Globalization, Armed Conflicts and Security

edited by Alessandro Gobbicchi
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*Alessandro Gobbicchi*

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Acknowledgements

During my three years of work at the Military Centre for Strategic Studies, I have had the opportunity to meet with professors and scholars from many different countries and to exchange opinions and perspectives about many aspects of the political, economic and social changes that are taking place in the world. The ideas gained from these encounters and from my own studies convinced me that the links between such changes and the violence which accompanies them ever more frequently still had to be examined. The same was true for the consequences of these links on the definition of appropriate security policies. These considerations and the desire to discuss them led me to organize an international conference on “Globalization, Uncertainty, New Conflicts” that took place in Roma at the Centro Alti Studi della Difesa at the end of May 2003.

I want to thank Brig. Gen. Carlo Finizio, Director of the Military Centre for Strategic Studies, for the support he gave me in organizing the conference, the results of which are presented in this book.
Introduction
War and Security in the Globalized World

Alessandro Gobbicchi

The Dark Side of the Moon

Understanding the multifaceted characteristics of globalization is fundamental to understanding the nature of contemporary wars. In the same way, the definition of a concept of security must be clearly informed by the context in which such security is to be pursued, as well as the factors unleashing and sustaining armed conflicts.

The globalization literature is rich in reference to wars. Whether the study be focused on its economic, political or sociological aspects, war recurs as a factor with which we must reckon, both as a product of globalization (direct in some cases, indirect in others) and as a phenomenon which proliferates in the conditions created by globalization.

1. Some of those who study the economic aspects of globalization see armed conflicts as proof of negative political and social consequences following unsuccessful economic growth. Others see it as the challenge to pursue a more uniform distribution of globalization’s benefits. The data demonstrate that a country reaps important benefits from participation in the international economy and that the risk of war between “successful developers” is 10 times less than between “marginalized countries”. It is nevertheless true that the number of marginalized countries is increasing and that, outside the West, the countries benefiting from their participation in the international system are restricted to East Asia and Latin America. Given that conflict impacts a country’s very chances of development, the prospect of falling into “the conflict trap” becomes ever more tangible for an increasing number of countries.

Though globalization is associated with economic development, which is associated in turn with the decreased likelihood of civil war, it is also true that often the distinctly non-economic aspects of development are what trigger conflicts. Frequent and consistent shocks in the movement of capital affect
power relations and traditional hierarchies; they lead to the appearance of new actors on the scene who pursue their own interests according to differentiated and often conflictual strategies. Experience demonstrates that social divisions are often generated by factions’ wills to exploit new opportunities for wealth; where the state is weak, they seek power through such wealth. Thus policies for promoting growth must be accompanied by policies aimed at “protecting” society and preventing the breakdown of political institutions. Such policies might pursue the elimination of corruption, political and legislative reforms, limiting countries’ exposure to price shocks and reducing the risks of ethnic dominance.

When viewed as the final stage of deteriorating relations between collectivities caused by economic instability, armed conflicts have become the litmus test of the validity of economic policies implemented by global institutions like the International Monetary Fund or World Bank, whose job it is to provide funds to needy countries to enable an economic recovery, and thereby promote political stability. This sensitivity to political stability has been heightened in recent times, so much that the term “development”, which is held out as a panacea for an endangered society, is now always associated with “social stability”. We now know that programs of uncontrolled commercial liberalization, industrial privatization and deregulated foreign capital investment ought to be evaluated in light of their possible effect on the social contract. This contract is grounded in the principle of equity and binds citizens to their government. To rupture the social contract is to cause more or less violent disturbances and disorder.

The problem of equity is particularly acute. It has been proven that, within certain limits, it isn’t poverty which causes the discontent which generates disturbances, but the perception of inequality and injustice in the distribution of wealth and opportunities. It is no accident that more and more people, while granting that globalization has improved life conditions for millions of people, still emphasize that this has been accompanied by an increased gap between rich and poor, both at the global level, and, in some cases, in individual countries. Such increased inequality has to be taken seriously by those interested in conflict prevention. In this perspective, some economists’ genuine enthusiasm for an average annual growth in the global income of 2.5% is countered by the more general fears triggered by an increase of nearly 100 million people in poverty, and the perception of a direct relationship between the different levels of economic well-being and ethnic identity.

Aware of the relationships between unfavorable economic conditions and armed conflicts, and the spiral of interdependence that binds them, global institutions seek to carry out their functions with a view to maintaining peace.
and stability. Thus the World Bank commissions studies to determine the social, political and economic conditions that systematically increase the incidence of civil war, in order to shape effective development policies for reducing global conflict.

It thus emerges that economic decline, dependency on primary commodity exports, low per capita income and an unequal distribution of wealth place a country at high risk for civil war. These elements respond to dynamics whose dimensions usually are the fruit of multiple and articulated interests and go beyond the single state possibility of regulation. In zones characterized by low and declining incomes and an unequal distribution of wealth, entrepreneurs of violence from all over the world are able to cheaply recruit great masses of men. The presence of natural resources, moreover, can contribute to instability inasmuch as they may provoke possessive desires and may also be a source of material support for rebel organizations or separatist movements. The problem arises when these kinds of economic conditions are associated with incompetent, non-democratic and ultimately weak states, which are unable to oppose those who would wield power through violence.

2. In the political sphere, the connection between globalization and war passes for international disorder, and this is in turn associated with the fragmentation of power. The loss of State power in the face of advancing national and transnational organizations (institutional and non-institutional) makes orphans of sociologists, political scientists and even an economist or two. The prospect of a future without States as we commonly know them, without their power and authority, worries many of those who care about global stability and the peaceful survival of society. Fears for the future of democracy mix with “realist” considerations of the warlike tendencies of authoritarian governments and the destabilizing power of the political longings of power networks.

It is not clear how these worries are mitigated by those who maintain that globalization can only become concrete in circumstances conditioned by states’ will and is therefore subject to state rules. Corporate profits speak clearly and cast serious doubts upon some sovereign states’ chances of opposing, or even influencing, the investment policies of some of the particularly powerful Multinational Corporations, even when they might generate internal conflicts. In some cases, the intermediate possibility of transforming state powers into functions of mediation, coordination and regulation of social relations (be they conflictual or cooperative) is of little help. In this case, the problem seems to be the state’s ability to adapt to changing national and international conditions. But young or weak governments do not have this adap-
tive ability. Lacking experience, legitimacy and power, these governments crumble in the face of complex political dynamics, and return to traditional, localistic and solidarity-based forms of government, rooted in traditional and local bonds as well as economic interests. The current debate on the effectiveness of state power and the changing nature of the state and its power structures sees the state as actively promoting itself as a privileged actor in “collaborative power arrangements”. It interprets globalization as a consequence of states’ action in promoting the strategies of their corporations at the international level. We need to acknowledge that these capacities require experience in governing, as well as legitimacy. So far only the democracies have experienced the centuries of political deliberation necessary to produce this result.

The issues at the heart of the current globalization debate demonstrate the degree of fear provoked by the scaled-down powers of the State and the loss of its capacity to “absorb” phenomena potentially dangerous to global stability. Alongside dichotomies like centralization/decentralization, local/global and national/global, which signal a strong interest in the relationship between the Whole and its individual parts and seek to establish at the global system level possible regularities able to predict the forms of a relationship after that the mediating action of the State has been reconceived, we now find concepts such as global identity, world society and trans-national states. These new terms suggest new possibilities for global cohabitation, and underscore how this question can no longer be solved with the traditional concepts.

The debates and studies on governance and the role of civil society, currently unfolding in a larger context of debates on the effects of globalization, demonstrate the importance of the quest to manage the relations between “interest groups” and may suggest a practicable alternative to the now difficult exercise of solitary power by a State, whose sovereignty is limited by the power of the many actors on the international scene.

Used as we are to the omnipresent and reassuring action of the State, we feel bewildered in the face of the possibility of its loss. In Western thinking the State represents the protection of law and stability from barbarism and chaos. The idea of a stateless global society terrifies us. The possibility of global disorder triggers the fear of violence, and with this a revaluation of the monopoly on the use of force and the figure of the monopolist. States have conquered this position over the centuries, and in some periods this has provided a certain security. Some economists argue that a stable international environment is the necessary condition for maintaining a world trade system and that only the monopoly on force can guarantee this. This argument tracks another one made decades ago by N. Elias. In conditions of monopoly, he claimed, there
is no more room for the conquest of chances of power by force, so the com-
petition for power passes to the economic sphere, which does not admit vio-
ence. When the monopoly on violence is lost, the competition shifts to the
military sphere, rekindling widespread violence.

This process has characterized the history of Europe and it is one that
we ought to take seriously. However, the conditions have changed and eco-
nomic power may now threaten a political power claiming a monopoly on the
use of violence. The proliferation of economic power centers must therefore
be watched carefully, especially when considering countries whose govern-
ments lack strength and legitimacy. Certain situations on the African contin-
ent exemplify developments as dangerous as they are unexpected and, ap-
parently, ungovernable. Here the debacle of institutional power is reflected
in its incapacity to provide security for itself and its own citizens, and in the
appearance of Private Military Companies to protect citizens where the State
fails to do so. In countries where violence is the primary mode of interaction,
the control of violence represents a source of power. This is a power that ex-
pands and branches out, that transforms itself and penetrates every habit of
daily life, but in the end it always remains a violent power. War thus becomes
the context in which genuine social, political and economic systems that are
alternative to the State prosper, and they survive because of their ties to
transnational criminal networks.

Sociological perspectives

If globalization has had the merit of emancipating sociology from
methodological nationalism, part of the credit is due to its in-depth study of
the relations between the components of the global system and the dynamics
that regulate this system and its processes. From this perspective, war is seen
as an internal social phenomenon, a mode of relationship between subsystems
and is thus considered worthy of interest.

Modern sociologists feel the burden of the disappointment of 19th centu-
ry positivist expectations for peace. Affected by the unexpected consequences
of the 19th century modernization process in Europe, which gave rise to ro-
mantic-nationalist movements, today sociology demonstrates a keen attention
to issues related to globalization that threaten potentially conflictual reactions.
Aware of a strong relationship between globalization and modernization, so-
ciologists focus on the relationships between economic changes and cultural
shifts, on the uncertainties of social change, on the consequences that sudden
changes can have on traditional societies and on the role of collective identities and religion as instruments of mobilization.

The exportation of modernity implied by the globalization process leads to rapid social and cultural changes and the concomitant loss of traditional references. The introduction of new modes of production, the variation of levels of well being, the dissemination of new values (which often conflict with traditional ones) and rapid social mobility all affect social changes which produce anxiety and insecurity. At the same time, they arouse a strong desire for cultural and social identity, which can often be satisfied by ethnic differentiation and religious reawakening. Different forms of adaptation to the changes, different cultural responses to the processes of modernization, different forms of social order become associated with an ascribed difference, such as ethnic difference, or deep commitments, such as religion. This creates a potentially conflictual relationship between communities rooted in the belief that dialogue is useless.

This process of ethnic differentiation has many consequences. In civil struggles (be they for greater rights, better economic opportunities or organized groups’ access to power) a shared common identity is a core factor around which mobilization structures are organized, or an easy, unproblematic individual identification with collective actions is generated. Where no other form of identification exists, such as classes or ideologies, the desire for reciprocal recognition in the pursuit of interests is usually satisfied by the ethnic and religious distinction. In many countries, ethnically grounded identity and belonging are the main points of reference for the We-They distinction; this reinforces the bonds of solidarity and loyalty necessary to the pursuit of any goal in a context characterized by a loss of moral and institutional references. Precisely because of its apparent immediacy, the ethnic factor is immediately perceptible by the most emarginated, least educated groups, those who are most impressionable and disposed to the use of violence. The perception of diversity is then within reach, ready to be deployed as a tool for emphasizing a difference that can become a reason for fear and mistrust.

It is for this reason that ethnic and religious confrontations represent the most widespread forms of armed conflict.

Ethnic belonging is what remains after everything else has come into question. In the politically and socially chaotic situations of some African countries or the republics of the former Soviet Union, collective actions require strong bonds of solidarity, potentially able to ensure absolute and unconditional fidelity, to withstand in time and survive different degrees and kinds of disruption strategies. This holds true for those who govern or command any form of power, as well as for those who are excluded from the ex-
exercise of power and have to organize themselves to assert their rights. Ties of this kind can be provided only by ethnic – if not tribal or even familiar – belonging.

In this perspective, sociology and anthropology’s attention to the local-global relationship marks an awareness of the value that, in a globalized world, “the local” has as an antidote to the loss of reference and identity, which might otherwise lead to the search for radical and dangerous differences upon which to ground identity.

**Globalized Wars**

In as much as globalization represents a redistribution of economic opportunities, a redefinition of national and international power structures and a cultural confrontation, war is an aspect of globalization. Historical events demonstrate that simultaneous economic, political and social changes are destabilizing per se, and this instability, in the absence of a coordinating power able to impose its own authority, will unleash chaos and a total confrontation in which the actors engage all their force; the synthesis of this is war.

Total confrontation is also global war, because it engages all those involved in the globalization process who see it as an opportunity to increase their own power, or who see the chance of being overwhelmed.

The focus then shifts to the conflict as a mode of encounter, as a necessary step toward the definition of new hierarchies of power and new centers of political and economic power, as an initial attempt to define the new modalities of interaction between new international actors, as a tool for measuring the new collective actors’ ability to survive, in short, as a tool for creating a new global order.

The international community is aware of the stakes and the danger of this confrontation. But while we are precise and efficient in making war, we are less brilliant in preventing it. Moreover, the profound, multiple and multiform interconnections between globalization and war make it hard to reduce war to a definite set of categories. They also provoke an alternation of roles, so that sometimes the processes of globalization lead to conflict, and other times it is the conflict which triggers globalization’s mechanisms.

The economic aspect of conflicts gives us a clear example of this dynamic. War is expensive, but it may offer considerable opportunities for income and power. The nexus between globalization and war is not foreign to this consideration. No armed conflict can last if the belligerents do not have suffi-
cient funds to obtain weapons and sustain the fighting forces. In an area like warfare, in which technological superiority and training make the difference, and in which industry invests considerably, money is an essential prerequisite. But just as costs are high, so are the payoffs for he who succeeds in gaining power by winning a war and for those whose businesses thrive in a belligerent environment.

War has thus become a global economic phenomenon in as much as it represents an opportunity to profit. Weak states and geographic regions rich in natural resources become the objects of desire. Their existence excites diverse transnational groups, which see war’s chaos as an opportunity for social advancement, political realignment and increased earnings, to mobilize ambitious global projects. Within the globalized world, war may represent a desirable option for those enterprises which thrive by financing and organizing the supply of men and materials, or by illicit trading of minerals and drugs and also men and women. It is no accident that many civil conflicts take place in areas of considerable mineral wealth, and that almost the global whole production of drugs is concentrated in conflict-driven countries.

In the globalized world war becomes a context in which new non-institutional, illegal, political and economic systems can thrive. The “marketization” and “de-institutionalization” of war makes war very difficult to regulate. In contrast to nation-states able to sustain a military defeat, who engage their people in a rational discourse about war’s costs and benefits and for whom there exists a moral discourse about responsibility towards the people, the networks know that defeat means their expulsion from the game, and therefore their disappearance. The elites’ “irresponsibility” in the global epoch is being transformed, through transnational organizations, into the possibility of playing power games in any part of the world without any legal or moral constraint. They are immune from both government sanctions and emotional attachments, able to recruit men and acquire weapons wherever the power games so require.

In this context, the issue of conflict regulation becomes all the more complex, especially when one considers the diversity of the actors involved. The regulation of the use of force is a primary objective as an alternative to mutual destruction. Because of war’s ability to creep into other areas of the system and destroy them, it is potentially detrimental to the whole system and thus warrants the particular attention of the international community. The care with which war is regulated shows the significance attributed to it. The development of modalities of armed conflict therefore reveals the international system’s ability to govern its own internal processes, in other words, its efficiency.
The subdivision of armed intervention into multiple categories and denominations is a symptom of the need to distinguish in order not to superimpose, to determine with precision causes, actions and subjects in order to limit and circumscribe armed interventions. The point of all this is to avoid erroneous perceptions that could lead to dangerously more cruel interventions than are necessary.

But war transforms itself. Violence follows the multiplication of economic and political interests and ideological differences, and it reflects the many possible combinations of culture and technology. In this context the discourse of prevention becomes articulated and complex. Armed conflict belongs to the current historical period. The current cultural conditions of the global world’s inhabitants do not enable us to predict sensational developments in the immediate future in the area of world pacification. It is therefore useful to study with due realism the possible avenues of prevention.

Systemic Security

The economic, political and social changes brought about by globalization have triggered a number of social and political transformations, sometimes marked, within individual States. These transformations have had deep repercussions in the international sphere. Of these, the most significant seem to be the ending of the bipolar order, the appearance of new actors on the international scene and States’ loss of their monopoly over the use of force. The global situation created by these transformations represents a threat to the present model of international order, which is strongly based on a balance of power between States.

The main danger is implicit in the very dynamics of globalization. Globalization may influence the outbreak of a conflict in the first place, while also multiplying and extending its adverse effects. The costs of armed conflicts to affected populations in the global age are not strictly limited to the use of weapons, but also (and to a much higher degree than in the past) to diseases, malnutrition, migrations, environmental harm, crime, and social disorder.

Most of the time, parties’ intervention capabilities are so extensive, their interests are so mutually interrelated and the possibilities for war-related disorder are so many that governments can barely fathom the elements and interests in play. Moreover, even if they could, they cannot always make a difference. Many interconnected factors prevent most of the States in which conflicts take place from effectively managing them. Among such factors, we can
mention: the multiplicity and diversity of the actors interested in influencing conflicts, the large assets with which they can effect such influence and cause the mass destruction of material resources, the spread of violence at every level due to the proliferation of weapons, the trans-national nature of most of the parties to the conflict and their ability to mobilise resources in other parts of the world and provoke conflicts in neighbouring areas.

The major problem in handling today’s conflicts seems to be related to the control of the factors in play. The more the world “globalises”, the more significant this problem becomes. Contemporary conflicts’ potential to wreak material destruction and social disintegration is matched by the delicacy and complexity of the social, economical and political requisites for a society’s survival in the present international system. The destruction of infrastructures, the flight of capital abroad, the killing of men and women of working age, sometimes the wiping out of natural environments and the suppression of the political and economic system can have long-lasting effects. These effects can hinder economic recovery and prevent the revival of the country in the long term, which further exposes a war-torn state to future conflicts. Data show that the per capita income of a country at the end of an average civil war is 15% lower than if the conflict had never occurred. If we add to this the deterioration of institutions and therefore their decreased ability to impose strategies for economic recovery, and the fact that civil rebellion is much more likely in a country where the average income is low and the economy is in decline, we see the danger facing the most marginalized, conflict-ridden countries.

This situation of chronic marginality also threatens the security of the globalized world.

In the global system, security is the security of the global system. This security is connected to the functioning of the system itself, and this in turn is connected to the functioning of all of its parts. The system’s effectiveness is the proof that there are no conflicts between its members, which may prejudice their interaction and halt the operation of the whole. However, the interdependence that links single parts to each other, and relates them to the system as a whole, makes it essential that each of them function as part of an interlocking mechanism, adapting their own operating modes to globally shared principles. A security action then means emanating basic principles to govern the political, economical and social fields, and managing the individual components’ adaptation to these principles. In case of deviations from the governing principles, corrective interventions are prescribed. These appear to be the principles inspiring contemporary global security politics. This is strictly re-
lated to what is defined as “global governance”, which sees the reconstruction of societies and market economies as the way of preventing wars.

There are many problems with this approach.

First, conflict over the global governing principles is to be expected. The redistribution of global economic power has challenged Western economic and cultural leadership. The consequent decrease in the homogenizing power of its culture has limited the ability of its models of social and political order to penetrate globally, and has contributed to the rise of alternative political, economic, and social systems. These alternative systems are based on cultural affinities able to create “strong” bonds and are genuine models of social order, able to expand their influence in culturally similar areas. Given the impossibility of imposing unilateral perspectives, the relevant factors for evaluating possible global shared principles in this context become the flexibility of existing models, their potential openness and the level of mutual diversity.

Looking at the functioning of the global system, it is worth considering that in such a system, any activity which causes slowdowns, fractures and oppositions may provoke disorder and ungovernability. Therefore, the challenges facing the kind of security politics outlined above arise from a variety of potentially dangerous areas. Inequality in the distribution of natural resources, the high debt burdens on developing countries, the uncontrolled flows of financial capital, the increase in weapons manufacturing, malnutrition, despotism, uneven distribution of population, ethnic and religious divisions, political fragmentation, pollution, disparities within States, and economic, social or political changes are all risk factors in so far as they can interrupt, or create the premises for interrupting, the system’s functioning.

The system addresses these risks by disseminating principles and guidelines for the management of local affairs, delegating oversight and implementation to trans-national institutions and local authorities. Thus, the conversion to democracy, commercial agreements and the internationalization of justice become methods for the management of the global system. Human rights becomes a regulating factor and a cushion against the more severe aspects of a global system grounded in market dynamics. The negative consequences of globalization are to be checked by the application of guidelines for the elimination of discrimination, for the introduction of democracy, religious freedom, women and children’s rights, freedom of expression, the right to health care and due process.

Cultural resistance, objective difficulties related to the State’s weakness and organized boycott all make the local implementation of these principles difficult. These principles are frequently disregarded, often leaving whole
populations to grapple with just the negative aspects of a system engaged in fast and deep social changes. Thus, the globalized world demonstrates the existence of potential and actual conflict situations in many areas of the world. Such situations can range from ethnic conflicts in the ex-Soviet republics, to separatism in Southeast Asia and India, to religious conflicts, often linked to ethnic ones. Other situations include the problems related to the control of water resources and the population increase in Middle East and in North Africa, the control of the huge mineral resources in sub-Saharan Africa and the control of oilfields.

The result is a gap between a globalized and relatively stable centre and a periphery. The periphery is moreover divided into one area, organised and united by its aversion to the system’s principles, and another area characterised by an almost total lack of control and high levels of near chronic conflict. Such fracture makes it hard to integrate these parts into a single system. The frequent conflicts between different parties to the global system prevent the system from doing what it must in order to reach the efficiency levels required for its security. The level of internal complexity that such a security would require is not met by the de facto situations within the global system. Nor can economic specialisation solve the problems arising in the political sphere. The reconceptualization of security in terms of development sees a balanced distribution of social and economic resources as important for managing the tensions. It decreases the risk of institutional and social breakdown compared to a society marked by destabilising conditions such as pervasive poverty, extreme socio-economic disparities and systematic lack of opportunity. The underlying assumption here is a trust in modern processes and their ability to affect the social and cultural changes able to stabilize the more vulnerable societies. Facts show that such politics risk provoking a violent rejection or disorder caused by problems in adaptation and that might take the shape of nationalistic revivals.

This and other example demonstrate that problems that seemed to be resolved (or easily resolvable) according to the Western-style development model still have unpredictable aspects. If applied to different cultures and contexts, customary mechanisms yield reactions based on a logic that the West hardly remembers and which requires a deep comprehension of the ways in which institutional and cultural factors are produced and reproduced within the local articulation of the global system.

Following the conceptual path outlined above, the collected contributions are divided into three sections: the first examines some particularly in-
teresting aspects of globalisation from the point of view of the relationship between globalisation and world-wide stability. Herein some crucial issues are thematized, such as the inherent contradictions of globalization, and the limits to global governance; the changing role and significance of state power and organized military force; and the normative issues of new security identities and ethical debates concerning the justified or legitimate use of force.

The second section of the book deals with particular forms of conflict that arise in the wake of globalization. Findings from the first section are herein borne out by an outline of the dynamics of the international system, and of the effects issuing from the changing nature of the state. Relevant features of ethnic conflicts are discussed, eliciting reflections on the relationship between globalization and modernization, and on identity issues as a conflict-triggering factor.

The third section draws upon the previous two for an analysis of new concepts of security that take into account the changing international context. Relevant questions are discussed herein, such as: whether state authority can still be regarded as the most effective actor of security; the implications of the so-called human security paradigm; the relationship between security and liberty and the what are the consequences of the arising of multiple security agencies.
Part one

*Globalization, Governance, World Disorder*
Constitutional Instability: a World-System Issue

Vittorio Olgiati

The Deconstruction of Post-Cold War’s International Legal Relations

Considering different social and legal contexts, it is almost banal to note that radical transformations have occurred in the past decades. The material and symbolic variables that nurtured such transformations, and shaped their patterns, is impressive. Equally impressive is their actual and prospective impact. It is hardly surprising then that a systematic inquiry into past, present and future developments – as well as their short and long term evolutionary consequences – is now at the top of many scientific agendas.

Consequential to these changes is a fact – rooted, as we will see, in much wider epochal trends – whose relevance can no longer be hidden or ignored: the social, political and cultural deconstruction – weakening, fragmentation and erosion – of the fundamental principles and primary rules that have previously been held up as reference standards of the basic interests and values of Western society.

As a matter of fact, what is directly challenged is the totemic force of attraction and stabilization of the constitutional narratives and constitutional systems that officially governed Western society since at least the middle of the last century, especially those rooted in the cultural legacy and power structures of the State-form, and State-oriented international relations.

This does not mean that current formal Western-style constitutional arrangements – either as ideographic devices or as operational mechanisms – no longer play an important role in the worldwide social dynamic. Surely they are and will continue to be resilient in various respects. Nevertheless, it is increasingly apparent that they no longer embody nor represent the totality of social, political and economic issues that derived from that cultural legacy and support those power structures in one way or another. Therefore, they can no longer coherently guarantee and reproduce the embodied values and interests that once shaped them as “universal” models, theoretically fit for any society.

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The aim of this paper is to focus on some features of this problematic state of affairs, in light of the official implementation of a radically new political doctrine affecting the whole realm of inter-societal and inter-state relationships: the “pre-emptive war” doctrine, a doctrine that signifies – as I will try to show – both the fulfilment and the bankruptcy of “globalization” as a new world-system governance model of the post-Cold War national and international order.

Given my professional expertise, the analysis will be carried out according to a theoretical sociological and legal approach. In turn, given the limited space and time at my disposal, I will focus on some general issues of mainly constitutional relevance. Lastly, given my cultural background, I will look at these issues from a Western/European point of view.

As “Globalization, Governance and World Disorder” is the theme that I shall address in this first conference session, I will take seriously the conceptual “trilemma” that these three terms evoke together as a distinctive line of thought. In so doing, I will argue that, due to either long-lasting historical conditions or the already apparent political and institutional implications of the above-mentioned doctrine, a widespread constitutional instability is becoming a major feature of contemporary society. More precisely, I will argue that the reasons for such current and future constitutional instability at the world-system level is not so much a “clash” between Western and non-Western “civilizations” – as Huntington says – but rather a “clash” among Western governance values and interests, and therefore a “clash” within Western Rationality and Western society itself.

The Theoretical and Practical “Trilemma” at Stake

Let me start by saying that the theme of this first conference session “Globalization, Governance and World Disorder” constitutes a theoretical and practical “trilemma” insofar as it forces us to reflect upon present-day Western constitutional systems by questioning not only traditional legal discourses and dominant institutional structures, but also the overall rationale of recent globalization debates, processes and policies. That means rethinking contemporary Western Modernity, not only from the point of view of current epochal crisis of the Ius Publicum Europaeum (i.e. the crisis of positive law as the most refined expression of Western Reason, as epitomized by the Doctrine of State Interests since the 16th century), but also with a view to the question-able patterns and paradoxical outcomes (veritable social, political and organi-
izational “intelligence failures”) of the Western-styled “governmentality” project, carried forward by trans-national agencies and economic corporations after the fall of the Soviet bloc, under the label of globalization.

More precisely, to open up a discussion that could be - as Luhmann would say - “plausible” (i.e. grounded on relevant, testable evidence) and “socially adequate” (i.e. based on irrepressible social demands) regarding the causal links, functional couplings, genealogical paths and symbolic interactions between each horn of this trilemma, I will focus on a “fundamental curve” – as Le Goff would put it – of their historically-determined patterns: the paradoxical outcome of the “moulding through” of the (high-tech based) “Will to Power” of Western ruling elite and the (failed) “Universal Promises” of Western Modernity as a specific constitutional contradiction. This will offer a better view of how and why the contemporary Western Ratio Iuris and Ratio Status are moving, now more than ever, along intrinsically incompatible paths, and, therefore, how and why Western society, far from providing higher security and welfare standards, will produce increasing political disorder and constitutional instability worldwide.

To illustrate this point, I will examine the topic through the lens of a realist perspective, such as the one implied by the above-mentioned Doctrine of the State Interests, i.e. the perspective that – to recall Meineke – has been at the core of European political thought since Machiavelli.

Western Rationality at an Epochal Turning Point

According to Immanuel Kant, one of the greatest thinkers of Western Modernity, there are three ways to think about human/social dynamics, in order to envisage the future: to imagine a never-ending regression (which leads to moral panic); to imagine never-ending progress (eudemonism); and to imagine a never-ending oscillation (a kind of Vicoean return) between progress and decay.

For a number of well-known reasons, the great projects of Western Modernity have been always constructed with a view to never-ending progress: an ascending irresistible advancement towards universalistic ideals, higher rationality, social emancipation, legal certainty, etc., as if their (Western-style and Western-centric) epistemic, theoretical and practical, foundations were truly universal.

Yet, as historical experience teaches, such an as if rationale – the main pillar of the functional-fictional mode of production of both the Western positive legal system and constitutional narratives – is surely just a refined con-
structionism, as jurists such as Hagestrom and Vaihinger conceded. This constructionist strategy, however, might also spread "a pestilential breath" over society – as Jeremy Bentham, another master of Western Modernity, put it – especially when it lacks, as it lacks now, the mimetic support of dominant discourses and power structures.

Of course a lot of water has passed under the bridge since Bentham. But a tour d’horizon of current social dynamics is enough to realize that he was right and that this is the present case: we are now experiencing the spread of such "pestilential breath" throughout the local, national and international socio-legal arena.

Due to the end of the Promethean era of worldwide Western hegemony – i.e. the era of the tight, organic intertwinement of the (1) cultural, (2) political and (3) institutional primacy of Western society vis-a-vis other societies in the world – we are not only witnessing a mere "defensive modernization" of Western constituencies (even when this sort of modernization is enhanced by means of sophisticated aggressive tools), but also seeing the consequences of the unbearable burden of a holistic Western-centric world-view (even if this burden is "softened" daily by massive doses of propaganda and high-tech security measures).

To put it in systemic terms: because of that organic intertwinement, Western society was, paradoxically, de-re-composed into a number of functionally differentiated self-referential systems, whose seemingly formal-rational (but actually virtual-fictional) performances and procedures now lead either to an increasing cultural, political and institutional Weberian désenchantement or to a mere imaginary "free raiding" policy – a veritable "wishful desire", as French post-modernists such as Clouscart would say – towards never-ending "optimal changes". Therefore, it is no accident that we are now experiencing what Wallerstein calls "the vanishing guarantees of Western rationality" at both the structural and symbolic levels.

Indeed, as evidence shows, a major constitutive trait of Western/Westernized society is now the growing inconsistency in the balance between instrumental rationality, value-based rationality and practical form. This can also be conceived as an increasing deficit in the balance between what Aristotle called techne, episteme and phronesis – within both social-scientific and political-institutional realms, as either the rise of the so-called Risikogesellschaft or the corrosive impact of multiculturalism on judicial interpretations of the self-styled "universal" values of Western constitutional settings demonstrate.

In turn, to the extent that the core values of Western constitutions lose their universalistic (but in fact historically-determined) foundations, domi-
nant doctrines and practices concerning Western constitutional standards stimulate a growing legal “superstition” and a widespread social fundamentalism among those Western/ized thinkers who still maintain the idea, typical of 19th century politicians as varied as Metternich and Mazzini, of the unquestionable “world civilizing mission” of Western countries vis-à-vis any other society. Such thinkers still seek to export these alleged “universals” not only “as if” they really were universal, but also “as if” the international exchange ratios between Western and non-Western societies had not fundamentally changed.

In both cases, if one lifts the ideological “veil of ignorance” of their narratives and recognizes that the universalistic pretensions of Western governance models are far from being unquestionable, one cannot but facing the contours of a sort of “Naked King” being increasingly apparent that even most renowned Western-driven official institutions do not respect the “fundamental” Western values and rules (such as democratic standards) according to which they claim to act.

To put it in philosophical terms, it is more and more apparent that, by empowering its own self-referential rationality, the Schumpeterian “destructive creation” of Western-centric dynamics turned Western society into a social body wandering into a Heideggerian vital “nothingness”, whose fictional appearance merely covers its true epistemic essence.

The Decline of the Nomic Function of Western-styled Legal Formalism

What has just been said holds true as a general view about contemporary Western society as a whole. But it holds especially true for the inner logic, structures and functions of contemporary Western legal systems.

As is well-known, since the traumatic legal experiences of the failure of the Weimar constitution, the rise of the Nazi double-State system and the enactment of the Nuremberg Trials, the (alleged) “universals” of Western Modernity have been trapped into the decomposition of the organic unity and identity between Western legal and institutional systems, one the one hand, and Western ruling elites, on the other hand.

A number of general standard rules have become mere virtual “labels”, concealing the particularistic interests of certain internal fractions of the self-same Western elites. The legal positivisation of “human rights” and their concurrent semantic shift in almost all Western constitutional settings – conceived at present as synonymous with mere “fundamental” rights – is just an example.
In turn, formal law is no longer the “dominant stance of the hegemonic ideology” of traditional nation-state “historic blocs”, being exploited and challenged by the rise of totally different legal discourses and practices produced by powerful private (corporate) socio-legal orders ruled by other competing ruling fractions, internal or external to such “historic blocs”. Being internally divided by the attachment to different political “loyalties”, Western elites are no longer concerned with “universal” ideals, except that of a global governance system without a proper formal-official representation. A clear sign of this is the ongoing debate among Western legal scholars about the crisis of the “State sovereignty” principle and the quest for its conceptual revision.

Consequently, it is no coincidence that, having anyhow abandoned in actual practice the idealistic model of either a Kantian perpetual peace or a Kelsenian pure State law, a variety of elite fractions increasingly set up “tribal” rules and fight as “tribes” – as Omahe has shown – outside, but also inside their constituencies and among themselves, in order to pursue their own specific individual interests.

If one now considers that all this concerns inter-and trans-national relationships between Western States and Western corporations at the world system level, one can easily understand what sort of decay runs within the traditional Western socio-legal Weltanschauung and current political-institutional architecture-in-action.

At the same time, however, a number of formally-enforced, constitutionally-relevant social patterns are working as if nothing has changed. These patterns act therefore – as Braudel would put it – as veritable mental prisons de longue durée. In brief, they are still re-producing the rhetoric of age-old Western socio-legal narratives as if they were still rationally accepted.

Altogether, therefore, one may say that a deeply-rooted tension between the “disclosure” and “concealment” of both the theoretical and practical paradoxical outcomes of Western Modernity, modern Rationality and current (Western-driven) Modernization process and policy, is not only de facto a major strand of contemporary (Western and non-Western) society, but it is also a major indicator of the utter weakness of its current social, political and constitutional dynamics. In other words, it seems that gradually – as Renè Thom’s catastrophe theory suggests – the spread of the dark side of the consequences of Western Modernity – as Giddens put it – is now reaching its apex.

According to Immanuel Wallerstein, all the above indicates that the world-system is indeed moving from one historical stage to another. In his view, this move will imply both greater changes and greater choices. As he puts it, “[w]e always have choices – practical choices, moral choices. But when we
are living during the normal life of a historical system, the range of choice is quite narrow. When however a historical system is in its phase of disintegration, the range of choice expands considerably. I think we are at such a moment now, and for the next 20-50 years” (Wallerstein 1996: 20). If so – if current historical system is really disintegrating– what is to be done?

My suggestion is to seize the moment, and immediately engage ourselves in the search for a way out of the paradoxical short-circuits and failures of Western modern Rationality.

**The Ephemeral Fortune of Globalization**

Among the reasons that should drive Western society towards the search for a plausible and socially adequate exit from the disquieting state of affairs briefly summarised above is a clearer perception and understanding of the (latent and manifest – perhaps unintended, but quite foreseeable) negative outcomes of the so called “globalization”.

As is well known, the term “globalization” has been discussed in the last decade in almost all disciplines, becoming an almost unavoidable analytical key word. In turn, the socio-technical potential of globalization as a governance re-engineering project has been emphasized to such an extent in most fields of activity that its factual consistency is now widely taken for granted. Therefore, let us devote some comments to its heuristic value and empirical evidence.

Contrary to the dominant globalization talks, scientific analysis reveals quite a different picture. Far from supporting the idea of an irrepressible, successful trend worldwide, evidence shows that globalization is nothing more than a highly unsettled, incoherent and ideologically constructed scenario.

As a matter of fact, the more the notion of globalization has been called upon to explain certain social changes or the functioning of certain social systems, the more its scientific validity and its empirical consistency have dissolved. The ephemeral nature of globalization as both an analytical model and as actual fact is confirmed also by its multiple dysfunctional results. In this respect – as we will see – its self-destructive socio-political logic played a major role.

Significantly – as Ronald Robertson, one of the first and most renowned globalization theorists, openly admits – what one calls “globalization” can be scientifically thematized as a just a “new form of social complexity”: a form that has been added on to the broader social complexity of contemporary so-
ciety. Globalization therefore is just an added variable within pre-existing (particular/general) contexts. It stems from a given local “basin”, carries out specific imprinting, and exaggerates the uniqueness of its evolutionary character.

In summing up, as such globalization does not constitute, does not represent and cannot explain the basic complex logic of current of social trends, social dynamics or the diversity of social issues that characterize contemporary society. This holds true in every social context.

Let us briefly consider the case of the contemporary economic system. Here globalization has had its most extraordinary impact. Yet, what has been achieved by large corporations in the last decades is not the rise of a “global market” at all, but rather the rise of a veritable “dual market” system. What occurred is simply the superimposition and overlapping of a specific model of world economic policy and a specific model of corporate organizational standards upon a variety of different pre-existing and irrepressible – because either living or institutionalized – local markets and territorial economic districts. This dual-market system, in turn, cannot be further reduced to a global one, because – as Polanyi would put it – economy is, by definition, a multi-layered socio-institutional field, not a pure economic system, i.e. is not a system working according to (self-styled) universalistic standards, skills and procedures at all. Indeed, how can one ignore that in a market system the added value of goods is related to their scarcity, not to globalism?

Let us now look at contemporary legal systems. For brevity’s sake, let us deal with *Lex Mercatoria* (merchant’s law) only. As is well known, in the last decades a number of legal scholars claimed it as a major example of the rise of globalisation in the field of law. Yet the evidence shows that *Lex Mercatoria* overlaps with pre-existing or *ex novo* legal systems without subsuming or destroying them. It does not exclude other legal sources. Hence, far from convincingly demonstrating the successful enhancement of globalization in the field of law, it proves the opposite. It is a true “local legal system” as regards its content (economic matters only, not family, criminal, or other matters), as regards its techniques (arbitration and contracts only), as regards the parties involved (businessmen only, not children or housewives), as regards the expertise (elite lawyers only), etc. In other words, *Lex Mercatoria* signals the erosion of positive law and the “explosion” of legal pluralism, i.e. socio-legal particularity and fragmentation, not globalization.

Let us also look at trans- and supra-national institutions such as the WTO, OCSE, the World Bank, etc. Conceived by many as the quintessential
models of successful globalization policy at the institutional level, they are, paradoxically, also examples of a new type of international division of labour, of social and institutional discrimination and exclusion, even of political elitism and neo-colonialism. As the desire for a political move from WTO to G8, the questionable experience of OCSE in Kosovo, or the role of the World Bank in the bankruptcy of Argentina indicate, the “achievements” of all these institutions cast serious doubts upon both their alleged “expertise” and their officially-declared aims as self-styled “global players”.

What then about the realm of constitutional systems? In the last decade, an enormous literature on the financial crisis of the nation-state and the erosion of its constitutional sovereignty due to the successful impact of globalization – even claiming their prospective withering away – has emerged. Yet, historical evidence shows the opposite, i.e. that globalization, at most, is just the last evolutionary stage of a much wider and deeper historical process concerning the crisis of the State-form as a particular variable of the epochal decline of Western civilization at the world-system level, just as scholars such as Spengler and Toynbee – following a Hegelian line of thought – claimed in the early 20th century.

Within this general epochal trend, however, present-day evidence also shows a relevant counteractive pattern. Far from fading away, the nation-state model is now gaining a new momentum in the world-system arena: not only has the number of nation-states increased in the last decade, but their traditional core issues – i.e. their territorially-settled and politically-legitimated constitutional arrangements – are increasingly “castled” and reframed – sometimes by virtue of supra-national structures, such as the EU – to cope defensively with internal and external pressures, globalization’s pressures included. Needless to say, all this concerns national-oriented vs. international-oriented power elites as well, as demonstrated by the increasing “political activism” of the judiciary within the traditional sphere of parliamentary policy.

At any rate, if one combines the long-term crisis of the nation-state (as a constitutive part of the Axial Age of Western Modernity) with the current “castling” and reframing of its core issues, one must conclude that what really matters in deciphering the current contours of Western constitutional systems is not globalization as such, but rather globalization’s historically determined socio-political premises, i.e. the decay of the cultural and political hegemony of the bourgeois class as nation-state ruling elite and the rise of what Mosca and Pareto called the “functional feudalism” of social, political and economic corporations, just before, but even more so during, the de-colonization and the Cold War era.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to discuss this point in detail here. For brevity’s sake, one can only stress that what occurred during that period not only explains the increasing socio-legal closure of the so-called “open society” in the course of the second half of the 20th century – for, as Schmitter has shown, socio-economic corporatism implies socio-legal pluralism and vice versa, i.e., a particularistic deconstruction of the (alleged) universal rationale of the “bourgeois project” as a constitutive part of Western-styled “progress” – but also explains the intrinsic limits of the liberal ideology as a theoretical and practical guideline for the implementation of globalization as a governance re-engineering model.

Yet, how can one deny that globalization processes and policies were basically set up to deal with the above-mentioned historical trends and to sustain a neo-liberal project at any cost? And how can one deny that, by virtue of such an ideology, globalization weakened rather than empowered both the “rational calculability” of the Western capitalistic economy and the nation-state orientation and class composition of Western ruling elites at the world-system level?

As a matter of fact, globalization processes and policies implied a systemic (generalized) “indifference” to (1) territorially-based economic regulatory mechanisms, (2) economically relevant cultural patterns and (3) economically incompatible political institutions, all derived from, or related to, the traditional foundations and architecture (interests and values) of nation-states. Consequently, it is no surprise that globalization not only radicalized the already existing structural and super-structural cleavages between the traditional State-form and new powerful corporate socio-legal orders, but also turned the ongoing competition among the internal fractions of Western elites into a veritable clash between resisting Pouvoirs Constitués and ravenous Pouvoirs Constituants. In short: acting as a de-constructionist tool as regards existing constituencies, globalisation exacerbated tensions at social, political and institutional level and set up historical conditions for the erosion of basic socio-legal ties.

Within this general scenario, recent shocking events further exasperated the instability of the overall globalization wave. After September 11, in particular, it has become clear that globalization has been directly wounded also. After September 11, it cannot be further enhanced as it was before.

Despite any globalizing efforts, it is clear that a radical amicus-hostis divide now marks a substantial turning-point in many relevant fieldworks of the World-system dynamic: security measures – not a free movement global policy – are now becoming the main issue in any political agenda. As such security measures are concerned with the same problems left open and unresolved
by globalization processes and policies, globalization – as it has been represented and performed so far – is over.

The Self-Destructive Logic of Globalization as a Re-engineering Political Project

The fact that, after September 11, globalization can no longer be assessed as it was before, does not exclude that the term might still carry a meaning that was previously covered up, taking on a different, more specific, meaning and performing a different, more specific, function.

Significantly, this is the case: as is well known, as early as 1999, Henry Kissinger had no hesitation in saying that “globalization is a new word for America’s dominant role in the world”. Given the authority of the source, let us take the statement seriously, and look at the way in which globalization has been implemented and used for this specific purpose.

If one examines the way in which globalization has been manifested in the last decade as a strategic socio-technical governance tool at the world-system level to promote a dominant role for the US in the world, one is stuck by the amount of social, political, economic contradictions and conflicts that it created and/or exacerbated within Western society, more than its positive results. Significantly, this was clear since the beginning.

At the institutional level, scholars such as Dahrendorf and Huntington warned about the risky globalizing logic of globally oriented governmental or non-governmental agencies and expert service infrastructures sharing or promoting allegedly common “global” standards. In particular they claimed that such institutional arrangements, far from creating a fruitful social “togetherness” between different countries and societies, might lead to serious cultural opposition to Western society and even foster a state of long-term regression and decay within it.

At the economic level, it was Wallerstein who first stressed how the globalizing logic of Western-style deregulated capitalism, supported by powerful global players at the world-system level, could nurture non-Western (mainly far-eastern) productive forces to such an extent to create a totally new economic order marked by the unconstrainable activism of those forces, thus creating the structural conditions for reversing the West’s traditional geo-political, economic and technological dominance.

At social-cultural level, Fearstone and Giddens have provided a detailed analysis of the risky self-reflexive claims of late-modern Western universalism
as re-vitalized by the ideologues of the globalization talks. As Giddens put it, universalistic ideals embedded in particularistic Western interests can be assessed on a global scale only by taking social experiences away from their local contexts and restructuring them in terms of abstract systems. Yet, late-modern Western society no longer seems culturally and economically fit to provide its typical self-reflexive “services/products”, i.e. the emasculation of ancient local traditions and the creation of appealing universal utopias as constitutional pillars for (Western-styled) social-engineering projects. Hence, it is likely that, lacking substantial symbolic and material resources, such ideals will be reshaped by hybridization, and increasingly colonized – as documented by Lee – by the already apparent rise of local, non-Western Modernities.

As one can see, the above analytical references cast serious doubts on globalization as a “refined” and “advanced” socio-technical governance model able to provide, even to a powerful Western country such as the US, a dominant political position in the world. Indeed, the main issue a stake in all these arguments is clear: to the extent that either the exchange ratios of socio-cultural patterns, or the structural trends of the socio-economic re-production of productive forces, are subjected to the logic of globalization processes and policies, the third pillar of the overall socio-institutional dynamic – reciprocity – does not turn in favour of, but against, Western constituencies. Yet, this is not all.

At the political and economic levels, the risky outcomes of globalization - foreseeable, as has been noted, in theoretical terms – have proven true also. As soon as these outcomes matched the historically rooted “fundamental curve” of Western society sketched above – i.e. the epochal crisis of the State-form as a consequence of the epochal decay of the hegemony of the bourgeois class as a ruling political elite – worries about unbalanced “balance of powers” in the West, and the rise of non-Western superpowers such as China, began to become a central topic among geo-political strategists. This, in turn, made apparent a concern about globalization that was certainly the most abhorrent evolutionary pattern of any such strategy: its inner self-destructive logic.

As Charles Darwin said, compulsory pressures towards evolutionary enlargement inevitably lead to gigantism. Gigantism, in turn, is the last stage in the evolution of the species. Well: this is precisely the inner constitutive logic of globalization. In the short or long term, globalization is, and cannot but being, absolutely self-destructive.

The history of all great empires – as Polibius showed with reference to ancient civilizations – confirms the above statement as regards social and political institutions as well. Once a given aggrandizement has been reached, polit-
ical institutions either implode or explode, either because of a surplus of (wasted) inner potentials, or because of financial and managerial shortcomings in the internal control and governance mechanisms. To put it otherwise – as modern organization theory teaches – as soon as a given threshold has been reached, size ceases to be a “competitive advantage”, as it produces inertial effects in the inter-organizational co-alignment of the various internal potentials, and between them and the environment. Consequently, first the environment, and then the other internal potentials slip out of the control of the central governing body and turn against it.

Well-aware of the wisdom provided by thousands of years of historical records about that, it is not by chance therefore that a renowned jurist such as Samuel Pufendorf, legal adviser of Friedrich the Great of Prussia, repeatedly warned that “the claim for a Universalis Monopolium” on the part of a self-styled “Universal Power”, “is a policy of mere imaginary interests and the fuse by means of which the world will be put into combustion”.

Needless to say, the only organizational device that can act as an antidote to such a self-destructive outcome, especially when the environment undergoes radical changes, is bio-diversity, i.e. social, political, etc. differentiation. Accordingly, it comes as no surprise to note that, in the course of its implementation, the political and organizational patterns of globalization have been increasingly oriented in favour of local, context-based and “country-specific” arrangements.

This explains what has been discussed above about the irrepressible vitality of social complexity, i.e. the scientific inconsistency of globalization as a heuristic tool. But this also explains an otherwise undervalued fact: i.e. that large economic corporations, large political socio-legal orders such as the EU, and even super nation-states such as the US, increasingly – albeit instrumentally – fostered regionalism, diversity and multilateralism – as OECD, GATT, GAT and MAI negotiations demonstrate – as pivotal “added values” for unionism and centralization in the last decade.

Interestingly, this fact explains in its turn two other things: that such an antidote remains highly corrosive to any centralizing effort, and that, beyond such an antidote, there is no more room to manoeuvre.

To face such an already apparent prospective result, a political move towards a preventive/pre-emptive global-local action carried out “by other means” – just to recall Klausewitz’s well-known theory – thus appeared to some “global players” as the very last chance to deal strategically with the unresolved problems of the so-called post-Cold War “new world order”. This political move, sponsored by US inner circles, was thus intended as “the very
chance” for the US to take on the role of the imperial power at the world-system level.

Symptomatic signals about such a relevant change were systematically ignored by the media and seemingly underestimated by public opinion leaders. Hence, certain preventive/pre-emptive measures, “interlocking” with mutually reinforcing institutions to prevent any sort of defection on the part of the partners in case of armed conflicts, were easily enforced under the cover of globalization talks about multilateral security, while the new political framework was already governed by totally new political guidelines, such as the US Presidential Decision Directive n. 25 of May 14th 1994.

It is clear to the general public now – i.e. after the Iraq war – that the US claim for such a self-styled imperial role has been well established in US Administrations since the early Nineties.

**Globalization as an Anticipation of Pre-Emptive War and the Disruption of World-System Legal Order**

In order to understand why such a political move was theoretically envisaged and practically enforced in the last decade – as the Kosovo war, the first war in Europe since World War II, and the subsequent Afghanistan and Iraq wars demonstrate – it is opportune to take a step backward and focus not so much on globalization’s general aims and its self-destructive logic, but rather on its operational weakness as a re-engineering political tool.

With regard to this point, significant insights are provided by the basic difference between contemporary economic and political governance systems as regards global-local interplay.

While large economic corporations try to handle, in real time and at the world-system level, the complexity of country-specific arrangements by virtue of delocalized and dematerialized means, such as highly centralized and standardized financial networks, large political socio-legal orders and nation-states by contrast – even if provided with the support of “constitutional substitutes” lacking any democratic investiture – can only rule that complexity by virtue of ideological discourses and symbolic procedures. The social impact and efficacy of these cannot be easily and steadily assessed, maintained and fully exploited, either at the local or the international levels. This is because they concern (1) territorially negotiated constituencies, (2) psychically and physically mobile social actors, and (3) multilayered communicative interactions.
This systemic difference not only concerns the two systems at the very core of the structural and super-structural dynamics of contemporary society, but is a constitutive pillar of the way in which Western Modernity constructed them as “relatively autonomous” social systems vis-à-vis Western society at large. Hence it cannot be abolished or bypassed at whim or by force, without serious socio-institutional imbalances and political-constitutional troubles. In any case, it is impossible to transform the creative indeterminacy of human actions, rooted into historically determined contexts, into high-tech virtual models and vice versa.

Well: contrary to such epistemological evidence and the formal and material rationale of centuries-old, officially-settled, Western constitutional patterns, globalization has been systematically used to set up just a synchronic and synergic mix between law, economy and society, as if these systems were not historically determined, but rather intrinsically “flexible”.

Yet, history is not water: societies always have their carrying-capacity standards, territorially-defined by their own monumental historical legacies: in this case a legacy derived from the very liberal ideology that globalization implied!

To avoid resistance and speed up the programme, besides the ideological claim for “flexibility”, an additional constructionist excamotage was set in motion: as the well-known “triple helix” programmes of the equally well-known R&D (Research & Development) agencies indicate, a (US-styled) generalized implementation of high-tech virtual models was enforced. Acting as mere “functional equivalents” of allegedly common – but in fact country-specific – legal, political and social rituals, practices, values, etc., these new virtual models tried to technically subsume and replace the traditional living ones by turning the limit – the rise of any possible political or ideological opposition – into a potential resource. For the purpose they also pursue a systematic internal deconstruction – a veritable splitting and mobilization – of “epistemic” structures such as professional bodies, academic communities and cultural institutions. Moreover, large (mainly US-driven) media and lobby campaigns were set up at the world-system level either to demand the deregulation of existing (politically-legitimate and territorially-defined) nation-state legal rules and procedures, or the normative superimposition of self-styled “universal” standards, such as the so-called (Western-styled) “best practices”, “quality certificates”, “codes of conduct”, etc., all basically shaped according to US-style big firms’ organizational patterns.

