Human Agency and the Politics of World Order

Post Scriptum on Relative and Absolute Gains

Enduring without an Enemy: NATO’s Realist Foundation

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Terrorism, Supreme Emergency and Killing the Innocent


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Popularizing International Politics: Human Agency and the Politics of World Order

MATTHEW S. WEINERT

Abstract: This article articulates a politics of the world as process, which is imperative as globalizing forces render boundaries unintelligible; trans-border issues occupy international public policy makers as subjects for global governance; and human agents increasingly act in the realm of world politics. Rather than tackling the infinite details of each of these, I instead concentrate on their convergence. I find in Marx and Carr a language and a logic (even if they are rudimentary) with which to recognize the centrality of human agency in a politics of the world. I then turn to Hannah Arendt, whose global conception of politics, which centered on the generative power of human agents, helps us extricate Marx and Carr’s accounts from statist boundaries. Finally, I apply their insights to the institutional and normative dimensions of Hedley Bull’s underdeveloped concept of world order. Together, their insights enable us to rethink anarchy as a space for political activity.

Key words: human agency, anarchy, Hannah Arendt, politics, world order

INTRODUCTION

Our conception and study of politics depends on where and how we draw boundaries, whether they be physical – e.g. ancient city walls – or conceptual – e.g. sovereignty, for instance. By virtue of its divisive function, the boundary delineates an inside against an outside and denotes putative realms of possibility against spheres of impossibility. In International Relations (IR) theory, the systemic turn initiated by Kenneth Waltz’s third image theorizing (1979) was a (if not the) chief defining moment of the discipline, for it quite clearly demarcated the interstices between states and claimed that the proper subject matter of international relations theory must exclude dynamics internal to the state. This move not only distanced IR theory from its earlier preoccupations with diplomatic history and foreign policy, but it also delimited ‘a modern politics’ whose chief expression came in the form of ‘the principle of state sovereignty’, and exposed the contradictions ‘inherent in any claim to a politics of “the world”, that is, a politics that exceeds the legitimate authority of sovereign territorial jurisdictions’ (Walker, 2000: 215).
Walker no doubt establishes a high threshold for a politics of the world. After all, what constitutes exceeding the legitimate authority of sovereign jurisdictions? And why is a politics of the world equatable with an eclipsing of sovereignty? I am less concerned with articulating the specifics of Walker’s conception than with the general formulation of a politics of the world, which seems increasingly imperative as the forces of globalization render physical and intellectual boundaries increasingly unintelligible and perhaps untenable as issues once thought to reside within domestic jurisdictions – issues related to human welfare and the environment, for example – now occupy international public policy makers, and as ordinary peoples compound an agenda that had previously been long dominated by state elites. Tackling all of these issues in their manifold specificity is surely beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I focus on their convergences: first, their convergence in the recognition of the central role of human agency in a politics of the world; second, their convergence in a broadened conception of politics; and third, their convergence in the opening of a space within which the process of a politics of the world occurs and needs a more definitive articulation.

To aid our understanding of the first convergence, I appeal to what E.H. Carr called the popularization of international politics (1939: 2), which echoes a similar formulation by Karl Marx on the necessity of citizen participation in, and knowledge of, international politics. To aid our understanding of the second convergence, I attempt to capitalize on an ever-expanding and fertile dialogue between political theory and IR by exploring Hannah Arendt’s ideas on politics as a ‘global dominion in which people appear primarily as active agents who lend human affairs a permanence they otherwise do not have’ (2005: 97). Finally, to aid our understanding of the third convergence and to more centrally relate the concerns back to mainstream IR theory, I bring Marx, Carr, and Arendt’s insights to bear on Hedley Bull’s underdeveloped concept of world order to impart on it some purchase power. Importantly, each author helps us to rethink anarchy – that space between states – as a political space of possibility, thereby opening theoretical thinking to the construction of a politics of the world as a process, not as a thing. I consciously avoid references to contemporary literature and debates; by appealing to different, perhaps unexpected, voices, I hope to enrich and enliven the existing debates on the state of the state in a globalizing world, the nature of agency, and the space within which global governance activities occur.

Put differently, this article treats as salient the fact that states and international organizations increasingly recognize and accept in policy relevant ways the reducibility of the state to the individual. Examples include the human security agenda, the formulation in principle of a ‘responsibility to protect’ populations from egregious, systematic violence and suffering (ICISS, 2001), the erection of the International Criminal Court, poverty reduction and alleviation programs, including micro-fi-
nancing and debt-forgiveness (i.e. Jubilee 2000, and the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative through the World Bank), the Millennium Development Goals, environmental protective measures, the 1997 Ottawa Convention that bans antipersonnel landmines, the Kimberley Process Diamond Certification Scheme to interdict the sale of conflict or ‘blood’ diamonds, the prohibition on the use of child soldiers, victims’ assistance units in international criminal tribunals, and the 2007 launch of the Advance Market Commitment, by which wealthy states pledge to ‘support and finance the development of vaccines for children in poorer countries, and to purchase the vaccine once it is produced’ (Rosenthal, 2007). Notably, the United Nations Security Council – that high political body charged with the solemn task of maintaining international peace and security – has not remained immune from considerations of human agency and human welfare. Since 2000, the Council has used its interpretive and declaratory powers (see Alvarez, 2006: 189–198) to broaden the scope of what it considers to constitute a threat to or breach of international peace and security. It has adopted resolutions interpreting HIV/AIDS, international crimes, terrorism, and the trade in illicit (conflict) diamonds to be actual or potential threats to international peace and security, and it has also adopted additional resolutions on other non-country specific, human welfare-oriented issues such as civilians in armed conflict, children in armed conflict, women, peace, and security, and the roots of conflict as implicated in the concept of human security. The Council even held an unprecedented April 2007 meeting to explore interconnections between global warming, state security, and international security.

These ‘events’ are noteworthy for they appear to challenge the edifice of a state-centered conception of international relations through their appeal to a more primordial, more fundamental unit of international political analysis: the individual as both subject and object of a politics of the world. How, then, should IR theory treat such events, and how might a politics of the world be expressed conceptually and theoretically, given attention to both human welfare and human agency?

THE POPULARIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Let us consider two statements about the study and practice of international relations. Chronologically, the first comes from Karl Marx.

‘If the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal concurrence, how are they to fulfill that great mission with a foreign policy in pursuit of criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices, and squandering in piratical wars the people’s blood and treasure? It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes, but the heroic resistance to their criminal folly by the working classes of England that saved the West of Europe from plunging headlong into an infamous crusade for
the perpetuation and propagation of slavery on the other side of the Atlantic. The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference, with which the upper classes of Europe have witnessed the mountain fortress of the Caucasus falling prey to, and heroic Poland being assassinated by, Russia; the immense and unresisted encroachments of that barbarous power, whose head is at St. Petersburg, and whose hands are in every cabinet of Europe, have taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective Governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations’ ([1864] 1969: 18).

Three-quarters of a century later, E. H. Carr mused that

‘[d]own to 1914, the conduct of international relations was the concern of persons professionally engaged in it... The more picturesque aspects of diplomacy had a certain news value. But nowhere, whether in universities or in wider intellectual circles, was there organized study of current international affairs. War was still regarded mainly as the business of soldiers; and the corollary of this was that international politics were the business of diplomats. There was no great desire to take the conduct of international affairs out of the hands of the professionals or even to pay serious and systematic attention to what they were doing. The war of 1914–1918 made an end of the view that war is a matter which affects only professional soldiers and, in so doing, dissipated the corresponding impression that international politics could safely be left in the hands of professional diplomats. The campaign for the popularization of international politics began in the English-speaking countries in the form of an agitation against secret treaties...The blame for the secret treaties should have been imputed, not to the wickedness of the governments, but to the indifference of the peoples. Everybody knew that such treaties were concluded. But before the war of 1914 few people felt any curiosity about them or thought them objectionable. The agitation against them was, however, a fact of immense importance. It was the first symptom of the demand for the popularization of international politics and heralded the birth of the new science’ (1939: 1f).

Though Marx and Carr understand popularization somewhat differently – Marx’s agonistic, contestational approach morphs into Carr’s academic study – both in the end arrive at a similar conclusion: popularization aims to excise ‘the conduct of international affairs [from] the hands of the professionals’ by paying ‘serious and sys-
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tematic attention’ to their work and in doing so potentially derail more aggressive state policies (Ibid.: 1). Several points bear mentioning.

First, each offers not a unitary account of the state, but a disaggregated one that differentiates agents, whether diplomats, professional soldiers, or classes. The result is a clearer and a more complicated portrait of both international relations and how agents and processes within the state affect politics outside the state. Yet this disaggregated approach does not preclude personification of the state and treating it, conceptually, as a distinct agent. According to Carr, ‘[t]he hypothesis of state personality...is neither true nor false, because it does not purport to be a fact, but a category of thought necessary to clear thinking about international relations’ (Ibid.: 150).

Second, it follows from this disaggregated conception of the state that distinct actors possess different, though not always incommensurable, interests, needs, and motivations. That state interests may be entirely dissimilar from the interests of other actors renders specious any assumed pre-given homogenous national interest. True, sometimes interests cohere: all relevant actors might agree on a particular interest, say, in promoting human rights, though devising methods for doing so may produce or reveal disagreement. Rather, Marx and Carr alert us to the potential unilateral state manufacture of a singular national interest in conditions of popular indifference, mock sympathy, or shameless approval. Bluntly stated, both authors demand an active, engaged citizenry, else international politics will devolve in some cases into brutishness.

Third, even if resistance to and an understanding of international politics fail to prevent or restrain particular state policies, the process – that is, unraveling the mysteries of or popularizing the study of international politics – is as important as the intended effects, for popularization engenders a public space (or makes a notional space real) that is characterized by action and speech within which citizens may propagate more national national interests than those that are commonly construed in IR theory (see Gilbert, 1999: ch. 1). Marx is much more direct than Carr on this point: the laws of morality and justice championed by popular (democratic?) sentiment and reflection appear distinct from government interests; the former categorically restrains the latter.

Marx’s formulation, of course, begs many questions. Are these democratic interests reflective of a will of all (or most) or of specific class interests? Are we to ascertain coherence of interests only in the presence of explicit assent for state policy? Importantly, of what do these laws of morality and justice consist? Are they comprised of more than popular passion? Mustn’t they be? After all, Thucydides alerted us to the consequences of Cleon’s demagogic inflammation of the passions of ordinary Athenians which spurred their vote to annihilate Mytilinea. Fortunately, the vote, coupled with Diodotus’ more rational arguments, produced a moral hangover.
the following day and a second vote – this one to reverse their previous genocidal decision. Likewise, slavery and institutional racism were once supported by masses of people for centuries. These can hardly be construed as moral or just, even if they were, on a simple majoritarian view, democratic.

While the laws of morality and justice might precipitate from a universal code of ethical or moral principles, their specific application and content stems from political activity itself: that is, from deliberation and negotiation between diverse sets of actors. For instance, all may agree on the general value of human life, but its translation in policy specific terms is contingent on the particular context within which the value demands articulation. Ideology, religious belief, philosophical position, material resources, histories, perspectives, and the like influence agents’ positions and must be taken into account. And this appears to be why ordinary peoples, in the views of Marx and Carr, have something significant to say about how states interact. To be sure, their conception of international politics is primarily about inter-state or inter-governmental relations, yet they complicate the equation. Popular participation in and concern with inter-state relations necessarily act as counterweights to elite-generated policy. This entails that IR theory must expand its notions of agency beyond the state, work into its framework a more substantive account of process, and consider multiple discourses and ways in which diverse agents participate in international politics and, moreover, negotiate and manage the space between them.

In the end, Marx and Carr’s accounts of the popularization of international politics are emancipatory, yet rootless and rudimentary. They are emancipatory because they recognize the potential of individuals to instigate change. They are rootless and rudimentary because the authors do not sufficiently or systematically examine the implications of their observations or link them to the study of international politics. This is primarily because each wrote, respectively, at the conception and the birth of a discipline. Despite these shortcomings, Marx and Carr offer a valuable discourse for the study and practice of international relations. Popularizing international politics is important not simply because it recognizes (potential) citizen contributions to political processes in ways that might compel states to reformulate policy and planned courses of action. Rather, the popularization of international politics interrogates the meaning and process of politics itself, which has not received sustained attention in mainstream IR theory (see Ebata and Neufeld, 2000).

HANNAH ARENDT ON POLITICS

Hannah Arendt seems well-suited to be introduced into our ruminations for she conceived of ‘individuals as political agents, acting within specific circumstances, but always retaining a unique character and capable of unpredictable and surprising acts of great political significance’ (Williams and Lang, 2005: 2). Her emphasis was not specifically borne out of a robust cosmopolitanism but out of the horrors of the
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twentieth century in which she herself was immersed – as a detainee in the Gurs concentration camp, from which she managed to escape – and thus out of necessity. The enormity and proportion of the crimes committed by the Nazis (and Communists) shattered all pretense to tradition, culture, and civilization and made us painfully aware that ‘the claim to global rule’ pursued in the name of humanity transformed humankind from ‘a beautiful dream of unity or a dreadful nightmare of strangeness’ into ‘a hard inescapable reality’ (Arendt, 1951: 434). In this respect, her political thought complements Marx and Carr and serves as an antidote to a social science predisposed to studying grand, systemic impersonal forces implied by ‘science’ at the expense of the intersubjectivity implied by its qualifier ‘social’.

Arendt framed her conception of politics at one end by the human condition of plurality, or the fact that every individual is distinguishable from the rest, and at the other by freedom. Each presupposes the other. Plurality cannot exist except in biological fact if we are not free to pursue our life projects, communicate our thoughts, and act in concert with others; freedom likewise would be emptied of content in conditions of homogeneity (think of Arendt’s criticisms of totalitarianism and its reduction of human agency into automatonism). Because both plurality and freedom are social concepts, Arendt’s emphasis on the individual was not a crass individualism. ‘Individuals are rooted and conditioned creatures’ (Williams and Lang, 2005: 11) who, I would add, exist in communities, though not always in communion with others. Politics evolves from that community and the myriad of interpretations, judgments, and understandings communicated and enacted in public. For Arendt, politics is thus chiefly about the (public) space between agents, the issues and interests that affect all, the action that occurs within this space, and the space itself.

To be an active agent means to be capable of acting in and with the presence of others regardless of the intention or desire to act or participate in public affairs (Arendt, 1958: 188; cf. Giddens, 1984: 5–14). To act means to begin something anew or to set into motion a process; the plurality of the human condition ensures infinite, spontaneous, mutable, and unexpected action (Arendt, 1958: 177). Therefore, ‘action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all human activities. Moreover, since action is the political activity par excellence, natality, not mortality, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical, thought’ (Ibid.: 9).

Politics, then, is also centrally about ensuring the conditions for action, protecting plurality, and elevating natality and all that it implies to the center of politics. In these
senses – the human agent as the irreducible analytical category of politics; plurality and freedom; and the common world shared by acting, thinking, speaking individuals who, in their infinite capacity to discuss, deliberate, interpret, adjudge, and act, constitute new identities and interests – Arendt can speak of politics as ‘a global dominion in which people appear primarily as active agents who lend human affairs a permanence they otherwise do not have’ (2005: 97). While Arendt noted at the time that politics had not yet attained the level of universality the definition implies, she observed there were ‘plenty of historical examples of people being shunted as active agents’ (Ibid.), which suggests with Marx and Carr that people are an inherent and important part of international politics. If they were not, there would be no reason why governments would need to silence them when state interests or policies come under scrutiny or are resisted by citizens.

In Arendt’s understanding, a global politics did not appear until the concept of humanity became ‘an inescapable fact,’ that is, when the crimes of the Nazis were fully revealed to the world in all their sordid, horrific detail. The London Charter’s articulation of an entirely new crime – a crime against humanity –, even if (to paraphrase the French judge at Nuremberg) the Tribunal let it evaporate (1963a: 257), engendered the notion of a common humanity as ‘one political entity’ (Arendt, 1951: 436) by writing it into law. And the effect was historic for Arendt: it marked the transcendence of one sphere of international law from a managerial, regulative role in inter-state affairs to a space ‘above’ nations (Ibid.), a space of humankind. In that new space – a nascent politics of the world – states deemed a crime against humanity to be a crime “against the human status” or [one] against the very nature of mankind,’ and an attack, moreover, ‘upon human diversity as such...without which the very words “mankind” or “humanity” would be devoid of meaning’ (1963a: 268f).

Though one may disagree with Arendt’s laudation and understanding of international criminal law as supranational, her reflections highlight a sine qua non in politics: agency presupposes recognition; and law, both domestic and international, formalizes that recognition. The point is important. For the Greeks, nomos (law) delimited and in some senses constituted the political by ascribing agency vis-a-vis citizenship, erecting boundaries between those covered by the law (citizens of the polis) and those not (barbarians, non-citizens) and prohibiting and prescribing particular behaviors. ‘Internationally’, the space between citizen and barbarian marked precisely the end of politics, a no man’s land, a land of violence and war. Conversely, the Romans took a more expansive view. Lex, the actual meaning of which is “last- ing tie” but which ‘quickly came to mean “contract”’ (Arendt, 2005:179), was primarily political. Lex formalizes the relationship between self and other precisely by binding the two together in mutual recognition, in community though not necessarily in communion. Law ‘links human beings together...[;] it comes into being not
by diktat or by an act of force but rather through mutual agreements’ (Ibid.). In the case of the founding of Rome, its ‘law of the Twelve Tables...was not the work of one man,’ the legislator, who in the Greek experience ‘was radically disconnected from the truly political activities and affairs of the citizens’ (Ibid.). Rather, Rome’s law emerged from

‘a contract between two warring factions, the patricians and the plebes, that required the approval of the entire populace... Significant for the contractual nature of the law is the way this basic law... [did] not unite the quarreling parties simply by erasing the distinction between patricians and plebes. The opposite was the case: the explicit prohibition – though later rescinded – of marriage between patricians and plebes emphasized their separation even more explicitly than before. Only the state of hostility between them was set aside... The res publica, the life of public affairs, which arose out of this contract and evolved into the Roman Republic, was located in that in-between space between formerly hostile partners...And just as such an agreement can come about only when the interests of both sides are recognized, this basic Roman law is likewise a matter of “creating a common law that takes both parties into account”’ (Ibid.: 179f).

The Roman concept of law is thus the outcome of political activity: the outcome of contestation and the decision to act, to take the initiative to insert oneself in public. Put differently, if agency transforms the desert between hostile parties into a public, political space (one might say action constructs the public), law completes the metamorphosis by formally embedding recognition of the other and binding that other to the self. Here we might understand the significance of Marx and Carr’s conception of the popularization of international relations: popularization is an eminently political activity and defines a space for a politics of the world. In one sense, it is the taking of an initiative by inserting one’s self into the other’s political space. In another, it is the taking of an initiative by recognizing the claims of the other and bringing those claims into dialogue with the self. In yet another sense, it is the taking of an initiative by understanding endemic problems differently, by expanding the scope of politics and political activity, of governance and rule, of management and creation (some might call it, after Foucault, governmentality; see Jaeger, 2007). Each constitutes shifts in understanding that permit admission of ordinary citizen concerns into the public political discourse and policy making in ways that permit dramatic fluidity and movement between the local and the national, between the national and the inter-national, between the inter-national and the global, and between the global and the local.12

If the Greek conception of law insulated politics by erecting barriers and embedding divisions in an effort to permit political flourishing within the polis, then Roman law
both dismantled barriers and constructed bridges over the remaining divides, thereby ascribing a developmental promise both to the relations between agents and, more generally speaking, to the space between agents. The Romans appreciated the fact that recognition was central to politics and for that reason could expand politics beyond their geographic confines. But sometimes one must fight for recognition, whether that struggle is verbal or physical; and in those acts of contestation, dialogues, and concerted action, Arendt comes to understand politics as an infinitely creative activity spawned by the myriad of novel self-reflective and not so self-reflective ways people present, re-present, produce, and re-produce themselves. These acts and relationships of (re)presentation and (re)production, speaking and acting, that is, the intersubjectivity inherent in political activity, in turn produce interests (inter-ests), or that which exists between and which can only specifically exist between. These relationships and interests may in turn be translated into relationships of rule and ruling within which some command and others obey, which are but one form of political relations. True, Arendt is rather skeptical of reducing politics to institutional relationships of command and obedience, of management and rule, in part because doing so both reduces recognition to the fulfillment of prescribed roles and constrains agency. In Arendt's understanding, ruling as a form of management merely replicates; it does not create.

While ruling and management are necessary for the maintenance of public life, they stand in tension to her agonistic, contestational, praxeological politics that arises when engaged individuals in their plurality produce an ‘ephemeral, intersubjective’ space ‘in-between’ that is ‘laden with immanent potential and unpredictability’ (Williams, 2005: 201; Arendt, 1958: 182f). But that is the price we must presumably pay. This space, this global dominion as it were, is not the universal, tangible analogue of the ordered, institutionalized Greek agora or Roman Republic from which many of her ideas spring. For that reason, Arendt grants primacy to the principles behind the agora, and not necessarily to the institutional frameworks within which they may be embedded. For her, plurality, agency, recognition, freedom, equality of status and access, ‘the right to contribute to debate, discussion, and decision, [and] the opportunity to place oneself into the public realm – to appear as a political individual’ (Williams, 2005: 201; and Arendt, 1958: 186–207) are the sine qua non of politics. Ironically, then, in contradistinction to those who criticize her for idealizing a particular (Greco-Roman) narrative of the state, Arendt actually ‘moves away from the state as the principal political actor that is characteristic of so much of International Relations theorizing. It is the socially conditioned and located individual who is the focus of politics and the essential political agent’ (Williams and Lang, 2005: 5). While the state remains ‘vitally important’ insofar as it is ‘a necessary condition for the fulfillment of human agency,’ the very potentiality and reality (as Marx and Carr remind us) of ‘its perversion into the nemesis of a proper human life’ require for Arendt that the emphasis of politics be placed squarely on human agency (Ibid.).
Arendt thus lays important groundwork for reading the process of popularization into today’s international political condition in ways that reflect a politics of the world. However, I do not construe a politics of the world as a fait accompli. Rather, I construe a politics of the world as a process, ongoing and in some regards aleatory. Some see it in the guise of an emerging global civil society (e.g. Lipschutz, 1996), others in transnational movements (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998), and others still in moments of popular dissent (e.g. Bleiker, 2000) or democratic internationalism (Gilbert, 1999). Arendt had no such conceptual language at her disposal during her lifetime, but she approximated those developments in at least two contexts or along two tracks.

The first may be found in her ruminations on revolution and comments on the American, French, Bolshevik, and Hungarian revolutionary councils (and the Paris Commune), in which people sought freedom into politics, not freedom from politics (Arendt, 1963b: 13-52 and 217-281; and Arendt, 1972: 231f).

‘Since the revolutions of the eighteenth century, every large upheaval has actually developed the rudiments of an entirely new form of government, which emerged independent of all preceding revolutionary theories, directly out of the course of the revolution itself, that is, out of the experiences of action and out of the resulting will of the actors to participate in the further development of public affairs. This new form of government is the council system, which as we know, has perished every time and everywhere, destroyed either directly by the bureaucracy of the nation-states or by the party machines... [T]hey never came into being as a result of a conscious revolutionary tradition or theory, but entirely spontaneously, each time as though there had never been anything of the sort before... [T]he council system seems to correspond to and spring from the very experience of political action’ (Arendt, 1972: 231f).

To illustrate this, for instance, Thomas Jefferson envisioned a system of ‘elementary republics’ or a ‘ward system’ to ensure the survival ‘of the revolutionary spirit through the republic’, which would ‘permit the citizens to continue to do what they had been able to do during the years of revolution, namely, to act on their own and thus to participate in public business as it was being transacted from day to day’ (Jefferson, quoted and paraphrased in Arendt, 1963b: 251). Hence ‘the ward system was not meant to strengthen the power of the many but the power of “every one” within the limits of his competence; and only by breaking up “the many” into assemblies where every one could count and be counted upon “shall we be as republican as a large society can be”’ (Ibid.: 254).

The second such instance or track may be inferred from her proposition (following, it seems, Karl Jaspers) that an international tribunal was the only appropriate
forum for trying Adolf Eichmann because only such an institution could represent the
wronged, that is, humanity (Arendt, 1963a: 269). This oddly situated view – odd be-
cause its institutionalization contraposes her laudatory view of direct participation
– might indicate the strength of her normative commitments in the face of tyranny
and the realization that a direct participatory politics may be more constrained, in-
effective, or counterproductive in certain circumstances than in others. In the case
of Eichmann, a national state could only interpret the charges against Eichmann in
national, not cosmopolitan terms – as crimes against the Jewish people as opposed
to crimes against humanity (Arendt, 1963a: 254, echoed at 257 and 261). What was
needed was an institution free of national biases that could act in the interests of
humanity itself and the body politic in which humanity presumably resides. Bor-
rowing heavily from Telford Taylor, the American prosecutor at Nuremberg, Arendt
maintained that

‘criminal proceedings rest on laws whose “essence”... “is that a crime is not
committed only against the victim but primarily against the community whose
law is violated”. The wrongdoer is brought to justice because his act has dis-
turbed and gravely endangered the community as a whole... The reparation ef-
ected...is of an altogether different nature; it is the body politic itself that stands
in need of being “repaired”, and it is the general public order that has been
thrown out of gear and must be restored’ (Ibid.: 261).

The idea assumes greater significance if juxtaposed to comments she made in 1970.
On her reading, the experiences of the council systems, the diminishing of inter-
state war, and increased state reliance on alternative mechanisms to resolve dis-
putes impress upon theory the need for ‘a new concept of the state’ (Arendt, 1972:
230). While she locates this new concept in ‘the federal system’ in which power ‘is
horizontally directed so that the federal units mutually check and control their pow-
ers’ (Ibid.), and ‘which begins from below, continues upward, and finally leads to a
parliament’ (Ibid.: 232), she also tantalizingly suggests a reformulation (a new con-
cept?) of international relations in which an emerging constellation of global insti-
tutions, coupled with direct individual participation, is increasingly oriented around
a human constituency and the claims of justice that often animate their interven-
tions in the global in-between.

Though Arendt’s speculations remained trapped within statist confines, notice
how the praxeological and the institutional directly relate in ways that invite appli-
cation to IR: from popular, spontaneous activity and the necessity to protect en-
during human interests and needs arise institutional forms that embed and
presumably safeguard human plurality and ultimately freedom. Political activity must
perforce, despite Arendt’s suspicions, morph into institutional management and re-
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production of that which has been produced, else the needs, principles, interests, and claims of justice that inform it will eventually be forgotten and relegated to the dustbin of history. On my reading, she thus offers a quasi-Hegelian account of political architecture with an unexpected gloss.

In Hegelian thought, civil society mediates between the private interests of individuals in the family and the public interests of the state. In the global space of politics, some might be inclined to replicate the Hegelian scheme and read an emerging global civil society (replete with nongovernmental organizations, religious institutions, and transnational advocacy networks) as situated between peoples and states. Yet Arendt complicates that scheme; global institutions can likewise mediate between peoples and states. In the only example she gives us, that of an international criminal tribunal, the institution metes out retributive justice for crimes committed, thereby serving the interests of specific individuals and communities. But also, by issuing extensive and detailed judgments documenting crimes and the contexts within which they occur, and by responding to a supreme violation of a global human order, such a tribunal serves the cause of reparative justice and upholds the principle of a common humanity.14

POPULARIZING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: HUMANIZING WORLD ORDER

The twin emphases on action and global institutional development move the argument directly onto the terrain of international relations and approach what Hedley Bull referred to as world order, or ‘patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among [hu]mankind as a whole’(1977: 19). Let us begin with the most direct correlation to the account of popularization offered thus far: agency.

Like Marx, Carr, and Arendt, Bull admits human agents into his scheme: since individuals are the ‘ultimate units of the great society of all [hu]mankind,’ world order is ‘morally prior’ to inter-state order and thus ‘more fundamental and primordial’ than inter-state order (Ibid.: 21). This may be a reason for some to equate world order and its conceptual cousin, world society,15 to cosmopolitanism. In that equation we find echoes of Martin Wight’s ‘revolutionary’ or Kantian tradition of international relations (1992: 8), which claimed that cosmopolitan commitments will ‘renovate and unify the society of states’ (Ibid.: 22) by means of ideological homogeneity, erection of a world empire, or the construction of cosmopolitan networks of individuals and their agencies that produce ‘a world society of individuals which overrides nations or states’ (Ibid.: 40–48). Unfortunately the ‘oppositional view of the relationship between international society and world society’ and the relationship between their components of order ‘has become rooted in ES [English School] thought, and serves to cut off the possibility of positive interaction’ (Buzan, 2004: 29).
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But it would be a mistake to read ‘human activity’ as referring solely and directly to actual engagements and interventions by individual human beings. Rather, the term is refined by its referent – the primary goals of humankind as a whole – which includes activity conducted by multiple agents related to those goals. Thus it is worth underscoring at the outset that neither world order nor world society necessarily eclipses the states-system, even if they broaden the horizon of actors and possibilities and contain elements that might eventually entail the supersession of the states-system. For Bull (1977: 269), world society ‘stands to the totality of global social interaction [just] as... international society stands to the concept of the international system.’ As world society is constituted by a ‘world political system,’ or a ‘worldwide network of interaction’ among states and non-state actors (Ibid.: 266), it ‘in no way implies the demise of the states system’ since, historically, ‘the states system has always operated within a wider system of political interaction’ (Ibid.: 271). Neither does such an interaction ‘assure the emergence of an integrated world society’ (Ibid.: 269). Rather, world society and the processes of world order that undergird it rely at base on the Westphalian vocabulary of sovereignty, autonomy, and territoriality. However, processes of world order are exposed and develop along the fault lines between a Westphalian vocabulary and another vocabulary, that of responsibility, commonality, and globality, which also finds a deep resonance in the Charter of the United Nations.

Implicitly, expansion of the international relations lexicon justifies Bull’s conceptual differentiation of world order from international order, by which he meant ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states’ (Ibid.: 8). And this brings us to two additional points of correlation with our account of popularization: that of interests and goals on the one hand and that of institutional development on the other, which I shall address in tandem. As with Marx and Carr’s articulation of a citizen – state antinomy, the difference between world order and international order rests on dissimilar reference points: human interests and state interests (neither of which is as monolithic as the terms suggest). If human interests, a wider system of political interaction (process, popularization), and a worldwide political network (the space in-between, politics as a global dimension) figure into the composition of processes of world order, then state interests, processes of inter-state interaction, and the political network between states comprise international order. But by granting moral primacy to the former, Bull drives a wedge between world order and international order in ways that strongly suggest that world order aims at the supersession of the legitimate authority of the sovereign state. Thus, as world order is underlined by ‘deeper questions of more enduring importance’ concerning ‘order in the great society of all [hu]mankind’ (Ibid.: 21 and 19), we should expect that the goals, interests, and normative commitments peculiar to international and world order be qualitatively different.
In one sense they are. States, as a matter of international order, seek preservation of self and system, independence or external sovereignty, and peace, meaning ‘the absence of war’ (Ibid.: 16ff). Importantly, states have developed institutions, including the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great powers, to advance these interests and uphold the core principles of a Westphalian logic. Yet Bull tells us that ‘the common goals of all social life,’ including limitation of violence, stabilization of property rights, and the keeping of promises, inform both international and world order. When a categorical distinction is absent, world order conceptually collapses into international order and we are left with a tautology: world order entails patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain international order, which in turn entails patterns or dispositions of activity that sustain world order. The only difference is the institutional impoverishment of world order, which, compared to international order, has few corresponding institutions. And this move effectively subsumes all human interests under the umbrella of state interests.

While the goals of international and world order need not necessarily be mutually exclusive, Bull’s conceptual map demands at the very least that these ‘deeper questions’ and their associated goals and interests be given more sustained consideration. Here, Bull’s admission of human agents into a world political process enables deeper, fuller accounts that assess the transformative, productive power of human agency and how its engagement with existing structures and institutions generates new interests and goals to be pursued, or amends existing ones. Practically speaking, we might claim that (some) peoples no longer find it expedient to act within the confines of the state but sometimes find it more feasible and efficacious to act outside of and in some cases against the state (we can link the insight to the global civil society and transnational social movement literature and think illustratively of Jubilee 2000 for debt forgiveness, HIV/AIDS activism, or the landmines ban process).16

And yet, as Arendt intimated, sometimes participatory politics may be more constrained, ineffective, or even unproductive in certain circumstances than in others, and therefore they must be supplemented by institutionalization. Global institutions, to wit, may increasingly act in ways that mediate between human and state interests – which is not to say that institutions act contrary to the state and its interests; quite the contrary. But it is to recognize the functional disaggregation of the state and the articulation of new linkages between the local and the global.

This view does have some resonance in Bull, for world order unfolds as both institutional development (formal and informal organizations and networks) and normative development (an understanding of a global whole defined in terms of humankind). For centuries, world order remained a figment of a clerical – some might say humanist – mindset since ‘no actual political system corresponded to it’ (Ibid.: 19). World order, if one could speak of it, simply amounted to the ‘sum of the various political systems that brought order to particular parts of the world’ (Ibid.).
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Not until the late 1800s could we speak of world order in conjunction with the emergence of a ‘genuinely global’ political system in the form of a ‘global system of states’ which owed its origins to ‘the Portuguese voyages of discovery in the fifteenth century’ and ended with ‘the partition of Africa in the nineteenth’ (Ibid.: 19f).

