THE EDITOR'S DESK

BY HUSSEIN SOLOMON

There is an old Yoruba proverb which states, 'Not even God is wise enough...' Over the past few months I have often mulled over this proverb, as ACCORD's Research Unit and Early Warning System produced early warning and situation reports of Africa's potential and actual conflicts: Algeria, Angola, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Niger, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda… The list is seemingly endless. Those of us committed to peace on this strife-torn continent do not have enough information on the origins of a particular conflict and the multiplicity of variables fuelling such conflicts. But our ignorance does not stop here. Often proper interpretation of data, such that is available, is jettisoned in favour of the sound-bite effect. In this, effective analysis is replaced by stereotypical phrases. Consider, in this regard, one such example. Amongst, academics and policy-makers there is a growing tendency to view inter-state conflicts as being replaced by intra-state conflicts. On closer inspection, however, one finds that such a dichotomy is false: historically there has been a strong interaction between the two forms of conflict which continues today. Surveying the current state of Africa, it is evident that several rebel movements – be they Jonas Savimbi's UNITA or Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army – would cease to exist in the absence of external support. Despite the falseness of such sound-bites masquerading as analysis, it has been readily internalised by policy-maker and scholar alike in a desperate effort to simply understand the complexities and ambiguities that is contemporary Africa.

The need to eschew such simplistic notions and embrace more holistic understandings of African conflicts is essential if we are to effectively eradicate, or at least minimise, the conflicts afflicting our beloved continent.

In the absence of effective analysis, we should not wonder at the persistence and 'intractable' nature of conflicts. After all, defective analysis means a defective policy, and ultimately, a defective policy is a failed policy. It is in this vein that the contents of Conflict Trends are offered: to offer information and analysis on African conflicts and provide a forum for discussion and debate. In doing this, we hope to contribute in a small way, towards an African Re-awakening.

In Timothy Shaw's thought-provoking article he examines the strong linkages between poverty, human security and good governance within the context of globalisation. If one accepts these deep inter-relationships, Shaw suggests that the path to sustainable peace on the African continent needs to move beyond such 'band-aids' as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions and embrace more holistic, comprehensive and longer-term approaches.

Howard Adelman's article, which explores the strong similarities of the ethnic-cleansing in Rwanda and Kosovo and the international responses to it, makes for fascinating reading. But his article also warns of the dangers of early warning unaccompanied with an early and effective response.

Similar notes of caution are raised in Claude Kabemba's excellent expose of the conflict and mediation efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Commenting on the numerous failed efforts to resolve the conflict, Kabemba argues that one of the most important lessons is that mediators need to obtain the very best intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of all parties to the conflict.

In an age where the politics of identity has replaced the politics of ideology of the Cold War years, Korwa Adar provides an incisive account of the contentious issues that drive Sudan's own rendition of the Thirty Years War. He also provides possible options to the warring parties to end the turmoil afflicting this country.

In Paul-Henri Bischoff's penetrating analysis of South African foreign policy and the call for an African Renaissance, he notes that the purpose of intra-African diplomacy and regional initiatives by state and non-state actors should be to indigenously define, manage and contain conflict. Bischoff further argues that this entails constructing security regimes, security communities and security systems.

Finally, Kamar Yousuf provides a concise background and overview of the conflict trajectory in Sierra Leone and argues for a comprehensive strategy to attain sustainable peace.

'IN NEITHER CASE DID MOST OBSERVERS PREDICT THE EXTENT OF THE GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING' P13

'ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE DRC CONFLICT HAVE BEEN UNDER-MINED BY THE SELF-INTEREST OF VIRTUALLY ALL COUNTRIES INVOLVED' P23

'THE NEED TO ACHIEVE STABILITY HOLDS THE KEY TO A NEW AFRICAN VISION' P33

'THE COMING CENTURY WILL SEE THE EMERGENCE OF AFRICA. BUT AFRICA CANNOT MOVE FOR-WARD DIVIDED AS IT IS' P37

UPDATE

BY HUSSEIN SOLOMON

The following is a list of important developments that occurred in June 1999, just before Conflict Trends went to press:

Newly elected Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo has called for the repeal of all laws inconsistent with democracy. In addition, President Obasanjo unveiled his government's plans to end corruption, revamp the economy and rehabilitate the country's infrastructure.

Also in West Africa, an Implementation Committee (IC) was formed after the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the government reached agreements on guaranteeing 'safe and unhindered access' to humanitarian agencies. The IC will assess the security of routes to be used by humanitarian agencies and review complaints that may follow the implementation of the agreement.

These positive developments in West Africa are also being mirrored in Southern and Central Africa. Zambia and Angola, for instance have signed an agreement 'to forget all past disputes' and put them behind following growing tensions between the two states over Angolan allegations of Zambian assistance to the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel movement. The agreement was signed in Mbabane, Swaziland and was facilitated by Swazi King Mswati III.

Nigerian President Obasanjo

Meanwhile, both South Africa and Malawi went to the polls on the 2nd and 15th June respectively. In this, both the country's incumbent governments won the elections. In the case of South Africa, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) received 10 601 330 votes representing 66,35 percent of the 15 977 142 votes cast. In Malawi, President Bakili Muluzi won with a narrow majority. He received 2 442 685 votes representing 51,37 percent of the 4 755 442 votes cast. The opposition front-runner, Gwanda Chakuamba, came a close second with some 2 106 790 votes representing 44,30 percent.

Meanwhile, in the strife-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), President Laurent-Desire Kabila's government and the rebel Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) are expected to sign a peace agreement at a Heads of State Summit scheduled for 26 June 1999 in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. Representatives of the three rebel factions: RCD-Goma, RCD-Kisangani, and the Mouvement de Liberacion Congolais (ML-C) have agreed in principle to 'harmonise their differences and present a united front' at the Lusaka peace talks.

Offsetting these positive developments, however, have been situations such as in Nigeria's Delta State, where the State Governor, James Ibori, has imposed a dusk to dawn curfew in the city of Warri, where fierce fighting has raged between heavily armed Ijaw and Itsekeri youth.

Meanwhile, Guinea-Bissau's new armed forces chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Correia, said the government would not tolerate any attempt by outside forces to destabilise the country. He was speaking at a ceremony marking the anniversary of the army mutiny that ousted President Vieira. This was interpreted as a reference to the intervention by Guinea and Senegal in 1998.

In Chad, the conflict is set to intensify following rebel leader Youssouf Togoimi's, of the Mouvement pour la justice au Tchad (MDJT), statement that his forces will be in the capital, N'Jamena by the end of the year.

In Uganda, security forces arrested 77 people in connection with 'acts of terrorism' committed in eastern and western Uganda. Uganda's Director of Military Intelligence Henry Tumukunde told reporters in Kampala that the acts were being co-ordinated by Muslim fundamentalist groups operating with the help of the Sudanese Embassy in Nairobi. However, the Embassy of Sudan in Nairobi denied having any involvement in the attacks.

Fighting between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces intensified on the Mereb-Setet front near the contested border region of Badme.

Government troops in the Republic of the Congo have captured the railway station at Kibossi, about 50 kilometres west of Brazzaville, in their continuing efforts to clear rebels from the railway line linking the capital with the port city of Pointe-Noire.

The Angolan conflict rages on with UNITA continuing with their sporadic shelling of the government-held city of Malanje, 450 kilometres east of the capital, Luanda. UNITA forces also fired three grenades at the Luqixi Dam that supplies electricity to the city of Uige.

CONFLICT **WATCH**

BY SENZO NGUBANE

Conflict at a glance - an overview of developments in conflict spots on the continent over the last quarter.
This is Conflict Watch. Winds of change are sweeping across the continent. And yet we must be
aware of opportunities to work for transformation, to focus our resources. These are the facts...
The continent of Africa has been divided into five regions based on the OAU administrative regional division.

AFRICA (GENERAL)

7 April 1999   The Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), a rebel group from Chad, has blamed Niger for a mass grave discovered in the east of Niger. The movement declared that the discovered bodies were those of its activists killed last year during a joint Nigeria-Niger-Chad military operation.

20 April 1999   The Coalition to stop the use of Child Soldiers released a report which revealed that about 120 000 children, including girls under 18 years, are used as soldiers in most conflict areas around Africa.

22 April 1999   The Representative of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Albert-Alian Peters, told reporters in Johannesburg that Africa has 8 million refugees. 2 million of the refugees emanate from wars in the Horn of Africa, including Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.

3 May 1999   The meeting of the signatories of the Ottawa Landmine Ban Treaty opened in Maputo, Mozambique. Jody Williams, the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate reported at the

International organisations are mobilising the world to outlaw the use of children as combatants


Angolan refugee at Caxito Camp

meeting that Angola, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, being, signatories of the treaty, have since failed to honour its stipulations.

10 May 1999   The spokesman for the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Lieutenant Colonel Chris Olukulade, stated that the group's forces managed to curb a rebel attack on the town of Port Loko about 58 kilometers northeast of Freetown.

22 May 1999   The Chairman of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Mr Boney Katatumba, stated that the regional group's member states have resolved to pressurise South Africa to accept goods from countries belonging to this group. He noted that the country's restrictive trade barriers have prevented them from having effective trade links with South Africa.

NORTH AFRICA

MAURITANIA   MOROCCO   ALGERIA   TUNISIA   LIBYA   EGYPT

ALGERIA

1 March 1999 An extensive man hunt and search operation began after 9 people, including 5 children, were killed and two others wounded by 'terrorists' in Berboucher, Ain Delfa.

4 March 1999 Following a tip-off from citizens, the government security forces ambushed and killed Mehieddine Boudjnah, a perceived 'dangerous terrorist.' This is said to be a major step in the fight against terrorism in the Tizi Ouzou area.

6 March 1999 An attack in Ouled Boudouma in Taougrit Municipality of Chlef Proiri left six people dead, including two children and three others wounded.

7 March 1999 A group of Moslem rebels ambushed a military convoy near Bordj Khemis village in the Bouna region. 16 Algerian soldiers died and 21 more were wounded during the attack and one rebel was killed.

9 March 1999 A bomb explosion in a key Islamist stronghold southwest of Algiers killed three people and left 31 wounded.

11 March 1999 An anti-personnel mine exploded in the south of Tlemcen, 400 kilometers west of Algiers, killing six government military personnel.

13 March 1999 The government announced that a group of Muslim rebels killed 17 civilians, including five children in Melas Hamlet, Tipaza Province, 60 kilometers west of the capital.

3 April 1999 Twelve 'terrorists' were killed during an operation by the government's security forces in the southern border of Tipaza province.

4 April 1999 Rebels ambushed a military convoy and killed 22 soldiers in Melaha hamlet near the town of Blida.

14 April 1999 Six presidential candidates withdrew from the elections following the governments failure to meet their demand to annul the votes that have already taken place in the barracks and overseas. This call for an annulment was made after leaders accused the government of supporting former foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who now remains the only candidate for the presidency.

16 April 1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the sole presidential candidate, was announced a winner of the election with 73,79 percent. A few hours after this announcement, a number of Algerians marched on the capital Algiers in protest against what they called election rigging.

26 April 1999 The government deployed riot police in the capital Algiers in order to enforce a ban on all planned protests ahead of the inauguration ceremony of the country's new president, Bouteflika.

2 May 1999 Government security forces issued a statement that Muslim rebels killed nine civilians in Kasni hamlet in Tiaret province, 220 kilometers southeast of Algiers. This is the first reported killing by a rebel group since the country's elections last month.

3 May 1999 Muslim rebels ambushed a government military convoy and killed seven soldiers and left one wounded.

8 May 1999 Algerian soldiers reportedly killed 20 Muslim rebels in the Tizi-Ouzou area, 90 kilometers east of capital Algiers. Employing ground troops and helicopters, the government surrounded a group of rebels in what appeared to be the largest military operation since last month's election.

EGYPT

8 March 1999 Fourteen Muslim militants were sentenced to a maximum of 15 years by a state security court. The group was charged with arson attacks on video shops.

31 March 1999 The Muslim militant group, Jihad, vowed that it would continue its fight against enemies of Islam, including the United States.

5 April 1999 Cairo denied reports that it was taking sides in the on-going Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute by selling arms to Eritrea.

LIBYA

5 April 1999 Two Libyans, Al Amine Khalifa Fhima and Abbel Al Magrahi, suspected of masterminding the bombing of a Pan Am jetliner in Lockerbie, Scotland, left Tripoli to face trial in Holland.

MOROCCO

15 March 1999 Mohamed Abdelaziz, President of the self-proclaimed Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) warned the Moroccan government that if the proposed referendum does not take place, a war would erupt in the area.

WEST AFRICA

BENIN

10 May 1999   The government announced its intentions to withdraw its troops from Guinea Bissau. The soldiers, who are currently part of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Guinea Bissau, were withdrawn following a coup which overthrew President Bernado Vieira.

BURKINA FASO

10 May 1999   Riot police had to use teargas in the capital Ouagadougou in order to disperse a group of protesting students. The students were demanding an arrest of six presidential guards for alleged involvement in the death of Norbert Zongo, a leading journalist.

GHANA

1 March 1999   The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) continued to slide as market indicators lost another 5,3 points bringing the index at the beginning of the week to 856,73.

GUINEA-BISSAU

9 March 1999   A peaceful demonstration ended in clashes between protesters and the Senegalese troops. The demonstrators were demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from their soil.

6 May 1999   Thousands of civilians were forced to flee from the capital city following renewed fighting between rebel forces and pro-President Vieira troops.

7 May 1999   President Bernardo Nino Vieira of Guinea-Bissau was overthrown after fierce fighting broke out between the forces loyal to him and rebels. The coup, which led to about 100 deaths, came after a peace accord signed in November last year failed to bear fruitful results. The ousted president has since sought refuge in the Portuguese embassy in Bissau.

8 May 1999   The new Military Junta's spokesperson, Zamoro Inuto, announced its intention to hold talks with the members of parliament in order to find a suitable replacement as the country's head of state following the departure of Vieira.

13 May 1999   Portugal refused to heed the call by the new military junta to hand over the ousted president to the new rulers. The military wants the former president to stand trial on the crimes they say he committed during his 19 years in power.

LIBERIA

25 March 1999   Following accusations by Nigeria and Sierra Leone, President Taylor denied providing support to rebel forces in Sierra Leone.

8 April 1999   Thirteen people convicted of treason were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment by the Liberian criminal court.

17 May 1999   President Charles Taylor accused ECOMOG of involvement in training rebels in Sierra Leone to overthrow his government.

NIGER

7 April 1999 Parliament voted in favour of a plan to retire 2 000 state employees over the course of next year.

9 April 1999   Following reports of a military coup in Niger, Prime Minister Ibrahim Assane Maiyake, announced that the President, General Ibrahim Mainassara, had died of an 'unfortunate accident.'

12 April 1999   The National Reconciliation Council (NRC), headed by Major Daouda Mallam Wanke (commander of the presidential guard), was set up to lead the country. The new military junta outlined a nine month transitional programme.

NIGERIA

28 March 1999   Approximately 100 people had lost their lives and dozens of settlements

Nigerian soldiers stand guard over gutted houses in the riot-torn town of Warri

destroyed in the on-going ethnic strife between farmers and cattle herders. Such clashes are said to occur during the dry season when the cattle herding Fulani group move further north into farming areas.

2 April 1999 Eight Yoruba militants were killed and 15 people were hospitalised after clashes erupted between the group and the police in the town of Okitipupa.

7 April 1999 Sixty-one Ijaw communities reportedly occupied oil production areas after Mobil Oil failed to meet demands contained in the ultimatum sent to the corporation.

21 April 1999 Nigeria accused Cameroon of engaging in a military build-up in Bakassi, an oil-rich peninsula claimed by both countries.

7 May 1999 Violent clashes between Ijaw and Itsekeri communities in Warri, southern part of Nigeria, left 10 people dead. The fighting began when a group of Itsekeri people abducted some Ijaw youths.

SENEGAL

2 March 1999 Clashes broke out between riot police and students marching to the city to register as jobless following the government's programme to register all people without jobs.

23 April 1999 The Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS), the leading opposition party, announced its intentions to boycott the National Assembly in a bid to push for measures against fraud in the country's presidential election next year.

SIERRA LEONE

10 March 1999 The rebel forces Field Commander, Sam Bockarie, rejected calls for a cease-fire. He vowed that the war would continue until rebels were assured that their leader Foday Sankoh was in good health.

21 April 1999 It was reported that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) killed about 100 civilians in Songo, 40 kilometers from the capital city, Freetown. This act came at a time when preparations for talks between ranking members of the RUF and their founding leader, Foday Sankoh, were underway in Lome, Togo.

28 April 1999 The government revealed that it has recently acquired two new Ukrainian-built MI-24 gunships to be used to ensure the security of the country.

13 May 1999 RUF demanded that a four-year transitional government be established. It called for greater participation of civil society and the people of Sierra Leone in that process.

TOGO

15 May 1999 Amnesty International released a press statement in which it charged the government of arresting two members of its branch in Togo. Mr Nadjombe Kofi and his wife were arrested after a report issued by Amnesty Iternational detailing human rights abuses in Togo during and after the 1998 presidential elections.

CENTRAL AFRICA

ANGOLA

1 March 1999 The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces killed 18 people and injured several others in an attack at the city of Malanje where the rebels control 12 out of 14 municipalities.

1 March 1999 The Angolan Ambassador blamed Zambia for failing to take prompt action after a bomb explosion near the Angolan Embassy, which killed one security guard.

2 March 1999 Lusa News Agency reports that Angolan government troops have regained control over the town of Cangola, north of the country. The government has also vowed to continue its campaign in the districts of Sanza-Pombo, Buengas, Quimbele and Milunga controlled by UNITA.

**2 March 1999** UNITA claims to have re-captured Catchiungo,

Tchicala, Tcholoango and Chinguar.

9 March 1999 The UN High Commission for Refugees states that more than 4 000 Angolans had crossed the border into Zambia.

10 March 1999 The Angolan Minister of Defence, Kundy Payama, stated that UNITA may be migrating southwards since the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) attacked the towns of Andulo and Bailundo which are the headquarters and military base of UNITA.

18 March 1999 The Angolan government submitted a document to the UN Committee on Sanctions against UNITA detailing 'proof' that the Zambian government is supporting UNITA.

6 April 1999 It was reported that UNITA had taken the town of Ambuila, which is 96 kilometres from the capital of

CHAD

CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

EQUATORIAL
GUINEA

SAO TOME AND
PRINCIPE

GABON

REPUBLIC OF
CONGO

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
CONGO

ANGOLA

An Angolan refugee child cries as she receives a polio inoculation at the Caxito refugee camp near Luanda

of the airport in Malanje, the second largest city in Angola. The move to re-open the airport came after four months of closure because of an apparent military threat from UNITA.

13 May 1999   UNITA shot down a civilian plane when it was taking off from Luzamba airport. Six people were reported dead.

23 May 1999   The Angola's cash-strapped National Bank prohibited all mining companies from depositing revenues generated from diamond sales in foreign banks. The government also implemented measures that enabled foreign transactions in foreign currencies to be conducted through the banking system.

CHAD

12 March 1999   Defence Minister, Oumar Kadjallami reported that a clash between the army and rebels at Woum in the Borkou Ennedi Tibesti district, led to the death of 28 rebels and wounding of four soldiers.

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

1 March 1999   The Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church objected to human rights violations in Congo caused by on-going clashes between the government and opposition forces. They noted that peace could only prevail through reconciliation between the supporters of President Denis Sassou Nguesso and former President Pascal Lissouba. They called on the military to refrain from 'terrorising' civilians.

16 March 1999 It was reported that schooling had come to a standstill in most schools in Congo due to the on-going clashes between the government forces and the rebels.

4 May 1999   The National Transitional Council charged the former President Pascal Lissouba on two counts of high treason. The first charge involves the shooting of opposition militants in 1993 in which three people died. The second charge relates to a cut-price sale of Congolese oil which the former president and other members of his regime made with Occidental Petroleum Corporation in return for US$150 million.

9 May1999   The Ninjas, a pro-Lissouba rebel group,

Uige province.

14 April 1999   A polio epidemic, said to be the second largest in Africa since the Congo in 1995, broke out in Angola.

23 April 1999   UNITA rebels ambushed two motor cars in Cuanza Norte Province east of the capital, Luanda, killing 12 people and wounding 16. In a separate incident in the Canjala region, 250 kilometers south of the capital, UNITA staged another ambush that left 25 people dead.

4 May 1999   The World Bank threatened to stop all funding to Angola unless the country began to implement economic reforms. Angola's debt is currently estimated to be around US$11 billion.

10 May 1999   The Minister of Social Re-integration Albino Malungo, warned that the humanitarian situation in the country could be worsening. Addressing the National Assembly, he revealed that there are about 220 000 war-displaced people in Luanda coming from all corners of Angola.

13 May 1999   Angolan state radio announced the re-opening

Congolese rebel soldiers

reportedly attacked in Brazzaville, forcing a number of people to flee their homes whilst several others were either seriously injured or dead.

9 May 1999 Government forces freed 13 000 civilians who were taken hostage by the Ninja rebel group in the Congo's Pool region. The government also accused the Ninjas of using civilians as human shields in their on-going clashes.

12 May 1999 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that some '750 new refugees' fleeing from conflict in Congo, entered the DRC border daily.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

2 March 1999 The Congolese Armed Forces (CAF) attacked the town of Kindu, which is controlled by rebel forces.

3 March 1999 CAF declared that they were prepared to re-capture the town of Lisala in Northern Equator Province.

10 March 1999 A British diplomat and five other British and US officials were accused of espionage and expelled by the government.

10 March 1999 Fierce fighting broke out between the government and rebel forces at Pweto in Shaba Province.

10 March 1999 Professor Jean Pierre Magungu, Deputy Minister of Human Rights, launched a complaint on behalf of the DRC, to the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR). The complaint was filed against Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda for violating these rights in the DRC. This was the first time since the Commission's formation that an African country took such action.

23 March 1999 The DRC reported that it would not take part in the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) military exercise dubbed Operation 'Blue Crane' due to take place from 10-30 April 1999

18 March 1999 The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) announced in a statement that they had shot down a Zimbabwean MIG jet fighter.

29 March 1999 Three delegates who had attended a Peace Conference in Durban, South Africa, have been summoned before a court martial in DRC. These are Mr Modeste Mutinga, Andre Ipakala and Dr Kabamba Mbwebwe.

8 April 1999 DRC President Laurent Kabila, arrived in Angola for a summit with the leaders of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. During the Summit the leaders of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia re-affirmed their commitment to support Kabila against the rebels.

19 April 1999 Presidents Laurent Kabila of the DRC and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda concluded a cease-fire agreement in Syrte, Libya. The terms of the agreement called for negotiations to end the conflict in the DRC, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the region.

20 April 1999 President Laurent Kabila dissolved the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), after he accused its members of corruption. ADFL had helped him assume power in the DRC.

24 April 1999 A peace deal signed by Presidents Kabila and Museveni was reportedly in a state of disarray following its rejection by most parties involved in the conflict.

26 April 1999 The government announced the change of venue for a national debate between the warring parties. Instead of Rome, Italy, the gathering was to take place in Nairobi, Kenya, from 8-15 May.

1 May 1999 The Presidents of the DRC and Zambia, issued a joint communiqué pledging their support to all efforts aimed at preventing the escalation of the conflict in the DRC into its neighbouring states.

8 May 1999 It was announced that a national debate called by President Kabila, due to take place in Kenya, was postponed until June in order to allow 'further consultations' between all the parties involved in the conflict.

