



Situation Report

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South Sudan: origins and implications of emerging (in)security dynamics

Introduction

On 9 January 2011 the people of South Sudan in all parts of the world voted in an historic referendum to decide the fate of the semi-autonomous region of the country then known as Sudan. The referendum was in fulfilment of one of the major requirements of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which brought an end to more than two decades of hostilities between the North and South and one of Africa's most violent civil wars – the second Sudan civil war. In the run-up to the referendum, a number of provocative political exchanges between the North and South, as well as logistical challenges, had cast doubt on the possible occurrence and peacefulness of the event. Its orderly and generally peaceful nature therefore drew the commendations of the international community for the commitment of both the North and South to peace in Sudan. An overwhelming 98,83 per cent of Southern voters cast their ballots in favour of separation.¹ Doubts still existed among the international community in the immediate aftermath of the referendum due to suspicions about Khartoum's possible response to the choice of separation. It therefore came as a pleasant relief when even before the official announcement of the results, President Omar al-Bashir declared his respect for the choice of the people of South Sudan.

Days before the official declaration of the results and about a month after the start of the referendum, militias loyal to renegade General George Athor Deng clashed with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Fangak county on 9 February. The clashes claimed more than a hundred lives and displaced several thousand people. Athor's rebellion was not new – its origins are traceable to the April 2010 elections. However, this attack was important because it registered the de facto breakdown of intra-South dialogue efforts initiated by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) prior to the referendum. It also highlighted the existence of unfinished business in the attainment of a unified South for independence in July 2011. Since this incident, a number of other former SPLA generals have revolted and separately declared their intentions to topple the GoSS and to replace it with an all-inclusive broad-based government that is representative of the people of the South.

The situation has raised serious questions about the state of intra-South cohesion, the capacity of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the SPLA to provide security for Southerners, the SPLM's ability to preside over and/or nurture

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a viable state, and the overall implications of the emerging (in)security dynamics for the future of the new country. This situation report provides explanations for the state of affairs in South Sudan and the implications of the emerging dynamics for the future of the new state. It is based on interviews with members of the GoSS, civil society organisations, faith-based organisations, academics, politicians and representative of women groups in South Sudan, and a review of secondary literature. The report advances certain key policy recommendations and options that the various stakeholders, particularly the GoSS, could pursue to nurture and sustain internal peace and stability in South Sudan.

The security history of South Sudan is inextricably linked to the history of Sudan as a whole. This is because the North–South civil war, which has ultimately led to Sudan splitting into two independent countries, is the defining premise of the security history of the South. The civil war has been one of the major sources of insecurity for both parties and was fought in two major cycles – Anyanya I (1955–72), and the second Sudan civil war (1983–2005). The first Sudan civil war was fought for 17 years (1955–72) between successive leaders of the North² and insurgency groups in the South. The principal motivation for Anyanya I was centre–periphery tension originating largely from Arab dominance and the marginalisation of the predominantly African South. It started as a mutiny by the Equatoria Corps³ in August 1955. The uprising remained guerrilla in nature, carried out by several independent insurgencies from various remote camps, until General Joseph Lagu Yanga, who defected from the Sudanese army in 1963 to join the South Sudan resistance against the Government of Sudan, united all the fighting forces of Anyanya I as a military wing of the South Sudan Liberation Movement, which aimed at achieving greater autonomy or outright secession for the South.⁴

Under General Lagu, the fighting units in the South formed a unified front and persisted with their insurgency until a mediation process led to the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in March 1972. Among other factors, the international political isolation of the Khartoum administration pushed the North to the negotiation table. The agreement granted the South autonomy and participation in the Government of Sudan, and required the integration of Southern guerrillas into the national army. However, it broke down due to systematic violations and abrogation of its provisions by President Gaafar Nimeiry, who argued that the agreement was ‘neither the Qur’an nor the Bible’.⁵ In response to a mutiny by troops from the South, therefore, he dissolved the South’s constitutional guarantees, declared Arabic the national language and replaced traditional Sudanese law with Islamic sharia law.⁶ This move effectively cancelled the South’s autonomy and led to the renewal of conflict between North and South in 1983. This time, the South organised around the SPLM/A under the leadership of Dr John Garang de Mabior.

Efforts towards peace between the two warring parties culminated in attempts to suspend sharia law in the country after the overthrow of Nimeiry. However, a coup led by General Omar al-Bashir of the National Islamic Front, later named the National Congress Party (NCP), ousted the Umma Party. Under the new regime, the civil war worsened and existing peace processes stalled as a result of the regime’s declaration of a jihad against the South and the further Islamisation of the country. In 1991 the international isolation of the NCP and a weakening of the previously unified Southern front due to internal splits in the SPLM/A made it easier for the two parties to resume negotiations.⁷ The resultant series of negotiations facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) climaxed in the signing of the CPA in 2005. Largely midwifed by neighbouring Kenya through the good offices of retired President Daniel arap Moi and championed by retired Lieutenant General Lazarus Sumbeiyu, the CPA reflected a number of important concessions in the area of power sharing, wealth sharing and security. The most outstanding concessions were provisions that granted autonomy of governance and secularism in the South vis-à-vis the existence of Islamic sharia in the North, and the involvement of Southerners in a government of national unity.

The CPA also provided for a referendum on self-determination for the South after a six-year transition period and for popular consultations in the areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The former provision became the legal basis for the 2011 referendum in South Sudan. Despite the delays and the political positioning that bedevilled the transition period, one of the greatest successes of the CPA was the implementation of the referendum, which took place in January 2011.

Four main categories of insecurity can be crystallised from the history of and current situation in South Sudan: (1) insecurity emerging from age-old cultural practices such as cattle rustling and child abduction; (2) inter-ethnic tensions originating from age-old animosities and tensions; (3) insecurity emanating from strains in North–South relations; and (4) politically motivated tensions originating from political competition, alliances and inter-personality clashes. The latter represents the political dimension of the current insecurity, which has led to the emergence of several armed groups since April 2010. Eight individuals are currently leading active rebellions in Southern Sudan. Of these, only generals Peter Gatdet and Abdel Bagi Ayii took up arms after the referendum. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that all eight individuals have become active or resumed their fight against the GoSS after the referendum (see Table 1).