But a profound disconnect between the institutional (that is, the construction of a global political system) and the normative (that is, a holistic understanding of humankind) marred this first (colonial/imperial) phase of world order. Under imperialism, ‘civilized’ peoples encountered the ‘uncivilized’ (see Gong, 1984); the confrontation engendered race theory, racism, and notions of the ‘white man’s burden,’ that is, a hierarchy of color (see Arendt, 1973: 158–221) that accorded particular peoples a certain place in a racially reconfigured great chain of being. Put differently, imperialism may have linked the non-European periphery politically, economically, and socially to the European core, but this linkage reduced much of the great society of humankind to serving an exploitative global politico-economic, mercantile framework. Dialectically, the institutional dimension of world order’s first phase precipitated new normative goals to be pursued, such as formal equality and independence, which in turn stimulated world order’s second phase: the struggle for liberation by which the subjugated ‘took their places as member states of international society’ (Bull, 1977: 20). But as we learned from Arendt, Nazi crimes hastened the normative development of world order, for the sheer enormity and extensiveness of the crimes compelled many to recognize that a human being is, to put it simply, a human being, no matter what sort of person one is or becomes.

We might expect that with the ongoing (if uneven) development of world order and the global political system, including deeper regional integration, greater recognition of the rights of individuals, concerns of ecological and distributive justice, and so forth (see Ibid.: Part 3), we would witness new articulations of interests, needs, values, and problems. Bull cannot assume that individual human beings remain wed to particular goals. Indeed, on Arendt’s account, (new) interests, objectives, and understandings emerge from interaction between diverse agents; on Bull’s account, the fulfillment of primary goals, which entails on-going sets of practices and rules, generates conditions of stability within which higher-order goals may be pursued. For this reason, Bull could aver that ‘if international order does have value,’ it is only ‘because it is instrumental to the goal of order in human society as a whole’ (1977: 20).

Yet Bull fails to directly connect his developmental conception of world order with more substantive considerations of justice, or what he calls a ‘world common good’ (Ibid.: 81). Considerations of justice include species preservation, or the preservation of human life and human civilization from mass annihilation, whether in the form of chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons-based destruction, terrorism, or egregious human rights abuses; distributive justice, meaning a ‘more equitable distribution of wealth’ or ‘minimum standards of wealth or welfare’; and ecological justice, or ‘the
solidarity of all human beings in facing [and resolving] certain ecological or environmental challenges that face them as human beings’ (Ibid.). Bull dismissed considerations of justice for they lacked an adequate concrete expression, however much they animated the minds of commentators and however much they ‘may one day become powerful.’ ‘The great mass of mankind,’ he mused, ‘does not have the means of interest articulation and aggregation, of political socialization and recruitment, which...are the hallmarks of a political system’ (Ibid.: 82). His skepticism compelled him to ponder whether ‘world order might not be better served by...other forms’ (Ibid.: 20f) of political organization such as ‘world government’ or a ‘new medievalism’ under which he subsumes regional integration, state disintegration, the ‘restoration of private international violence,’ the growth of transnational organizations, and ‘the technological unification of the world’ (Ibid.: 244–266). A global states system, he maintained, is but one form of world order, since ‘states are simply groupings of men, and men may be grouped in such a way that they do not form states at all’ (Ibid.: 19). Consequently, he concludes that

‘ideas of world or cosmopolitan justice are fully realizable, if at all, only in the context of a world or cosmopolitan society. Demands for world justice are therefore demands for the transformation of the system and society of states, and are inherently revolutionary’ (Ibid.: 84).

But why this is so remains unclear for two primary reasons. First, expansion of the states-system provided an institutional outlet for the expression of normative visions. A global socio-political network thereby developed within which awareness of a common humanity and its attendant interests, needs, problems, and values could be identified, articulated, and modified. But if world order’s first phase extended a (pre-existing, state-based European) network, then decolonization challenged the narrow conception of humanity that animated imperialism by conferring upon non-European peoples formal independent status in the global system. Decolonization provided non-Europeans with a political institution through which to represent and communicate their specific needs and interests. But the fact that many of these newly independent states lacked the material resources to sustain their populations, which only reinforced popular perceptions of the illegitimacy of their governments, led to the articulation of new goals to be pursued: distributive justice and rectification of problems emanating from the colonial experiment.

Second, despite his avowed skepticism, Bull nevertheless left open the possibility that substantive considerations of justice could be realized within the confines of a reformed state-system. What he could not know was how robust world order could become. Here is where Marx, Carr, and Arendt are valuable, for the popularization of international politics speaks to interest articulation, political socialization and re-
and the creation of new political spaces and interests. Not only do we have the direct, participatory politics that Arendt found so compelling, but also, congruent with the functionalist logic of the 1950s and 1960s, the generation of functionally-based global institutions which correspond to distinct spheres of justice – an International Criminal Court and the Global Environmental Facility are just two examples. Contra Bull, then, a politics of the world does not entail the supersession of the states system in order to sustain the primary (and more substantive) goals of social life among humankind. Our conception of a politics of the world, of a process of world order, needs to take heed of the popularization of international politics in its participatory/emancipatory and institutional senses.

CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction, this article focused on articulating a politics of the world as a process, a task rendered increasingly imperative as the forces of globalization render physical and intellectual boundaries more and more unintelligible and perhaps untenable, as issues once thought to rest squarely within domestic jurisdictions increasingly occupy international public policy makers as subjects for global governance, and as ordinary peoples continually compound an agenda that was previously long dominated by state elites. Rather than tackling the infinite details of each of these facts, I instead opted to consider what their convergence reveals. To that end, I found in Marx and Carr a language and a logic (if rudimentary) with which to recognize the centrality of human agency in the construction and reformulation of a politics of the world. For them, a serious and systematic attention to state interests and policy potentially checks excessive state action predicated on narrow constructions of state interest.

But our view of human agency need not be so curtailed. Here, I invoked the political thought of Hannah Arendt. Because the individual is at the center of her notion of politics, she defined it as ‘a global dominion’ in ways that extricate Marx and Carr’s account of popularization from statist boundaries and contrarian motives. Because of the need to ‘lend human affairs a permanence they otherwise do not have’ (Arendt, 2005: 97), political activity spawns institutions. Though Arendt did not systematically study or offer thoughts on international politics, I nevertheless located some key points in her thought that could be reasonably extended to flesh out a politics of the world. On the one hand, we have her grass-roots, participatory conception of politics as illustrated by the council systems which developed in post-revolutionary societies. One might translate this track as an early account of an emerging global civil society or of transnational social movements in which ordinary peoples have found a method of articulating their interests and politically socializing and recruiting others. On the other, one might appeal to her idea that global institutions might directly represent the interests of humanity itself and act in some
significant senses as mediators between state and people. In these two tracks, I found a link to Hedley Bull’s conception of world order.

I disregarded Bull’s proposition that world order entails a whole-scale revolution or reform of the states-system in order for higher order goals to be achieved. Such radical reform is unnecessary since the development of the global political system is, as Bull suggested, necessary for the furtherance of higher-order goals. But development of the global political-system need not be confined to states; multiple agents participate in this system. World order attempts to capture this politics of the world in ways that a strict focus on the state and its relations cannot, and in ways that highlight the development of another vocabulary – one of responsibility and commonality – that exists alongside the conventional Westphalian vocabulary of state and sovereignty.

Though this article has surely raised many questions and left many issues unconsidered, it nevertheless sought, at its core, to introduce a particular way of thinking about a politics of the world in ways that involve not only increasing participation in world affairs by human agents, but increased attention paid to the ways in which human agents can radically disrupt perceived ‘normalcy’ in international relations. Examples of this were provided in the introduction. Read together, those events establish the claim that international relations involves more than violence, as recent news from Georgia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, among many other locations, seems to attest. Rather, the multidimensional nature of international relations contains space for the idea that ‘humanity is no longer just “a regulative ideal”, as it was for Kant...[but is now] “an inescapable fact”’ (Arendt quoted in Owens, 2007: 144), to which the political world must and does respond. Violence is surely one prominent side of the equation; yet so too are events of the aforementioned sort.

ENDNOTES

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3 For example, S/Res/1329 (5 December 2000); S/Res/1341 (8 February 2001); and S/Res/1534 (26 March 2004).


1 For example, S/Res/1459 (28 January 2003).

2 For example, S/Res/1296 (19 April 2000) and S/Res/1674 (28 April 2006).


4 For example, S/Res/1325 (31 October 2000) and S/Res/1820 (19 June 2008).

5 For example, S/Res/1625 (14 September 2005).

Arendt writes ‘the crimes against human rights, which have become a specialty of totalitarian regimes, can always be justified by the pretext that right is equivalent to being good or useful for the whole in distinction to its parts’ (1973: 298f). The claim as I read it reveals the necessity of appealing to absolute ethical and moral standards while permitting some negotiation and dialogue to guide their application.

6 We are left to wonder why Arendt did not consider European colonialism and imperialism, as did Hedley Bull, to mark the shift from ‘humanity as a regulative idea’ to humanity as ‘an inescapable fact.’ Both imperialism and Nazism dehumanized classes of peoples, stripped some of the status of human, and understood ‘right’ in conjunction to that which was ‘good or useful for the whole in distinction to its parts’ (Arendt, 1973: 298f).

7 To illustrate, one might read human security as a translation of globalizing forces (environmental degradation and global warming, disease migration, wealth disparity, and the like) into manageable chunks by re-territorializing and reading them as insecurities or specific security threats in ways that impinge on human capability and livelihood, and thus in turn on state capacity.

8 Insofar as the victims were also Jews, however, Arendt concurred that ‘it was right and proper that a Jewish court should sit in judgment’ of Eichmann (1963a: 269). She of course objected to what she perceived as the theatrics of the proceedings.

9 Arendt, however, objected to courts doing anything except adjudging the acts of a specific person.

10 Bull (1977: 269) defines world society as ‘not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built.’

11 In the end, though, state support is vital if such interests are to be translated into policy.

12 In Part 3 of The Anarchical Society Bull (1977) often treats world order not as an analytical concept to capture an aggregate of activities to measure progress vis-à-vis specified goals, but as a thing or a destination.

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HUMAN AGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF WORLD ORDER

MATTHEW S. WEINERT

Post Scriptum on Relative and Absolute Gains

MATUS HALAS

Abstract: The article offers a new perspective on the problem of relative and absolute gains that evolved into the important debate between neorealism and neoliberalism in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The proposed reformulation of relative gains computation and of the utility function enables a proper differentiation between various distributions of capabilities. Then, as the second step, I fill the unfortunate gap of the unformalized relative gains sensitivity coefficient that was skipped in the original debate. Power position vis-à-vis the interacting partner and power position vis-à-vis the system are two variables that help formalize neorealist assumptions about the coefficient’s variance. This makes it possible to determine when exactly relative gains matter. The final part shows that payoffs symmetry, as a usual a priori condition employed in agent-based models and questioned by neorealists during the debate, is actually an accurate generalization of gains distribution patterns that ensue from the formalization of the neorealist argument itself.

Key words: relative gains, sensitivity coefficient, payoffs symmetry, neorealism

INTRODUCTION

The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism during the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s represents one of the key theoretical discussions in international relations. The core of the debate focused upon the possibility of cooperation among states and the role international institutions can play in the facilitating and strengthening of such a cooperation. Both neoliberals, claiming that more cooperation is possible, and neorealists, arguing against such a viewpoint, based their conclusions on assumptions about the behaviour of states derived from microeconomic theory. Although initially containing several focal points (see Baldwin, 1993: 4–8), the debate between these two already significantly similar theoretical positions, sometimes jointly described as the ‘neo-neo synthesis’ (Waever, 1997: 163), gradually narrowed even further. The relative/absolute gains problem thus became the cornerstone of, if not the label for, the whole debate. Since the problem remains unresolved, innovative contributions sporadically appeared even many years after the summarizing article by Robert Jervis (1999; see, for example, Mulford and Berejikian, 2002; Mosher, 2003), hence proving the significance of the issue at stake. My intention in this article is twofold. First, I will try to provide several mathematical improvements...
of the way relative gains are computed, so that the equations concerned would be better suited for differentiating between various situations. This will make it possible to fulfill the other goal of this article, which is to explore the issue of payoffs symmetry that is closely related to the relative/absolute gains debate. Think, for example, of a situation in which two actors, very different in their respective capability levels, begin to repeatedly cooperate but according to the payoffs symmetry assumption, which is usual in many game-theoretic models, both receive the same absolute gains. After multiple iterations their capability levels gradually approach each other. Thus the stronger player is clearly relatively losing its power. This illustrates what a profound impact the payoff symmetry assumption has upon relative power positions. I formalize the neorealists’ power-related statements that deal with the fundamental question of ‘When the relative gains matter?’ (Matthews, 1996: 146), and subsequently show that the very results of those statements are inconsistent with the neorealist critique of payoffs symmetry. The main reason for such an inconsistence is the unfortunate form of the original equations for relative gains computation proposed by the neorealists themselves.

The text, which is divided into three parts, proceeds in the following order. After portraying the background of the relative/absolute gains debate, I reformulate the gains computation by shifting attention back to expressing relative gains in absolute instead of percentage terms while nonetheless taking account of the power position of the actor. In the second part, two factors help me to formalize the neorealist reasoning about shifts in the sensitivity coefficient. These are power vis-à-vis the interacting partner and power vis-à-vis the system. The last section employs the sensitivity coefficient formalization and the utility function with embodied new relative gains computation in order to determine their joint consequences upon distribution of gains between players in binary interactions. This is illustrated with the help of two very different examples of distributions of capabilities from the history of the international relations system. By showing that the payoffs symmetry of the interacting players is in fact an appropriate generalization of the pattern of gains distribution that results from the proposed equations, I try to rebuff the specific criticism directed against agent-based models as well as to highlight some of the consequences and pitfalls of the neorealist argument.

THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION AND REFORMULATION

Even though the key texts of neorealism and neoliberalism were published at the end of the 1970s and in the middle of the 1980s respectively (Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1984), the foundations of the future relative/absolute gains debate were laid in 1980 and 1981 by three articles written by Robert Axelrod on the Prisoner’s Dilemma computer tournaments (Axelrod, 1980a; 1980b; 1981). In them he proved that co-
operative behaviour is possible even among egoists in an environment without central authority. At that time, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game was already established as a model for the crucial international relations problem of the security dilemma among states (see Snyder, 1971: 73 or Jervis, 1982; for the security dilemma see Herz, 1950: 157). In addition, the natural state, as described by Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan* (1998 [1651]) and later adopted by realists as a metaphor for the anarchic environment of states, was interpreted as representing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game itself (Taylor, 1987). It is no wonder then that Axelrod’s conclusions, sharply contrasting with neorealist predictions of the consequences of selfish agents’ behavior under anarchy, opened up new possibilities for criticism of realism. Neoliberalism seized the opportunity (Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985), claiming that even after the acceptation of some neorealist assumptions, like that of the anarchical structure of the system with states as the key actors, more cooperation is still possible among nations. The neorealist counter-critique of the neoliberal argument followed almost immediately (Grieco, 1988), referring to an important misunderstanding of states’ concerns when considering engagement in cooperative interaction. The relative/absolute gains problem emerged.

According to neorealists, the problem lies in the fact that states focus also upon relative gains rather than only on absolute gains, as implicated by neoliberalism. Axelrod (1980a; 1980b) assumed in his tournaments symmetrical payoff matrices for both players in all interactions regardless of the power position. As is illustrated by the statement below, the actors’ behaviour implied only absolute gains concern about payoffs maximizers:

‘From the participant’s point of view, the object is to do as well as possible, regardless of how well the other player does.’ (Axelrod, 1990: 22)

Neoliberal theory further promoted this view of state interests. It perceived states as rational egoists maximizing their own utilities, which are independent of one another. In this view, states ‘do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains or losses of others’ (Keohane, 1984: 27). Neorealists strongly disagreed. Already Waltz stressed that

‘The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system’ (Waltz, 1979: 126)

Relative gains concern, as emphasized by neorealists, makes cooperation among states much harder. In neorealist theory, states are defensive positionalists (the term is from Grieco, 1988: 500), and they are concerned about both relative and absolute gains. Any gain, seen as a possible increase in capabilities, is closely related to
power defined as a distribution of capabilities in the system (Waltz, 1979: 192). Since power is perceived as a relational concept (see, for example, Jervis, 1988: 334; or Gilpin as cited in Grieco, 1990: 40), states must care about relative gains. They try to ‘prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities’ (Grieco, 1990: 39) because under a state of uncertainty with regard to others’ intentions, states in an anarchic system seek first of all their own survival and security (Waltz, 1979: 91 & 126). In such a system, the increased capabilities of a current friend could be those of a future enemy (Grieco, 1990: 29 & 47). Under these circumstances of relative gains concern and particularly with respect to the original equation proposed to compute a state’s utility (see below), the symmetry of payoffs axiom seems to be an unrealistic restriction present in a great many game theoretic models. Grieco’s critique of Snidal’s work points precisely to this ruling out of any relative gains problem by an a priori assumption of equal payoffs (see the discussion of constant returns in Snidal, 1991: 714–715), which actually avoids and does not solve the relative gains problem:

‘Snidal, then, has excluded by definition the exact situation that realists posit as triggering the relative-gains problem for cooperation, namely, that one partner does better than another and enjoys an advance in relative position over the latter. Indeed, the situation analyzed in his model – one in which states receive payoffs in such a way that there is no change in relative position – is exactly the one in which realists would not expect the relative gains problem to be in operation,’ since ‘for realists, the emergence of the problem is predicated upon the prospect of gains that are unequal and lead to a change in relative position among partners.’ (Grieco, Powell and Snidal, 1993: 730, emphasis in original)

From here the critique goes back to Axelrod’s tournaments, in which a symmetry of payoffs was assumed as well. Both actors in any of the binary interactions received 3 points if they mutually cooperated and 1 point for mutual defection. The payoff for unilateral cooperation was zero independently of who was the naïve guy, and the temptation to unilaterally defect was always worth 5 points. The relative gains debate therefore has impact not only upon the issue of relative and absolute gains but also upon symmetry of payoff matrixes of individual interacting players.

To sum it up, neoliberals claimed that states are absolute gains maximizers and that more cooperation is possible even in an anarchical environment. According to neorealists, states also care about relative gains. The results of the Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments cannot be easily generalized upon the international system because they a priori disqualify relative gains concern. Both theories applied microeconomic utility theory but with a different understanding of utility per se, which was caused by the different worlds they were concerned with (Jervis, 1999: 45). While neolib-
eralists understood utility in terms of wealth in which my utility of one million $ does not decrease just because of other millionaires living in the same city, neorealists understood utility in terms of distribution of capabilities in the system. For them, the power I have with regard to my neighbour thanks to the automatic rifle in my closet will vanish in case (s)he will acquire an automatic rifle too. The ensuing debate was devoted to analysing the impact of relative gains as well as to answering the question of under what conditions states pay attention to relative or, alternatively, to absolute gains. Nevertheless, even after almost twenty years since the start of the inconclusive relative/absolute gains debate at the very end of the 80s, the clarification and upgrading of the argument are still desirable.

The first issue that needs clarification and reformulation is the equation proposed to compute an actor's utility function (Grieco, 1988: 500):

\[ U_i = G_i - r_i(G_k - G_i) \]

\( G_i \) and \( G_k \) represent one's own and a partner's absolute gains respectively, and \( r_i \) is the coefficient of sensitivity to relative gains. The difference between \( G_k \) and \( G_i \) is then obviously the relative gain (or loss). Important to note is the fact that relative gain is expressed in absolute terms (as a difference between the players’ absolute gains) and not in percentage terms. As Mosher (2003: 649–651) pointed out after 15 years, this is a rather confusing definition of relative gains, since it pays no attention to power positions of states. Suppose that state A or any other social entity has 100 tanks but the second one (state B) has only 50 of them (note that from an analytical point of view it doesn’t matter what units of capabilities we use). They agreed to produce 2 new tanks together per year and to divide the production equally. According to the above mentioned equation, there would be no relative gains at all for either side since the gains (new tanks) of states A and B are equal. Consider, however, the initial and the final distribution of capabilities. The former is [100; 50]. The latter is [101; 51], which is clearly beneficial for state B, but counterproductive for state A. After 100 iterations the capabilities distribution will be [200; 150] (or 4:3), which is quite different than the initial ratio of 2:1 (or [100; 50]). The equation proposed by Grieco cannot compute relative gains properly. In fact, it enables cooperation even when an entirely relative gains seeking state is losing power, and all this despite numerous neorealist claims about power as a relational concept.

How could this be? The misunderstanding of the proper character of relative gains can be traced back to Waltz (1979: 105):

‘When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?” If an expected gain is to be
divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.’

Without any reference to the initial distribution of capabilities or more precisely to power positions of states either in the system or towards each other, Waltz assumed that an asymmetric division of gains would hamper one state while benefiting the other. He may claim to be implicitly thinking of the equal initial capability levels of interacting states when symmetry also represents proportionality, but in light of the above stated citation, the equation proposed by Grieco becomes much more understandable. What Waltz started with his rather confusing statement, Grieco completed with his utility equation. The proposed formulas departed from the neorealists’ argument that emphasized power. The relative gains problem, therefore, seemed possible only if unequal absolute gains were present. Symmetric payoffs made this case purportedly impossible by assumption.

Another problem of the original equation [1] is the coefficient of sensitivity. Grieco explicitly stated only that the lower limit for \( r \) could never be zero because ‘given the uncertainties of international politics, … gaps in payoffs favoring partners will always detract from a state’s utility to some degree.’ (Grieco, 1988: 501) The upper limit remained undefined and no relationship between the levels of attention paid to relative and absolute gains was established. Duncan Snidal (1991: 706) reformulated the utility equation proposed by Grieco into:

\[
U_i = (1 - r)G_i + r(G_i - G_k)
\]

Such a computation of utility set the lower as well as the upper limit for the coefficient \( r \). Snidal apparently supposed \( r \) to be the same for both players and to remain within the interval \( <0, 1> \). In addition, sensitivity to absolute gains inversely connected to sensitivity to relative gains successfully disqualifies the possibility of counting relative gains ‘twice’. This was possible under certain conditions (particularly in case of pure relative gains concern) when using the first equation.

As already mentioned, Mosher (2003) stressed the faults caused by the original form of relative gains computation and especially by its disregard for capabilities distribution. The initially proposed computation mistakenly assumed the identity of the meaning of symmetry and proportionality since it considered relative gains as possible only in case of unequal (asymmetric) distribution of absolute gains. Mosher proposed alternative equations with relative gains calculated in percentage terms rather than in the original absolute terms. He derived relative ‘percentage’ gains (Mosher, 2003: 649) from:
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[3] \[ G_{IR} = \frac{G_{iA}}{W_{iI}} - \frac{G_{iA}}{W_{kI}} \]

\( G_{IR} \) and \( G_{iA} \) stand respectively for relative and absolute gains of player \( i \). \( W_{iI} \) and \( W_{kI} \) represent the initial capability levels of players \( i \) and \( k \). Player \( i \)'s utility function with reformulated relative gains computation was:\(^1\)

\[ U_i = (1 - r_i) \frac{G_{iA}}{W_{iI}} + r_i \left( \frac{G_{iA}}{W_{iI}} - \frac{G_{iA}}{W_{kI}} \right) \]

Division of absolute gains by the initial capability level in the first term of the right-hand side of the formula makes the sum of absolute and relative gains utilities possible, as opposed to the case when the former remains in absolute and the latter in percentage form. It also introduced a certain form of the marginal utility metaphor because, ceteris paribus, the utility of the same absolute gain will decrease as the initial capability level increases. Mosher's article thus clearly illustrates the possibility of significant improvements in the relative gains problem even after many years.

But although he paid attention to distribution of capabilities among players, his utility equation distorts reality. It does not accurately calculate actors' utilities precisely because of the percentage character of relative gains. Take the first example. Initially, state A has 8 capability units represented by, let's say, tanks, to stay with the already used illustration. State B owns only 4 of them. Suppose there are two cooperative alternatives before them. Namely, these could be either to jointly produce 8 new tanks and divide them equally or to produce 20 tanks and divide them in the ratio 3:2. Which state will opt for which alternative given pure relative gains concern \( (r = 1) \)? According to Mosher's utility equation they must be indifferent between the two alternatives because relative percentage gains remain the same in both cases. However, the ratio of the two players' final capability levels after cooperative interaction is 3:2 (12 and 8 tanks respectively) in the first case and 5:3 (20 and 12 tanks) in the second one. Player A would, therefore, be better off if it opted for the second alternative in order to lose less power, and player B would be better off if it chose the first option in order to gain more. Some further reformulation of [4] can, nevertheless, still solve this problem while remaining faithful to the percentage form of relative gains.\(^2\)

Consider, however, our second example. Suppose that state A has 100 tanks at its disposal and must choose between two alternative offers according to the utility they can provide. In any case it will acquire 9 additional battle tanks each year (or, if you prefer, during each round of cooperation) in a planned joint venture with some other partner, but it needs to decide which of the two proposed offers represents more favourable conditions of cooperation. Should it cooperate with a slightly weaker partner that has 90 tanks and will benefit from the mutual cooperation by
adding 9 new tanks to its army each year as well, or with an equally powerful state that will acquire 10 battle tanks per year? According to Mosher and irrespective of the value of the sensitivity coefficient, there is no difference for player A between these two alternatives since the ratio of absolute gains over the initial level of capabilities is the same in both cases and for both players. The indifference between the alternatives holds even if the states iterate mutual cooperation. But after infinite iterations, the ratio of final capabilities will approach 9:9 in the first case or alternatively 9:10 in the second one. There is a real difference between these options. If we compare the initial and the final capabilities ratios in both alternatives after infinite iterations, we come to the conclusion that the first option is better for our decision-making state A. It will lose less power (-1/10) if the gains are divided equally, given the initial power levels of 100 and 90 tanks, than under the second scenario (then it would lose 1/9 of its power). The preference of the opponent cannot be determined since contrary to the decision-making state A, in the case of the second actor, the two options do not represent alternatives to each other but two completely different situations with different initial capability levels, i.e. they represent two different second actors. However, more important is the fact that even if we do not fix absolute gains and allow for their continuous growth at the same pace as that of the growth of the capabilities throughout the iterations, the indifference between the two alternatives will still remain intact according to [4]. Finally, even the possible reformulations of relative percentage gains that can solve the problem of the first above mentioned illustration cannot overcome the difficulties of indifference and iteration that appeared in the present example.

As I have already briefly mentioned on the previous pages, the problem behind relative gains is basically that of proportionality and symmetry of payoffs. If the states’ interest, as derived from the very heart of defensive realism and described above, is to limit the interactions that lead to power shifts, then they have to prefer gains divided proportionally according to the ratio of the initial power levels of the interacting players. If gains are divided equally (symmetrically), they do not lead to change in the power position of the interacting partners with respect to one another if and only if both players are equal in power before the interaction occurs. In such a case, symmetrically divided gains are also divided proportionally. This is, however, the only one case where the original computation of relative gains does not distort the reality. In any other case than that of the equality of initial power positions, asymmetry of absolute gains is a necessary condition for securing their proportionate character, and thereby for avoiding power shift and the occurrence of relative gains. This reasoning stands behind the following proposals of how to reformulate the utility function of interacting players.

To cope with the hurdles implicit in [4], I propose a revision of the relative gains computation as well as of the utility equation. The shift from the absolute to the per-
percentage form of relative gains as demonstrated by progress from [2] to [4] turned up to be the cul de sac. I switch back and calculate the value of relative gains in absolute terms, i.e. in the same units as the ones that represent the overall capabilities.

\[ \frac{W_{i2} - G_R}{W_{k2} + G_R} = \frac{W_{i1}}{W_{k1}} \]

\( W_{i2} \) and \( W_{k2} \) represent the final capabilities of actors \( i \) and \( k \) while simultaneously being equal to the sum of \( W_i \) plus \( G_A \) for each respective player. As is apparent from the equation above, an increase in the capability level of one player by a relative gain \( (G_R) \) corresponds precisely to an equal decrease in the capabilities of the other player \( (-G_R) \), which is the central characteristic of the relational nature of power. Simply stated, when we subtract relative gains, expressed in absolute terms, from the final capabilities of one actor and add the equal but negative relative loss to the final capabilities of the other player, we must arrive at the initial ratio of the actors' capabilities. Without relative gain/loss, there cannot be any shift in power. The initial and the final ratios of power capabilities must then be equal. In fact, the reasoning behind [5] closely corresponds to the neorealist argument. According to it, 'states define balance and equity as a distribution of gains that roughly maintains pre-cooperation balance of capabilities' (Grieco, 1990: 47). Thus if the gains from the mutual cooperation are divided fairly, the power distribution won’t change, and nobody gains anything relatively to the other player. After substituting \( G_R \) in [5] by zero as required by the no-power-change assumption, we see that the final ratio of capability levels must be equal to that at the beginning of the interaction. Since the final capability level is the sum of the initial one plus the absolute gain, the only condition for a fair division of absolute gains is their division in the (proportionally) same ratio as that of the initial capability levels, and this is precisely the guaranty of zero relative gains and no power shift. Equation [5] corresponds to realist thinking.

From [5] we easily infer the relative gain of state \( i \) as:

\[ G_R = \frac{G_A W_{k1} - G_A W_{i1}}{W_{i1} + W_{k1}} \]

But there has to be a marginal utility factor similarly as in the case of Mosher. Other things (like the opponent’s capability level and payoff) being equal, the utility of the relative gain/loss worth of ±1 capability unit has to be regarded differently when the state’s overall capabilities add up to 1000 than when they add up to 100. Relative gain or loss inevitably has a different impact in different situations. Additionally, in contrast to absolute gains, where the reference point for marginal utility is the initial capability level, the reference point for relative gain (or loss) has to be the final level of capabilities \( (W_2) \) rather than the initial one \( (W_1) \). This is because the relative gain/loss is subtracted from (or added to) the final outcome in order to get to the
proportionate division of gains, as is clear from [5]. The relative gain of actor \( i \) with the added marginal utility metaphor is therefore:

\[
\frac{G_R}{W_{i2}} = \frac{G_{iA} W_{k1} - G_{kA} W_{i1}}{(W_{i1} + W_{k1}) (W_{i2} + G_{iA})}
\]

The need for a correct understanding requires some clarifying statements. The relative gain of state \( i \) in a binary interaction with state \( k \) is exactly the same as the relative loss of its partner. For all of the above mentioned examples as well as for any other conceivable illustrations, this holds true when using [6]. However, it does not and need not hold for [7] because of the added marginal utility. First of all, the two players’ (marginal) utilities are intersubjectively incomparable, or in other words and with respect to microeconomic theory, there is no way to compare the utilities of different actors. Moreover, even if the utility functions of all states had the same shape, the utility of relative gain \( x \) for the player with the final capability level \( y \) would have been different than that of the relative loss \((-x)\) for any opponent with the final capabilities other than \( y \). And remember that only the relative loss and gain have to be the same, not the final capabilities. Thus if the relative loss \((-G_R)\) of one player is the negative version of precisely the same relative gain of the other \((G_R)\), the utility of such a loss \((-G_R/W_{i2})\) is not the same as the negative version of the gain utility \((G_R/W_{k2})\) except for the rare situation in which the final capability levels \( W_{i2} \) and \( W_{k2} \) are equal. The marginal utility metaphor will also have some important consequences later on when I consider the indifference curve of the reformulated utility function equation, which is calculated for actor \( i \) according to the following formula:

\[
U_i = (1 - r_i) \frac{G_{iA}}{W_{i2}} + r_i \left( \frac{G_{iA} W_{k1} - G_{kA} W_{i1}}{(W_{i1} + W_{k1}) (W_{i2} + G_{iA})} \right)
\]

The reformulated equation easily solves the problems connected with all the above mentioned examples and thus enables us to correctly distinguish between different alternative situations.\(^5\)

But there still has to be some indifference curve even after the reformulation. The best illustration of indifference between some possible alternatives is when we fix the initial capability levels and make changes only to payoffs while simultaneously assuming the extremely harsh condition of pure relative gains concern \((r = 1)\). According to [8], two equally powerful players with, for example, 100 capability units each at the beginning of interactions are indifferent between the following divisions of payoffs: [10; 9], [20; 18,909] and [30; 28,818]. The reason for why it is so derives from marginal utility. The relative gain/loss of the two actors with the initial capability worth of 100 points is different in all of the three above mentioned pairs of absolute gains. This is, however, compensated by different individual final capability levels. Thus indifference ultimately appears. Note that the second payoffs distribution [20; 18,909]
cannot be replaced by the simplified division \(10; 9.45\). In such a case, indifference with the absolute gains division \(10; 9\) would not be established because there would be the same final capability level of the first player \((100 + 10)\) but a different relative gain. An altered relative gain given the same final capability level secures a different marginal utility. Stated plainly, according to the reformulated equations, indifference occurs if the ratio of the final capabilities levels of the two interacting players is the same in the compared situations. One of the above mentioned possible refinements of the equations that still uses relative gains in percentage terms can ensure indifference between these three situations as well. Even according to Mosher’s equations, there are very similar indifferent pairs of gains division, namely \(10; 9\), \(20; 19\), and \(30; 29\). Thus it seems that the indifference curve of the proposed reformulated formulas employing relative gains expressed in absolute terms closely resembles those of equations that use relative percentage gains. The added value of the proposed reformulation lies in more precise results, especially in extreme situations.