11 May 1999 President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia and mediator in the DRC conflict, announced a moratorium on the agreement signed by the DRC and Uganda in Libya in order to enable the Lusaka peace attempts to go ahead.

11 May 1999 The allied forces launched an air attack on two rebel held towns of Goma and Uvira leaving 30 people dead and 15 seriously injured.

12 May 1999 Rebel officials announced that 29 people were killed and 16 wounded when the government bombed two residential areas in Goma, a rebel held town, on Congo's eastern border with Rwanda.

13 May 1999 Frederick Chiluba revealed that consensus was gaining ground among the various parties involved in the DRC conflict. Chiluba, who was returning from Lubumbashi where he held talks with President Kabila, announced that a regional meeting was planned to take place before the end of May 1999.

13 May 1999 Jean Pierre Ondekane, Commander of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), declared that they had captured the town of Manono, about 1 600 kilometers east of Kinshasa. In the process, 86 government troops were killed and 108 others captured.

GABON

18 March 1999 The L'Union newspaper reported that the Franceville Uranium Company would close down at the end of May, after its last uranium mine at Mikoulounou in Mounana Town dried out. The Company had previously employed about 1 400 workers. Currently only 137 are still employed.

EAST AFRICA

BURUNDI

11 March 1999   Fighting erupted between the army and rebels in Nyamaboko, Southeast of the capital Bujumbura, leaving a soldier and eight civilians dead.

12 March 1999 Pierre Buyoya, Burundi's President, ruled out any possible demobilisation of the army or opening it up to Hutus rebels who are at war with the government.

4 April 1999   Hutu rebels based in Tanzania conducted a cross-border raid in southern Burundi, killing 16 people and destroying several houses.

8 April 1999   The Burundi peace facilitator, Julius Nyerere, declared that the refugees in Tanzania have to be included in the peace process in order to ensure its success.

5 May 1999   Colonel Mamert Sinarinzi, Burundian army spokesman, said that three rebels were killed in clashes with the state security forces in Livingstone village, about 15 kilometers south of the capital Bujumbura.

14 May 1999   The Supreme Court sentenced to death five soldiers accused of assassinating the country's first Hutu president. President Melchior Ndadaye, the first head of state to be democratically elected, was murdered in October 1993.

COMOROS

9 March 1999   The police used teargas and rubber bullets in order to disperse a crowd of protesters in Moroni. The demonstrators were protesting the influx of refugees from the island of Anjouan who were fleeing from fighting on their island.

11 March 1999 President Tadjiddine Ben Said Massonde, made a radio announcement implicating leaders of the opposition for hiring the services of foreign mercenaries to assassinate him. He also stated that when the alleged plot was discovered, the mercenaries left the country.

1 May 1999   The new military leader, Col. Assoumani Azzali, who ousted the Massonde government, issued a decree suspending the Constitution and subsequently dissolved the government.

11 May 1999   The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) reported that it would consider withdrawing the military wing of its Observer Mission in Comoros because conditions impair the proper functioning of the operation.

ERITREA

1 March 1999   The Eritrean Radio news reported that Ethiopian air strikes destroyed 150 houses. A 65 year old man was killed and a 12 year old girl seriously injured.

8 March 1999   The Eritrean government expressed its concern over Ethiopia's refusal to stop its aggression and accept the peace-plan. The Foreign Ministry stated that Ethiopia continued to attack Eritrea on the Mereb-Setit. This was regarded as a violation of the Framework's Agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the two countries.

16 March 1999 The government announced that it had prevented a large-scale offensive from Ethiopia's continued attacks on the Tsorona flank of the Alitena-Mereb.

17 March 1999 Eight civilians were injured during Ethiopia's bombing of Kenafana town which lies north-west of Tsorana.

22 March 1999 Eritrea appealed to the 69th OAU session of the Council of Ministers convening in Addis Ababa that a neutral venue be found for discussions on the border conflict with Ethiopia.

ETHIOPIA

2 March 1999   The government stated that chances of a cease-fire with Eritrea in the near

SUDAN

ERITREA

DJIBOUTI

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

UGANDA

KENYA

COMOROS

MADAGASCAR

TANZANIA

RWANDA

BURUNDI

Eritrean villagers dig five graves after an Ethiopian air attack killed family members

future were minimal.

5 March 1999 President Negaso Gidada of Ethiopia stated that the war with Eritrea was aimed at regaining the country's lost territories and guaranteeing the country's sovereignty.

15 March 1999 Government spokesperson, Ms Selome Tadesse, confirmed that renewed fighting with Eritrean forces was taking place along the Zalambesa-Egela front. The spokesperson repeated Addis Ababa's call that Eritrea should withdraw its troops from occupied territories before any negotiations resume.

28 March 1999 Ethiopia claimed that it had inflicted heavy loses on Eritrea since renewed fighting broke out between the two countries. The government announced that almost 23 000 solders from Eritrea had died and 51 tanks destroyed in two clashes between 13-16 and 17-26 of March.

29 March 1999 An Ethiopian Army Officer declared that Eritrea had planted about 110 000 landmines in Badme and some parts of Sherora, both of which are now under Ethiopian rule.

31 March 1999 The leader of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONFL), Muhammad Umar Uthman, said in a statement that his group had killed 78 Ethiopian troops and wounded 59 during their February operations. He further stated that the group had no alternative but to continue fighting because the government had failed to meet the DNFLO regarding their demands for self-determination.

8 April 1999 The ONFL stated that it had recently carried out 20 military operations against the government.

14 April 1999 Addis Ababa reiterated that it would approve a cease-fire proposal once the Eritrean government agreed to begin withdrawing its troops from Ethiopian territory.

15 May 1999 The government issued a press statement confirming that it had carried out air raids on the Zalambessa front. This caused heavy damage to Eritrea's Sawa military training centre.

KENYA

6 March 1999   Clashes occurred between the police and protesters in various areas in the country. At Nyeri and Karatina, people protested over the state of the roads, at Kisimu workers protested against the demolition of a kiosk.

7 March 1999 Kenyan Television reported that tribal fighting broke out between Turkana and Pokot tribes (north-western Kenya) in which 27 Turkana and 14 Pokot died.

15 May 1999 Ten people were admitted to Moyale hospital, in the northern part of the country after their motor-vehicle drove over a landmine hidden on the Debel-Moyale road.

27 May 1999 More than 106 people died and about 2 000 others were hospitalised after an outbreak of malaria in Kisii Bondo districts in the western part of Kenya.

29 May 1999 Ten people alleged to be members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) based in Ethiopia, were sentenced to 10 year imprisonment in Kenya for possession of dangerous weapons which included eight AK-47 assault rifles, one carbine, one machine gun, two rocket propelled grenades and two bazookas.

RWANDA

11 March 1999   The military court in Nyamirambo, Kigali, sentenced a former member of the Rwandan army, Pierre Bizimanawho and Dr Martin Kageruka to death for the murder of Queen Rosalia Gicanda and her family in 1994.

7 April 1999 President Pasteur Bizimugu challenged the Roman Catholic Church to explain the activities of Bishop Gikongoro Augustin Misago, accused of being involved in the killing of thousands of people in a church during the 1994 genocide.

19 May 1999 Kayumba Nyamwasa, Army Chief of Staff, stated that his country's soldiers would remain in the DRC as long as it was necessary to destroy the Interahamwe rebels bases in that country.

SOMALIA

16 April 1999   Fighting erupted between the fundamentalist Islamic Al-Ittihad organisation and a group of the Ogadeni clan. A number of the armed Al-Ittihad group members were forced to flee into Kenya.

9 May 1999 Fierce fighting broke out between militiamen loyal to Hussein Aideed and a faction led by the governor of Merka, Mahdi Mohamed Jumale. The fighting was over a weapons cache supposed to be shared by the two groups, which Hussein's loyalists threatened to repossess.

SUDAN

9 March 1999   The government deployed about 1 000 recruits to join its forces in battle with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

2 April 1999 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Sudan stated that rebels had executed three government officials and one relief worker abducted in southern Sudan in February.

10 April 1999 The government decided to suspend all peace talks with SPLA after it was reported that the rebel group murdered four Sudanese officials.

5 May 1999   United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) issued a press statement stating that the government of Sudan was responsible for the bombing of a compound belonging to Operation Save Innocent Lives, an NGO stationed in southern Sudan.

UGANDA

1 March 1999   The government announced that Rwandan rebels had abducted 14 foreign tourists and an unknown number of Ugandans from the Bwindi forest in the south-western part of the country.

3 March 1999   President Museveni announced his government's intentions to hunt down the rebels responsible for the killing of tourists. Addressing a press conference from the State House, he criticised the Hutu Interahamwe rebel group, and vowed that the Ugandan army would follow the trails of the rebels into the DRC until they are caught.

9 March 1999   The Ugandan army captured and killed 10 Rwandan Hutu rebels allegedly responsible for the murder of eight foreign tourists and a Ugandan in Bwindi National Park, on the 1st March this year.

30 March 1999   The Ugandan army captured and detained 104 rebels from the Sudanese People's Army caught in possession of arms near the Uganda-Sudan border. The government stated that the arrested rebels would be deported to and face trial in Sudan as they could not be charged under Ugandan law.

6 April 1999   Eleven people were killed and three others injured when the rebel group, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), ambushed a car carrying civilians in the western part of the country.

11 April 1999   The police reported that they were searching for clues of a bomb explosion in Kampala which left four people dead and 13 seriously injured.

13 May 1999   The New Vision newspaper reported that the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) had killed 34 rebels of the ADF and captured five others in the Ruwenzori region during a week of intense fighting.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

LESOTHO

12 May 1999   The Interim Political Authority (IPA), the transitional governing body in Lesotho, declared 8th April 2000, as the date for the country's general election.

MALAWI

6 April 1999 A legal battle took place between the Electoral Commission and the opposition parties ahead of the country's general election. The action followed the refusal of the Commission to allow two opposition party leaders of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and Alliance for Democracy (AforD) to stand as running mates.

16 April 1999   The High Court ruled in favour of the opposition parties, by allowing the two opposition candidates, Gwanda Chakuamba and Chakufwa Chihana to stand as running mates.

11 May 1999   Four opposition candidates launched an appeal to the High Court for the postponement of the country's upcoming election on the 25th May 1999. The candidates protested against alleged voter registration bias towards President Bakili Muluzi's ruling United Democratic Front.

17 May 1999   The High Court ruled that President Muluzi should convene a parliamentary session to amend the electoral law postponing the elections to 8 June. This would be the third postponement of the election, which was originally scheduled for 17th May 1999.

MOÇAMBIQUE

23 March 1999   Clashes broke out between Front for the Liberation of Moçambique (FRELIMO) and National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) members in the central region of Mungari.

18 April 1999   Opposition mounted to the government's new conscription laws which could mean that every Mozambican between the age of 18 and 35 would be subjected to a two year compulsory military conscription.

ZAMBIA

MAURITIUS

NAMIBIA

MALAWI

BOTSWANA   SOUTH AFRICA   LESOTHO   SWAZILAND   ZIMBABWE   MOÇAMBIQUE

NAMIBIA

2 March 1999   The South African government released statistics showing that Namibia had imported military equipment worth N$5,2 million from the country in the past three years. The amount of equipment increased significantly last year.

6 May 1999   Two Caprivi Strip secessionist leaders, Mishake Muyongo and Chief Boniface Mamili, were granted political asylum in Denmark. The other 13 leaders who fled to Botswana were awaiting confirmation of which western countries are to accept them.

SOUTH AFRICA

1 March 1999   According to opinion surveys released by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), potential voters were more likely to vote for political parties believed to be able to deal with escalating crime rates. Police figures show that the country was affected by a murder rate of 59 people per 100 000 of population and 116 rapes per 100 000 in 1998

4 March 1999   The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) refused amnesty to the 27 African National Congress (ANC) members who had applied.

26 March 1999   Fresh outbreaks of taxi violence left one person dead in Giyani, Northern Province. The police were investigating the possibility that a gang could be responsible for this and other killings.

26 March 1999   A farmer, Shea O'Connor, was murdered in KwaZulu-Natal. Five teenagers were subsequently arrested after being found in possession of the farmer's gun.

1 April 1999   The TRC granted amnesty to seven former members of the ANC-aligned Thokoza self-defence unit (SDU). The SDU was engaged in violent clashes with the Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) supporters in the run up to the country's 1994 elections in East Rand, near Johannesburg.

SWAZILAND

27 May 1999   Immigration authorities from Swaziland and Moçambique were to meet to discuss Swaziland's alleged violation of the bilateral agreement on the repatriation of illegal immigrants. According to Moçambique news reports, Swaziland violated the agreement when it deported 300 Moçambicans without informing Mozambican officials.

ZAMBIA

2 March 1999   Following a series of bomb blasts in the capital Lusaka, the Minister of Defence, Chitalu Sampa, told parliament that the Zambian army was to be expanded in order to defend the country against terrorist related acts.

18 March 1999   The government charged six journalists with espionage following a newspaper article doubting Zambia's military capability against neighbouring Angola. The charge, under the laws of the country, is punishable by a minimum of 20 years imprisonment.

2 April 1999   The Post newspaper reported that former president Kenneth Kaunda survived an assassination attempt at his home when his vehicle was shot at by five assassins.

19 April 1999   The resettlement of about 15 000 refugees from Kaputa to Mporokoso began with the arrival of approximately 300 men, women and children. This came as a relief measure for Kaputa, where an influx of refugees from the DRC was reported in the past few months.

13 May 1999   It was reported that the town of Kaputa, in northern Zambia, suffered an outbreak of the cholera epidemic. Movement in and out of the town was restricted in order to curb the possible spread of the disease.

ZIMBABWE

8 March 1999   Police shot and injured two students participating in the nation-wide demonstration organised by the Zimbabwe National Students Union (Zinasu). Among other grievances, the students called for the government's withdrawal from the DRC as this was impacting negatively on the country's economy.

12 March 1999   The three Americans held by the Zimbabwean authorities in connection with possession of arms, were charged with terrorism and espionage against the Zimbabwean State.

18 March 1999   Civic organisations withdrew from negotiations on the re-drafting of the Zimbabwean Constitution. The Chairman of the Constitutional Assembly, Morgan Tsvangarai, justified this action, saying that the government intended to exercise control over the process without considering the proposals from other (political) organisations.

8 April 1999   A local independent newspaper reported that the government was planning to buy arms to boost its military campaign in the DRC.

3 May 1999 The Minister of Justice told reporters that the government would continue with the constitutional reforms without the opposition parties. Opposition parties had opted to boycott the proceedings after the government failed to meet their call for an independent reform process.

13 May 1999   President Robert Mugabe disputed a report by a local newspaper that he was about to retire from politics. The

A Zimbabwean student throws a teargas grenade back at riot police during clashes on campus

President was quoted as saying that no one would dictate the way he should depart from politics.

14 May 1999   The government was reportedly preparing legislation to restrict industrial action following the expiry of the decree banning all strikes imposed by the President last November.

Early Warning and Ethnic Conflict Management:

RWANDA AND KOSOVO

BY PROFESSOR HOWARD ADELMAN

Politicians and armies are said to always be fighting the last war rather than the one at hand. More recently, the same has been said of humanitarian organisations. Contrary to those who say we do not learn from the past, we do. As Bill Richardson said, 'We must avoid the mistakes of the past.' But perhaps we learn only to handle the latest crisis as if it were the last one. Thus, the West handled the Rwanda crisis as if it was going to another Somalia. They did not want to get involved. Many have said that the West is handling the Kosovo crisis as if it was another Rwanda. Only this time the same states that twiddled their thumbs while at least a half million Tutsi were slaughtered in a genocide, are now dropping bombs on Serbia so that no one could say they did nothing this time. Yet, in 1989, Milosevic stripped the region of the political autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed under the 1974 constitution.

There are many similarities. Both countries were run by elected dictators. Both countries had a legacy of nationalist authoritarianism. The concept of a loyal opposition would have been odd to both systems. Both countries lacked a strong middle class. Both countries had well-developed oppositions that had put considerable pressure on the regimes for reform. The dominant extremist Hutu tried to eliminate the Tutsi from Rwanda. The dominant Serbs are trying to eliminate the Kosovars from Yugoslavia. In both cases, there was plenty of early warning of the intentions and activities of the dominant group actively abusing the human rights of the minority. As the Transnational Foundation stated in its 17 August 1998 report, 'no outbreak of violence on earth was more predictable than the one in Kosovo.' 'There were more early warnings about this conflict than about any other.' On 22 September 1998, Kevin Bacon, a Pentagon Spokesperson, said that the most immediate threat was a large humanitarian disaster.

Further, a civil war had developed under the cover of which the abuses escalated. A large internally displaced population and a large refugee population were produced in both conflicts. There were anticipations of massive violence aimed against the minority, but in neither case did most observers predict the extent of the genocide and the ethnic cleansing that did in fact occur.

In fact, Dr. Oberg, of the Transnational Foundation and a staunch critic of the Albanian separatists, asked rhetorically, 'Can about 1.5 million people be cleansed? Is that Serbia's goal, and if so, would Serbia be allowed to by international community?' The answer is evidently yes, if the international community followed Dr. Oberg's advice. One year before the mass movement, on 6 May 1998, a report of the International Crisis Group, 'Again The Invisible Hand,' stated, 'there exists the danger of huge population shifts. Thousands of Albanians might leave Serbia proper for Kosovo, Albania or other destinations. Many members of the Serb minority in Kosovo might flee their homes or Serbia and points west.'

In both cases, there were clear and unequivocal warnings that peacekeeping forces would be targeted for reprisals. In Rwanda, it cost 10 Belgian Blue Berets their lives. In Macedonia, three US peacekeepers were kidnapped. In both cases, a flurry of international diplomatic activity preceded the final outbreak of all out violence and the involvement of external military forces.

There are other eerie coincidental similarities. In January of 1993, an international human rights investigation team reported on what appeared to be a genocide in Rwanda, though the phrase was subsequently withdrawn in the published report. Five years later, in January of 1998, the US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights in Serbia, accused the Serbian police of

An old Hutu prisoner suffering from Tuberculosis awaits trial

Ten thousand refugees return daily to Rwanda from neighbouring countries

Some 6 500 Hutu prisoners in an overcrowded prison

committing the most widespread and worst abuses of human rights against as many as the 90 percent or the Kosovar population that consisted of Albanian Muslims. (The 1981 census claimed that 77 percent of the 1 548 000 total population was Albanian. The census of 1991, boycotted by the Albanians, claimed 82 percent of a population of 1 965 000 were Albanians. If the Albanians who left since 1975 are counted, perhaps the figure is actually 90 percent. But then the rest of the population is not only Serb; in the 1981 census, 9 percent of the population was said to consist of Montenegrins, Turks, Croats and Romani). Further, that population is reproducing at three times the rate of the rest of Yugoslavia, and Kosovo, like Rwanda, is one of the most densely populated regions in the world. On 9 March 1998, Serb police buried 46 Albanians including 14 women and 12 children killed during the Drenica (the highland area in northern Kosovo) crackdown following a February ambush by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that killed four Serbian police officers.

In both countries, a peace agreement was tantalisingly near – the Arusha Accords in the Rwandan crisis and the Rambouillet Agreement for Kosovar. There were, of course dissenters from both agreements. The delegation from the government side of Rwanda was divided. It faced a united and disciplined negotiating team representing the Rwandan Patriotic Front. But the Rambouillet process did not produce an agreement. The Albanians wanted to think some more and Thaci refused to put his signature to the agreement without further consultations or a guarantee of a referendum in three years. Milosevic seemed to have been saved by Albanian indecisiveness. The Americans were frustrated at their inability to fulfil their threat to bomb Belgrade into peace. At the beginning of March, 4 500 Yugoslav troops and 60 tanks were assembled on the Kosovo border to launch an offensive. More telling, Milosevic increased his internal security forces to 28 000. Could anyone be surprised about what was about to occur given the evidence of the past? This was particularly true since the NATO resolve to launch air strikes was widely reported as faltering. As the International Crisis Group reported (Report No.5) 'with the campaign against both airstrikes and NATO ground troops growing stronger in some Western capitals, the likelihood that NATO forces will

KLA guerrillas carrying the coffin of their comrade

A Serbian woman protests during a visit by a UN official

Convoy of returning Kosovo Serbs

Jubilant NATO General Wesley Clark in Pristina

strike if Belgrade refuses once more, is looking less likely by the day.' The effort to bring Milosevic on side once again with Senator Dole's last minute mission was viewed as one more bow before the all-powerful Milosevic.

In the former Yugoslavia, when the talks began in the castle near Paris on Saturday 6 February 1999, the Kosovars were divided in dealing with the Serbian central government. But the Yugoslav army was similarly divided. General Momcilo Perisic who had bombarded to Bosnian city of Mostar in 1992, in January 1998, moved into the peace camp. However, on 24th November 1998, Milosevic dismissed him, putting in a complete loyalist, Gen. Lt. Gragoljub Ojdanic as his replacement.   The dismissal gave rise to widespread speculation about the shakiness of the regime. James Rubin, the US State Department Spokesman, offered such a suggestion in his press conference on 2 December 1998. Djukanovic and Zoran Djinjre, leader of the Democratic Party in Serbia, both viewed the firing as an effort of Milosevic to shift his base of power from parliament to the military and security forces. (Will anyone be surprised when Montenegro becomes the last republic to break away from Serbia?) The politicisation of the Yugoslav armed forces seems to be supported by the solid evidence that, in both countries, the armed forces were infiltrated with extremists, spies, and a secret police controlled by a small faction in the country. This situation reinforced the conviction that Milosevic was about to launch a scorched earth policy against Kosovo.

Shades of Rwanda
The Rwandan army had also been divided between those ready to make peace and elements controlled by extremists. Bugosora outmanoeuvred the peace camp and took effective control over the armed forces. Sure enough, the end of Rambouillet marked the beginning of the Belgrade assault on Kosovo, an assault which started before NATO began its bombing campaign several weeks later. Serbian troops with heavy artillery entered Kosovo 'in routine winter exercises' along with 20 Yugoslav army companies, six times more than that allowed by the cease-fire agreement. By the middle of March, heavy fighting had broken out in Kacanik in the south, Vucetrin in the north and

around the old town of Prizen in the southwest. OSCE, (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) instead of verifying a peace agreement, were confirming widespread and systematic acts of violence.

Though an opposition press and radio emerged in both Rwanda and Serbia, particularly after the 1996-7 demonstrations in Serbia, media was used to control and unite the country in opposition to a demonised enemy – radio in Rwanda and television in Serbia. In Rwanda, the Habyarimana family and allies controlled the key media outlets – newspapers and radio. In Serbia, just when Milosevic made his historic meeting with Ibrahim Rugova in May of 1998, the suppression of the media began with the cancellation of licenses of a number of radio and TV stations, and astronomically raising the monthly fees of the few allowed to operate. Thus, the monthly fee of the most independent of stations, Radio B-92, was raised from $200 to $12 000. Almost a million US dollars in fines were levied against various newspapers, radio and TV stations quite aside from the prison sentences against prominent journalists and editors. Slavko Curuvija, owner of the daily, Dnevni telegraf and the weekly Evropljanin, along with two journalists, each received five months in prison.

In Rwanda, the evil demons were Tutsi. In Serbia, it was the Kosovars and their NATO allies and supporters. The propaganda was so effective in Serbia, that a large percentage of the population, including human rights and peace advocates in Belgrade, claimed that the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was public relations fraud perpetrated by NATO. All out war was used as the pretext and cover to close down all opposition outlets, including B-92 in Belgrade, the only non-partisan broadcast outlet.