Although traditional constituencies – as has been said already – were severely challenged, this strategy did not create a substantial global synchrony
and synergy between law, economy and society. Rather it created a variety of political, financial and organizational “stormings”. Altogether therefore, not only institutional systems, but also many different social groups witnessed not the setting up of a “new global order” at all, but the spread of a rising insecurity: an insecurity that affected even the self-proclaimed “global winners”, i.e. even of the local, national and international power elites that directly supported it.

This was so much the case that veritable “butterfly effects” occurred within and across many different social ladders. In turn the social credibility of traditional constitutional legitimation was seriously put into question even in the course of electoral proceedings, as the cases of US, France, Austria, Italy, etc. indicate.

As far as globalization’s “butterfly effects” are concerned, for brevity sake, let me just say what I mean. As Gleick has shown, the “butterfly effect” is a metaphorical concept that signals a typical operational condition of the so-called acentric (chaotic) systems: it empirically recalls a micro-effect studied by meteorologists to explain previously unpredictable environmental changes at the macro level, i.e. the fact that even a light flap of a single butterfly in Australia might cause a tornado in New Jersey. Given its fruitful heuristic potential, the concept is now increasingly applied – together with Thom’s catastrophe theory – by political scientists to explain allegedly unpredictable radical changes in geo-political systems.

Well: once it was set in motion as a re-engineering tool in different global and local field of law, economy and society, globalization could not but unfold as a typical acentric phenomenon concerned with chaos, as the exemplar case of the diffuse existence of God in Spinoza’s theory suggests. Yet, contrary to this analogy, in the case of globalization, it was the traditional order that turned into a chaotic mess, for its “butterfly effects” produced the most devastating consequences in precisely these areas, as Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen’s etc. cases clearly indicate.

As regards the vanishing social credibility of traditional Western constitutional narratives, it is impossible here to discuss in detail the case of recent electoral results in Western countries. Therefore, let me just mention another emblematic issue: that of the so-called “Washington Consensus”, as it has been developed – albeit in slightly different fashion – by the Clinton and G. Bush Jr. Administrations.

As is well known, the so-called “Washington Consensus” has been used as the ideological label for the official implementation of globalization “as a new word for America’s dominant role in the world” (for the term “consen-
corresponds to the notion of “consensual domain” as thematized by geopolitical eco-systems’ theorists, i.e. stands for a systemic “structural coupling”). To raise such a “consensus” among as many countries as possible, the Clinton and G. Bush Jr. Administrations repeatedly stated that, in pursuing US interests, they would respect the country-specific arrangements of such countries, would not exploit their resources, would not control their markets, would not act as rulers, etc.: briefly, they would only export “universal values” such as (Western-styled) democracy, welfare, etc.

Yet, given what has been said so far, how could these statements be accepted and shared by the current world-system community? In a non-Western country, such as China, one can immediately counter that similar values – legal protection for the poor, free commerce and religious freedom – were used by Gengis Khan to impose Mongolian rule over the Chinese Empire. In turn, in Westernized countries such as Brazil or Peru, one can recall the fact that the very first assessment of (Western-styled) Human Rights as “universal rights of the mankind” – made by Francisco Vitoria from Salamanca – concerned the (unilateral) enforcement of freedoms such as the *ius peregrinandi et eligendi domicilium* (territorial occupation), the *ius commercii* (economic exploitation), the *ius predicandi evangelium* (cultural superimposition), etc. also by means of the *ius belli* (just war) of the *conquistadores* in case of any sort of opposition on the part of the natives. Last but not least, in Western European countries, one can even recall that when the Catholic Church claimed itself *Ecclesia Universalis* schismatic sects were already active.

Certain historical facts and their long-term consequences – as the above examples suggest – cannot be easily ignored or suppressed when a “globalist consensus” – such as that proclaimed by a superpower such as US – is the issue. Even more so, if one realizes that this occurs after the solemn recognition of the principle of “self-determination” of any country – officially proclaimed by the same US just after World War I – and, more recently, after the official refusal of US to sign, among others, the constitutive act of the International Criminal Court as a means to legally judge politically-relevant violations of the international order.

Paradoxically enough, the Clinton and G. Bush Jr. Administrations’ emphasis on Western “universal” values to promote the “Washington consensus” worldwide is analogous to the line of thought used by Lenin, i.e. that a “New Order” can be created by combining electrification and sovietization, i.e. by combining extraordinary technological achievements and the promise for a better future for the whole mankind (a promise – not by chance – drawn from a grand Western eschatological narrative!). Unfortunately, the fact that this
sort of statement has been made now – in a cultural and political conjuncture, characterized, as has been noted, by the “vanishing guarantees of Western rationality” – makes it even less than simply rhetorical. It is a pure fiction.

Indeed not only are the Western values proclaimed by the Clinton and G. Bush Jr. Administrations devoid of any universal appeal at present (as they are not and cannot be supported either by a hegemonic or an organically coherent, plausible and socially adequate, Western Rationality at the world-system level), but also the “state of the art” – i.e. the epochal decline – of Western Modernity cannot be masked or hidden anymore.

As the example of the Iraq invasion demonstrates, the US’s call for a preventive/pre-emptive war (a)outside the legal framework of an international institution such as the UN, (b)against a cluster of structurally different but politically undifferentiated targets (terrorist groups, rouges States, dictatorial regimes, political leaderships, etc.), and (c)for a number diverging and equivocally-defined reasons (chemical weapons, democracy, geo-strategic resources, etc.), empirically confirmed the above statement. In turn this issues produced devastating political consequences, such as those already apparent within the European Union and between EU and US relationships. Surely – as Adorno said – “Es gibt kein richtges Leben im falschen”, there is no good life in falsehood.

At the end of the Axial Age of Western Modernity, Western values can only be verbally proclaimed – but not steadily enforced or disseminated – by means of a fundamentalist political ideology backed by an overwhelming high-tech military force. In any case, even the type of constitutional patriotism that these verbal claims evoke among certain social strata is weak. Being based on a typical “amicus-hostis” political divide, rooted in a nationalistic Weltanschauung, by its very nature it cannot promote any universal togetherness, especially in a historical context permeated by multiculturalism.

In turn, even an overwhelming high-tech military force is not a solid tool in itself, particularly when the political definition of the main strategic target is unclear, and the symbolic and practical support of a legitimate legal framework is totally lacking.

Given all the above, one might reasonably expect from now on, not so much the establishment of a US-type imperial global rule at the world-system level, but a multivariated attempt to deal locally with the increasing constitutional instability that has been created, even within Western society.

Due to the overall social milieu, it is likely that this attempt will be carried out by means of a number of generalized (but not systematic or convergent) security measures. This might create a veritable “Kampf um die Rechtswis-
senshaft”, a socio-political “struggle for the law” – as Herman Kantorowicz would put it – to counteract what enlightened Western scholars and non-Western societies call “Western barbarism” – i.e. the Risk-society, as epitomized by current legal revisionism about the notion of “just war” – in order to try to prevent or pre-empt additional constitutional breakdowns. Otherwise, the fate of the Horkheimerian and Adornian “Dialektik der Aufklärung”, might turn the current disquieting world disorder into another, déja vu, world tragedy.

Conclusion

In the course of the above analysis three main issues have been stressed: (a) the historically determined link between the “vanishing guarantees of Western rationality” as a part of the decline of Western Modernity and the “intelligence failure” of Western-driven globalization as a post-Cold War governance re-engineering model; (b) the historically determined link between the deconstructionist patterns, and the self-destructive logic, of globalization and the rise of the preventive/pre-emptive war doctrine as a strategic tool for a (self-claimed) imperial rule of the US at the world-system level; and (c) the historically determined link between the above issues and the generalized social insecurity and constitutional instability characterizing the present world system.

Altogether, these historically determined issues raise a number of questions about the future of Western society. As a sort of conclusion, therefore, let me briefly single out some items, as they might offer a clue to future trends.

1. - The constitutional instability produced by globalization and the pre-emptive war doctrine set in motion the quest for a systematic enforcement of security measures in every field, worldwide. Such an enforcement will not only end globalization as we know it (because security measures will impede a free, i.e. deregulated, movement of goods, capitals, services and actors), but also will feed further social, institutional, political and cultural cleavages.

2. - While nation-states could cope quite easily with such a security-based “social closure”, given the experience provided by their centuries old organizational model, large private economic corporations will be painfully wounded, as they will not be able to carry on their own global plans and assess their standards as freely as they did before.

3. - Hence while nation-states’ ruling elites will be able to advance the “castling” of basic state-centric institutional mechanisms (whether or not supported by public opinion), private corporations’ governing boards will either call for a substantial change at the strategic geo-political level (for a more or
less aggressive policy) or bypass certain security measures (by means of a soft implementation, or by directly violating them). Serious conflicts within and between these boards will surely arise.

4. - In any case, due also to the already-incumbent economic stagnation of Western societies, both Western nation-states and private corporations will become less transparent and less “democratic”. A significant – albeit instrumental and tactical – alliance between fractions of territorially settled nation-States elites and transnational corporations’ inner circles could also arise.

5. - If so, either the battlefield or the competitive advantage of élite groups will concern – as Olsen teaches – the “organizational dominance” over the core issues of the cultural domain, i.e. not so much over Western high-tech scientific achievements (easily acquired and quickly updated), but over context-based, centuries-old symbols and rituals of both political and religious systems. In other words, the antagonism between each fraction of Western ruling elites will be carried out as a veritable “war for investiture” over the control of this symbolic domain.

6. - Last, but not least, core principles and values of derived from Western Enlightenment and Political Economy, as a constitutive part of Western Modernity and modern Rationality, will be further contested, revised and even abandoned. Western constitutional systems might even move further towards a locally fragmented and hierarchically established legal pluralism, i.e. towards a veritable new-Gothic law.

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Governance and Nation-State

Andrea Borghini

The aim of this paper is to investigate the roles and functions the Nation-State could hold within Global Governance. In contrast to the thesis which predicts the final eclipse of the State⁴, in this work the hypothesis that the Nation-State is going through a phase of redefinition of its form and powers will be supported. This reorganisation takes place within an ever more globalised context, and is an attempt to compensate the shortenings in the Global Governance theory. Politically, this constitutes a still-to-be-summoned challenge.

It will first be necessary to present the basic concepts that will be used throughout the paper, and a few observations on the historical situation which has served as the springboard for our analysis.

Globalisation² has amplified the crisis of the State as a political construction of Modernity³. More specifically, from a perspective of the organisation of political space, the economic dimension of globalisation – which is becoming increasingly more immaterial and driven by a highly digitalised technology – develops according to a form of spacial network whose nodes are represented by towns and regions (or groups of these). Such an organisation disrupts the traditional concept of political space, based on closed and well-defined boundaries of the Nation-State.

This brings about a reduction of the powers and importance of the State; its powers, in fact, have been eroded by the action of multiple forces working

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¹ See, in particular, the works of Ohmae (1996); Reich (1993); Strange (1998).
² Obviously, *globalisation* is term which is not easy to define. Here we follow the definition suggested by Keohane and Nye Jr. in the *Introduction* of the book by Nye Jr. e Donahue (2000: 1-45). According to these authors “Globalisation is the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick” (p. 7).
³ The crisis of the State, drastically put in focus because of the globalisation processes, is the side effect of a less visible crisis the State has been facing ever since the beginning of Modernity. It is a crisis of *legitimacy* and *consensus*, which has rendered the State progressively less capable of managing a society growing more and more complex.
from above – MNEs, supra-national institutes (WTO, IMF, WB), NGOs, the
global financial market –, and forces such as social movements or resurgent
ethicisms and regionalisms which weaken the State structures from below.
These factors undermine the State’s powers and identity acting on its pillars
and functions: sovereignty, state monopoly of force, tax monopoly, legitimacy,
rationality and unity of action.

What are the most striking effects of such a scenario from a political per-
spective? First, the state no longer retains a central role in the direction and reg-
ulation of society or of a more and more trans-national economic system, and
it strives to deal with problems which become increasingly complex and glob-
al, i.e. those concerning environmental threats and international terrorism.

Moreover, the state is inextricably immersed in a network of relations
which influences its political decisions and forces it to confront a number of
new political actors such as: NGOs, multinationals, regional blocks, market
actors. The resulting situation is characterised by a strong policentrism and an
intricate tangle of powers that induced many authors to call our times a new
medievalism.

Finally, after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
weakening of the State brought with it a global series of radical changes in the
socio-political order, which encouraged the spread of a dangerous and indis-
tinct international disorder and an increase in global insecurity. In order to
face this “increased complexity and uncertainty, governments, market partic-
ipants and others” multiply their efforts “to comprehend and manage these
increasingly complex interconnected systems” (Keohane and Nye 2000: 12).
In other words, they try to find the political solutions that will enable them to
govern that growing complexity.

**Governance: evolution of a concept**

To avert such a macroscopic crisis of government, in recent times we have
witnessed the emergence and spread of institutional strategies whose ultimate
expression is the concept of governance. This concept, however, has not yet
received a definite epistemologic stance. Like globalisation, it functions as a
“buzzword” to represent the institutional strategies initiated at various levels.

Governance has multiple disciplinary matrices which range from institu-
tional economics to international relations, from organisational studies to de-
velopment studies, from political science to public administration.

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4 See particularly Kobrin (1999: 165-187).
Emerging after World War II to compensate for the political strategies of the various national governments, which found themselves in growing difficulty regarding themes such as welfare and development (Mayntz 1993: 9-20), the idea of governance has become so all-encompassing as to be used, in some cases, as a synonym for governing itself.

Governance is essentially defined as a way of coordinating the collective actions of multiple subjects or groups, that is, it represents intermediate forms of regulation between urban agglomerations and actions by the State: this would include all forms of regulation that are neither State- nor market-driven and that establish a relationship between network systems of MNEs and political regulation5.

G. Stoker outlines various aspects of its primary meaning and functions:

- It refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government;
- It identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues;
- It identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action;
- It is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors;
- It recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide (Stoker 1998: 17-28).

R.A.W. Rhodes identifies six different meanings of the term, among which are the concepts of governance as minimal state and governance as self-organizing networks (Rhodes 1996: 652-667)6.

The definitions Rhodes gives are testimony to the progressive success of such a method for guiding collective action within more and more extensive socio-political structures, ranging from a regional to a national level, and from an international to a global level.

Such an extent requires establishment of an effective theory of governance (Mayntz 1999: 3-22)7 while at the same time creating a normative meaning of

5 See the Introduction to Perulli (1993: 7-19).
6 The other interpretations are governance as corporate governance, new public management, good governance, or socio-cybernetic system.
7 In literature, we find different connotations for this concept; among others, we recall Rosenau’s definition of governance as the sum of order plus intentionality. The author, moreover, theoretically legitimise the idea of Governance without Government. See Rosenau, Czempiel (1998).
the term, whose most evident formulation can be found in the political pro-
gramme of the Commission for Global Governance\textsuperscript{8}. Founded in 1995 and
headed by such high-profile personalities, as W. Brandt and J. Delors, the
Commission had the precise goal of thinking through a new post-Cold-War
world order. The Commission has, in fact, legitimised the adoption of govern-
ance as a political strategy, and has combined it with ethical principles to ob-
tain a “better management of survival, better ways of sharing diversities, bet-
ter ways of living together in the global neighbourhood that is our human
homeland” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 19). In this way, the
Commission intended to promote its own idea of Good Governance.

Now let us look beyond the various definitions and levels of implementa-
tion of governance to consider the theoretical core elements, that are the basis
of its technical description. Governance presupposes the autonomy of subjects
within areas under their own control, the need to stimulate forms of coopera-
tion and negotiation between subjects, a horizontal coordination and social self-
regulation, the participation of formal and informal actors, the exercise of hier-
archical forms only within subjects’ own sphere of control (which justifies its dis-
tinction from government).

From the considerations above, we can make some relevant observations:

- Governance is a strategy which seems to adapt itself to levels of increasing
  complexity in the world at present and is, from this point of view, clearly
  a post-modern concept. It enters the century-old dialectics between hier-
archies and market by introducing the concept of network, and shifts atten-
tion from the subjects (authority) to the object of political actions: that
is, to behaviour, structures and attitudes of those who are subjected to po-
itical control. Governance sets aside traditional vertical authority within
the general political sphere, but reintroduces it as a mean of control of the
internal dynamics within the single actor’s sphere of action. The single ac-
tor’s principal aim is, in fact, to optimise performances in their individual
areas rather than to control the general administrative norms and proce-
dures.
- Governance is characterised as a pluralistic and democratic strategy as long
  as it implements the action of multiple actors of various kind, guided by a
  logic of interaction, by a rationale of dialogue and by feedback processes

\textsuperscript{8} Also the World Bank tried to make the global idea of Governance spread, esp. in the de-
veloping countries. According to WB’s theorists Global Governance has to combine a liberal-
democratic model of politics with competent and responsible administrations (see World Bank,
which are motivated by the fact that each actor involved does not have recourse to sufficient knowledge or resources to solve the problem unilaterally. Governance, thus, reflects the uncertainty and limits of the human conscience as well as that complexity of powers and political mechanisms which is typical of our era, and favours the raise of private subjects (NGOs, market actors, trans-national actors) endowed with political dignity and legitimate authority, encouraging a rethinking of the traditional distinction between public and private (Hall and Biersteker 2002: 6).

It is no wonder, then, that, with such characteristics, it has been adopted as a political model at a global level as well.

If it is true that governance abandons the traditional concept of authority (preferring minimal state forms), than the State continue to play a role within governance, at least at an intra-national level. R. Mayntz points out the numerous rights the State still exercises within governance such as the right of legal ratification, the right to impose authoritative decisions whenever social actors are unable to come to a solution and the right to take legal or executive action whenever an independent system does not satisfy the expectation of regulations. In other words a form of auto-regulation which indirectly exploits the existing hierarchies, but formally eludes them (Mayntz 1999: 9).

Theoretical limits of Global Governance and the role of the State

Having defined Governance and its various levels of applications, we will now focus our attention on the effectiveness of such a strategy in its global dimension, and on the role the State can play within governance. The major limitations of governance lie in the transition from a sub-state to a global level, and are related to the deficiencies in both its technical definition and its normative meaning.

Let us consider this second aspect, and, specifically, the assumptions of the Commission on Global Governance. Because it achieved few of its initial goals, much criticism has arisen. The negative position of M.C. Smouts’s is one of the most significant. Smouts concentrates her attention particularly on the programme of the Commission on Global Governance. Although this program was dedicated to the definition of the requisites of a good governance, in her opinion it would be practically ineffective (Smouts 1998: 81-89).

Smouts, in fact, claims that governance can be a useful instrument only if it is applied in milieus ranging from local to international levels, where the
actors involved share the same referents and “communication codes” (the author here refers specifically to free trade and human rights). However, at a global level, values are not shared by all the actors, as the Commission presupposes, and governance, as it is defined (see above), naturally lacks that centrality and coherence of action the Commission would take for granted. Conversely, the more globalisation advances, the more subjects organise the action in light of their particular characteristics. Smouts’ conclusion is that the normative intentions have overtaken the technical goals, and that such a normative purpose, in reality, hides a reiteration of neo-liberal and functionalist theories.

In other words, because it privileges non-state actors, Good Governance would hide a reintroduction of a logic of less government and more market.

The criticisms of the normative version of governance make it possible to reveal additional theoretical limitations of the strategy of Global Governance. Those intra-national problems regarding such topics as order, accountability, legitimacy, democracy, security and transparency of procedure, in fact, appear even more serious. The success of Global Governance must necessarily lie in the sharing of a collective identity or solidarity which, unfortunately, is still out of reach. Reseaux of independent actors immediately pose responsibility issues. At present, it is extremely difficult to reconcile the hierarchical dimension of power with the cooperative dimension, because of the difficulty in identifying which institutions can assume the important role of coordinating decisions, and, especially, which apparatuses should control order and security within the complex intertwining of powers and functions generated by such an institutional strategy.

There is a practical impossibility of distinguishing a precise identity, neat boundaries and clearly assigned rights and duties. The powers of non-state actors are, therefore, endangered “by their lack of accountability, sovereignty and democratic structures” (Luck 2002: 9).

The extension of the theory to the global level, according to Mayntz, determines the need for coping with such themes and with the urgency of combining the theory of governance with the theory of democracy (Mayntz 1999: 13). Those very characteristics of governance that makes it an effective strategy at local and national levels, become problematic, if not dangerous, at the global level.

Given these shortcomings, what solutions could, then, be suggested?

Certain authors think the democratic deficit of supra-national institutions (one above others the EU) could be solved through the seek for legitimacy forms other than the national one, that is to say: by avoiding forms of domes-
tic analogy. Actually, in international debate, the State has been re-proposed, though with different characteristics.

By way of example, in the writings of R. Rhodes, the State gives up its privileged position of sovereignty, though “it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks” (Rhodes 1996: 660). B. Jessop distinguishes a local level and a global one. He introduces, for the local level, the idea of metagovernance – to indicate: the organisation of self-organisation –, by which the State, no more hierarchically organised, functions as a court of appeals, as an authority which makes various mechanisms of governance compatible, intervening to balance all subsystems in order to promote systemic integration. The State, in other words, should play the role of primus inter pares (Jessop 1998: 29-45). At the global level, the author talks about the hollowing out of the State, and not simply of its demise. He believes that there is no longer a place for a Keynesian welfare state; rather, that it is time for a Schumpeterian workfare State emerge. Thus, he concludes that:

“the hollowed out national state retains crucial political functions despite the transfer of other activities to other levels of political organisation; in particular the national state has a continuing role in managing the political linkages across different territorial scales and is expected to do so in the interests of its citizens” (Jessop 1994: 274).

According to the author, the State maintains a central role in coordinating local, regional, international and global levels. It is, thus, a State which acts as a key intermediary between the upper and lower levels, in which, at present, the socio-economic processes take place.

Hirst and Thompson, instead, argue against the novelty of globalisation, in favour of a precise role of the State, which, however, is no longer sovereign, but cedes a part of its power. Governance, then, presents itself as a concept halfway between the centrality of the State, which is no longer sustainable, and the need to govern a globalisation that cannot be interpreted in terms of homogenisation and triumph of the free trade:

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9 This thesis is upheld by Keohane and Nye Jr. (2000).
10 In fact, Stoker, studying in depth the single points of his own definition, believes that the raising networks of independent actors need to be governed to some extent by some new form of State, which should do the job of constructing and deconstructing, coordinating, influencing and orientating, integrating and regulating, in other word it should run the system in order to avoid unpleasant side-effects (see Stoker: 24).
“States will come to function less as ‘sovereign’ entities and more as the components of an international ‘quasi polity’; the central functions of the nation state will become those of providing legitimacy for and ensuring the accountability of supranational and subnational governance mechanisms” (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 257).

“The nation state is central to this process of suturing” with the distribution of power between the international and the sub-national level (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 270). According to Hirst and Thompson the Nation-State, being an institution in direct contact with its territory and population, maintains a key role: on the one hand, it gives up shares of its sovereignty, but, on the other, it volunteers itself as the figure in charge of legitimising those new supra-national institutions to which it has ceded powers.

Therefore, because of the processes of withering away or hollowing out of the State, there is no other actor which can take over its historical tasks - we think specifically of the Weberian monopoly of violence and social control - so that the State itself should anyhow, within governance, play the role of upholder of the law (Lütz 1998: 153-168). Consequently, according to some authors (Luck 2002: 9), even problems like human security could be resolved within the wider context of national security and would necessarily go through the strengthening of the states, and not through their weakening.

This State, though different from the traditional one, is no longer a unitary actor, but allows its parts to form alliances with other parts\textsuperscript{11}. It has changed into a resilient state, maintaining old roles and acquiring new ones in a context that, at present, is tending inevitably towards globality. In the European context, for example, the State still has to guarantee peace and security, mediating between the opposite extremes of localism and globalism, and, from time to time, harmonising the various projects of social promotion (Bianchi 1991: 157-168). The State remains a key element for regulating the market and protecting rights.

From examination of these topics, it becomes clear that in the global scenario that is our present world, there is a pressing need to create and organise institutions capable of coping with newly-born and urgent problems of increasing complexity, but only on the condition that any supra-national institution could not leave aside the national organisms that gave birth to it. There is no doubt that only a very layered institutional organization system could allow for the construction of effective supra-national institutions, since no ex-

\textsuperscript{11} Lütz asserts: “the state is no longer a unitarian actors, but its parts most in touch with the global economy are increasingly leading a life of their own” (Lütz 1998: 167).
isting institution presently can reconcile in and of itself the aspirations of local, national, and global population layers Vernon (1998: 28).

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“Today little vitality remains in the idea that force is justifiable only to the extent that it is used to protect the common interest or well-being of society. This norm has ceased to operate as a limit because the ‘interest of society’ no longer coincides with either the geographic boundaries of society or the foreign commitments of a society”.


This is not a quote from a contemporary scholar discussing the impact of globalisation on the way that the justified use of force is viewed. It is from taken from Sheldon Wolin’s discussion of violence in Western political thought in the 1960s when the word globalisation did not yet enjoy its current, seemingly irresistible, appeal. It nonetheless adequately captures a tension deepened since Wolin wrote his article: namely the tension between the inside/outside (state) boundaries which are used when thinking and reasoning about the justified use of force and the geographic boundaries and foreign commitments of “society”. This tension has increased as a result of two parallel developments in political identities. The first of these is the development of transnational political identities articulated in relation to issues which have boundaries different from those of the state. The interest of the community no longer coincides with the geographic boundaries of the state in Wolin’s wording. The second development is the parallel affirmation of the rights of individuals to resist oppressive states (and their use of force) – the acknowledgement of political identities defined outside and against states – which creates uncertainty about the “foreign commitments of society” to intervene in support of that right.

These developments have created a gap between a political practice where non-state and transnational movements and actors are given a legitimate role and considerable scope in defining the legitimate use of force and
the institutions and norms which frame thinking about the governance of the use of force. The most concrete expression of that gap are the seemingly intractable dilemmas in which the flourishing debate about changes in the “global governance” tends to get stranded.

Who Defines the Justified Use of Force? A “bias for states”

Before taking stock of the ways in which shifting political identities are leading to a rethinking of the use of justified use of force, it is important to underline that although there has never been an uncontested agreement on what constituted a justified use of force, modern political thinking (and even more so modern international relations thinking) has relied heavily on the idea that a priori states have the ultimate authority to define which uses of force are justified and which are not.

The (still) most accepted and widely used definition of the state is the Weberian one: the state successfully monopolises the legitimate use of force. In historical perspective this is a reasonable way of thinking about states. European states were established by claiming a monopoly on the use of legitimate force within their territories. States did actually manage to wrestle the control of justified use of force from various alternative authorities and in the process of doing so developed the administrative and legal apparatuses which we have come to identify as states. Moreover, in the course of the nineteenth century the state’s claim to monopolise the legitimate use of organised force was extended to cover also the international realm (Thomson 1994). Clearly, this state monopolization was never total. There were pockets – even in Europe – where non-states authorities (e.g. the Sicilian Mafia, see Gambetta 1993) successfully continued to claim control over organised force and internationally piracy and mercenaries never fully disappeared. But it became broadly (and hypocritically, see Krasner 1999) accepted that states should claim to monopolise the use of force. This discussion about monopoly, however, says little about whether or not states were justified in establishing and using their monopoly control over the use force. Weber himself is curiously silent on what the nature of the legitimacy he invokes is. One can read him (as Walker does, see Walker 1993: 144-6) as resting it on an exclusionary version of German nationalism. Most other authors prefer to simply let legitimacy drop.

Footnote 1: Classical accounts (emphasising different aspects) of this process include Elias (1998/1939), Hintze (1975), Tilly (1990).
Tilly refers to “controlling the principal means of coercion within a given territory” (Tilly 1975: 638) and Giddens to the “direct control of the means of internal and external violence” (Giddens 1985: 121). When the reference to legitimacy is there it has a disturbing tendency to be devoid of substance. It tends to become totally circular: the state is legitimate in its use of force because it is the state and hence sets the criteria of legitimacy. Obviously, “if we take states themselves as the assessors of legitimacy, it is clear that the state is the legitimate deployer of coercion. Rebel groups, separatist movements, and transnational groups are not viewed as legitimate deployers of coercion by the states or statesmen as a group” (Thomson 1994: 8).

This is precisely what has tended to happen in international relations. The peace of Westphalia in 1648 is widely read as setting the stage for the modern state system where it became part of the accepted international practice that polities should be allowed to determine the norms according to which they were governed on their own. The religious wars, where an essential goal was to change these norms, was to be a thing of the past. Interference was to be replaced by a “bias in favour of states”, allowing states to define for themselves according to which norms their polities should be ruled and which uses of force should count as (un)justified. On this account, thinking about the use of force internationally was confined to thinking about which uses of force between states were (un)justified (ius ad bellum) and which means could justifiably be used in these wars (ius in bello).

This reading of Westphalia and its implications for thinking about the justified used of force is shared (for opposite reasons) by the two grand traditions for thinking about the relationship between violence and politics. The first of these traditions (which most IR scholars would call “realist”) backed it because it seemed the best way to ensure order. In their understanding violence is always an inevitable part of politics (because of human nature, the irreducible and conflicting nature of norms or because of some structural logic of anarchy). In such conditions, the question becomes how to manage inevitable and omnipresent violence and how to keep it from propping up. Relying on states to monopolise violence within and possibly to establish some kinds of norms and institutions (if one follows the so called English school, see Buzan 2002: chap.1) for how to regulate it without seemed an obvious way of diminishing conflict.

2 The distinction between these traditions stems from Arendt (1969) who develops them as general ways of thinking about the relationship between violence and politics, but they are neatly mirrored in thinking about violence and international politics.
The other tradition (which most IR scholars would call “idealistic” or “liberal”) backed it because it seemed the most adequate way of allowing polities to rule themselves. Indeed, on this account politics can (and sometimes does) take place without violence. In fact, a crucial question is how to keep violence out of political processes and hence make it possible for politics to determine their own fate according to un-imposed rules. On this account it is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for preventing violence from interfering with politics that states keep violence out of politics (by legislation and law) within and by mutual respect and non-interference (and possibly the development of international law) without. It is hence not surprising that “liberals” such as Frost or Walzer have the principle of non-interference figuring as high on their agenda as do classical realists such as Kissinger or Morgenthau (Frost 1996, Walzer 1977, Guzzini 1998).

The agreement around an *a priori* stance which make states central in defining and the justified use of force within their boundaries and which by the same token reduces the international discussion of which uses of force are (un)justified to the use of force in wars between states has of course never been absolute. There are three obvious (and widely acknowledged and discussed) cases where there is no way around taking a stance on the substance of claims that internal uses of force are justified. The most obvious of these are when competing authorities claim statehood (and hence the right to monopolise the justified use of force) on the same territory. Thus, in wars of secession as well as in civil wars or revolutions, it is impossible to ignore the question. There is no way around deciding which authority is right in its claim. It is a practical matter of deciding who to deal with as a state. The second case is when state violence is so enormous that we cannot ignore it because it “chocks the moral conscience of mankind” (Walzer 1994: 107). However, as amply illustrated by history and present debates, reactions to human rights abuses may come with delay if at all and our “common moral understanding” and our interpretations of legal norms tend to be very elastic. But gross state violence certainly does place the norm of arguing that states define the justified use of force on their territory under considerable strain. The third case, is when there is no state to refer to and hence no appeal to a state which defines the justified use of force is possible (Hassner 1995b: 352). The question of how to think about the justified use of force is in clear a profoundly vexed one. While modern political thinking rests on the idea that states monopolise the justified (legitimate) use of force, this idea is either a tautology or in need for further elaboration. In international relations there has been a broad agreement to keep the door closed on the question of how states define the justified of force, except as it touches the use of force between
states. The generally accepted norm has been (in crude terms) that “once a population is incorporated into complete citizenship, a nation-state is given almost complete authority to subordinate the population. It can expropriate, kill, and starve with relatively little fear of external intervention”. (Meyer 1980: 119). But, as indicated by the “almost” and “relatively” in the quote, this closure has never been total. The two next sections argue that the breach in the bias for states is growing because of the ongoing redefinition of political identities and the increasing weight of transnational and non-state actors in international political practice.

The Development of Transnational Political Identities

Political identities are increasingly defined in relation to political communities which have borders different from those of the state. Consequently the claim that “all normative issues in world politics today refer, either directly or indirectly, to the state, interstate relations and the role of individuals as citizens of states” (Frost 1996: 79), is decreasingly valid, except as a triviality: with few exceptions (stateless people in particular) people belong to states since states cover the entire globe. Instead with the development of transnational political identities the polity in relation to which the use of force is (and has to be) justified has boundaries frequently diverging from those of the state.

Political identities are increasingly defined in relation to issues and borders which are different from those of states. There has been an enlargement of the political space people refer to, take part in and feel concerned by. There has been a transnationalisation of the polity in relation to which they define their political identities. In part this is due to the increasing mobility of people. As tourists, migrants, or neighbours of migrants, people feel concerned by what goes on in a much wider polity than that of their own state. (Beck 2000: 72-7; Held et al. 1999: 321-6). Thus, migrant networks play an important role in re-shaping politics both in the “host” and “home” states. Their involvement is growing not only as a consequence of the increasing number of diasporas/migrants, but also because of the growing possibilities of using these communities to organise (illegal) trade to finance political movements, raise “taxes” (viz. the PKK or the UCK in Germany), disseminate propaganda, or even simply to get votes in regular elections. They in fact play an important role in creating a transnational political space which can be used for contesting the use of force by states (Angoustures 1993; Bozarslan 1993; Weissman 1993). Even if there is no immediate personal reason to feel concern, people may well enlarge the poli-
ty with which they identify and in which they participate. The media brings developments in a much larger polity to peoples daily lives. “Wars [and one might say more broadly the use of violence] lose their spatial location, and, through their telegenic (re-)presentation, become political crises in which questions of justice and intervention must also be publicly discussed and decided in the far-off centres of global civil society” (Shaw 1996).

The making of transnational political identities is further accentuated by enlargement of the political agenda to inherently transnational issues. Indeed, the sphere of the political expands as “previously depoliticised areas of decision-making now find themselves politicized” (Beck 2000: 99; Pizzorno 1987). Ecology, science, food safety or the gender relations have been placed solidly on the political agenda. The way that states use and/or sanction the use of force in relation to these issues becomes a matter of concern for issue specific groups.

For example family law in Morocco is of concern to women in the US. For many, questioning state uses of force elsewhere is a central aspect of their activities. On some issues (human rights being a prime example) this questioning extends far beyond the issue specific groups. One might even argue that since the defeat of fascism after the second world war there is an attachment to human rights and democracy and a belief that these are principles which demand universal respect (Habermas 1998a: 71-9).

Finally, it is important to avoid an overly voluntaristic picture the redefinition of political identities.

It is not only a matter of changing self-definitions, universal values or expanding political agendas. The expansion is just as often imposed by the linking up of social spaces through what one might term structural changes (Lænder 2001). This is not only true in the sphere of the economy where it is most often argued and situated. Also political, cultural and social space is directly affected. International networks, education, funding, and media play an important part in setting local political and cultural agendas (Loureiro 1998). Moreover, studies of states in Africa (and more generally the developing world) concur on the importance of the international granting of statehood rather than its internal constitution3. “The international system is increasingly penetrating”4. This has not escaped activists who consequently view the

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3 For Africa see Bayart (1997), Clapham (1996), Reno (1998). Tilly’s monumental overview of state-making concludes on a “drift from internal to external state building” that is the increased importance of access and handling of external (as opposed to internal) capital and means of coercion. See Tilly (1990).

4 Buzan, (1995: 195). He goes on to argue that “it is not clear how states develop under these conditions, or even whether they can”.

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source of their troubles as rooted far away from home, and act accordingly. As a commentator of 11 September expressed it: they aimed at the symbols of an unjust global financial, political and military might on which they depend.

That failure to target also a key symbol of global cultural might (such as Hollywood) may either reflect that they did not think much of culture, or that they were sociological illiterates.

The consequence is that any state use of force and its justification can be (and is) challenged, contested or approved by a wide range of actors and movements. First, it is contested by individual citizens who do not necessarily lobby directly, but still have firm beliefs about what is justified or not for other states to do. They find it important that children should not be used as soldiers in Columbia, Falungong members tortured in China or tribal law applied in Pakistan. It is further contested by a wide array of advocacy groups of various forms, including private business and NGOs who try to influence the ways in which force is used. Lobbying by Amnesty International in the UN is a way of contesting the legitimacy of the Myanmar government’s use of force against the Karen, and blocking Shell stations in Germany a way of contesting the Nigerian government’s violent treatment of the Ibo. Finally, it is contested (more or less violently) by groups that have a direct stake in a conflict. Thus, Kurdish attacks on shops owned by Turks in Germany become a way of contesting the Turkish state’s claim to use force in a justified way. The overall consequence in Beck’s wording: “where the dominant political image of modernity was Leviathan, the moral standing of ‘national’ powers and superpowers will, for the future, be captured in the picture of Lemuel Gulliver, waking from an unthinking sleep to find himself tethered by innumerable tiny bonds” (Beck (2000: 72).

Second, the redefinition of political identities also increases the pressure on governments to interfere with the uses of force (and its justification) elsewhere. Indeed, much of the transnational politisation runs through states (Zürn et al. 2000). The individual, expert communities, advocacy groups or NGOs who mobilise around questioning the use of force often do so by putting pressure on their own states. Concretely translated, this means that there is pressure on states to intervene with the definition of what is a justified use of force in other. The most spectacular illustration of this are “humanitarian interventions”. It certainly is no longer the case (as conventionally argued, by for example Frost 1996) that only interventions have to be justified. On the contrary as shown by the debates surrounding Algeria (Malmvig 2002) and

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Rwanda (Barnett 2002), governments also are under strong pressure to justify non-intervention. But the increased international involvement in the definitions and debates about the justified use of force nationally, is also visible in less spectacular – but equally important – policies. Governments use sanctions, political conditionalities on loans and aid. There is growing pressure by states on firms to become “good citizens” and shoulder their “social responsibilities” in particular by checking that their activities do not encourage or benefit from “illegitimate” practices in other countries (as illustrated e.g. by the Kimberely process to limit the trade in “blood diamonds”). Political identities are increasingly conceived in relation to polities and issues which are transnational in nature. This makes it more difficult to fall back on the state as the institution with ultimate authority to define which uses of force are (un)justified within its territory. Claims about justified uses of force are decreasingly taken at face value but submitted to transnational scrutiny. There is deep breach in the bias in favour of accepting states as the ultimate authority.

The Growing Significance of Political Identities Defined Outside and Against States

The breach in the bias in favour of states has been further widened by the increasing formulation of political identities against the state, rather than in relation to or as constituted by it. In much contemporary thinking about the relationship between political identity and the state, the state is construed as the main threat to political identities and also the key source of violence (i.e. of unjustified use of force). This line of thinking runs straight against influential understandings of the relationship between the state and political identities such as the Hegelian one (where individuals are constituted and given political identity through their relationship to the state, see Frost 1996: 147-50) or the communitarian one (where morality is “thick” inside states and “thin” outside, see Walzer 1994). This section outlines four reasons for this development in order to argue that it is difficult today to defend any a priori assumption that sovereignty and the state system are positive and important per se.

The first reason for revisiting of the relationship between the state and political identities has deep roots in modern political understandings of legitimacy. Indeed, the “dilemma” of how to reconcile the multiplicity of individual political identities and the dominance of the state is a fundamental and persis-

6 Contrary to what is claimed by many. E.g. Frost (1996: 106-9).
tent part of modern political thinking stemming from the disenchantment of enlightenment. Because indeed, “the issue of legitimacy blossoms when appreciation of the conventional character of social norms and institutions becomes widespread” and we can no longer ground legitimacy in some religious or transcendentally derived understanding (Connolly 1984a: 2). This dilemma is all the more pronounced as the state “expands” and gets involved with everything from labour relations, to film-making and the constitution of the family.

This has far reaching implications for the credibility of the state in defining the justified use of force. Indeed, with state expansion comes a centralisation and mobilization of power and “this very mobilization of power endows it [the state] with awesome potential for evil” (Connolly 1984b: 17). This “potential for evil” may become a key source of oppression of identities which are at odds with the “hegemonic identity of the state”. (Connolly 2000). The state may be fundamental in creating these identities (by defining nationals, criminals, madness etc.). Awareness of the conventional nature of the norms on which it rests make unreflected acceptance of these identities impossible. This does not justify a total rejection of the state and even less of democracy, but it does have a sobering effect on thinking about the relationship between the state and political identities. It underlines the need for caution and reflexivity in regard to states’ definitions of which uses of force are justified. It underlines the importance of adopting a “perhaps” position (Connolly 1991: 220-2). The second revision is similar in that it also poses the potential that the major threat to political identities might come from the state, in a very immediate and physical manner. This revision is tied to the re-readings of the history of the twentieth century, where the state stands out as anything but an institution which can be counted on to use force in justifiable ways. Indeed, one reading of the history of the totalitarian state violence is that it is not only not opposed to the process of monopolising the legitimate use of violence in state institutions but a sign of the fragility and potential reversibility of that process (this is Elias argument, see Elias 1982), or even more strongly a logical consequence of that process. Bauman’s work on the Holocaust epitomises the latter position. He argues that it is precisely the concentration of power in the state and the development of bureaucratic culture which is the cause of the Holocaust. The development of the bureaucratic culture gives the Holocaust its peculiar shape and efficiency. More than this “the light shed by the Holocaust on our knowledge of bureaucratic rationality is at its most dazzling once we realize the extent to which the very idea of the Endlösung was an outcome of the bureaucratic culture” (Bauman 1989: 15). The monopolisation of the use of force with the state had the effect of freeing the use of violence from
moral calculus (Bauman 1989: 28). Hence, “in the face of an unscrupulous team saddling the powerful machine of the modern state with its monopoly of physical violence and coercion, the most vaunted accomplishments of modern civilization failed as safeguards against barbarism. Civilization proved incapable of guaranteeing moral use of the awesome powers it brought into being” (Bauman 1989: 111). The Holocaust disconfirms the widespread Hobbesian idea that:

“...the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any form of Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civil war; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge...”.

(Hobbes 1985: 238)

Bauman’s point is that the modern state is not necessarily a lesser evil; rather it can turn out to be the key source of evil in some contexts.

A third kind of revisiting of the state which has led to a growing acceptance of political identities articulated against it stems from rethinking of the state outside the European context. While with some stretch of imagination (and neglect of the violence entailed in the process) one can argue that state building in Europe was based on some kind of community building process, a similar move is literally impossible in the rest of the world. Most blatantly in Latin America and Africa, existing political organisations, communities and boundaries played a very limited role as states were established by European colonial powers (Appiah 1993; Clapham 1996). But also elsewhere (post-) colonial states developed in conditions which are very different from those in Europe and which make it difficult to imagine states as picture polities sharing a thick moral and political culture.

To imagine this is made all the more difficult because of the oppressive, exclusionary nature of many states, confirmed in any counting of instances of internal-wars, violent deaths and ethnic cleansing (e.g. Rotfeld 2001; Holsti 1996). To denote that a “state is not a state”, scholars (as well as policy-makers) attach adjectives to states. States become quasi-states (Jackson 1990); failed-states (Bilgin and Morton 2002); rogue-states (Chomsky 2000, who reverses the usage and applies it to the US); criminal states (Bayart et al 1997); war-lord states (Reno 1998) etc. These “states with the adjectives” cannot – or do not want to – control the use of force on their territories. The lines between public and private authority, between police forces and criminal gangs and be-
tween the armed forces and private militias are blurred to the point of disappearance (Howe 2001). In such conditions, it is hard to grant the state any “a priori positive bias” in defining the legitimate use of force and on the contrary easy to sympathise with the many political identities articulated against state violence.

This lead straight onto the fourth and last source of change in the direction of becoming more accepting of political identities defined outside the state. In “risk society”, identities are increasingly formulated around issues of security to which the private sector is increasingly called to reply. The argument about the rampant sense of insecurity is nicely articulated by Bauman who argues that it has triple roots in the uncertainty about the distinctions which guide everyday life, insecurity about the future (linked to the economic system of exploitation), and physical/bodily safety. (Bauman (1997). However, there is a tendency to slide into a focus exclusive on the safety part of insecurity and in particular on the safety of the body, protection from crime and military matters. But this slide in unlikely to do anything to alleviate the underlying problem: “There is a story of a drunken man who searched for a lost banknote under a lamp-post – not because he lost it there but because the part of the pavement underneath was better lit. Transferring anxiety from global insecurity and uncertainty, its genuine causes, into the field of private safety follows roughly the same logic” (Bauman 1999: 49). The result is that “politics” does not seem capable of seeing (let alone dealing with) the problem. Moreover, politics appears increasingly irrelevant to people’s daily concerns. There is a gap between the sense that the state is expanding and that politics seems not to actually capture the key preoccupations people have. The “agora” where private grievances could be articulated politically and “agglomerated” to a political force is disappearing (Bauman 1999: 7). The result is that the many “small” sufferings are not articulated politically, and, since the “big sufferings are gone”, each individual is left to deal with seemingly private and personal problems (Bourdieu 1993).

The consequence is that politics – as embodied by the state and its institutions – appears ineffective while private responses stand out as legitimate and necessary. In a world where the state is seen as either incapable of picking up and/or of articulating adequate responses to insecurity (mostly formulated in physical terms) it is only fair enough to bring in private alternatives. The so called “neo-liberal revolution” and the rethinking of the state in utilitarian terms (as an essentially self-serving and rent-seeking institution) has added legitimacy to this move by giving an aura of effectiveness and appeal to private solutions. (Evans 1997; Feigenbaum et al. 1999). The re-
sult is a rather spectacular growth in the reliance on private security guards, private police-forces, private prisons, and private military companies, many of these are roofed under efficient service-providing firms operating transnationally (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Johnston 1992; Moyle 2001 and Leander 2002).

It certainly is no longer the case that “practices [of non-state uses of force] are not only prohibited but have become unthinkable” (Thomson 1994: 145). Rather, there is a mounting effort to ground this privatisation in ethical and political terms. Two political philosophers conclude that “...in a mercenary context there may well be less killing motives around. The moral economy of a mercenarist world would appear to be preferable to that of the Statist societies we currently inhabit”. (Lynch 2000: 152). Politically, there is increasing pressure on governments to revise their stance on mercenaries (and in particular on “private military companies”). Hence, in response to the recent green paper the secretary of state argues for a limited role of “professional, responsible and well regulated PMCs” in ensuring order7. There is “a self-replicating dynamic that assigns private force to alleviate human insecurity only to deepen its root causes. As a result, these private armed groups are able to position themselves, where self-interest so motivates them, as guarantors of social and economic stability, and to selectively challenge the state; in an increasing portion of the world, this is a battle for hearts and minds that the state is losing”(Shannon 2002: 45).

These revisions of the link between the state and political identities are (obviously) far from uncontested. But they are a part of contemporary political practice. Just as the transnational identity construction referred to above, they make state claims to define (and monopolise) the justified use of force questionable. States might be justified in their definition and use of force; but they might also not. The “bias in favour of the state” in judging the matter has suffered a substantial downgrading in international political practice. An ill-articulated “perhaps” has slunk into thinking about states’ claims to have a monopoly on the justified use of force. Conventional doubts about the boundaries of the polity have taken on gigantic proportions as has conventional distrust of states. Simultaneously, private claims to define the justified use of force are increasingly legitimate. There is a denationalisation and privatisation of politics (Beck 2000: 1-14).

Shifting Political Identities and Dilemmas of Global Security Governance

As political practice places conditions on states’ right to define the justified use of force, a Pandora’s Box of questions is opened. If states do not define the justified use of force then who does? From where does the authority to do so derive? What exactly are the standards according to which the justified use of force are judged? Are these standards equitably defined and applied? What is it possible to do about the infringements of these standards? These questions are the stuff of the debate about global governance of security. They turn around how political rule over the use of force in international “anarchical society” should be understood and re-organised. The redefinition of political identities has made these questions relevant far beyond the circles engaged in providing blueprints for a hypothetical world state or arguing that such blueprints will not work or are not desirable. It is no longer a matter of scheming about potential future changes but rather of dealing with unfolding developments. Unfortunately, the norms and institutions which inform our political thinking provides little scope for innovation. The state is the modern answer to the problem of the use of force and existing institutions reflect that answer. It is hence not surprising that discussions about global governance (which is the code word for thinking about governance involving non-state actors at levels above the state) tend to produce seemingly intractable dilemmas. They have to deal with, and justify, the breach in the bias in favour of states on the basis of a norms and institutions which are grounded in that bias. This section illustrates the difficulty by pinpointing four dilemmas which are produced as changing political practices clashes with the inertia of state based thinking on the regulation of the use of force.

A first dilemma is that while on the one hand the increasing presence and importance of transnational and non-state actors has made the insufficiency of existing international processes and institutions more blatant, political thinking which posits the state as the solution to the problem of violence makes it very difficult to devise concrete and practicable suggestions for how to make these processes more equitable. In fact, it even makes it difficult to imagine hypothetical solutions.

There is growing interest in, awareness about the importance of, but also contestation of the international political processes, institutions and norms involved in deciding on the justified use of force (such as e.g. the UN, the OAU, the OSCE, NATO). With the transnationalisation of political identities international procedures and institutions become more important as politics is pushed upwards. Various transnational movements pressure states to inter-
vene with uses of force elsewhere. States in turn rely on international institutions and reference to the international community to justify interventions, to coordinate and to contest them. Moreover, transnational political movements directly try to influence and shape politics in international institutions and the formulation of international norms (viz. the process around the establishment of the ICC for example, see Glasius 2003). As the international politics matters more, it also matters more if the political processes and institutions which play a central role are seen as insufficient and inequitable. For many they are precisely that. Not all instances of state violence are placed on the agenda, and even fewer provoke international reaction and condemnation (Hassner 1995a: 381). This underlines the need for an agenda setting less dependent on the interests of leading powers, the fads of the media, the presence of NGOs or personal links. Obvious inequities in the handling of issues placed on the agenda further underlines the urgency of reform. Criticism abounds of the way that some conflicts are singled out to justify intervention (viz. the discussions surrounding Iraq or Kosovo) while some are left running their course (Rwanda, Soudan, Algeria) and even more of the forms interventions. There is biting criticism of the processes in which these choices are made, the domination of the great powers (and the US in particular; see Patomäki 2001; Patomäki 2002) and of the implications of the choices and calls for reform (including blueprints for such reforms) of existing institutions. In Neuman’s words “In Kosovo, the end of the legitimate warring state was at stake. Where is the political entity that may legitimately speak in the name of humanity?”(Neumann 2002: 80).

However, even if this a criticism (or parts of it) is widely shared and the need to reform international institutions perceived as imperative, the dilemma arises because there is an equally widespread conviction that reform is practically very difficult and possibly not even desirable. Reform is practically very difficult for the obvious reason that the resistance to reform on behalf of those who see the current order either as serving their interests or as better than any alternative are most likely to block it. Since the institutions to a large extent do benefit dominant states, the blocking is likely to be effective. This is an undeniable practical problem which is not directly linked to a state based view on how force should be regulated but to a concern with the functioning of existing institutions. However, there is a more profound issue, namely the question of whether or not moving politics upwards is desirable. The under-

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8 See for example the chapters in Van Ham (2002).

9 Held is no doubt the key reference for this (Held, 1995 and 2002) but there are many others.
lying fear is that creating stronger international procedures might undermine the existing international norms and institutions designed to regulate and limit the use of force by states without providing a better alternative. A classical worry is that a too powerful international Leviathan would prove oppressive and hence worse than current arrangements. A second concern is that existing institutions (solidly grounded in the voluntary collaboration of states) would be undermined and that nothing would be there to replace them. The fate of the League of Nations is used to point out that trying to move too much authority “upwards”, or doing so in ways perceived as unfair, will simply have the effect that those who see themselves as the losers in this shift start ignoring the institution. The upward move will simply have been counterproductive. Both these fears (and the seemingly intractable dilemmas they produce for reformers) presuppose and only make sense from a perspective where existing procedures are assumed to be less oppressive and better functioning than the hypothetical alternative. They only make sense if the same conditional clauses that are introduced on states monopoly definition of the justified use of force in political practice are kept out of thinking about reforms of institutions and political processes.

The second dilemma illustrating the clash between changing political practice and the inertia of discourses also evolves around the tendency to move politics upwards and arises from the difficulty of legitimizing such a move. The dilemma is that although politics is de facto moved upwards, it is hard to imagine the existence of a political community which can justify this move. There is a strong concern that this community might not be “thick” enough to justify moving politics – and the right to define the justified use of force – upwards.

