



Situation Report

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Completing the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the link to security sector reform of FARDC.

Mission difficult!

Introduction

In January 2009, the Congolese government announced that the second phase of its demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process would be completed at the end of December 2009. This announcement came with the caveat that, should any combatants still not have been demobilised by that time, their demobilisation would become the responsibility of the United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) for the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Congolese *Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des conflits Armés* (STAREC).

The first phase of the DDR programme started in November 2004 and ended in December 2006. However, renewed violence in the eastern DRC meant that the process had not been effectively completed. This ongoing violence also resulted in the delay of the second phase of DDR, which only commenced in July 2008 and ended in December 2009. The conflict between the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) and the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP), begun in October 2008, was only defused in January 2009 when the CNDP decided to integrate with the FARDC and the Rwandan government arrested General Laurent Nkunda. This was not, however, the end of the violence. The joint operations between the FARDC and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) against *Forces Démocratiques et de la Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), followed up by the joint FARDC and MONUC operation Kimia II, have worsened rather than improved the situation in the eastern DRC. In fact, Kimia II was terminated as a result of gross violence perpetrated against the population by both sides to the conflict, the FARDC and FDLR.

In January 2009, a new operation, Operation Amani Leo, between the FARDC and MONUC, was implemented with the aim of demobilising the FDLR. This operation is still ongoing. The mandate of MONUC ended on 30 June 2010 and the United Nations Security Council further decided that, in view of the new phase that has been reached in the DRC, MONUC would, as from 1 July 2010, bear the title of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).¹ It is against this historical background that the Congolese government and MONUSCO are attempting to demobilise, disarm and

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reintegrate the remaining Congolese rebel groups, as well as the non-integrated FARDC brigades.

The FARDC is simultaneously conducting an SSR programme of its own. Since 2007 the Congolese Ministry of Defence has tabled several different SSR plans for the FARDC. On 26 January 2010 the Minister of Defence, Charles Mwando Nsimba, again presented the international community with a 'new' reform plan for the military. The recent Secretary General Report on the situation in the DRC is still concerned about the lack of progress with the reform of the FARDC. In an effort to move the process forward, MONUSCO convened an ambassadors' forum and working group meetings on SSR, which included the participation of officials representing the DRC's ministries of Defence and the Interior, as well as the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President. MONUSCO also continued to encourage the DRC government to develop a viable national SSR strategy and provided support to the national authorities by developing tools to facilitate information sharing among SSR stakeholders.² This again highlighted the challenges as to SSR and the role of all parties involved.

This situation report examines the demobilisation process in the DRC, including the factors impacting on the process, the new Army Reform plan, the role of the STAREC and UNSSSS plans, challenges, recommendations and the way forward.

Demobilisation in the DRC is aimed at three groups:

- The Congolese militias, including CNDP and the *Mai-Mai*
- The Congolese army, FARDC
- Foreign armed groups, including the FDLR and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Two processes are used: the demobilisation of the Congolese army and militias is implemented through DDR processes, while the demobilisation of the foreign armed groups is implemented through the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration or resettlement (DDRRR) processes co-ordinated by MONUSCO and funded by the World Bank. The non-completion of these processes presents the most immediate obstacle to the effective reconstruction of the army and ensuring stability in the eastern DRC.

Origin, specificity and particular aspects

Since 2004, with financing from the World Bank and the MDRP Group, and more recently from the African Development Bank, the DRC has been implementing a national DDR programme. The initial aim of this programme was to reintegrate approximately 350 000 combatants from the signatories of the peace agreement and others who had agreed to the principle of voluntary disarmament. Women are estimated to make up 3 per cent of this number. Approximately 150 000 combatants were to be integrated into the new armed forces and 150 000 were to be reintegrated into civilian life.

