significant still comprises roughly 75 percent of the population of the oil-rich areas of eastern Saudi Arabia.

However, the future role and impact of both Saudi Arabia and its regional adversaries in Lebanon are very much undecided: both the ongoing civil unrest in Syria and the potential implications of the STL indictments on Hizbollah leave the Saudis and its domestic allies with the hope that the tide of Lebanese domestic politics will turn once again.

Assessing Western Influence: The US and France in Lebanon

Early Patterns of Involvement in Lebanon (1976-2005)

Foreign powers have always been involved in the complex state of domestic Lebanese politics, mostly by creating ad hoc political alliances with local parties and sectarian groups and taking advantage of the country’s internal divisions. However, not all countries have shown the same level of interest and commitment. Of all the Western countries and actors that have been involved in Lebanon, two are particularly prominent: France and the United States.

France’s interest in Lebanon clearly surpasses that of all other EU countries, mostly due to its historical, cultural, and linguistic connections with the small Mediterranean state. Modern day Lebanon came about during the post WWI French protectorate as a way for the French to create a safe haven for the Lebanese Christians; since then, there have been strong connections (cultural, religious, and linguistic) between the Maronite community and France. Moreover, aside from these cultural ties, France still sees former Middle Eastern colonies, including Lebanon and Syria,
as areas where it can exercise strong political and diplomatic influence. In addition, the country has maintained special political, economic, and even personal ties with Lebanon. In recent decades, for example under the presidency of Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), Lebanon became an especially important priority in French foreign policy. This was due in large part to the unusually strong personal ties between the French president and Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri.

The United States, in contrast, does not have a deep historical bond with Lebanon, nor in the course of the past decades has it ever considered Lebanon a top foreign policy priority. Lacking in natural resources, internally divided, and prone to conflict, Lebanon has been seen by the United States mostly in instrumental terms. In other words, policy decisions regarding Lebanon have been made through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship with Syria, mostly looking at Lebanon as a bargaining chip in the broader issue of Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

This has been especially true since 1983, following two direct interventions – in the late 1950s and again in the early 1980s. Since then, the US has primarily decided to avoid intervention in Lebanon’s complex internal politics, a trend that was partially reversed in the post-9/11 period of increased political activism in the Middle East. Since the 2005 Cedar Revolution, the US has maintained an interest in Lebanon, as the existence of a “pro-democracy,” Western-friendly government is seen as a strategic asset, both strengthening democracy at the regional level and frustrating the ambitions of its regional foes, Syria and Iran. Clearly this ideal of Lebanon as a “regional model” is now somewhat undermined by the gradual political demise of the March 14 forces, but nonetheless the country remains under Washington’s close watch. At the same time, however, to a certain degree the US administration remains reluctant to step up its involvement.

This was not always the case. As early as 1958, it was direct US intervention, in response to the calls by Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, which allowed the government to prevent the outbreak of a civil war between the political establishment and the pro-Nasser Arab forces led by Sunni and Druze Muslims and generously supported by states such as Syria and Egypt. That intervention was a direct consequence of the Eisenhower doctrine on the Middle East, which specifically placed assisting the “preservation of independence and resistance to subversion” in Middle
Eastern states under the rubric of “vital interests” – a Cold War foreign policy formulation aimed at stopping any other country in the region to pursue the Egyptian path and gravitate towards the USSR’s sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{54}

Dispatching US marines in Beirut in 1958 was a success: it stopped the spread of “subversive ideologies” and it restored calm. However, it did not achieve long term stability and did not prevent the country from slowly drifting into a civil war. With the outbreak of hostilities following 1975, both the United States and France took a similar approach to Lebanon: first approving the deployment of a UN-backed force, and then backing direct military intervention. The US was in fact a strong backer of the creation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), formed in reaction to the 1978 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{55} France was equally supportive of UNIFIL and sent the most soldiers to contribute to the first UNIFIL unit.\textsuperscript{56} In parallel, the US expended substantial political capital to restore calm, first by brokering an informal agreement between Israel and Syria, de facto dividing their role and influence in Lebanon,\textsuperscript{57} and after 1982, by pushing for an Israeli-Lebanon peace agreement. However, these efforts were frustrated by Syrian efforts to foil the deals, as any agreement not directly approved by Damascus would have been a severe blow to Syria’s hegemonic claims over Lebanon.\textsuperscript{58}

Following this initial diplomatic involvement, and as the civil war continued to escalate, the international community decided in 1982 to step up its role and in response to a request by the Lebanon government send a multinational force to Lebanon. The mission was headed by the US and included troops from France, Italy, and the UK.\textsuperscript{59} This intervention was substantially different from the limited yet effective 1958 military operation: the multinational force was soon drawn into the Lebanese civil war. After gaining a reputation for fighting with the Christians against the Shiites, it became the target of numerous attacks organized mostly by Hizbollah through its proxy organization Islamic Jihad. These attacks included the April 1983 suicide operation against the US Embassy in Beirut, and the showcase barracks bombings in October 1983 that killed 241 US and 58 French paratroopers.\textsuperscript{60} In addition, these years saw several kidnappings and murders of both US and French diplomats in Lebanon.

The attacks were effective in expelling the international community from Lebanon, and by 1984 the chapter of US activism in Lebanon was effectively
terminated. Indeed, although along with Saudis and the Syrians the US engaged in the process that led to the ratification of the Taif agreement, the US de facto diminished its involvement in Lebanon in the post-1984 years, further consolidating the rise of Syrian limited hegemony. Moreover, following Syrian cooperation in the Gulf War, both the US and its European allies, including France, turned a blind eye to the creation of a Syrian protectorate in Lebanon. In the years of the tutelage both European and US diplomacy with respect to Lebanon was conducted either in consultation with the Syrians or via Damascus directly, thus contributing to both legitimizing and institutionalizing the Syrian occupation.

This paradigm slowly began to shift in the new millennium, however, partly in light of the post-9/11 shift in US foreign policy, with its increased emphasis on both “democracy promotion” and holding states supporting terrorist groups, like Syria, accountable. In this context, reports regarding Syria’s involvement in helping the Iraqi insurgency after the US invasion in 2003 strengthened the impulse to hold the Assad regime more accountable for its actions. Consequently, the US began to reconsider its policy on Lebanon, gradually beginning to argue in favor of a Syrian withdrawal. In addition, the Bush presidency supported the passing of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of December 2003, demanding Syrian withdrawal and addressing the issue of economic sanctions against the regime. At this stage Lebanon was seen only as a pawn in a larger regional game; the demands for withdrawal were finalized more to keep Syria in check rather than to promote Lebanese sovereignty per se.

At the same time, while the US was focusing on Lebanon as a means to pressure Damascus, France began to focus increasingly on the Assad regime’s “excessive” meddling in Lebanese affairs. When Hafez al-Assad was succeeded by his son, Paris adopted a friendly stance towards Bashar, partially sheltering Syria from the increasingly harsh stance adopted by the US in the post-9/11 world. It is no secret that France was not supportive of the Bush administration’s neoconservative foreign policy agenda. In this sense, France’s opening to Damascus was both in line with this political disagreement and a way to reclaim its traditional influence in Lebanon and Syria. However, Chirac’s opening to Bashar did not deter the new Syrian ruler from disregarding the French advice not to press for the extension of President Lahoud’s term, which in turn aggravated relations with Paris as
well as with the Saudis and with PM Rafiq Hariri – himself a close friend of Chirac.