With changing political identities “thicker” transnational, non-state political communities are emerging and they push politics upwards. Some think that we are heading towards an ever growing delegation of authority upwards (see Shaw 2000; Wendt 2003). Be this as it may. For many, moving authority upward is an important political project for moral reasons but also to follow the development of transnational polities. But for the most part, “cosmopolitanism” is firmly Kantian: it does not suggest to do away with the state, but to organise international institutions on the basis of sovereign authority. However, even if only a part of state authority is moved upwards, the question remains: what is the “glue” binding the political community behind that (partial) authority? What kind of “civil religion” (Rousseau) or basic common contextual understanding could make legislation possible and legitimate? Human rights is an obvious (perhaps the only?) serious contender under discussion.
for that role. But it is also a contender around which there is intense disagreement. Partly because these rights privilege a specifically “Western” understanding of the individual. It developed in the West, it looks at the individual as detached from community religion and context, and it disregards alternative understandings of rights (Owen 2002). But more centrally, human rights are often argued to provide too thin a glue to hold the community together. As argued by Habermas “even a world wide consensus about human rights is no equivalent to the solidarity among citizens developed in the national frame. Solidarity among citizens has its roots in specific collective identities. However, solidarity among world citizens must rely exclusively on the moral universalism expressed in human rights” (Habermas 1998b: 162-3). These “universalisms” are too weak to provide the bonding of a real existing moral community. They risk merely serving the purpose of depoliticising politics by locating it at such a distance that citizens no longer can – or want to – participate (Kymlicka 2001).

This discussion about human rights is interesting as much for what it says as for what it leaves out. The underlying assumption is that the identified and indeed very real problems of legitimizing political rule and grounding it in a community which it identifies are smaller or inexistent in state based political communities. There is an unspoken contention that communities are indeed thick at home and thin abroad and that states are closer to political communities than would be international authorities. But clearly this is precisely what is contested in a political practice where transnational and non-state political identities are increasingly prominent. Again there is clear discrepancy between evolving political practices and the continued reliance on the state as the answer to the problem of violence.

The third and forth dilemmas in which discussions about of global governance tend to get stuck arise from the growing clout of non-state political actors in regulation and definition of the use of force. Once political identities are articulated against the state, and individuals, groups, movements and various other non-state entities contend for the right to define the justified use of force, it is difficult to think about international political processes as involving exclusively (or even mainly) states. The boundary between international society and world society is blurring. A wide range of non-state actors claim a space in international politics. NGOs, representatives of ethnic, religious and civil movements as well as firms and banks play an important role in already existing processes. They are consulted, have seats in the UN and often are the institutions through which policies are channelled. Diplomacy has to be rethought to include transnational and non-state actors.(Strange 1996; Stop-
ford and Strange 1991). But they also act politically on their own account. Firms and private banks have their own conditionality (Nelson 1993; Friedman 1983; Porter 1999). NGOs negotiate truces, aid corridors and taxes with states as well as with non-state authorities. Politics is “privatised” and NGOized (Clapham 1996).

For discussions about the “global governance” of the use of force this development is problematic because the integration of non-state actors also highlights the need for some procedure for singling out (and justifying) why some actors (and not others) are granted the legitimacy to act on their own and/or are included in state led processes, it also brings home the difficulty any such exercise. Questions of who these non-state actors represent and how representative they are seem impossible to circumvent, but also profoundly vexed.

Many non-state actors make no claim to represent any community at all. Such is the case of most firms and of many gang leaders who are driven mainly (and possibly increasingly) by economic interests. But even those who claim representativeness of some political identity find it hard to uphold such claims. They by definition represent a specific group with a specific political identity. This paves the way for contesting the weight of that specific community. For example, how important is really the community of battered women in Azerbaijan which the women’s movement claims to represent or the international community of the women more generally which international feminist movement claims to stand for? Did these communities exist at all prior to donors willingness to grant money? Are they displacing other more locally rooted communities? But even if the community (and its identity is accepted as significant) there are considerable difficulties tied to establishing that a private actor represents a specific community in any meaningful way. How representative is the PKK of the Kurds in Turkey, Green Peace of the environmentalists, Amnesty International of human rights activists or the Landmine movement of peace activists etc.? If non-state actors represent no one but themselves, a very marginal part of some larger group, or a fraction of the own group what is the justification for making them part of the political processes and what is the criteria according to which one can establish whether or not they should be allowed to take part? The rhetorical questions “Who elected the bankers?” (Pauly 1997) and who exactly “has the authority to act in the name of rainforests and dolphins”? (Walker 1994: 675) can reasonably be posed to an entire range of private movements. Obviously, there is no answer. This problem of representativeness of non-state actors as a dilemma for their

10 As argued in Ergun (2002).
involvement in political processes is clearly a profound one. However, it is often forgotten that very similar problems exist for many states. There is no reason to assume that states are more representative of a polity that they can speak for it, that state officials have been elected or that the polity they represent does not crowd out and oppress other potential polities with different identities. The insight that the contrary is often true is the reason for which political practice has given so much larger space to non-state and transnational actors. The dilemma construction is once again the outcome of the discrepancy between political practices and the inertia of discourses and thinking.

The last dilemma which illustrates this gap is the that which arises from the gap between the practical inclusion (and empowering) of transnational and non-state actors and thinking about that inclusion. Even though Hobbes’ spectre of the war of all against all might not be considered the worst prospect in all conditions, it still is a fearful one. Even among the most adamant defenders of transnational civil society, there is acute awareness that empowering non-state actors might be counter productive, in particular if it leads to a withdrawal (or weakening) of state institutions, so that large chunks of territory are simply abandoned and left at the mercy of whoever happens to posses most arms and/or the best contacts for getting those (see Poirier 1993). It is difficult to ignore that this was the concrete result of the privatisation policies (and the policies officially intended to encourage civil society development) pursued with great energy since the early 1980s. “Instead of forging a new more responsive relationship between state and society, as the civil society theorists of the 1980s had anticipated, the state simply withdrew from large part of society. What was revealed beneath the layers of state control was not civil society but incivility [...] Civil society was ineffective because there was no rule of law; there was no public control of violence”. (Kaldor 1999: 203-4). This dilemma also figures prominently in the discussions about how far to allow (and encourage) privatisation of military and policing. In Eastern Europe disagreements have raged between those who think that the privatisation of the control over the means of force will lead to a Sicilian syndrome and those who think that it is merely a step on the road to creating order. (Volkov 2000 contra Varese 1994). Similarly, at the international level there is intense disagreement about whether or not the restrictions on the use of mercenaries (as defined by the UN and the OAU conventions) should be changed to make it possible to rely more extensively on PMCs to (re-)establish order, or, if this would lead to increasing disorder and violence.

However, the view of this as a dilemma downplays the many similarities which arise when uncivil states are included as actors in international political
processes and empowered by this inclusion. As pointed out by Reno, for governments in “warlord states” sovereignty is a key resource and often a key explanation for the perpetuation of a form of rule which is anything but “civil” (Reno 1998). Hence, although the concern with empowering uncivil non-state transnational actors is a grave one, its constitution as a dilemma is tied to a view of the state as a more adequate solution. Yet it is precisely the contestation of that view which explains the emergence of the problem in the first place.

The “intractable dilemmas” just discussed have in common that they ultimately stem from the gap between a political practice which gives increasing space to transnational and non-state political identities in the definition and regulation of the justified use of force and a political thinking which remains anchored in the idea that ultimately the definition and regulation of the legitimate use of force rests with states. The consequences of the evolving practices defining and regulating the justified use of force are not drawn in political thinking. It is as if political (and particularly IR) thinking had been so profoundly shaped by what Sofsky calls “the myth” (Sofsky 1996) about the importance of the state in regulating the use of force in society, that the changing role of states is hard to comprehend and accept and political imagination severely stifled. It is easier to fall back on deep rooted and well rehearsed ideas. Yet, changes in political identities are occurring and they do shape political practice. Therefore, just as the ills flowing out of Pandora’s Box could not be stuffed back into the box, so the “dilemmas” of global governance are bound to remain. A large share of what scholars in international relations busy themselves with are precisely these dilemmas, so there is no reason to rejoin the common whole-sale complaints about the triviality of work done in IR and/or its irrelevance to international/world politics. However, there is reason to wish that more of this work was sensitive to the fact that these dilemmas stem from the rather paradoxical willingness to grant non-state transnational political identities legitimacy in political practice (hence denying the state part of its exclusive right to define and regulate the legitimate use of force) and the unwillingness to question legitimacy of the state monopoly on legitimate uses of force in theoretical thinking.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that shifting political identities has led to severe strains in the conventional notions that \textit{a priori} (though not absolutely) states have the right to define the justified use of force on their own territory and
that *a priori* discussions about the justified use of force internationally should be restricted to discussions about the use of force among states. It has also argued that as a result “global governance” of the justified use of force has become a more salient issue in international politics. As the stakes grow, existing practices and institutions of global governance are under intense scrutiny and their reform is a key issue of contention. The current resurgence and flourishing of the debate about global governance is driven precisely by these developments. Yet, although there is a prolific production of books and articles on the topic, relatively few tackle the grand questions about what the implications of these trends are for thinking about and practising global governance. In part, this might be because of the dominance of “reindorsement discourses” (Gellner 1959) which take the ordinary language usage to be the correct one: since our ordinary notion is that the state has a monopoly on legitimate use of force that claim is taken as a given. In part it may be because the key challenge is located at the level of state-building (not at the level of global governance): the trouble is that we need to construct more stable states and that is essentially a national process. Both miss the point. Even if there is undeniably a “weak state dilemma” (Holsti 1996) and even if we mostly continue to assume that states have a monopoly on the justified use of force, we also give increasing space to transnational and private political identities and this is leading to a reform of the norms governing the justified use of force.

This paper has insisted that the reason it has proven so difficult to actually confront these changes is that they go against the grain of our understanding of the state as the (only known and available) solution to the problem of violence internationally. However, an ostrich strategy which either avoids confronting the difficulties or refuses to try to innovate is unhelpful and unfair. If the system of global governance of the use of force is ever to become more than a euphemism for a “ramshackle assembly of conflicting sources of authority” (Strange 1996), it is clearly necessary to find ways of bridging the gap between a political practice where transnational and non-state authorities are increasingly legitimate and thinking about governance which cannot recognise that legitimacy.

**Bibliography**


The New Uni-Multipolar System and the Crisis of Predictability

Epistemological panic. Theoretical and conceptual sparring without end. Confrontation between rival paradigms of international relations that continually ends in a draw. The end of widespread fascination with philosophies of history, together with the proliferation of a multiplicity of endisms, truly remarkable for a generation that had predicted the end of every teleological reading of history. A possibly definitive crisis of predictability, manifested in an unforeseen, previously unimaginable macro-event, like the implosion of the ex-USSR.

This, in short, is the methodological state of international relations in the post-bipolar era, after reawakening from the theoretical torpor of the Cold War. This is certainly an empirical consequence of a state of constant and assiduous mutations in the morphology of international politics, beginning with the implosion of the USSR, and continuously redesigned by the inter-related and super-imposed nature of various factors: political and territorial disintegrations, with consequent reassertions of sovereignty; the grand return of the geopolitical variable with all of its theological and political trappings; the rise of at least three international systems out of the collapse of Soviet Russia, suspended between impulses towards the diffusion of power (or, in other words, fragmentation) and an irresistible tendency towards the integration of its units at every possible level (economic, political, legal, cultural, as well as technological); the entry of new non-state actors onto the international stage and the short-circuiting of international law and its already limited certainties; a global war (after September 11) triggered by “private” enemies and justified in eth-

1 This is part of a larger research project that I am doing under the supervision of Alber-to Martinelli, Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Milan. I thank him for his excellent advice and helpful comments on the first draft of this essay.
ical and not political terms (and thus of an unlimited intensity, because moved more by a desire to bring justice than to find an equilibrium of peace, to punish more than to generate political order); the rise of problems of a global reach, manageable only through state cooperation, an unprecedented interdependence brought about by an unprecedented technological progress that has, paradoxically, increased the opportunities for cooperation, but also for conflict between potential rivals; and, last but not least, situations of general bewilderment, certainly not eased by the continual unpredictable swaying of the current hegemon of the post-bipolar era: the United States of America. Since March 1991, the American administration has been undecided, not only whether to occupy the throne of the world empire that, almost despite itself, it found itself having to manage, but, especially, whether to seek a minimum of consensus from the international community (the multilateral option) or simply act the empire (the unilateral option).

All of this characterizes inter-state politics post-1989, and there is certainly much more.

This situation has obliged scholars to undertake a sight-navigation of the archipelagos of international relations theory, in a titanic attempt, considering the unprecedented fluidity of the moment, to give meaning to the continuous unfolding of events within the short time (a decade) of heterogeneous post-bipolar international systems, attempting to adequately map them. Often desperate interpretative efforts are undertaken by international relations scholars, abandoned by the splendid geometry of the Cold War bipolar system, whose theoretical simplicity gave them the luxury of ignoring political mutations, each state’s natural historicity, and thus every international system. They have therefore contented themselves with a certain explanatory parsimony (because what counted most was the ever-present bipolar system) and dismissed as unthinkable the crisis of any poliethnic state of the international system, thus eternalizing the state, forgetting that Hobbes’ Leviathan is a God, but is also mortal (machina machinarum!).

In this epistemological confusion, attempts to give form to events in progress and, in particular, to unearth a definition for the current international system and an interpretative framework for American foreign policy have been numerous, often unsatisfactory, but sometimes interesting.

If we set aside frameworks based on the clash of civilizations, the end of history, the realization of the cosmopolitan utopia (world state) or the neo-medieval nightmare of a world empire of political units in perennial war, two interpretations are worth discussing for the purpose of this study. The first concerns the attempted definition of the current organization of the internation-
al system proposed by S.P. Huntington, with his intention to find a clever compromise between realist-structuralist analyses, liberal inter-dependency theories and geopolitical apologies. In an article (Huntington, 1999), less well known than the many others that have consecrated him as a guru of the social sciences, the Harvard political scientist proposed the following shrewd definition of the post-bipolar international system: a uni-multipolar system with one single hegemonic power, the United States, and islands of multipolarity anchored by pivotal regional states (the great continental powers), some with a universalistic vocation, in competition between themselves and with the hegemon through the formation of alliances along civilizational fault lines that group them less according to calculations of pure national interest than ethno-cultural affinities.

The second interpretative framework that warrants mention, after Huntington, is the one proposed by authors who characterize post-bipolar international politics in terms of the tension between dynamics of political-territorial fragmentation, on the one hand (thus setting off processes of state formation), and processes of economic and juridical integration between the system’s units, on the other. Studies of ethnic and national phenomena, as well as globalization in its various aspects, can clearly be included in this category.

Uncertainty about the post-bipolar phase centers upon two important and incontrovertible factors: the persistence of a hegemonic system dominated by the American colossus – however challenged by ascending powers – and the fragmentation/integration dialectic between the units of the system. The current persistence of this crucial, duplicitous, peculiarity of post-Cold War international politics has channeled the attention of scholars to the relationship between two macro-phenomena, which are tightly linked: the study of American foreign policy and the analysis of processes of fragmentation and integration or, as we say in a simplified manner today, globalization.

In the following pages I will analyze and relate American foreign policy with the phenomenon of globalization, focusing primarily on one aspect: the interrelation between Washington’s foreign policy and the question/necessity of “governing globalization,” the interrelation among the foreign policy options open to the American administration and the vital need to guide the formless mass of global social and political phenomena that defines the current epoch. In particular, we will see how the adoption of an alternatively unilateral or multilateral foreign policy cannot be easily reconciled with globalization and represents, moreover, the problem in an overly simplistic way.

2 See for example Clark (2001).
The Isolationism/Internationalism Dilemma

Once upon a time, there was the isolationism/internationalism alternative. After Bush Jr.’s very narrow victory over Gore in the presidential elections, the public debate concerning the two candidates’ foreign policy orientations predictably centered on the classical isolationism/internationalism dichotomy. The pan-interventionist internationalism typical of Gore’s liberal-progressive ideology saw (in widespread and systematic human rights violations in numerous closed societies of the inter-state system, in the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear arsenals and bacteriological and chemical arms, in the phenomena of ethnic chauvinism, and in the destabilizing bellicosity of rogue states) reasons to continue to play the sheriff in the post-bipolar world, maintaining supremacy for the sake of international primacy. In contrast, the conservative neo-isolationism of the Republican George W. Bush favored a consistent withdrawal of the United States from most international crisis areas (starting with Europe), an inevitable choice, according to the neo-con clan, in order to avoid fiscal crisis in the American system caused by imperial overstretch. This can result from a definitive alteration of the “Lippmann gap” (the delicate balance between external engagements and resources) which, at least since the rise of the doctrine of containment, looms over the choices of every administration. In short, according to the alarmed columnists and editorialists of the time, the view of international politics as “social work” à la Clinton would be followed by a foreign policy that was extremely prudent in its approach to interventionism and characterized by the shrewd strategy, of British fame, of engagement without entanglement.

The isolationism/internationalism dichotomy, insistently advanced by opinion-makers, discounted the fact that “American isolationism” had traditionally meant much more than a simple withdrawal from international relations, along the lines of America first, and second and third, of Pat Buchanan and his followers. American foreign policy had certainly been isolationist in the past, but only if by this we intend an avoidance of permanent engagements in order to guarantee a freedom of action from bellicose Europeans and the treacherous Albion. What had often been defined as isolationism was the simple and occasional American disengagement from the European checkerboard, the result of a shift of the American national interest towards other regions of the world, in primis, the Pacific (the acceptance of isolationism proves, in fact, to be the fruit of a particularly European perception of American foreign policy). Moreover, the isolationism/internationalism dichotomy as presented by the mass media, and also by numerous political scientists and historians, was a
false and, in many ways misguided, reading of American foreign policy. This is because the facts show that the United States has never adopted a strictly isolationist foreign policy. To support the idea that Americans had no foreign policy simply because they were not very interested in the “confrontations of power” in the European theater (even before 1898, the fateful year of the Spanish-American war and the traditional date marking the beginning of an assertive American foreign policy) is rather perplexing. How can we forget the spectacular and unprecedented territorial expansion of the 13 colonies throughout the 1800s, which some assert continues to this day? (Fallow 2002). This was a kind of foreign policy best known to Europeans: the expansionist kind.

Revealing certain analysts’ fears of a neo-isolationist tendency in the Bush II team as unfounded were a constellation of neo-Reaganite super-interventionist writings by authors who would become members of the executive and counselors to the President (Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, and the duo Kristol and Kagan, to cite a few). Moreover, the many factors that act as irresistible systemic forces – the demonstrated inability of regional powers and organizations to settle inter-state and intra-state crises, the deep uncertainty concerning the rules and principles that regulate international politics, the potential disintegration of polyethnic states, and the menace posed by rogue states in a remorseless race to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction – can all make Washington’s involvement necessary, and, in a certain respect, inevitable, because of their potential to become – even indirectly – the source of a grave threat to American national security.

The victory of the neo-Reaganite contingent of Bush II, and the inauguration of a super-interventionist foreign policy, thus exposes the isolationist hypothesis as surreal and anachronistic, together with the explanatory dichotomy of isolationism/internationalism. The events of September 11, and the subsequent immersion of Republican Washington in foreign policy, simply relegate this antiquated and unhelpful reading of American foreign policy to the attic.

The plurality of threats and the progressive “multi-polarization” of the international system, as a result of Washington’s “policy of concessions”\(^\text{4}\), have

\(^3\) The nightmare of failed-states.

\(^4\) The United States, after 11 September, in order to act undisturbed in the global fight against terrorism, had to lean on pivotal states within each regional geopolitical system in order to further its aims and to protect its national interest everywhere, thus recognizing the partners’ important power and authority in their respective zones of influence. This option is only apparently multilateral, because it is more a consequence of the need of the U.S. to reduce the number of obstacles it encounters in its struggle against trans-national terrorism.
led the Republican administration of Bush II to create a foreign policy quite different from that of his predecessor, while still sharing the same desire for a cocktail of foreign policy made up of a pro-democracy pan-interventionism (setting aside for now the free market), mixed with abundant drops of traditional power politics.

This reshuffling of foreign policy traditions has required a new reading of Washington’s conduct in the international arena. This is how the unilateralism/multilateralism dichotomy – indicated as useful by analysts in explaining the Americans’ particular style of conducting foreign policy and by practitioners as the alternatives par excellence in policy elaboration and implementation – appeared on the market of interpretative frameworks for American foreign policy. On the one hand, multilateralists prefer a benevolent hegemony, that makes itself loved by seeking to legitimate its behavior by garnering consensus through the continuous recourse to multilateral consultation and cooperation, and by remembering that the problems of the era of globalization cannot be managed unilaterally (one can refer here to the third way to globalization of Clinton and his adepts and the academic writings of Keohane or Nye). On the other hand, there are those who see the multilateral logic as a simple strategy for “dividing the costs before dividing the booty” (burden sharing), because the specter of imperial overreach is always waiting in ambush, and also as a strategy for creating consensus among friends but not necessarily among allies (because, as the Rumsfeld doctrine states, “the mission creates the alliance and not vice versa”). According to them, garnering consensus is not an indispensable precondition to action in international relations whenever defending American national interests makes an immediate intervention necessary. In such case, America could also act alone.

This new interpretative dichotomy of American foreign policy was put to the test almost immediately after September 11. This would change everything. The Americans began to look at multilateral strategies with increasing diffidence, viewing them as unable to guarantee national security, to determine friends and enemies, and to further the defense of national interest to the bitter end, the primary objective of an assertive foreign policy. The motto continuously repeated by the neo-cons in power – “who is not with us, is against us” – effectively captures this position of iron intolerance towards the irresolute of the Bush administration, obsessed with a possible repetition of the massacres of the World Trade Center. It is this administration that – starting with the bombardment of Kabul initiated as early as September 12, 2001 and the

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5 President Bush himself, Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz and the analysts, for example, of the PNAC, the Project for the New American Century think tank.
subsequent war/retaliation unleashed against the Taliban regime (and not the state of Afghanistan, as was immediately specified) as the sponsor of Al-Qaeda, followed by a campaign in Iraq initiated without U.N. Security Council authorization — would inaugurate a series of spectacular circumventions of international law and its institutions, almost destroying any semblance of international “community”. The Bush II administration confidently sacrificed the multilateral option on the altar of national security, upsetting delicate balances with the great (re-)emerging regional powers (Russia and China) and altering historical relationships of cooperation with traditional allies (the Franco-German axis), though it opened new cordial understandings (with Central Eastern Europe and India) and gave new life to already established special relationships (as with Poland and Pakistan). This Republican administration’s unilateral drift had an immediate, foreseeable, illustrious victim: global politics - or, the consultation among powers, especially at the UN, aimed at managing and giving form to the confusion of globalization and arranging the global governance of the system. The management of global emergencies and planetary distress – the fight against terrorism, trans-national organized crime, environmental issues and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – has thus become all the more difficult. The proper functioning of super-national institutions and international law in particular, has thus been short-circuited. The interpretation of international law norms has launched the great powers of the international system in a cynical and endless negotiation.

Realist Unilateralism, Liberal Multilateralism, and Global Governance

What is taking place is a contest between worlds and respective visions of them. The division of the inter-state system in a pluriverse of partial orders, managed by regional powers of imperial (and sometimes universal) vocation, is certainly the result of an objective fact (the actual number of existing super and great powers), but also of a way of describing the form of the international system and defining its structure.

The current theories of international relations that describe the unilateralism/multilateralism alternative at Washington’s disposal in the elaboration of its foreign policy are many, but can easily be grouped under the two classical paradigms of the discipline. The first is the liberal-institutional paradigm, with its emphasis on the cooperative dimension of international cohabitation as the only antidote to the endemic anarchy of the international system (because a sovereign world power does not exist and the hegemon of the moment
always claims to be *legibus solutus*). This paradigm prefers the institutional variable, which limits reciprocal diffidence by generating expectations among actors, thus containing the perverse effects of the security dilemma (the number one dogma of the realist credo). The second is the realist paradigm (classical or structural, offensive or defensive), with its attention to the relations and distribution of power and its preference for the worst-case scenario (that in which the national security is threatened). The philosophical underpinnings of this paradigm embrace the prospects of anthropological pessimism and see, in the rivalry among states to secure limited resources, the true norm, thereby scrapping the grand game of international politics and the anarchic nature of the international system (to take the scheme of Waltz’s three images) (Waltz 1954). This vision claims to be able to explain everything, giving Waltz & Co. the authority to predict everything on the basis of its very strong positivist approach, which tries to account for (and more often to invent) presumed regularities in international politics.

If we look a bit more closely at the positions of these two paradigms and the respective theories deduced from them in order to describe the *American foreign policy style*, the unipolarity of the international system, according to the realists, always leads the hegemon to (sooner or later) adopt a unilateral foreign policy, regardless of, they remind us in a curious reversed reductionism, the political culture of the hegemon’s leadership. This is because the *(de facto)* recognition of the one superpower’s abnormal concentration of power by the others in the unipolar system makes the superpower anything but indifferent to power, thus predisposing it to arrogance. And this is, according to the realist vulgate, one of the few regularities in the game of international politics. A unilateralism, stemming from a surplus of power, would be followed by the formation of a balance of power (another regularity), or the formation of blocks of power that oppose, and attempt to counterbalance, American hegemony (such is the case of the recent axis including France, China, Russia and Germany created on the eve of the invasion of Iraq). However, it has to be said, it is often only a limited counterbalancing, since, as in the case of the Iraq war, Great Britain chose to pursue a bandwagon strategy after deciding not to join the block hostile to the United States. In fact, Great Britain joined the hegemon in order to prevent, according to the words of Prime Minister Blair, the formation of a coalition, including major democracies, against the United States, which would not only have transformed the reluctant sheriff into a solitary ranger, but, even more, would have signified an end to the West as a geopolitical unit and a bastion of liberal democratic thought. In vain, therefore, are the premonitions of the important branch of realist analyses (those of
K.N. Waltz, S. Walt, R. Gilpin, J. Mearsheimer, to cite a few) that look with increasing preoccupation at the unilateralist drift of the Bush II administration: they worry about the formation of blocks (including traditional allies) which are hostile to the United States, and especially about the risk of imperial overstretch, through an excess of war zeal. The United States, according to them, should limit its involvement in foreign affairs, count on alliances (if only for dividing costs), and believe less in the myth of *America as a model for the world*.

According to the liberal-idealist (or liberal-institutionalist) tradition, by contrast, the systemic variable (the structure of the international system) certainly conditions (but does not determine, as for the realists) the type of foreign policy a state will adopt; the particular political culture, the ideological and political orientation of the leadership in power, and bargaining among groups (economic and ethnic lobbies) within the political system count even more. In this way, for liberals, the unilateralism/multilateralism dichotomy refers to a style of conduct in foreign policy, that is determined almost entirely by internal variables and not the distribution of power within the international system; in other words, whether Republicans or Democrats are in power makes a difference. For liberals, the primacy of foreign policy over international politics remains as valid as ever. The fans of multilateralism in the liberal galaxy of international relations (Keohane, Nye, to cite the most famous) believe, therefore, that in the era of globalization, *America can't go it alone*. From this premise, the liberal-institutionalists conclude that managing the global dimension of the many emergencies and anxieties that assail the world today would be easier if the United States adopted a multilateralist foreign policy, respectful of the demands of the international community with whom it must cooperate, in order to build an international order *à la Versailles*. In other words, America ought to respect the treaties meant to govern the global environment (physical and political) and place the global national interest (of the large family of humanity) above its own individual interest. There is more. The liberal vulgate obsessively repeats that phenomena such as uncontrollable trans-national organized crime, recent, devastating environmental problems, migration flows that break down barriers and make the state porous to the entry of foreigners, and unbridled technological development, should all suggest to the American hegemon that international cooperation is the only solution to the management of these issues, at the risk of an implosion of the system. Liberals maintain that since foreign policy is public policy, fruit of both elite political culture and the compromises and bargains of internal lobbies, it is necessary to try to consolidate and

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6 From the first big debate within the discipline.
spread a political culture (like that of Clinton’s Third Way) that imbues foreign policy with a strongly multilateralist spirit; this would prevent the system’s unipolarity from generating a unilateralist foreign policy, while also maintaining the delicate balance between external engagements and resources (an excess of humanitarian zeal could lead to imperial overstretch putting the political and fiscal system at risk; this makes it advisable to always support missions in which the costs are divided among friends and allies). It would also avoid the security dilemma (so adored by the realists) of all against all, that keeps the international system hovering on the edge of a Hobbesian nightmare.

From the above we can infer that the unilateralism/multilateralism dichotomy is mainly the result of a way of looking at international politics through a liberal lens that deforms American foreign policy, by doubling the options open to it. This is a false dichotomy for realists, who believe that a state’s foreign policy will always be ultimately unilateralist. It could not be otherwise, given that a state’s very purpose is to defend its integrity. Multilateralism, for the realists, may be an occasional option for secondary issues, or to ingratiate public opinion (domestic and international) before and during some exhibition of power, but never when the national interest comes into play; and this is always a possibility. As argued by Robert Kagan, flag bearer of orthodox realism, with his habitual dose of coarseness, American multilateralists are, in fact, unilateralists, or, with a nice turn of the phrase, “instrumental multilateralists”: a call to alliances would not hide the demands of burden sharing, a call to international organizations would only allow Americans to act more undisturbed (while enjoying the consensus of international forums), while a call to humanity would only be the most diabolical way of disqualifying the enemy, transforming a war into a crusade, and punishing the defeated by imposing a highly penalizing peace on he who had attacked the international order.

Such is the disillusioned cynicism of the realists, unperturbed by the somewhat naïve attempts of a liberal like Nye, who every so often cloaks himself in the robes of realism; in a recent article (Nye 2001:10), he tries (though not very well) to think of seven tests to determine when the multilateral logic is the best option; his answer: when it does not interfere with national interest. This, as we said before, is potentially always.

**Neo-con Unilateralism and Global Governance**

The new unilateralist thought of the homegrown conservative Washington credo finds its home in what has been re-baptized as “the Rice doctrine”.

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This emerges out of numerous academic studies and public speeches, in which the National Security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, the American iron lady, has deepened, complemented and formalized three other similarly famous doctrines: the Rumsfeld doctrine (missions create the alliances and not the inverse), the Wolfowitz doctrine (which supports a spread of democracy through its imposition), and the Cheney doctrine, taken up by the Project for the Next American Century, PNAC\textsuperscript{7}, in its report Rebuilding America’s Defense of September 2000 (in short, take advantage of American supremacy by increasing it).

Rice’s thought does not reflect the catalogue of maxims and precepts à la Rumsfeld (the notorious “Rumsfeld rules” distributed by the Secretary of Defense to his Pentagon employees), but rather expresses itself in her more than twenty years of academic writing in the field of international relations theory. Rice is an expert of strategic and military questions, which she studied against the backdrop of Russian and Central Eastern European foreign policy. She is a political scientist, comfortable within the splendid strategic geometry of the Cold War system and used to the rigor of the predictive and explanatory models of the bipolar looking glass. The American iron lady is a full member of the galaxy of realist theorists of international relations (hand in hand with the offensive realist school) and subscribes to its fundamental philosophical assumptions and relative prescriptions in foreign policy (see Rice 2000): the nation-state is the principle actor in international relations, the defense of national interest is the primary objective of every foreign policy, the recourse to multilateralism is a simple strategy to avoid assuming all of the costs of an operation, the cosmopolitan ideal – the hypothesis of a world state – is pure delirium, foreign policy has primacy over domestic politics, and the degree of the internal socio-political solidarity of a state is related to the existence of external enemies and wars in progress: an enemy and, eventually, a war a day, resolve divisions on the domestic front, to paraphrase Jean Bodin’s famous sentence.

However, as evidence of how much September 11 re-shuffled all of the cards, and to further demonstrate how obtuse a rigid counter-positioning of “democratic multilateralism vs. Republican unilaterialism” is, the adjustments Rice has brought to her doctrine have disoriented most analysts, at least initially – because what characterizes the American iron lady is not only a disenchanted Realpolitik, but also some measured doses of an evangelical, Wilsonian idealism. And this is, in a certain sense, a further reversal of traditional philosophies of consolidated foreign policy. Conservatives, according to the

\textsuperscript{7} Project for the Next American Century.
Rice doctrine, should no longer think of themselves as reluctant sheriffs but rather assert themselves in an international environment still hostage to the ever present (however latent) war of all against all. The response should be assertive foreign policy that takes as its central tenets: the promotion of liberal democracy and the free market on a global scale, the struggle against rogue states (in which an internal situation is a menace to international order) and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Clearly, at least structurally, a certain osmosis between conservative real-ism and democratic liberal-institutionalism has taken place. Such objectives, which have always been part of the progressive ideology of American Democrats, have here become the cultural and political and ideological arsenal of conservatives. The conservatives’ traditional mistrust for the export of democracy and institutional engineering has been definitively shelved (and the warnings of the father of conservatism, Edmund Burke, thrown to the sea), while the philosophy of “more may be better” of Waltz & Co. (which concerns the controlled diffusion of WMD) (Waltz and Sagan 2001), so dear to Republican administrations, is abandoned for good, having been judged suicidal after September 11. Evidently, the promotion of democracy on a global scale by the neo-cons in power is, in contrast to the multilateralist strategy of Democrats, an indirect way to defend national security, rather than being primarily aimed to support international order. The unlimited interventionism put forward by Rice would potentially bring the United States to fight two wars simultaneously (as the National Security advisor likes to repeat) for the love of democracy and because the defense of American national interest is the (true) collective global good that must be guaranteed and preserved. Everyone, starting with Europeans, should believe this.

New American Strategic Documents. Searching for a National Interest Lost

The Bush doctrine (expressed in the NSS\(^8\) of September 2002 and in the NSCT\(^9\) February 2003) stems the rush towards the political and economic integration of the international system by bringing the state, and the particularistic logic of a defense of national interest at all costs, back to the center of every political action: foreign policy serves simply, according to the new neo-

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\(^8\) National Security Strategy of the United States of America (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf)

conservative thought, to promote and defend particular national interests. The eventual defense of global interests, according to the two documents, is nothing but the simple and often underestimated side effect of a complete and total pursuit of national interest by the liberal democracy par excellence, the United States of America. Thrown out to sea, then, is the watered-down multilateralism of the Clinton era, guilty, according to Bush II, of having hypocritically presented every foreign policy choice under the guise of multilateralism. The Republican administration has developed its ideas in a series of publications in which the role played by the political culture of its members is evident in their attempt to emphasize the (re) formation of an international system with strong Westphalian connotations, downplaying every move towards further integration, and every relative transfer of sovereignty to super-national institutions with the consequent diminution of state power.

Clinton's third way logic held that the balance of power was insufficient to regulate the global nature of the problems of our times. It could even be an obstacle. The Weltanschauung of Clinton & Co. recovered, with a rare coherence, that of the president-political scientist Woodrow Wilson, who saw the persistence of the balance of power system as the root of all evil, and thus believed that uprooting it would put an end to every situation of tension and purge the world of the nightmare of war. The Bush administration not only believes in the virtue of the balance of power, and considers the healthy competition between rival powers over limited resources as justified by the natural modus vivendi of an international system that is, in fact (and in capabilities) multipolar, but also believes that the survival of international organizations with a universal vocation like the UN, or the ratification of multilateral treaties in the interest of humanity, are an obstacle both to the effective defense of one’s own national interest, and also to the effective defense of global interest. This is because it is even more difficult to defend universal principles in a multipolar system, mainly because of the particularity of the interests at play.

Bush’s justification for failing to ratify the Kyoto protocol is, in this regard, crucial: the United States would have to swiftly adopt energy conservation policies and also increase the tax for environmental damages, which could compromise the American economy, hurting its competitiveness compared with other the great powers not required to reduce their quota of gas emissions (China, Russia and India to start with, which could translate such an advantage into military power). It is the game of power politics within the international system that blocks the ratification of the Kyoto protocol, according to the Bush administration.
Now, if we take a look at the two principle strategic documents of the Bush II administration, we see different passages that push for maintaining American supremacy, the indispensable precondition for maintaining American hegemony in a multipolar system on its way toward progressive consolidation. The two documents, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) of February 2003, cut the global politics hypothesis to pieces, while occasionally recognizing the global nature of the issues of the post-bipolar world. They have a preamble that seems fit for a constitution, and abound in declarations of intent for profitable collaboration with other pivotal states, and insist that regional organizations like NATO be reinforced and enlarged. The proposed recipe is borrowed from an extreme unilateralism of initiative which does seek the support of friends and allies for each mission, but does not make this a precondition for action; in particular:

- The NSS notes the multi-polarization of the international system (see “Main centers of global power,” section VIII), to which the United States should respond by trying to cooperate with other rival powers in the management of new global emergencies, reinforcing regional organizations like NATO, by enlarging it for example. However, the NSCT adds wherever this is written (in the introduction), that “…if necessary, however, we will not hesitate to act alone, to exercise our right to self-defense.” Where the NSS speaks of friends and allies, the NSCT document insists on the concept of partnership.
- In the NSCT document, in the paragraph, A New Global Environment, the following is written word for word: “members of Al-Qaida use ostensibly charitable organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for funding and recruitment”.
- The only environment recognized as worthy of being protected is the security environment (so, ecologists, rest assured, there is nothing new on the environmental front).
- In referring to America’s enemies, the two documents often speak of enemy (inimicus, meaning private enemy in Latin) and less of foe (hostis, meaning the public adversary): the enemy becomes something that must be annihilated. Terrorists are the pirates of modern times: the so-called aliud est hostis, aliud rebellis has been interred by a re-theologization of war that only sees inimici generis humanis everywhere.

The NSS document, above all, baptizes the preventive strategy doctrine, abandoning the pre-emptive one. This is not a banal language game, a seman-
tic subtlety. This is, on the contrary, perhaps the most important innovation introduced by the Bush II administration along the lines of every man for himself. To understand how the distinction between pre-emption/prevention has become the neo-con epitaph on the tomb of the international community, it is enough to read the antiseptic definition of two terms furnished by the *Dictionary of Military Terms*\(^{10}\), published by the Defense Department a few years ago, amended last January (to nearly 800 pages), and taken up by the administration to explain the difference; one can read:

- Preemptive attack: an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.
- Preventive war: a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.

All is clear. Better to manage threats than concrete dangers. Better (alas, this time) to prevent than to cure. This undoubtedly represents a theoretical and conceptual putsch within the architecture of legitimate defense foreseen by the Charter of the United Nations (article 51): the doctrine of preventive self-defense will destroy, if carried out with the coherence announced by its zealous authors, any semblance of international law, will erase any idea of global politics, by creating precedents that would be promptly imitated by other great powers. The outcome? The international community will collapse into an indiscriminate war (because legally unregulated) of all against all, where not only the hegemons, but everyone, will pretend to be legibus solutus, let loose from any legal bonds in the quest to defend national interests. The justification given by the Bush Administration is that the new war unleashed by private terrorist groups, non-state actors though sponsored by states, is unpredictable and would oblige the targeted-states (like the United States) to reconsider the assumption according to which the absolute imminence of a danger is the necessary condition triggering a reaction of legitimate defense (pre-emption). The threat itself becomes a sufficient cause for invoking legitimate defense, whether or not it is immanent. “If you have a snake in the garden, don’t wait to find it in your bed, go, round it up, and kill it”, Condoleezza Rice reminds us with a uniquely effective metaphor. In vain are the propositions of certain globalists (but also Henry Kissinger) who call for a consultation between the US and the rest of the world in order to pose clear legal limits to the definition of what constitutes a threat and its intensity, so that preventive

defense can call itself legitimate (not legal) and therefore justifiable. The neo-cons remind us that the “evil-stars” of the axis of evil do not make much of an effort to respect the norms and principles of international cohabitation; in other words, they cynically conclude, it is important not to count too much on international law.

Another document merits attention in order to understand the unilateralist regression of the Republican administration and the globalists’ vain beliefs in the United States of America as the only promoter of the democratization of the international system (the neo-cons speak a different language, that of Meinecke, Morgenthau, Niebhur and the German geopolitics). The document in question is the report Rebuilding America’s Defense written by the Commission on America’s National Interests, a lobbying group of important analysts and policy-makers of various academic and political affiliations, published by the Project for the Next American Century (PNAC) in September 2000, thus before the World Trade Center attack. The authors (Rice, Graham, T. Allison, R. Armitage, P. Krugman, to cite the most notable) were moved by the consideration of providing the U.S. with a new framework for foreign policy that finally sets the priorities, threats, objectives to pursue at all costs, and the missions that should not be undertaken (unnecessarily), new modes of waging war, and techniques for capitalizing on America’s technological surplus in order to transform it into military predominance. In the document, there are no strategic stammers: the style is one of a crystal clear decisiveness. The pleasant introduction is followed by the central body of the document, full of strategic fury, a catalogue of containments, profoundly polemical, making the existence, or invention, of the enemy the very essence of an authentic foreign policy. The inspirational philosophy of the document was clearly “offensive realism”: the potential enemy is to be confronted by intimidating him and punishing the truly exemplary (like the Taliban regime). The central tenet of the document is no longer a pre-emptive strategy – inadequate in the new international environment – but a preventive strategy: the degree of imminence of the threat is an insufficient criteria for neutralizing it, there is no need to wait until the menace becomes concrete, it is necessary to act before it takes shape (here we are: the Iraq of Saddam Hussein). Therefore, preventive strategy was discussed long before the attack on the Twin Towers. September 11 had simply accelerated the implementation of this kind of foreign policy.

Reading America’s National Interests is like real time travel: to the future, because it anticipates nearly every point of the NSS and the NSCT; and to the past, because it borrows heavily from the neo-Reaganite manifesto of the duo William Kristol-Robert Kagan (“Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy”),

The international system described by America’s National Interests, from which the strategic lines that would guide Republican Washington were taken, are decidedly those of a Westphalian system. The promoters and patient compilers of the document gently remind one of the 17th century. Foreign policy is no longer social work, a typical missionary engagement of the Clintonenesque third way, but becomes Machtpolitik, a politics of power. International politics is no longer conceived in an environment where cooperation is not only possible but necessary, but instead is seen as a reign of competition between enemy (and not rival) powers for snatching up scarce resources and extending imperial hegemony.

This is not to everyone’s taste. What is expressed in the American strategic documents written by the neo-con administration are truly secularized theological concepts, to take a famous epitaph on the tomb of a modern state on the verge of de-politicization. It is the return, in grand style, of political theology. The great criminalization of the adversary lies in waiting. Legal wars are finished; legitimate wars have taken their place. The era of the war-crusade will return – to the cheers of international law and globalist dreamers.

Decline and Return of the Nation-State. The Globalist Utopia and the Crisis of International Law

Analysts who think according to their own desires; this could describe many international relations scholars when they attempt to change international politics simply by narrating it differently than it is, in the (vain) hope of redeeming it from the (ever-present) specter of war. That is why it is so common for them to conceive of systems of military alliances as embryonic forms of continental political macro-groupings (a spill-over typical of die-hard functionalism), or to see, in the circumstantial devolution of portions of sovereignty to supranational organizations, the definitive renouncement of that sovereignty, with the arrival of political obligations of a merely contractual nature (that described in the post-modern world of Robert Cooper, foreign policy advisor for Tony Blair, and aesthete of grand narratives). When analysts are then moved by the ardor of the cosmopolitan utopia of one world (like certain traditional orthodox liberals of international relations and certainly post-mod-

11 Or “structural” as Michael Lind would say; see: Lind (1992).
ernists, whether constructivist or not) nothing is safe: the current reinforce-
ment of state sovereignty (one of the few remaining certainties today) is noth-
ing but an “innocuous delay on the path” to the inevitable establishment of a
world state and the consequent transformation of international politics into
international police. What a bad habit, to systematically deform reality in or-
der to change it, also typical of academics who like to claim that they read re-
ality in a disenchanted, positivistic way, in order to uncover the laws of inter-
national politics. Such is also the case for the realists (neo-structuralists, clas-
sical realists, offensive realists and defensive realists) who are busy, as usual,
reflecting on the worst-case scenario (the integrity of the state) and trying to
maintain this proverbial detachment, without noticing that they reflect the
very reality that they are trying to understand, deforming it according to the
circumstances of the moment in order to make it ad usum delphini. The real-
ist rhetoric remains strongly prescriptive, aimed at advising the Prince to en-
able him to maintain and, perhaps, extend his realm: this is a technique of
power, and Machiavelli is its theoretical inspiration par excellence. This is why
the realist paradigm is always so eager to emphasize and exaggerate those ten-
dencies of the international system that somehow prepare and assure Ameri-
can hegemony.

In the next case, the game of enchantment is also introduced from the out-
set. The liberals, accompanied, in this case, by the post-modernists and con-
structivists à la Wendt, in an effort of emancipation from the nightmare of war
and the overcoming of sovereignty, espouse the multilateral logic and interna-
tional cooperation as the only antidote to the Hobbesian Armageddon of the
bellum omnium contra omnes, through a proliferation of international regimes
(which should precisely limit anarchy) and through channels of “regimenta-
tion and sterilization of international politics” by the multiplication of institu-
tions and treaties that weaken the state framework, fostering its disappearance.
The United States, as the hegemon, should subscribe to all this and set an ex-
ample. This would mean guaranteeing respect for international norms and in-
stitutions, and punishing all violations. In vain therefore are the observations
of those (mainly the realists) who remind liberal-institutionalists that to ask
Americans to act multilaterally in pursuing national interest, but unilaterally in
punishing transgressors of the general will of the planet, and to subject them-
selves to the same laws that they must enforce, is not only utopian but a bit naïve.
To deny the United States every pretext to hegemony, but, at the same
time, to invoke its regulatory power to contain anarchic drives, the spread of
power, and the multipolarization of the international system (which would re-
duce international law to a simple “exchange good”), is decidedly naïve.
Some facts show that the prescriptive previsions of the realists are right. And facts are stubborn. The oft-repeated circumvention of the UN by the Anglo-American axis and its current partners, before and after the Iraq campaign, and also by other big actors of the international system (France in the Ivory Coast, Russia in Chechnya, China in the Muslim province of Xinjiang, to cite some rare but significant cases), along with the apology of national interest contained in the principle American strategic documents (as we have seen); the return to old historical rivalries between European powers (France and Great Britain); and, finally, the desperate attempts of stateless ethnic groups to gain prestigious statehood – all of this has revealed, on the one hand, an unprecedented crisis in international law, and, on the other hand, the resurrection of the nation-state, with its legal and political trappings and its most important institution – sovereignty.

Committed to (and obsessed with) signs of the imminent extinction of the Leviathan, the untiring detractors of the state and aesthetes of prediction, for love of globalism, have failed to realize that in the era of globalization, the evolution of the state must be observed, not only from an internal, but especially from an international perspective, that of the international system whose (for now) persistent security dilemma explains the incredible appearance of the modern state. If the detractors of the state had also turned their attention to the study of empirical reality, they would have realized that absolute claims of a general crisis of state sovereignty or national identity would find very little empirical verification. And if they had been able to realize that the agony of international law and its institutions (with a regional but also universal vocation), are precisely the consequence of a reinforcement of a state sovereignty in progress for some time (at least since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, in reality, since de-colonization), but not taken into consideration very much because of the perhaps excessive attention that was placed on the aggregative phenomena of international cohabitation and the presumed implacable historical tendency towards the formation of a single global political system. The disorientation provoked by the river of words on processes of political and economic integration (the much-invoked globalization), had prevented proper consideration of the myriad of factors that lead, on the contrary, to a reinforcement of state power, to the detriment of the well being, and eventual reinforcement, of international law. Let’s take a look at a few.

The very long twentieth century has been the century of state-building, or the uncontrolled proliferation of the number of states (whose birthrate is still unstoppable). The principle of the self-determination of peoples, at least since the end of the First World War, when coherently applied in polyethnic states,
was and continues to be innate to what it means to be a state, an oath of allegiance to statehood. The detention of weapons of mass destruction destroys the capacity of the state that does not have them to protect its own citizens (the dialectic *protego ergo obligo* that links state and civil society is thus short-circuited), but, at the same time, defends to the end the ultimate integrity of the state that possesses them. Globalization itself should mainly be read as the export of the State on a global scale, and that’s not all. It is probably the bloated version of the state that is in crisis. What is happening is only a circumstantial (therefore, always reversible) devolution of aspects of sovereignty to supranational organizations. The unobtrusive nature of the multi-polar international system opens margins of freedom to states which were unknown during the Cold War, while the grand revenge of international law that took place with the institution of the International Criminal Court has been undermined by one of its own articles (number 16), whose application allows the Security Council – the club of hegemons – to discretionally suspend any initiatives. Not to mention the new wars, like computer wars conducted by hackers on the payroll of states in conflicts with rival-states, or the war against global terrorism that reveals itself in both the adoption of emergency legislation on the domestic front and in the wars fought against state sponsors on the international front (thus giving life to truly inter-state wars).

International law, for its part, has trouble adapting to the challenges of legal globalization. The state, in fact, is not losing its monopoly over the political as much as its monopoly over the legal. Law ceases to be a state monopoly when an authentic competition between different subjects in the process of legal production (the big law firms) reigns. In this case law becomes a law *à la carte*, a product that is continually negotiable according to the requirements of the time, its norms following the unfolding of events and the development of needs rather than anticipating and regulating them, being continuously rewritten, an exasperating work in progress. International law, now, responds to a reactive logic. It is no longer a series of norms imposed from above, projected by legal minds *a priori*. The certainty of law has become a reign of uncertainty, a nomadic reality, no longer based on a legacy of knowledge.

The result opens itself up to every hypothesis. The success of the state in adapting to the pressures imposed by globalization seems to short-circuit the universalist vocation of international law, because the state can always bypass it, thus undermining the very precondition of its being truly effective. Moreover, international law seems to be incompatible not only with a hegemonic-imperial international system like the current one, where the emperor is considered to be and in fact is *legibus solutus*, and thus free from legal bonds. It
would also be incompatible with a potential multi-polar international system. This is because the “community of hegemons” would view the international legal order as a bothersome obstacle to its regional appetites. It would thus cite the lack of normative universality as an excuse for disobedience, thus revealing the great tension between political particularism and humanity’s cultural and legal heterogeneity, so decisive in the era of global confrontation.

The legitimacy of an international legal order absolutely depends on the impossibility that any actor consider itself *legibus solutus*. The hypothesis of one liberal-democratic world state (the maximum expression of state-ness conceivable), of making one political actor coincide with the entire globe, seems to be a remote possibility as the appropriate foundation of an international law looking for its lost legitimacy, and even a bit of science fiction. The “giusglobalist” utopia of “peace through law” and the political and moral unity of humanity, when it becomes reality, if it becomes reality, will still pass through the familiar old channels of statehood. This is because, for now, the state remains the only form of political and territorial organization known and invented. Others, for now, are waiting to be invented.

**Conclusions**

Currently, an undeniable anti-American sentiment nourishes the political culture of liberal Catholics, social democrats, and the leadership of rival states to the American *hyperpuissance (in primus* the French and Chinese). The *renouveau* of Progressivism in the Third Way announced by Anthony Giddens, updated by ex-President Clinton in a recent conference in the U.S., and taken up by certain democratic candidates for the primaries that will begin next January, is probably a prelude to the grand return of multilateralist thought. The strategy developed by the supporters of the Third Way proposes to counter this anti-American sentiment, which they see as the result of the unilateralist drive of the Republican administration, by continuing to emphasize the defense of American national interest, but combining this with the necessity of refining the mechanisms of *multiplayer governance*, which allows for the participation of other non-state actors in the management of global issues (environment, transnational crime, migration flows, international legal system). Proponents of the Third Way insist that framework within which we should try to give a meaning and a direction to the multiform processes of globalization can no longer only be that of the state. It is necessary to start to think *with* the state but also *beyond* the state. The organization of a foundation for multilevel global gover-
nance, beside the traditional seats of state power, is a first response. The next presidential elections will be the first grand confrontation between neo-con thought and the Third Way over the alternative ways to create and manage the post-September 11 international order. One thing is certain: the strategy of the neo-con Americans of the Bush team – the promotion of national interest at all costs – cannot forever hide the fundamental contradictions made up of a Protestant conservative traditionalism and a market apology, of militarism and the love of pacifism, and of a profound intolerance towards a multipolarist relativism. Moreover, the neo-cons must explain to American electors and the international community how a unilateralist foreign policy and a multipolar international system can live together without conflict. This is the fundamental dilemma that the neo-cons cannot easily get around.

The need for the United States, and the other leading powers in the game of international politics, to neutralize the cause of the endemic instability of the post-September 11 international system – by de-politicizing it – and to make what happens in the international arena understandable and minimally foreseeable, will require initiating a real deployment of tellurian energies, not only military, but especially theoretical and conceptual. The neo-con unilateral approach is an ambitious and risky challenge – which tries to reduce the complexity of globalization with a decision-making tendency that aims at the elimination every rival power – to the fans of multilateralism, who would propose or actually choose, if they were in power, the path of cooperation. The multi-polarization of the international system, the formation of blocks of great powers in competition with each other for scarce resources, in large part already under the control of the Americans (especially after the victorious Iraq campaign), is probably already a reality.