The ambitious objectives of that initial programme were:

- To promote the placement of ex-combatants in economy sectors such as agriculture, fishing, environment, health and education, and primarily to involve the local community, together with the ex-combatants, in this economic revival through the encouragement of small, transformational activities
- To create jobs for high intensity labour, such as road or school rehabilitation
- To improve basic social services within disadvantaged communities across the country, particularly those of demobilised and other DDR target groups in the local communities
- To rehabilitate the socio-economic infrastructures in the host communities and to facilitate ex-combatants' and host communities' access to basic needs such as education, drinking water, medical supplies, agricultural roads, and other rural infrastructures

Implementation and results of the national DDR programme

The first phase of the DDR programme started in November 2004 and ended in December 2006. The process was terminated before its completion because

of renewed violence in the eastern DRC. The second phase started only in July 2008 and ended in December 2009. This phase was not completed either and is currently ongoing as part of the STAREC and UNSSSS plans. The first phase of the DDR process was co-ordinated by the *Commission Nationale pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion* (CONADER), guided by the *Programme National pour la Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion* (PNDDR), and financed entirely by the World Bank and the UNDP. The World Bank provided CONADER with US\$200 million for the implementation of the DDR programme, amounting to a unit cost of just over US\$1 200 per person.³

1st phase financing⁴

Phase	Financing origin	Amount (US\$ in millions)	Period	Area
Demobilised	IDA/World Bank	100	2004–2006	All of DRC
	MDRP (regional)	100	2004–2006	All of DRC
	Total	200		

During the first phase 186 000 combatants went through the process, of which 102 104 were demobilised and 83 896 were integrated into the FARDC.⁵

Results achieved during the 1st phase⁶

	Male	% of total	Female	% of total	Total	% of 300 000	Observation
Total strength of ex-combatants treated	182 280	98	3 720	2	186 000	62	Gap 48%
Total of ex-combatants demobilised	99 854	98	2 160	2	102 014	68	40 000 ex-combatants reintegrated
Total of ex-combatants integrated into the Armed Forces	82 426	98.1	1 560	1.9	83 986	56	14% without free choice of DDR or Armed Forces integration
Weapons recovered					104 455	35	Gap 65%

Because of the ongoing conflict, phase two of the DDR process only started in June 2009 and ended in December 2009. The budget for this phase was US\$75 million. The funds were provided by the World Bank and managed by the UNDP and the PNDDR. At the end of October 2009 only 18 per cent of the funds had been utilised and it was foreseen that not more than 30 per cent would be used.


2nd phase results reviewed on 28 February 2010⁷

	Total number	Number integrated into FARDC	Number demobilised	140 US\$ payment	300 US\$ payment	Observation
FARDC	12 843	8 236	4 607			
Armed group	1 353	–	1 353			
Total	14 196	8 236	5 960	5 872	5 023	Of 508 women demobilised, only 4 981 have received the two instalments of US\$150 de US\$150 x 2 = US\$300

During this phase only 12 820 combatants went through the DDR process, of which 4 782 were demobilised and 8 038 were integrated into the FARDC. The money was then allocated to the STAREC programme to enable it to continue with the DDR process. During 2010, within the STAREC programme and with the support of MONUSCO, a further 2 000 combatants have gone through the DDR process.

A combatant entering the DDR process has one of two options: demobilisation or reintegration. Former combatants who choose reintegration into the FARDC become the responsibility of the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration*/Integrated Military Structure (SMI) that, along with the FARDC (and MONUSCO for logistical support), transports the former combatants to the *centres de brassage*.⁸

Graph 1: DDR processes



DDR centres are spread out around the country at Kitona (Bas-Congo, on the coast), Kamina (Katanga), Kisangani (Orientale), Rumangabo and Nyaleke in South Kivu, and Luberizi in South Kivu. Different donor countries, including South Africa, Angola and Belgium, took responsibility for running each centre. The *brassage* process involves approximately 45 days of 'military training', after which the former combatant is officially integrated into the newly unified army and is posted to a FARDC brigade, usually some distance from his place of residence. The main function of the *brassage* process is to break the chain of command that exists within the different warring groups.⁹

However, armed groups and militias such as the CNDP and the *Mai-Mai* have demanded that former combatants who are integrated into the national army remain in the region where they operate (hence the introduction of the *mixage* process). After the 2008 conflict in Bukavu, the FARDC made a difficult compromise with Nkunda's CNDP by 'mixing' brigades loyal to Nkunda with FARDC brigades, although this practice was not supported by the international community and MONUC. *Mixage* differs from *brassage* in that combatants who do not go to a *brassage* centre are integrated within their own area and deployed there.¹⁰