The Syrian posture with regard to France was especially puzzling considering not only the relatively friendly position Chirac assumed toward Damascus, but also the central role France took in the early 2000s in increasing economic assistance to Lebanon. In 2001 and 2002, for example, France organized large international conferences (Paris I and Paris II) to help Lebanon deal with its soaring internal debt.64

In retrospect, Bashar’s undiplomatic refusal to listen to France was a major mistake for the Syrians. This allowed Paris to put aside its differences with Washington and join forces to demand the passage of UNSC Resolution 1559, officially calling for Syrian withdrawal.65 Following September 2004, US and French policy joined under the common objective of pushing the growth of a Lebanese opposition and obtaining the end of the Syrian tutelage, ending the previous laissez-faire policy that had put Lebanon under Syrian occupation for over a decade.

Involvement in Post-Hariri Lebanon: Common and Diverging Trends (2005-2011)

In the days following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, France and the US joined forces in demanding that Syria comply with UNSC Resolution 1559, urging for a speedy withdrawal of Syrian troops and at the same time supporting the nascent March 14 movement.66 For both parties, a Syrian withdrawal also represented a way to bring Lebanon closer to the West and a way to disengage Damascus from Lebanon.

In addition, both countries began together to support the creation of an international mechanism to hold the suspected Syrian perpetrators of the murder accountable, a tool that was viewed in part as a way keep Damascus in check in the future. In fact, in the minds of both Paris and Washington, it was clear that Damascus had either orchestrated or at least consented to the assassination. Just a day following the killing of Hariri, the US recalled its ambassador from Damascus,67 a gesture that signaled that the Americans thought Syria was involved in the murder.

However, despite these common immediate goals, the US and France maintained separate views of what the long term strategy for Lebanon ought to be. France was primarily concerned with obtaining an end to the
tutelage and avenging Hariri’s murder (also because of his close personal with Chirac), while steering clear of destabilizing Damascus, fearing broader regional implications. The US, on the other hand, saw the end of the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon as a tool to potentially destabilize Damascus; the Bush administration made it no secret that a regime change would be seen as a positive outcome.68

In the end, the combination of US-French-Saudi pressure, together with the emergence of a strong anti-Syrian national movement within Lebanon, led to a complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005, paving the way for the rise of the March 14 coalition to power. In Washington, this development was greeted warmly. The US administration considered the formation of what it saw as a more democratic and pro-Western government as a positive development, which could serve as a model for other countries in the region. To support this development tangibly, the US invested substantial resources in the new March 14-led government, increasing its foreign aid to Lebanon and providing financial assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, a trend that began with the November 2006 announcement of a $10.6 million grant.69

In tandem, Washington continued to eye Lebanon through the prism of Syria, and in the months following the 2005 parliamentary elections urged the new Lebanese government to maintain an anti-Syrian rhetoric and an uncompromising posture as a tool to weaken the Assad regime.70 While the US pursued this isolation strategy, both France and Saudi Arabia worked to keep Damascus in check by a combination of measures that included direct engagement with the Assad regime, trying to convince it to pledge to collaborate with the UN investigations regarding the Hariri murder. The result of this mixed approach was questionable, failing both to deter Damascus from attempting to derail the March 14-led process of reform within Lebanon (through its alliance with the local opposition), and to coerce it to truly cooperate with the UN investigation on the Hariri murder.

In this context, the United States was not entirely displeased when a new round of hostilities erupted between Israel and Hizbollah in July 2006, as from the US perspective the military operation was a potential breakthrough. Had Israel succeeded in crippling Hizbollah, the blow would have been felt both in Damascus and Tehran, weakening the regimes and strengthening the pro-Western March 14 coalition within Lebanon.
In the days following the beginning of the hostilities, the US showed its support for Israel; the Senate passed a resolution condemning Hizbollah and recognizing Israel’s right to defend itself. In addition, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in steady contact with the Siniora government, pressuring it to maintain a harsh line against Hizbollah. Washington’s hope that the military operation would curb Hizbollah’s power and influence partly accounts for the relatively slow pace with which the US sought a ceasefire and agreed to a boosted UNIFIL presence in southern Lebanon.

France, much less enthusiastic about the Israeli military offensive, took on a different role during the hostilities, expressing its solidarity with the Siniora government, urging Israeli “restraint,” and pushing the international community to impose a ceasefire on the parties. However, despite these initial differences, the US and France worked closely in the process that led to the formulation of UNSC Resolution 1701, which declared a cessation of hostilities and an enhanced UNIFIL role in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, despite its initial reluctance, France followed its diplomatic efforts towards the ceasefire with a military commitment to deploy roughly 1,600 French troops in southern Lebanon as part of the UNIFIL contingent. From the French perspective, the emphasis on leading the ceasefire efforts represented a way to demonstrate ongoing interest in Lebanon while displaying its influence in the Middle East to its EU and US counterparts.

When the dust settled, the July 2006 war between Israel and Hizbollah did not dramatically change the balance of power within Lebanon; both the political opposition and Syrian influence remained strong, and the ability of the March 14 coalition to move Lebanon forward in the direction of the Cedar Revolution remained tenuous. Eventually, after November 2006, the situation escalated in the 18-month political boycott of the Siniora government, again challenging the success of the post-Syrian tutelage transition.

The US approach to the political crisis in Lebanon matched its strategy, in place since 2005, to isolate Damascus by curbing Syrian influence within Lebanon and supporting the March 14 coalition. First, the Bush administration maintained its critical stance regarding Damascus, openly accusing the Assad regime of responsibility for the political crisis. For example, a September 2007 presidential statement asserted: “The US stands with the Lebanese people as they resist attempts by the Syrian and Iranian regimes and their
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends

...allies to destabilize Lebanon and undermine its sovereignty.” Second, Washington continued to back the creation of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon; and the US played a crucial role in allowing the passing of UNSC Resolution 1757 in May 2007, which allowed the formal establishment of the STL.

In addition, the Bush administration continued to focus on strengthening its relations with the Siniora government, increasing the aid to the government — with the US pledging $1 billion in assistance in the 2007 donor conference for Lebanon — while at the same time boosting its military cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces. In 2007, funding to the Lebanese Army in fact increased more than sevenfold, with the US stating its desire to upgrade its relationship with the Lebanese military to a “strategic partnership.” The US also relied on these strong ties to pressure the March 14 government to stay its course in face of the opposition’s political boycott, urging it not to agree to the Hizbollah-led opposition’s request to create a unity government. A similar posture was also adopted with respect to the March 14 coalition’s aspirations to replace President Lahoud with a more sympathetic candidate. In this respect, the US was very clear in backing the March 14 and its presidential candidates, while accusing the opposition, as well as Syria and Iran, of attempting to derail the electoral process. For instance, in March 2008, the US deployed a missile destroyer off the Lebanese coast as a way to “show support” for the government in its attempts to elect a new president and to send a warning to the opposition. This move was widely perceived within Lebanon as misguided and reflecting a lack of understanding of the political dynamics on the ground.