In both cases an international contact group had been very active in the pursuit of peace. The proposed peace agreement had called for the presence of observers to help implement the agreement. In Rwanda, the Force Commander, General Dallaire had insisted a small but effective and well-equipped force could stop the genocide. In Kosovo, as early as 6 October, Western envoys made clear that NATO intervention 'could actually lead to more violence between Serb forces and ethnic Albanians,' and only

Kenyan factory workers making blankets for Kosovo refugees

KLA Leader Hashim Thaqi

An ethnic Albanian in Prizren's prison

sending in large numbers of ground troops could prevent the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovars. But NATO was committed to avoid deploying peacemakers in Rwanda, though a secret build up of NATO troop strength had already begun in Macedonia by mid-March. In Rwanda, when the conflict broke out, the observers and most of the peacekeepers present were withdrawn. In Kosovo, the members of the observer team were also withdrawn. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, the international mediators were accused of being too mealy-mouthed and laid back and less demanding of proof a solid concrete action towards peace. For example, in March of 1998, Milosevic was given seven days notice to halt the violence of his police against the Kosovars and enter into peace negotiations. Then he was given a further ten days, then an additional grace period of four weeks. On 29 April, an asset freeze (excluding the Russians) was announced, Milosevic was not backed into a corner but given a way out. Instead, he used the delays to consolidate his position.

For six months, the US and Europe rationalised the delays and kept sending mixed signals about the use of force. Recall, that Washington, London, Paris, Belgium, Bonn had issued travel warnings to its citizens six months before the bombing raids actually began. At that time, they asked their nationals to leave the country. In both cases, aid kept flowing into both Belgrade and Kigali in spite of the efforts of both parties to sabotage the

peace. For example, in September 1998, the US gave 40 million marks to the Belgrade regime that was exacerbating the crisis for humanitarian assistance while Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania were buckling under the economic weight of the refugee population with far too little assistance.

In both cases, the implementation of the agreement seemed to hinge on the commitment of one man – Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Juvenal Habyarimana in Rwanda. And both men seemed to say one thing and do the opposite. For example, Habyarimana endorsed the Arusha Accords but systematically sabotaged any effort to implement them. Belgrade claimed to have ended its offensive many times while, in fact, escalating and intensifying its campaign. At the end of July, Serb forces attacked the KLA in the area of Malishevo and, coincidentally, managed to produce an exodus of virtually the whole civilian population according to International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports, including those who had recently arrived from Arohovac which had just been cleansed of its civilian population. As was the Serb general practice, the houses vacated were looted and burned to the ground. On September 29, 1998, Serbian forces pounded mountain villages in southern Kosovo just hours after Belgrade announced it was ending its offensive. On 10 October 1998, the Transnational Foundation which consistently opposed bombing, claimed there were 450 000

40 000 blankets are airlifted from Kenya per week for refugees in Kosovo

An ethnic Albanian refugee

A Rwandan refugee child at a UN Transit Centre

Refugees waiting to return to Kosovo

displaced who had been forced to flee, 150 000 in the open with no access to necessities. Of these, over 100 000 were refugees – 30 000 in Albania, 25 000 in Macedonia, 15 000 in Bosnia and the rest in Europe. The 13 August 1998 ICRC report stated that the refugee population was then well over 100 000. 45 000 homes had been flattened or made uninhabitable. 1 700 Albanians had been arrested. 1 300 others were 'missing.' 1 472 fatalities were reported including 162 women, 143 children, 297 over the age of 55 and 373 unidentified. Mass graves were widely reported in addition to these official figures. US envoy, Richard Holbrooke, on 13th October 1998 announced that he and Milosevic had agreed on an OSCE international ground and a NATO (and possibly Russian) air verification of Belgrade's compliance with UN resolutions on Kosovo and that Milosevic would sign the agreement. But, like Habyarimana, he kept finding excuses. At the same time both men presented themselves as middle of the road leaders, the lesser of two evils. Habyarimina had his CDR to the right and Milosevic had Vojislav Seseij, the leader of the ultra nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS). In the 250 seat Serbian Parliament, the SRS now controls 71 seats and Seselj is now Deputy Premier. Milosevic's own party, an SPS-Jul coalition, controls only 30 more seats. In fact, Seselj openly stated that Milosevic's agreement with Holbrooke, was just a tactical retreat until Milosevic could resume his commitment to the fight against Albanian 'terrorists.'

But these similarities are outweighed by the differences. The most important is that NATO intervened with a bombing campaign against Serbia while the UN peacekeepers almost entirely withdrew from Rwanda. Retired Yugoslav General Vuk Obradovic, against the popular view in the West, indicated at the time that NATO displayed its might in June of 1998, that the Yugoslavs could only launch a token resistance. Five years after the UN authorised a Chapter VI peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) for Rwanda with the most restricted of mandates and a paucity of military equipment, on 23 September 1998, the United Nations Security Council in a 14-0 vote, with only China abstaining, adopted a resolution on Kosovo sanctioning the use of force 'as long as regional security is threatened.' (Russia had supported the motion, but Yevgeny Primakov had not yet been elevated to Prime Minister.) In fact, Russian envoys on 5 October 1998, warned Milosevic that NATO would bomb if Milosevic did not go along with the agreement. While Habyarimana went along with the UN, Serbian President Slobadan Milosevic taunted the UN. He called the threat of force merely providing support for terrorists and a violation of the integrity of Yugoslavia. Habyarimana kept insisting he supported the agreement, while he secretly seemed to be undermining it. Milosevic made his position repeatedly clear. The Serbs had no intention on backing down in a stand-off with the West. They would not accept a foreign occupation army in the guise of peacekeepers on their soil.

The agreement provided that NATO through KFOR is solely responsible for ensuring compliance with the agreement. The UN plays no role. Yugoslav security and military forces are to be totally withdrawn from Kosovo, though 2 500 unarmed Minister

of Interior forces would remain and used for civil police functions. In addition, there would be 1 500 Border Guards and 1 000 logistics personnel. Thus, instead of a new integrated army as provided in Arusha, provision was made for a disintegrated army, including for the KLA, which agreed to publicly commit itself to demilitarisation.

While Habyarimana had a weak control of the media and the levers of economic power, Milosevic had a very firm hand on the levers of power and influence. While Habyarimana was known to bend to pressure, Milosevic had a reputation of never changing his position with appeals to negotiate or warnings of Serbian economic hardship, isolation or even the horrors of war. Only threats to his power, never incentives, ever made him change his position. A political opportunist, the principles of truth and compromise mean nothing to him. He began his career in Kosovo by appealing to Serbian nationalism, and in 1991 he channelled Serbian nationalism towards fighting for a greater Serbia, but, under pressure of a countervailing threat that would undermine his power base, in 1993 he abandoned the Serbs of Bosnia and of Yugoslavia. Milosevic signed Dayton after his army had been weakened by air strikes. But Kosovo was the spiritual and historical heartland of Serbia. How could the same pattern work in this case?

In Rwanda, the Hutu and Tutsi shared the same culture and religion and it was difficult to refer to them as different ethnic groups, though a prevalent body type in each group was radically different. In contrast, the Serbs and Kosovars belong to different religions and speak different languages but look the same. The Hutu and Tutsi lived side by side on the same hills. The Kosovars are said to make 90 percent of the population of a once autonomous Kosovo. In Serbia, the KLA was being decimated. Whereas at the beginning of the summer of 1998, the KLA had controlled 50 percent of the Kosovo region, by the end of the summer their control had withered to 10 percent. In contrast, in Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was on the verge of winning the war. The KLA was fighting for a separate Kosovar state. The RPF was fighting for a united Rwanda that treated all its citizens – including Tutsi and Hutu – equally. The KLA consisted of rabid ethnic nationalists. The RPF was made up of rabidly Rwandan rather than Tutsi nationalists. In Rwanda, the opposition was disciplined and united. In Kosovo in September of 1998, Adem Demaci, the political representative of the KLA, sharply criticised Rugova for supporting the US Kosovo peace plan for being too pro-Serb. In fact, the dramatic meeting of Milosevic and Rugova on 15 May 1998 was a product of the diplomacy of the Contact Group. Richard Holbrooke postponed the ban on economic investments and stopped the freeze on Yugoslavian assets that had begun on 29th April. Lifting the economic sanctions was a remaining carrot held out before Milosevic.

While the Rwandese army was ill trained and poorly equipped except for a few elite units, NATO officials believed that the KLA and they both faced an efficient and effective heavily armed war machine with Mig-21 fighters. Politicians opposed to

Rwandan prisoners accused of having participated in the 1994 genocide

both Habyarimana and the RPF were assassinated in Rwanda. On 21st September 1998, the KLA captured 12 Kosovar politicians involved in supporting the negotiations with Milosevic. They were released unharmed after questioning. Acts appearing to be genocidal had occurred every time an RPF offensive was launched, and an average of 300 people were victimised in about six separate incidents over a three year period. In Kosovo, there was no let up in the ethnic cleansing that the Serbians had launched one full year before the NATO bombing started. Thus, on 16 September, Serb forces were reliably reported as burning and looting the mining town of Magura and most of the population had been forced to flee. In October of 1998, already 300 000 refugees had been displaced from Kosovo.

Further, there were widespread fears that Montenegro, which on 1 June 1998 just elected a moderate, Milo Djukanovi, with an outright majority its President, would be re-incorporated into a unified Yugoslav, as Milosevic made moves to take control of the Montenegrin police. In December of 1998, Milosevic blocked Montenegro's plans for economic reform.

The West had tried to be helpful in reaching a settlement in Rwanda, and never put any heavy-duty pressure against Habyarimana. Further, the Western powers all took different positions. In contrast, US National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, Defence Secretary, William Cohen, General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made it crystal clear that if Belgrade did not cease hostilities, withdraw its military forces from Kosovo and permit the refugees who had been driven from their homes to return, NATO would use military forces against Serbia. In Rwanda, the government was represented on the Security Council and knew full well that the West was unwilling to be involved in Rwanda. In Rwanda, the media was virtually silent about the genocide that was underway in Rwanda. On 31 March 1998, the United Nations Security Council by a vote of 14-0 (China abstained) imposed an arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as an ambiguous message that violence and ethnic cleansing would not be tolerated. (But who believed that even clear UN messages

would be followed by any enforcement action?) In October of 1998, the North Atlantic Council reported widespread atrocities by Serbian forces against ethnic Albanian civilians. The flow of refugees out of Kosovo, particularly after the air strikes, became the main headline in the news. In the West, media and political pressure was minimal in support of intervention. In the case of Kosovo, the media and public pressure grew for intervention; it was the NATO leadership that kept delaying and offering Milosevic just one more chance. For example, on 28 October 1998, the NATO forces were said to be waiting for an 'activation warning' to prepare to launch air strikes against Serbia aimed at halting Serb on civilians in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

In Kosovo, two options were held out to the resisting Serbs six months before the threat was actually exercised – the use of air strikes to stop the Serbs or, alternatively, the employment of peacekeepers in considerable strength to supervise the cease-fire. Those air strikes were to proceed methodologically – a first phase targeting radar sites with Harm and Alarm anti-radar missiles, a second phase involving the use of aircraft to attack defence sites, military airports, helicopter bases, logistics and ammunition depots, and, in third phase, army barracks.

In the Balkans, Montenegro (3 000 in September after allowing in 75 000 refugees) and Macedonia (40 000 in April of 1999) forcibly deported their refugee populations to Albania. In Zaire, almost a million Rwandese refugees which included approximately 150 000 genocidists from the Rwandese army and the interahamwe militias, were fed and housed at international expense as they rearmed and prepared their counter attack against the new RPF government under the umbrella of the Mobutu government of Zaire.

Were the bombings, under these circumstances, that began on 27 March 1998 the least evil of the options? Or, since the bombings united the Serbs behind Milosevic, and did nothing to stop the ethnic cleansing, were the bombings not only useless but also counterproductive? They helped to rally the democratic movement behind Milosevic. Would not a further effort at diplomatic negotiations been more effective?

It is not an easy question to answer. But an assertion about NATO's action as evil and governed by malevolent intent does not help. Nor do pat claims that bombing is evil, and in any case, has been a failure. For we are not in a position to judge. Certainly, assertions than NATO caused or even triggered the mass outflow of refugees seems erroneous according to the evidence, though the Serbs obviously accelerated the ethnic cleansing once the bombing ensued. Finally, the evidence suggests that the proper legal requirements had been obtained and the bombing was neither illegal nor immoral. Whether in the end it can be justified must wait until the real effects can be measured.

Professor Howard Adelman is the Professor of Philosophy, at York University in Toronto, Canada

Globalisations and Conflicts in Africa:

Prospects for Human Security and Development in the New Millennium

BY PROFESSOR TIMOTHY SHAW

Africa may be the most marginal continent in terms of economic production and performance, but it is increasingly central to issues of global conflict and insecurity of both traditional and non-traditional varieties. Such a distinctive position poses challenges for those engaged in advancing peace and security on the continent. Challenges posed relate to analysis and practice, policy and process for a multiplicity of actors and approaches. How does one define and realise human security/development at the dawn of the twenty-first century given the multiple – positive and negative – impacts of globalisations?

Globalisations and Governance

Globalisations (the plural is deliberate, as the inter-related phenomena are so diverse) are defined variously – from Coca-Cola and CNN to cell-phones and the internet – yet they are as uneven as they are ubiquitous. Their incidence and impacts are various on the continent, from global airline alliances to proliferation of light weapons, symbolised by the juxtaposition of emerging markets with coming anarchies.

Globalisations include ideology (neo-liberalism/market), processes (compression/homogenisation), structures (multinational corporations based on flexible production processes), taste transfer (KFC/Nike) and technologies (IT/call centres); but they also intensify inequalities (between classes/cities/communities/countries/continents). Thus differences are exacerbated, leading to inequalities and tensions and so onto fundamentalism and overt conflicts. Thus it is not coincidental that the post-bipolar world is characterised by higher levels of conflict than during the Cold War 'order.'

Globalisations have also transformed states and states' relations with non-state actors; that is economies/companies and societies/non-governmental organisations (NGO's). Everywhere, but especially in Africa, the budgets, scale, ambitions and expectations of states have been downsized. Many of their previous functions, from educational and health services, to roads and water, are now undertaken by private or not-for-profit sectors: the subcontracting/outsourcing nexus in which both local and global companies and NGO's determine policy and provide services in collaboration with diminished, 'franchise' states.

Hence the emphasis by global agencies like the World Bank (see especially its World Development Report 1997 on 'The State in a Changing World') on 'partnerships' between states on the one hand and non-state actors like companies and NGO's on the other hand. Such 'triangular' relationships are expected to create an 'enabling environment' for market forces and basic needs: growth with development – but the emphasis always tends to be on personal profit rather than collective goods.

And hence the new focus on 'governance' rather than government; i.e. how state and non-state organisations together make and implement development policies. 'Good governance,' as defined by international agencies and the donor community, means formal elections and governments' accountability, and the likewise transparent democratic practices by non-state actors.

In short, after almost two decades of structural adjustment conditionalities in some parts of the continent – from economic to political and other 'liberalisations' – state-economy/society relations are quite transformed, with profound implications for prospects for human security (as defined by the UNDP in its Human Development Report 1994:3): '…safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also

means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of our daily lives – whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment.'

Human Development/Security

Human security, the prerequisite for human development, thus means sustainable community, economic, ecological, gender and health and personal security. This in turn requires good governance from the global to the local level to be realisable. Such governance requires not only occasional co-operation and innovation among the trio of heterogeneous actors, but rather protracted interaction or institutionalisation.

This essay assumes that sustainable peace and good governance – both essential for human development – are organically inter-related. The converse is also true: without the combination of peace and good governance, the prospect of attaining, let alone sustaining, human development is slight. The proliferation and persistence of conflicts and crises on the continent may serve as a telling indicator of the interrelations between human security and good governance.

Human development/security throughout Africa requires, then, good governance to ensure sustainable peace. In short, would good governance, now involving non-state as well as state actors, serve to minimise conflicts and vice versa: would less conflict advance better governance? This challenge becomes particularly problematic when the profound limits on states' resources are recognised. As Pierre du Toit has recently noted and lamented in 'Peacebuilding in Africa: Prospects for Security and Democracy Beyond the State' (African Security Review 8(1), 1999: 11-19), most contemporary regimes in Africa and elsewhere, have begun to lose the capacity to protect their citizens. Thus protection of person and property – basic human security – has increasingly to be bought by those who can so afford the privatisation of security, another global phenomenon.

Such privatisation in turn poses profound challenges not only for human development/security, but also for good governance, which requires sustained peace to be possible. For a minority of affluent individuals and communities, a range of products and services based on 'gated suburbs,' armed guards and rapid response capability, may achieve a degree of private security. For the majority of less affluent such expensive solutions are impossible. Moreover, the poor become more vulnerable when the rich are so insulated as collective pressures and resources are thereby diminished or diverted. The bourgeois world increasingly consists of transnational relations among gated communities: from Los Angeles to Johannesburg, New York to Nairobi. The non-bourgeois is increasingly vulnerable outside the actual or virtual walls.

Du Toit is sceptical about the salience of internal reactions thus far to realise sustainable peace in an era of diminished state capabilities. He is likewise pessimistic about whether 'transnational

security regimes (can) develop successfully in Africa, not as an alternative to states but as an adjunct, contributing to the role of states, both as units of security and of democracy?' (p16-17).

If, however, our analysis expands both beyond the local, national and regional and beyond the dichotomy of state and society to include: a) all levels of both conflict and co-operation (see below), and b) the trio of partners as suggested above by the World Bank and others – that is private sectors as well as NGO's, then there may be more grounds for optimism. Neither local nor global economies can flourish in the long-term without sustained peace along with appropriate infrastructure; that is enabling environments.

Levels of Conflicts/Responses

A structural or political economy perspective raises questions about the range of responses and resources required if conflict is to be contained and peace-making is to be successful. Such a comprehensive, longer-term approach suggests the imperative of going beyond so-called 'complex political emergencies,' 'peace-keeping operations' and 'humanitarian interventions,' towards the recognition of and reaction to the structural roots of inequalities and tensions.

First, at the global level, the continent is confronted by a myriad 'new' security threats. These include the nexus of drugs, gangs and guns along with so-called 'small arms,' ecological vulnerabilities to droughts and floods and social disruptions associated with migrants and refugees. Although the Cold War is over, extra-continental 'interventions' have yet to disappear: the arms trade and renewed mercenary threat – euphemistically characterised as subcontracting to private armies – plus ubiquitous 'humanitarian interventions' by International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO's). Nicholas Wheeler (Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds) 'The Globalization of World Politics' (Oxford: OUP, 1997) 405) suggests that such 'non-forcible humanitarian intervention' extends beyond the pacific activities of states, international organisations and NGO's in delivering assistance and facilitating third party conflict resolution and reconstruction to: '…the activities of non-state actors and third party mediators in complex emergencies, but it also needs to encompass global interventionary strategies designed to address the underlying causes of human suffering in world politics.'

Second, at the continental level, after a half-century of orthodox inter-governmental activity, both the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) are becoming more flexible in relating to a range of non-state actors, with an emphasis on companies and civil societies respectively. In the post-bipolar dispensation, then, the continental security architecture is hardly robust. Despite French, United Kingdom and United States diplomacy, no effective African interventionary force has materialised yet. However, both peace mechanisms and civil society centres facilitate 'track-two' diplomacy and post-conflict enquiries or tribunals.

Third, most conflicts and responses occur at the crucial regional level, even though most social strife initially erupts internally. Thus, Africa's sets of apparently domestic disputes all have regional dimensions, from arms and refugee flows to the overt or covert interventions of neighbours. At the formal inter-state level, regional groupings like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have orchestrated nominally collective peace-keeping operations (PKOs), even if in reality these reflect the interests of just a minority of typically hegemonic actors. In association with occasional 'track-two' diplomacy, involving non-state actors like think-tanks, academics, NGO's, such regional endeavours might lead to novel forms of 'security communities' in parts of the continent. Conversely, the apparent spread of inter-state alliances particularly around the fraught territory of Congo in the late-1990's, may lead back towards more orthodox realist calculations, even if some allies include extra-state mercenary formations.

As Du Toit indicates, the evolution of embryonic regional security communities in Africa poses considerable challenges for governance architecture: how to construct a peace coalition and then sustain a range of actors/interests in peace-building? Conversely, any return to more exclusive state-centric realist calculations would imply a retreat towards more authoritarian patterns of government. Clearly, the outcome of this security community/new realism dichotomy in the first few years of the new millennium holds profound implications for the prospects for enhanced human security/development throughout the continent, with the former more compatible than the latter.

And finally, fourth at the national or local levels, the persistence or recurrence of conflicts indicates the imperative of new analyses as well as responses. The few relative 'success stories' like Moçambique or Uganda stand in contrast to the several troubled communities in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc. The latter indicate the need to go beyond any short-term diagnoses or 'band-aids' towards investigating the deep roots of conflicts, which in turn points towards an understanding of the real political economy of civil strife. As the realistic 'Report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council… on Africa' (New York, April 1998: 3-4) indicated: 'Despite the devastation that armed conflicts bring, there are many who profit from chaos and lack of accountability, and who have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and much interest in prolonging it… in Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber and other raw materials was one of the principal objectives of the warring factions… The same can be said of Angola, where protracted difficulties in the peace process owed much to the importance of control over the exploitation of the country's lucrative diamond fields… (and) Sierra Leone... .'

New Regional Responses

Given the large scale of the African landscape, compounded by often rudimentary infrastructure and the relatively modest scale of the competing forces, much of the national/regional conflict occurs over rather narrow border areas. So a framework of flexible, regional-level 'triangles' of conflict and response may be most appropriate.

Africa has received no peace dividend from either the end of the Cold War or the end of apartheid and South Africa's destructive regional destabilisation. Nevertheless, the renewed optimism generated by the successful transition to majority rule in the continent's largest economy produced great expectations of a regional if not continental boom. To be sure, notions of emerging markets are no longer entirely fanciful (consider Botswana, Ghana, and Mauritius in this regard) even if they co-exist with apparent anarchies in several regions.

The former has led to the articulation in the mid-1990's of an 'African renaissance,' to be juxtaposed with the contemporary 'Asian crisis.' Whilst some scepticism already exists about the former, particularly in terms of its security as well as economic implications, such a renaissance might be compatible with the further development of good governance and resultant human security/development, particularly in a fraught context like that of South Africa.

Challenges for Peace-builders: Multi-layered Diplomacies

In conclusion, given the cumulative and continuing incidence and impacts of globalisations, any reconsideration of definitions of and prospects for good governance and human security in Africa, which treats non-state and state actors at the levels indicated, holds insights for several parallel fields/discourses, including comparative analyses of regions and transitions.

They also pose challenges for those analysts and institutes on and around the continent which seek to understand and facilitate the causes and consequences of peace and its absence or elusiveness: how to engage in confidence-building, peace-building and reconstruction in such problematic and inauspicious circumstances, local to global? A starting point, of course, is to recognise and work with the trio of actors involved in contemporary governance; that is with companies and civil societies as well as states and inter-state organisations. Onto continuous 'track-two' diplomacy and advocacy at all levels – local to global – as essential aspects of good governance and human development/security: quite a responsibility!

Timothy Shaw is the Professor of Political Science and International Development Studies at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, Canada where he is also Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies; he has been a visiting Professor at the University of Stellenbosch in 1998-1999

CENTRAL AFRICA.

