



Ten years ago, in April, two events occurred in Africa that was to leave an indelible mark on the history of the Continent. The first was the birth of democracy in South Africa and the installation of the first black President of a country dominated for over 300 years by a white minority population. This was an event that brought new hope to millions of people in Africa and the rest of the world. The people of South Africa had chosen dialogue as a means to resolving their conflict.

Today, ten years later, the people of South Africa go to the polls for the third time to elect their representatives to the Parliament. In that time, the Government has been able to provide housing to almost 6 million citizens, provide over 60 percent of households with access to clean water, 63 percent of households with access to sanitation, and increase electricity connections to over 70 percent of households. This is a remarkable record when one compares the low base that existed prior to 1994. This is the peace dividend that came from South Africans opting for dialogue instead of war.

There were several factors that led to this remarkable record of the provision of basic social services to the millions of destitute in South Africa. Included among these factors is the fact that South Africa's choice of dialogue over war, ensured that its intellectual capacity remained alive and its infrastructure remained intact. These two factors have allowed South Africa to make rapid progress.

While South Africans and the world were celebrating their new beginning, another event occurred that redefined how the world viewed Africa. In April 1994, almost half a million people were massacred in a sweeping genocide that shocked the world and placed Rwanda on the international agenda. The people of

Rwanda chose to silence their opponents rather than dialogue with them.

The genocide left Rwanda without schools, hospitals and other basic social services. It also left a non-functioning State with no civil service and no administrative capacity. Commercial infrastructure was destroyed.

Today, despite the best efforts of the Government and people of Rwanda, they still face severe challenges. The peace dividend is taking a long time to come. The country faces a huge task in reconstructing its infrastructure. These are the consequences of war.

The lessons from these two examples that occurred so ominously close to each other, must surely indicate to the entire world that the only hope for sustainable peace and rapid development, is dialogue and the peaceful settlement of disputes. On this the tenth anniversary of the South African freedom and the Rwandan genocide, let the lessons of these countries be our guiding beacon towards shaping a new world order... a world order premised on dialogue and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Unless we reflect on these two countries and that short but significant ten year history, we will continue to have more 9/11's, more Bali's, Madrid's, Iraq's, Bosnia's, Liberia's and Palestine's. This global war of "unknown" enemies must come to an end if we are to get peace and stability in the world. Let us begin a global dialogue, across all barriers. Let us use all the means at our disposal, including the media and diplomacy... let us speak with words and understand each other rather than speaking with arms and killing each other. ♣

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LAURA BISAILLON

FEATURES

living in limbo

A profile of Djibouti's Somali refugee women

*C'est une vie incroyablement précaire ...
la vie d'un africain.*

(Farah, 2000)

Somali author Nuruddin Farah reminds us that the lives of many Africans is highly precarious. For the refugee living in a country other than his/her own, this is even more the case. Indeed, Farah's comment is a direct quotation from a Somali refugee living in a Kenyan refugee camp at the beginning of the 1990s. The man had fled Somalia in 1991 after ethnic and clan conflict broke out in the country as a result of the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre's regime in January of that year. Ironically, the man had headed up a refugee camp for Ethiopians in Somalia from 1981 to 1989. At one time, Somalia

was host to a constant stream of immigrants, with Ethiopians forming more than a quarter of the national population (Farah, 2000). After dispensing care to refugees for many years, the man found himself a refugee.

This example illustrates that the life of the refugee is indeed precarious: refugees are largely dependent on external assistance from the international community, the host government and locally based non-governmental organisations. It is also indicative of the close human and geo-spatial relationships that exist among the peoples of the Horn of Africa. If there are refugees in Djibouti, it is because of inter-regional and national conflicts, in addition to natural disasters, in the neighbouring countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.



Somali refugee women are of Muslim faith, and camps are locations of conservative observance to Islamic and cultural practices. Women are outside of decision-making circles and age, gender and clan relations determine the social hierarchy

Community reconnaissance

Under different circumstances, women refugees in Djibouti would be journalists, architects and dentists, and they would have increased chances for formal learning and working in non-traditional disciplines. Yet, overcoming these obstacles, female refugees in Africa have successfully taken measures to reduce their dependency on external agencies, thereby increasing their self-sufficiency and improving local capacity. Through creative community planning and programming, refugee self-confidence, safety and long-term prospects have been enhanced (UNHCR, 1995).

In spite of scattered success stories, however, the lives of female refugees can be particularly precarious: along with children, they are most often victims of violence and social exclusion (UNHCR, 2003b; 1996). In Djibouti's refugee camps, for example, Somali women lament that they have not enjoyed full access to education, and their lives have been characterised by monotony and repetition in the thirteen years that the camps have existed. What is more, women are not included in the major decisions with which the camps are faced. Their share of family responsibilities outweighs those of their mates, and women find it difficult to create sources of income. Boredom and depression are the two most persistent conditions, causing distinct health problems according to camp physicians (Dhaka, 2003).

It can be argued, therefore, that women and

children are the most vulnerable sectors of society in post-conflict situations, and are most in need of critical and sustained care tailored to their particular needs. In accordance with international law, repatriation happens strictly on a voluntary basis, and Somali women in Djibouti camps ask themselves:

“What happens to us should we stay in Djibouti? Where is home? What awaits us on our return to our native country?”

Complexion of a community

Women outnumber men in Djibouti's two refugee camps. Djibouti hosts approximately 24 000 Somali refugees, as well as a small group of Ethiopian refugees,¹ in two camps at Ali Adde and Holl Holl, south of Djibouti City, the capital of the country. The demographic complexion of the two camps is different. In Holl Holl, the refugee population is homogenous: peoples of Somali extraction. In Ali Adde, by contrast, there are two distinct groups of refugees: Somalis and Ethiopians, with nine-tenths of these Somali. Exact and up to date numbers of refugees are not known because the last census of the refugee population dates from 1997.

The Ali Adde and Holl Holl camps are located 119 km and 50 km, respectively, from Djibouti City, and are located next to villages housing approximately 1 000 and 4 000 inhabitants. In addition to the population that resides in the camps, nomads from the surrounding volcanic mountain ranges populate the areas around the camps. An estimated 20 percent of the country's population are nomadic pastoralists (Republic of Djibouti, 1998). Resident refugee populations in the two camps have been in the Djibouti hinterland for approximately thirteen years. Djibouti has also hosted Somali and Ethiopian refugees in the past at a number of locations throughout the country. The greatest influx of refugees was in 1977, when thousands of Ethiopians arrived in Djibouti fleeing Ogaden War (Lévèillé, 2004). In 1981, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established a permanent presence in Djibouti. The country's and the capital city's population swelled and the demographic make-up of the country changed considerably.

Absence of critical life skills

The tiny room that is host to twenty or so Somali

refugee women is breezy, though the arid wind sweeps up the dust and whips sand all around, obliging the women to hunch their backs and shield their eyes in protection. Their faces are already somewhat masked by the colourful and ample fabrics that conceal most of their upper and lower bodies; the *de rigueur* Muslim uniform for Somali women. The country's seasons are two: hot and slightly less hot. From May to October, winds called *Sabo* and *Khamsin*² howl, and temperatures hover around 45° Celsius. Such climatic conditions are challenging, as are the difficulties relating to water supply. Ali Adde refugee camp, unlike Holl Holl, is not naturally endowed with a plentiful underground water source. Women young and old, as a result, travel great distances to furnish their families with the fresh water supplies necessary for cooking and bathing.

While the climatic and weather conditions present thus burden women in particular, the most serious social and lifestyle handicap women face is the inability to read and write. Refugee women above the age of twenty in Djibouti's two refugee camps are generally illiterate. Women generally do not read or write in English or Somali.

Today, the group of women has assembled according to the committees into which they have divided themselves. The president of the young women's group is present, as is the representative of the mature women's group, along with the leader of the widow's group. Several women know how to write their names, and take a very long time to carefully write the six or so characters across the blackboard. During these moments, silence falls on the room as women observe each other with great interest (and possibly envy).

The Somali refugee women have come together at the request of the new UNHCR Community Services with the aim of collecting qualitative information about them, as recounted from their point of view. To be sure, gatherings of women engaging in activities other than those of a domestic order is an uncommon spectacle and arouses curiosity from some (especially the male members of the camps), and downright suspicion from others. Initially, the women are too timid to speak aloud, preferring to have one woman speak on their behalf. Gradually, though, the women refugees begin to speak about themselves, volunteering information and answering questions about their collective selves in an animated



and then vibrant, even boisterous, fashion.

How do you come to be a refugee? How did you reach Djibouti? From which part of Somalia do you hail? How long have you resided in the camp? What are your skills, needs, ideas, and dreams? What is it like to be a refugee in this camp?

Mapping acts as springboard

Women congregate in tight and non-confidential quarters because there is no women's centre. With the men safely at bay, the women come alive! Babies swathed in voluminous layers of fabric are roused from slumber because of the dulcet tones and familiar traditional rhythms. This welcoming and friendly start is the form adopted for the commencement of all community meetings between the women and UNHCR Community Services.

When presented with a wall-sized, attractively coloured topographic map of the Horn of Africa, with Somalia at the far right bordered by the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, the women's eyes widen. They cannot read the letters or interpret the map. When the map makes its appearance a short distance and within arms distance in front of them, the friendly women are hushed. The geographical



Somali refugees were historically nomadic pastoralists in the Horn of Africa before adopting a sedentary lifestyle approximately thirteen years ago

configuration of the Horn of Africa is explained, including the spatial relationships between the region's five countries. Curiosity is roused. The contours of the mountain range running east to west along the Gulf are what provide the women with some visual clues as to where their native villages are found. Guided by the quietly eloquent 22-year old bilingual interpreter, Zahra Mouhoumed Moussa, who gracefully interprets from Somali to English and vice versa, communication flows with an agreeable cadence.

Women refugees and their families fled Somalia on foot to find refuge in Djibouti in early 1991, when civil war broke out in north-western Somalia following the demise of the Siad Barre regime. Clan conflict characterised the fighting in this part of Somalia, from which the country has yet to recover. The vast majority of Somali refugees were nomads prior to sedentarisation about 13 years ago. Investigations relative to future aspirations and plans conducted with women from July to September 2003 reveal that returnees are apt to adopt a sedentary rather than a nomadic lifestyle in either Somaliland or Somalia.

The women's fingers glide tentatively across the map surface from the Djibouti border in the west to the north-eastern tip of Somaliland where the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean meet at Africa's easternmost point. The women are in a concentrated and

concerted search for their community names, which include *Waqooyi Galbeed* in the north-west of Somaliland, *Seylac* and *Lughaya* along the Gulf of Aden, and *Boorame* and *Gabiley*, adjacent to the Ethiopian border. A minority of refugee women hail from Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.

Women's clearly articulated needs

For three months, from July to September 2003, UNHCR Community Services engaged in extensive fieldwork in Djibouti's camps. Efforts focused on analysing the situation, working with groups of women and vulnerable persons to collect qualitative data, and identifying needs and skills. The goal of these exploratory activities was to design a strategic plan for community development based on specific, realistic and mutually agreed upon actions. Djibouti's first *Community Services Action Plan* drew inspiration from examples of successful planning with Burundi refugees in Kibondo, Tanzania (Pitzner, 2002) and creative community programming in non-refugee settings (McKnight and Kretzman, 1996).

The Somali refugee women articulated their needs succinctly and clearly. They wish to live well and improve the lives of their children. They therefore seek basic literacy courses for illiterate adult women refugees; continuing education training, including 'self-awareness' (reproductive health and self-protection) for women refugees in their late teens and early twenties; and vocational skills training, specifically tailored to provide avenues for current and future income-generating activities. There is also an interest in continuing education training for camp teachers, who are often young refugees.

Articulating skill sets was more of a challenge. The refugee women were not under the impression that they possessed any skills of particular merit. However, preparing healthy food, rearing children successfully and birth spacing, and animal husbandry require skills such as planning, communication and organisation. Once it was demonstrated that women in other parts of Africa transform these seemingly ordinary skills and knowledge into income-generating activities (UNHCR, 1995), the women were prepared to speak of corollary skills such as singing, dancing, wood-working, sewing, leather work, handicraft

fabrication, and reading, to name a few.

The goal of the Action Plan is to increase refugee self-reliance through a comprehensive and sustainable initiative that puts refugees at the centre of their own development. In the process, girls, adolescent and mature women become educated and qualified, and gain self-confidence and leadership skills. Vulnerable persons also come to play a more central role in the refugee communities. The provision of new life skills, while focusing on the enhancement of refugee dignity and their sense of self-worth, is also an essential component. Decreasing refugee dependency on aid agencies is also a key outcome. The objectives of the Action Plan are to find durable solutions to observed problems; train women to be responsible actors in their development and growth; employ a participatory approach towards programming; and intervene swiftly and with concrete action based on solid preparation.

Social fabric and considerations of culture

It is absolutely indispensable to consider gender, religious and clan roles and relationships when trying to understand the dynamics in the Djibouti refugee camps. UNHCR Community Services found it useful to consult excerpts of Somali (in particular the Issa Clan) law to examine societal organisation and codes pertaining to the status and role of women (Ali M. Iye, undated). Almost all refugees in the camps are of the Islamic faith and as such age, gender, and clan relations determine the social hierarchy. The male elders are said to have been traditional leaders in Somalia and remain the decision-makers in the camps. Historically, men have been the breadwinners, though currently in Somaliland, “women are the principal wage earners in 60 percent of Somaliland homes” (Life and Peace Institute, 2003). Women are responsible for domestic activities such as cooking and the collection of firewood and water, and there is little opportunity for women to engage in activities other than subsistence. However, a growing number of young women are interested in health training opportunities offered by the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia, UNHCR’s health partner (Zahra H. Elmi; Dhakal, 2003).

Women are largely excluded from the decision-making circles and do not enjoy rights or opportunities equal to those enjoyed by men. For



UNHCR
Women are generally illiterate but have an avid interest in learning languages, mathematics, sewing, business development and a range of other valuable life skills that will increase their knowledge base and facilitate their reintegration in Somaliland or Somalia. The recently painted façade of the elementary school at Ali Adde refugee camp is seen here

example, sexual violence against women is not followed up in a systematic fashion with the result that the immediate protection and long-term care of women is not guaranteed. Cases of rape may or may not be reported and resolution is often in the form of financial compensation negotiated by a traditional council composed of male relatives. In addition, young women are largely absent from community meetings because the social structure dictates that they be in their homes attending to domestic responsibilities. In general, adolescent girls leave school at fifteen because they are increasingly expensive to the family purse as they enter puberty and approach the age of wedlock (Zahra M. Moussa and Zahra H. Elmi, 2003). Lastly, until November 2003, women did not participate in the monthly distribution of food rations. This makes Djibouti’s refugee women different from any existing operation organised jointly by UNHCR and the UN World Food Programme.

There are thus potential limitations to what can be accomplished and these are influenced by cultural, temporal and historic factors at play in the two camps. Refugees at Holl Holl and Ali Adde have depended for a protracted period of time on allowances and the distribution of aid. Therefore, refugees in these camps have tended to learn dependence as a means of survival. What is more, they tend to be passive recipients of aid. Over the past thirteen years since the inception of the camps, refugees have benefited from sporadic community development efforts by implementing partners. A lack of consistency in

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A Community Services Officer engages Zahra Mouhoumed Moussa, covered in turquoise, and other refugee women in a community-building exercise near the gardens at Holl Holl refugee camp

community development services, however, has meant that refugees have little or no experience with concepts such as the participatory approach, active self-support, self-responsibility, income-generation activities, or collaboration and collective action.

Relations between camps and capital city

The relationship between the refugee population and Djibouti's hinterland and capital city has been assured for some time. There is regular traffic between the camps and the capital as refugees travel over land to and from the camps for a variety of reasons. First, young female refugees are often employed as maids in neighbouring villages. Most women do not earn an income, though there are some who travel within the administrative district or to Djibouti City, to buy, sell and trade manufactured goods, foodstuffs and *khat*.³ The sale of this latter product is a source of considerable income for some urban-based women (World Bank, 1997). The financial ramifications for refugee women as a result of *khat* sales are as yet uncharted.

Second, it is more common that men travel to Djibouti City for similar purposes, as well as for entertainment and/or for prolonged stays. It is not uncommon to find adolescent male refugees being sent to study in nearby Ethiopia, their studies being

funded by relatives in the camps or in Djibouti City. In addition, refugees periodically travel back and forth to north-west Somalia. In December 2003, a group of women and men was sent by UNHCR Somalia, in coordination with UNHCR Djibouti, to investigate lifestyle and infrastructure conditions in north-west Somalia. The purpose of the mission was to have the refugees view and assess the quality of the infrastructure and consider options for repatriation.