However, despite this public show of support in early 2008, US backing for the March 14 presidential candidates was not subsequently followed by open and strong US support for the government’s plan to elect the president short of a two-thirds quorum (a way to bypass the pro-Syrian opposition), thus failing to resolve the political standoff in favor of the March 14 government. In this context, since at least the fall of 2007 if not before, US support was seen as insufficiently strong to elect a president bypassing the political opposition. This perception contributed to lowering March 14’s resolve on the matter and encouraged the government to cede its preferred candidates and accept someone more amenable to the opposition and Damascus. This paved the way for the election of Michel Suleiman.
While the Americans were trying to resolve the political crisis and the stalemate in the presidential election both by supporting the March 14 forces and by criticizing Syria, France attempted to break the political standoff by directly engaging Damascus. This approach was intensified following May 2007 and the election of French President Nicolas Sarkozy. With the departure of Chirac, France in fact launched a new chapter in its diplomatic involvement in both Syria and Lebanon, one without strong personal relationships between the Elysee and the Hariri family.

These different circumstances led France to adopt a less principled approach and increase its contact with both the Lebanese political opposition and the Syrian regime, hoping to break the political impasse by persuading Assad to agree to the election of a mutually agreeable candidate. At first, however, the French efforts were just as unsuccessful as the US efforts; Assad proved to be quite impervious to French (and Saudi) requests to intervene to solve the political crisis. In turn, this led to a progressive deterioration of French-Saudi relations, with Sarkozy publicly threatening Damascus to cut ties with Syria by December 2007, but failing to coerce Assad to moderate his position. The temporary freeze in Syrian-French relations in early 2008 likely contributed to Damascus ultimately agreeing on the election of Suleiman as the consensus candidate, but the election only took place after Syria and its local political allies had clarified the real balance of power within Lebanon.

In this context, Hizbollah’s temporary takeover of West Beirut in May 2008 and the process that led to the Doha agreement was a clear demonstration not only of the genuine balance of power on the ground, but also the level of commitment of the March 14 “Western allies.” The lack of a strong response by the US (and Europeans) to the Hizbollah military takeover was widely seen as disappointing from within the ranks of the anti-Syrian movement in Lebanon, further pushing the balance of power toward March 8 and Syria. The post-Doha political dynamic was similarly tilted towards Damascus, as both Saudi Arabia and France moved closer to the Assad regime.

France returned to full-fledged diplomatic engagement with Damascus, officially praising the Syrians for having facilitated the presidential election and the end of the political crisis and inviting Assad to the July 2008 Mediterranean Summit. The US also began to shift away from its aggressive
stance towards Syria in Lebanon, further strengthening the perception that the Cedar Revolution had become less of a strategic priority for the US, or that the reality on the ground left little hope that Damascus’ influence could be effectively thwarted in the short term. In addition, with the election of Barack Obama, Lebanese March 14 groups widely expected that the pressure on Damascus would gradually soften.

The perception was not entirely false. The new president wanted a clean slate in US foreign policy in general, and the Middle East specifically. The Obama administration planned to renew diplomatic dialogue with both Iran and Syria. However, regarding Lebanon the new administration did not necessarily envision departing from the main pillars that had characterized US engagement in the post-Rafiq Hariri Lebanon: the US continued its strong support of the STL, pledged to increase its economic and military aid to Lebanon, and continued to invest in its relationship with the March 14 forces, for example by praising them as “voices of moderation” while supporting them in the pre-June 2009 parliamentary elections phase. At the same, the renewed efforts of the Obama administration to engage the Syrians, especially with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, also led to lessening the pressure on the Assad regime within Lebanon, which mirrored the Saudi and French reconciliation with Syria. France was in fact just as involved with both the Lebanese government and the Syrian regime in 2009, with the country holding numerous official meetings and continuing in its rapprochement with Damascus. Moreover, France followed the ongoing Syrian-Saudi reconciliation closely and supported the efforts of Lebanon’s traditional powerbrokers in easing the creation of a new executive cabinet after the June 2009 elections.

The Syrian honeymoon, however, did not last long. By the summer of 2010, the Obama administration began to face new challenges with respect to its Lebanese and Syria policy: not only were the efforts to engage the Assad regime not progressing, but in addition, widespread reports of both Syrian smuggling of weapons to Hizbollah and the Lebanese-Shiite militia’s involvement in the Hariri murder contributed to challenge the strategy of constructive engagement. As early as August 2010, the US Congress suspended $100 million of military aid, voicing concerns that Hizbollah might be too well connected and influential within the Lebanese Armed Forces, and thereby evincing Washington’s growing concern over
the political future of Lebanon. The move backfired, however, as it both contributed to weakening the elected Hariri government and allowing Iran to step in and offer to replace the US in supporting the Lebanese military.\textsuperscript{94}

Although the Iranian offer to arm the Lebanese military was not accepted by Lebanon, Iranian influence had certainly increased by late 2010 – shown, for example, by President Ahmadinejad’s visit in October 2010. In addition, the Saudi-Syrian mediation efforts to prevent a Lebanese political crisis over the STL indictments reflected the results of a period of diminished US interest in Lebanon and an ongoing decline of US influence. To reverse the situation, only a few days after Ahmadinejad’s departure, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman visited Beirut, stressing the importance of the UN Special Tribunal and urging Lebanon to respect its mandate and findings.\textsuperscript{95} In November 2010, the US pledged $10 million to support the STL.\textsuperscript{96}

In other words, by the fall of 2010, the Obama administration’s priority within Lebanon became support for the continuation of the STL.

Originally, when the international community decided to comply with Lebanon’s request to create an internationally sanctioned mechanism to investigate the political assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the principal hope of countries such as the US or France was that the findings would somehow implicate Syria. This would allow them to impose harsher measures on the country and curb its power within Lebanon. In 2010, even as the momentum to weaken Syria had largely passed and leaks regarding the indictments seemed to let the Assad regime off the hook, supporting the STL was still a strategic priority for the US. The end of the STL would sanction the final decline of the power of the March 14 coalition and its post-Cedar Revolution democratic transition in Lebanon. Moreover, this would only strengthen Hizbollah and its allies, Iran and Syria. For these reasons the Obama administration decided to intervene against the ongoing Syrian-Saudi efforts to broker a compromise between the March 8 and March 14 forces over the tribunal.

To reverse this trend, the Obama administration, after watching the STL negotiations from the sidelines, became more vocal in its support of the UN Special Tribunal, playing an important role in making sure the STL deal never materialized. France, on the other hand, while officially maintaining an equally firm position with respect to the importance of Lebanon complying
with its international commitments and collaborating with the tribunal, maintained a more nuanced stand on the possibility of striking a deal between the parties, while still showing support for PM Hariri.

Although prevention of a Saudi-Syrian deal watering down the STL represented a positive outcome for Washington, the US did not manage to balance between its need to support the STL and its desire to keep Hariri and the March 14 strong and Hizbollah weak. The collapse of the Syrian-Saudi negotiations in fact led to the fall of the Hariri government and the rise of a March 8-dominated new Parliament and cabinet, surely a blow to US interests in the Middle East. In addition, the rise of the new Mikati government further questions US relations with Lebanon and the future of its economic programs and military aid to the country, especially if the government takes actions against the STL or fails to cooperate and act on the arrest warrants issued based on the indictments.