The unilateralism at all costs of the Bush team will only accelerate this tendency towards the multi-polarization of the system. But perhaps this is the actual aim of the neo-con.

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Part two

Armed Conflicts
Asymmetrical Warfare or Asymmetrical Society?
The Changing Form of War and the Collapse of International Society

Alessandro Colombo

War, the International System and International Society

The conventional wisdom usually overlooks the relationship between the form which war has taken in the last decade – the so-called “asymmetrical warfare” – and the changing form of international society as a whole. Asymmetrical warfare seems to be conceived as just a way of fighting war – the way which prevails when adversaries have incomparable degrees of technological and organizational development and, therefore, conceive and practise war in an incompatible manner. From the stronger party’s side, asymmetrical warfare consists in the use of Stealth bombers, cruise missiles and unmanned delivery systems against adversaries who don’t have such means at their disposal, and lack the proper means to defend themselves against the stronger party’s weapons. Reciprocally, from the weaker party’s side, the threat or the use of asymmetrical warfare consists in the use of relatively crude, low-tech methods to attack a superior high-tech enemy.

In such a definition, war seems to have no relationship with the surrounding international relations. Asymmetrical Warfare is described as an invisible and finite exception to the rule of contemporary international society which is simultaneously represented as if it should just move in the opposite direction – towards the expansion of democracy, the assertion of human rights and, in the background, the transition from the old international society of states to a new, cosmopolitan global society (Falk 1987; Held 1996). Accustomed throughout the bipolar era to a clear division of labour between theorists of Cold War and theorists of interdependence, most political scientists and international relations scholars continue to consider war as an accident. At the same time, the fact that this kind of accident is more and more frequent, and less and less similar to the accidents of the past, is relegated to scholars of war and strategy.

This paradoxical division neglects the fact that war is much more than the continuation of policy by other means. War is the reflection of policy, its mirrored im-
age. Looking at war we can say whether the use of violence is consistent with social order or reveals its collapse, what the principle of social life is and who its actors are, what relationship they have with space and what role – if any – law plays.

It is no accident that, in the modern world, the legitimacy of war is held to distinguish domestic politics from international politics. And it is no accident that all the principal efforts to change international politics revolve around war – from the actual reform implemented by the United Nations, which has drastically limited the legitimate use of force in international law, to the revolutionary change demanded by advocates of global society and world government – a change intended to eliminate war by transforming international politics into domestic politics on a global scale.

Nevertheless, war offers an ideal perspective from which to look at the changes taking place in the international system. This is because war itself is the principal turning point in international politics, the event which selects international actors, distributes power and prestige among them and eventually determines who will “govern” the system and what the post-war international order will be like (Gilpin 1987).

But war is also crucial in another sense. Although conceived as the most impressive element of continuity in the history of international relations, war reflects its discontinuity as well. War is intractable, the realists repeat, but it is also constantly changing, in strict relationship with the overall social context. This is because arms’ development has never significantly differed from work tools’ development, because combatants’ organization has never significantly differed from the surrounding social organization and, above all, because the state of war has always resembled the state of international relations to which it belonged (Aron 1966).

At the most superficial level, war suggests the point at which the political and strategic interdependence among actors reaches its limit. In Paix et guerre entre les nations, Raymond Aron goes so far as to identify the possible extension of war with the actual extension of international system: “I call an international system the ensemble constituted by political units that maintain regular relations with each other and that are capable of being implicated in a generalized war” (Aron 1966). In such a definition it is not difficult to recognize the legacy of the two World Wars of the twentieth century – “world” wars, precisely because they reflected a process of globalization rooted not only in the economic but also in the political and strategic domain, and resulting both in common experiences (of suffering, fear and mourning)\(^1\) and in universal ideologies and (institutional) projects.

\(^1\) See, for example, Leed E.J., No Man’s Land. Combat & Identity in World War I, Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1979; Fussell P., The Great War and Modern Memory, Oxford UP, Ox-
But Aron’s analysis also suggests the tendency for political-strategic global- 
alization to progressively decline, instead of increasing, as it did after the end 
of the Cold War. In Aron’s definition, it was bipolarism which resulted in a 
true globalization, *a monde fini*, as he put it:

“Since 1945 the international system has included the five continents, the 
whole of humanity. There is no event, in Korea or Laos, which does not make it-
self felt in the Soviet Union or in the United States. The diplomatic universe is 
like an echo chamber: the noises of men and events are amplified and reverbera-
ted to infinity. The disturbance occurring at one point of the planet communica-
tes itself, step by step, to the opposite side of the globe”.

(Aron 1966: 373)

With the end of the Cold War, this echo chamber has dramatically bro-
ken up. Although the political-strategic globalization has been apparently re-
vived by such labels as *global* war and *global* alliance against terrorism, the 
continuity among the regions which make up the international system has ac-
tually been diminished by the collapse of the global conflict between the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union. Eventually, each region has started including 
different actors, different distributions of power, different conflicts and dif-
ferent languages again (Colombo 1997).

If, therefore, the possibility of being involved in a common war does de-
termine the actual extension of the international political system, the quality 
of such a war suggests something significant about the quality of internation-
al life. This is why Raymond Aron draws attention to the continuous oscillat-
ing of warfare between game and total violence, namely, between the transfor-
mation into an institution and elementary fury (Aron 1992: 433): “In each era, 
the society of states and the nature of warfare are in strict relationship. The so-
ciety of states gives rise to a certain kind of war and the kind of war affects 
both the organization and the single components of the society of states” 

Likewise, the quality of war is the cornerstone of Carl Schmitt’s reflection 
on international politics and international law. If he focuses on the history of 
European international law (*jus publicum europaeum*) (Schmitt 1991), it is be-
cause he conceives it as the most prolonged and successful attempt of giving 
war a form. As Schmitt puts it,
“it would be a mistake to represent the international legal system between the 17th and 20th centuries as pure anarchy, just because war was allowed. European interstate wars between 1815 and 1914 were, in fact, regular and legal processes, limited by neutral great powers”.

(C. Schmitt 1991:227)

Finally, the nature of war plays a fundamental role in the reflection of Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and the British School of International Relations. In particular, the nature of war is an important feature of the tension between the international system and international society – between the network of political, economic and strategic interdependences which make up the former and “the development among states of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life” (Bull 1977: 67), through which the system transforms itself into an international society. War is the most paradoxical but, at the same time, the least ambiguous aspect of this tension. In fact, when combatants are not bound by common rules and common values, war cannot have restrictions other than the ones dictated by the enemy’s will and the “magic circle” (Clausewitz 1984: 246) of technologies. On the contrary, when the system develops into an international society, war itself meets with other restrictions, which involve the right to make war (jus belli), the way in which war is conducted (jus in bello) and the role which war performs in social life (Bull 1977).

Although it is usually associated with the most persistent feature of the modern international system – anarchy, in the sense of the absence of government – war reveals that anarchy itself can assume very different forms: anarchy can have or not have a form (Buzan). There is an indissoluble bond between the form of war and the form of international life. On the one hand, war cannot have a legal or cultural form unless the international life has one too. On the other side, any crisis in the form of war should be perceived as a signal of the possible or actual crisis in the international society.

Aron, Schmitt, Wight and Bull recognize this very signal in the First World War. If, before 1914, it seemed possible to “give war a form,” as Schmitt writes (Schmitt 1991: 163-173), or to transform it into an institution,
as Bull does (Bull 1977: 184-199), it was because war was still strictly integrated in the overall architecture of European international society. The “clear and unambiguous distinctions” which Schmitt represents as the “classical” feature of the *jus publicum europaeum* – the distinctions between domestic and international politics, war and peace, soldiers and civilians, belligerents and neutrals – stemmed from the common background of the European state system. This system was in turn rooted in a still deeper network of common political, cultural and legal values.

The catastrophe of the First World War revealed the collapse of this order. The “total war” which erupted from the conflict resulted in the crisis of the *old* distinctions and in the massive production of *new* hybrids – beginning with the hybrid between civil and international war and the hybrid between peace and war, which resulted in the oxymoron of Cold War. Moreover, the crisis of the form of war carried with itself the crisis of the whole architecture of the international society of states. Aron, Schmitt, Wight and Bull disagree on its causes, although they recognize some common factors – the nationalization of masses, the collapse of cultural homogeneity brought about by the Bolshevik revolution, on the one hand, and the erosion of the Western legacy on the other (Bull & Watson 1984), the advent of an alternative conception of world order, founded not upon the particularism of the society of states but upon the universalism of the so-called global society. Indeed, what is most important is that this crisis stemmed from the war and expressed itself through it. It was the First World War that revealed and, at the same time, definitely allowed the collapse of the international society. In fact, its whole history turns out to be included between two military catastrophes, the civil wars of religion at its beginning, and the First World War at its end. As Hedley Bull puts it (1977: 258), “the international history of this century so far may be regarded as a prolonged attempt to cope with the drastic decline of the element of society in international relations brought about by the single, catastrophic ‘accident’ of the First World War”.

**Symmetry and War in the “Classical” International Society**

Since the form of war has never been an exception to the form of international society, may the asymmetrical warfare be conceived as just a way of

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fighting war, or does it also reflect a particular state of international relations – just like the *guerre en forme* of the *jus publicum europaeum* and the “total war” of the last century?

In order to answer this question, we ought to remember the crucial role that the opposite condition – the political, legal and technological symmetry among combatants – has always played in the process of the institutionalization and limitation of war (Miglio 1988: 763-790). In the history of international relations there have been many examples of “limited war” – from the wars between the Greek *poleis* before the Peloponnesian war, to the wars which took place in the feudal society and in the chivalrous world, among the mercenary soldiers of the 16th century, among the pre-Napoleonic armies, in the “bourgeois century” between the Congress of Vienna and the Geneva and Hague Conferences, up to the attempts to impose restrictions on the possession and use of nuclear arms during the Cold War. All these experiences depended on the fact that the adversaries shared or pretended to share a certain homogeneity of ways of life, values or, at least, patterns of rationality; a further homogeneity in the organization and in the technological and social means of war; a mutual (although uncertain) expectation of victory, which gave war the risk dimension and, at the same time, made it similar to a game of chance.

Behind the efforts to give war some restrictions (and, therefore, a form), each side has always been conscious of dealing with equals, with whom it was possible to play under the same conditions. Whenever the adversaries have conceived themselves as complete strangers – like in the wars between the Greeks and the Persians, between the chivalrous cavalry and the new communal armies, or in the continuous clashes between the Christian and the Islamic world – the “good rules” have given way to the “pure” war or, as Clausewitz should have put it, to the “absolute war” – “an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force” (Clausewitz 1984: 77).

Modern (or classical) international society can be regarded as the most successful attempt to combine war with symmetry. In the first place, because the whole process of the limitation of war was founded upon the fact that adversaries shared the same legal and political form, statehood. As war became an institution, sovereign states claimed for themselves the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in the international society. In order to have the right to wage war it was no longer enough to just have the *power* to do it, but it was also necessary to have the same legal and political *form* as the others. As Hedley Bull puts it:

“The development of the modern concept of war as organised violence among sovereign states was the outcome of a process of limitation or confinement of violence. We are accustomed, in the modern world, to contrast war
between states with peace between states; but the historical alternative to war between states was more ubiquitous violence”.

(Bull 1977: 185)

In the second place, there was an even more sophisticated form of symmetry between adversaries: the mutual acknowledgment of the *jus belli* – what Carl Schmitt defines as “non-discriminating war” (Schmitt 1991). According to its nature of institution, war became impervious both to the belligerents’ internal characteristics – in the sense that each state (whether “good” or not) had full right to take part in the game – and to their reasons.

“The justice of the wars waged in Europe by magni homines, namely by the *personae morales* of the *jus publicum Europaeum*, represents a very particular problem. The international law doesn’t conceive it as a theological or moral problem of guilt. (…) Of course, international law only allows just wars. But the justice of wars doesn’t consist any more in their compliance with theological, moral or legal norms. On the contrary, it consists in the institutional quality of political entities that fight one another under the same conditions and, despite war, do not conceive one another as betrayers and criminals, but as *iusti hostes*”.

(Schmitt 1991: 166-167)

This voluntary rejection of any moral tribunal was the cornerstone of the European international law which arose from the wars of religion (Schmitt 1991; Koselleck). At the same time, it was the basis of the characteristic analogy between war and duel – namely, the most perfect metaphorical reflection of the “classical” war’s symmetry.

“When the duel is taken as an institution, its justice does consist in the clear separation of the *justa causa* from the form, namely, in the separation of the abstract norm of justice from the concrete *ordo*. In other words, a duel is not right because the just party always wins, but because the protection of the form guarantees the duelers’ title, the respect of a particular procedure (through which the limitation of violence is made possible) and, eventually, the mutual resort to witnesses. By virtue of it, right becomes an institutional form, consisting in the fact that honourable men resolve by themselves a question of honour in the prescribed forms and in front of impartial witnesses”.

(Ibidem: 167)

Besides this equal right, the duel-pattern involved at least three other factors of symmetry among combatants. The first affected communication and consisted in the necessity for each party to legitimate war on the basis of prin-
ciples shared both by the enemy and by the “neutral” witnesses (such as the dynastic or, later on, the nationality principle). Of course, this symmetry of languages did not prevent the principle of legitimacy from being interpreted in incompatible ways – rather, this was just the case for conflict. Nor could it be excluded that the principle was simply a pretext, the real motives being quite otherwise. Nevertheless,

“the state which at least alleges a just cause, even where belief in the existence of a just cause has played no part in its decision, offers less of a threat to international order than one which does not. The state which alleges a just cause, even one it does not itself believe in, is at least acknowledging that it owes other states an explanation of its conduct, in terms of rules that they accept. There are, of course, differences of opinion as to the interpretation of the rules and their application to concrete situations; but such rules are not infinitely malleable and do circumscribe the range of choice of states which seek to give pretexts in terms of them. The giving of a pretext, moreover, means that the violence which the offending state does to the structure of commonly accepted rules by going to war in disregard of them is less than it would otherwise be; to make war without any explication, or with an explication stated only in terms of the recalcitrant state’s own beliefs – such as the Mongols’ belief in the Mandate of Heaven, or the belief of the Conquistadores in the Pope’s imperium mundi – is to hold all other states in contempt, and to place in jeopardy all the settled expectations that states have about one another’s behaviour”.

(Bull 1977: 45)

The second element regarded the duel’s scene – the theatrum belli. Even before affecting communication, symmetry affected the combatants’ experiences. Through ceremonial acts like the declaration of war – a “notional state of affairs” (Bull 1977: 185) which started the war in the legal or normative sense, even though no actual hostilities were taking place – the enemies found themselves either in peace or at war. When one actor considered there to be a state of war, the other did the same. It was not possible for there to be any asymmetry in their feelings. This explains why the same psychological climate spread over all the European countries when the First World War was declared (Leed 1979). But such a reciprocity survived even in the Cold War, by virtue of mutual deterrence and mutual assured destruction. Although indifferent to the old distinction between war and peace, the mutual vulnerability did remain a basic determinant of the shape of the system. It was this kind of symmetry which made it possible to transform the clash into a game and, therefore, to develop the bipolar “war-system” into a fragile international regime (Santoro 1988).
Finally, the nature of duel required that each actor had a chance of victory – whether due to its own efforts or to the help of allies. This factor involved risk and, therefore, represented a strong restriction upon war. On the one hand, it encouraged actors to be cautious before resorting to violence, since power and prestige were always at stake. According to Clausewitz (1986: 86), this gambling was the main similarity between war and game:

“In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely remembers a game of cards”.

(Clauseswitz 1986: 86)

On the other hand, once the war had broken out, it was the enemy’s will which allowed its escalation to be restrained. War, Clausewitz adds,

“is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total non-resistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him”.

(Clauseswitz 1986: 77)

This is also what Clausewitz conceives as the main feature of war:

“The essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts”.

(Clauseswitz 1984: 149)

It is no accident that the very lack of these elements – the risk of losing and the necessity to cope with the enemy’s effective will – was conceived by Gaston Bouthoul (1982) as the main peculiarity of colonial war, asymmetrical war *ante litteram*, if not true archetype of asymmetry:

“If there exists an enormous disproportion between the belligerents’ technology and organization, then we witness a colonial war. *What distinguishes a colonial war is the fact that one of the belligerents enjoys such a superiority that the
Asymmetrical War and the Collapse of Reciprocity

It is not difficult to realize that none of these factors of symmetry has been able to bear the strain imposed by the political, legal and technological changes of the last decade. Asymmetrical war is the perfect reversal of the previous model. Instead of affecting only the technological domain, the collapse of reciprocity affects all the dimensions of war, in such a way as to make it completely extraneous to the political and legal categories of the “classical” international society.

In the first place, asymmetry overthrows the basis of the modern restrictions upon war, the similarity in the political and legal form of combatants. As one of them is not a state – like in the so-called “global war against terrorism” – the mutual acknowledgment of the *jus belli* and the traditional rights of combatants is no longer possible. The treatment of Al-Qaeda prisoners in the US base of Guantánamo is a major example of this asymmetry. Outside its old legal framework, war feeds on the mutual denial of acknowledgment just as the classic war was based on the opposite principle. The clash among states and terrorists is not “without rules” just because terrorists do not comply with them, but because there are no shared rules among states and terrorists. Instead of speaking to both combatants, law itself performs a function of separation and discrimination. On the one hand, it divides subjects who have the right to make war from subjects who have not, in a political and legal frame which evokes the archetypical form of the war against piracy. On the other hand, instead of giving war a set of restrictions, law becomes the legitimation of wars without restrictions, since they are conducted against “bandits” who lack the membership requirements of the international society.

By asymmetrical wars, both the common language and academic discourse usually mean the conflicts between states and non-state actors. Currently, the political and legal asymmetry among combatants is also seen in wars between states. In fact, it is true that in the last decade the United States and its allies have fought most wars against other states: Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001. But it has not been enough to rescue the political and legal symmetry between adversaries. On the contrary, by asymmetrical warfare we can also mean the same process which Carl Schmitt
recognized, seventy years ago, as the irreversible crisis of the non-discriminating war⁴. All the main factors of this crisis are at work in the present international context: the political use of the concept of mankind, the legal and moral condemnation of enemies, the transformation of war into a police operation, which hides war precisely because it dispenses with symmetry between combatants. As Carl Schmitt put it in the Begriff des Politischen, for the application of the technical means of killing

“a new and essentially pacifist vocabulary has been created. War is condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace remain. The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity. A war waged to protect or expand economic power must, with the aid of propaganda, turn into a crusade and into the last war of humanity. This is implicit in the polarity of ethics and economics, a polarity astonishingly systematic and consistent”.

(Schmitt 1996: 79)

It is no accident that, in this transition, the metaphor of the duel gives way to the metaphor of the tribunal. It is true that it maintains and rather strengthens the relationship with law. But, this time, the success of the procedure does not consist in just the compliance with the prescribed forms, but also in the fact that the just party always wins. Instead of the previous formal equality among states, the tribunal-war dictates a clear asymmetry between the sanctioner and the sanctioned. The party who acts in the name of law, democracy or, in extreme cases, mankind, cannot be put in the same conditions as the party who is brought to trial. Also the role of witnesses and neutrals do not remain the same. Whereas, in the “classical” war of the jus publicum europaeum, they were requested to supervise the observance of the forms, while remaining outside the playground, in the present war, neutrality becomes as suspicious as indifference when the choice between good and evil is at stake. As war assumes the form of a tribunal, neutrality is lowered to the level of a false testimony. The witnesses’ job, we might say, is to cease to be neutral.

In the third place, asymmetry affects communication, depriving both the adversaries and the neutrals of a shared principle of legitimacy. Although a similar crisis also took place in the 20th century, the present one is even more profound. In fact, the “European civil war” of the last century did arise from a common culture, whose heritage was at stake – and it is no accident that the

conflict revolved around such key words of the western political vocabulary as democracy, modernity and progress. On the contrary, in a conflict like the so-called global war against terrorism, each part addresses only itself. There is no longer the propaganda as in the European civil war, the attempt to conquer the hearts and minds of the enemy. Instead, the separation is taken for granted, while communication takes different and irreconcilable paths. Carlo Galli noted this with regard to the political reactions to September 11th:

“The ability to communicate was the first victim of the terrorist violence, which resulted in the creation of two opposing parts, two identities which did not manage to speak to each other. Thanks to al Jezira, Bin Laden primarily addressed his Islamic public opinion. Thanks to its television, America addressed Western public opinion. The crossing effects on the public opinion of one’s adversary were crude, uncontrolled and, often, counterproductive”.

(Galli 2002: 28-29)

In the fourth place, despite the importance of this cultural break, we should not lose sight of a still more profound break, which risks being overshadowed by the growing emphasis on the “clash of civilizations”. Before affecting communication, asymmetry affects experiences. In the asymmetrical warfare, the antagonists do not perceive war in a different way just because they belong to different civilizations, but because they do not have the same experience of the war. For one actor – Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Yugoslavia in 1999, the Palestinian people since 1967 – war remains what it has always been, a daily experience of fear, vulnerability and death. By contrast, for the other actor war can assume the appearance of peace – reflected in the euphemistic language of “peace enforcing” and “international police” but, above all, based on the concrete possibility of ignoring its existence. Also the duel’s space, the theatrum belli, disappears. War does not begin for each actor in the same moment, nor does it take place in the same space. On the contrary, war imposes its presence on one actor just as it hides itself from the other – even when the adversaries live close to each other, like in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Along the lines of this transition, the twentieth century production of hybrids radically changes too. Whereas, during the Cold War, both antagonists found themselves somewhere between war and peace, they at least shared this hybrid condition; now the hybrid consists in the fact that one actor cannot escape the war while the other continues to enjoy the peace. The new hybrids feed on asymmetry, just as the old ones fed on mutual vulnerability. And we should ask whether this asymmetry, instead of (or in addition to) the cultural
differences or the technological progress, may explain two of the main features of the new terrorism: the level of commitment and purpose, which makes terrorists more willing to suffer losses than the Western (and peaceful) society the ability to commit indiscriminate acts of destruction in peacetime. In an international context in which the antagonists no longer agree on the distinction between peace and war, terrorists shift the war to the space in which their enemy’s peace resides.

Finally, asymmetrical warfare is a war without hazard. Like in the two Gulf wars, as well as in the wars against Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, the result is known in advance: one part knows that it cannot lose and the other knows that it cannot win. The traditional duel-pattern is overwhelmed by the disappearance of gambling. It is true that an amount of uncertainty remains as to both the human and economic costs of war and its political effects. But, in the military domain, the result of asymmetrical warfare can be taken for granted, as a simple result of the asymmetry between combatants.

While eliminating one of the main features of the traditional war, the disappearance of gambling does away with its restrictions too. On the one hand, the weaker party’s awareness of its own inferiority encourages it to restore the hazard by shifting it outside the space and the means of “conventional war.” This is the reason why the potential targets of the next American military campaigns are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. As the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction puts it (2002: 1), “for them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest.” But this pursuit of hazard also explains the new terrorism. As the technological superiority of the last superpower grows, its adversaries’ propensity to wage war at lower and lower technological levels (namely, at levels in which the technological superiority is not productive) grows as well.

But asymmetry affects the stronger actor too. First of all, its awareness of superiority wipes out the caution which has always restrained the transition from peace to war. The more and more frequent resort to the threat or the use of force has a strict, although unconfessable, relationship with the certainty of


6 The italics are mine.
impunity, just as the strategic rationality of the US doctrine of preventive war is due to the fact that an enemy’s second strike is inconceivable. The dramatic superiority of the USA and its allies, together with the trust in the superiority and appeal of its values and its political regime, turns out to be a permissive condition. On the one hand, the present wars tend to be strongly legitimized in the name of inalienable values, such as the respect of human rights; on the other hand, the people who claim these values have not to put their lives and their welfare at stake.

Moreover, asymmetrical warfare makes the stronger actor free from Clausewitz’s framework of interaction. Unlike Clausewitz’s war, asymmetrical warfare does resemble “an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter”. The adversary doesn’t dictate to us as much as we dictate to him. Once immobilized by electronic war, he transforms himself into a passive and yielding object which cannot react. In this transition, the technological asymmetry reveals its kinship with the legal asymmetry among combatants. It is impressive to read the remarks which Carl Schmitt made, fifty years ago, about the relationship between technological development and the dissolution of reciprocity:

“If weapons are clearly unequal, then it erases the concept of mutual war in which the adversaries are under the same conditions. In fact, in such a war there is always a chance of victory. If this is missing, then the adversary becomes just an object of coercion. In the same degree, the contrast among the parties grows. The weakest one will shift the distinction between power and right in the bellum intestinum. The strongest one will instead see his military superiority as evidence of his justo causa and, therefore, he will define his enemy as a criminal, since the concept of justus hostis is not available any more. Both the discrimination of the enemy as a criminal and the involvement of justa causa keep pace with the strengthening of the means of destruction and the spatial uprooting of the theatre of war. The strengthening of the means of destruction results in a destructive juridical and moral discrimination as well”.

(Schmitt 1991: 429-430)

Conclusion

Against the background of economic globalization and democratic peace – and in a controversial relationship with them – war reveals the amount of asymmetry which resists and actually tends to increase in international society.

7 See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, chapter V.
Its overall evolution has affected by this change. First of all, as war becomes asymmetrical, it becomes more frequent and less predictable too. Not only does the way of fighting change, but the oscillation between peace and war changes as well. On the one hand, the resort to war appears to be a “normal” behaviour since it becomes politically and militarily less and less costly. This explains the unusual frequency of the use of force by the United States in the last decade – more than once every two years, 1989 (Panama), 1991 (Iraq), 1993 (Somalia), 1995 (Bosnia), 1996 (Iraq), 1998 (Afghanistan, Sudan and Iraq), 1999 (Yugoslavia), 2001 (Afghanistan), 2003 (Iraq). On the other hand, as the technological, legal and cultural discrimination among combatants grows, war loses any reference to normality. Since the combatants no longer agree on what a legitimate war is and should be, each of them fights in a time, a space and by means of destruction which the other one conceives as unacceptable. Instead of the traditional dialectic between offence and defence, asymmetrical warfare drives each part to begin the war when and where the other is not prepared to fight it. Just as the Cold War could be conceived as a mutual defensive war (Santoro 1988), asymmetrical warfare looks like a mutual offensive war. Its morphology seems to work as if both the combatants played the role of attackers, whose first strike is not aimed at winning the match but at deciding the playing ground (or, at least, at avoiding the enemy’s decision).

The growing frequency and unpredictability of war is a “systemic” feature. But asymmetrical warfare has a still stricter relationship with the crisis of the institutional and legal framework of the international society. The absence or the decline of institutional means able to limit or confine the spread of violence jeopardizes one of the elementary and primary goals of social life as such (Bull 1977). The crisis of reciprocity in war reflects and, at the same time, nourishes an overall crisis of reciprocity in international society. On the one hand, asymmetrical warfare arises from a more and more asymmetrical international society, both in the distribution of power (by virtue of the unipolar moment) and in international law (owing to the shifting from the equality among states to democracy as the new, although controversial principle of international legitimacy). On the other hand, asymmetrical warfare strengthens these asymmetries by clearing away any common ground for competition, not only in the military phase but also in the pseudo-diplomatic phase which precedes it. If the total wars of the 20th century overcame the clear distinctions of the previous guerre en forme, while saving the possibility of mutual deterrence and arms negotiations, the collapse of reciprocity wipes out this possibility too. Asymmetrical warfare is a war without sociability, a failing institution in a failing international society.
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Mythology and Dynamics of Ethnic and Religious Factors in the New Generation of Conflicts

Vitaly Naumkin

The collapse of Communism generated illusions that a crucial positive turn in the international system might soon occur that would terminate not only the probability of a major war, but also use of military force in solving problems between the states and groups of people. Reality frustrated these expectations. In the post-bipolar world a new generation of violent conflicts that included several different categories of them emerged in various regions of the world. This development revived the old debate in political science between the advocates and opponents of realist theories (or, better to say, realist tradition) by having given to the realists a new powerful argument.

Disbalanced world

In the 1990s many efforts to define the realist paradigm were undertaken, but I would like to refer in this regard only to the recent comments by Stephen Walt. He argues that the realist tradition “tends to emphasize the continuity of historical experience and is skeptical of efforts to transcend the competitive nature of political life” (Walt 2002: 199). New wave of fierce competition between state, as well as non-state actors who sometimes observed no rules indicated that the post-bipolar world had entered the era of anarchy, disorder, and strategic uncertainty thus playing into the realist assumption that “the international system is anarchic” (in the sense that no central authority can govern world affairs). Major and regional powers along with non-state actors launched assertive efforts pursuing their own political goals, rise of nationalisms marked the end of inter-ethnic peace in many polities, human agents began to play an exclusively important role in the disbalanced world.

The events that has taken place in 1990-2000s brought us back to the main conclusion of all realists – that “the existence of several states in anarchy renders the security of each one problematic and encourages them to compete with each other for power or security” (Walt 2002: 200). This last realist problematique in my view has been clearly supported primarily by all developments in the Iraqi crisis. The post-bipolar world proved to be more war-prone than the bipolar one. Realists are probably right in asserting that “major powers will continue to compete, the shadow of organized violence will continue to loom large in their calculations, and competitions between and within states will sometimes spill over into warfare” (Walt 2002: 230). That has been already happening during all this period.

As it has been mentioned at the beginning of this paper, post-bipolar violent conflicts comprise of several categories. Let us address some of them without pretending to work out full classification.

One of these categories was represented by Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait in 1990. It looked like quite a traditional type of warfare between two states, but this war occurred when bipolar world was already collapsing, and the emerging anarchy had encouraged the ruler of Iraq to undertake this adventure in the absence of international support. Here the myth – ‘Kuwait was historically a part of Iraq’ – played its role in escalating to war that security-centered conflict.

Second category was represented by the UN sanctioned use of force by an international coalition against Iraq as an aggressor state. The international unanimity in condemning the aggressor was not only unprecedented, but has not ever happened in the years that followed this event.

Third category was the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001. These attacks made the world speak about international terrorism as one of the main threats to global security and order. Since then social scientists have been scrutinizing issues relevant to Islamic extremism, its roots and causes, activities of transnational terrorist networks, etc. These topics even overshadowed previous explosion of studies referring to ethnicity and nationalism.

US led military operation against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that was supported, but not shared, by the majority of nations represented the forth category, different type of warfare. The case of US-British military operation against Iraq in 2003, despite some similarity with these two cases, was a clear example of unilateralism of the only superpower that had its own agenda in this operation, and thus can be considered a special case. It is almost obvious that this war can hardly lead to better “world governance”.

Separate category of post-bipolar world conflicts includes various types of ethno-political conflicts incorporating cases of the former Soviet Union,
former Yugoslavia, Kashmir, Rwanda, Somalia etc. In several cases religious component took its role combined with the ethnic one. In this paper I am addressing those ethno-political conflicts in the Soviet successor states that have escalated into the violent phase. Given the time’s limits of presentation of this paper at the distinguished audience of CeMiSS I’ll confine it to a short excursion into some theoretical discourses combined with a brief empirical journey over several violent conflictual cases.

A Conceptual Framework

Conceptual frameworks for studying these conflicts often take the shape of dyads. For instance, such a dyad can be exemplified by two well-known, almost classical explanations of the formation of nations that are at odds with each other. In accordance with the primordialist one it is defined by certain “givens” of the human condition, like kin, religion, language etc., that can not be changed, and that create the foundation for an individual’s affinity with people with a similar background. This view is opposed by the view of the ‘instrumentalists’ who regard ethnicity “as the pursuit of interest and advantage for members of groups whose cultures are infinitely malleable and manipula-ble by elites” (Brass 1974: 39). Both of these two views which can be, however, reconciled by some compromise indicate that there are strong links between ethnicity and religion, important for the understanding of ethno-political conflicts.

Another example of a dyad is represented by the two mutually exclusive approaches that exist among multiple explanations of ethnic war and seem to have both many sympathizers: the symbolist and rationalist ones. Russel Hardin probably gave the clearest interpretation of the rationalist approach arguing that “ethnic war is explicable as a function of individuals’ rational pursuit not of material benefits but of personal security” (Hardin 1995: 143). On the other hand, as Abner Cohen stated as early as in 1974, “political man is also symbolic man” (Cohen 1974). Following this line, Stuart Kaufman suggests that “a fundamental factor causing ethnic conflicts to escalate to war is that first one side, then eventually both sides, come to fear that the existence of their group is at stake” (Kaufman 2003: 31). Supporting the symbolic theory he assumes that “the necessary conditions for ethnic war are myths, fears, and opportunity, the timing of war is explained by an increase in fear, opportunity, or hostility justified by the myth” (Kaufman 2003: 34). When these elements are strong, some triggering effect leads either to acute hostilities, or to
shauvinist mobilization (thus, the opportunity means opportunity to mobilize and fight). These two outcomes are related to two different types of ethnic movements – mass-led and elite-led ones. It is very important to study and feature the relationship between elites and masses in different regions of the post-Soviet space, especially in the Southern Tier, where the dominance of patronage networks determines the dynamics of ethnic and religious mobilization.

Identity crisis which after the collapse of the Soviet Union struck stronger those ethnic groups in the post-Soviet space that had not achieved full-scale national consolidation and suffered from deep fragmentation contributed to mobilization at the sub-ethnic (regional, clan, tribal etc.) level. Religion played an important role in the process of mobilization and sometimes was used by political actors merely as a mobilizing tool. That was obviously the case of Tajikistan where Islam was used by the regional elites of Ghram-Karategin cluster of regions in order to mobilize supporters within these regions under the banners of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan. Instrumental role of Islam in this case leaves no doubts, though it is also true that the population of these regions had higher level of religiosity than the others, otherwise it would not have been possible to mobilize it on the religious ground. This and many other similar examples play into the rationalist theory undermining the arguments of the supporters of the symbolist theory. So the tryad ‘myths-fears-opportunity’ can be replaced in the realm of these cases by something more rational and security-oriented like, for example, ‘interests-concepts-tools’.

However, there are also examples supporting the mythologist approach. The ‘myth-symbol’ complex plays a crucial role in the Karabagh conflict. Both Armenians and Azerbaijanis appeal to ancient myths and the arguments of imagined history to prove their claims for the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, and fears mean a lot in this case. In Sri Lanka the Buddhists Sinhalese used ancient religious myths contained in the sixth century A.D. sacred text called Maharasma to mobilize against Hindus Tamils. With regard to this, Theravada Buddhism “was spared destruction from the forces of resurgent Hinduism at the beginning of the eighth century A.D.”

The relationship of ethnicity to all other forms of collective identification, and especially religious identity, is represented by mutually excluding cases, when they support each other, or conflict. With regard to Chechen separatists they clearly supported each other; during the Tajik civil war Islamists were identified with one of the two conflicting sides, secularists with the other, both comprised of Muslim Tajiks, and the conflict in its essence, as it has been al-

ready mentioned, had little to do with Islam *per se*. In the Northern Ireland confessional borders divide ‘us’ and ‘them’. In Bosnia the ethnic and confessional lineages intertwined. Ernest Gellner as early as in 1983, before the violent conflict emerged in this region, observed that religious affiliations there referred to past, not present differences, and Bosnian Muslims “could not describe themselves as Serbs or as Croats (despite sharing a language with Serbs and Croats), because these identifications carried the implications of *having been* Orthodox or Catholic... Nowadays, to be a Bosnian Muslim you need not believe that there is no God but God and that Mohamed is his Prophet, but you do need to have lost that faith” (Gellner 1983: 71-2).

**Ethnicity, Religion, Violence**

The analysis of ethno-political conflicts and the controversial relationship of ethnic and religious factors in them cannot be complete without the conceptualizing of violence. According to Charles Tilly (Tilly 2003: 56), observers of human violence divide into three camps: idea people, behavior people, and relation people. *Idea people* stress “consciousness as the basis of human action”, *behavior people* stress “the autonomy of motives, impulses, and opportunities”, *relation people* “make transactions among persons and groups for more central that do idea and behavior people”. “Ideas thus become means, media, and products of social interchange”. Different combinations or compromises among idea-, behavior-, and relation-oriented approaches are sometimes offered. These combinations seem much more productive than single theories, as is the case of some other explanatory discourses.

The issue of violence as a part of culture, often omitted from explanatory factors, must be addressed to understand the origins and functions of the very nature of violent ethno-political conflicts. Not surprisingly many modern radical ethnic and religious movements in Soviet successor states comprised as main political actors wrestlers, boxers, former special forces servicemen, etc. *Adolat* movement in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley in the beginning of 1990s consisted primarily of young specialists in martial arts; the most notorious field commander of Uzbek Islamists, Juma Hojiev (Namangani) had served in the Soviet forces in Afghanistan; some field commanders of the Islamist opposition in Tajikistan had been also soldiers in the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and some of them were specialists in contact sports. In Dagestan a prominent political figure associated with the Islamic activism, Nadirshah Khachilaev was a famous wrestling champion.
All of them were “specialists in violence”, whom Charles Tilly views as a significant type of political actors specializing in doing damage. Such cast of characters normally functions on the side of governments as well as outside them. On many occasions they are summoned not actually to inflict damage, but only to threaten doing it in order to force people to observe rules imposed by emerging organized ethnic and religious movements that also claim to maintain public order.

For this purpose demonstrative, ritual acts take an important role in solidifying the reputation of experts in violence, as well as in proving the inevitability of punishment in case of noncompliance. Thus, when Juma Naman-gani captured and decapitated fighters who decided to return to their village upon declaration of amnesty, it served both his image as fearless, determined, and cruel commander and the inevitability of punishment of those who betrayed “the cause of jihad”.

Though such type of political actors in radical ethnic and religious movements is not the only one, these characters are of great importance in promoting culture of violence by different means, including the aforementioned violent rituals which are a feature of the Caucasian and Central Asian political life. In this regard comparison can be drawn between Central Asia and the Caucasus, where public violent rituals play even more significant role in creating ‘strong’ images of public figures and subsequently – in political mobilization. Let’s remember televised public executions and floggings organized by the Chechen separatist authorities in the break between two wars (1996-1999), or the punishment of a policeman who was beheaded by Islamic radicals in the Ferghana Valley. It has presumably something to do with certain code of honor the Islamic radicals sought to establish and elements of blood feud. Cutting ears of killed enemies during the Tajik civil war was another vivid and frightening example of such public violent ritual.

It is fair to say that specialists in violence are recruited in Central Asia, for instance, not only by Islamists but also by secular non-government forces that oppose them. During the first phase of civil war in Tajikistan in 1992 many former racketeers and often criminals took the side of secular opposition to the Islamic Revival Party, thus acting as members of solidarity groups, serving interests of certain regional elites. Sangak Safarov, the leader of the Popular Front – a force that provided victory of the Kulyabi-Leninabadi-Hissari alliance against the Ghrarm-Karategin-Pamir block of Islamists and “democrats” – had spent 23 years in jail. Some of the former racketeers after the victory over Islamists were rewarded by appointment to ministerial posts (including, for example, Yaqub Salimov as Minister of Interior).
A factor that helped to maintain culture of violence not only in the Southern Tier of the former Soviet Union, but all over the whole post-Soviet space was the high level of militarization of society. A great number of former army, police, security servicemen, all those who had been trained to use weapons and to fight, came into politics, business, civil service or became unemployed.

A special subdivision of violence practiced by nationalist radicals and religious extremists is an opportunistic violence. This category usually includes such by side product of violent struggle for the ethnic or religious cause as hostage taking, looting, enslavement, etc. They resort to opportunistic violence to revenge, to make profit, and to scare people. In some cases it turns into a full-size business. For certain nationalist and radical Islamic movements this activity is so common that observers qualify them as business-oriented. Such is the case of Chechens or, at least, a part of Chechen separatist movement, and the case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Involvement in hostage-taking, however, not necessarily means that the movements which are responsible for it must be considered merely as gangs as criminals: it can be just ‘business on the side’, its attractiveness being aggravated by huge gap in living standards that emerged in post-Soviet societies.

Religious Determinism

Religious determinism as expressed in religious doctrines is important for shaping individual and group behavior in the Southern Tier of the former Soviet Union and not only there. In medieval Islam a broad debate unfolded between jabriyyah and qadiriyyah in the framework of religious philosophical discourse about freedom of will. Are the Muslims free in their actions or everything in the world as predestined by Allah? Herein, do they bear responsibility of what they commit? The jabriyyah asserted that individual could not be responsible for his deeds since Allah guides people in this world and predestines all what happens. The qadiriyyah believed that Allah always gave the believers choice of actions in a certain range, and by choosing from possible set of actions individuals realize their free will, and for such choice, either right or wrong, an individual will be either rewarded or punished on the Day of Judgement. Though this debate seems to belong to history, its influence is until now pretty strong in any Islamic doctrinal thinking. There is no doubt that it is relevant to the interpretation of behavior of a Muslim group inspired by certain teachings.

A useful comparison may be drawn here, for instance, between Islam and Buddhism – religion that lacks system of justifying arguments for group be-
behavior. In contrast with Islam Buddhism offers no constraints on an individual’s behavior, therefore one could have suggested that in Buddhist religious discourse there in no need to discuss the problem of free will. But such suggestion is completely wrong. Another mechanism – that of karma – makes the believers’ view even more deterministic. Nadezhda Bektimirova asserts that “a part of the members of the Buddhist sangha (community of monks) who suffered the most from Pol Pot, later declared that the Pol Pot genocidal regime is the result of karma of the Khmer people, that is to say, a retribution for the ancestors’ past sinful deeds, particularly for the wars of conquest against its neighbors in the period of the Angkor Empire. It was through the concept of ‘personal karma’ that many ordinary Cambodians explained their long-suffering in regard to the Pol Pot experiments and their inability to organize any resistance in the localities” (Bektimirova 2003).

Thus, determinism as a universal part of any religion as well as the notion of responsibility and divine award opposed to it can be equally employed in political mobilization. It is needless to say that mobilization for collective violence and response to it are directly linked to these motivations.

Levels of Violence

Levels of violence differ in the broad variety of listed cases of ethno-political conflicts. Ted Robert Gurr’s catalog of violence involving ethnically defined minorities (Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000) also provided an important baseline for comparison to many analysts. In Tilly’s view, however, Gurr’s method mixes violence inflicted by governmental agents and allies with that delivered by dissident groups. Still, Gurr’s scale of violent protest and open rebellion lasting over five-year periods can be very helpful for us in understanding the spectrum of violent actions. It runs as follows:

0 - none reported
1 - political banditry, sporadic terrorism, unsuccessful coups by or on behalf of the groups
2 - campaigns of terrorism, successful coups by or on behalf of the group
3 - small-scale guerrilla activity, or other forms of conflict
4 - guerilla activity involving more than 1000 armed fighters carrying out frequent armed attacks over a substantial area, or group involvement

3 Tilly, op. cit., p. 64.
in civil revolutionary, or international warfare that is not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues

5 - protracted civil war, fought by military units with base areas.

Gurr’s catalog can be applicable not only to the violent ethnic movements, but also to the religious ones. As far as the Southern Tier of the former Soviet Union is concerned, the violent conflict in Tajikistan fits into categories 5 and 4 at its different stages in 1992-1997. It cannot be interpreted as a conflict directly related to Islam. Most scholars tend to either take a functionalist approach towards Islam in this case viewing Islam only as an instrument of political mobilization, or even deny its role in these events. Olivier Roy (Roy 2000) believes that the basis for political mobilization in Tajikistan is always regional, not ideological or religious. So far the inter-Tajik conflict, in his view, is a conflict between regions. It is more appropriate, as I have already suggested, to say that it was a conflict between regional elites competing over redistribution of wealth and power rather than conflict between regions, given the traditional political passiveness of the majority of the population and the lack of direct interest on its part in this competition. Also the role of Islamic factor cannot be underestimated in this case. Islam was used instrumentally for political mobilization and as a genuine system of values and concepts around which some groups of the population could rally. Roy goes so far that his approach view Islamic identity as imagined, constructed for the sake of political goals of primarily nationalist nature.

The activities of first radical Islamists in Uzbekistan in the beginning of the 1990s fit into category 1 of Gurr’s scale, and subsequent incursions of Islamists into Uzbekistan probably fits into category 2. The same Islamic groups were involved also in similar violent clashes with the government forces in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the end of 1990s.

The violent activities of radical Islamists not only in the Soviet successor states, but everywhere need special discussion outside this more general paper. Here again complicated relationship between religion, ethnicity, nationalism, extremism, terrorism, modernization, interests of masses and elites, role of structures and human agents, state and non-state actors, secular and religious institutions, clan, tribe and family networks etc. deserve long-term analysis. I only like to mention in this regard that comparing numerous categories of explanations of the aforementioned phenomenon, I would like once more to stress the necessity to combine different approaches. However, forced to chose among various theories that explain the phenomenon of Islamic anti-Western extremism I would have preferred the security-oriented family of explanations that derive it to the feeling of vulnerability and insecurity that gen-
erates social resentment in Islamic societies faced with technological and cultural penetration of stronger secular and transnational Western civilization, Westernization and modernization. The demonstration affect due to the spread of mass media makes feeling of insecurity and inferiority stronger. A clash-of-civilizations-based approach is one of the varieties of approaches that branch off this category (it can be viewed also as a culturalist approach rather that this rational choice security dilemma but, in my view, the deep feeling of insecurity is the overwhelming factor that allows us to link this case to security concerns). Rejection of Western culture, at least some of its components, is common in many Islamic societies, and the desire to protect the authenticity of Islamic culture, order, and style of life might be conducive to extreme patterns of thinking and behavior. But some scholars, notably Roy, observe that many members of extremist Islamic groups and terrorist networks have been well integrated into Western societies, received their education at Western universities, and were re-Islamized there. This observation undermines the adequacy of security-oriented explanations but fails to explain the cases when extremists have not been in direct contact with the West.

Conclusions

Concluding this short excursion into the problem I repeat that the present disbalanced and disorganized condition of the world international system continues to encourage political actors of all levels and types to compete with each other and to resort to violence in pursuing their goals. Ethnicity remains a powerful means of identification and a tool for political mobilization, religion supporting it and only in rare cases playing independently. Myths and realities, emotions and interests, human agents and institutions, each having its dynamic, underlie this growing common quest for security and power.

Bibliography

The Problem of Solving Ethnopolitical Conflicts

Tarja Väyrynen

The events in Afghanistan and Iraq have given the international system new coordinates: the United States uses its hegemonic power in global politics and wages wars with its allies against ‘terrorist states’. We have witnessed typical wars between states. In the most recent conflict analysis literature, this location of conflict is, however, questioned. It is argued that political violence is mostly located in intra- and inter-societal relations. In other words, it is claimed that the sovereign state has lost in many cases its role as the ‘gate-keeper’ of violence. Statistics show that during the 1990s, there were not many inter-state conflicts. According to Ted Gurr (1994: 347-349), the rise of non-inter-state conflicts is actually a continuation of a trend that began in the 1960s. He discovered, for example, that in the 1980s there were 233 significant ethnic groups which were politically mobilised and prone to ethnic protest.

As argued above, these findings can be interpreted to suggest that the location of conflict has shifted, and that this trend challenges the authority of the existing states. The assimilation thesis, which argues that when the modernisation process succeeds, different identity groups will merge into the major population and give rise to a fully integrated society, is largely neglected. The decline of the authority of states caused by internal forces has made some authors to evoke a powerful metaphor of ‘black hole’ to account of the disintegration of nation-states in the context of global change. It is suggested that ‘black holes’ create ‘zones of war’ in which the disintegration of states continues as a result of fragmentive tendencies from within (Hettne 1993: 71). The empirical findings can been seen to imply also that societies, identity groups, are becoming important political actors, and that they are undermining the authority of nations-states at the international sphere too.

The challenge put forward by ethnic conflicts for interstate cooperation can seen to be among the most pressing issues in the international system. Human rights violations and refugee problems are a part of ethnic conflicts, and the management of these requires interstate cooperation. Similarly, effective
conflict resolution of ethnic conflicts necessitates in many cases cooperation across state borders. For example, the political mobilisation of the Kurdish population and the demands expressed by them in the area which transcends the borders of three states (Turkey, Iraq and Iran) and consists of small enclaves in two states (Armenia and Syria) is a conflict situation which solution needs to arise from cooperative actions at the regional level including both state and non-state actors.

Identity Politics and the Politics of Identity

The term ‘identity politics’ hints at the idea that identity claims can take many forms. From the point of view of the study of international relations and, particularly, conflict, such identity claims as religious movements and separatist ethno-national movements are among the most vital ones. The dimension of politics in identity should be kept in emphasised. In other words, the formation of identities includes always politics, for both politics and identity-formation arise from social encounters. There is politics in every encounter between human beings. Politics, on the other hand, indicates power. Politics does not imply relational power manifest in control of behaviour. Rather, power sprigs up between people when they act together. In other words, power is what keeps the public realm in existence. Power is a power potential, not an unchangeable, measurable, reliable entity like force or strength (Arendt 1958: 178-184).

The growth of identity politics can be seen to have different sources. For Benedict Anderson (1993: 22-36), the nation developed when the conception of homogeneous, empty, time emerged, and when the idea of simultaneity started to mean temporal coincidence as opposite to old ‘Messianic time’ (religious time). Messianic time was marked by prefiguring and fulfilment as well as a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present. In the emerging modern thinking, on the other hand, it became possible to make politically significant connections horizontally, where lots of people can be joined without being at the same place or being in any direct way related to each other. An important factor in creating this new cosmology was the rise of print capitalism characterised by the wide availability of the novel and media. Modern cosmology made possible, according to Anderson (1993: 36), “for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and relate themselves to other, in profoundly new ways”.

In a similar vein, Walker Connor (1994: 37) argued that the improvements in the quality and quantity of communication and transportation me-
dia curtailed the cultural isolation of identity groups. Advances in communication and transportation tend, according to him, increase the cultural awareness of the minorities by making their members more aware of the distinction between themselves and other. In other words, the individual becomes more aware of alien identity groups as well as more aware of those who share his or her identity.

Ultimately, the ‘revival of identity politics’ poses, in Andrew Linklater’s (1992: 79) words, “the normative problem of state, the sociological problem of community and the praxeological question of reform”. Given that the state system and states themselves are systems of inclusion and exclusion with precise distinctions between citizens and aliens and that the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality form their foundations, the possibility of imagining alternative identities and loyalties which are not based on the nation-state is limited in the international system. In other words, the sovereign state has traditionally tried to provide a ‘sovereign solution’ for the question of identity. It has aimed at providing a solution which dismisses the possibility of, for example, sub-national and transnational loyalties (Linklater 1994:119-131).

It can be, thus, argued that identity conflicts arise often at the points where the imagining and creating of alternative identities and communities are suppressed by the solution the sovereign state (or other authority) imposes. In identity conflicts, the collective ‘self’ is a problem. They are conflicts where the issues related to identity-formation overwhelm other aspects in the relation between the ‘self’ and ‘other’.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

Given that ethnicity can be seen to be a form of identity, it consists of elements of boundary-making, institutionalisation and cooperation. Ethnicity is one possible circle of individual and collective identity. Identities are attached to issues (e.g. gender, language, religion) whose importance varies according to social and historical situations. The approach suggested here, thus, rejects the view in which ethnicity is claimed to embrace such ‘objective’ criteria as language, religion, race, culture, customs and traditions, territory and a common history. In short, it cultural difference between two groups is not the decisive feature of ethnicity. Instead, ethnic groups are, as Fredrik Barth (1969: 9-38) has argued, categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves. As categories of ascription and identification they organise interaction between people. Ethnic groups are, thus, ‘imagined communities’
which are constructed, invented and imagined; there is nothing fixed or given about them.

Ethnicity emerges and is made relevant through social situations and encounters as well as through people’s ways of orienting themselves in their lives (life-worlds). Ethnicity is not a property of a group, but an aspect of a relationship. Aspects of relationships are fluid and negotiable and, thus, ethnic relations are going through continuous negotiations in social encounters and situations (Eriksen 1993: 1-13). Although ethnic relations are negotiable, this does not imply that ethnicity is subjective. Rather, ethnic identity is an inter-subjective identity which is formulated in the social world accordingly to social groups a person belongs to. In this sense identities are not freely chosen. They are, rather, formed in accordance with cultural patterns which prevails in societies: there are social and cultural frameworks within which people are conditioned to act and construct their social identities, and which set limits to their choices.

Ethnicity is constituted through social contact. For ethnicity to come about, the social groups must have a minimum of contact between each other, and they must entertain ideas of each other as being culturally different. This refers to the element of boundary-making and -maintenance which is inherent in ethnic identity. In Eriksen’s (1993: 38) words, “the ethnic group is defined through its relationship to others, highlighted through the boundary, and the boundary itself is a social product which may have variable importance and which may change through time”.