In Djibouti, there is also a significant (although unknown) number of 'floating' migrants, essentially from Somalia and Ethiopia. A unique characteristic of Djibouti City's population is that a good portion of the residents is non-national, and either of Somali or Ethiopian extract.⁴ There are no exact figures on the presence of refugees living in the capital city, but it is suspected that significant numbers of men and women with official refugee status reside in Djibouti City.⁵ Individuals in these cases travel to the camps for medical attention or at the time of monthly food distribution. The comparatively high wages earned by workers in Djibouti renders the country attractive to migrant Somalis and Ethiopians. Given that peace continues to elude Somalia, and Ethiopians of Oromo extraction still hesitate to return home in the post-Ogaden War and post-Mengistu eras, the population of the capital city continues to ebb and flow. But physical and social planning have not kept pace with demographic changes in Djibouti (Republic of Djibouti, 1987) and everywhere there are signs of stress: homelessness, squatting, unregulated growth, and densification and degradation of popular neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, migrants, refugees, and those whose status is undetermined continue to be used as scapegoats for crime and poor sanitary conditions in the capital city.

Where is home?

Somalia's Nuruddin Farah commented on the precariousness that characterises the lives of refugees (2000). Though there is no specific reference to women refugees in his writing, it has been shown from examples in Djibouti's two refugee camps that female refugees are confronted with a host of challenges unique to their gender. They are often more vulnerable than their counterparts for a range of cultural and institutional reasons.

UNHCR Djibouti is in a repatriation phase,

"women are largely excluded from the decision-making circles and do not enjoy rights or opportunities equal to those enjoyed by men"

meaning that the two camps in Djibouti will progressively be dismantled, their populations dwindling through time. Beginning in February 2004, groups of Somali refugees will gradually be returning to Somaliland. UNHCR Djibouti aims to repatriate approximately 1 000 persons per month during the year 2004. This being the case, community service will focus on the challenges of reintegration. Community Services is currently preparing to collaborate in cross-border initiatives to ease the transition for women and their families. A number of successful UNHCR and community-based programmes in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia provide encouragement and opportunities for cooperation in the area of community services.

For the women who will not immediately return to Somaliland, however, life in Djibouti's camps remains a challenge for the inter-connected reasons

elaborated upon above. Questions foremost on the minds of many women in Holl Holl and Ali Adde are as follows:

Where is home and what does this mean?

What awaits us across the not-too-distant border? Should we be among the first to voluntarily repatriate to our homeland?

Nuruddin Farah studied and surveyed the Somali people, summing up their concerns for the future of their country (and their families) with compelling insight and emotion. He illustrated that many Africans and African refugees live in limbo, a condition that is particularly applicable and of consequence to female refugees. ♣

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Endnotes

- 1 The minority Ethiopian population in Ali Adde camp was essentially urban and educated before fleeing Ethiopia when Mengistu's regime fell in 1991. Ethiopian refugees tend to be more educated than Somalis. There is a certain reluctance for the communities to work together, mainly because there is no history of collaboration between the two groups, who are culturally and ethnically distinct. What is more, there is a physical separation of the two segments of the refugee population in Ali Adde that serves to reinforce and accentuate cleavages.
- 2 Translated from the Arabic, this word represents the figure fifty. This implies that, for fifty consecutive days, strong winds and sand blow with great force.
- 3 *Khat* or *Catha edulis forskalis* is a plant cultivated in the Middle East and Africa for its leaves and buds. It is a source of a habit-forming stimulant when chewed, and is commonly used as a mild stimulant in Djibouti and Somalia. *Khat* is routinely chewed on a daily basis from afternoon to evening (World Bank, 1997).
- 4 Precise figures relating to Djibouti and Djibouti City's populations are insufficient and imprecise in the absence of accurate and reliable national census data. Often, population figures are conflicting (Republic of Djibouti, 1998; United Nations System, 2002).
- 5 In August 2003, a transit centre called Aour Aoussa, located towards the south of the country, was inaugurated to house the undocumented urban populations residing in Djibouti City. An estimated 15 000 persons were transferred to this centre to await status determination as refugees, asylum seekers or neither. After an interview process, and for those who receive refugee status, refugees will be transferred to either Holl Holl or Ali Adde camps.

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ALEXANDER JOE/AFP

FEATURES

H. SOLOMON & G. SWART

Defending **african unity**

Can the Peace and Security Council of the African Union succeed?

President Joachim Chissano (above) of Mozambique, the current Chairperson of the African Union, under whose tenor the African Union Peace and Security Council is likely to be established

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, violence and the collapse of governments and ultimately the state have come to represent the greatest challenges to peace, security and stability. On the African continent, these threats have been much more pronounced and indeed have taken on a scale, intensity and frequency that has defied even the imagination of the greatest science fiction author. The African Union (AU) has initiated vital steps towards the creation of a Peace and Security Council (PSC) that will serve as the decision-making institution and the sole authority for deploying, managing and

terminating AU-led peace operations. Furthermore, the AU has proposed the development of a common defence policy that would enable Africa to avoid over-reliance on the international community to solve its problems.¹

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union

The impetus for the creation of a Peace and Security Council for the African Union was realised with the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU in July 2002.



South African President Thabo Mbeki is greeted by Mozambican President Joachim Chissano at the start of the African Union Heads of State Summit in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003

The rationale for its establishment came through mutual concern expressed by the Heads of State and Government and member states of the AU about the “continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between states”.² Further rationale for its establishment was found in a firm awareness that the development of strong democratic institutions, and the observance of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the implementation of post-conflict recovery programmes, are essential for the promotion of collective security, durable peace and stability, as well as for the prevention of conflicts. A strong determination and commitment by the African Union to play a central role in bringing peace, security and stability on the continent and to establish an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, and peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, became an overriding objective, fervently expressed by the

member states gathered in South Africa in July 2002. African leaders meeting at the AU summit in Maputo in July 2003 offered wide support for a Peace and Security Council and portrayed the process of establishing the council as a top priority at the summit. The South African president and former chairman of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, urged member countries to give special priority to the establishment of an African standby force to allow the continent to solve its own conflicts.

Objectives and functions of the Peace and Security Council

In accordance with the protocol, the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and a Special Fund, shall support the Peace and Security Council.

The central objectives of the Peace and Security Council shall be to:

- ▲ Promote peace, security and stability in Africa;
- ▲ Anticipate and prevent conflicts and circumstances where conflicts have occurred;
- ▲ Undertake peace-making and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of these conflicts;

ISSOUF SANOGO/AFIP



ECOMOG
Senegalese soldiers stand guard in the village of Lomo nord, in central Ivory Coast. The force has deployed on the demarcation line to replace the French army based in the area since September 2002

- ▲ Promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;
- ▲ Develop a common defence policy for the AU;
- ▲ Promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and freedom.³

Guiding principles of the council include early responses to contain crisis situations, so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts, non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another, respect for borders inherited on achievement of independence, and the right of the AU to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Key functions of the Peace and Security Council include:

- ▲ The promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;
- ▲ Early warning and preventive diplomacy;
- ▲ Peace support operations and interventions;
- ▲ Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

Furthermore, the PSC shall be organised to be able

to function continuously. Another crucial element in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts is the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System consisting of an observation and monitoring centre located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union. The situation room will in turn be linked to the observation and monitoring units of sub-regional organisations such as those being established within the Economic Community of West African States, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development

in the Horn of Africa, and the Southern African Development Community.

In order to enable the Peace and Security Council to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such a force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.⁴

A central and vital task of the Peace and Security Council includes that of peacebuilding, where assistance will be provided for the restoration of the rule of law, the establishment and development of democratic institutions, and the preparation, organisation and supervision of elections in the concerned member state. Other functions include the consolidation of peace agreements that have been negotiated following the end of hostilities, the implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, and the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons. The Peace and Security Council will also cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council and other relevant UN agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.


The Peace and Security Council

The concept of an African Peace and Security Council is indeed a positive development, in as much as African Heads of State and Government have woken up to the stark and sobering reality that violence and conflict on the continent threatens to render NEPAD and other vital programmes aimed at Africa's renewal null and void. In 2003, the AU exerted considerable pressure on countries at war, setting the end of the year as the deadline for the cessation of hostilities on the continent.⁵ This was a highly ambitious deadline, one that has undoubtedly not been fully met.

The fact that the peace and security department (tasked with the maintenance of peace, security and stability) will have four times as many staff as the political affairs department reflects the inevitable focus of the AU on (more expensive) conflict management as opposed to (much cheaper) conflict prevention.⁶ This also serves as a tacit admission that resolving African conflicts will not be as easy as the Peace and Security Council document envisions.

The Peace and Security Council's prestige will surely be eroded and in many instances has already been undermined by serious errors of judgement regarding nations where conflict and violence have reigned supreme. The crisis in Zimbabwe has demonstrated that a country does not have to be at war to pose a threat to regional peace and stability.⁷ The African continent's inability to confront, address, contain or deal with the Zimbabwean crisis effectively and authoritatively leaves many question marks and grave concerns as to whether a body such as the Peace and Security Council will in actual fact have the capacity, capability or adequate authority to respond when a genuinely devastating regional war or internal conflict does occur.

Nigeria's decision to provide former Liberian President Charles Taylor with refuge can also be lamented, given his role in the severe political and economic crisis and destructive conflict that left many Liberians dead. Consider the fact that the UN War Crimes Tribunal for Sierra Leone has also issued an arrest warrant for Charles Taylor for his role and involvement in the conflict in Sierra Leone. The fact that Nigeria, one of the leading nations in the AU and NEPAD, has agreed to host ex-President Taylor does not bode well for the future credibility of a body such as the Peace and Security Council,



which is tasked with prosecuting violations of precisely such a nature.

A report to the G8 leaders also effectively dealt a blow to hopes for setting up an African peacekeeping force, dashing expectations drummed up ahead of the June 2003 G8 summit in Evian of large-scale financial and institutional support for such a force. The G8 leaders did, however, endorse a plan to help Africa equip itself with its own peacekeeping and intervention force. Their estimates however suggest that Africa should only be able to deploy troops in crisis zones by 2010.⁸ The G8 representatives propose in their report that there be far greater consultation on the vision of an African peacekeeping force and that existing foreign support be better coordinated. The report takes the view that a great deal more work is needed to prepare the AU peace and security framework, which will govern the use of such a force as well as its actual military capability. AU military chiefs at a meeting held in Addis Ababa proposed five 'brigades' to carry out an African peacekeeping function, which experts have warned could be well beyond what the G8 is prepared to finance. Although egalitarian, the cost of five regional brigades may be more than the AU can carry.

The African Standby Force: Does Africa have the capacity?

By the end of this decade, Africa should have a five-brigade UN-style force ready to police the continent's trouble spots. In terms of a plan drafted by a panel of experts, the force will consist of five regionally based brigades in addition to a sixth, continental formation based at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The document, adopted by the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) at a meeting in May 2003, contains detailed proposals on the establishment of the force, to be known as the African Standby Force (ASF).

The African Standby Force

The African Standby Force is to be established in two phases.

PHASE 1: 30 June 2005

The first, ending 30 June 2005, will see the AU develop and maintain the full-time capacity to manage:

Scenario 1 Missions:

AU and regional military advice to a political mission, and

Scenario 2 Missions:

AU and regional observer missions co-deployed with a UN mission, as well as a standby reinforcement system to manage:

Scenario 3 Missions:

Stand-alone AU and regional observer missions.

The body will eventually develop the capacity to use a standby reinforcement system to manage:

Scenario 4 Missions:

AU and regional peacekeeping forces for Chapter VI and preventative deployment missions.⁹

PHASE 2: 30 June 2010

During the second phase, the period up to 30 June 2010, the AU must develop the capacity to manage up to:

Scenario 5 Missions:

AU regional peacekeeping forces for complex multidimensional missions.

The deployment targets envisioned by the ASF appear to be highly ambitious: full deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a resolution for traditional peacekeeping operations, complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days, and recommendations for the establishment of a robust military force able to deploy in 14 days to respond rapidly to situations of genocide.

The right to intervene must also be paralleled with the capacity to do so. Robust intervention requires strong command and control, logistics and equipment. Currently, most African countries lack the capacity to support even the most modest of missions.

Moreover, the plan, however commendable, is said to contain a number of loose threads that could unravel the entire concept. The ASF panel of experts claimed to have studied various NATO and UN models, but stated that they were inappropriate "for various reasons". The 48-page report is supported by a great many annexes, explaining aspects of the UN system in much detail. Other than the concerns already raised, which may see the ASF swamped with good intentions and impractical ideas, the force will also likely be diluted to the lowest common denominator in an effort to include "everybody" and be tripped up during deployment by long time-lines and political indecision, which could hamper the entire purpose of the force – speedy deployment in times of crisis. A related issue is the question of ownership, which refers to the question of whether the ASF is to be an AU (continent-wide) as opposed to SADC or ECOWAS (regional) project. Serving both the AU and the region would be difficult. More output was also expected from Botswana, Kenya and Egypt, all countries considered to possess reputable, disciplined, armed forces. One of the most critical aspects of the ASF that remains to be resolved is the issue of how it will be financed. The lack of central funding and reimbursement for peacekeeping costs has severely inhibited the full participation of less endowed member states.

Moreover, South Africa's foray into efforts to construct a standing African army may be limited at best, following South African National Defence Force Chief of Joint Operations Lt-General Godfrey Ngwenya's admission that South Africa had reached the limit of its international peacekeeping capability. International demands have grown

because of South Africa's prominence in the African Union.¹⁰ South Africa currently has approximately 3 100 peacekeepers in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia/Eritrea, while at least the same number must be in training to replace those on service every six months – a virtually impossible task for South Africa to deploy 7 000–8 000 fit soldiers and able personnel without depleting home defenses, while HIV/Aids has also left an indelible impact on force capacity.

The prospects for African peace and security, let alone a fully fledged body to deal with it, have thus been disheartening. Many African states have “failed” while others face the prospect of steep decline, barely able to cope with dealing with the collapse of internal peace and security, let alone sharing concern for similar situations plaguing their neighbouring states.

Military adventurism such as the kind witnessed by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia during the most intense stages of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, could also harm efforts to develop a coordinated effort through the Peace and Security Council, as the risk always remains that individual states (who may possess political or economic interests in a conflict) may seek to formulate their own defence policy towards another state. African states have also frequently intervened militarily on the continent outside of formal organisations. Most African militaries also do not possess specialised units that can be deployed in the event of a crisis and have relied greatly on assistance such as that provided by the United Nations. This would imply the need to train and establish specialised units, a major challenge, as the ability to sustain a sizeable force has already proven difficult.

In attempting to craft a viable way forward, African states need to concentrate on making incremental progress and resist the temptation to jump from one ambitious plan to another without effect.¹¹ Overly ambitious plans divert already scarce resources away from more realistic projects. There is no doubt that the Peace and Security Council is of great importance, yet its architects are endangering its prospects of functioning effectively by seeking to solve the continent's complex conflicts by adopting overly simplistic and utopian visions of what should be done, without taking full cognisance of what can actually be realistically achieved, within



ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP

the many constraints and challenges on the African continent. ▲

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ECOMOG

Senegalese soldiers prepare to leave the village of Lomo nord, in central Ivory Coast

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CONFLICT PREVENTION

P. IYER & L. HANCOCK

zones of peace

A framework for analysis

Introduction

Many a time, in a protracted, intractable, and violent conflict, it is more useful to initiate measures to mitigate the conflict – short-term violence reduction – than to attempt to resolve or transform the conflict. One of the most important methods of conflict mitigation is through what is called institutionalising conflict, that is, bringing conflict under a set of rules. A concrete example of this is through the establishment of Zones of Peace (ZoPs).¹

ZoPs are usually territorially defined or personal (although there are instances in which the concept is more abstract, such as a whole community of people) in which, by agreement, certain acts are

prohibited or some acts encouraged. It is important to mention here that while ZoPs are visualised in many different contexts such as inter-state border zones (such as the one between Peru and Ecuador), maritime trade zones, and nuclear free zones, those highlighted in this paper are those that are created within states in areas where there has been an ongoing armed violent conflict. This excludes the intra-state contexts of urban intermittent violence (such as gang-violence and riots).

In this context of intra-state violent conflict, it is possible to create a typology of ZoPs in various dimensions such as by whom they have been initiated, degree of formalisation of the zone, the geographical extent of zone, and other criteria. We believe that another useful unit of classification is

to examine zones of peace in a temporal context. This means we examine the creation, implementation, and sustainability of these zones in reference to their relationship to the level of peace or conflict in the surrounding society. By “peace” we mean formal peace processes and agreements between warring parties agreeing usually in an incremental way to end the violence and bring peace. And while this classification does not cover all instances of peace zones, it does provide a broad overview through which most instances can be categorised to some extent.

Zones of Peace on a temporal scale

If we think about a ZoP in a temporal fashion, it seems reasonable to examine three different time frames within which a zone might be created:

1 A ZoP created or maintained **during a period of violent conflict**. The primary purpose of this type of zone is to ameliorate or remove the effects of the conflict on the local population. The characteristics of this type of zone include, in general, the goals of protecting non-combatants, attempting to establish policies and practices of neutrality with regards to all sides in a conflict, and seeking to prevent or restrict the types of violent activities taking place within the zone. Short-term versions of this type of zone may be established for the purpose of delivering aid or conducting humanitarian operations, such as administering vaccines.

