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*A NEW APARTHEID?
URBAN SPATIALITY, (FEAR OF) CRIME, AND SEGREGATION
IN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA*

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Justification

All phenomena occur over time, and thus have history, but they also happen in space, at particular places and so also have geography. Clearly the two perspectives are linked, but over-attention on the former has occurred at the expense of geographical-based analysis. This paper seeks to establish a socio-geographical exploration within the field of development, not to simplistically determine *where* places are, but to analyse spatial relationships¹. This focus on space in relation to society does not seek to negate the value of 'time/history' approaches, but to complement such emphases and attempt to redress previous research imbalances.

The 'development problem' of inequality exists internationally (between countries), and nationally (within countries); and is both structural (e.g. between agriculture and industry), and spatial (e.g. between different regions, or city-sectors). In recent years, there has been increasing pressure on developing countries to attain the macro and micro "spatial structure most suited to ... development"². This paper addresses uneven development *within* the spatial structure of the South African City. Such micro-level spatial inequality has facilitated polarisation between differing urban spaces and their inhabitants. Whilst this was intended in the Apartheid City, it appears to be continuing into the post-apartheid era, albeit in a slightly different guise.

South Africa provides a key example of the necessity of embracing geographical space³ to analyse development. South Africa has encountered numerous social engineering projects (e.g. colonialism, Apartheid, democratisation), all of which have "profound spatial implications and left significant legacies in the geography" of uneven development⁴. Indeed, Apartheid's concept of 'separate development' delayed the emergence of international development concepts in South Africa. However, 'separate' was synonymous with 'uneven', and thus South Africa's key hurdle to post-apartheid development is the prevalence of "plenty amidst poverty"⁵. Whilst 'plenty' is *socially* located amongst whites (1% households below poverty line), 'poverty' remains concentrated amongst blacks (60.7% households below poverty line)⁶. The legacy of Apartheid in creating "islands of spatial affluence" in a "sea of geographical misery"⁷, ensures this *socially* uneven development is projected onto *space*.

Furthermore, rapid urbanisation⁸ ensures the majority of South Africans now reside in urban areas (54% in 1996⁹), thus indicating the post-apartheid city a relevant representation of broader South African socio-spatial trends. Indeed, some go further; suggesting internal South Africa represents a "microcosm"¹⁰ or "caricature"¹¹ of *global* uneven development. However, for the purposes of this paper, analysis addresses the internal socio-spatial form of Cape Town, as pre-Apartheid's *least* segregated city, yet Apartheid's *most* segregated city.

¹ The connections between people and spaces - i.e. networks of production and exchange at different levels of human interaction (personal, regional ... global) as shaped by changing socio-political and economic processes (e.g. racial discrimination, industrialisation, trade, political systems)

² Gilbert (1976:ix)

³ From henceforth, the term 'space' is used in a socio-geographical sense (i.e. not physics).

⁴ Christopher (2001:1)

⁵ 1997 Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR) - May (2000a:16)

⁶ 1997 PIR. May et al (2000b:31-32). The official Apartheid racial classifications of white (European), Black (African), coloured (mixed heritage), Indian (Asian descent) are used because they continue to reflect general socio-economic inequalities. Black (upper case) refers only to Africans, whereas black (lower case) includes all non-whites.

⁷ Williams (2000:168)

⁸ Population movement toward densely populated non-agricultural settlements.

⁹ Lemon (2000:186)

¹⁰ Lemon (1995:xi)

¹¹ Parnell (1996:42)

Introduction

Apartheid was “*essential spatial*”
Christopher (2001:8)

Apartheid is South Africa’s strongest spatial determinant, representing the “pinnacle of artificial geographical confinement”, serving to displace and hide perceived problems (e.g. poverty)¹². Apartheid’s urban spatiality was fundamental to social order; lines were drawn on maps, and people re-ordered accordingly. Overcoming this inherited structure is South Africa’s modern challenge, compounded by the escalation of violent crime. Spatial analysis in ‘New’ South Africa is not about geographical maps, but struggles over urban spaces (their meanings and usage), between people.

Previous tendency’s to blindly accept Anglo-American theories and experiences has struggled to embrace the specific cultural, economic and political needs of developing countries¹³. Indeed, an awareness of South Africa’s distinctiveness implies the futility of “intellectual traffic” between the post-apartheid arena and elsewhere¹⁴. However, although Simon accurately criticises prior over-emphases on Eurocentric visions of ‘real’ cities, his call for South Africans to exclusively re-shape urban agendas fails to recognise the need to combine this with external experience and research¹⁵. Robinson and Rogerson accurately reject this isolationist and “pigeonholed” approach, arguing against conceptualising South Africa as entirely unique; instead they encourage international collaboration, to jointly produce comprehensive agendas for South Africa¹⁶.

In terms of structure, I propose a hypothesis that post-apartheid fear of crime facilitates a new form of internal residential spatial order remarkably similar to Apartheid segregation. I then analyse urban socio-spatial and fear of crime theories and experiences (predominately Anglo-American, with Brazilian references) as background. Investigation then addresses the forces involved in creating the Apartheid City, to facilitate later comparison with modern forms. I subsequently assess current crime and fear of crime (principally utilising the 1998 Cape Town Crime Survey), and analyse their impact on post-apartheid socio-spatial residential urban-forms (citizen adjustments and state urban planning), in comparison to Apartheid. Finally concluding with suggestions regarding South Africa’s urban future.

¹² Bond (1992:39)

¹³ Gilbert (1976:10-12; 1998)

¹⁴ Robinson & Rogerson (1999:v)

¹⁵ (1999) – and also, ironically, negates his own UK-based research.

¹⁶ (1999:vi). Demonstrated by their combined article (Robinson is British; Rogerson South African).

Hypothesis

Urban South Africans endure fear of crime irrespective of race, class or spatial-residence. However, responses to fear differ according to socio-spatial identity. As citizens protect themselves from crime via urban-form, their differing strategies serve only to undermine government planning and deepen existing socio-spatial segregation.

This paper seeks to analyse residential urban-forms of citizen housing adjustments, and state urban planning. The focus is principally on the former, in undermining the latter and prohibiting post-apartheid visions of a non-racial spatial order.

The creation of these urban-forms is governed not just by crime, but *fear* of crime, leading to increased socio-spatial segregation and a 'New Apartheid'.

THEORETICAL BASIS

“Human social relations may be both space forming and space contingent”
John Western (1981:5)

Urban Space & Social Relations

Traditionally, urban space¹⁷ is considered principally geographical, but modern interpretations¹⁸ are increasingly steeped in historical, social and political-economy disciplines¹⁹. This paper dual-categorises urban space as physical (built environment), and symbolic (perceptions and fears). These spaces are personal (e.g. imaginary), private (e.g. domestic residence), public (e.g. streets), or mixed (e.g. schools, shopping-centres). Analysis addresses private and physical residential space, as a consequence of symbolic personal space, and impacting public physical and symbolic space. Space is not an isolated geographical entity, but changes according to circumstances. Thus, analysis emphasises the “spatial configurations of social relations”²⁰.

Although space and social relations are inherently tied, there is uncertainty regarding the importance of the former in determining the latter, or vice versa. Whilst the dynamics of urban spaces are a product of social interactions (between people, institutions etc.), spaces also create distinct social identities.

This ‘socio-spatial’ debate is traced to the Chicago School ‘human ecology’ interpretation (e.g. Park, Burgess, Wirth), explaining human behaviour by reference to the laws of ecology²¹. Their spatial determinism utilises a Darwinist ‘natural selection’ of space, in which dominant social groups competitively secure beneficial spatial positions. Burgess’ concentric-zone city model identifies closely juxtapositioned spatial zones, forming a ‘mosaic’ of touching but not penetrating social worlds²². This spatial proximity of difference (i.e. of those occupying different zones) is used to explain social relations. For example, Wirth attributed high criminality in the ‘transition zone’ to the *spatial* absence of formal (e.g. laws, institutions) and informal (e.g. shared community) controls, irrespective of the zone’s *social* composition²³. This emphasis on space in determining social action is further developed by Park’s detection of ‘natural areas’ within the transition zone, which combat the potential for deviance by developing spatial (rather than social) solidarity and identity²⁴.

Although Chicago School spatial determinism remains influential²⁵, such “spatial fetishism”²⁶ implies that urban space can be manipulated (e.g. by urban planners) and controlled (e.g. by police) to create a new social order. This ‘social order via spatial control’ served as Apartheid’s ideal, but its neglect of the social forces involved in creating urban spaces ultimately proved Apartheid’s downfall. However, opposing approaches²⁷, reducing spatial form to a static, passive backdrop and mere product of dynamic social relations, are equally problematic. Complete rejection of the socially constitutive force of space is as inaccurate as overwhelming acceptance.

Urban space and social mechanisms share a reciprocal relationship, with spatiality both a consequence and cause of social relations²⁸, for “society no longer accepts space [solely] as a container, but [also] produces it”²⁹. This interdependency is embraced by use of ‘socio-spatial’ throughout this paper, and further confirmed by John Western’s 1970s Cape Town research, recognising that whilst “space *enhances* societal distinction; social structure ... mirrors space”³⁰.

¹⁷ When ‘space’ occurs without the prefix, the meaning is always ‘urban space’.

¹⁸ E.g. Lefebvre (1974); Logan & Molotch (1987)

¹⁹ Miles et al (2000:29)

²⁰ Massey, (1999:166)

²¹ Park et al (1925)

²² From Zone I (central business district – fairly well ordered) outwards to Zone II (transition area: factories, poverty, criminals - collapsed moral order), then Zones III, IV, and V (commuter belts - increasing outwards in wealth, suburbia and ‘moral strength’). Pile (1999:13)

²³ Rock (1997:246)

²⁴ Park used Harlem as his case-study of the ability of area-based homogeneity to produce a distinct identity.

²⁵ E.g. Davis (1998) is a modern interpretation of Chicago School principles

²⁶ Unwin (2000:22)

²⁷ E.g. Lefebvre (1974); Soja (1989)

²⁸ Harvey (1973:10)

²⁹ Smith N (1984:85)

³⁰ Western (1981:254)

Crime and Development

Although crime and violence are increasingly recognised as “major obstacles to the realisation of development objectives”³¹, emphasis has prioritised obvious war and conflict manifestations rather than more long-term ‘normalised’³² crime and violence. However, the negative consequences of rapidly expanding crime rates³³ on economic development and productivity (especially in developing countries), has encouraged recent (albeit limited) research into non-war crime³⁴.

