

CONFLICT TRENDS

A PUBLICATION OF ACCORD

October 1998 Issue 1

Wisdom
FROM AFRICA

Reconciliation
FROM RWANDA

Water Security
in Southern Africa

INTERNET: **Conflict**
or **Co-operation**



ACCORD

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ACCORD is a non-governmental, non-aligned conflict resolution organisation based in Durban, South Africa.

The organisation is constituted as an educational trust. ACCORD is committed to finding african solutions to african challenges

It should be noted that views expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the individual authors and not those of ACCORD

The 1990s have proved to be exciting and challenging times. Far-reaching developments in technology and phenomenal changes in the global political and economic environment have brought with them new challenges, many not foreseen at the turn of the decade. Many analysts predicted a more stable world order. The opposite has since materialised as the order of the day. The world today is confronted with a global environment characterised by political and economic chaos alongside unprecedented progress in science and technology... a paradox of failure and progress co-existing in a world of predictable uncertainty.

Africa exists and survives in this new paradigm. To the uncritical yet interested observer of African affairs, her survival belies the many death defying challenges that confront her people—yet it is Africa's survival that bears testimony to her ability to meet these challenges. To the participants of this African drama, their preoccupation with meeting these challenges often distracts their attention from the progress that surrounds them.

It is in this context that we launch our magazine. We hope to give the interested observer deeper insight into the many challenges that confront us in Africa. To the many other Africans who share this drama with us, we hope to provide a balanced and objective understanding of our challenges and our numerous yet unrecorded successes at meeting these challenges.

We have developed a structure for the magazine that will maintain regularity to give you, the reader, the ability to make progressive comparisons—yet we will ensure sufficient flexibility in editorial review to ensure that the latest trends and developments are presented to you in the most appropriate format.

The continuous progress towards sustainable human development characterised by the successful social, political and economic developments in Africa needs to be constantly measured and evaluated. The *Renaissance Barometer* section will focus on the positive developments and achievements on our continent, while not ignoring obstacles and negative sides. It will focus on statistics, and include brief comment and analysis. Likewise, *Conflict Watch* provides a condensed, statistical overview of conflict, and is of use to practitioners, policy makers, academics and the general public. We will be providing this in each issue, focussing on the interven-

ing period between each quarterly issue of our magazine. All major conflicts on the continent will be monitored and attention will be given to emerging conflicts. The remainder of the publication will carry in-depth articles analysing both current conflicts and the underlying trends which give rise to conflicts.

ACCORD is an organisation dedicated to finding solutions to the many conflicts that confront Africa. We do not claim to be neutral or apolitical on the issues that we deal with. To claim this would be a denial of our identity as Africans, living amidst conditions of poverty and deprivation of freedoms of one kind or another that stifle individual and collective potential. In this context our neutrality and political silence will be an abrogation of our responsibility to alleviate the conditions of those who are poor and deprived of freedoms. *Conflict Trends* provides a forum for this ongoing reflection and analysis.



Vasu Gounden
Executive Director
ACCORD


In dispensing our responsibility we have to be mindful of the role that we have chosen to play in this African drama. We have to find an appropriate and effective manner to dispense our responsibility.

Our role is that of an impartial broker and facilitator of solutions to complex and simple challenges that face Africans at the local, national and continental levels. In addressing these challenges we will use all our resources to seek and achieve peaceful solutions that advance human development.

Our modus operandi has been and will continue to be one where we develop skills in conflict management, research conflict situations and provide possible solutions, and facilitate communication between conflicting parties. This magazine will reflect that modus operandi. We will present in a non-judgemental way the views of autocrats and democrats, dictators and liberators, academics and policy makers, young people and old people, modernists and traditionalists, moderates and extremists. Our intention will be to educate and enlighten and to use this mechanism in a responsible way to facilitate the peaceful settlement of African conflicts.

We hope in this way to make a modest contribution towards making the twenty first century the Africa Century! We invite you to share in this hope with us by using *Conflict Trends* as a vehicle to make African voices heard on African issues.

Renaissance Barometer




The continent is abuzz with talk of an African Renaissance. What will these changes mean? How do we chart their progress. **Conflict Trends** gives you a quarterly update on the most significant events in civil society, government and business sectors for the continent, with a particular focus on the growth in Africa's ability to manage her conflicts.

State

At the state level, in certain parts of the continent there seems to be a move away from "zero-sum" politics and an embracing of a politics of inclusion. Egypt's Muslim militants, for instance, seem to be moving away from the violence that has cost about 1 200 lives in six years. Montasser al-Zayyat, an unofficial spokesperson for al-Gama'a al-Islamiya, Egypt's biggest militant group, said its exiled leaders had now dropped their opposition to a truce call issued by jailed Gama'a leaders in Egypt a year ago. The change of heart on the part of the Gama'a leadership seems to have occurred as a result of Cairo's gradual release of hundreds of Gama'a sympathisers since January 1998¹.

But it is more than just politics of inclusion at a state level, we are witnessing growing attempts by states to bridge the gap between state and human security through good governance. Between March and June 1998, for instance, 45 policemen were expelled from the police force in the northern Mozambican province of Nampula on charges including drunkenness and extortion². The message was clear: the culture of impunity which has evolved regarding people in uniform is now being rolled back.

States are also attempting to improve the quality of life of their citizens and in so doing, are re-fashioning the image of the African continent in a more positive light. Consider one such example: the Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast, Daniel Kablan Duncan, recently announced that the government has



embarked on a plan to raise the country's literacy rate from the current 43% to 48% by the year 2000. This literacy drive is to be accompanied by the establishment of village libraries³.

Civil Society

Concerning civil society, it is becoming increasingly apparent that African governments have to come to terms with growing assertiveness in civil society. Several examples can be cited to substantiate this point of view. On July 31, 1998, hundreds of thousands of women throughout Ethiopia staged peace rallies calling for an end to the bloody border dispute with Eritrea. In Addis Ababa, alone, close to 100000 women marched along the main streets of the city carry-



ing placards and chanting: 'No milk is gained out of war, but blood'⁴. What makes this demonstration so remarkable is not only the fact that civil society used to play a relatively passive role in African polity in the past. It is also an aggressive proclamation of the strength of African womanhood—a sector of society that has traditionally been marginalised and repressed.

It is important to note, however, that the resurgence of civil society is not always in reaction to, or in challenge to state authority. In several instances, the positive energies of civil society are also harnessed in support of state structures, or the objectives of groups of states. Thus, on July 14, 1998, lawyers from fourteen of the Southern African Development

Community (SADC) countries met in Maputo to discuss draft statutes to regulate a future SADC Bar Association. This was seen as a first step in the long-term objective of a single justice system for Southern Africa⁵. In this way civil society is contributing towards the goal of regional integration.

Regional Co-operation

In addition to economic co-operation initiatives such as SADC and COMESA, co-operation between African states is also occurring on the question of democratisation. For instance, the question of how to make democracy work

in Africa topped the agenda at the 24th Ordinary Session of the International Assembly Francophone Parliamentarians held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast in July 1998. But words were also coupled with deeds. Thus, Congo (Brazzaville) and Rwanda were suspended from the group on the basis that there were no democratically elected parliaments in the two countries. Their suspension was the first of its kind in the history of the group⁶.

Regional co-operation can also be seen in the more assertive role the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is playing in the continent's affairs, as witnessed in Guinea Bissau. Soon after the eruption of hostilities in Guinea Bissau, the OAU immediately pledged its support for President Vieira and lent its support to the initiatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Lusophone Contact Group. It also sought the support of the United Nations Security Council for these sub-regional initiatives. Furthermore, OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim sent his special envoy, Ambassador Alexandre Zandamele of Mozambique to Guinea Bissau⁷.

Economics

At an economic level, it is clear that the basket-case that was traditionally perceived to be Africa seems to be making a remarkable turn-around. A recent World Economic Forum Survey of the economic performance of twenty-four African states revealed that the continent reported a 2% growth rate between 1990 and 1996, after a decade of negative economic growth. The breakdown for individual countries is even more revealing. Between 1994 and 1996, Lesotho's economic growth averaged more than 10% per annum. Between 1990 and 1996, Mozambique's average annual growth rate stood at 6,6%. Over the same period, annual economic growth rate for Uganda and Botswana averaged 6,5% per cent and 5,1% respectively⁸.

In the meantime, whilst most of the globe's stockmarkets are suffering the consequences of Asia's economic woes and the meltdown in the Russian economy, Africa's 16 stockmarkets have outperformed most other emerging stockmarkets in dollar terms—and that is despite the ongoing war in the Congo, and bombs in Kenya and Tanzania⁹.

1 Egypt's Moslem militants ponder cease-fire, Reuters News Service, 9 July 1998

2 Disciplinary Measures Against Mozambican Police, Panafrican News Agency, 10 July 1998

3 Cote d' Ivoire Gears To Reach 48 Per Cent Literacy Rate, Panafrican News Agency, 12 June 1998, <http://.../PANA/news/19980712/feat8.html>

4 Ghion Hagas, Women Call For An End of Border Dispute with Eritrea, Panafrican News Agency, 11 July 1998, <http://www.africanews.org/PANA/news/19980711/feat2.html>

5 SADC Bar Association To Be Created, Panafrican News Agency, 15 July 1998,

<http://.../PANA/news/19980715/feat22.html>

6 Democracy Tops the Agenda at Abidjan Meeting, Panafrican News Agency, 8 July 1998, <http://.../PANA/news/199807/feat22.html>

7 OAU Calls for the Restoration of Legality in Guinea Bissau, Panafrican News Agency, 15 July 1998, <http://.../PANA/news/19980715/feat4.html>

8 The Sunday Times, 22 March 1998

9 Wally Lambert, African bourses have much to offer, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 28 August to 3 September 1998, p. 33

conflict WATCH

By Godfrey Mutisya

Conflict at a glance—an overview of developments in conflict spots on the continent over the last quarter. This is Conflict Watch. Winds of change are sweeping across the continent. And yet we must be aware of opportunities to work for transformation, to focus our resources. These are the facts...


In Guinea-Bissau on 7 June 1998, sections of the army mutinied under the leadership of former army Chief of Staff, General Ansumane Mane, who was sacked after being implicated in the trafficking of arms to rebels in Senegal's Casamance region. This highlighted the inter-relationship between conflicts in different countries and the need for regional security organisations to effectively deal with such trans-national issues.

In August 1998, UNITA leadership was split in two, with one faction led by Jonas Savimbi from his strongholds, and the other by Jorge Valentim, based in Luanda. This development suggests the difficulty posed to conflict resolution experts – who to negotiate with? The Angolan civil war came to an end in 1994 with the signing of the Lusaka protocol, an agreement designed to end 30 years of civil strife. Under the accord, Savimbi gave a commitment to hand territory under UNITA control back to the government, while having his forces integrated into a new Angolan defence force. However, there are no indications that Savimbi's UNITA have complied with the terms of the Lusaka protocol. Recently, he has recaptured more territory in the diamond rich Lunda Norte and parts of Cuango valley. Furthermore, he has acquired updated weaponry and recruited fresh soldiers. The decision by the MPLA to only negotiate with the Luanda-based UNITA faction suggests that an intensification of the military conflict in the interior of the country between Savimbi's UNITA and the MPLA is imminent.



Conflict over environmental resources, particularly water, was underlined by the on-going dispute between Botswana and Namibia over the waters of the Okavango Delta and ownership of Kasikili/Sedudu Island on the Chobe River. The matter has been referred to the International Court of Justice, and has highlighted the weakness of institutional mechanisms within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to cope with such problems.

May 1998 witnessed the resurgence of interstate wars seen so graphically in the border dispute between land locked Ethiopia and Eritrea. Even though the border dispute is the immediate cause that triggered the conflict on May 12, the border skirmishes are a reflection of deeper economic problems. The Ethiopian government demanded economic transactions be conducted in hard currency as opposed to Nakfa, Eritrea's new currency with the same value as the Ethiopian Birr. The Eritrean government had introduced the Nakfa a few weeks before border skirmishes erupted, exacerbating tensions. The border skirmishes highlighted the need for the OAU conflict mechanism to be strengthened.



The on-going civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) exposed the interplay between interstate and intrastate conflicts. The conflict there has so far drawn in Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda. The Congolese Movement for Democracy (CMD), allegedly backed by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, was seeking to overthrow Laurent Kabila's, and military conflict erupted August 1998. They appeared to be on the verge of success before Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia intervened militarily to restore Kabila's governments' authority - thereby putting the rebels on the defensive.