2 The second temporal type of zone is one that is established **either during a peace process or its implementation**. This type of zone may often be used as a safe area for one or more of the combatant groups. It may also serve as a safe zone for the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatant forces. This type of temporal zone is often limited in duration, either to the period of peace talks or to the period required for the demobilisation of forces.

3 The third temporal type of zone is one that is established **in the post-conflict environment**. This type of zone attempts to address a number of issues, including those affected by ongoing civil violence short of the types of civil conflicts that

engender the first temporal type of zone. Some of the issues that can be addressed by a post-conflict ZoP include continuing human rights violations, criminal and gang-related activities and a lack of economic and social development.

And finally, there are those zones which do not clearly fit into the three categories described above. While most of these ‘special’ zones do take place during violent conflicts, we have chosen to place them in a separate section due to their focus on specific elements and individuals affected by conflict, such as children, sacred spaces, or temporally limited zones used for aid distribution or provision of healthcare to affected populations.

Type I: Zones during conflict

ZoPs during violent conflicts and civil wars are the main focus of our research.³ This interest is primarily due to the incongruity of having a location or zone of non-participation in the midst of a modern intra-state or civil conflict.

Colombia: zones, associations and national movements

Colombia has been held hostage, so to speak, by more than thirty years of civil violence, or *la violencia* as it is called. One of the responses of ordinary Colombians living in the countryside to the constant civil war and the endemic corruption that always seems to follow, has been a movement to withdraw from the conflict by creating a host of ZoPs, municipalities of peace and even one or two communities of peace that focus more on the people than on their geographic location. In fact, the use of peace zones (PZs) in Colombia has become so extensive that it is possible to discern and describe them on three levels.

At the first level, individual zones or municipalities, Colombia has over a hundred, with more being formed. An example of this is the Samaniego Territorio of Peace, which came about as a result of a confluence of events in 1998. When the National Liberation Army (ELN), one of the leftist guerilla groups, kidnapped the newly elected mayor of

“the idea of a zone of peace where ordinary people can stand up against the violence that affects their lives is an idea whose time has come”

HOTI SIMANUNTAK/AFP



Director of the Henri Dunant Center, David Gorman (R) at the unveiling of the newest peace zone in Lhoksemauwe in Aceh

Samaniego, it caused an outcry among the town's residents and they managed to secure his release. Following this, the mayor invited the citizens to participate in the creation of a zone of peace.

Some of the strategies for implementing 'active neutrality' by the new zone of peace included the symbolic gesture of the open hand (by which the inhabitants could remind themselves of their commitment to remove their territory from the influence of the conflict), radio campaigns, training and educational materials promoting respect for human rights and conflict management principles, a high school for peace, a boys' and girls' club for peace, family programmes, programmes to mediate and transform violence in families, and, essentially, programmes to change the existing culture from one geared towards war and violence to one geared towards peace.³

The success of these local zones inspired some national NGOs⁴ to propose an initiative called "100 Municipalities of Peace in Colombia", a project funded by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. This initiative was designed to expand the number of different types of ZoP experiences across Colombia as a method for combating the long-running civil war.⁵

Such networks are the second level of ZoPs in

Colombia where groups of local zones have banded together to create associations to share information, generate moral support, and address issues on a province-wide basis. One zone is the Association de Municipios de Antioquia Oriente, consisting of 23 municipalities including those of Sonson, San Luis, Carmen, and El Retiro. This association has held a number of meetings with representatives of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the ELN to discuss issues such as the release of the governor of Antioquia and allowing safe passage of peasants through roadblocks to get their produce through to markets in Medellin.

At the national level, which is the third level at which one sees the efforts to promote ZoPs, are NGOs such as REDEPAZ (the Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against War), Justice y Pas (justice and peace) and a government sponsored initiative known as REDPRODPAZ (the National Network of Development and Peace Programmes). These regional and national initiatives are groups that respond to the wishes of localities that either want to establish ZoPs or request assistance with co-ordination or other peace-zone-related activities, thus ensuring that the peace zone movement in Colombia remains rooted in the principles of citizen based peacemaking.

Type II: Zones during peace implementation

The creation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration zones may not seem at first to be a part of the focus of our original research. However, we felt that many of the characteristics of a typical zone of peace created during a conflict also served to describe these ‘cantonment’ zones designed for military or ‘rebel’ personnel.

Aceh: peace zones as a prelude to demilitarisation

The violent separatist conflict⁶ in Aceh,⁷ Indonesia, has been going on for over 27 years. The concept of PZs in Aceh is uniquely positioned on the temporal scale. They were established during the period of peace process and as part of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)⁸ signed between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or Free Aceh Movement)⁹ and the Indonesian government on 9 December 2002. The Henry Dunant Center (HDC) brokered the peace agreement.¹⁰ However, because of the very nature of the ceasefire agreement, the PZs seem to fall in the period “before peace”.

It has been our observation that in other cases where the main goal of establishing a PZ has been disarming, demilitarisation, and demobilisation, a ceasefire precedes the establishment of the peace zone. In Aceh, the PZs were to go together with the ceasefire but its goal was demilitarisation and demobilisation leading to a political settlement. See figure 1.

The PZs were therefore to be a prelude to disarming, demilitarisation, demobilisation and reconstruction, for all of these activities were to take place after the actual establishment of the PZs but within those zones before they were to occur elsewhere in the province.¹¹


The COHA contained a whole section on the establishment and maintenance of the PZs in Aceh. Special committees comprising of GAM, the Indonesian government, and HDC representatives were appointed to monitor and administer sanctions should either party break any of the provisions of the agreement.¹²

In the period between the signing of the COHA and 9 February 2003, when GAM was supposed to begin a phased disarmament process, seven PZs were established. The PZs were announced with great fanfare (some more than others) and in the beginning it seemed they had served the primary purpose for which they had been set up. The violence in the PZs dramatically decreased. In the meantime, international donors pledged to contribute to reconstruction and development in the PZs first. In some sense, therefore, there was every motivation to get the parties committed to maintaining the PZs. However, closer to the day when disarmament of GAM was to begin, violence once again erupted on a large scale. In the following months and leading up to May 2003, the ceasefire and every other agreement between the parties was broken. Neither side showed any commitment to COHA. The HDC was attacked and international peace monitors were hounded out of Aceh. COHA had failed and the PZs had collapsed.¹³

Type III: Post-conflict peace-building and development zones

Overall, there are very few examples of post-conflict peace-building efforts that explicitly call for the creation of a ‘zone of peace’. The one example we have found is the Local Zone of Peace (LZP) in El Salvador. We feel that the uniqueness of this zone holds promise for other areas attempting to recover

Figure 1



from the ravages of conflict or, perhaps with some modifications, zones of poverty and crime in advanced industrialised states.

El Salvador and the local zone of peace

In the arena of post-conflict peace and economic development, one LZP centres on the southern coast of El Salvador. This ZoP was declared in August 1998 by a group known as the Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America and a campesino movement known as La Coordinadora, which works in 86 Salvadorian communities to address poverty, violence, and other social issues.

The LZP was established as a part of the development activities of La Coordinadora.¹⁴ Post-conflict El Salvador still faces a number of difficulties.¹⁵

The creation of the LZP was assisted by Ramón López-Reyes,¹⁶ whose experience supported the idea that in order to be successful a zone of peace needed to be instituted from the grass roots up, rather than from the government or top-down.¹⁷

The LZP is territorially defined in its founding principles as “a territory occupied by a community” seeking to define their own goals and aspirations to live peacefully, using the LZP to create a foundation for “the free and full expression of rights, be they economic, social and cultural, as well as ... civil and political rights”.¹⁸

The overarching goal of the LZP was to create a Culture of Peace throughout the zone. In order to do

this, the organisers of the LZP developed a comprehensive programme¹⁹ aimed at:

- 1** Restoring human rights,
- 2** Promoting peace and indigenous methods of conflict resolution, and
- 3** Fostering the transformation of the organisational culture to reflect the aims of peace and democracy.²⁰

One of the main rationales behind the creation of the LZP was the difficulty of implementing effective economic development activities in the post-conflict environment of continued violence and gang-related or criminal activities. Some of the economic development activities undertaken or started by La Coordinadora include the creation of

community organic farms, shrimp farms, cottage chicken-raising businesses, providing ‘green’ agriculture training to campesinos²¹ and other such economic activities.²²

Primarily, a peaceful environment allows for economic development to take place, and the ability of La Coordinadora to provide resources for economic development may assist in bringing parties to the table for peace-building and to encourage ‘buy-in’ to the Culture of Peace programme.

Human rights are considered an integral part of the LZP. Paragraph four of the LZP’s declaration indicates that they believe “it is absolutely necessary that they form a society ... which has human rights promoters”.²³ Furthermore, as described by Chupp, the Culture of Peace programme outlined above had as its first goal the restoration of human rights and responsibilities.²⁴

Specialised and limited zones

In addition to what might be described as ‘traditional’ ZoPs, designed to ameliorate the conditions of conflict for a particular geographic community or to assist in the implementation of a peace or post-conflict reconstruction, there are a number of peace zone types of activities that have non-traditional foci. Although we cannot cover all of these areas in this paper, three that are interesting for our purposes include the ideas of personal ZoPs, centred on particular persons or categories of persons; site-specific ZoPs that seek to protect particular geographic locations rather than the communities that inhabit them; and ZoPs that have particular goals and a limited duration, usually considered operative just long enough to meet those goals.

Personal zones: children as zones of peace

The phrase ‘Children as ZoPs’²⁵ is over two decades old. The concept extends to providing for a variety of child rights and protection for children.²⁶ However, these rights assume a special meaning in the context of a war situation. So on our temporal scale, we would tend to locate these personal zones in the ‘before-peace’ phase.

UNICEF’s policy efforts have often been translated into action but most of them have been

“the overarching goal of the Local Zone of Peace was to create a culture of peace throughout the zone”

in a very abstract sense, limited to creating a list of acts against children that are encouraged or discouraged. One such example is UNICEF-Australia's efforts in Sri Lanka.

In Sri Lanka, the UNICEF initiative – Children as ZoPs – was discussed with a wide range of actors (LTTE, Ministry of Defence, religious leaders, teachers, NGOs and people affected by conflict) and a coalition of NGOs and individuals was formed. This coalition decided that the initiative should be promoted as a concept and not as a programme. After five months of consultation with civil society and political representatives, a best practices booklet was created to explain the concept. Published in English, Tamil and Sinhala, the booklet was widely circulated and in 1998 the initiative was launched. The objectives of this programme are very noble but their activities have largely been limited to advocacy and the dissemination of information.²⁷ Their biggest problem has been in translating the concept of ZoPs into action, which in turn affected the programme's ability to gather the commitment of all actors.

The other type of zone for children, the creation of sanctuaries, is best exemplified by the Butterfly Garden project located in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka. This project, initiated by the University of Manitoba, Canada, developed a space (an actual land area which they called Butterfly Garden) in which the children could come and indulge in a variety of activities and where they were safe from the ongoing violence in the region. The “Butterfly Bus” would gather the children from their schools and take them to the Butterfly Garden. The organisers of the project garnered support from all of the warring parties, which allowed the bus to travel free from harassment and security checks. This helped to make the project a success in terms of the sheer relief and enjoyment it brought to the children of Batticaloa and the surrounding areas.²⁸



HOTU SIMANJUNTA/APP

Ironically, perhaps the most successful and massive campaign of “children in war” speaking for peace, comes from Colombia. The Children's Peace Movement was founded by Juan Uribe, together with support from UNICEF and other organisations. This movement got its start in October 1996 as the result of a special election²⁹ known as the Children's Mandate for Peace and Rights.³⁰ The highlight of this movement is that children have developed their own rules for areas declared ZoPs, where children are not allowed to be targeted and where there can be no violence of any kind.

In a sense, therefore, the children's initiative in Colombia is the “true” form of declaring children as ZoPs. It is only directly in this form that the children are given a voice to air their opinion on the political situation in their country.³¹

However, we have to say that the concept of children as ZoPs is still a very abstract concept. Often, it ends up comprising activities that ensure the rights of the child and not specifically dealing with the context, that is of children at war. There are very few cases where commitment has been generated from the warring parties to respect children as ZoPs. We strongly feel that this cannot just remain an emotional issue; it is the real issue of an entire

Director of the Henri Dunant Center, David Gorman (R) talks to residents about the ceasefire agreement between the rebels and the Indonesian government at a village in Banda Aceh

future generation that will be maimed physically and mentally by war.

Sacred sites and localities

A second type of specialised peace zone stems from efforts by various groups, both local and international, to protect sites considered to be of significant cultural or religious value. As argued by members of these movements, conflict and civil war take their tolls not only on the people in the region,

but upon religious and spiritual places which have historic value and cannot easily be rebuilt or replaced.

An interesting case is that of the Madhu sanctuary in Mannar district of northern Sri Lanka. The seventeenth century Catholic church in Madhu was a sanctuary for centuries and was famous for its miracles and healing powers. People of all religious faiths considered it sacred and flocked to it to receive blessings in their thousands. In recent times, it became a place of refuge and sanctuary for Tamils

displaced from their villages. During a fresh outbreak of violence in December 1999, the church was attacked and destroyed. The LTTE and the Sri Lankan government blamed each another for the attack. Over 40 people who had taken refuge in the church were killed and many others were injured. This is an interesting case where all the warring parties and the local people had an unwritten commitment to maintaining the church in Madhu as zone of peace; unfortunately that unwritten commitment proved inadequate.³²

Limited duration or purpose: Operation Lifeline Sudan

One of the most prominent examples of a conditional or limited zone of peace are the “days of tranquillity” fostered by the UN sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan. This programme, created in 1989, has focused on the use of two types of limited PZs; “corridors of peace” and “days of tranquillity” to attempt to provide humanitarian relief supplies and health services to refugee populations affected by the civil war.

These were modelled on earlier efforts during the El Salvadoran civil war designed to create

periods of peace wherein their aims and goals were limited to ameliorating existing conditions affecting children’s immediate health.³³

These temporary zones were created essentially by pressure from the UN and the international community; but were not ‘forced’ on the local political actors. Instead, these groups were persuaded by the focus of the zones on purely humanitarian purposes, especially the later initiative targeting the health of children, and by the limited scope and duration of the zones themselves. Although some have thought that these zones might prove useful in promoting more peace-making activities, the evidence to date is that no such transference has taken place. Operation Lifeline Sudan has been moderately successful in reducing the number of deaths that would otherwise have taken place.³⁴

A framework for analysis

In looking at each of these different phases in which PZs have been initiated and maintained, it is possible to begin to discern some of the factors that contributed to their successes – limited in most cases – or their glaring failures. Again, success itself is something that is hard to evaluate. If one returns to our argument that ZoPs are one attempt to mitigate violence in existing conflicts or assist in the process of ending conflicts, then one can clearly see that the cases mentioned above have had varying degrees of success. Some of the zones have managed to mitigate the effects of the conflict over a short period, and others over a longer period.

However, it is also apparent that many of these zones have aimed to achieve more than just ‘withdrawal’ or ‘mitigation’ of existing conflicts. Some of the more intensive efforts in places like Colombia, El Salvador and Aceh attempted to create social change and social justice and to expand the principles of positive peace beyond their limited borders. It is in connection with these types of issues that we believe another set of questions becomes important for study: who initiated the creation of the zone, who participated in this creation and maintenance, and what were the governance structures and leaders of these zones.

In Colombia, the efforts have clearly been a grass-roots initiative with some support from regional and national NGOs. In our research, we have observed similar parallels in the Philippines

“Operation Lifeline Sudan provided temporary ‘corridors of peace’ in order to provide humanitarian relief supplies to refugee populations”

where the local communities have taken the initiative largely through the support of the local church. In our research we have also come across the interesting case of the UN-initiated safe havens in Bosnia where it was clear that the lack of commitment from the Serbian paramilitary forces and the complete lack of local participation might have contributed to their failure to survive.

In the case of Aceh, local participation was again missing. We also believe that when demilitarisation and demobilisation become the goals of the PZ preceding an overall political settlement, they are more difficult to maintain. Our research draws attention to the case of Assembly Points in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) that had some goals similar to Aceh PZs but had a far higher rate of success. We believe this is because in Rhodesia the warring groups knew of a larger political settlement being negotiated separately and the assembly points did not aim for demilitarisation and demobilisation but aimed more humbly to be a cantonment zone.

In the case of our limited time-period zones, it seems as if the success was more because these zones were not a threat to any of the parties than because of their limited time duration. In the case of the sanctuaries or children, it seems that the initiators of these zones were able to acquire the buy-in of the warring parties at least for a temporary period. The buy-in in these cases came from the values held by local people, which extends or appeals to all parties in the conflict.