Distinguishing between crime and violence is necessary, for whilst ‘crime’ (“an act punishable by law”) is dependant on specific laws (although most crimes receive international agreement); ‘violence’ enables broader definition as “the undue exercise of physical force”³⁵. This paper addresses ‘crime’ (including violent crime³⁶) rather than ‘violence’.

Although the globalisation of crime is crucial to South Africa’s rising crime rates (the end of apartheid catapulted the nation into international arenas, after decades of isolation), global ‘organised’ crime in is not the focus of this paper³⁷. Rather, attention addresses the normalised property and personal “silent riots of everyday life”³⁸. World-wide, the majority of urban crime is property-based (e.g. burglary, mugging), whilst violent personal crime (e.g. assault, murder, rape) forms 25-30% of offences³⁹. Their validity in South Africa is confirmed by the 1998 Cape Town Crime Survey: property crimes are most common (47.2% of crimes), followed by violent personal crimes (16.8%)⁴⁰. Both types of crime encourage fear and insecurity, often according to specific urban spaces and social groups.

Despite general agreement that crime impedes development⁴¹, there is minimal consensus regarding whether development reduces⁴² or encourages⁴³ crime. However, the complex causes of crime are beyond adequate attention here, as analysis addresses victims (real and potential), fear of crime and subsequent urban-form protections, rather than perpetrators⁴⁴. “South Africa is ... riddled with violent crime [generating] ... an exaggerated fear of crime”, serving to spatially isolate an already divided society⁴⁵.

³¹ World Bank (1997) in Fajnyblyer et al (1998:1)

³² In contrast to war-time crime and violence as abnormal and temporary.

³³ Urban violent crime has risen by 3-5% per year since 1980 – Vanderschueren (1996:94)

³⁴ E.g. Ayres (1998), Fajnyblyer et al (1998), Vanderschueren (1996)

³⁵ Ayres (1998:24)

³⁶ Crime causing physical and/or psychological damage – Vanderschueren (1996:96)

³⁷ See Shaw (1996a), Gastrow (1998), Ellis (1999), & Smit (2001) regarding South Africa’s global organised crime.

³⁸ Bourdieu (1999:59) – comparing life in French and American ghettos

³⁹ UNICRI, 1995. Vanderschueren (1996:95-97)

⁴⁰ Camerer et al (1998:26, Fig 3)

⁴¹ E.g. Ayres (1998:7-8); Fajnyblyer (1998:32); Moser & Holland (1997:1)

⁴² E.g. Ayres (1998:31); Fajnyblyer (1998:31)

⁴³ E.g. McIlwaine (1999:454); Rogers (1989:314); Vanderschueren (1996:98-99)

⁴⁴ However, the blurred distinction between victim and perpetrator classifications is acknowledged - Moser & Clarke (2001)

⁴⁵ Shaw & Gastrow (2001:235-237)

Behavioural Theories

Anomie

Although not the primary focus of this study, it is necessary to briefly consider behavioural theories of criminality in order to facilitate subsequent analysis of victim (real or potential) responses. The anomie theory is favoured, where alienation occurs in the context of social disruption (e.g. the end of Apartheid and democratisation), encouraging citizens to aspire unachievable goals. Tönnies' (1887) human association concepts of 'gemeinschaft' and 'gesellschaft'⁴⁶ are utilised by Wirth, in explaining urban crime as a consequence of urban anonymity and impersonality (gesellschaft), and absent traditional community units (gemeinschaft)⁴⁷. Although Tönnies refuted claims of favouring gemeinschaft⁴⁸, his concepts fuelled subsequent explanations of crime as a consequence of urban isolation and anomie (i.e. gesellschaft)⁴⁹. Indeed, Park and Wirth's foundational premise is that urban anomie and the spatial juxtaposition of extremes provide excess crime potential by making the unattainable visible⁵⁰.

In South Africa, the combination of officially defunct spatial Apartheid laws and majority government has given rise to anomie. Indeed, in 1994 Nelson Mandela predicted that post-Apartheid freedom of movement between previously hidden socio-spaces, and the absence of a common enemy (i.e. the government), would encourage Apartheid struggle 'comrades', frustrated by unmet expectations, to develop a new enemy in "people who drive a car and have a house"⁵¹. Unfortunately, this is evident in South Africa where "brutal normlessness" feeds from the frustration of unmet expectations⁵².

Natural Surveillance

Jacobs strives to overcome anomie's negative consequences via street-level diversity. In this sense, dense, busy areas are favoured, as having more "eyes on the streets" (e.g. crime witnesses, bystander intervention), than the sterile pedestrian zones of modernist planning⁵³. She argues that 'natural surveillance' is facilitated by "almost unconscious networks of voluntary controls and standards" perpetuated by strangers in busy areas, thus promoting feelings of safety⁵⁴. Her work is animated by 'urban village' studies⁵⁵, and Newman subsequently developed her belief that spatial design can encourage citizens to acquire mutual responsibility, with his architectural 'defensible space'⁵⁶. Newman facilitates Jacobs' 'eyes' of natural surveillance via residential building design, yet also establishes territory to encourage Tönnies' gemeinschaft, in the midst of urban anomie.

⁴⁶ Tönnies (1955)

⁴⁷ Wirth (1938)

⁴⁸ Tönnies (1955:v)

⁴⁹ E.g. Durkheim (1893); Simmel (1903); Wirth (1938); Lewis (1959)

⁵⁰ Miles et al (2000:213)

⁵¹ Quoted in Scheper-Hughes (1996:897)

⁵² Adam & Moodley (1993:160-161)

⁵³ Jacobs (1961:64)

⁵⁴ Ibid:41

⁵⁵ E.g. Young & Willmott (1957); Gans (1962)

⁵⁶ (1972)

Fear of crime

Fear of crime does not necessarily match the risk of victimisation, but rather than augment the existing wealth of risk-fear mismatch literature⁵⁷, I address fear as a distinct issue in impacting urban-form, irrespective of actual risk. Fear is spatially, socially and temporally distributed⁵⁸, as an “emotional and practical response”⁵⁹ to perceived crime. Crime surveys and ethnographic research clearly indicate the ‘situated’ nature of fear of crime. Nevertheless, whilst Pain relegates spatiality a minor role in comparison to the constitutive force of social associations⁶⁰, Smith argues the opposite, that “*where* people live is often more important than *who* they are”⁶¹ in determining fear of crime. However, this dispute between social or spatial forces in constructing fear of crime is redundant in light of their indissoluble relationship noted earlier.

Citizens seek to alleviate socio-spatial fear and mitigate the incidence of crime by providing a sense of protection via urban-form (e.g. walls protecting residence) and altered lifestyle (e.g. restricted spatial movement, limited social interaction). Although this paper principally addresses the former, this clearly has an impact on the latter. This risk management, in which individuals assess risk and modify behaviour and urban form to eliminate fear and minimise crime, is aptly described as the “architecture of fear”⁶², and has a long history in urban design and public planning.

Fear in urban planning

Fear has always played a role in urban forms⁶³, influencing urban planning, residential design, and the spatial distribution of citizens. Indeed, Jeremy Bentham’s classic ‘panoptican’ prison design allowing permanent anonymous surveillance of prisoners, has strongly influenced numerous social engineering and design projects. Historically, the pre-modern city constructed walls and gates to exclude undesirables and thereby minimise fear, whilst the modern city was subsequently created in response to increasing fear of those already inside the walls. Baron Haussman’s nineteenth-century Parisian reconstruction is perhaps the most famous example of combating fear via urban-form. He ‘boulevardised’ the city in order to displace and fragment the feared revolutionary threat posed by the under-class⁶⁴. Although post-war modernist planners (e.g. Le Corbusier) subsequently altered strategies to destroy streets, eliminating fear remained the primary motivation, albeit via artificially ‘pure’ environments. As noted earlier, Jacobs and Newman’s approaches were both in opposition to this sterile modernist drive, but still sought to decrease fear via urban-form (natural surveillance and defensible space respectively).

The post-modern “globalisation of doubt”⁶⁵ and uncertainty has encouraged quests to control the uncontrollable. However, rather than previously *public* fear-based planning, post-modern fear-management is increasingly (although not exclusively) driven by *private* forces (including individual citizens). “Form [still] ... follows fear”⁶⁶, but increasingly creates privatised fortress spaces with ‘panoptican’ surveillance ranging from suburban shopping malls, fantasy worlds (e.g. Disney parks), to gated communities⁶⁷. Although predominately the domain of the affluent, such strategies to avoid difference (to eliminate fear), have significant consequences on the poor (usually the excluded and avoided ‘difference’), especially where wealth and poverty lie in close juxtaposition (e.g. South Africa).

⁵⁷ E.g. Beck (1992), Valentine (1992)

⁵⁸ This paper recognises, but does not specifically address the latter.

⁵⁹ Pain (2000:367)

⁶⁰ Ibid:372

⁶¹ Smith S (1987:6)

⁶² Agbola (1997)

⁶³ E.g. castle moats, Norman forts

⁶⁴ Benjamin (1968)

⁶⁵ Beck (1992:21)

⁶⁶ Bannister & Fyfe (2001:810)

⁶⁷ Ellin (2001:872-875)

Response to Fear: the negotiation of difference

Urban-form responses to fear essentially seek to negotiate the inevitable difference of city life. Whilst Burgess and Park identify spatial borders to avoid social difference, Jacobs embraces social difference to induce mutual responsibility and vibrant public space. More recently, post-modern drives to manage fear by controlling inhabited space (e.g. erecting physical and symbolic 'walls' to fix spaces and minimise interaction) serve only to increase fear and segregation.

The walled and exclusive city

The use of exclusionary walls ranges from Chicagoen concentric zones of separated city space⁶⁸, to extreme manifestations of 'gated communities'. The latter can be perceived as an intense (and artificial) version of Park's 'natural areas', whereby social groups maintain mutual solidarity and exclude difference via controlled private spaces. This is evident in America⁶⁹, where citizens "terrified of crime ... flock to gated enclaves"⁷⁰; and Brazil⁷¹, where proximity of difference and fear of crime have encouraged residential enclaves; and is increasingly evident in South Africa⁷². Fortified enclaves have various manifestations⁷³, but this analysis addresses "privatised, enclosed and monitored"⁷⁴ residential spaces. Enclaves spatially segregate social difference by physical separation (e.g. walls, gates), symbolic exclusion (perceptions of undesirables), private security (e.g. armed guards, electronic surveillance), inward-facing self-containment, and (artificial) social homogeneity⁷⁵.