The bombings of the United States' embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam underline the threat posed by religious fundamentalism. The United States' subsequent retaliatory bombings of targets in Sudan and Afghanistan point to the danger of an escalating 'tit-for-tat' strategy of reprisals.

The importance of free, fair and transparent elections under the auspices of an independent electoral commission was clearly demonstrated in Lesotho, following the May 1998 elections where strong allegations of vote rigging have been made against the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy. Since then political stability in Lesotho has been elusive, with violent clashes between police and protestors in August. Matters deteriorated sharply in early September when junior army officers arrested 22 of their seniors, including army commander, Makhula Mosakheng, forcing him to announce his resignation. The situation further deteriorated in early September with the burning of buildings and the looting of businesses in Maseru, prompting SADC to take action. On 22 September, a joint South African-Botswana force entered the mountain kingdom.



PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN UGANDA

by Hussein Solomon

For over a decade, Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group operating in Gulu and Kitgum in northern Uganda, has been conducting an insurgency against the government of President Yoweri Museveni. Ostensibly, the rebels seek to topple the secular Museveni regime and to rule the East African country along the lines of the Bible's Ten Commandments¹.

Whatever the ideological or theological basis of the conflict, however, the human costs have been horrific. Tens of thou-

sands have been killed or horribly mutilated, 200 000 have been displaced in northern Uganda and economic infrastructure destroyed. Often in such conflicts the most vulnerable, the children, suffer the most. According to Amnesty International, up to 8 000 boys and girls, some as young as seven, have been abducted in the past three years. Children have reportedly become the main source of recruitment for the various rebel armies operating in Uganda².

As the body bags mount, and it becomes increasingly obvi-

ous that a military solution on either side is not feasible, it is clear that there is a need to find a political solution to the current crisis.

Why the War Cannot Be Won


Kampala has, in the main, responded to the threat posed by the LRA at a military level. Thus, in November 1997, the Ugandan government announced a new phase in their counter-insurgency campaign. This involved the deployment of small groups of mobile foot soldiers to harass Kony's forces around the clock³. For a time, it seemed that such a strategy was paying dividends. For example, in March 1998 security forces killed 18 LRA rebels in three different clashes in Kitgum⁴. These military successes have prompted President Museveni to declare a victory over the LRA forces twice in just two years⁵. Each time, the LRA returned with a vengeance. Meanwhile the government's military campaign is placing an inordinate burden on the fiscus: twenty per cent of its annual budget is spent on its 50 000-strong army⁶, which is having an adverse knock-on effect on the rest of the economy.

Museveni's disenchantment with the results of his security force's military campaigns was graphically expressed in two reshuffles of the top army leadership conducted during the first two months of this year. In January 1998, Museveni appointed his younger brother Major-General Salim Saleh as acting Minister of State for Defence. Saleh replaced Amana Mbabazi, who was transferred to the President's office⁷. In February, Museveni then appointed Brigadier Kugume, former chief of operations and training, as deputy army commander. In addition, Colonel Henry Tumukunde, former army chief of personnel and administration, succeeded Colonel Fred Tolit, former director of military intelligence. The reshuffle also witnessed a shift of Brigadier Ali Kiiza, former director of the air force to the post of presidential adviser on the air force. Colonel Masaba, his deputy, filled the vacancy left by him⁸.

These military reshuffles, however, are unlikely to translate into victory on the battlefield. Several reasons account for this. First, in addition to the LRA, the Ugandan army is facing two other insurgencies—the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in the country's west (in particular, the Ruwenzori mountains) and the West-Nile Bank Front, who are active in the south-western region. This means that the army may be too stretched on the ground to deal effectively with the insurgency in the north. Second, there are reports that these disparate rebel groups are allegedly being co-ordinated and supplied by the Sudanese government⁹, a move which comes in response to Kampala's perceived

support of John Garang's Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), who are waging a war in southern Sudan against Khartoum. Third, the army is not the disciplined and effective fighting force it once was. For instance during a two-hour ADF attack in June this year on the Kichwamba Technical Institute, the army troops guarding the institute fled, leaving the students to their fate¹⁰. Fourth, the districts of Gulu and Kitgum together comprise an area of 28 000 square kilometres with approximately 90% of the population residing in rural areas. This fact, coupled with the rugged terrain and the fact that the LRA conducts its campaigns in the rainy season, when the bush is overgrown and its forces are easily concealed, makes it extremely difficult to protect the civilian population in these areas¹¹.

On the other hand, several considerations prevent Joseph Kony from transforming his guerrilla insurgency into a conventional military campaign that would enable his forces to consolidate their authority in Gulu and Kitgum and march on Kampala. First, the LRA consists of a force of between 3 000 and 4 000 combatants, the majority being abductees¹². For this reason, they have proven to be unreliable troops, their loyalties to the LRA are not certain, and they often defect to government troops. Second, the SPLA's current offensive in southern Sudan is not only threatening LRA rear bases in Sudan, but also threatening Khartoum's alleged arms supplies to the LRA. As a result, it is reported that the majority of LRA forces are deployed in southern Sudan alongside Sudanese government forces defending against an aggressive SPLA military offensive¹³. Finally, LRA activities are also hindered by the fact that they do not have the support of the local population—most Acholi are opposed to the violence employed by the LRA¹⁴.



Towards a Negotiated Settlement?

The reality of a de facto military stalemate has resulted in both the government and the rebels starting the first tentative steps towards a political solution out of the impasse. In February 1998 the LRA proposed a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Their peace proposals were delivered to the government through a Reverend Oyo¹⁵. Moreover, in July 1998 President Museveni sent the LRA a letter in which he, too, proposed peace talks¹⁶.

The road to peace, however, is a rocky one and there are hawks on both sides of the divide opposed to a negotiated

(Continued on pg 14)

Civil War in Guinea-Bissau

by Napoleon Abdulai

Guinea-Bissau, a small nation on the western rim of the African continent, exploded into civil war in June this year. While a tenuous cease-fire is currently in place, the war has wreaked havoc both within Guinea-Bissau and with her neighbours. Thousands of people have died, and there is an internally displaced population of over a quarter of a million. The conflict is typical of conflicts seen in West and Central Africa in recent years, in that it has a regional and not an exclusively internal character. While the dismissal of army commander General Ansoumane Mane is reported as the spark that fanned the revolt, the causes of this conflict are historical and cultural in nature. Specifically, the war is implicitly linked to the struggle for independence of the Casamance region of southern Senegal—just over Guinea's northern border. The people of Casamance have deep bonds, both political and cultural, with Guinea-Bissau. The involvement of Guinea-Bissau's military in the Casamance struggles is directly behind the precipitation of the current crisis.

Since the eruption of the conflict, both Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau's southerly neighbour, have intervened militarily in the conflict—further indications of the regional character of the problems. In order to explain this complex and longstanding 'conflict system' we shall explore further the historical and cultural background of the current war, in order to shed light on how these factors impact on the situ-


ation. We will conclude with some suggestions for resolving the numerous crises and conflicts in the sub-region.

Origins of the conflict

The civil war in the ex-Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau has its origin in the country's anti-colonial war (1960 to 1973). Guinea-Bissau was formerly made up of the mainland of Guinea and the rocky and sparsely populated islands of Cape Verde in the North Atlantic Ocean. It has a population of one million, with 300 000 in the capital, Bissau. She is completely surrounded by Senegal, Guinea-Conakry and the Atlantic Ocean. Portugal colonized Guinea-Bissau in the 15th century, together with four other African countries. Unlike Britain and France, Portugal refused to recognise the fundamental right of the African people under her rule to independence. Hence, in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, African nationalists formed liberation movements to free their countries from the yoke of Portuguese colonialism.

In Guinea-Bissau, nationalist forces under the leadership of Dr Amilcar Cabral, Aristides Pereira and others formed the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) in 1956.

Cabral, one of the foremost theoreticians and practitioners of the African liberation struggle¹, operated the PAIGC from Conakry, capital of neighbouring Guinea. Guinea-Conakry was the first Francophone African country to have gained her independence by voting 'No' in



the famous 1958 referendum organised by France, under General Charles de Gaulle, as a way to manage the colonial problem (the politics of independence) France was facing.

From 1960, Guinea-Conakry then demonstrated her support for the liberation struggle of her neighbours by allowing the PAIGC to operate rear-bases from her territory. Under the leadership of an ex-trade unionist, President Ahmed Sekou Touri, Guinea-Conakry also accelerated the armed struggle in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau by acting as a channel for weapons sent by Ghana and the Eastern European states to the PAIGC.

The role of the Casamance

Guinea-Conakry was not the only neighbour to offer assistance to the armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau. For a long time the histories of Guinea-Bissau and the Casamance region have been inextricably linked. It is these links that are central to the current conflict.

Portugal ruled the Casamance region of Senegal as part of Guinea-Bissau until the end of the last century. France, the dominant colonial power of the region, then annexed this territory in 1900s and incorporated the Casamance as part of its clutch of colonies collectively known as the French Sudan—with head-quarters in Dakar, Senegal.

The Casamance people, however, share a common linguistic and cultural base with the people of Guinea-Bissau, and are predominately Christians with a history of fierce resistance to colonialism. Their annexure by France and subsequent incorporation into Senegal laid a seed of discontent which continued to grow until it gave birth to the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MDFC), and a separatist struggle, in 1982. The discontent includes major economic and political factors. Casamance has become the breadbasket of Senegal, and supplies the nation with rice, an important staple food. In Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the 'politics rice' can make or break governments as demonstrated by the Master-Sergeant Samuel K. Doe coup of 1980 in Liberia².

Drawing on these extensive political, economic and cultural ties the people of the Casamance made a substantial contribution to the PAIGC's struggle. Their political elite went to Conakry to join the struggle against the Portuguese, while the ordinary people provided food, clothing, and shelter for refugees. To the people of the Casamance, the liberation of Bissau was 'their struggle'.

Independence and instability

The PAIGC waged one of the most successful guerilla campaigns against any colonial power in Africa. By 1971, it had more than two-thirds of Guinea-Bissau's territory under its control—partly due to the remarkable role played by women combatants, who made up a quarter of the nationalist forces. To mitigate the military and diplomatic victories of the liberation movement, mercenaries and agents of the fascist dictatorship in Portugal (the Salazi/Caetano government) organised an invasion of Guinea-Conakry with the objective of killing the leaders of the PAIGC and the Pan African leader Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah, who was in exile in Conakry following the February 1966 coup in Ghana, was very close to Cabral. On January 21, 1973 agents of the Portuguese secret service assassinated Cabral in Conakry, where they had infiltrated the PAIGC structures. However, they did not succeed in discouraging the nationalist forces, and later that year the PAIGC leadership, meeting in the eastern city of Bafata (the second largest town), declared Guinea-Bissau an independent state on 10 September 1973. She was immediately recognised by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). General Joao Bernsardo 'Nino' Vieira, the current president, became the defence minister.

Guinea-Bissau became a one party state at independence. Unlike in Angola, there had been only one anti-colonial movement, and for 10 years, the country was peaceful. Then in 1983 General Vieira followed the example of the military in West Africa by seizing power in a bloody coup³. The reasons given for Vieira's coup—'corruption, nepotism, economic mismanagement—were no different from the reasons given by General Sani Abacha for removing the democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari on 31 December 1983, or by the leaders of earlier coups in Nigeria, Benin, Mali, Chad, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Ghana.

Vieira's coup set in motion the division of the country into two. The Cape Verde Islands vigorously opposed the coup and declared themselves an independent state, led by Aristides Pereira, one of the original founders of the PAIGC. She became the 16th Member State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was formed in 1975 in Lagos to further regional integration. Later, in 1990, Cape Verde gained the singular honor of becoming the first African country to vote out any ruling political party in a peaceful election. Benin (formally Dahomey) was next, voting out longtime military 'Marxist' dictator Major Martin Kerekou, and in 1992 the Zambians followed by voting out

President Kenneth Kaunda. In a masterstroke of ‘diplomatic volte-face’ of African politics, Kerekou was returned to power in 1996 in the second multi-party election.

Internal and external conflict

Ongoing conflict over self-determination for the Casamance region has continued to mar relations between Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia, whose people also share common linguistic and cultural links to the Casamance people. Links between the separatist struggle in this region and political developments in Guinea-Bissau are the major cause behind the current crisis in that country.