In the months since Mikati has been in power, Lebanon’s relations with both the US and France have been cordial, though far from warm, and the situation risks further deterioration, following the issuance of the first STL indictments implicating Hizbollah in June 2011, and due to the ongoing and rising frictions between the two countries and the regime in Damascus.

The State of Israel and Lebanon: A Difficult Conversation
Although the focus of this study is the role and influence of foreign powers through both direct and indirect government-to-government relations, no account of the relations between Lebanon and principal regional powers can be complete without mentioning the complex history of Israeli-Lebanese relations.

Israel’s role within Lebanon is better analyzed by understanding Jerusalem’s perception of its northern neighbor. First, Israel has always looked at Lebanon as inherently weak and ineffective, a perception that began to form as early as the late 1960s. This has since become an important element in formulating Israel’s Lebanon strategy. Even with no outstanding territorial conflict, Lebanon has nevertheless been perceived as a security threat to Israel because of its inherent weakness, which in turn allowed the country to be a proxy for waging war against Israel, first with the PLO in the 1960s and 1970s, and then with the rise of Hizbollah since the 1980s.
In this context, the relationship between Israel and Hizbollah is the second crucial element to keep in mind when tracking Israeli involvement in Lebanon. With the organization’s raison d’être clearly focused on waging war against Israel and with its long record of conducting armed attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets alike, Israel’s perception of Lebanon has inevitably become intertwined with its view of Hizbollah. Furthermore, with the political and military rise of Hizbollah within Lebanon and the strengthening of the Iranian-Hizbollah alliance, Israel increasingly sees the Lebanese government in merely a supporting role, with Hizbollah and Tehran dominating the stage. Accordingly, there is a widespread Israeli perception of Hizbollah acting as a surrogate for Iran. This spurs the fear that a confrontation between the Islamic Republic and Israel would lead to an inevitable armed confrontation between Lebanon and Israel as well, and connect Lebanon, through Hizbollah, to the “axis of resistance.”

Therefore, based on the view that “Hizbollah is bigger than Lebanon” and that other Lebanese political actors as well as the Lebanese government and armed forces have limited influence, Israel sees Lebanon primarily through a security prism.

However, this was not always the case. In fact, as argued eloquently by Hilal Khashan, Israeli-Lebanese relations have shifted over time from an “implicit peace to explicit conflict.” Even before the birth of the State of Israel, there were contacts between Zionist leaders and the Maronite Christian community. Between 1948 and the beginning of the civil war the two communities maintained ongoing contact, and although never rising to strategic alliance, the relationship was nevertheless one of sporadic tactical cooperation. In addition, Lebanon did not play a prominent role in the 1948 war against Israel, and in the years between 1948 and the late 1960s, the country mostly took a back seat in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, fearing being dragged into direct confrontation with Israel while also eschewing the possibility of direct peace negotiations.

However, the Israeli perception of relative stability and realistic potential to sign a peace agreement with Lebanon started to crumble by the late 1960s. By then, the country was becoming the PLO’s logistical base for launching cross-border attacks against Israel, especially following the relocation of the PLO strategic headquarters to southern Lebanon after the September 1970 Jordanian military campaign to drive the group out of Jordan.
As a result, Israeli military incursions into Lebanon became more frequent (averaging 1.4 a day between 1968 and 1974), a trend that intensified following the outbreak of the civil war. Meanwhile, since the mid-1970s, Israel assumed a growing interest in strengthening the bonds with the Maronite Christians, increasingly providing military assistance to their militias while indirectly assisting their battle in southern Lebanon by creating a “Good Fence policy.” This initial indirect support grew to become direct military involvement, first in 1978 and then in 1982. Operation Litani of 1978 secured the temporary withdrawal of the PLO north of the Litani River, led to the creation and deployment of UNIFIL following the US-brokered Israeli withdrawal, and facilitated the rise of Christian South Lebanese Major Sa’ad Haddad and his “Free Republic of Lebanon” (which would later become part of the Israeli security zone). Between 1978 and 1982, and despite the US-brokered ceasefire in 1981, the conflict in southern Lebanon was never fully resolved, escalating again in 1982 following the June 1982 assassination attempt of the Israeli ambassador in London.

Israel’s Operation Peace for the Galilee in 1982 was far more extensive in scope than the 1978 operation. Indeed, the campaign was designed to eliminate the PLO presence in the south, weaken Syrian influence on Lebanon, and ensure the creation of a more friendly government led by Christian militia leader Bashir Gamayel. Volumes have already been written on this chapter of Lebanese and Israeli history, and while an in-depth analysis of the First Lebanon War is beyond the scope of the study, suffice it to say that the military operation profoundly changed Israeli-Lebanese relations. First, it led to the establishment of the security zone, an area constituting about 10 percent of Lebanon’s territory that remained under the joint military control of the IDF and the Southern Lebanese Army (a Christian militia that acted as an Israeli proxy in the occupied areas from 1985 to 2000).

Second, following the initial welcome of the Shiite community to the Israeli tanks in 1982, the relationship between the two actors quickly deteriorated, facilitating the creation of Hizbollah and the rise of a new enemy for the State of Israel. In this sense, although the 1982 operation did see the departure of the PLO headquarters from Lebanon, it did not lead to the end of cross border threats; Hizbollah’s anti-Israeli activities more than compensated for the absence of PLO operations.
Third, the attempt to shape the Lebanese political process in a way perceived as favorable to Jerusalem failed, as the Syrians were able to effectively step in and thwart any progress on that front. This also led to the permanent demise of the previous marriage of convenience between the Maronite Christians and Israel outside the security zone. As a result, since the end of the civil war, there have been extremely limited relations between the State of Israel and any of the Lebanese political actors.

This was of course particularly true during the years of the Syrian tutelage, when it became clear that Lebanon’s foreign policy was controlled by Damascus and that as such, any progress on the Israeli-Lebanese track would only occur through entente with the Assad regime. Given the establishment of the security zone, Israeli-Lebanese relations can be seen largely through the prism of the war of attrition launched by Hizbollah against Israel from 1985 to 2000. In those years, the IDF and Hizbollah fought a mostly limited war linked to a common “understanding”—informally in place since 1993 and put in writing in 1996 in a Lebanese-Israeli agreement—to ensure “that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack, and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching ground for attacks.” Despite the terms of the agreement, the rules of engagement were not always observed: Hizbollah launched rocket attacks against the Israeli civilian population, and in response, Israel launched larger scale military operations against the organization and its rockets, in 1993 (Operation Accountability) and 1996 (Grapes of Wrath).

However, military operations failed to destroy Hizbollah or convince Syria to curb the Shiite-Lebanese organization. Due to a mix of security and political considerations and facing mounting domestic and international pressure against its occupation of southern Lebanon, Israel eventually decided to shift gears and pursue a strategy of unilateral withdrawal. The military redeployment was completed in May 2000.

Israel’s unilateral withdrawal behind the demarcation line established by the UN effected compliance with 1978 UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called for Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Lebanon. However, this did not lead to any substantial changes in Israeli-Lebanese relations: the Lebanese government continued not to engage in any dialogue with Israel, arguing that the Israeli withdrawal was “incomplete,” and refusing to deploy the Lebanese Army along the Blue Line. In turn, between 2000 and
2006, Hizbollah continued its military operations against Israel, albeit more sporadically and mostly limiting its activities – with the notable exceptions of anti-aircraft fire and kidnapping operations – to the “disputed” Shab’a Farms area.