Such bounded spaces are promoted by fear of crime rhetoric⁷⁶ and 'not in my back yard' (NIMBY) exclusionist and escapist mentalities⁷⁷. Their proponents promote such enclaves as necessary to provide protection from the external city (e.g. enabling minorities to establish themselves), and as crucial for fostering community in the midst of urban anomie⁷⁸. Indeed, Charles Jencks views enclaves as an inevitable and realistic solution to Los Angeles' ethnic heterogeneity, by limiting cross-cultural contact and thus preventing conflict⁷⁹. However, walls cannot create 'community', and Jencks' implicit endorsement of racist avoidance ignores the inequality of segregation, whilst his belief that separation eliminates conflict is not empirically proven. Defensible housing and planning can actually increase crime and conflict by deepening socio-spatial isolation and inequality. For example, Davis describes Los Angeles as a "fortress city"⁸⁰ in which segregation and fear have facilitated Burgess-esque dartboards of contained and warring spaces demonstrating "class war at the ... built environment"⁸¹. His comparison to the reel world is engaging, but encourages exaggerated predictions of public space's Armageddon. Jacobs and Newman are similarly negative, believing enclaves encourage a "gang way of looking at life" (i.e. territorial tribalism), bringing the "end of civilisation"⁸² and "total lockup"⁸³.

Unfortunately, such pessimism seems justified. The long-term negative consequences of residential enclosures are severe: in America and Brazil 'walls and gates' reinforce a vicious circle of poverty and exclusion, by concentrating the poorest social groups in spaces with minimal economic and political leverage⁸⁴. In South Africa, the pervasive and resilient nature of Apartheid's physical and symbolic socio-spatial exclusion and domination indicates a strong potential for emulating these experiences. Previously segregated racial groups now face a "new [visibility] of extremes" mirroring post-industrial

⁶⁸ E.g. Marcuse's "quartered city" (1995:256)

⁶⁹ E.g. Davis (1990, 1992 & 1998); Dillon (1984); Massey & Denton (1993).

⁷⁰ Dillon (1984:8). 8 million Americans are housed in 20,000 gated communities – Ellin (2001:874)

⁷¹ E.g. Caldeira (1996a, 1996b, 1999 & 2000); Scheper-Hughes & Hoffman (1998)

⁷² E.g. McLaughlin & Muncie (1999:117); Judin & Vladislavic (1998)

⁷³ E.g. enclosed malls (offices, recreation, accommodation, shopping), residential gated communities, Common Interest Developments.

⁷⁴ Caldeira (1999:114)

⁷⁵ Ibid:125

⁷⁶ Caldeira (1996a:55); Judd (1994:162)

⁷⁷ Ellin (2001:874)

⁷⁸ Blakely & Snyder (1997); Marcuse (1995:244).

⁷⁹ (1993:93)

⁸⁰ Davis (1990:224) parallels modern Los Angeles to Ridley Scott's 'Bladerunner' vision of the urban future.

⁸¹ Ibid:228

⁸² Jacobs in Dillon (1984:11)

⁸³ Newman (1972:2)

⁸⁴ America: Massey & Denton (1993:ix); Saff (1993:72). Brazil: Caldeira (1999:115)

western transformation, where the sudden proximity and visibility of material difference induced socio-spatial unequal concentrations of wealth and poverty⁸⁵. Empirical research identifies the negative impacts of fortified enclaves in facilitating “uneven development” (i.e. socio-spatial concentration of opportunities and resources)⁸⁶, legitimising the denial of difference, rendering public space usage conditional or unsafe⁸⁷, increasing unsubstantiated fears, and displacing crime to create a “city of walls”⁸⁸. Furthermore, enclaves are not solely responding to difference and fear, but actually deepen segregation and reinforce fear by excluding difference. These consequences receive further analysis in subsequent sections.

(b)The mixed and inclusive city

More optimistic views regarding the negotiation of urban difference emphasise social mixing⁸⁹. The inclusive city does not necessarily require a romantic vision of utopian harmony, but resigned cohabitation and occasional interaction. This ranges from Jacobs’ street-level chance encounters as the foundation of urban life, to Goffman’s desire for increased citizen exposure to diverse public spaces⁹⁰, and Simmel’s more pessimistic understanding of urban cohabitation as merely a necessary survival strategy⁹¹. For example, South African white residential spaces become day-time black spaces as domestic workers arrive each morning. However, the existence of diversity per se does not produce tolerance, and Goffman notes the fine-line between “full calm” and “agitation” in mixed urban space⁹². Ironically, strategies encouraging mixing and inclusion (e.g. Newman’s building design) actually provide the necessary territory and awareness of ‘other’, for increased exclusion and fragmentation⁹³.

⁸⁵ Massey (1996:359 & 409); Vanderscheuren (1996:99)

⁸⁶ Smith N (1984)

⁸⁷ Scheper-Hughes & Hoffman (1998:361-362)

⁸⁸ Caldeira (2000)

⁸⁹ With Amsterdam providing the classic example. Amin & Graham (1999:21)

⁹⁰ (1971:329)

⁹¹ (1903)

⁹² (1971:329)

⁹³ Judd (1994:165)

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Irrespective of utopian aim (exclusive or inclusive city), urban-form fear-management strategies (by citizens and urban planners) fall under situational crime prevention classifications of 'environmental design' (CPTED), seeking to manipulate physical (and by implication symbolic) spaces in order to alleviate (not eliminate) crime and fear⁹⁴.

Although fear of crime has long affected urban design, CPTED origins are traced to Jacobs, Newman, and formalised by C. Ray Jeffrey⁹⁵. Whilst Jacobs sought to encourage natural surveillance via street usage and layout, Newman translated this into residential design using territorial ownership, whilst Jeffrey subsequently expanded this to urban planning with his landscaping, security barriers, and street-lighting⁹⁶ emphasis. Later research has added spatial *perceptions* (i.e. symbolic socio-space) to the CPTED design matrix⁹⁷.

Typical criticisms that CPTED only displaces crime from the rich (who can afford situational prevention), to the poor (thereby increasingly vulnerability), are not empirically supported⁹⁸. However, some displacement seems likely, and CPTED is thus predominately promoted as a strategy to alleviate fear rather than combat crime. More concerning CPTED consequences lie in the emergence of 'fortress societies', used by the powerful to exclude undesirables.

Urban-form fear-management strategies strive towards desired socio-spatial alternatives. Indeed, Jacobs' critique of modernist sterile environments (e.g. Le Corbusier's designs) stemmed from her utopian ideal of diverse interactive societies. However, her assumptions of voluntary 'natural surveillance' only succeed when harnessed with territorial affinity (as Newman recognised). Yet this territory ultimately facilitates socio-spatial segregation (the very opposite of Jacob's aspirations), and the exclusion of difference (i.e. non-territory members). Whilst this exclusionary discourse seems fundamental to human nature, problems lie in the significant inequality between segregated groups. In South Africa the post-apartheid challenge is to combat this exclusionary ethos to create "inclusive urban spaces that welcome diversity and meet the contrasting needs of different social groups"⁹⁹ without inciting segregation.

⁹⁴ Clarke (1997:2)

⁹⁵ (1971)

⁹⁶ see Painter & Farrington (1997) for empirical research on street-lighting.

⁹⁷ Ekblom (1995:120)

⁹⁸ Clarke (1997:38)

⁹⁹ Beall (1997:3)

Consequences of exclusion

Both exclusive and inclusive mechanisms to negotiate difference and order urban space (e.g. erecting walls or pedestrianising spaces) promote symbolic spaces of safety, but also of danger (where disorder is displaced), “informed by a perception of the relative riskiness of particular zones”¹⁰⁰. Strategies to banish crime paradoxically establish “new versions of dangerous people and dangerous places”¹⁰¹, incited by “moral panics”¹⁰². Urban exclusion is driven by economic (e.g. fortified enclaves have higher property values), political (e.g. Haussman fragmented a perceived revolutionary threat), and social (e.g. fear of ‘other’) considerations. This analysis principally addresses the latter as the over-arching motivation, generating a new urban ecology based on the perceived dangerousness of ‘other’.

Fear of Other

Although fear of crime is commonly used as the justification for segregatory urban-forms, it is not necessarily matched by increasing crime, and is often used to disguise underlying motivations¹⁰³. Gold and Revill define this as “fear of crime *plus*”, and Judd’s urban America research reveals no direct link between crime rates and fear of crime (except in high-crime areas), with the majority exhibiting fear having minimal first-hand victimisation experience¹⁰⁴. This is upheld by Adler’s conclusion that “fear of crime [in America] may outstrip its reality”¹⁰⁵, and Scheper-Hughes notes similar experiences in Brazil, where a “culture of fear permeates daily life”¹⁰⁶. In South Africa, whilst whites manifest the highest levels of fear of crime, it is poor non-whites who actually suffer the most real crime¹⁰⁷. Although Judd suggests fear of crime as “code-word” for fear of race¹⁰⁸, the wider reality is fear of difference.

Linking fear of crime to certain social groups and spatial places¹⁰⁹ directs fear away from crime towards the undesirable ‘other’. Indeed, crimes with easily identifiable offenders rarely impact ‘fear of crime’; whereas blaming the unknown other renders problems uncontrollable, thus increasing fears¹¹⁰. The image of this “incendiary other”¹¹¹ is fuelled by everyday “talk of crime”¹¹², in which incidences are magnified, and the criminal is constructed as a member of the collective other (usually poor and black), seeking to penetrate ‘our’ socio-spatial purity. This incites a ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality, giving rise to exclusionary mechanisms legitimised as a reaction to fear of crime, but actually a consequence of (prejudiced) fear of ‘other’. Fear of crime is thus an expression of powerlessness due to loss of control over territory and urban order.

Exclusion of Other

“Who is felt to belong and not to belong” shapes residential space¹¹³. Ironically, although fear induces strategies to separate difference, such separations actually generate increased ‘moral panic’ by limiting social mixing and thus increasing paranoia and mistrust between groups. Mead’s “generalised other”¹¹⁴ provides a means of spatialising (i.e. “representational space”¹¹⁵) the negotiation of social difference by facilitating categories of ‘them’ (bad) and ‘us’ (good). Fear of difference disguised as fear of crime is “projected onto ... spaces ... which can be polluted by the presence of non-conforming people [other]”, thus necessitating ‘their’ exclusion for ‘our’ security¹¹⁶.