As pointed out earlier, the people of the Casamance played an historic role in the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau. Then, in 1982, the MDFC was set up, with the main objective of liberating the Casamance region from domination and control by the ruling elite in Dakar. The MDFC, under the leadership of Father Augustine Diamacoune Senghor, began a guerilla war, supplied with arms by Guinea-Bissau authorities from the huge stocks of arms left behind after Portugal's defeat in 1973.

Senegal stands on the other side of the conflict, and has engaged the rebel forces in a series of battles over the last 16 years, with fairly heavy casualties on both sides during this period. France remains embroiled in the conflict in her ex-colony. Under bilateral military agreements with Senegal she has several thousand troops stationed at a garrison outside Dakar, and has offered military assistance to the Senegalese army in the form of training in guerilla warfare.

The twenty main political parties remain totally opposed to the rebel movement, supporting rather the Senegalese government's policy of ‘national integration’. As part of its strategy to weaken the rebel movement, the government is said to have had a hand in precipitating divisions within the rebel leadership. Two factions have emerged, one led by Salif Salo (the northern region) with an emphasis on negotiations, and the other by Paris-based Mamadou Nkrumah Sane. This southern faction currently refuses to compromise on their position of armed struggle for an independent state.

Hence, the military struggle continues. The MDFC operates from a number of bases in Guinea-Bissau, along the border with Senegal. Landmines are common in the Casamance, making life difficult for the civilian population—in the last year alone, more than 1 500 landmines were disarmed. The region is also a popular tourist spot, and there are notices all over places such as Cap Skirring, near the Guinea-Bissau

border, warning tourists ‘not to stray far from the camp’⁴. Control of the territory vacillates between the government and the rebels, who have at one time or another controlled a series of villages and small towns, including Cap Skirring. In January 1996 a cease-fire was put in place, but it was short-lived and by 1997 the rebels were again attacking army positions, including Ziguinchor.

Due to this increase in rebel activities, Senegal began putting pressure on president Vieira to curtail rebel movement in his country. Refugee camps were moved from the border areas to inland towns such as Nahla, 380 km from the border. A few hundred also moved to The Gambia, where, as previously mentioned, some Gambians have strong cultural ties with the refugees.

Then on February 1 this year, in a move implicitly linked to the war in the Casamance, President Vieire dismissed his popular army commander, General Ansoumane Mane, on suspicion of helping the MDFC. According to the London-based newsletter, Africa Analysis, weapons were sold to one faction of the MDFC, the Southern Front. The article stated that the removal of Mane indicated a division within the military. General Mane is a Gambian by birth, but his father migrated to Bissau, where he joined the PAIGC. General Mane, like Major General Fred Rugimane of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), rose to a position of prominence, in command of the national armed forces of Guinea-Bissau⁵. A popular officer, General Ansoumane Mane has the support of ninety per cent of the national army according to diplomats and humanitarian workers in West Africa.

As a result of Vieira's action, fierce fighting involving the national army broke out in the picturesque capital of Guinea-Bissau on June 7 this year. Both Senegal and Guinea-Conakry intervened militarily under the terms of an October 1997 agreements which grants the three countries power to intervene in each other's domestic affairs. Senegal's intervention with 2000 troops came as no surprise, since president Abdul Diop, who came to power in 1981, had a clear strategic interest in stamping out the rebellion because of its impact on tourism, agriculture, and of course politics, in his own country. According to the French publication, *Le Soleil*, by July forty Senegalese soldiers had died and over 280 had been wounded. They met staunch resistance from war-hardened rebel Guinean troops, who had seen active service during their interventions in Liberia during the Tolbert administration (1964 -1980), and in Sierra Leone. Without the military support of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry it is clear that President Vieira's government would have collapsed.

(Continued on pg 32)

RIVER DRY, MOUNTAIN HIGH

Water security in Southern Africa

by Jo-Ansie van Wyk

A river knows no boundaries. What happens at its source will reverberate through its course until it reaches the ocean. Almost none of Southern Africa's major rivers is contained within the borders of a single state. Three aspects of water shape its role in potential for causing international conflicts. Water is the most likely renewable resource to generate conflict. No society can survive without adequate water supplies. Water is required for the operation of any economy, even an agrarian one. It is usually associated with a particular territory over which states may fight for control. Water often crosses international boundaries, so access to water is increasingly a potential source of conflicting international relations. Also, water resources tend to be unevenly distributed. These aspects underpin profitable trade in water while simultaneously contributing to the politicisation of water. A state like Lesotho is poor in natural resources, but income derived from water trade earns the country valuable foreign exchange. It is also not insignificant that Lesotho heads the Water Sector in SADC. Despite this, there is no unanimity of what water is really worth, since it is a migrant commodity with a variable value. A common theme runs through conflicts over water—they are produced in fixed locations but traded to distant places. Since rivers often pass through more than one state they are constant sources of potential tension. States upstream may not only pollute the water, but as a political measure may threaten to dam the river as a means of coercive diplomacy. In the case of Botswana, for example, 94% of fresh water originates outside its border, contributing to the vulnerability of the state.

Worldwide, water resources are under threat. Water issues in the region are some of the most important, but also some of the most neglected security issues in the region. Current predictions of the region's water profile in the next millen-

Issues

Water issues pose three challenges to security policy makers in the region—those of water shortage and availability, water supply and water quality, the maintenance of which remains an issue. Rapid population growth, cross border migration and urbanisation also pose threats. The facts of the matter are:

Southern Africa's water inventory is characterised by several contradictions. South Africa is home to one third of the region's population. While South Africa accounts for 80% of Southern Africa's water use, only 10% of the total water resource is available in South Africa

The overall picture that defines the region's water profile is that of scarcity. At least three of the region's states (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) are acutely short of water

Resource geopolitics in Southern Africa has long been neglected. However, water is now recognised as a fundamental political weapon in the region. Despite the 'peace dividend' in the region water will increasingly shape international relations and security arrangements of the region

The relative wealth in Southern Africa is concentrated in the water poor south of the region

Poverty is worst in the water poor north of the region

nium present a picture of absolute scarcity. The subcontinent of Africa is vulnerable to endemic droughts as a result of the El Nino/Southern Oscillation phenomenon that causes dry conditions in the region. The effects of El Nino on water resources on the region remain uncertain, and governments

are responding with drought contingency plans—with World Bank assistance in some cases. The complexity of the environment–security debate is well illustrated in the issue of water. Water is likely to be a source of strategic rivalry depending on the following factors: the degree of scarcity, the extent to which water supply is shared by more than one state or region, the relative power relationship of the sharing states and the accessibility to alternative fresh water resources.

Southern Africa as a hydro political security complex

Members of the Southern Africa Development Community form a security complex. A regional security complex is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.’ The hydro–political security complex includes all those states that are geographically partly ‘owners’ and ‘users’ of the rivers in the region and consequently regards the rivers as a major national security issue. The concept of a hydro–political security complex contributes to an analysis of how water scarcity is affecting the security situation in Southern Africa and what underlying potential conflicts can be identified. The joint dependency on rivers in the region indicates that the national security of all states is linked. Therefore, the security perception must be based on the region as a level of analysis. This notion challenges the traditional definition of national security. In this way, Southern Africa composes a hydro–political security complex. Various sub-complexes are identified. These include, amongst others, the Zambezi hydro–political security complex, the Okavango and the Orange River hydro–political security complex.

Recent events in Southern Africa highlight the potential for conflict in this regard. Conflicts over natural resources and environmental degradation have dogged Southern Africa for decades and are likely to intensify since there are few agreed mechanisms for their equitable resolution.

Water diplomacy in Southern Africa as a constructive resolution of disputes

If individual countries in the region are to realise the benefits of water diplomacy with respect to shared river basins, this will contribute to regional development as envisaged



The Orange river basin is under threat from all sides

in SADC’s protocol. It is also imperative that measures are taken and mechanisms put in place to strengthen existing links in the water sector.

International water law is organised around four main doctrines. These doctrines attempt to delineate the rights of riparian (river basin) states to utilise water from an international river course. Having evolved at different times, reflecting developments in international water law and responding to claims by riparian states, these doctrines reflect different historical and juridical approaches to riparian problems. What is clear, is that despite these doctrines, international law as an instrument of regulation on trans-boundary freshwater issues is at present inconclusive and weak. The absence of formal political agreements contributes to this problem.

However, a widely accepted set of guidelines for international water rights is to be found in the Helsinki Rules on the *Uses of Waters of International Rivers*, adopted at the 52nd Conference of the International Law Association in Helsinki in 1966. Despite criticisms against these rules, the guidelines concentrate mainly on the water rights and obligations of states. An important principle of the Helsinki Rules is that each nation is entitled, within its own territory, to a ‘reasonable and equitable share’ in the beneficial uses of water of an international drainage basin. However, there are no comprehensive guidelines in international law on the non-navigational use of international rivers beyond the principles of ‘equitable utilisation’ and *sic utere tuo ut alienam non laedas* (states must not permit the use of their

territory to cause injury to other states) as enshrined in the Helsinki Rules. Since 1974 the UN's International Law Commission was unable to establish any binding framework. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are still the only means of establishing rights. These agreements are often insufficient to facilitate the management of conflict. The Law Commission has, however, progressed in application from the initial concept of an international river, to that of an international drainage basin and currently to that of an international watercourse system.

Extensive co-operation exists between Southern African states regarding specific river basins. These include, amongst others, river basin commissions relating to the Orange, the Limpopo and the Okavango, a series of Joint Permanent Technical Committees, the LHWP and the ZACPLAN. However, full regional co-operation and co-ordination remains lacking.

A significant development in this regard was the signing of SADC's protocol on *Shared Watercourse Systems* on 28 August 1995. The object of the protocol is to develop close co-operation for judicious and co-ordinated utilisation of the shared watercourse systems in SADC. This protocol was formulated under the Environment and Land Management Sector co-ordinating unit of SADC (SADC-ELMS).

The Water Protocol includes rights and responsibilities. One of these responsibilities is that states within a particular river basin must co-operate with other states on issues regarding the river. In addition, it calls for states to establish institutions on three levels. At the level of government via Joint Permanent Technical Committees, signatories should agree on the sustainable sharing and development of common resources. At the level of the river basin a commission should be established. On the third level, there should be co-operation through river authorities, board and utilities. The Protocol also provides for the establishment for a regional monitoring unit based at the Water Sector.

Mozambique and Zambia have not signed the Water Protocol. The protocol has not been implemented by all its signatories. Future implementation of this protocol is likely to impact on the water future of the region. However, a number of obstacles remain.

Schemes such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project provide temporary relief from water stress and at best buy time by transferring water from one drainage basin to another. In this way, however, they limit the development possibilities in the donor basins and donor states. They could also contribute to environmental degradation by affecting the ecology of the

river basins receiving water. Efforts to ensure survival could take on the form of 'water imperialism', that is transferring water from river basins from states not even neighbouring on the water-stressed state.

One of the most important obstacles in achieving water security is to overcome the institutional weakness of SADC as an organisation. This is illustrated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case between Namibia and Botswana. The case has gone to the ICJ because SADC as an institution could not resolve the conflict despite the provisions contained in the SADC Water Protocol for the settlement of disputes.

In addition, states' sovereignty may feel threatened by stronger regional integration in this regard. A further threat is a general lack of awareness in the region about the true value of water in monetary terms. Northern water-rich states may use this to their advantage. Interstate linkages are threatened by different water rights and legislation within states. Lastly, large scale linkages could contribute to other environmental security issues. Water transfer from one state to another could seriously impact on downstream states.

Another threat involves the total lack of long term planning in current arrangements such as the Water Protocol. This is hampered by the lack of reliable data in this regard.

There has been a proliferation of proposals for tackling water scarcity issues in Southern Africa. Towards the end of this millennium, developments relating to water management are characterised by the return of the state to regaining control over water resources, as opposed to individual ownership, so as to effectively manage water resources in the public interest. An illustration in this regard is the fact that water in Israel is managed by their Ministry of Defence. Similarly, South Africa is currently undergoing a water revolution under Kader Asmal's leadership (the South African Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry).