The reformulated equations’ added value with respect to proper differentiation between various situations is perfectly visible in extreme cases like, for example, those of very high possible absolute gains that can double or even triple the initial capability level. One such example is the already mentioned situation of two players initially having 4 and 8 tanks respectively. One of the players has to decide whether to jointly produce 8 new tanks with his partner and then divide these gains equally or whether it is better to opt for some other alternative. The two increasing lines without markers on the figure above show what other absolute gains divisions are equivalent to that of \([4; 4]\) (8 new tanks produced jointly and divided equally). In other words, they connect indifferent situations under stable initial capability levels. From
the thick line that represents the proposed reformulated equation, we can see that the players with the initial capability levels of 4 and 8 tanks are indifferent between the absolute gains divisions of [2; 1], [4; 4], [6; 7], and [8; 10]. On the contrary, the thin line of Mosher’s equation indicates that the very same players would be indifferent between the gains divisions [2; 0], [4; 4], [6; 8], and [8; 12]. The thin line intersects with the thick one when absolute gains division corresponds to the pair [4; 4], i.e. in the situation we try to find equivalents to. From the benefiting actor’s point of view, as opposed to that of the losing player, the line connecting the indifferent situations is always steeper according to Mosher’s equation than in the case of the reformulated formula. The basic reason for that is the fact that if we use the original equation, then the bigger the sum of absolute gains to be divided, the better their division must correspond to the initial ratio of capabilities, if we want to achieve indifference with some fixed situation (in our case the fixed situation is the [4; 4] gains division). This stands behind the gradual decrease of the indifferent situations’ final capabilities ratios as illustrated by the thin curve with markers. The limit of that curve is 1/2, which is the ratio of the two actors’ initial capability levels. The situation is different if we use the proposed reformulated equation. In that case, the bigger the sum of absolute gains to be divided, the better their division must correspond to the specific ratio determined by the two players’ final capability levels in the situation we want to find the indifference line to. This ratio is always necessarily higher for the benefiting player than the initial ratio of capabilities.

Maybe more telling is the comparison of the two lines with markers that picture the final capability levels ratios under various indifferent absolute gains divisions. The thick line of the reformulated equations is constant. In all situations where the indifference comes forth, there is the same final ratio of capabilities, namely 2:3. This is not the case of the thin line with markers. The final ratios decrease from 10:12 under the [1; -2] absolute gains division to 7:12 under the absolute gains division [10; 16]. According to the original equation that uses relative percentage gains, players should be indifferent between situations that lead to different ratios of final capability levels, i.e. to different outcomes. The proposed reformulated computation making use of relative gains in absolute terms leads to no such conclusion. If the players care only for relative gains, then they are properly indifferent only between such situations that lead to precisely the same outcomes with respect to their relative final power positions. However, in order to be able to identify indifference between various absolute gains divisions for other values of $r$ than just that of pure relative gains concern, we need to formalize the computation of the sensitivity coefficient.

**DETERMINING RELATIVE GAINS CONCERN**

Since Axelrod (1980a, 1980b) did not assume equal power positions for the players in his tournaments (except for the very first round in the game), he actually indi-
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rectly enabled, rather than prevented, the occurrence of relative gains as they are properly defined by the proposed reformulated formulas. And this happened despite, or rather because of, the fact of symmetrical payoffs matrixes. A confusion of the meanings of proportionality and symmetry with respect to power position caused many misunderstandings in the original debate. Although payoffs symmetry does not preclude relative gains, it is, nevertheless, an a priori assumption. The only remaining question now is to what extent is this assumption of symmetric gains relevant with regard to the neorealist theory itself. Grieco dismissed symmetry with the help of his utility equation [1]. However, this equation pays little attention to power position as emphasized in realist thinking. Moreover, without the formalization of the sensitivity coefficient, no rigorous evaluation of probable gains distribution can be pursued. In the analysis above we considered only some extreme situations like those of pure relative gains concern. Extremes are especially suitable for testing new ways of relative gains and utility computation because if the reformulated formulas pass these tests, they will most probably pass any other test too. But still, to make the argument a little more realistic, we must examine the impact of other possible values of the sensitivity coefficient as well. In most cases, states care about both absolute and relative gains (see Grieco, 1990: 28 & 41). Surprisingly enough, it is precisely the sensitivity coefficient, the factor that determines how much we actually care about relative gains, which was persistently omitted from any attempts at formalization. Although several intuitive assumptions about possible variables influencing the value of relative gains concern exist, no formal model is present. By paying special attention to scholars’ power-related intuitive assumptions about what affects the sensitivity coefficient, I thus propose two possible variables that influence relative gains concern and that make evaluation of the consequences of neorealist theory with respect to payoffs symmetry possible. These variables are the actor’s power position vis-à-vis the other player and the actor’s power position vis-à-vis the system. My focus is upon power as a key variable in neorealist theory, although I am conscious of other variables that may have significant impact upon the sensitivity coefficient as well. They include, for example, geographical distance or even the effects of players’ previous interactions. This article, however, has no ambition to develop a full-fledged model of the international relations system, which would most probably be necessary for formalizing all the other possible variables that influence the sensitivity coefficient. Therefore, I pay attention to only one of them – the one which is crucial for neorealists – namely, power.

According to Grieco, how much states care about relative gains may depend, for example, on the previous history of interactions among the actors (e.g. allies vs. enemies; traditional allies vs. ad-hoc coalitions), on the issue area concerned (e.g. higher relative gains concern in hard security than in economy), on the convertibility of the capabilities from one issue area to another, or on power position and its
change, when a declining power position brings about higher concern for relative gains (Grieco, 1990: 45–46; see also Powell, 1991). The importance of the number of states either within the cooperation agreement or in the system was stressed elsewhere (see, for example, Grieco, Powell and Snidal, 1993: 731; Snidal, 1991). Still another argument given by Waltz expects greater absolute gains when competition among states weakens (Waltz, 1979: 195). Such a condition occurs when the power position of the states concerned is relatively secure (the next most powerful states are far behind with respect to capabilities) and when the uncertainty in the system decreases, as with the second strike capability that renders winning a nuclear war impossible. Interdependence between power distribution and the possibility of disproportionate costs acceptance (low relative gains concern) was promoted by Waltz:

‘The smaller the number of great powers, and the wider the disparities between the few most powerful states and the many others, the more likely the former are to act for the sake of the system ...’ (1979: 198, emphasis added)

Hence, Waltz can be understood as connecting relative gains concern with the number of great powers and the gap separating them from the rest of the players. My intention in this section is to combine in a single framework those of the above stated assumptions concerning shifts in relative gains concern that reflect the core of the realist theory. Together with the reformulated utility equation, this will enable us to examine the issue of payoffs symmetry, which is so important for the relative/absolute gains debate. As was already stated, in trying to formalize the computation of the sensitivity coefficient, I focus upon two factors: power position in the system, and power position vis-à-vis the interacting partner. These two variables can sufficiently encompass the above mentioned assumptions, especially those related to power.

With respect to the first variable that codetermines the sensitivity coefficient, consider the impact of the difference in the capability levels of interacting states. To be more specific, I assume that the greater the distance between the levels of capabilities of two interacting players, the lower the marginal utility of the same relative gain and, therefore, also of the attention paid to relative gains as such. Attention or competition peaks when the interacting states are equally powerful. As the power distance gets wider, the same relative gain makes a lower impact. A position of pre-eminence or of a greatly disadvantageous status thus makes relative gains less important. The situation on the market for power is easy to conceive. A relative gain of one ballistic missile added to your stockpile of, let’s say, 10 missiles would be more valued (and therefore $r$ would be higher) when the partner you interact with has the same amount of missiles than in a case when it has a great many of them. And on the other hand, a relative gain of one missile would be less significant when
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your advantage over your partner is already great than in a balanced situation. The marginal utility of the same relative gain, and thus also of the attention paid to it, decreases in proportion to how big your relative ‘surplus’ of power is when compared to your partner in interaction, and also in proportion to how big your relative ‘debt’ is, i.e. when you have fewer capabilities then your opponent.

In order to formalize the above described relation between power position and the sensitivity coefficient, I propose the following formula for the computation of the first power position factor \( F_1 \). The initial power position of state \( i \) \((W_{i1})\) vis-à-vis that of its partner \( k \) \((W_{k1})\) affects relative gains concern according to the formula:

\[
\alpha = \min(W_{i1}, W_{k1}) : \beta = \max(W_{i1}, W_{k1}) : F_{i1} = \frac{\alpha}{\beta}
\]

The first power position factor can get values from 0 to 1, which deliberately corresponds to the interval of the sensitivity coefficient as modified by Snidal (1991). Both of the interacting players have the same first power factor in the examined interaction, but its value can nevertheless change with a shift in the ratio of their capability levels. An \( F_1 \) of (almost) equally powerful states is (close to) one, i.e. they care only about relative gains. As the gap between their capabilities increases, \( F_1 \) approaches zero and raises the interest in absolute gains. Since no gap exists between the values of the first power position factor of two directly interacting players, then according to \[9\] if the ratio of their capability levels is, for example, 1:64, they will both devote only one 64\(^{th}\) of their attention to relative gains and the rest to absolute gains. If one player is two times as powerful as its opponent, they will both dedicate half of their attention to absolute gains and the other half to relative gains. Apparently, I assume binary interactions of the players as a basis for analysis. This can be easily challenged as an oversimplification since multilateralism does exist in the real world. However, binary interactions can be justified by two reasons. First, ‘The game of power politics, if really played hard, presses the players into two rival camps’ (Waltz, 1979: 167). Even if this does not necessarily imply a shift from multipolarity to bipolarity (alliance formation is a more probable solution, as Waltz correctly stated), there is no reason why we could not have applied \[9\] upon binary interactions of entire blocks. And second, if our aim is to examine the symmetry of the payoffs assumption in game-theoretic models, we should at least consider the fact that these models usually assume binary interactions, as was, for example, also the case with Axelrod (1980a, 1980b). The condition of only two sides in each of the many possible interactions, as is presumed above and in fact in the whole text and in the whole relative/absolute gains debate, thus constitutes the point of connection with the roots of the payoffs symmetry problem, while simultaneously it does not contradict the neorealist argument.

The second factor I propose as an influence on relative gains concern \( (F_2) \) is the state’s power within the system. In other words, this is the factor of power concent-
tration and of the number of players in the system. Consider the following three alternatives. In one world there are only two states – one with 100 tanks and the other with just two of them. The average number of tanks per state is 51. In a second world there are three states with 100, 51, and 2 of these capability units respectively. The average number of tanks per state is similarly 51. In a third world there are 5 countries with 100, 76, 51, 26, and 2 tanks respectively. The average number of such roughly estimated capabilities is again 51. Suppose you are a citizen of the most powerful state. Which world would you like to live in? Or rather, where would you be the least concerned about relative gains? Most probably you would choose the first world.

Consider a second example. Besides one great power in a system with, let’s say, 101 tanks, there are either 49 small states with one tank each, or alternatively one medium power with 49 of these capability units. The net system capabilities are equal in both alternatives (150). Again, which world would you like to live in if you were a citizen of the most powerful state? Where would you care more about relative gains?

In order to properly explain this variable, it is crucial to stress the fact of the translatability of power increases between various interactions. If the power capability level \( x \) of player A is increased by the payoff \( p \) from the interaction with player B in time \( t \), then the first player’s capability level in time \( t + 1 \) would be \( x + p \) in all conceivable interactions, and not only in that with player B. To make it more understandable, suppose that all gains in all interactions in the system are divided proportionally so that no relative gains emerge. Suppose that some state interacts with some other country which is less powerful and that this is the only interaction where relative gains can emerge. If all other states, which are outside this specific interaction, were far less powerful than the stronger of the two interacting countries, this stronger state would be much less attentive to the possible relative gains of its opponent because it would take much time until any other state would be able to catch up with it (remember the translatability of power increases/decreases). On the other hand, if all other states outside this specific interaction were of the same capability level as the stronger of the two interacting countries, this stronger state would be far more concerned with the possible relative gains of its opponent because given translatability as well as the proportionate distribution of gains from all the other interactions, the stronger actor’s power would immediately decrease below the power level of all states outside the interaction. This shows the importance of the systemic context within which any interaction occurs.

To be able to correctly distinguish between the alternative contextual circumstances of all possible interactions, I thus introduce the second power factor, which takes into account the power position of the player within the system of international relations:

\[
F_2 = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{n} F_{ik}}{n}
\]
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Although it is only a simple arithmetic average of all the first power factor values of the given player \(i\) when interacting with all \(n\) other states \(k\), it can easily distinguish between systems with various numbers of players and different distributions of capabilities. The logic of the equation is straightforward. The more similarly powerful states (like my own state) there are in the system, the more players I have to fear and the more I care about relative gains. But one may point out that we can get the values of the second power position factor in two different ways – either as an average of all the \(F_1\) values from all the interactions of the given player, or as an average of the first factor values from the given player’s interactions with only the most powerful states. The second way may, at first sight, better correspond to the neorealists’ emphasis of the role of great powers. However, the inclusion of the interactions with all the players into the computation of the second power factor is necessary particularly with respect to translatability of power. If we include into the computation of the second factor only those first factor values that come from interactions with great powers, a player at the lower end of the power ladder would make no difference between an environment in which there are many players with a similarly low capability level and an environment of only great powers plus this one single weak state. Such an indifference contradicts the logic of translatability of power that tells us about A’s preference for situations in which as few B states as possible could take immediate advantage of A’s power decline. To come back to our above mentioned situations of capability distributions, relative gains concern in the first example would be the least intense, according to [10], in the world where only two states are involved (capability levels [100; 2]) – and it would be the least intense for both of them. In the second example, the superpower would clearly prefer a world of 49 micro states plus itself.

Finally, the sensitivity coefficient itself can be computed as a simple average of two power factors since they both get values from the interval \(<0, 1>\) with 1 representing pure relative gains concern and 0 standing for pure absolute gains concern. I will also show that the effects of such a composition of relative gains concern closely correspond to neorealist thinking. But before doing that, it still remains to answer the question of whether two power factors are not too much and whether only one of them would not do the job as well. I argue to the contrary. It is true that the first power factor is also included in the second one, and thus it may seem that it is counted twice. But if the sensitivity coefficient was composed only of the first factor, two interacting states would make no difference between a situation where they represent two poles in a bipolar system and a situation where they are parts of a perfectly competitive system with all the actors having the same power capabilities level. If there was only the second factor, the interacting states would distinguish between bipolarity and perfect competition, but for any single player, it would make no difference whether the particular interaction occurred with the great power or
with the power dwarf, as far as the distribution of the power in the system would be the same. Therefore it is important to include both the first and the second power factor. Moreover, contrary to the first power factor, the value of the second variable is not the same for both of the interacting players, except for the case of their power capability levels being equal. The different levels of the two interacting players’ relative gains concerns that affect absolute gains division are thus attributable to the second factor.

Until now, I employed capability units that took the rather unusual form of tanks, ballistic missiles, or automatic rifles instead of using some index that takes into account expert knowledge or variables like population and strength of the economy. The purpose of such examples was, however, to illustrate hypothetical situations in order to highlight the necessity of new equations. Units of capabilities could have been sticks as well without any impact upon the argument. In the real world, the power capability level of each state is naturally a matter of the perception of the leaders concerned and ‘Crude quantitative indicators of capabilities cannot accurately represent decision-makers’ assessments.’ (Wohlforth, 1995: 97 & 98) However, my aim is not to apply the theoretical hypothesis upon some real world situation (a thorough case study would be necessary to do that), but instead to examine the consequences of the formalized sensitivity coefficient and the reformulated relative gains computation with respect to neorealist theory and its criticism of the payoffs symmetry assumption. Material capabilities as indexed by the Correlates of War project (Singer, 1987) are perfectly suitable and satisfactory for a task like that. The National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset (v3.02) with its Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) offers entries from 1816 to 2001. With the help of the following figure we can examine whether data from the years 1945 and 1894 that were processed by means of the proposed equations correspond to neorealist expectations of shifts in relative gains concern. These two years represent two very different examples of distribution of power in the international relations system. Never in modern history has any country dominated the system to the extent that the United States did shortly after WWII (for a brief description, see Lundestad, 2005: 1–2). In complete accord with that, no single year in the NMC dataset witnessed a greater concentration of power in one country than 1945. Even the case of the post-Napoleonic United Kingdom is no match for the almost 40 percent share of the USA in the overall systemic capabilities in 1945. On the other hand, the year 1894 was deliberately chosen because of the precisely opposite tendency with respect to distribution of power. Since neorealists stress the importance of great powers (Waltz, 1979: 72) and the goal here is to examine the consequences of the neorealist argument, I naturally focused upon the most powerful states and tried to find the case with the highest number of states at the top of the power ladder and with the most similar capability levels for those states at the same time. According to the NMC
dataset, differences between the most powerful states in the international relations system were extraordinarily narrow during the 1890s and the most so in 1894. As many as six great

Figure 2: The average sensitivity coefficients (upper lines) and their standard deviations (lower lines) for all states in the years 1894 (thin line) and 1945 (thick line) as computed with the proposed equations (Source of Data: NMC v3.02).

powers reached the very high power level of approximately a ten or more percent share in the overall systemic capabilities but none of them exceeded the 20% threshold, which is an extremely rare situation. Unsurprisingly, the late 19th century often serves as a classic example of peace through balance of power, which nevertheless ultimately culminated in the WWI disaster (see Kahn, 1962: 172–173). The early 1890s, which began with Bismarck’s resignation, stand precisely in the middle of the period that started after the German unification and ended with the Sarajevo assassination.

Yet still, even such different situations of power distribution in the system as those of 1894 and 1945 have very similar consequences with respect to the sensitivity coefficient (see figure above), at least according to the proposed equations. In both cases, the average sensitivity coefficient (the upper two lines) has a hill-like shape with the highest values in the cases of countries whose capability levels are closer to that of the median, which is actually much lower than the average power level in the system. However, the average sensitivity coefficient of some actor has a low explanatory value, if we do not consider its variance. For example, the second power factor of any given actor gets pretty much the same value as the corresponding average sensitivity coefficient, but contrary to the latter, it has no variance at all. The sensitivity coefficient of a given player is the most important variable in examining the relative gains problem and we can fully and properly understand the impact of this variable only if we consider not only its average value for each player but also
its dispersion around that average. Yet even with respect to the standard deviation of the average sensitivity coefficient, the two examples are very similar. As portrayed by the lower two largely flat lines on the figure above, the standard deviation of the sensitivity coefficient generally remains between 0.07 and 0.14. Of course, relatively stable values of standard deviation in both 1894 and 1945 tell a different story about the sensitivity coefficient dispersion when its average is equal to 0.15 than when its average is twice as large (note the hill-like upper lines). But the significant point here is that both of the extreme cases, 1894 and 1945, are very similar in both their average sensitivity coefficients and their standard deviations. Finally, does the figure above correspond to neorealist assumptions about shifts in relative gains concern, or are the effects of the sensitivity coefficient formalization different from what neorealists expected? In order to answer this question, the following citation is worth reproducing in its full length.

‘states of differing levels of power may experience differing levels of sensitivity to gaps in gains. Very powerful states may believe that, at least in the short run, gaps in gains arising from any particular relationship will have little impact on their position of preeminence. Very weak states may believe that they cannot in any event ensure their security through their own efforts and thus can largely ignore shifts in relative capabilities arising from gaps in cooperatively generated gains. In contrast, middle-range states may be extremely sensitive to gaps in gains, for they must simultaneously fear the strong and aspire to their status and they must worry that they might slip down into ranks of the weak.’ (Grieco, 1990: 46, emphasis in original)

A better description of the proposed equations’ consequences is hardly conceivable. Their outcomes perfectly correspond to what Grieco expected with respect to the impact of power upon relative gains concern. Furthermore, the first factor of power position vis-à-vis the interacting partner is actually a mathematical form of Snidal’s assumption about the relationship between the interacting states’ capability levels and their sensitivity to relative gains. According to him ‘relative gains concerns peak when states are roughly equal and drop off when one state is either far behind, or far ahead of, the other’ (1991: 725), which is precisely the logic behind the first power factor. In spite of the fact that Snidal is clearly not a realist, the view that his statement can hardly confirm the neorealist character of the proposed relative gains formalization would be premature. In his critique Grieco actually pointed to the neorealist nature of Snidal’s statement, which ‘refutes the claims he [Snidal] makes against realism and, again, supports realist argument’ (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal, 1993: 732). Finally, if we consider the great powers’ acting for the sake of the system (and the related costs acceptance) to be a cooperation-friendly be-
haviour, then the conditions of its occurrence as described by Waltz (1979: 198) correspond exactly to the logic of the second power factor. If the number of great powers is small and the gap between them and other players is wide, as happened shortly after WWII, then the great powers care less about relative gains and they are more willing to cooperate and to provide the system with collective goods. Accordingly, the average sensitivity coefficients for the countries at the top of the power ladder are lower in the case of 1945 than in the case of the highly balanced system of 1894. This is also supported by the microeconomic analogy of the market so often used by Kenneth Waltz (1979; but see also Snidal, 1985: 32). A cooperative agreement is less probable and less durable in a situation approaching perfect competition with a very large number of players (firms) than in the case of an oligopoly. Firms can negotiate with a potential competitor more easily and settle an agreement faster in the case of an oligopoly. The same holds for the international relations system. An oligopolistic concentration of power brings about fewer conflicts and a greater possibility of cooperation. To sum it up, it seems that the two power factors that help us to formalize shifts of the sensitivity coefficient reflect the neorealist argument very well. We can, therefore, proceed to the next section, in which I will examine the joint consequences of the reformulated relative gains computation and the formalized sensitivity coefficient with respect to the payoffs symmetry problem.

PAYOFFS SYMMETRY AS A USEFUL GENERALIZATION

The neorealist criticism of the payoffs symmetry assumption can be taken seriously only if it is supported by the consequences of the reformulated equations. I made every effort to stay faithful to the neorealist argument while constructing these formulas. The new form of relative gains computation pays due attention to the power positions of actors. The sensitivity coefficient was formalized with full respect to neorealist expectations as well. It remains to answer the question of whether or not payoffs symmetry is the outcome of the proposed formulas. If it is so, then the neorealist criticism has to be taken with a great deal of caution since it lacks internal consistency.

To examine the equations’ consequences, we need to find out what payoffs division the actors will most probably agree upon in their interactions. Certain problems emerge when we try to do that. So far in the article, I tried to determine the proper utilities of one player in various situations. I used the marginal utility metaphor, as introduced by Mosher (2003), to enable each player to correctly distinguish different options according to their own calculated utilities. Even if they were computed with the same formula, I did not use utilities to provide any comparison of two different players since any interpersonal comparison of utilities is considered to be controversial, to say the least. We cannot compare the individual utilities of two
different players, and therefore it is not viable to simply place the first player’s utility equation on the left-hand side of the formula and that of the second player on the right-hand side in order to find out how they would split the gains. Employing utilities is not the best way to compare two players’ attitudes towards some distribution of gains. Hence, I propose the following equation to capture the division of gains from binary interactions between states. Players will agree to cooperate most easily if they split the gains in such a way that for both actors the weighted sums of absolute and relative gains are equal. Then nobody will be perceived as receiving a disproportionate part of the overall gains:

\[ (1 - r_i) G_{iA} + r_i G_{iR} = (1 - r_k) G_{kA} + r_k G_{kR} \]

In contrast to the first part of the article, here I compare the weighted gains of two players instead of the utilities of the alternative situations standing before one single player. Since we derive relative gains from absolute gains and from the known initial positions, all we need to do is to find the proper ratio of absolute gains. The left- and right-hand sides of the formula above apparently correspond to the equation [8] for \( i \) and \( k \) respectively but without the marginal utility metaphor. Besides breaking the interpersonal utility comparison restriction, adding the marginal utility metaphor to [11] would also greatly distort the results. With both sides of [11] in the form of the full utility formula, the players would actually almost completely disregard the sensitivity coefficient. Whatever value the relative gains concern got according to its proposed formalization, the two sides of the formula [11] would then be equal only under an almost perfect proportionate distribution of absolute gains.\(^8\) Even if a state, thanks to its power position, cared only about absolute gains and was therefore supposed to pay no attention to the other player’s power, according to the version of [11] with the added marginal utility metaphor, such a player would still look for an almost perfect proportionate division of gains. This would turn the sensitivity coefficient into a redundant variable, allow Snidal’s a priori assumption of the impossibility of the relative gains occurrence to return through the backdoor, and make the whole relative/absolute gains debate rather obscure. On the other hand, equation [11], as it is proposed correctly, makes certain that given pure relative gains concern, the terms on the two sides of the formula are equal only in the case of a perfect proportionality of the division of absolute gains. It also guarantees that the closer the sensitivity coefficients get to pure absolute gains concern \((r = 0)\), the more symmetrical the absolute gains division has to be in order to secure the equality of both sides of [11]. With pure absolute gains concern, states properly disregard the opponent’s power. They behave as if they were under the ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971), where they don’t know the level of the opponent’s capabilities. Moreover, any absolute gains ratio that secures equality of the two sides of the formula is valid in-
respective of the total amount of gains to be divided. This would not be so with the
alternative formula that employs the marginal utility metaphor.

After justifying the equation, which can help us determine the division of absolute
gains in any binary interaction, the time has come to portray such a division with the
help of some distribution of power. The figure above represents the absolute gains
from hypothetical binary interactions of 64 states with capabilities distributed ac-
cording to the Correlates of War project dataset entries for the year 1945 (the ca-
pabilities ranging from a little less than 40% of the system for the USA to only a little
more than a millesimal of one percent of the systemic capabilities for Iceland). In
order to achieve comparability with Axelrod’s payoff matrix, the more powerful
player in every interaction gets 3 points for mutual cooperation. The absolute gain
for the weaker actor is calculated according to [11] and by using the sensitivity co-
efficient formalization and the relative gains computation as proposed above. The
same holds for the figure below that shows the gains division from all possible in-
teractions of the 39 countries present in the system in the year 1894. The capabili-
ties ranged from less than 17% of the system in the case of the UK to a little more
than a hundredth of one percent in the case of the Dominican Republic.

If we compare the two figures, we find some similarities as well as differences,
but the most interesting thing with respect to payoffs symmetry is the relatively nar-
row gains interval of the less powerful player in the interaction. As stated above, the
stronger actor receives 3 points as a payoff, but the calculated gain of the weaker player stays within an interval of payoffs between 2 and 3. Interestingly enough, the absolute gain of the less powerful actor in the interactions never decreases below 2,0 with the exception of some 30 interactions out of the total 2016 considered just in 1945. In 1894 not even

![Diagram of gains from mutual cooperation](image)

**Figure 4:** Division of gains from mutual cooperation according to the proposed equations and with the distribution of capabilities as in the year 1894 (Source of Data: NMC v3.02).

one such case occurs. Thus if the weakest player in the system receives, according to the proposed formulas, a payoff from a binary interaction that is only 3% lower than that of the most capable of all of the actors, even though that state is more than 27 000 times more powerful, then the symmetry of the payoffs seems to be a useful generalization of how players divide their gains, at least according to the proposed equations that formalize the neorealist argument. The shift away from a proportionate division of payoffs gets stronger as the gap between the interacting players widens. When two players’ capability levels are close to each other, they split the gains proportionally. Since they are similar in terms of power, their proportionate gains are simultaneously symmetric. As the gap between capability levels gets wider, proportionality diminishes but a significant amount of symmetry is still retained. Gradually, a greater and greater portion of the received gain consists of a surplus gain that represents that part of the gain above the proportionately appropriate payoff. The highest surplus gains generally come from interactions with the most powerful players (great powers acting for the sake of the system) and even
more so if the power is highly concentrated. Simply stated, the weaker the opponent when compared with the other player in the interaction, the more it gets in surplus gains. When the capability levels of the interacting players get closer to each other, surplus gains vanish and absolute gains recover their proportionality, which in that case, however, means symmetry as well. Accordingly, since the power distribution was more balanced in 1894 than in 1945, the surface chart is shallower for the former than for the latter case. Particularly the payoffs of player A when interacting with the most powerful of the players B do not reach values as high as those in the case of 1945 because competition between great powers (and thus their relative gains concern) in the balanced system of 1894 was much higher than in the extremely concentrated system of 1945.

What conclusion can be inferred from such gains distributions? Despite the fact that we based all of the equations explicitly upon realist assumptions, payoffs symmetry seems to be a useful generalization of the way the gains are divided. Even if actors with different initial power positions surely do not receive perfectly equal payoffs from cooperation, their gains can be still much more appropriately described as constantly maintaining a certain level of symmetry rather than as being continuously proportionate. It appears that payoffs symmetry is a direct consequence of the neorealists’ arguments about variance in the sensitivity coefficient. Data from the Correlates of War project enabled us to illustrate that fact. I do not claim that entries in the NMC dataset exactly correspond to real historical distributions of capabilities. Instead, I tried to examine the consequences of the neorealists’ views about relative gains, the sensitivity coefficient, and symmetry of payoffs. With regard to that, the Correlates of War data fulfilled the role of a useful tool more than appropriately.

CONCLUSION
I focused my attention in the article on three main issues. First, I tried to show that the main puzzle of the relative/absolute gains debate had much to do with the definition of the problem per se and with the fact that power positions were not properly taken into account. Then I reformulated some equations and formalized the sensitivity coefficient in order to properly compute relative gains and to reflect the neorealists’ expectations about shifts in relative gains concern. Finally, I examined the problem of payoffs symmetry – an important question with regard to the prospects of agent-based modeling of the international relations system and one closely related to the relative/absolute gains debate. The aim was to find out how much players care about relative gains under the proposed computation and how it affects payoffs symmetry. I found that if we properly take account of power in reformulating relative gains computation, and if we formalize the sensitivity coefficient with the help of the neorealist power-related intuitive as-
sumptions about shifts in relative gains concern, we come to results that indicate that symmetry is still an appropriate generalization of the overall tendency in gains division.

This provides some reasons to pursue potential agent-based simulations of the international relations system with the same payoff matrix for all players. Certainly, the payoffs symmetry assumption is not a necessary precondition of agent-based models. Axelrod realized that (1990: 17) but he nevertheless employed payoffs symmetry. Authors of other computer simulations and models dealing with the evolution of cooperation usually did so as well (see, for example, Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Brauchli, Killingback and Doebeli, 1999; Grim, 1995; Kraines and Kraines, 1989, etc.). One reason for doing that was that ‘post-Axelrod’ research tried to reexamine his results and to achieve comparability with his conclusions by also adopting his payoff matrix. The logical question therefore arose: Is Axelrod’s payoff matrix capable of withstanding the neorealist critique of its symmetric payoffs assumption or not? The conclusion of the article is that payoffs symmetry actually results from the formalization of the neorealist argument rather than contradicting it. Wide capability gaps and high power concentration diminish relative gains concern and make cooperation gains more equally divided. This is, however, the most unstable situation too. Less powerful states receive disproportionately large payoffs and are more rapidly closing the power gap than under a more balanced distribution of power in the system. The results of the proposed sensitivity coefficient formalization and the reformulation of relative gains open up the doors for the neorealist explanation of the power shift but simultaneously necessitate a reconsideration of the bipolar system stability hypothesis with greater attention paid especially to the individual strategies of the key players. To sum it up, a more elaborate critique is necessary to invalidate the common assumption of payoffs symmetry of agent-based simulations.