In conclusion, therefore, it is noted that these factors of creation, structure, and direction play different roles depending on the temporal context of the zone of peace. It seems clear that in zones during conflict, a high level of participation and ownership is required by the local population while it appears much less important to have government support or direction. In fact, government involvement may prove detrimental to the zones goals of maintaining neutrality among the warring parties. The situation for disarmament zones is quite different, with these creations requiring active governmental or rebel support and, perhaps less support from the local population. In our example of a post-conflict peace zone, it appears that a coalition of governmental and local actors was required to make the zone viable and allow it to conduct its activities. Finally, it is our conclusion that the idea of a zone of peace where ordinary people can stand

up against the violence that affects their lives is an idea whose time has come. ■

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- 2 This paper forms part of our research work with the 'Local Zones of Peace Project' of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. For more details of the project refer to our website at www.gmu.edu/departments/icar/activities/localzonesofpeace.
- 3 Sara Ramirez (2003), 'Samaniego "Territory of Peace"', in *Establishment of Peace Zones in Colombia*. Fairfax, VA: ICAR.
- 4 One of these was REDEPAZ (the Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against War).
- 5 For more detail on the '100 Municipalities' project, see Catalina Rojas (2000). *The People's Peace Process in Colombia: A preliminary review of peace zones in Magotes, Samaneigo and San Pablo*, Fairfax: ICAR.
- 6 The roots of the conflict go back to the colonial period. When Indonesia achieved independence, Aceh was mortified over the fact that they received the status of a special province of the country. They demanded independence, and this was the birth of the separatist movement. The movement intensified and developed into an armed struggle in the mid-1970s when the discontent over sharing revenues from its oil resources with the centre grew. For more information, see Pushpa Iyer (2003), *Peace Zones in Aceh: A Prelude to Demilitarisation*; available from http://www.gmu.edu/departments/icar/Aceh_PZs.pdf.
- 7 Aceh is located on the northern-most tip of the Sumatra islands of Indonesia and is the western-most point of the country.
- 8 COHA, however, was mainly a ceasefire agreement and provided a framework for further negotiations. Hence, it was less of a peace agreement.
- 9 Also known as Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF). Hasan di Tiro (the last scion of the pre-colonial sultanate and currently in exile in Sweden) founded GAM in 1976 on political, religious, and economic grounds.
- 10 The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) was revamped in 1999. Formerly known as the Henry Dunant Institute (HDI), it was set up in 1965 by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Swiss Red Cross. The main objective of the Institute is to make available ways and means of carrying out studies, research, and

Endnotes continued

training in all branches of the Red Cross, thus strengthening the universality of the Red Cross. In 1995, the General Assembly of the HDI began a discussion on the future of the institute with a view to redefining its role and activities. The study was concluded in 1998, and in 1999 the organisation was launched with a new name and mission, to strengthen intercultural and multi-disciplinary dialogue and to promote sustainable solutions to humanitarian problems. The centre is currently involved in Aceh and Myanmar/Burma. For more information on past projects, visit www.hdcentre.org.

- 11 For a detailed analysis of the Peace Zones and their failure in Aceh, see Iyer, 2003; Pushpa Iyer and Christopher Mitchell (2004), *The Collapse of Peace Zones in Aceh*; available at www.gmu.edu/departments/icar/activities/localzonesofpeace.
- 12 It was agreed by all parties that in the PZs:
 - (a) they will not carry weapons within the peace zones outside of their respective posts and bases;
 - (b) if they are unarmed they can move freely within the peace zones;
 - (c) no political or clandestine activities will take place within the peace zone;
 - (d) neither of them will engage in provocative acts;
 - (e) no military posts will be allowed within the zones of peace;
 - (f) neither side can move more forces into any existing peace zones;
- (g) POLRI (Polisi Republik Indonesia – Indonesian Police) are to investigate criminal activities in these areas in consultation with Joint Security Council (JSC).
- (h) See Iyer, 2003.
- 13 Iyer and Mitchell, 2004.
- 14 According to Chupp, the LZP was based on a United Nations concept derived from the 1971 UNESCO declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the subsequent 1990 declaration of Latin America as a zone of peace by several of the region's presidents. Refer to Mark Chupp (2003), 'Creating a culture of peace in postwar El Salvador', in C. Sampson, M. Abu-Nimer and C. Liebler (eds), *Positive approaches in peacebuilding: A resource for innovators*, Washington, DC: Pact Publications.
- 15 These include the failure of land reform to redress historical inequalities, a poor distribution system, and endemic violence. While La Coordinadora was created to address economic and social development issues, it soon became clear that criminal violence, especially violence conducted by gang members repatriated from the USA, was seriously hampering efforts to rebuild the local economy and attain a level of economic and social self-sufficiency.
- 16 Director of the International Center for the Study and Promotion of Zones of Peace in the World, based in Hawaii.
- 17 Margaret Hayes (1998), *Declaration of the Local Zone of Peace*, Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America; available from <http://fssca.net/zop/declaration.html>.
- 18 This passage from the declaration of the LZP indicates that the members see the establishment of a zone of peace as precursor to the creation and maintenance of a whole series of rights, economic and political, necessary for a stable civil society. Refer to Margaret Hayes (1998), *The Local Zone of Peace*, Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America; available from <http://fssca.net/zop/>.
- 19 The Culture of Peace programme has also been involved in a number of direct conflict interventions. Most notable were a series of interventions with members of two local gangs, whose members had repatriated from Los Angeles. These interventions, conducted by Chenchu Alas, resulted in an end to violent conflicts between the two gangs, community projects involving gang members, and a redefinition by those members as 'youths' instead of 'gang members'. Refer to Jose 'Chenchu' Alas (2000), *The Road to Hope*, Fall/Winter Newsletter, Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America 2000; available at <http://fssca.net/pastreports/1100/index.html>.
- 20 Chupp, 2003.
- 21 La Coordinadora (2000), *The Coordinadora Keeps Growing*, Spring Newsletter, Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America; available at <http://fssca.net/pastreports/500/index.html>.
- 22 La Coordinadora (2000), Fall/Winter 2000 Newsletter, Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America; available at <http://fssca.net/pastreports/1100/index.html>.
- 23 Hayes, 1998, *Declaration of the Local Zone of Peace*.
- 24 Chupp, 2003.
- 25 The idea of children as a 'conflict-free zone' emerged in the 1980s. This concept was first formulated by Nils Thedin of Sweden in a proposal to UNICEF. Subsequently, UNICEF appointed a special commission, under Graça Machel, to investigate the situation of children in armed conflict. As a result of the report published by this special commission, in February 2002, UNICEF's optional protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict came into force. This protocol was an amendment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and addresses the issue of forced conscription in two ways:
 - Prohibiting armies and armed opposition forces from involving children under 18 years of age in armed conflict;
 - Banning the compulsory military recruitment of children under 18.
- 26 While this concept was initiated (and is still largely so) to cover those children and their issues during war, it has been extended to cover issues such as child labour and health care.
- 27 UNICEF-Australia (2001), 'Sri Lanka: Children as Zones of Peace'.
- 28 Renuka Senanayake (2001), 'Sri Lanka: "Peace Garden" for Children in War Zone', *World News – Inter Press Service*.
- 29 On the day of the elections, many of the warring factions adhered to a ceasefire – unprecedented in Colombian history, as election days had probably been the most violent.
- 30 Some 2.7 million children voted for rights they considered important. An overwhelming majority voted for the right to life and peace.
- 31 Brenda McDonald (2002), 'Children Lead the Struggle for Peace in Colombia', *MSU-Bozeman News Service*.
- 32 S. Rajendran (1999), 'Dozens of Sri Lankan refugees killed in artillery attack on Church', *WSWS News*, 10 December.
- 33 Ram Anand Shankar (1998), 'Analyzing health initiatives as bridges towards peace during complex humanitarian initiatives and the roles of actors and economic aid in making these bridges sustainable', Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia.
- 34 Guido Galli (2001), 'Humanitarian cease-fires in contemporary armed conflicts: potentially effective tools for peacebuilding', MA, Dept of Politics, University of York.



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PEACEMAKING

Prospects for peace and state re-building in **Somalia**

Introduction

The third phase of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference is currently underway in Nairobi, with some of the sticky issues that rocked the second phase playing themselves out prominently. These include power-sharing and the formation of an all-inclusive government within the realms of the new constitution for a federal state.

The current conference is the fourteenth attempt at bringing peace in the war-torn Somali republic, whose state collapsed in January 1991 after the fall of General Mohamed Siad Barre. The conference started on 15 October 2002, with meetings in Eldoret, 300 km west of Nairobi. On 27 October, faction leaders participating in this conference signed a Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities, but refused to disarm without a guarantee that an all-inclusive government of national unity would be formed, and that they would be properly represented.

At the heart of this argument is a confusion between the permanent structures of statehood and the transitory organs of government. The faction leaders equate the state with the government of the day. This implies a zero-sum calculus of power, where the predominance of one political faction is understood by others to be intrinsically detrimental to their interests, and eventually this becomes intolerable.

Armed with the conviction that the state can only represent the interests of the dominant group, these factions deny the possibility of compromise through dialogue and accommodation. They instead seek redress through force of arms. This is what one observer has called “primitive rebellions based on a generic dislike for the current order and the inhumanities of the age it presides over”.¹ However, armed resistance is as much a consequence of the failure of the state paradigm, as it is a failure of the government itself.



A rebel militiaman belonging to the Somali National Movement, fighting the regime of dictator Siad Barre, points his gun towards the broken portrait of president Barre near the town of Zeila, northern Somalia

Failed state paradigm

Somalia is a country of a culturally homogeneous people made up of related clans of nomads, but the country strolled into the twenty-first century without a modern state or its institutions. For thirteen years, Somalia has been without an internationally recognised government, an effective peace agreement, or even a forum for inclusive dialogue. To the Western world, Somalis exist in the depths of anarchy or even nihilism.²

The failure of the Somali state brought with it total institutional collapse. The security structures and public service delivery systems disappeared, together with the legal and normative standards that previously regulated social interactions. Competing and often contradictory political factions, economic and religious interest groups, and clan elders attempted to fill the vacuum. The subsequent civil war brought unprecedented human suffering and displacement of Somalis within the country and as refugees in other countries.

That the state of Somalia failed is not particularly surprising, as it was premised, similarly to other states in Africa, on the European model. But

unlike the European state-building process, which lasted for centuries and was accompanied by frequent and large-scale wars, the process was accelerated in Somalia, as elsewhere in Africa, having to be completed in decades rather than centuries, and under much less permissive conditions. Indeed, Somalia had to create state structures allowing it to meet its international obligations whilst complying with standards of democracy and human rights observance, which the European states only began to meet after centuries of state-building under autocratic rule and with few civil rights for the populations.

The colonial legacy

The Somali state arose from the ashes of the partition of the Somali nation. The state was formed during the European 'scramble for Africa' in the late nineteenth century, when the European colonial powers – France, Britain and Italy – divided the Somali nation among themselves. Thus, the Somali nation was divided into three main areas: British Somaliland (north-west region), French Somaliland (the current republic of Djibouti) and Italian Somaliland (north-east and southern Somalia). The other two regions, the Ogaden area and the Northern Frontier District, were allocated to Ethiopia and present-day Kenya, respectively.

Somali nationalism, inspired by the resistance to colonial conquest led by Mohamed Abdille Hassan between the early 1900s and 1920,³ was given a new impetus after the defeat of Italy in 1941. The dream of pan-Somali territorial unity was reinforced by the seemingly approving attitude of Britain, which promised to create such an entity by incorporating all the Somali inhabited areas. Despite these promises, Britain recognised Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden in 1942, relinquished control over most of it in 1948, and ceded the Haud areas to Ethiopia in 1954.⁴ In September 1948 in Paris, after the end of World War II, the Allied powers placed the ex-Italian Somaliland colony under trusteeship.⁵ This ignited resistance in the north, which found expression in two movements, the Somali National League (SNL) and the United Somali Party (USL). Though reunification with the recently lost Ogaden and Haud was the key political issue, each of these movements had narrow clan appeal.⁶

The granting of independence to British Somaliland on 26 June 1960 renewed hopes of reunification. In addition to reunification with the Ogaden and the Haud areas, hopes were high that Britain would then allow at least the Northern Frontier District in Kenya to join their union with Somalia, and that French Somaliland would also join later, when France granted its territory independence. Both of these hopes were destined to be dashed. Thus, only British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were united at independence on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Democratic Republic.

Even this reunification generated new problems. First, while grass-roots opinion favoured reunification, Somaliland's leader, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, opposed immediate reunification. Secondly, the terms of reunification in the Act of Union envisioned a referendum with location of the capital, the structure of government, integration of the state institutions and power-sharing being the key issues. But the reunification was undertaken before conducting any such referendum.⁷ A year later, in June 1961, a referendum in Somaliland, with the proposed constitution being an additional issue for the reunified state, rejected the constitution and opposed reunification by a 70 percent margin.⁸ However, the turn-out for the referendum was less than 20 percent, and in any case it was too late.

Thus, the colonial heritage bequeathed the new Somali state both internal and external conflicts. Internally, the problems threatened the survival of the state while externally they opened up conflicts with neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya.

The first republic

Upon receiving independence, the Somali state adopted a structure of government modelled along the Italian system. Ingredients of this model included freedom of voters to elect candidates of their choice; free competition among candidates and political parties; accountability of elected representatives; the influence of elections on government policies; and a nationally oriented electoral process. But the model failed, for several reasons.

Firstly, Somali politics was organised around clan structures, i.e. groups of clans, clans, sub-clans, sub-sub-clans, etc. Thus, the system produced a large number of clan or sub-clan based parties that lacked policies or platforms that transcended their



own clan interests. Secondly, in 1960, while 90 percent of the population had no formal education, the parties that sought to represent them on the basis of clans consisted of the elite, the petit bourgeoisie, which had formed during colonial times. As a result, the majority of the population did not participate in the democratic processes, which were controlled by this elite.

Thirdly, the rejection of the reunification referendum in Somaliland raised issues of legitimacy. Indeed, a year after reunification, a group of army officers staged a mutiny in Somaliland's provincial capital, Hargeisa. Their grievances revolved around the restoration of independence of Somaliland in accordance with the incomplete treaty of 1961.

Fourthly, poor infrastructure and official communications hampered government operations. Telephone links between Mogadishu and the provincial capitals were non-existent, the road network was in poor condition and airfreight was overly expensive. This was coupled with linguistic barriers posed by the fact that each region used a different language – English in the north and Italian in the south.⁹ Moreover, human resources policies varied between regions; for instance, British-trained public servants in the northern region were considered to be more professional than Italian-trained civil servants in the south.

Fifthly, there was a judicial crisis at the higher courts courtesy of the different colonial legacies.



Former Somali warlord now interim President Ali Mahdi (L) and Somali warlord Farah Aideed (R) participate in reconciliation talks in 1997 to end Somalia's long-running civil war

The legal system in the north-west was based on English common law, the Indian penal code and Somali customs, while family law was administered in accordance with Islamic law. In the southern region, the Italians had established a different legal system based on customary and Islamic law.

Lastly, the state faced the monumental challenge of merging not only the police and military forces of the two regions, whose heritage was totally different, but also the economies, which were competitive rather than complementary. Indeed, even the tariff levels were different, with the rates in British Somaliland being lower than in Italian Somalia, and the currencies were different, with the northern region using the East African shilling, linked to the British pound, and the southern region using the somalo, which was linked to the Italian lira.¹⁰

These challenges created a crisis of state, which, as Nzongola-Ntalaja notes, is a function of its nature as an authoritarian control structure preoccupied with the political survival and material interests of those who controlled it.¹¹ Given that the leadership was made up of *petit-bourgeois* nationalists who on the whole were more interested in replacing colonialists in the leading positions of power and privilege than in effecting change in the state, they could hardly address the crisis. Instead, they opted for the easy way out: self-aggrandisement.

Thus, the elite entrenched personal rule, whose hallmarks were nepotism, tribalism, clannism and corruption, vices that generated power struggles along clan lines.¹² To protect their power, those controlling the state appealed to pan-Somali

nationalism, which was characterised by an irredentist tendency towards neighbouring countries.¹³ A consequence of this was the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1964 and Somalia's support for *Shifita* insurgents in Kenya.¹⁴

The state also adopted oppressive internal policies, which saw the president, Aden Abdulle Osman, manipulate the law to bar certain candidates from running for the presidency. That did not, however, prevent him from losing the 1967 elections, although in essence the restriction of the democratic space meant that those outside the ruling clans could not find a "satisfactory outlet in the existing national political parties".¹⁵ The intensifying clan rivalry culminated in the assassination of the next president, Abdul Rashid Shermake, on 18 October 1969, while on a tour to the north. This laid the groundwork for the 21 October overthrow of the government.

The fascist state

The military, led by General Mohamed Siad Barre, replaced the civilian cabinet with a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) upon overthrowing the government in 1969. The SRC acquired executive powers, which were exercised by a clique drawn mainly from Barre's group of clans. It also usurped the powers and privileges of the national assembly, while the judicial arm lost its independence and impartiality. As elsewhere in Africa, the regime adopted the ideology of developmentalism, which held that economically backward Somalia needed development more than the luxuries of democracy.

Using these rationalisations, the regime ruthlessly suppressed political activities and non-state actors such as the media and civil society. Furthermore, Barre declared socialism the official ideology and Islam the official religion. As the junta consolidated its hold on power, the now expanded military took over all instruments of state, thus transforming Somalia into a fascist state.