The impact of such projects is that donor states stand to lose water to the recipient states. In addition, major water transfers require substantial 'water diplomacy' via international negotiation and agreement. So far, they have been limited to bilateral agreements such as the LHWP. Other efforts of water diplomacy in Southern Africa could

Conflicts over natural resources and environmental degradation have dogged Southern Africa for decades and are likely to intensify since there are few agreed mechanisms for their equitable resolution

include establishing river authorities for each river, including all states in the basin, establishing an early warning system on water issues, enforcing the Water Protocol and implementing the Cape Town Declaration, signed in December 1997 by African Ministers in charge of water resources. Despite the imbalance between water availability and usage as well as the potential conflict areas associated with it among states in Southern Africa, it cannot be considered the principle *casus belli* in Southern Africa. It could be a contributing factor in regional instability as some states are richer in water resources than others are. However, South Africa and her SADC partners are faced, as a security complex, with one of the greatest challenges in the region. The long-term solution might be the revival of the SADC Water Sector, the creation of commissions and regulating authorities. The problem might be addressed on a smaller scale, i.e. on a basin or water-

course wide level. The absence of water issues on the agenda of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) could be addressed. South Africa's leadership in the region places a double responsibility on the country often accused of acting as a de facto upstream state in its water diplomacy. As the current chair of SADC as well as in its leadership of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security South Africa has the opportunity to reverse this perception.

Jo-Ansie van Wyk lectures International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of South Africa. This contribution draws partly on the author's research for the New South African Security Policy Fellowship, 1995. Also see JK van Wyk, SA moet voortou neem om water in streek te bewaar, *Die Burger*, 10 Septemeber 1996 and Towards water security in Southern Africa, *Africa Security Review*, vol 7 no 2, 1998

(Continued from pg 7, *Prospects for Peace...*)

settlement. Despite this, there are several indicators that suggest the strengthening of the pro-peace lobby. One of these indicators is the positive role being played by civil society. In October 1997, for instance, over 5 000 students marched in the streets of Kampala urging the government to talk with the rebels and end the bloodshed. One of the placards carried by the students summarized their argument eloquently: 'If you can't kill Kony, talk to him'¹⁷.

In my view, three steps can be taken to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In the first instance, there is a need to transform the LRA from a rebel army into a political entity, and for it to carve a niche for itself in the body polity, within the current system if possible. If not, then the LRA needs to come to the negotiating table with a view to suspending the 1995 Constitution, which bars political parties from operating. This would give the LRA a stake in any new political dispensation, and if that dispensation also incorporated an element of federalism for the Acholi people of northern Uganda, all the better.

Second, both sides need to utilise the positive energies of civil society, both inside and outside Uganda, to assist the process of dialogue and reconciliation. For instance, the Acholi elders have expressed their preparedness to peacefully reintegrate LRA combatants into their communities. In addition, the Catholic Church, certain Islamic leaders as well as the Comboni Fathers of Verona, Italy, have all expressed their desire to support the peace initiatives¹⁸.

Finally, the success of the peace process is also dependent upon the support of the international community at the level of post-conflict reconstruction. Here it is important to note that just between October 1996 and August 1997 almost 80 primary schools were torched in northern Uganda¹⁹. Peace, after all, is a meaningless concept in the context of socio-economic deprivation, which in many instances is the root cause of the conflict.

















In conclusion, then, there are several indications, which suggest that peace in northern Uganda is not as elusive as some might suggest.

Hussein Solomon is the Manager of ACCORD's Research Unit.

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
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WATER RESOURCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN RIVER BASINS: A SELECTION OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT ISSUES

RIVER	STATES	AREA (KM ²)	POTENTIAL CONFLICT ISSUES
 CUNENE		117 000	<p>Local water demands are low as the river lies in a sparsely populated area. Opposition to the hydro-electrical scheme in the Epupa scheme was voiced. A hydro-electric project dam in northern Namibia in the Cunene River could displace 2000 Himba people.</p> <p>Namibia intends to drain water from the Okavango River causing a diplomatic row between Namibia and Botswana.</p>
 ORANGE		973 000	<p>The Orange basin embraces four countries but the LHWP involves only South Africa and Namibia.</p> <p>The social impact of efforts to ensure water security. The LHWP displaced 1500 people and affect the livelihood of 20 000. In 1996 the level of 16 per month earthquakes associated with the building of new dams reached a level of VII on the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale.</p>
 OKAVANGO		586 000	<p>Zimbabwe is not a member of the Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM). Botswana and Namibia are currently involved in an International Court of Justice case.</p> <p>Botswana and Namibia await the outcome of the decision of the International Court of Justice over the ownership of the nondescript Sedudu island in the Chobe river during a period of massive military build up in Botswana.</p>
 LIMPOPO		423 000	<p>South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe have plans to extract water from their tributaries. Mozambique has a minor share and an imbalance in this regard.</p>
 ROVUMA		155 000	<p>Mozambique is denied most of the water of the Save and Limpopo Rivers. The Rovuma River could be an important resource for development in this country.</p>
 ZAMBEZI		1 234 000	<p>The Zambezi River drains 8 member states of SADC.</p> <p>The Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) involves only two of these states, namely Zimbabwe and Zambia.</p> <p>Angola and Zambia did not sign the SADC protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems.</p> <p>A political confrontation looms over South Africa's plans to solve its water demands by obtaining supplies from the Zambezi River.</p>
 SAVE		104 000	<p>Three consecutive years of drought have forced the Tanzanian government to investigate alternative water resources.</p> <p>Most of the water resources of the Save River lie in Zimbabwe. As in the case of the Limpopo River this leaves Mozambique with a water shortage.</p>
 ZAIRE		3 981 000	<p>The Zaire River forms the border between the DRC and Angola.</p> <p>Potential conflict could arise out of its vast surplus of water (ten times that of the Zambezi River).</p> <p>The Inga Rapids has the largest single hydroelectric energy potential in the world.</p>

Wisdom from AFRICA

This is a very well written and detailed book about conflict resolution wisdom in Africa. It begins with a detailed but concise narration of African history and gradually moves on towards modern times. It focuses the discussion of conflict by utilising a social context approach. It looks at how conflicts are normally addressed in the environment where they are emerging or have emerged. Talking may start informally within the families or neighbourhoods concerned. It also looks at how members of society, i.e. elders of both genders, may make meaningful contributions to preventing conflicts. Another constructive way of preventing and counteracting conflict is to promote socio-economic development. Africa's experience of imposed, foreign types of development has led to an important change of perspective. A home-grown version of people-centred development is being advocated, and is apparently gaining support. People-centred perspectives have wisely been introduced into the area of ethnicity as well. When, recently, various subdued and dormant ethnic aspirations were revived, all sorts of linguistic, cultural and ethnic agendas were widely accepted and emotionally pursued. Although all the examples of conflict prevention and



resolution are obviously of a practical nature, this practicality deserves to be specifically highlighted. These examples are practical, not in the sense of extemporaneous, ad hoc actions, but rather as practical procedures developed out of real life experience. In most, if not all, cases, this development could have included discussion and contemplation, but most probably such talking and thinking were constantly related to actual experience. It is this life context which makes all these methods so useful and worthy of recommend. From neighbourhood negotiation to the OAU mechanism, they were designed *out of life experience for application in real life*. So also, the alarming increase in

internal conflicts between minorities and majorities highlights the need to address the sensitive but serious problem of majoritarianism.

The book covers many aspects of conflict resolution, and if there is any criticism, then it has to be that the book is rather too detailed. The way it is written, however, in a way that makes it flow easily, more than makes up for this excess.

By Alioune Sall

United Nations Development Programme, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire

One of the major constraints to nation-building in post-colonial Africa is that externally generated and directed processes of state formation and development have tended to undermine indigenous values, institutions and patterns of solving problems. This has fostered a tendency to look outside the continent for solutions to Africa's problems. The challenge now is to reverse this mindset, not to reject good ideas from outside the continent, but rather to integrate them with the wealth of accumulated knowledge, wisdom and expertise within Africa. Professor Jannie Malan's *Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa* is a major contribution to this challenge. Insightful, intellectually stimulating and functionally targeted, it is a remarkable blend of that which is humanly universal to humanity and that which is distinctive to Africa. It should serve as a useful guide to scholars, political leaders, peacemakers and other activists anywhere in the world, but particularly in the African context.

By Ambassador Francis Deng

Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION WISDOM FROM AFRICA

by Jannie Malan

The urge and inspiration to put something on paper about conflict resolution wisdom from Africa grew out of the context in which I happened to find myself. This included the privilege of being an inhabitant of such a human and social continent as Africa. During all my working years I have been enjoying the further privilege of working together with fellow South Africans who broadened and enriched my experience. I admired their skin colours, studied one of their languages, and listened to their cultural perspectives. For more than three decades this co-operation was unfortunately hampered by the enforced separatedness of apartheid. We (my family and myself) deplored the injustice the group we happened to belong to was inflicting on the majority of South Africans. But we utilised opportunities to oppose and counteract the system, and to participate in the struggle towards change. Now, for almost a decade, it has been our privilege to be part of the new South Africa, and to be committed to the process of transformation.

When I became interested in and devoted to conflict resolution, I was impressed by the wide diversity as well as the essential unity in this relevant field. I appreciated the way in which conflict resolution experts from abroad encouraged us, in South Africa and Africa, to take note of imported models, but to focus especially on developing home-grown models. So, when I joined the ACCORD team as researcher, I began working in this direction as soon as possible.

When I shared my thoughts and objectives with my colleagues in ACCORD, they gave me an encouraging go-ahead. As the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, we were taking our roots in Africa and our links with Africa seriously. Then, as I carried on with reading, listening, thinking and discussing, I had the thrilling experience of really feeling at home with approaches and insights from Africa.

Putting all these impressions, convictions and recommendations into writing was a satisfying task. To share such meaningful material with others is indeed a stimulating activity. But just like any other writing project I have been involved in, this one also had its frustrations and dissatisfactions. There were the interruptions caused by other commitments that could not wait. There were the constantly recurring questions about the quantity and quality, clarity and impact of what I was writing. There was the feeling of inadequacy. After all, so much more could be said, and everything could be edited and improved, endlessly. What gave me some reassurance, however, was the way in which friends from the heart of Africa endorsed the draft manuscript. And, of course, there was the consideration that this booklet was only supposed to be an unpretentious contribution to the planning and practising of conflict prevention, management and resolution. It is in this spirit that I am sharing something about conflict resolution wisdom from Africa, and that we, in ACCORD, are looking forward to frank responses and further contributions.

Copies of *Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa* can be ordered direct from ACCORD.



JUSTICE WILL HELP RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA

by Kingsley Moghalu

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which nearly a million ethnic Tutsi and politically moderate Hutus were massacred within three months, is one of the most traumatic events of the century. Together with the Holocaust and apartheid, it could be classified the 'ultimate crime'. Rwanda after the genocide is a war-torn and traumatised society.

In establishing the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), in November 1994, to bring to justice the individuals responsible for the genocide, the UN Security Council expressed the hope that the tribunal would contribute to national reconciliation in Rwanda and the Central African sub-region. The Rwanda tribunal is therefore an instrument of conflict resolution. Indeed the

tribunal is unique in being the first example of bringing an international judicial dimension to the resolution of an internal conflict. Its creation is a firm statement that there can be no long-term peace without justice in Rwanda.

Justice and accountability are important elements in resolving conflict because the punishment of the perpetrators of mass atrocities builds the foundation for genuine national reconciliation. When justice is done—and seen to be done—it provides a catharsis for those physically or psychologically scarred by war crimes. Deep-seated resentments are removed, and people on both sides of the divide can then feel that a clean slate has been provided for co-existence. That is the goal of the Rwanda tribunal.

In addition to the retributive justice targeted at the culprits, a programme was also initiated to render justice of another kind—a compassionate, restitutive justice directed at the victims of the genocide, many of whom are women and children. The tribunal will soon start a programme of legal assistance, psychological counselling and limited material assistance for the rehabilitation of victims. It is hoped that this kind of justice, which completes the circle by addressing a gap that retribution alone may not fill, will contribute to more effective national reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda.

Parallels are often drawn between the work of the UN genocide tribunal for Rwanda and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). While both have broadly similar aims of contributing to reconciliation in strife-torn societies, they approach those goals in fundamentally different ways. South Africa's present political system was a compromise, forged peacefully. While apartheid's ghost had to be laid to rest, a war-crime trial was deemed an inappropriate mechanism; hence a TRC, based on the premise of the cleansing power of revelations of truth, but largely without the accompanying legal culpability for mass crimes against the black majority. As Professor John Daniel, a member of the TRC, told an international conference in Durban in June 1998, South Africa did not see retributive justice as an indispensable prerequisite for reconciliation. "The TRC approach trades justice for truth", he observed, "it is surely for every nation to decide its own approach to these kinds of difficult situations".