Mediating peace where there is none

BY CLAUDE KABEMBA

The state of the crisis

The abrupt departure of the late Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko from the Congolese political scene failed to usher in the rebuilding of the state and a credible transition. The Congolese population had hoped that the end of the 32-year dictatorship would herald a democratic, stable and peaceful Congo. One main cause for the transitions failure was that Mobutu's end – although campaigned for – came as a surprise. It caught both the rebels and the internal opposition unprepared to assume control of the country, as none of them had a post-Mobutu – plan de societe. More alarmingly, Kabila suspended the constitution and proclaimed himself president. He banned all party-political activities and ruled by decree.

Another cause of the failed transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was the foreign policies of both Rwanda and Uganda towards that country. These two former allies wanted by all means to bring their influence to bear on the Congo's domestic affairs. Having been frustrated in this aim, they engineered a rebellion against Kabila. The security reasons advanced to justify the rebellion do not hold. The Ugandan and Rwandan armies were in control of the DRC's security soon after Mobutu's fall as Kabila did not have an effective army. They, and not Kabila, failed to police the Congo's long eastern border. Today, even though they control the eastern part of the DRC militarily and administratively, Hutu militias continue to infiltrate Rwanda and Ugandan rebels continue to be active inside the country.

By the time Kabila ordered Rwandan and Ugandan troops out, he was assured of two things. Firstly, the support from the Congolese who rejected the presence of foreign occupying troops. Secondly, the certainty that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) would rally to his support. Both events have materialised.

The war, which began on 2 August 1998, has been heavily ethnicised. It is a war between indigenous Congolese and Tutsi ethnic groups. It has exposed the vulnerability of the very small population of Banyamulenge Rwanda and Uganda's protégés – to Congolese nationalism.

We have also seen the participation of three SADC countries – Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia – forces fighting alongside les Forces Armees Congolaise (FAC). This alliance, which also includes Chadian forces, has failed to crush the Rwandan and Ugandan backed rebels in the east of the country. The rebels now control almost 40 percent of DRC territory. Besides the presence of these national armies, there are also at least 12 irregular armed groups.

Failed Mediation Efforts?

This upswing in fighting, drawing in countries that have no quarrel with one another, is accompanied by intense African diplomacy. Various summits – the Pretoria Summit, and Non-Aligned Movement in Durban, dealt extensively with ways to resolve the DRC conflict. The Victoria Falls, the French, the Addis-Abba, the Mauritius-SADC, the Lusaka and the Namibian Summits – and many informal meetings have been organised on how to end the DRC conflict. Two of these, the Franco-African Summit in Paris on 27 and 28 November, and the Namibia Summit of January 1999, raised hopes. Thereafter, parties to the conflict announced that they had agreed to sign a cease-fire agreement. Alas, this failed to materialise. In short, diplomatic efforts came to nought.

Kabila's unwillingness or unpreparedness to enter into negotiations may seem to explain the failure of these concerted efforts. On taking a closer look at the atmosphere prevailing at the time the rebellion resumed, some felt it was not in Kabila's interest to negotiate. The basis of negotiation for the rebels at that time was Kabila's exit from power, therefore making any discussion a non-starter. There was also a fall-out between Kabila and the international community, particularly the United States and the UN.

In the end Kabila desperately needed to restore some degree of credibility and military strength before looking into other options, such as negotiation. In this, he might have been aware of one of former US President Nixon's ten commandments of leadership and negotiation: 'always be prepared to negotiate, but never negotiate without being prepared.' To buy time, Kabila refused to talk directly to the rebels, preferring instead to talk to Rwanda and Uganda.

Secondly, the time was not ripe for negotiation. Most of these mediations took place while both sides to the conflict thought they could militarily defeat the other. As long as this thinking persists, negotiations are impossible.

Thirdly, the inherent bias against negotiation by the region's leaders militates against successful discussion. Kabila has been accused of a lack of commitment to negotiation, because of his persistent refusal to meet directly with the rebels. However, other role players share this non-commitment to negotiation. An informed person would not have expected much to emerge from the talks that have involved the three leaders Kabila, Kagame, and Museveni. All three have one belief in common: the legitimisation of the use of force and the de-legitimisation of negotiation. Like Kabila, Museveni and Kagame have steadfastly refused to talk to, or to negotiate with, any of the rebel movements or militias fighting their respective governments.

Fourthly, early calls for mediation lacked the urgency that the magnitude of the armed conflict warranted. This was partly because people underestimated the ability of the three SADC countries supporting Kabila to remain in Congo for any length of time. Some envisaged an early break up of the alliance. This would have lead to the easy defeat of Kabila. One of the most important lessons to emerge from this instance in international conflict management, concerns the ability of mediators to obtain the very best intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of all parties to a conflict; this has been the mediator's weakness.

In the fifth instance, the neutrality and independence of mediators have negatively affected their efforts. South Africa was said to be the only country with the ability to mediate in the DRC conflict for two reasons. Firstly because of its leadership embodied in the person of President Mandela. Secondly the call for an African Renaissance by the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki has created even higher expectations on the continent of the leadership role South Africa should play. As Mamdani puts it 'when the leadership of post-apartheid South Africa heralded the dawn of an African Renaissance, Africa and the world understood it as a claim to political leadership on the continent.' But South African initiatives have, so far, failed to bear fruit.

The causes of South Africa's failure to mediate fall into two possible categories: inadequate intelligence gathering and faulty judgement. If experience in the Congo demonstrates anything, it is the weakness of the South African intelligence and policy process, where South Africa either lacked knowledge of what was going on or deliberately chose to gloss over the situation.

The South African government failed to understand and accept that this rebellion has been put together by external forces. South Africa's stance against foreign military intervention – in the face of a rebellion already driven forwards by foreign intervention – could be viewed as a lack of understanding of the foreign interventionist nature of the DRC conflict, thereby tacitly condoning the existing intervention.

Although it appears that South Africa has been sidelined in Congo, it carries more weight than any other country in the region and has the capacity to influence the direction of events. Its position as described above, sent an incorrect signal to the rebels and their backers indicating that they can be tolerated. This is why it has been particularly difficult for President Mandela's peace and reform options to prevail. Put plainly, South Africa is struggling to find its place as the pivotal middleman because it appears to be closer to the rebel camp than to Kabila's.

It is not only the neutrality and independence of South Africa that has suffered. Until recently President Chiluba was considered the leading figure in the mediation. But his impartiality suffered a serious blow when Angola accused his government of supporting UNITA. The war in Angola is also being fought on Congolese soil where the Angolan government and UNITA are supporting Kabila and RCD rebels respectively.

In the sixth place, Southern Africa is deeply divided on the Congo war. On the one hand we have Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia who intervened militarily in the DRC to prevent the toppling of Laurent Kabila. On the other, we have Botswana and especially South Africa who declined military engagement in the DRC, arguing for an inclusive political settlement, but yet South Africa saw it fit to intervene in Lesotho. This has led the participating protagonists to accuse South Africa of 'double standards.' This has revealed fundamental differences of perception and conduct in the security arena between the SADC member states. One of the areas retarding national and regional decision making within SADC is the lack of reliable intelligence collection and sharing of information. Intelligence agencies in the Southern African region, important pillars of the Inter-State Security and Defence Committee (ISDSC), are supposed to be sharing intelligence, enabling the leaders to speak with one voice on regional issues.

Seventh, is the international community's approach to the conflict. The failure of international moral and legal principles to act as mediating factors between conflicting parties or nations is a problem. The Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of Congo sets a particularly destabilising precedent for Africa and indeed the world. This problem has been exacerbated by the evident unwillingness of the international community to put significant pressure on Kagame and Museveni. Here, Uganda's role in supporting US foreign policy in the region has influenced the US response to the conflict, adding to the delay in finding a solution.

Contrary to optimism in some quarters that Africa has the necessary leadership to deal with this crisis, the problem lies in the lack of such leadership and the failure to take concerted action to confront the situation. The negotiations or attempts to solve the DRC conflict have also been undermined by the self-interest of virtually all countries involved. It appears that the dominant motivation behind this approach is that some countries wish to ensure that the Congo government will favour them for economic reasons. This is manifested by the apparent economic deals between the Kabila government and its allies on

Although South Africa recognises Kabila as the legitimate ruler of Congo, it has yet to condemn the methods that the rebels and their backers have used in an effort to change the government in the DRC. In taking this position, South Africa has undermined the OAU resolution of 1997 that opposed the use of military means to change legitimate governments. Furthermore the OAU Charter upholds the territorial integrity of member states.

one hand and Ugandan and Rwandan exploitation of the resources in the area they occupy. The war in Congo is also about whom gets preferential access to its resources; the countries concerned are not prepared to accept a deal which threatens their economic interests.

Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood

There are signs that peace might be in the offing in the Congo. This note of optimism relates to the several initiatives under the auspices of the OAU, SADC and individual countries to resolve the current crisis in the DRC. A note of caution needs to be sounded regarding these peace initiatives: there is no clarity as to how they fit in with each other and there is no assurance that they will succeed. Despite this note of caution, there are still grounds for optimism. Firstly, the Kabila government recently issued several statements indicating a readiness to negotiate directly with the rebels. Secondly, at a mini-summit in Libya attended by Presidents Kabila and Museveni, the latter pledged to withdraw his troops from the Congo.

Thirdly, the recent statement issued in Tanzania by both Rwanda and Uganda – backers of the rebels in the DRC – called for a cease-fire. This was soon thereafter followed by talks in Pretoria between Rwandan military strongman Kagame and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki in an effort to reach a cease-fire. Fourthly, the Congolese national debate bringing together all stakeholders – Kabila's government, the rebels, opposition parties, the Mobutists, and civil society – is in preparation and set to take place in Nairobi. This debate might not take place for one reason: Kabila's tendency to dictate terms. There have been no preliminary interactions between these groups to prepare the terms of reference and constitute the list of participants.

Although these initiatives have not eased the fighting, the time may now be ripe for mediation. Mediators should increase their involvement on how to co-ordinate the different initiatives and accelerate the peace process.

There are two dimensions to finding a durable solution to the conflict in the DRC. The first has to do with state-building. The war in the DRC should be understood primarily as a crisis of the state. Before a state can be rebuilt, there must be a political order. Such a political order cannot be achieved in a climate of war.

The Congolese national debate is the first step in an effort to rebuild the state. The parties to the debate must be given the opportunity to develop a genuine commitment to the process. The aim of the debate would be to create new prescriptions regarding the form of the state, its specifications and how to make it sustainable. It would have to be negotiated by the Congolese themselves. The process of creating a democratic state and stable government in the DRC will be a long one. An essential element in the rebuilding must be an inclusive political formula; a mechanism that will allow all sections of the community to belong to and participate in the new political order. Here the Banyamulenge's citizenship problem would have to be resolved.

The internal negotiation and resolution of the Congo conflict will not mean an end to regional instability. Although it is possible to resolve conflict in one country – in isolation from the rest of the region – the spill-over effects requires simultaneous attention and different approaches to these conflicts. This takes us to the second dimension of the current crisis, namely the security of Uganda and even more Rwanda.

The withdrawal of foreign troops presently in the DRC would create conditions for internal discussions. It should be recognised that the instability in the DRC encourages the presence of many militias as well as the Angolan and Ugandan rebels. Strategies would have to be formulated to deal with the security concerns of the said countries. Given that the DRC cannot effectively police its borders, it is advisable that an international peacekeeping force be deployed to monitor cross-border movements. The challenge here would be how to deal with the DRC-based rebels and militias. These groups will have to stop their violent and military opposition, and return to their own countries in a free political atmosphere. This could only happen if both Kagame and Museveni were to accept political competition as the only solution to their countries' problems. That this is possible is evidenced by the good example set by Burundi.

Although there are indigenous Congolese in the rebel ranks, the rebellion is perceived entirely in Congo as an external one, initiated and promoted by the minority Congolese Banyamulenge - Tutsi in complicity with Rwanda and Uganda.

· James C. Humes, 'Nixon's Ten Commandments of Leadership and Negotiation,' Touchstone Book, New York, 1997, p 29
· Mahmood Mamdani, 'South Africa Initiative in the Congo Crisis,' The 1998 rebellion in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ACAS Special Bulletin, no 53/54, October 1998
· Yusuf Bangura; 'Comments on Regional Security and War in the Congo,' The 1998 Rebellion in the Democratic Republic of Congo, p24
· Steve Friedman, Claude Kabemba, Chris Landsberg, Zondi Masisa and Maxine Reitzes 'State of Anxiety? Reconstructing the state, democratization, and economic growth in Southern Africa,' paper commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in South Africa, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, 1999
· The Citizen, Thursday 6 May 1999, Johannesburg

Claude Kabemba is the Research Officer at the Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa

ECOMOG AND SUBREGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

BY AMADU SESAY

Africa has not benefited much from the post-Cold War peace dividend, for it was not only the most violent continent in the 1990s, but West Africa was also the most turbulent, with wars raging simultaneously in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, Africa and West Africa also present contrasting experiences on another level. While the post-Cold War period exposed the inability of the continent to tackle its conflicts and the endemic collapse of states, West Africa became the first subregion to establish an indigenous peace support initiative in Liberia in 1990. Known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECO-MOG has resulted from the failure of the major powers to intervene in the Liberian civil war despite massive violations of human rights in the country. America, Liberia's benefactor, was engaged in the Gulf crisis at the time, and the inaction of the great powers was a concrete sign that Africa had lost its geopolitical relevance in the international order. The onus was thus on Africans themselves to find lasting solutions to their problems.

General Ibrahim Babangida

The challenge was taken up by the then Nigerian leader, General Ibrahim Babangida, who successfully master-minded the creation of ECOMOG in May 1990 at the Banjul Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOMOG has been credited with restoring the peace in Liberia, although arguably at great financial cost to Nigeria. According to the late General Sani Abacha, the operation cost some US$7 billion, and hundreds of Nigerian soldiers lost their lives. ECOMOG successfully supervised the general elections in Liberia in July 1997, that saw Charles Taylor, the former rebel leader, assume power as the country's executive president. In 1998, ECOMOG II, also led by Nigeria, intervened in Sierra Leone and ousted Major Johnny Paul Koroma who had overthrown the democratically elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in May 1997.

The successful deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone seemed to have fulfilled the injunction, 'Try Africa First' that had partially informed the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. This exhortation calls for African states to find African solutions to African problems. ECOMOG represents an acceptance of this challenge, as well as a local response to the marginalisation of Africa, showing the world that Africans are capable of finding lasting solutions to the continent's problems without external prompting. From such a perspective, ECOMOG marked the beginning of the African Renaissance on the eve of the 21st century.

ECOMOG is the product of a complex mix of circumstances, among others, the domestic politics of member states, regional politics and leadership idiosyncrasies, rather than the establishment of an institutionalised conflict resolution blueprint. The decisive factor was perhaps the existence of a military dictatorship in Nigeria, West Africa's most important nation, that enabled Babangida to sponsor ECOMOG, and almost single-handedly finance its operations despite its unpopularity at home. Significantly, Olusegun Obasanjo announced in February 1999, after his election as civilian president, that the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG II would be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity. The commitment of his new government to a peaceful solution to the conflict that culminated in the Lome Peace Accord of July 1999, reinforces the point, and it was announced that Nigerian troops in ECOMOG would gradually be withdrawn from August 1999.

The ECOWAS initiative in Liberia has been fraught with controversy since its inception. The operation was unpopular among the informed public in Nigeria who saw it as an

expensive adventure in a faraway land. Many Nigerians did not believe in its cause, seeing it as an attempt by Babangida to save his friend, Samuel Doe. Doe's regime was about to succumb to military pressure mounted by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) that launched a rebellious war on Christmas eve in 1989, with the apparent support of two ECOWAS members, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Babangida did not hide his close ties to the Liberian dictator, among others, taking over Liberia's US$30 million debt with the African Development Bank (ADB) for hitherto unknown reasons. The Nigerian leader went out of his way to include Doe into the 'club' of African leaders after his ostracisation in 1980, following the gruesome murder of President Tolbert and the public execution of thirteen of his top lieutenants. Babangida was also known to have supplied arms and ammunition to Doe in his war against the rebels. The Nigerian leader was contemptuous of civilians and believed that a military leader, no matter how obnoxious his regime may be, should not be disgraced out of office by 'bloody civilians.' Added to this disdain, was his ambition to civilianise himself à la Doe, a prospect that would be shattered if Doe were to be deposed by rebels under civilian command. Finally, it was believed that the successful overthrow of Doe would encourage opposition to Babangida's power bid at home by a combination of pro-democracy and human rights groups. It was thus hardly surprising that the massive weight of the Nigerian state supported ECOMOG's attempts to frustrate Taylor.

ECOMOG had a divisive effect on subregional politics and came close to threaten the integrity of ECOWAS. Francophone members led by Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso refused to accept ECOMOG and its mission mandate in Liberia. For Côte d'Ivoire, it was revenge for the murder of William Tolbert, the father of Adolphus Tolbert, and the husband of the Ivorian president's daughter, on order of Doe, in the aftermath of the April 1980 coup in Liberia. For the Burkinabe leader, Blaise Compaore, it was solidarity with his father-in-law, the Ivorian leader, Felix Houphuet-Boigny. Compaore used his links with Muammar Gaddafi to facilitate the training of Taylor and some of his commanders in Libya. Burkina Faso became a conduit for arms and other support facilities from Libya to the NPFL forces. This hostile posture made life difficult for ECOMOG in Liberia and contributed significantly to the internationalisation of the Liberian war.

Internationally, ECOMOG was seen as an effort by Africans to find lasting solutions to African problems. Beyond that, the intervention seemed to have set two important precedents. The fact that a peacekeeping force was mounted by a subregional body without the prior approval of the United Nations was perhaps the most important. Although the operation was retroactively approved by the UN, the world body played second fiddle to ECOWAS and ECOMOG. The endorsement of ECOMOG in Liberia could be interpreted as a significant devolution of power by the UN and, given the selective support of the great powers for peacekeeping and peace support operations, and their reluctance to fund those considered

peripheral to their geopolitical interests, represented a major shift in the organisation.

The second precedent is the triangular co-operation facilitated by ECOMOG between ECOWAS, the OAU and the UN. Such a tripartite relationship in conflict management, prevention and resolution was never anticipated by the founders of the UN, a point that was not lost to its former Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali: the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was the '… first peace-keeping operation undertaken by the UN in co-operation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by … a sub-regional organisation.'

The circumstances of ECOMOG's creation impacted on its operations in at least two ways. Firstly, it allowed for extreme flexibility and even unilateral action on the part of Nigeria, its major sponsor. As the force's major financier and largest troop contributor, Nigeria was able to change its mandate and command without reference to ECOWAS, as would have been the case with a fully institutionalised outfit. For example, Abuja unilaterally forced the exit of the Ghanaian commander of ECOMOG less than a month into the operation, when General Mamman Kontagora, a Nigerian, was appointed as Field Commander. This followed the murder of Doe by Prince Yeduo Johnson of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). Until the elections in July 1997, all subsequent ECOMOG commanders were Nigerian. The same is true of the command of ECOMOG II in Sierra Leone.

Secondly, ECOMOG became a divisive issue in ECOWAS as Francophone countries, led by Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, vehemently opposed its creation and deployment. This caused a crisis of legitimacy and seriously hampered ECOMOG's operations and effectiveness, with the presidents of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso deriding it as a Nigerian creation and an instrument of Abuja's hegemonic intentions in the subregion. The hostile campaign mounted by the two countries against Nigeria and ECOMOG also encouraged Taylor to violate several peace accords with impunity, and prolonged both the war and the suffering of the Liberian people.

Lessons from the ECOMOG experiment

Several lessons are discernible from the ECOMOG experiment in West Africa. Firstly, a subregion can successfully contain a deadly war if some of its leaders are committed to make the necessary financial and human sacrifices.

Secondly, Africans and their subregional organisations are also in tune with the significant changes taking place in the global system after the end of the Cold War. The result is the redefinition of key concepts, such as non-interference and sovereignty, that were set aside in the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. African leaders are furthermore aware that the concept 'security' has become much more elastic, with a firm emphasis on human security. This shift is reflected in the current prominence of 'humanitarian interventions' and 'peace support

operations,' and the creation of a permanent international court for crimes against humanity. From such an angle, ECOMOG appears to have opened up a Pandora's box in African politics, for African states no longer hesitate to plunge headlong into the affairs of their neighbours: the seemingly blatant scramble by neighbours of the Democratic Republic of Congo to meddle in its domestic affairs and politics is but one example.

Thirdly, it would be wrong to conclude that the ECOMOG experiment threatens the emergence of a sophisticated 'world community' as the globalists claim. The response of the international community to emergencies in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes left much to be desired. The size of the UN presence in countries experiencing debilitating conflicts and wars is particularly instructive: for example, UNOMIL consisted of only 33 observers to cover the entire country. In Sierra Leone, UN observers were the first to withdraw from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion of the city by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). UN observers were withdrawn from Rwanda, sending the final signal to the Hutus to commence with a merciless genocide. The lukewarm response of the UN created legitimacy problems for ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and seriously dented its image as an impartial arbiter in these conflicts. The response of the international community simply confirmed the fears of the sceptics that not much has changed in international society and politics. The response of world leaders to developments in other parts of the world will always be influenced by the way they perceive their national interests in such situations. However, the callous attitude of major European powers – France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands – that did brisk business with Taylor in the thick of the war in Liberia, can hardly be explained. Unfortunately, proceeds from dubious transactions not only empowered the rebels to inflict more suffering on innocent citizens, but also prolonged the war, with major powers hypocritically joining in at a later stage to condemn the rebels for committing atrocities against humanity.

The deployment of ECOMOG not only ensured the internationalisation of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but also made them more difficult to resolve. The inability of ECOMOG to maintain a neutral position in Liberia turned the NPFL against it. ECOMOG was accused of committing atrocities, with force members involved in illegal business deals. By assisting in the establishment of an interim government in Monrovia, ECOMOG unwittingly confirmed the fears of Taylor that it was not an impartial force. As far as the rebels were concerned, ECOMOG was seen as an important party to the conflict. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG aligned itself with the pro-government Kamajor and Kapra militias as soon as it was deployed, and created the impression that it could win the war against the RUF. It therefore did nothing to encourage Kabbah to opt for an early resolution of the conflict and an end to the war. This changed after the successful infiltration of Freetown by the RUF in January 1999. Coupled with the return to civil rule in Nigeria, it was hardly surprising that Kabbah had to sit down with Sankoh and work out a peace deal that gave more to the RUF than would

have been the case if his government bargained from a position of strength. By giving the rebels four Cabinet positions, as well as the chairmanship of the committee overseeing precious minerals in the country, the RUF got much more than it could have bargained for under different conditions.

In spite of these deficiencies, ECOMOG as a mechanism for the maintenance of subregional security in West Africa has gained both local and international recognition, legitimacy and acceptability. Its shortcomings may have been a blessing, as they have led to a single subregional conflict management mechanism in ECOWAS. At a conference in Banjul in 1998, the Francophone Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement (ANAD) and the ECOWAS Mutual Assistance on Matters of Defence (MAD) mechanisms have consented, at least in principle, to make way for this new mechanism.

ECOWAS should supplement the mechanism with a sanctions regime, however, to check the ambitions of military politicians who might be tempted to overthrow democratically elected governments in the subregion. Regimes that pose a threat to subregional peace through gross human rights violations, for instance, could be the subject of collective political and economic sanctions. If member countries comply with such sanctions and secure the support of the major powers, the strategy could thwart situations that would lead to political instability and civil war in the subregion.