Yet any future simulations will have to include other possible factors in the sensitivity coefficient. In proposing the relative gains concern formalization, I focused upon the most important variable in realist thinking, which is undoubtedly power. The question may, nevertheless, arise as to why one should do that with the help of only two factors. After all, other variables like geography, history of interactions, or uncertainty may be as appropriate as the two power factors. Most probably, such a complication of the sensitivity factor formalization would enhance its reliability with respect to the real world situation. This was, however, not the goal here. I merely tried to examine the consequences of the neorealist argument. Similarly as with the question of more factors influencing relative gains concern, various weights assigned to different variables can constitute a real improvement of the equations as well. I pass both of these tasks to those who are interested in the problem.
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ENDNOTES
1 Although Mosher did not explicitly mention any utility equation, it can be deduced from his discount parameter formula (2003: 651).
2 Two possible reformulations of relative gains in percentage form are promising with respect to the stated example of two alternative divisions of gains. In the first reformulation (see [a] below), relative gain is the difference between two fractions of absolute gain over the corresponding average of the initial and final capability levels, while in the second reformulation (see [b] below) it can be expressed as a fraction of the difference between the ratios of the final and initial capability levels over the average of these two ratios. These reformulations do not enable a proper computation of relative gains, nor are they simple enough to claim any intuitive plausibility. Unfortunately I cannot provide the reader with the name of their author since I do not know it myself.

\[ G_{IR} = \frac{\frac{G_{A1}}{W_{A1} + W_{A2} + G_{A3}} - \frac{G_{A4}}{W_{A4} + W_{A5} + G_{A6}}}{2} \]  
\[ G_{IR} = \frac{2 \left( \frac{W_{A1} + G_{A3}}{W_{A1} + G_{A4}} - \frac{W_{A2} + G_{A5}}{W_{A2} + G_{A6}} \right)}{W_{A1} + W_{A2} + W_{A3} + W_{A4} + W_{A5} + W_{A6}} \]

3 With absolute gains being stable, the distribution of capabilities according to the first alternative will be 109:99 after the first round, 118:108 after the second round, 127:117 after the third round, etc. According to the second scenario, the distributions will be 109:110, 118:120, 127:130, etc. respectively.
4 If we consider this statement by Grieco, then his disregard for power capabilities levels in the original utility equation proposed by him is even more puzzling. Sometimes it seems as if Grieco’s narrative and his attempts at formalization followed two completely different paths.
5 Nothing more than a piece of paper and a pencil is necessary for anybody interested in verifying which alternative must be opted for by which actor in order to maximize its utility according to [8].
6 The specific year 1894 was chosen because of the lowest standard deviation of actors’ capability levels. Naturally, the problem is how many countries you should count as great powers. Most of the time the answer is not that difficult, and you can, for example, look for the first big drop between the capability levels of two countries immediately following each other with respect to power rank. According to the NMC database, in 1894 the first such drop occurred as low as between the sixth and the seventh place. The sixth most powerful country was almost twice as powerful as the seventh one. Moreover, thanks to the rule that it is usually the case that the lower the country is on the power ladder, the more states there are with a similar level of power (see Organski, 1968: 364), it seems most probable that the hill-like shape of the average sensitivity coefficient line is a general law rather than a matter of chance or a matter of the specific characteristics of the two chosen examples.
7 The argument, however, does not have to be so clear-cut if we consider Waltz’s own earlier deliberation about increased competition under bipolarity. According to Waltz, in bipolarity, it is clear who is your
enemy, but in multipolarity, ‘who is a danger to whom is often a most obscure matter’ (1964: 883). A high intensity of competition under bipolarity has the same meaning as a high sensitivity to relative gains (not even small losses are acceptable; no change is irrelevant; see Waltz, 1964: 883), and thus it is possible to say that Waltz views bipolarity as less conducive to cooperation. This makes understanding his later statement about the relationship between costs acceptance and power concentration (Waltz, 1979: 198) more difficult. From an agent-based simulations point of view, the different strategies of the key actors are crucial in ultimately determining the system’s stability and level of cooperation. However, this is a dimension not considered by neorealists, who focus only upon power distribution.

* The best and easiest way to determine the effects of equation [11] and its alternative ‘full utility’ version is to focus upon an extreme case of the system with only two actors.

* Both states A and B in any given binary interaction are drawn from the same set of actors. Since the country obviously cannot interact with itself, interactions on the central diagonal (the one running from the pair of the two least powerful states to the pair of the two most powerful states) must be an empty group. Values for these pairs were interpolated as an average of those values immediately bordering on them. The same holds for the case of the year 1894.

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Enduring without an Enemy: NATO’s Realist Foundation

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Abstract: NATO’s present raison d’être is rooted in its members’ national interest having defensive and offensive elements, consisting in both security and autonomy. With security from other great powers all but assured, members seek a greater offensive capacity to shape the international environment. The United States wants legitimacy from its European partners in order to facilitate offensive operations while several European states desire military capabilities for force projection. NATO as an institution is well-suited for hashing out the terms of this exchange, but NATO, as a realist’s bargain, portends a troubled marriage, in which levels of anxiety and animosity can best be reduced if the United States brings its own sources of legitimacy to the relationship.

Key words: NATO, cooperation, balancing, realism, transatlantic relations

INTRODUCTION

While many scholars accept the realist origins of the NATO alliance and that it balanced a growing Soviet threat, the modern NATO poses a tougher question: How can realism explain NATO’s endurance (Kaplan, 2004: 1–8; Mastny, 2002; Wallander and Keohane, 1999; Duffield, 1994–1995)? The Soviet threat no longer exists, but NATO has enlarged its membership, expanded its mission, and invested in new capabilities. Realist theory, pegging NATO’s fate to that of the Soviet Union, usually cast the alliance as a relic from a classic, bipolar power struggle. Yet, NATO has somehow managed to outlast the pole of power it was created to balance.

Liberal scholars enthusiastically submit that NATO persists because of common ideals that the United States and Europe share and that NATO’s continued existence testifies to the true power of ideas over power balancing (Moore, 2003).¹ This explanation might persuade realist critics if not for the growing European trend to move toward autonomous military capability, to the point of jeopardizing the consensus necessary to execute combined operations of the alliance (Howorth and Keeler, 2003; Rynning, 2002). Liberal theory expects an increase in the benefits of transatlantic cooperation with the spread of common ideals and competent institutions rather than a race for unilateral policy options. How do we explain the persistence of NATO in a post-Soviet international order while simultaneously explaining
the behavior of avowedly liberal members engaged in open competition with one another for a freer hand in world affairs?

Contrary to both realist and liberal conventional wisdom, NATO persists because of what turns out to be fundamentally realist considerations on both sides of the transatlantic divide. Yes, the institution of NATO does matter, but as a kind of brokerage house through which members perceive opportunities to increase their individual autonomy, especially after their home territories are essentially secure from attack (Deni, 2007; Thies, 2003; Snyder, 1997). For the United States, gains in autonomy are primarily achieved through greater legitimacy, while the Europeans seek gains in autonomy in terms of greater force projection capability. Each actor needs the other’s unique element of autonomy in order to promote their individual, state-based visions with greater effect. These national visions subordinate the common ideal of a liberal peace to the contagious desire – highlighted by realism – for impunity from others, including allies, in the system.

Understanding the continuance of NATO matters because of its theoretical implications and because there is a need to acquire policy relevant knowledge about the true character of international cooperation within this important partnership. Post-Cold War NATO represents a proving ground for the current relevance of realist theory, but it is also a launching pad for liberal optimism that has weathered even the controversial American-led war in Iraq. Proponents of realism find themselves in the unenviable position of defending false prophets of the 1990’s whose predictions demonstrably failed as NATO endured. Liberals, ironically enough, find their renaissance in an organization that once exemplified the kind of balancing liberal theory discounts.

While neither realism nor liberalism can claim total monopoly when it comes to characterizing the endurance of NATO, we present evidence that is underreported by both camps but ultimately favors a more pessimistic view. The United States and Europe seem to be embroiled in a battle for autonomy that is quite relevant to NATO’s future but largely outside current theoretical interest.

Our vignettes cannot be considered a representative sample of all state-to-state interactions within the alliance. They cannot therefore be weighed statistically against numerous examples from conventional realist or liberal arguments. However, the evidence does confirm a third logic, a bargaining story consistent with longstanding conceptions of national interest that better explains the remarkable volatility within the larger truth of NATO’s endurance after the Cold War.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. We discuss the importance of autonomy as a complement to defensive-minded security in realist thought, despite the fact that realists have rarely employed it in treatments of NATO. Next, arguments from both realist and liberal camps, as they relate to NATO’s endurance, are reviewed to show that neither literature quite captures the actual dynamic of the al-
liance, which resembles a troubled marriage somewhere between imminent divorce and liberal cooperation. We then add autonomy, specifically to the realist recipe, and discuss the implications for the future of NATO as a convenient center for members to trade assets as they attempt to maximize their autonomy. The final sections provide anecdotes to demonstrate that within the security saturated alliance, hard state-on-state bargaining over complementary means to gain autonomy is indeed taking place. Given the United States’ status as the most powerful member and primary supplier of force projection capabilities, we conclude with ideas for how the Americans could improve the rate of exchange for European legitimacy, raising approval for American leadership outside the alliance in order to support the value of U.S. hardware inside NATO.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY

The notion of autonomy goes as far back as Thucydides’ ‘Melian Dialogue’, in which the Athenians apprised the tiny island Melos of whether Spartans would come to their aid (Hammond, 1973: 400–208). The Melians claimed that Sparta would intervene because of proximity and a shared heritage. The Athenians replied, ‘Goodwill shown by the party that is asking for help does not mean security for the prospective ally. What is looked for is a positive preponderance of power in action’ (Ibid.: 405). These two sentences lay the foundation for a realist conception of security having both offensive and defensive elements that are fundamentally linked. Today’s narrow conception of security overemphasizes the defensive orientation to protect and preserve the status quo, while autonomy represents the offensive capacity to achieve national goals in the wider international context. Each component of broader security requires power to achieve. The offensive manifestation of security – in other words, autonomy – captivated the Athenians at Melos and during the precarious peace that obtained between the great power clashes with Sparta.

In his article, ‘The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test’, Michael Altfeld (1984: 524–527) defined autonomy as ‘the government’s capacity to adopt whatever positions it wishes to with regard to international issues salient to it and to change those positions at will.’ Altfeld discussed autonomy and security as if they were complementary economic goods, inferring that under a budget constraint, with every gain in one ‘good’, there was an opportunity cost associated with it. His technical construct included equations for the threshold at which a state would choose to enter into an alliance rather than acquire traditional arms. Essentially, Altfeld created expressions that recalled market forces and opportunity costs for entering into alliances from the point of view of the superior power as well as that of the inferior beneficiary.

Autonomy, in international politics, is fundamentally realist because its pursuit demands that states vary levels of security, engage their power, and assume calculated risks in an anarchic international system. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s (1975) ‘Mea-
suring Systemic Polarity’ anticipated Altfeld’s use of alliances as examples of how security and autonomy interact. In his subsequent textbook, Bueno de Mesquita (2003: 406–407) articulated the opportunity costs that each alliance member assumes when a new member is inducted by first delineating the relative strength and weakness of the pertinent states.

There was an inverse relationship between the weak and strong states in the creation of an alliance since the weak state made gains in security but lost in autonomy while the strong state made opposite relative gains. Asymmetric alliances, or alliances built on complementary goals, had a statistically significant tendency to last longer than symmetric alliances, or alliances built on common security interests (Ibid.: 407–408). This may not seem intuitive at first, but upon closer examination, states seeking greater autonomy, who possess a surplus in security, will form stable alliances with states that have a relative willingness to surrender autonomy because of their deficient security posture. Alliances formed to seek communal gains in either autonomy or security do not directly address the partners’ relative weaknesses and do not therefore incorporate as much incentive to endure should the external threat decline. In either scenario, the pursuit of autonomy or security through alliances is essentially a realist calculation.

Bueno de Mesquita’s construct of alliance behaviors and tendencies raises significant questions about NATO. Is NATO an asymmetric or a symmetric alliance? If NATO has shifted to the more fragile category, a symmetric alliance, as demonstrated by the mutual and independent pursuit of autonomy on the part of very secure member states, why does it persist nonetheless?

With these questions in mind, the autonomy/security conception of state goals still offers a coherent realist alternative to liberal notions for the perseverance of NATO. The ability of a sovereign state to act when and where it perceives that its interests are best served is essential to the purposes of state power (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975: 189). Ultimately, if the facts can establish that the U.S. or European nations are using NATO to pursue autonomous capability, the transatlantic relationship still unfolds according to realist considerations.

In order to understand the role of autonomy in NATO, the existing realist and liberal explanations must first be laid out. The realist explanations to date share the common flaw of oversimplification in order to preserve integrity at the level of grand theory. Meanwhile, liberal explanations fail to account for inconvenient examples of exploitive behavior among allies in their politics of national security. The desire for autonomy when linked back to complementary instruments of state power – legitimacy and force projection capability – offers the best explanation for the self-interested behaviors that persist within a liberal alliance saturated with security.
THE REALIST DILEMMA

Difficulties associated with realist reactions to the persistence of NATO begin at the foundations of realism itself. Realism as a theoretical orientation toward the international system supposedly values what is over what should be (Carr, c1938, 2001: 63). When a theory that values cold, hard, objective reality as the cornerstone for explaining what will occur denies something obviously real, like continued NATO activity, the irony is damning.

Beginning with neorealism, the scientific brand launched by Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) *Theory of International Politics* offered a cogent restructuring of classic realist thought (Keohane, 1986: 14). Waltz addressed Hans Morgenthau’s failure to clarify the usage of such central terms as ‘power’ and ‘balance of power’ while avoiding the reductionism that weakened previous formulations. With respect to actors and goals in his theory, Waltz disciplined his predecessors’ ideas, summing up states as ‘unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination’ (Ibid.: 13–15). He argued that the fundamental nature of states leads to balancing in their interactions. The position of every state within the structure of states’ relative capabilities permits a systemic expression of international order (i.e., bipolarity or multipolarity) (Nye, 1988).

For Waltz, the Cold War was a classic example of bipolar power alignment, NATO was fundamentally linked to this bipolar power alignment, and NATO would not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union because new power arrangements at the interstate level would render it obsolete (Keohane and Waltz, 2000–2001). Waltz excused the glaring failure of neorealism by arguing that the dissolution of the Soviet threat ultimately allowed American policy to become capricious (Waltz, 2000). Essentially, he retreated to the notion that while constancy of threat produces constancy of policy, in the absence of threat, policies become unpredictable.

Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder (1990) asserted that the cooperation among allies is susceptible to two vulnerabilities. First, states may join alliances that are only perceptually not substantively consistent with domestic aims. Second, states may be taken advantage of by member states that choose to pass the buck rather than sacrifice themselves to stop a potential hegemon. A state that feels threatened may balance by allying with other states while at the same time sharing as little of the burden of opposition as possible. Applying this buck-passing theory to the continued existence of NATO would still require identification of the hegemon that is supposedly being balanced as well as some demonstration of how certain partners are attempting to avoid the costs implicit to balancing.

Taking his cue from Stephen Walt’s (1987) famous amendment to neorealism, Randall Schweller (2004) proposed that interaction between states in an anarchic system can best be explained in terms of balance of threat. Schweller argued that
states only engage in true forms of balancing when a threat against state sovereignty – a glaring deficit in security – is imminent. This balance of threat argument still faces the challenge of explaining exactly which offensive intentions would prompt unity within NATO. While most argue that there is no perception pressing enough for balance of threat theory to apply, Robert Kaplan (2005), in his article ‘How We Would Fight China,’ does claim that China is a threat that may pose a grave danger to the security of the United States. Unfortunately for the balance of threat argument in the European theater, Kaplan concludes that NATO is unsuited for the task of countering an aggressive China.

Another realist theory that has some bearing on the NATO debate is articulated by Robert Pape, a leading proponent of ‘soft balancing.’ Pape (2005) argued that U.S. preemptive policies in Iraq since 2003 led other major powers to have greater cause for fear, that this fear prompted major powers to ‘delay, frustrate and undermine’ U.S. policies through the use of international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements, and that soft-balancing measures would continue so long as the United States pursued unilateral policies. Pape (2005: 9–10) suggested that hard-balancing under the current distribution of material resources was not an option for major powers because of the costs and risks involved in staging such an opposition. Instead, soft-balancing offered a safer means of opposition that did not confrontationally challenge U.S. dominance. This theory, assessing the security threat against allied states to be low, again put NATO’s perseverance into question, though it did justify Europe’s flirtation with autonomous military capabilities outside NATO. Even so, other scholars soon questioned whether European efforts to date should be considered ‘soft’ or simply not balancing in the first place (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005).

After digesting the prevailing views on Europe’s movement toward autonomous military capabilities, Barry Posen (2006: 150–151) offered the explanation that Europe does ‘not trust the United States to always be there’ to address its security problems. He argued that fear of abandonment drove Europe to pursue the development of its own capabilities. For Posen’s argument to work, however, the existence of a European fear of abandonment, as well as some explanation for its source, must be established. Posen (2006: 171) asserted that this source was the abstract notion that hyperpowers are unlikely to engage international politics through a multilateral framework. Ultimately, the question of why European states would still participate in NATO and enjoy apparent security if abandonment by the United States was imminent presents a serious puzzle.

BURGEONING INCONVENIENCES FOR LIBERALISM

Liberal explanations for the persistence of NATO are not suspect for incongruity with the bulk of evidence, which shows an alliance transitioning, albeit haltingly, to-
ward out-of-area crisis management and political development projects as it makes do with the relatively small military contributions of new members (Deni, 2007; Rynning, 2005; Barany, 2004; Wallander and Keohane, 1999). The trouble with liberal optimism comes in the inconvenient and persistent exceptions to cooperation that are out of sync with projections of an ideologically homogeneous alliance. One example is the way Germany recently approached the issue of increasing strategic airlift capacity. Both the EU and NATO expressed concerns over the capability and capacity of their current airlift assets for out-of-area missions. Germany volunteered to explore options for each organization, and eventually it settled on a lease agreement with the Russian-owned company Antonov, which supposedly would meet the needs of all the parties involved (Booth, 2006).

On its surface this event may appear benign, but the reality is that Germany succeeded in negotiating this issue in such a way that in the end, it was the only true winner. The EU and NATO must now work through German political institutions to access this strategic airlift capacity; in other words, the German-brokered deal leaves Germany with significant leverage over both institutions. If nothing else, the decision on the part of Germany to lease from Russia instead of its more liberal allies brings an odd twist to Immanuel Kant’s principles, which imply an ever growing economic interdependence among liberal states.

This situation, among others in NATO politics, indicates a competitive military streak that lingers despite extra opportunities for cooperation sponsored by international institutions. Liberal theory misses important aspects of intra-alliance bargaining, particularly when the theory’s logic takes individual state characteristics and infers from them features of the alliance as a whole. Examples like the German airlift decision highlight the weakness associated with a purely liberal explanation of NATO’s perseverance since security-related competition finds its niche even in what some portray as a near-ideal liberal community (Moore, 2007; Cooper, 2004; Wallander and Keohane, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1997; McCalla, 1996).

Under liberalism, NATO could still have a security role – that of reducing threats for fledgling democracies and thereby shielding the expansion of peace (Gibler and Sewell, 2006). This argument uses the addition of former Soviet satellite states as evidence of NATO’s effectiveness in creating conditions suitable for developing democracies to grow and prosper (Barany, 2004). What contrasts this argument from a balance of threat explanation is that in this construct, NATO does not exist primarily as a military instrument for defending against a rising and aggressive great power. Former Warsaw Pact or Soviet states may feel a security threat, but NATO itself, as well as the liberal explanation, explicitly rejects any characterization of the alliance’s accession policy as a response to the long-term concern of a resurgent Russia. Rather, NATO’s adoption of these members reflects motives grounded in liberal philanthropy: when former Soviet-dominated states benefit in their political.... 
and economic development, socialization among all parties in the extended North Atlantic zone improves as well (Gheciu, 2005).8

In his cautionary article ‘What went wrong with NATO?’, Sean Kay (2005) objected that while the NATO alliance persisted after the Cold War because of ‘a deeply embedded community identity reinforcing democracy and free market economies,’ its institutional framework nevertheless prevented it from adapting to new threats. Kay framed these threats as challenges against the promotion of ideals rather than territorial security. He used the NATO involvement in Kosovo to defend his assessment. ‘The Kosovo crisis was a direct threat not to the security of the NATO allies, but rather to the credibility of the alliance’s new mission oriented around extending values and promoting stability’ (Kay, 2005: 71). The essence of Kay’s argument was that NATO never fully reoriented itself to its role as liberal benefactor. This finding leaves liberalism in the lurch. NATO is in business to promote and extend the liberal community, but it does not conduct its business well.

Interestingly, the precepts of functionalism, a vintage concept from the early stages of European integration, temper the tone of liberal approaches in a manner similar to Kay’s, tying NATO’s growth to previous operational successes. David Mitrany (1948) articulated the foundational concepts of functionalism, arguing that federations comprised of sovereign states inevitably grant more and more power to the central organizing body as a way to maintain the federation. Mitrany believed that because federative alliances between sovereign states always began as narrowly focused organizations designed to contend with a prescribed set of circumstances, any change in the original set would represent opportunities for the organization to extend influence over its sovereign members. Time would bring a melding of state interests as new policy demands would open more doors for a centralized, federative authority. What began as an alliance based on mutual interest within a narrow scope of military cooperation would inevitably spill over into other areas of concern like the economy or political structure of member states.

Philippe Schmitter (1969) elaborated on spillover in his work ‘Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration,’ concluding that even if the original goals of the organization were maintained, changing circumstances would force the federation to become more flexible with the means by which goals were met. In a similar vein, Ernst Haas (1980) explained that interdependent relations were forged between states as a means of escaping the costs of isolationism. Haas pre-saged the literature of complex interdependence by refining the concept of inter-national regimes, which he defined as ‘norms, rules and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area’ (Haas, 1980: 358).

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1998: 83) explained complex interdependence as ‘a world in which security and force matter less and countries are connected by
multiple social and political relationships.’ This notion cohered with what the functionalist Donald Puchala (1970) had foreseen as a condition in which great numbers of considerations emerged – when certain states interacted to include trade, commerce, social, and cultural transactions. The effect from the sum of these interactions was a mutual dependence that hiked the price of war. Puchala (1970: 741) added that in some cases the level of interdependence could lead to a supranational melding of national identities.

Modern interdependence arguments, as they relate to NATO’s persistence, boil down to the idea that in order to preserve regimes among nations, institutions must be tailored to meet a growing list of useful tasks. NATO, in sober liberal estimations, has become just such an institution. In contrast, realist-oriented critics, at a loss to explain the strategic reasons for NATO’s vigor and, indeed, its enlargement and expansion of mission, nevertheless seize on operational difficulties. NATO has struggled quite transparently, for example, to wring deployable capabilities from various members, old and new, and to execute crisis management in places like Kosovo and Afghanistan (Rupp, 2006; Michta, 2006; Barany, 2003; Carpenter, 2000; Waltz, 2000; Mandelbaum, 1999; Yost, 1998; Mearsheimer, 1994–1995; Krauss, 1986).

There is some truth in the sniping at liberal theories. They do tend to predict blue skies and fair sailing for NATO, neglecting the patently competitive tendencies among alliance members. If NATO has storms to weather, the implication is that recalcitrant members or retrograde factions within those states will sooner or later heed every secretary general’s refrain for a redefinition of national interest in the mode of liberal idealism. The habit of putting off inconvenient facts recalls Waltz’s fallback of capricious behaviors, though from the other side of the debate.

All this leads to a rather debilitating stasis in the analyses of NATO. There are two rigid camps, one pessimistic, the other optimistic. Each has a ready list of failures or successes impeding movement in either position. During 2007, the United States still cut bilateral deals with certain NATO members on intelligence and missile defense, and several European members still failed to meet NATO’s defense spending targets (Hendrickson, 2007: 105). Yet, at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO extended membership action plans to Albania and Croatia and reiterated its commitment to block the resurgent Taliban and stabilize Afghanistan.

Deadlock between conflicting analyses on the future of NATO calls for an alternative theory that can accommodate evidence from both sides of the current debate. Because national defense policies since the dawn of the alliance have looked to NATO as a brokerage for member states to acquire, in one way or another, additional military capability, realism, though unsuccessful to this point, comes to the task with certain advantages.
REALIST ADVANTAGE

In the end, realism provides a better conceptual framework for dealing with the issue of NATO’s persistence. Realist systems are predicated on the assumption of a dynamic continuity in which states pursue their end goals but without any guarantee of permanence in the outcome. The aim of realism is to describe the continuous cycle of acquiring and then losing power and to explain state interactions, both conflictual and cooperative, that bring accumulation of power into a competitive, though necessarily temporary, equilibrium.

Realism predicts that states will act according to their own best interests but that the greater system of states prevents or makes more difficult the realization of those individual objectives. Even in instances when the state achieves its goals, this achievement does nothing to negate the corrosive nature of the anarchic system in which these gains must be defended. Realist structuralism distinguishes the international system as a kind of natural construct, which persists without any necessary correlation to individual state intentions.

Liberal theory rejects the notion of systemic continuity. Its basic tenets establish biases that ultimately minimize the impact of the broader state system on international outcomes. Liberal theory focuses on acquisition of societal ends – at the domestic level on behalf of individual happiness – as a gauge of advancement toward the ultimate international condition of Kantian peace. Whereas realism seeks to determine where the system is on a predictable, cyclic continuum, liberalism uses states’ political and economic development as milestones on a climb towards the end of history. Rather than a mere result of economic or social forces, each bit of domestic progress is both a confirmation and a means to further systemic change. Realism describes the international system as a state of being; liberals describe the international system as a state of becoming. Liberalism, therefore, has a handicap in establishing explanations for an enduring behavior pattern, or a continuing relationship, that features serious tensions (Waltz, 1962).

For all the apparent advantages of realism, clear explanations of NATO’s present existence have not been as forthcoming as one would expect from a theory that claims predictive ability based on the integrity of its levels of analysis. While liberalism inaccurately portrays a blissful marriage for NATO’s states, just as unfortunately, realists have hounded the alliance like paparazzi, desperate to capture and highlight any sign of divorce. Neither approach has acknowledged the reality of a volatile and troubled, but also persistent interrelation of state interests.

DYNAMICS WITHIN REALISM

Current analyses do not reconcile NATO’s increasing institutionalization with uncooperative tendencies that nevertheless occur within the alliance. These seemingly incompatible phenomena can be explained simply enough by using a variation on
the core idea from asymmetric alliance politics: the concept of autonomy versus security equilibrium (Morrow, 1991). Bueno de Mesquita’s (2003) textbook characterization of alliances actually predicted the dissolution of symmetric alliances like NATO, but a small adjustment to this theory provides an excellent framework for understanding the persistent difficulties within an alliance that at the same time shows few signs of permanent rupture.

The Cold War NATO validates much of the original argument that a state will give up autonomy in order to acquire greater security by entering into an alliance. As it stands, however, the autonomy-security exchange does not explain a situation in which member states symmetrically have little to fear from a security standpoint and yet continue to associate. NATO’s persistence must come from a capacity to maintain high security while providing divergent, asymmetric opportunities to the United States and European states for greater autonomy. In the case of the United States, marginal gains in autonomy come about through needed gains in legitimacy while European states accrue autonomy mostly by means of new force projection capability.

At present, the United States possesses unparalleled military budgets and technology. Yet, it still finds itself unable to police with impunity in disparate areas of the globe like Darfur, Yongbyon, and Baghdad because of its deficit in legitimacy, i.e. acceptance in the rest of the world of the idea that the United States judiciously employs its unmatched power while taking into account the good of all. The global outcry against the U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrated the limitations of the United States’ ability to deploy its unique capabilities without reaping the negative consequences of international opprobrium.

In general, European states possess a greater measure of legitimacy because of their present willingness to seek international approval and subject themselves to international processes, but they lack the hard power tools necessary to project this vision globally (Kagan, 2004; Yost, 2000–2001). The inability of Europe to address paramilitary violence in the Balkans without outside aid demonstrated both patience with multilateral consultation and military challenges for European members vying to exert foreign influence.

In summary, the United States possesses capabilities that Europeans need to act with a freer hand while Europeans possess a measure of political credibility that can be lent for effective employment of U.S. capabilities, particularly in non-conventional operations like post-war stabilization efforts. Each side has what the other side needs in order to act autonomously, or project offensive power. Members following their national interest – properly conceived as containing defensive and offensive elements – see a reason to associate. This explains the persistence of NATO.

Bueno de Mesquita noted that ‘Alliances between states with different objectives are more easily formed and longer lasting than are alliances based only on mutual
quests for security or on mutual quests for autonomy' (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003: 407). During the Cold War, Europe was willing to give up autonomy to the United States, allowing forward basing of American troops on European territory in order to achieve relative gains in security. In exchange for these basing rights, the United States, reluctantly at times, tied its security to vulnerabilities in Europe. This pure complementing of interests explains the effectiveness of the Cold War NATO alliance at tamping down the intensity of internal disputes.

Though times have changed and more members would now trade a measure of security for greater autonomy, the current NATO alliance is still asymmetric, but in a different sense: different parties pursue autonomy in ways that are complementary. Two states pursuing autonomy through military capability would be an instance where the symmetric nature of objectives would further limit the benefits available from association. However, in the case of the United States and Europe, associates push for greater autonomy in ways that cover their individual scarcities. Asymmetry and opportunities for exchange within the new NATO persist due to the remaining dissimilarity and the complementary nature of each party’s abundant resources.

Recognizing variation in the means for autonomy also leads to a reason for the now serious friction that occurs between NATO states. Pursuit of autonomy within NATO takes place in an arena of interacting state interests that are only partially compatible. Unlike in the autonomy-security equilibrium in which there is a clear tradeoff between the two, gains in autonomy achieved by one member do not automatically correlate with gains for the other. The United States and European states indeed bring two different inputs to the market for autonomy, but subsequent use can exacerbate conflicts among divergent foreign policies. In this market, featuring complements in supply and competition in consumption, participating states are both suppliers and consumers. Looking ahead to consumption, or wielding influence abroad, states will drive hard bargains on the supply side as they associate to exchange military capability and legitimacy.

Military capabilities are the baseline tools required for out-of-area control while legitimacy represents a conferring of de facto authority to employ these tools. The interaction between the United States and Britain over computer codes for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was indicative of legitimacy’s superiority in a market for autonomy. The United States eventually made serious concessions in sharing sensitive technology (capability) with the British for little more than a preservation of the status quo in legitimacy (Defense Industry Daily, 2006). While the United States has a comparative advantage in the capabilities market, when traded against legitimacy, capabilities are the inferior currency, which explains the repeated U.S. willingness to pay dearly for fleeting declarations of diplomatic support in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

European states have a clear advantage in this NATO-brokered exchange of autonomy instruments, in part because Europeans can use the European Union as
lack of Syria.

The EU has demonstrated a desire to become a player in the capabilities market, and potential substitutes or increases in supply naturally drive down what the United States can ask in return for its tradable good. Conversely, the EU, much like any bargaining unit, affects the autonomy market by using collusion to limit supply and drive up the price of its primary service – conferring Europe’s imprimatur. Finally, European states exploit EU security policy for their own national advantage. A recent German acquisition of airlift capability, the French advocacy for an autonomous ESDP, and the French leadership of ceasefire talks during the Georgia crisis represented attempts to hold out for concessions to their national interest, including those from pro-American EU partners, before accepting measures which would really only be pieces of broader policies sought by the United States.

Essentially, the states in NATO trade precious resources, some of which they have in surplus, for other elements that are useful for autonomy, which they sorely lack. NATO persists because it acts as a broker in this political market that allows states to acquire more autonomy even as they subsequently express that autonomy in ways that promote divergent national interests. There is no steady price in the market of autonomy, but legitimacy is demonstrably superior to capabilities as a type of currency for obtaining more influence in areas outside the stable Euro-Atlantic zone. The high quality and short shelf-life of legitimacy explains the conflicted behavior of the United States and its European allies. Each side haggles and remonstrates to obtain a better price for its specialty items, some mix of which is optimal for maximizing autonomy. At the same time, no one walks away permanently from the bazaar. There is neither divorce nor proper matrimony. NATO, for realist reasons, becomes a fixture for endless bickering and occasional trades in mutual self-interest, usually involving a limited and temporary grant of legitimacy in return for an outright acquisition of or access to significant military capabilities (Moravcsik, 2003: 83–84).12

EVIDENCE OF A TROUBLED MARRIAGE

Beyond unilateralist moves by the United States, France in the past has demonstrated clear dysfunctional tendencies, at least from the perspective of an alliance reinforced by cultural similarity and liberal ideology, and these intensified with the passage of time and the transformation of NATO. France’s independent streak – without going so far as a clean break – was evident in its persistent moves to challenge U.S. dominance on European security and later European autonomy.

In 1959, Charles de Gaulle expelled all NATO nuclear weapons from France as a means of protesting what the French viewed as imperial overreach (Bowen, 2005). Seven years later, France famously removed its forces from NATO’s integrated military command – though in the middle of the Cold War, intense cooperation with American forces in Europe continued. Today, a very different French president in
The fact that France’s latest push for ESDP began before the Sarkozy presidency, during a time when French foreign policy starkly opposed U.S. designs on Iraq, gave pause even to optimistic analysts of allied cooperation (Howorth, 2005). While NATO acknowledged that European consolidation of military power could be beneficial if brokered within the alliance, attempts to resurrect ESDP as part of a foreign policy dispute with the most powerful North American member signaled that European interests in lowering their demand for U.S. capability were preeminent even within the context of a so-called political alliance (Ibid.: 40–44). When put to the test, France, along with Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, demonstrated a propensity to elevate idiosyncratic national interests above alliance objectives. The tendency has been around as long as NATO, but without the common fear of the Soviet Union to tamp it, diplomatic hardball has become more prominent and frequent within alliance politics.