In Rwanda, the scope of the crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the Geneva Convention—was so vast, the time span of their commission so short, and their cruelty so shocking, that the Rwandans decided that justice had to be done before reconciliation could be possible. The victorious Allies in World War II similarly took the path of justice for the Holocaust, trying war criminals from Germany and Japan at the war-crime trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Today, both the former Allied powers, and the Axis powers they defeated and prosecuted, are partners in the Group of Eight (G8) industrial power. Justice cleared the path to reconciliation.

Using justice as an element of conflict resolution is not as straightforward a process as might be assumed. International tribunals are less than perfect mechanisms for dealing with mass atrocities for a number of reasons: only a relatively small number of people can be tried, and trials are unavoidably lengthy because of the intricacies of judicial proceedings—including the need to respect due process and the accused's right to a fair trial. All of this can tax the patience

of victims and observers, raise questions about their true deterrent effect, and so on. But, what is the alternative? Do nothing and raise the spectre of self-help vigilante justice? Or take a shortcut with the judicial process and risk undermining its credibility? Neither can be acceptable.

What has been our experience in this endeavour at the Rwanda tribunal? Despite the inherent challenges, the tribunal has made a significant and positive impact in the Rwandan context and is poised for additional achievements. It has indicted 36 individuals, most of them alleged ring-leaders of the genocide, and more than 30 of them are in detention at the tribunal's headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania.

Judgements in three or four cases will be delivered this year and several other trials will begin later in the year.

Indeed, the tribunal will soon make legal history when it delivers the first judgement by an international tribunal for the crime of genocide, in the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, former mayor of the Rwandan town of Taba.

In another historic event, Jean Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, pleaded guilty to six counts of genocide and crimes against humanity at his initial appearance before the Rwanda tribunal on May 1, 1998. His plea is very significant for three reasons. It is the first time in history that anyone, let alone a head of government, has pleaded guilty to the crime of genocide before an international tribunal. Secondly, the plea of guilty by such a high ranking figure has the potential to contribute to the long term healing process in Rwanda and has reverberated throughout Rwandan society. Finally, it reinforces the tribunal's potential as an instrument for national reconciliation in Rwanda, and its relevance, effectiveness and credibility as an international court of justice. The Rwandan government has welcomed this event and reaffirmed its support for the tribunal.

But in order for the Rwanda tribunal to achieve its goal of ensuring that justice is done, and thus clearing the path to national reconciliation, it needs the full political, moral, and material support of the international community—African countries in particular. One practical way in which African countries can support the tribunal is by providing prison facilities for the enforcement of the sentences of those who may be convicted by the ICTR. South Africa, for one, is well placed to offer such concrete assistance, and the tribunal would welcome it.

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Conditions for Intervention:

DRC AND LESOTHO

by Cedric de Coning

The controversial SADC Intervention in Lesotho raises familiar questions around enforcement and begs the question: Why have we not learned from Somalia and the many other examples of failed interventions at our disposal? It also forces us to ask: When is an intervention legitimate? What are the correct conditions for intervention?

Firstly, it is important to remind ourselves that what we have seen in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is not peacekeeping or even peace enforcement. Peacekeeping is when the United Nations or other bodies, such as the OAU or NATO, are authorised to enter a conflict situation as third party or neutral forces to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement or cease-fire. Key prerequisites are consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. Peace enforcement is where all the parties do not agree to third party intervention, where there is no peace agreement, but where the international community, normally out of humanitarian considerations, authorize a neutral third party to enforce a peace. In other words the parties to the conflict is forced to peace, or at least an area of peace is established where humanitarian activities can be carried out. The most important factor in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement is the neutrality or impartiality of the third party intervener. The SADC military intervention we saw in Lesotho and in the DRC were actions where forces were deployed on the side of one of the parties to a conflict. In the DRC, troops from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia were deployed on the side of Kabila's forces to defend the capital, Kinshasha, from a rebel onslaught, i.e. the SADC force entered the civil war on the side of one of the parties.

In Lesotho, South Africa and Botswana intervened to prevent a military mutiny from developing into a full scale coup,

and to restore normality to a country which had become ungovernable in the face of weeks of demonstrations by opposition parties. The opposition parties believed that the elections that brought the LCD government to power in May 1998 were fraudulent. Their protest action included confiscating government vehicles and closing government offices through intimidation. Most of the junior officers and privates in the Lesotho Defence Force were sympathetic to the opposition party stance and refused to act against the opposition demonstrators. On one occasion an attempt by the police to break up an opposition demonstration at the royal palace resulted in a shots being exchanged between the police and the defence force units at the palace. As the situation became more untenable the Prime Minister of Lesotho wrote to SADC governments asking them to intervene. On the basis of this request, with information that the military mutineers was about to declare a military coup, and with the LCD government in hiding, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe agreed to send a SADC force to Lesotho to restore the elected government of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosissili. The opposition parties and the mutineers resisted the SADC intervention and several South African soldiers and mutineers from the Lesotho Defence Force died in the ensuing clashes. The SADC intervention sparked a popular uprising, which quickly turned into an orgy of looting and destruction that left the capital of Maseru virtually destroyed. The opposition parties declared the intervention an invasion, and accused South Africa of interfering in Lesotho politics on the side of the LCD party.

The controversy around both these SADC interventions raise the question: When is an intervention legitimate? What are the conditions for intervention ?

Simply put, under international law an intervention is legitimate if duly authorised by the international community as such. It is illegitimate if one country invades another without that intervention having been sanctioned by the international community. Who is the international community? The United Nations (UN) or regional organizations such as the EC or the OAU, or sub-regional organizations such as SADC. What would 'duly authorize mean? It would refer to a decision making process recognized by the members of that organization, e.g. in the case of the UN this would be a resolution by the UN Security Council authorizing a certain action, e.g. sanctions against apartheid South Africa.

There is general agreement that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was an illegitimate intervention. In United Nations speak, one would say that it was a breach of the peace and that it threatened international peace. The UN authorised a multinational force, led by the United States, to restore the peace. The UN did not try to act as a neutral or third party broker between Iraq and Kuwait because the international community identified one party, Iraq, as the aggressor. The multi-national force was authorised to use all necessary force to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. This is both a classic example of an illegitimate invasion (by Iraq into Kuwait) followed by a legitimate, duly authorised enforcement mission, or in another context, a legitimate intervention.

The role of the United Nations in Angola is another example. The UN deployed peacekeepers to monitor the withdrawal of the Cuban troops, and later to monitor the peace process in Angola and the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. In this case, there is an ongoing civil war between a legitimate government, elected through a process that was recognized as free and fair by the UN, and a rebel movement. The UN peacekeepers, however, are a neutral third party force that is deployed to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement. Despite the legitimacy of the government, they are not deployed on the side of the government, but as a neutral third party force.

What were the conditions for intervention in the DRC? The Zimbabwe led coalition of SADC forces that intervened in the DRC argued that the DRC was the victim of foreign aggression. President Kabila argued that the rebellion in eastern DRC was in fact an invasion by Rwanda and Uganda, under the guise of a rebellion. The Zimbabwean-led coalition

supported this interpretation of the situation and deployed troops which successfully defended Kinshasa and ended the western campaign of the rebels. If a mutual defence agreement existed among the SADC countries, and if the ongoing rebellion in the DRC were indeed nothing else but a foreign invasion, an intervention on behalf of the Kabila government would have been legitimate. The fact is, however, that whilst it is a stated objective of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security to negotiate a mutual defence agreement among SADC countries, no such agreement exists at present. At the same time, very few people outside of the Kabila government would really argue that the rebellion in eastern DRC is just a foreign invasion. The involvement of Rwanda and Uganda has been established, both by eye witness accounts and by implication, following their very prominent role in the wide range of peace talks that have subsequently been attempted. Their role in Kabila's own rebellion less than a year ago, against the then Mobutu regime, has established the pattern of Rwandan



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and Ugandan involvement in the Great Lakes Region. Then as now, however, it would be short sighted to argue that the civil war in the eastern DRC is nothing but a foreign invasion. At the very least, it is indicative of an unresolved internal political situation in the DRC, and one that will continue to produce political turmoil, instability and civil war, if not addressed.

Another argument used by the Zimbabwe led coalition in the DRC is that SADC and the OAU have decided that military coups, or other forms of unconstitutional changes of government, will no longer be tolerated in Africa. They argue that the rebel uprising is an attempt to violently overthrow a

government and that it will therefore constitute an unconstitutional change of government. The SADC force was thus deployed to prevent yet another unconstitutional change of government in Africa, and in SADC.

Similarly, South Africa argued that the intervention in Lesotho was in reaction to an unfolding coup, i.e. to protect the legitimately elected government, and to restore peace and stability to the mountain kingdom.

Thus, in both the DRC and Lesotho, one of the reasons why SADC intervened was to prevent unconstitutional changes of government. This argument has moral authority and is preceded by the OAU decision at the Harare Summit in June 1997, which condemned the military coup in Sierra Leone and authorized ECOWAS to restore the elected civilian government. In a similar fashion the countries in east Africa and the OAU condemned the military coup in Burundi in July 1996. They refused to recognize the government of Pierre Buyoya and imposed sanctions against Burundi.


One has to recognize, however, that whilst the OAU and SADC position against the unconstitutional changes of government has been verbalized in various speeches by the OAU Secretary General and other African leaders, neither the OAU nor SADC have formally adopted any resolutions that will institutionalize this stance as policy. Apart from the above mentioned OAU decision on Sierra Leone, no resolution has been adopted by either the OAU or SADC condemning coups or unconstitutional changes of government in principle. Nor has any resolution been adopted that authorizes member states of the OAU or SADC to intervene if such military coups or unconstitutional changes of government take place, or to prevent them from taking place.

The problem lies in the vacuum between a stance that is widely accepted and the lack of any formal policy to back it up. What is needed is clear, transparent policy decisions at the OAU and SADC level which will leave no ambiguity about when member states are authorised to intervene. A very important element of such a policy is the process that a member state(s) would be required to follow prior to being authorised to carry out such an intervention.

Fifty years of United Nations experience has produced a specific set of procedures and checks and balances that ensure that troops deployed under UN auspices do so with a clear mandate and with a specific set of enabling agreements and

operating procedures. These include a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the mission. This resolution provides the overall mandate for the mission and sets out what is expected to be achieved by a mission—what level of force may be used, etc. Other key documents include the *Rules of Engagement* that spells out the when and how force may be used, and the *Status of Forces Agreement*, which is an agreement between the UN and the country hosting the UN Mission. This procedure recognizes that when troops are sent into a country under the auspices of an international body, a totally different set of parameters applies. Special procedures and international mandates are necessary to render national identity and interests neutral for the greater good of the internationally authorised mission.

The UN procedures ensure that any mission involving the dispatch of troops has been authorised at the highest level—the UN Security Council—and that there is a transparent and public mandate, that the rules of engagement are clear, and that the status of the mission personnel in the host country have been agreed to. Once these steps have been taken it is public knowledge that a UN mission has been approved for a certain country and what the mission is supposed to achieve, i.e. the so called end-state. Whilst this process is not without its own complications, as many failed UN missions can bear testimony, it is the only internationally accepted procedure to authorize multi-national missions we have to date.



The UN Charter, Chapter VIII provides for the use of regional bodies, such as SADC, for enforcement purposes, but only with the prior authorization of the UN Security Council. Some would thus argue that the SADC interventions in the DRC and Lesotho were both unauthorized actions in terms of the UN Charter. South Africa, and most other SADC countries, do not wish to be seen as countries that do not respect international law. It is thus in our interest to establish the necessary enabling mechanisms and procedures at SADC and OAU level as a matter of urgency.

One of the first issues that SADC needs to clarify is at what level a decision can be taken to authorize the deployment of troops under SADC auspices, whether for peacekeeping purposes or for enforcement action, be taken. In the case of the DRC a number of SADC Defence Ministers, under the auspices of the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), met

at Victoria Falls and took a decision to intervene on the side of the Kabila government. In their assessment a fellow SADC country had been invaded by foreign powers. Other SADC governments, most notably South Africa, argued that a decision to militarily intervene under SADC auspices has to be taken at least at the Summit level, and that they were thus uncomfortable with the Zimbabwean, Angolan and Namibian forces intervening in the DRC under the SADC banner.