Table 1: Rebel leaders in South Sudan since April 2010

	Person(s) involved	Tribe	Date of rebellion	Reasons	Area of operation
1	George Athor Deng	Dinka	April 2010	Alleged rigging of gubernatorial elections	Jonglei
2	Bapiny Monituel	Nuer	Did not integrate after the 2006 Juba Declaration	<i>Tribal</i> grievances about the current SPLA leadership	Unity
3	Gabriel Tanginye	Nuer	Did not integrate after the 2006 Juba Declaration	Long-standing differences	Upper Nile
4	Peter Gatdet Yak	Nuer	April 2011	Accusations of corruption and marginalisation	Unity
5	Gatluak Gai ⁸	Nuer	After April 2010	Politically motivated	Unity
6	Abdel Bagi Agyii	Dinka	March 2011	Politically motivated; accusations of the marginalisation of the Muslim minority	Northern Bahr el Ghazal
7	David Yau Yau	Murle	April 2010	Politically motivated and linked to internal Murle politics	Jonglei
8	Uluak Oliny	Shilluk	After April 2010	Unknown	Upper Nile

Source: Authors

The violence in the South has had unique trajectories and dynamics. The attacks in Fangak in north-eastern Jonglei State on 9–10 February 2011 marked the beginning of post-referendum activity by the rebelling generals. Forces loyal to George Athor Deng carried out attacks that led to the deaths of an estimated two hundred people.⁹ Athor announced his rebellion after the April 2010 gubernatorial elections during which he alleged vote rigging took place. A presidential decree pardoned him as part of efforts to achieve intra-South unity in the run-up to the referendum. The Fangak attacks therefore meant a de facto breakdown of the presidential pardon and the South–South dialogue it represents. In the latter part of the same month, fighting resumed between Athor’s fighters and the SPLA in Jonglei State. Like the previous attacks in Fangak, the clashes between the SPLA and Athor’s forces led to the deaths of more than a hundred people.¹⁰

In the following month, March 2011, two separate attacks led by Captain Uluak Oliny, an ally of Athor, north of Malakal in Upper Nile State left more than a

hundred dead. Although little is known about Oliny, the resumption of attacks by his forces after the referendum appears to be timed to send a clear political message. In the same month, former General Abdel Bagi Ayii from Northern Bahr el Ghazal State and a former presidential adviser on traditional affairs to President Salva Kiir announced a rebellion.¹¹ Bagi, a controversial man with more than 70 wives, cited issues of discrimination by the ruling elite of the SPLM and demanded 30 per cent representation in the GoSS cabinet for the about one per cent Muslim minority in the South. Bagi announced his rebellion from Khartoum, which presents an interesting twist to Southern suspicions of Northern support for his rebellion and pervasive interference in the South.

Similarly, in March General Peter Gatdet Yak, a former commander of the SPLA's air defence system and deputy commander of its Division III also defected and issued a declaration establishing the formation and launch of the South Sudan Liberation Army. According to Gatdet's 'Mayom declaration',¹² his organisation aims to oust the Juba-based GoSS and replace it with a broad-based, inclusive government. In a subsequent series of attacks in Mankien and areas around Mayom country in Unity State, an estimated 85 people were killed.¹³ In May 2011 the same group was blamed for launching simultaneous attacks with the North's takeover of the Abyei region.

In April 2011 forces loyal to General Gabriel Tanginye clashed with government forces south of Malakal, which led to the death of about 57 people.¹⁴ Tanginye is one of the warlords who fought against the SPLA for most of the second Sudan civil war and did not integrate with either the North or South following the 2006 Juba Declaration. His group has since been accused of incidents of violence in Malakal town, the capital of Upper Nile State. Following the 2010 presidential pardon of rebelling generals, he subsequently joined the advisory board of a US-based investment group and announced his reconciliation with GoSS.¹⁵ However, his forces have been active since the referendum.

Other active rebel leaders include David Yau Yau of Jonglei State. Unlike the other rebel leaders, Yau Yau was a civilian who contested parliamentary elections for the Gumuruk-Boma constituency seat as an independent candidate in the 2010 elections. He started his rebellion after losing to Judy Jokongole, an SPLM candidate. His rebellion is therefore attributed to internal Murle politics and his failure to win the parliamentary seat. His forces have been active around the Avod, Boma, Bor, Duk, Gumuruk and Pibor areas and were responsible for attacks against SPLA forces in Gadiang in April 2011.¹⁶ In Unity State, the late Gatluak Gai, a former police officer, led a separate rebellion, which began after the 2010 elections and lasted until his death in July 2011. Gai is believed to have supported gubernatorial candidate Angelina Teny, wife of Vice President Riek Machar, with the hope of getting appointed as a county commissioner. However, when she lost the gubernatorial elections, Gai began a rebellion against the GoSS in Unity State.

A number of underlying fault lines in South Sudanese society are fuelling the current trend of insecurity. These issues are generally linked and are not mutually exclusive of one another. They can broadly be categorised into five key issues and are discussed in greater detail below.

1. Longstanding splits in the Southern leadership

Despite a shared history of struggle against the North, the people of South Sudan have not succeeded at any time in their history in forming a unified front in pursuit of their shared interests. The history of the armed struggle against the North is marked by incessant internal fragmentation. This observation is not only buttressed by the emerging divisions in the South, but also by three major occurrences in the conflict history of the region.

Firstly, it is notable that the uprisings in both the first and second Sudan civil wars did not begin with a unified front, but originated from disparate rebellions and fighting units under different commands in different geographical locations.