It follows, that dormant ethnic boundaries can be activated. This happened, for example, in ex-Yugoslavia where presumed cultural differences which had been irrelevant for decades were activated and invoked. It took place, for example, in the medium of language which has a strong symbolic function for the identities of the ethnic groups in the area. Serbo-Croatian split into three different standard languages, the difference not being solely the way it is written (i.e. Cyrillic or Roman alphabets). ‘Serbian’ (srpski jezik), ‘Croatian’ (hrvatski jezik) and ‘Bosnian’ (bosanski jezik) were announced to be separate and independent languages. ‘Croatian’ was vigorously cleansed from influences coming from ‘Serbian’. ‘Bosnian’, on the other hand, adopted more and more Turkish vocabulary (Nuorluoto 1995).

It should be emphasised that in addition to the inherent feature of boundary-making in ethnic identity, there is an aspect of cooperation and sharing in it too. As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991: 65-109) note, all human activity is subject to habitualisation in which action is casted into a repeatable pattern. Institutionalisation occurs wherever there is a reciprocal typification.
of habitualised actions by types of actors. In other words, the origins of institutionalisation lie in the typification of one’s own and others’ habitualised performances. When a segment of human activity is institutionalised, it has been subsumed under social control in which conduct is controlled by setting up predefined patterns of conduct. Ethnic identity is an ‘institution’, because it implies habitualised, taken for granted and shared ways of behaviour. Furthermore, these ‘ethnic institutions’ are embodied in individual experience by means of roles, for by playing roles the individual participates in a social world, and by internalising these roles the same world becomes subjectively real to him or her. ‘Ethnic institution’ implies, therefore, a socially shared universe of meaning.

From the point of view of the theory of ethnic conflict, the point where the collective ‘self’, ‘identity’, becomes a problem and excludes cooperative interaction is vital. The points where the logic of exclusion (border-drawing and -maintenance) overcome the logic of inclusion which allows the existence of multiple identities and multiple forms of political communities are, thus, crucial for the understanding of conflict. At the points of extreme exclusion, the ‘Other’ is closed off, identities anchored strongly to single issues and alternative identities rejected. In other words, in the situations of strong exclusion, politics ceases to exist. When the power potential characteristic to politics is ‘continued by other mean”, violence emerges.

Ethnic conflicts, as other conflicts too, consists a break-down of a shared reality. The theory of conflict underlying this understanding is based on the view according to which we approach the world around us through culturally produced typifications. Our ‘sociality’ and cooperation is based on shared typifications: a common reality is defined through shared typifications. Maurice Natanson (1970: 58-60) maintains, that to be with others is to share typifications, to respond to them, to participate with them, and to assume that others typify in the same way as we (or I) do. He argues that “when such typification breaks down or is for certain reasons denied or severely circumscribed, then we have, at least in descriptive terms, evidence of fundamental differences or basic prejudices” (Natanson 1970: 59). If shared typifications break down, a common reality, the undergirding structure of shared reality, collapses. The breakdown of language and communication is merely a symptom of this ‘fractured sociality’. When the breakdown is far-reaching, according to Natanson, we have some form of anomie in the society.

Natanson’s idea can be further developed by arguing that anomie may take the form of conflict. However, what finally counts as conflict is culturally constituted in the processes of intersubjective typification. Conflict may ap-
appear either within an in-group (where a part of an in-group becomes an out-group) or between an in- and out-group. In sum, what is at the centre of conflict, what is characteristic to it, is a far-reaching breakdown of shared definitions of a reality. Furthermore, conflict involves the struggle to impose one’s definition of reality upon the other. Thus, a focus in conflict is also whose description of reality is taken seriously, and even acted upon (Väyrynen 2001).

**Challenges for Conflict Resolution**

Identity and ethnic conflicts are fought not just about resources or power, but also, for example, about protecting group status, culture, and identity. Gurr (1994: 365) argues that these issues are non-negotiable. They may be the subject of creative compromises, but not the subject of bargaining based on means-ends (instrumental) rationality. In Herbert Kelman’s (1992: 80) words, “a political agreement may be adequate for terminating relatively specific, containable interstate disputes, but it is an inadequate response to conflicts that engage the collective identities and existential concerns of the societies involved”. Therefore, the success of conflict resolution attempts is dependent on the capability of the form of conflict management exercised to tackle ‘non-material’, and even existential, issues.

Among those non-material issues is security. Since identity groups are units operating in an international system, their security, ‘societal security’, should be taken into account. States do not coincide with identity groups and, therefore, the security concerns of these groups on identity do not necessarily coincide with the security concerns of sovereignty of states. Societal security is, thus, about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms. The issues related to societal security are perceived issues: it not possible to give any ‘objective’ definition when there is a threat to societal security. According to Waever (Waever et al. 1993: 27), “societal security is relevant in itself and not only as an element of state security, because communities (that do not have a state) are significant political realities, and their reactions to threats against their identity will be politically significant” (Waever et al. 1993: 17-29; Williams and Krause 1997: vii-xxiv).

Official and formal negotiations and mediation are seldom capable of dealing with non-material issues including societal security. Fred Iklé’s (1964: 3-4) traditional definition of negotiations reveals some of the problems related to negotiations as a form of conflict resolution. According to him, negotiation is a “process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for
the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest where conflict interests are present”. As argued above, ethnic and identity conflicts are not solely about interests, they are about values, and more fundamentally, about the construction of identities, interaction and reality for the parties. Thus, negotiations which rely solely on instrumental bargaining do not necessarily contribute to their resolution. The involvement of a third party in the role of mediator does not necessarily remove the elements of bargaining and instrumental reasoning from conflict resolution. It may transform the bargaining structure (from dyadic to triangular), but not the ultimate framework of discussions.

The bargaining structure founds its extreme form in the cases where the mediator is so called ‘biased mediator’ who relies on the stick and carrot approach, for whom ‘leverage is the ticket to mediation’. The biased mediator has interests and operates in a context of power politics and instrumental cost-benefit calculations. In other words, this type of mediator intervenes because of its interests in the conflict or in obtaining an attractive outcome. Manipulative mediator, thus, suggests ideas for compromise, negotiates and bargains directly with the adversaries, and is able, by manipulating inducements and pressures, to influence the parties to modify their positions (Touval 1975: 51-69; Touval 1987: 37-52; Zartman and Touval 1985: 27-45).

From the point of view of identity and ethnic conflicts instrumental bargaining on interests is problematic, because it assumes and imposes a limited type of identities; identities which are anchored to certain negotiable interests and utilities. Bargaining requires, for example, giving up largely the symbolic dimensions of identities in the conflict resolution situation. As a consequence, it strengthens ‘material’ dimensions by turning value and identity issues into negotiable utilities. Since, as it has been argued, identity and ethnic conflicts emerge at those points where the collective ‘self’ becomes a problem, the emphasis on material issues leaves the foundations of conflict intact.

Given that identities are constantly formulated in the social world and that realities are also socially constructed, a process of conflict resolution evolves around identities and realities too. In other words, the construction of realities and ‘negotiation’ of identities do not cease in the conflict resolution process. Here lies another challenge conflict resolution needs to face: how to deal with multi-dimensional and fluid identities without fixing and privileging some identities? And how to allow the imagining and reflecting of ‘alternative’ identities without imposing the solution suggested, for example, the exclusive logic of sovereign ‘nation-state’. There is, thus, a need for political space in the resolution process where identity politics can be explored. Seen
from the angle of mediation, the more facilitative style actions the third party employs, i.e. the less the mediator encourages the parties to bargain on interests, the more value and identity issues can be allowed to gain place in the resolution process.

Approaches to conflict resolution lack also often an understanding of the multiple nature of different actors in conflicts. Conflicts involve different type of actors to whom the conflict situation is differently constituted. For example, political leaders may perceive the conflict in different terms from people living in a war-zone or refugees. The exclusion and marginalisation of, for example, these actors limits the possibility of finding ‘alternative’ solutions and imagining ‘alternative’ identities on which conflict resolution in identity and ethnic conflicts can rest. Similarly, state-related actors are seldom the most relevant actors from the point of view of conflict resolution. As Håkan Wiberg (1993: 33) argued about the conflict in former Yugoslavia, “in order to get beyond such conflict management in terms of restoring some order and to get into conflict resolution, however, nongovernmental actors are more important than governmental ones”.

A Means for Resolving Ethnic Conflicts

A means to promote dialogue about non-material topics is problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. It provides a means to explore identity related issues when it is conceptualised in terms of identity politics as suggested above. The understanding of the workshop possessed by the facilitator is especially important in this particular mode of conflict resolution, because the conceptualisation is feed directly to the participants in the form of theoretical talks.

What is, then, problem-solving workshop conflict resolution? To put it simply, it is constructive conflict management which takes place in problem-solving workshops. Workshops are academically-based unofficial small group discussions which bring together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication. A panel of scholars which facilitates and promotes communication between the parties is an essential part of this type of conflict resolution. However, the role of the third party differs from that of the traditional mediator. Unlike many mediators, facilitators do not propose or impose solutions. Rather, the function of the third party in the problem-solving workshop is to create an atmosphere where innovative solutions can emerge out the interaction between the parties themselves. The objective of the workshop is both to
create analytical communication and to generate inputs into political processes. Although problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is not meant to be negotiations, it is (and it should be) in practice a complementary and parallel process to them, and, therefore it is called also ‘second-track’ diplomacy.

An essential feature of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is its full confidentiality and secrecy. Another characteristic is that workshops take place in isolated locations. The participants are, thus, brought away from the ‘reality’ of their conflict to a new environment. Moreover, there is no strict agenda in the workshop; the participants are assumed to set their agenda themselves and discuss the topics which are of a vital importance for themselves (for a summary see Väyrynen 2001).

Problem-solving workshop conflict resolution allows the participation of non-governmental actors in the resolution process. In order to contribute to problem-solving conflict resolution, the participants do not need to be equal in power. Since workshops do not encourage the parties to bargain on utilities and reason instrumentally, the resources of the participants do not need to be balanced. Even marginalised actors may participate in the workshop.

The facilitator has an important role in workshop conflict resolution. One of the most important tasks in terms of the resolution of ethnic conflict is the promotion of discursive rationality between the parties. As John Dryzek (1990: 19) argues “important social problems are pervaded by conflicting values, which instrumental action cannot resolve”. Similarly, since many conflicts are permeated by identity issues, instrumental rationality which appeals mainly to individual utility maximising does not necessarily contribute to their resolution.

The domain of discursive rationality is interaction, where individuals construct and interpret the identities of themselves and others. The aim is neither the control nor the selection of means to an end, but the generation of normative judgements and action principles. Since differences in identities are not merely semantic, i.e., they may involve a lack of agreement on the very existence of certain objects, a form of rationality is needed which stretches across differences. If an agreement is absent, for example in an encounter which takes place in a problem-solving workshop, the parties can still reach consensus based on reasoned disagreement by striving to understand the conceptual framework and the construction of the identities of the other party (Dryzek 1990: 40-43, 53-56, 90-108).

The facilitator should also pay attention to language games employed in the workshop context. The tendency of the parties to give priority, for example, to certain identities and marginalise others can be pointed out in the workshop. Similarly, language games which rely solely on instrumental reason-
ing in an issue which is clearly an identity related topic can be directed towards discursive reasoning which consists of the reflecting of the interpretative frameworks and identity-formation of the parties in conflict.

Two philosophical sources of the understanding of the ‘human condition’ are implicit in the view of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution introduced above. First, seeing the workshop as an encounter between identities and identity politics from which a shared reality possibly arises comes close to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1979: 273) idea of the fusion of horizons in the process of interpretation. For Gadamer, understanding consists of the fusion of the horizon of the present with that of the past. Similarly, in order a shared framework of understanding to emerge in the problem-solving workshop a degree of the fusion of the typificatory frameworks of the parties is needed. It is not expected that the parties give up their interpretations of the conflict at hand and adopt a new one. Rather, it is claimed that they need to ‘learn to live with difference’ and adjust their interpretations and identities in order the fusion to take place. Second, the notion of discursive rationality which is assumed to be vital for the facilitator resembles with the Habermasian conception of ‘ideal speech situation’. (Habermas 1991, 1992) Although it is not argued in the view suggested in this paper that truth is based on rational consensus, there is a strong belief in unconstrained dialogue and communication as a way to find a shared reality even in situations of conflict.

**Conclusion**

Political violence is mostly located in intra- and inter-societal relations. Although the location of violence in international system can be disputed, many conflicts are constructed for the participants themselves as disputes over identities and over identity-formation. Given this feature of conflicts, conflict resolution needs to face the identity related issues and tackle them successfully. However, traditional conflict resolution including mediation engages the participants often solely in instrumental bargaining, and limits the types of participants allowed to take part. Therefore, traditional conflict resolution does not necessarily advance the resolution of identity conflicts. A means to tackle identity and ethnic conflicts may be provided by problem-solving workshop type of conflict resolution given that it is based on the full participation of multiple - and even marginalised - actors; that is derives from the social constructionist view of identity politics; that it directs the participants towards the exploration of ‘alternative’ identities; and that it encourages discursive rationality.
Bibliography


Future Wars. Characteristics, Forms of Reaction and Strategic Requirements

Sven Bernhard Gareis

Changes in the Global Crisis and Conflict Scenario

Over the centuries, since the establishment of the Westphalian Order in 1648, war was generally perceived as the organized and instrumental use of violence between sovereign states. Free from any moral evaluation, war was the second legal status besides peace generally accepted in the relations between states. Before the background of this classical perception, Clausewitz could formulate his well-known dictum of the war being a form of continuing policy by other means and, with the doctrine of the ‘peculiar trinity’ of the elements Government, Army, People, build up a theoretical framework for a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon of mankind. The explaining power of this theory has been deeply influencing the general notions of war up to our days. Modern statehood – starting with the Westphalian Peace – did not only introduce the right of war for each and every state, the *liberum ius ad bellum*, but simultaneously postulated a states’ monopoly of using this instrument – a claim that was brought through by the states with all their power also against insurrectionists, renegades or other irregular war parties (Creveld 1998: 66). By subjugating the right of warfare under the rationality of a state’s interests, a decisive development was simultaneously initiated for a progressing legal regulation of war – a significant progress in comparison with the devastation caused by the Thirty Years’ War and its predecessors. The law of war, the *ius in bello*, agreed between states or emerging through the states’ practice, thus became the second pillar of classical international law and the fundament of humanitarian international law. Finally, the general prohibition of war and violence by the Charter of the United Nations and the transfer of legitimacy of the use of violence to the UN Security Council can even be perceived as the last utterances of the states’ monopoly on the instrument of war.

Certainly, the classical understanding of war as an international conflict still is anchored in public consciousness as well as in political and scientific...
discussion, but it has become obsolete step by step, surpassed by new realities. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 aroused the discussion about the new faces of war also among a larger public: Indeed, it is a question whether these unprecedented attacks, led by private actors, and the measures of defence subsequently taken by the US, actually should be categorized under the heading of ‘war’, or if these attacks rather should be called a ‘crime’ (Münkler 2001: 582). The process of deep qualitative changes in the international war and conflict scenario (where even terror is being based upon) has been lasting over decades – though, with a considerable acceleration during the last decade. Count among the essential developments characterizing this process:

- a progressing erosion of state sovereignty as a consequence of increasing transnational relations of interdependence;
- the simultaneous decrease in the State’s capability of keeping the promises of overall security to its citizens;
- a growing privatization in the use of force and violence by an increasing number of sub-state and/or non-state actors;
- the mix of war actions with crimes;
- last not least the borders becoming more and more blurred between the classical spheres of internal and external security.

These characteristics will more and more coin also future wars and conflicts, thus forming an essential part of the framework which strategists and planners in politics and in the military have to consider. Therefore, these characteristics should be looked on more thoroughly.

First, war as a mean of forcing through political interests on the international scene certainly is not yet a matter of the past, nevertheless it has been becoming the exceptional case. On the one hand, this development results from the experience of two World Wars and the subsequently created General Prohibition of the Use of Force (Art. 2, 4 Charter of the United Nations). On the other hand it is particularly due to the rapid process of democratization and modernization that many states ran through in the second half of the 20th century. Thus, democratic societies force their governments to non-violent conflict solutions in their international relationships. Exceptions from this rule – e.g. in form of a defensive war – are only to be admitted under the respect of narrow boundaries of legal and ethic legitimacy. The more complex societies become, the more they get dependent from a broad variety of interdependent relations – and the more the losses and costs of a war will show in
the books. After all, modern societies do not define any more their power and prosperity primarily over territorial possessions and the rule over other peoples or nations, but more and more over technological, economic and cultural capabilities and advantages. In order to secure the benefits of such systems of interdependence on a long-term scale, the participating states need a narrow network of treaties and contracts. These measures are aiming at the transformation of the freedom of arbitrariness and anarchy (as rooted in the classical notion of state sovereignty) into mutual obligation and predictability. Due to this process, the *domaines réservés* of the states will more and more diminish. With the decentralisation and privatisation of large fields of responsibility, the spectrum of affairs to be regulated by the state will be reduced. Furthermore, the state’s latitude of action will progressively be limited due to the growing necessity of considering the interests and options for action of private actors, particularly on the economic scene. Under the premise of globalization, state sovereignty does erode not only due to growing external legal and political bindings, but also due to deep-going internal socio-political processes of change.

These are very favourable conditions for the development of stability, freedom and economic prosperity. As for the guarantee of security, however, this process has been raising new problems. The more interdependency does show stabilizing effects on the relations between states participating in such a system, the more, on the other hand, it does make them prone to new forms of threat by external (but also internal) actors. Decentralized structures, free communication channels and platforms of interaction – all of these indispensable for prosperity and development of modern societies – simultaneously constitute inroad gates for the declared foes of these open societies. As again shown by the September 11 attacks, religious fanatics – despite a sight of the world that appears medieval to others – are being keenly familiar with the last details and vulnerabilities of global economic and financial relations as well as with the media-enacting strategies of high-tech societies. Pre-modernism and post-modernism create increasingly explosive mixtures in the threat scenario of developed international terrorism.

The phenomenon of classical international war fading away, however, does not lead to a dissolution of using force and violence. War and conflict rather dislocate increasingly to the inside of States and societies, now being characterized by the simultaneous appearance of moments of classic warfare, civil war, organized crime and a systematic large-scale violation of human rights (Meyers 2001: 14). The significantly preponderant part of more than 200 wars and conflicts counted since the end of World War II meanwhile be-
long to the category of intra-state conflicts – for which, rather astonishingly, the label low intensity conflict (LIC) has taken root (see AKUF 2000 for another among more possible manners of counting and categorization). Certainly, the use of weapons in these conflicts cannot be compared with the huge battles in the great wars of the Twentieth Century, nevertheless the number of casualties, damages and development deficits caused by the so-called LICs may be much higher than in other wars led according to classical rules – as it is underlined by the examples of conflicts in Angola, Sudan, Afghanistan and elsewhere, some of them rankling over decades.

One of the essential reasons of the increase in intra-state wars and conflicts does root in the lacking capability of many states of fulfilling basic integrative functions, such as forming an own national identity, organization of a community and the guarantee of a monopoly on violence by the government. Under the cover of the national state, many of the states that had been constructed on the drawing boards of peace conferences (or were formerly under colonial rule) maintained pre-modern structures, the latter offering manifold causes and occasions to violent conflict resolutions (Pradetto 2001: 16). Often enough, secession or anti-regime wars along the confrontation lines between ethnic or religious groups, clans or warlord-led groupings are the consequence. These LICs mostly result in large-scale humanitarian sufferings, going along with refugee movements of tremendous size. In the 1990s, the United Nations first of all found itself confronted with the necessity of developing new models of complex peace support operations (PSO). These missions were of a complex design, not only covering militarily peace accords or armistices, but also increasingly fulfilling civilian functions in the framework of peace consolidating missions, the so-called post-conflict peacebuilding (Gareis and Varwick 2002: 106). Developing countries are preponderantly suffering from these recent forms of intra-state violence. As it is underlined, however, by the decay of Yugoslavia as well as the development in some of the successor states of late Soviet Union, these phenomena are not at all limited to the so-called ‘Third World’.

The failed states – Afghanistan and Somalia certainly counting among the most prominent representatives – for long time have been observed particularly under the aspects of humanitarian mourn and relief measures. Not only 11 September 2001, yet has shown that these states constitute a nearly ideal hotbed for sub-state or private violent actors who either act within the borders of the failed state as warlords, or may project their violence into other states by means of terrorism (Walt 2001/02: 62). The different species of these private violent actors mostly have at least two characteristics in common: first-
ly, they do not follow any interest to be measured according to the scales of classical international politics, but only their own case – be it striving for a ‘God’s State’, be it just the possession of actually such secular goods as money. Secondly, where they find themselves faced to an adversary being too powerful according to conventional rules, they stake on strategies of asymmetric warfare. These strategies are aiming at identifying and using the weak spots in the adversary systems. In democratic societies, this is frequently enough public opinion which can be influenced particularly either by own casualties or by images spread by the media showing actual or alleged civilian victims of combat actions. This connection is underlined by the example of Somalia, the TV pictures showing killed US soldiers being draggled trough the streets of Mogadishu, as well as by the discussion about the use of high-tech weapons in the Kosovo campaign of 1999, in the fight against the Afghan Taliban regime in 2001/02 or repeatedly in Iraq 2003.

Under the aspect of asymmetric warfare, though, there had to be regarded also the will and the preparedness of terrorists to go beyond even the scope of imagination. Certainly, terrorism *per se* is characterized by the attempt to psychologically influence more people than are directly struck by the respective action. Moreover the different terrorist organizations, from Abu Sayyaf to Al-Qaeda, have developed even virtuous capabilities of exploiting world-wide media of mass communication. But the terrorist attacks in the U.S.A. also have shown that terrorists meanwhile, with cool deliberation, not only aim at destroying the enemy’s symbols but also at a maximization of casualties. This development is the more important seen the prospects of terrorist organizations having probably weapons of mass destruction at their availability and, moreover, being supported by a range of so-called states of concern. It has to be taken into consideration, though, that even states of international reputation, such as Saudi Arabia, are narrowly linked with transnational terrorist networks, and in a number of further – apparently rather stable – states, such as Uzbekistan or Egypt, do occur terrorist groups and forms of privatised violence ranging beyond the borders.

The fact that these protagonists are being thrown upon all forms of financing is also to be considered as a result of both, privatised as well as asymmetric warfare. Thus, for decades intra-state guerrillas as well as terrorists acting on the international level both have been increasingly amalgamating with organized crime and its specific forms of earning money through trafficking drugs, arms and humans, and moreover actions of money laundry (Weintraub 2002). Not later than at this point, the boundaries between internal and external security become blurred, and new forms of integrated action by the dif-
different national security agencies become as necessary as their intensified co-operation on the international level.

Finally, the self-sacrificing devotion shown by the performers of belligerent or quasi-belligerent actions can be regarded as a further characteristic of future challenges on the field of security policy. One of the most significant aspects of the September 11 attacks certainly is to be seen in the fact that a group of 20 individuals, after all, on a command left their usual life space in order to realize a long-term planned violent venture that, for being successful, necessarily includes the loss of their own lives. As it is also shown by the assault on India’s parliament in New Delhi, in November 2001, by the nearly daily suicide attacks in Israel in 2002 and in Iraq after the official end of the war in May 2003, terrorist groups develop more and more clearly a new kind of rationality: The priorities of their efforts are now aiming at the successful execution of the attack whilst questions of escape and disguise become unimportant. This kind of acting is to be basically distinguished from the preponderant majority of earlier forms of terrorist attempts, thus leading to completely new challenges of military-strategic planning and preventive actions of the states potentially concerned (Varwick 2001: 40).

These characteristics of crisis and conflict occurring after the end of East-West confrontation do not at all appear clearly distinguished from each other, but simultaneously, either parallel or overlapping, and the challenges they contain are increasingly of a comprehensive and global nature. Thus, war in the lucidity and rationality of Clausewitz’ classical model rather does not exist any more. Consequently, all the forms of security providence – still referring to these notions – through extensive defence forces sooner or later will become obsolete. They have to be replaced by new multidimensional and flexible instruments, which can be tailored according to the probably most frequent conflict scenarios and forms of mission required in the future:

- pacifying low intensity conflicts;
- peace consolidation and its ensuring under the roof of peace support operations;
- protection against terrorism and asymmetric warfare.

This spectrum is to be complemented by the growing probability to deny production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction even by military means if diplomatic efforts fail.
Recent Approaches and Forms of Reaction

During the about one and a half decade since the end of the East-West-confrontation the dynamic changes in international relations again and again gave rise to new problems and crises before satisfactory answers could be found to the respective challenges world politics had to deal with. In this phase of lasting and sometimes turbulent transition, any long-term planning in politics and military turned out to be extremely difficult, not to speak even of the development of a grand strategy. Concrete maxims of acting have been established preponderantly in a reactive manner, orientated towards situation-related requirements, and often according to the learning by doing method.

Nevertheless, a number of promising and sound approaches and maxims of acting have been designed on the conception field as well as on the level of political practice, even though these are still in need of improvement. In this way, the United Nations, by means of a whole range of world conferences, has staked out the field of global issues to be dealt with, thus contributing develop a worldwide public consciousness of a new complex understanding of peace and security. Reaching far beyond military deterrence this comprehensive notion also considers particularly economic, social, ecologic dimensions as well as the guarantee of minimum humanitarian standards and of human rights. These maxims of acting, based upon an this extended perception of peace and security, were successfully put into practice by NATO and EU members in the case of stabilization in Eastern and Eastern Central Europe and by the support of the transformation processes in these countries. Dialogue, broad cooperation and the willingness to continue the European integration process were realized under the roof of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). These developments are constituting a really exportable concept. But due to hindering particularities adaptation and implementation in other regions of the world have yet to come.

On the field of peace missions, explosion-like extended in the 1990s, United Nations have developed, even by putting up with considerable throwbacks and casualties (e.g. in Somalia and Rwanda), models of peace support operations (PSO) which, at least in their theoretic design, correspond to the complex requirements of peacekeeping and peace consolidation following civil wars. As it became obvious in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo and also in East Timor, the practice of these new-type peace missions, aiming at nothing less than building a new state or community, shows some weak spots yet – particularly with regard to rapid deployment of a sufficient number of civilian
experts and administration forces (police, judicature, administration, education etc.). All in all, however, these missions can be considered as successful, even though these successes only can be obtained at the price of an engagement of the nearer and farer neighbours, lasting over years and with an end not to be foreseen (Gareis 2002b). August Pradetto therefore recommends caution in the new international missions on the field of state-building, particularly when an externally forced regime change did precede these attempts, as e.g. in the Afghanistan case (Pradetto 2001a: 28) As legitimate these doubts may be, seen the alternative to be stated yet between a mission’s failure and permanent presence, as obviously they point at the existing dilemma: Both an intervention or its omission may come along with unforeseeable consequences and costs. An efficient approach towards crisis prevention could show the way out of this dilemma, but worldwide the development of such a conception is just in the beginnings yet.

As relatively satisfactory the balance of peace support missions may turn out, as clear we have to point at the problem of selective interests that comes along with double standards with regard to assessing a situation as a humanitarian catastrophe. Still it can be taken as a rule that the probability of a humanitarian intervention – with or without a mandate by the Security Council – will raise or fall with the measure of vital interests shown by industrial nations in a country or a region. Whilst certain conflicts (e.g. on the Balkans or in Afghanistan) do absorb the largest part of the world-wide expended funds for PSO, other hot spots with probably even more aggravating effects keep on being unconsidered as ‘forgotten conflicts’. This tendency is being even amplified by the fact that efficient alliances certainly do place their capacities at the disposal of collective security measures, but in return they keep the complete power of decision and disposition concerning scenario and country of a mission. United Nations, as the agency actually responsible of global collective security, will have to count for difficult missions in far regions on often only insufficient support. These attitudes, particularly shown by industrial states, are questionable and short-sighted not only for humanitarian reasons. Recently, the Afghanistan example has forcibly shown again the consequences arising from conflicts that were forgotten or repressed over decades.

Among the classical security institutions, it was probably the military to be confronted with the most deep-going changes during the last decade. After the end of the East-West confrontation, armed forces have been reduced dramatically worldwide and, at least in the European region, increasingly transferred to multinational structures. The creation of common headquarters and units allowed the participating states to secure the peace dividend grown
from the reductions by simultaneously maintaining strategic and operative levels and competences. Moreover, such structures bear by several states correspond to a high extent with the requirements caused by the new complex peace missions: All the new and complex peace support operations are built up by contingents coming partially from even more than thirty contributing countries.

More vigorous effects than by force reduction or by structural reform, however, have been coming along with new-type missions and a changing ethic-legal fundament of the soldier’s profession. Over the last two centuries, soldierly self-perception had been primarily characterized by the defence of the own country or of an alliance’s territory – a concrete and comprehensive motivation for military service, particularly in conscription armies. A soldier of the post-confrontation era, though, has to serve his country over a broad spectrum of roles and functions with regard to the essentially more abstract field of interests and responsibilities of his country (Bredow and Kümmel 1999: 16). This new soldierly job profile does include the combatant’s role as well as the one of a global street-worker, the latter often to be played by soldiers particularly in peacebuilding processes due to the lack of available civilian experts. The question remains open whether these two poles of a modern soldier’s professional image can be integrated in just one individual soldier, or whether new organizational differentiations in the armed forces’ structures will become necessary along these different kinds of tasks. As the classical defence armies distinguished between armoured troops, infantry, and other branches with specific tasks, in the future special combat forces for intervention or fighting terrorism will become necessary as well as units specialised in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) or peacekeeping.

After the East-West confrontation had ceased to exist, large parts of the defence armies kept up particularly in Europe – with a focus on motorised infantry and armored troops – have been no longer complying with the requirements of the new conflicts and wars. The backbone of modern armed forces is being formed by small and flexible units of light infantry with the possibility of rapid deployment, command and logistic support over distances of thousands of kilometers. In the 1990s, since the second Gulf war, more and more new paths were opened up for the forms of combat management, firming under labels such as RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs), C4I (Command & Control, Communication, Computer and Information) or network-centric warfare. The notion linked with RMA of a ‘blank battle field’, where the fight is won due to one’s own information dominance and by means of long-range precision weapons, moreover derives from a central postulate of the so called
Powell doctrine that consists in fighting battles and wars with a minimum of own casualties and losses. This doctrine had been successfully employed during the 1990s, nevertheless by putting up with, partially significant, ‘collateral damages’.

Both the technological and financial expenditures of this RMA, however, are being enormous – and they are far from being beard by all those states contributing to common military missions. Certainly, such a task sharing will come along with some differences regarding the technological level and the equipment – but the technology gap must not become too large lest the opportunities of influencing on the formulation and the implementation of the strategy to be chosen should get lost. The Kosovo war, the fight against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the war on Iraq as well as other scenarios have been emphasizing the fact that there is a narrow correlation between equal say and decision on the one hand and the capability of contributing efficiently to the implementation of the decisions made. Actually, the European states are well advised to coordinate their common foreign and security policy as well as their security and defence policy in a faster and narrower manner, and they should do their utmost to create the basic conditions for being in a position to act more independently on the field of security policy. First important steps already have been done by the buildup of common European forces counting 60,000 personnel, by the creation of politico-military bodies of planning and decision, by the settled acquisition of the Airbus A 400M for strategic airlift and by the further development in course of strategic reconnaissance capacities. It will, though, still take some years until Europe will be capable of leading independent military operations – EU could utilize this time to practice the definition of common positions and solid unanimous political action.

It has to be underlined, however, that RMA cannot be the answer to all the military challenges. Certainly, it could be possible to fight down a Taliban regime by air strikes (even though also in this case, ground battles with very real bloodshed were led by the auxiliary forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance), or to force a Milosevic to give in (even though in the Kosovo case, political and diplomatic processes should have been weighing heavier than the military efforts). First of all, the course of warfare in Iraq as before in Afghanistan shows that also the US and their allies had to employ ground forces, and they also had to put up with casualties. On the other hand, totally different qualifications and equipment are required for the deployment to LICs or the protection of the reconstruction of destroyed communities and infrastructures. The armed forces of the future, in their structure, equipment
and training methods, will have to be orientated towards a very differentiate spectrum of possible mission forms. Correspondingly, they will have to train and to maintain a large range of capabilities and capacities.

Under the impression of increasingly merging classical spheres of internal and external security as well as of changing mission scenarios, and seen the changes made during the recent years in purpose and structure of the armed forces, the opposite pair of ‘political versus military solution approaches’ (which was formerly so familiar) can only be maintained in a very limited way (for more details, see Varwick and Woyke 2000: 36). Many of the political processes on the fields of peace-building or state-building need military protection. As it is underlined by the autumn 2001 example of disarming insurrectionists in Macedonia, military missions even may create essential prerequisites for civilian missions.

Further Requirements

The military answer to the terror of September 11, 2001 turned out to be rapid, consequent and probably successful (Kamp 2002: 4), and a large number of states did refine also the non-military protective mechanisms. As for the necessity – conjured up again and again just in relation with terrorism – to fight the causes of violence, terror and war by efficient preventive strategies, however, there were scare obvious progresses to be found. Certainly, such topics as global development, good governance and a fair world economy order take prominent places in the communiqués of UN jubilee or millennium summits and similar conferences. But political practice shows that expenditures by prosper industrial states depart more and more from the promise given about 30 years ago to invest 0.7 per cent of their gross national products in international development aid.

Without any doubt the objection is correct that poverty and pauperisation alone are not the causes of the use of violence or terrorism. On the other hand, one cannot neglect the fact that militias, terrorist organizations and other violent groups are growing the best where being backed and supported in underprivileged and suppressed societies. Here they find this critical mass of marginalized young men without any perspective for life. Due to lacking alternatives, this potential is easily to be won for armed struggle for whatever aim it would be. Not only under the angle of terrorism but of a large spectre of violence phenomena, global security provision cannot make without creating fairer living conditions throughout the world. If anything is proved by the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians since the autumn of 2000, this is
only the fact that military superiority alone cannot guarantee neither peace nor
security.

It is, however, much easier to lay down such a normative postulate than
to fulfill it. To push forward development and the narrowly linked good gov-
ernance on a global scale means much more than just to allocate further finan-
cial resources for development aid. Instead are required an “active engaged
statehood” and a ‘world political new deal including also radically pushed
forms of international cooperation and integration’ (Maull 2001: 6). But this
requires the willingness of the states to an international balance of interests
(especially open markets for the goods produced by the developing countries)
and to bind themselves into generally accepted legal norms and rules within
the corresponding contractual regimes, as well as the development of sound
structures for the cooperation between state and non-state actors. On the oth-
er hand, this goes along with the claim to point at the functional failure or even
criminal machinations by the governing elites in many countries and to insist
on political changes. Seen the complexity of this venture, it is not astonishing
that any harmonized strategy and adequate common acting among free demo-
cratic industrial states is to be perceived at most in some blurred outlines. Per-
haps the September 11 attempts have called back the narrow links between
development, multilateral cooperation and security into the consciousness of
the statesmen in Europe and in the US, thus strengthening their readiness to
perceive a global structural policy (Hamm et al. 2002: 11) also as an invest-
ment in the security of their own states and to take appropriate initiatives.

To begin with, an extensive conception of peace consolidation could be
established to overcome the job sharing practiced over the recent years ac-
cording to the pattern ‘US fight, UN feed, EU fund’ and to transfer it to new
approaches. It should actually contribute to support credibility of western in-
dustrial states, but first of all the success of their engagement for peace poli-
cy, whether the proportion between the expenditures for military operations
and those for the consequently necessary civilian peacebuilding efforts could
be brought into a rather balanced ratio. As UN General Secretary Kofi Annan
did correctly underline in his speech before the Bundestag, the German par-
liament, (Annan 2002), it is not very meaningful to disarm militias, civil war
armies or clans under large and dangerous efforts without opening prospects
of a peaceful life to the people concerned. It is neither very meaningful to let
international interim administrations implement legal norms without being
able to guarantee their long-term maintenance by efficient justice and police
bodies, nor to organize democratic elections when the officials finally turn out
to be unable to maintain the basic functions of a community. As a tendency, successful consolidation of peace is appropriate to make it clear to other disrupted societies that nonviolent forms of living together offer the largest benefits for all sides. On the other hand, halfheartedly-led missions which then are broken off without any success will amplify contrary effects and entail further cost-intensive engagements.

Apart from the requirement of preventive acting on the global level, the September 2001 terrorist attempts, however, have also made clear the necessity of facing the global threat by transnational terrorist networks with appropriate repressive measures. The key lies at the individual states which will have to do anything in their power to prevent the formation of terrorist groups and the execution of attempts, but at least to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. Essential prerequisites for efficient collective acting is the existence of internationally accepted standards and norms serving as an orientation for national regulations. Since the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircrafts of September 14, 1963, all efforts taken by the international community for establishing such standards have led to not less than 12 UN Conventions, numerous resolutions and declarations in General Assembly and Security Council and a number of regional agreements on forms of terrorism and the fight against it, though without being able to present an obligatory definition of terrorism itself. Moreover, during the recent years the states hesitated to ratify swiftly the conventions adopted by significant majorities in the General Assembly, and to transfer them into national laws. Up to September 11, 2001 only 29 states had ratified yet the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings that was adopted in 1997 and only five states had acceded the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism from 1999. It needed just the Security Council’s resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, to draw a number of purposive measures for the fight of terrorism and the suppression of its financing out of the time loop of the ratification processes and to impose their execution on the states by means of force. This was simultaneously a sign of exhortation addressed to the states to be aware not only of their rights but also of their duties in the process of development of international legal standards. After the shock of the 9/11-incidents, the number of accessions to the relevant conventions multiplied, but nevertheless it is much less than half of the UN-Member States (72 by March 2003), which ratified the convention against the financing of terrorism.

The cooperation on the field of information collection and treatment on the international level as well as between nation authorities is as important as
expandable. Whilst coordination in Germany and – under the NATO roof – also between the allies seems to function satisfactorily, the European Union did not yet take any corresponding measures. Seen the narrow European space of entanglement, permeable borders and the manifold appearances of terrorism and its neighbor disciples in organized crime, progresses in the development of cooperation between secret services seem to be absolutely necessary (For details concerning strategies of fighting terrorism see Hirschmann 2001: 13).

Seen the increasingly blurred borders between internal and external threat, a narrow coordination of security efforts between the different ministries and institutions remains a matter of necessity on the national level. Looking at a discussion led in Germany, it is not a question of interest whether this task should be guaranteed by a national security council to be created, or by the existing coordination framework in the chancellery or in the Federal Security Council. It is of much more importance that such a coordination is designed on long-term and that the efforts will not weaken after a certain phase of tranquility.

As for the strategies of secret services, the concentration on high-tech systems (particularly cultivated in the U.S.A.) for surveying international communication by neglecting human intelligence will have to be re-examined. Consciously doing without any information on what other nations or cultures do feel or think of the U.S.A. and their allies, and which are the forms resentments will forge ahead – this certainly did contribute to the phenomenon of surprise by the terror of September 11. Units of analysts working in the countries and regions to be observed without the appropriate linguistic qualification and knowledge of cultural particularities neither can guarantee an adequate early warning, nor prepare any infiltration or even destruction of terrorist networks. A reformed ‘all-source intelligence’ (Cilluffo et al. 2002: 67), additional to being fixed upon signal intelligence, will also have to eliminate these deficits.

**Perspectives**

Due to the contrivers, the symbolic power of their targets, the mass-media transport and, last not least, their effects on the structures of world economy, the attacks of New York, Washington and Pennsylvania sometimes have been called the first war under the conditions of globalization. Actually, the relations of interdependence – in good as in bad – between the different states of the world could not have been clearer underlined than by the international reactions on these attempts. The reflections pushed by the terror of Septem-
ber 11 on the global challenge through new forms of war, its causes and effects, however, did make clear two things, namely:

First, there is scarcely any war or any other form of large-scale use of violence to leave unimpressed the other citizens of the global village.

Second, each and every individual state, and may it be far superior to each other, is overcharged with mastering the new complex phenomenon of war.

We have to wait and see whether this knowledge will give growth to a recall of the stabilizing effects of multilateral arrangements, or even to a ‘UN renaissance’ (Gareis 2002a) as the embodiment of a global consultation and cooperation platform. In this context, large parts – if not the whole – will depend on the developments that U.S. policy will take in the months and years to come.

In a period immediately after the 11 September attacks the deliberate way and method of proceeding in which the Bush administration did react by staking on a worldwide anti-terror coalition instead of immediately striking back was considered a proof that the United States are willing to integrate increasingly into the international system instead of ruling it as the only superpower. Nevertheless in spring and summer 2002 already harsh American initiatives against the International Criminal Court (ICC) put into doubt a stable orientation of the US-administration towards a form of multilateral co-operation considering global forums and mechanisms being more than an instrument for the international legitimization of national ambitions (Gareis, 2002c: 9-12). Indeed the international behaviour of the US during the Iraq-crisis flaring up newly in summer 2002 nourished respective fears worldwide. In his speech of September 12, 2002 to the UN General Assembly President Bush underlined his will to proceed in compliance with the UN Charter and the decisions of the Security Council, but simultaneously he demanded from the organization a proof of its capability for determined collective action. The US then returned into the UN Security Council in fall 2002/spring 2003 but soon they were confronted with lacking support for their policy and a dramatic polarization between supporters and opponents of a military solution of the Iraq-problem. On 20 March 2003 the US attacked Iraq without a mandate by the UN Security Council and despite the concerns of numerous partners in the international alliance against terror. The future shape of international security cooperation will depend extensively on the outcome of this war and the management of its consequences. At the moment amongst the political elite in the United States there seems to be only a minority of people who remember that some of the great builders of the American superpower status, such as Harry Truman, Dean Acheson or John F. Kennedy, were institutionalists, able to realize American interests even more efficiently via multilateral agreements and actions (Ikenberry 2001: 26).
With regard to the instability after the official end of the military campaign in Iraq and the continuing international criticism there might be possible a change of perspective towards more classical American orientations.

The justified objection not only from the side of neo-conservative strategists, that in certain situations of danger ahead – such as the prevention of production, proliferation and threatening use of weapons of mass destruction – decisions are to be made immediately and even unilaterally, however, does not modify the fundamental advantages of multilateral interlacing. Any unilateral action can be justified the more convincingly when the state concerned otherwise had shown as a reliable member of multilateral communities. A comprehensive doctrine of preventive wars – even if called pre-emptive self-defence (The White House 2002) – which claims to put the identification of a problem and the decisions on the manners of its settlement into the hand of one superpower will impossibly find support in the world.

Just because the wars of the future lack the rationality and instrumentality initially mentioned, they need for their prevention and mastering more than ever a strategic interplay between global institutions and individual state behavior: Seen the complexity of war, individual states without any support by international organizations and platforms are overcharged, and on the other hand these organizations cannot display their capabilities without being supported by the states. When the consciousness of this mutual dependence will prevail, then there is at least the possibility to reduce the number of wars worldwide step by step.

Bibliography


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Giovanni M. Carbone

On the Weakness of an African State

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), known as Zaire between 1971 and 1997, has historically been a paradigmatic illustration of the weakness of Africa’s post-colonial states. The country’s dramatic experiences, since the second half of the 1990s, tell us a lot both about the way weak states become a fertile terrain for conflicts and about some of the dynamics that African conflicts have assumed in a post-Cold War world.

The immense size of the former Belgian Congo magnified the difficulties of building effective modern-state structures encountered by other countries on the continent. The capital Kinshasa was to direct the creation of fully-fledged state institutions over 2,300,000 sq. km of land, casting central authority up to 2000 km eastward, with only exceedingly weak communications and transport infrastructures. Joseph Conrad’s portrait of a long and hard journey through a mostly sparsely-populated and densely-forested territory, in his Heart of Darkness novel, provided an early hint of state-building dilemmas for this enormous country. The issue of state authority-building in low-population territories, systematically investigated by Jeffrey Herbst, is a problem concerning African states at large. But the geography of the Congo, characterised by population concentrations in regions at the far ends of the country, aggravates the complexities of projecting power through its vast but relatively ‘empty’ core (Herbst 2000: 148).

It was not by chance that the first African state to experience a secessionist attempt was newly-independent Congo, in the early 1960s, with the war in the remote Katanga region. Scarce population combined with ethnic heterogeneity, resulting in ethno-regional areas over which a weak presence of the state has troubles in countering autonomist or independentist claims. This is a situation far from unique to the Congo – as somebody put it, ‘every African state has its Katanga’ – and thus the impact of the Katanga secessionist movement was critical to the emergence of the view that, if African leaders wanted
to avoid a domino-like process of state fragmentation, the boundaries inherited by the colonial partition were to be protected in spite of their non-indigenous origins. Some form of mutual recognition of state borders was necessary. Such a recognition came in 1963, when the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) made illegal any claims to border changes and thus sanctified and preserved the territorial integrity of the Congo as much as of all other African states. External recognition meant that the reality of ‘quasi-states’ which do not meet empirically the ideal-typical requirements of effective control over territory and people – nor, often, those of internal legitimacy – would be disregarded. The UN system itself was based on principles of state juridical sovereignty and non-intervention that were ‘extraordinarily supportive’ to weak states (Clapham 1996: 15-43). UN Resolutions no.1514 and 1541 of 1960 (concerning the independence and self-determination of colonial territories), alongside the non-aggression principles contained in the UN Charter, showed that “the idea that states either logically or historically precede the international system” is not always true (Clapham 1996: 15).

‘Freezing’ state borders had the overall effect of inhibiting interstate wars. Few conflicts in Africa have pitted state against state, and – except for Somalia’s 1977 invasion of the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia and, between the 1970s and the 1980s, Libya’s clashes with Chad over the Aouzo strip – most conflicts were not conquest wars. Without war nor the menace of it as threats and incentives for effective state-building, not only states which should have consolidated did not, but those that would have been eliminated were left in place as “states that will not disappear but simply cannot develop” (Herbst 1990: 138).

In most of the ex-colonial world, but most strikingly in Sub-Saharan Africa, Darwinian processes of inter-state competition were not only discouraged, but positively ruled out by the new international and regional state systems. Governments that lost effective control of the populations and territories over which they nominally ruled did not as a matter of course fear wholesale predation on the part of their neighbours. There was conflict aplenty, but it was almost all internal.

(Moore 2000: 8-9)

In addition, the reasons for building an effective state capacity were further reduced as several African independent states, from inception, relied

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1 The OAU motion on the mutual respect of existing borders was rejected by Morocco (occupying and claiming Western Sahara) and Somalia (with irredentist claims over Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, Djibuti and Kenya).
heavily on mineral revenues and overseas aid for their own financing, that is, they became dependent upon ‘unearned income’. This dependence had important consequences since “unearned state income derives from few sources, requires little organisational and political effort to collect, and involves little interaction between the state (civilian) apparatus and the mass of citizens” (Moore 2000: 12). Contrary to what happened in Europe, where modern “states were constructed in the process of earning an income” (Moore 2000: 3). African polities were spared the burden of establishing functioning bureaucracies for purposes of systematic taxation and they thus allowed a growing gap between feeble public institutions and their populations to develop.

Relatively few exceptions to the rule of state ineffectiveness could be found on the continent, from the soundness of democratic Botswana to authoritarian experiences such as that of Rwanda, where state institutions were comparatively so well-established they could lead and implement the dramatically quick and systematic killings of the 1994 genocide.

In many countries, the very internal legitimacy of the state remained extremely poor and did not help the establishment of strong institutions. Inherited from the colonial experience, to most Africans the modern state remained an alien, distant and largely exploitative creature. State legitimacy was further enfeebled by extreme levels of ethnic and religious heterogeneity, by lasting respect for non-state authorities such as traditional leaders, and by the heinous diffusion of corruption in the public sector and of systematic predation of private resources.

The geopolitical confrontation of the Cold War partly concealed the ineffectiveness of states whose regimes were propped up and stabilised through external military and financial support. Since he took power in Zaire in 1965 until the early 1990s, for example, general Mobutu Sese Seko benefited from its loyalty to Western sponsors (the United States, France and Belgium) interested in retaining stable allies on the African chess board and in economic opportunities in the mineral-rich Zairian territory.

Besides international support, however, it was Mobutu’s neo-patrimonial skills which were crucial to his riding the tiger. Rather than building an effective state authority, public institutions or command hierarchy, the essence of political power in Mobutist Zaire became economic control over a number of networks of clients, commercial syndicates and military units that dominated the different territorial areas and economic sectors (Reno 1998: 148, cfr. Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 141ff.). These networks were ably played against each other by the Zairian autocrat to remain in command. Personal control over burgeoning clientelistic distributions were central to the exercise of political
authority. A long-term shift of government expenditure from crucial sectors such as agriculture and social services to Mobutu’s presidential office provides evidence of the way the regime progressively lost interest in activities other than personally-controlled particularistic distributions (Reno 1998: 154, see Table 1 below). Compared to 1980, when about 30 percent of the state budget was allocated to Mobutu’s office, from where it would be dished out at the pleasure of the president, by 1992 this share had risen to 95 percent and only a small percentage of what was in state coffers went to the agricultural sector, with none going to social services. Little wonder that the Mobutist state became a paradigm of kleptocratic and patrimonial rule. In the process, the state progressively retreated from its citizens, at the same time as citizens tried to retreat from the predatory attitudes of those in control of a waning state.


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Civil Conflicts in Africa: the Emerging Dynamics of the late 1980s and early 1990s

Four main types of civil conflicts have torn modern African states (Clapham 1998). First, liberation wars were fought not only against late Portuguese colonialism – in places such as Angola or Mozambique, where independence only came in the mid-1970s – but also against racist regimes of countries such as Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe) and South-West Africa (now Namibia). Secondly, a number of unsuccessful secessionist insurrections followed the original experience of Katanga, from the Biafran war in late-1960s Nigeria to the ongoing conflicts in the Casamance region of Senegal and
in southern Sudan. In this latter class of civil wars, Eritrea, part of Ethiopia until 1993, stands out as the single triumphant example of an independentist movement achieving its goal. A third group of conflicts consists of reform-oriented insurrections. These include guerrilla movements that took power between the 1980s and 1990s and went on to fundamentally reform the state—such were the cases of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The fourth and final type of internal wars consists of so-called warlords conflicts, in which the main aim of the insurgents is to gain control over resources of various kind (most often mineral wealth, but also land or even the state itself). Warlords wars have produced the most brutal atrocities against civilian populations, as testified by widespread sufferings in countries such as Sierra Leone or Liberia.

The occurrence of these four types of conflict over four decades of African independence has not been even. In particular, the 1980s and 1990s marked a partial shift in the predominant forms of warfare. Liberation struggles came to an end with the Namibian independence and the transition to democracy in South Africa. Secessionist movements remain a phenomenon unlikely to disappear any time soon: in spite of the Eritrean success, fighting in southern Sudan and in Casamance remind us how difficult it is to settle this kind of disputes. Reform insurrections and warlords conflicts are the two types of conflict that have been on the rise in the late-1980s and early 1990s.

The numerous rebel insurgencies that materialised over the last twenty years generally operated in the context of widespread deterioration of state structures and weakness of public sector performances described above. Indeed, the very lack of capacity and effectiveness of many African states reflected in a loss of control over organised violence. The despairing state of the state not only increased the efficacy of rebel activities, but it was frequently among the very reasons that led the insurgents into action and gave them some legitimacy. Several new armed movements emerged, “usually originating in the countryside and often attacking across state frontiers, which have sought to contest the power of African states, and have frequently established their own forms of rule, in territories from which the control of established states has disappeared” (Clapham 1998:1).

The fragility of many African states was further exposed by the global events of 1989, which caused a waning of interest in the preservation of a geopolitical status quo. Africa became further politically and economically marginalized, as evidenced by declining commercial exchanges and aid flows over the 1990s (cfr. Callaghy 2000: 44-50). Autocrats that had previously been
propped up by their external sponsors could now be attacked and directly or indirectly overthrown, as happened to Siad Barre in Somalia, Mengistu in Etiopia, Habyarimana in Rwanda or Mobutu in Zaire.

This, as pointed out, resulted in an increase in factional as well as reform-oriented civil wars. The two, however, have produced opposite outcomes in terms of impact on state institutions. On the one side, the public sphere has been largely re-founded in countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda (albeit in this latter case, as pointed out, the state was never on the verge of collapse) and Zaire (although the reformist agenda in Laurent Kabila’s 1997 toppling of Mobutu was more rhetorical than in the other cases, and has not led, thus far, to a systematic re-organisation of state structures). In Liberia, Somalia and partly in Sierra Leone, by contrast, internal war led to a temporary disappearance or a full-fledged collapse of the presence of the state in large portions of their national territories.