There are currently 18 integrated brigades, composed of former combatants as well as members of the former Congolese army (*Forces armées Congolaises*, (FAC)). The composition of the brigades is determined by the dominance of certain armed groups. However, breaking up the different armed groups in the eastern region has proven to be a difficult task as different factions remain suspicious of one another, and cohesion therefore remains 'fragile'.¹¹ It should be noted that a number of integrated battalions, that is, those that have gone through the *brassage* process, are being trained by various bilateral donors, including France, Belgium, South Africa, Angola, Tanzania and the US. Due to this, integrated battalions receive varied levels of military training and strategic ethos.

The fact that numerous battalions are not yet integrated due to the halting of the DDR programme has resulted in a weak and uncoordinated national army. The support from the various bilateral donors in providing army reform programmes mainly assist with the training of brigades or ensuring that salaries are paid to FARDC soldiers. They may have proved effective in the short-term but from a longer-term perspective, the problem of sustainability, paying wages, and their differing military training/ethos could prove detrimental to the national army.

Those who opt for civilian reinsertion are given US\$110, to be used for their return transport home and to assist with basic needs. After that, for the next 12 months, the former combatants receive US\$25 to meet basic living needs and to 'hold them over' until a reintegration programme has been established in their community.¹² As of February 2007, CONADER has disarmed and demobilised 115 000 adult combatants and 54 000 children associated with armed groups and forces.¹³ Of the adult combatants, approximately 45 000 have been reinserted into the military,¹⁴ and the remaining 70 000 await the establishment of reintegration programmes in their communities. Most of the children have been returned home to their families, with the support of UNICEF.¹⁵ Statistics reveal that at least about 80 000 combatants must still go through the process of DDR and that the majority of these come from the non-integrated FARDC brigades.¹⁶ This process will have to be completed as part of the UNSSSS for the DRC and the Congolese STAREC.

SSR goes hand in hand with the completion of the DDR process. It is evident from the events of the past six years that there will be little progress with SSR if DDR is not effectively completed. It is thought by many that the best starting point for SSR would entail the training of the FARDC, but this is only viable if the FARDC sends its soldiers to the training centres. If this happens then an estimated 15 battalions, nearly 12 000 soldiers, will be trained every year. However, this can only be part of the solution to the situation in the DRC as it will undoubtedly be almost impossible to put 130 000 combatants to be integrated into the FARDC through selection, vetting and training in what is a relatively short time. The European Union, the United States and South Africa are but a few of the countries that on different levels are supporting MONUSCO with the process of training the FARDC. There is a crucial need for a National Security Strategy in the form of a White Paper on Defence to ensure that the FARDC adopts a strategy and a structure on which to build an effective defence force.

Achieving an effective strategy will likely be dependent upon a sound selection system. This can only be achieved through differentiating:

- Those combatants that could become part of a professional army, estimated to be between 50 000 to 60 000
- Those who are old and should rather go onto a pension scheme, estimated to be 30 000
- Unskilled ex-combatants who cannot become soldiers, estimated at 30 000. It is crucial that there is no attempt to integrate them into the FARDC. Countries like South Africa have learned very expensive lessons in this regard

Such a programme, with an estimation of reintegrating 20 000 ex-combatants per year, would require a timeframe of at least six years. This is time that the government of the DRC does not have. Another factor that must be taken into account is that this programme cannot happen in a vacuum, but must be undertaken simultaneously with the other objectives of UNSSSS and STAREC.

Factors impacting on the DDR process

Violence has continued to flare up in the eastern DRC, especially in the Kivus, as 'newer' dissident armed groups continue operating. These renegade elements operate with virtual impunity as a consequence of the weak Congolese political and security apparatuses. These armed groups remain powerful because they gain access to the mineral resources of North and South Kivu, and these issues are exacerbated by the ethnic and land rights rivalries there. However, even if this immediate issue of the Kivus were removed, reconstructing the army

would still engender a host of challenges, such as the difficulties of institutional development in neo-patrimonial states where there is the need for nationally inspired reforms rather than reforms that have been designed primarily by outsiders. Enormous resources will also be required if the transformation is to be effectively orchestrated.

