

FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

BY HUSSEIN SOLOMON

Southern Africa, or to be more precise the fourteen states which comprise the political entity known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), constitutes a sad anomaly. The region is vast: consisting of 9 278 000 square kilometres with a population of 184 748 000 people. It is a region rich with natural resources and could well be the engine that drives Africa's economic Renaissance. Consider the following in this regard:

- In 1997, SADC exported goods to the value of US \$46 160.9 million.
- In the same year, SADC imports were valued at US \$45 990.7 million.
- In 1998, annual growth rates for several states in the region were quite positive: the Botswana economy grew by 8.3%, Lesotho by 5.8%, Malawi by 6.2% and Mozambique by a spectacular 11.6%.

Despite these positive indicators, the region's people continue to experience unemployment, poverty and malnourishment.

What accounts for this anomaly in a region so well endowed in terms of natural resources? A very large part of the problem relates to the ongoing political instability in the region, of which Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo are possibly the quintessential examples. War results in a diversion of foreign capital flows to more stable regions. War also has its own economic logic that is oblivious to human suffering. To fuel the war machine, the rich resources of one's country are traded for the latest tank or jet fighter. In the process, a vicious cycle of death and impoverishment is created. To break the cycle and to secure the development of the region, it is imperative for a solution to be found for the current wave of political instability besetting several countries in the region. One of the first steps necessary in order to resolve a problem is to understand the problem fully. It is in this vein that this issue of Conflict Trends focuses on Southern Africa.

In the first article, Roger Southall stresses that the situation in Lesotho after the SADC armed intervention and in the run-up to the April 2000 elections remains tenuous. Southall also stresses the need for a more concerted peacebuilding effort designed to establish a reasonable degree of consensus between the conflicting parties if sustainable peace is to be achieved.

Senzo Ngubane notes the tenuous state of affairs in Malawi following the 15 June 1999 elections. While the election brought victory to President Bakili Muluzi's United Democratic Front once again, the legitimacy of the election has been called into question by two opposition parties – the Malawi Congress Party and the Alliance for Democracy. Ngubane notes that the post-election woes of Malawi clearly reveal the lack of a culture of political tolerance.

Reflecting on the current conflict raging in Angola, Hussein Solomon notes that prospects for conflict resolution in the short term are slim. He also stresses the need for a more integrated approach to conflict resolution that involves the international community and civil society in a more co-ordinated fashion.

Building on this theme of greater co-ordination between African and international actors in efforts to resolve conflict on the continent, Kwezi Mngqibisa turns his attention to the Democratic Republic of Congo. He reflects on the potential role of the international community in the Democratic Republic of Congo to sustain the peace effort following the signing of the ceasefire agreement that was prepared in Lusaka by all parties by 31 August 1999.

Mozambique, meanwhile, goes to the polls for its presidential and parliamentary elections in December 1999. In his article, Senzo Ngubane discusses some of the issues in the run-up to the elections and also raises broader points relating to multiparty democracy and governance in Africa.

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Unlike other countries in the region, South Africa continues to be plagued less by political, and more by criminal violence. Consider in this regard the following statistics: South Africa has an average of 53.4 murders per 100 000 people; the international average is 5.5. In addition, it has the most reported rapes – 99.7 per 100 000. In this situation, ordinary citizens feel

fearful and insecure. This fear and insecurity drive them to form vigilante groups that mete out ‘popular justice’ to criminals. In the final article, Marlene Roefs discusses the formation of these anti-crime movements and how they could further escalate tensions between the state and its citizens, thus potentially developing into an additional source of insecurity.

UPDATE

The following is a list of important developments that occurred in September 1999, just before Conflict Trends went to press:

In Sierra Leone, the fragile peace process was given an added boost when Major Johnny Paul Koroma sent a conciliatory message to his troops in order to heal any division between his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front.

Also in West Africa, delegates from twenty African countries, subregional economic groupings, the United Nations, and research institutions gathered in Accra, Ghana for a two-day workshop aimed at setting up a Light Weapons Arms Register and Database. Its aim is to serve as a mechanism for greater transparency.

In another positive development, African defence and security officials met in Swaziland to discuss conflicts plaguing the continent and ways and measures to contain them. According to media reports, special emphasis was placed on the conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Offsetting these positive developments, however, have been situations such as in Burundi where several civilians have been killed and scores more injured in rebel attacks in the Mutanga district, five kilometres west of Bujumbura and in the Kayogoro area of Makamba in south-eastern Burundi.

Meanwhile, in neighbouring Uganda, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) announced that 93 Karamojong warriors were killed in the recent clashes between the Matheniko and Bokora ethnic groups in eastern Uganda.

Prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo dimmed when the Goma faction of the rebel Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) led by Emile Ilunga rejected three proposed facilitators – Father Matteo Zuppi of the Rome-based missionary community Sant’ Egidio; former


President of Benin, Derlin Zinsou; and former OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo of Togo – for the national debate on the political future of the country agreed under the terms of the Lusaka peace deal. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba’s Kisangani faction stated its preference for Sant’ Egidio as the sole neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese talks.