Until General Joseph Lagu brought the fighting forces of Anyanya I together, the different fighting units operated independently. Similarly, the main forces, which later became the Southern uprising in the second Sudan civil war, did not emerge as a unit, but as two distinct uprisings. Anyanya II started in 1978, when Southern dissidents in the eastern Upper Nile area took up arms.¹⁷ This was followed by the mutiny of Southern soldiers from the garrison town of Bor in 1983 under the leadership of Dr John Garang de Mabior. The latter group formed the SPLA and succeeded in dominating the struggle against the North and therefore subsumed the Anyanya II elements.¹⁸ However, the differences in the geographical locations of the two groups meant differences in their ethnic compositions. Anyanya II was predominantly Nuer, whereas SPLA elements were largely Dinka. Despite integrating and operating as a movement, the underlying differences never fully disappeared and contributed to the 1991 splits within the SPLA.

The second issue, which indicates the lack of cohesion in the South's leadership, was the rapid splintering of the fighting forces and leadership of the South. In 1991 elements in the SPLA led by Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Koang Chol attempted to remove Garang as the leader of the SPLA. This move was blamed on the lack of democracy in Garang's leadership. In reality, however, a cocktail of issues, in particular a leadership struggle; tribal competition; and, most importantly, differences in the strategic direction of the struggle were the primary underlying factors. The latter factor was prime. There was a fierce contest between supporters of Garang's 'New Sudan' vision and proponents of self-determination for the South. Rather than remove Garang as the leader, the move by Riek Machar and Lam Akol resulted in a split of the SPLA into two distinct movements – SPLA-Mainstream (led by Garang) and SPLA-United (led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol). Although they were both Southern, the two groups differed in their goals and alliances. Whereas SPLA-Mainstream championed the 'New Sudan' vision and was supported by Ethiopia, SPLA-United espoused a vision of self-determination for the South. The latter group later aligned itself with the North against SPLA-Mainstream. The resulting struggle between the two groups remains one of the most violent periods in the entire history of the second Sudan civil war. Following internal differences, SPLA-United further split along personality lines. Riek formed the Southern Sudan Independence Movement, while Akol took over the leadership of SPLA-United in 1996.

In addition to the above splits, several tribal armed groups and militias emerged in the Equatoria areas of the South among the Bari, Latuka, Mundari, Didinga and Taposia peoples. Others also emerged in the Murle areas of south-eastern Upper Nile, among the Fertit people of Western Bahr el Ghazal, and among Dinkas in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile. The majority of the groups in these areas emerged as a result of alleged SPLA abuses, so a significant number of their fighters were therefore ex-SPLA fighters. The groups were largely armed by the North and later collectively organised themselves into the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) and became signatories to the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the Government of Sudan.¹⁹ In 2000 Riek Machar split from the SSDF and founded the Sudan People's Democratic Front/Defence Forces (SPDF) and by 2002 had left the SPDF for SPLA-Mainstream before the 2005 CPA ended the war. The SSDF and some of the other armed groups (OAGs) later integrated into the SPLA following the CPA's outlawing of OAGs and the signing of the 2006 Juba Declaration.²⁰ See Figure 1 for the status of the SSDF and selected OAGs after the Juba Declaration.

The integration of the SSDF and OAGs into the SPLA led to the integration of armed groups and personalities who were not core members of the SPLA and who had had reason to fight the SPLA or not to join it in the past. This effectively further weakened the cohesion of the SPLA. The resultant effect of this move was that the SPLA became a conglomerate of armed groups and warlords, and not a tightly knit movement of members fully committed to their core interest or united by a common past. Hence, factional competition, rivalry, power struggles and personality complexes reduced the rebel leadership's capacity to unite and rally the masses behind one umbrella faction.

Figure 1: Status of SSDF and selected OAGs after the Juba Declaration



Source: UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan), *CPA Monitor*, annex 20, <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPA%20Monitor/Annexes/Annex%2031%20-%20OAG-SSDF%20after%20Juba%20Declaration%20-%20200607.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2011)

Thirdly, throughout the period of the splintering of armed groups in the South, many leaders made multiple defections between different armed groups. According to SPLA spokesperson Colonel Philip Aguer Panyang, Abdel Bagi Ayii alone made about ten defections between 1991 and the signing of the CPA in 2005.²¹ His case indicates the lack of attachment of many of the leaders to a particular cause, but rather to personal and tribal interests at the local and political levels.

We argue that these occurrences and characteristics in the history of the South have conspired against the realisation of cohesion in both the South and the SPLA. It is therefore not surprising that post-referendum security realities and revolts are emerging along the lines of some of the elements who were integrated into the SPLA. Abdel Bagi Ayii, for example, has never been a core member of the SPLA. The current trend of events is therefore the case of the proverbial ‘chickens coming home to roost’. It indicates that unless the internal cohesion of the SPLA and the South is radically improved, similar fault lines within the region may give way to worsening insecurity. If unchecked, this will foster elements that will critically undermine the South’s ability to unify its people and govern itself.

2. Ethnicity and fear of Dinka dominance

As in other parts of Africa, the question of ethnic identity has become impossible to dissociate from leadership personalities and their choices of political alliances in South Sudan. Notwithstanding the fact that ethnic diversity should be a pillar of strength, historical circumstances and current realities have often caused violent conflict among the region’s 65 different ethnic groups. Tribal tensions in post-referendum South Sudan provide another explanation for the trend of security dynamics in the South, which can be traced to three major sources.

Firstly, there are inter-tribal tensions originating from historical and age-old grievances between particular groups owing to cultural practices such as

cattle rustling and child abduction. The second major source relates to wartime relationships and alliances between tribes and the principal contenders in the second Sudan civil war – the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. During the period of the splintering of armed groups in the South, some of the groups aligned with the North and were subsequently armed by the latter against the SPLA. The case of the Murle tribe is particularly striking. As early as 1963 the Murle aligned with the North and were subsequently armed by the latter to fight the uprising in the first Sudan civil war.²² Despite the end of hostilities, this past Murle alliance with the North has set them against other tribes that sided with the South's liberation struggle. In a related case, the intra-SPLA tensions, which resulted in the splitting of the group, saw the exit of some of the Nuer and Shilluk elements into SPLA-United, which also aligned with the North to fight the SPLA. This provides the context for the rivalry between the Dinka-dominated SPLA and some Nuer and Shilluk elements in the recent history of the South. It remains an historical source of conflict around which suspicions still exist among the tribes referred to.