However, this relative state of stability along the Israeli-Lebanese border did not survive Hizbollah’s cross border operation of July 12, 2006, which resulted in the abduction of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of eight. The ambush drew a large scale Israeli military response, which escalated into a thirty-four-day war. The war was a reminder of the unstable and precarious situation at the border, the lack of a meaningful relationship with the Lebanese government, and the rise of Hizbollah from a marginal sectarian militia to a well organized and equipped hybrid army capable of engaging in both unconventional as well as (limited) conventional mobile warfare.

While both sides claimed victory following the war, the conflict failed to decisively tip the balance in favor of either of the two parties. Hizbollah won the media war within the Middle East and claimed its “divine victory,” but the organization was nevertheless wounded (albeit not mortally) by the Israeli offensive, and heavy losses inflicted on the Shiite community restored a measure of deterrence at the border. Israel, in contrast, emerged in a better position than its counterpart and was able to both obtain a renewed moment of calm along the Blue Line along with the passing of UNSC resolution 1701, which called for a stronger UNIFIL, for the extension of the Lebanese Armed Forces presence in southern Lebanon, and for the dismantling of Hizbollah. However, Israel failed to win decisively and swiftly, and remained unable to oust Hizbollah from southern Lebanon.

In terms of Lebanese-Israeli relations, the war did little to change the longstanding deadlock. In fact, even following the Syrian withdrawal of 2005 and the rise of a more pro-Western government under the March 14 coalition, no progress was made on the Lebanese-Israeli front. The new government was particularly wary of being perceived in any way as going against the “resistance.” Therefore, even if since the July 2006 war March 14 forces were increasingly and publicly calling for discussion of Hizbollah’s armament (while behind the scenes harshly criticizing the state of affairs), this did not translate into a public repudiation of the notion of the “resistance” against Israel, nor did it pave the way to open contact between
Lebanese political actors and Israel. In turn, a combination of the lack of progress towards the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the deadlock in relations between Israel and Lebanon, along with the ongoing process of rearmament of Hizbollah, contributed to the creation of a fictitious state of calm at the border (at times disturbed by small scale skirmishes between the IDF and the newly deployed Lebanese Armed Forces).

As such, it is not surprising that both parties have been planning for the next round of hostilities, while being mutually deterred to escalate the conflict due to a shared perception that the next war will be far more devastating on both sides of the border. Meanwhile, the political changes within Lebanon, and in particular the rise of the Mikati government and the marginalization of the forces driving the Cedar Revolution, further confirm the Israeli perception of Lebanon becoming more entangled in the Syrian-Iranian “axis of resistance.”

In other words, Lebanon’s border with Israel is still inherently unstable and the potential for conflict remains high. Furthermore, the future of Israeli-Lebanese relations is unclear in the context of the ongoing regional political changes of the “Arab spring.”
Conclusion

The Battle for Beirut and the New Middle East

Internally divided along sectarian lines and with an inherently weak government, Lebanon over the past decades has been a playing field for regional and international actors alike, often acting as a surrogate for interstate conflicts. Battling for Beirut has become a key feature of contemporary Middle Eastern politics, with all the major regional powers considering the country a key asset to help shift the regional balance of power in their favor, and thus competing for power and influence over Lebanon. In this sense, although the game players keep changing, the blurring of domestic and foreign politics and of national and international actors remains a fixed feature of Lebanese political life.

Although virtually every regional (and to a lesser degree, international) power has developed a stake in Lebanon, this study has focused on a key set of states: those that have so far invested the most political capital in the Lebanese political system.

First and foremost on this list is Syria.

Of all the regional and extra-regional powers, Syria has… exercised the greatest influence over Lebanon’s domestic politics and its foreign policy…it is also true that [as Syria has] proved to be very capable of sabotaging any efforts to resolve Lebanon’s dilemma that did not take into considerations the interests of Syria and of its leaders, Syria will, thus, continue to be a pivotal part of Lebanon’s tragic puzzle, and it behooves future peacemakers, whoever these may be, not to lose sight of this simple fact.¹
Although these lines were written in 1984, they are still relevant and effectively sum up the current situation in Lebanon.

Looking at Lebanon through “Greater Syria” lenses and treating Lebanese domestic and foreign policy as a matter of Syrian national concern, the Alawite regime has always asserted a special prerogative over Lebanon. The historical and ideological connection between Syria and Lebanon has provided the basis for a solid partnership between the two countries, one where Syria traditionally played the role of “guarantor” and “tutor.” This partnership was cemented through Syria’s participation in the civil war, and it gained international acceptance, if not legitimacy, through the post-civil war arrangement established by the Taif Accord. The following period of Syrian tutelage (1990-2005) served to further solidify the presence of the Damascus regime within Lebanon, not only by military occupation of the country, but also by use of its intelligence apparatus and its acquisition of influence in the political system – both by ensuring that pro-Syrian politicians would be in charge of key political offices and by marginalizing and “discouraging” the rise of an effective political opposition.

Through this combination of military and political measures, Syria managed to maintain tight control of the country. Even the rise of a massive anti-Syrian opposition and the final ousting of Syrian troops from Lebanese soil were insufficient to permanently rid the country of Damascus’s presence. In fact, although many analysts (especially in the West) had initially interpreted the end of the Syrian tutelage in 2005 as a sign of the imminent end of Syrian control over Lebanon, the role of Damascus in the post-Rafiq Hariri Lebanon tells a radically different story.

In the last decade, the Syrians have survived both the shocks of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, as well as the repercussions of their own military redeployment in 2005. In this context, the lengthy delays in the post-2005 UN-led investigation of the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri, combined with the inability to create an effective regional or international strategy to isolate and contain Damascus in the period following the Syrian withdrawal, gave the Assad regime time to regroup and develop a new strategy for Lebanon.

Consequently, Damascus has thrived in the new post-Cedar Revolution Lebanon and has worked to reposition itself at the center of the Lebanese political arena. It has done so by adopting a “divide and conquer” strategy,
playing on the internal divisions among the anti-Syrian movement and by capitalizing on their political alliance with the Hizbollah-led March 8 forces. Currently, Syrian influence over Lebanon is stronger than ever, thanks to the rise to power of the Hizbollah-backed Mikati government and to the political marginalization of the political forces that orchestrated the anti-Syrian revolution.

Paradoxically, Syria has found a way to preserve its influence without having to continue its military occupation of Lebanon – certainly a positive trend for the regime in Damascus. In other words, as encapsulated by the passage quoted early in this chapter, Syria has established its role and influence within Lebanon, and as such, no effort to bring peace or stability to Lebanon will succeed short of Damascus’s approval.

Of course, this is granted that the Assad survives the wave of political unrest that is shaking the very foundation of his regime. The alternative is a possibility that the current government of Lebanon does not seem to contemplate, though the March 14 forces are banking on it to make their political comeback. In that case, the game might truly change on both sides of the border, perhaps redefining the historic relationship between the two countries. However, for the time being, it is still Syria’s show.