A final lesson is that it is much cheaper for the subregion and the international community to prevent disasters if they address the conditions that lead to the emergence of dictators like Doe or Mobutu. The reconstruction and reconciliation that have to be undertaken in Liberia and Sierra Leone for peace to prevail, however, are of more pressing concern. ECOMOG has done what it could, and the ball is now in the court of the international community. But the international community has neither a blueprint nor a commitment to the reconstruction of these countries. In Liberia, Taylor's government does not have the capacity or resources to restore the country, despite his flamboyant rhetoric to the contrary. As for Sierra Leone, it is hoped that the Lome Peace Accord would be honoured by the government and the RUF, and that the international community would support the peace process and the task of reconstructing the country.

The peace and security of each nation in the subregion can only be guaranteed by the entrenchment of democracy and good governance. Governments that are transparent and accountable would safeguard human rights and encourage the public participation in the political process. Multilateral interventions under the auspices of subregional arrangements cannot provide permanent peace and security. ECOWAS should therefore focus its attention on fulfilling the basic needs of the subregion's citizens as a more reliable peace insurance policy.

Professor Amadu Sesay is in the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

CONFLICT RESOLUTION
in Sudan

BY DR. KORWA ADAR

Since the re-emergence, in 1983, of the Sudanese civil war more than 2 million lives have been lost – in addition to the millions of innocent people who have been maimed – and resulted in over 4 million refugees. This is the worst ethnic or religious tragedy since World War II and demonstrates unwarranted insensitivity, irresponsibility, and lack of political will on the part of the contending Sudanese leaders to institute tangible mechanisms for conflict resolution. Attempts to resolve the Sudanese conflict under the banner of 'African solutions to African problems' with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and bilateral diplomatic initiatives (Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, among others) have not succeeded. What are the main contentious issues that have led to the recurring conflict with the adversaries pursuing zero-sum objectives? What possible solutions are available to the warring parties? These are the questions that this paper seeks to address.

Contentious Issues

The incorporation of *Sharia Law* in the Sudanese Constitution, which has inherent cultural and religious Islamisation and Arabisation implications, constitutes one of the main centres of disagreement between the Sudanese leaders of the north and the rebels of the south and the Nuba mountains. *Sharia law* controls and regulates the socio-cultural and econo-political lives of the Sudanese. It is also used as the basis for promoting Islamic principles. This means that Islam becomes the *din wa dawla*, that is, Islam is religion and state. Implementation of *Sharia law* means conforming to the will of God, who by extension is the sole legislator. Thus, the law or God's will precedes the state. To disobey the law means contravening religious doctrines and is subject to religious punishment. There is no distinction between religion, Islam, and the

state. The northern Islamic Sudanese leaders have used the state as the custodian of Islam.

Those following other religious beliefs are only 'permitted' to practice their religions. The southern Sudanese who are largely Christians and animists, advocate for the adoption of a secular state. They do not accept their second class status enshrined in the traditional conceptions of Islamisation. Though applied at variance, Islamisation still constitutes the modus operandi for the Sudanese administrations, particularly with respect to mobilisation and identification.

Although the current civil war began in 1983 with the formation of, among others, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA), conflict in Sudan dates back to 1955. The cost of maintaining one of Africa's largest armies has been enormous. Between 1974

SUDAN'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE (IN MILLIONS OF US$)

Source: US World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990-1994
(Washington, D.C. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995)

and 1975 Sudan spent more than US$170 million and US$150 million respectively. The figures increased to US$450 million in 1981 to US$600 million in 1982. By 1990s Sudan was spending over US$2 million a day to maintain its armed forces. As indicated in the figure below Sudan spent nearly US$2 500 million to maintain more than 100 000 Sudan People's Armed Forces (SPAF), and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), in 1992 alone. President Bashir's aim is to increase the total number of SPAF and PDG to more than 655 000 to pursue the 'Islamic holy war.' He is determined to defeat the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a conglomeration of the Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), John Garang's SPLA-Mainstream, Sudan Communist Party (SCP), the Beja Congress Armed Forces (BCAF), and Sudan Allied Forces (SAF), among others. Whereas the SPLA has maintained its war efforts in the south, the SAF and the BCAF operate along the Sudo-Ethiopian and Sudo-Eritrean borders respectively. However, because of the current Ethio-Eritrean war, Sudan has reached an understanding with Eritrea not to allow rebels to use its territory for military purposes.

With a population of over 30 million and 500 hundred ethnic groups speaking more than 100 languages, Sudan faces a daunting challenge to institute amicable solutions acceptable to the stakeholders. One of the central questions that need to be asked is: What policy options are available to the Sudanese leaders with regard to conflict resolution in the country? There are a number of policy options that can be considered relevant to conflict resolution in the Sudan. However, only those considered to be most applicable to the study will be examined. They include:

A Escalating the War efforts to Defeat the Enemy
B Instituting a Federal System
C Granting Self-Determination and Full Autonomy to the South
D Allowing a Peacekeeping Mission to be Stationed in Sudan

Of the four policy options examined, Alternative C seems to be more viable. It has the potential of establish tangible and durable

ALTERNATIVE (A)

ESCALATING THE WAR EFFORTS TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY

Merits

1 Whichever side wins the war, it would give it an advantage to impose its policies in the country. In such a situation, it is likely that a winner-takes-all based on zero-sum perspectives would carry the day. If it is the Sudanese Government that wins the war, it is likely that the policies of Islamisation and Arabisation would be officially institutionalized in the Constitution. Adoption of an Islamic state would be consonant with what most of the Sudanese leaders have advocated for throughout the country's independence.
2 On the other hand the defeat of the Sudanese Government by the rebels of the south in particular would pave the way for the establishment of a secular state which the SPLM, among other southern rebel movements, has demanded over the years. The separation of religion and state as inscribed in the objectives of the movements would lay the foundation for religious tolerance and equality.

Disadvantages

1 Resolving conflict through duress is unlikely to bring lasting peace among decades old enemies and may necessitate more military spending by the regime in power to maintain the system.
2 This may encourage other rebel movements such as the Nuba and the Beja, to declare independence.

ALTERNATIVE (B)

INSTITUTING A FEDERAL SYSTEM

Merits

1 This would bring a lasting peace among the Sudanese people particularly if the rights of individuals were clearly provided for in the Constitution.
2 Separation of religion and state would constitute the core of such an envisaged Federal Constitution where individual's beliefs would be recognised and incorporated.
3 If all the people of Sudan, by whatever mechanism or method they decide, participate in the formulation and establishment of such a system, they would feel part of it and ensure its survival and durability.
4 A federal system would end the domination of the regions by the central government. It would ensure a just distribution of power and resources.

Disadvantages

1 There is no guarantee that religious dominance would not resurface which might once again engulf the country into civil war. Such a scenario is likely to occur if people of the south dominate the leadership of Sudan.
2 It is unlikely that the Sudanese Islamic fundamentalists would accept the establishment of a secular state system in which religion would play no role in the society.

Sudanese children attend a school run by UNICEF

ALTERNATIVE (C)

GRANTING SELF-DETERMINATION AND FULL AUTONOMY TO THE SOUTH

Merits

1 A lasting peace is likely to prevail if the south is granted full autonomy and becomes an independent sovereign state with Juba as its headquarters. This is what the southern Sudanese have been advocating for over the years.

2 Separation of religion and state would clearly be provided for in the Constitution and hence recognition of the rights of those who do not subscribe to specific religious doctrines.

3 It will also give the northern Sudanese people an opportunity to live by Islamic laws if that is their wish.

Disadvantages

1 It is unlikely that the Sudanese government, like most other countries in the world, would allow the secession of part of its territory let alone granting independence to the southern Sudanese people.

2 Granting independence would imply a defeat of the north by the southern rebel movements and Khartoum would be opposed to such capitulation.

3 It is likely that the two countries would be hostile to each other and may necessitate military preparedness by the two sides. This would place economic strains on the two countries.

ALTERNATIVE (D)

ALLOWING A PEACEKEEPING MISSION TO BE STATIONED IN SUDAN

Merits

1 This policy option is based on the assumption that Sudan would be prepared to enter into negotiations with the rebel movements under the auspices of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Inter-Governmental Authority and Development (IGAD). The two African regional bodies could be given a broader mandate to help the adversaries to reach an amicable solution to the conflict. Most of the rebel movements, particularly under the umbrella of the NDA recognise IGAD as a neutral body to the conflict.

2 The international community would see Sudan as a peace broker and a country willing to solve its own internal problems. Such a decision would be in conformity with international law as well as the principles enshrined in the Charters of the UN and the OAU.

3 It would give humanitarian aid agencies an opportunity to reach areas affected by famine without hindrance by the warring parties.

4 That the peacekeeping mission would be given the mandate to enforce security and stability even to the extent of imposing no-fly-zones to ensure compliance by the parties.

5 This would discourage countries such as the United States from categorising Sudan as a terrorist state.

Disadvantages

1 Allowing peacekeeping missions to be stationed in its territory would imply that Sudan has surrendered to the demands of the southern rebel movements.

2 It would also imply a surrender of its sovereignty.

3 Any solution to the conflict that undermines Islamic principles may not be acceptable to the majority of Muslims of the north and as such has the potential of laying the foundation for instability in the country.

peace in the area. Nothing is more pertinent to the success of establishing a durable solution to the civil war than political will on the part of the parties concerned. In a country where leaders and ordinary citizens believe in the superiority of their religion, the probability of lasting peace based on the principles of socio-economic, cultural and political equality of the Sudanese cannot be guaranteed unless a separate state is established for the southerners. This view is reinforced by the prevailing suspicions that exist between the north and the south on the nineteenth century slave trade and the derogation by the Arab-speaking Sudanese

Muslims of the religious practices of the south. Slavery is still practised in some areas in Sudan. Most of the 2 million people who have died in the civil war and over 4 million refugees are southerners. Some of the religion-based political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Umma Party believe that the National Islamic Front government under Bashir has become too secular. The possibility of a purist party, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which draws its support from conservative Muslims, to support a secular state lead by a southern Sudanese Christian or animist, is unlikely.

Dr. Korwa Adar is a senior lecturer at the Department of Political Studies and International Studies Unit at Rhodes University

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR ALL?
South Africa and the call for an African Renaissance

BY PROFESSOR PAUL-HENRI BISCHOFF

African Diplomacy and African Security

In the political vacuum that accompanies Africa's 'strategic marginalisation' and in a situation of fifteen conflicts, our continent finds itself in a state of flux. Here lies the challenge for inter-African diplomacy and regional initiatives by state and non-state actors seeking to indigenously define, manage and contain conflict. The intention must be a purposive one: to seek to normatively structure an environment 'paddocked' to provide security for states, civic society, communities, women, children and individuals. Constructing security regimes, security communities and security systems to achieve this is a priority; a project sustained by a whole range of players at a local, national and regional level able to create and maintain a web of relations to ensure new and safe levels of both state and human security.

The achievement of an all inclusive, secure environment held up by both state and non-state actors have important implications. African diplomacy needs to take wider community needs into account in order to be relevant and achieve such broad based solutions. The need to achieve a secure environment must make reference to those who in the past have been marginalised by the African state, its governing elite and the international forces which have sustained non people-centred policies. Included here are rural communities, the urban poor, ethnic minorities, women or individuals and those who represent their interests. Importantly, where security becomes the business of not just the state, but of the many, it cannot be separated from the freedom of the community and the individual to deliberate and influence what ought to drive all developments taking place around them.

This broader view of security suggests the need for a paradigm shift on how to evaluate development. It allows for the advance of people-centred development to accompany the promotion of profit-centred development (where the success of the latter depends on the 'right mix' and relationship with the former). But also, in the context of addressing mass needs, it suggests that conventional 'ways of doing things' be re-evaluated. This implies that the previously under-represented majority view must come to inform a broader, African view of development.

As such, one of the means for achieving security as an outcome lies in participatory democracy and development, a process in which African values and their social context can punctuate the course of overall development. In short, the need to build security presents an opportunity for African renewal.

Such a renewal is timely. It comes at a time when the political, social and economic demands made by different constituencies on African leadership at a local, national, regional and global level are ever more pressing. It makes a cultural redefinition of self – of finding a new composite and workable social identity – a vital building bloc towards achieving a secure environment in which extensive and pervasive development can occur.

Such a social identity must serve allow the state and civil society to build up its knowledge base, address basic needs in society and help sustain participatory development and solidarity across gender, social, community, class, age and interstate lines.

South Africa: Site of national renewal and source for the call of an African Renaissance

Given the continued coincidence of class and social group based divisions, South Africa remains a society of two nations and two ways of life. Given this inheritance, the country has to forge a new identity for itself. It remains the site of a democratic project where the state and civil society promote broad participation and the building of an all embracing social and national identity. Given the interdependence with its region, this cannot be undertaken in isolation or at the expense of a Greater Africa around it.

The policy of reconciliation, a hallmark of the first democratic government under Nelson Mandela, aimed at achieving consensus and support for the new beginning in the country's history . The policy vehicle for much of the change lay in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which sought to rebuild a society and an economy ravaged by apartheid and its inequities and the isolation and conflict forced on the country by the previous order.

Mobutu Sese Seko, Nelson Mandela and Laurent Kabila

Former South African President Nelson Mandela with his wife Madam Graça Machel and President Thabo Mbeki

A democratic South Africa after 1994 attempts to define, manage and contain various types of conflict. This occurs in the context of a constitutional order that lays stress on promoting a culture of human rights. In doing so, prevailing international norms on democracy and good governance are being translated into practise, adapted or – as in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – recreated to, in turn, inform international norms. This has been the starting point for a process of renewal in the country.

It is a national project aimed at promoting change, marred by its own unavoidable contradictions and ambiguities. Driven by changing interests, power relations, attitudes and ideas, the transformation process is far from complete. What began as 'a national renaissance' including the nation-building project centred on a redefined African self and the transformation of the society to achieve a more equitable redistribution of power and wealth, is part of a continuum which wants to be part of the change occurring in Greater Africa. Out of this transformation for which the rest of Africa hoped, struggled and suffered, has therefore come South Africa's advocacy in Africa and the rest of the world for an 'African Renaissance.'

Foreign Policy after 1994

The call for renewal on the continent followed an initial period after 1994 when South Africa's foreign policy was responsive, piecemeal and lacked a convincing theme, to the extent of where it found itself damned for overbearance when it acted and indifference for when it stayed silent. It followed attempts to single-handedly grapple with the continent's marginalisation in global life. South African policy makers accorded centre stage at international venues – such as at meetings of the G-7 in 1995, or the annual Davos Summits. They sought to advance the place occupied by Africa in international deliberations on the management of world issues, especially those affecting development. In doing so, South Africa wished to counter an international mood of 'Afro-pessimism' which appeared to justify a gradual withdrawal by the international

donor community from its previous commitments towards the continent.

Propelled by the fear of insecurity in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, a first bid to play the role of the honest broker had Mandela, Mbeki and prominent members of the South African cabinet involved in a high profile diplomatic initiative on board a South African naval ship. They intended to bring Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila to negotiate a transfer of power in the lead up to the collapse of the Mobutu regime. This action demonstrated an attempt at leadership and signified 'a renaissance in African diplomacy' but brought little by way of any lasting political settlement in Congo-Kinshasa. It showed the limits of combining near-to unilateral exposure and personal diplomacy. This approach was repeated in Angola and Sudan, where President Mandela offered to intervene as a peacemaker. However, stature, charm and persuasive powers failed to make real headway. The lesson learnt was if diplomatic ground in Africa was to be won on a particular issue, leadership had to be demonstrated in a more holistic manner.

Given the tenuous state of democracy and observance of human rights on the ground, the attempt to forge a consensus exclusively based on human rights or democracy was too narrow a concern to pursue. A more holistic view, the notion of an 'African Re-awakening,' an idea primarily developed within the African diaspora and a long tradition of Pan Africanism, lent itself to a more selective and effective South African foreign policy position on Africa. Similarly, it suggested a greater reliance on consultation and multilateralism as foreign policy instruments.

In 1994, South African foreign policy had put forward a number of separate concerns which it sought to project in its relations with Africa. By 1997, the call for an African Renaissance had begun to subsume all of these. This included promoting human rights, democracy and good governance, furthering the political, economic and social well being of Southern Africa, establishing

constructive and mutually beneficial interactions with all African countries, and searching for common solutions to environmental issues, drug trafficking, discrimination against women, mass migration, refugee flows, endemic disease, drought and other natural disasters. These concerns had to be defined and operationalised in the context of the African Renaissance, a collective vessel meant to accommodate all concerns. A greater African presence, the new Pretoria proceeded to open from less than a handful, to what currently are 26 South African diplomatic missions on the continent intended to deliver allies who can contribute to regimes aimed at producing greater security.

The African Renaissance in South African foreign policy is a policy initiative still in the making. Whilst at first blush it can be made to look as a rather conventional attempt to provide leadership to fellow African states or simply advance South Africa's own narrow economic and commercial interests, it is clearly intended to amount to far more than this.

Foreign policy making has been a concern of the Deputy-President's Office. It has encouraged the constitution of an Inter-Ministerial Working Committee to make an African Renewal the subject of inter-ministerial policy debate and policy formulation. There have been no formal high level inter-governmental all-African conferences on Africa and the African Renewal. Instead, it has come to mean employing diplomacy to first and foremost address conflict, encourage economic interactions with the continent, and to appeal to a broad African society to focus on the need for renewal. The intention is to create an African Renaissance of many – autonomous but developmentally reinforcing – sites.

Given its own enduring experiences – primarily in KwaZulu-Natal after 1994 – the new South Africa is deeply concerned about conflict in Africa. It began to take an active part in helping to resolve conflicts. This included the constitutional and political crises in Lesotho, the initiation of a constitutional review process in Swaziland and efforts aimed at stabilising Burundi, Rwanda and the Comoros (Pretoria is a member of the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution aimed at the resolution of African conflict). Latterly, the preoccupation is in setting up a peace-keeping force in SADC.

Government has provided financial incentives for South African investors in the region of the Southern African Development Community. The Ministry of Telecommunications has plans to forge new integrated networks of communication to facilitate intra-African co-operation and commercial intercourse. It encourages state and private capital to invest in African Telecommunications. Similarly, the Ministry of Education –

> The African Renaissance is a call for identity and democracy, economic participation and wider respect and recognition of Africa

with the help of UNESCO – wishes to make South Africa a centre of 'relevant' learning for African students who would otherwise go on to study in North America or Europe.

In another vein, Deputy-President Thabo Mbeki has called for the rediscovery and reconstruction of an 'African identity,' reflective of the rich human diversity in South Africa and the wider continent. The reconstruction of an African identity and projection of Africanness, is intended to be a vital resource in achieving home-grown solutions and reliance on people-centred sustainable development. In bringing the mass of people into the mainstream of meaningful and life enhancing development, the intention is that Africans will have more to contribute to a local, regional and world economy and, as such, begin to more meaningfully participate in world politics. The African Renaissance is a call for identity and democracy, economic participation and wider respect and recognition of Africa.

In all of this, South African foreign policy is hampered by the collective memory of its past dominance as a state, the continued asymmetry in its relations with other African states and state rather than society centred notions of security amongst some of its own decision-makers (vide the contentious military intervention in Lesotho in 1998) and those of other African governing elites. This retards the projection of South African leadership around the notion of an African Renaissance. South Africa spends more on its military establishment than any other state in sub-Saharan Africa. More importantly, its looming economic presence and irksome trade imbalances – set against a SADC Trade Protocol which remains unratified – overshadow relations with countries like Zambia or Zimbabwe, coupled by irritation from countries like Namibia and Botswana with its protectionism.

But there is also a difference in political style. The African National Congress (ANC) government's openness and dismissal of the mystique and symbolism of formal state power sets it apart from those elsewhere who are less democratically inclined. The Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1994 represented a young democracy whose ANC leadership drawn from the national liberation struggle, bluntly rejected the false gravitas, rhetoric and rigidities of power so reminiscent of the old authoritarian order it had come to replace. Its attempt to forge a genuine constitutional order comparable to those of developed liberal democracies has brought its own affinities in its relations with Western states.

The need to achieve stability holds the key to a new African vision, as does the recognition that there have to be many ways of achieving stability. Uniting different efforts to bring peace to the continent is the all-embracing vision of an African Re-awakening. The idea of renewal is first and foremost an attempt to bring about an African view on the containment and prevention

Rwandan Mayor-General Paul Kagame shakes hands with Nelson Mandela

Thabo Mbeki speaking at the World Economic Forum

Nelson Mandela addressing a news conference

of conflict, second, the eschewal of authoritarianism and third, the attempt at functional co-operation to make autonomous communication and co-operation possible in the face of global encroachments.

Renewal should not serve narrow commercial interests and allow South Africa to be used as a staging post for the re-conquest of the continent by globalised capital. A South Africa which amounts to no more than the cat's paw of multinational capital, will simply have no African followers. It would reproduce the very structural economic imbalances a process of economic and social renewal needs to overcome. The connotations conjured up by an African renewal demands a far larger project. An African Renaissance needs to amount to more than simple market growth in established sectors. Thabo Mbeki's seminal statement of 'being an African' amounted to a redefinition of the African self, as the social product of all those who have lived on and worked for the continent. It is a call for all those who live permanently in Africa to dedicate themselves to Africa's general welfare. It is a call for action, an African internationalism informed by a sense of new being; a mission to transform old dependencies into creative autonomy or partnership.

To have followers, the African Renaissance must be a 'people-driven movement,' a new paradigm of thought and guide for action which involves great numbers of people, including women, to feed into a reconstituted African self. This takes place outside the confines of narrow national interest and alongside a recontextualisation and rediffusion of existent culture and epistemologies in Africa.

Given the grasp of outside forces, any African Renewal faces the danger of capture by the forces of globalisation; business and financial interests amplified through the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation, United States, European Union and ruling elites. Amidst already existent marginalisation, the kidnap of the movement would

mean reinforcing patterns of exploitation and implanting new ones. In this sense, President Clinton's identification with an 'African Renaissance' begins 'to look, walk and smell like neo-colonialism.' There are those who wonder to what extent the promotion of globalisation or a cult of personality may be at stake in Thabo Mbeki's advance of the idea of renewal.

Yet, the social transformation taking place in the former racial state on which the idea of renewal is, in part, grounded, has set something in train which is ultimately much bigger than the purported intentions of individual leaders in business or government. The restoration of human dignity and freedom marks the end of an ideological, brutalising state dominated by one exclusive party. In setting the scene for institutionalising a culture of human rights, it is an experiment of creating a society that no longer denies humanity.

Similarly, any meaningful Renaissance in Africa must make reference to the freeing of the human spirit and mind to release new, productive and creative energies in society. 'The motive forces for bringing about the renaissance of Africa should not only be the elites, ordinary masses should play the leading role. If left on its own, the Renaissance will just become a movement of the elite.' As such, a transforming South Africa must search out those in Africa who are isolated but who struggle towards the transformation of the continent. It is a project that is bigger than individual governments and implies transnationalism in its best sense. Intellectuals in Africa are called on to begin to innovate and create new ideas pertinent to the African experience and African realities. The starting point should be the problems of the continent, South African foreign policy and its subscription to an African Re-awakening is but a small part of a process of lighting many fires.