During 2007–2008, friction between the United States and the EU over the staging of missile systems within EU member states on a bilateral basis again demonstrated competitive tendencies even among newly minted and presumably eager NATO members. The United States negotiated deals, including technology access, with Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy various elements of a missile defense shield as a means of preventing Iranian missiles from reaching their targets in Europe and beyond. The United States argued that the move would benefit both the United States and Europeans while some EU members argued inside and outside NATO forums that the United States and certain Eastern European members were creating a diplomatic situation that could isolate and eventually provoke the Russians (Smith, 2007). At the very least, this situation represented a failure of the strongest international organizations to remove the rough edges from conflicting national policies. In some sense NATO membership actually provided a safety net, allowing small members to aggressively engage self-interested, bilateral negotiations.

With respect to NATO’s tortured response to the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, our portrayal of NATO as a troubled marriage cannot explain every nuance of the dramatic diplomacy to preserve Georgian sovereignty, but some key decisions were consistent with our application of realism, which emphasizes autonomy as an oft-overlooked motive for state behavior.

When Russian armor overran two independence-minded enclaves and endangered the capital of the newly democratic Georgia, this threatened NATO enlargement as a means for democracy expansion and stabilization, but it did not threaten the existence, that is, the vital security interest, of members under the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article V. Under the circumstances, neither conventional liberal nor realist
analyses anticipated NATO’s response, which was to protest Russia’s move while backing away from plans to admit Georgia.

With regard to autonomy, Russia’s dismemberment of Georgia and troop deployments to enforce Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence over Western objections did imperil members’ freedom of action, which in 2008 was still at stake in Russia’s near abroad from Ukraine to Uzbekistan. Interestingly, France and Germany saw a double threat emanating not just from Russian aggression, but also from a potential U.S. overreaction that during the American presidential campaign could rely too heavily on military muscle.

The real possibility of European diplomatic resistance limited U.S. and NATO actions to NATO patrols in the Black Sea and humanitarian aid to Georgia proper, gingerly channeled through unoccupied ports at Batumi and Poti. The United States, despite Georgia’s prior support in Iraq, did nothing that could molest Russia’s consolidation of military gains in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (BBC News, 2008). With physical force projection off the table, legitimacy and future cooperation became the main bargaining chips for protecting the Western position against additional Russian claims. As NATO faded, French President Nicolas Sarkozy in his role as President of the EU European Council became the natural choice to lead negotiations.

Sarkozy took full advantage. Without being disloyal to his American NATO ally, he curbed U.S. freedom of action as it suited his purposes. The United States might have urged NATO to do more by lobbying East European and Baltic members, but in short order these countries backed Sarkozy’s softer approach instead, endorsing EU ceasefire talks in September (Economist, 2008; Weiland, 2008). By November, appearing beside Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the eve of a G20 summit to deal with the world financial crisis, Sarkozy declared that Russia had complied with the essentials of the EU ceasefire agreements, that the EU would reengage strategic partnership talks with Russia in early December, that the United States and Russia should participate in EU sponsored talks for a new European security architecture, which would last into 2009, and that neither the United States nor Russia should deploy new missiles, including missile defenses, in Europe before those discussions concluded (Pop, 2008).13

Such developments may in the end be good for the world, but they hardly affirm U.S. global leadership or, for that matter, NATO’s role in spreading democracy (Savodnik, 2009). On the other hand, Russia’s ascendance remains fragile and subject to the world financial crisis and sliding oil prices, a far cry from the unifying threat of the old Soviet Union, and still NATO is unlikely to break up any time soon. The alliance endures in Afghanistan, the Baltic states, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere without a great power enemy.

In short, NATO after Georgia did not unite to pounce on Russia, break up in defeat, or promote democracy in Europe. In this crisis, it was mostly a clearing house.
for transatlantic bargaining. Since basic national security among members was not lacking, the different currencies in play at NATO discussions were desired for their capacity to buy national autonomy. By persuading the rest of Europe, especially Eastern Europe, to husband allocation of legitimacy to the United States, France banked U.S. Navy ships and humanitarian aid while calibrating the Western response to Georgia according to French sensitivities, which hemmed in the United States, and not just Russia.

Europeans of late are trading legitimacy in exchange for access to superior U.S. military assets via NATO institutions (Associated Press, 2009). France’s formal return to the integrated command structure at NATO’s Sixtieth Anniversary in Strasbourg was not inconsistent with this strategy. France, on the way in, collected two leadership posts dedicated to improving force projection: Allied Transformation Command in Norfolk, Virginia and command of the NATO Response Force when it rotates to Lisbon (Larrabee, 2009; Leymarie, 2009).14

Partisan objections within national parliaments notwithstanding, France and other European partners appear to be trading wisely. As the United States transitions to a new presidential administration, the influence of European voices in transatlantic affairs is rising while U.S. autonomy and its capacity to effect change in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq without NATO wane. Again, more multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy may not be a bad development. At the same time, an unending decline in terms of trade for the United States – ever more access to American capability in exchange for smaller grants of European legitimacy – could at some point prompt the United States to exit NATO, just as sharply declining terms of trade might lead a developing country to exit the global economy (Bacevich, 2009; Layne, 2008, 1988).

The long delayed death of NATO would fulfill realist prophesies, but it might soon be mourned by states on both sides of the transatlantic divide.15 Leaving aside the traditional security cooperation and democracy promotion benefits, the dissolution of NATO’s brokerage would mean a loss of efficiency in acquiring autonomy for all concerned.16 Blame for the painful divorce would fall heavily upon the United States because its failure to inspire legitimacy undermined the value of its own export to Europe: dazzling American capability could no longer win sufficient European endorsement to make NATO worthwhile.

**TOWARD MORE CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION**

The notion that individual elements of offensive state power can be assessed as tradable goods among allies has policy as well as theoretical implications. Rules governing the international exchange of goods and services that are rival in consumption have been well established to serve the needs of national authorities
responsible for effective coordination of their economies. For effective coordination of state interests, an application of similar principles to exchanging instruments of power such as grants of legitimacy or deployable forces can help forge a more efficient cooperation.

Focusing on trade occurring in the background as several nations seek to increase their autonomy, the United States’ lack of legitimacy can be analogized to a problem of underdevelopment. Solutions for dealing with famine, for example, are straightforward in the sense that one can anticipate whether they will lead to dependency or recovery. A country suffering severe shortages will seek emergency aid from outsiders to mitigate short-term effects while pursuing development of sustainable, domestically controlled policies aimed at preventing the current crisis from becoming cyclical. It is the ability of the state to substitute its own capacity – if there are no reliable alternate suppliers – that determines whether or not that state will sink into dependency and find itself dominated by the power of outsiders.

In essence, the United States must become a producer rather than a net importer of legitimacy if it is to escape its current crisis and lower animosity levels at NATO. To date, U.S. efforts at containing the cost of acquiring legitimacy, particularly from European allies, have come to naught. European states have neither been shamed into relieving U.S. defense contributions nor cajoled into admitting global partners – read alternative legitimacy suppliers – as new members of NATO.17

It is as if a consumer (the United States) was left to pay more than what was really required by vendors (European states) today in the hope that the vendors would lower prices tomorrow. This kind of pre-paid legitimacy is not in the best interests of the United States or NATO. Yet, voracious demand persists for the European label because of a lack of domestically generated alternatives. The United States should forge its own brand of legitimacy that could reverse a deteriorating market in which the United States is fast becoming an exploited consumer.

Because of its economic and military prominence, the United States is in a decent position to produce legitimacy (Nye, 2004: 267, 270). Visibility and influence are vital resources in international politics that the United States maintains as a comparative advantage. For the United States to gain some control of the legitimacy market, it must adopt salient policies that would bring a positive and measurable global change. Not only must the impact be demonstrable to the United Nations, but it must also avoid being perceived as merely duplicating Europe’s cosmopolitan internationalism. U.S. policy has to outflank the current European oligopoly.

One example of how this might be accomplished is by the United States taking initiative to open up its markets to global competition. While this point is hotly contested in the United States and Europe, it is safe to say that whoever is able to consolidate enough domestic support to bring down agricultural trade barriers will impress a global audience (Timmons, 2008; Barrionuevo, 2005). Here again the
United States, as one sovereign, is in a better position to take this step than its European allies, who, in order to make such a proposition a reality, must consolidate a confederacy of economic interests weighed down by divergent national interests. While opening markets in the United States would be extremely difficult politically, the level of difficulty pales in comparison to the diplomatic labors European states would have to accomplish under the multi-sovereign structure of the EU.

For nearly twenty years, as NATO endured and expanded, realists struggled to find a clear demonstration of their theory in the post-Soviet order. At the heart of realism, there is indeed a story about the pursuit of power, dynamic enough to match the evolving capabilities of states. The Cold War represented a time when hard power for traditional security played a preeminent role in state interaction. Now, the post-Soviet reality has been witness to the rise of soft power for greater autonomy to shape turbulent regions which are geographically but not politically distant from world capitals. Just because the new power is soft, it does not mean that its purposes are always defensive or determined by some international committee, nor that hard power is any less important now.\(^\text{18}\) Legitimacy as a force-multiplier for offensive action prompts modern realists to reexamine the bivalent nature of security as a national interest. The offensive purposes of states to influence their wider environment, particularly in a period when most NATO members have confidence in their basic security, condition international bargaining over complementary resources. Explaining NATO’s persistence in terms of autonomy for member states invigorates ailing concepts from traditional realism, lifts realist theory beyond its post-Soviet doldrums, and suggests policy changes that could ease frustrations in the North Atlantic’s troubled marriage.

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ENDNOTES

\(^\text{1}\) Here, we simplify matters, referring to works from both institutionalist and constructivist perspectives as ‘liberal.’ There are, of course, important distinctions within both liberalism and realism, but we focus on the fault line between realist analyses anchored in the balance of power – overly pessimistic about NATO’s prospects – and those examining the potential for liberal ideas, including responsive institutions and democratic values, to trump old-style power calculations.

\(^\text{2}\) Deni’s (2007) *Alliance Management and Maintenance* analyzed NATO outcomes on force structure and military doctrine for NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs) in terms of state members’ bargaining
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positions. For Deni, some of those positions were highly articulated, using several domestic variables in
order to explain implementation details of the corps. Here, we stick to positions defined in realist terms
– by state power relative to competitors in the system – in order to examine NATO’s persistence along
with notable limits on NATO cooperation.

 Each sovereign state’s desire to be free from domination by others is a basic, or ‘foundational,’ concept
for different schools within realism. Our aim is to lay out a plausible explanation of NATO’s endurance
that rests on realism’s common foundation: states wielding power to assure their own security (Brooks
and Wohlforth, 2008; Mearsheimer, 2001).

 For a recent analysis that embraces multiple theoretical perspectives at once, see Betts (2009). In our
view, Betts properly acknowledges evidence of the liberal gentleman’s club and a realist alliance strug-
gling to gauge the threat from out-of-area crises in places like the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan,
as well as from a resurgence of its original great power foe. Yet, the Three Faces of Eve split personality
analogy misses the important action we highlight here: an increasing share of intra-NATO bargaining
recalls the rough-and-tumble, open-air bazaar of another classic American movie – Casablanca.

 We follow Palmer and Morgan (2006) in their criticism of conventional realism, but we impose geo-
graphic specificity to their ‘two goods’ of maintenance and change in the international status quo. For
us, change is an expression of state autonomy which occurs abroad and consumes two basic inputs:
force projection capabilities and political capital in the form of legitimacy granted by other states.

 With regard to our broad brush in labeling theories, a socialization mechanism to bring about identity
transformation in East European states sounds like constructivism rather than liberal institutionalism, but
when it comes to understanding NATO, these schools of thought often merge. From the introduction
of Imperfect Unions (Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, 1999), in the institutionalist vein, ‘Institu-
tions play a role in security relations by affecting states cost-benefit calculations... by inducing confor-
mity to established conventions and norms; and even, in the long run, by altering how societies view their
interests and the mandates that states have to act in world politics’ (p. 1).

 The member states having ‘little to fear from a security standpoint’ is our own judgment. It is consistent
with the modest defense budgets among most European NATO members, measured as a percentage
of GDP. It is also consistent with conventional wisdom on the very low likelihood of another war between
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. However, our reviewers pointed out that not every analyst
buys this assumption, and plausible, realist explanations for NATO’s endurance as a ‘tethering’ alliance
to keep Europe from re-fragmenting into rival centers of power may arise if Europe is, in fact, far less se-
cure than it appears today (Yost, 2002; Weitsman, 1997).

 As transatlantic specialist Julian Lindley-French (2006–2007) put it after the Riga Summit, ‘NATO is
thus part of a new transatlantic “contract” in which Europeans “minimize” the very considerable risks
they face in the world, in return for legitimizing American-led structural interventions when Europeans
so agree.’

 Here again, we simplify in order to emphasize a mechanism generating transatlantic frictions, a major
policy concern for the largest, most powerful NATO member. In principle, a similar trade could take
place between differently situated European states, or between states dealing in economic as well as military instruments for international influence. See the chapters by Jens van Scherpenberg and Kathleen McNamara in Anderson, Ikenberry, and Risse (2008). Glenn Snyder (1990) described a range of intra-alliance bargains, especially during conditions of multipolarity, that could set the contract terms, or price, for members’ commitment in the event of future peril. The strategic considerations were quite similar to those attending peacetime trade among rivals (Morrow, 1997).

12 Moravcsik (2003) seized on the complementary nature of American and European instruments of power as the basis for a new transatlantic bargain. For us, the bargain will be struck under somewhat harsher terms since we expect divergent national objectives to persevere despite some broad common interests for the West after 9/11.

13 See the contrary views that Russia has not complied with the EU ceasefire agreements from the U.S. Atlantic Council (Smith, 2009; Hamilton et al., 2009: 18–19).

14 Interestingly, University of Leicester scholar Adrian Hyde-Price (2007: 89) previously cited two commands, Allied Command Transformation and the NATO Response Force, as important levers in the U.S. ‘toolbox’ for enhancing its power over Europe. Both commands now belong to France.

15 For insightful analyses on NATO endurance as a public good, see Lepgold (1998) and Beer (1972). We follow their framework, attributing NATO’s internal crises to ‘frustrated private benefit expectations’ of individual members (Beer, 1972: 31). At the same time, we introduce a new private benefit – autonomy as a rising consideration in members’ national interest after the Cold War – and a new public good – the NATO brokerage that facilitates exchange between grants of legitimacy and force projection capability – which remained unspecified in the previous collective action models.

16 In the aftermath of the intra-European rift over Iraq, Jolyon Howorth (2003–2004) argued that France and Britain, on the basis of their private interest, would regret any severe damage to either the EU or NATO, even though their hard bargaining on behalf of private interest strained both alliances as an unintended consequence. Sandler and Hartley (1999) provided a more detailed analysis of the ‘public’ benefits of traditional alliances, but compared to Howorth, we believe they underestimated the presence of private interest.


18 For a well-established opposing perspective, see Keohane and Nye (1989: 20–25).

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International Relations at the Movies: Teaching and Learning about International Politics through Film

STEFAN ENGERT, ALEXANDER SPENCER

Abstract: For mainstream Political Science, ‘popular culture’ is still not considered worthy of serious investigation. Similarly, the idea of using movies as a pedagogical tool has remained at the margins. Nevertheless, film can be a valuable means of teaching university students about politics and international politics in particular. This paper identifies four distinct ways of using movies as a teaching tool: the first approach uses film to portray historical events such as the Cold War, and the second utilizes film to debate specific issues in international politics such as terrorism or genocide. The third approach examines movies as cultural narratives – e.g. anti-Americanism in Turkey –, while the fourth uses film to explain and critique IR theories (here, for example, Post-Modernism is discussed with the help of the movie Pulp Fiction). The article examines the strengths and weaknesses of using film in the IR classroom in general and illustrates each of the four approaches by using examples from movies.

Key words: international relations, learning, theory, film, visual turn

‘I stand upon my desk to remind myself that we must constantly look at things in a different way.’
(John Keating in Dead Poets Society)

INTRODUCTION
‘Images’ in International Relations (IR) have become increasingly important. Regardless of whether one believes in the dawn of a ‘pictorial turn’ (Mitchell, 1994) or an ‘aesthetic turn’ (Bleiker, 2001) in the field of IR, very few people would refute that our knowledge about the world is predominantly shaped by the powerful visual representations in newspapers and television. Even the cinema has become, or maybe always has been, a potent form of political communication. Nonetheless, the idea of using popular art in the form of films to explain/understand and teach international politics is still at the margins in IR. This is surprising as the idea of using
film in the classroom is by no means new or uncommon (Haney 2000: 238). One of the first scholars to note the possibilities of film in the teaching of political science was John D. Millett (1947) just after the Second World War. But even this early, Millet (1947: 526) realized that ‘there is little advantage in employing a film simply to photograph a classroom lecture’. So there is more to it than just plugging in the VCR or rather the DVD player to fill some of the time of the lesson and let the film do the teaching. Since the late 1940s others have also noted the potential of the idea. In the 1970s Patrick O’Meara claimed that ‘the use of the film is not only a challenging new direction within political science, but also one of vital future relevance and promise’ (O’Meara, 1976: 220). And two years later, Charles Funderburk (1978: 111) wrote that ‘the use of feature-length motion pictures in the classroom is a teaching resource of considerable potential for political scientists’. ‘Cinematic IR’ has become increasingly popular (Holden, 2006) and it is now firmly established that ‘popular culture has much to offer to our contemporary understanding of international relations’ (Debrix, 2005: 553). As we will see, there are a number of scholars who have specialized in the subject, and among these, there are some who focus specifically on the opportunity of using popular art in the teaching of international politics.

The article will be structured as follows: The first two parts will review the existing literature on film and IR and examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of using film and movies as a method of teaching in general. This will then be followed by an overview of the different ways of using film. Although the possibilities of using movies as a pedagogical tool for teaching university students are nearly limitless, we have identified four major ways in which films have been used in the past: the ways of events, issues, cultures and theories. Although this kind of classification is artificial and there are obviously overlaps, we believe that it can nevertheless be helpful for teachers in framing their own teaching objectives. As will be made clear in the article, the four approaches differ with regard to their understanding of political science: The first two approaches are represented by scholars such as Robert Gregg (1998), Lynn Kuzma and Patrick Haney (2001) and are influenced somewhat by a more positivist view of International Relations (IR), which believes that a real world exists which can be investigated from the outside with ‘scientific’ means in order to establish an unbiased and real truth. The first approach focuses on the explanations of certain historical events such as the Cold War while the second approach examines specific issues of IR such as war, terrorism or genocide. Following this, the article will investigate two more post-positivist understandings of using movies to teach international politics. These approaches, exemplified by scholars such as Jutta Weldes (2003) and Cynthia Weber (2005), are based on the assumption that inter-subjective, not objective, knowledge is the dominant form of discourse. Here, the paper briefly outlines the potential of film for the understanding
of cultures and then focuses on IR theories by using the film Pulp Fiction as an example with which to illustrate and critique post-modern approaches to IR.

AH ... I SEE! THE ADVANTAGES OF USING MOVIES IN THE IR CLASS

The use of movies does have some clear advantages, and students of IR do potentially benefit from the use of film in the IR classroom. For example, it is widely accepted as scientific knowledge that the human memory stores information in both a visual and an oral form and that a combination of both cognitive capacities helps people access, learn and then remember information (Champoux, 1999; Kuzma/Haney, 2001: 34): ‘Students retain 10% of what they read, [but] 50% of what they see and hear’ (Stice, 1987, cited in Powner and Allendoerfer, 2008: 77). We have to accept the contemporary student’s affinity for visual stimulation: they get their information and ideas about the world in a visual fashion through television and the internet and have been socialized through all sorts of visual channels. It is therefore inevitable that the perceptions and information from films enter the classroom whether we like it or not (Lee, 1990: 96). It seems that young people in general and students in particular have become inherently good at dealing with visual material. It therefore makes sense to consider the use of such material in class in order to facilitate the teaching and learning of international politics.

For Robert Gregg (1999: 129) movies and films help students learn and enhance their knowledge about international politics as they constitute a ‘window on the world’. Showing a movie in class provides a common reference point to which all participants can refer in order to make their arguments, points and views clear for the other members of the class (Sachleben/Yenerall, 2002). After seeing the movie, it can act as a kind of empirical case study as everyone in the class is then familiar with it, and thus it can provide the ‘hook’ with which to open a class discussion (Waalkes, 2003: 156).

At the same time films can make challenging abstract concepts, ideas and theories such as deterrence, terrorism or neo-liberalism more concrete, thereby making students ‘see’ and understand the issues involved (Lovell, 1998; O’Meara, 1976: 219). Students get an insight into issues which they have little experience of and would otherwise not encounter in their normal life (Waalkes, 2003: 169–170). Events seem more ‘real’ and relevant in movies as they can show events and issues more vividly than the printed word (Haney, 2000: 240; Kuzma/Haney, 2001: 35). They dramatize an event or idea by bringing a human face to even the seemingly most mundane issues in international politics (Hartlaub, 2001: 431; Giglio, 2002). A movie can lead to a personal identification with a political actor and help students to step into their shoes. Thereby they are led to empathize, consider the scope of manoeuvre the actors involved may have and reflect on the choices as well as on the
This personalization, this dramatization and this kind of visual confrontation with political and sometimes violent issues and theories dealing with war and peace inevitably create a certain level of emotion among students (Cracium, 2004). For one, these emotions lead to a higher level of attention and some have argued that emotions have a large influence on students' learning ability as they help imprint information in their memory (Kuzma/Haney, 2001: 35). These emotions evoke enthusiasm, encourage class participation and, without doubts, have the potential to provide the means for animated class debates and discussions (Funderburk, 1978: 111; Leib, 2000: 1).

As students are familiar with movies and are used to talking openly about films, movies can also work as a ‘levelling device’ between the teacher and the students (Chandler/Adams, 1997: 12). They seemingly readjust the power structures and reduce the stringent hierarchy which can impede class discussion and privilege the learning over the teaching component. The positive effect of familiarity with movies is further underlined by the use of science fiction movies as metaphors for political events, issues or theories. In contrast to clearly political films where students may be more reserved about their comments, students seem to be more comfortable in participating in a discussion and hypothesizing about the meaning of a metaphorical movie as there is no right or wrong interpretation (Cooper, 2002; Webber, 2005: 381).

PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES OF TEACHING IR AT THE MOVIES

In contrast to the advantages and benefits mentioned above, there are also a number of difficulties and objections to using films in the classroom which need to be discussed and taken into consideration. Firstly, there are technical and logistical issues which need to be taken into consideration when planning such a course. For example, the seminar room has to be suitable for showing movies and all the necessary technical equipment (DVD player, projector, loudspeakers, etc.) has to be arranged and working before things can get on the way. Although this may sound obvious, these aspects are easily underestimated as we found out, for example, that some copy protection software on older DVDs prevented them from being played via a laptop. One should also be aware of copyright aspects and the legal questions of private/public performance which may arise through showing the movie in class.

Apart from these technical and administrative difficulties, there are a number of other (more fundamental) questions which arise when considering the use of movies in the IR classroom. For example there is the ‘trade-off between the time spent watching a film and the instructor’s ability to cover the course content’
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(Kuzma/Haney, 2001: 46). Teachers have to decide whether it is worth it to show the whole film in class, whether to make students watch the film outside of class or whether to simply show short clips or scenes to highlight certain events, issues or theories (Sachleben/Yanerall, 2002: 3). On the one hand one could argue that there is probably a lot of irrelevant material in a whole movie which does not help in the understanding of the event, issue or theory and therefore wastes valuable discussion time (O’Meara, 1976: 215). On the other hand, however, by only showing certain clips, the instructor is explicitly pre-selecting certain issues and is therefore reducing the amount of critical thinking the students have to do to identify aspects that they consider to be of importance.

On the student level, movies can have two negative effects which both represent the extremes of the spectrum. On the one side they may become little more than passive, merely consuming observers, as students are used to seeing movies and films as entertainment and as a way to relax from the stresses of university life (O’Meara, 1976: 219; Waalkes, 2003: 158). On the other hand students can become too emotionally involved with the topic of the film. Some authors have pointed out that extreme emotions such as fear and anger can reduce the viewers’ attention and hinder the learning process, as they prevent critical and thoughtful reflections on the subject (Haney, 2000: 241). As Allen (1998) points out in this respect, it is impossible to guess what students have been through in their life and the emotional baggage they bring to class. It thus might be useful to discuss certain aspects of the film with the students in advance or prepare with them a common list of guiding questions or issues which would help them to focus on the original research interest while watching.

One of the main arguments against using movies in the IR classroom is that they are simply not made for teaching IR. With respect to IR theory Gregg (1998: 10) argues that movies do not explicitly champion a certain theory. At the same time certain theoretical components are found more often than others. For example, ‘realist’ assumptions have been very dominant in movies about international politics. Similarly, movies generally only deal with certain things while they almost totally neglect other very important issues of international politics (Gregg, 1999). ‘Conflict sells’: movies predominantly focus on exciting things such as war or a violent crisis rather than on international economics, international law or international organizations despite their vital importance for international politics. Even when focusing on one political issue such as war, genocide or terrorism, movies are mainly about death, destruction, heroism and physical and psychological anguish. They do not tend to explore the causes of the conflict or the consequence for international politics. ‘The result is a picture of the puzzle of international relations from which important pieces are missing or seriously underrepresented’ (Gregg, 1998: 9). Movies therefore have to be selected carefully and prepared in accordance with the course objectives.
A number of scholars have argued that many movies are not really suited to teach students about international political events as they oversimplify and revise history and thereby give a distorted view of international politics (cf. Gregg, 1999: 129). Historical figures and events are reinvented to fit the plot of the movie and ‘[m]ore often than not Hollywood gets it all wrong. Students need to be reminded that the movie industry is in the entertainment business and not in the business of manufacturing historical documents’ (Giglio, 2002). As films rarely last longer than two and a half hours, they have to condense history, they heighten the drama, and they portray individual characters as being representative of a whole category of people. Every film is a necessary simplification and condensation of events no matter how complex and intricate the storyline may be (Berenson, 1996: 514).

Accordingly movies are inherently biased and always express a clear and distinct viewpoint no matter how value-free they present themselves to be (O’Meara, 1976: 216). Apart from a personal, maybe aesthetic, bias, there is also a certain more general Western or Eurocentric bias as most movies used in IR classes are likely to have been produced for the European or American market as well as by Western film studios in Hollywood, Berlin or London (Gregg, 1998: 7). As will be seen in the following parts of the article, other authors, however, believe that subjectivism is not so much a problem but a benefit. For example, Lee (1990: 104) argues that ‘[i]n some cases, even defects can become positive resources for teaching’. As we will show in sections three and four, openly questioning and critically analysing the background behind a certain perspective or narrative (here: culture or theory) is an important thing for students to learn. Therefore, highlighting certain ‘inaccuracies’ or biases can lead students to critically question the issues raised in the film and examine the fundamental and often implicit power structures of the movie as well as those in international politics.

APPROACHES TO USING FILM IN IR: UNDERSTANDING EVENTS, ISSUES AND CULTURES

There are four distinct ways of utilizing film in the International Relations classroom. All of them are interconnected and most films can be used as examples to illustrate certain points in all four approaches. This section will illustrate three of the four approaches and concentrate on illustrating how films can be used in the classroom to teach events in international politics, issues of importance in international relations and cultural identities and narratives.

The first approach, which focuses on events, represents a more traditional way of utilizing film in class. Here the film or movie is simply used to give students information on a specific event or historical period and the movie takes over the role of providing a kind of lecture. The approach is usually not suitable for teaching a whole
course but is commonly used at all levels as a device for supplementing the normal seminar readings. Most of the time this includes documentaries on historical time periods which shaped world politics such as the famous and Academy Award winning documentary *Fog of War* on the events of the Cold War and *Hearts and Minds, Winter Soldier, or Sir! No Sir!* for the Vietnam War.

A little bit more adventurous and therefore facing the threat of being called unscientific is the use of popular movies rather than documentaries. Such (partially) invented stories may have the advantage of automatically avoiding the suspicion of being identified as impartial, correct, or objective (hi)stories. Nonetheless, Oliver Stone’s award-winning movie *JFK* (on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas) is a prominent example of a highly acclaimed movie persuasively narrating a ‘correct history’. Yet, providing the audience with high quality, accurate historical information is not the primary aim of such films. As popular films are made for entertainment and financial success at the box office, the choice and availability of themes and histories in the events approach that can be discussed in class are somewhat limited as wars and conflicts dominate much of the historical filmmaking (Giglio, 2005; Gianos, 1998; Pollard, 2002). In this context, it becomes quite obvious that movies also serve political purposes and either reflect a dominant national interpretation of an event or are used by the political elites to create a certain narrative of an event – in both ways, the instructor has to be aware of the fact that the events approach has a heavy subjectivist bias. For example, despite their aesthetic quality, the Vietnam movies *Apocalypse Now, Platoon,* and *Full Metal Jacket* are by their very nature partial and over-exaggerated. In order to perform a useful function, we hence argue that event movies work best if they are embedded within an analytical or theoretical framework. For example, one could use Roger Donaldson’s film *Thirteen Days* to introduce students to the historical circumstances of the Cuban Missiles Crises in 1962, the height of the Cold War. The movie is, however, solely a US narrative of that event – the Soviet perspective is totally absent and performs the function of the ‘Other’. In order to escape the ‘subjectivity trap’ of the events approach, a more fruitful way of turning the movie into a valuable contribution to be used in the classroom is to embed it within an analytical framework, e. g. deterrence theory and Graham T. Allison’s and Philip D. Zelikow’s (1999) ground-breaking analysis ‘The Essence of Decision’, in order to grasp the superpower-logic of the Cold War. In addition to documentaries and movies, one might even turn to fictions, which, of course, never have the intention to serve ‘visual history telling’, but which nonetheless do so. A rather exotic example which nicely adds to *Thirteen Days* or *The Fog of War* is *Star Trek VI* (cf. Weldes, 1999), a science fiction movie about the Iron Curtain coming down in outer space in the 23rd century. The 1991 movie also lends itself to a social-constructivist framework of analysis by investigating the (de-)construction of enemy images (cf. Weller, 1992; Fiebig-von Hase/Lehmkuhl, 1997).
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Obviously there is a clear overlap between examining historical events and analysing issues of importance for international relations. As Dan Lindley (2001: 663) points out, he not only uses the film classic Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb to teach about the history of the Cold War but he also uses it ‘as a springboard to discuss deterrence, mutually assured destruction, pre-emption, the security dilemma, arms races, relative versus absolute gains concerns, Cold War misperceptions and paranoia, and civil-military relations’ and places these in their historical context in the process. There are a number of scholars who follow this model and choose ‘films which dealt with very specific political themes’ (Sanchez, 1976: 94) to teach international politics courses. Some, such as Robert Gregg (1998, 1999), focus on issues in ‘International Relations’ while others, such as Kuzma and Haney (2001), Haney (2000) or Gerner (1988-89), examine issues in ‘Foreign Policy’. Here Gregg (1998) focuses on issues such as sovereignty; nationalism; civil strife; subversion; decision-making; war; economic interdependence and development; ethics and international law; the clash of cultures and the domestic roots of IR. In contrast Kuzma and Haney (2001) focus on McCarthyism; deterrence; the Berlin Wall; Glasnost; Covert Operations; presidential and congressional powers in foreign policy; and State Department and Foreign Service Officers, as well as the War Powers Act.

There is a vast number of different issues which play an important role in movies and at the same time are important issues in international politics. For example, the topics of genocide and forced displacement could be illustrated with the help of Hotel Rwanda, Star Trek IX or The Killing Fields. Some films even exemplify two or more topics, e. g. Blood Diamond, which is suitable for the discussion of new wars, the role of private military companies, and the effectiveness of new forms of governance such as the ‘Kimberley Process’ to control the export of conflict diamonds. One issue of international politics that has so far been neglected but seems predestined to be the subject of IR film classes is terrorism (Bloggs/Pollard, 2006). One of the very first movies to deal with the topic of terrorism was Alfred Hitchcock’s film Sabotage in 1936, which was the film version of Joseph Conrad’s 1907 book The Secret Agent (Davies, 2003). In a fairly early text on the topic, Walter Laqueur (1987), one of the leading terrorism experts, examined the potential of gaining insight from films on terrorism. He, however, was sceptical about the genre, believing that it had little future in the film industry, and more recently, others have also questioned the use of movies in teaching about terrorism (Miller, 2006). Nevertheless, we believe that there is a vast number of other films which could be used to highlight and reflect upon some of the issues surrounding terrorism (cf. Slocum, 2005; Fröhlich et al., 2008; Spencer, 2008).

In sum, the main problem with regard to the events and issues approaches is that students often take documentaries as ‘correct histories’, i.e. as the narrative of a par-
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ticular event (objectivism) rather than as one individual viewpoint or perspective among others. But no matter how ‘perfectly’ a documentary is directed or how acclaimed it is by film critics, the national film academy or the scientific community, all documentaries are inherently subjective. Moreover, they (necessarily) oversimplify and condense history (cf. Berenson, 1996: 514). By their very nature, documentaries are considered very persuasive as they successfully create the illusion of an ‘unfiltered […] access to reality’ (Trinh, 1991, cited in: Denzin, 2000: 410). In addition, students often fall into a ‘consumer trap’ and display a tendency to simply watch the movie and thereby lose their ability to maintain a critical distance from what they ‘see’.