In addition to lasting or renewed internal warfare, the end of the century saw the emergence of interstate conflicts of an unprecedented kind on the African continent. Between 1998 and 2000, clashes over small border areas escalated into outright war between the former allies of Ethiopia and Eritrea, with the quick deployment of some 600,000 troops from each of the two armies. The hegemonic tendency of Ethiopia over its former province and the latter’s anxiety about its status and independence reflect on an excess of emphasis over the issue of defining common borders. Also in August 1998, an international war, partly disguised as a domestic insurrection, erupted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – as Kabila re-branded Zaire – when Rwanda and Uganda invaded the eastern part of the country, on grounds of national security, and some southern countries (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, but briefly also Chad) responded by sending troops to support Kabila.

**Domestic or ‘African’ War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?**

The current wave of conflicts in the Congo combines international and domestic dimensions. The internal component, in turn, includes popular reform-oriented efforts (such were, in part, Kabila’s guerrilla takeover in 1997 and the rebellion of the Mouvement de Libération Congolais-MLC, currently active in the Equateur province) as well as violent scrambles for the control of mining areas and trade networks by ‘rebel’ groups and foreign armies.

But the DRC had not experienced any large scale mass violence for thirty years, since the Katanga crisis in the early 1960s. Nor had Africa ever seen
major interstate wars. So, why this conflict, why now, and why did it involve an international dimension? Three are the key factors that help answering these questions. First, again, the manifest disintegration of the Zairian state. Second, the emergence of a Great Lakes regional context, with region-based dynamics, interests and actors. And, thirdly, the presence of attractive and ‘lootable’ natural resources scattered on the Congolese territory.

The weakness of state institutions in Zaire was fully exposed by the end of Mobutism. The latter was the result of a reduction in patronage resources available to the dictator, his international isolation (notably between 1990-94), the emergence of civil society’s pressures for democratic reforms, and the physical problems of the Zairian autocrat. The materialization of cross-border armed movements during the 1990s owes a lot to the progressive fragmentation of the country’s political system. As the Mobutu regime confined itself to little more than the exercise of legal sovereignty, a growing gap between state and society had developed, progressively leaving huge regions in a de facto situation of autonomy. Far away from the capital and from any real control from state authorities, these regional and local autonomies became more and more evident when domestic and international resources for patronage shrunk, in the early 1990s. The military units and the mining and trade syndicates that once served Mobutu, and held his person as the single head of complex networks of clienteles, became increasingly self-directed private units operating in areas such as Kivu, Kasai or Shaba/Katanga2.

A fragile Zairian state, whose presence was hardly felt on huge parts of the country, could not easily counter any internal rebellions or external interventions. Thus, the country, which already experienced internal political instability since the early 1990s, could not avoid an escalation to overt violence from the mid of the decade. The permeability of African borders had already been exposed by guerrilla movements active elsewhere on the continent. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), for example, had operated in Sierra Leone with rear bases in Liberia; similarly, for years the Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) moved more or less without restraint beyond Zairian frontiers. Further, by the mid-1990s, events in Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda had demonstrated the potential success of guerrilla movements attacking from the periphery with the aim of overthrowing rulers with flagging legitimacy.

The second element that explains the explosion of conflicts in the Congo is the emergence of an increasingly-integrated Great Lakes regional context.

Poorly-respected national boundaries were a cause and a consequence for the development of closer and closer connections between eastern Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and western Tanzania. As pointed out, the growing regional autonomy of the eastern provinces of Zaire led to an increase in the contacts, social bonds and commercial links with neighbouring countries. “Because of the breakdown of rail and road networks”, for example, “mineral-rich provinces such as Shaba and Kasai [did] much more business with their southern neighbours than with Zaire’s domestic market. Kivu in the east has closer contact with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda than with most of Zaire” (Reno 1998: 150). Thus, informal trade networks progressively created a degree of economic integration in the Great Lakes3.

Besides business and commercial connections, important ethnic bonds existed which linked eastern Zaire with other states in the region. This was not only due to a number of kin groups living on both sides of national borders, but also to cross-border population movements that gradually increased ethnic exchanges and heterogeneity. In this sense, a special position is occupied by the large Banyarwanda diaspora which linked eastern Zaire to densely populated countries such as Rwanda and Burundi. In the mid-1990s, between 15 and 20 million Hutus and Tutsis lived in the region – concentrated in Rwanda, Burundi, the Kivus, southern Uganda and western Tanzania – of which 10-to-12 million were Kinyarwanda-speakers and 5-to-8 million Kirundi-speakers4.

3 Prior to the insecurity that spread to the region following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, eastern Zaire was commercially connected to eastern and southern Africa through trading routes that linked Kampala to Bukavu (via Goma-Rutshuru), Bujumbura to Uvira, the Orientale Province to Uganda (via Beni and Butembo), Kalemie in the DRC to Kigoma in Tanzania (through Lake Tanganika) and Lubumbashi to Dar-es-Salaam (via Zambia) (Mwanasali 2000: 140).
4 See Lemarchand (1999: 196) and (2000: 327), with partly different estimates. The first Banyarwanda came to eastern Zaire over two hundred years ago, followed by several waves of economic immigrants and refugees. A predominantly Hutu influx of manpower was promoted by the Belgians during colonial times. Then, a wave of Tutsis arrived during the persecutions suffered in Rwanda at the time of independence. Finally, a great number of revenge-fearing Hutus came when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took over power in Kigali, at the end of the 1994 genocide (Prunier 1997b:195). The Banyarwanda community in the Congo thus comprises nationals, migrants and refugees, with an internal composition that is ethnically differentiated according to geographic location: in South Kivu they are mostly the Tutsis that live south of Uvira, locally known as BanyaMulenge, whereas in North Kivu they are mostly Hutu (the BanyaMasisi and BanyaRutshuru) (Mamdani 2001:239). Hutu and Tutsi identities among Congolese Banyarwanda, however, only gained saliency in the 1990s (Mamdani 2001:235ff.). Increasingly tense ethnic relations between the Banyarwanda and ‘indigenous’ people developed mostly out of ‘economic envy’ in an area where high and growing population densities exacerbated economic competition for land (Prunier 1997b:195, cf. Cyrus Reed 1998:143, Lemarc-
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda acted as a powerful multiplier in the diffusion of conflicts throughout the region. When the Hutu authorities and the genocidaires were overthrown by the Tutsi-led RPF guerrillas, an estimated one million people fled to eastern Zaire for fear of retribution. Here, from refugee camps established near the Rwandan border, raids soon began to be launched into Rwandan territory to destabilise the newly-established RPF regime.

Between 1995 and 1996, the situation in eastern Zaire became explosive. Zairian Hutus and the new Hutu refugees allied with indigenous militias to target, kill and displace the Tutsi of North and South Kivu. It did not take long for the Rwanda to decide an intervention. A coalition of local Tutsis (known as Banyamulenge) and indigenous groups was formed and a Congolese ‘failed revolutionary’, Laurent Kabila, was chosen as the nominal head of an insurrectionist movement aimed at toppling Mobutu. The Zairian dictator was held responsible for the threat that eastern Zaire posed both to local Tutsis and to Rwanda. But the Tutsi-Kabila alliance did not last after Mobutu was overthrown, in 1997. By mid-1998, anti-Tutsi feelings began to emerge in the Congo, since Kabila, now head of state in Kinshasa, remained surrounded by Tutsi military elements and personalities. The new Congolese ruler resolved to get rid of his mentors. He accused Congolese Tutsis and Rwandan troops of start-

hand 2000:334, Mamdani 2001:242). The local Banyarwanda were politically subordinated to local chiefs, but economically better off. While, in practice, they had not been recognised as an ‘indigenous’ community with rights over an ‘ethnic area’, they had bought land through the market. Since the Zairian national conference of 1991, Kivu delegates had begun to exert pressure for a ‘selective’ application of a 1981 citizenship law which revoked citizenship rights (including land rights) from all individuals who could not prove that their ancestors lived in Zaire before the colonial period (Prunier 1997b:195). While many Hutus and Tutsis would actually qualify as ‘autochtones’ – residents since before colonial times – Banyarwanda were recognised as civic but not ethnic citizens of Congo: because they were not ‘indigenous’, they were not entitled to a Native Authority, i.e. no customary land use rights over ‘an ethnic patch of their own’ (except for the BanyaRutshuru). Banyamasisi and Banyamulenge are only recognised lower level chieftaincies, but, in spite of their claims to indigeneity, they fall in and pay tribute to other native authorities (‘collectivité’) such as the BaHunde’s. In other words, they were only accorded limited citizenship rights (which include land rights) (Mamdani 2001:237ff., Lemarchand 1999:197). The enforcement of the citizenship law was set to reinforce the political subordination of local Banyarwanda, excluding them from elective or appointive offices (Cyrus Reed 1998:143). Competition for land in one of the most densely populated areas on the continent was made more explosive by every new wave of refugees or immigrants (Lemarchand 1999:197). In particular, the 1994 post-genocide influx of refugees reversed the balance between nationals and migrants, on the one side, and refugees, on the other. Fear spread among ‘indigenous’ people and prompted their rejection of the Banyarwanda as a whole (Mamdani 2001:237).
ing violence in Goma, Bukavu and Kindu, in eastern Congo, asked the Tutsi to leave the country and started persecutions of Rwandan and Banyamulenge Tutsis in Kinshasa and in the east. For the RPF-regime in Rwanda, the safety of the Tutsi was still not guaranteed on either side of the border.

The ‘Congo War’ broke out when Uganda and Rwanda decided that their troops would enter the country in support of a new ‘indigenous rebellion’ – a remake of Kabila’s westward triumphant march aimed, this time, at overthrowing Kabila himself. The latter could not be relied upon for stopping the interahamwe’s incursions into Rwanda as well as raids into western Uganda by Sudan-supported rebel groups also based in the Congo.

The regional scenario of the 1990s made this possible. Not only the current ruler in Kinshasa lacked major international sponsors, but the disengagement of Cold War powers meant that countries such as Uganda and Rwanda were now freer to pursue their national interests and to identify issues of national security in accordance to a strictly regional logic. That the dominant scenario was a regional one was made clear by the chain of rebellions that took place in Uganda, Rwanda and the Congo since the 1980s. Museveni took over power in 1986 through a guerrilla struggle in which Ugandan Tutsis – including Paul Kagame – played a prominent role. In the early 1990s, these same Tutsi refugees-turned-guerrillas organised a Rwandan Patriotic Front in Kampala, Uganda, which, probably armed by the Ugandan military, launched the ‘invasion’ of neighbouring Rwanda. By the second half of the 1990s, it was the RPF itself, now in power in Rwanda, which sponsored the rebellion of Laurent Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL). In the case of the Congo, therefore, rather than a mere demonstration effect, there was actually an externally-sponsored and direct transmission of the insurrection virus from Uganda to Rwanda to the Congo.

Yet, there were important differences in the agendas and approaches of Uganda and Rwanda, and this did not take long to cause deep divisions. The Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, held that a protracted intervention was necessary to promote and train a genuine popular rebellion that could counter Sudan- and Congo-backed rebel movements operating in Uganda from north-east Congo, establish a more progressive and stable regime in the country, and open up the eastern Congo market area to Eastern Africa. Kigali’s ruler, Paul Kagame, was thinking of a blitzkrieg which would rapidly overthrow Kabila and establish a satellite regime – one that would allow Rwanda to control the Kivus – as a guarantee against ethnic threats. Divisions between the two countries found expression first in a split in the ‘local’ rebel movement, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratique (RCD), into a Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma and a RCD-Kisangani sponsored by Uganda, and later in direct clashes between Rwanda and Ugandan troops for Kishangani, a town crucial to the control of illegal trade in minerals. Cfr. Prunier (1999), Lemarchand (2000: 341).
The third key component of the war was the ‘archipelago of resources’ (Reno 1998: 150), available for looting in the Congo. The relevance of economic resources was probably augmented by the reduction in international (non-African) support for both regular armies and rebel insurgents. In several cases, “lacking external patronage, warring parties have been forced to develop their own means of economic sustainability” (Duffield 2000: 73-82). For Unita guerrillas, for example, the end of foreign assistance created an incentive to strengthen its control of diamonds extraction in Angola, approaching a 60-70 percent share of total output for the 1992-2002 period. Similarly, during the Liberian conflict, Charles Taylor’s guerrillas could count on some $400-450 million per year out of an illegal diamond trade (Duffield 2000: 73-82).

It is difficult to say to what extent economic benefits were part of the original agendas of Uganda and Rwanda in the 1990s. But the opportunities for profit soon became a major issue in the conflict. Since 1996 – and in particular after the invasion of 1998 – new networks were established to control and smuggle not only diamonds, gold, timber or coltan, but also resources such as arms and fuel (cfr. Lemarchand 2000: 345, and Prunier 1999: 51,55-6). Ugandan officials and the Rwandan army inevitably developed an interest in prolonging their control over precious resources and trade networks. Indeed, the political divisions between the two allies became most explosive when they combined with a scramble for the control of mineral riches by their armies or by their ‘indigenous’ rebel allies. Eventually, troops from the two armies clashed for the control of the north-eastern town of Kishangani, in 1999 and again in mid-2000.

Foreign countries which sent troops in support of Kabila, such as Zimbabwe and Angola, were also concerned with ways of profiting from their interventions. The commitment of some 12,000 troops by Zimbabwe had mostly to do with private interests of elements of the government and of the armed forces in the illegal trade of precious minerals, notably in Katanga6. Angola’s involvement in the war was partly aimed at supporting Kabila in exchange for his pledges to prevent Unita from establishing rear bases and trafficking diamonds on Congolese territory. In addition, the Angolan government was protecting the oil-rich Cabinda enclave from the possibility of a rebel or foreign takeover in Kinshasa. But even for Luanda, profit opportunities became part of the game, as Angolans set up a joint venture for petroleum extraction in the Lower Congo province and became themselves involved in the illegal commerce of diamonds in Kasai (Weiss 2000: 17).

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Conclusions

A long process of pacification, based on power-sharing agreements, formally began as early as mid-1999, but it only gained some credibility after the murder of Laurent Kabila – succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, in January 2001 – and the signing of further peace deals between the Congolese government, rebel movements and invading countries. The withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops appeared to be making progress between late-2002 and the first half of 2003.

Whether or not we are witnessing the end of the Congo wars, none of the factors that promoted the wave of conflicts of the 1990s will be easily removed. The creation of a less fragile Congolese state is likely to remain a hard political task for the foreseeable future. The recent wars may have increased awareness of the need to develop functioning country-wide state institutions and infrastructures, and, as a matter of fact, Laurent Kabila initially appeared to restore a degree of control over central institutions such as the police and the army. But years of fighting seem to have caused, on balance, more havoc, devastation and state decay rather than setting in motion any major processes of state consolidation (except, perhaps, for something akin to a nationalist sentiment of Congolese people rallying around the Kabilas against foreign intruders; cf. Weiss, op.cit.). Significant parts of provinces such as Shaba/Katanga, the Kivus and Orientale – far away from the capital and separated from the latter by the huge and forested central regions – are likely to remain eastward-looking, maintaining strong commercial and ethnic bonds with neighbouring countries. It is doubtful that Joseph Kabila will be willing and able to exert control over the threat that rebel raids originating from these areas have posed to countries such as Rwanda and Uganda. Furthermore, the Congo’s huge mineral resources – many of them also located at several hundred miles from Kinshasa – will keep attracting undue attention, as they have done uninterruptedly for the last century or so. Finally, a peace deal that legitimises rebel movements by taking them on board with vice-presidential and ministerial positions – albeit on a temporary basis – may represent an incentive for would-be-rebels to come up in the future and claim their share.
Bibliography


Part three

Security
On the Notion of Insecurity

Mario Aldo Toscano

Insecurity is the most widely debated topic in the world today. Since the time when even the earth’s best protected country was violated and its territory proved no longer immune from the social and human upheavals familiar to other lands, our collective feeling of insecurity has certainly risen dramatically.

The way we experience insecurity depends on individual as well as on general factors, both personal and cultural, subjective and objective. Still, one must admit that ‘insecurity’ is a rather vague dimension of our spirit, and that it could perhaps be more accurately analysed and more precisely defined.

It is an effort well worth making, as any possible project for building up some sort of protective system is closely connected to it. The conceptual delimitations resulting from that attempt at better analysis and definition would also determine the diversification of the protection system. There is therefore also a practical result to aim at in the process of our scrutiny.

From the point of view of our reflection, at least three distinct meanings and aspects of ‘insecurity’ must be considered for the correct interpretation of our theme:

1. Anxiety
2. Insecurity
3. Uncertainty

Those three terms, although connected to one another in their destabilizing transitions of negativity, -the prefix ‘in-‘ being equal to ‘not’, of course – are variously evocative, as they refer to substantially different concepts. In other terms, they introduce worlds, or introduce us to worlds which cannot be wholly homologised, however closely related and relatable to one another they appear.
1. Anxiety

Its immediate referent is the world of the individual self. Common parlance describes this state of mind as ‘not being at peace with oneself’, where the heart is pervaded by a tormenting tension originating from sources of all kinds, which destroy mental peace.

It is precisely the blurred nature of the relatively indistinctive and multifarious causes of anxiety – which does not become less impervious to treatment, however many new names we find for it, like stress, alienation, worry and so on – that prompts us to put the whole topic under the main heading of the existential human condition. By this latter we mean the perpetual conflict between thought and material resources, between the imagined and the possible, between knowledge and destiny, or even, as is more frequent in oriental cultures, as the incommensurable gulf of discontinuity between mind and body.

Obviously, here it is not just human beings that are called into question, but humanity from all times. This is a point worth stressing because anxiety may be more or less pervasive, more or less profound according to circumstances, but it still remains historically determined and yet somehow outside history –i.e., meta-historical – having always and everywhere existed among people.

Humanity owes to anxiety a number of effects and influences at many different levels, art and science, power and conquest, renunciation and contribution, mysticism and sanctity.

In our framework, anxiety is mainly a problem of the individual: the world of self is eminently idiosyncratic, however open it is to all kinds of social relationship.

Thinking in terms of defence from it, anxiety as a problem of the individual requires a number of salvation paths –real or fictitious, as it may be - that depend on personal choices. With a few possible generalisations: a child’s anxiety finds appeasement in its mother’s loving care; the adolescent’s in the warm companionship of the peer group; the adult’s anxiety can be assuaged in private philosophy or religion.

It is at this point that Saint Augustine’s great paradigm presents itself to our mind. As is well known, one of the greatest dicta in the literature on anxiety is the line from his Confessions “inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te, Domine” (restless is our heart until it finds rest in Thee, o Lord).

Of course oriental religions teach various ways in which we can overcome anxiety and attain the state the Greeks used to call ataraxia, of spiritual restfulness and serenity. But it should be remembered that Greek philosophers in-
cluded among the aims of philosophy as a mode of religion the quest for human harmony with god, with the self and with all other beings.

Many secular routes have also been devised and practised, especially in modern times: psychology and psychoanalysis have developed into actual systems of ‘soul administration’ and are in greater and greater demand from crowds of individuals in the ‘advanced’ or affluent countries.

To summarize: anxiety as deprivation of inner peace has been known to people from all periods and regions of the world. It has driven them in many directions in their quest for remedies, even outside the subjective domain — as far as generalisation is possible — mainly towards philosophy, religion and science.

2. Insecurity

The reference here is the world of institutions and of one institution particularly, the State.

As is well known, the whole theory of the modern State is based on the expectation of security the individuals can attain as members of that particular State. Thomas Hobbes is a formidable thinker, always praised for the incisiveness of his lesson on the nature of the modern State destined to guarantee its citizens first of all security against the ever present external and internal threats.

We can say, at this point, that institutions, as structures for the stabilisation of time, announcer of unpredictable future developments — assume security as the foundation of their own constitution, in the fashion of a collective enterprise. Thus, the State shares in the nature of institutions, whose character it reproduces and emphasises, to emerge as the fundamental remedy against collective insecurity.

In modern times the concept of security has widened so much that it now encompasses the issues concerning the Welfare State and the various versions — more or less strong or emotionally involving — as we often say — of the Social State. The State has thus taken upon itself — in the course of time — the protection of the individual, guaranteeing not only his/her liberty from external and internal menaces, but also accepting as public duty the safeguarding of their health, safety at work and dignity in old age. Social and citizenship policies tend to fill with more and advanced meanings the promise of internal security, threatened, so to say, not by other people, but by misfortunes themselves. In this respect, security falls in the steps of insurance policies and ends up by becoming itself a global insurance. Clearly, the welfare state can only exist for the few and it usually goes hand in hand with the wealth of the nation.
External security can be guaranteed in several ways: through agreements, treaties, unions, all the apparatus of more or less peaceful relations that history has proposed. Unfortunately also through war, and today, even preventative war.

Naturally, there is no such thing as an absolute guarantee of security, external or internal: and very often the political battle is fought on the degree of security those in charge of the State are, or are not, able to offer. Moreover, even the most restrictive version of security cannot be interpreted as the sheer safeguard of the citizens’ safety, but rather as a system for the defence of their rights and duties, that is as a global legal system. On this regard, it must be said that when we speak of confidence in the institutions, of their credibility and efficiency, we are ultimately speaking of the quantum of actual security a State is able to provide within the limits of its historical circumstances.

3. Uncertainty

What is concerned here, from our point of view, is, ‘simply’, the world. ‘World’ is both a difficult and a slippery: entity: it designates a whole group of elements that are both objective and subjective, all converging towards to diminish ‘certainties’ somehow inherited from the past or from more recent traditions.

The catchphrase could be here: all is under debate. Ethics is under debate, science is under debate, and so are economics, politics, society, and therefore the family, education, jobs, national health, and so on.

We could enlarge the concept of narrative, and say that the great narratives are failing or dead. Even the once so useful distinction between nature and nurture seems to have become doubtful.

The world as Kosmos, i.e., as a well ordered world, regulated by a set of rules ensuring some sort of normality, however problematic, is rapidly regressing towards its chaotic origins: back to Chaos, in fact, the foaming broth not yet touched by Nomos. The rate of internal risk that menaces the world is increasing enormously. And we should not forget that most irreducible and constant factor of risk is Man. We are our own threats.

A defence system against uncertainty should obviously be equal to the amplitude of the phenomena to be faced. Except that here one is confronted not just with identifiable subjects, but rather with whole epochs and with the powerful constituents of history.

Habermas, Bauman, Giddens, Beck, to mention only a few among the most relevant authors, all underline the ‘risk of the world’, breakable into many intermediate risks: and it this possibility of subdividing risk that enables
us devise a policy of defence to be implemented locally as well as globally. The procedure is hard to realise because the intersections among countries, emphasised by globalisation, demand that joint decisions be wide and comprehensive in the highest degree.

At this point we have to acknowledge the existence of a crisis within a crisis: that is the crisis of the organisms that used to prefigure a useful —albeit imperfect — form of world government. The responsibilities of unilateralism are grave, and certainly questionable also from the point of view of a defence ensured exclusively for one country and —what’s more- for one people.

The question is whether the complexity of the world is now such that salvation can only be the result of a collective decision, which entails the necessity of powerful, multilateral agreements.

The conceptual dimensions we have pointed out and their semantic references, obviously represent as many levels for reflection, indeed they are a methodological introduction to the general investigation. They cannot be considered in isolation, except in the course of testing the typologies within a complex, simultaneous reality. Anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty constitute a continuum and a circuit, with their own perfectly predictable back-references and intersections. The problem remains that reaction modules can vary and that the modality of action must be different depending on whether we are dealing with the world of the Self, or with the world of the institutions (and particularly with the state), or ‘simply’ with the World.

In this brief illustration of a field in which further interpretive tools and methods are obviously needed, no mention was made of war: war looms upon us. We talk about it and will go on doing so. Personally, we are convinced, for reasons both ethical and vocational – sociology as such rejects war! – that the laborious re-creation of the world which is born each day and each day reproduces its diversity pouring it into a plurality of worlds, cannot contemplate the use of force as a means of solution. This is because of the elemental contradictoriness of force itself in a complex world, although in a civilising process that must give priority to all other instruments, force cannot be regarded as the very last of factors to be employed —rationally and reasonably.

Anxiety, insecurity and uncertainty: each is a step in the inquiry and quest for orientation in a world we all share in constructing.
The aim of this paper is to offer a reflection on the transformation which the concept of security has been undergoing over the past few years. The ideal starting point for such a reflection is an analysis of some recurrent problems that are currently dominating the international scenario. The security debate no longer focuses exclusively on the political borders of nation-states, but also considers individual persons and communities. In a context characterized by increasing uncertainty and complexity, it is difficult: a) to separate the production of security from the production of risks; b) to differentiate between the functions of the various ‘agencies’ set up to protect citizens and communities. Security, defining security and identifying security strategies frequently stimulate political clashes and social conflicts.

Supra-national institutions representing both states and citizens could be a valid solution, provided that security is conceived as a public asset and a collective responsibility to be pursued in a framework of legality, which derives directly from the authority of states and people.

World Disorder: Confusion and Uncertainty

Over recent years the international geo-strategic scenario has changed profoundly. From a sociological perspective, the most important features of these changes are not only the end of the bipolar order and the consequent creation of a new power structure, but rather the increase in the number of events which can change perspectives and strategies and the rate at which such radical and unexpected changes alter political priorities at all levels. This situation is mainly due to an increase in the number and diversity of the actors present on the international scene as well as an intensification of their interaction and communications.

Several sociologists of the first age of modernity (e.g. Simmel and Durkheim) noted – each with his own particular approach – that an intensification of ex-
changes and an increase in relations (and in the number of actors involved) accelerates the rate at which processes of social change are implemented, and also introduces deep discontinuities. This process now appears to be complete not only at the level of individual state societies, but also at the global level. Weber’s concept of ‘fluidity’ is fully developed in the liquid society theorized by Bauman (2000).

The current scenario has nothing to do with the stability of the two opposing alliances of the cold war period. Generated by reciprocal fear and great powers’ capability to influence thinking, the security complex (Buzan 1998) confirmed the interdependency of the two alliances which, despite their mutual hostility, nevertheless shared many common interests in terms of security. To summarize the transition to the new, more flexible, more nuanced situation, we could speak of a change from a balance of terror to an imbalance of terror in which the only constant element is terror.

Although the spectre of the nuclear holocaust has momentarily hidden its face, it has certainly not vanished. In this postmodern Middle-age of group suicides, mass murders, epidemics, recurrent genocides, proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and environmental and climatic disasters, the security concept as a phenomenon, strictly dependent on a state-centered vision of international relations – with the related conflicts – has been definitively abandoned. Even international policies which focus on national interests and the defence of the state’s sovereign autonomy have had to face problems of security – including problems of internal security – which are not exclusively attributable to other state entities and thus cannot be tackled using traditional politico-military strategies.

During the cold war, the security of a nation was measured by its offensive potential and the quantity of military installations possessed. Each state monopolized the management of such resources and the main strategies followed were top level: political control of war, establishment of balance of power – using typical tools of dissuasion and systems of alliances – and security negotiated via diplomatic dialogue and influence. Protection from threats was spread across many levels, ordered and differentiated according to the institutions concerned, and included internal, national, regional and global security.

Today symmetrical and linear conflicts are tending to be replaced by asymmetric and non-linear clashes, thus questioning the state’s monopoly on security and leading to an ever greater difficulty in distinguishing the level of involvement of civilian and regular military forces. Indeed, the terms of conflict relationships and their corresponding strategies are changing. As a strategic concept, symmetry can be understood as a struggle in which both sides
have equal strength, whereas the concept of dissymmetry refers to cases in which one of the antagonists is seeking superiority. Asymmetry is the inverse application of this concept, in which one antagonist tries to exploit its adversary’s weaknesses in order to eliminate or reduce its superiority. However, the concept of weakness acquires a new meaning in the light of the increasing difficulties we have in determining what constitutes strength and what weakness. For example, the power deriving from possession of sophisticated technology can also become a factor of vulnerability. While dissymmetry is typical of state strategies, asymmetry is more common among non-state groups.

Most of the ‘new’ conflicts being fought all over the planet using new and old weapons and even no-weapon weapons – civilian technologies, computer viruses, financial destabilization, environmental disasters and disinformation used for destructive purposes – are asymmetric clashes which combine conventional war with transmilitary and non military operations (Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui 2001). The actors involved are no longer only states with their technical-functional military apparatus, but also include warfare networks (Kaldor 1999) such as paramilitary groups organized around a charismatic leader, terrorist cells, warlords who control particular areas, organized criminal groups, fanatic volunteers, units of regular forces or other security services, as well as mercenaries and private military companies. In many cases, the distinction between political structure, civil society and techno-military forces is lost.

The loss of a clear-cut distinction leads to radicalization of conflicts. Ideology becomes a weapon – perhaps the most important weapon. Many new forms of war are merely armed aspects of a struggle conducted in the name of a specific vision of the world; expressions of an ideological, political and military synthesis, they are conducted using all available means, without limits and on all fronts.

The internal and transnational conflicts which characterized the past decade – and which still represent a significant percentage of all armed clashes – have led to the creation of particularly destructive social conditions. Indeed, the classic strategy of security and defense implemented through the reciprocal control of armaments is no longer of any great significance. It was designed to prevent wars between states by means of massive, sophisticated armaments, whereas the most recent internal conflicts have been fought using light weapons which are both easy-to-use and easy-to-hide. In wars such as these, the belligerent potential of the economy and society has a significant weight; that is activated though mobilization and transformed into effective military capacity. Key roles are also played by networks of international non-state relations (religious communities, emigrants, Diaspora groups, organized
criminal associations), by neighbouring states who support the warring parties and by ‘diverting’ the flow of international humanitarian aid to the purpose of war.

Cities play a new central role as warfare events become increasingly frequent in urban environments. Familiar environments are infiltrated by various, undefined hostile forces.

On another – equally important – level, the production of wealth goes hand-in-hand with the production of environmental and social risks. Indeed, globalization of the economy has produced a series of consequences, such as world-wide repercussions of financial crises, widening gaps between countries and regions, increases in cross-border crime, environmental risks of industrialization and the frailty in the ability of government institutions to control such risks. As a main actor in the international system, the state has to cope with a transversal, trans-legal power which creates dynamics – through the multifaceted interplay of unanticipated consequences (Merton 1936) and effets pervers (Boudon 1977) – both difficult to regulate and hard to hold in check. In addition, international instability is further increased by the actions of populations and groups destabilized by the collateral effects of forced modernization (e.g. through migratory flows which are difficult to control).

Two opposing processes are currently in progress, the first of which tends towards homogenization-homologation and the second towards fragmentation-laceration. Despite their radical difference, they are both profoundly connected. Paradoxically they are both expressions of global ‘players’, i.e. they use tools made available by technology and manage directly or indirectly to involve considerable numbers of people. Their presence testifies to the failure of the modernity project, that is the possibility of a linear process of development. According to Beck (1997), rather than one single modernity, we are in the presence of several different modernities. However, although the world is now highly interconnected, it still travels at different speeds and is still structured in differentiated temporal lanes. Technologies – or expert systems, as Giddens calls them (1990) – have altered the time-space coordinates of social life causing a time-space compression. From a political point of view, the world is simultaneously living in three different eras: pre-modern (tribal struggles), modern (wars between states) and postmodern (recent conflicts). As Baudrillard (1994) underlined at the beginning of the 1990s, we are now living in the age of recycling; forms and phenomena which we believed had been suppressed for ever may re-emerge from the warehouse of history.
Evolution of the Concept of Security

Some of the most visible consequences of these changes are the erosion of the classic distinction between internal and external security, the increased vulnerability of the civilian population, and especially the difficulty in formulating an univocal definition of security. Indeed, the concept of security has had to expand to encompass the complexity of the way in which violence changes and new threats develop and the new ways in which conflicting parties of different natures oppose each other.

Many national and supra-national institutions have already moved on from the idea of balance of forces (between politico-military powers) to accept a concept of cooperative and holistic security which considers human, economic, environmental and military security in one single context. For example, the Maastricht treaty raised the idea of security from a national to a supra-national level. Indeed, the culture of peace and security which is currently being developed in Europe is rooted in human security and the individual citizens of Europe have replaced the states as holders of the right to security. The question is no longer one of collective security against an external enemy, but rather of the multiplication of aspects of security (linked to the development of human rights) within which military defense has only one place among many.

Institutional and societal urges have also forced the concept of security to assume increasingly horizontal and democratic dimensions and to include the idea of prevention as well as intervention. This process has facilitated an escape from the strictly modern discourse focusing on nation-state context – parsed in both politico-military terms and in terms of social control – in order to embrace a social and cultural approach according to which the perception of a common destiny which links all the inhabitants of the planet significantly changes relations between the centre and the peripheries. Poverty, illness, internal conflicts and urban decline undermine the security of communities and are also considered threats to national and international security that need to be addressed.

Since the end of cold war, the concept of security has developed in leaps and bounds. Having been profoundly transformed and extended to include transborder dimensions, the security concept is now oriented towards both human and global security. Human security is distinguished from the traditional concept of security both by the fact that the threats come from both within and outside the state and by its purpose, which is the protection of individuals. Global security, which also includes human security, takes into account a set of interconnected non-military risks – economic crises, underde-
velopment, environmental decline – which cross state borders and above all are beyond the state’s powers of regulation.

The new concepts of security are associated with a more general decline of state sovereignty. On one hand, individual citizens have replaced the state as primary holders of the right to security, while, on the other, the task of producing security ‘sans frontières’ has been taken over by international institutions and organizations. Of course, this does not mean the end of states, but rather their transformation. In other words, what is being questioned is not the state as such, but the monopoly of security management held by the state or by a group of nation-states through alliances and balance of power. Many (political, diplomatic and military) factors have contributed to the decline of state, or at least its institutional monopoly over security. Among the most important factors there are:

- the development of concepts linked to the defense of human rights and the rights of minorities and the widespread condemnation of crimes against humanity;
- the continuing spread of democratic values;
- the increase in the pace of human activity and especially the flow of relationships and communications linked to new technologies;
- the impact of the mass media;
- the globalization of the economy and the presence of non-state transnational actors;
- worldwide impact of environmental problems (no state possesses suitable tools to face such problems on its own);
- great social transformations: mass migrations, revived ethnic nationalism, the international impact of militant religious fundamentalism;
- new widespread threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of new types of armed conflict, the spread of international crime and of international terrorism which make borders more permeable.

In the light of such scenarios, security studies have changed considerably. Some (Gray 1992; Haftendorn 1991) even speak of a true ‘refounding’ of the concept, based on a reconsideration of several fundamental questions regarding the existence, nature and social construction of threats and the ways in which security is implemented. This new concept of security is based on new interpretations and new uses (David and Roche, 2002). Authors from other – mainly European – backgrounds have tried to redefine the concept of securi-
ty by challenging the classic distinction between internal and external security, analysing the foundation international security practices and the significance of international discourse on the basis of social factors.

European sociological thought (e.g. Bauman 1991; Beck 1999; Giddens 1990) has played a fundamental role in structuring the debate along the lines of the risk-security dichotomy. Indeed, the analyses of European scholars highlight a fundamental aspect of security: the fact that it is a collectively constructed symbolic asset. This characteristic has become even more obvious now that the bipolar balance of power no longer exists and the single unambiguous threat has given way to a multitude of ill-defined risks. The concept of risk involves the probability of an event happening, while calculation of this probability requires a interconnected combination of expert knowledge, common sense, opinions, assessments, indicators and other objective and subjective aspects. Furthermore all risks are socially denoted. Thus security is a public asset which also has a significant symbolic value.

According to the sociological concept of security as a collective and symbolic asset, each individual is simultaneously a beneficiary-exploiter and a producer of security, called to choose not between the alternatives of security and risk, but between different – and often non-comparable – situations of risk. Thus it is important to understand the social construction of the perception and definition of ‘threat’ and the ways in which security practices can be socially accepted and acceptable.

Thus, at a theoretical level, the question is not one of trying to formulate a single definition of security but rather of analyzing how the different concepts are constructed and evolve, and how to trace a certain coherence within profoundly different notions.

The Risk-Security Ambivalence

In today’s multi-polar world, the new parameters of security are particularly complex. They regard a large number of processes and actors, all with particular needs, interests, ideologies and strategies. In this context, the nature of risk as social construct and the increasing number of situations perceived as risk put multi-faceted and unsolvable risk-security ambivalence at the very heart of the matter.

A first aspect is the fact that the expansion of the concept of security makes it difficult to fully fulfilment. The problem is further complicated by the fact that, in many situations, it is now, paradoxically, more difficult to dis-
tistinguish between security measures and sources of risk. Furthermore, public opinion is well aware of the fact that all security measures are also sources of risk: there is no such thing as ‘safe’ security.

This is far removed from the thinking of the not-too-distant past which took for granted that the security of a nation – the state and its citizens – depended on its offensive potential and the quantity of military installations possessed. Today these elements are often considered factors of risk for both individuals and armed forces. One need only think of the many decades in which we lived in fear of nuclear weapons, or of the recent controversy over the effects of depleted uranium bombs.

The difficulties experienced in identifying ‘safe’ security measures include the increase of the protection of some groups which could – in today’s fragmented society – constitute or be seen as a threat for others, and the private legally-constituted security and military companies which could be seen as a challenge to the public power and to the private companies which use their services. No-one can deny that the state security system is an important mechanism for ensuring human security from internal and external threats, yet – as many crisis situations have revealed - the same state structures can also threaten the civilian population. General insecurity leads private citizens to arm themselves. Yet the widespread carrying of arms by the population also constitutes a risk.

All human activities can be a source of threats and risks. The economy represents an emblematic case. While it is frequently emphasized that the real problem with economic globalization does not affect those involved, but rather those excluded, the increase of investments in regions on the verge of - or at - war and the consolidated policy of international aid during post-war peace-building initiatives have led to the creation of new opportunities, but also the generation of new risks and instabilities. Consequently, many resources and shrewd care are required.

Paradoxically, even the widely approved defense of human security and human and minority rights and the condemnation of crimes against humanity – a cause of great ferment among organized forms of civil society, spontaneous groups and even public opinion – can produce undesired effects. Indeed, increased social sensitivity can involuntarily stimulate new conflicts: all minorities can constitute sources of internal conflict in the name of equality, human and cultural rights and self-determination – and not only those – in the hope of protecting their ethnic and religious differences and attracting the attention and support of the international community for their policies of autonomy, regardless of the grounds upon which they are based.
For these and many other reasons, the concepts of risk and security can only truly be defined within a precise historical, political, legal, economic, cultural or social context. Furthermore, their sustainability is negotiable. Which security measures are socially and culturally sustainable in a specific society and for how long? And what is their cost in terms other than economic?

The Decline of Functional Differentiation

The unsolvable ambivalence involving security and risk is accompanied by a second important transformation: the crisis of functional differentiation. Not only have ‘politically relevant’ risks multiplied – as a result of the fact that the huge number of people involved has meant that even non-political risks produce a political effect – the number of ‘security agencies’ has also increased considerably. In the global era of ‘produced uncertainties’, one of the important changes (which mark a break with modernity, leading us to another context – post-modernity, radical modernity, liquid modernity, second age of modernity – the social sciences abound in definitions) is an erosion of the self-referencing separation between various spheres of activities. This separation, which Weber considered an important step from tradition to modernity, is today nuanced.

The fact that a large number of security agencies exists means that the large number of areas of interest covered by the new concepts involve a large number of actors, all of whom compete in the security market. New parties – governmental and non – which have never previously been involved in the problems of security have joined the fray. Furthermore, wide acceptance of the idea that the term human security refers not only to ‘freedom from fear’ but also to ‘freedom from want’ and confirmation of the so-called ‘responsibility to protect’ has meant public institutions have had to shift their focus from ‘sovereignty of control’ to ‘sovereignty of responsibility’. In addition, the range of producers of security has widened. Security policy is no longer based on unilateral foundations, but is rather the result of synergies, multi-lateralism and trans-nationality. As the need for coordination increases, communications become fundamental in managing the overlapping responsibilities of the various public, private, national, international and regional agencies.

The number of security agencies operating in various sectors of the security market is continuing to increase. Even negotiated security activities typical of preventive diplomacy or peacemaking initiatives – activities traditionally performed by political leaders or authorized representatives of states – have
begun to include ‘multitrack’ or citizen’s diplomacy operations whose key actors include governments, churches, foundations, NGOs, religious communities, citizens’ groups, professional organizations, academies, business communities and even leading international celebrities. Peacemaking in civil society is a practice which is now consolidated at international level and makes an important contribution to the resolution of conflicts. For example, the community of Sant’Egidio in Rome played an important role in the peace process in Mozambique which concluded at the beginning of the 1990s, while, in 1993, the Norwegian Labour Union’s Social Research Institute facilitated the Oslo Peace Process between Israel and Palestine. Many forms of negotiations are carried out at even more informal and basic levels in almost all areas of conflict. Even though they are often local and restricted in scope, these security operations have offered important points of departure for more widespread and far reaching initiatives. There is a copious literature on the subject.

The economy has also taken on a new role as a result of the positive and negative effects it can have on the natural and the social environments (Maniscalco 2002). Decisions on regulation of the economy and those on regulation of the environment are made with a view to creation of security. The security which is sought and constructed using economic tools is no longer entrusted only to top decision-makers. Indeed, the new concept of business sees the private sector as a responsible component of development and security; this concept is destined, according to some, to transform the role of enterprise in the community and the way in which organized economic activity is considered. A company is considered socially responsible when it spontaneously decides to contribute to the improvement of society and to the environment in which it operates. According to this line of thought, being a ‘producer of wealth’, the business world is the main device for ensuring collective well-being. As collective well-being contributes to the creation of greater security, it can bring local economies which have collapsed or are about to collapse into a virtuous circle and thus save them from falling into the state of war economies (Nelson 2000). This new concept has been in a certain sense ‘certified’ by the ‘Global Compact’ project launched by the Secretary General of the United Nations in Davos in 1999 (Maniscalco 2003).

The advocacy activities of NGOs and national and transnational grassroots movements for protection of the environment and other causes are well known. Through intense exchanges of information, these new players in the international system not only try to create forms of pressure on political decision makers, but also to transform the terms and the nature of the debate. As in many of the other cases mentioned, in this case too, the security produced
is security in the widest sense. However, the essentially symbolic and communicative activities of these actors can give important warning signals about threats which are still not sufficiently well known or included in political agendas or incorporated into public opinion (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

The mass media must also be considered builders of security. A simple communication which supplies elementary information regarding the fundamental needs of a population can have extremely positive effects in terms of collective security in humanitarian crises and help stimulate the population into reacting. The media are also considered important facilitators of widespread security during periods of post-conflict reconstruction.

Finally, it should be remembered that even the field of protection of security typically attributed to specialized bodies of the state (the sector of human security known as ‘freedom from fear’) is now being ‘cross-fertilized’ from the sphere of civil society. For example, the civil defense sector has recently been made responsible for protection from threats (including wars proper), a mission which rather than being entrusted exclusively to specialized bodies of the state, has been widened to include a contribution from the general public, who in turn are expected to make a contribution in terms of training and discipline. An original aspect of this new approach is the provision of unarmed escorts to protect threatened activists and leading figures and the protection of the headquarters of associations, trades unions, churches, etc., when at risk. These services are offered by Peace Brigades International. The use of non-violent civil defense procedures and unarmed interposition is rather limited in its application and has not always been particularly successful. Indeed, in order for non-violent action to be successful the parties involved must not have been affected by the mechanism of dehumanization. Non-violence does not work – and is therefore not secure – when one party considers any of the other parties non-human. Nevertheless, the use of civil defense techniques offers further proof of the number of the ways in which security can be understood and practiced.

The large number of concepts of security and relative ‘agencies’ involved risk extending the concept of security to such an extent as to make it ‘evaporate’. Indeed, the loss of traditional points of reference means that every social, political, economic, financial, environmental and military event risks being considered a threat. Thus it is of fundamental importance to trace the coherence between the concepts, a ‘convergence criterion’ which avoids linking everything to security and enables us to attribute a precise profile to security proper.
Security: a New Frontier for Social Conflicts and Political Clashes?

The large number of actors – each of which has different values, professional cultures and decision-making approaches – in the security market can generate problems and even create new sources of risk (Hampson 2002). Currently, following the evolution of peace operations, the situation is complicated by the fact that an arena characterized by conflict is ‘crowded’ with many actors from different areas of expertise, whose actions are based on different underlying principles. Humanitarian relief and security are ends that can be defined and pursued in many different ways according to whether the party involved adopts humanitarian or military principles.

As far as individual countries – and especially democratic countries with lively civil society – are concerned, primary risks and threats (e.g. asymmetric threats or ecological crises) may be joined by secondary problems associated with the struggle to define the risks and their causes, the identification of their hierarchical importance, the fleeting nature of the consensus offered by relative policies and the choice of the right tools to oppose them. The new forms of ‘deterrence’ still need a deep cultural and social legitimation. Such legitimation will obviously be based on a collective definition of the levels of sustainable security/insecurity offered. Protecting security in new scenarios often requires the employment of huge human, financial and material resources which must necessarily be subtracted from other areas, with the risk of subjecting the population to sacrifices and restrictions.

The political and cultural conflicts involved in the definition of risks could increase the vulnerability of democratic societies and therefore add additional risk factors. An example can be seen in the anti-globalization movements, which – in a borderless world in which time and space are increasingly ‘compressed’ – aim to prevent individuals being confronted with serious threats to human security and dangerously disrupted daily life patterns which provoke new economic, environmental, cultural, personal and socio-political insecurities. However, when taken to the extreme, the denunciations and protests of these movements may actually increase turbulence. Inspired by the aim of creation of an international system more secure and more protected from the risks of globalization, they could constitute – at least according to public opinion – a source of risk more dangerous than globalization itself.

In today’s extremely problematic scenario, the definition of risks and levels of acceptability can constitute reasons for controversy, even prior to the attribution of responsibilities and identification of lines of intervention. This is because the identification of risks and threats has become less immediate,
while security has taken on a symbolic role in the cognitive and emotional imagination of groups with different interests and concepts of reality, whose sensitivities regarding the problems of ecology, food safety and terrorism differ considerably. In a world composed of cultural ‘fragments’, the various ways of understanding security often clash. Models of security based on military defense (including pre-emptive intervention) are profoundly different from those founded on strategies of dialogue and negotiation, while both differ from ‘inclusive cooperative’ models. In such a chaotic situation, no option can be excluded, and none can be valid on its own.

Yet, it is only possible to speak of security when the whole of society legitimizes the common objective to be pursued and agrees on all the aspects of the concept, the risks to be identified and their hierarchy and the security policies and strategies to be adopted. Thus it is necessary to develop a democratic debate, a common awareness of security as the collective responsibility of the society in which we live. In order to govern the confusion and widespread conflict we need new institutions and new rules, yet in order to develop them we must first clarify our objectives and assess our values.

Multidimensional Collective Security: the Role of Supranational Institutions

A global reorganization more appropriate to recent changes and to the old and new threats needs to be implemented by the supranational institutions representing states as well as citizens directly. We have long since abandoned the idea of negative peace (absence of war) in favour of a positive concept (peace as a process which promotes stability and inclusiveness). Now we must develop the concept of security as a collective responsibility. Indeed, peace cannot be pursued without guaranteeing security; the reciprocal fears – which are self-fuelling in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion - tend to spiral conflicts towards their extreme expression.

Thus a new world order, rooted at the bottom in local communities and headed at the top by supranational institutions, could be envisaged as fundamentally characterized by the idea of cooperative strategies and limitations imposed on state sovereignty for the protection primarily of human security. It could imagine a coordinated multilevel system in which each actor feels responsible for its respective capacities and level. The concept of responsibility involves ethical components: new rules cannot be based on purely pragmatic bases, without considering moral aspects. The virtually inextricable relationship between politics – the art of the possible – and law – the art of what is
just – means that a simultaneously realistic and idealistic attitude must be adopted. Thus state interests pursued in the name of sovereignty must be considered together with the ideal values which, in the name of justice, limit such sovereignty (Moccia 2003).

Although this new scenario may seem rather utopian, there is no doubt that the quality of the challenges to be faced in the third millennium may only be effectively confronted by looking beyond traditional nation-state borders towards an institutional organization which is able to ensure participation and democracy in view of planetary issues such as collective security, human rights, social justice, protection of the environment and so on.

I believe this project, and reflections it will generate, will keep us occupied for a long time to come.

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The Return of Ethics in IR Theory

Ethics is on the rise in the field of international relations theory. In the last decade a large number of new works have contributed to debate about the norms and codes that can be and should be involved in international politics\(^1\).

The traditional absence of ethical reflection in the field is understandable since it is consistent with the predominant orientation of the field: political – and thus ethical – realism. A basic tenet of political realism is that politics supplants ethics. To assume the realist standpoint in the analysis of international relations is to adopt the posture that the political dynamics of security national interests on the international playing field contains no moral dimensions. It is neither moral nor immoral. Instead, it is a-moral. (Campbell and Shapiro 1999; Donnelly 1992; Hutchings 1992; McElroy 1992). Based upon a Weberian-inspired understanding of interest in international politics, the realist and neorealist branches of IR theory have built upon the more or less coherent conclusion that differences between opposed international entities are to be resolved based upon questions of power understood as a strategic, military and technological dimension and connected to the security of a given nation state. Indeed international politics is considered an adept device for translating the perilous metaphysics of values – be they religious, cultural, ethnic, etc. – into the universal language of military power. In other words, the essential

\(^1\) A large variety of English language works have appeared in the last six years. (Appadurai, 2001; Barkan, 2000; Barry, 1998; Bleiker, 2001; Cochran, 1999; Crawford, 2002; Doyle and Ikenberry, 1997; Finkielkraut, Badinter et al., 2000; Gasper and Institute of Social Studies (Netherlands), 2001; Graham, 1997; Gregg, 1998; Harbour, 1999; Hutchings, 1992; 1999; Jabri and O’Gorman, 1999; Lefever, 1998; McElroy, 1992; Meyer, 2002; Oppenheim, Carter et al., 2001; Robinson, 1999; Seckinelgin and Shinoda, 2001; Segesvary, 1999; Shaw, 1999; Smith, Hazel, 2000; Smith, Karen Elizabeth and Light, 2001; Sutch, 2001; Thomas, 2001). For a critical review of recent literature see Walker (1994).
differences between states may derive from metaphysical value differences, but they are negotiated on the secular field of international politics.

This paper focuses less on the debate concerning ethics of international relations understood as a question of the consequences of adding ethical reflection to the theoretical debate. Rather it seeks to develop the argument that international relations theory – and security – is already an ethics, already profoundly linked to an ethical position and an ethical debate.

Ethics and International Relations: Endogenous or Exogenous?

Already some ten years ago, R.B.J Walker reflected upon the growing canon of literature on ‘ethics and international relations’, affirming its importance while at the same time making a crucial observation about its constitution. ‘I am concerned primarily’, he noted, ‘with the extent to which so much of the literature is informed by the highly problematic assumption that ‘ethics and international relations’ is the name of intersection, a junction between two separate areas of disciplinary inquiry’ (Walker 1993). ‘Ethics and international relations’ is indeed a meeting place, but one where two completely heterogeneous field of thought come together and interact in a way which does not disturb or problematize either one. ‘Ethics’ remains a codified set of principles and norms to be applied to any given object. ‘International relations’ remains crystallized set of assumptions and methods about the makeup of the relation between two or several states. Neither is any sense in a situation of mutation or development based upon interaction with the other. The various narratives of the one are simply applied to the narratives of the other, only to withdraw to their stable and entirely incongruous domains.

Walker responds ingeniously by questioning and re-construing both the concept of international relations as something distinct from ethics. Instead he develops an analysis considering the degree to which claims of ethics are compatible with claims of international relations, ‘the spatio-temporal articulation of political identity and community (Walker 1993: 51). In order to do so he proposes three innovative readings of international relations as embodiments of ethics. The first reading concerns the parallel trajectories of the ethics and international relations as they emerge from similar parallel states of modernity. According to this reading, the dichotomy announced in Weber’s version of modernity between instrumental rationality and value-based rationality is problematic and troublesome, though certainly not unwarranted. The second reading of the connection between ethics and international relations,
criticizes the identification of political sovereignty and thereby political community with conventional territoriality. The questions of ethical relations are, according to this model, inevitably framed in terms of the differentiation of political space. In his final reading, Walker questions the classical conception of international relations as a negotiation of the opposition between state and anarchy advanced in the 1970’s by Hedly Bull (Bull 1977). An international relation in this optic is one form or another of ‘exclusion’ of the anarchical and ‘inclusion’ of the sovereign. This two dimensional schema resists any supple ethical configuration.

In each of these three models, Walker locates a ground for the incongruity of ethics and international relations on the side of international relations. The following analysis supplements Walkers project of re-launching international relations as an ethical practice, by focusing on the political nature of ethics. In particular it will focuses on ethics as a political practice involved with security. An analysis of the ethical subject of security will begin with the already classical definitions of security, community and political agency, but will depart considerably from this model.