Just over a month later South Africa and Botswana intervened in Lesotho under the auspices of SADC. South Africa argued that the broad mandate given to South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe in 1996 to act as the guarantors of the democratization process in Lesotho, and the decision by SADC and the OAU not to tolerate any coups, was the basis for its intervention. It is unclear, however, at what level the final decision to intervene was taken. One can assume that the four countries involved—Mozambique was included after the Mauritius Summit in September 1998—must have approved the intervention at the highest level, but it would appear as if no formal decision was taken at any SADC meeting authorizing the intervention in Lesotho.

This is not only an academic question. In the case of the Lesotho intervention, for instance, the uncertainty and secrecy around the intervention (Who authorized it? With what aim? etc.) directly contributed to the mission being perceived as illegitimate and biased. The mutinous elements within the Lesotho Defence Force and the opposition parties saw the SADC Task Force as an attempt by South Africa to support the government of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosissili. The Lesotho intervention has again shown that under these circumstances the perceived legitimacy and neutrality of the intervention becomes critical to its success. Despite the fact that South Africa and the other SADC countries may be of the opinion that they had some kind of mandate from SADC to intervene, the subsequent perception in Lesotho, and generally in the international community, is that it was not clear when such a mandate was given and what it contained. The result was that it was perceived as a South African operation. The lesson learned is that transparency is a crucial ingredient for multi-national actions of this kind.

It was also unfortunate that the initial, and most sensitive, intervention into Lesotho was done by South African troops only. Although the military planners probably thought that speed was of the essence, they did not appreciate that the multi-national nature of the mission was as crucial as speed to the way in which the SADC Task Force would be perceived. Again, it is a very well known lesson learned from Somalia and elsewhere that for a force to be perceived as international,

it has to be truly multi-national. No amount of UN Security Council resolutions could remove the American character of the mission in Somalia. Similarly, once CNN referred to a “South African intervention in Lesotho” it was clear that that the authorizing process did not achieve its objective of projecting the mission as a SADC mission.

This also speaks to the issue of surprise. It would appear as if the South African planners thought that they need to maintain the element of surprise. They thought the best way to handle the expected resistance from the opposition and mutinous elements within the Lesotho Defence Force was with a classical military-style surprise attack. With international operations of this nature, however, one needs transparency and public awareness, not surprise. If the mandating procedure was in the public domain, e.g. a SADC Organ meeting at Foreign Minister level; if the objectives and purpose of the mission were clearly communicated to all concerned prior to any intervention—is it not likely that the level of resistance in Lesotho would have been much less, or at least of a very different nature? What would have been the scenario if SADC approached the opposition parties, the King, and the mutinous elements within the Lesotho Defence Force, and explained to them the objectives and nature of the mission, and announced the time and date that the SADC force would enter Lesotho? It is possible that this would have gone some way to change the perception, and thus the reaction of the opposition parties and mutinous elements within the Lesotho Defence Force? At the very least, one would have known prior to crossing the border how the various parties were posturing themselves.

Some would argue that these kinds of procedural requirements are impractical in light of the need to sometimes act with urgency. Zimbabwe argues that the Kinshasa would have fallen to the rebels within 12 hours if they did not intervene when they did. Similarly, South Africa argues that there would have been a coup in Lesotho if they did not intervene when they did. The counter argument is that when the deployment of an international force is at stake, it is much more important to do it right, to ensure that everybody agrees that all peaceful means have been exhausted, so that whatever action flows from such a decision is blessed with the legitimacy that comes with a transparent international process. One of the criticisms leveled at the UN, for instance, is that the period it takes from the time of the authorization to the time of deployment in the field is too long. The UN has tried to improve its reaction time by establishing a stand-by system and a rapid deployment headquarters. In other words they are improving their planning systems and reaction procedures, but no one would even think

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INTERNET - CONFLICT OR CO-OPERATION?

The information age rolls out special challenges for Africa

by Ian Henderson-Wille

The *Cat in the Hat*, a fondly-remembered title from childhood story-times, features a gregarious feline and his companions come to relieve the boredom of two lonely children left alone in a large, empty house for the day. The growth in communication technology, and the Internet in particular, has much in common with this story. It is seen by many as a magical happening bringing the inventive and extraordinary to revolutionise society and our way of being. But even in the stories of Dr Seuss, revolution comes at a price—of conflict with the old, established order—represented there by a grumpy and rather paranoid goldfish. The fish is unaccustomed to being uprooted from his established place as ruler of the roost by a young and impetuous outsider. Like the fish, there are those in power today who feel threatened by these changes, who may stand to lose from the restructuring of society and who would prefer things to remain as they are. For too long Africa has been excluded from global developments—economic, political and social—or at best has been playing a catch-up game, always destined to lose the race. I will argue that the growth in communication technology and the Internet poses challenges for Africa, and risks increasing conflict potential on the continent. However, it also offers new opportunities for transformation—chances that Africa cannot afford to pass up on.

We live in a changed world

Only those living a very isolated and insular existence would be unaware that we live in a world of vast change and fluidity. Throughout history peoples have travelled beyond the boundaries of their own communities, whether for purposes of trade, exploration or conquest. Empires have risen and fallen and the world has become an increasingly interconnected place. But in the last two decades, particularly, a new type of change has been underway, often referred to as *globalisation*. The entire structure of the way people relate, compete and function has been transformed. This can be most clearly

seen in the case of the European Union, who for several decades have been building a 'super-state', with central government, open borders, and a common currency, the *Euro*. Power is changing. Many have argued that the nation-state is on the wane, and that the balance of power is shifting to the international corporate conglomerates who operate across the globe and are accountable only to themselves. Recent mergers have resulted in select companies, particularly banks, whose turnover that is larger than the entire GDP of a medium-sized developing country.

Trade barriers have begun to fall away, and the lightning fast movement of capital across markets from east to west, and throughout the developing world, has allowed global macro-economic forces to play an enormously more powerful role in shaping national developments—both political and economic. The world really is beginning to look more like a global village than ever before. The growth in communication technology has been a major factor behind these developments, because of its critical role in the transport of information across the globe.

It is this fundamental connection between globalisation and communication technology that I would like to examine more closely. I would argue that current realities in Africa make the continent vulnerable to a rise in conflict potential as a result of these changes, and that it is going to take a massive commitment from Africa's leadership to avert crisis in future years. Conversely, these changes also offer potential for transformation, co-operation and growth across Africa and I shall examine some current initiatives and plans in this regard.

The role of information

In her article on water security in Southern Africa¹, Jo-Ansie van Wyk argues that water has become a critical resource underpinning a state's ability to survive and compete eco-

nomically. It is an extremely valuable tradable commodity, which has become increasingly politicised as its potential to be a source of international conflict grows.

Water and information may not appear to have much in common to the uninformed observer, but the parallels can be striking. What is the role of information in making it possible for companies to function under these new conditions? The global village operates at high speed, 24-hours a day. To compete a company must know conditions and demands in current and new markets—their ability to be successful rests in their ability to control a live chain of information from customers to suppliers. They are no longer bound by traditional relationships to consumers, labour or resources, but can constantly seek out new ways of conducting business. Stock markets across the planet now trade electronically; business conducted on the Internet grows at a rate of hundreds of percent per annum; and news about what is happening in one corner of the globe can be distributed within minutes. The power of the Internet to communicate information looks set to make the impact of television appear simply a tremor before the earthquake.

It follows that if the communication of information is such a critical factor underpinning the way the world is changing, then the control and management of information is going to become increasingly important. It comes as no wonder, therefore, to discover that the United States remains the focal hub of the Internet family, and that the developing world, and Africa in particular, remain poor relatives trying desperately to gain a piece of the action.

Conflict potential in Africa

Global power structures are fast changing from a north-south split, to a centre-periphery arrangement of power, with power centres concentrated in the resource-rich north, but distributed also across the major cities of the south. The conflict potential created by this imbalance in power has shifted from an inter-continental focus to a national or intra-state focus. What are the implications of this for the developing world, and Africa in particular?

Those in the centre are in control of power, and have access to resources, wealth and skills—those in the periphery are increasingly disempowered and dispossessed. The major urban power centres of the developing world are places where a middle-class young person, whether Kenyan or Malaysian, may be indistinguishable from his New York brethren—wearing *Nikes*, clutching a cellphone and speaking in techno-babble. On the periphery, in contrast, society continues to operate as it has

for centuries, separated from the power centres by the seemingly impenetrable barriers of education, finance and access. If access to, and control of, information are the factors that underpin access to power, then those on the periphery find themselves alienated. Modern communication technology is prohibitively expensive, particularly so in the global periphery where Africa finds herself firmly located. So the divide between rich and poor is one that mirrors the centre/periphery split—those who have leap gladly onto the bandwagon, while those who don't can only watch as it recedes into the distance, carrying their hopes of a future.

These changes are reflected in ever increasing gaps between the young and old. Simon Caulkin, in his article for the *Mail & Guardian* newspaper in May this year²—*Net generation rules the boardroom*—speaks of a new generation, the “N” generation, who are taking over the reigns of global commerce because of their command of the Internet. They are young, upwardly mobile and well educated, with the future in their hands. In contrast, the older generation find themselves outside, excluded and losing access to power.

And finally, but perhaps most disturbingly for Africa, are the implications of the brain drain. It has been estimated that there are over 300,000 information technology vacancies in the US, where salaries of over \$50,000 per annum are the norm in this sector. When one considers the sheer impossibility of coming up with comparable amounts in Malawian Kwacha, Ugandan Shillings and even South African Rands, it is small wonder that Africa's IT professionals are leaving in droves for “greener” pastures. These human resources are Africa's hope for the future, her *real* gold and diamonds in a rapidly changing scenario—yet the structure of labour in this new world makes it increasingly difficult to hang on to them.

Africa's vulnerability

It has been widely acknowledged that the world is entering a new phase—that the *information age* is dawning. We have outlined, above, some of the challenges posed to the developing world by changes in global power relations, and the role played by telecommunications and the Internet. But what is it that makes Africa particularly vulnerable to these threats?

While many African countries have ambitious plans afoot to expand Internet access to their citizens, and notwithstanding the great strides that have been made since 1994, current statistics still give grave cause for concern. There are approximately one million subscribers online in Africa—and if one excludes the 900,000 located in South Africa only 100,000 remain among the rest of Africa's 700 million people. This

means that there is only one subscriber for every 7000 people north of South Africa, compared with a global average of one user for every 40 people, and ratios as high as one user in four people in North America and Europe. Access to technology, and the human resources necessary to run it is only part of the problem. Perhaps more of a barrier is the cost of services. The average cost of a dial-up account in Africa, based on as little as five hours online time per month is barely under US\$60 per month—prohibitively expensive for all but wealthy individuals, corporates and foreign aid workers in most African states.

On the positive side, most countries on the continent now have an international link of more than 64Kbps, compared to only four countries in May 1996. Only Congo (Brazzaville) looks likely to be without full Internet by the end of the year, and there has been a gradual roll-out of services beyond the capital cities to rural areas. Money is flowing, if not yet pouring, in from both private companies eager to capture a slice of the action, and from donor agencies—such as the UN Secretary General's System-Wide Initiative on Africa which has launched a \$11.5 million programme called *Harnessing Information Technology for Development*.

Of course, the underlying problem dogging the extension of Internet services has been the quality of the existing telecommunication infrastructure—since the lack of national penetration and the poor quality of the networks still remain a basic impediment to rapid growth in Internet use. Tele-density in Africa south of the Sahara remains as low as one per 200 inhabitants, with 50% of the available lines concentrated in the capital cities where only 10% of the population live. There is, however, great variation, as some African countries have made telecommunications a priority and are installing the latest technology. Rwanda and Botswana, in particular, boast among the world's most advanced networks, where 100% of the main lines are digital, compared with only 49.5% in the United States. Unfortunately at the other end of the scale sit countries like Uganda and Madagascar which have only highly reliable analogue systems.

Tele-data links between Africa and the outside world are limited. Currently, southern Africa feeds through Telkom South Africa's link to the Canary Islands hub, while most other countries have to make use of prohibitively expensive and low speed direct satellite links. Plans for the future include Telkom's SAFE Project (South Africa-Far East) in collaboration with Malaysia Telecom, with plans to lay an Indian Ocean fibre-optic cable to Asia via a variety of stop-off points including Mauritius. In North Africa the SEA-ME-WEA cable has already been completed along the Red Sea and across the Mediterranean, providing high-bandwidth access

to north African countries. AT&T's well known Africa One venture aims to lay a fibre-optic necklace around the entire continent, but it is yet to be finalised, since its announcement in 1995 a number of other competing projects have emerged. RASCOM, the African satellite consortium owned by African PTOs has advanced plans to launch its own satellite in 1998.