The third approach to using film in the classroom is concerned with movies as a cultural narrative of the ‘self’. Authors such as Gregg (1998) and Kuzma and Haney (2001) (mentioned above) assumed that films reflect real events and provide a more or less objective visual representation of the world ‘out there’. Movies were understood as a simple and easy opportunity to gain access to the ‘reality’ of (hi)stories and topics of world politics. However, some argue that there is no such thing as an ‘unproblematic window on the world’ (Holden, 2006: 807). Post-Structuralists state that there is no direct observation of reality, objective reflection of history, or sole ‘correct’ account of an event. The world of politics and political science and the world of film making and popular culture do not exist independently of each other – not even fiction is outside of the cultural, social, or political spheres of reproduction (Weldes, 1999, 2001; Debrix, 2005: 553). For example, a director will always be influenced by his/her ideological, national or ethnic background as well as by his/her gender, class or family (Denzin, 2000: 417). The ‘real’ is therefore always inter-textual, an image of the world among many other images that claim to adequately represent the world. Movies are neither objective nor culturally neutral texts, but socially constructed transcripts of ‘reality’: inherently subjective, equally valid, and, most of all, culturally bound stories. The ‘second hand model of reality’ consequently regards films as visual representations of various ‘selves’ rather than as searches for the one or the true story. Within such a framework, the subjectivity inherited in movies is not a ‘mistake’, but a crucial advantage that allows us to develop an ‘epistemology of perspectives’ (Denzin, 2000: 422). In being aware of their inter-textual bias, one can look at movies as an important tool for understanding particular cultural narratives of events or topics: the mutual constitution of the aesthetic and international politics (cf. Holden, 2006: 801, 807). Here, popular culture is the product and the cause of international politics. In order to take into account this ‘bias’, one has to accept that all movies are context-bound and filtered by the director’s lens, the historical context, and budget restrictions, as well as by the expectations and interpretations of the audience. The critical view allows for the understanding of films as specific, individual versions of truth – a film is a visual representation of a re-
ality in which the images provide meaning to a particular historical view. See, for example, Cynthia Weber’s (2006) analysis of the construction of American identity and US foreign policy reflected in popular film culture after 9/11. The main problem of this third approach is one of cultural representativeness. If we can gain access to diverse cultural narratives via a supplementary reading of these images, i.e. by biased but nonetheless valuable insiders’ views of history, how do we know that the individual perspective provides us with a better understanding of collective concepts such as cultures, times, or peoples? In short, how can we protect ourselves from analysing completely extreme, absurd or ‘invalid’ stories? Is there a criterion for untruth? Of course, the radical constructivist answer is ‘We cannot and we need not!’ Already posing such questions is wrong; this creates artificial categories through which we (seemingly) separate the valid from the non-valid, truth from non-truth, or science from non-science. It is exactly the belief in the principled equality of truths and the benefit of ‘the margins’ which will tell us much more about histories and the power-relations written into narratives than the mainstream or the broader focus. However, there is also a more moderate, slightly positivist-like possible answer: Taking into account the reaction of the audience will help us to better understand the social-cultural context. Most films touch people emotionally as they reflect cultural values and historical meanings, i.e. a particular image of truth (cf. Denzin, 2000: 426). Hence, the more a film hits an audience’s nerve, the greater its success at the box-office will be. And the more successful a film is (measured in box office takings), the higher the probability that it is a representative (rather than a marginal) narrative of the identity or values of a particular country.

A good example of a film which illustrates an interesting and very particular cultural narrative is Valley of the Wolves: Iraq (hereafter VWI) – with three million viewers in its first two weeks, Turkey’s most successful movie production of all times. The 2006 film about the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 portrays the US as an evil country as well as the Other of the Turkish nation.1 As Washington and Ankara have been strategic allies for over 50 years (Redmond/Pace, 1996: 438), the successful domestic reception of the Other image is puzzling. Whilst any positivist would criticize that VWI is – apart from the linkages to the Abu Greibh prison scandal – not an objective movie about the ‘real’ criminals in Iraq (the dictatorial Baath regime of Saddam Hussein) but tells an imagined and hence ‘false’ story by portraying the US soldiers as the bad guys (as conceited criminals lustig for power), the post-positivist would point out that exactly such inter-subjective or seemingly ‘absurd’ views tell us valuable ‘truths’ about Turkey’s interpretation of the post-9/11 events. VWI hence helps us to understand the contemporary Turkish mind-set. The negative image of the US goes hand in hand with what the majority of the Turkish people perceive as an ‘arrogant’ unilateral policy of the US that ignored Ankara’s regional sensitivities and feelings of security in 2003. Together
with other examples from Turkey’s popular literature (Uçar/Turna, 2004), the film suggests that the anti-American Zeitgeist portrayed in the movie is not an absurd or marginal interpretation but that it reflects a dominant reading of the US image in Turkey. Thus, popular culture (here movies) can indeed be a valuable tool for students and researchers for understanding the role of political narratives in international politics and changes in political cultures. The film was well received also among the Turkish political elite. For example, Bülent Arinç, the President of the Turkish National Assembly, praised it with the words ‘In a word, it is great. It follows the historical facts to the letter’. Therefore, one might also analyse whether the constructions in popular discourse constitute ‘realities’ and eventually affect Turkish foreign policy preferences towards the US in ‘real’ life (cf. Katzenstein/Keohane, 2007: 276).

Within this third approach movies could be used to compare cultural narratives and display changes over time. For example, the change of the US perspective on the use of torture before and after 9/11 is displayed in Edward Zwick’s 1998 movie The Siege (cf. Wilkins/Dowing 2002), which clearly condemns torture, and the highly popular US television series ’24’, focusing on a fictional counter-terrorist unit of the US government, which has fuelled a domestic debate on whether torture is not a legitimate means to prevent terrorist attacks (Erickson, 2008). Moreover, the sole example of one event (here the World War II battle over the Japanese island Iwo Jima) being complementarily portrayed from two viewpoints in popular films is that of Clint Eastwood’s movies Flags of our Fathers (the US perspective) and Letters from Iwo Jima (the Japanese angle).

TEACHING IR THEORY WITH THE HELP OF MOVIES

The preceding parts of this article have examined the possibilities of using films to teach certain events, issues, or cultures in IR. In this section we want to outline a fourth approach and examine the potential of using movies to teach IR theories. This approach has been introduced by Cynthia Weber (2001, 2005), who connects the illustrative aspect of movies with a critical perspective. Others have followed this interest in combining popular culture with IR theories. For example, Hulsman and Mitchell (2009) use the movie The Godfather to illustrate different American foreign policy perspectives, and Ruane and James (2008) use Lord of the Rings to relay the theoretical debates in IR. Due to a lack of space, we have decided to follow Cynthia Weber’s approach and concentrate in the following on one theory per film, in our case post-modernist theory and Pulp Fiction, rather than applying a range of theories to the same movie.

Weber examines ‘how IR theories appear to be true’ (Weber, 2001: 281) and analyses how the film and the theory make sense of the world and what they both
portray as normal or deviant in their worlds. Although movies were never intended as IR theory teaching tools, they generally (explicitly or implicitly) make use of the same meta-theoretical assumptions about the world and the nature of the actors in it as IR theories. Films portray a certain interpretation of how the world works – for example, they follow a logic of consequentiality, a logic of appropriateness or both (cf. Risse, 2000; March/Olsen, 1989, 1998). One of the main strengths of such an approach is that students are ‘forced’ to apply the theories to a much less self-evident object of study. Theories are scientific constructs, and as such they can be much better understood and their explanatory strengths and weaknesses can be much better uncovered if they are applied to a world which is as obviously artificially constructed as the theory itself, such as the world we encounter in a movie. To attain a better grasp of the theories’ main assumptions and to become able to critically evaluate their ontological or epistemological underpinnings, it is helpful to re-direct the centre of attention away from the ‘usual suspects’ (empirical politics and policies) to a rather unfamiliar setting (the world of fiction). This could lead to a deeper understanding of and more critical thinking about the theories’ potential and limits. In our view, a good starting point is to identify in advance the respective theory’s main assumptions in order to help students focus on the selection of scenes which display the diverse ‘bits and pieces’ of the theoretical approach.

EXAMPLE: PULP FICTION AND POST-MODERN IR THEORIES

Identifying the core elements of Post-Modern IR theories (cf. Campbell, 2007: 225) is an intricate task, in particular as this school of thought by definition questions the usage and usefulness of labels. We will start with describing very briefly what we consider some of the main ideas of post-modern thought in IR before discussing some of its elements in greater detail with examples taken from the movie *Pulp Fiction*.

Post-modern (or post-structuralist) theories give language a central role. The world is understood as a discursive (social) construction, which acquires meaning only through exchange of speech acts: The agents (as well as the political scientists) are an indivisible part of the discursive context and at the same time (re-)produce these structures linguistically. Reality hence cannot exist outside discourse and must be understood ‘from within’ (Hollis/Smith, 1991: 72); its analysis always requires an abstraction or interpretation (Campbell, 2007: 204). Being aware of the manifold interpretations of reality, post-modern theories subscribe to the idea of *multiple truths* (cf. Foucault, 2002 [1969]). This worldview contrasts sharply with that of the positivist mainstream, where truth is viewed as an ‘objective’ fact. By contrast, post-modern theories believe that truth is inherently subjective (given its interpretative na-
theory) or inter-textual (dependent on a particular discourse). Thus, they are convinced that a final version of truth – a so-called master-narrative (cf. Lyotard, 1984) – cannot and should not exist. However, this does not mean that post-modern theory is totally indifferent to truth or that it has an arbitrary attitude towards science. Rather, it is aware that knowledge is always linked with power and – in order to be regarded as ‘valid’ – must conform to the ruling societal canons of meaning, which define which thoughts are admissible and which are not (Steans/Pettiford, 2005: 130; Smith, 1997: 181). In other words post-modern theories are hyper-critical of any accounts that present themselves as ‘objective’ whilst dismissing or excluding alternative accounts as trivial, marginal, or ‘false’ (cf. Diez, 2006). Their common concern is to undermine the hegemonic discourses by exposing the textual interplays and hidden assumptions through which power relations are sustained and (re-)produced (cf. Derrida, 1976). This method is called deconstruction (Diez, 2006): the reading of a text’s sense (its contents and linguistics) and the reading of the text’s hidden message, i.e. the so-called knowledge/power-nexus. This includes analysing what is written and what is not said or written (Campbell, 2007: 216–218) as the latter may have become trivialized or silenced by the use of ‘binary oppositions’ such as self/other, central/marginal, truth/falsity, or science/non-science (Steans/Pettiford, 2005: 130).

As ‘there is always more than one reading of any text’ (Smith, 1997: 182), the analysis usually also involves a re-interpretation of the events from an – according to the mainstream – unconventional or dissident perspective that is incompatible with the dominant ways of reference (Diez, 2006).

In the following we want to consider this theoretical understanding in the movie Pulp Fiction. Pulp Fiction (PF) is a 1994 film directed by Quentin Tarantino. Its reception at the box office was huge as it grossed about 210 million USD while having been produced on a budget of only 8 million USD. In addition, the film was highly acclaimed by the critics and won the Oscar for ‘Best Screenplay’ as well as the Golden Palm at the Cannes Film Festival. The movie is hence distinctively not what its title or the first word of its title (‘pulp’) claims it is: rubbish or a trash movie with ‘a lurid subject matter’ (PF 0:18). Already in its beginning, the film thus deliberately tries to blur the boundaries between ‘high’ and ‘low’ art.³

PF is frequently cited as a prime example of the post-modern cinema in an aesthetic sense (Steans/Pettiford, 2005: 137). Its unconventional multiple narrative structure breaks with the tradition of linear storytelling and is therefore difficult to summarize: The overall plot is told in three parallel accounts or major storylines (The Bonnie Situation, The Gold Watch, and Vincent Vega and Marcellus Wallace’s Wife), which are, however, eclectically narrated in seven sequences (!). In the end, the whole story is resolved in the final coffee shop scene (The Diner), which is, however, also the movie’s beginning or prologue. ‘Pulp Fiction has a circular narrative [...] it shifts and rewinds, forcing the viewer to construct the story [...]’ (Villella, 2000).

³
director, Quentin Tarantino, himself explicitly noted: ‘[Y]ou can tell it in any way you want. It’s not just, you have to tell it linearly. [...] Pulp Fiction would [then] be dramatically less interesting’ (cited in Winnefeld, 2006: 7).

Although there is a large number of different issues of post-modernism to focus on in the film, the following part will concentrate on three aspects: firstly, Tarantino’s dissident reading of violence, secondly, his homage to dialogue and the constitutive role of language in PF, i.e. the various ways the speech-acts of the characters (re-)produce a violent world, and finally, how the idea of multiple truths relates to a possible criticism of post-modern theories in IR as having an arbitrary understanding of science/quality.

PF offers a dissident perspective on violence and has been largely criticized for its excessive and – from a mainstream point of view – politically incorrect display of brutality (Ebert, 2001). But quite contrary to glamorizing violence, PF tries to make violence totally ridiculous. The film is a cartoon: its world and its actors are per definition un-realistic, exaggerated, and weird as according to Tarantino (1994), the sole use of the violence in PF is to entertain. In this respect, the movie does not want to be taken seriously; it does not want to paint a ‘true’ account of the world. PF is a neo-noir movie: Everything brutal is covered under a large blanket of black humor, sarcasm, and irony. Tarantino’s disproportionate use of violence aims at ‘disturbing’ and de-constructing the artificial ‘good/bad cop’ categories. For example, the two hitmen, Vincent and Jules (played by John Travolta and Samuel L. Jackson) cannot be pigeon-holed: They are somewhat but not totally unsympathetic, but they do not clearly belong to the dark side either. Moreover, none of the killings after the introductory ‘kids scene’ at the beginning (PF 13:48–20:15) are premeditated – they all happen by chance. None of the homicides are thus meant to create fear or suspense, which would be the typical function in every ‘serious’ mainstream action movie. Accordingly, it’s not the spectacle (the action) that is central in PF but the dialogue. During the whole movie, Tarantino makes use of humorous conversations in order to decrease the negative effects of the violent pictures (Winnefeld, 2006: 15–16). See, for example, the gangsters’ shallow ‘chit chats’ about everyday matters (Villella, 2000) such as the ‘little differences’ between the US and Europe (PF 7:35) or the dangers inherent in foot massages (PF 8:30–13:00). Under ‘normal’ circumstances, the harmless dialogues would contrast sharply with the evil events. PF, however, is not an action movie such as Rambo or Terminator in which the main characters say very little. PF is a celebration of language. It is a ‘novel converted into a motion picture’ (Tarantino, 1994), in which people – unfortunately, but consistently – get killed during and in-between discourse.

So language has a central role in PF and is inherently linked to violence: it is constitutive for the agents and structure. The vulgar, aggressive, and violent verbal
communication mirrors how the agents understand and construct their world. Violence is absolutely ‘normal’ in PF as all the characters have either a totally agnostic or a supportive attitude towards violence. ‘Violence’ is – so to speak – the ‘mainstream’, i.e. the ‘usual’ or ‘ordinary’, in this world: Nobody cares for not manipulating boxing wagers (PF 22:26), earning one’s living honestly (PF 2:33), and respecting physical integrity or fairness in sports (PF 1h11:11). The dignity of human life is permanently violated, e.g. when Jules and Vincent assassinate the college boys (PF 20:15) or when Butch kills the unarmed Vincent (PF 1h27:58) and runs over the defenseless Marcellus (PF 1h30:48). Outside, in the real world (the ‘real’ Los Angeles of today), violence is dissident: Hierarchy and order exist, protected and enforced by state police. Breaking the rules or ‘the law’ is a criminal act (illegal, not appropriate) and an exception to norms (deviant) – it usually results in going to jail. Inside the strange world of PF, this logic is reversed: Illegalities, arbitrary justice, brutality, and violence are common. Disorder and anarchy enable the strong and powerful to maintain the somewhat cool and entertaining ‘tyranny of evil men’ (PF 19:20-20:14). The violence in action perfectly mirrors the violence in language. Jules Winfield’s notorious use of the Bible quote Ezekiel 25:17, which he ritually cites (e.g. PF 19:14ff) before murdering someone, is the most representative discursive manifestation of the meaning of violence in PF. Tarantino hence offers a double reading of violence. In his various portrayals of violence, the ‘usual’ moral categories and normative frames of reference fall apart or become blurred. Whilst watching the movie, the spectator becomes increasingly unsure whether shooting people is ‘terrifying’ (PF 13:00ff), ‘funny’ (PF 1h51:20; cf. 2h11:00), or – in fact – ‘cool’ (PF 2h15ff; PF 2h20:40 ff).

Having become accustomed to the ‘other’ perspective on violence throughout the whole movie, PF ends with a quite unexpected U-turn: the conversion of one of the hitmen (Jules). Similar to the biblical figure Saul, who transformed into St. Paul, Jules declares that he wants to refrain from violence and decides to develop into a (good) ‘shepherd’ (PF 2h22:07–35). Following the constitutive function of language, Jules’ frequently cited Bible quote undergoes a new interpretation, acquires a new meaning, and reflects a new pacifism and a newly rendered moral understanding. As the social context is different, ‘Ezekiel 25:17’ is no longer considered ‘a cold-blooded thing to say’ before executing people (e.g. PF 19:14ff), but acquires a new meaning – a re-interpretation of violence as ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ – as an ‘other’ set of moral standards to lead Jules’ new life (PF 2h18:12–2h23:25; Winnefeld, 2006: 14). The reason for Jules’ conversion is a miraculously survived shooting: In one scene, a man rushes into the room and fires six gun shots at him and Vincent, but all of these shots miss their target (PF 1h48:05–50). Jules is immediately convinced that this ‘wasn’t [just] luck’ and interprets the event as ‘divine intervention: [...] God came down from Heaven and stopped these bullets [...] what happened here was a mira-
cle’ (PF 1h49:20–1h50:10). In the aftermath, he informs Vincent that he has decided to quit being a hitman (PF 1h50:44–1h51:01).

But the U-turn and its practical consequences – Jules completely changes his life – are not in line with the dissident view on violence so far presented in PF and are hence puzzling. In fact, we find that the new practice damages the credibility of Tarantino’s dissident reading of violence, in particular as it goes hand in hand with the conversions of other characters such as Butch (PF 1h39:00–20) and ostensibly Ringo and Yolanda (PF 2h19:00; 2h22:48ff). To replace the film’s obviously controversial but nonetheless straightforward dissident perspective with the ‘usual’ moral condemnation of violence and a rather ‘normal’ happy ending, which is so often typical for every Hollywood film studio, damages the movie’s tight post-modern ‘grip’ and dilutes the clarity of its dissident perspective. In doing so, the movie becomes much more ordinary, normal and very much attached to the mainstream cinema. Its ‘message’ then is quite simple: Instead of (positively) irritating the viewers in order to induce them to critically think about violence, the viewers leave the cinema with a quite contemplative, rather non-troubling, and ordinary message. This message is: Those who continue to live a life based on violence, those who are unable to change and cannot take other perspectives into account, have made the ‘wrong’ choice: they are doomed to fail just like Vincent, who is killed later (PF 1h27:50ff). But those who are able to change, those who progress or are on the way to doing so, have made the ‘right’ choice: they will survive and probably live a different or a better life like Jules or like Butch with his girlfriend Fabienne (PF 1h43:00–47:00).

At the end of the film, the world has become a slightly better place. In other words there is a fairly mainstream and common moral message to the film. This contrasts sharply with Tarantino’s ‘disturbingly’ complex and colorful portrait of diverse images of violence that he has tried to paint throughout the movie. The intellectual attractiveness of the dissident discourse on violence combined with a multiplicity of perspectives or ‘truths’ is finally reduced to a simple black and white scheme proclaiming only one rather ordinary and mainstreamed version of truth, which is that violence has many shapes and sizes but is always ‘bad’. Rather than interpreting this as another dissident element within a film in which violence has been portrayed as mainstream or as an interesting change of discourse once the new and different perspective on violence is put forward by Jules, Tarantino de-constructs and contradicts everything that the movie has previously attempted to (de-)construct. One could also say that our conclusion is an allegory of the so-called ‘reflexivity problem’ of post-modernism (cf. Diez, 2006): As there are no standards for differentiating between high and low art as well as high and low science, ‘anything goes’, i.e. by epistemological definition, nothing can be ruled out as unscientific (cf. Holden, 2006: 805). Vice versa, this assumption of a total relativity of truth logically implies that we
will also never know (for sure) whether what we have seen, heard, or read is a good post-modern story, simply mainstream, or just ‘pulp’. Of course, post-modern analyses are not arbitrary and there are criteria for assessing such research – for example, the originality and the degree of innovation of the alternative presented, the consistency and the plausibility of the main argument, the potential of the analysis to contribute to or even solve actual political problems, and its ‘corrective function’ (Mathias Albert cited in Diez, 2003: 488), that is, its value in outlining alternatives to the mainstream and pointing out the negative consequences of knowledge-power relationships in politics. Nevertheless, the movie *Pulp Fiction* offers a means of debating the abstract notions inherent in the ‘reflectivity problem’ of post-modern IR theory.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE ‘SCIENCE’ OF FILM**

The paper provided an overview of the benefits and problems of using movies in the IR classroom and has given an insight into the different approaches of using film. On the one hand we have seen some of the benefits of using movies: students are used to and are generally good at dealing with visual material, and it would make sense to utilize these skills that they already have to help them in other areas. In addition there are clear medical reasons for using films in the classroom as viewing a film involves the use of both halves of the brain and therefore makes learning easier. Here movies can also be used as a kind of empirical case study which would help us to make abstract concepts understandable. Films also engage emotions, which contributes to the learning process, and using movies can actively contribute to reducing hierarchies in the class and encouraging discussion. On the other hand there are scholars who have highlighted a number of grave difficulties and hazards: It may be risky for the teacher’s professional development as using movies may still be seen as unscientific. Certain parts of movies may be a waste of time as they do not really contribute to the understanding of the issue at large and films generally do include a lot of irrelevant material. Films are simply not made for teaching international politics: they only focus on certain aspects while neglecting others. Some also believe that movies can provide a bad history and are subject to a personal and Eurocentric bias. Having examined some of the good, the bad and the ugly of using films and movies in the IR classroom in the first part of the paper, we believe that the benefits far outweigh the problems. We are by no means claiming that movies should replace the reading of primary literature and academic articles and books, but a combination of showing films and movies together with the appropriate reading for each session does provide a fruitful alternative to a normal lesson.

However, one has to be careful about which approach one chooses for a course as this depends very much on the learning objectives of the course and the level of
the students one is teaching. The first approach seems inappropriate for a university as it does not challenge the students to reflect critically about the events seen on the screen. The second approach could be successfully used to give undergraduate students an insight into some of the more abstract concepts found in international politics, thereby preparing them and giving them tools and information that would be useful for the rest of their studies. Both the third and, in particular, the fourth approach appear to be more suited to students who already have a basic understanding of some of the main issues and theories in IR. Here they are led to reflect more critically on the knowledge they have so far obtained at the university.

ENDNOTES

1 For more details, see the official movie website at www.valleyofthewolvesiraq.com [30 March 2007].
2 See Turkish Daily News, 23 February 2006; Zeit, 23 February 2006 or Welt, 18 February 2006.
3 For more information see: www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=pulpfiction.htm [8 August 2007].

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Terrorism, Supreme Emergency and Killing the Innocent

ANNE SCHWENKENBECHEER

Abstract: Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line of argument. First, one may doubt that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents or non-combatants. However, I will focus on the second objection, according to which there may be exceptions from the prohibition against killing the innocent. In my article I will elaborate whether lethal terrorism against innocents can be justified in a supreme emergency. Starting from a critique of Michael Walzer’s account of supreme emergency, I will argue that the supreme emergency exemption justifies the resort to terrorism against innocents to avert moral disasters such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, provided that the criteria of last resort, proportionality and public declaration are satisfied.

Key words: terrorism, supreme emergency, Michael Walzer, Igor Primoratz, Brian Orend, killing the innocent

INTRODUCTION

To most people, it is perfectly clear that terrorism is immoral. And indeed, there are many good reasons for sharing this view. Terrorism, as it is usually defined, includes a variety of morally reprehensible actions, such as exploiting fear or horror, using violence or force against persons or property, intimidation and coercion. The most common argument for morally condemning terrorism is that it infringes the prohibition against killing the innocent. Sometimes a very similar argument is brought up, namely that terrorism infringes the principle of non-combatant immunity. Both approaches share the intuition that terrorism targets those who may not rightfully be targeted, i.e. illegitimate targets, and is therefore morally reprehensible. This claim can be challenged in two ways. First, one may doubt that terrorism always targets so-called innocents. Second, one may argue that in certain extreme situations, innocents may rightfully be targeted. In this paper, I will leave the first problem aside and focus on the second. In the context of war, violence against innocents or non-combatants is sometimes considered justified if it helps to avert a supreme emergency. But could this apply to the context of terrorism too?
PRELIMINARIES

To start with, it must be clarified in which way the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘innocents’ will be used in this article. I will use the term ‘terrorism’ as describing an indirect strategy of using fear or terror induced by violent attacks or force (or the threat of its use) against one group of people (direct target) or their property as a means to intimidate and coerce another group of people (indirect target) and influence their actions in order to reach further political objectives. Terrorist acts are the violent acts that form part of such a strategy. I will furthermore distinguish between strong and weak terrorism: When the direct targets are so-called innocents, it is strong terrorism; in any other case it is weak terrorism.2

Obviously, defining terrorism is a delicate issue. There are problematic elements in every definition of terrorism and this one is no exception. As my objective is to focus on the ethical implications of terrorism and not on the definition, I will merely point out the two main difficulties. I will not go into much detail here, as I believe that they are not decisive for my argument. The first difficulty is that to some scholars, the definition may appear to be too wide, meaning that it includes acts typically considered acts of war and not terrorism. This is not very problematic, though, as in my understanding, certain acts of war may constitute acts of terrorism. The second difficulty lies in the distinction between weak and strong terrorism. Some scholars (e.g. David Rodin, Igor Primoratz, Tony Coady, Uwe Steinhoff, Peter Sproat, Michael Walzer, Jenny Teichmann) claim that violence against innocents is the distinctive feature of terrorism in contrast to other forms of collective violence and thus opt for a so-called narrow definition of terrorism. Others share the view that the direct targeting of ‘innocents’ is very often an element of terrorist violence, but not a necessary one (e.g. Georg Meggle, Tony Dardis, Virginia Held, Seumas Miller, Angelo Corlett, Robert Young, Simon Keller, Olaf Müller) and thus prefer a wider definition of terrorism. However, as I said before, I will not discuss this issue here. In this paper I will focus on strong terrorism, i.e. terrorism which falls under both narrow and wide definitions.

According to my definition, strong terrorism is characterised by violent acts that are intentionally directed against so-called innocents, i.e. people who cannot be held responsible for the problem the terrorists are fighting and are thus immune from attack. Innocents are all those who do not expect to be targets of attack, and with good reason. This may be because they do not participate in the business of violence, as soldiers or policemen do, or simply because they do not intend a threat to any other person’s life. In war conditions these persons would be immune to aggression and protected, as they are not contributing to the act of war. Clearly, there are a few problems with the term ‘innocent’, as it seems to indicate moral immaculateness, as opposed to moral ‘guilt’. But this is not how the term should be understood in this context. The notion of innocence in this context refers to their not being contributors to harm and not being responsible for the problem the terrorist actors
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combat. Innocents are those who have not engaged in actions which would justify lethal violence against them. There is a considerable moral difference between the targeting and careless harm of innocents and that of non-innocents. Innocents are persons not responsible, either on the grounds of individual or accountable collective actions or on the grounds of individual or accountable collective omissions, for the significant injustice the terrorist fights or claims to fight. Innocents are therefore not liable to lethal attack by terrorists.

In general, violence against non-innocents differs from violence against innocents inasmuch as it targets people with respect to what they do or have done, rather than arbitrarily. Thomas Nagel argues:

‘[...] hostile treatment of any person must be justified in terms of something about that person which makes the treatment appropriate. Hostility is a personal relation, and it must be suited to its target.’ (Nagel, 1972: 133)

Nagel continues:

‘[w]hatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject. It should manifest an attitude to him rather than just to the situation, and he should be able to recognize it and identify himself as its object.’ (Nagel, 1972: 136)

Nagel’s claim illustrates the moral distinction between targeting innocents and targeting non-innocents. In a Kantian sense, Nagel holds that targeting non-combatants in war signifies a lack of respect for them as persons. In this particular case, a parallel can and should be drawn between war and terrorism. I assert that what Nagel says about the former is also true for the latter. Killing non-combatants in war and innocents in strong terrorism is failing to respect them as persons. Strong terrorism uses people as means to an end and fails to treat them as subjects. It is ‘depersonalised’ killing. Nagel states that:

‘A coherent view of this type will hold that extremely hostile behavior toward another is compatible with treating him as a person.’ (Nagel, 1972: 134)

Consequently, the term ‘innocents’ makes the most sense in this context as referring to those persons which have nothing ‘about them’ which would justify hostile behaviour.

Terrorism very often involves the killing of innocents. In fact, this is often claimed to be the feature which primarily makes terrorism wrong. When scholars argue that terrorism should be condemned because it targets innocents, they mostly implic-
itly, rarely explicitly, refer to a general moral principle against killing innocents, or prohibition against killing innocents. Strong terrorism infringes the moral prohibition against killing the innocent. However, there can be exceptions to this prohibition. Even though ending another person’s life is usually morally condemnable, it may sometimes be justifiable. The objective of my considerations here is to discover whether in a supreme emergency it may be justified, or morally right, to kill an innocent person, and whether terrorist violence may ever be one of these exceptions. I herewith challenge the claim made by many scholars (e.g. Coady, Meggle, Rodin) that terrorism in the narrow sense is always morally reprehensible. I am going to assume that, generally speaking, there are strong moral reservations against killing in general and against killing innocents in particular, which in most moral theories come very close to a prohibition against killing innocents. However, unless one adheres to moral absolutism, there are exceptions to these rules.

My reflections, however, should not be understood as an attempt to excuse or defend terrorist acts in general, or to advocate terrorism. Rather, they are intended to reject both unconsidered affirmations of terrorism, which hold that a noble objective may justify any means, and unconditional condemnations of terrorism while, at the same time, war and other forms of political violence are judged more indulgently.

SUPREME EMERGENCY
This paper comprises an argument on a famous approach to the question of the permissibility of killing innocents currently discussed in moral philosophy, namely the supreme emergency exemption. Walzer’s account has raised not only attention, but also a lot of criticism, which will be rehearsed in part here. It must be noted that his argument does not refer to the morality of terrorism, but to the justifiability of violence against civilians in war. However, I will examine its applicability to the realm of terrorism. The following rather comprehensive discussion of supreme emergency is aimed at clarifying what constitutes a supreme emergency, whether it really allows for an exception from the prohibition against killing the innocent, and if so, what kind of exception that is.

WALZER ON SUPREME EMERGENCY
Michael Walzer, otherwise a strict adherent to the satisfaction of jus in bello conditions in war, especially to the condition of non-combatant immunity, argues that in supreme
emergencies, a state actor can infringe upon this principle and directly target enemy civilians. What is a supreme emergency? According to Michael Walzer it is:

‘... an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful.’ (Walzer, 2000: 253)

Hence, a supreme emergency is an exceptional and threatening situation that collectives may be facing. For a situation to count as such, the danger has to be imminent and it ‘must be of an unusual and horrifying kind’ (Walzer, 2000: 253). Furthermore, ‘a supreme emergency exists when our deepest values and our collective survival are in imminent danger.’ (Walzer, 2005: 33)

Walzer holds that Great Britain was facing such a supreme emergency during a certain period of World War II when it was under attack from Nazi Germany, which constituted an ‘evil objectified in the world’. Walzer holds that, at least in the first years of the war while Germany was undefeated, the situation was a supreme emergency because a German victory would have constituted an ultimate threat to Britain. However, Walzer claims that after it became clear that Germany could no longer win the war, there no longer was a supreme emergency (Walzer, 2005: 46). In a supreme emergency situation, it is morally permissible to directly and intentionally target and kill innocents, or non-combatants. In Walzer’s example, it was justified to bomb residential areas of German cities, thus directly targeting the civilian population.