A second crucial actor is without a doubt Iran. Iranian involvement in Lebanon is neither a new nor a surprising phenomenon. The ties between the Lebanese Shiite community and its Iranian counterpart date as far back as the sixteenth century, and over the following centuries there were recurring contacts and cultural crossovers between the two communities. However, a solid and strong alliance between the Lebanese and Iranian Shiites was only forged following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. For this to occur, three distinct trends had to converge: Tehran’s desires to export the Islamic Revolution regionally; the domestic mobilization and politicization of the Lebanese Shiite community in the midst of the Lebanese civil war; and the desire to create an effective counter-response to the Israeli invasion of 1982. This confluence resulted in the creation of Hizbollah, which over the following decades became one of Tehran’s strategic assets in the region, serving both Iranian foreign and domestic policy.

Since 1982, the partnership between the Lebanese Shiite organization and the Islamic Republic intensified, thanks to the group’s ideological proximity and adherence to Khomeini’s teachings, the close ties between
the Iranian regime and the Hizbollah leadership, and the substantial financial and logistical military, political, and economic assistance that Iran continues to provide to Lebanon.

During the years of the Syrian tutelage, Iranian involvement in Lebanon focused primarily on supporting and assisting Hizbollah, in agreement with Damascus and with respect for the Syrian prerogative in Lebanon. However, following the Syrian withdrawal of 2005, Iran found itself at a defining moment in its relations with Lebanon: with the Syrian protectorate gone and no one to defend Hizbollah against attempts to disarm the group or constrain the resistance, Iran felt a potential threat to a crucial piece of its foreign policy. At the same time, the exit of the Syrians from Lebanon also represented an opportunity for Tehran to increase its direct influence in the country.

In response to this crisis-opportunity in 2005, the Islamic Republic has stepped up its involvement in the Lebanese political arena. This process, in place since 2005, has led to continued Iranian support for Hizbollah, the gradual enhancement of ties with the March 8 political coalition, and an increase in the diplomatic, political, and economic relations between the Lebanese and Iranian governments. So far, the rise of Iranian influence within Lebanon has not managed to spark significant friction between the Islamic Republic and Syria. Their goals and agendas for Lebanon are mutually reinforcing; however, a certain degree of (benign) competition is definitely present, especially as Damascus insists on preserving its Lebanese prerogative.

Ideally, Iran would like to offer itself as a regional alternative to Lebanon’s Western allies, particularly the United States. The Islamic Republic has reiterated this on numerous occasions, both by offering to provide Lebanon with the military assistance it needs, as well as by promoting a larger resistance axis beyond Iran and Syria. Despite these efforts and regardless of the indisputable rise in the role and influence of Iran in the Mediterranean country, it is for the time being unlikely that Iran will manage to overcome Lebanon’s sectarian politics and internal divisions and pull the entire country away from its other regional and international donors towards Tehran. Iranian influence is currently strong in Lebanon, especially thanks to the political rise of a friendly and Hizbollah-dominated government under Prime Minister Mikati. Even so, this should not fool
anyone into thinking that Tehran has usurped the Damascus lead; in fact, although Iranian support for the resistance is highly agreeable to the Assad regime, Syria is still adamant in declaring that Lebanon remains Syria’s backyard and the Iranians cannot (i.e., should not) get caught up in the fine print of Lebanese daily political life.

A third important player is Saudi Arabia. Indeed, despite the major power and influence that both Syria and Iran seem to wield in and over Lebanon, the battle from Beirut is far from over, as other powers have also been at work in Lebanon since 2005 to counter the rise of the Iranian and Syrian alliance. In this context, Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in Lebanese domestic politics, partly responding to the preexisting connections between the Kingdom and the Lebanese Sunni community and the Hariri family, and partly in an effort to oppose the rise of the Shiite crescent. Saudi Arabia thus shifted from a traditionally friendly policy with respect to the Assad regime and its tutelage of Lebanon to one of progressive confrontation between 2003 and 2005, leading the country to assume an important role in pushing the Syrians out of Lebanon following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Following the withdrawal, however, Saudi involvement in Lebanon failed to prevent the rise of Syria and Iran.

Between 2005 and 2008, the Saudis pursued conflicting objectives with respect to Syrian involvement in Lebanon: on the one hand, they sought to isolate Damascus, pressure it to commit to the STL, and coerce it to normalize its relationship with their former protectorate. On the other hand, they refrained from aggressively pursuing these objectives and preferred not to cut ties completely with Damascus, both fearing regime change and not wanting to push the Syrians further into the hands of the Iranians. In the end, this middle of the road approach did not succeed, failing to compel Damascus to mend its ways with respect to Lebanon and allowing the Iranian-Syrian alliance to strengthen. Moreover, in the years following the Hariri assassination, the progressive demise of the political power and momentum created by the Cedar Revolution diminished the prospects for establishing – at the expense of Syria and Iran – stronger Saudi influence.

The culmination of this trend was the May 2008 armed confrontation between March 8 and March 14 forces in Beirut and its surrounding areas. The dramatic demonstration of force by Hizbollah led the Saudis to chart a new course and attempt a rapprochement with the Syrians.
In the months following the 2008 Doha agreement, Saudi Arabia decided to continue its role as the main supporter of the March 14 forces in Lebanon. At the same time, it shifted its overall strategy and began a rapprochement with the Assad regime, again hoping to establish its influence on Lebanon by making a deal with the Syrians, also with the aim of excluding Tehran. Currently, following the collapse of the Saudi-Syrian negotiations over the STL in late 2010 and the rise of the Mikati government in early 2011, it is clear that even though the Saudis have been a key powerbroker in the Lebanese political arena, they have not managed to curtail Iranian influence within Lebanon.

Finally, the West has also played an important role. American and French attempts to contain Syrian and Iranian involvement in Lebanon have been equally unsuccessful. Historically both countries were involved in Lebanon, albeit for different reasons. France has always seen Lebanon through the prism of its colonial past and through its connections with the Maronite Christians. The US, on the other hand, saw Lebanon through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict, looking at the country as a bargaining chip in the context of its negotiations with the Assad regime.

Despite these different outlooks, the alliance between France and the US was vital in creating the international pressure that between 2003 and 2005 facilitated the Cedar Revolution and the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Following the withdrawal, however, the two countries adopted very different strategies with respect to Lebanon. Although both countries have similar objectives – namely to support the March 14 coalition and (to a lesser degree, in the case of France) the STL – the policies chosen to achieve these goals have been different.

Between 2005 and 2008, the US relied on a strategy of isolation of the Syrian regime, while the French government never abandoned the hope of being able to compel the Syrians to cooperate in Lebanon through direct engagement. In the end, both attempts failed to profoundly affect the political situation in Lebanon and reverse the reaffirmation of Syrian influence. Also, they were followed by a rapprochement with Damascus after 2008. Recently, the US has bolstered its involvement in Lebanon to ensure the continuation of the country’s cooperation with the STL (for instance, by reportedly preventing a Syrian-Saudi deal in late 2010), but overall, the US
lacks a clear and consistent strategy to counter the rise of the Iranian-Syrian axis, especially following the creation of the Mikati government in 2011.

**Policy Implications: Lebanon and its Neighbors**

This brief and by no means exhaustive discussion of recent patterns of foreign involvement in Lebanon reveals that to this day, Lebanon continues to serve as a surrogate for the ongoing battle for regional power. As such, dramatic shifts in the country’s patterns of alliances have important regional ramifications that inevitably reflect the balance of power in the Middle East, as well as Israel’s position in the region. The picture portrayed in this study shows a rather complex scenario, one where the rise of Syrian and Iranian influence over Lebanon is not fully matched by the renewed Saudi and American influence in the country.