¹⁰⁰ Rose (2000:101)

¹⁰¹ McLaughlin & Muncie (1999:104)

¹⁰² Cohen (1972). Media reports also incite panic but are not addressed by this paper.

¹⁰³ Amin & Graham (1999:17)

¹⁰⁴ (1994:162)

¹⁰⁵ Adler (1983), ppix-xx

¹⁰⁶ Scheper-Hughes (1998), p380

¹⁰⁷ Shaw & Gastrow (2001), p236

¹⁰⁸ (1994:161)

¹⁰⁹ E.g. Milgram’s mental map of New York (1972)

¹¹⁰ Hollway & Jefferson (1997:259-260)

¹¹¹ Metaphor for 1993 LA firestorms labelling of blame – Davis (1998:130)

¹¹² Caldeira (1996b:201)

¹¹³ Sibley (1995:4)

¹¹⁴ (1934)

¹¹⁵ Lefebvre (1991)

¹¹⁶ Ibid:91

In America, fear of crime strongly determines the “design of buildings, commercial and residential space [e.g. Newman], and the spatial distribution [i.e. segregation] of urban populations”¹¹⁷. Irrespective of whether these fears are well-founded or unsubstantiated, their ability to “immobilise individuals and communities” is significant¹¹⁸. In Los Angeles, privatised spaces, panoptic surveillance and gated enclaves dominate the urban landscape¹¹⁹, but this is not limited to the West, and São Paulo’s rich and poor live in close *physical* proximity, but are *socially* and *spatially* segregated by walls, security systems and fear¹²⁰. Whilst socio-spatial segregation is a consequence of fear, this segregation increases fear of certain spaces and their inhabitants (‘other’) because of non-contact, and decreases confidence in public spaces.

Public Order and Citizenship

The consequence of replacing public spaces (e.g. streets) with private spaces (e.g. malls), and transforming public space to discourage ‘deviants’ (e.g. gates, electronic surveillance), is paradoxically, a decline in public order. Because, instigators of preventative spatial re-ordering (e.g. private citizens) have no responsibility ‘outside’ (i.e. to public order), the consequence is a spiral of ever-increasing segregation and unsafe public space for all¹²¹. Ironically, strategies to increase safety (by privatising space) actually increase the dangerousness of remaining public space, by abandoning it to those unable to afford the private world. By promoting private-owners to the rejection of all else, Douglas’ prediction of a future society composed of pure insides and dangerous outsides seems fulfilled¹²². These strategies invoke extremely limited and profit-driven understandings of public safety, failing (or refusing) to recognise the fine-line between safety and exclusion, thus legitimising the latter supposedly in the name of ‘safety’.

This retreat from public space promotes inequality and separation, which are irreconcilable with the democratic values (crucial to post-apartheid South Africa) of universality and equality. Segregation ensures public space is unsafe for everyone, and renders usage a conditional right¹²³. Indeed, Caldeira notes that the Brazilian obsession with minimising crime by controlling space has involved the rejection of universal individual rights (to those perceived a threat), and thus undermined democracy¹²⁴. Democracy requires the acceptance that different social groups deserve equal rights, whereas segregation encourages polarising social groups into distinct universes¹²⁵. Robinson disagrees, arguing that the importance of space in democracy (i.e. constituencies) has strengthened the “voice”¹²⁶ of previously ignored South African social groups¹²⁷. However, this ignores the inequalities of socio-spatial separation (which voting power has failed to address), and inability of the poor to “exit”¹²⁸ ‘their’ spaces.

The assumption that every perceived risk demands a security response produces a fortress city of uneven development. Davis’ “ecology of fear” model identifies containment and exclusion zones, which only serve to create additional fear, isolation and social exclusion; benefiting the rich at the expense of marginalising the poor¹²⁹. Fear of crime further excludes already marginalised groups by labelling them as dangerous ‘other’, in order to legitimise ‘their’ exclusion, for ‘our’ safety. This symbolic exclusionism is South Africa’s fundamental development obstacle.

¹¹⁷ Judd (1994:160)

¹¹⁸ Sandercock (2000), 209

¹¹⁹ Davis (1992)

¹²⁰ Caldeira (2000)

¹²¹ Franzén (2001:205)

¹²² Douglas (1966)

¹²³ Scheper-Hughes & Hoffman (1998:361-362)

¹²⁴ (1996b:204)

¹²⁵ Caldeira (1999:136)

¹²⁶ Hirschman (1970)

¹²⁷ Robinson (1998:546-547)

¹²⁸ Hirschman (1970)

¹²⁹ Davis (1992, 1998)

SOUTH AFRICA

“In our country we have civilised people, we have semi-civilised people and we have uncivilised people. The Government ... gives each section facilities according to the circumstances of each”
Minister of Justice, Mr Swart (1953)¹³⁰

Introduction

Clearly South Africa is distinct, in that Apartheid designated spaces for social groups (by race and ethnicity). However, the prevalence of segregation in post-apartheid South Africa and also in cities without a history of official Apartheid (e.g. Los Angeles, Paris, São Paulo), warrants comparable analysis. In fact, segregation in non-apartheid cities is also often unnaturally enforced¹³¹, and the Apartheid City concept is similar to advanced capitalist cities (e.g. Burgess' model), with a Central Business District surrounded by residential areas differentiated according to socio-economic status (under Apartheid, different class-based spaces existed within races).

Despite official 'middle-income' classification, South Africa hosts (at least) two countries, displaying an advanced white economy alongside wastelands of black poverty. This extreme inequality is traced to South Africa's long history of racial segregation, particularly Apartheid. Although typically explained using the 'apart-ness' literal translation, Apartheid is better defined as a "social system founded upon the 'setting apart' in space of different race groups"¹³². Apartheid manipulated both society and space, in that the *spatial* distancing of blacks on urban peripheries reflected and facilitated *social* distancing from whites. In order to assess post-apartheid socio-spatial citizen urban-forms and state planning, it is first necessary to analyse Apartheid City construction.

¹³⁰ Christopher (2001:5)

¹³¹ E.g. Paris: Baron Haussman's reconstruction; Los Angeles: Davis (1990:228) attributes urban segregation to postliberal elite's (Reagan-Bush); Belfast: segregation as consequence of ethno-sectarianism (Shirlow, 2001).

¹³² Robinson (1996:1)

The Apartheid City

Apartheid projected racial discrimination onto three levels of spatial structure. 'Grand' Apartheid partitioned national space to create ten 'homelands' for the Black population, leaving 87% of national land for whites, coloureds and Asians (24% of the population)¹³³. This legitimised Black disenfranchisement, as they became citizens of their (supposedly one-day independent) homelands, rather than of South Africa. 'Petty' Apartheid segregated public spaces and facilities between whites and non-whites; whilst 'urban' Apartheid established race-based residential segregation. This analysis principally addresses the latter Apartheid level (although petty and grand receive assessment by inference), as a residential socio-spatial solution to negotiating urban difference.

The Afrikaaner National Party came to power in 1948, introducing a barrage of legislation to preserve white supremacy. All South Africans were officially classified according to skin colour, history and language by the 1950 'Population Registration Act'. The 'Group Area Acts' (1950 and 1966) projected these population groups into specific urban spaces, separated by buffer-zones of open land. This urban re-design sought to minimise racial interaction, allocating preferential urban space to mirror socio-political positions (i.e. an enforced Chicagoan ecology). Whites were allocated large central areas, and blacks displaced to distant urban periphery townships. This urban transformation involved the physical destruction of previously black areas¹³⁴, and by 1984¹³⁵ had forcibly relocated over 126,000 families (only 2% were white)¹³⁶. Day-to-day urban interaction was regulated by the 1953 'Reservation of Separate Amenities Act', which prevented personal contact by providing separate facilities¹³⁷. However, Apartheid did not just segregate races, but entrenched inequality; of housing form, geographical location, environmental landscape, and distribution of facilities. There was no attempt to disguise Apartheid's explicit white-supremacy, justified by blaming the victims ('backward' Africans) for their fate¹³⁸. Apartheid manipulated urban spaces to legitimise inequality (based on white hegemony), but ultimately produced a violently divided society rather than peaceful separation.

The origins of the Apartheid City are fiercely debated, with battle-lines drawn between urban segregation as a continuation of prior colonial strategies¹³⁹, or a radical alteration to previously liberal urban policies¹⁴⁰. Empirical evidence confirms both; in that although the 1948 National Party inherited highly segregated cities¹⁴¹, Apartheid's subsequent legislation formalised previously haphazard processes, and the degree of change varied (e.g. impact was severe in Cape Town, which had previously hosted residential integration). Analysing the motivations behind South Africa's history of urban segregation provokes similar disagreement. Although Swanson's orthodox 'sanitation syndrome' explains Black segregation as initiated to curb the spread of disease¹⁴², new research suggests this health justification a pretext for alternative motives, such as state power¹⁴³, or material economic interests¹⁴⁴. However, racist fear of 'other' remains the salient motivation, whether disguised as spatial quarantine, political sovereignty, fear of commercial competition, protection of property prices, or securing business land.

Although the Apartheid City model maintained Burgess' *concept* of socio-spatial separation, his annular concentric zones (requiring cross-group commuting) were inappropriate, and a sectoral structure prevailed¹⁴⁵. Christopher assesses the translation of this urban Apartheid model into reality, using 1991 census data. The level of urban segregation was almost total, and surprisingly (given it's integrated past) Cape Town was South Africa's most segregated metropolis. Nationally, only 8% of the 1991 urban population lived outside designated areas (5.7% in Cape Town), mostly constituting migrant workers resident in hostels, or domestic servants resident in white employee homes¹⁴⁶. The

¹³³ Smith (forthcoming:7)

¹³⁴ E.g. Sophiatown (Johannesburg), District Six (Cape Town - see Kruger, 1992).

¹³⁵ When court ruling ended forced removals.

¹³⁶ Christopher (2001:112)

¹³⁷ The quote by Mr Swart (p15) was used in justification of the Act.

¹³⁸ Tapscott & Thompson (1998:4)

¹³⁹ Christopher (1990, 2001); Davies (1981); Lester (2000); Maylam (1995); Robinson (1996)

¹⁴⁰ Lemon (1990, 1991)

¹⁴¹ Davies (1981)

¹⁴² (1977)

¹⁴³ Robinson (1992, 1996)

¹⁴⁴ Bond (2000); Mabin (1995); Maylam (1995)

¹⁴⁵ See Davies' (1981) pictorial model.