He nevertheless insists that although the prohibition against killing innocents is overridden by more important considerations, it is not being suspended: ‘There are limits on the conduct of war, and there are moments when we can and perhaps should break through the limits (the limits themselves never disappear).’ (Walzer, 2005: 40) To Walzer, a supreme emergency constitutes a dilemma: it is a situation where one can only choose between two evils and should opt for the lesser one. Thus the political leader facing a supreme emergency ought to choose the ‘better’ alternative, although the act which follows this choice is in itself morally condemnable. Walzer emphasizes that ‘The effect of the supreme-emergency argument should be to reinforce professional ethics and to provide an account of when it is permissible (or necessary) to get our hands dirty.’ (Walzer, 2005: 47) He thus advocates for choosing the lesser evil, even if it means to infringe the prohibition against killing the innocent. To Walzer, in the face of a disaster, it would be irresponsible to adhere to a moral rule if the only way to stop or prevent the disaster from happening lies in breaking this rule. He argues that moral absolutism ‘represents... a refusal to think about what it means for the heavens to fall. And the history of the twentieth century makes this refusal very hard to justify.’ (Walzer, 2005: 37)
Furthermore, resorting to targeting innocents in a supreme emergency is only allowed for if the criteria of military necessity and proportionality are satisfied:

"'Supreme emergency' describes those rare moments when the negative duty that we assign – that we can't help assigning – to the disaster that looms before us devalues morality itself and leaves us free to do whatever is militarily necessary to avoid the disaster, so long as what we do doesn't produce an even worse disaster.' (Walzer, 2005: 40)

Also, the requirement of last resort must be fulfilled.5

It is important to note that the concept of supreme emergency only applies to collectives, not to individuals:

'... individuals cannot kill other individuals to save themselves, but to save a nation we can violate the rights of a determinate but smaller number of people.' (Walzer, 2000: 254)

Walzer does not apply his concept to all kinds of collectives. Here, he speaks of the individual collective as a 'nation'. One is only entitled to violate the rules of war when facing 'a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community'. (Walzer, 2000: 254)

**OBJECTIONS TO WALZER**

Walzer’s concept of supreme emergency has given rise to numerous objections, of which I do not intend to provide a full account. I will only consider those objections relevant to the debate on justifying terrorism.6 Some scholars, (especially Brian Orend, but also Igor Primoratz) criticize certain inconsistencies in the argument and in the concept itself. Steinhoff suggests that Walzer does not see a possible justification for terrorism by resort to supreme emergency. (Steinhoff, 2007: 133) Others, such as Cook and Coady, argue against supreme emergency as such by claiming that a permission to kill innocents in extreme situations always runs the risk of being applied too indulgently and should not form part of a moral theory of war or political violence (Cook, 2007; Coady, 2004a). Walzer has also been found to give too strong a preference to the political community by Coady, Steinhoff, Primoratz, Valls and Cook. (Steinhoff, 2007: 132f; Valls, 2000: 73; Coady, 2002: 19 & 2004a: 88; Cook, 2007: 146ff; Primoratz, 2007: 19) Toner holds that the supreme emergency exemption applies to individuals too and is therefore unacceptable. (Toner, 2005) The last two objections will not be reviewed here.

**Inconsistencies**

a) The two-in-one objection: Both Orend and Primoratz hold that the concept of supreme emergency is ambiguous, as it contains two different notions of emer-
gencies which are not explicitly distinguished.’ Walzer justifies the overriding of the rules of war with the following argument:

‘...a world where entire peoples are enslaved or massacred is literally unbearable. For the survival and freedom of political communities [...] are the highest values of international society.’ (Walzer, 2000: 254)

Igor Primoratz counters that ‘it is one thing to suffer the fate the Nazis had in store for peoples they considered racially inferior, and another to have one’s polity dismantled.’ (Primoratz, 2007: 19)

I believe Primoratz to be correct when claiming that Walzer’s notion of supreme emergency in fact contains two different concepts, between which he does not sufficiently distinguish: (1) moral disaster, such as genocide or enslavement; and (2) the threat to the survival of a political community. Primoratz holds that:

‘... whereas genocide, expulsion, or enslavement of an entire people might be thought a moral disaster that may be fended off by any means, its loss of political independence for a political community is, at most, a political disaster.’ (Primoratz, 2007: 19)

Walzer indeed fails to separate the two notions, sometimes using one, and sometimes the other. However, I assume that Walzer holds that it is precisely the combination of both which constitutes a supreme emergency, even though he sometimes describes it as a moral disaster and sometimes as a political disaster (in Primoratz’s terms). This strong sense of political community is founded in Walzer’s communitarian approach and has raised some criticism which I am not going to reflect here. Yet, I agree with Igor Primoratz and Brian Orend that it is rather the moral disaster, the danger of genocide or expulsion of an entire people, which creates the supreme character of this emergency, but not the threat to the survival of a political community as such.

b) Brian Orend furthermore notes a certain inconsistency in Walzer’s methodological approach: _Just and Unjust Wars_ is overall committed to a deontological perspective and is clearly dismissive of consequentialism, in particular utilitarianism. Yet, when it comes to supreme emergencies, Walzer, to Orend’s surprise, appeals to consequentialist concepts such as the ‘greater good’. (Orend, 2000: 25) Orend claims that the supreme emergency doctrine ‘bears a striking similarity to one form of rule-consequentialism: during ordinary conditions of war, we are to adhere absolutely to the rules of _jus in bello_. However, when confronted with the hardest case, we are to set aside these rules and do what we must to prevail.’ (Orend, 2000: 26) According to Orend, ‘part of Walzer endorses Churchill’s consequentialism, while another part
of him supports Kant’s deontology.’ (Orend, 2005: 146) With regard to supreme emergency, Orend argues, Walzer is clearly inclined towards consequentialism.

Let me briefly comment on Orend’s methodological criticism. If one accuses Walzer of failing to argue within a coherent normative framework, one must consider that the just war tradition itself draws on deontological as well as consequentialist principles, and Orend explicitly acknowledges this elsewhere. (Orend, 2008) Moreover, Walzer’s manoeuvring between consequentialism and deontology is in fact a struggle for a plausible normative account which would avoid the shortcomings of both utilitarianism and moral absolutism:

‘The doctrine of supreme emergency is a way of manoeuvring between two very different and characteristically opposed understandings of morality. The first reflects the absolutism of rights theory, according to which innocent human beings can never be intentionally attacked. [...] The second understanding reflects the radical flexibility of utilitarianism, according to which innocence is only one value that must be weighed against other values in the pursuit of the greatest good of the greatest number.’ (Walzer, 2005: 35)

Yet it is right that Walzer does not succeed in providing a convincing normative framework to embed the supreme emergency exemption. Starting from his entirely accurate observation that utilitarianism and an absolutism of rights cannot be reconciled, Walzer arrives at a ‘utilitarianism of extremity’: in a supreme emergency, ‘our deepest values are radically at risk’, and the war constraints which depend on these values ‘lose their grip and a certain utilitarianism reimposes itself’. (Walzer, 2005: 40) The dichotomy between the two understandings of morality Walzer presents here ignores the fact that there are moderate deontological approaches which do not submit to an absolutism of rights but are still categorically opposed to utilitarianism in that consequences are not the only factor in the moral evaluation of an action. If he had assumed a more flexible, moderate deontological concept instead of a rigid absolutism, Walzer would not have had to carry out such a balancing act. He could simply endorse a deontological position according to which the fact that innocents are being killed always counts as a reason against the respective act. Consequently, this nearly always leads to a condemnation of acts in the process of which innocents are killed. Yet, sometimes consequences can deliver a strong reason for the killing of innocents to be permissible, which would overpower the reasons against. One could then specify what kinds of consequences deliver reasons that are strong enough to justify the killing of innocents. The advantage of this line of reasoning lies in the fact that it does not force us to resort to pure utilitarianism in a supreme emergency simply because our deontological position cannot accommodate exceptions.
As a result of his twofold approach, Walzer has difficulties mediating between allowing for overriding *jus in bello* and nevertheless maintaining that the infringement of non-combatant immunity is wrong. His remedy is to consider supreme emergency a paradoxical concept which combines the rightness of the consequentialist responsibility for the outcome of the act and the wrongness of the infringement of the deontological principle (Walzer, 2005: 50). He argues that:

‘... in supreme emergencies our judgments are doubled, reflecting the dualist character of the theory of war and the deeper complexity of our moral realism; we say yes and no, right and wrong. That dualism makes us uneasy; the world of war is not a fully comprehensible, let alone a morally satisfactory place.’

(Walzer, 2000: 326–327)

It is precisely this dualism which Brian Orend rejects: ‘In the final analysis, Walzer leans a bit towards consequentialism, and this allows him at least to offer coherent advice, but it comes at the cost of some of the moral controversy attaching to that attitude.’ (Orend, 2005: 147–148) On the one hand, for a political leader facing a supreme emergency, there is a duty to get one’s hands dirty, as it were, to avert it; on the other hand, one is acting wrongly and must personally shoulder the burden of this crime, according to Walzer.

Orend offers the following alternative to Walzer’s dualism: he proposes viewing supreme emergency analogously under the moral and the prudential perspective. While morally it is a ‘terrible tragedy’, prudentially it is a struggle for survival.9 From the moral point of view, says Orend, in a supreme emergency, all options are wrong. It is a full-blown tragedy in which one runs out of permissible options: one is forced to do wrong. He characterizes the moral tragedy in a supreme emergency in the following way: ‘It is a moral blind alley: there is nowhere to turn and still be morally justified. Colloquially speaking, “you’re damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.”’ (Orend, 2005: 148–149) He holds that there is no supreme emergency exemption, and thus no moral loophole, because in a supreme emergency, all options are just wrong. Orend claims that at the most, one of them is excusable (see also Orend, 2005: 151).

However, there is a difference between the concept of ‘dirty hands’ and that of a moral dilemma, a moral blind alley, or a moral tragedy, which Orend fails to account for. Tony Coady describes the difference between the dirty hands tradition and the moral dilemma idea, first characterized as a ‘moral blind alley’ by Thomas Nagel (Nagel, 1972: 143), in the following way:

‘This position [the “moral blind alley”-position, A.S.] has some affinities with the dirty hands tradition but strikingly differs from it in not coming down on
the side of the necessity to violate the absolute prohibition. For Nagel, it would be just as “right” or “necessary” to adhere to the prohibition, but that is quite against the spirit of the dirty hands tradition in either its ancient or contemporary forms.’ (Coady, 2004c: 780–781)

Without wanting to go into much detail on the concept of ‘dirty hands’,¹⁰ I argue that Orend must decide which of the two concepts he adheres to. In fact, he clearly holds that in a supreme emergency, a political community must infringe the rights of innocent victims. Hence, according to Coady’s characterisation, Orend’s approach is not an account of a moral blind alley, or a moral dilemma, insofar as it clearly demands that the respective political leader infringe the principle of non-combatant immunity.

As to the prudential perspective of supreme emergency, Orend holds that there are still rules which apply to the conduct of the struggle for survival. Five conditions should set limits to the actions of the political leader who is forced to commit rights violations in a violent struggle: (1) last resort; (2) public declaration; (3) appeal to international community; (4) right intention; and (5) prospect of success. (Orend, 2005: 149–150) I will come back to these criteria and discuss later whether or not Orend’s account can serve as the basis for a moral evaluation of terrorism.

With regard to Orend’s criticism of Walzer’s normative dualism, it is difficult to reconcile how the dichotomy between the prudential and the moral offered by Orend differs substantially from the paradoxical concept by Walzer, who cannot see a particular difference either:

‘[...] his [i.e. Brian Orend’s, A.S.] effort to avoid the paradox that I describe – when “the right thing to do is the wrong thing to do” – seems to me only to confirm the paradox, in slightly different (less provocative?) language. ... But the paradox remains, given the fact that political leaders are morally bound to act prudently (because they are acting for others) – and so they may be morally bound to do what it is morally wrong to do.’ (Walzer 2007: 168)

Walzer, I believe, is right in claiming that Orend’s account does not overcome the paradoxical nature of the supreme emergency exemption, but merely reformulates it.

To sum up what has been discussed so far, both Walzer and Orend hold that in a supreme emergency, a political leader is excused for attacking civilians, but the aggressive act itself nevertheless remains wrong. With Orend and Primoratz, against Walzer, I hold that the decisive aspect for considering a situation a supreme emergency is the threat of genocide, enslavement or ethnic cleansing to a collective, but not necessarily the threat to the ‘ongoingness’ of a political community. Furthermore, in a supreme emergency certain rules continue to apply and must be satisfied.
TERRORISM, SUPREME EMERGENCY AND KILLING THE INNOCENT

This revision of Michael Walzer’s supreme emergency doctrine and Brian Orend’s criticism of it were meant as the first step in examining whether terrorism against innocents could ever be justified in terms of supreme emergency. As such, we must examine whether the concept of supreme emergency is actually applicable to terrorism against innocents. Yet, there remains the problem of the paradoxical moral nature of the exemption. This, I believe, is in fact related to the question of whether the respective violent measures are merely excusable or in fact justifiable. It is important to investigate whether the measures taken in a situation of supreme emergency are justified rather than merely excused. This is the view held by Igor Primoratz (Primoratz, 2007b) and it will be discussed further down.

WALZER ON TERRORISM

Walzer constructed the doctrine of supreme emergency with the purpose of excusing extraordinary measures in times of war, but not terrorism. In the following, I will show that even though Walzer has sometimes been very categorical about the inapplicability of the supreme emergency exemption to terrorism, he is less strict on this than it would seem at first glance. Furthermore, the reasons he gives cannot survive detailed scrutiny.

Walzer’s view on supreme emergency and terrorism is not without contradictions, which makes it difficult to discuss. This is, above all, caused by his using the term ‘terrorism’ in two different ways. On one hand, he uses it to denominate a certain strategy employed by non-state or sub-state actors, characterized by the deliberate violation of ethical and political norms, and thereby indefensible. (Walzer, 2000: 197–206) On the other hand, he also sees the bombing of German cities by the Allies in World War II as an example of ‘terrorism’ (e.g. Walzer, 2000: 260), this time partially defending, or at least excusing, the strategy. Walzer is, therefore, not entirely consistent in his approach to terrorism. At one point in his 1988 article Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses, he claims that:

‘No one these days advocates terrorism, not even those who regularly practice it. The practice is indefensible now that it has been recognized, like rape and murder, as an attack upon the innocent.’ (Walzer, 2005: 51)

He must, then, have a different example in mind when, four pages later in the same article, he claims that terrorism may be justifiable:

‘Would terrorism be justified in a “supreme emergency” as that condition is described in “Emergency Ethics” (Chapter 3)? It might be, but only if the oppression to which the terrorist claimed to be responding to was genocidal in character. Against the imminent threat of political and physical extinction, ex-
treme measures can be defended, assuming that they have some chance of success. But his kind of threat has not been present in any of the recent cases of terrorist activity. Terrorism has not been a means of avoiding disaster but of reaching for political success.’ (Walzer, 2005: 54)

In his 2006 article Terrorism and Just War, Walzer argues again that terrorism may, at the most, be excusable:

‘In rare and narrowly circumscribed cases, it may be possible, not to justify, but to find excuses for terrorism. I can imagine myself doing that in the hypothetical case of a terrorist campaign by Jewish militants against German civilians in the 1940s – if attacks on civilians had been likely (in fact they would have been highly unlikely) to stop the mass murder of the Jews.’ (Walzer, 2006: 7)

Accordingly, I assume that Walzer is not as categorical about the moral evaluation of terrorism against innocents, and about the possibility of it being defensible, as he appeared to be in the first instance. Yet, the second statement cited gives rise to confusion regarding whether he holds terrorism as justifiable or as merely excusable. Given that Walzer considers targeting civilians in a supreme emergency excusable, but not justifiable, I assume that he does not consider terrorism justifiable either and that in the above quotation, he is simply inaccurate in the choice of his terminology.

Walzer furthermore argues that terrorism, apart from murdering the innocent, denies men and women the freedom from fear and targets people because of their membership in a certain community. (Walzer, 2006: 7) However, I hold that not all terrorism is of this kind. But even if it were, Walzer’s criticisms of terrorism hold just as true for war against innocents and for the Allied bombings, which, in Walzer’s view, can be excused.

He further expounds that terrorism can never be excused because it never is the last resort. He claims that if people run out of all other options and terrorism is the only one remaining, the ‘easy response is to insist that, given this description of their case, they should do nothing at all; they have indeed exhausted their possibilities.’ (Walzer, 2005: 53) However, Walzer is not as restrictive with regard to excusing direct violence against innocents in war: he does not measure terrorism and war with the same moral yardstick.

Taken all in all, it can be said that Walzer’s claim about terrorism and supreme emergency is unconvincing. Walzer’s account of supreme emergency is based deeply in his communitarian political approach. (Walzer 2005: 33-50) Part of the reason for why he is more sceptical of excusing terrorism than of excusing the targeting of innocents in war is his account of (political) communities and the prefer-
ence he gives to these, in contrast to collectives who do not act on behalf of such a community. This undeniable bias has been criticized by numerous scholars (Coady, Steinhoff, Primoratz, Valls, Cook), but it will not form a part of my reflections. All in all, there is no convincing reason why supreme emergency should not be applicable to terrorist violence.

**TERRORISM AND SUPREME EMERGENCY**

In the following, I will apply a revised version of the supreme emergency exemption to strong terrorism. Let me therefore briefly return to Orend’s account of the exemption. He holds the resort to violence against civilians in war excusable if, in the face of a supreme emergency, the following criteria are satisfied: (a) last resort; (b) public declaration; (c) appeal to international community; (d) right intention; and (e) probability of success. Both Walzer’s and Orend’s arguments on the morality of attacking civilians in war are based on the assumption that these civilians are innocents in the sense that they are not engaged in any hostilities and not attacking anyone. Hence, these civilians fall under my definition of innocents, and it appears unproblematic to use the term ‘innocents’ instead of ‘civilians’ in the following elaboration. As for the five criteria Orend implements, not all of them are necessary. Conditions (b) and (c) are significant because they are not usually included in accounts of just war or justified violence. Particularly the appeal to international community in condition (c) is a convincing requirement because it reflects the demand that the community in danger attempt to mobilise support, even if such attempts are not always successful. However, it is actually a sub-aspect of last resort, in my view, because as long as an agent has not considered requesting help from third parties, he has not really run out of options. Last resort is an important criterion which already formed a part of Walzer’s account. As to the criterion of public declaration, it is important inasmuch as it forces the violent agent to pause, recapitulate and publicly reconsider his project and the reasons for it before resorting to extreme measures. Orend regards this requirement to be closely linked to last resort (Orend, 2005: 150), but I cannot see how there is a strong connection between these two. Rather, the demand that the political agent publicly declare his or her intentions is an independent criterion for averting hasty decisions and a lack of political transparency. I will come back to the criteria of right intention and probability of success shortly.

Another approach to examining the justifiability of infringing the prohibition against killing the innocent in extreme situations is Igor Primoratz’s account of moral disaster, which is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but more restrictive. Primoratz considers only two situations to be a moral disaster: (the threat of) genocide and (the threat of) ethnic cleansing. He holds the satisfaction of the following two criteria to be necessary: (a) last resort, (b) prospect of success (Primoratz, 2005b: 58). In con-
trast to Orend, he considers the employment of violence against innocents as justi-
fied in a morally disastrous situation rather than merely excused.

The kind of supreme emergency exemption I want to offer comprises elements of
all three accounts. What is missing in both Primoratz’s and Orend’s accounts, but
present in Walzer’s, is the notion of proportionality. The just war tradition distin-
guishes two different notions of proportionality, *ad bellum* and *in bello*. While the
former requires the positive results or moral benefits of resorting to violence to
outweigh the negative results or moral costs, the latter claims that the agent must
employ no more violence than necessary to achieve the required objectives. Though
*proportionality* is a criterion notoriously difficult to assess, I consider it a necessary
component of the moral evaluation of violent acts. One could argue that the ques-
tion of proportionality is redundant in this context because the supreme emergency
exemption only applies to situations so horrible that almost anything may be un-
undertaken to prevent them. Yet I would disagree with this reasoning; even a supreme
emergency does not justify any available means. It is obvious that the supreme emer-
gency exemption may only be allowed for if it does not cause an even greater emer-
gency. If the only way to prevent the ethnic cleansing of a group from its land is to
expel another group or several other groups, then the *ad bellum* proportionality re-
quirement is not met.

The criterion of prospect of success is in fact a sub-criterion of proportionality *ad
bellum*. Given that in order to assess proportionality *ad bellum*, the prospective pos-
tive results must be weighed against the prospective negative results, a violent cam-
paign which is not likely to succeed, i.e. which is not likely to bring about the desired
positive outcome, cannot meet this requirement. Hence, the condition of propor-
tionality *ad bellum* renders the condition of prospect of success redundant.

The *in bello* proportionality, or necessity requirement, is an essential condition to
ensure that no more innocents are killed than necessary to achieve a cessation of the
supreme emergency situation. Admittedly, it is impossible to determine exact num-
bers in this context, and yet, there are cases of clear disproportion. In Walzer’s ac-
count this requirement is reflected in the criterion of necessity.

As to the requirement of *right intention* suggested by Orend, it is important to de-
mand that the violent actor not abuse the supreme emergency exemption and act
with an inclination to destroy. However, one could argue that it does not change the
moral status of the act if the agent acts for revenge or bloodlust, as long as these ac-
tions remain within the limits of proportionality. These require the agent not to cause
more harm than benefit, and to employ no more violence than necessary to achieve
the aspired for justified goal. The restrictions of proportionality together with the
demand that the situation be a genuine supreme emergency (this corresponding
to the just cause criterion in just war theory) make the requirement of right intention
negligible.
Moreover, the supreme emergency exemption should not only excuse the employment of violence against innocents, but justify it, in my view. Walzer appears to be indecisive with regard to the justifiability of killing innocents. He argues that ‘there are moments when the rules can be and perhaps should be overridden’ (Walzer, 2005: 34) and that the deliberate killing of innocent people in order to prevent a Nazi triumph was ‘morally defensible’. (Walzer, 2005: 35) Orend claims that in a supreme emergency, one is ‘forced to do terrible things to survive’ (Orend, 2005: 151) and can therefore be excused, but never justified. Therewith Orend situates the violent agent’s actions in a supreme emergency outside the realm of morality: obviously one cannot be judged morally for something that he or she was forced to do or something that he or she had to do as there was no other choice. Yet here Orend appears to create precisely the moral loophole he rejected earlier. While he is right in presenting the killing of innocents as a tragedy from the victim’s perspective, he is not accurate, however, in describing it as a necessity or forced choice from the agent’s perspective. The agent clearly has a choice in a supreme emergency: that between killing a (limited) number of innocents on one side and allowing for a moral disaster to occur on the other side. Not only does the agent have this choice, but it is also clear that only one of the two options is right, namely the former. In contrast to Orend, I hold that in order to avert a supreme emergency, an agent is not only excused for killing innocents – given the satisfaction of the conditions discussed so far – but actually morally required to do so. Hence, if one has a moral obligation to act in a certain way, then one is morally justified in so acting.

On the basis of the previous review of the supreme emergency and the moral disaster exemption, I hold that an agent is justified in resorting to terrorism against innocents if the following criteria are met:

1. Last resort (including the appeal to international community);
2. Proportionality (ad bellum & in bello); and
3. Public declaration.

One might still insist on the immunity of innocent people from attack being an absolute moral principle which can never be justifiably infringed. Indeed, any possible justification of a terrorist killing of innocents is facing the problem of disregarding the victims’ right to life and integrity. If the prohibition against attacking the innocent is considered absolute, i.e. that it must not be disobeyed under any thinkable circumstances, strong terrorism can never be justified. Under certain circumstances, however, such a moral attitude is entirely irresponsible: In the case that the targeting of innocents can prevent a moral disaster, it would be morally wrong not to take these appropriate steps. Moreover, the above presented account does not clear the way for justifying all varieties of strong terrorism. In the overwhelming majority of situations, the killing...
of innocents is prohibited. Only in morally extreme (and rare) situations can such measures be justified. Even in the face of extreme consequences, the demand to satisfy a set of strict conditions remains. Hence, there are still major obstacles to legitimizing terrorism, namely the conditions of last resort & proportionality, but above all the condition that the situation in question must constitute a genuine supreme emergency. These conditions will be very difficult to satisfy for strong terrorist actors.

The supreme emergency exemption derives a lot of its persuasive power from the claim that given their enormity and finality, extreme situations such as genocide and ethnic cleansing are a category apart. However, one could object that it may be difficult or even impossible to consistently and unequivocally determine whether or not a given situation is a supreme emergency. The concept of genocide has been extensively dealt with in academic debate, and the UN has agreed on a definition that can arguably be considered binding. Yet the definition of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in particular, a term sometimes used to denote a preliminary stage to genocide, is still a moot point. Demanding accuracy when labelling a situation as a supreme emergency is certainly justified. Nevertheless, there are many cases which are doubtlessly recognizable as cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Tony Coady has brought forward a slippery-slope argument in which he asserts that when people begin justifying their actions by resort to supreme emergency, other parties might be encouraged to do the same, and ‘there is likely to be an increased tendency for the scope of resort to supreme emergency.’ (Coady, 2005: 150) In a similar manner, Martin Cook objects to the supreme emergency exemption with the argument that extreme cases usually do not lead to good rules:

‘There is a common saying in law in the English-speaking world: “Hard cases make bad law” ... The point of the saying is that it is often a mistake to attempt to derive normative guidance from the fortunately very rare and extreme case. Attempting to state a normative standard for the extreme often results in creating permissions and restrictions that will be applied in circumstances where they are not really intended.’ (Cook, 2007: 140)

Both scholars are right. Such misapplications of the supreme emergency exemption can and will certainly take place. Yet the criteria for such an exemption are very difficult to satisfy. In general, no theoretical concept is immune to misapplications. Yet, it is a necessary risk which can be minimized by elaborating such concepts scrupulously and amending them if necessary to impede misapplication of the permissions they give.

CONCLUSION

In this article I hope to have shown that it is not accurate to condemn strong terrorism on the grounds of its infringement of the prohibition against killing the inno-
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There are exceptions to this prohibition. I have demonstrated that the supreme emergency exemption justifies the resort to terrorism against innocents to avert a moral disaster such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, provided that the criteria of last resort, proportionality and public declaration are satisfied.

ENDNOTES

1 In fact, many scholars reject the notion that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents: Georg Meggle, Tony Dardis, Virginia Held, Seumas Miller, Angelo Corlett, Robert Young, Simon Keller, Olaf Müller.

2 The distinction between strong and weak terrorism is similar to the corresponding distinction Georg Meggle makes, but it is not the same. To Meggle, strong terrorism is all terrorism that is strongly reprehensible, and everything else is weak terrorism. Meanwhile, my distinction does not include a moral judgment. See Meggle, 2005b.


4 This view is generally shared by Garrett and Primoratz, though their opinions differ concerning the moment the situation ceased to constitute a supreme emergency. Garrett argues that ‘At the dawn of 1942 ... it appeared that Russia had survived, the vast might of the Americans was now engaged, and the entire strategic situation had been dramatically transformed. Under the circumstances, the only supreme emergency that loomed was the one the Germans would face sooner or later. ... If any vestige of supreme emergency had passed by February 1942 then this concept cannot be used to justify the initiation of the area offensive.’ (Garrett, 2004: 150)

Igor Primoratz holds that ‘The supreme emergency argument may have been valid only during the first year of the campaign: in 1942, the victory of Nazi Germany in Europe – a major moral disaster by any standard – might have been thought imminent. However, after German defeats at El Alamein (November 6, 1942) and at Stalingrad (February 2, 1943), that was clearly no longer the case’. (Primoratz, 2005a: 76)

5 Walzer clearly holds that the criterion of last resort must be satisfied. With regard to World War II, he argues that ‘if there was no other way of preventing a Nazi triumph, then the immorality – no less immoral, for what can the deliberate killing of the innocent be? – was also, simultaneously, morally defensible.’ (Walzer, 2005: 34-35) Elsewhere he argues that one is allowed to resort to an immoral response under the condition of ‘every legitimate alternative having been exhausted’ (Walzer, 2005: 47).
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One of the objections which I will not discuss here is that Walzer’s WWII example does not, strictly speaking, satisfy the conditions for supreme emergency and thus undermines Walzer’s original argument. (Orend, Coady, Steinhoff, Cook, Garrett)

A slightly different point, which will not be discussed here, has been brought forward by Cook: ‘Walzer seems to be arguing that any time any community faces the loss of its way of life, it is faced with a supreme emergency, and therefore is entitled to disregard the war convention […] Given the historical reality that most human communities that have ever existed have at some point disappeared, often as a result of conquest, invasion, or loss of political autonomy, such a generalized permission would be a recipe for rather frequent supreme emergency.’ (Cook, 2007: 147)

Brian Orend makes the same point in Orend, 2001: 23.

This is the part of Orend’s analysis in which he singles out five different ways to conceive the concept of supreme emergency: (1) One can hold that the concept of supreme emergency constitutes a bastardization of just war theory, and should be generally rejected. According to this perspective, there is no such thing as supreme emergency. (2) In supreme emergency, only *jus ad bellum* matters, but *jus in bello* may be set aside. Orend calls this ‘Churchill’s (Jus ad Bellum) Consequentialism’. (3) Even in supreme emergencies, the rules of *jus in bello* apply. (Briefly summarized, Orend dismisses these three accounts as ignorant of the existence of real supreme emergencies (1), as ignorant of the rights violations against the innocents (3), and as unrealistic and irresponsible (3).) (4) The ‘paradoxical account of dirty hands’, which is what Orend considers Walzer’s actual approach to be. (5) Orend’s own account of supreme emergency. (Orend, 2005: 146–151)

For a more detailed account on supreme emergency and dirty hands, see Coady, 2004c: 781f.

The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is usually applied to describe the practice of forced emigration in order to render an area ethnically homogeneous. However, the term’s definition is a moot point. (See, e.g., Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew (1993), ‘A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 110–121.)

According to Article 2 of the UN Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, genocide is defined as:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Tony Coady has made a similar point against Walzer, whose concept he thinks is too permissive, as it could be applied to completely different areas to justify violence against innocents, e.g., for the sake of a corporation: ‘Yet, in the context of public discourse about war and terrorism, we should be particularly worried about allowing exemptions from profound moral and legal constraints under categories that are, at the very least, so open to divergent interpretations. … Why not allow that the
exemption can apply to huge corporations, the existence of which is central to the lives and livelihoods of so many?’ (Coady, 2004a: 91f) Walzer gives strong preference to the political community, but not to other kinds of collective entities, such as commercial institutions. Though political entities to a certain degree, commercial corporations would certainly not be considered by Walzer as indispensable to our existence as political communities. Under certain circumstances, it may occur that a threat to a corporation would also threaten a political community which is closely linked to the corporation. But in such a case it would still be the threat to the political community, not the menace to the corporation, that would be the main reason for a supreme emergency. As such, I cannot see how Walzer’s concept may be extended to corporations, as Tony Coady suggests.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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TERRORISM, SUPREME EMERGENCY AND KILLING THE INNOCENT

Reviews

TUOMAS FORSBERG AND GRAEME P. HERD: DIVIDED WEST. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP


THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Divided West is a book written by Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme P. Herd. The main research field of both of the professors is contemporary security politics. In the book the authors focus on the topic of incoherence in the foreign policy strategies between the EU and NATO and, most importantly, between the U.S. and the EU. Incoherence is followed by such undesirable effects as mutual competition and duplications. These problems emerged especially after the War in Iraq broke out. The authors are trying to give some predictions for the future development of the mutual relations. This is supported by a broad analysis of the political, economic or cultural background of individual regions. The authors also seek the answers in the great theories of international relations by investigating the development of the mutual relations from the realist, liberal and constructivist points of view. As for the future development in the transatlantic relations, the authors mention three possible scenarios: divorce, realignment and dissonance. The book is clearly divided into chapters, starting with the theoretical basis and then moving on to five European regions with different strategies in their transatlantic relations. This gives the reader a comprehensive and systematic overview of the changing situation after 1990. The authors are objective in their judgements and always try to look at the events from various perspectives. The book is thus neither anti-American nor anti-European, but it still reveals the uneasy facts about the problems in the transatlantic cooperation. Is NATO inefficient and drifting towards its own destruction? Is Europe just a military foreland to the US? After reading the book, one gets closer to answers to questions of this kind.

Causes of the strategic divorce

At the beginning, the authors try to define the dynamics which led to the strategic divorce. They claim that the U.S. remained to be seen as a positive hegemon even after the end of the Cold War. The main events to change its image in international relations were, according to the authors, the conflict in Kosovo, the election of George W. Bush as the U.S. president, the Prague NATO summit in 2003 and subsequently the War in Iraq.
The authors then observe the opinions of different schools of international relations on the transatlantic crisis. The realists claim that the loss of a common enemy has caused the split in the relations. They see Europe as weak and the U.S. as a strong power, which leads to different strategies in their foreign policy. While the U.S. represents the so-called ‘hard power’, Europe is seen as an example of ‘soft power’. However, realists observe division not just in trans-atlantic relations but also within Europe. According to realist theories, the small states should be less interested in the fight against terrorism, and the states with a large Muslim minority should act in favour of the war. On these examples the authors show the weak points in this theory. Liberalism sees the problem in the different values of EU and the U.S. While Europe, with its attitude to religion and family values, is more of a postmodern power, the U.S. remains more traditionalist. Constructivists investigate the wave of anti-Americanism in Europe and see its origins in envy, rivalry or an opinion considering a possible degeneration of American society. The authors claim that all of the theories fail to explain some political facts and events.

**Europe and transatlantic relations**

The UK is traditionally the strongest U.S. partner in terms of both business connections and military cooperation. The UK supported the war in Afghanistan and followed the U.S. in Iraq as well. The UK’s motivation is to show that it is the closest ally of the States. On the other hand, Blair was criticised for undermining the UK’s position within the EU. The fact is that the EU needs the British army to be operational, as the authors claim. Nevertheless, a dissonance between the UK and the U.S. was also found on several issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court or steel tariffs. In the book the problem of the British schism is well expressed by a quotation of Nye Bevan, a Welsh Labour politician: ‘We know what happens to the people who stay in the middle of the road. They get run over.’