Another setback is that donor co-ordination in support of the SSR process in the DRC has still not been adequately addressed. Competing strategic, political and institutional interests of donors within the country makes it very difficult to achieve a coherent, international, army-assistance approach. Many donors are currently working bilaterally, often in secrecy, with little co-ordination.¹⁷ The majority of support to the defence sector has taken place at the bilateral level. The Congolese government has clearly stated and demonstrated its preference for bilateral support in the area of defence, which tends to focus on more operational aspects such as training and equipment. The government considers aspects pertaining to oversight, and command and control – which tend to be supported by multilaterals such as the EU – as a threat to its control over the security forces. The EU Common Defence and Security Policy mission EUSEC RD Congo, which assists in the defence sector in both an advisory capacity and with assistance in the form of projects (organisation of the chain of payment; biometric identification of personnel; the creation of a computerised system for managing personnel; training in the area of administration of the FARDC, etc.), has nonetheless made some progress with its engagement.¹⁸

Another issue is the lack of ownership for this process. The Congolese government is not sufficiently interested in putting policies and procedures in place but, rather, has prioritised the equipping of the army (and police) and the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force. The Congolese government appears to have little interest in Western visions of efficient and accountable security forces, instead focusing on the acquisition of more weaponry and a useable Rapid Reaction Force. The Rapid Reaction Force may even be envisaged as a tool that may eventually bolster the personal power of particular politicians.¹⁹

The DDRR process

In addition, due to the presence of foreign armed groups and militias in the eastern DRC, the DDR process has operated parallel to the DDRRR process for foreign armed groups. The process has been co-ordinated mainly by MONUSCO, guided by the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and been spearheaded by the World Bank and the UNDP. With regard to DDRRR, from 2003 to February 2010 MONUC has repatriated more than 16 100 soldiers (and dependants) from foreign armed groups mainly from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.²⁰ However, one of the most notorious foreign armed groups, the FDLR, has not been entirely terminated as a result of the DDRRR programme and continues to remain a central security concern for the eastern regions of the country. The resolution of the FDLR problem is now the target of sustained co-operative efforts between the Congolese and Rwandan army, with the support of MONUC.

On 26 January 2010 Defence Minister Nsimba presented the international community with a 'new' reform plan for the military. This plan is based on the February 2009 plan that the government approved in May 2009.²¹

The reform of the military will constitute a period of 15 years (2009–2024), and will consist of three phases:

- Phase 1: stability and internal reform of FARDC (2009–2011)
- Phase 2: Capacity building, territorial forces, Rapid Reaction Force, logistics (2011–2016)
- Phase 3: To develop the military and return to normal military routine, with their envisaged participation in peace support operations involving the AU and the UN (2016–2024)

Based on identified economical, political and ethnically grouped areas in the DRC, the reform plan makes provision for three military regions: East, Central and West DRC. The military will deploy the following to these regions:

- One brigade for rapid deployment
- Army, Air Force and Navy bases
- Infrastructure such as sickbays, headquarters, and training centres

The Minister of Defence also announced that the current number of soldiers would have to be reduced by 46 000 over the next three years, at a cost of US\$1 87 million.

In terms of resolving the issues surrounding the FARDC, the UNSSSS seeks to address the issue of DDR as part of a greater holistic plan that can bring stability to the DRC. Accordingly, and within the framework of the security component of the government of the DRC's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan, the UN and other international partners plan to support the government of DRC's efforts in three primary areas of intervention:

Emergency strengthening of FARDC capacities. The UN and its international partners will support a series of measures that are needed to urgently enhance the professionalism, discipline and operational effectiveness of FARDC units deployed in the Kivus and Ituri. This support will be closely aligned with the medium- and long-term actions foreseen in the Revised Army Reform Plan and the *Plan Intermediaire d'Urgence*. Support will be oriented towards reducing exactions committed against civilian populations by the FARDC, and towards strengthening the operational capabilities of operational units in joint operations with MONUC against the FDLR and LRA in Orientale Province. The Revised Army Reform Plan makes provision for three overlapping phases spanning 12 years. The short-term phase, from 2008 to 2010, is based on:

- The training and deployment of 12 battalions of a Rapid Reaction Force drawn from elements yet to undergo *brassage*, as well as from the 18 existing integrated brigades
- The establishment of the legal framework necessary for army reform
- The completion of the transitional disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and army integration programmes

Key principles of international support include a 'protection-first' orientation; a focus on non-lethal support to FARDC units; and quick execution of activities in high-priority areas first. International support will be planned in close collaboration with the Ministry of Defence, the FARDC hierarchy, and provincial authorities. These principles will be implemented within the phased approach foreseen in STAREC, which consists of:

- An initial preparatory phase that focuses on an evaluation of deployments and operational needs
- A second phase that focuses on the redeployment of targeted units; the improvement of living conditions (food, medicine, temporary garrisoning); and initial training
- A third phase that focuses on the further strengthening of capacities, including full training, the provision of non-lethal equipment for operations, and garrisoning
- Support for the disengagement of armed groups. The UN and international partners will support a series of measures aimed at completing the disengagement of armed groups in North and South Kivu. For those armed groups who have yet to disengage (particularly in South Kivu), support will be provided for the registration and processing of combatants at re-groupment centres, which the UN will construct and maintain. For those combatants eligible for integration into the army or police, support will be provided for their training and integration into FARDC Integrated Brigades and the National Police (PNC) respectively. Combatants eligible for demobilisation but not the *Programme Nationale DDR (PNDDR)* will be reintegrated within the framework of rapid income-generating activities and community-based recovery programmes. Support will also be provided for the early identification and extraction of children. Parallel with the disengagement of armed groups, the international community will also support the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo's (GoDRC) efforts to prevent the creation of

security vacuums, through their assistance in the deployment of trained Rapid Intervention Units of the PNC

- Enhanced protection of civilians in conflict areas and disengagement zones. Within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1856 (November 2008) and to the best of its capacity, MONUSCO will support the GoDRC in ensuring the protection of civilians in conflict areas and zones from which armed groups are disengaging. Military support within this framework will be provided through regular patrolling from established camps, as well as through the deployment of temporary Operating Bases in insecure areas. These temporary bases, from which patrols will be launched, will increase the reach of MONUSCO, providing a security presence in wider areas for longer periods of time. Civilian support will be provided through the deployment of multi-disciplinary Joint Protection Teams, operating from MONUSCO military bases, which will help assess, identify and respond to threats to civilian populations

The programme has also identified five operational objectives, of which the following three will impact on the DDR process:

- Strengthen the operational capacities of FARDC Integrated Brigades, as this will result in improved capabilities to conduct successful operations against armed groups and reduced exactions against the civilian population
- Consolidate the process of integration of combatants from armed groups into the FARDC and PNC, which will result in the creation of trained, disciplined and effective integrated units
- Support the dismantling of Congolese armed groups in North and South Kivu through the demobilisation and community-based reintegration of those opting for civilian life (Congolese armed groups) and the disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation of FDLR combatants, which should ensure the effective dismantling of armed groups and the accessibility by the State to areas previously controlled by such groups

In terms of the FARDC ensuring a secure environment, the UNSSSS and STAREC plan foresees the following outcomes:

- There will be the redeployment of 15 FARDC trained battalions and their dependents, facilitated through the provision of food, medical and logistical assistance
- Internal weapons control systems are to be established within FARDC units through support for the development of Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs), the provision of equipment, and monitoring
- Operational FARDC units and their dependents are to be provided with temporary accommodation outside population centres
- Integrated FARDC units still needing to receive training are to be transferred to *brassage* centres for basic training and *brassage*, supported through the provision of food, medical and other services
- Complementary training is to be provided to 15 FARDC battalions, Luberizi (South Kivu), Nyaleke (North Kivu)
- Non-lethal operational support (communication, transport, food assistance and logistics) are to be provided to operations
- Military justice capacities in all FARDC units are to be enhanced through provision of technical and material support, as well as regular monitoring
- Permanent barracks for FARDC units are to be either rehabilitated or constructed, and include the necessary support structures for dependents
- Widows of former combatants (with their families) will be repatriated towards a chosen location.
- Regular, timeous payment must be made to the FARDC units