This transformation generated a crisis as the regime's internal base narrowed. In different parts of the country, different groups started stirring, while the external forces, which had been supporting the regime, started searching for an alternative. To salvage his regime, Barre, while manipulating clan loyalties, instituted a series of populist measures such as the 1972 promulgation

decreeing Somali to be the national language, and the 1973 urban and rural literacy campaigns. Moreover, under the guise of liberating Somalis in the Ogaden, Barre invaded Ethiopia in 1976.

At the time, both Somalia and Ethiopia were economically weak countries; they could hardly engage in a major conventional war without external support. But torn between Ethiopia and Somalia, the latter's erstwhile benefactor, the Soviet Union, supported Ethiopia, and together with Cuba assisted Ethiopia to drive Somalia out of its territory. Humiliated by the Soviets, Barre turned to the US camp. However, instead of uniting the old Somali nation, the Ethiopian invasion led to the disintegration of the state.

Two civil wars

The economic crises precipitated by the war with Ethiopia generated military disaffection and a political reawakening. While the reawakening expressed itself along clan lines, the growing disaffection in the military resulted in the first post-war coup attempt against Barre's regime in 1978. The reactions of the Barre regime were oppressive, including bombing the major towns and villages in the north and the extra-judicial execution of civilians.

This spawned armed resistance in 1978, under the banner of the Somalia Salvation Front (later renamed the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front, or SSDF). This movement established military camps in Ethiopia and carried out cross-border incursions. Then, in 1982, another movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM), based in the north-west of the country, took up arms against the regime. It too established military bases in Ethiopia and conducted cross-border raids. Barre's regime reacted harshly towards civilians in the north, disrupting economic activities, destroying water-points and often burning down whole villages. The raids culminated in a full-scale war between the rebels and the government.

Towards the end of the 1980s, two more movements took up arms. These were the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Congress (USC). The SPM conducted its military operations in the southern region, while the USC operated in the central regions and then in Mogadishu. The USC's entry changed the dimensions of the war, and the full-scale uprising of its supporters drove



Barre's government out of power on 26 January 1991. That marked the end of the first phase of the civil war, in which all sides committed atrocities and human rights abuses.

The complex events that followed, with a small group in Mogadishu creating an interim government, headed by Mohamed Ali Mahdi as interim president, started the degeneration of order within the USC that in turn led to a new civil war. The SNM leadership in the north-west declared its secession from Somalia and formed the Republic of Somaliland, with Mohammed Ibrahim Egal as president.

Meanwhile, the other groups, including General Mohamed Farah Aidede's USC, started organising themselves for war. In the south, Barre's former forces regrouped, while in the north-east, the SSDF reorganised its forces. To evade full-scale war, the interim government called a peace conference to form a government of national unity. But, while the SSDF, SPM and Somalia Democratic Movement (SDM) welcomed the conference, the SNM, Aidede's USC and Barre's forces rejected it.

The stalemate gave birth to the second phase of the civil war. Since then, Somalia has been experiencing sporadic civil warfare, which continues in some parts of the country today. The aftermath of state collapse created an unprecedented human catastrophe in Somalia. The battle for the control of Mogadishu, for instance, greatly exceeded the destruction inflicted on the country during the first phase of the civil war. The war also uprooted millions of people from their homes, who ended up as refugees in neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, while others drifted to other parts of the world.

Farah Aidede (L) and Ali Mahdi (R) shake hands after signing a peace agreement in Mogadishu in 1992

The quest for peace

The first peace parley was held in July 1991 under the guidance of the government of Djibouti. The meeting was attended by representatives of various groups. The conference recommended a central government, with Ali Mahdi as interim president. But some groups rejected the resolution and the subsequent battle consumed thousands and obliterated many buildings in Mogadishu.

Later, in March 1993, the UN called a peace conference, which was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. All parties, including the breakaway Somaliland, attended the conference. However, Somaliland refused to sign a peace deal proposing the establishment of regional administrations and a Transitional National Council (TNC). The rationale of the deal was to reconstruct the central government from the grass-roots. Other factions rejected the involvement of the UN's mission to Somalia (UNOSOM). The subsequent battle left 24 UN peacekeepers dead, and the USA withdrew in haste after Somali militias killed 18 of its soldiers in street battles.

Other major attempts at peace include the Cairo Peace Conference of 1997 and the second Djibouti conference of 2000. The Arab countries of Egypt, Libya and Yemen convened the Cairo summit, while the government of Djibouti sponsored the second Djibouti conference. Neither of these conferences produced resolutions acceptable to all the factions involved in the war. Moreover, between these two conferences, there were other disparate efforts to bring the warring factions to a round table.

After the failure of these efforts, the SSDF announced the formation of the state of Puntland in the north-east. Though Puntland did not wish to secede from the Republic of Somalia, the leaders proposed a federal state, with Puntland being semi-autonomous. Another summit in 2000 in Cairo and the Millennium Summit in New York proposed the establishment of a 245-member provisional parliament and a Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Abdilqassim Salad.

Though the TNG is participating in the current Nairobi peace conference, its influence hardly goes beyond certain neighbourhoods of Mogadishu. But war fatigue has finally caught up with most of the factions and they have now merged to form three large groups that are negotiating in Nairobi. These

include the TNG and the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC) led by Hussein Aideed.

Towards a new state

After many years of war, some parts of the former Somalia have begun to emerge from the dislocation and trauma of conflict to rebuild their shattered lives. There is a new *laissez-faire* attitude towards private initiatives. Economic activities have sprung up and trade among the regions in Somalia is developing. All airports in Somalia receive frequent flights, bringing *khat* from Kenya and Ethiopia and consumer goods are generally available. Financial transfers are possible through a budding banking sector, though there is no official currency, and communication systems are operating through satellite-based technology. Fuel is also available for powering vehicles and generating electricity.

More importantly, organised governance is emerging at the primary units. There is a stable government in the breakaway Republic of Somaliland with functioning institutions, while elections have been held in Puntland. These bottom-up initiatives have influenced the direction of talks at the Nairobi conference. A comprehensive peace agreement must include consideration of the types and scale of political institutions to be adopted. Indeed, the past peace initiatives failed because they emphasised national institutions and ignored local governance institutions.

The bottom-up institution-building processes raise the possibility of a new model of statehood. Unlike the new model, external interference and alien models of administration typified the old model of statehood. Divided between five different states at the moment of their independence, the Somali people have known a bewildering array of administrative systems which, as a rule, were imported, imposed and artificially maintained. Even the so-called self-reliant socialist system envisioned by Siad Barre was in fact dependent throughout its lifetime on generous handouts in cash and kind from donor states, running up a debt higher than 360 percent of Somalia's annual gross domestic product.¹⁶

But the new approach is sensitive to delicate and fundamental issues inherent in statehood, in order to stop the civil war and defuse future wars. These

issues include power-sharing, the decentralisation of authority, the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, guarantees of political, social and economic equity, and a system of checks and balances – in essence, a new social contract.

However, for the country to realise permanent peace, the new state-building process must surmount certain key challenges. First, the new leadership must find a balance between Somali nomadic traditions, Islamic religion and its traditions, and modern developments in governance. Secondly, the process of state formation must incorporate inherent mechanisms of reunifying the Somali people within the New World Order. Thirdly, the structure of government ought to incorporate several tiers so as to accommodate localised governance.

Fourthly, the state formation process has to envision a programme of consolidating the many independent militias into one national military force with a view to controlling the weapons in their hands, rather than disarming individual militiamen.¹⁷ Suggested options include letting all major militias send a quota of their current militias every month for retraining and reassignment within a new national military force with integrated instead of clan-based units. That will be followed by systematic demobilisation of this large force and these young soldiers will be cross-trained and given assistance in becoming self-sufficient in the civilian economy. Only a UN peacekeeping force has the capacity to carry out this task.¹⁸

Fifthly, there is a need for a programme of demining the countryside and reconstructing public infrastructure. The new national military may be involved in this programme, in line with the model of the US Army Corps of Engineers, until the economy recovers sufficiently so that these former militiamen can survive economically. Related to this is the need to contain the anarchical inclinations of all the beneficiaries of the current chaos, including the warlords, who work directly for the political groups and are paid on the basis of services rendered.

Lastly, there are monumental challenges of containing the secessionist tendencies within regions and the loyalties of past autocracies, and reintegrating them under one government, constituting a national police force, formulating a national education system, minting a national currency and establishing a national Central Bank. Of course, central to the process is the nurturing of democratic institutions

such as broad-based political parties, civil society and the media. The overall challenge, however, that is facing the Nairobi peace conference is to assist Somalia to surmount these obstacles. 🗨

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Endnotes

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- 2 Hussein Adam and Richard Ford, 'Removing Barricades in Somalia: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation', USIP fact-finding mission, 1997; Robert Kaplan (1994). 'The Coming Anarchy', *Atlantic Monthly*, February, p. 44–76.
- 3 Mohammed Farah Aideed and Satya Pal Ruhela (1993). *Somalia: From the Dawn of Civilization to the Modern Times*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.
- 4 Abdirahman Mohamed (Farole) (2001). 'The Peace Process in Somalia', Speech presented at the Somali Symposium at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, 12 May.
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 Jack L. Davies (1996). 'Reunification of the Somali People'. Bochum, Germany: Institute of Development Research and Development, Ruhr-Universität Bochum.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 Georges Nzongola Ntalaja (1987). *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Africa*. Institute of African Alternatives, p. 73–91.
- 12 At the time of independence, the leadership line was as follows: President of the Republic was Aden Abdulla Osman; President of Parliament was Mohammed Ghalib (Irir Isaq); the Prime Minister was Abdul Rashid Ali Shermarke (Carod); Foreign Minister, Abdulla Issa (Irir Hawiya); and Defence Minister, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal (Irir Isaq). The majority of these were from one group of clans.
- 13 For a detailed exposition on irredentism as a policy, see Nzongola Ntalaja, *op. cit.*, p. 52–53.
- 14 In October 1962, the leaders of the ethnic Somalis in Kenya demanded the integration of the region into Somalia. Both Britain and the Kenyan government rejected this. No sooner had Kenya become independent in December 1963 than Somali pressures forced the new state to declare a state of emergency two weeks later. *Shifita* were Somali insurgents who were fighting the Kenyan government with a view to secede from Kenya and reunite with Somalia.
- 15 Mohammed Farah Aideed and Satya Pal Ruhela, *op. cit.*
- 16 Davies, *op. cit.*
- 17 These proposals were contained in a press release issued in Nairobi by SRRRC/SNA leader, Hussein Farah Aideed, 5 May 2003. See also the SRRRC's detailed post-peace talks demining programme presented at an international convention in Geneva, Switzerland, on 15 May 2003. Similar proposals also appeared in a release by faction leader Alhaji Yasin Mohammed on 18 September 2003.
- 18 *Ibid.*



PEACEMAKING

BRITT DE KLERK

Cabinda

Where to from here?

Resolutions to conflict are often categorised according to long- or short-term measures and then further delineated according to the focus area, theme, or avenue of approach. In the short-term, the emphasis is on achieving a cessation of conflict and the long-term approach is to transform those structures or systems that promote or provide for conflict. Efforts at achieving immediate and sustained peace are the responsibility of a variety of actors at the individual, local, provincial, national, regional, and international level. Political will, or in fact social and economic will, to resolve and transform conflict is indeed a prerequisite for sustaining peace and it is one factor in peace promotion that needs to be urgently addressed. Resolving conflict and building lasting peace is possible through the will of all the actors involved, that is, actors directly and indirectly involved in conflict resolution and the promotion of peace.

In the Cabinda enclave, the most salient aspects of the conflict are the struggle for secession by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of

Cabinda (FLEC) and its various factions, while the government of Angola is becoming more open to discussions on autonomy. Another feature is the impact (direct and indirect) of oil production on the political, social and economic postures of the various actors involved. Thirdly, the apparent lack of will among actors to become involved in fostering negotiations is also a marked feature of the conflict.

The conflict in Cabinda is reminiscent of other conflicts in Africa where identity, resources, and political will are key factors in determining the direction and duration of the conflict. A case in point for comparison would be the conflict in the Sudan. In this country, the pursuit for self-determination by the South, the conflict over the control of resources (especially oil concessions), the influence of regional and international actors, and the lack of political (and social and economic) will to either negotiate or facilitate negotiation has marked the history of the conflict – at least until the current peace process which started in Machakos, Kenya, in 2002. Similarly, Cabinda is primarily categorised as

a secessionist conflict in which the control of oil resources in terms of national revenue and social development is of key concern. Coupled with this is the lack of political will by the conflicting parties to readily negotiate and the regional and international actors to play key facilitation roles in bringing an end to the hostilities or to encourage and participate in talks for resolving the conflict. Faced with these challenges, what are the possible recommendations for bringing peace to Cabinda?

Background to the conflict

Cabinda was from 1885 a Portuguese protectorate, which was joined in an administrative union with Angola by the Portuguese government in 1956. The call for the secession of Cabinda can be traced back to 1960 when two separatist groups formed, the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC) and the Alliance of Mayombe. Three years later, the two groups joined forces to form FLEC and in the same year Cabinda was declared the 39th state still to be decolonised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). (Angola was ranked at 35th.) In contrast, in January 1975, the Alvor Agreement declared that Cabinda is “an integral and inalienable part of Angola”.¹ The agreement was signed between the three Angolan liberation movements at that time, namely the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Since then, the conflict has been marked by various failed attempts at talks and negotiations, prompted and facilitated internally and by neighbouring states, and the formation of numerous factions of FLEC. Up to August 2003, an estimated eight attempts at talks by national and regional actors had failed. During this period, the FLEC had splintered at least four times, spawning the Military Command for the Liberation of Cabinda (CMLC), the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front-Renewal (FLEC-Renovada), the Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC), and later the FLEC-FAC-Armed Forces of Cabinda.

Geographically, Cabinda is separated from the rest of Angola by a 60 km-wide strip of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It is rich in oil and has been dubbed “Africa’s Kuwait” due to



its vast petroleum resources, which account for close to 60 percent of Angola’s oil production. The humanitarian costs of the conflict are high, with large numbers of the population displaced and many reports of human rights abuses. With the end of the war in Angola, hopes were raised that the conflict in Cabinda would also end, but this has not been the case, with continued reports of clashes between FLEC (and its factions) and government troops.



Cabinda is rich in oil and has been dubbed “Africa’s Kuwait” due to its vast petroleum resources, which accounts for close to 60 % of the 80% Angola generates from oil production

Discussions on the most salient issues

The approach adopted in the current Sudanese peace process could provide some valuable lessons for working towards peace in Cabinda. Following a conflict that has raged for over nineteen years, the Sudanese conflicting parties agreed to enter into negotiations, with the facilitation and support of regional bodies and the international community. The negotiation agenda included salient issues such as the length of the interim period, power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and the separation of religion and state. The talks have not been entirely smooth, but significant progress has been made in terms of reaching agreement on the key issues. Efforts by the civil society organisations in Sudan and the neighbouring countries and the Diaspora have also influenced the direction of the talks positively. Key to these talks has been the willingness of the parties to negotiate and the strong support and interest of the international community in bringing peace to Sudan.

As in the case of Sudan, the two issues which raise the most concerns and present the most challenges for resolving the conflict are FLEC and its factions’ strident call for self-determination of

the people of Cabinda, and the control of revenue generated by the oil concessions. The call for secession has been argued from legal, historical, cultural and ethnic perspectives, as well as the initial argument of their united front for independence;² however, the government of Angola has indicated that its preferred solution is autonomy.

Arguments on the issue of oil revenues generated from the abundant oil concessions largely drilled by multinational organisations (these include Chevron Texaco, Agip, TotalFinaElf, Petrogal and the state-owned Sonangol) show that there is little social and economic benefit for the Cabindan communities. Whereas oil comprised 80 percent of Angola’s revenue and Cabinda generates 60 percent of that oil revenue, it is estimated that oil exports from the province are worth the equivalent of US \$100 000 per

annum for every Cabindan. Yet Cabinda remains one of the poorest provinces in Angola.³

Moving towards peace

A commonly held position is that a negotiated settlement is the only solution to such a conflict; however, the preparation and implementation of such a process requires a number of issues to be addressed. The planning and sequencing of the negotiation agenda between the conflicting parties is vital and central to this preparation is a willingness to negotiate by all the parties, concerted efforts to identify the salient interests, the identification of legitimate and representative interlocutors, and the inclusion of civil society actors in the process. Further, determining power-sharing and wealth- or revenue-sharing as well as national and provincial parameters is crucial. However, as a first step the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops is paramount. Estimates indicate that the government has approximately 30 000 troops in Cabinda and FLEC troops amount to about 2 000. The population of Cabinda is estimated at 600 000. The abundance of armed troops in a territory of this size does not bode well for building a sense of security and confidence, nor a willingness to talk or negotiate.

Working towards peace would require a coordinated and concerted effort by a myriad of actors. Preparing for negotiations is not just the responsibility of the conflicting parties. Rather it is a joint effort by various sectors in society at the local, national, regional and international levels, including civil society, community and political leaders, regional organisations, international governmental and non-governmental organisations, as well as the international corporate and business community. Strategies for bringing peace to Cabinda should include all these actors and all these levels.