Professor Paul-Henri Bischoff is an associate Professor in the International Studies Unit, Department of Political Studies, Rhodes University, South Africa

The Principle of Emancipation:
Creating Capital for Conflict Resolution

BY ALISON LAZARUS

This is the second article in a series of three conversations with scholars in African History, Culture and Society. In the interaction with Professor Kwesi Prah, ACCORD explores the relationship between democracy, culture and non-western forms of Conflict Resolution, and asks how this can shape our training interventions on the African continent

Professor Kwesi Prah, Director of the Centre for the Study of African Society (CASAS), based in Cape Town, and a sociologist by discipline, highlights the Principle of Emancipation and the need for Cross Border Institutions as a mechanism for resolving conflict in Africa.

Radical Politics of Tolerance
In the post-cold war period, war motivated by the strategic and security interests of the USA and the former USSR, has subsided. The world has seen an increase in intra-state and ethno-cultural conflicts. Genocide in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia and most recently in Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the ongoing war between Tamil and Sinhalese groups in Sri Lanka has forced our attention to the role identity and culture play in conflict.

Prof. Prah explains there is no culture or cultural group that is static or has not been 'interpenetrated.' He argues that any kind of argument for cultural exclusivity is void.

I think that the universal human community consists of a wide variety of cultural formations which overlap and interpenetrate in many areas. Cultural formations do not have single borders; in some aspects they are distinct but in other aspects they share certain common features with other cultures either proximate or fairly removed.

There are certain features of life, like the use of cars, certain popular music, which is global whether you are in Tokyo or Honolulu. These cultural features are increasingly shared, but

at the same time we should be careful not to impose our cultures on others. Tolerance is increasingly becoming more and more important as the world becomes a village where everybody is living next to everybody else. We have to open our eyes and actively make exchanges of tolerance, become able to endure and appreciate what other cultures have to offer without necessarily abandoning our own culture. At the same time, we should make it possible for those of us who want to cross cultural borders, to do so without hindrance. All of this is tolerance.

Central to the issue of cultural identity, is its relationship to power. Intra-state conflicts manifest as conflicts between groups whose identity is the source of a groups power or powerlessness, access to resources (such as land, water, national identity, political, economic and social power) and moral authority to govern and control.

Cultural difference itself is not the problem. Lack of tolerance, or the mobilisation of cultural identity to favour one group's access to power and privilege against another, is. In linking culture with power, Kwesi Prah highlights identity and security (in its widest sense meaning human not just collective security), as root sources of conflict in intra-state or inter-group conflict. Culture as a way of life is therefore a material force in the everyday lives of people. Prah gives a historical materialist analysis of how this works:

Sometimes economic, social and political interests, basic material interests in societies, will force their way as determinant factors in the social process. In other words, a social, economic and political contradiction may be played out literally and phenomenally at the level of identity. For example, the history of Ireland, is a history of English colonialism, and the creation of an Anglo-Irish community aligned to Protestantism which ignores the popularisation of the dominantly Catholic Irish masses. The Protestant ascendancy and the neglect of the poor Catholic masses appears as if it is a Catholic-Protestant conflict. But it is superficial to interpret it that way.

Conflict often plays itself out at a certain cultural identifica-tional level. The root causes are structural, economic, social and political. However, I am not saying that other identities manifested in conflict are of no relevance. They are utilised as mobilising factors in the dominant beliefs on both sides of the coin. One must differentiate between the elites on both sides of the conflict. They are not just on the one side, they are on both sides. They use popular forms of identification to mobilise people for their own, often very narrow interests.

A global culture linked to a global economic and political agenda exists alongside current attempts to make group cultural identity exclusive and excluding. At both the group and global village, we see the mobilisation of culture, that is, values and identity in the pursuit of resources. Kwesi Prah proffers a yard-stick by which we can measure whether identity (be it cultural group, national or global) can be judged to be productive or debilitating:

Whether we like it or not, the culture of Coca-Cola is world-wide. Some people call this globalisation. I have difficulty with the term globalisation because it is a bit kitsch, a modern or new utility for imperialist international integration of the world into one social, economic world order. I am not passing judge-ment on that. It has certain positive features, it also has nega-tive features. We do not judge the forces of history on the basis of value systems. We judge them only on the extent to which they represent emancipatory tendencies. In other words, whether they yield more freedom, more ability for increasingly larger sections of the human community to release and express their creativity in an increasingly globalised village.

Difference is natural to the world, diversity is always there. What is important is how we manage diversity. The key princi-ple is that of tolerance, underwritten by another: the principle of emancipation. This principle of emancipation cannot be compromised: the ability for society to free, empower and enable increasingly larger sections of the population to achieve control over the material and non-material means of fulfiling or achieving their dreams and their objectives.

In other words, the freedom of one cultural group or one society, (I want too see this globally), if it is to be positive, must contribute to the making of everybody else's freedom. No one particular society's freedom must be freedom at the expense of somebody else's freedom. As wider sections of humanity achieve freedom, we do not all have to consult each other. We have to live with certain principles of democracy, of toler-ance, openness, of equity, of justice. How we deal with such problems within our own context, within our own society is driven by a need (in a general sense) for the next person, for the next society.

Democracy and The Principle of Emancipation in Africa

The radical politics of tolerance as Kwesi Prah elucidates

requires a commitment to the principles of democracy with room for experimenting the structural forms it can take. He argues that globalisation and localisation must be judged by the same principles of emancipation and tolerance. This suggests a way out of the impasse created by the 'Cultural Relativism' debate. 'Cultural Relativism' argues that because cultures are different, and vary from group to group, they must be judged contextually by a set of principles specific to that culture. Prah responds to those who argue that democracy is western and that democratic principles are neither universal nor applicable as a yardstick in African societies. The focus on the principles of emancipation and tolerance breaks the immobility and imposed voicelessness created by the distinction of 'insider' and 'out-sider' which came with the 'Cultural Relativism Debate.' There is a common principle by which one may understand a local, national or global culture to be democratic. The principle of emancipation allows for those who want to cross over culturally to do so thus making outsiders 'insiders.'

Is the bloodletting on the continent not an indication that we are far from embracing the principle of emancipation? The conflicts tell us something is drastically wrong, but what is it? Do we assume that those who say, 'Democracy can't work in Africa' are closer to a correct analysis? For Kwesi Prah, Africa is moving towards greater expression of the principle of emanci-pation. The point is to see change and conflict as processes:

I do not think that there is any historical process such as democracy, which has an End State. It is an historical process constantly evolving with society. We know when a process is democratic, but we cannot say that this formula of democracy is true for all time. Certain principles are true, but the way in which the principles are manifested, the way in which they unfold, express themselves in the formation and structuralisa-tion of the society, is constantly changing. A 150 years ago there was slavery in Africa. Then we moved from slavery to the period of free trade and the condemnation of slavery. This meant progress. Then we had the classical form of colonial-ism, which is now dead. This is once again an improvement on the old. And now we have neo-colonialism, which will also be superseded. When we refer to democratic processes in Africa, we must refer to these processes as long term processes not as one short event.

The understanding is that conflict generates continuous change. Historically societies are moving towards greater understanding and expression of the principle of emancipa-tion. But does it have to cost so much? Who is to act and who is not acting? For Prah, the elites of Africa have to bear responsibility for much of the blood flowing on the continent precisely because they refuse to activate the principle of emancipation.

The Role of the Elite

Prah reserves his strongest criticism for elites: intellectual and political.

There is a problem with us. Africans, particularly our elite, tend to look down on our history. That is the source of the problem, the elite has become too heavily imitative of western practices and this is one of the major causes of our problems.

For Prah democracy does not need to translate into western conceptions. For him, it is a matter of acting according to the principle of emancipation, the expression of the principle should be contextually relevant. If it is, then it will be more effective. He comments that many of the elite based in parliaments in Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other institutions are resistant to engage in the enculturation of institutions. The resistance he argues is one based on self-interest:

The problem derives from the blindness of the elite. I do not think it is total blindness. Its interests, our interests, are so tied up with the interest of our former colonial masters, and yet we are giving leadership to our societies in which we are totally alienated. In South Africa the Zionist Christian Church (ZCC) is the biggest Africanised Christian church, yet it lies outside the South African Council of Churches and they do not include it. These are the people who talk about democracy and openness. They do not see how antagonistic, how foolish their attitude of excluding the ZCC is. It's an elite, a religious elite. Instead of being happy with it, they would rather not have anything to do with the ZCC. So that is the problem, we, the elite, are the problem.

A further problem is that while elites may hold political and economic power in Africa, they are unable to influence the cultural and social direction of the continent. Prah argues that this makes it difficult for elites to positively enhance Africa's ability to manage and resolve its conflicts:

But how do we do it with an elite like this? An elite which is ashamed of its own language, an elite which uses only a foreign language, an elite which abandons its own religious practices, an elite which has no respect for its own heritage, yes heritage is part of identity.

Given that people are effectively connected through ritual, values, language and group identity, what role should traditional leaders play in conflict resolution? How do we manage in a context where two structures of power, moral authority and cultural power are active in the conflicts in Africa. Kwesi Prah, argues that separate spheres of influence should be delineated:

Professor Kwezi Prah

Traditional leaders should not hold political power. But they can be given an arena: in the area of culture for the maintenance of certain traditions, authority over cultivation of language/s. Traditional leaders can be gainfully employed… they can operate as custodians of the unperishable part of a cultural cargo. Practices which are moral, ethical, formative for the personalities, the behaviour, the attitudes and the ethics of use. They can legitimately operate within these frames.

But again our attitudes toward the question of what is African is typical. People look to Europe where we have the Queen of England, the Queen of Spain, Barons, Lords… traditional leaders. When we consider Africa we immediately consider getting rid of traditional leaders. This is an incorrect attitude. Even if they are not good, let us allow time and history slowly to curtail and minimise their role. Let us not be too hasty about it because we may be chopping off our heads. My argument is that people use their history. They not behave as simple products of colonialism. Not everything that the west has is good, neither is everything that existed before the west good.

The emphasis on regional organisations, the enculturating of institutions and the role of elites in responsibly considering their roles and obligations to resolve conflicts in Africa are part of the agenda of an African Renaissance. Prof. Prah warns that the process is going to be extremely difficult and painful;

The coming century will see the emergence of Africa. But Africa cannot move forward divided as it is. There has to be some way in which countries are able to coherently work together across borders… out of 45 African countries, I don't believe any one of them is economically viable in the long term. If we don't begin creating economic institutions across borders, South Africa will also become victim of the history of this continent.

Existing regional structures are insufficient to the task and serve the interests of international capital. Prah calls for direct interaction between non-state actors if an African Renaissance is to be effective. While his elucidation highlights the need for openness in economic activity to be extended to include non-sate actors, he holds the same view regarding political activity, education and culture. The latter also require open cross-border activity involving the direct interface between people.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a meeting point of governments to discuss. What about the

people? We want the people to move, we want businessmen in South Africa to link up with the businessmen in Zimbabwe, with another one in Angola, with another one in Zaire, with another one in Kenya, with another one in Ghana; and create a large enterprise in which people act. The current regional structures serve the intentions of international money, I mean big Metropolitan, multinational money. What would happen if Moçambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa together shared the commonality of their interest, represented their interest jointly to say Coca-Cola…then we would make some progress, the same thing the European Union is doing... now Europe is united, before our eyes.

Mechanism for Conflict Resolution: Cross Border Institutions

Prof. Prah argues that we need to understand the impact and role that the legacy of colonial institutions and borders play in generating conflict on the continent. An understanding of how this affects groups at an economic, political, social and affective level demonstrates the need for what he terms 'Cross Border Institutions.'

Many of the conflicts in Africa arise out of an inherited colonial legacy that we are not yet sufficiently empowered to change. This inheritance tends to benefit particular groups or elites. For example, a conflict is looming in the Namibia, Botswana area: Lozi speaking people are moving into Botswana. It's possible to give subjective responses such as Mishake Muyongo's, leader of the Caprivi Strip Liberation Movement, thirst for power. But many of those that are moving into the area are Tswana speaking Lozi. Further, Botswana is more prosperous than Namibia. Zambia has become poor. Now they find it easier to relate at the level of the village, at the level of the person who is linguistically and culturally bound to his own little frame, they are able to relate more with the Tswanas and the Lozis than with the Ovambo or Herero.

My problem is that we are not actively finding solutions that will help us transcend this legacy. We may begin to transcend this legacy if we create cross-border institutions and educational systems that allow people to share their affinities, traditions, customs and cultural solidarity.

Prah believes that neither the view that holds the post-colonial state as a 'holy and god given formation' nor the view that espouses the immediate removal of all borders has been constructive in dealing with conflicts in Africa. His idea of cross-border institutions suggests a need to revise the concept of sovereignty.

He is also cuttingly critical of those who make reductionist analyses of conflicts in Africa:

Take the situation in Angola. To accuse Savimbi of being a bandit can only lead to more conflict. Its not as simple as that, where does this Savimbi get his support from?… the rural areas! How could he control the majority of the countryside for

so many years if he is simply a butcher? I am not denying that he has butchered a lot of people or that he continues to do so. I am not denying that the other side consists of despots, thieves and robbers who equally are pilfering the wealth of the country. To simply understand the conflict in Angola as a question of banditry and the dishonesty of one man, Jonas Savimbi, is to deny the fact that Savimbi is Ubundu. Historically the Ozibundu… are the biggest ethno-cultural entity in the Angolan state. They have always felt themselves at odds with the assimilado elements who dominated the MPLA, and are culturally more closely linked to Portugal than rural Africa.

There you have a recipe for conflict which we should be able to direct our attention to. Not slip all these other factors under the carpet and simplify the issue as one of banditry… that means we will not solve the problem.

If group relations that pre-existed the post-colonial states are active in the present, what formats from past institutions and cultural practices will enable us to think our way through conflict in Africa? Like other African thinkers, Prah is careful to point out that institutions that hold sway in the minds of people need to be critically utilised:

I am not saying that we should go back and import wholesale. For as long as institutions hold sway in the minds and the lives of Africans in the rural areas, we cannot wish them away. It is better that we take hold of them, and with simple engineering and adaptation, democratise them, so that they work for us, rather than treat them as if they do not exist. For example, it would be wise to consider how customary legal practices could be used to deal with the perpetrators of genocide. Customary institutions will be easily understood and recognised by the masses, instead of establishing a western legal process, which is not accepted. I am suggesting this approach as a general principle.. Much research would be required.

For example, neighbourhood tribunals in the townships, like those implemented by the Chinese beyond the revolutionary period, are being discussed. Elders, sitting together with everybody, will hear a case, judge the case according to precepts that they have known from time immemorial. If aspects of these precepts are not acceptable, then we change them. But we must not throw all institutions out of the window and expect to make progress. Rather let us reconsider the old institutions, see how they can be improved and modernised. That way we are sure of enforcement. Let us make sure that customary safeguards enjoy modern legal usage, and are upheld in a proper court.

For Prof. Kwesi Prah, training for conflict resolution requires us to identify the root causes of conflict as economic, political and social interests. We must realise that what is perceived as genocide is calculated and premeditated mobilisation of murder in the ruthless pursuit of power for the few which only a radical tolerance of cultural difference can effectively resist.

Alison Lazarus is the Manager of ACCORD's Training Unit

Conflict and Conflict Resolution
IN SIERRA LEONE

BY KAMAR YOUSUF

Death, destitution and despair – these words have come to describe the crisis in Sierra Leone for the last eight years. This paper attempts to explain the root causes of the conflict and the major players, and examines ways in which this crisis could be resolved.

Background and Overview to the Conflict

A civil war erupted in Sierra Leone in 1991 when insurgent forces, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), launched attacks against the government of President Joseph Mamoh. The country has now faced violent armed conflict for eight years with no noticeable end in sight.

Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has endured a succession of corrupt military regimes and struggles over economic and political power. Flawed economic and political models have led to dismal growth per capita income, falling rates of food production, mismanagement of natural resources, disregard of human rights, and ongoing civil war. The latest round of violence is unique in the scale and grotesque nature of the attacks on civilians. The extent of the conflict has resulted in much of the rural areas being inaccessible, thereby creating difficulties for relief agencies to distribute urgently needed food supplies to the starving rural population.

President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah came to power in 1996 in the first multiparty democratic election in Sierra Leone for many years. On 25 May 1997, his government was overthrown by disgruntled sections of the army under the command of Major Johnny Paul Koroma. The President was forced to flee to exile in Guinea. The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a charismatic former army corporal, supported by the armed forces of Liberian leader, Charles Taylor, and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. The military junta led by Major Koroma, and the RUF were united in their opposition to President Kabbah's government.

Charles Taylor supported the RUF in retaliation for President Mamoh allowing the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops to use Sierra Leone as a rear base for its operations during the seven-year Liberian civil war. The RUF at first seemed a puppet movement, an offshoot of Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). It was however, able to attract support from the impoverished countryside by exploiting the frustrations of uneducated and unemployed youth, resentful of the manner in which the Freetown élite has enriched itself at the people's expense. Disillusioned bands of young men and disparate groups who regard violence as a means of solving local disputes, have provided fertile recruiting grounds for the RUF.

The military junta, which established control of Sierra Leone, called itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). It joined forces with the RUF to form a regime characterised by serious human rights violations resulting in a complete breakdown of the rule of law. In February 1998, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping troops forced the AFRC/RUF out of

power and reinstated President Kabbah. Since this reinstatement, the rebel alliance has been waging war against ECOMOG and the government.

With no recognisable political platform, the rebels are committing widespread atrocities and grave human rights abuses in an attempt to regain power. The AFRC/RUF are targeting unarmed civilians, torturing and mutilating them, often by amputating their limbs. Women have been targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. Violence meted against children has included killings and forcible recruitment as soldiers. In addition to various forms of physical abuse, Sierra Leoneans suffer from psychological trauma due to the intentionally cruel methods of inflicting harm against these individuals and their communities. More than a million Sierra Leoneans have been displaced. Most have become internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands have fled the country as refugees, redominantly to neighbouring Guinea and Liberia.

Sierra Leone civilians involved in Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacks await medical attention. Human Rights has condemned the rebel atrocities committed on the civilian population

The parties supporting the government forces include the Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLA); the Kamajors, a civilian militia group loyal to the current President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah; and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.

The rebels supporters include the RUF commanded by Sam Bockarie; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; and renegade Sierra Leonean soldiers, led by Johnny Paul Koroma. The RUF leader, Sankoh has been in jail since March 1997 and has been sentenced to death for treason. He has appealed against the sentence, and has recently participated in the current peace agreement.

President Kabbah returned to office to face the task of restoring order to a demoralised population and a disorganised and severely damaged economy. The fragmented Sierra Leonean army is neither strong nor effective. Before the conflict started, the RSLA numbered around 3 000 soldiers. This was dramatically increased to 13 000 soldiers, in response to the RUF's constant attacks. Army recruitment was largely random, with the admission of criminals and unemployed street youth to bolster numbers, and given minimal training before being armed and sent up to the front. Due to public spending cuts, the army was often not paid leading to looting and some joining the rebels.

Foreign Involvement in the Conflict

The conflict in Sierra Leone has not received international attention. Attention has rather focussed on exploiting the countries rich diamond and mineral deposits. This mixture of exploitation and indifference, coupled with a history of weak respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions, has enabled military leaders to hold power and divert revenue from the mines for their own benefit. In recent years both govern-ment and rebel groups have sought to tip the balance of political and economic control, by employing private security firms or mercenaries, often in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions.

A diamond smuggling web is thriving in Sierra Leone. The illicit operators are able to take advantage of the ongoing political instability. Foreign mercenaries defend mineral resources, at the same time as assisting rebel or government forces. To cite an example, the South African based company, Executive Outcomes (EO), which has a history of providing military support for particular armed conflicts and thereby causing destabilisation, provide defence to the diamond-mining companies. In addition, they provide military assistance to the ECOMOG forces.

It has been reported that major mining corporations, such as De Beers and the British-owned company Branch Energy, are

amongst the clients of Executive Outcomes. The South African mercenaries maintain security in the diamond regions. At the same time EO has launched attacks on RUF-held areas with the use of attack helicopters and sophisticated radio equipment, trained and supported RSLA forces.

The international community, including the United States, and Britain, has charged that Charles Taylor's forces continue to support the RUF, although he has denied this allegation. Recently, ECOMOG confirmed that Liberia and Burkina Faso were providing arms and support for the rebels, including through Ukrainian mercenaries.

The Economic Setting

Sierra Leone is one of the world's five poorest countries, belonging to a group of countries classified by the World Bank and the IMF as 'Highly Indebted Poorest Countries' (HIPC). Years of economic mismanagement have resulted in a plethora of severe socio-economic problems. Fewer than 40 percent of Sierra Leoneans have access to health services and there is poor provision of other social services. The ongoing civil war has resulted in the further deterioration of the economy and impoverishment for ordinary Sierra Leoneans.

The majority of the population is subsistence farmers. Ironically, Sierra Leone possesses an abundance of natural resources, including gold, diamonds, bauxite, titanium dioxide, and is a producer of coffee, rice and cocoa. However, the enormous wealth generated from these exports has served to enrich some government officials, international mining companies and business-men. The granting of mining licenses and Customs and Excise duties have provided the main source of revenue for the government. Smuggling is, however, rife with an estimated US$200 million of diamonds each year illegally exported. Collected revenue has often not found its way into the country's treasury, with many officials using their positions to accumulate per-sonal wealth. Awareness that massive corruption has denied the majority access to the wealth of the country has resulted in popular disaffection.

In January 1995, the Australian and American owned company, Sierra Rutile, which was the world's largest producer of titanium dioxide, and the Australian owned bauxite exporting company, Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company, shut down legitimate mining activities following attacks and looting. These companies were previously major employers in the region. They provided the government with about half of its export earnings. Both companies are considering resuming operations in Sierra Leone, once destroyed infrastructure is rebuilt and there is a return to some degree of stability.

Meanwhile, some diamond mining has continued, but smug-gling has also increased, facilitated by networks of army officers and rebels. Recently, there has been a resumption of diamond mining in the Koidu area under the protection of Executive Outcomes. Branch Energy has been given a special mining concession in the Koidu district. Providing the security and monopolising the diamond business may mean that Branch Energy has a very strong hold on any future government.

The production of rice, cocoa and coffee, important staples of the economy, have been seriously disrupted by the conflict. Terrorised farmers have fled their lands and food distribution has been virtually halted due to the insecurity of the road network. Export earnings have collapsed and the country, tradi-tionally a rice exporter, now imports foodstuff.

In sum, the government is virtually bankrupt and dependent on World Bank and IMF loans with most of the revenue used for servicing the war.

Military coup leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma speaks at a press conference in Freetown

The bodyguards of military coup leader Johnny Paul Koroma

Long-term Prospects for Sustainable Peace

Years of poor governance, economic mismanagement and lack of control over economic resources such as the diamond mines have caused the crisis in Sierra Leone. The wealth of the country has not resulted in economic growth. Inequity between the few in a position to exploit the resources and the majority who go without is extreme. Sierra Leoneans have never experi-enced responsible government. There is widespread resentment and a loss of faith in government and politicians. Most affected are the youth alienated from government and traditional authority. The war is the result of the acute political and economic crisis. Sustained violence has exaggerated the crisis and created a humanitarian emergency.