¹⁴⁶ Christopher (2001:123-5)

significance of this for South Africa's future is immense; for so few of South Africa's 1990s urbanites had "lived even part of their adult lives in racially and ethnically integrated communities"¹⁴⁷ that the post-apartheid continuation of exclusionary 'other' mentalities is surely to be expected.

However, although urban segregation was achieved, Apartheid was not a static model translated direct from theory into urban-form, but ultimately forced to respond to internal (e.g. Black urbanisation and resistance) and external (e.g. international sanctions and investment) pressures. The subsequent section addresses Black urbanisation, as crucial in bringing Apartheid's demise, and shaping post-apartheid urban space.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid:128

Demise of the Apartheid City

Urban Apartheid strove to enforce the impossible; for whilst whites considered the city their cultural domain, with Blacks merely 'temporary sojourners' (homelands being their permanent space), whites required cheap labour. Urban Apartheid thus destroyed itself by establishing a "myth of spatial forms so discordant with reality"¹⁴⁸. This white urban-ideal was "patently unsustainable"¹⁴⁹, and the inevitability of Black urbanisation proved Apartheid's spatial downfall.

Black urban presence was necessary to sustain white hegemony, but was not matched by adequate accommodation. In fact, Cape Town's 1955 declaration of coloured labour preference legitimised poor housing provision by rendering Black presence virtually unnecessary. However, the housing of Black workers in migrant hostels or requiring commuting from distant homelands was insufficient to fulfil white needs, and informal squatter settlements became a common blemish on the Afrikaaner urban utopia. Blacks with no roots in 'their' homelands and unable to afford distant commuting from "dormitory housing areas"¹⁵⁰, defied Apartheid to secure urban space. Although illegal, their "precarious perch"¹⁵¹ was strengthened by the mid-1970s survival of Crossroads settlement (Cape Town) against the threat of demolition. However, the violence within settlements inhibited progress, and their tendency to locate on township peripheries only reinforced Apartheid geography.

Recognition of the inevitability of Black urbanisation alongside housing shortages, generated the 1988 'Free Settlement Act' of 'orderly urbanisation'. Although important in recognising the permanence of urban Blacks, the periphery locations of subsequently established townships (e.g. 'Khayelitsha', south-east Cape Town¹⁵²) simply continued expensive commuting and racial segregation, accompanied by zero-tolerance against squatting in central areas.

By 1990, (in the context of violent uprisings and international pressure), FW de Klerk's government finally accepted Apartheid's long-term unsustainability and entered negotiations with the ANC (pragmatically hoping to preserve white minority interests). De Klerk subsequently repealed the Group Areas Act, Nelson Mandela was released after 27 years in captivity, and South Africa's 'long walk' to reconciliation commenced.

¹⁴⁸ Smith (forthcoming:2)

¹⁴⁹ Smith (1992:7)

¹⁵⁰ Dewar (1992:246)

¹⁵¹ Smith (forthcoming:1)

¹⁵² See Cook (1992) re-Khayelitsha's origins

Cape Town

Located on Africa's south-western tip, Cape Town is South Africa's oldest urban settlement (founded in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company), and third largest city (after Johannesburg and Durban). Cape Town's demographics are radically different to South Africa in *not* accommodating a Black majority (only 25% of Cape Town's population), but an almost coloured majority (48%), and relatively dominant white minority (21%)¹⁵³. This demographic anomaly is a consequence of the Coloured Labour Preference Act (which artificially constrained Black urbanisation), and Cape Town's heritage as the birthplace of coloured people (descendants of mixed unions between Dutch settlers and Malay slaves).

This distinct population significantly affects Cape Town's political control and segregation history. As voting continues to reflect racial identity, Cape Town's municipality is an ANC void. In South Africa's first democratic elections (1994), the National Party retained city council control, and the Democratic Alliance dominates the new 'unicity' council (2000 elections)¹⁵⁴. Although Cape Town witnessed South Africa's first Black segregation (1901, to avert spreading bubonic plague), it was the least segregated city inherited by the 1948 National Party. In fact, Cape Town's liberal municipality initially boycotted the implementation of the Group Areas Act. However, this was a pragmatic desire to maintain existing social segregation (e.g. separate facilities), and avoid the expense of constructing residential segregation, rather than an ideological opposition to Apartheid *per se*¹⁵⁵. The subsequent implementation of Group Areas radically re-structured Cape Town's socio-space to "unscramble"¹⁵⁶ residents, particularly coloureds (who previously enjoyed residential integration).

As noted earlier, Cape Town subsequently became South Africa's most segregated city, dividing differentiating quality space according to race. Cape coloureds were forcibly removed to unconsolidated Cape Flat scrub-lands (and subsequently Mitchell's Plain dunes), with virtually non-existent services, and long commutes to employment. Cape Town Blacks remained in already segregated periphery locations, thus were less affected by Apartheid's initial introduction, but were subsequently (1955) expelled in favour of coloured labour¹⁵⁷. By 1983, township over-crowding and squatting (e.g. Crossroads) in defiance of Apartheid, led to the creation of Khayelitsha Black township on the distant south-eastern city edge, with minimal water and sanitation facilities¹⁵⁸. Although this township was demarcated for formal housing only, by 1993 there were 50,000 informal shacks and only 16,659 formal homes¹⁵⁹. In contrast (both to Capetonian blacks and other South African whites), Cape Town's white population enjoyed secluded prosperity throughout Apartheid, having spatially and socially distanced themselves from 'other' (blacks), and 'their' problems (e.g. violent crime, poverty). Preserving inner Cape Town was essential to white-identity, for coloured presence served as reminder of the potential outcome of racial mixing.

Robinson parallels Foucault's image of a carceral city¹⁶⁰ to the Apartheid City, with its barrack-like residential zones, and prison-like army surveillance¹⁶¹. However, the socio-spatial structure of the Apartheid City delved far deeper than Foucault's mere physical image, to penetrate symbolic socio-space. Apartheid's *spatial* distancing of Blacks far from whites, flanked by coloured zones, reflected *social* distancing, but also "re-made" spaces to deepen social divides¹⁶². Western's research revealed that although Apartheid space was based on race, the new spaces of Apartheid altered perceptions of the city, to produce deeper social distinctions¹⁶³. In Cape Town, the same ethnic groups re-located to different areas subsequently developed spatially-distinct identities (e.g. coloureds resettled in southern suburbs considered themselves *socially* superior to coloureds in the *spatially* distant Cape Flats). In this sense, spatiality both *makes* and *enhances* difference, by dividing groups, to re-produce symbolic perceptions about 'other' and 'difference'¹⁶⁴.

¹⁵³ 1996 census. Wilkinson (2000:200)

¹⁵⁴ Merten (2000)

¹⁵⁵ Bickford-Smith (1995:65-74); Western (1981:121-125)

¹⁵⁶ Bickford-Smith (1995:74)

¹⁵⁷ Saff (1998a:87)

¹⁵⁸ Cook (1991, 1992)

¹⁵⁹ Saff (1998a:89)

¹⁶⁰ Foucault (1977)

¹⁶¹ Robinson (1992:292)

¹⁶² Western (1981:253)

¹⁶³ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁴ The classic example being Vancouver's Chinatown (Anderson, 1987)

According to Saff, Cape Flat wastelands “lacked the social cohesion ... [of] previous areas”, leading to a “mushrooming of crime, divorce, alcohol abuse [etc]”¹⁶⁵. Although Saff risks romanticising the past, Kruger and Western provide strong empirical evidence for Cape Flats anomie against vibrant interaction in previous locations (District Six and Mowbray, respectively). The Apartheid strategy of resettling households (rather than entire communities), destroyed socio-spatial roots, entrenched the spatial distancing of social groups, and encouraged black fear of immediate yet unknown surroundings (as opposed to white fears of distant unknown spaces)¹⁶⁶. Apartheid Cape Town emphasised the ‘containment’ (of coloured labourers, to periphery spaces) and ‘abolition’ (of Blacks, to distant homelands) of ‘other’, to provide security and improve race relations (to benefit whites). Yet the manipulation of space served only to increase fear and worsen race relations, as Capetonians became increasingly spatially and socially distant.

¹⁶⁵ (1998a:52)

¹⁶⁶ Western (1981:310)

Crime in urban South Africa

The end of apartheid, democratisation and majority rule was optimistically anticipated to end the violence of South Africa's 1980s armed struggle. However, since 1990¹⁶⁷, a new form of "urban terror" has engulfed South Africa, prioritising criminal activity rather than political insurgency, and spreading into previously protected white suburbs¹⁶⁸.

South Africa clearly hosts a severe crime epidemic, yet the unreliability (and unavailability) of official statistics renders quantification virtually impossible. Crime statistics are universally ambiguous, dependent on victim/witness reporting and police recording. In South Africa these problems are aggravated by historic police mistrust, previously functioning as brutal enforcers of government procedures, rather than citizen protectors. In addition, the recent moratorium on crime statistics has further hampered public confidence and trust in the police¹⁶⁹. Nevertheless, despite statistical problems, crime figures are necessary to discern *general* crime trends¹⁷⁰, especially if considered alongside crime surveys¹⁷¹.

Following the moratorium lifting, figures released in 2001 reveal horrific increases (from 1994 to 2000) in serious crimes, in particular, residential burglary (property crime) increased by 16.6%, and rape (violent personal crime) by 9.4%¹⁷². Evidently, South Africa is engulfed by violent crime, and is commonly entitled the world crime capital, (with Cape Town as murder capital), yet international comparisons are ambiguous (e.g. different reporting and recording levels). However, murder serves as an adequate proxy for comparisons (reporting is high because the evidence (i.e. a body) is difficult to permanently conceal). In 1998, South Africa had the world's highest recorded per capita murder rate, at 59 per 100,000 people (almost ten times the USA rate of 6.3)¹⁷³. Furthermore, research undertaken during the moratorium (by the Medical Research Council), reveals that 41% of Cape Town's children who die before the age of 19 are murdered, by firearms in 50% of cases¹⁷⁴. This is largely a consequence of gangsterism and vigilantism on the Cape Flats¹⁷⁵. These limited statistics are sufficient to accept South Africa as crime-ridden, but impact is not uniform, and varies according to social group and spatial area.