The third source relates to relationships between the Dinka and other tribes. Since the dawn of peace, however, another critical dynamic relates to the fear of Dinka dominance in post-independence South. Owing to the dominance of the Dinka and Nuer in the history of the struggle for the freedom of South Sudan and particularly the SPLA, it has become a natural consequence for them to dominate the resultant government of the South led by the SPLM. However, this is raising a great deal of suspicion and grievances among the remaining tribes. Certain tribes believe that the Dinka are marginalising other tribes that contributed to the liberation struggle and that the Dinka may exploit their place in the SPLM leadership to settle wartime scores. Others also fear the dominance of the Dinka amid the growing perception of corruption in the GoSS, membership of which is seen as giving access to national resources at the expense of other groups. During the fieldwork for this study, various respondents spoke of the reality that the wealth distribution in the South is skewed, as are lucrative appointments to government posts. There is thus a widespread perception that peace dividends are not reaching beyond Juba.²³

One group that feels marginalised is the Nuer tribe. This is evident in the involvement of some Nuer tribespeople in the ongoing revolts, including Peter Gatdet and the late Gatluak Gai. In admitting the existence of Nuer perceptions of marginalisation and attempting to address the issue, the SPLM's minister of legal affairs and constitutional development in the GoSS, John Luk Jok, has argued that despite a fair representation of the Nuer tribe in the ruling SPLM, including the post of vice president, disturbing perceptions exist among them about their marginalisation by the Dinka.²⁴ Jok has subsequently stated that he saw the revolts of Peter Gatdet and a few of his colleagues in terms of the explanatory framework of the exercise of tribalism and stated unequivocally that the Nuer dominate the rank and file of the SPLA in the majority of the states in the South.²⁵

3. Militarisation of Southern politics

South Sudan is one of the geographical spaces in Africa that has known no durable peace since the country's independence (i.e. that of Sudan in 1956). The first Sudanese civil war started prior to the attainment of independence and since then the region has spent more than four decades in the throes of war. Throughout this period, patriotism and Southern nationality have been defined by participation in the armed struggle. As such, participation in combat and martial exploits remains a critical factor in deciding who has contributed or not to the cause of freedom. In present-day South Sudan, it is not uncommon to be asked, 'What did you do during the days we were in the bush? Do you have any scars to show for it?' Such expressions point to the extent to which wartime experiences and military participation have become critical in the definition of post-conflict nationalism and leadership. Additionally, what an armed struggle (i.e. armed violence) can achieve is clearly exemplified by the referendum and the country's freedom.

As a consequence of the above, the politics of the South has been heavily militarised. As such, army generals remain the dominant actors in the politics of the South and in the ruling SPLM (see Table 2). Of the ten state governors, for example, eight were once SPLA generals. Such skewed dominance speaks of the high militarisation of politics in South Sudan, which in itself threatens the emergence of a civilian leadership – a critical pillar of stabilisation in post-conflict societies. The implication of this is that militarism sometimes dictates military solutions to political crises. Given their warlike past and the weak internal structures for the redress of perceived grievances, it becomes easy for disgruntled elements to resort to the gun to address these grievances. The case of generals Athor, Yau Yau, Bagi Ayii, Peter Gatdet and others speak to this point. Following allegations of vote rigging in favour of the SPLM incumbent, Athor announced an uprising instead of seeking redress through dialogue and other established democratic processes. Such unilateral tendencies have much to do with the socialisation processes of the current crop of leadership – bred in the bush in a state of continuous war. The reorientation of the leadership is critical, as for many in South Sudan war remains a powerful means to a political end – power.

Table 2: State governors in South Sudan

State	Governor	Rank/occupation/title
Central Equatoria	Clement Wani Konga	Major general
Eastern Equatoria	Louis Lobong	Brigadier general
Jonglei	Kuol Manyang Juuk	Lieutenant general
Lakes	Chol Tong Mayay Jang	Engineer
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Paul Malong Awan	Lieutenant general
Unity	Taban Deng Gai	Brigadier general
Upper Nile	Simon Kun	Brigadier
Warrap	Nyandeng Malek Deliech	Ms
Western Equatoria	Joseph Bakosoro	Colonel
Western Bahr el Ghazal	Rizik Zackaria Hassan	Brigadier General

Source: Authors

4. Political interference by the SPLM

High levels of political grievances emerged in South Sudan after the April 2010 elections. This is as a consequence of political interference by the Political Bureau of the SPLM in the 2010 gubernatorial elections. The 27-member Political Bureau is charged with decision-making in the party. In the 2010 elections, one of its key roles was to endorse the various candidates elected by the electoral colleges of the various states. Each electoral college submitted a list of three names to the bureau. The main reason for the three names was to enable the bureau to choose a different candidate in the event that the top candidate did not meet the requirements of the Electoral Act. Rather than endorse the candidates at the top of the lists, the 27-member bureau rejected some of the names and endorsed other candidates deemed to be loyal and longstanding members of the SPLM. Cases in point were the alleged rejection of Lt General Mark Nyipuoc of Western Bahr el Ghazal State and the selection of a different candidate for the Upper Nile gubernatorial elections. Despite Nyipuoc being allegedly elected with about 98 per cent of the vote in the state's electoral college, the Political Bureau rejected his candidature.²⁶ A similar situation surrounded General Athor's participation in the gubernatorial elections. Athor could not get the unanimous support of the Political Bureau. A vote on his candidature resulted in a split, and his candidature was later vetoed in favour of the incumbent by President Kiir. Athor subsequently contested the election as an independent candidate, but lost to the SPLM candidate. Because of the circumstances surrounding his candidature, however, he maintained that his loss was a result of vote rigging in favour of the SPLM candidate.