VIEWPOINT

The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) did not bring a rapid end to the war and corruption, as promised in 1992, and the coup revealed that weak governance continued. The challenge for President Kabbah's government now is to reverse these trends, and bring stability and economic growth to his collapsed country. Economically, Sierra Leone has the potential to be self-sufficient and with its rich mineral deposits it is reasonable to assume that there could be healthy foreign investment in the country. Sustainable peace in Sierra Leone is feasible if the government and the international community commit to playing the following roles:

Role of the Government

In order to end the cycle of violence in Sierra Leone, perpetrators of human rights violations must be held accountable for their actions. This includes all those suspected of having committed human rights abuses including AFRC/RUF members and former AFRC/RUF collaborators, and members of the armed forces. All suspects must be given fair trials and if found guilty, punished according to national and international law. The government should consider utilising international judges in cases regarding war crimes.

To succeed in promoting sustainable peace the government must pursue a three-pronged strategy that aims to achieve good governance, economic revival and nation building.

Roles of the UN, OAU and ECOWAS

The United Nations

The international community has a crucial role to play in promoting human rights, the rule of law, and stability in Sierra Leone. The United Nations agencies are well placed to implement programs and policies to meet these ends. The United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) should closely monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian law and ensure that ECOMOG's mandate to train the new Sierra Leonean army results in an ethnically and geographically balanced force.

Practical measures to support the strengthening of a human rights culture include the provision of necessary resources (at UN headquarters and in the field) to the human rights office of UNOMSIL in order that it effectively monitor and report publicly on the human rights situation in Sierra Leone. In addition, the human rights office must provide technical assistance and training to the Sierra Leonean government and local human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

UNOMSIL must carefully monitor the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme for combatants, developed by the World Bank and the Sierra Leonean government. UNOMSIL should ensure that ECOMOG, which is responsible for the implementation of the DDR program, treats captured or surrendered combatants, especially the large number

GOOD GOVERNANCE SHOULD INCLUDE

1   A sustainable peace agreement

2   The re-establishment of functioning state institutions

3   A strong civil – military plan, including demobilization and rehabilitation of ex-combatants and the re-training of police and soldiers

4   Upholding the rule of law, observing human rights and strengthening the judiciary

5   Rehabilitating education and health sectors, and providing these services throughout the country

6   Establishing strong political leadership, and legitimizing opposition political parties

ECONOMIC REVIVAL SHOULD INCLUDE

1   Fiscal accountability

2   Building capacity for transparent decision-making

3   Encouraging the return of foreign investment and ensuring that this is regulated in a manner consistent with Sierra Leone's financial and economic requirements

4   Employment creation, specifically provisions must be made for unemployed youth and soldiers demobilized from the Sierra Leone army and the RUF

NATION BUILDING SHOULD INCLUDE

1   Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2   Creating trauma counselling and psychological treatment for mutilated civilians

3   Promoting dialogue among different groups – religious leaders, scholars and business people – based on mutual trust and recognition of rights and responsibilities of all Sierra Leoneans

of child soldiers, in a humane fashion. It should ensure that ECOMOG works closely with other agencies to facilitate the reintegration of children and other former combatants into civilian communities.

In order to put an end to the cycles of violence and atrocities against civilians, the UN will have to focus on the root causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. With the democratically elected Kabbah government reinstated, the UN should provide required resources to train the civilian police. Also, the UN should support the government's efforts to establish institutions of justice.

Rebel leader Foday Sankoh (2nd right) flanked by senior aides at peace talks in Togo

The UN can assist by encouraging democratic and accountable systems of governance and the strengthening of civil society with full respect for human rights. Further, the UN can facilitate the bringing together of different players who can lobby for and lend assistance to the effective and responsible functioning of the Kabbah government.

The Organization of African Unity

As the OAU lacks adequate finances and infrastructure to assemble a peacekeeping force, its role is limited to that of a co-ordinating body. The OAU should transfer and delegate responsibility to sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to act as peace enforcers, peacekeepers, mediators, and to assist in post-conflict reconstruction.

The Economic Community of West African States

The ECOWAS should ensure that human rights concerns are integrated into ECOMOG's mandate, as well as into its own initiatives to promote peace and stability in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG troops should stop obstructing humanitarian aid and take measures to minimise the impact of their military initiatives on civilian populations and structures. ECOMOG should work closely with UNOMSIL, UNHCR, and humanitarian agencies to assure that accurate and neutral information regarding security is provided to the public, especially to refugees, displaced populations, and aid workers.

Role of Multilateral Institutions

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have to undertake steps to encourage the international community to support the long-term reconstruction and development of Sierra Leone. In the past, under its post-conflict reconstruction funding activities, the World Bank has provided money for social safety net projects for conflict-affected populations of its member countries. Therefore, the Bank should formulate a framework to support Sierra Leone's post-conflict reconstruction through sustainable social and economic development. It can also support demobilisation and integration of ex-combatants, mine clearing activities, and rehabilitation of infrastructure.

Moreover, the World Bank and the IMF need to bring together donors to address the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. Post-conflict reconstruction should include (a) jump-starting the economy through investment in key reproductive sectors; (b) creating conditions for resumption of trade, savings, domestic and foreign investment; and (c) promoting macroeconomic stabilisation, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and restoration of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.

In conclusion, it seems that peace in Sierra Leone is impeded by two factors. First, mercenaries, including Executive Outcomes form part of a powerful political-commercial network that adversely affect the prospects for sustainable peace. Peace negotiations should include the removal of all mercenaries from the country.

Second, the current violence in Sierra Leone has not been confined to conflict between two organised factions. The RSLA High Command seems to have lost control of its soldiers necessitating the intervention of foreign forces. Poorly supervised rogue elements within the army, together with cross-border bandits have used force to steal diamonds, locally produced food stocks and attack food convoys. Stories of complicity between rebels and government troops abound and there have been several cases of soldiers serving the government by day and rebels at night. This gave birth to the term 'sobels,' an acronym for disloyal soldiers.

Similarly, it is clear that Foday Sankoh is not in full control of the rebels on the ground. Just hours after the cease-fire agreement signed by the government and the RUF rebels, entered into effect on May 24, 1999, RUF rebels attacked the ECOMOG forces.

Despite these setbacks to the quest for sustainable peace, there are three encouraging signs that provide hope that the prospects for peace may not be as bleak as some might suggest. First, the fact that Foday Sankoh is attending talks between the government and the rebels in Lome, Togo. Second, that the government has agreed in principle to release Sankoh. Finally, prospects for peace are enhanced by the positive role being played by third-party mediators such as the Togolese president and the influential Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone. The thawing in relations between the parties has already had some positive consequences. Recently, the RUF has released its hostages, including three Catholic missionaries.

Kamar Yousuf is a Research Intern at ACCORD

VIEWPOINT

MOUTHPIECE

Each quarter Mouthpiece will focus on a particular aspect of ACCORD's work. Emphasis will be placed on analysing developments in the conflict resolution field on the continent and looking at how ACCORD's programmes are striving to meet Africa's complex and ever-changing challenges

LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXERCISE BLUE CRANE

BY CEDRIC DE CONING

Cedric de Coning is the Manager of ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit

Exercise Blue Crane, a SADC peacekeeping exercise, was hosted by South Africa during April 1999. The Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD, as part of the Norwegian funded Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project, was responsible for the civilian aspects of the exercise.

Twelve of the fourteen SADC countries participated in the brigade level exercise, with approximately 4 500 personnel. It was the first time that SADC staged a peacekeeping exercise of this size and scope and was the largest of its kind ever held in Africa. Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom contributed financially, while India, Belgium and the United States assisted with the airlifting of the various contingents. India and France participated in the naval leg of the exercise. The United Nations, the Organization for African Unity and about nineteen other African and international countries sent approximately 50 advisors and observers to the exercise.

ACCORD was tasked by the participating SADC countries to design, plan and co-ordinate all the civilian aspects of the Exercise. Modern peacekeeping missions incorporate a large number of civilian actors. UN peacekeeping missions are led by a civilian, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and include various UN, governmental and NGO agencies and organisations in the humanitarian and human rights fields. These include UN agencies such as the UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF; the ICRC and NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children and CARE. Modern peacekeeping missions often find themselves in a situation where there is more than one international organization involved. In Exercise Blue Crane we also added a civilian OAU Observer Mission and a SADC Human Rights Observer Group. ACCORD designed the civilian component, integrate it into the rest of the exercise, and co-ordinated the civilian activities during the exercise. The preparations included a peacekeeping training workshop for the instructors at the South African Army Battle School at Lohatla, where the exercise was held, and a Civil-Military Co-ordination Seminar, immediately prior to the actual exercise.

Our understanding of conflict systems have undergone considerable change in the last decade. In the new conflict paradigm civilians are both the targets and perpetrators of violence. In today's conflicts civilians have become the principal objects of war. Civilians are willfully displaced, killed and or tortured to create chaos, to de-populate certain areas and/or to commit ethnic genocide. The way civilians have been consciously targeted and terrorised in Kosovo and Sierra Leone are current examples. These types of conflicts need a specific type of response, namely a political and humanitarian driven response. The roles civilians play in modern peacekeeping missions have thus been developed in direct response to these changes in our understanding of the new conflict paradigm.

Peacekeeping is no longer exclusively a military affair where a neutral force is deployed between two warring parties to monitor a cease-fire. In our times peacekeeping missions have become complex multidimensional campaigns, where the military is but one player in a multidisciplinary team that includes diplomats, conflict resolution experts, humanitarian relief agencies, human rights workers and civilian police. Exercise Blue Crane involved a unique range of civilian actors including UN civilian police, UN diplomatic, human rights and humanitarian staff, an OAU monitoring mission, a SADC Human Rights Observer Group, the International Committee of the Red Cross and African non-governmental organisations.

Exercise Blue Crane provided the SADC countries with an opportunity to train together, to exercise multinational command and control and to integrate the civilian and military roles in an exercise that simulated many of the realities of a modern conflict scenario. Most participants came to the realisation that peacekeeping is much more complex than they first realised. Bringing together a couple of thousand people from different cultural, functional and organisational backgrounds, and integrating them into one operational activity, is not easy. The complexity of the undertaking is multiplied when undertaken at short notice under difficult and often dangerous conditions. The logistics of feeding, clothing, housing and continuously re-supplying such a large group of people is in-itself a huge undertaking.

SADC has gained a great deal from this experience. These include the need to intensify joint peacekeeping training and to

integrate certain aspects of military, police and civilian training and preparation for peacekeeping missions. The exercise will assist SADC refine its training priorities to cover aspects most needed. The exercise assisted SADC decide how it would conduct multinational field training exercises of this nature in future.

Benefit was derived from jointly exercising the various units and commands. SADC's capacity and readiness to contribute a sub-regional brigade for UN style peacekeeping operations was assessed. The Exercise developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that could be used by SADC, and others, in any future peacekeeping missions of this nature.

The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of SADC agreed in principle, during their recent meeting in Swaziland, to the establishment of a SADC stand-by brigade. Exercise Blue Crane thus also contributed to the assessment of the feasibility of such an initiative. If such a proposal were implemented, SADC would develop and maintain a SADC brigade level capacity to participate in UN style peace missions, and lodge this capacity with the OAU and UN stand-by systems.

Exercise Blue Crane gave each participant, whether they were a corporal from Moçambique or a UN civilian affairs officer from Zambia, the opportunity to get as close to the real peacekeeping as is possible. It gave the various military contingents the opportunity to work together under joint command, to test their interoperability and to practice their common SOP's.

The Exercise also created an opportunity for the various civilian actors, the police and military, to develop and test co-ordination mechanisms such as a Mission Co-ordination Centre (MCOC). The latter is a new concept that was based on the Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre (CMOC) developed under different circumstances in NATO missions in the former Yugoslavia. Exercise Blue Crane thus provided the UN and the international community with an ideal laboratory to test the MCOC's feasability in a UN-style peace mission.

The physical legacy of the Exercise will be a set of SADC SOP's for future UN style peacekeeping missions that have been jointly developed in the run up to the Exercise by the SADC planning team. The SOP's have been tested in the course of the Exercise, and will be available to SADC once the necessary adjustments have been made. Exercise Blue Crane will also be followed-up with a Lessons Learned Seminar in July 1999. Various SADC and international participating countries will come together to analyse and formulate the lessons that can be drawn from the Exercise Blue Crane. Experience will be used for future similar exercises, or where relevant, for future UN peace missions.

BOOK **REVIEWS**

PROTECTING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE MILITARY CHALLENGE

L. DU PLESSIS AND M. HOUGH, HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL (HSRC), PRETORIA (1999) 278P

Reviewed by Brig. James Machakaire (rtd), Intern in ACCORD's Peacekeeping Unit

This book examines how policies adopted by states after independence influenced the enhancement of security through investment in and development of the armed forces. Coincidentally most states in this region attained independence by armed struggle. The desire and temptation to enhance security through the rapid and massive development of military strength was so high on the agendas of most of these states, that it over-shadowed the need to rationalise distribution of available resources.

The authors note that in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, armed units existed for protection, (police forces) rather than as professional armies prior to independence.

On attainment of independence, most Sub-Saharan governments poured available resources into defence projects at the expense of other needy areas. Whilst their intended objective was the establishment of national peace, the reverse was the outcome. Few state resources were channelled into social and developmental projects resulting in poverty, disease and destitution for the majority of citizens.

The authors argument that prior to colonialism, there were no armies in Africa, cannot go unchallenged. Historians have recorded numerous wars fought by men and women using spears, bows and arrows, fighting on horse back and on foot. These wars have been acclaimed as having been fought by organised armies that fought great battles. Many of the men and women who took part therein, were regarded as brave and honourable. Wars fought by African kingdoms were waged in similar fashion. The men who partook in these conflicts were equally led and organised. The fact that these wars were fought by Africans cannot be used as the basis for concluding and misreprinting facts about the non-existence of armies in the Sub-Saharan region prior to colonialism. Historians owe it to the world to present facts accurately. In the same manner that the world acknowledges what the Roman and Ottoman empire armies stood for, it should recognise the professionalism with which the kingdoms of Monomotapa, Tshaka, Lobengula and Mzilikazi organised their armies in or out of the battle field.

In Chapter 2, the book outlines the relationship between historical military development and economic development. Numerous variables are sighted as conditional to the attainment, by any Sub-Saharan State, of modern military professionalism. South African's armed forces stand out as having managed a standard comparable to a number of armies in countries of the North. The professionalism of other regional armies is however, constrained by financial and technological constraints. Ironically many regional military personnel have gained modern military professionalism through direct participation in the conflicts that continue to exacerbate regional and international peace efforts.

In Chapter 5, the authors note the predicament most Sub-Saharan states face in trying to achieve the military standards such as those of countries of the North and South Africa. Selected countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe, have managed a measure of modernisation in air power. Dependence on the foreign military industry undermines sustained improvement. Most Sub-Saharan countries possess old aircraft in their inventories. These weapons are often not maintained due to financial constraints.

The authors undertook substantial research. Information pertaining to equipment related analysis and equipment usability in most Sub-Saharan African countries is accurate and informative. The authors analysis and argument does not lose sight of the delicate balance required between national economic competence, maintenance of prestige and resource allocation between military, social,

economic and cultural sectors. The ability to formulate policies that addresses this important balance has been starkly absent in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, the resultant economic ruin, social unrest and increase in conflicts that continue to perpetuate poor governance, human migration, poverty, hunger, disease, industrial decline and increased weapons trafficking.

In Chapter 8, the authors accurately narrate the history of the emergence of the idea of collective security and the arguments which defeated the idea of an African High Command (AHC). Of serious concern were the difficulties associated with the management, financing and maintenance of such an organ within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This is compounded by the varied differences in culture, languages, and training doctrines amongst those seconded forces. The authors noted how the external threat posed by South Africa and Rhodesia during the 1960s and 1970s influenced the focus and definition of external threat within the OAU. Since that threat has fallen away, leaders need to develop an understanding of contemporary threats to peace in Africa. The authors argue that threats to peace today emanate from crime, corruption, hunger, civil wars, dictatorships internal and external refugees, coup d'etats, lack of democracy and bad governance.

The book argues in favour of regional security arrangements in place of a continental effort co-ordinated through relevant OAU and UN mechanisms. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are notable developments towards the realisation of regional peace. Recent developments in the security of the SADC region however, have surfaced to challenge the authors' theory, argument and conviction. Despite the existence of various agreements to guarantee collective security in the region, some leaders have entered into arrangements that undermine original efforts.

The book was well researched and paints an accurate picture of contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors painstakingly elaborate on the state of civil – military relations, identify most of the causes of under development and conflict as they relate to the economy and military build up within the region. Threats to peace in the Sub-Saharan African region revolve primarily around tribal, religious and ethnic issues. The book further argues that power rivalry and political exclusiveness encourages secessionist attempts and coup d'etats. The authors argue that some of these problems can be traced back to the colonial period. The myopic and impractical political policies implemented by the post colonial ruling elite have inadvertently fuelled and worsened other inherent societal differences.

The book places further emphasise on the need for enhancing state co-operation. The issue of state sovereignty is no longer a valid argument for leaders to argue for non-intervention in internal matters of a state by another state. Contemporary problems have an international dimension. This compels states to co-operate and co-ordinate responses. The book suggests that to obviate this dilemma, co-ordination, co-operation, consultation, tolerance, good governance and freedom of the press, democracy and

observance of human rights are guidelines engendering regional stability and peace.

The book concludes by forecasting that economic and technological constraints would not present an improved military picture for most Sub-Saharan African states in the 21st century. However, the adoption of the concept of regional security arrangements through joint training for peacekeeping, the fight against drug trafficking and smuggling of weapons would remove misplaced individual threat perceptions and enhance mutual understanding among neighbours. The authors suggest that a gradual realisation of common goals and agendas amongst Sub-Saharan countries would influence the needed reduction in military build-ups. Hopefully leaders would be able to address development and give the African Renaissance a chance.

....

A PEACE OF TIMBUKTU, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND AFRICAN PEACEMAKING

ROBIN-EDWARD POULTON AND IBRAHIM AG YOUSSOUF, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH (UNIDIR), NEW YORK AND GENEVA (1998) 366P

Reviewed by Senzo Ngubane, Research Assistant in ACCORD's Research Unit

The statement that something 'new' always comes out of Africa, as depicted in Pliny the Elder's story centuries ago, is clearly reflected in this book. This something 'new' contrary to the ugly picture painted by Pliny of Africa, happens to be positive.

Africa was not unaffected by the turbulent years of the Post Cold War era. Since the end of global bipolarity, the winds of change have blown strongly across the African continent. This is most graphically evidenced in the process of democratisation, which witnessed the ousting of 'Big Men' like Kenneth Kaunda and Hastings Banda from the corridors of power. A peace of Timbuktu reflects on the processes of change resulting from the replacement of an oppressive regime by a democratically elected government.

The authors guide the reader through the socio-cultural background of Mali. They argue that this background informs the political organisation and outcomes of Mali's transitional period that began in the early 1990s. The opening chapters of the book reveal the particular unique features of the Mali state as compared to other African states. Whereas language and skin-colour are commonly used as guides to ethnic origin in Africa, it is noted that in Mali 'language, like dress and skin-colour is a poor guide to ethnic origin' (p3). This lends itself to a common Malian identity.

Mali shares two trends with the rest of Africa. Firstly, like other states in Africa, the country was under one party rule of Moussa Traore. The system of a one party state is accompanied by the exclusion of certain groups of people from the processes of governance and decision making. In the case of Mali, the northern part of the country was systematically marginalised by the central government. As such it lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of economic development.

Popular anger at the excesses of the single party state culminated in a series of revolts that began in 1990. Without necessarily undermining the impact that the revolts had on the population of Mali, the authors rightly argue that the revolts never progressed into a full-scale civil war. This was the case because, among other reasons, the rebels opted for a negotiated settlement even though they had a chance of a military victory over the Traore regime.

A 'peaceful' transition to a new era is usually unstable and threats of a return to arms were ever present in Mali. Transition and the eventual dawn of democracy had to be achieved through efforts and the guarantee that the economic re-generation of northern Mali was to occur. It is in this regard that one notes the positive role played by the United Nations and its specialised agencies directing developmental projects particularly towards northern Mali. This stemmed from an understanding that as long as northern Mali remained neglected economically, the future stability of Mali as a political entity would continue to be threatened.

Common to many African states is the problem of civil-military relations where the population views the army as a source of insecurity. Mali was no exception. It was only after the signing of the National Pact, the peace agreement between the rebel forces and the Traore regime, that measures to restore people's confidence in the army were initiated. These measures included the creation of an internal security corps made up of all sections of the population to serve their respective local authorities p 253).

Civil society both inside and outside Mali played a positive role in supporting the re-integration of former combatants into society, thereby assisting Mali's transition to democracy.

The last few chapters give an analytical insight of what the necessary conditions for sustainable peace are. Good governance and democracy, are presented as the cornerstone for this process. Furthermore, the notion of peace, in the context of Africa, cannot be separated from development and popular empowerment.

This is a well-written book and its value lies at three levels. First, it reveals the interface between socio-cultural variables and conflict. Second, it offers critical insight into how dynamic partnerships between state and non-state actors can be forged in the interests of peace and security. Finally, at a time of growing Afro-pessimism, the book narrates the tale of an African success story, where dialogue and reason finally overcame the politics of violence and vengeance.

RENAISSANCE
BAROMETER

BY SENZO NGUBANE

The continent is abuzz with talk of an African Renaissance. What will these changes mean? How do we chart their progress. Conflict Trends gives you a quarterly update on the most significant events in civil society, government and business sectors for the continent, with a particular focus on the growth in Africa's ability to manage her conflicts. The continent of Africa has been divided into five regions based on the OAU administrative regional division.

AFRICA GENERAL

1 March 1999 According to the Regional Office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 countries signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty on the ban on landmines. These include South Africa, Lesotho, Benin, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Moçambique, Namibia, Senegal and Zimbabwe.

3 March 1999 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, released a report detailing measures to be implemented to boost Africa's peacekeeping capacity. The report called for the creation of funds and scholarships to be used to train military personnel from Africa. He also recommended the establishment of a working group made up of Africans and non-Africans to be responsible for the training programme.

17 March 1999 The United States Export-Import bank vowed to increase its business in Sub-Saharan Africa. To date the bank has backed exports to Africa up to the value of US$200 million.

18 March 1999 In a joint communique, Presidents Bizimugu of Rwanda and Museveni of Uganda, stated that war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was unnecessary. They urged Eritrea and Ethiopia to opt for a peaceful settlement.

22 March 1999 The 69th ordinary session of the OAU held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, stated that there was a need to restructure the secretariat of the continental body to enable it deal with issues affecting Africa more effectively.

23 March 1999 Over 250 delegates from multinational corporations in the telecom business and Ministers of Communication and Information from South Africa, Ghana, Cameroon and Chad assembled in Ghana for a three-day Telecom Summit. Corporations present expressed interest in Africa's unexplored telecommunication market. The Ministers saw as a challenge the need to make telecommunications services available even in rural areas.

13 April 1999 The Paris based International Agency of the Francophone issued funds to media organisations in sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean islands. These grants are aimed at improving information technology of such organisations in the South.

28 April 1999 A two-day conference of Health Ministers from the Great Lakes region held in Kigali ended, with a declaration by the directorate of Rwanda's National AIDS Control Centre (PNLS) that an amount of US$400 000 was be set aside for an HIV/AIDS prevention programme in the region.

19 April 1999 Health Ministers from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), held a meeting in Pretoria last week. Among other things, the ministers held discussions on the adoption of a draft SADC protocol on health, which would provide a legal basis for member states to work together on health related issues.