Certainly an inhibitor to telecommunication development in some African countries has come from regulatory barriers kept in place by state bodies nervous about losing control of a lucrative telecomms market. Governments without strong democratic traditions have also become paranoid about the prospect of advances in the capacity of civil society to oppose their rule, brought about increases in the speed and ease of electronic communication.

Conflict or Co-operation: hope for the future

Many analysts delight in painting a gloomy picture of the future, an outlook that sits well with the trend towards Afro-pessimism we have seen resuscitated by conflicts which have flared in recent months. This paper has concerned itself with the potential for increased conflict in Africa in the medium-to-long term. While arguing that Africa is vulnerable to the negative impact of globalisation I have alluded to the possibility for communication technology and the Internet to assist Africa to convert that negative potential into a positive response. What are some of the ways this is occurring, and can do in the future? What is the positive, co-operative potential in these changes, both with respect to Africa's relationship with the rest of the world, and regionally within our continent?

Statistically Africa remains essentially stuck in an agrarian age, where up to 80% of the population still eke out a living from the soil in impoverished and increasingly overpopulated rural areas. Land remains a strong cultural symbol—a part of both communal and individual identity. In terms of economic development, Africa remains several centuries behind the developed north, which is emerging from the industrial age into the information age. But an economic agenda to drag the continent through industrialisation can only lead to disaster. The plummeting value of unskilled labour, intense international economic competition, declining influence of the state and the looming threat of environmental degradation, if not collapse, conspire to make large-scale industrialisation a non-viable option for the continent. The challenge facing Africa is to find ways to leapfrog straight into the information age.

Yet what does life in this new age look like? Fundamentally it is an understanding of business, political and social practices that places new forms of communication at its heart. What is so dramatic about our advances in electronic communication and information management is that they are redefining how we see ourselves, our neighbour and our world. Suddenly a business partner or a client may live in Iceland or Honolulu. Investors may be transformed into partners playing an active role in the management of a business while never having met you face to face. The remarkable opportunity for Africans is that we are *no longer encircled by a security cordon of underdevelopment and pessimism*. The world has become an open place and Africa has as much of an opportunity to take her seat at the table as anyone else.

A fundamental characteristic of the information age is the emphasis on diversity. Small has become beautiful and powerful. This is good news indeed for Africa, which generally does not possess the resources to compete directly with massive international corporations. *Amazon.com*, with a staff complement of under ten, have been able to take on the largest book retailers in the US and beat them at their own game by utilising the power of the Internet to sell a huge range of publications. *Salami.com*, initially an Internet frontage for a small Massachusetts delicatessen, is now a pipeline for speciality foods trading globally, with a huge Japanese market and a turnover of millions of dollars. There is no reason why Africans cannot do the same thing. It is a brave new world, and one in which the playing fields have been levelled like never before.

There is no doubt that the growth in telecommunication is set to have a fundamental impact in the way political systems across the continent are structured. In every country in the world where there is a tele-density of more than 20 phones per 100 inhabitants, stable democracies flourish. Communication is evidently a major tool for the promotion of democracy. Dictatorships and military rule depend on controlling the flow of information. The loose affiliation of diverse computer networks that makes up the Internet presents a diffuse presence that is impossible for an authoritarian government to control. The growth of the Internet, and particularly basic email services, has already begun to affect a very real shift in the balance of power regarding the control of information to civil society.

At the beginning of this article I said that it is going to take a massive commitment from leaders across the continent to bring Africa into the information age, dealing along the way with ever-present conflict potential. Leadership in this context refers to government—but also to business and civil society.

The prevalent paternalism that expects governments to solve all problems will have to be relinquished if we are to get anywhere. I will conclude with a brief look at how civil society is taking the initiative to put communication technology to work in the fight against conflict, and towards co-operation.

Humble email technology remains probably the most useful tool. Most universities, NGOs and development agencies are now connected to email, allowing them high-speed, low-cost communication, once the initial capital equipment has been purchased. Listserves (discussion forums where comments from an individual are copied to all members of the list) have made it possible for whole constituencies to remain in touch with the issues and each other. There are a number of international services of this kind which are relevant to Africa, but one of the best known African resources is the PRODDER development-focussed list (<http://www.prodเดอร์.org.za/>) which has thousands of members – primarily in Southern Africa.

The East and Central African Human Rights Network (HURINET) met recently in Harare to discuss the establishment of a clearinghouse for information on human rights for the region, to be linked with similar projects for West and North Africa, based in Burkina Faso. Human rights leaders are very aware of the potential of such a flexible and powerful tool working for their cause. Many organisations working in the field of conflict resolution now promote their work through organisational websites. There are then also initiatives to utilise the Internet to disseminate reliable and timely updates and news of ongoing conflicts. ConflictNet (<http://www.igc.apc.org/igc/conflictnet/>) and ReliefWeb (<http://www.reliefweb.int/>) are among the best-known international sources for this kind of information on Africa, and a range of African-based initiatives is currently under development.

Viewed cynically, the roll-out of telecommunication across Africa is another nail in the coffin of the dispossessed, testimony to the growing alienation between the haves and the have-nots. It will assist the powerful in the South to move into stronger relationship with the power-holders of the North. We can accept this negative scenario, or we can search for the blue sky ahead. The African Renaissance is about building a future together. The new world that confronts us is an imposing place, but also a place of potential and hope. The rebuilding of a new global village offers Africa an opportunity to take her rightful place in the world community.

- 1 River Dry, Mountain High – Water security in southern Africa' *Conflict Trends* 1998/1
- 2 *Mail & Guardian* May 6 1998

Ian Henderson-Wille is the Manager of ACCORD's Communication & Information Unit.

FOCUS ON ACCORD

Each quarter Mouthpiece will focus on a particular aspect of ACCORD's work. Emphasis will be placed on analysing developments in the conflict resolution field on the continent and looking at how ACCORD's programmes are striving to meet Africa's complex and ever-changing challenges

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a non-governmental conflict resolution organisation based in Durban, South Africa. Our focus includes the whole of the African continent, and our activities stretch from the SADC in the South, through the Great Lakes region to West Africa and the Horn of Africa in the north-east. ACCORD strives to offer innovative and effective African solutions to African challenges.

When ACCORD was established, Africa lacked a culture of conflict resolution and our initial brief was to popularise the peaceful settlement of disputes through conflict resolution as an alternative to violence. The scenario has now changed, and public opinion and political policies in Africa generally favour negotiated settlements to conflicts. ACCORD's second five-year plan reflects this change and our focus is currently on institutionalising conflict resolution by building capacity, structures and systems.

ACCORD is part of the growing momentum for an African Renaissance. Through our work over the last five years we

have developed a comprehensive peace model, officially recognised by the United Nations as a viable model for Africa. The model is based on four pillars: intervention, education and training, research, and networking. The core of our work in the education and training sector is conflict resolution training. Within our Peacekeeping, Preventive Diplomacy, Public Sector, Youth, Gender and Tertiary Institutions Programmes, we train different sectors in conflict resolution strategy, methods and systems. A Rapid Response Mechanism and an Early Warning Unit facilitate early intervention in emerging conflict situations. ACCORD's intervention and training activities are supported by a research department and we are developing a comprehensive on-line information network on conflict resolution in Africa, called ACCNET.

In addition to the comprehensive peace model, ACCORD also hosts several special initiatives. The Africa Peace Award is a high-profile biennial event which focuses on a person, group or country who has made an exceptional contribution to peace-making, respect for human rights and good governance in Africa. ACCORD is also planning the construction of a permanent Peace Centre, the first in Africa. Our vision is of a retreat, conference, training and research facility, that will provide a peaceful setting and a comprehensive range of services that can accommodate high level conflict interventions, continuous training and research. The Centre would also be a venue for policy makers, academics and practitioners to gather on a regular basis to discuss conflicts, formulate policy and evolve practical responses to conflicts in Africa.

THE PUBLIC SECTOR PROGRAMME AT ACCORD

The fragile democracy that South Africa continues to build places immense challenges on the public service and the need is thus more urgent than ever for structural changes in the style and nature of governance to begin to consolidate this democracy. As we approach the turn of the millenium more creative approaches to dealing with transformation challenges are necessary for the African continent.

ACCORD has, as one of its core programmes, a Public Sector Conflict Management Programme (PSCMP) which facilitates the organisation's commitment to serving as a vital resource in the field of conflict resolution on the continent of Africa.

Within the context of ACCORD's theme of finding *African Solutions to African Challenges* the PSCMP was conceptualised against a background of transforming the public service into a dynamic needs-based and proactive instrument, capable of playing an integral and strategic part in the entrenchment of good governance principles. The programme's goals are being achieved through a well-developed training programme which increases the capacity of the public service to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. The PSCMP is also involved in overseeing the development of institutional mechanisms in the public sector to deal with recurring conflict.

The programme has been implemented in the KwaZulu-Natal

Health Department as a pilot funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Approximately 40 people at senior management and leadership level have been taken through an intensive five-course conflict management training programme. The participants were drawn from clinical, administrative and organised labour settings and provided a unique mix of expertise and experiences for a dynamic learning opportunity. In addition to the skills learned, participants benefitted from a unique opportunity to build trust and strengthen relationships across their diverse sectors.

The programme covered courses in *Basic Conflict Resolution, Advanced Conflict Resolution, Negotiated Investment Strategy, Facilitation, and Dispute Systems Design*. A multi-disciplinary approach was used, and through the generous efforts of our funders we were able to enlist the expertise of US host-trainers for two of the courses. A selection from the participants will be trained as trainers on a *Training for Trainers Programme*. From the calibre of the trainees drawn from the Health Department it appears that at least 95% of these trainees will be put through the *Training for Trainers* course.

It is envisioned that the ripple effect of this will spread throughout the department, contributing to a positive environment, and equipping individuals to analyse, diagnose and resolve conflicts. The establishment of an *Office of Mediation*, which is the next phase in the implementation plan of the programme in the KwaZulu-Natal Health Department, will provide an on-site institutional mechanism to deal with conflict resolution, management and prevention.

Given the success of the programme, ACCORD is currently in in-depth discussions with the Northern Cape Provincial Legislature on transferring the programme to this Province. An in-principle commitment has been made by the ACCORD trustees to take the PSCMP across the nation and onto the African continent. Plans are underway to realise this goal.

Bhekumzi Dlamini, the Deputy Director in the Department of Labour Relations at the KZN Department of Health: ‘It has been quite a challenge to restrict myself to only one example of how the ACCORD training has benefited the staff of the Directorate: Labour Relations in executing their responsibilities and duties... On 17 August 1998, a meeting was held between ourselves and representatives of employee organisations at Emmaus Hospital to address grievances of Tradesman Aids who were not happy about the way that posts for Handymen were filled. Such grievances had had serious repercussions in that the newly appointed employees (handymen) were prevented from entering the hospital premises. In mediating the dispute the facilitative and evaluative mediator technique with broad problem definition was used as follows:



Bhekumzi Dlamini
Deputy Director:
Labour Relations
KZN Dept of Health

Evaluative: The parties were urged to accept broad settlements, in that by accepting the experienced handymen they would stand a better chance of being trained thus developing their skills for the future. The impact of not settling (WATNA—Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement [ed]) was predicted as follows—all people who intimidated newly appointed employees would face disciplinary action.

Facilitative: parties were assisted in understanding issues and interests, i.e. they were advised that although their interests were based on the fact that they saw themselves as the only suitable candidates for the positions, people from outside had a constitutional right to be considered for the posts and be appointed to the positions as long as they qualified.”



Augusta Dorning
Director:
Labour Relations
KZN Dept of Health

Augusta Dorning writes: “The Directorate: Labour Relations was called to assist in resolving a violent conflict at Nqutu between two sets of foreign doctors. The nature of the conflict threatened to bring the delivery of health services to the community to its knees. With no time for preparation given the direct circumstances which had presented, the Superintendent-General, the Director: Labour Relations and another member of staff landed on a mercy flight on the private airstrip of Dr Sosaballa Mbatha a traditional healer, late in the afternoon. The techniques and skills acquired during the ACCORD programme averted the crisis. By instinct the principles and process of the negotiated investment strategy were used, a day in advance of the theoretical training. Skills developed in facilitation and listening had to be applied sensitively and honestly. Through listening, exercising very little positional power and practising diplomacy the dispute was analysed by the parties themselves and focussed to the satisfaction of all concerned. The extent to which language barriers and cultural values were honoured and respected paid tribute to our commitment to promoting sound dispute resolution mechanisms and employee relations within our department.”