The Political Bureau's interference in the run-up to the 2010 elections subsequently led to the emergence of disgruntled party members, especially those such as Athor who were not members of the core group. In a similar development, General Alfred Ladu Gore contested the results of the Central Equatoria State elections, alleging SPLM manipulation of the Electoral Commission and stating that the commission had not been independent in the conduct of the election process.²⁷ According to sources in South Sudan, the declaration of results in favour of the incumbent SPLM candidate, Clement Wani Gongga, nearly sparked another revolt, which was prevented only by the timely intervention of the church.²⁸

The Political Bureau's role appears to have been born out of the desire of the SPLM to maintain a firm grip on the processes preceding the referendum and its desire to put trusted and longstanding members in key positions at the state level. However, the bureau's actions created a wave of divisions in the party, some of which have resulted in the emergence of the likes of Athor. It appears that this interference is creating a conflict between elements of the grassroots and the top leadership of the party. However, the fragility of the situation has to do with the lack of matured structures for redress within the SPLM.

There is also the apparent perception of limitless access to power and resources once one is given political office. Losing political office has thus meant the loss of influence, power and resources to some generals who think it is their time to benefit from their years of fighting in the bush. Since violence is seen to have worked in the past, the conflict over access to power, resources and influence is likely to lead to further violence. If such conflict persists and the weaknesses of the SPLM remain, more revolts may emerge similar to those of Generals Athor and Peter Gatdet.

5. Northern interferences in the South: fact or fiction?

As Volkan remarks in his influential book on parties' 'need for enemies', the elites in both North and South Sudan tend to retain a perpetual view of each other as enemies.²⁹ Such a categorisation of the other essentially nurtures and sustains feelings of in-group love and projects hostilities towards the other group (the enemy). Under such circumstances, as Kriesberg notes, conflicts become an effective means for political leaders to deflect internal pressures by constantly reminding the masses of the external enemy.³⁰ Thus, over the years, both the Northern and Southern elites have perfected and played on this image of the 'enemy' in order to galvanise support for their policies and causes. Despite the CPA's success in ending hostilities between the two parties, the agreement failed to deal with the mutual suspicions and deep-seated mistrusts between the warring parties. Their post-2005 relationship can thus at best be described in terms of 'co-habitation', or 'managing an enemy you know'. It is therefore not rare for some Southerners to refer to the North as 'the enemy', a description that gives a vivid indication of the 'us-versus-them' perceptions characterising the two sides. In the post-referendum South, this perception of the North as 'the enemy' appears to be a rubric that can explain all the current (in)security dynamics. Since the spate of revolts started emerging, therefore, one of the explanatory variables frequently touted by Southerners is that the NCP is covertly arming the rebels.

Several attempts have been made to substantiate these allegations. In October 2010 the leadership of the South announced that in the previous August it had impounded a Khartoum-destined cargo helicopter carrying men loyal to General Athor in Upper Nile State.³¹ In a second major attempt to involve the North, the spokesperson of the SPLM, Pagan Amum, presented copies of documents alleged to have leaked from the North in March 2011.³² In a third attempt, Philip Aguer shared intelligence information claiming that:

On 24 April top Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) security generals met with Peter Gadet in Nyama, East of Abyei, in which Peter Gadet was instructed to participate in liberating Abyei from Abyei Police as he will receive better armament and equipment and Popular Defence Force (PDF) and Janjaweed Commanders were introduced to Peter Gadet as counterparts.³³

He also indicated that the Sudan Armed Forces general headquarters ordered the divisional commander in Muglad to arm forces loyal to Abdel Bagi Ayii, Peter Gatdet and Gatluak Gai. In an interview with Philip Aguer in Juba, he intimated that he had proof of Northern involvement. Northern politicians have denied all the Southern allegations and argued that the South is only blaming others for its security mess.³⁴ To date, no independent proof has been presented to indicate Northern involvement in the revolts and violence in the South.

Does this imply that there is no Northern involvement? Perhaps not. Proponents of the Northern involvement theory support the merits of their case in terms of historical precedents of Northern interference by arming Southern factions during the civil war. They also refer to pronouncements by President Bashir to the effect that '[t]he South does not have the ability to provide for its citizens or create a state or authority'³⁵ as indicating that the NCP leadership might want to make sure the South fails in order to establish its claim over the whole of the region. A third case is the perception of the closeness of some revolt leaders to Khartoum. Abdel Bagi Ayii, for instance, announced his rebellion from Khartoum. It is also widely known that the members of the NCP leadership are not speaking with one voice and that some individuals are reportedly unhappy with the CPA in the first place and the 'dismemberment' of Sudan brought about by the independence of the South – which might set a dangerous precedent for other regions with ongoing, active armed rebellions, such as Darfur.

Without further proof, however, it is difficult not to question the current validity of historical alliances without concrete evidence to support such claims. This is because President Bashir has also admitted the possible negative impact of an unstable South on the North. It does appear, however, that if the North is interfering, this might have been initiated by the rebels in the South in their quest for allies and arms, or the North may be taking advantage of existing fault lines in the South. Overall, however, the Southern allegations remain to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The trend of emerging intra-South insecurity is particularly disturbing for several reasons. Firstly, it threatens to undermine the hopes for peace in the South and has redefined the parameters of the region's insecurity following its separation from the North. It is giving credence to the expectations of sceptics who predicted an implosion and to beliefs about the inability of Southerners to maintain stability and govern the expansive region. In 2010 Dennis Blair, the former US director of national intelligence, made one such prediction in a statement to the US Congress. He warned (emphasis added):

Looking ahead over the next five years, a number of countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass killing. All of the countries at significant risk have or are at high risk for experiencing internal conflicts or regime crises and exhibit one or more of the additional risk factors for mass killing. *Among these countries, a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur in Southern Sudan.*³⁶

Such predictions should be a wake-up call to the Southern leadership to take proactive measures to prevent and manage internal violence that, left unchecked, could pull the region down the ugly path of civil war.