Specifically, the current rise of the Hizbollah-backed Mikati government and the marginalization of the forces of the Cedar Revolution reflect the increased role and power of Syria and Iran. This does not, however, mean that Lebanon has officially transitioned towards the “resistance axis” and that it has completely turned its back on its other allies. To this day, Lebanon maintains tight economic and political relations with Saudi Arabia and appears keen to continue its relationship with the US, mostly because of the role of the March 14 coalition.

This means that Lebanon is pulled simultaneously in opposite directions by two powerful and antagonistic political blocs. Although the Syrian-Iranian bloc has the upper hand at the moment, it lacks the capacity to implement such a dramatic political change, short of risking igniting a renewed internal conflict.

At the moment, it is difficult to assess the long term policy implications of this trend, both from the point of view of Israel as well as in terms of the regional balance of power, as the future outcome of the ongoing battle for Beirut largely depends on a series of domestic and global processes. More specifically, the future of Lebanon looks precarious, as the political fate of the country is linked to dynamics that reside entirely beyond its control: the developments of the STL trial, as well as the unfolding of the “Arab spring” in general and the ongoing unrest within Syria in particular.

Since the first release of indictments against the suspected perpetrators and organizers of the Hariri assassination on June 30, 2011, Lebanon and
its government have been in a highly tenuous and fragile position. Although the issuing of the indictments against Hizbollah members has, for the time being, failed to ignite internal strife or produce the expected political earthquake, still the level of tension, especially between the Sunni and Shiite communities, is extremely high. In addition to carrying the potential for renewed internal strife, the STL also risks further eroding the relationship between Lebanon and its Western allies. This would in turn further aggravate internal sectarian tension, while also threatening to bring the country even closer to the “resistance axis” – a negative development for the State of Israel.

Furthermore, the future of Lebanon is closely related to the current development of the “Arab spring” and to the ongoing protests taking place in Syria. If the Assad regime manages to survive both the massive internal uprising and the widespread international criticism against its government, then the “axis of resistance” composed of Iran, Syria, and Hizbollah is empowered. Within Lebanon, the Mikati government and Hizbollah can once again count on Assad as the main guarantor of their internal position of power. Under this scenario, the March 14 forces, already marginalized by the current government, would be hard pressed to undermine the Iranian-Hizbollah-Syria-Lebanese connection. For Israel, this would simply mean that nothing changes in the internal current balance of power within Lebanon, and that its main regional foe, the resistance axis, has managed to endure the storm initiated by the “Arab spring.”

A second important potential scenario emanating from Syria is the prolonged continuation and escalation of the internal strife between the Alawite regime and the mostly Sunni opposition. A civil war scenario in Syria would also have potential negative implications for Lebanon, as it would worsen the already tense relations between the Sunni and Shiite communities within Lebanon itself, raising the potential for armed confrontation. This would be a difficult scenario for the Lebanese population and an unfavorable one from an Israeli perspective as well, as prolonged internal strife would generate further regional instability while risking additional empowerment of Hizbollah – by far the most competent military group within Lebanon. In this sense, the present weakness and autonomy of the government as well as the potential for renewed internal violence represent challenges to both regional stability as well as Israeli security.
Another possible outcome of the Syrian crisis is the fall of the Assad regime and the beginning of a (much uncertain) new political chapter. Although the dire divisions within the Syrian society in general and the Syrian opposition forces in particular make both the composition and the stability of a new Syrian government very much unknown, it is fair to say that the end of the Alawite regime would mean a strategic shift for Lebanon. The collapse of the Assad regime would likely constitute a substantive blow to Hizbollah and its political allies. In fact, in the case of Assad’s downfall, it is by no means certain that the new Syrian government would choose to continue its current partnership with Hizbollah and Iran. Within Lebanon this could also lead to an internal reshuffling of power and to renewed strength of the March 14 coalition, while overall weakening the “axis of resistance.” In general, this scenario is the most favorable one from an Israeli perspective. However, even in the event of the total collapse of the Alawite regime in Syria, Hizbollah – counting on its local power and on its main patron, Iran – would still continue to hold its military and political power, as well as its capacity to challenge Israel.

Finally, another important factor that inevitably affects the political stability within Lebanon, as well as regional stability, is the ongoing tension between Israel and Hizbollah, as Lebanon’s border with Israel is inherently unstable and the potential for conflict remains high. Since 2006 both countries have been preparing for a second and substantially greater round of hostilities, and although it has been in both parties’ interests to prevent escalations, the state of calm is illusory, as new factors may lead to reignite the conflict (including, for example, miscalculations, an Israeli attack on Iran, and an attempt to divert attention from the Syrian crisis).

In conclusion, in these times of sweeping political and social changes, the characteristics of the emerging Middle Eastern order are still very much in the making. However, even in the “new Middle East,” Lebanon will continue to play a crucial role in the regional balance of power, and as such, regional powers will continue their battle for power and influence in Lebanon. Moreover, as the massive wave of political unrest unleashed by the “Arab spring” continues, new players may become more active in the region in general and in Lebanon specifically.
Notes

Note to Introduction, Lebanon: The Wildcard of the Middle East

Notes to Chapter 1, The Usual Suspect: Syrian Involvement in Lebanon
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
9 Harris, “Syria in Lebanon,” p. 11.
12 Harris, “Syria in Lebanon,” p. 11.
14 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, pp. 43-47.
16 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 50.
References:

22 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 54.
23 Ibid., p. 55.
24 The security zone was an area constituting about 10 percent of Lebanon’s territory that after 1982 fell under the military control of both the IDF and the Southern Lebanon Army, a Christian militia that acted as an Israeli proxy in the occupied areas. See Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, “(In)security Zones in South Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23, no.1 (1993): 61-69.
26 The Taif agreement (signed on October 22, 1989 and ratified on November 4, 1989); available from: http://www.mideastinfo.com/documents/taif.htm. The excerpts below are taken from this source.
33 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, ch. 4.
36 For example, when in 1996 Hizbollah refused Amal’s invitation to compete in the upcoming elections through a united list, Syria summoned Nasrallah to Damascus to “recommend” reconsidering his decision. Soon after, Hizbollah agreed to Amal’s joint list proposal. See Graham Usher, “Hizballah, Syria, and the Lebanese Election,” Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 2 (1997): 64-66.
39 See, for example, US Congress, Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends


40 “Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria,” p. 27.

41 “Lebanese Parliament Votes to Extend President’s Term,” Al-Manar Television, September 3, 2004, provided by BBC Monitoring Middle East.


45 In fact, even though the 2005 elections were an electoral success for the March 14 bloc, which won 72 out of 128 seats in the Parliament, the group would have needed FPM’s 21 seats to have an absolute majority. See Safa, “Lebanon Springs Forward,” p. 36.

46 “Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon after Syria,” pp. 22-23.

47 Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”


55 Harris, “Lebanon’s Day in Court.”

56 Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”

57 At the time, March 14 and March 8 strongly disagreed over the procedures for the presidential election. Article 49 of the Lebanese constitution establishes that the president must be elected by a two-thirds majority in the first electoral round or by an absolute majority after the first ballot. Therefore, the March 14 alliance argued that in case the two-thirds quorum was not reached in the first electoral round, the government would then have had the power to choose a successor to Lahoud relying on a simple majority. This interpretation would give them the power to elect the president without the need to rely on the opposition. However, the Hizbollah-led bloc strongly rejected this constitutional interpretation and insisted on the two-thirds quorum requirement.