THE PEACEKEEPING PROGRAMME AT ACCORD

The Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD was established in 1995 when ACCORD, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) initiated the Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project (TfP), with funding from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ACCORD is responsible for the training aspects of the project, in addition to policy development, some research and advocacy activities. The TfP Project is the largest African NGO peacekeeping training and capacity building project, and is one of the largest NGO-driven peacekeeping training and development projects in the world.

The training part of the Peacekeeping Programme consists of a series of training workshops which are being conducted in all the SADC countries. Workshops have been conducted in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mauritius and Mozambique in 1996, and in Botswana, Namibia and Malawi in 1997. In 1998 peacekeeping training workshops were conducted in Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa. Workshops have thus far been conducted in 11 of the 14 SADC countries.

The workshops are conducted over five days and cover topics ranging from preventive diplomacy to peacebuilding and include issues such as civilian policing (CIVPOL), civilian roles, and the humanitarian and human rights dimension of peace operations. The focus is on the multifunctional nature of modern peace operations and the need for synergy among the various sectors present in a modern peace operation. Participants are from the military, police, foreign ministry and civil society. The programme is built around African case studies and a series of interactive syndicate exercises that make use of role play and other techniques to give participants the opportunity to develop practical skills. A group of international and African experts present the various briefings and guide the participants through the syndicate exercises.

The policy development part of the programme provides for a series of seminars that address specific issues such as *The Role of Civilian Police in Peace Operations*. Where the training workshops are conducted in each country, the seminars cre-

ate an opportunity for participants from all the SADC countries to consider the issues together in one group.

As part of ACCORD's contribution to the research objectives of the programme, an Occasional Paper series was launched in 1997. In addition, staff from the Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD are involved in: advisory and related activities, such as representing the programme at the International Association of Peace-keeping Training Centres (IAPTC)—where Cedric de Coning, ACCORD's Peace-keeping programme manager, was elected as incoming chair; participating in the South African White Paper on Peace Operations review process; and lecturing at the Armed Forces International Centre—Norway's Peacekeeping Commanding Officer's Course—and at the Regional Peace-keeping Training Centre's Peacekeeping Commanders Course at the Zimbabwe Staff College. The Peace-keeping Programme at ACCORD has been tasked to plan and co-ordinate all



the civilian aspects of the SADC peacekeeping exercise, *Exercise Blue Crane*, scheduled to be held in November 1998 in South Africa.

Africa has started to develop a military capacity to contribute to peace operations, but its capacity to contribute to the civilian aspects of peace operations is largely undeveloped. There is therefore a need to develop Africa's ability to contribute to the civilian aspects of peace operations. ACCORD is focusing on the various civilian aspects of peace operations such as civil-military relations, CIVPOL, human rights observers, civil affairs, gender in peacekeeping, and are developing specialised courses in these areas. At the same time ACCORD will continue to present the generic peacekeeping training workshops it has developed over the past two years.

(Continued from pg 23, *Conditions for Intervention*)

of tampering with the requirement for a public UN Security Council mandate prior to deployment.

Another element of contention is the minimum use of force. The minimum use of force is a general premise for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, and a stated objective of the SADC force during the Lesotho intervention. With that in mind, one can ask why the SADC Force thought it so important to capture the Makonyane Military Base, and other strategic positions, when a cordon and containment type operation would probably have been as effective. If the objective was to ensure peace and stability, then the crucial factor with regard to the mutinous elements within the Lesotho Defence Force was to prevent them from interfering with the restoration of law and order in the rest of the country. From a minimum use of force perspective, this could possibly have been achieved by containing them in their positions, and negotiating with them once a reasonable measure of stability had been achieved. A better understanding of the principle of minimum use of force may also have prevented the loss of so many lives.

The point is that a clear and transparent authorizing procedure is needed in SADC so that everybody knows what constitutes a legitimate SADC Mission—e.g. a decision taken at the Foreign Minister level of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. Such a decision should be in the form of a UN Security Council-type mandate that sets out the objective of the mission, key tasks, the expected end state of the mission and the level of force that is authorised for the mission.

SADC also has to decide what kind of missions it is willing to deploy. Is SADC going to enter conflict situations as a neutral third party peacemaker, or is SADC willing to enter conflicts on the side of one of the conflicting parties as it has done in the DRC and Lesotho. The latter cases are highly complex. In the Lesotho case, for instance, the Prime Minister of Lesotho (the Head of Government) requested the intervention. One of the issues of contention is whether such an intervention should rather have been done on request of the King of Lesotho, the neutral Head of State. At this stage it would appear as if, according to the Lesotho Constitution, the Prime Minister was under obligation to consult the King, prior to requesting foreign intervention. This is a matter for Lesotho's constitutional future and part of a larger, as yet unresolved issue, around the role of the King in Lesotho. At the same time however, one has to recognize that the Lesotho government have been in a crisis of legitimacy following allegations that they came to power under the shadow of a fraudulent election process. Whilst this in no way legitimize a coup or

any other form of an unconstitutional change of government, it should impact on the way SADC handles the situation. By automatically rushing to the aid of a so-called elected government, SADC appeared to ignore or judge the position of a significant number of opposition party supporters. At the very least, one would have liked to have seen a more neutral stance by a SADC force, one where SADC forces have intervened as a neutral force, to restore law and order, so that the political processes can continue. If that had been the case one could have called it a peace enforcement mission and it could have achieved international legitimacy. This is a subtle difference, but one that caused the SADC Task Force in Lesotho to be viewed not as an international peace mission, but as a politically biased South African intervention. To avoid the latter and achieve the former is a simple matter of following a pre-recognized transparent process at, for instance, the SADC level.

What is important for SADC is to find a mechanism that will prevent it from automatically rushing to the aid of every government, regardless of how it came to power or what its current status or legitimacy is. This does not imply sympathy for unconstitutional changes of government, merely a less automatic and more assessed approach in dealing with these issues. In a case like Lesotho, where the elected government was clearly in the midst of a legitimacy crisis due to an alleged fraudulent election, a more neutral approach may have been more appropriate—one where the SADC force did not intervene in support of the government of the day, but as a neutral third party to ensure peace and stability so that diplomatic efforts to find a political solution could continue on a level playing field. This type of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations is much more desirable than the recent spate of military interventions SADC has undertaken. These operations are internationally recognized, and there is a wealth of information, expertise and experience that can be brought to bear on SADC's capacity to fulfill its obligations in this regard with honour and pride. If the internationally acceptable procedures are followed, they are easy to explain and people generally understand their purpose.

For this to happen, the current impasse around the SADC Organ and the dual Chairmanship of the SADC Organ and SADC proper, has to be urgently resolved. As in the case of the DRC intervention, the controversy around the Lesotho intervention can be regarded as a direct result of the impasse around the SADC Organ. The SADC Heads of State, and especially Presidents Mandela and Mugabe, must show the political will to resolve this issue as a matter of urgency.

Cedric de Coning is the Manager of ACCORD's Peacekeeping Programme.

The Conflict Management Process

Since the war started in June, three different entities have set in motion mechanisms to mediate an end to the hostilities: the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), Portugal and ECOWAS. The Nigerian dominated ECOWAS has a permanent military force, the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), stationed in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In seeking an extension of the ECOMOG mandate to cover his own country, however, Vieira faced the obstacle of Guinea-Bissau's poor participation in ECOWAS. In fact, the Bissau government has not lived up to its responsibilities to the OAU or to ECOWAS. She has not paid her dues to ECOWAS since the early 1980s, despite pleas from the organisation. President Vieira also refused to send troops to join ECOMOG. Additionally, Vieira's government has been inward looking in terms of international diplomacy, and at many continental and sub-regional meetings.

The CPLP, with the moral support of ECOWAS, managed to negotiate a cease-fire on July 26. The rebels agreed to recognise the legitimacy of the government of president Vieira, and the 100-strong National Assembly, through its permanent commission of parliament, is expected to play a critical role in resolving the problems underlying the conflict. The rebels have accused ECOWAS of supporting President Vieira, but according to diplomatic sources in Nigeria, they are in turn supported by Portugal. The Portuguese, like the French did in Africa from the 1960s to the early 1990s (see

Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe are in the country to monitor and observe its implementation. Portugal, aiming to play a further strategic role in the conflict, has drawn on South Africa's experience in preventive diplomacy during the war in Zaire last year in using one of their ships, The Corte, as a venue for talks between the government and rebels.

ECOWAS foreign and defence ministers met in Abidjan in July and proposed three measures to end the war—firstly, 'dialogue and negotiations', secondly recourse to sanctions (and embargo if this failed), and lastly the application of force. There was agreement that the use of force does not resolve conflicts—it only postpones their resolution, as demonstrated in Liberia and Sudan. Neither do sanctions work in cases where there is not the ability to enforce and monitor them, as is often the case. Dialogue and negotiation, taking into account the root causes of the conflict, are the better alternatives.

What is undeniably clear is that the problems in Guinea-Bissau have both a national and a regional character. Rebel leader, General Ansoumane Mane, referred to what he sees as some of the internal problems in Guinea-Bissau when he stated on Portuguese television (July 5) that 'a piece of bread should be divided among a people in a fair way. You should not give a small piece to the people so that the president has the rest'. At the same time, however, the ECOWAS ministers made the observation in Accra in August that 'lasting peace could not be achieved in Guinea-Bissau unless initiatives to resolve the crisis were undertaken within the context of efforts to safeguard sub-regional security'. Such a statement indicates moves in the right direction, provided ECOWAS has the courage to discuss the Casamance problem. This is in recognition that there can be no peace in Guinea-Bissau while a liberation war rages in the Casamance—any attempt to end the civil war in Guinea-Bissau without addressing the causes of the rebel war in southern Senegal would only postpone the conflict. This is not an internal matter, but a West African problem; hence a regional approach is appropriate.

FRENCH TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1960 - 1992						
REGION						
West Africa	35,000	9,200	2,640	2,639	1,870	1,600
Central Africa	12,000	6,600	1,130	2,190	2,150	2,400
Madagascar	11,500	5,500	2,650	450	0,000	0,000
Djibouti	1,800	0,000	3,900	4,558	4,150	4,000
Indian Ocean	0,000	0,000	400	2,572	0,000	1,450
Total Strength	60,300	21,300	10,720	12,279	8,665	9,450

Within French speaking states only excluding Madagascar but including Comoro and La Reunion. Source Brune, 1995

table), appear to be utilising the civil war to reassert control over their former colony. By providing telecommunication equipment and support to the rebel forces, they seem to have hoped to play a role in determining the outcome of the conflict.

As part of the terms of the cease-fire, 100 Portuguese-speaking troops from Mozambique, Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde,

Resolving West Africa's conflict

Ongoing conflict in the sub-region demands a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and management. Piece-meal approaches have been proven not to work in the past. An approach is needed that focuses on the region as a 'conflict system' - a regional approach which may, in my

opinion, involve the adjustment of some national borders, the deepening of democratic processes, including devolution of powers, and the development of strong, viable local government structures.

Above all, the reduction of poverty, through the redistribution of national or regional resources is an essential part of the way forward. Free movement of labour and capital and, in certain cases a common citizenship, together with the uni-

fication of the smaller, poorer states in the region may be the collective way forward. Society must become demilitarised, and a politics of inclusiveness must be introduced. The rebuilding of civil society and the involvement of women - both at local and national government level - are some of the key points to ending the negative conflict in West Africa.

Napoleon Abdulai is the Manager of ACCORD's Intervention Programme.

- 1 Among the causes of the April 1980 coup in Liberia was the rise in the price of rice by the William Tolbman government, which led to massive demonstrations.
- 2 For further reading, see *Revolution in Guinea* (1979); *Black Masks* (1977); by Cabral, and *The Conakry Years* (1991) by June Milne, Zed press.
- 3 In 1983, out of the 16 member ECOWAS States all except Senegal, Ivory Coast and Nigeria were under military or military-dominated rule. On 31 December,

General Sani Abacha announced the coup against the civilian regime of Alhaji Shehu Shangari

- 4 *Africa Confidential* Vol. 39, No 2, 23, January 1998, p6.
- 5 Frelimo trained Fred Rugeme in Mozambique; fought in the Tanzanian counter-invasion of Uganda (1979-80); later he rose to be the army commander of Uganda 1986-1990.

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