Facilitated dialogue is critical to building confidence, encouraging negotiation, and providing platforms for open and constructive consultation on how best to move towards peace. Dialogue between the communities represented by civil society and the warring groups, between the communities themselves, between the factions of FLEC, between the communities and the multinational companies present, and between the warring groups and the multinationals is crucial. International and regional support for these dialogues is essential and efforts to highlight this conflict and its repercussions outside the borders of Angola should be undertaken by national, regional and international actors. For example, the African Union and the United Nations should be encouraged to intervene in terms of facilitating pre-negotiations dialogue, particularly between the warring parties and with the multinational organisations, and the negotiation process as a whole. Furthermore, the regional and international actors should facilitate a cease-fire agreement between the conflicting parties.


The conflicting parties should engage further with civil society within Angola and Cabinda in developing the agenda for negotiations, and ensuring that issues of governance in and authority over Cabinda are addressed, as well as wealth-sharing. Public participation in the peace process is essential, and all levels of society should engage in this preparation to ensure that the interests of the community are indeed included on the agenda, as well as those of the conflicting parties. Moreover, to ensure constructive engagement between the parties, civil society should be strengthened in terms of communication and negotiation skills, institutional capacity building, and development of a cohesive and organised entity.⁴ In fact, the same capacity building is required for the liberation

movements in Cabinda to ensure that they too can effectively engage each other and others in constructive peace-promoting dialogue.

International engagement with the multinational corporations involved in the region is also essential. The social responsibility of these companies operating in territories other than their own should be highlighted and efforts at dialogue between these companies and other actors are vital. It is worth pointing out that the activities of these corporations in Cabinda directly impact on the provinces socio-political and economic environment and efforts to engage these corporations on pertinent peace and conflict issues is critical for resolving the conflict in Cabinda.

At the same time, humanitarian assistance to the province is necessary, as well as efforts to stem human rights abuses. The province should be opened up to allow the free movement of humanitarian and relief agencies, thus providing some security to the people of Cabinda.

Conclusion

Ultimately, moving Cabinda towards peace is the primary responsibility of the people of Angola and Cabinda. However, regional and international support for the peace process is crucial for resolving the salient issues of the conflict. Bringing peace to Cabinda is not the responsibility of one or two, but rather all the actors at the local, national, regional and international levels. 

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Endnotes

- 1 See the IRIN Web Special on Cabinda for a concise chronology of the conflict in Cabinda. Available online at www.irinnews.org/webspecials/cabinda/default.asp.
- 2 For a detailed analysis of the arguments for self-determination, see Porto, João Gomes (2003). *Notes on a soon to be forgotten war*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies Paper 77.
- 3 *Ibid.* p 3.
- 4 For a discussion on civil society in Cabinda, see the report *A Common Vision for Cabinda* from the conference organised by the Open Society in Angola, from 9-10 July 2003.



KATE GERAGHTY/AFP

DDR

Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration: The case of Angola

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a vital step in the transition from war to peace. No peace process can be successful when armed groups exist that pose a threat to fragile peace efforts. Comprehensive DDR programmes create a safe environment, enable people to earn adequate livings through constructive means, and assist in reconciliation processes by reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life and reuniting communities. However, DDR is a complicated process in a post-conflict environment where previously armed groups are divided by animosities and face a security dilemma when surrendering their arms, where societies are traumatised and not ready to receive ex-combatants, where government, judicial and civil society structures have crumbled, and where the economy has been destroyed by the conflict. Despite the many challenges involved in implementing a DDR

programme, it is evident that no post-conflict peace building process is complete without it. This paper examines the important role that DDR plays in the peace building process, and briefly explores the DDR process in Angola as a case study.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – the concepts

DDR is a process and should be seen as circular, as the three phases are interconnected and the successful completion of each phase is vital to the success of the next phase. Although the three phases are distinguished by different goals, actors and functions, they should not be seen as isolated. Disarmament and demobilisation phases are usually completed fairly quickly by military personnel and are relatively easy to plan and implement as they involve a limited number of actors.

The reintegration phase is the most time-consuming, complex, long-term and costly phase, as it requires the co-ordination of a variety of actors to be successful. Many conflict management practitioners agree that for any DDR process to be successful the reintegration process must be sustainable and communities adequately prepared to receive former armed groups. Before a DDR process can begin, there need to be stable security arrangements to ensure a safe environment, a commitment by all the warring factions to the peace agreement, and the involvement of all stakeholders and actors in the design of the DDR programme; moreover, the programme should form part of national reconciliation efforts. In addition, the DDR programme should be clear and realistically outlined in the peace agreement, and sufficient funds should be allocated to the programme.

In terms of implementing the DDR programme, DDR staff need flexibility, mediation skills and confidence-building skills. The leading institution should be a civilian one that is neutral, specialised and administratively competent. The short-term goal is the restoration of security and stability through the disarmament of warring groups and their demobilisation. The long-term goal is the sustained social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into a peaceful society. For DDR programmes to be sustainable, they must be integrated with other post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and social and economic development.¹

Demobilisation

“Demobilisation is the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the individual level, is the process of releasing combatants from a mobilised state.”³

Demobilisation includes the assembly of ex-combatants, which ensures their participation in the DDR programme, orientation programmes, which offer viable alternative means of income other than fighting, and transportation to their communities or training areas for the new army. There are usually large logistical challenges at this stage, which need to be planned for at the outset. For example, finding assembly and reception areas that are neutral and do not advantage any one belligerent group can be difficult. Once the ex-combatants are registered and screened, they go through a survey process where their needs and preferences, in terms of jobs for example, are identified. When discharged, they are given reinsertion packages for reintegration and encouraged to return later for more benefits. Ex-combatants should spend at least three months in these areas to ensure that they are confident to leave.

Disarmament

Disarmament is defined by the United Nations as “the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone”.² Disarmament usually occurs in assembly areas where combatants are gathered together in camps. Weapons are confiscated and then either stored for the new national army or destroyed. Some ex-combatants are encouraged to disable their own weapons, which has a psychological benefit as it symbolises their transition to civilian life. At the disarmament sites,

combatants usually have to undergo a test to verify their combatant status and they are then registered on the DDR system to gain access to benefits. They are given food aid, clothing, shelter, and medical attention, and are enrolled in basic skills and orientation programmes. At this phase, creating a transparent, secure environment is important, as surrendering arms can be traumatic for the combatants and this should therefore be used as a confidence-building exercise. At this collection phase, incentives are often used to encourage groups to disarm.

Reintegration

Reintegration has two phases, initial reinsertion and long-term reintegration. Reinsertion addresses the most immediate needs of ex-combatants in terms of relief, providing a safety net for their initial arrival into their communities. Cash allowances in installments (to prevent abuse) and/or reinsertion packages containing household goods, land, farming equipment and housing materials are handed out. Reintegration has the long-term focus of assisting the community and ex-combatant in the difficult transition into civilian life. Former fighters enter job placement services, participate in skills training, win scholarships, or enter reintegration programmes. This phase is usually run by civilians, and requires co-ordination between various national and international organisations. It is important that this stage is started soon after demobilisation, because if demobilised fighters have to wait to be reintegrated they may become frustrated and return to fighting. Reintegration typically includes 5 steps:

- 1** gathering information on the needs of ex-combatants;
- 2** conducting orientation briefing and counselling;
- 3** providing subsidies and benefits;
- 4** social reintegration or sensitisation campaigns; and
- 5** economic reintegration programmes.

The DDR process in the overall peace-building process

The presence of weapons in society makes peace-building a very difficult task, especially when there is wide availability and use of small arms in civil wars, and both combatants and civilians own weapons. Without the removal of arms and the demobilisation of armed groups, the potential for a return to conflict is very high. Therefore, the DDR process is a fundamental step in the peace-building

process. Many international policymakers consider DDR to be one of the most vital elements in the entire peace process, and the World Bank has defined a successful DDR programme as “the key to an effective transition from war to peace”.⁴ The success of DDR after conflict also represents the ‘moment of truth’ for any peace-building process, therefore in order to build sustainable peace special attention has to be paid to the long-term prospects of the ex-combatants who are giving up their livelihood.

Peace-building is essentially about removing or weakening factors that breed or sustain conflict, and reinforcing factors that build positive relations and sustain peace. Since DDR aims to remove the means of violence, such as small arms, from society and aims to reintegrate ex-combatants into functioning communities, it contributes greatly to the overall aims and objectives of peace-building. DDR programmes also lay the foundations for reconciliation as they bring the communities and ex-combatants together in a constructive way through education programmes and community-building projects. Reintegration programmes often include projects that equip the ex-combatants with life and education skills to enable them to become contributing members of society. It must be emphasised that reintegration programmes also need to focus on communities and ensure that they are part of the process and take ownership of reintegration so that the transition is a smooth and mutually beneficial one.

Successful reintegration programmes are also important for peace-building as ex-combatants who do not find peaceful ways of earning an income are likely to return to conflict. Dissatisfied veterans can also play a large role in undermining reconciliation efforts and destabilising social order if there are not programmes for them to join.

The case of Angola

Since the signing in April 2002 of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Cessation of Hostilities, between the military leaders of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the civil war in Angola has been declared at an end. Angola is now faced with the challenging task of post-conflict peace-building in an unstable

social, economic and political environment, and in the midst of a severe humanitarian crisis.

A DDR process is underway in Angola as part of the peace-building effort. The MOU updated the military components of the Lusaka Protocol, governing the DDR of UNITA troops and the integration of the armed forces. The DDR process in Angola is unique in that its provisions are the result of a military victory and negotiations between the FAA and UNITA, there is a limited role for the international community and no provision for formal third party monitoring.⁵ The DDR process in Angola is also unique in that the government has assumed the management and financing of the process. Two institutional structures were created for the process, the Joint Military Commission (JMC) to oversee the application of the MOU, and a Technical Group (TG) to assist the JMC in terms of drawing up timetables for the implementation of DDR activities. The MOU stated that ex-combatants were to receive benefits such as demobilisation cards, five months' salary, travel expenses, resettlement kits and vocational training. The MOU planned 80 days for the completion of the disarmament and demobilisation phases, but nearly double the anticipated number of UNITA soldiers arrived in the quartering areas, most of them with their families, which created enormous logistical problems for which the JMC and TG and humanitarian partners were unprepared. These structures were also not flexible or sensitive to the needs of the beneficiaries.⁶

The lack of adequate planning and unrealistic timetables resulted in huge numbers of ex-combatants not receiving the necessary supplies or attention, and an increase in criminal activity. Health problems and malnutrition further complicated the situation in the camps. The locations were not ideally located and in some instances were inaccessible to receiving aid. These challenges hampered and prolonged the disarmament and demobilisation process. The government declared the first phases complete in August 2002, but it was evident that the process was not complete by the fact that vast numbers of ex-combatants had not been registered and that many weapons had not been verified.⁷ In addition, the dismantling of the JMC came about before the phase was adequately complete. This illustrates that the DDR process cannot be rushed; moving onto the reintegration



APF

phase was fraught with complications because the previous phases were incomplete. The disarmament process was ad hoc and the government eager to close all quartering areas quickly. This has resulted in future problems for the overall DDR process. For example, ex-combatants' morale has been negatively affected and ex-combatants who were forced to leave the camps that were closing did not receive demobilisation cards and therefore cannot get the benefits owed to them.

Another reason why the DDR process is hampered with difficulties is the government's reluctance to significantly involve the UN, while the UN and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were criticised for being slow to react because they had to secure government permission to enter the quartering areas. Related to this, there is limited co-ordination between the various actors. Although the FAA is responsible for assisting the ex-combatants, the World Food Programme (WFP) and NGOs and humanitarian agencies have supported family members and distributed food and non-food items, seeds and tools, and helped with family tracing.⁸ The World Bank also disbursed financial aid to ex-combatants. Currently, the conditions have stabilised, although access to the quartering areas has not improved and vast amounts of funds are needed to implement reintegration programmes. There have also been complaints that the government has not gone far enough to assist the ex-combatants in terms of vocational training and handing out salaries. In addition, there is a concern

Angolan General Cruz Neto (C) promoting ex-Unita guerilla officers in order to integrate them into the Angolan national armed forces in Luanda in 2002

that the settlements are becoming permanent and that ex-combatants and their families are not being moved into reintegration quickly enough and do not want to move back to their communities. As a consequence of the war, communities are also traumatised and fragmented, and thus resistant to receiving the ex-combatants. This has caused communal conflict.

There are still up to 30 quartering areas open and just over 20 percent of the total disarmed and demobilised have been resettled, although 80 percent received demobilised documents and were ready to move to the next phase.⁹ A related problem was that the cash benefits that were distributed were not properly marketed as they were disproportionate to local market salaries and prices, and ex-combatants spent them on non-essential goods such as alcohol. The delivery of resettlement kits was difficult during the rainy season and there were problems in procurement.¹⁰ From the outset there was no clear framework for reintegration, and this caused enormous problems once the ex-combatants were demobilised. This illustrates the importance of planning for all three phases prior to the commencement of disarmament.

There was no provision made in the DDR programme to disarm civilians, and studies show that 10 percent of the uncollected arms are in the hands of civilians, posing a short-term security threat. The economic and security value of weapons in the hands of civilians and ex-combatants in the context of poverty, as in Angola, has to be taken into account when implementing DDR programmes.¹¹ Berdal notes that “disarmament and weapons-control measures have limited value unless those that are being disarmed are reasonably satisfied with security and economic incentives offered in return”.¹²

Despite the many difficulties facing the DDR programme, a great advantage in Angola is the fact that the peace process is home-grown. In addition to this, due to the FAA’s victory over UNITA, the belligerents fairly quickly agreed on a ceasefire and there was unhindered political will demonstrated in the completion of the Lusaka process.¹³

Conclusion

DDR has proved to be complex, time-consuming and expensive, but essential to sustaining lasting

peace in post-conflict societies. National governments are usually directly involved in planning and implementing DDR programmes in partnership with international organisations, usually the UN, local NGOs and donors. It is therefore important that all DDR efforts are co-ordinated and well funded to be sustainable. The environment around DDR is fragile and communities can often strongly oppose the reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-combatants may enter into criminal or violent activities that threaten the process. All these challenges need to be considered and the DDR process well planned before implementation to avoid the pitfalls experienced recently in countries undergoing DDR. DDR practitioners also need to take note of lessons learned from programmes elsewhere, such as the one in Angola, when designing DDR programmes for countries making the difficult transition from war to peace. ■

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JON LEVY/AP

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PEACEBUILDING

Coherence and integration in
the planning, implementation and
evaluation of complex


peace- building operations

Peacebuilding operations are international interventions that support the process of reconciliation and reconstruction in post-conflict societies. In the short term they are designed to support the peace process and prevent a relapse into conflict, but their ultimate aim is to address the root causes of the conflict and to lay the

foundations for social justice and sustainable peace.

The peacebuilding concept was first introduced in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 *Agenda for Peace*,¹ and it is still emerging as a distinct form of international action. The international community has, however, been involved in international conflict resolution and post-conflict support for much

**Kofi Annan, the
Secretary-General
of the United
Nations (above)**



Boutros Boutros-Ghali initiated the Agenda for Peace in 1992

longer than that. Research undertaken by Roy Licklider over the period 1945–1993 suggested that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after they have been signed.² There are many reasons why peace processes fail. One can blame the protagonists in conflicts, because they often agree to peace agreements for tactical reasons without being committed to a long-term peace process. One can also blame the international community for pressuring protagonists to sign peace agreements when they know that the agreements are unlikely to survive, due to unrealistic timetables or more often because the agreements failed to address the root inequalities that caused the conflicts in the first place. However, if one leaves these dynamics aside for the purpose of focusing on how peacebuilding operations may contribute to these failures, one factor that stands out is the disjointed nature of the international response.

Despite a growing awareness that the security, socio-economic, political and reconciliation dimensions of peacebuilding are interlinked, the international community has not yet managed to successfully integrate these different dimensions into coherent peacebuilding operations. Although several peacebuilding operations have been undertaken over the last decade, no generic model has emerged that can serve as a blueprint or template

on which future integrated peacebuilding missions can be based. One of the reasons why it has proven so difficult to achieve coherence is because the different agencies lack a shared understanding of the need for coordination and a common vision of how it can be achieved. Peacebuilding lacks a common framework to explain the role of coordination in binding the different dimensions into an integrated system. This essay will attempt to address this need by proposing a complex peacebuilding model that has the potential to provide a basis for improved coherence, coordination and integration in peacebuilding operations.

Complex peace operations

There seems to be a growing acknowledgement of the complexity of peace operations. The emergency relief community started to use the concept of complex emergencies in the early 1990s, while the peacekeeping community started to use the concept of complex peace operations in the late 1990s to describe the multi-dimensional and multi-agency nature of contemporary peace operations. This would suggest that there is a common acknowledgement in these communities that the problems they are addressing are complex. If they are, one should be able to use the knowledge of how complex systems function to improve our understanding of peacebuilding operations. One should be able to identify those characteristics that hinder the effective functioning of peacebuilding systems. And one should be able to generate mechanisms and processes that could improve the coherence and coordination of peacebuilding operations.