59 Ibid.
61 Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”
71 Harris, “Lebanon’s Day in Court.”


Ibid.


Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”


Notes to Chapter 2, *Engineering a “Resistance Axis”: The Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon*


Ibid., p. 66.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 73

Ibid., pp. 84-86.


Lebanese Shiites are Twelver, and as such, believe that following the death of Mohammad, there were twelve righteous and infallible imams who guided the community. The twelfth imam, according to Twelver doctrine, did not die, rather disappeared and went into “occultation.” Accordingly, he will remain hidden until he returns as the madhi on the eve of the Day of Judgment.


“In the absence of the Twelfth Imam, the highest religious and political authority should rest in the hands of an Islamic jurist. The faqih, or jurisprudent, thus becomes both the community’s supreme leader and the deputy of the Twelfth Imam, thereby demanding unconditional obedience and obtaining virtually unrestrained power.” Benedetta Berti, “Lebanon,” in Assaf Moghadam, ed., *Militancy and Political Violence in Shiism: Trends and Patterns* (London, New York: Routledge, 2011).


Ibid., pp. 187-89.

Young, *The Ghosts of Martyrs Square*, p. 102.

Ibid., p. 103.


Zisser, “Iranian Involvement in Lebanon,” p. 11.


Matthew Levitt and Jake Lipton, “Dangerous Partners: Targeting the Iran-


50 The rise of the FPM-Hizbollah political alliance is explored in detail in chapter 1.


52 Ibid.


61 Ibid.


Ibid.


Berti, “Ahmadinejad in Beirut.”


See Benedetta Berti, “Hizb Allah’s Position on the Arab Spring,” *Combating Terrorism Center (CTS) Sentinel*, United States Military Academy at West Point, Volume 4, no. 6 (June 2011).

Notes to Chapter 3, “Discretely” Seeking Power and Influence: Beyond Syrian and Iranian Involvement in Lebanon

4 Ibid., p. 85.
7 Badran, “Saudi-Syrian Relations after Hariri.”
8 Ibid.
12 Badran, “Saudi-Syrian Relations after Hariri.”
14 Badran, “Saudi-Syrian Relations after Hariri.”
16 Ibid.
19 Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends


25 See chapters 1 and 2.


30 Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”


36 Young, The Ghosts of Martyrs Square, p. 233.


39 “Saudi Arabia, Syria Call for Unity Government in Lebanon,” Arab News website, BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 9, 2009.

40 Paul Salem, “Lebanon’s Fall?” Carnegie Middle East Center, November 18,
Nicholas Blanford, “Rare Arab Summit to Forestall Possible Hezbollah Unrest in Lebanon,” Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 2010.

“Syrian MP Says President’s Saudi Visit Aimed at Improving ties,” al-Jazeera, BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 18, 2010.

Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”


“Al-Hariri says he agreed to abolish the STL for the sake of the country; the paper has been accomplished and everyone is waiting for the Saudi King to return in order to prepare the final settlement.” al-Diyar, December 22, 2010.

“Iran Paper discusses Syrian, Saudi, Turkish Efforts to Solve Lebanese Crisis,” Jaam-e Jam, BBC Monitoring Middle, January 26, 2011.


“Commenting on the Bloody Repression that Targeted Protesters in Bahrain,” press statement, Hezbollah International Relations Bureau, March 17, 2011.


Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 47.


Tepperman, “U.N. Peacekeepers to Lebanon?”


“Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon after Syria,” p. 6.


See chapter 1.


Ibid, pp. i: 3.


Gambill, “Syria after Lebanon.”


See chapter 1.


Schenker, “America and the Lebanon Issues,” p. 213.


Gambill, “Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon.”


87 “Trial by Fire,” p. 7.
88 William Harris, “Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride,” in Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis, p. 79.
94 See chapter 2.
95 Berti, “Ahmadinejad in Beirut.”
97 Israel has no pending territorial controversy with Lebanon, following its 2000 withdrawal behind the Blue Line. Lebanon, on the other hand, claims that Israel is still occupying parts of Lebanese territory (Shab’a Farms and a group of seven villages south of the Lebanon-Israel border). This claim, however, is accepted neither by Israel nor by the UN.
100 Ibid., p. 3.
108 Laurie Eisenberg, “History Revisited or Revamped? The Maronite Factors
The Ongoing Battle for Beirut: Old Dynamics and New Trends

in Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon,” in Conflict, Diplomacy and Society in Israeli-Lebanese Relations, p. 68.


120 See, for example, Jeffrey White, “If War Comes: Israel vs. Hezbollah and Its Allies,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 106, September 2010; Bilal Y. Saab and Nicholas Blanford, “The Next War: How Another Conflict Between Hizbollah and Israel Could Look and how Both Sides are Preparing for It,” Analysis Paper 24, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, August 2011.


Note to Conclusion, The Battle for Beirut and the New Middle East

INSS Memoranda 2007 – Present


No. 109, June 2011, Shmuel Even and David Siman-Tov, *Cyber Warfare: Concepts, Trends, and Implications for Israel* [Hebrew].


No. 107, March 2011, Emily B. Landau and Tamar Malz-Ginzburg, eds., *The Obama Vision and Nuclear Disarmament*.


No. 104, June 2010, Gallia Lindenstrauss, *Mediation and Engagement: A New Paradigm for Turkish Foreign Policy and its Implications for Israel* [Hebrew].

No. 103, May 2010, Tamar Malz-Ginzburg and Moty Cristal, eds., *A Nuclear Iran: Confronting the Challenge on the International Arena* [Hebrew].


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 99</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Meir Elran, ed.</td>
<td><em>The Civil Front</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 98</td>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>Anat N. Kurz</td>
<td><em>The Palestinian Uprisings: War with Israel, War at Home</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 97</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Shmuel Even and Amos Granit</td>
<td><em>The Israeli Intelligence Community: Where To?</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 96</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
<td>Ron Tira</td>
<td><em>The Struggle over the Nature of War</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 95</td>
<td>August 2008</td>
<td>Anat N. Kurz</td>
<td><em>The Palestinian Uprisings: Struggle on Two Fronts</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 94</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>Ephraim Kam, ed.</td>
<td><em>A Nuclear Iran: Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Defense</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 93</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>Shmuel Even and Zvia Gross</td>
<td><em>Proposed Legislation on the IDF: Regulating Civil-Military Relations in the Wake of the Second Lebanon War</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 92</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>Dani Berkovich</td>
<td><em>Can the Hydra be Beheaded? The Campaign to Weaken Hizbollah</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 91</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Benny Landa and Shmuel Even</td>
<td><em>The Israeli Economy in the Age of Globalization: Strategic Implications</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 89</td>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>Ron Tira</td>
<td><em>The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations: On Standoff Warfare, Maneuver, and Decision</em></td>
<td>English and Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 88</td>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>Ephraim Kam</td>
<td><em>A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done.</em></td>
<td>English and Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 87</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
<td>Ephraim Kam</td>
<td><em>A Nuclear Iran: Analysis and Implications</em></td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>