Bashir has also said: 'The South suffers from many problems. It's been at war since 1959. The South does not have the ability to provide for its citizens or create a state or authority.'³⁷ Although it might be easy to dismiss Bashir as the proverbial man who sees a mote in the other's eye but not in his own, the larger implications of insecurity in the South should not be taken lightly. Against a backdrop of such warnings and scepticism, the deteriorating security trends have had implications for investor confidence and the return of South Sudanese in the diaspora, with many adopting a 'wait-and-see' attitude. In particular, such uncertainty among the Southern diaspora and the lack of clear incentive programmes to make return attractive constitute a missed opportunity should the skilled diaspora fail to return to make critical contributions to the development of the new state.

Secondly, coming in the wake of a peaceful referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Southerners voted for independence, the point can be registered that despite rallying round the question of secession in the South, the region still lacks cohesion. With the removal of the North as a common enemy, therefore, existing cracks within the Southern leadership and Southern communities will continue to surface. As one respondent stated during interviews in Juba, 'too many things were swept under the carpet. Now that the carpet has been removed, the mess is showing'.³⁸ Such sentiments are warnings of larger structural and relational issues that the political elites must learn to embrace and manage.

The future implications of this situation are equally worrisome. If the current trend persists, it has the capacity to reinforce the existing weaknesses of the new state, thereby helping to perpetuate the South as a weak state where the government's monopoly over the use of force is virtually non-existent. Because of the more than four decades of conflict in South Sudan, the region has emerged with numerous challenges. These include under-development, low literacy rates, high levels of internally displaced populations, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, inter-ethnic suspicions, over-dependence on aid and weak institutional structures. Even in the absence of fresh insecurity issues, these challenges will require a great deal of commitment, many sacrifices, much humility and vigorous proactive efforts before a fully stable state can emerge from the current rubble of war. The focus of the new state on addressing these challenges will be badly undermined should the present violence and conflict-causing issues persist.

Thirdly, questions are already being raised by a section of Southerners about whether the SPLM/A has what it takes to provide security for the citizens of the new state. Despite the SPLM's assurances, it remains to be proven if the movement can confront the emerging rebels and win not only the fight against these rebels, but the hearts and minds of the resident communities as well. The SPLA will be deeply tested if the rebel generals manage to organise themselves into a unified front. The more time it takes to contain the emerging unrest, the more difficult it will be for the SPLM to maintain its credibility in the eyes of the people of South Sudan.

The continuation of current security trends and political tensions is also capable of slowing development in the South. While the South has emerged as the world's newest state in July 2011, it also surfaces as the world's most inexperienced state and one of the most under-developed regions of the globe. In terms of the robust and encouraging international goodwill and the country's rich natural resource endowment, it remains one of the world's most hope-filled states. Its oil endowment, unexplored mineral deposits, rich arable lands and massive agricultural prospects make it a potential breadbasket for the millions of hungry people on the African continent. However, the current insecurity is capable of slowing the South's pace of development by its adverse effect on investor confidence and its capacity to dramatically increase the defence budget, which may skew resource allocation and impact development adversely. Beyond monetary costs, the threat of a possible war (whether internal or external) curtails the unrolling of developmental agendas and energies. It will continue to militarise the political and security landscape, cause doubt among the populace, embolden ethnic militias and warlords, and consequently undermine national cohesion and development. Importantly, it will also hamper efforts for security sector reform and increase threats associated with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the new state.

Mindful of the negative effects of the trend of insecurity and the need for the South to foster unity, the GoSS has embarked on important initiatives aimed at building peace for the troubled region of Sudan. In all, three major moves have been made since the signing of the CPA, as discussed below.

1. South–South dialogue forums

Plans for South–South dialogue are traceable to 2005, when the region declared its commitment to intra-South peace.³⁹ The first conference in this direction took place in 2008. A similar conference aimed at discussing and resolving divisive

issues in the South was organised under the auspices of President Kiir, Vice President Riek Machar and the chairperson of the SPLM in November 2010. It brought together representatives of 27 political parties in the South together with members of civil society organisations and faith-based organisations and had as its theme, 'South Sudan United for a Free and Fair Referendum'. Representatives at the five-day conference expressed their commitment to unity and peace and their resolve to foster a better future for the citizens of South Sudan.

2. Amnesty for rebelling generals

In October 2010 the president of the semi-autonomous region of South Sudan issued an executive order pardoning senior army officers who had rebelled before and after the April 2010 election. The officers involved were Gabriel Tanginye, George Athor Deng and the late Gatluak Gai. The executive order also granted free movement for these officers and offered them reintegration into the SPLA. The main aim of the amnesty was to foster unity among Southerners in the run-up to the referendum. Symbolically, it spelt out the South's recognition of existing tensions and the need for dialogue. Although the amnesty broke down, the initiative succeeded in preventing hostilities between the SPLA and the forces of these officers between October 2010 and the referendum. Athor, however, effectively reneged on his commitment to the provisions of the amnesty following his forces' resumption of military activity. As an initiative, it represents an important step towards Southern self-realisation and signals the top leadership's commitment to and readiness for dialogue, and a move for peace within South Sudan.

3. Institutionalisation of the quest for peace and grassroots peace initiatives

Perhaps one of the most symbolic moves indicative of the South's commitment to internal peace was the establishment of the South Sudan Peace Commission and its subsequent elevation to the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation. The commission started in 2001 as the Upper Nile Peace and Reconciliation Integration Office. It was later transformed into the SPLM's Peace Desk and turned into the South Sudan Peace Commission in 2004. It has now been transformed into a ministry. The establishment of the commission and its elevation effectively institutionalise the quest for peace in the South and give it the requisite profile for resource mobilisation and visibility. However, the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation should be mandated to conduct intensive grassroots peacebuilding and given the capacity to do so.