Although crime affects all South Africans, the "threat of victimisation ... is determined by where individuals live and work", and Apartheid's socio-spatial legacy ensures crime remains concentrated in poor black social groups and spaces¹⁷⁶. According to the 1998 'Cape Town Crime Survey' undertaken by the Institute for Security Studies¹⁷⁷, white suburbs experience less crime per capita (than black areas), but are disproportionately affected by property crime (40% of crimes against whites are burglary)¹⁷⁸. In contrast, black areas host both property crime (25% of crimes against blacks) *and* high violent personal crime (34% of crimes against blacks are murder or assault)¹⁷⁹. Although unsurprising that those comparatively wealthier are most vulnerable to property crime, the divergent socio-spatial experience is significant.

This is aggravated by Apartheid's skewed socio-spatial distribution of personal and institutional resources. For example, despite lower crime rates in former white areas, the majority of police stations

¹⁶⁷ The crime explosion came in 1990, not 1994 as commonly assumed (Louw, 2001:138)

¹⁶⁸ Hough (2000), p71

¹⁶⁹ In July 2000, the government banned releasing crime statistics, arguing that errors reduced reliability. One year later, in June 2001 the moratorium was lifted after legal action from the media (Kindra, 2001; Smith C 2001)

¹⁷⁰ Louw (1997:142)

¹⁷¹ Shaw & Gastrow (2001:238). Crime surveys reveal 60-70% more crime than official statistics (Schönteich & Louw (2001:1)

¹⁷² Kane-Berman (2001)

¹⁷³ Masuku (2001); Thompson (1999:87)

¹⁷⁴ Smith C (2001)

¹⁷⁵ Which is beyond the scope of this paper. See Pinnock (1985); Kinnes (1995, 2000); White-Hafeele (1998) regarding gangsterism in Cape Town.

¹⁷⁶ Shaw & Gastrow (2001:243-244). Although age, gender, and socio-economic status also determine victimisation, this dissertation predominately addresses socio-spatial determinants.

¹⁷⁷ The survey asked experiential (direct victimisation) and perceptual (sense of safety) questions to a representative sample (6,000 respondents) of Cape Town residents, and is the basis for subsequent analysis. (Camerer et al, 1998).

¹⁷⁸ Ibid:32, Fig 7

¹⁷⁹ Ibid:30-31, Figs 5 & 6

are located here¹⁸⁰, inhabitants are more protected by infrastructure (e.g. private cars, street-lighting), and able to afford private security. In contrast, poorer blacks inhabit areas with weak 'defensible space' (e.g. no street-lighting or telephones, abandoned open spaces), are poorly policed, and cannot afford private security. This spatial distribution of victimisation and resources strongly impacts fear of crime.

¹⁸⁰ In 1996, 75% of all police stations were in former white areas. Budlender (2000:134)

Fear of Crime in Cape Town

Despite South Africa's long history of crime, its increasing visibility in previously protected (white) areas, has fuelled modern anxieties. In a 1994 public opinion survey, only 6% of respondents viewed crime as a major concern, yet by 1997, this figure had swelled to 58%¹⁸¹. This increase is significantly above the relative rise in crime rates, representing the growth of post-apartheid fear of crime. Although *growth* in fear is predominately concentrated amongst whites, fear of crime per se is not confined solely to wealthy white suburbs, and “[poor] settlements ... are [equally] permeated by fear”¹⁸².

Measuring fear of crime is problematic, given its emotional and qualitative nature. Despite the inadequacies of crime surveys¹⁸³, this analysis utilises the 1998 Cape Town Crime Survey to provide information on fear and responses to fear. According to this survey, 77% of residents believe crime has increased since 1994, and their fear of crime is closely tied to temporal socio-spatiality. For whilst 95% of whites feel safe in their day-time residential area, only 52% of Blacks and 56% of coloureds agree¹⁸⁴. Fear is most stark at night, when only 11.9% of Blacks and 9% of coloureds feel safe in their residential areas, as opposed to 51% of whites¹⁸⁵. This is confirmed by actual victimisation; for whilst most (79.2%) white victimisation occurs away from residential areas by unknown assailants, most Black (51%) and coloured (55%) victimisation occurs in their residential area, by known assailants¹⁸⁶. This racial divergence represents the different social-spatial individual and institutional resources noted earlier. All groups demonstrate fear, but whilst whites fear what lies beyond neighbourhood boundaries, blacks fear immediate surroundings. As crime rates increase (even if crime stabilises, reporting is increasing), fear will theoretically follow suit.

However, as noted earlier, fear is not solely linked to crime, but masks fear of ‘other’. This can be traced to perceptions regarding the causes of crime; for whilst whites see rising crime as representative of the new (black) government’s inability to rule (i.e. protect citizens), blacks attribute increased crime to unfinished democracy and African immigrants¹⁸⁷. Whites have long used fear of crime as a euphemism for fear of blacks; Apartheid’s ‘swart gevaar’ (Black danger) and ‘skolly menace’ (scoundrel coloureds) justified segregation, and post-apartheid uncertainty extends this to fear of ‘their’ rule. For blacks, crime is not new but upsurges are linked to the influx of ‘ama-kwiri-kwiri’¹⁸⁸ following 1990 border openings. Thus fear is traced to ignorance (e.g. of spatial origin) and inability to understand (e.g. language) the ‘other’ blamed for crime.

This ignorance was aptly highlighted by Cape Town’s (white) intelligence-chief, Attie Trollip, who publicly asked colleagues at a recent police briefing the location of high-crime coloured areas, saying: “where is Delft? Where is Hanover Park?”¹⁸⁹. However, this ‘other’ ignorance is not confined to whites: 77% of blacks claim not to understand whites, and 51% could never imagine having white friends¹⁹⁰. The consequences of Apartheid’s spatial isolation in prevented social understanding and thus encouraging a fear of unknown ‘others’ is the post-apartheid continuation of this fear, still used as justification for social and spatial distancing.

¹⁸¹ Gordon (1998:17)

¹⁸² May et al (2000c:254)

¹⁸³ E.g. asking fear-based questions increases anxiety; specific groups (e.g. men) under-acknowledge fear.

¹⁸⁴ Camerer et al (1998:74, Fig 24)

¹⁸⁵ Ibid:75, Fig 25

¹⁸⁶ Ibid:51 & 58, Fig 7

¹⁸⁷ ISS 1996 survey – Shaw (1998:43)

¹⁸⁸ Xhosa term for African immigrants - based on the sound of their speech.

¹⁸⁹ Lemer (2001)

¹⁹⁰ Institute for Justice and Reconciliation survey - Mail & Guardian (2001)

The Post-Apartheid City

The 'negotiation of difference' is particularly important in the post-apartheid South African City, where necessary socio-spatial re-structuring cannot openly condone the suppression of difference, but requires new types of spatial planning¹⁹¹. Re-mapping the Apartheid City is fraught with conflict, fuelled by identities rooted in the "(very present) ghosts of apartheid spatiality"¹⁹². In Cape Town, post-apartheid development is constrained by conflicting agendas; whilst government and business aspire world-class status, poverty-stricken residents demand equality, and wealthier Capetonians security. The latter is driven by fear, augmented by those demanding equality, both of which undermine the former. Despite significant political progress, with two democratic elections and a progressive constitution, Apartheid's socio-spatial structure remains dominant. Although groups previously perceived as 'other', now have the spatial potential to become 'neighbour' by moving from the periphery (townships, homelands), to increasingly visible areas (squatting or purchasing property within white areas), in reality this potential is severely constrained¹⁹³.

A crucial issue facing any post-apartheid government is the "desegregation of social space, particularly the residential milieu"¹⁹⁴. However, whilst urban planners struggle to reconcile the conflicting post-apartheid agendas of diverse stakeholders, citizens are responding independently. In the absence of Apartheid controls and coherent urban planning, the indication is that such sudden proximity of difference is increasing fear and private retreat, rather than promoting integration. This is confirmed by Christopher's 2001 geographical analysis, in which he identifies escalating fear of crime in (increasingly 'grey', mixed race) city-centres as responsible for business relocation to (racially segregated) suburbs¹⁹⁵. In a similar manner, extreme fear within former white suburbs (particularly fuelled by squatting) has encouraged residential enclaves and gated roads with private security guards¹⁹⁶.

¹⁹¹ Mabin (1995:187)

¹⁹² Robinson (1998:546)

¹⁹³ Sandercock (2000:203)

¹⁹⁴ Maharaj (1994:21)

¹⁹⁵ (2001:213). E.g. The 1990s Stock exchange move from Johannesburg to Sandton.

¹⁹⁶ Judin & Vladislavic (1998)

Response to Fear: Citizen residential strategies

Space invaders

Grant Saff's seminal research identifies a dual process of desegregation and deracialisation of space in post-apartheid urban South Africa. The desegregation of white suburbs is characterised by the "in-migration of blacks of an income status equal to or higher than those [whites] moving out"¹⁹⁷. Whites predominately accept these middle-class migrants on the basis of their social status and limited number, and space has been made available by 'white flight' (overseas and to enclosed neighbourhoods), rather than from disruptive housing construction. The expected and feared flooding of blacks to non-white areas has not materialised, only 1.58% of Cape Town's property transfers (1990-1994) involved movement into areas previously zoned for another group, and desegregation is concentrated in a handful of southern suburbs with pre-existing coloured heritage¹⁹⁸.

In contrast, Saff's concept of deracialised space involves the invasion of "informal settlements onto the boundaries of, or within, 'white' areas"¹⁹⁹. Although this juxtaposition of extreme affluence and poverty successfully alters *spatial* dynamics, *social* dynamics persist as black residents (squatters) are refused access to the suburb's 'white' facilities (e.g. schools, health clinics). Thus, non middle-class blacks remain socially excluded from white privileges, and spatially concentrated in segregated suburb peripheries.

Although Cape Town has long tolerated land invasions on periphery space, in 1991 three settlements erupted adjacent to affluent white areas (Hout Bay, Noordhoek, Milnerton – i.e. not periphery locations), and were unexpectedly granted legitimate status. Opposition from property owners (predominately white) in neighbouring suburbs was couched in exclusionism, justifying 'their' (other) removal from 'our' land. Although anti-squatter discourses stress non-racist justifications (fear of crime, decreasing property values), these "camouflage"²⁰⁰ a (predominately racist) fear of 'other'. By excluding 'other' into deprived spaces and only welcoming blacks of similar socio-economic status, the social construct of 'other' as dangerous is reinforced, providing further exclusionary justification. This competition for space polarises insiders ("with access to desirable space") from outsiders ("on the margins, looking in")²⁰¹. Moving away from simplistic white-black lens, to embrace this insider-outsider exclusionism, explains why township blacks oppose black squatters and immigrants, in the same manner as whites oppose black squatters but accept affluent blacks. Apartheid used this individual 'right' to space as justification for white supremacy, whilst the post-apartheid context is developing a virtually identical included/excluded socio-spatial system.