The Concept of Security

A certain concept of security plays a role in every aspect of life. Security is thus a fundamental notion in human affairs. Accordingly it can be analyzed across a myriad of discourses, from psychology to biology, to economics, to physics, and on. Within the field of international relations the concept has had a slow but persistent development. Until the publication of Buzan’s People, States and Fear in 1983 the concept was relatively underdeveloped. In his survey of extant literature, he points out that, at the time, most of the work on security came from the field of empirical strategic studies for which ‘security’ is the core concept. Discussions are by and large limited to measuring the limits and stability of national security (Buzan 1991: 3). Since ‘security’ is the tacit foundation of security studies, it is rarely problematized. More general studies on security institutions and their role in international relations hardly scratch the surface of this central concept.

Buzan’s book is a milestone in the sense that it opens the concept of security to a more penetrating analysis of the nature, structure, and extension of the concept. It was also the first in a long line of increasingly sophisticated literature on the nature of security, generally taking its point of departure on the over strict interpretation of security as ‘military’ security. The productive
problematization of the concept of security has become a field unto itself. Yet the most innovative contributions to understanding the concept of security has come, on the hand, from the constructivist ‘Copenhagen School’ of security analysis, itself building upon and enveloping Buzan’s earlier work (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998; Wæver, 1996; Wæver, Buzan et al 1993) and, on the other hand, the post-structuralist critique of traditional security thought (Campbell 1993; 1998a; 1998b; Campbell and Dillon 1993; Campbell and Shapiro 1999; Connolly 1991; Der Derian 1987; 1992; 2001; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Walker 1993; Weber 1995).

The fundamental originality of the Copenhagen School is double: first, and in general, it has developed and systematized the notion of security as a system of reference, based in part by the semiotic theory of Greimas. According to this approach, the meaning of security lies in the use of its concept, in the act of securitization, whereby, ‘the exact definition a criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 25). This methodology of analyzing security discourse as extended strategies of securitization redefines the concept security as a pragmatic function, as the transitive act, of ‘securitization’. Indeed in the latter years it has become more strongly construed as a ‘speech act’ carried out by a ‘security actor’ (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 40) inspired by Austin’s speech act theory.

The semiotic structure of securitization differentiates between ‘referent objects’, ‘securitizing actors’ and ‘functional actors’. A ‘referent object’ of securitization is something that is considered to be existentially threatened. In the vast majority of cases the security referent is the state, though Wæver et al. recognize that this is not necessarily the case: The makeup of the semiotic system of analysis opens for a much broader set of referent objects than is covered by conventional security analysis. A ‘securitizing actor’ is the actor who actually performs the speech act of securitization, by declaring the referent object ‘existentially threatened’ (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 36). A ‘functional actor’ is a participant in carrying out the pragmatic consequences of securitization.

The most important theoretical innovation of the securitization approach of the Copenhagen School is its differentiation between subject and object of security. The subject of securitization carries out an act ascribing security valence to the referent object. Security is never objectively given. According to the suppositions of constructivism there is no implicit, objective or given relation between the subject – the security actor – and the object of securitization. Rather this relation is constructed intersubjectively through social relations and processes (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 30-31).
Wæver et al. underscore that the constitution of the ‘securitizing actor’ is problematic. By isolating or ‘identifying’ any given actor as the unique securitizing actor runs the risk of rendering invisible the social or institutional setting from which that actor ‘securitizes’: ‘How to identify the securitizing actor is in the last instance less a question of who performs the speech than of what logic shapes the action. It is an action according to individual logic or organizational logic, and is the individual or the organization generally held responsible by other actors? Focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act is probably the best way to identify who or what is the securitizing actor’ (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 40).

The main axis for identifying the subject of security is fundamentally intersubjective. It is based on the movement of meaning and perception between the individual and the social setting. But the identity of the securitizing subject, securitizing actor, the author speech act lies in the ‘organizational logic’ of the speech act. I firmly believe that Wæver et al. have correctly identified the locus of the ethical subject of security in the logic of the speech act. Yet in what follows I wish to pursue the hypothesis that this level of constructivist approach is ultimately too narrow, precisely because this ‘organizational logic’, like the subject itself, is not neutral, not objectively given. Rather it is itself organized and structured by the uneven relations of power implicit in the categories of individual, group, state and society. By taken the individual embedded in itself organizational logic as a given, we miss the ethical nature of the subject.

To reiterate the assumption with which I started this paper: the ethical is not some endogenous property of the subject. On the contrary it contributes to constituting the subject. Therefore the speech act theory of securitization needs to be supplemented by attention to an analysis of the subject of security. The actor of security is not the same as the subject of security. What does their difference mean?

The History of the Subject

What is a subject? What does it mean to say that the subject is ethical? Michel Foucault (1926-1984) would certainly agree that a securitizing actor is the subject of its securitizing speech acts. The environment in which the securitizing actor acts is however much more complex, multi-layered and composite then that theorized by the speech act theory of security. The lacuna in the speech act theory revealed by a Foucault-inspired history of subjectivity is
that, while the actor of the speech act is characterized by its ability to deploy power – military, social, economic, environmental, etc. – in the name of the security of its object referent, that actor is itself the effect or product of power and the result of its ethical constitution.

Foucault’s general project is to return the traditional philosophical question: ‘what is thinking?’ He does so by asking what the conditions of a possible relation between the subject of thought and the object of thought actually are.

“The question is to determine what the subject must be, to what conditions it is submitted, what statute it should have, what position it should occupy in the real or the imaginary in order to become a legitimate subject of any given knowledge. In short, it is a matter of determining its mode of ‘subjugation’, for this is obviously not the same depending on whether the knowledge in question takes the form of a sacred text, an observation of natural history or the analysis of the behavior a mental ill individual”.


The history of the subject is the history of its experience of itself as subject. Experience – be it the experience of insecurity and security – must also be understood in a relatively broad sense as ‘the correlation, in a culture, between domains of knowledge, types of normativity and forms of subjectivity’ (Foucault 1994e: 540). Foucault’s work allows us to ask the question What are the conditions under which a subject of security relates to itself. What are the procedures by which the subject can observe itself, analyze and understand itself? (Foucault 1994a: 633). The speech act theory of security, valuable in its own right, brackets the entire question of the way in which the very subjectivity of the securitizing subject is constituted by its relation to power and to the ethical.

Foucault’s project can be divided into three simultaneous genealogies of the subject, separate but interrelated. The first is a historical ontology of humans in relation to the truth, which permits us to constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge. The second is a historical ontology of humans in relation to a field of power, permitting us to constitute ourselves as actors in relation to others. This is the genealogy we have been considering so far, as it relates to the political subject of security. The third genealogy is a historical ontology of our relation to morality, which permits to constitute ourselves as ethical agents (Foucault 1994b: 393).

Foucault draws our attention to the fact that power circulates in all aspects of our lives. In particular he draws our attention to the fact that power
also circulates in our conceptualizations of power. Parallel to the re-insertion of power in the analysis of the subject of security, Foucault gives us the means to understand the implicit ethical nature of the subject in general and the subject of security, in particular. Whereas Kant opened our eyes to the relation between rationality and power, Foucault makes possible the insight that the organizational logic of securitization is, by its very rationality, already caught up in a power struggle. For Foucault, the essential questions of the subject preceed from the determinations of power, knowledge and ethics. It is a question that concerns implicitly and explicitly all theories of international relations: What is power?

The Concept of Power and the Security Subject

Cleary, this question of power is operative in virtually all of Foucault’s writing. In his late work, however, he begins to engage a more direct analysis of the notion of power in terms of the history of the institutions that make up the modern state. In The Will to Knowledge (1976) describes how he understands power as resisting common political institutions, in particular those that characterize more or less completely the concept of power used by IR theory. Power, he suggests, should not at all be understood as the institutionalized rules that are commonly called state power. Nor should it be understood as a systematized domination of one group against another. For this reason one must not begin, as do the vast majority of theories of international relations, by postulating the state, or the general juridical ‘forms of law’ or ‘general domination’ as the basis for the analysis of power (Foucault, 1976: 121). Instead, power should be understood as:

“…the multiplicity of relations of force that are immanent in the domain in which they are exerted and are constitutive of their organization; the play which by the way of struggles and incessant confrontations transforms them, reinforces the, inverses them, the supports that these relations finds in such a way as to form chains or systems or, on the contrary, the gaps and contradictions which isolate them from each other, and finally, the strategies in which they take affect and whose general design or institutional crystallization forms a body within the state apparatuses, in the formation of law, in the social hegemonies”.

(Foucault 1976: 121-2)

According to Foucault it makes no sense to search for the key to power in a central, sovereign anchoring point, one which organizes some hegemon-
ic set of sub-powers. There is no radiating center of power, which could be seized and analyzed. There is no base of power, or rather the base is a moving set of relations, from which emerge, local, heterogeneous, indefinite powers.

“Power is everywhere. It is not that englobes everything. It is that it comes from everywhere. And ‘the’ power, in the sense that it is permanent, repetitive, inert, self-producing is merely the effect of the ensemble”.

(idem)

In Foucault’s eyes, power thus resists all forms of categorization, compartmentalization, instrumentalization, institutionalization, etc. Power is not a thing, nor a substance. It is a matrix of domination. It is not something, which can simply be seized or taken, shared and transmitted along the channels of objective communication.

More importantly for the question of security and the subject of security, power is never exterior to other forms of relations, not even to those that are customarily taken as the objects of the social, human and political sciences. Power, in other words, is intrinsic to economic processes, to knowledge, to social and cultural associations and to sexual relations. All these objects of study, of cognition of understanding are, according to Foucault, already effects of power. The conundrum of all human subjects is that power precedes all objects of human experience. By the same token, all power arises from the ‘grass roots’. Power is not simply applied from a central source.

Indeed the opposition between oppressor and oppressor is, in Foucault’s optic, a false one, since power cannot simply be directed from one ‘place’ to another. Instead, multiple relations of force form and play themselves out in different mechanisms of production, in families, groups, and cultural organizations. Power relations can thus never be entirely intentional, never entirely objective (Foucault 1976: 123).

The Ethical and Security

Foucault’s conception of the ethical is closely connected with his general project of working through the history of the Western subject. As we have seen above the subject is constituted through its relation to power. Similarly the ethical nature of the individual, collectivity or organization is constituted by its ethical understanding of itself. When we say ‘ethical subject’ we refer to not to a traditional system of morality, ready-made norms and principles of right and wrong, suited for application to any arbitrary situation. Foucault differ-
entiates between ethics understood as the deployment of moral codes and rules, which are imposed externally, and the attitude one has toward oneself. It is the relation to oneself which determines the ethical nature of the subject. Thus, when asked in an interview whether his *History of Sexuality* contained an ‘ethical concern’, whether it was trying to tell people how to act, he responded:

“No. If you understand by ‘ethical’ a code, which would tell us in what manner we should act, then of course the *History of Sexuality* is not an ethics. But if by ‘ethical’, you understand an individual’s relation to itself when it acts, then I would say what it tends to be an ethics, or at least, or to show what could be an ethics of sexual behavior. It would be an ethics that would not be dominated by the problem of the profound truth that governs the reality of our sexual relations”

(Foucault, M. ‘Une interview de Michel Foucault par Stephen Riggins’, in Ewald, F. and Defert, D. 1994, IV: 536)

According to Foucault, the *ethical* nature of the subject was a key to its relation to truth about the world. Access to experience and knowledge were ethically determined. To be immoral was implicitly understood as a hindrance to true experience and true knowledge. Before Descartes one could not be impure or immoral and possess truth about the world. Descartes’ contribution was to show that demonstrate that immorality was not relevant, that the ethical nature of the subject – the relation to self in view of moral norms – did not determine knowledge. The rationality of proof was sufficient (Foucault 1994b: 410). This rational proof however remained a phenomenological one, an individual experience of rationality. Kant took the ethical subject further, postulating a kind of universal subject, or rather, defining knowledge as a universal aspect of rationality, detached from ethical consideration.

Foucault develops his thinking on the ethical nature of the subject toward the end of his life, in his lectures and writings surrounding the publication of the second and third volumes of the *History of Sexuality*.

The word of the Delphic oracle: “Know thyself” is, despite its force in traditional histories of philosophy, *not* the real guiding key to Western self-consciousness. The more relevant question is not how to know oneself, but rather

2 Both *The Care of the Self* (Foucault, 1984b) and *The Use of Pleasure* (Foucault, 1984a) appear in 1984. Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, re-edited as *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (Foucault, 2001) develop the same themes, as does the planned general introduction to the 3 final volumes of the *History of Sexuality*, (including the unfinished *Avowals of the Flesh*), ‘The Use of Pleasure and the Techniques of the Self’ (Foucault, 1994e).
what to do with oneself, what actions are relevant in order to maintains one’s identity (Foucault 1994c: 213). It is not the fact that espionage against one’s homeland is generally considered to be wrong, which constitutes the ethical subject, it is one’s one relation to oneself which is ethical. The ethical subject understood as relation to self has evolved vastly through Western culture.

This ambiguity lies closer to the surface in the term ‘ethics’ (‘la morale’). By ‘ethics we understand, on the one hand, a set of values and rules of action, given to individuals or a group by different kinds of prescriptive mechanisms like the family, schools, the Church. On the other hand, however, we understand the actual behavior or reaction of individuals or groups to the values and rules given. Foucault continues:

“One is thus designating the way in which they submit more or less completely to a principle of behavior, in which the obey or resist an interdiction or a prescription, in which they respect or neglect un set of values. The study of this aspect of ethics must determine comment and with which margins of variation or transgression, individuals or groups behave in reference to a prescriptive system which is explicitly or implicitly given in their culture and of which they are more or less clearly conscious”

(Foucault, M. ‘Usage des plaisirs et techniques de soi’. in Ewald, F. and Defert, D. 1994, IV: 555-6)

In Foucault’s understanding of the ethical and the subject, the ethical subject constitutes itself not by precisely carrying out the code of conduct prescribed by one authority or another. The subject constitutes itself, becomes itself through its reaction to the code of conduct, through its particular adhesion, partial resistance, variation and mutation. Given a code of conduct, there is clearly a multiplicity of possible ethical reactions to it, a multiplicity of modes of ethically experiencing it, through sympathy, aversion, etc. Foucault calls these differences the ‘determination of ethical substance’, that is, ‘the way in which the individual constitutes one part or another of itself as the basis, as the ‘raw material’ of its ethical conduct (Foucault 1994e: 556).

The panoply of difference also determines the ‘mode of subjugation’ of the ethical subject. The degree of harmonization between the code and the subject is the measure of the dimension of power necessarily in place in order to subjugate the subject. It is the measure of the resistance of the subject to conformity to the code, the degree of contrariety to the will, collective or individual, of the subject. It is thus in this sense also the measure of the ‘ethical labour’ which the subject is forced to perform on itself in order to render its conduct in conformity with the code (Foucault 1994e: 556-7).
Lastly, this difference, this space of variation between a given set of codes or values concerns what Foucault calls the ‘teleology of the moral subject’. Any given ethically determined act may seem singular, but it is in effect inserted into the ensemble of values and rules that constitute the code. A single ethically determined act is also an element in the evolution of the ethical code. It marks the continuity and durée of the ethical subject. It tends toward its own fulfilment in the sense that through its fulfilment the constitution of the ethical conduct, which leads the subject to behave in one way or another, also contributes to the future determination of the essence of that subject – to its always new constitution (Foucault 1994e: 557).

The Traditional Meaning of Power and State Sovereignty

The relation between power and state sovereignty is the object of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France during the academic year 1975-76, approximately simultaneous with the publication of the first volume of the *History of Sexuality*, which we cited above. The lectures are edited as ‘One Must Defend Society’. In his ‘Résumé of the lectures, Foucault, poses the central question of his teaching and research of that year: ‘How has war (and its different aspects, invasion, battle, conquest, victory, relations of victors to vanquished, pillage and appropriation, upheavals) been used as an analyzer of history and, in a general way, of social relations?’ (Foucault 1997: 243).

The starting point and red thread of the entire analysis of ‘One Must Defend Society’ is a questioning of the conventional notion of what he calls the juridical model of sovereignty. The implicit assumption of this model is canonical and well-known: the individual is regarded as the subject of natural rights and a primitive empowerment. This basic power is the seed of the power of the modern state such as it is conceived in the Renaissance. According to the classic concept the state is the repository of law, and law is the fundamental manifestation of law. Standard analyses and histories of the state take the concept of power as a given. Foucault’s project is to open the concept of power, to explore and draw out the consequences of its many facets, layers and aspects. Foucault’s genealogy of the state thus takes up the analysis of the tacit relationship between power and the subject outlined above:

“One must try to study power, not by starting with the primitive terms of relation, but with relation itself, since that is what determines the elements for which it carries consequences: rather than asking of ideal subjects what they have re-
nounced of themselves or their powers in order to be subjected, one must seek out which relations of subjection can create subjects”

(Foucault 1997: 239)

This way of analyzing the state is in conformity of Foucault’s general strategy for studying the subject and subjectivity in general. The political subject of the state is not taken as an a priori. Rather the subject is seen as an effect of an effect of power, a byproduct of the relations of power. Power always precedes the subject. Power is never simply a creation of the political subject, much less its political instrument. There was never a power-free subject that served as the origin of power, the creator or even the first user of power. However just such a conception of the state dominates political history and political philosophy, exemplified by the Hobbesian model of state sovereignty. It is Foucault’s intention, in ‘One Must Defend Society’, to retell the history of the state in terms of the history of the subject.

‘Politics is War Continued by Other Means’:
The Alternative Reading of the History of the Subject

Sovereignty, law and power

In Foucault’s eyes, political history and political philosophy are centered upon a presumed identity between sovereignty and power. This theoretical assumption dates to the Middles Ages when, in Western societies the development of legal thought was naturally attached to the monarch. By the same token, power is essentially royal power. This constellation of power, law and monarchy was, according to Foucault the consequence of the ‘reactivation of Roman law’ in the mid-Middle Ages (1997: 23). Accordingly, legal theory has since that time had one central aim, namely to secure the legitimacy of power. Law and sovereignty work at the service of each other. Theory of law works out the theoretical legitimacy of the state and, inversely, the sovereign legitimates legal theory. The consequence is a kind of categorical stronghold or paradigm: the only legitimate form of legal reflection is that which reduces all forms of force or domination to the logic of sovereign power, either in terms of sustenance of the status quo or in adversary form. Consequentially all forms of domination are inevitably reduced to one form or another of sovereign power. As we shall see, it is precisely Foucault’s project to separate these two domains, to rediscover the concept of power as domination not centered in the circle of legitimacy and sovereignty.
Ascending-descending power

The exemplification of this model of sovereignty is, of course, the *Leviathan*. The theoretical motif of the Hobbesian state, which has essentially dominated political realism to this very envisages the sovereign as an idealized concentration of power equated with legitimacy. Through the philosophical support of juridical systems of the type just mentioned, all power, and all conceptions of power are conceived as referents of the sovereign. All power is channeled into a closed economy with the sovereign, either flowing to it or from it. Foucault’s project resists this closed and bi-directional model of power. The ‘body’ of which Leviathan represents the concentration is, according to Foucault’s reading, a polymorphic composite of power. Power, according to his conception, does not flow in linear ways through the state. Rather it circulates through and around different groups and individuals, not simply aligning them with the sovereigns logic of unified power. As Foucault puts it, ‘Power transits through individuals. It is not applied to them’ (1997: 26).

The subject-subject cycle

According to the theory of sovereignty that dominates European political history the political subject, the subject of sovereignty – and thereby the subject of security – is part of a cycle of subjectivity. A political subject is, in line with the norms and values of the European Renaissance and the European Enlightenment an individual is naturally endowed with certain rights and principles, yet these rights and principles are only coherently understandable within the framework of power linked to the unified sovereign. The state, in turn, is organized in a vast multiplicity of political powers. Such powers are, however not properly political, but rather what Foucault calls ‘capacities, possibilities, an authorities’ all integrated as moments in the general unity of power. This unity takes the form of the sovereignty within the original framework of legitimacy. The constitutions of the political subject is therefore a kind of cycle: from sovereign subject to individual subject, all as part of one and the same legitimization of law and legalization of power. This cycle itself is considered by Foucault as ‘primitive’. It seems impossible to conceive of any organization of power that precedes it, that is more fundamental or more original.

Oddly enough, Foucault’s opposition to the Hobbesian model is not base on a theoretical reason, but rather an empirical effort. In his archival work Foucault uncovers a fundamental political sub-culture in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth, what he calls a ‘new mechanics of power’ (1997: 32), featuring a social organization, which circumvents the traditional conception of
sovereignty. While this is not the place to present this material, it makes for extraordinary reading. Foucault’s theory of subjectivity is thus based on a largely empirical demonstration of the failure of the Hobbesian model of sovereignty. Foucault is clearly of the conviction that this conception of power and subjectivity is incorrect. However the remarkable rigor of his project lies in the fact that he uncovers a mutation in the model which would ordinarily empirically disprove the theory of sovereignty.

“In sum, one must get rid of the model of the Leviathan, the model of an artificial man, who is at the same time an automaton, equally artificial and unitary, who envelopes all real individuals and whose citizens would be its body, but whose soul would be sovereignty. One must study power beyond the model of the Leviathan, beyond the field delimited by legal sovereignty and the institution of the state. It is a, rather, a matter of analyzing it starting from the techniques and tactics of domination”.

(Foucault 1997: 30)

**Conclusion: The State and the Ethical Subject of Security**

While the speech act theory of security teaches attentiveness to the object of security and to the dynamics of reference that connect security actors with objects of securitization, the Foucault-inspired approach underscores the multivalent nature of the security actor as an ethical subject.

The approach to security has been widened along two axes, adapted from Foucault’s history of the subject: power and the ethical.

The analysis of the subject of security in terms of power shows that security subject is not a simple agent of power, that power is not simply an instrument of the subject. The subject of security is already the effect of power, already involved in a flux over power, which precedes it and determines it even while it is trying to manipulate the field of power for its own protection. This understanding of the subject of security rejects the notion of state sovereignty as the fundamental category of security concerns. There is little innovation in the claim that the sovereign state as the most relevant object of security has been weakened. This analysis has suggested that state sovereignty is not the most relevant subject position from which to securitize.

The analysis of the subject of security in terms of the ethical has confirmed the relevance of ethics to security studies, but in an unexpected manner. By innovating the understanding of the concept of ethics according to the mod-
el proposed by Foucault, we can see that there was never a question of that
the ‘new ethics’ in international relations is only ‘new’ if one accepts the no-
tion they were never intrinsically related. Yet we have shown that the ethical
is deeply constitutive of the subject in general and the subject of security in
particular. Understanding the ethical subject of security as a function which
resists fixed categories of ethics and of power in an age when these categories
are more complex than ever, helps us to have gain a clearly picture of the dy-
namics of security in our age.

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Fighting Terrorism – A Narrow Path Between Saving Security and Losing Liberty

Berthold Meyer

Striving for Security and the Problems of Risk Assessment

This contribution will concentrate on the difficulties facing democracies which seek to preserve both security and liberty in their fighting against terrorism. But before addressing this, it is necessary to make some remarks on the human striving towards security in principle. The desire for security is a universal human characteristic (Kaufmann 1973). Understood as the pursuit of safety measures against an unpleasant natural environment, as well as against other, unfriendly human beings, security efforts have given important impulses to the whole “process of civilization“ (Elias 1977). But it was only during the 20th century that “security” became the symbol of a social value, especially in the rich, mostly democratic states of the North.

In this connection, the German social and political situation demonstrates peculiarities, which might derive from the German language itself. In German, the word “Sicherheit” means not only security but also “safety, reliability, certainty, and carefreeness” (Kaufmann 1973: 149). Each of these elements of meaning is connected to the others. The loss of any one of these elements makes the remaining “Sicherheit” seem “false”. It is, therefore, quite obvious that transient phenomena of insecurity are rooted in diverse causes.

The conjunction of a “seemingly evident unambiguity” and the “vagueness of the informative content” give the term “security” an enormous potential for “emotional appeals” (Kaufmann 1973: 32). Because of this, the term became the “point of crystallization for extremely different associations” (Frei 1977: 13). The perception that a relatively comfortable situation might deteriorate, or the mere uncertainty of its stability, produces fear. The promise of security works like a drug against these feelings, but its effect wears off when new uncertainties come into sight. By the many changes in our everyday life, as well as by the many catastrophes transmitted to us by the media, we are con-
stantly exposed to new uncertainties. This being the case, holding out the promise of security is a sure way to increase one's clientele or voting base.

Frei has drawn attention to the difference between subjective and objective uncertainty (Frei 1977: 13). In doing so, he was able to define four different levels of security and insecurity. Subjective uncertainty is caused by the fact that the future behaviour of others can only be expected, but it cannot be calculated. Objective uncertainty results from current, and even more from future, possible consequences of other people's action. Dividing both dimensions of uncertainty into high and low, Frei gains the four types: “real security”, “false security”, “insecurity” and “obsession” (Frei 1977: 20).

Fig. 1: Four Types of the Perception of Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective Uncertainty</th>
<th>Objective Uncertainty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>insecurity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>obsession</td>
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Real security prevails when the expectation of a negative event is both objectively and subjectively low, or very improbable. On the contrary, insecurity prevails when there is a very uncertain subjective chance of realistic expectation and an objectively ambiguous situation.

In the context of fighting terrorism, the two asymmetric types of security perception are more interesting: someone who thinks he lives in security, but actually lives in a “false security” either misjudges an objective danger or has chosen the wrong measures for self-protection. In actuarial terms, such a person is under-insured. Someone who, on the contrary, is obsessed by fear reacts excessively to unimportant or improbable risks. He tends towards over-insurance, i.e. his efforts for security are higher than his losses without insurance would be.

But individuals, as well as whole societies and states, run into trouble when they must decide which security measures, and how much of them, are sufficient for coping with the risks facing them. Correct risk assessments claim to predict if a negative event might occur in the future, when it might occur, and what its consequences will be. To arrive at such an assessment, it is necessary to examine past information on comparable events and their prevailing conditions, bearing in mind whether it is possible to draw conclusions for the future and which are best for the assumed danger. Someone who has a bet on
a coin toss can calculate the probability of winning, and the risk of losing, at
50 percent. But social, technological and international risk assessments de-
pend on a vast number of risk factors, with different degrees of damage.

Here is an example from our everyday life. During mass meetings, inci-
dents of crime and accidents can happen. Pick pocketing and hooliganism
take place relatively often; but it is also possible that a panic breaks out after
a fire alarm. Therefore, at large sport events, numbers of policemen, firemen
and paramedics are prepared to do their work if such an incident occurs. This
high state of alert did not prevent a terrorist bomb from detonating during the
1996 Olympics Games in Atlanta, killing and injuring some visitors, nor did
it prevent members of the terrorist Aum-sect from infecting the Tokyo sub-
way with Sarin poison. To prevent such dangers as much as possible, thou-
sands of more policemen would be needed for strictly controlling all entrances
to stadiums, amusement parks, discos and subway-stations. Otherwise, it
would be necessary to reduce the number of mass events, as well as subway-
stations, with the effect of restricting Western lifestyle and mobility.

Here is another example. In the late 1990s, the U.S. devoted billions of
dollars to a very ambitious anti-missile program, aiming at protecting the
country against air raids by “rogue-states.” It is hardly possible to judge how
effective this system would be should it ever be needed, because only a few
tests were performed up until 2001. But then September 11th came, the day
in which 19 terrorists captured four civil aircrafts from U.S. airports, threat-
ened the crews with carpet knives and steered two of the aircrafts into the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center and the third into the Pentagon. They
might have caused another disaster with the fourth, if the passengers had over-
whelmed them. Although the terrorists’ attack proved that it had made sense
to reflect on the vulnerability of the U.S.’s own continent, it also showed that
the experts had focused their attention only on attacks from abroad, while ne-
glecting the dangers originating close to home. Only after terrorists chose a
method which they could have used years or decades before, did politicians
and experts began to reflect on how to prevent attacks carried out with prim-
itive but extremely effective measures – for instance by blocking the door to
the cockpit against being opened from the passenger’s cabin.

Terrorism: Attacks on People’s Security and Liberty Needs

Not only the U.S. government reacted to the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11th. In what follows, I shall examine the particular German reactions to
terrorism, asking whether and to what extent averting the dangers to state security may be counterproductive, when the price is a strong limitation on the civil rights and liberties of those who should be protected in their freedom by the government.

Tensions between striving for freedom and for security arise in principle whenever democratic states ruled by law try to guarantee both to their citizens. However, there are important differences between the political cultures of the different states. In the U.S., the tradition of freedom has deep roots and is associated with the firm conviction that individuals themselves are responsible for their personal security; that is the reason why the 2nd Amendment to the U.S. constitution guarantees the people’s right to possess and bear firearms. This integral part of the American political culture does not reflect the European history of states and constitutions, which shows the security-promoting effects of giving the national government a monopoly on the use of force. Elias characterizes the formation of this monopoly as a path from constant individual insecurity, caused by violence during earlier phases of civilization, “to a characteristic form of security” (Elias 1977: 325). But because the monopoly on the use of force is not sustainable without control by the rule of law, it is necessary for the constitutional state to combine both. (Senghass 1997: 560-75). Therefore the constitutional state has to overcome the difficulty of balancing liberty and security, as every additional security measure necessarily narrows individual space and exposes freedom to inherent risks and the insecurity.

Terrorist attacks against democratic states are aimed at suspending the monopoly of power. They thereby try to upset the precarious balance between security and freedom. All terrorist actions are intended to gain great publicity effects. They not only want to spread fear, but also to gain the sympathy of a special part of the public (Hoffman 1998). With this intention, revolutionary leftist terrorists like the “Rote Armee Fraktion” in West Germany or the “Brigate Rosse” in Italy in the 1970s used violence against representatives of the states in which they lived. They argued that these persons were responsible for economic exploitation and political repression, but they acted selectively and tried to avoid harming innocent bystanders. They wanted to undermine and eventually overthrow the political and social order which had been guaranteed until then by the state, including – in the view of the majority– reliability and therefore security, as well as the guarantee of their political freedoms. The terrorists expected the state to try to cope with its responsibility for public order after an attack, so that the political class would “unmask” the state as illiberal and repressive and this would lead people to lose trust in the state’s willingness to guarantee their freedom. In the next phase, further spec-
tacular actions would demonstrate to the public that, despite the growing limitations of their freedoms and rights, no more security was being gained. This way the terrorists hoped to alienate the citizens from the state, gain sympathizers from among the citizens and find potential accomplices for their revolutionary aims.

As terrorist attacks are mostly characterized by an element of surprise, which intensifies the fear of follow-up actions, they directly influence the security needs of the people. What matters here is not so much the scope of the attack itself, but the sudden collapse of a situation previously perceived as quiet and safe, and the uncertainty of the risk of further attacks in the near future. Therefore such a situation of “political insecurity” seems more dangerous than others (Kaufmann 1977: 19).

Whatever purpose the terrorists had intended with their act, they force the directly- or indirectly-concerned government to react quickly and actively. Were a government to take a wait-and-see approach, it would risk that its own people, foreign states and, last but not least, the terrorists themselves would view it as weak. For this reason, a government has first to try to prevent further attacks. As a result, the immediate reactions of states are to increase the controls for gaining more information and early warning to prevent the preparation of new terrorist activities. Such security measures are aimed at enabling the people to return to a normal everyday life free of fear as soon as possible. But because absolute security cannot be attained, politicians worry about leaving gaps in prevention, because this could have the side effect of making them take responsibility for the harms inflicted the next time. Therefore politicians tend to maximize their security preparation, at the price of more restrictions on citizens’ freedoms and civil rights than are necessary for effective prevention.

The German Reactions to “September 11th”

The first reactions in Germany and other countries to the attacks in the U.S. were measures to guarantee the safety of air traffic by intensifying controls on passengers and baggage at airports, and measures to protect aircraft against hijacking. This was understandable because the airlines had to regain their extremely insecure clients. Additionally, the ministers in charge reacted very quickly by bundling legislative provisions against terrorism and trying to implement these by decree, if possible, and by parliamentary law-making, if necessary.
From September 11th, the starting positions of the countries concerned were quite different, as a sidelong glance at the U.S. shows. Because of its deep-rooted tradition of freedom, there is no obligation in the U.S. to register with the police nor to carry identity cards. Such a card will be tested for the first time during the next years on members of the army and concerned parts of the administration, and might then become obligatory for everyone. This is criticised by civil-rights activists, who see “big brother” behind these plans because all the details will be recorded on a magnetic strip of the identity card, and linked to a central data bank, to enable permanent checks on the owner’s residence.

In Germany, by contrast, we have been familiar with the obligation of registering and carrying identity papers (identity cards as well as passports) for generations; such papers have been more or less safe against counterfeiting for more than a decade. Here the Bundestag (federal parliament) already started restricting constitutional rights in connection with the emergency constitution in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the relevant laws were amended to provide against terrorism and extremism. More recently, some civil rights were restricted in order to fight organized crime more effectively. The climate was ripe for the legitimation of intrusions into people’s privacy by undermining the basic law of the inviolability of dwelling from the eavesdropping of police and secret services (“Großer Lauschangriff”), and only three months before September 11th the Federal Intelligence Agency’s rights to wiretap telephones were extended. It would thus have been reasonable to expect that Germany – as opposed to the U.S. – had no deficiency in its internal security legislation. But this was not to prove true!

Together, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the responsible ministries of most of the federal states started pinpointing suspects by means of computer data analysis involving many people (“Rasterfahndung”), which had come into the code of criminal procedure in the times of RAF-terrorism. At the same time, the federal states prepared to enlarge their police services. Exactly one month after September 11th, the Bundestag debated the so-called “Sicherheitspaket 1” (security legislation #1). On the one hand, it eliminates the privileges for religious groups which had been provided by the law of associations, in its aim to withdraw legal protection from those organizations conducting their extremist activities under the cover of religious devotion. On the other hand, it contains an addition to the criminal code (§129 b) to make it possible to punish individuals for membership in a foreign criminal organization, and provides for an increased possibility to get information from telecommunications firms on telecommunications links. All these measures
found the agreement of a very broad majority of the Bundestag, with the exception of some members of the Green Party and the PDS (left Socialists).

In the immediate wake of this new law, the Minister of the Interior Schiely (SPD) presented the “Sicherheitspaket II” (security legislation #2) to change many other laws and regulations¹ in order to:

- give greater competences to all offices responsible for internal security,
- improve the exchange of data between the offices and services,
- prevent the entry of terrorists into Germany,
- improve the measures of personal identification on visa documents,
- improve the possibilities of control at the borders and
- improve the ability to recognize extremists staying in Germany.

Some other laws like those on passports and identity cards were to be changed, especially in order to:

- improve the security examination of persons in professions and positions with relevance for interior or external security,
- create a legal basis for the placement of biometric data into passports and identity cards,
- stop the activities of extremist organizations of foreigners in Germany, and improve the possibility of using social data during the “Rasterfahndung”.

Both lists show the Federal Ministry of the Interior’s priority of providing greater authority to the security offices and services and improving their co-operation, especially their ability to exchange information. The main focus was on the control of foreigners who either wanted to travel or immigrate to Germany, or who are already resident here. But a lot of measures in the “Sicherheitspaket II” concern all persons living in Germany.

Part of this security legislation provided for introducing fingerprints, three items of biometric data, and a holography chip into the passports and identity cards of all citizens, in order to protect these documents against falsifications or misuse by persons who look similar to the owner. On December 14th 2001, the Bundestag agreed to this plan in principle only, and put off the procedural details for a later law.

¹ Namely the Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, the MAD-Gesetz, the BND-Gesetz, the Bundesgrenzschutzgesetz, the Bundeskriminalamtsgesetz, the Ausländergesetz and some regulations for foreigners staying in Germany.
The security legislation also allows the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Interior Secret Service) and the Federal Intelligence Agency to gather information from banks and other financial institutions on accounts, account-holders, and other authorized persons, as well as on the transfer of money and financial investments. These services are also empowered to collect data on the use of telecommunication links from telecommunication services. In addition, the Interior Secret Service is allowed to gather information from airlines and the postal service. Finally, the law seeks to prevent money laundering and investigate the financial transactions of potential terrorists by collecting and storing information regarding all German bank accounts in a central register (“Kontoevidenzzentrale”). This would be a serious infringement on the banker’s duty to maintain confidentiality, even if the transfer of money itself will not be registered in detail.

The opposition Christian parties CDU and CSU were concerned with the public acknowledgement of their competence in questions of internal security. Concurrently with the government’s security legislation, they filed an application to amend the constitution in order to legalize domestic operations of the Federal army (Bundeswehr) for protection of property. In 2001 they could not mobilize sufficient support for this proposal in the Bundestag. They clung to their aim, and indeed, in May 2003, the new Federal Minister of Defence, Struck (SPD), showed sympathy for such aim when he presented his first Defence Policy Guidelines, with some remarks on new ways of cooperation between Bundeswehr and the police in cases of terrorist threats. Nevertheless, there is no real chance for such an amendment to the constitution, because an application will not get the necessary two-thirds majority in the Bundestag in the foreseeable future.

**Does Security Protect Liberty?**

Anti-terrorism laws in a democratic state ruled by law only serve their purpose if they improve the ability of the state to defend itself against terrorist attacks, without excessively restricting the civil rights of the citizens. According to political theory, the citizens, in an act of sovereignty, confer the use of force solely upon the state, hence creating the state monopoly of the use of force, and have the right to be protected. Citizens understand this protection as not only the preservation of their life, which does not depend on the continuity of a given kind of functioning state, but as a democratic state with the rule of law. The value that is worth being protected is the continuity of the lib-
eral lifestyle of the state’s sovereign, the people. In the case of protection against terrorist attacks the question already discussed earlier concerning internal security is:

“how to defend the republic without contradicting the idea of liberty, without suspending civil rights: Liberality and efficiency need to be balanced in a way suitable for democracy. The defence of freedom is a pre-conditioned task: the success is predestined by the means which have to be chosen very scrupulously”.

(Leggewie - Meier 1995: 16 - translated by the author)

Neither the German Ministry of the Interior nor the Attorney General in charge of the corresponding “U.S.A. PATRIOTIC Act”\(^2\), nor their colleagues in other states, have fulfilled this demand. Moreover, they have demonstrated a behaviour typical of politicians in charge of internal security, as described by Preuss in 1989: “Whenever new problems occur, they think first about more severe punishment and enlarged authorities of the police.” (Preuss 1989: 488).

The very broad parliamentary majority in support of the first security legislation did not extend to the second one. When the Federal Minister of the Interior tried to introduce severe measures, like the planned changes in the passports and identity cards by way of regulation, representatives of the Green party spoiled this in a “coalition talk” at the end of October. Only after this was the intention pursued in the regular legislative way. After some serious considerations concerning the law of data protection, the details of changing passports and identity cards were set forth in second security legislation passed by the Bundestag on December 14th 2001. Additionally, the intention allowing the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency to start making inquiries, without any suspicion of a public prosecutor’s office, as well as the plan for refusing foreigners entry into Germany when there is a suspicion against them, found no Green agreement in the coalition. Some of the Greens’ other rejections were later softened by the promise that some of the measures would only run for five years.

Minister Schily’s draft of the Security Legislation II was criticized in the Bundestag by members of his own SPD faction, as well as by the Greens, the liberal FDP and the left PDS; outside parliament, it was criticized by lawyers, judges and also by the data protection officers of the Federal Republic and of the Federal States. The main reason for these criticisms was the fear that these laws would create the “man of glass,” i.e., that citizens would not longer

\(^2\) “PATRIOT Act” is the abbreviation of: Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.
have any secrets vis-a-vis the state. They see in this tendency a weakening of the basic law providing that citizens may autonomously determine the fate of their personal data (“informationelle Selbstbestimmung”), which the Federal Constitutional Court derived from articles 1 and 2 of the German constitution in a 1983 decision. On the other hand, the draft of the Security Legislation II was praised by the right wing of the Bundestag, especially by the CDU/CSU faction. This was no surprise: whenever it must decide between the values of security and freedom, conservatives of all factions vote for security, and likewise, only a handful of Liberals (notwithstanding the name of their political party) are prepared to follow the advice once was given by former Federal Minister of the Interior, Maihofer (FDP): “In dubio pro libertate!” (When in doubt, choose liberty! See Maihofer 1976: 83). Maihofer’s job, in the 1970s, had been to formulate the first anti-terror law including a new crime, the “formation of a terrorist association,” which would penalize a group of persons not for their acts, but only for their future plans. Maihofer had difficulties with the preventive character of this description. Therefore, he vehemently argued against a “security policy which produces stockpiles of paragraphs on suspicion as being deeply in opposition with liberal principles” (Maihofer 1976: 88).

The Security Legislation II which passed the Bundestag on December 14th 2001 is specifically intended to be such a stockpile of paragraphs, to be ready for all eventualities. At least this intention is not connected to the attempts of conservative politicians and lawyers to introduce the fiction of a basic law of security into the German discussion on constitutional law. They argue that the Grundgesetz (German constitution) would imply such a basic law (see Isensee 1984). But if it were possible for the individual to take legal action against the state in order to gain security, in the same way as he may gain rights of freedom, the state would be obliged to unlimited precautions against all kinds of insecurities. The consequences of this

“can be shown quite clearly in the right of defence against dangers: in the police law, a danger is defined as a situation in which one of the goods which are to be protected by the police (life, health, property, public security, etc.) would be harmed with ‘sufficient probability,’ without protection. Following the police law manuals, ‘sufficient probability’ may only be presumed, if and when the ‘fear that the danger will become reality’ is grounded in life experience’”.

(Preuss 1989: 489 - translated by the author)

Working on the basis of “sufficient probability” and “life experience” is like walking on shaky ground, as the events of September 11th show: Before
this day, there seemed to be no grounds for the presumption that a civil aircraft would be steered into a skyscraper with a terrorist intention. Since that day the “life experience” has to consider the risk of a repetition of such attacks, but this experience gives us no hints as to the probability, nor to the possible targets. Therefore it is absolutely impossible to determine whether it is necessary to secure all buildings higher than a certain number of storeys, by police or even by military observation posts, or whether it is sufficient to forbid flights over certain parts of big cities and to control this, to protect the supposed basic law of security for everyone living or working in a skyscraper. If the existence of this basic law is accepted, the door for an enormous enlargement of security regulations and systems will be opened.

In contrast, three examinations would have been necessary in the autumn of 2001 before law-making, in order to avoid superfluous, nonsensical or ineffective provisions in the security law: firstly, an exact examination of the security laws already in place. This would have shown that it was more important to remedy deficits in the execution of these laws rather than try to close supposed gaps in the laws themselves. Secondly, it would have been necessary to examine each single measure of the Security Legislation II before enactment to see whether it would have been suitable to prevent attacks like those of September 11th or to arrest the terrorists who lived inconspicuously in Germany as so called “sleepers“ before they could enter the aircrafts. The third would have been to try to find an answer to the question of whether such preventive laws are suitable to deter potential terrorists by the threatened punishment. This is obviously not the case vis-a-vis persons who have decided to sacrifice their own lives in the planned attack. In their view, their own death as “martyr” is eventually more important than the death of their victims. They cannot therefore be reached by measures of deterrence.

It is possible that not all of the consequences of the narrow path between saving security and losing liberty, set out by a planned law, can be foreseen. But to prevent a quasi-state of emergency from becoming a regular one, and to prevent freedom’s rights from being permanently limited, the Bundestag would be wise to limit the duration of already enacted security laws, as well as those which are still in preparation, to just two years. After the purpose of a law has ceased to exist, or after coming to realize that some measures are ineffective, freedom’s rights then can regain full validity. This will prevent freedom’s rights from being limited longer than is absolutely necessary.
Bibliography

The Global War on Terrorism is a Real War

Ian Roxborough

In the last year or two American strategists have come to make comparisons between the present global situation in which the United States finds itself, and that of the Roman Empire. The term “empire” is now widely used to describe America’s role in the global system. This is remarkable. Two years previously, the word “empire” was a taboo word in government circles. Whatever the preponderance of American military power, nearly everyone in the strategic community vehemently denied that the United States was an empire of any kind. Today, the term is freely used1. One retired Army officer, now a political science professor, recently wrote a book – *American Empire* – whose main thesis is that the US is an empire and the central policy question must therefore be: what kind of empire shall we be? (Bacevich 2002).

Two things need to be emphasized. First, the talk of empire comes as much, if not more, from the right as from the left. It has been common for the American left to use the word; for the right to use it, and to use it approvingly, is new. Second, while talk of an American “empire” is common in Europe, it is novel in the United States. It is this novelty that requires our attention.

One image that the Roman Empire brings to mind is encapsulated in the motto: Oderint dum metuant. Let them hate so long as they fear. It suggests an imperial power capable of organizing the world on its own terms and in its own image. It implies a reliance on military force as a principal instrument of policy. The analogy with the Roman Empire may be far-fetched and deeply flawed. That it is now in common use attests to a new assertiveness in the use of American power.

The new assertiveness is a result of 11 September. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower left America searching for a definition of the global security environment. It

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1 If empire is understood to mean control of territory, then the United States is clearly NOT a classical empire. The term is used largely metaphorically.
was, in the words of Richard Haass, a “reluctant sheriff” (Haass 1997). September 11 provided the United States with an enemy and generated a new activism and sense of urgency in the government. It was now willing to take on the task of re-ordering the world; and was therefore prepared to think of itself as an imperial power.

Besides the acceptance of the notion of empire, an equally remarkable development in recent American strategic discourse has been a widespread claim that the United States is now engaged in World War IV. (World War III was the Cold War). This notion of World War IV has been publicly presented by Eliot Cohen, a leading intellectual on the Defense Policy Board, by retired CIA Director James Woolsey, and by commentator Norman Podhoretz. Only a few people have explicitly adopted this metaphor of World War IV. However, this chapter argues that the notion of a global conflict reflects a fundamental American worldview. Like the image of the Roman Empire, the notion of World War IV is a metaphor heavily laden with implicit meaning (Cohen 2001; Woolsey 2002; Podhoretz 2002).

The official term to describe current American strategy is “the Global War on Terrorism”. Time will tell whether this is merely a passing rhetorical flourish that will eventually fade away and be replaced by some other concept. This paper argues that the global war on terrorism is not just rhetoric. The principal argument of this paper is that global war on terrorism is the contemporary equivalent of the Cold War concept of the “containment of Communism”. This simple phrase, “containment of Communism” served as a conceptual shorthand for a well-elaborated set of understandings (and misunderstandings) about the nature of the security environment. The global war on terrorism has come to replace containment as the central organizing concept of American strategy. The global war on terrorism is a real war, not a metaphor or rhetorical hyperbole.

After a decade of strategic uncertainty, heated debate about the likely threats that would face the United States in the future, and calls for a new George Kennan to come forward and clarify matters, a moment of strategic crystallization occurred a little less than two years ago. The “Long Telegram” arrived on September 11, 2001, courtesy of Osama Bin Laden, and spoke through the mouth of President George W. Bush. The United States is now engaged in a protracted, global war against terrorism. The strategic uncertainty of the 1990s was deeply uncomfortable to American strategists and politicians; the attacks of September 11 seemed to offer some certainty and direction in what was otherwise an amorphous and puzzling strategic environment.

2 I do not wish to over-stress the differences between the Clinton and Bush administrations on this issue.
The global war on terrorism was immediately conceptualized in terms familiar to most Americans.

The global war on terrorism is seen through the prism of the cognitive framework of the Second World War and to a lesser extent, through the prism of the Cold War. It is assimilated to those titanic struggles. As such, it resonates deeply with major currents in American culture. If we appreciate the cultural roots of the way in which the global war on terrorism is being framed, we can better understand current American strategy and its revolutionary implications.

In the months prior to the war in Iraq many people around the world seem to have been puzzled by the arguments presented by the Bush administration to justify military intervention. The connections between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, tyranny, and threats to the United States seemed implausible. The administration seemed to shift constantly from one justification to another. However, a close reading of the public speeches of key administration officials, most notably those of Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, suggests that in their minds there were clear connections between these various issues. Wolfowitz argued that the overthrow of rogue states such as Iraq was an integral part of the war on terror. We should take him at his word. In the minds of key administration officials, these elements are indeed tightly interconnected. President Bush recently referred to the war in Iraq as a “battle” in the larger war.

3 The recent war in Iraq was justified in two broad ways: as the defense of the United States against a potential future threat (whether from Iraq or from terrorists), and as a crusade to liberate Iraqi citizens from a brutal dictatorship. There has been much confusion about American justification for war. This derives in part from the failure of the first set of arguments to convince many people, and from a belief that there was a “real” reason (such as oil) underlying American action, distinct from the publicly articulated reasons, which were held to be little more than insincere efforts to fool a gullible public. I believe that we should take administration reasons at face value. The varying justifications reflect, I think, differences within the administration itself. Whereas as President Bush seems to have been most convinced by the link between terrorism and Iraq, and bought into the liberation rhetoric rather late in the day, largely as a secondary issue, other top officials have consistently dwelt on the theme of liberation. For these officials, primarily Wolfowitz and Cheney, the democratization of Iraq was intended to start a reverse domino process in the Middle East. The result would be the collapse of Arab autocracies, and the beginning of durable peace in the Middle East as well as a drying up of the social bases of Islamic radicalism. However implausible one might think this theory, it is a consistent theme running through Wolfowitz’s speeches. Clearly there was a contest within the Bush cabinet to define the nature of this war, and with it the parameters of American grand strategy. The victory of the “liberationists” this time makes it likely, but far from inevitable, that they will define the future course of American grand strategy.

The central purpose of this chapter is to describe this new cognitive framework\textsuperscript{5}. This chapter attempts a Weberian form of \textit{verstehen}. The goal is to describe the strategy and situate it in its cultural context so that it becomes intelligible as the set of beliefs that a particular group of American policy-makers, in a particular conjuncture, could reasonably be expected to hold. Given these cognitive and evaluative frameworks, the policies adopted by the U.S. become intelligible, even if we disagree with them.

However, before entering on a detailed discussion of the strategy and its cultural roots, three caveats need to be entered. First, the policies and justifications that emerged were the result of intense debate within the inner circle of decision-makers and within the government bureaucracy as a whole. To think of the strategic as being developed in a pristine manner from some sort of tabula rasa by a unitary rational actor is to misunderstand the American policy-making process. Not only is there a vast amount of cognitive inertia in the bureaucracy, as well as bureaucratic turf wars, but even in the President’s inner circle, there were profound differences in the assessment of the strategic situation. The result was, during 2002 and the early months of 2003, a series of shifting rationales for the attack on Iraq. These tensions within the government were reflected in public uncertainty about the “real” reason for the war with Iraq.

The second caveat is that it is a mistake to think of the grand strategy underpinning the global war on terrorism as an entirely rational product of pure cerebration. The basic terms of the strategy invoke highly emotionally-charged images of American identity and purpose in the world. As a result, it is hard for policy-makers to apply “pure logic” (if there is such a thing) to the arguments developed to guide and justify action. While reason and evidence play their parts in articulating strategy, so too do values, culture and emotions.

The third caveat is that the strategy underpinning the global war on terror is, like all strategies, the outcome of political debate and contestation. As such it is always subject to change, as different groups pursue different agendas. The strategy of the global war on terror should not be thought of as some immutable, clearly defined set of ideas. While an analysis like the one presented here necessarily portrays the strategy in a static, coherent way, it should always be born in mind that the strategy is the contingent result of dynamic political processes, and as such is neither static nor entirely internally coherent.

\textsuperscript{5} All the qualifiers, complexities and subtleties that you might wish to add to an analysis of the cognitive frame labelled “containment of Communism” apply also to global war on terrorism. Just like Kennan’s Long Telegram, global war on terrorism will likely be re-interpreted and misinterpreted over the years.
To return to the main theme, it is necessary to belabour the obvious: the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 changed the strategic landscape as far as American strategic thinkers are concerned. The immediate consequence was the announcement by President George W. Bush of a “global war on terrorism”.

The new strategic posture was formalized in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. It enunciated two novel propositions: that responsibility for acts of terrorism was to be laid at the doors of the states that harboured terrorists; and that the United States would engage in pre-emptive (some would say preventive) war to deal with this threat.

There is much more to the global war on terrorism than simply a doctrine of preemption. It must be seen, at least within influential policy circles, as a statement of a long war, a protracted struggle. This war is a GLOBAL war; in archaic terms, another WORLD war, the Fourth World War. In the minds of its architects, this is a war for the defense of the political values that define the Western world. To the rhetorical question, “why do they hate us?” the answer is, “because of our freedoms”. The global war on terrorism is a crusade for freedom.

The National Security Strategy is best known for its emphasis on the need for preemptive strikes. What is less well-appreciated is the clear declaration of purpose. The first paragraph reads:

“The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom… These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages… We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent”.

To understand the resonance of these images, we must return to the Second World War. This was a defining moment for American statecraft. In the eyes of the American people, the Second World War saw the United States rescue the world from totalitarianism. It saw the United States lead a crusade to defend freedom. The Second World War was not simply about the defense of the United States; it involved the liberation of others, including the liberation and reconstruction of America’s defeated enemies.