A number of national structures have been established to provide strategic direction, technical and programmatic guidance, and operational co-ordination and monitoring of efforts within the STAREC framework. These structures, which also integrate those of the Amani Programme,²² have been established at central (Kinshasa), regional and provincial/district levels, and are composed of both relevant government actors as well as international partners. The key guiding

structure is the STAREC Oversight Committee (*Comite de suivi*). The Oversight Committee provides overall strategic orientation for the implementation of the GoDRC Plan, ensures overall coherence of efforts, and undertakes periodic reviews of progress at the provincial level. The Oversight Committee is chaired by the prime minister, and is composed of the vice-prime ministers; and ministers of interior; defence; planning; international and regional co-operation; justice; finance; budget; social and humanitarian affairs; mines; public works and infrastructure; gender and family. It also includes representatives from the presidency, the prime minister's office, civil society, the STAREC national co-ordinator, the UN, and other important donors. The Minister of Planning provides the technical secretariat for the Oversight Committee. The implementation of the plan will depend on the level of stability that can be achieved in the short to medium term.

According to an International Peace Academy workshop report the following challenges and recommendations have been identified:

Challenges and recommendations for a lasting DDR process in the DRC²³

CHALLENGES	RECOMMENDATIONS
Recurrent conflict and instability in the eastern DRC prevents the fair and normal completion of both DDR and SSR in general.	SSR and DDR cannot be implemented in such an insecure environment. It is therefore useful to separate the chain of operational command from that of SSR, DDR must not be implemented in areas that are so insecure that the risks outweigh the benefits.
The lack of a united vision and approach from the Ministry for Defence, the FARDC and other governmental stakeholders about the completion of DDR causes disjointed decision-making and prolonged delays in implementation.	It is necessary for all parties to share a common vision and to implement a strong co-ordination structure at high levels.
There exists a lack of political will and decisiveness about the completion of the DDR process, as well as a lack of sufficient national ownership.	It is necessary for there to be a determined political will and ownership that should be demonstrated through financial participation or through involvement with other types of support.
Political decision makers are regularly replaced after one year of service, and many live with the permanent expectation that they are soon to leave. This results in numerous reassessments of the situation and much delay in the implementation of a viable plan.	There should be a fixed mandate with deputies who are both fully motivated and employed.
The geographical size of the DRC, exacerbated by poor infrastructure and communications, makes it difficult to reach the areas where DDR must be implemented. A great deal of time must be spent in DDR areas and although Assembly, Regrouping and <i>Centres de Brassage et Recyclage</i> (CBRs) utilise the new system of mobile teams, these teams frequently cannot reach the locale of ex-combatants in time. The FARDC is not able to transport integratees to the CBRs. There is also limited capacity to provide basic needs for those who have been integrated. As a result of this, such ex-combatants often become demoralised and return to their previous armed group. This poses a threat to local security in the eastern DRC particularly. DDR facilities are not adequately equipped for the families that arrive with the ex-combatants.	A solution to many of these problems may be found if the DDR process was delocalised while still taking into account the extent of the country. Although it is evident that the dependents of these ex-combatants must be catered for, there must be some fixed limit on the extent of an ex-combatant's family.