The author represented the Core Europe with Germany. Germany supported the U.S. in Afghanistan but was against the War in Iraq. Gerhard Schroder built his election campaign on refusing the War in Iraq and it led to a split between Germany and the U.S. However, after the conquest of Iraq, Germany was willing to cooperate in the rebuilding process. After 2004 the quarrel is settled, but there is still a significant drop in the popularity of the U.S. in Germany. The U.S. government under the Bush administration desired loyalty from Germany, while Germany, being still in the process of emancipation, would have preferred to be consulted more intensively. On the other hand, Germany showed itself to be an incoherent opposition to the U.S., as it was not able to put Europe together on the basis of a common strategy.

As some of the states from the former communist bloc showed themselves to be more willing to cooperate with the U.S. in Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld claimed that the
new strategic centre of Europe is shifting more to the East. What were the incentives for the ‘new states’ to support the U.S. in Iraq? According to the authors, one could see them in, e.g., a fear of Russia (the former suppressor), gratitude to the U.S. for liberating the formerly communist states, or the arrogance of ‘Old Europe’, which is noticeable in its lack of interest in the broadening of NATO. The presumption of the authors is that after the ex-communist states enter the EU, these factors will decline in importance for them. Also, defeating terrorism and fighting for freedom are not issues of great importance here. Due to these facts, the authors conclude that a broadening of Atlanticism to the ‘New Europe’ is improbable in the future.

The ‘non-aligned Europe’ is made up of the EU member states which are not NATO members. The authors use the Baltic states – Sweden and Finland – as an example. Sweden and Finland showed differences in their attitudes to 9/11 and to the War in Iraq, but neither of them showed an interest in entering the NATO. Both Sweden and Finland are traditionally supportive of international law and institutions. Their neutrality is supported by the transatlantic divide. The transatlantic cooperation would lead to the opposite of these conditions. Especially in Finland, a significant presence of anti-Americanism is apparent.

At the end of the 90’s, Russia’s relations with the EU were warmer than their relations with NATO. However, the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) appeared to be still under the shadow of NATO, which is why Putin turned his attention in this more convenient direction. After 9/11, EU sees Russia as an authoritarian power and has a different opinion on the revolutions in the post-Soviet bloc. and Russia accepts the existence of the EU, but it often prefers to deal with individual states on a bilateral basis. The European fragmentation is thus another reason for Russia to focus more on its relations with NATO. The authors conclude the issue of NATO-Russian relations by claiming that ‘Russia has a clear preference for cooperation over confrontation.’ This point of view might be put into doubt by the later developments in world politics after the year 2006, when the book was published. During the War in Georgia in 2008, Russia showed itself as a recovered and independent military power, and its relations with NATO practically froze. Moreover, Russia was intensively opposing the U.S. plan to build a rocket base in Middle Europe and threatened to carry out a counteraction.

Transatlantic futures
After the Cold War the EU-U.S. relations were strong in many areas. After 9/11 this changed significantly. There is mostly a consistent agreement that fragmentation in the mutual relations is negative, but the future scenarios for cooperation differ. The extreme scenarios are either a strategic divorce, when the U.S. is preceived by Europe as a hegemon acting in its own interest, or cooperation under a common threat. According to the authors, a strategic dissonance is the most probable sce-
nario for the future. Still, the strategic dissonance can also be constructive and reflect the dynamic shift in the balance of power. The authors conclude this opinion by saying that ‘In the word where black and white have become opaque, grey really is the color of hope.’

Knowledge assumed

It seems that the authors try to break both the unrealistic optimism and the futile scepticism about transatlantic relations, and their predictions for the future are usually conceivable. Still, a certain amount of optimism can be observed in this book, which could be seen as a positive fact. On the other hand, due to this optimism, the authors might have underestimated the growing importance and emancipation of Russia (which will probably continue into the future) and its reduced will for cooperation. In any case, the coherent and deep analysis of the transatlantic divide and all its factors allows the reader to form his own well-founded opinion.

The topic of dissonance in transatlantic relations is very actual indeed, even more so in the time of the 60th anniversary of NATO’s establishment, when many voices are speaking about the necessity to transform this strategic union. If we know that there are certain problems in the cooperation, we should first try to investigate the reasons for such problems. This book is a convenient guideline for such an investigation and thus it could be useful for both theoreticians and policy-makers who are willing to understand the real background of the problem and not just criticise either Europe for its reluctancy in security topics or the US for its lack of diplomatic efforts.

David Kopecký

ENDNOTES

2 Ibid., p. 110.
3 Ibid., P. 140.
RYAN C. HENDRICKSON: DIPLOMACY AND WAR AT NATO. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND MILITARY ACTION AFTER THE COLD WAR


With the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) lost its original purpose and mission. Some observers predicted that NATO would collapse without an adversary. However, NATO still does exist as a very agile organisation. The post-Cold War NATO attracts attention for many reasons. Its expansion in Central and Eastern Europe was widely examined and its air strikes in Bosnia and in Kosovo were also in the spotlight of academic interest. However, very little attention has been paid in academic literature to secretaries general, NATO’s political leaders. If the secretary general is mentioned in an analysis, he is often described as a minor player operating under severe political constraints. One exception is Robert S. Jordan’s Political Leadership in NATO, which chronicles the secretaries general from 1952 to 1971 (the Cold War period).

Hendrickson’s book Diplomacy and War at NATO provides a new view on the diplomacy within NATO. This book attempts to fill a major void in the academic literature on NATO’s post-Cold War organisational leadership. The first four post-Cold War secretaries general and their role in moving the alliance towards military action are examined in this book. Hendrickson describes the secretaries general as very active diplomats who, despite facing very serious constraints, play a critical role in reaching consensus and serve as advocates for unity.

Because so little has been written about NATO’s secretaries general, the first chapter provides an historical overview of the Cold War secretaries general. They led the alliance in a political context which was very different from the context in which the post-Cold War secretaries general worked and no one oversaw NATO when the organisation used military force. The first chapter is important for us to understand how the role of the secretaries general has been evolving. In contrast to their post-Cold War successors, the first secretaries general exercised a much weaker position than the supreme allied commander, Europe (the SACEUR), and therefore relations with the SACEUR were critical to the work of the secretaries general.

The book follows with comparative case studies of the first four post-Cold War secretaries. Each chapter focuses on the role of the secretary general in the use-of-force decisions. Each chapter also provides a brief historical background on the origins of the examined conflict. The concluding chapter summarises the findings and offers a comparative assessment of effective diplomatic leadership in NATO as well.

Much of the leadership provided by the secretary general is exercised in close-door sessions of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and documentary evidence on
NAC discussions is very rarely released to the public. Under such constraints, Hendrickson relies upon interviews with senior political and military leaders of NATO, and therefore his book provides a unique view into the decision making process in the alliance.

In order to properly analyse the secretary general’s role in use-of-force cases, in the case studies, Michael G. Schechter’s framework for assessing Cold War intergovernmental organisation leaders is used. Hendrickson derived three ‘leadership forums’ from Schechter’s framework. First, at the systemic level, the primary factor for analysis is the secretary general’s role in influencing the international political conditions prior to the use of force. Although a secretary general has little independent authority apart from his minimal organisational power at NATO, he may or may not attempt to steer NATO’s public political agenda. By examining the organisational level, we gain a field for the analysis of the secretary general’s leadership of the North Atlantic Council. The secretary general has no vote within the council, but the council still provides a primary organisational forum for him to exercise some formal leadership of the alliance. The final leadership forum examines the secretary general’s leadership in the realm of civil-military relations, especially the relationship with the SACEUR. The reasons for analysing the third forum are understandable: the SACEUR’s role at NATO is historically important, and the focus of each case study is NATO’s uses of force. (pp. 41–43)

The first examined secretary general, Manfred Wörner, was leading NATO when the war in Bosnia occurred. Wörner made clear his view that NATO should take a more active stance towards stopping the atrocities in Bosnia. Hendrickson points out his performance during the North Atlantic Council meeting in April 1994, where the NAC agreed to a much wider military role in protecting UN safe havens through air power. Wörner’s appearance at this NAC meeting is regarded as his greatest single leadership act while at NATO, and according to Hendrickson, it demonstrates the organisational influence he could exercise when issues reached the NAC. (p. 60) Considerable credit was given to Claes for not convening an NAC council prior to the use of force in the few hours before Deliberate Force began on August 30 1995. It avoided launching an additional political debate within NATO and allowed the bombing campaign to ensue. Similarly he used his authority to resume the bombing on September 4.
The ninth NATO secretary general Javier Solana appeared ready to use force earlier than the rest of the allies and was calling privately for military action. However, Solana placed no open pressure on the allies to act. Given the mixed public opinion across Europe on NATO’s campaign, Javier Solana was able to exercise leadership in the NAC by placing himself, in the view of the public, at the centre of NAC decisions. His ability to find ‘sufficient legal basis’, as this phrase allowed the members of the alliance to justify NATO’s international legal authority to act to their varied domestic constituencies (p. 102), for military action without an explicit UN Security Council approval, and his leadership in the NAC while using the ‘silence procedure’ stand out as critical and historical actions during his tenure. (p. 115)

In the last case study, Lord George Robertson’s leadership role prior to the American invasion to Iraq is examined. The NATO was asked by the USA to invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to reinforce the defence of Turkey against a potential Iraqi attack. Upon the United States’ official request, when the issue appeared formally on the agenda for discussion, Robertson became an active supporter of the American position. (132) The Article 4 issue became a symbol of attitudes towards Iraq and therefore the negotiations within the NATO were very tough. In that time Lord Robertson used all possible instruments to reach an agreement on Article 4. However, it was felt by some ambassadors and NATO staff members that Robertson had pushed too aggressively and quickly for a resolution before consensus was reached, and that he chose to side with the American position too quickly. However, Hendrickson notes that if Robertson had not sided with the United States, it might have been a devastating political blow to his own position as secretary general. (pp. 136–137)

For analysing the secretary general’s leadership role Hendrickson used three leadership forums, the systemic one, the organisational one and the one assuming a relationship with the SACEUR, supposing that every one of these could similarly be influenced by the secretary general. In the systemic forum the secretary general may attempt to shape the international political agenda on a given issue. In the organisational forum we can see the secretary general’s leadership role in the North Atlantic Council, and in the secretary general’s relationship to SACEUR, the author describes his role in military planning. All these forums seem to be chosen rationally considering the examined issues, but Hendrickson’s book gives evidence that only the organisational forum is interesting enough to be used in analysing the secretary general’s leadership role.

Although the systemic level is important for understanding the political conditions that a secretary general faces, when comparing the case studies, it seems clear that a secretary general’s ability to shape the political agenda can be neglected. Manfred Wörner publicly made clear his view on the NATO’s role in Bosnia and attempted to steer a political agenda towards military action. However, his vigorous
activity could not change the systemic conditions, especially the American government policy. At the contrary, Wörner’s successor Willy Claes reflected the systemic realities, in which no transatlantic consensus existed, and decided not to steer the alliance in a different policy direction. Nonetheless, after the systemic conditions had changed, he was able to exercise his organisational power to shift the alliance towards the military operation. Therefore Hendrickson had to conclude very often in his book that the systemic conditions had placed highly serious obstacles into the paths of the secretary generals.

The ability to influence the alliance policy is completely different on the organisational level. Although the secretary general cannot act against the will of the member states, he can use and has used some powerful instruments to reach consensus. The most interesting way to avoid political obstacles in this field is the ‘silence procedure’. When the silence procedure is used, a state may not completely agree with NATO, but it also may not wish to obstruct NATO’s ability to act on the given issue. Thus the procedure, if used in the appropriate political circumstances, can be an effective diplomatic tool in promoting consensus. (p. 133) The procedure was successfully exercised by Javier Solana in order to save member governments from unpopular decisions. But inappropriate use of this procedure by George Robertson quickly presented the alliance with a major and openly visible crisis and made the allies’ political differences a news item across the world. (pp. 133–134)

Why the third leadership forum was chosen is quite understandable considering the role of SACEUR during the Cold War and the fact that the examined issues are NATO’s military actions. However, in the case studies, there was no problem presented in the relationship between the secretary general and SACEUR. The only difference between the examined secretary generals in this respect was in how much they dealt with military matters. For example, Willy Claes’ more ‘hands-off’ approach vis-à-vis General Joulwan is different from the very close cooperation between Javier Solana and General Clark.

The Hendrickson book is worth reading for its view inside the NATO’s diplomacy. A number of interviews with former NATO ambassadors, alliance military leaders, and senior NATO officials provide a unique and interesting source of information about secretary generals, a topic which has previously attracted very little attention in the academic literature on NATO. The only weak point of this book may be that it tends to overestimate the secretary generals’ ability to shape a policy. This is obvious in the systemic forum, where Hendrickson overestimates the secretary general’s power; he supposes that the secretary general is much more influential than he actually is. Nevertheless, such a small weakness cannot decrease the significance of this book for explaining the NATO’s decision making.

Tomáš Kučera
ENDNOTES


5 ‘The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.’ (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4)


If you open any newspaper in the West, chances are that there will be at least a column on Iran in its international section. Iran and its infamous president, Iran and its nuclear program, Iran and its economic problems, Iran and its assertive politics in the Middle East. We are all confronted with developments taking place in this important yet not fully known country.

Academics, journalists and politicians alike decided to quench our thirst for knowledge by publishing numerous books on Iran. While many of those books repeated what we already knew, only a few managed to offer new insights or to put the Iranian politics into a wider perspective. Maryam Panah’s book The Islamic Republic and the World attempted to fill this gap.

First and foremost, we need to say that the task was not easy. The expectations were certainly high and making sense of the politics of a Middle Eastern country so that a Westerner without a deep knowledge of its history and society would understand it has never been an easy task. Nevertheless, Panah’s book is a very refreshing addition to already existing scholarship on the Iranian revolution and the Iranian republic.

Panah undertook the task to study the Iranian Islamic revolution in its international context, as well as to put the history of the Islamic republic into the international framework. This is certainly a praiseworthy undertaking because no social movement, however indigenous it may seem, is isolated from the world. This review also follows the structure of the book. Panah at first builds her theoretical framework and then proceeds to apply this framework on her case. While we may not agree with the framework itself, the application is very convincing and the overall result is worth reading, even though at times it is superfluous.

Panah’s theoretical framework is Marxist. Panah sees the world order in terms of capital, exploitation and imperialism. Even though she never defines any of those terms, she illustrates them all on the example of the relationship between Iran and the US during the shah’s rule. She argues that when a state does not follow the interest of the capitalist class anymore, the only recourse of the capitalist states ‘robbed’ of their mechanism of exploitation is ‘to use the visibly coercive instruments of force’. She also claims that the tensions between the status quo players and revolutionary states are due to the impediments imposed by the revolutionary states on the exercise of more ‘incisive power’. From those positions, we may get the
impression that Panah got her ideas from Khomeini himself – who saw the US in very similar terms.

The author’s analysis of the Iranian revolution starts in 1941, when the Reza Shah vacated the throne to let his son, Muhammad Reza, reign. The period of the beginning of the Cold War and the rapprochement between the US and Iran is closely scrutinized in the book. Free of any unimportant details, while being very detailed when it is needed, the book provides a lengthy overview of how Iran became the pillar of the US Gulf policy. Panah argues that the US tried to prevent the emergence of any anti-capitalist movement (not only Soviet-backed movements as outlined in the Eisenhower doctrine). This is, however, no surprise, as many authors have argued that the US Middle East policy stood on three pillars – support for Israel, oil supply safety and countering the USSR. Panah at length discusses the US-backed coup in 1953, which removed the popular (but nationalist) prime minister Mossadeq from power and comes back to this event several times throughout the book. Panah portrays the Iranian political system under the Shah as the one which came to power thanks to the US and kept the power thanks to the same power. One of the strongest points of the book, however, is the detailed description of the social impact of the international context on the common people in Iran. It is truly crucial for the understanding of any movement, revolution or system alike, that we understand what is ‘going on’ on the ground. Without this understanding, we cannot grasp the logic of the past and present. Panah nevertheless succeeded in detailed depictions of the impact of the industrialization and the active role of the state in it on the life of the population of Iran.

While the author also strived to look at how the revolutionary discourse appeared in Iran, it must be said that this part of the book is useful for the understanding of the following passages, but if a reader truly wants to find out more about the revolutionary discourse, he or she should look further than Panah’s book. Vali Nasr’s recent *Shia Revival* is an excellently written primer for understanding the Shiite politics and especially the ideological underpinnings of the Revolution.

Khomeini’s populist discourse and his ideas are discussed in Chapter 3 of this book, which also shows a trajectory of how the power came into the hands of a few. Panah offers insights into the contradictions and controversies within the clergy and also those between cities and rural areas. While Iran and the Iranian public are often seen as a single body, Panah’s insightful depiction of the various factions within the revolutionary mass is very useful. On direct examples of property rights or rights of women, Panah illustrates the inherent controversies within the revolution. The author also describes with precision the hardliners’ discreditation of the provisional government, which was depicted as made up of liberals. In fact, everybody who was opposed to any Khomeini-led policy was depicted as either liberal, US conspiracy-driven or secular left, none of which were reconcilable with ‘the revolution’. The author also debates the support that Iran offered to the Islamist move-
ments around the globe, acknowledging that those were often eager to accept Iranian support, training and arms, but scarcely willing to accept the Iranian aims.

The author takes pains to describe and analyse two events that largely affected Iran and its immediate geopolitical situation – the one being the storming of the US embassy and the other the war with Iraq, which is to date the bloodiest of the Middle Eastern conflicts. While she comes here and there to the Iran-Iraq war, she doesn’t talk about the conflict itself, but rather about its internal repercussions and impact on the life, society and politics in Iran. She describes the mobilization of the Iranian society, including the war donations and general war effort – something that we know well from the modern European and US histories too. On the background of the deadly conflict with Iraq, the author describes the disintegration of the revolutionary coalition of Islamists and other leftist groups, with Khomeinism being left as the only current.

The revolution has failed to bring about the desired economic change – in fact, the opposite occurred as the situation worsened when the lack of economic development was coupled with US-imposed sanctions that were laid on the country. The support for the revolution deteriorated too. The ulama preached that posterity is the right way. However, the end of war and the death of Khomeini led to a small ‘reformation’ – in the 1990s, material wealth has ceased to be demonized and posterity was not the tenet of the day. The election of the reformist president Khatami brought with it also the promises of social and political changes, but it left the economic field largely intact. Panah claims that the reforms have largely failed and that the state still controls the better part of the economy.

In the last chapter, Panah assumed to analyse the newly assertive foreign policy of Iran. She claims that the fall of the Soviet bloc led to the assumption that Islam is the only alternative to capitalism. The Iranian media started spreading the word of the revolution, partly in order to escape what Olivier Roy called the ‘Shia ghetto’. Iran improved relations with its Central Asian neighbors and continued to support the Palestinian and Lebanese movements against Israel. However, the only country where an Islamic government came into power was Sudan. She also discusses Iranian attempts to replenish Iran’s military power, including the military use of nuclear power. Panah mentions that the pressure of the US has increased since the election of George W. Bush into the White House, but she also says that the US-imposed sanctions are not as widely respected by Western companies who follow their business interests.

Maryam Panah concludes that more international pressure on Iran will lead to more domestic support for conservatives who posit themselves as the bulwark against the hostile capitalists.

The book truly deals with all subjects that are pertinent to contemporary Iran. The author is right to show that the enmity between the US and Iran is much deeper
and older than the current issues with the Iranian nuclear dossier. On the other hand, one needs to point to some shortcomings of the book. The book fails to mention anything about the Iranian support for the Lebanese movements that took US hostages in the 1980s, the subsequent US pressure on Iran and the sales of arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war through Israel. While the book is largely critical towards the revolution’s results on the economic plane, it mentions only one failure of the revolution – the failure to export. It does not say anything about the dissent among the clerics (including the top echelons consisting of marja’), which is studied in great depth in Olivier Roy’s seminal Failure of Political Islam. When the author illustrates that the western companies and banks do work in Iran in defiance to the US-imposed sanctions (to support her claims that other Western countries are more interested in business than in obeying US sanctions), she mentions several companies that in the meantime left Iran exactly due to the sanctions. Deutsche Bank is an illustration of such a company, and the current reluctance of the French Airbus to engage in business in Iran is another example of US-imposed sanctions actually affecting Western companies.

Despite these shortcomings, the book is useful for everybody interested in understanding contemporary Iran. It sheds light on numerous issues which are discussed today and enhances our understanding of Iran. Beyond the newspapers’ headlines...

Michal Onderčo
BAHAR RUMELILI: CONSTRUCTING REGIONAL COMMUNITY AND ORDER IN EUROPE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA


This book is a thought-provoking attempt at showing the role identity plays in the security relationship between, on the one hand, regional organizations for cooperation such as the EU or ASEAN and, on the other hand, states outside such organizations. The author grapples with several issues of great interest and contemporary importance: firstly, and possibly most interestingly, the role outsider states have in shaping the identity-formation within regional organizations; and secondly, the role identity plays in shaping and possibly solving (or worsening) security issues. Rumelili argues that the two are connected in the way that the self-perception of a regional organization is to a large extent based on how it perceives its outside, thus either constructing non-member states as dangerous or too different culturally and thereby fuelling possible conflict with such states, or on the other hand perceiving outsider states as possible partners or even future members and in such a fashion downplaying differences by creating an atmosphere of cooperation or trust.

The author is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Koc University, Turkey, and the book is an expanded and enriched version of her Doctoral thesis. The book is divided into three main parts. The first part consists of an introduction and a comprehensive, well-argued and enlightening theoretical background. Following this part is a series of chapters aiming at pin-pointing empirically the nature of what the author calls ‘EU identity’ and how this identity is mirrored, and indeed upheld, by EU stances on countries outside the Union. The author seems to argue that in the case of Turkey, a Turkish challenging of the EU perception of Turkey as non-European was successful and eventually led to a reformulation of the EU identity as well as to the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country. After this, the author goes on to show what impact this change of stance had on Turkish-Greek relations, and how the acknowledgment of Turkey as a possible future member-state led to a relaxation in the tense Greek-Turkish relations. The final part of the book, that is, the last chapter, makes a compressed similar study of the relations between ASEAN and Australia, arguing that an Australian attempt at challenging the ASEAN identity by forwarding Australia as a south-east Asian country largely failed, in contrast to the case of Turkey, and did not manage to produce a thaw in Indonesian-Australian relations.

Arguing from a constructivist viewpoint, Rumelili is still recognizing constructivism as incomplete. Drawing on the heritage of Karl Deutsch, Rumelili uses the term ‘security community’ to denote a regional cooperation where conflict is settled peace-
fully thanks to a common shared identity. She argues, drawing on post-structural thought, that such an identity, indeed any identity, is not possible without an outside contrast: in other words, she rebukes the idea that identity could be self-reflective and argues that any identity must be the product of boundary-drawing between those sharing the identity and the rest. The case of the regional identities of the EU, or ASEAN, it is claimed, is not different in any way. This said, she continues to draw the reader’s attention to a distinction between inclusive and exclusive identities, inclusive identities being of a nature that they are at least theoretically open for new members – an identity resting, for example, on democratic principles – and exclusive identities being based on inherent qualities such as geography or religion.

While she argues that the EU identity is a mix of the two, she concludes that the ASEAN identity draws far more on inherent qualities. It seems to be the author’s point that this is at heart the explanation of how and why Turkey could successfully persuade the EU to transform its identity to include Turkey as at least a candidate country, while the ASEAN identity could not be moved to include Australia. Thus, she concludes that while regional identity is built on differentiation, it may also be open to change and can be influenced by outsiders in order to let new countries in.

Rumelili impresses with her theoretical attempt at welding constructivism with post-structuralism, with providing a framework for analysing the relationship between conflict and identity, and her skill in navigating between complex and complicated theoretical issues. This theoretical discussion is definitely one of the most rewarding parts of the book, and one which will inspire anyone interested in regional integration and identity issues. At the same time, it is a bold manoeuvre indeed to argue that there is such a thing as an ‘EU identity’ and, furthermore, to draw the conclusions she does. As the literature on European integration theory shows, the search for a European (or EU) identity is sometimes almost reminiscent of the search for the Holy Grail. While the method of discourse analysis which the author uses may certainly be an excellent choice for the subject, it clearly shows at the same time the difficulties of the endeavour as such: the evidence put forward by the author in support of her claim to the existence of an EU identity consists mainly of transcripts from European Parliament sessions. This not only provides a number of very different ideas (as the author herself indirectly acknowledges), but it could also be argued that some of the opinions voiced are perhaps more propagandistic than truly representative of an underlying, popular European self-perception. The book reviewer finds it surprising that the author has chosen to give MEP’s from EDN or without party-group affiliation, who argue for an exclusion of Turkey from the EU on cultural grounds, such a prominent voice in her study. It is debatable whether these MEP’s are representative of an EU identity (if there is such a thing). At another place, Rumelili tries to explain the flat refusal of the EU to consider Morocco’s application as an example of shutting out a country in order to prevent it from threatening the
EU identity, rather than being an effect of the fact that Morocco is not situated in Europe. Although I agree with her that the borders of Europe are not given, at least to the east and southeast, and are the subject of political debate and open to (re-)formulation, I find this case of Morocco far-fetched.

In her analysis on how identity and security interact, Rumelili proves an ability to marry two abstract concepts in a concrete and believable way. She shows how community-building and the formation of security communities can be both productive and destructive for the promotion of peace and peaceful change outside the community. As she succinctly puts it, ‘While collective identity may promote sustained peace and cooperation among states within the community, the production of difference from outsider states may help aggravate conflicts between insider and outsider states’, thus echoing an old integrationist fear as first put forward by Mitrany. However, as Rumelili shows, the question of identity and difference is not one that is as simple as that; identities are open for change, and pursuing a policy of association and identification may empower moderate and open-minded parties on both sides of a conflict. In other words, by expanding common identity or at least opening for this possibility, pursuing such a policy may de-escalate a conflict from one of identity to one of more hands-on, solvable issues.

It was particularly rewarding to have the case of EU contrasted with that of ASEAN in a comparable way; one could only wish for more thorough comparisons of this sort.

The book is fascinating, not least because of its scope and theoretical rigour, and it is first and foremost recommended for anyone interested in constructivist ideas on identity-formation in the footsteps of Deutsch. It is well-argued at heart, providing an interesting case study of both successful and less successful formations of security communities; it asks provoking questions about what role identity plays in guaranteeing peace, how we can recognize such an identity and, not least, what role the world outside the regional organizations has in shaping regional identities. It may be somewhat lacking in empirical thoroughness when it comes to pin-pointing existing regional identities and one may not agree with all the conclusions the author makes, but I still found it an enlightening read.

Jakob Sjövall

ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 125.
ATTILIO STAJANO: RESEARCH, QUALITY, COMPETITIVENESS: EUROPEAN UNION TECHNOLOGY POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOCIETY


This book is a valuable resource. Couched largely in descriptive terms, it offers voluminous secondary data on the economic performance of the European Union. Further it provides specific economic profiles for a number of individual EU states. Despite Stajano’s descriptive approach, he stresses competitiveness and the failure of EU states to keep up with the U.S. While the EU preference for strong safety nets provides continuing citizen welfare, the price paid for universal coverage is in competitive wages and labor costs.

While seldom troubled by U.S. competition despite low dollar exports, Europe has hardly matched consistent U.S. pockets of high technology, particularly in information technology and medical research. Yet, currently, it is the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) that are penetrating more traditional European markets. It is in the higher value added technology that Europe weakens its competitiveness, regularly devoting to it one half of research and development expenditures, compared with the U.S. Thus, the battle for technology is on as Europe faces not only that challenge but globalized penetration from the BRICs.

The comparison with the U.S. is unfair to Europe. Whether it’s the Nordic Model, the British version of the Anglo-Saxon Model, or the Continental/Social Democratic/Rhine Model, Europe eschews the free market methodology of the U.S. Europe tends toward 50% public involvement in GDP, such as France, among others, in protecting national ‘champions.’ Only now with the sub-prime mess in the U.S. and world, has the government concluded that it must return somewhat to the medicine of the 1930s in government ‘bailouts.’ Thanks to F. D. Roosevelt’s social security imposition on the free marketers, the American public will not starve to death. Keynesian economics has made a comeback.

Europe could do better than emulate the U.S. With 47 million Americans without health care insurance, the comparison with Europe is pathetic. If the EU wants to spend more on research and development (not necessarily a true measure of technical acumen) it might better dispense with the Common Agricultural Policy and save over 40% of the EU budget. It could then be spent on research. But it is necessary to understand that not all research money is spent by the U.S. government. Huge amounts are spent by medical research firms and particularly pharmaceutical firms. Each is looking not only for a cure for cancer but a cure for numerous other diseases. Once stem cell research emerges from the Obama administration, more
will certainly be spent. If the U.S. has a problem, it throws money at it. This has hampered its aid programs throughout the world. There is no reason for Europe to make the same mistakes. Certainly Germany is not inclined to join the ‘bail out’ contagion even if some of its companies might, were it not for the recession, be willing to do so. Only Ireland has postulated that in 20 years, it wants to be at the forefront of biomedical research. Based on its earlier tripartite (government, business and education) alliance in information technology, it may well set the standard for Europe.

But Stajano knows where the trouble is. It is in the means. Looking at the European education and training programs, one concludes that reform is necessary. How many 30 year old German doctoral students are still studying Goethe and wondering where and when their employment will materialize? Europe needs to go high tech and soon. Automobiles can no longer drive the economic motor of the U.S nor of Europe. Obama has already observed that the U.S. stands in 15th place in broadband accessibility in the world. It is one thing to do R and D. It is another to disperse or distribute the benefits of that research. Certainly Finland has done so in information technology. Why are Boeing and Airbus trying to build an airplane that will carry an entire neighborhood across the Atlantic? The reduction in time may be in the order of 90 minutes. Europe’s high speed train from Brussels to Strasbourg already moves officials at over 200 kilometers per hour while disturbing the tranquility of rural France.

Stajano asserts that the Lisbon strategy was weakly conceived (p. 225). It was ‘dirigiste’; it lacked focus; and it lacked rewards and sanctions. He cites former Netherlands prime minister Wim Kok (p. 226) arguing the barriers of European low population growth and ageing; failing to act propitiously on Lisbon strategies; proceeding with an overloaded agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities. His recommendation: strengthening the knowledge society; expediting the single market; creating supportive business strategies; developing strategies for lifelong learning and active ageing; sustaining environmental improvements. Regarding the new members, EU 10 + 2, Stajano states that despite some skepticism among the EU 15, the new members ‘...have enlarged the internal market and also provide a sizeable pool of both skilled and unskilled labour. It does not follow, however, that western Europe may be faced with an uncontrollable horde of immigrants... western companies may choose to relocate to the east, to make use of cheaper labour on the spot...’ (p. 315).

The Seventh Framework Program consists of a 65% increase in its budget allocation over the Sixth Framework (p. 193). The largest allocations were for health, biotech, information society, nanotechnologies, energy, environment, transport socio-economic (the smallest) and security and space. Specification is made for the development of joint public/private investments (JTIs). Yet, Stajano observes that
the Commission’s manpower and willingness to proceed with political and legislative tasks may not be sufficient (p. 193).

Returning to the means, one of Stajano’s excellent inclusions lies in pp. 481–485. This section includes university courses on research, quality and competitiveness, followed by an appendix of recommended read web sites. As a professor, he understands the importance of input to output. It occurs to this reviewer that perhaps a commission of business/academics/government officials could focus critically on bringing the tripartite approach to the EU, as it was so well inaugurated by Ireland: a careful injection of funds along with an appropriate mechanism for sounding out the bottom up ingenuity needed to stimulate local talent while energizing the levers of EU administration to proceed with innovation, exploration, testing and adoption rather than hunkering down in a basement waiting for a unique cure for cancer to make itself evident. The EU means cooperation but also means tapping its resources. If the present approach has been too dirigiste, the model change might well involve stimulating those outside the Brussels mania wishing to participate in R and D explorations.

Stajano has integrated a formidable collection of data and textual materials on the EU in his book. On the data side, a nice collection of bar graphs, charts and figures provides significant amounts of economic data, much of it designed in a comparative format. On the text side, his Part III includes useful sketches of all the EU treaties, descriptions of the original constitutional treaty in 2004, and the succeeding document, The Reform Treaty of Lisbon, that shared a similar ignominious negation leaving the EU constitutive authority as conceived by the various treaties. Despite the failure of the membership to ratify either the constitution or Lisbon, the EU has managed to survive resting on its various pillars. Perhaps these failures have emboldened some to seek out interactive committees within the EU Parliament and EU Commission to gestate agreements that might result in legislation to amend or otherwise tweak existing treaty practices. Were that to continue, the dirigiste conundrum might disperse itself more widely among parliament officials and membership representatives. Thus, the three pillars might embrace change or modification by agreement in the absence of a gala constitutional document that so far has befuddled the public and stiffened protective reactions from certain EU members.

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