The complex peacebuilding model is an interpretation of the contemporary dynamics of peacebuilding. It is not a projected ideal state, but an explanation of how the dynamic relationships among agencies function in contemporary peacebuilding operations. The model recognises a system of elements represented by individual agencies and

the programmes they pursue. These elements are interdependent in that no single agency can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding operation – addressing the root causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. Each agency undertakes programmes that address specific facets of the conflict spectrum. The total cumulative effect works towards achieving the peacebuilding objective. In this context, the success of each individual programme, and the agencies that undertake them, is a factor of the contribution they make to the achievement of the overall peacebuilding goal. If the peace process fails and the country relapses into conflict, the time and resources invested in every programme have been wasted, even if a particular programme has achieved its own objectives. It is only if the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

The complex peacebuilding model argues that, as agencies are participating in a collective effort, and as the success of their own programmes is dependent on the success of other programmes and the total cumulative effect of their joint undertaking, it will be in their interests to encourage coherence and coordination in the planning, implementation and evaluation of their own individual peacebuilding programmes.

Peacebuilding and the need for improved coordination

The international response to conflict, as developed in the context of the United Nations, is first to try to prevent conflict. If that fails, the next step is to ‘make peace’, by facilitating negotiations among the parties. If a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached that includes a neutral third-party monitoring role, the UN or a regional organisation authorised by the Security Council would typically deploy a peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire and to support the implementation of the peace agreement. Once the conflict zone has been stabilised and a peace process has been agreed upon, the international community would shift its focus from emergency assistance to post-conflict reconstruction. This phase, peacebuilding, is focused on rebuilding and reconciliation, with the aim of

addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to prevent it from recurring.³

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change.⁴ The nexus between development and peace has become a central focus for peacebuilding theory and practice over the last decade.⁵ The lack of integration between programmes undertaken in the humanitarian relief and development spheres and those in the peace and security spheres has been highlighted by almost all the major evaluation and best practice studies undertaken over recent years.⁶ Most have identified the lack of meaningful coordination among the peacebuilding agencies as a major cause of unsatisfactory performance. The Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding,⁷ that analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a strategic deficit, as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. This study found that more than 55 percent of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy. Another significant finding of this study is that a peacebuilding operation needs to build momentum over at least ten years in order for it to have a sustainable impact. Not all the individual programmes need to be in place over the entire history of the operation, but the overall operation need to be systematically sustained over at least a decade in order for it to have a lasting impact.

What we can conclude from the existing literature and evaluation reports referred to above is that peacebuilding operations have been less coherent and integrated than we would like them to be, and this lack of strategic coherence and meaningful integration is continuing to undermine the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations and the peace processes they support.

“there is an opportunity for greater coherence and coordination among the donor countries as they have substantial influence on both the peace and security dimension and the relief and reconstruction dimensions of peacebuilding operations”



Although peacekeeping is typically associated with the military, they are in fact just one of several components that together make up complex peace operations

The complexity in complex peacebuilding operations

There are many factors that hinder effective coordination, but two stand out. The first is the large number of international and local agencies involved. They include the parties to the conflict; states, some as neighbours or interested parties, and others as donors, troop contributors and decision-makers at the strategic level; international institutions such as the United Nations and World Bank; regional institutions such as the European Union and African Union; sub-regional organisations including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC); international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs); commercial contractors; and civil society. Although none of these agencies is in principle opposed to coordination, the reality is that they all have their own interests or mandates, organisational cultures, operating procedures and sources of funding to whom they have to be accountable. The combined effect inhibits effective coordination.⁸

One should also recognise, however, that the relationships among these peacebuilding agencies are not necessarily unstructured. There are various

clusters, groupings, alliances and hierarchies within this diverse group and it would be important to study the inter-relationships, linkages and networks among these agencies to understand how they relate and to identify coordination opportunities than may be underexploited. Because of the complex, multidimensional and multidisciplinary nature of these peacebuilding operations, no single agency is able to manage all the aspects of a peacebuilding operation. This does not imply that there is a flat hierarchical system at work. Not all the agencies have equal power, influence and status in the system. For instance, a donor

agency that funds several other agencies at various levels within the system will have more influence than a small NGO.

In fact, the donor agencies deserve particular focus from a strategic coordination perspective. A relatively small number of donor countries, approximately 15 to 20, are responsible for funding almost all peacebuilding programmes. Most of these donor countries are also the dominant players in the peace and security arena. They are the principal peace-makers, they contribute troops to peace operations, and some are permanent members or rotating non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. When they are not in the Security Council itself, they are part of influential alliances, coalitions and regional and sub-regional groupings that influence those who are serving on the Security Council. There is an opportunity for greater coherence and coordination among the donor countries, perhaps more so than any other grouping, as they have substantial influence on both the peace and security dimension and the relief and reconstruction dimensions of peacebuilding operations.

Even though no single agency is able to take overall responsibility for a peacebuilding operation, there is an expectation, expressed in public opinion, by national political leaders and by representatives

of the UN system, that the different agencies involved in peacebuilding operations should establish cooperative links with each other and together muster a coherent response. The large number and diverse nature of agencies, and the intricate dynamics of the relationships among them, is one of the factors that makes the coordination of peacebuilding operations complex.

The other factor that inhibits coordination is closely related to the first, namely its multidimensional nature. Peacebuilding operations combine conflict prevention, peace making, security operations, humanitarian relief and recovery operations, transitional justice and rule of law programmes, human rights monitoring and education, and political transition support and institution building, in a multi-layered, multi-disciplinary and multi-functional peacebuilding operation that is intended to build positive momentum for peace across the whole conflict spectrum. For such positive momentum to come about in a post-conflict society, every individual must make thousands of micro-decisions about their own security, shelter, health, wellbeing, employment, education and future prospects. Peacebuilding operations need to reflect this multi-faceted nature of society and therefore consist of a large number of programmes designed to have a system-wide impact on the peace process across the whole conflict spectrum.

These programmes are often grouped together in clusters and sectors. For instance, the *Utstein* study grouped the peacebuilding programmes it researched into four clusters: security, political framework, socio-economic foundations, and justice and reconciliation. Another example of clustering, this time from a contemporary operation, is evident in the 2004 draft UN strategy document for Iraq where ten clusters are identified: education and culture; health, water and sanitation; infrastructure and housing; agriculture; water resources and environment; food security; mine action; internally displaced persons (IDPS) and refugees; governance and civil society; and poverty reduction and human development.⁹ The point is that the large number of specialised programmes and diverse range of thematic areas covered in peacebuilding operations does have the potential to be more systematically categorised and grouped together in clusters, sectors and other groupings for coordination purposes.

The reality is, however, that most of these

programmes are planned and implemented in relative isolation by specialists in different agencies. Most programmes are resourced through headquarters and the little coordination that does take place is about implementation, not design and strategic coherence. Programme managers are held accountable to their own institutions against their own institutional plans and budgets. Implementation is further hampered by institutional rivalries, information hoarding and a lack of understanding of a common purpose. This makes the coordination and synchronisation of peacebuilding operations extremely complex.

The complex peacebuilding model

Despite the fact that most, if not all, of these agencies agree that more coordination is needed, the current framework of inter-institutional relationships among peacebuilding agencies inhibits the effective coherence, coordination and integration of peacebuilding operations. There seem to be two schools of thought on how this problem can be resolved. The one advocates that improved coordination can be achieved through centralising control in one agency or by introducing a hierarchical coordination and management structure. In Afghanistan, for instance, the UN tried to achieve greater coherence by requiring all the UN system agencies to work under and through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Others have proposed giving a specific UN agency like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) overall responsibility for peacebuilding operations, or creating a new UN agency that would be responsible for peacebuilding operations.¹⁰

This essay suggests another approach. It argues for a model that recognises the systemic nature of peacebuilding operations and that builds on the inherent capacity of complex systems to self-organise. It favours a distributed system-wide responsibility for coordination, but recognises that some agencies have a more influential role in this process than others. This complex peacebuilding model functions as a complex system made up of a

“in the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping to peacebuilding”

large number of independent programmes that are undertaken by multiple agencies over time, with the common binding assumption that they would collectively and cumulatively promote and support sustainable peace across all aspects of the society with whom they have engaged.

Coordination as a function of self-regulation

It is important to understand that the complex peacebuilding model does not foresee the achievement of a perfectly coordinated or regulated system. Peacebuilding operations exist in a dynamic environment, take place over time, and are the product of continuous dynamic non-linear interactions among the agencies and programmes within the system. Self-regulation is the process whereby individual agencies continuously synchronise their actions with each other. As this process unfolds over time, and as a result of various feedback loops in the system, the overall effect is an integrated peacebuilding operation that is highly flexible and responsive to the changing needs of its environment.

A key feature of this complex peacebuilding model is that its success relies on the quality and flow of information. For the self-regulation process

“the nexus between development and peace has become a central focus for peacebuilding theory and practice over the last decade”

to work optimally, each programme must adjust its own actions in response to progress or setbacks experienced elsewhere in the system. In practice, however, peacebuilding operations are burdened by institutional cultures and traditional management and command structures that discourage information flow. They block, hinder or distort the flow of information and thus starve the system of the information it requires to self-organise. This

causes the system to break up into smaller components. If this tendency is not managed, peacebuilding operations develop information silos that operate, at best, in isolation from each other, or at worst, against each other. To counter this tendency, the complex peacebuilding model favours coordination mechanisms and processes that are designed to create linkages (connections) among the various agencies at all levels to ensure that the flow of information through the system is facilitated,

supported and maintained.

If programmes are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the overall peacebuilding objective, the responsibility to coordinate will be distributed across the system. Some agencies will be more connected than others, and they will become important nodes in the overall coordination of the system. During the implementation phase, various coordination mechanisms and processes will enhance the ability of the system to self-organise. In the peacebuilding context, one would not have the luxury of time to allow the self-regulation process to take place at its own pace. It would thus make sense to develop mechanisms and processes that would speed up the desired feedback effect. These would consist of mechanisms and processes that encourage, facilitate and support the flow of information at every phase of the project cycle, i.e. combined assessments, integrated planning, shared coordination during implementation, and cooperative monitoring and evaluation.

This cooperation needs to be replicated at every level, i.e. at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the peacebuilding operation. It also needs to take place in and between every sector and cluster to ensure the best possible flow of information throughout the system. The more information available, the greater the ability of the various components of the system to synchronise their actions with each other and thus with the system as a whole. It is not just about quantity, however, as the quality of the information becomes very important and the coordination mechanisms and processes should act as routers that identify and forward the kind of information that are needed by different parts of the system. They need to share best practices and alert each other to emerging problem areas. In essence, the flow of information need to produce a feedback effect, and it should thus convey data that will enable the various agencies to judge the performance of their individual programmes against the performance of others and the system as a whole.

Strategic coherence

Strategic coherence is a crucial element in the complex peacekeeping model. The rationale behind the existence of any peacebuilding programme is the contribution it makes to the overall goal of

supporting a post-conflict society on its path to sustainable peace. This implies that the peacebuilding community must have a strategy in place for how it intends achieving this goal. The peacekeeping model is based on the open connection between individual programmes and overall strategy. The process of developing and then adjusting (through ongoing monitoring and evaluation) the overall strategy, and continuously sharing this information with the agencies in the system so that they can synchronise their own programmes with the overall strategy, is a critical part of the self-regulation method.

In the complex peacebuilding model, it would be important for this planning process to be as participatory as possible. If each individual agency is going to align itself with the overall strategy, it needs to take ownership of that strategy. The processes that have produced it would have to be perceived as credible, legitimate and participatory. It would, of course, not be possible for each individual agency to be part of every aspect of the planning process, but each individual agency should be represented through coordination mechanisms which can include sector, cluster and various other input mechanisms. The strategic planning process needs to be championed by a core group of agencies, but cannot be limited to them. These are typically the member states of the UN Security Council, supported by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN Secretariat for the peace and security dimension, and the UNDP and other development agencies in the UN System, the World Bank and donor agencies for the relief and reconstruction dimension.

The pace and sequencing of peacebuilding operations

There is a need to synchronise the project cycles of the different clusters to ensure that the combined



ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP

effect on the society is positive, consistent and produced at a rate that can be absorbed by local institutions and the body politic. The latter aspect is largely ignored in contemporary peacebuilding operations. The success of capacity building initiatives tends to be measured in terms of the resources and activities that are expended to undertake the programmes, instead of evaluating the sustainable capacity that is developed as a result of the programmes. The legacy of conflict typically results in the host society having a much lower capacity to absorb the support provided by the peacebuilding community than the international community anticipates. There is a relationship between the length and intensity of the conflict and the length and intensity of the post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction operation that is needed to achieve sustainable peace. This relationship is generally calculated as a one-to-two ratio, i.e. the peacebuilding programme would need to be sustained over a period twice as long as the violent conflict lasted. Peacebuilding operations are, however, typically intense three to four year interventions, and the bulk of the money potentially available for long-term peacebuilding is spent within this time frame. This result in considerable wastage, in that a large amount is spent on programmes that the host society simply cannot absorb.

The pressure to show short-term results is influenced by a perceived narrow window of opportunity

United Nations troops prepare for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme in Sierra Leone

calculated as the period for which international media attention remains focused on the post-conflict story, i.e. the length of time domestic politics will, as a result of public interest stimulated by the media, remain interested in the story. As a result, national political events like a US presidential election can have a profound influence on, for instance, the timetable of the peacebuilding programme in Iraq. This approach has resulted in a peacebuilding culture that is obsessed with rapid response, quick-impact, short-term successes and rapid withdrawals. Not surprisingly, this approach has not had much


“the synchronisation of delivery with absorption should be an important aspect of ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes”

success with achieving sustainable peace. Its only long-term effect is donor fatigue on the side of the international community and prolonged instability, underdevelopment and continuous cycles of conflict on the side of the recipient societies. The only way to counter it is to synchronise the rate of delivery with the rate of absorption.

The complex peacebuilding model suggests that individual programmes and the overall strategy have to be much more sensitive to the time-scales within which they operate and the capacity of the host-society to absorb and incorporate the support offered. It suggests that the synchronisation of delivery with absorption should be an important aspect of ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes. Not all programmes have to be long term, but the overall peacebuilding effort needs to be sustained until the post-conflict society has been assisted to the point where it can be reasonably expected to successfully continue on its path towards sustainable peace without the support of a peacebuilding operation.

Conclusion

The complex peacebuilding model advocates an approach that is intended to overcome the problems of timing and sequencing experienced by contemporary chronological and linear approaches to peace processes. It argues for a multi-agency multi-dimensional system that makes use of the advantages of distributed coordination and self-regulation to achieve an integrated, coherent and coordinated peacebuilding system. It suggests that

such a peacebuilding system will be more flexible and responsive to the dynamic and shifting needs of a post-conflict environment than a system dominated by a single bureaucratic agency that assumes overall responsibility for peacebuilding operations through a centralised coordination function. The complex peacebuilding model can assist agencies to have a common theoretical understanding of the need for coherence, coordination and integration in peacebuilding operations. 

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Endnotes

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South African democratic

elections

With the announcement that 14th April as the official date for South Africa's third multi-party general election by President Thabo Mbeki, political parties have begun to jostle for what promised to be a fascinating contest for state power. The political lines are clearly drawn. Party election manifestoes range from combating the high incidence of crime and corruption, to the provision of HIV/AIDS anti-retroviral drugs, and from poverty alleviation to unemployment.

The African National Congress (ANC), which is the majority party in the country, is vying for total control of all the provinces, with a particular focus on the contested provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The attempt by the ANC to take over the whole of South Africa is normally referred to as "the consolidation of democracy" or "liberating South Africans in those provinces" where the ANC does not have a complete majority. On the other hand, parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) want to reclaim provinces such as the Western Cape, while the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) would like to hold onto KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) where it is currently in the minority. The IFP had to enter into a pact with the

DA in order to govern KZN.

Political parties in South Africa are at liberty to register for elections at a nominal fee of R500 set by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Well over 140 political parties have been registered by the electoral commission, but only 35 parties will contest the 2004 general election, eleven of these at national level and the rest at provincial level. Most of the parties which participated in the 1999 general election are still contesting this time around.

Notable political parties on the election scene are the ruling African National Congress (ANC), the New National Party (NNP), Democratic Alliance (DA), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the United Democratic Movement (UDM). A few parties whose following is believed to range between 1 percent and 4 percent, but which have been around since 1994, include the Pan African Congress (PAC), African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the Azanian People's Party (AZAPO). Most of the parties represented in parliament, before the floor-crossing process, are contesting the elections. New parties which promise to split the vote, particularly the Coloured vote in the Western Cape, and are posing a

threat to the DA and NNP are the Independent Democrats led by Patricia de Lille, and the New Labour Party led by Peter Marais. De Lille and Marais defected from the PAC and NNP respectively during the floor crossing in 2003. Following the floor crossing, major parties such as the ANC and NNP in the Western Cape and the DA and the IFP in KZN were forced to co-govern in these provinces. With the lead-up to the election, with regard to the ANC/NNP corporation agreement, it is clear through their campaign strategies that the gloves are off and both parties are relentless in their quest to get the votes in the same areas. In contrast, the DA and IFP have moved much closer and formed a stronger coalition with regard to their campaign strategies.