Indeed, since 1992, no further informal settlements adjacent to white suburbs have been condoned, and in light of violent Zimbabwean land-grabs, even periphery invasions are now unacceptable. For example, in August 2001 flooded Khayelitsha-township residents built shacks on adjacent (periphery) land, but were driven off by police using teargas²⁰². Subsequently the government has strengthened the law to ensure future land invasions are prosecutable, and the Cape Town municipality has assembled an anti-squatting rapid response team with equipment to demolish shacks²⁰³. This blaming of 'dangerous' squatters rather than embracing recognition of South Africa's catastrophic housing shortage, is remarkably similar to Apartheid's abolition of urban Blacks, and serves to legitimises white panic of this 'other' as violent and criminal (i.e. stealing land), rather than recognising any equal right to housing and space.

Fortress City

For affluent urban whites, with high mobility and conditional majority rule support, rising crime is used as justification for emigration and socio-spatial isolation. Since 1994, South Africa has experienced an

¹⁹⁷ Saff (1994:382)

¹⁹⁸ Saff (1998a:94–97)

¹⁹⁹ Ibid

²⁰⁰ Saff (2001:90)

²⁰¹ Ibid:102

²⁰² Ferreira (2001)

²⁰³ Ibid

annual net loss of (disproportionately high-skilled) citizens²⁰⁴, and those remaining have increasingly embraced private security and fortified homes, thus entrenching Apartheid-esque socio-spatial divides.

As Cape Town's privileged perceive declining political control and rising fears, 'NIMBYism' prevails, believing that removing problems from visibility (e.g. squatters, poverty), effectively removes the problem. Again, this resembles Apartheid and pre-Apartheid strategies of removing urban Blacks to displace problems (e.g. bubonic plague) away from whites. However, not content with security-conscious houses, wealthy South African's are increasingly seeking to avoid crime and mitigate fears by fortifying entire neighbourhoods, closing street access, and employing private security guards to patrol their citadels. Local authorities have been inundated since 1994 by requests to close entire neighbourhoods, but the length of time involved in gaining legal consent, has led to numerous illegally enclosed neighbourhoods²⁰⁵. Indeed, Gauteng is the only province with specific legislation regarding such enclosures, and other authorities remain uncertain how to proceed. The absence of research into enclosed neighbourhoods is striking considering their potential long-term consequences, but is currently being redressed by CSIR studies²⁰⁶.

According to the study there is no conclusive evidence to support pro-enclave claims of decreased crime or increased community²⁰⁷. In fact, erecting walls and monitoring entrants (potential residents and visitors) actually facilitates social exclusion, enhances urban segregation, and disrupts urban planning and management (e.g. emergency and municipal service routes). Thus far, "fortress Johannesburg"²⁰⁸ has dominated enclosures in South Africa, but as crime and fear rise in Cape Town, South Africa's 'murder capital' seems destined for a similar 'fortress' fate. Johannesburg's experience thus provides potential predictions for urban South Africa, and as her wealthy areas have become increasingly shaped by "separated and fragmented cells" this has affected not just those living inside, but also those excluded²⁰⁹. By creating a fantasy of control and safety for those 'included', the fundamentals of democracy and equality are not only undermined, but physically prevented.

These perverse 'defensible space' strategies are not facilitating Jacobs' natural surveillance and urban vibrancy, but promoting Le Corbusier's modernist desire to 'kill the street', and forcing the poor into deteriorating gutters. Irrespective of whether enclosures reduce crime and fear their impact is exclusionary and reproduces uneven development.

Residential protection

Although enclosed neighbourhoods are confined to the affluent, other fear-management strategies *do* exist; yet the majority of Blacks (92%) and coloureds (87%) have no form of residential protection, as opposed to a minority (30%) of whites²¹⁰. However, although white homes are best protected, they also suffer most property crime. Of those 8% Black Capetonians with some form of protection, most rely on basic strategies such as dogs, window grills and high fences²¹¹. Cape coloureds with protection adopt similar physical strategies, but a minority also utilise burglar alarms²¹². By contrast, the 70% of whites with residential protection rely heavily on sophisticated alarms, high walls, and armed response private security²¹³. Overall, the vast majority (80%) of Capetonians with residential protection, identified this as important in alleviating fear of crime²¹⁴. These responses to fear correlate with perceptions of safety noted earlier. For whilst those with protection (whites) feel most safe in their residential areas, those with minimal protection (blacks) feel least safe in their areas.

²⁰⁴ See Kane-Berman (1998)

²⁰⁵ E.g. Gauteng 'Robinson Group'. Mabanga (2001)

²⁰⁶ Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research – preliminary findings in Landman (2000a)

²⁰⁷ This is supported by USA research. E.g. Blakely & Snyder (1997)

²⁰⁸ Lipman & Harris (2000)

²⁰⁹ Landman (2000b)

²¹⁰ Camerer et al (1998:68, Fig 22)

²¹¹ Ibid:69

²¹² Ibid

²¹³ Ibid:70

²¹⁴ Ibid

Although alternative policing is expanding, with the wealthy increasingly employing private security²¹⁵, and poorer communities exercising vigilantism²¹⁶ and neighbourhood watch, such non socio-spatial urban-form responses are beyond this paper.

Cape Town manifests diverse fear-management strategies, yet the universal consequence is increasing crime and fear, amidst a reinforcement of Apartheid-esque socio-spatial divisions. . For whilst, “the rich live behind walls topped with barbed wire; the poor cope as best they can ... crime is a way of life”²¹⁷. High walls, dogs, armed guards and enclosed neighbourhoods have not brought peace of mind, but reproduced fears (via ‘talk of crime’) as homogenous groups are socio-spatially distanced from their ‘other’. Whilst whites fear the unknown ‘other’ as perpetrator, black fears address a different ‘other’, and perceived inability to protect their residence. This socio-spatial segregation and unequal ability to protect appears remarkably similar to urban Apartheid.

²¹⁵ The private Security sector has witnessed an annual growth rate of 18% since the 1980s. See Shaw (1995); Schönteich (1999).

²¹⁶ E.g. People Against Gangsters And Drugs (PAGAD). See Shaw (1996b, 2000).

²¹⁷ Thompson (1999:87)

Response to Fear: Government Strategies

Transforming Apartheid's socio-spatial physical and symbolic segregation is South Africa's fundamental post-apartheid challenge. However, citizen fear-management strategies of erecting walls and enclosing neighbourhoods have had a perverse effect, leaving public and private spaces devoid of natural surveillance, deepening segregation, and undermining government strategies.

Crime Prevention

Rather than transform the Apartheid ethos of centralised policing (to suppress opposition), the post-apartheid government has retained centralised control, using the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) to co-ordinate all crime prevention activities. The NCPS is based on four pillars: improving the criminal justice system, environmental design to minimise criminal opportunities, increased public participation in crime prevention, and tackling trans-national crime²¹⁸.

This paper is principally concerned with the second pillar, reducing crime opportunity by permanently altering physical and/or social environments. The Apartheid City operated environmental crime prevention (for minority-safety) on a grand scale, and thus post-apartheid interventions require local contextualisation to prevent repeating Apartheid-esque crime displacement to poorly protected areas. However, NCPS' Pretoria-centric nature is ignorant of localised needs. Indeed, Cape Town interventions have addressed wealthy areas (e.g. Waterfront), least affected by crime, thus facilitating displacement to townships and informal settlements, where layout and density (e.g. pedestrian-only access to houses, scarcity of telephones) inhibit policing²¹⁹. Furthermore, the lack of measurable targets has made quantification of success or failure virtually impossible, and the NCPS is largely perceived to have made no impact on crime or fear of crime²²⁰. In order to address these inadequacies, crime prevention in South Africa requires implementation within and/or alongside urban development strategies.

Urban Development

Two visions dominate post-apartheid urban development: the financial and political 'one city one tax base', and the compact-city design to combat late-Apartheid's urban sprawl²²¹. Despite immense opposition, the former is essentially achieved by Cape Town's 'unicity', and analysis addresses the latter.

The compact-city model seeks to expand the range of facilities accessible to all South Africans by locating urban growth *within* existing boundaries, rather than constantly extending urban edges. This requires utilisation of Apartheid's empty spaces (e.g. buffer-zones, low density white areas), and the creation of 'activity corridors' (with retail, housing, offices etc.) between different group areas, to facilitate Jacobs-esque vibrant interaction. 'The Urban Foundation'²²² and World Bank promote this strategy, as necessary for channelling development towards "compact, accessible, economically prudent" cities²²³.

In theory, Apartheid's reservation of excessive central urban land for whites facilitates compact-city space²²⁴. However, citizens have undermined urban plans: low-cost central housing provisions have been pre-empted by squatters, and fortressing rejects 'activity corridors', whose reliance on private security-conscious malls negates Jacobs' interaction anyway. In an attempt to regain control, the 1999 'City Integration Programme' identifies low-cost housing in central suburbs (to promote desegregation rather than deracialisation)²²⁵, but remains constrained by lack of finances and the fortressing which follows attempts to infiltrate former white areas with non-middle class blacks (other).

²¹⁸ RSA (1996:7)

²¹⁹ Shaw & Louw (1998)

²²⁰ Shaw (1998:36); Budlender (2000:137)

²²¹ Robinson (1999:182)

²²² South African business-sponsored think-tank.

²²³ Urban Foundation (1990a:43)

²²⁴ In 1992, there was 1,632 hectares of under-used state land in Cape Town. Behrens & Watson (1992)

²²⁵ Christopher (2001:238)

Irrespective of implementation failures, there is considerable doubt over the potential ability of the compact-city to facilitate interaction and decrease fear, even if implemented. For example, increased inner-city density in America has led to increased violence and conflict, not mixing and peace²²⁶. However, alternative strategies to upgrade services and build low-cost housing *within* existing townships (e.g. 1994 Reconstruction & Development Programme, 1995 Urban Development Strategy, 1997 Urban Development Framework) although providing much-needed services, effectively legitimise Apartheid segregation by abandoning blacks to socio-spatial peripheries, albeit with marginally improved material conditions. As yet, the post-apartheid governmental strategies to alter *space* into order to ensure an equitable *social* order, have all inhibited real transformation by emphasising stability (with incremental change), serving only to “amplify [the] worst characteristics” of the apartheid city²²⁷.