Since the institutionalisation of the resolve, a number of grassroots peace initiatives have been spearheaded by the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation to resolve inter-tribal fighting. According to the under-secretary of the ministry, ten peace centres, one in each of the ten states, have been set up with the aim of serving as symbols of peace.⁴⁰ Their respective peace coordinators are also a means of monitoring the state of peace in the various states. However, the ministry should work closely with its sister ministries and development partners so that functional grassroots peace and developmental peacebuilding (peacemaking accompanied by real practical developments) takes root. Only such fusions can guarantee durable peace.

Despite the above initiatives, intra-South peace remains an unfinished project, because of two main issues. Firstly, despite the publicity surrounding the intra-South dialogue, the majority of the actors still question the genuine commitment of their leadership to the implementation of the decisions that have been taken. For example, following the 2010 intra-South conference, representatives agreed to hold a constitutional review conference after the referendum so as to agree on the critical issues affecting the formation of a new transitional broad-based government before July 2011. However, a presidential decree establishing a constitutional review committee did not follow the stipulated roadmap agreed by representatives at the conference. This situation has led several Southern politicians and members of civil society to question the commitment of the SPLM and the Southern leadership to the call for intra-South dialogue.⁴¹ In a related case, the establishment of the

Constitutional Review Committee and the nature of its membership raised a great deal of discontent due to allegations of the SPLM's dominance of the process and the side-lining of faith-based organisations, particularly the church.⁴² Southern elites need to realise that political exclusion is not only a threat to peace and stability; it also dampens public confidence in the system.

Secondly, despite the SPLM's efforts, it appears that processes surrounding initiatives such as the presidential decrees have not usually enjoyed sufficient buy-in by actors crucial to their success. Such processes, even though laudable, should be initiated in the right political environment so as to enjoy the total commitment of parties to peace and to make peace a cherished commodity to all involved. Political inclusiveness and support for civic participation in national agenda setting and inputs into national processes guarantee the expansion of political and governance spaces. Such steps are critical to building the nation and rallying citizens' power for development and national advancement.

Thirdly, progress requires high levels of buy-in from the political elite who matter in the opening up of the political space. With increasing discontent associated with the nature of politics, militarised governance and perceived Dinka dominance, the lack of commensurate attempts to open up and widen the democratic space is crucially undermining the effectiveness of ongoing national reconciliation and development efforts.

The more than four decades of North–South war impacted South Sudan in different ways. In particular, it exposed and reinforced the deep-seated ethnic mistrusts and divisions in the region. Although coalescing around the quest for independence, these divisions persist. With the end of the civil war in 2005 and the South's attainment of independence in July 2011, the lid covering intra-South tensions has been lifted. Cracks are beginning to show in alarming forms that are capable of threatening the stability and development of the new state. The quest for intra-South peace remains an unfinished project and is clearly the next important task for the new state, notwithstanding efforts already being made. To achieve progress in this area, the following recommendations are presented.

To the South Sudan leadership:

1. *Prioritising intra-South peace.* Regardless of the ongoing efforts towards intra-South peace, the political leadership must treat the need for South–South dialogue as a matter of national urgency. This needs to take place at two separate levels – (1) the grassroots, and (2) the political levels. Within the former, nationwide programmes should be set up aimed at promoting peace among Southerners. This should take place at the community level. At the political level, negotiations should be opened with rebelling generals. These two levels should be given equal attention due to their mutually reinforcing relationship. Lack of peace at the community or grassroots level snowballs into lack of peace at the political level, and occasionally vice versa. Addressing existing concerns at these two levels will increase the chances of progress in the overall quest for peace. However, it should be noted that peace does not automatically satisfy hunger and an empty peace is no peace. Peace without employment for the thousands of jobless youth, idle militias and other war-ravaged populations will not be sustainable. Thus the GoSS leadership must reduce over-reliance on aid and begin spreading peace dividends beyond Juba to the hinterlands and establish creative economic and social programmes to mop up especially the youthful population, who will otherwise form a critical recruitment pool for renegade generals. Indeed, through innovative programmes such as jobs for youth and women and the demobilisation and reintegration of tribal militias, the government could tap into and transform the 'war energy' of the population into progressive 'peace energy' for development and societal recovery and advancement.

2. *Post-independence transition and political reforms.* The current political structure and culture reflect the necessities of the transitional period in which the SPLM spearheaded the managing of the affairs of the pre-independence semi-

autonomous region. Now that independence has been achieved in July 2011, it is time for the new state to embrace and construct a broad-based government that is representative of the diverse political elements that contributed in diverse ways towards the achievement of independence. This will require a post-independence transitional period during which a government of national unity should be instituted and charged with the duty of preparing the state for democracy and political reform. This should be done within a framework of efforts towards opening up democratic space for the numerous political actors in the South.

3. *Improving SPLM intra-party cohesion.* While the ruling SPLM goes in search of peace for the greater South, it is important for it simultaneously to work on attaining peace within its own ranks. Some of the rebelling SPLA generals have had issues with the SPLM and its politics. Addressing some of these challenges will go a long way towards alleviating the related problems so that they do not affect the country as a whole. This is particularly true about the internal politics and personality differences that prevail in the SPLM. Also important is for the party to institute and operationalise avenues for redress that are accessible and independent enough to win the confidence of all of its members. In this way, internal political grievances could be addressed at the party level in order not to spawn larger security concerns that may undermine the fragile peace of the new state.

4. *Patriotism on the part of the political elite.* South Sudan is in the process of building state institutions. At this crucial stage, therefore, sacrifices have to be made by the political elite towards eliciting zero tolerance for corruption, the elimination of negative ethnicity and the operationalisation of the institutional culture of the state. These are crucial in containing discontent emerging from the issue of ethnicity, the perceptions of corruption and the personalisation of state structures. Within this effort, existing state structures, particularly the security sector, require reform. This is because the culture of the army in the days of the struggle will clearly not be suitable for its role in a democratic environment.