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6 “We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.” (5) “We cannot let our enemies strike first… To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” (15)
One immediate response to the attacks of September 11 was to describe them as a new Pearl Harbor, meaning by this an unprovoked surprise attack. But the connotation that this was the first act of the Fourth World War was not far away.

We need to bear in mind what the previous three world wars stand for in the American imagination. They are each, at least in mainstream historiography, wars of liberation. The First World War was a Wilsonian crusade to make the world safe for democracy. The Second World War, fought by “the greatest generation”, was a war of democracy against fascism. The Third World War, the Cold War, was, in the words of NSC-68, a war for the defense of freedom against Communist tyranny. To these three world wars for freedom, there has now been added a fourth.

The terms global war on terrorism, World War IV, and a crusade for freedom are interchangeable. The central historical analogy in the recent debates about the war in Iraq was the appeasement of Hitler. As a new incarnation of the Hitler threat, Saddam Hussein was seen as expansionist, irrational, and a threat to world peace. The analogy forcefully suggested a policy of pre-emption. The other easily available analogy, that Saddam Hussein was like Stalin, surfaced from time to time, but never became popular. That analogy would have suggested a policy of containment.

The utility of the analogy with the Second World War was that it allowed a promiscuous fusing of seemingly disparate justifications for war. Since this was a war to defend Western civilization, all arguments for war – weapons of mass destruction, the need to oppose dictatorships, defense against terrorism – became conflated. The case for war was not simply a pre-emptive defense of the United States against a terrorist attack; it was cast increasingly in the emotionally comfortable – at least for an American public – terms of a crusade for liberty.7

7 To what extent this is a purely cynical rhetorical devise to win public support as opposed to a genuine belief, I leave up to the reader to decide. The conflation is, I believe, genuine and deeply grounded. Bob Woodward’s account (Woodward 2002) of the discussions in President Bush’s inner circle following the attacks of September 11, suggests that key policy-makers jumped rapidly to conclusions that the Iraqis were somehow involved. This cannot simply be dismissed as illogical thinking. Perhaps it is illogical. But my point is that we need to understand why these particular policy-makers made this intuitive jump from the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon to Iraqi involvement, and not some other intuitive jump. Why did they connect the dots in this way, and not in some other way? Why this particular illogic, rather than some other illogic?
A New American Century?

For a strand of American thinking, the story line gets pushed back to the creation myths of the Republic itself. Founded as a “city upon a hill”, the United States was to be an Empire of Liberty. Because America occupies a unique position in world history as the beacon of liberty, and because of the preponderance of American military power, it has a duty to bring liberty to the world. “Interest” and “ideals” are identical.

As the metaphor of empire is used in the United States today, this is what the Romans and the British did: they brought the blessings of civilization to the rest of the world with the sword. American military power, in this metaphor, is to be the instrument of liberation. The twenty-first century will see an American Empire of Liberty.

Liberty at home – and abroad – becomes, in this optic, the narrative axis of American history and, indeed, of global history (Fukuyama 1992). The recent talk about the liberation of the Iraqi people from a totalitarian state is not mere rhetoric designed to win support for a war whose real purpose is different – oil, profits, geostrategic location, etc. – but rather reflects deeply-held convictions about American purposes. This is, in many ways, a revolutionary ideology. It is certainly one that, as many Middle Eastern rulers fear, may have revolutionary consequences. Key policy-makers used the analogy of the collapse of the Berlin Wall to indicate the importance of the liberation of Iraq in sparking a revolutionary chain of political change. It is revolutionary in the sense that certain American policy-makers seek to export an ideology and way of life to other countries by force. This is not a war of “liberation” in the sense implied by the metaphor of world war, in which the liberation of the French people from German, Nazi dictatorship is the central image. In that instance, a democracy which had been overrun by a foreign dictatorship was restored. Rather, in current American thinking, countries that had no indigenous history of stable democracy were to be transformed into modern free-market democracies by the force of the sword. The meaningful historical comparisons here are the attempts to export the French and Russian revolutions to other parts of Europe. In this sense, current American strategy is quite literally revolutionary. This does not necessarily mean that it is “wrong,” but it is well to be aware of the implications of policies undertaken in the name of abstract principles.

Not only was the twentieth century the American century, but many American thinkers are determined that the twenty-first century will also be a new American century. This, unsurprisingly, is the name of the project to
which key figures in the current Bush administration signed on. This vision celebrates Republican virtue, distrusts supranational institutions, and sees a providential role for America in the world. It asserts the

“need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; we need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”

Conceptual and Rhetorical Difficulties of the Global War on Terrorism

The notion of a war on terrorism suffers from a number of inherent rhetorical difficulties, particularly in the definition of the strategic enemy. Firstly, “terrorism” is a vague and diffuse term. Secondly, defining the enemy as “radical Islam” is politically incorrect. Thirdly, both “terrorism” and “radical Islam” tend to be embodied primarily in non-state actors; but military strategists are most comfortable with states as adversaries.

The global war on terrorism is, by definition, a war against terrorism. But quite what this means is both unclear and full of potential political pitfalls. Defining a war against a technique or method is strange. It is using “war” as a metaphor. Wars are conducted against peoples or states, not against methods of fighting. The global war on terrorism becomes, therefore, a war against terrorists and the states that sponsor them. But even here there are considerable definitional problems. Quite who is a terrorist and who is not becomes a matter for political debate. Not all terrorists have equal priority in the eyes of American strategists. The central concern, of course, is for certain kinds of Islamist terrorists exemplified by Al Qaeda. However, other political actors now have an interest in redefining “terrorism” to suit their purposes, and this has the potential to dilute the American effort or even to derail it.

American thinking is torn between defining the adversary as “terrorism” as such, and as targeting militant Islam as the central threat. In this second view, the spectre currently haunting official Washington is, indeed, Jihad. To

8 Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz.
9 While a careful reading of the report suggests that the principal danger envisaged was China, the notion of the export of liberty through military preponderance can be directly translated into the global war on terrorism.
define Islam (or any other religion) as the adversary is, for the American poli-
ty, quite impossible. It is hard even to identify radical Islam or religious fund-
damentalism as the enemy. This is simply unacceptable in American society.

Here, spokesmen for the United States government are compelled to assert
repeatedly that the global war on terrorism is not a conflict with Islam\textsuperscript{10}. It is not
a war of religion. However, it is a war against radical islamism. It is a war against
Islamic terrorists. The religious dimension of the conflict won’t go away.

The problem is that to ignore the fact that Al Qaeda is a religious move-
ment, to ignore the fact that many Muslims have already defined the conflict
as one between Islam and America, is to ignore reality. To argue that the ene-
demy is terrorism, without tackling the question of the religious origins of this
terrorism, is to create cognitive disconnects and shortcuts in strategic think-
ing. These disconnects are so blatant that they cannot be kept suppressed. The
tensions keep reappearing.

The solution to this conundrum is not to argue that there are features in-
trinsic to the belief system of Islam that predispose that religion toward ter-
rorism and jihad. All religions are sufficiently elastic and malleable that they
can be interpreted as mandating a wide range of conduct. Christianity, for ex-
ample, has been seen variously as mandating pacifism (as in the literalness with
which Quakers take the injunction not to kill) and as justifying crusades to ex-
tirpate unbelievers. So it is with Islam. A proper understanding of the role of
religion in terrorism should not start with the religious texts, but should rather
ask why certain groups at particular times and places choose a militant inter-
pretation of their religion. It is sociology, rather than theology, that provides
us with the answers we need. To say this, however, is not to dismiss the role of
religion. Certain kinds of religious beliefs, particularly those of a manichean
and apocalyptic kind, add fuel to the fire of terrorism. These beliefs, and the
groups and institutions that propagate them, need to be countered by system-
atic efforts to provide an alternative, more tolerant and more reasonable
worldview. This applies as much to Christianity or any other religion, as it does
to Islam. It should be recalled that prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the most dramatic incidents involving loss of life in the United States – the Ok-
lahoma City bombing and the Branch Davidian siege at Waco, Texas – each
involved apocalyptic beliefs flourishing on the wilder fringes of Christianity.
The enemy of a tolerant, reasonable society is religious intolerance and unre-
ason, whether the believers adhere to Islam, Christianity or any other religion.

\textsuperscript{10} The National Security Policy argues that “The war on terrorism is not a clash of civi-
lizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, the battle for the future of the
Muslim world”.

© Rubbettino
A sociological analysis of the reasons for militant religiosity of the kind that sometimes spills forth in terrorism is required.

The third conceptual problem inherent in the global war on terrorism is the difficulty American strategists have in dealing with an adversary of a non-state kind. States generally deal with other states, and it is not surprising that the emphasis in U.S. strategic thinking is on state sponsors of terrorism, rather than on the terrorists themselves. Although U.S. military forces have directly targeted terrorists (and continue to do so), and although there are extensive on-going police and intelligence efforts to apprehend terrorists, the central strategic thrust is to reduce state sponsorship of terrorism. This has led to a concern not only for rogue states, but also for weak states and “ungoverned spaces” where terrorists can find sanctuary. This line of reasoning means that the United States must now be concerned about the internal activities of numerous foreign states, in all parts of the world. This is the “global” part of the global war on terrorism. It involves not only a vast dispersion of effort, but also makes it difficult to identify a clear intellectual focus for strategy.

**How Democracy is Supposed to Reduce Terrorism**

If it is a war against terrorism, what is it a war for? The answer is not defined, as one might expect, in terms of a community of law-abiding nations, though there are undertones of this. The answer is that the global war on terrorism is a war of liberation, it is a war to defend freedom in the West by extending liberty elsewhere.

For Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, one purpose of the recent war in Iraq was to drain the swamp of terrorism. The diagnosis is that the authoritarian nature of many Arab regimes, together with their poor economic performance, leads to a radicalization of political opposition. This takes the form of Islamism. It is a breeding ground for more terrorist attacks on the United States. What is required is political liberalization. This will enable disaffected groups to channel their protest into useful political channels and away from the symbolic and identity politics of Islamism. As democratic states in the Arab world find legitimacy in a popular mandate, there will be opportunity perhaps for what might be called “curriculum reform”, the effort to re-

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11 This is by no means necessarily a bad approach. It is possible for America to pressure other states to repress terrorists. The central difficulty with the state-centric approach is the conceptual myopia that it often brings with regard to the best methods of dealing with non-state actors.
duce the influence of fundamentalist religious teaching and to increase the amount of secular education. This, presumably, is part of any long-term effort to confront the threat of radical Islam.

Wolfowitz believes that the central problem with regard to terrorism is the economic stagnation and political tyranny of the Arab world. It is not a problem of Islam. In addition, the existing regimes in the Arab world are an impediment to a solution of the Palestine-Israel dispute. The solution both to terrorism and to conflict in the Middle East in general is a radical transformation of the Arab regimes. In what has been dubbed the “reverse domino theory,” Wolfowitz seems to believe that if one or a few Arab states democratize, then others will follow. The exact mechanism by which this occurs may not be obvious, but Wolfowitz’s theory is, prima facie, entirely plausible. Whether it is right or wrong is an empirical matter that remains to be seen. Whether democracy will come to Iraq (and by virtue of a reverse domino effect to the rest of the Middle East) clearly depends on many factors. To rule it out as an impossible and utopian aim on the part of naïve Americans blinded by hubris seems a premature and unwarranted judgement.

Implicit in Wolfowitz’s argument is a proposition about the connection between religion and terrorism. The notion is that there is nothing intrinsic in any particular religion that predisposes its adherents towards terrorism. Rather, terrorism is a response to political exclusion and frustration. As Arab polities become more politically inclusive, Islamists will increasingly become more moderate. This is good social science: as Geertz demonstrated thirty years ago, the internal variations in the meaning of a religion are so great that it is very hard indeed to argue that any religion dictates a particular course of action (Geertz 1968).

The Principal Currents within American Strategic Thought

The grand strategies of the Clinton and Bush administrations have much in common. It would be surprising if they did not. The structural position of the United States has not changed, and very little else in the world has changed. All administrations work within the constraints of American politics and culture. A commonality of American grand strategy is the commitment to perpetual military preponderance. If the Royal Navy at the beginning of the Twentieth Century held to a two-power standard, the Department of Defense seems to be operating on a twelve-power standard! The notion is that American military preponderance will discourage attempts to compete. This
Simplifying greatly, we might say that the Clinton administration was primarily staffed by people committed to multilateral institutionalism. The grand strategy was to promote American economic institutions and democracy, with the aim of creating a stable and peaceful global political economy in which US companies and the US economy could prosper.

The Clinton administration was also vulnerable to pressures from liberal activists, who sought to use American power to deal with humanitarian crises.

But there are also important differences. These arise because policy-makers have choices. They can also make selections, if that is the right word, among cognitive frameworks.

One way to think about the differences and similarities between the Clinton and Bush administrations, and also within each administration is with the aid of two simple dichotomies.

The first (vertical) axis divides those who are concerned with both the sub-state and the supra-state level from those whose concerns are with the organization of states. It divides activists who wish to make changes to improve the human condition from conservatives, who wish to maintain and develop the current global institutional order. During the Clinton administration, activism took the form of pressures for humanitarian and peace-keeping interventions. Now, in the Bush administration it takes the form of a crusade for freedom.

The second (horizontal) axis divides policy-makers in terms of their ideological vision of the world. It pits the Clintonian multilateralist globalizers against the Bush administration’s emphasis on unilateral leadership in a world of states. It pits global institution-building against the use of military force.

It may be helpful to think of current American positions on the appropriate use of American military power as a 2X2 table.

Two dimensions of American strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>conservatives</th>
<th>activists</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>multilateralists</td>
<td>multilateral institutionalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unilateralists</td>
<td>realists Bush prior to 9/11</td>
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Simplifying greatly, we might say that the Clinton administration was primarily staffed by people committed to multilateral institutionalism. The grand strategy was to promote American economic institutions and democracy, with the aim of creating a stable and peaceful global political economy in which US companies and the US economy could prosper.

The Clinton administration was also vulnerable to pressures from liberal activists, who sought to use American power to deal with humanitarian crises. Continuing preponderance will be achieved by relentlessly pursuing technical superiority and by fielding large and highly trained armed forces equipped for expeditionary operations.

13 This was really about a particular institutional style of global economic management.
Clinton embraced this only reluctantly; the armed forces even more reluctantly. While the Clinton years saw a number of humanitarian and peace operations, the central thrust was towards building global networks and institutions that would underpin American economic hegemony.

The initial intent of the Bush administration was to pull back from these “non-essential” peace and humanitarian commitments and to focus on the central strategic challenge of a rising China. This would place it in the realist camp. Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, was a proponent of this view. At the Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was concerned to push forward with a fundamental transformation of military capabilities in an effort to self-consciously embrace the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Rumsfeld was also a strong advocate of national missile defenses, a measure which would seriously undermine China’s nuclear deterrent posture. While campaigning for the Presidency, George W. Bush had adopted military transformation as a central plank in his platform. This realist posture suggested very selective engagement with the world, decried “nation-building,” and was aimed at the strategic adversary: China. The *Project for the New American Century* was its intellectual charter.

Then came 11 September. The proponents of “liberation” now focused on the tyranny at hand: Iraq. If we are to believe Bob Woodward, the inner circle at the White House immediately associated the attacks of 11 September with Iraq (Woodward 2002). This conflation made sense to American strategists. It reflects a world view that has its roots deep in American history. It is, in many ways, a revolutionary position. It meshes with a sense of mission deriving from a “born-again” Christian world view, as well as with more secular historical experiences. The result was that the Bush administration moved from realism to an ideology of liberation.

**Sustainability of the Global War on Terrorism**

Despite the cultural attractiveness of the global war on terrorism, with its invocation of the Second World War and its call to arms to defend and export liberty, there are reasons to believe that the strategy is unsustainable in the long run. In addition to the rhetorical difficulties already mentioned, there are some real-world constraints.

The core tenet of current American grand strategy is the attempt to maintain its current military preponderance. The United States will seek to preserve the “unipolar moment” indefinitely. The method will be continual inno-
vation in the art of war together with strenuous efforts to ensure that the international economic regime is as favorable to American enterprise as possible. At the same time, the United States will work to deal with a wide range of threats from rogue states, would-be peer competitors, terrorists, failed states and the like. What the global war on terrorism variant of American grand strategy does is involve the United States in detailed control of local politics in many parts of the globe. The task that American strategists have set themselves is the simultaneous maintenance of military preponderance and detailed local control on a global scale. The current mood in Washington is that if this sounds like empire, then so be it.

This grand strategy may seem like an impossible task. After all, empire cannot be built on force alone; the liberated must embrace their freedom. And Americans must be liked, or at least tolerated. If they are feared there will be more terrorist attacks. “Oderint dum metuant” will not work. The solution to the problem of “odernint dum metuant, in the minds of these strategists, is the biblical injunction to engage in good works. America will win the hearts and minds of the world by showing in practice how markets and democracy bring benefits to all who embrace them. Empires are always justified by the supposed benefits of peace, order, and civilization that are provided by the imperial power. The current version of this is the argument, made most forcefully by Robert Kagan (Kagan 2003), that the United States is currently underwriting the costs of global security, and that Europeans (and others) are getting a free ride.

The central question is the degree to which American strategy is open to change. At one extreme are the “new imperialism” analyses. These suggest that America’s position as the sole superpower inevitably leads to its acceptance of a role as global policeman. In this view the difference between Clinton and Bush is simply that under Clinton the United States was a reluctant superpower, whereas the Bush administration has actively and enthusiastically embraced this role.

On the contrary, this paper argues that the shift to assertive unilateralism is largely a matter of freely-chosen policy. If a democrat were to be elected President in 2004 or 2008, we could perhaps see a reversal in American strategy. There would be less unilateralism and more reliance on institutions of global governance, there would be a downplaying of the global war on terrorism. The global war on terrorism would be seen more as a police and intelligence operation than a military one, there would be less propensity to resort to military action. Just as there was more than one way to conduct the Cold War, so there is more than one way to conduct a global war on terrorism.
If American strategy has changed once, it can change again. There is nothing in the structure of world politics that requires the United States to pursue the global war on terrorism in the terms that it currently does.

The ability of the American political system to maintain a protracted war on a vague enemy who strikes only intermittently is open to question. Of course, if there is a repeat of September 11, Americans will focus even more intently on the global war on terrorism. But if American security forces are successful, and no more serious attacks occur, American policy-makers may well look as if they are crying wolf. The pressures for normalcy may well push global war on terrorism to a marginal position.

Furthermore, politics is the realm of the contingent, and the political forces that support a Clintonian form of multilateral institutionalism may perhaps prevail, for reasons more connected with domestic politics than with grand strategy.

A second factor militating against the continuation of global war on terrorism is the cost – both economic and political – of maintaining empire and micromanagement. If the allies can be persuaded to share the burdens, both in terms of cash and in terms of constabulary troops, then empire is feasible. That was the lesson of the first Gulf War and of Bosnia. But assertive unilateralism has a negative impact on burden-sharing. The American public will be reluctant to bear the huge costs of maintaining control on a global basis, and the global war on terrorism will be abandoned as unaffordable.

The third, and final, reason why the global war on terrorism may be unsustainable has to do with strategic choice. The global war on terrorism leads, more or less inevitably, into a concern with ungoverned spaces, arcs of instability, the challenge of radical Islam, and so into a form of global micromanagement. It leads to a diffusion of military effort. The situation is not unlike the British dilemma prior to the two World Wars of how to divide their attention between the needs of imperial policing and a continental commitment. While British strategists had little doubt that the continental balance was the central issue, the force structure and doctrine they developed was largely oriented to the needs of imperial policing. It is possible that the contemporary United States will soon face a similar dilemma.

Prior to September 11, many strategic thinkers in the United States were coming around to the view that China would be the major strategic challenge to the United States in the twenty-first century. The Al Qaeda attacks ap-

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14 It cannot be said that there is any evidence that current American strategists share a similar agreement about the central strategic challenge to the United States.
peared to change all that. However, China has not gone away, and sooner or later American strategists will have to turn their attention back to the question of how to deal with a potential peer competitor. Washington cannot cope with two things at the same time: it will either be the global war on terrorism or it will be China.

The burden of empire and the constant – if distant – anxiety about a peer competitor will generate pressures to abandon the global war on terrorism. To return to the analogy with the Roman Empire: the current administration in the White House is focused on the barbarians from the North. The threat of rival empires in Carthage and Persia (to muddle the time lines) may cause a redefinition of focus.

The global war on terrorism is imagined to be the Fourth World War. As such, it is simultaneously a war for liberation and an extension of American empire. While this worldview is currently dominant in American strategic thinking, there are reasons to think that it will not be permanent. America may yet turn away from its revolutionary mission to remake the world in its own image by military means.

Bibliography

Human Security

D. J. Winslow

Human security in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national security.

UN Secretary - General Kofi Annan 2000

The Human Security Concept

The concept of human security first emerged on the international scene in the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report where it boldly stated that, “The idea of human security, though simple, is likely to revolutionize society in the 21st century”. (UNHDR 1994: 22)². The argument of the UN was that the con-

¹ One can see antecedents in the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva in 1863, as well as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions, which created obligations for states to defend the security of peoples everywhere. Edson (2001) tells us about an early definition given in 1992 in connection with the establishment of the Common Security Forum, a network of scholars and policy makers interested in exploring Post Cold War global security issues via collaborative international research and dialogue. Human Security was described as “inclusive of but extending beyond the human dimensions of military conflict – incorporating health and population dimensions of political, ethnic, economic and environmental security as well”. (Chen 1992 quoted in Edson 2000: 4). The Common Security Forum, with key research being conducted at Harvard and Cambridge Universities, continues to play an important role in the human security debate.

² Lammers (1999: 46) points out that the Report was written in preparation for the 1995 World Social Summit for Social Development which coincided with the 50th anniversary of the UN, “Reason enough in itself, one would think, to look for ‘revolutions’”.

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cept of security was too narrow and focussed on threats to the state and national sovereignty. The UN called for a broader view of security focussed on the individual or community not the state. In this way the human security approach parallels the shift in economic development and international law from instrumental objectives (such as growth, or state rights) to human development and human rights. In doing so the human being becomes the “end” of development, not only as a “means” to increased economic productivity or legal coherence (Alkire 2002).

The end of the Cold War has culminated in a proliferation of intra-state conflicts. In addition various global issues have surfaced including those related to human rights violations, refugees and internally displaced persons, landmines and small arms, terrorism, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.

Against this backdrop, it is becoming increasingly difficult to address the wide range of serious problems that directly threaten the lives, livelihoods and dignity of individuals solely based on the traditional concept of state security, which requires the national government to protect the lives and property of its people by maintaining the security and prosperity of the country. In fact, in many cases it is the policies of the state itself, which cause and perpetuate insecurity. As Bellamy and McDonald (2002) point out states are more often part of the problem than the source of the solution. They tell us that:

“Not only are states unable to provide security for their citizens despite the appropriation of vast amounts of resources for this goal, many states actively contribute to individual insecurity. This may be through the direct murder of citizens (as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda), their abuse of citizens’ human rights (as in China and South Africa), the redistribution of income away from development needs towards militarism (as in India and Pakistan) or their material and rheto-
rical support for a global economic order that makes some people very rich while impoverishing a third of humanity (as in the USA and Japan)."

(Bellamy and McDonald 2002: 374)

Using the individual or community, rather than the state as the “referent object” of human security is one of the key elements which distinguishes human security from national security. As Bruderlein (2001: 358) remarks, “Human security is about recognizing the importance of the people’s security needs side by side with those of States, minimizing risks, adopting preventative measures to reduce human vulnerabilities and taking remedial action when preventative measures fail”.

In the UN Human Development Report, security was redefined to include “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life”. (UNHDR 1994: 23). The UN pointed out that humans need basic subsistence in addition to freedom from persecution and harm in order to be secure thus “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” were introduced as the two key elements of human security.

It is important to remember that human security is not the same as human development even though it shares the “conceptual space” of human development, which is also people-centred and multidimensional. Human development is a broader, long term, holistic objective that can capture the aspirations of any society, whether rich or chronically poor. The aim of human development is the flourishing or fulfilment of individuals in their homes and communities, and the expansion of choice (Alkire 2002). Human security can be understood as the ability to pursue choice in a safe environment. Human development has a long-term perspective whereas human security includes relatively short-term actions such as humanitarian relief and peace operations. While human development aims at “growth with equity,” human security focuses on causes of and solutions to insecurity4.

What makes people insecure? The UN (1994: 24-33 as cited in Lammers 1999: 47 and Edson 2001: 14) provides a list of seven sources of insecurity:

- Economic insecurity: threats of unemployment, job insecurity, bad working conditions, income inequalities, inflation, insufficient social security networks and homelessness.

4 Alkire (2002) describes this as the identification of critical pervasive threats, prevention so that the risks do not occur, mitigation so that if risks occur the damage is limited). Thus human security creates an “enabling environment” for human development.
• Food insecurity: problems with regard to physical and economic access to food.
• Health insecurity: threats to health and life from infectious and parasitic diseases, HIV and other viruses, diseases through polluted air or water and insufficient access to health services.
• Environmental insecurity: degradation of local and global ecosystems, water scarcity, floods and other natural disasters, deforestation and the pollution of water, air and soil.
• Personal insecurity: the threat of physical violence executed by the state and crime organizations, or within the family, and of violence in the workplace and industrial and traffic accidents.
• Community insecurity: the threat of ethnic tensions and violent clashes.
• Political insecurity: the threat of human rights violations and state repression.

We can see from the above list, that there are problems with the generality and breadth of the concept of human security. As Thomas and Tow (2002) point out, the UN and many subsequent articles on the subject do not distinguish between “general” and “specific” threats to human security. This can have an effect on policy and the allocation of resources. For example, after September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorism which officially kills fewer than 10,000 people a year was given political priority over the more “general” threat of malnutrition which kills more than 40,000 people a DAY (see Bellamy and McDonald 2002: 374).\textsuperscript{5}

Can Human Security be Measured?

Interestingly, a Human (In) Security Index (HIS) has not yet been developed. This may in part be due to the broad definition of human security, which leads to a lack of precision. However it is only when the concept of human security is operationalized can some improvement in people’s security actually be monitored. Of course there are the indicators from the human development reports but, as mentioned above, development indicators are not measures of human security. The \textit{Human Development Report} (HDR) does contains a section called “Ensuring Human Security” that supplies information

\textsuperscript{5} Similarly, Wolf (1999) describes the threat to human security caused by water-related disease. It is estimated that between five and ten million people die each year from water-related disease while more than half the world’s population lack adequate sanitation.
on a number of variables, but many authors find them to be an inadequate measure of human security. “A HIS would undoubtedly use some of the variables in the HDR, but it would need to go beyond what is found in the HDR in order to have credibility” (Brecke 2002).

The various proposals for a Human Security Report reflect the tension between “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”. For example, researchers at the University of Victoria, Canada, have done work on developing an index of human insecurity with most of the emphasis on environmental security (freedom from want) – while the University of Carleton University has an index of human security risk based on a country’s number of resource/territorial disputes, armed forces per 1000 individuals in the population, and military expenditures as a share of GDP. That is a very narrow a measure of human security. On the other hand, the Human Security Network has a very broad one that it proposed to the IVth Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Jordan in May 2001. The Network wants to approach the problem from 5 different dimensions (economical, social, environmental, political and cultural).

Many proposals to measure human security recommend a format similar to the annual Human Development Report. For example, the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University sees a Human Security Report as a complement to UN Reports such as the Human Development Report and the proposed Global Vulnerability Report, which will focus on natural disasters. Just as the core of the Human Development Report is the Human Development Index, Harvard proposes a composite Security Index based on such indicators as the number of deaths from armed conflict, the incidence of criminal violence and refugee numbers. The Human Security Report would also seek to map trends in key systemic causes of armed conflict and violent crime. These could include: democratic transitions, political insta-

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6 See http://office.geog.uvic.ca/dept/faculty/lonergan/
7 See http://www.carleton.ca/~dcarment/presents/cifp/sld036.htm
8 The Human Security Network originally grew out of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and Norway; the “Lysøen” partnership, named for the Norwegian island where the idea was conceived of in 1999. The Network now includes participation by over a dozen countries from all regions of the world. The Human Security Network identifies concrete areas for collective action, particularly international support for UN efforts to protect civilians.
9 For details see http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/meeting-e.asp
10 The Network noted that reliable data is necessary for any projections aimed at conflict prevention and acknowledged that the important thing about using data in studying human security “is maintaining the ability to identify trends, which will finally allow Governments to adopt measures to improve the security of individuals”. http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/santiago_annex1-e.asp, accessed 5 April 2003.
bility, polarized identity politics, decreases in GDP and increased rates of individual inequality (in the case of violent crime) and “group” inequality (in the case of political violence). Where reliable data are available the Report will also map some of the consequences of human insecurity, such as the indirect impact of war on the incidence of disease.

Similarly Professor Andrew Mack (2002) at the University of British Columbia in Canada proposes producing an annual report, which will document the incidence and severity of global violence; criminal violence as well as armed conflict. Such a report would be mainly devoted to mapping human insecurities. Although the report would adopt a rather narrow definition of human security, the sections that deal with the causes and consequences would use the same developmental variables as the broader conception of human security found in “freedom from want”. The core indicators of human insecurity according to Mack (2002: 3) are “battle-related deaths in armed conflicts, genocides and other forms of violent repression, and homicides”. The developmental and health consequences of insecurity would be drawn from a dataset produced by the World Health Organization.

It would seem that analysts and policy makers cannot agree on a definition of human security which would allow them to collect systematic empirical data. I believe this is due to “contested ground” at the core of the traditional definition of security where there are moral, ideological and normative elements that prevent people from agreeing (Buzan 1991: 7). This reminds us that human security is not just a list of objective universal indicators. In fact the universality of these indicators should be examined for western bias. Indeed Acharya (2001) tells us that some Asian governments and analysts see human security as yet another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies. “A good deal of controversy about human security today arises from a perception that the notion, at least in its Western usage, reflects the individualistic ethos of liberal democracy”. (Acharya 2001: 4).

Over and above “objective” indicators, we must remember that security is a socially constructed concept. As Lammers (1999: 49) also points out, “The presence or absence of security is mainly a subjective experience of the people involved”. It is a qualitative condition which entails individual and collective perceptions of threats to well being. Thus human security has meaning within a specific social context. It emerges and changes as a result of specific actions and discourses.


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The Global and the Local

This tension between the universal “global” indicators and the local perceptions of (in)security reflect in many ways the nature of human security. As the UNHDR (1994: 22) points out, “Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe”. But the effects on people’s lives are quite local.

In fact many discussions of human security blame the processes of globalization for the creation of an increasingly insecure world. For example a Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade document (1999: 1-2) tells us that globalization has left in its wake “violent crimes, drug trade, terrorism, disease and environmental deterioration” and internal war fought by irregular forces of ethnic and religious groups equipped with small arms. The decline of state control and, subsequently the growth of warlordism, banditry, organized crime, drug trafficking, and private security forces, have all led to increased violence against individuals. In addition, a “broadening range of transnational threats” renders individuals more vulnerable to economic globalization. Better communications and transportation increase pollution, disease vectors, and economic instabilities worldwide.

The global nature of the threats to human security means that there needs to be a global response and is includes an important role for international cooperation and international organizations. The state thus loses ground to international organizations. This reflects the view of many globalization theorists (see Held 2000) who believe that contemporary processes of globalization are so historically unprecedented that governments and societies across the globe have to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs. Nation-states are no longer the sole centers or the principal forms of governance or authority.

Certainly the rise of the human security concept points to a movement away from the view that the referent of security is the state. This traditional view of security is based on the principle that as long as the state is secure the people who live within its borders are secure. National independence and territorial integrity are essential and the key threats to these things are violence and coercion by other states. Security is achieved through the use or the threat of use of violence through military capability thus achieving a balance of power (Bajpai 2000: 36-37).

In the human security conception the individual is the primary referent of security and it inverses the traditional view arguing that ultimately state se-
curity is only a means to ensure individual security not an end in and of itself. Because of globalization the threats to individual security go beyond the capacity of the states to manage. Thus the state may be safe from other states but incapable of protecting its citizens.

As mentioned before the state may also turn against its own citizens so that a dysfunctional state’s security and individual security become inversely correlated. This situation entails intervention and an ensuing loss of state control over traditional areas of security. Thus the pursuit of human security cannot be realistically separated from intervention, especially as Acharya (2001: 9) stresses, “if our understanding of human security is to emphasize measures that reduce the human costs of violent conflict, such as genocide, massive refugee flows, and massacres of the civilian population in the hands of governments and armed groups”.

This said most advocates of human security expect it to be pursued through non-coercive and peaceful means. In fact most international initiatives pursue this diplomatic approach to human security. Let us look at these for a moment before returning to the question of intervention and its impact on the militaries that carry out these operations.

International Initiatives

The issue of human security has called upon the post-cold war international community, – governments, various international organisations and civil society including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – to protect people from threats to their lives, livelihoods, and dignity. Both Japan and Canada have played key roles in promoting human security in the international community.

“Two states in particular (one Western and one Non-Western) have publicly proclaimed that human security is important and both play prominent roles in advancing the human security perspective. These are Canada and Japan respectively. Both countries have a sound human security status themselves, enjoying some of the highest standards of living in the world. Interestingly, neither the world’s least developed states, nor the other end of the spectrum, the world’s hegemon, the United States pay quite as much attention to the notion as a policy framework”.

(Edson 2001: 84)

Let us take a closer look at these two initiatives and see the differences in the way these nations define human security.
a. Japan

Japan emphasizes human security from the perspective of strengthening efforts to cope with threats such as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel landmines, and has taken various initiatives in this context. Thus in 2000, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori of Japan stated in his speech at the UN Millennium Summit that Japan positioned human security as one of the key perspectives of its diplomacy and that it would establish an international commission on human security to further deepen the concept of the human-centred initiatives.

Following this announcement, a Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001\(^{12}\), with 12 internationally prominent members including Mrs. Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Professor Amartya Sen, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, serving as co-chairs, as well as Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan (see Table 1).

Table 1: Members of the Commission on Human Security\(^{13}\)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Co-Chairs (Titles as of June 2003)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sadako Ogata</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>Amartya Sen</td>
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<td>Master, Trinity College, Cambridge</td>
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Commissioners (alphabetical order)

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<th>Commissioner</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lakhdar Brahimi</td>
<td>Special Representative of UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lincoln Chen</td>
<td>Director, Global Equity Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School of Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bronislaw Geremek</td>
<td>Historian, Former Foreign Minister of Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frene Ginwala</td>
<td>Speaker, Parliament of the National Assembly, Republic of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sonia Picado</td>
<td>President, Inter-American Institute for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surin Pitsuwan</td>
<td>Former Foreign Minister of Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donna Shalala</td>
<td>President, University of Miami: Former US Secretary of Health and Human Services</td>
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The Commission was mandated to develop the concept of human security and make recommendations that will serve as guidelines for concrete action to be taken by the international community. The Commission dealt with the two critical areas of human security – freedom from fear and freedom from want. One area deals with human insecurities resulting from conflict and violence, and the other with the links between human security and development.

The Goals of the Commission on Human Security:

- to promote public understanding, engagement and support of human security and its underlying imperatives;
- to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; and
- to propose a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security.

The Commission submitted its final report *Human Security Now* on March 1 2003. According to the report Human security means protecting vital freedoms and protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. According to the Commissioners, it also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. (Commission on Human Security 2003) A very interesting point in the report is that the authors add one more freedom “freedom to take action on one’s own behalf”. To do this, it offers two general strategies: protection and empowerment.

The Report goes on to outline a number of policy initiatives:

- Protecting people in violent conflict

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14 See http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/outline.html
• Protecting people from the proliferation of arms
• Supporting the security of people on the move
• Establishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations
• Encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor
• Working to provide minimum living standards everywhere
• According higher priority to ensuring universal access to basic health care
• Developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights
• Empowering all people with universal basic education
• Clarifying the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations.

Unfortunately this requires states to cooperate and provide the resources for these initiatives. The Commission therefore proposed the development of a core group made up of interested states, international organizations and civil society, around the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, as a part of its critical initiative – in which a small input of resources might leverage great impact – to forge links with disparate human security actors in a strong “global” alliance.

The Commission hopes to draw from a Trust Fund for Human Security established in the United Nations Secretariat by Japan. The Government of Japan began funding the Trust Fund in March 1999 and by 2001, total contributions had amounted to some 18.9 billion yen, making the Trust Fund the largest of its kind established in the UN. The objective of the Fund is to translate the concept of human security into concrete activities. However the list of initiatives already undertaken by the Fund is very much like typical UN development initiatives or in other words, “freedom from want”\(^\text{15}\). As the Commission on Human Security would put it,

> “The developmental aspects of human security focuses on insecurities related to poverty, health, education, gender disparities, and other types of inequality. It also works on problems that cut across these themes, including institutional arrangements for reducing insecurities, new vulnerabilities associated with the current global situation, and an analysis of the magnitude and distribution of various types of insecurities”.

(Commission on Human Security 2003)

\(^{15}\) Most of the projects cover health and medical care and poverty reduction. See [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/effort.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/effort.html) for details on these projects and the fund.
b. Canada

In Canada, human security emerged as a foreign policy paradigm in the 1990s (see Axworthy 1997). It is associated with a foreign policy strategy for middle powers. Thus Ottawa joined with Oslo in establishing a Human Security Partnership. The partnership has identified a nine point agenda of human security focused on land-mines, formation of an International Criminal Court, human rights, international humanitarian law, women and children in armed conflict, small army proliferation, child soldiers, child labour and northern co-operation. As you can see from this list, Canada has taken a narrower view of human security than Japan. Canada has chosen to focus on establishing “freedom from fear”, which is seen as a necessary precondition for freedom from want. In fact when you enter the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade website16 the words “freedom from fear” occupy a very prominent place. Canada also has a more conservative focus than the UNDP version. In fact Canada has criticized the UNDP definition for focussing too much on threats associated with underdevelopment and ignoring human insecurity resulting from violent conflict (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 1999)17. According to Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, human security is “freedom from fear” and human development is “freedom from want”18. They are mutually reinforcing but distinct concepts as illustrated in the Foreign Minister’s speech to the UN below:

“Improvements in human security is a necessary precondition for success in the other important actions that we take to advance human, economic, aid and trade development. Farmers cannot work in fields strewn with landmines. Children cannot learn where they are abused and brutalized by war. Investors will not send money to regions racked by conflict. Societies cannot flourish when resources are pillaged to fuel violence and people are victimized by terror. Ultimately, freedom from fear is intimately connected to the freedom from want”.

(Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, 24 September 1999 speech to the UN General Assembly)

17 For a comparison between the two approaches to human security see Bajpai (2000).
18 Similarly Dr. Lodgaard of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs argues that human security should not be mixed with human development. Nor should it be about natural disasters or “precarious human conditions” such as hunger, disease and environmental contamination. The key defining criteria of human security is “vulnerability to physical violence during conflict”. (Lodgaard 2000)
For Canada, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives and the government has identified five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security:

- Protection of civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict.
- Peace support operations, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these missions.
- Conflict prevention, with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence.
- Governance and accountability, concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights.
- Public safety, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organized crime19.

As a result of these foreign policy priorities Canada has played a key role in a number of international initiatives linked to “freedom from fear” such as anti-personnel mines and small arms reduction.

Another Canadian initiative is the The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) set up in September 2000, following the UN Millennium Summit. ICISS examines the difficult questions surrounding if and when it is right for the international community to intervene in a nation-state’s domestic security20. Like its Japanese cousin this Commission also has a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001) which discusses the nature and dimensions of the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention” which has been a controversial foreign policy issue. The Commission tackled the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states for

20 See The ICISS report The Responsibility to Protect, in which the central theme is the idea that, “Sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/ accessed 5 April 2003).
take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state. According to the Commission, sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.

Canadians have devoted more energy to exploring human security in relation to the humanitarian interventions than the Japanese who are more reluctant than the Canadians to endorse interventionism per se, seeking instead, to lay more emphasis on the socio-economic components of human security. That is “freedom from want”.

The UN and Collective Human Security

As the Canadians have pointed out, UN peace operations constitute an important part of human security initiatives. “Collective human security” appeared in 1992 in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* and was recently expanded on in the Brahimi Report (UN 2000). Just like the concept of human security in the UNHDR, collective human security focuses on the individual as opposed to the state, which is the usual referent point for security. Collective human security thus poses a challenge to the traditional concept of national security. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992: 44) stated, “[the] time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty… has passed”.

Traditionally, security threats were assumed to emanate from other states with aggressive or adversarial designs. Security issues were examined in the context of state power. The protection of the state, its boundaries, people, institutions and values, was the responsibility and objective of the state. States built powerful military structures to defend themselves (Ogata 2002). In the post Cold War period, the UN vision for peace was built upon the realization that intra-state conflict was becoming more prevalent than inter-state conflict. In *An Agenda for Peace* the concept of peace was not simply the absence of conflict, it was a positive peace based on social justice and democracy (Peou 2002: 53). In this vision, peace was rooted in human security: “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. It was a social peace based on the individual’s human right to security, not the state’s right to sovereignty. The descrip-

21 The term “Brahimi report” refers to the United Nations (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The Chairman of the panel was Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria. The panel was convened in March 2000 by an initiative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
tion of threats to security included ecological damage, debt burdens, barriers to trade, unchecked populations growth and the growing gap between rich and poor. Unconventional threats included drug trafficking and terrorism (Boutros-Gali 1992: 6-7).

An Agenda for Peace also included an renewed UN commitment to the protection of human rights particularly for ethnic, religious, social and linguistic minorities. As Peou (2002: 53) points out, “this implies that individuals rights as human beings are legitimate and cannot be made subservient to states’ rights under the tradition of international law based on state sovereignty”. Thus the idea of universal human rights poses another challenge to the traditional concept of state sovereignty and gives rise to the idea of a global community based on a certain international rule of law. Of course the question still remains as to who determines the international standard and ultimately who is the legitimate enforcer of this law.

For the UN collective human security is a wide, all-inclusive concept and the solution is collective action led by the UN. The UN is portrayed as a global community, which shared in the collective responsibility for human security (Boutros-Gali 1992: 8). The proposed strategy includes the range from preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building to humanitarian intervention. As Peou (2002: 54) points out, “Logically An Agenda for Peace advocates the need for military enforcement of humanitarian aid delivery and its proactive support of forceful humanitarian interventionism”. The UN strategy for peace includes an important role for the military, which is traditionally a security organization associated with state sovereignty. As we will see below, this change in focus and mission has posed a challenge to military organizations in the post-Cold War era.

By the end of the 20th Century the UN had failed to deliver on its promises. It was not only weak financially it was politically impoverished. The Brahimi report (UN 2000: viii) referred to the UN Charter’s original objective, which was to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and then acknowledged that the organization “has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge”. Similar to An Agenda for Peace the Brahimi report questioned the argument that the state is the only legitimate provider of security (Peou 2002: 55) and urged the UN to step up to the plate as a “universal organization” ca-

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22 Of course not everyone agrees with this. Following the 1st Gulf War the UN there was an unprecedented role for the UN in post conflict reconstruction. This was followed by an extraordinary decade of UN involvement in peacekeeping and nation-building which led to a Nobel Prize for Mr. Annan and the organization in 2001. The controversy in the Security Council over the 2nd Gulf War has left the organization struggling to salvage its own future.
pable of promoting collective human security. This echoes Kofi Annan’s position to the UN Security Council in 1998 in which he underlined the importance of the concept of human security to the working purpose of the UN. “The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development. Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the United Nations”. (Annan 1998).

The Brahimi report’s approach to collective human security is based on three pillars: peacemaking, peace building and peacekeeping. Peace enforcement – the high end of peace operations – is not considered in the report which leaves this form of operation to coalitions of willing states, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN 2000: 10).

Peacemaking is based on diplomacy and mediation in order to bring an end to conflict. Peace building establishes the conditions for what I have been referring to as “freedom from want,” that is, improving quality of life, respect for human rights, democracy, etc. Peacekeeping entails the use of military forces to promote human security. The report proposes that the UN should be able to deploy 5000 troops “as a brigade formation, not as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one another’s doctrine, leadership and operational practices”. (UN 2000: 19) This is an important point. Outside of NATO militaries there is little commonality therefore UN operations run into problems due to a lack of compatibility or as I call it a lack of “cultural interoperability”. This can affect the UN’s ability to assure human security.

In a previous article (Winslow and Everts 2001) I developed something called a cultural interoperability model in order to examine possible points of tension, which can arise in peace operations due to a lack of cultural compatibility between the various militaries in the UN operation in Bosnia. The model explores five possible points of tension to be found in peace operations. These points of tension are related to organizational differences in terms of: organizational structure and culture, tasks and ways of accomplishing them, definitions of success and time frames, abilities to exert influence and control information and control of resources.

In UNPROFOR there was a great diversity in the organization of the operation and organizational studies show that diversity in organizations leads to increased communication and co-ordination problems and thus to potentially decreased organizational performance. One reason for the success of NATO in IFOR and SFOR was a common military culture shared between NATO participants in the operation. This commonality has been developed over fifty years of training and working together. Thus experience
in careful planning, clear hierarchies and strong discipline ensured co-operation and co-ordination in diversified structures typical of multinational 
opera-tions.

It is important to remember that during the Cold War peacekeeping was primarily a military activity that took place between states in order to monitor 
a peace treaty upon which all parties had agreed. However, contemporary conflict, in which civilians are the primary tools and targets, has forced traditional 
peacekeeping missions to evolve into broad and multidisciplinary “peace support operations”. As a result, involvement in international peace support 
operations has expanded to include civilian experts in almost all aspects of the 
operation. Their ability to work with each other affects their ability to assure human security but in many cases the different actors in these operations do not even agree on what security is let alone how to create a secure environment for the local population. Thus I then went on to apply the cultural inter-
operability model to civil-military cooperation in post conflict reconstruction 
(Winslow 2002). This is important since non-State actors, particularly NGOs23 are well suited to bring about human security in these environments (see Bruderlein 2001).

I called the article “Strange Bedfellows” since traditionally, interactions 
between the military and humanitarian workers were characterized by avoidance or antagonism. Until the end of the Cold War, NGOs and the military perceived their roles to be distinctly different and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy with military forces, either from their own countries or from the country receiving assistance perceiving that any contact with the military might compromise their position. Military leaders, on the other hand, tended to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed (see Winslow 2002 for details). However in the 1990s, the nature of interna-
tional conflict meant that relief workers increasingly found their lives and their

23 In peace operations, one can now find the large International Organizations (IOs) such as the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) in addition to the well-known international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as CARE, OXFAM, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) and the ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross). There are also larger numbers of smaller NGOs in areas of conflict in the post-Cold War period. For example, in 1989, 48 international NGOs were registered with the United Nations. By 1998, there were 1500 (Simmons, 1998: 75-76). These NGOs may be religious or secular, may include personnel from one nation or several, may be truly non governmental or may in fact receive large sums from government grants. Finally, a peace operation may also have small groups with a humanitarian interest running around doing any variety of things from distributing old prescription glasses to trying to set up dental clinics.
work at risk\textsuperscript{24}. Because of the deterioration of field situations, aid workers began to conclude that they needed weapons on their side in order to fulfil their mandates. Military and humanitarian aid workers thus found themselves compelled to work not only alongside but also in cooperation with each other in order to promote human security in war torn regions around the world.

The new security challenges have thus led to organizational change and increased cooperation. In fact Moskos has advanced the hypothesis that in peace operations we can observe an embryonic convergence between the two institutions: “a ‘softening’ of the military, if you will, and a ‘hardening’ of the NGOs” (Moskos, 2000: 33). Thus as the military and NGOs carry out overlapping missions in the same areas they develop common ground for improved relations. Working together helps each community to view the other as equally professional and committed to common objectives. This is a very important point. In fact as the organizations learn to share a common “human security” goal and depend on each other to reach that goal, they can develop a cooperative relationship and yet retain distinct organizational memberships and cultures.

Conclusions

I began this article with a brief review of the human security concept. We have seen that it is both a concept and an “end destination” and many feel that we need to define it in order to determine whether people have reached that destination. We did find some commonalities in the various definitions of human security. First and foremost is taking the individual or the community as the “referent object” as opposed to the state. The second is the underlying theme of vulnerability. People are secure when they are no longer at risk to violent and non-violent threats to their survival and well-being. There is also the important issue of “mutual vulnerability”. As Nef (1999) points out, we live in a world where there are pockets of human security amidst weaker pockets of human insecurity and vice versa. In the West we are increasingly made aware that we cannot take it for granted that we will always be secure and able to protect ourselves from the effects of, for example, global environmental change, international public health crises like AIDS or SARS, political or eco-

\textsuperscript{24} Relief workers in Rwanda and Chechnya were deliberately killed in 1997. In Burundi and the Sudan NGOs were expelled and workers killed because they were witness to local atrocities. In other countries workers have been victims of land mines, armed hijacking of vehicles, banditry, kidnapping and bombings.
nomic induced migration flows and ‘human trafficking’, downturns in the stock markets, or indeed terrorism and a war in Iraq.

There is still debate among analysts and policy makers about whether there should be a broad definition of human security including “freedom from want” or a more narrow definition focussed on “freedom from fear”. And there is also the question of objective quantitative measures of human security versus the more subjective and qualitative measures. I would propose that we see human security as a continuum with “freedom from fear” at one end as the basic building block of security and moving progressively toward alleviating “freedom from want” without forgetting the interconnectivity between these two elements. At a minimum, human security can be determined by people’s ability to be protected from the physical destruction of their lives and way of life. At its maximum it can mean a totally threat-free environment as defined by the peoples and communities themselves. At one extreme, I can imagine more objective indicators of physical security but at the other subjective and socially constructed criteria must play a greater role in determining whether a group is secure or not. We must also remember that sources of human insecurity can vary from region to region (e.g. varying environmental and health threats) and more importantly the local definition of secure is culturally and socially constructed. Thus the definition of human security must remain flexible and adapted to local contexts.

Inevitably we must examine the role of states in causing insecurity and promoting human security. As we have seen states like Canada and Japan have made special efforts to promote human security on an international scale.

However, the question remains as to how states can be encouraged to meet their responsibilities to their citizens providing them with humane governance and human security? We also need to look at how people participate in governance, not only as citizens of the state, but as actors in different local social environments and civil society that can be quite separate from formal institutional arrangements.

As noted earlier, traditional forms of security focussed on the state and defence of territory from external attack. This necessitated the maintenance of a large armed force and for many countries a conscripted force. Nuclear deterrence meant not only lines on the ground. It also meant lines in the mind. Soldiers had a specific threat that they trained for. This is no longer the case. The end of the Cold War meant a change from a bi-polar to a multi-polar

25 Incidences of physical violence and the presence of rule of law and public order can be measured. This would include the absence of physical torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, detention without trial, etc.
world and led to many changes in the armed forces, including massive downsizing and a change of mission. Militaries no longer just protect national sovereignty and that of allies. They intervene more and more in intrastate conflicts. These environments are unpredictable and require forces to be sharper since the situation on the ground can quickly escalate.

Military mandates are wider and more ambiguous and the tasks more multi-dimensional and multi-functional. In addition, they are often tasked with facilitating humanitarian relief, social reconstruction and protecting civilians in areas where there is no peace. According to Williams (1998: 14), “The military have taken on new and significant political roles”. They are now asked to broker deals, shelter the displaced, protect human rights, supervise the return of refugees, organize and monitor elections, and support civilian reconstruction. This takes them into the domain of human security. Moreover, these tasks require more convergence with non-military organizations. But has military organizational culture kept up with the changes?

Problems can arise when soldiers have difficulties in making the transition to the new human security tasks required of them. Some soldiers have expressed the view that they signed up to be “warriors” not “global street workers”. Others I have interviewed see peace keeping as “soft” versus the “hard” training necessary for war. “Soft” training is devalued yet this is precisely what is necessary in peace support operations. There is a danger of a certain form of culture clash between the traditional approach to security (war fighting) and the new human security agenda (peace operations); between what soldiers would call training green vs. blue (United Nations soldiers wear blue helmets or berets). Thus a shift in mission and mandate can also have an impact on soldiers’ identity. As Cadet Mary Tobin remarked, “It is one thing to know that I’ll have to lead thirty soldiers who don’t like me because I am a snot-nosed kid from West Point. But now I might have to go over there and basically be mayor of a town. That is a mission I never imagined”. Cadet Tobin expects to be assigned to Iraq after her graduation from West Point and her commission as second lieutenant (quoted in the New York Times April 18th 2003 “quote of the day”).

Future military activities will involve an important component of post conflict reconstruction. Therefore I believe that military training must involve an understanding of human security since the success of a mission can turn around the military’s ability to assure human security in their area of operations. The introduction of the human security concept into military training will allow soldiers to better understand the shift that is currently taking place in the global security environment.
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Finito di stampare nel mese di marzo 2004
da Rubbettino Industrie Grafiche ed Editoriali
per conto di Rubbettino Editore Srl
88049 Soveria Mannelli (Catanzaro)

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