Ironically, whilst central government officially advocates compact-cities despite implementation problems, Cape Town authorities and property owners favour exclusionary NIMBY responses. Since the December 2000 establishment of a unicity administration in Cape Town, the Democratic Alliance mayor, Peter Marais, has been intent on promoting Cape Town as a world-class city and tourist destination, albeit at the expense of sweeping blacks “out of sight”²²⁸. His 2001 ‘Operation Shack Attack’ to eradicate informal dwellings lining Cape Town’s airport-city route, and removal of informal traders from traffic lights, seek to remove eyesores, rather than tackle problems²²⁹. This exclusionary mentality of “make it invisible and the problem will disappear”²³⁰ seems evident amongst both Apartheid and post-apartheid citizens and officials.

²²⁶ Robinson (1997:380)

²²⁷ Bond (2000), p341

²²⁸ Rostron (2001). Although Marais was subsequently removed from office, his world-class vision of Cape Town remains upheld by other politicians and business-men.

²²⁹ Ibid

²³⁰ Education Minister Kadar Asmal. Ibid

CONCLUSION

"Freedom's just another word for someone else's space"
X. Mangu, (1998)

In response to the original hypothesis, interim analysis has revealed that citizen residential strategies *have* undermined government planning and increased socio-spatial segregation. However, this 'New Apartheid' is not driven by fear of crime, but fear of (and prejudice against) 'other', encouraged by South Africa's exclusionary history. Redressing this urban socio-spatial inequality (to facilitate development), requires challenging exclusionary mind-sets (i.e. symbolic rather than physical space).

Comparison to the Apartheid City

It was axiomatic that Apartheid's socio-spatial entrenchment would constrain post-apartheid urban development, but inherited obstacles have been magnified by post-apartheid responses to fear of other. Despite significant changes in urban space, such as black settlements adjacent to affluent suburbs, and the movement of blacks (including immigrants) to inner-cities, reactions from former inhabitants have prevented desegregation.

Three key similarities between the Apartheid and post-apartheid city are identified: use of fear, insider-outsider exclusionism, and spatial re-settlement. Under Apartheid, the State used 'swart gevaar' fear to exclude blacks (and associated problems) from visibility to urban periphery settlements. Similarly, post-apartheid citizens use fear of crime to mask their NIMBYist exclusion of other by settling within enclosed and protected spaces. Apartheid's reliance on exclusionary fear-management strategies ensured minimal mixing, maximum ignorance and fear of difference. In promoting the Groups Areas Act (1950), the Minister of the Interior remarked: "as soon as there is a group area then all your *uncertainties* are removed and that is, after all, the primary purpose of this Bill [requiring residential segregation]"²³¹. Apartheid encouraged all races to consider themselves a separate nationhood, with distinct physical boundaries and symbolic identities. Therefore, with sudden post-apartheid potential proximity of difference, citizens have emulated the fear-management strategy they previously witnessed the state operating, that of socio-spatial exclusion and segregation. Apartheid's strongest legacy is thus not physical structure, but symbolic exclusionism.

Cape Town remains a "city of exclusions, not inclusions", and according to media reports is more polarised and segregated today than in the 1980s²³². Whilst the government declares intentions for spatially integrated compact-cities, the failure to address pervasive exclusionary mentalities threatens to undermine South Africa's future, and return the nation to Apartheid. For example, upgrading periphery townships re-enforces Apartheid 'containment', poor blacks are prevented from travelling in wealthy areas by privately-controlled access points in a manner worryingly similar to Apartheid's 'passes' for urban blacks, and fear of the unknown cripples whites from accessing black spaces.

²³¹ Massey & Denton (1993:1) - my emphasis

²³² Rostron (2001)

Alternative Solutions?

Planning inevitably requires normalising and standardising reality to erase difference, and in South Africa this 'homogenisation' of needs has occurred to the extent of ignoring the diverse lifestyles within and between socio-spatial groups²³³. While modernist planning sought to 'manage' fear via the exclusion and 'purification' of public space, post-apartheid physical planning needs to encourage citizens to 'overcome' and 'face' fears, in order to embrace diversity and combat symbolic exclusionism. As yet, South Africa lacks an overall urban plan, but whilst this is criticised for inhibiting urban transformation²³⁴, Mabin & Smit caution against perceiving planning as South Africa's nirvana, arguing for less government planning and more citizen initiative²³⁵. However, unchecked citizen initiative (e.g. enclosed neighbourhoods) have severely negative public consequences, and thus urban planning and citizen needs require reconciliation.

Simon advocates constructing broad ranges of housing types, sizes and densities *within* single residential areas, in order to prevent a new class-based apartheid²³⁶. However, this naïve prescription (in terms of social mixing and spatial availability), would not affect those rich enough to establish fortified enclaves or emigrate, or those too poor to afford low-cost housing. Furthermore, experience reveals the failure of artificially integrated communities²³⁷, leading to deracialised rather than desegregated space.

Post-apartheid's urban-space problematic lies in the vast black urban periphery areas enduring from Apartheid; for whilst low-cost housing is most available here, township-upgrades only enhance segregation. This is a spatial reality avoided by compact-city idealists, and suggests planners need to move away from seeking the impossible task of re-scrambling the apartheid *spatial* order, to concentrate on the reality of contradictory and tense *social* relations. Such an approach stems from Sennett's theory that encounters with difference are fundamental to urban life²³⁸. By acknowledging fear as stimulation's flip-side, 'integrated urbanism' facilitates disorder by regenerating peripheral zones, and allowing citizens to change accordingly, rather than embracing 'master plans'²³⁹. This seems congruent with Mabin and Smit's earlier noted caution, and is evident in plans to develop 'activity corridors' between different group areas, which as yet have been unsuccessful only because of the government's misguided prioritisation of a 'compact city' previously fuelled enclosures.

Social integration cannot be forced via cheap housing in suburbs, especially when 50% of whites and 36% of blacks consider the Apartheid concept of separate development as "basically good"²⁴⁰. The legacy of apartheid is not solely spatial, South Africans conditioned by separation maintain racist exclusionary mentalities. Thus, rather than suppressing change and alleviating fear, South African planning needs to surrender to the inevitability of fear and segregation, prioritising *connecting* groups (i.e. activity corridors) rather than destroying segregated spaces.

Although enclosed neighbourhoods are certainly a form of environmental design crime prevention, their perverse impact on external crime render them beneficial only to a minority. Furthermore, as they undermine government policy and actually increase fear amongst residents, their effectiveness seems defunct. Yet their popularity remains strong, necessitating increased awareness amongst policy-makers. Whilst urban form strategies to manage fear are understandable; they are not a solution, but a reaction, with severely negative long-term consequences.

²³³ Spiegel et al (1999:145)

²³⁴ Lemon (1998:15); Williams (2000:171)

²³⁵ (1997)

²³⁶ (1999:32)

²³⁷ E.g. America – Saff (1993:72)

²³⁸ (1970)

²³⁹ Ellin (2001:876-881)

²⁴⁰ Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Survey. Mail & Guardian (2001)

The Future

The Post-apartheid image of diverse races embracing a single 'rainbow nation' (coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu), was used by Nelson Mandela to encourage unity and non-violent transition throughout the 1990s. However, the concept is a myth glossing over vast economic inequalities and deep racial divides. Thabo Mbeki has not embraced the concept, favouring a painfully honest description of South Africa as 'two nations' of black poverty amidst white wealth. Although criticised for openly challenging white economic power and thus increasing racial polarisation, Mbeki's analysis is largely accurate.

Landman projects current urban trends into the future, depicting a 2020 Johannesburg city of "urban forts". Her description parallels Davis' LA predictions, with wealthy citizens confined to protected enclaves, only exiting safety-zones within protected cars for brief exposures to "war-zone" public space²⁴¹. Although seemingly melodramatic, the consequences of abandoning public space are already evident in South Africa's city-centres, where residential and business flight to the suburbs has facilitated slum-like inner-cities and racial turnover from white to black. The problem is wide-spread, and Durban's September 2001 'World Conference Against Racism', estimated that 250 million people world-wide live in segregation²⁴². Although this paper has principally utilised American and Brazilian experiences, comparison to other African cities²⁴³, could provide beneficial lessons and predictions.

South Africa's urban future remains torn between walled and exclusive, or mixed and inclusive. Transformation to the latter requires challenging exclusive-inclusive symbolic mentalities *alongside* walled-mixing physical activities. Although limited interaction does co-exist with segregation (e.g. black domestic workers in white spaces), strengthening this fragile urban mix is problematic. For example, whilst Newman-esque CPTED mechanisms could alleviate fear and minimise exclusionism, they can also increase fears by providing territorial affinity on which to base exclusion. Alternatively, Jacobs' inclusive mixing could be facilitated by activity-corridors: but mall-styles discourage diversity, and destroy public space; whilst street-styles would not alleviate fears and thus be avoided by the protected privileged.

Apartheid's emphasis on changing space to limit social mixing (i.e. Chicagoen spatial determinism) ultimately failed because of inability to recognise the power of social forces (e.g. urbanisation). Post-apartheid citizens have continued this social determinism (e.g. squatting, fortressing), undermining the state's continued spatial determinism. For example, compact-city policies have fuelled maximum-security cities rather than integrated utopias. Therefore, planning requires transformation to embrace socio-spatialism (rather than spatial determinism), and reflect post-apartheid needs of equality and inclusion rather than exclusionism. This involves not lifting the poorest to luxurious minority life-styles (economical and environmentally unsustainable), but re-conceptualising acceptable life-styles and combating exclusionary mind-sets.

Whether the physical urban future holds military public space, fortified citadels, or integrated neighbourhoods remains to be seen. But in the absence of strategies to overcome symbolic exclusionism, the latter seems increasingly unlikely.

²⁴¹ (2000b)

²⁴² ZA Now (2001)

²⁴³ E.g. Harare – Cumming (1991), Davies (1992); Windhoek – Simon (1986); Lagos – Agbola (1997), Hart (1989), Piel (1991); Cairo – Hart (1989)

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