5. *National healing and reconciliation as part of a transitional justice.* Having emerged from decades of war characterised by intra-South divisions and clashes, the need for national healing and reconciliation as part of a system of transitional justice will be beneficial for peacebuilding. There is the need for a national healing and reconciliation process in which the victims and perpetrators of intra-South wars and abuses can be reconciled.

6. *Conscious management of North–South political disagreements.* Despite the recent divorce, North and South Sudan have had a long history of cohabitation. The two sides therefore have a lot of cultural commonalities and this will be the case for generations to come. The political leadership of the North and South will therefore have to consciously manage their political disagreements in terms of their social and cultural commonalities.

7. *Managing the blame game.* The political leadership of the South will have to manage its persistent accusations of the North in its quest to identify the causes of the South's internal insecurity. The risk associated with blaming the North for everything is that the South may lose sight of the internal drivers of these insecurities. Secondly, such accusations will tend to hamper the international response because they may end up being seen in terms of the South perpetually 'crying wolf'. Taking gentle but determined steps towards a sovereign statehood, the Southern establishment must begin to behave like one: it should deal diplomatically, operationally and discretely with issues of national security and the management of tensions or suspicions with the North and the South's other neighbours. Frequent public outcries by government officials over the perceived misdeeds of the belligerent North will merely diminish the regime's credibility and status.

To the international community:

1. *Institutional condemnation.* Despite the international support for peace in South Sudan, it remains to be seen what the regional and international community should do about the saboteurs of intra-South peace. There should be institutional condemnation of the penchant for resorting to violence by dissatisfied generals in the South. This will go a long way towards discouraging similar moves and encourage the need to seek redress through democratic institutions rather than through the barrel of the gun.

2. *Punitive measures against saboteurs.* In the context of the above, punitive measures should be instituted against generals and warlords who are persistently bent on derailing the attainment of peace in South Sudan. This can be achieved through the use of various forms of international justice instruments, targeted sanctions, and the naming and shaming of individuals found to be saboteurs of peace in South Sudan. IGAD and the African Union could lead and mobilise the international community in this regard.

3. *Mentorship programmes.* While Southerners attempt to build state institutions, international support for this effort is crucial. A functional future state is as good as the quality of its workforce. Building on existing and new bilateral arrangements, regional and international actors must invest in technical capacity-building and policy support for the nascent South's civilian workforce. International actors in the area of finance and economics, justice, diplomacy, and other crucial structures of statehood can institute mentorship programmes in which secondments can be made to boost and mentor expertise in the building of particular institutional structures. Such support is crucial in the areas of the judiciary, the police, the military, correctional institutions (prisons) and diplomacy, among others.

4. *UN peacekeeping presence.* The role of peacekeeping missions in post-conflict societies cannot be over-emphasised. In the case of South Sudan, this is one of the critical ways in which the international community can stay engaged in the quest for peace and the maintenance of security for the new state. The UN should therefore extend the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan within the South so that the necessary security and mentorship required for the restructuring of the security sector of the new country can be achieved.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	civil society organisation
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
NCP	National Congress Party
OAGs	other armed groups
PDF	Popular Defence Force
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SPDF	Sudan People's Democratic Front/Defence Forces
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Force

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- 1 For a detailed breakdown of the results, see <http://southernsudan2011.com> (accessed 22 May 2011).
 - 2 Technically, of course, the leaders of the North were the leaders of the entire country of Sudan, but the civil wars were fought between the Arab-dominated North and the African South.
 - 3 A military unit composed of Southerners in Torit.
 - 4 Interview with General Joseph Lagu, Juba, 28 March 2011.
 - 5 Ibid.
 - 6 ICG (International Crisis Group), Sudan conflict history, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/sudan.aspx> (accessed 12 May 2011).
 - 7 This was over issues of terrorism, particularly the harbouring of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
 - 8 At the time of going to press, Gatluak Gai had just been killed. Details of circumstances surrounding his killing and the armed men involved were still sketchy.
 - 9 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), More clashes in Southern Sudan, 2 March 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12623063> (accessed 6 March 2011).
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 - 17 ASAP (African Security Analysis Programme), *The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF): a challenge to the Sudan peace process*, ISS situation report, Pretoria: ISS, 2004.
 - 18 Not all the elements integrated into the SPLA. Some remnants of Anyanya II formed a militia under the leadership of Paulino Matiep, a Bul Nuer, and supported by General Jafaar Nimeiri. See ASAP, *The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)*.
 - 19 ASAP, *The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)*; John Young, *The South Sudan Defence Forces in the wake of the Juba Declaration*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2006, 18.
 - 20 See CPA, Articles 7a and 7c. For a detailed list of OAGs in 2006, see Young, *The South Sudan Defence Forces*, 42–48.
 - 21 Interview with Colonel Philip Aguer, Juba, 29 May 2011.
 - 22 May Ying Welsh, Sudan: transcending tribe, Al Jazeera, n.d., http://english.aljazeera.net/photo_galleries/africa/201111010324526960.html (accessed 13 May 2011).
 - 23 Interviews with civil society organisations (CSOs), religious leaders and women's groups, Juba, March 2011.
 - 24 Nuer marginalization in South Sudan a false claim – minister, *Sudan Tribune*, 26 April 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Nuer-marginalization-in-South,38708> (accessed 26 May 2011).
 - 25 Ibid.
 - 26 See The SPLM's independents should blame the Political Bureau's small clique, not Pagan Amum, *Sudan Tribune*, 13 February 2010.
 - 27 See also Gore criticizes NEC ruling in favor of incumbent Central Equatoria governor Konga, *Sudan Tribune*, 20 June 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Gore-criticizes-NEC-ruling-in,35452> (accessed 26 May 2011).
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 - 29 See Vamik D. Volkan, *The need to have enemies and allies: from clinical practice to international relationships*, Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1988.
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