In a gruelling process by the IEC to register new voters from all the provinces, more than three million people visited approximately 17 000 voting stations during the second round of nationwide voter registration. Currently, 20.6 million voters have registered for the elections, out of a population of over 40 million citizens and, according to Statistics South Africa, 27 million people in South Africa are eligible to vote. The IEC has issued an election timetable to be observed by all political parties participating in the election; adherence to this timetable is of the utmost importance as it will help to ensure that electoral processes are conducted as legislated. Speculation around the possibility of minimal pre-election violence may have waned with the signing of a peace pledge to observe the electoral code of conduct during the elections, in KZN on 20 February and Cape Town on 26 February 2004. The process has since been repeated in all the other provinces. A few days before the signing of the peace pledge, reports of political violence in KZN were occurring almost every week, but after the signing ceremony few election-related conflicts have been reported. A local newspaper, the Mercury of 15 March 2004, reported that, at a ceremony to introduce mediators to the representatives of political parties and the media, the chairperson of the IEC, when asked if the provinces political climate was conducive to free and fair elections, said that the values of political

tolerance and political maturity had been embraced by the people of KZN and that they had no desire to go back to the period before the 1994 elections.

It is also hoped that the call at the launch of the ANC manifesto by President Thabo Mbeki and that of the IFP by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi for tolerance and peace during the elections will be heeded. In other parts of the country, not much has been observed or reported in the way of political violence.

In most SADC countries, an election process is widely accepted as an alternative means to violence in order to achieve democratic governance, and South Africa is no exception to this widely accepted view.

The South African electoral process has gone one step further in ensuring that elections are generally peaceful, and this has been achieved through the setting up of conflict management structures such as party liaison committees and conflict management committees. In addition to these structures, the IEC and other collaborating non-governmental organisations working in the

area of democracy and good governance

have trained mediators and domestic monitors on how to assist in the electoral process. It is heartening to note that these consultative forums have gained momentum in the Southern African region, and ACCORD, through its Managing African Conflict (MAC IQC) programme, is ensuring that all SADC countries adopt these forums. The goal of this programme is to focus on political competition, specifically electoral competition, and to strengthen conflict-management capacities in the region. South Africa has been at the forefront of this process.

Furthermore, these consultative forums allow for accountability and transparency, and ensure that all electoral stakeholders are included in the electoral process, and incorporated into the electoral law or regulations dealing with elections. The IEC in South Africa has been able to come up with regulations dealing with party liaison committees, ensuring that all parties are consulted throughout the electoral process. However, these forums are mainly consultative with persuasive authority, and the IEC reserves the



power to make final decisions on any issues discussed. This process has been extended to other stakeholders, one of which is the provincial leadership forum, composed of NGOs, religious formations, the media, security agencies and other interested groups working in the field of elections. In all these structures, the IEC is a participant, to ensure the free flow of information from the commission to the electoral stakeholders and vice versa.

It is also worth noting that the type of electoral system a country adopts could also lead to a mitigation or exacerbating of election-related conflicts. A case in point is the former Lesotho electoral system, known as 'first past the post' (FPTP), which was recently replaced by the mixed member proportional system (MMP) (Matlosa 2002). The main advantage of the MMP is the combination of a single member constituency and proportional representation electoral system. Generally, the proportional representation system lends itself to the constructive management of conflicts, especially when violent, as the experience of South Africa during the 1994 elections clearly indicates. The proportional representation (PR) system adopted in South Africa during the 1994 election led to a broad-based representation in the legislature. This has led to stability in the electoral process, resulting in the adoption of the minority report of the 2002 Electoral Task Team by the Cabinet.

It will be remembered that, according to the transitional provisions in the drafting of the final Constitution of South Africa, it was agreed that after 1999, a new electoral system would be introduced through the enactment of national legislation. In order to effect these transitional constitutional provisions, in March 2002 an Electoral Task Team (ETT), was appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi. The mandate of the team was to look at possible improvements to the current system of proportional representation. However, due to time constraints, the Cabinet had to adopt the minority report of the ETT. This simply means that there is a need to change the current electoral system in South Africa. It is hoped that after these general elections or possibly after the local government election, parliament will revisit the question of a suitable electoral model for South Africa, a model which would take into consideration minority views while at the same time resulting in the setting up of electoral constituencies. The missing link in the South African electoral system, as well as in the entrenchment of democracy, is the

ability of the voters to vote directly for their representatives, as is the case with the FPTP system.

Although South Africa can boast of having one of the most liberal constitutions in the world, the country is yet to ratify the SADC Norms and Standards for Elections as a benchmark for the conduct, management and observation of elections in the region. In the region, only the Botswana parliament has ratified the document, which addresses issues relating to levelling the playing field for all players contesting elections, inequality in the funding of political parties, inadequate access to state-owned media, and election-related violence. Although the norms and standards are yet to be ratified by all member states in the region, they serve as a benchmark for SADC parliamentarians during election observer missions. Similarly, civil society organs working in the area of elections have developed a document known as 'Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region'. The Electoral Institute of South Africa is promoting these principles and they will be used during the South African elections as well as other elections in the region.

In conclusion, it could be said that the South African elections are expected to take place in an atmosphere conducive to credible and genuine elections. There has been a concerted effort by the Independent Electoral Commission and political parties to ensure that this atmosphere prevails, hence the setting up of conflict-mitigating committees in the lead-up to the elections. ▀

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HECTOR MAMA/AFP

COMMENTARY

THABO MBEKI

The seed of an African Renaissance

the Haiti Revolution

This is an abridged version of a speech made by President Mbeki in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, on 1 January 2004 during the celebrations of the Bicentenary of the Independence of Haiti

We bring you warm greetings and messages of support and solidarity from millions of your brothers and sisters in the vast expanse of the African continent. All of them, without exception, are with you in spirit as we celebrate a revolution that established the first black republic in the world, and the second independent state in the Americas and the Caribbean.

Indeed, all African people, wherever they may be, on the continent or in the Diaspora, view the

Bicentenary of the Haitian Revolution as an inspiring occasion that communicates an important message to all of us that the poor of the world can and must act together decisively to confront the common challenges they face – poverty, under-development, discrimination and marginalisation.

As we know, as a French slave colony, this country contributed two third of French overseas trade, was France's greatest colony in the world and an envy of other colonial powers.

Yet, as the coincidence of circumstances would have it, the San Domingo masses began their heroic revolt when the Paris masses carried out their historic revolution, which transformed France into a modern democracy, inspired by the principles of equality, liberty and fraternity.

Accordingly, we celebrate the heroic deeds of these Africans who single-mindedly struggled for their freedom and inspired many of us to understand that none but ourselves can defeat those who subject us to tyranny, oppression and exploitation.

We celebrate the Haitian Revolution because it dealt a deadly blow to the slave traders who had scoured the coasts of West and East Africa for slaves and ruined the lives of millions of Africans.

As we meet today, on the occasion of this Bicentenary, we are mindful of the fact that there are many problems that confront all Africans, here in Haiti, others Africans in the Diaspora and on the mother continent of Africa.

These are challenges that we must urgently overcome. Together we have a duty to join hands in mutually beneficial solidarity, to work in partnership to defeat poverty, underdevelopment, conflict and instability.

For far too long have Africans been incapacitated by the debilitating scourge of poverty!

For too long have the unbroken cries of the African child failed to sooth the pangs of hunger!

For too long has our underdevelopment stifled the potential of our people, condemning the energetic and the creative to be perpetual beggars!

For too long have Africans been victim to the indecencies of conflict and war.

For too long have some of us worked and acted outside the African spirit of humanism that teaches all to be guided by the ethos of respect for the human being, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, sharing, sacrifice and service to all our people.

Today we celebrate because from 1791 to 1803, our heroes, led by the revolutionary Toussaint L'Ouverture and others, dared to challenge those who had trampled on these sacred things that define our being as Africans and as human beings.

Today, we are engaged in an historic struggle for the victory of the African Renaissance because we are inspired by among others, the Haitian Revolution.

We are engaged in struggle for the regeneration of all Africans, in the Americas, the Caribbean,



Africa and everywhere, because we want to ensure that the struggle of our people here in Haiti, in the Caribbean, in the Americas, Europe and Africa must never be in vain.

Accordingly, together with the leadership and people of Haiti, we are determined to work together to address the problems facing this inspirational home of African freedom and achieve stability and prosperity in this important site of African heroism and wherever Africans are to be found.

We trust and are confident that in both the leadership and people of Haiti we will find equally determined partners, so that together we can here, help to recreate a model country, informed by the wise words of the 1805 constitution of Haiti that we have “an opportunity of breaking our fetters, and of constituting ourselves as a people, free, civilised and independent”.

In this way, we will contribute to the renaissance of Africans everywhere in the world and ensure that we are no longer an object of ridicule and pity, nor a tool of exploitation to be discarded at the fancy of the powerful, but that we become what we really and truly are: proud and confident human beings who occupy their pride of place as equals among the peoples of the world. 🇸🇰

“we celebrate the heroic deeds of Africans who single-mindedly struggled for their freedom and inspired many of us to understand that none but ourselves can defeat those who subject us to tyranny, oppression and exploitation”


Aspects of Peacekeeping

Edited by D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase,
London: Frank Cass, 2001, 286pp.

One of the defining characteristics of complex peace operations is their multi-dimensional nature. They combine conflict prevention; peace making; security operations; humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities; transitional justice and rule of law programmes; human rights monitoring and education; political transition support and institution building, in a complex and multi-layered peacebuilding response matrix that is intended to build momentum towards peace across the whole conflict spectrum.

A key feature of the systems approach to conflict resolution is that its success relies on the free flow of information. For the system to work, the different components must constantly adjust their own actions in response to progress or setbacks experienced elsewhere in the network. In practice, however, complex peace operations are burdened by institutional cultures and traditional management and command structures that discourage information flow. They block, hinder or distort the flow of information and this starves the network of the information it requires to self-organise. As a result, the network breaks up into smaller and smaller networks. When this tendency is not managed, complex peace operations develop information silos that operate, at best, independently of each other, or at worst, against each other. This is why civil-military coordination has become such a critical success factor in complex peace operations.

It is thus a rare pleasure to find a book that manages to capture the complexity of contemporary peace operations as well as this compilation by Stuart Gordon and Francis Toase. The book brings together a large number of the different



components present in contemporary peacekeeping and begins to explore the nature of the relationships among these organisations, institutions and constituencies. This is a crucial area of focus if we want to improve our understanding of the dynamics that influence the complex network of interests present in contemporary peace operations, and represent the critical divide between complex and classical peace operations.

The editors have divided the book into three parts: the first deals with the evolution and change experienced in the United Nations and the international system over the past decade, the second with the role of humanitarian action in peacekeeping, and the third with the changing role of the military in peace operations.

The first part of the book, on the evolution and change of the United Nations and the international system, deals with the watershed experiences in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in the early to mid-1990s, but stops just short of the more positive UN experiences in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. Gordon and Toase argues that those early deployments represent a shift in the purpose of peacekeeping, because peacekeeping was utilised as a tool to create the conditions for peace rather than safeguarding and monitoring an existing peace.

This, they argue, was the birth of the arguably still-born concept of 'strategic peacekeeping'. The dominating influence of these experiences in the former Yugoslavia is felt throughout the book, but it also contains useful insights into developments in Africa and Eastern Europe. This part of the book includes chapters on the humanitarian security dilemma (by Shasi Tharoor and Ian Johnstone), the evolution of UN command and control structures, and regional perspectives on Europe, Eastern Europe and Africa.

The second portion of the book focuses on humanitarian action and peacekeeping. The challenging operational environment so well captured in the first part of the book was particularly demanding of the humanitarian community. Weakened perceptions of state sovereignty; the growing acceptance, among states and civil society, of the right to humanitarian intervention; the intentional targeting of civilians; the large-scale abuse of human rights associated with the conflicts of this period; and direct attacks on humanitarian personnel have all forced the humanitarian community to reassess their operating principles. The editors argue that the new environment resulted in an enhanced political and strategic role for humanitarian action, regardless of whether humanitarian organisations themselves agreed to such a role or not, and that this has resulted in humanitarian considerations playing a more central role today in the international response to conflict situations than it did before the experiences of the 1990s. This part of the book includes contributions by Sergio Vieira de Mello on the evolution of UN humanitarian operations and Koenraad van Brabant on the coordination and security of humanitarian personnel.

The third and final part of the book, 'Peace Support Operations and the Military', explores the legitimate aspects of strategic peacekeeping and includes chapters on British peacekeeping doctrine, the safe-areas regime, civil-military coordination, and the search for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Gordon and Toase argue that the inability to use limited force in a precise way that is clearly linked to achievable and well-defined political objectives has, to a significant extent, diluted the enthusiasm of the international community for utilising military tools for humanitarian objectives. The experiences in especially the Bosnian safe areas

resulted in a new acceptance that where force is used it should be significantly greater than that provided to UNPROFOR in the consent-based, humanitarian access regime that prevailed in the former Yugoslavia in 1995. They show that the mixing of consent-based and coercion-based mandates in Bosnia and Somalia clearly led to a theoretical and practical illogicality: making war and peace against the same people, at the same time, on the same territory. Within this context, one can begin to understand why those trying to provide advice to operational commanders developed several peace-support doctrines over this period. This is seen, perhaps most clearly, with the British Army doctrine of 'wider peacekeeping', which tried to give commanders guidance on how to maintain and develop consent in situations where consent is agreed to at the strategic level, elusive at the operational level, and disputed at the tactical level. Richard Connaughton contributes a chapter dealing with the development of British Army doctrine during this period.

In complex peace operations, the multidimensional components are linked together to form a network or system of interconnected and mutually supportive functions. With such a large number of institutional cultures, professional disciplines and functional mandates vying for space in one mission, it is not strange that coordination has become one of the most critical success factors of complex peace operations. Edward Flint contributes an excellent chapter that captures the complexity of the humanitarian-military and civil-military interfaces that have become such an essential part of contemporary peace operations.

This unique collection of contributions offers an insightful examination of the issues that influence the relationship between the diplomatic, humanitarian and military components in contemporary complex peace operations. *Aspects of Peacekeeping* is a valuable contribution to the interdisciplinary debate on the direction which peace operations will take in the future, and is a useful multidisciplinary introduction for anyone seeking to explore the issues that influence the relationship among the diplomatic, humanitarian and military components in complex peace operations. 🏠

“the new environment resulted in an enhanced political and strategic role for humanitarian action”

Promoting an Integrated Approach to Combat Gender-Based Violence: A Training Manual

By Margaret Oguli-Oumo, et al, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002, 88pp.

As gender-based violence continues to be endemic in different forms, the need for various tools to combat it is enormous. In a move to contribute towards adopting a holistic approach to the fight against gender-based violence (GBV), the Commonwealth Secretariat has produced a training manual entitled *Promoting Integrated Approach to Combat Gender-Based Violence*.

The 88-page manual is targeted at training managers, middle-level professionals, development workers, extension workers and policy makers and planners in general. It aims to assist and encourage all relevant organisations, state and non-state agencies, traditional and non-traditional organisations to work together. This is inclusive of women's human rights organisations, civil society, parliamentarians, the private sector and all government ministries. The volume draws on experiences from workshops and consultations facilitated by the Commonwealth Secretariat in Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the SADC Secretariat.

The manual is based on the Commonwealth Secretariat model framework for an integrated approach to combat violence against women, and draws on the strengths of the Gender Management Systems (GMS) principles, a Commonwealth approach to gender mainstreaming. The integrated approach is designed to assist governments, the private sector, civil society and other agencies to understand GBV as a multi-faceted problem that should be addressed in a holistic manner.

The problems inherent in current strategies to deal with GBV are addressed, especially the lack of collaboration between different agencies and individuals working against gender-based violence. The argument and emphasis in the manual is that an

integrated approach improves coordination and collaboration among different stakeholders and subsequently enhances efficiency in delivering services in support of victims, survivors, and perpetrators of GBV. The integrated approach also enables governments to address violence against women as a complex social problem that requires an overall national policy framework and plan of action.

The publication thus aims to promote policy coherence and the development of comprehensive programmes to eliminate GBV at local, national and regional levels. The manual is divided into five sections, which give a background including the concept, definition and causes of GBV, the purpose of the manual, duration of a training programme, training approach, goal and objectives, a facilitator's guide including facilitator's notes that can be given to participants as handouts, and references.

There is reference to key regional and international human rights standards and commitments to address gender-based violence, and the role of governments in curbing the problem and meeting their obligations as spelt out in, amongst others, the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development (1997) and its Addendum: Prevention and the Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action; and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

There is no doubt that *Promoting an Integrated Approach to Combat Gender-Based Violence* is key in providing new directions in policy and programme reviews, formulation and implementation, and fostering closer strategic links between stakeholders. The manual is also timely as it stands to contribute towards the achievement of the Beijing commitments and goals, as the world moves steadily towards the end of the UN Women's Decade (Beijing + 10) in 2005. ▀