CHALLENGES	RECOMMENDATIONS
<p>Membership in an armed group has become either a business opportunity or a way to gain rank without adhering to any requisite criteria.</p> <p>There are no well-established, common criteria required for the allocation of rank within many of these military groups and this means that many integratees declare the rank they enjoyed previously, although in most instances this rank was not earned according to a formal, armed-force ranking system. This situation has been exacerbated by the lack of any tests that might evaluate their military competency.</p>	<p>Dealing effectively with the problems engendered by these forces' access to illegal resources and implementing a strict and formal armed-force rank system will assist in eradicating these unofficial armed groups.</p>

Links between the DDR and SSR of the FARDC

The problems that surface as a result of the functional links between the DDR programme and SSR need to be examined carefully. The integration of militia leaders and some of their troops into the police and the army has been one aspect of the peace negotiations, but often this integration has not resulted in a calm resolution to the conflict, as evidenced in Ituri where rebels remain active. Unfortunately the DDR and integration processes within the security forces did not include the checking of criminal records nor provide adequate vetting measures (that is, checks on the activities of militia leaders prior to their integration into the army, which might have resulted in certain ex-combatants being banned from joining the armed forces or even having legal proceedings against them).

There are also no formal assessments relating to human rights violations and war crimes, despite the fact that international human rights associations have recommended that thorough vetting processes be employed during the integration process. The absence of harmonisation between those responsible for DDR and those responsible for SSR is further proof of the lack of co-ordination that exists among the foreign partners. For example, South Africa's training of the Rapid Reaction Force was not linked to the DDR process nor what the GoDRC hoped to achieve. The significant transfer of militia members into the army and police force may be justified in terms of stabilising society but, in terms of the reform of institutions, it creates more problems than it solves. Illiterate personnel, untrained and probably untrainable – such as the *Mai-Mai*, 'magical warriors' from the heart of Congo, who often act out rituals of invincibility – are brought into the official military structure and any relative calm that may have been obtained by the promise of jobs in the army or the police comes at the price of any essential reform of these institutions.²⁴

Since the re-installation of Joseph Kabila as the DRC's democratically elected president in December 2006, a number of major security crises have amply illustrated the lack of DDR and structural progress in SSR, and the risks this entails for the stability of the country as well as for the consolidation of democracy. These crises include the fighting in Kinshasa in March 2007 between the bodyguards of opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and Kabila's *Garde Républicaine*; the military offensive against the Nkunda forces in December 2007, which resulted in a major defeat for the Congolese government; the heavy-handed policing operations in Bas-Congo province against the political/religious group *Bundu Dia Congo* in February and March 2008; and the recent fighting in North Kivu between the FDLR and the FARDC.

Mounting insecurity in Kinshasa, increasing levels of urban violence throughout the country, the reprehensible behaviour of members of the security forces (including the *Garde Républicaine*), as well as the continuous presence of non-state armed forces in the eastern DRC, can be added to this list of major incidents.

The lack of any fundamental impact of ongoing DDR and SSR programmes on human security in the DRC is a reflection of a wider problem that exists with

Conclusions

donor-led peace-building efforts. Peace building and DDR, as well as SSR, are all too often considered to be technical processes, and although there is a growing understanding that this emphasis fails to address the root of the problem, it is a failing that is not easily remedied. SSR is a particularly sensitive field of action as it deals with central elements of national sovereignty. In a post-conflict situation it becomes particularly difficult as democratic institutions are often fragile and control of the security services remains a key component of the consolidation of political and socio-economic power.

The case of the DRC demonstrates that successful DDR and SSR processes depend on the full engagement of political authorities, which in the DRC have been somewhat passive in the adoption of policies and strategies to implement effective reform of the security forces. It seems that the systematic organisation of insecurity is preferred to the organisation of security. This assessment has important implications for both the consolidation of the democratic institutions and significant socio-economic policies such as the management of natural resources in conflict areas in the DRC. Although the impact of the lack of progress in SSR is felt throughout the country, the Kivu provinces are the hardest hit. Lack of progress in SSR will continue to foster an environment in which local political and economic entrepreneurs will have little difficulty in recruiting militias, and capitalising on resentment against the governmental security forces as well as the lack of security and effective structures of governance. Such a situation, if left unaddressed, could easily lead to a resumption of more generalised conflict.

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- 18 Henri Boshoff, Dylan Hendrickson, Sylvie More Clingendael, Thierry Vircoulon, *Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place. An Analysis of the Donor Approach to Supporting Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Clingendael paper, June 2010.
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