10 May 1999 Officials from member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), made a call for the creation of a special organ to co-ordinate responses to emergencies in the region. This suggestion was made after a seminar on the 'Co-ordinated use of International Military and Civil Defence Assets in Emergency Management' was held in Ivory Coast earlier in May.

12 May 1999 Water Affairs Ministers from 10 States which use water from the river Nile met in Addis Ababa for a two-day conference. The conference sought to create cooperation on the sustainable use of the water resources. The Nile Council of Ministers is expected to compile a framework agreement on the use of Nile's water by 2002.

25 May 1999 A three-day meeting of the Board of Governors

of the African Development Bank (ADB), began in Cairo. It is hoped that the meeting would map out 'a new vision for development' for African states. The Bank wants to focus its new vision on three key areas, that is, agriculture and rural development, human resources and private sector development.

26 May 1999   The UN Secretary General met with the former Swedish Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlson. The former Prime Minister heads a three member team that is to investigate the role of the continental body in Rwanda's 1994 genocide. This task team has been established following allegations that the UN ignored the early warning signals it received regarding the genocide.

NORTH AFRICA

Algerian family members welcome released prisoners

Anti-peace activists protest at a peace conference

Nelson Mandela welcomes Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to South Africa

ALGERIA

8 March 1999   About 2 000 women marched on the streets of the Capital City, Algiers demanding improvements to women rights. The march ended in central Algiers where a wreath was laid in memory of Karima Belhadj, the first woman to lose her life in a rebel attack in 1993. The event was Organised by the Algerian Women's Democratic Rally, Algerian Rally for Democracy and Against Arrogance.

5 April 1999   At the close of the 9th session of the Algerian-Malian Joint Commission, the two countries committed themselves to co-operate in making the Sahel-Saharan region a zone of peace, stability and solidarity.

12 May 1999   The Information Unit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) released a press statement that a conference of African Ministers of Justice was to take place in Algiers from 1-2 June. The purpose of the gathering is to discuss ways of combating terrorism on the continent.

EGYPT

8 March 1999   The Egyptian government declared its support and solidarity with Libya over the Lockerbie stalemate. The statement came after a meeting between Presidents Gaddafi and Mubarak.

26 March 1999 The Islamic group, Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, expressed its willingness to support all initiatives aimed at ending armed operations begun by the group.

13 May 1999   Amr Moussa, Minister of Foreign affairs, met with the Sudanese leader of the opposition, Sadeq Al-Mahdi, to discuss the role that Egypt could play in promoting peace and stability in Sudan.

25 May 1999   The annual general meeting of the African Development Bank (ADB), opens in Cairo. The meeting was declared open by the Egyptian Minister of Economy, Youcef Boutros-Ghali. He appealed to all African States to remove customs barriers in order to foster intra-continental trade.

LIBYA

2 March 1999   President Gaddafi, reported that the verbal guarantees he received from Mandela are stronger than Security Council resolutions and they are sufficient to resolve the Lockerbie case.

8 March 1999 Colonel Gaddafi stated that there is a need for Egypt and Libya to co-ordinate their activities and resources for the mutual benefit of their people. Addressing people at Fayoum, South of Cairo, he stated that Libya possesses huge oil and gas reserves that Egypt could exploit for the development of the region.

19 March 1999 Colonel Gaddafi told the media that the Lockerbie affair is now in the hands of President Mandela (South Africa) and King Fahd Ibn Adbul Aziz (Saudi Arabia). The statement comes after the announcement that the two

Libyans suspected of bombing of a Pan Am flight in 1988 would be handed over to Dutch authorities on 6th April.

14 April 1999   The Summit of the Community of Sahel-Saharan states (COMESSA) opens today in Syrte, 450 kilometers east of Tripoli. The meeting, attended by Heads of State from Mali, Chad, Sudan and Libya barred Niger's Prime Minister from participating because of a military coup in that country.

15 May 1999   Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi was to head a meeting of six other African leaders in another bid to bring about peace in the DRC. President Kabila of the DRC and Rwandan Vice-President and Defence Minister Major General Paul Kagame were among the people to attend the meeting.

MOROCCO
2 April 1999   Morocco's Minister of Communications, Mohamed Messari, announced that Morocco no longer supported the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The minister stated that this was in accordance with the UN resolution to impose sanctions on UNITA.

WEST AFRICA

BENIN
5 March 1999   A final list of candidates was to be published by the Autonomous Electoral Commission ahead of the country's parliamentary election of 28th March.

GHANA
3 March 1999   A senior government official announced that the first phase of the 125 megawatt gas-for-electricity project would be complete by September 1999. The project is constructed by Ghana Petroleum (GNPC), a State subsidiary.

8 March 1999   Ghana entered into three agreements with Germany in which the country will receive a sum of 15 million deutsche marks as non-repayable grants. The grant will be used for developmental projects including water supplies to poor communities in the Volta and Eastern regions of Ghana.

18 March 1999   Peter Herrold, the World Bank's director in Ghana, stated that the bank would issue 100 million dollars to support Ghana's Public Sector Reform aimed at trimming this sector to allow the private sector to grow.

7 April 1999   The Africa Regional Conference of the International Bar Association began in Accra. The conference addressed mechanisms to make law more accessible to ordinary citizens in Africa.

16 April 1999   Ghana signed an agreement with Japan, granting 200 million yen (US$1.7 million) for food aid to Ghana.

19 April 1999   John Abu, Minister of Trade and Industry, announced the government's five-year development plan, for the period from 2001 to 2005. The plan is in line with the government's Vision 2020, a blueprint for economic development, aimed at making Ghana a middle-income country in the coming decade.

28 May 1999   The World Bank announced that it had approved credit of US$180 million to be used to assist in economic reform of Ghana. It is hoped that the initiative would contribute to the government's medium-term strategy, contained in the country's vision 2020 economic framework.

GUINEA
14 May 1999 The UN World Food Programme (WFP) agreed to offer US$1.1 million for a city cleaning pilot project in Conakry. This includes the upgrading of waste disposal systems and treatment of urban waste.

GUINEA-BISSAU
16 March 1999   The last group of Senegalese troops left Guinea-Bissau, having been stationed there from June last year, to assist President Vieira fight the army mutiny which threatened to topple his government.

6 April 1999   The UN Security Council supported attempts by the government and rebels to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the country.

13 May 1999   In a ceremony attended by diplomats and ECOMOG troops, the new military junta released 186 soldiers, between the age of 15 and 20 years, who were loyal to ousted President Bernado Vieira.

14 May 1999   Malam Becai Sanha was sworn in as the country's interim president following a coup. He declared his commitment to hold elections on 28th November 1999 as planned.

LIBERIA
9 March 1999   Liberian journalists gathered in Monrovia for a 10-day seminar organised by the Press Union of Liberia, the Justice and Peace Commission and CEDE. The seminar aimed to upgrade the skills of the journalists. Addressing the opening session of this gathering, Senator Brumskine urged journalists not to compromise the truth and stated that freedom of speech could only be limited through judicial action.

31 March 1999 Major General Daniel Chea, Minister of Defence, reported that the government intended to reduce army personnel from about 14 000 to around 6 000 soldiers. In future the ministry would be involved in training the army so that it can better understand its role in protecting and serving civilians.

NIGER

12 April 1999   Opposition parties in Niger expressed a willingness to co-operate with the new military regime to bring about reconciliation and the ultimate restoration of democracy.

19 April 1999   Major Daouda Mallam Wanke, the new military leader of Niger, named the country's 20-member cabinet. The cabinet is comprised mainly of civilians. Only two army officers were appointed as ministers.

22 April 1999   The military regime issued a decree preventing all military members from participating in the country's election to be held later this year. This decree applies to the current military ruler, Major Wanke, and the other members of the ruling National Reconciliation Council (NRC).

4 May 1999   The Military regime appointed a Commission to draft a new constitution for the country. The commission was responsible for drawing up an electoral code and a charter governing political parties. It was to report on 17th May 1999.

NIGERIA

1 March 1999   Justice Ephraim Akpata, Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission, formally declared that General Olusegun Obasanjo had won the Nigerian presidential election. The General, the flagbearer of the Peoples Democratic Party, obtained 18 734 154 votes thus defeating Chief Oluyemisi Falae of the All People's Party (APP) who got 11 110 287 votes.

27 March 1999 The Nigerian Public Policy Research and Analysis Centre named Presidents Mandela and Abubakar as joint recipients of the 1999 Nigerian Zik Prize for Political Leadership

29 March 1999 Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia signed an agreement for the creation of a regional centre for space and technology education.

29 March 1999 General Obasanjo President-elect called for African leaders to make use of the international favourable conditions for African development.

24 April 1999   Commonwealth Foreign Ministers decided to recall Nigeria to the Commonwealth when the civilian President-elect Olusegun Obasanjo is sworn in on 29th May 1999. This decision brings to an end a three-and-a-half year suspension period imposed after the execution of Ken-Saro-Wiwa by the former military regime of the late General Abacha.

5 May 1999   The Provisional Ruling Council approved a new constitution for the country. This would take effect after the 29th May 1999, the inauguration day of President-elect General Obasanjo.

13 May 1999   The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) called off a month-long strike by civil servants for higher wages in 32 of the country's 36 states, whose governments have agreed to meet the workers demands.

28 May 1999   General Abdulsalami Abubakar, the outgoing Nigerian ruler, announced the repeal of decree 2 of 1984. This decree was used by previous regimes to arrest people without due process of the law. According to the General, the decree had to be repealed as it was against the spirit of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution.

President General Abubakar hands over power to President Olusegun Obasanjo

Sierra Leone President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at peace talks

29 May 1999   Thousands of Nigerians and various Heads of State from around the world filled Abuja's Eagle Square to witness the ushering in of a new era for Nigeria. General Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn-in as the country's newly-elected President.

SENEGAL

26 March 1999   The Minister of Tourism and Air Transport, Tidiane Sylla, opened the third regional training centre on aviation safety which is owned by twenty African States. The purpose of the centre is to organise training for air travel safety in the continent.

7 April 1999   The Movement of Democratic Forces, a rebel group fighting for the secession of the southern Senegalese region, reportedly begun disarming most of its fighters.

SIERRA LEONE

8 March 1999   UN Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, announced that the UN would be returning to the capital city Freetown, because the situation has stabilised. The UN withdrew its observer mission and settled in Guinea when the rebels attacked Freetown earlier this year.

13 March 1999 The UN Security Council voted unanimously in support of a three-month extension of the observer mission in the country. The Council urged all UN member countries to offer financial and logistic support to ECOMOG. It called on the rebels and the government to give extra efforts to the peace initiatives.

17 May 1999   The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), announced that the unconditional release of their leader, Foday Sankoh, no longer stood as a requirement for peace talks. This announcement came after a meeting with President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo who was acting as a mediator.

26 May 1999   Peace talks between the government and the representatives of RUF resumed in Lome, Togo. The talks were attended by a delegation from the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); both parties were urged to work towards removing any obstacles that might affect the talks.

RENAISSANCE BAROMETER

CENTRAL AFRICA

ANGOLA
21 April 1999   A group of mothers from the province of Cabinda launched the first public protest against the government's proposed compulsory military conscription for all men born in 1978.

CAMEROON
21 April 1999   The government agreed to hand over three former Rwandan officials to stand trial in Tanzania before the International Tribunal on the 1994 Rwandan genocide. These are former Foreign Minister, Clement Jerome Bicamumpaka, former Public Works and Professional Development Minister, Prosper Mugiraneza and former Trade Minister, Justin Mugenzi.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
5 April 1999 Ange-Felix Patasse, President of Central African Republic, ended his four day visit to Togo where he concluded a treaty of friendship with his counterpart, General Gnassingbe Eyadema.

CHAD
10 March 1999   The National Assembly reiterated the call made by Adoum Togoi for a dialogue with armed rebel groups in the country. The government spokesman, Moussa Dago, declared that the government supported attempts to find a peaceful settlement in Chad.
3 May 1999   It was announced that Chad was to withdraw its forces from the DRC after a regional peace agreement was concluded. The Minister of Information, Moussa Dago, stated that the details of the withdrawal would be decided together with the DRC.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
1 March 1999   Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the leader of the Congolese Rally for Democracy, announced his intentions to campaign for the demobilisation of children from the rebel forces. The leader made the statement after he met the special representative of the UN secretary general on issues of children and armed conflict in Rwanda.
24 March 1999
The Ministry of Health established a working group to formulate a national policy and plan for eradicating onchocersiasis (river blindness). The plan is based on primary health care strategy and its intention is to involve local communities in

DRC refugees support the ceasefire agreement

An Angolan refugee builds a makeshift shelter

combating the disease. Currently about five million people are reported to have contracted this disease.
8 May 1999   A group of medical experts left Kinshasa for Goma, a rebel held town, to assist in combating the spread of Marburg fever, a disease similar to Ebola. This was the first humanitarian assistance from the capital city to a rebel-controlled town since the civil conflict started last year.

REPUBLIC OF CONGO
10 March 1999   A business delegation from Argentina arrived in Brazzaville on a visit aimed at consolidating bilateral co-operation.
1 April 1999   About 100 youths who were recruited by the Roman Catholic Church in Congo, participated in a clean up campaign in Bacongo and Makelekele areas in Brazzaville. 200 000 civilians are expected to return here after fleeing during clashes between the army and Ninja militiamen.
9 April 1999   Preparations were underway for a reconciliation round-table that would lay the basis for a negotiated settlement of the country's conflict. Although no dates were given, it was expected that exiled civilians and military personnel, delegates from civil society and government officials, would attend the meeting.
12 April 1999   China agreed to reschedule the payment of US$90 million debt owed by Congo to China. This move, it is believed, would assist the government to rehabilitate the country's economy.

GABON
10 March 1999   The 36th session of the Ministerial Committee of the Agency for the safety of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA), began in Libreville.
6 April 1999   The acting President of Comoros arrived in Gabon for a one-day visit. He was expected to hold talks with President Omar Bongo of Gabon on enhancing co-operation between the two countries.

EAST AFRICA

BURUNDI

11 March 1999   Burundi decided to observe Women's Day as an attempt to raise the level of awareness of women rights.

12 April 1999   A group of Burundians comprising of 18 political parties and civic organisations, began discussions in Arusha, Tanzania. The talks focused primarily on the country's conflict, prospects for peace and establishing national reconciliation.

17 April 1999   Presidents Pasteur Bizimugu of Rwanda and Pierre Buyoya of Burundi agreed to consolidate bilateral relations, and collaborate in attempts to combat crime and the ideology of genocide.

10 May 1999   Parties to the Burundi conflict entered into another round of talks in Tanzania. Representatives from government, Hutu rebels and opposition parties were expected to suggest proposals to restore the country's democracy, reform the Constitution and restructure the country's army.

18 May 1999   Japan promised to offer US$1 million to the Burundi UN Trust Fund to assist in resettling refugees and internally displaced people.

COMOROS

3 May 1999   The new military ruler, Azali Assoumani, made a commitment to hand-over power to an elected government after a 12-month period. He undertook a programme of meeting with civilian politicians to discuss the formation of a transitional government.

5 May 1999   Azali Assoumani, Comoros' new military leader, stated that the main political parties had given him the necessary support to set up and lead the new government which he promised to announce soon.

DJIBOUTI

9 April 1999   Citizens of Djibouti went to the polls to vote for the country's new president. Two candidates stood for election, Ismail Guelleh and Moussa Ahmed Iddus from the ruling alliance, the Popular Rally for Progress and Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy and the opposition Party for Democratic Renewal.

ERITREA

1 March 1999   The OAU welcomed the decision by the Eritrean government to accept the OAU framework agreement to end the border-dispute with Ethiopia. The OAU noted that Ethiopia had already accepted the peace-plan. There was thus optimism that the nine-month long border dispute could be settled.

5 March 1999   The Eritrean Foreign Minister Haile Wolde Tensae held a meeting with the OAU delegation in the capital Asmara in which he assured the OAU of his country's commitment to the proposed peace plan. The Minister stated that the government had created a body to consider the implementation of the peace plan.

ETHIOPIA

8 March 1999   A forum on 'Violence Against Women, Women and Peace, Women and Development' was held in commemoration of the International Women's Day. The gathering was conducted by the Inter-Agency Working Group on Gender of the UN Country Team, the Women's Affairs Office and representatives of civil society. The primary aim of the forum was to raise awareness of the abuse of women and the difficulties that they encounter in their struggle for peace and development in Africa.

8 April 1999   Ethiopia entered into an agreement with the French Development Agency through which the former is to receive a grant of US$9.9 million to upgrade the water supply system in Addis Ababa.

19 May 1999   Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi held talks with the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to address the on-going border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

KENYA

2 March 1999   The Kenyan port of Mombasa is to become one of the busiest in the world after the UN World Food Programme (WFP) announced its intentions to use it for food distribution to war affected persons in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

15 March 1999   President Daniel arap Moi informed journalists that Africa's road to development depends on renewed efforts to end corruption and an end to the merciless killing of people. Speaking to journalists after his meeting with President-elect Obasanjo of Nigeria, Moi said that the two had emphasised the importance of strengthening intra-continental trade.

18 March 1999   The Federation of Kenyan Women Lawyers lobbied for constitutional reforms to the status of women in Kenya. The group advocates for an end to gender prejudice. This includes the relaxing of prostitution laws and abortion, and the criminalisation of domestic violence.

19 April 1999   A planning meeting for the 'Roll back Malaria in Africa' campaign, organised by the World Health Organisation (WHO), together with the Kenyan Ministry of Health, opened in Nairobi. The meeting aimed to work out possible ways of fighting the disease on the continent.

RWANDA

25 March 1999   Government officials announced that preparations for the country's first local elections after the genocide were underway. Although no timeframe had been given, the officials said that the local elections would be followed by elections at commune and national levels.

19 May 1999   The European Union (EU) agreed to grant US$50 million to Rwanda to be used for economic reform measures. The EU had earlier refused to issue the grant due to the country's involvement in the DRC conflict.

A soldier guards relief supplies at a food distribution centre in Ethiopia

A Rwandan woman

Somalian civilians attend the 16 June celebration to mark the Day of the African Child

SOMALIA

17 May 1999   Ten faction leaders from Somalia were to meet in Addis Ababa for a peace conference following an invitation from Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

SUDAN

7 March 1999   Two rival tribes, the Dinkas and Nuers, sealed a peace deal which could see an end to their seven year conflict. The agreement, signed during a nine-day conference, pledged the two tribes to end all acts of conflict between each other.

2 May 1999   President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan and his counterpart President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, signed an agreement in an effort to end a five-year dispute between the countries. The agreement aimed to renew the diplomatic ties between the countries. Both leaders expressed their confidence that the agreement will work.

22 May 1999   General Gaffar Nimeiri, former Sudanese President, returned to Sudan after spending 14 years in exile in Egypt.

UGANDA

26 March 1999   A judicial Commission of Enquiry was to be set up to investigate the Criminal Investigations Department Director, Mr Chris Bakiza, and two other officers on charges of alleged corruption and misuse of office.

1 April 1999   The government announced a decrease of AIDS cases in the country from 30 percent to 12 percent among pregnant women over the past 10 years.

14 April 1999   President Yoweri Museveni re-iterated his commitment to uphold the constitutional requirement of having a referendum in the year 2000 on how the country is to be governed.

27 May 1999   The World Bank approved credit of US$13 million, aimed at enhancing the country's financial system. This would involve improving monetary management and payment systems and the restructuring and privatisation of the Uganda state-owned Commercial Bank.

27 May 1999   Following the agreement signed in Syrte, stipulating that foreign troops are to be replaced by an African intervention force in the DRC, an advanced group of Libyan soldiers arrived in Uganda to begin proper preparations for the task.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

BOTSWANA

11 March 1999   Bilateral talks were held between Botswana President Festus Mogae and Namibian Leader Sam Nujoma. Despite the two countries strained relations, the Joint Permanent Commission of Co-operation made a commitment to peacefully resolve misunderstandings between them.

LESOTHO

29 April 1999   It was announced that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeeping force is to withdraw from Lesotho because the situation has stabilised.

12 May 1999   The Interim Political Authority (IPA), the current governing body in Lesotho, declared 8th April 2000 as the date for the country's general election.

MALAWI

31 March 1999   Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi undertook a two-day visit to Malawi to witness the inauguration of the country's first television station. He was expected to discuss with his counterpart President Bakili Muluzi bilateral and other regional issues.

24 May 1999   Following the High Court's ruling regarding

the postponement of the election, the Electoral Commission declared the 15th June as the new date for the election.

27 May 1999   Eleven political parties with 668 candidates, reported that they would contested the 197 seats in Parliament in the general election.

MOÇAMBIQUE

19 April 1999   A conference aimed at dealing with child soldiers organised by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers began in Maputo. The conference aimed to develop regional coalitions to mobilise support for the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

NAMIBIA

14 April 1999   Four non-governmental organisations (NGO's) in Namibia, namely the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), the Namibian National Farmers Union (NNFU), the Rural Institute for Social Empowerment (RISE) and the Namibian Non-Governmental Forum (NNGF) decided to collaborate to lobby the government to speed up land resettlement and reform.

SOUTH AFRICA

3 March 1999   The Minister of Safety and Security, Mr Mufamadi, requested the establishment of a Commission of Enquiry on the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal Province ahead of the country's second democratic elections

30 March 1999   Speaking at an African Renaissance Conference, President Nelson Mandela appealed to the KwaZulu-Natal leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to commit themselves into finding workable solutions for peace as the country approached its second democratic elections.

7 April 1999   South Africa signed an agreement with the European Union in which US$105 million would be channelled to a community-based public works programme.

8 April 1999   A peacekeeping exercise codenamed Operation Blue Crane began at the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Battle School at Lohatla in the Northern Cape. About 4 000 defence force personnel, from 10 Southern African Development Community (SADC) member countries, attended the exercise.

10 April 1999   The fourth session of the Joint Bilateral Commission between South Africa and Iran began in Teheran. The session dealt with trade affecting both countries.

13 May 1999   General Siphiwe Nyanda, Chief of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), reiterated his country's position that an intervention in the DRC is not a solution to the conflict. Speaking after meeting his Namibian counterparts, he stated that the war in the region would not be won on the battle field.

23 May 1999   Alec Erwin, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Penuell Maduna, Minister of Energy Affairs, Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a business delegation left for Libya on a four-day visit. The delegation

Ministers Alec Erwin and Trevor Manuel of South Africa at the World Economic Forum

hoped to hold discussions on the establishment of a South African Embassy in Tripoli.

28 May 1999   The government reported that it had increased its shareholding status in the African Development Bank (ADB) to 6 percent thus making it the second largest holder in the Bank after Nigeria.

SWAZILAND

15 April 1999   It was reported that King Mswati was to act as a mediator in the on-going war of words between Zambia and Angola over allegations that the former is supplying arms to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

10 May 1999   The talks between Zambia and Angola aimed at resolving the tensions between the two countries following Angola alleging Zambian complicity in supplying arms to UNITA, began in Swaziland.

ZAMBIA

3 May 1999 The Representative of the World Bank in Zambia, Laurence Clarke, plead to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors to ensure that Zambia is accepted as one of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). This, according to Clarke, will help reduce the country's debt to a sustainable level since it currently stands at US$6.6 billion.

28 May 1999   Zambian Finance Minister, Edith Nawakwi, confirmed that Zambia had obtained US$630 million from the 'Paris Club' donors. About 240 million of this amount would be used to assist the balance of payment support and the other 390 million would be used for project financing.

ZIMBABWE

30 April 1999   The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZTCU) stated that it would be involved in measures to form a Labour Party to contest Zimbabwe's legislative elections in 2000.