Presidential elections were held on 19 September in the Central African Republic. Although these were conducted peacefully, the nine presidential candidates challenging incumbent President Ange-Felix Patasse said that they ‘reject in advance,’ the results of the first-round vote. In a joint statement, the candidates called for ‘popular resistance to prevent an electoral coup d’état by the candidate Patasse’.

Meanwhile, militant youth in Nigeria’s south-eastern oil town of Bonny forced the closure of the country’s US \$3.8 billion liquefied natural gas plant. Protestors were demanding jobs and social amenities.

Also in West Africa, Liberian Defence Minister, Daniel Chea, said government troops are in ‘complete control’ of Lofa County in north-west Liberia following weeks of intense fighting with armed dissident insurgents. Several hundred people had died in the fighting.

In Sudan, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), comprising northern opposition groups and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), said a special force of its Joint Military Command had blown up a two kilometre section of the newly-installed oil pipeline linking the loading terminal in Port Sudan with oil fields in the south. The NDA also warned that oil operations and their workers remained ‘legitimate military targets’.

The Angolan conflict continues to intensify with government forces engaged in a major battle to capture the UNITA rebel stronghold of Bailundo, some 480 kilometres south-east of the capital Luanda. 

CONFLICT WATCH

By Senzo Ngubane

AFRICA (GENERAL)

24 June 1999 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Early Warning Unit, based in Harare, has warned that the region could be heading for a shortage of maize. According to the Unit the shortage could force the region to import more than two million tons of maize.

9 July 1999 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) announced that seven countries have been barred from voting and participating on the organisation's activities for failing to pay their contributions. These are Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, the Central African Republic, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Seychelles and Liberia.

9 July 1999 The OAU appealed to Western countries and donor agencies to assist those African states faced with the problem of refugees and internally displaced people. It was noted that Angola has 1.6 million displaced people and 11 000 refugees, the continent's highest.

NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA

1 June 1999 It was reported that government forces have killed 33 Moslem rebels in its latest clashes with the rebel movements.

4 June 1999 An operation by rebels killed 19 people in Sidi Ahmed Derouni in Bouhnifa municipality, 300 kilometres west of Algiers.

1 July 1999 The bodies of six Moslem rebels thought to belong to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) were discovered in the province of Medea.

4 July 1999 Prime Minister Smail Hamdani urged the National People's Assembly, the Lower House, to support the proposed *Bill on Civil Concord*, an initiative to bring about reconciliation in the country.

5 July 1999 5 000 prisoners who were serving sentences for terrorism were released by the government. This was said to be in line with President Bouteflika's reconciliation attempts.

6 July 1999 It was reported that a group of rebels ambushed a government convoy in which six soldiers were killed and two wounded near El Aouana village in the Jijel region.

20 July 1999 A local newspaper reported that a mass grave of approximately 35 people, thought to be victims of Moslem rebels, was discovered near Algiers.

1 August 1999 Moslem rebels ambushed a military convoy and killed ten government soldiers and wounded five others at Batna, 300 kilometres east of Algiers.

5 August 1999 Sixty-one people were killed after a bomb exploded in the Ain Delfa province.

15 August 1999 The government blamed Moslem rebels for the killing of 29 people and the wounding of three others in the region of Bechar, 800 kilometres south-west of Algiers.

30 August 1999 The *El Watan* newspaper reported that seven people, among them a Moslem religious leader, were killed by an Islamic warlord when they tried to convince the warlord to join the peace campaign.

EGYPT

12 July 1999 Three human rights groups based in Egypt issued a report on the worsening human rights situation in the country. The Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR), the Al-Nadim Centre for the Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and the Human Rights Centre for the Assistance of Prisoners, declared that such violations include torture and arbitrary detentions.

1 August 1999 State prosecutors took 13 people accused of being members of the illegal Moslem Brotherhood in custody. The group is one of the oldest Islamic groups in Egypt.

19 August 1999 An Islamic group announced its intention to form a political party in order to pursue the interests of Islam and implement Islamic laws.

MOROCCO

25 August 1999 A draft plan to give women more rights in Morocco has caused an uproar among the country's Moslem leaders who view the proposed plan as against Moslem teachings.

WEST AFRICA

BENIN

22 June 1999 President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin instituted a third Cabinet reshuffle since assuming power in 1996.

BURKINA FASO

1 June 1999 A group comprising civic organisations and political parties in Burkina Faso called for a general strike on 8 June. The strike is aimed at forcing the government to take action against the members of the Presidential Guard implicated in the death of Norbert Zongo, a journalist, and three of his colleagues.

16 August 1999 A curfew was imposed in Banfora when a group of angry youth attacked a police station after a policeman killed a local mechanic.

18 August 1999 Trade unions embarked on a 48-hour strike in support of union members who were dismissed after a previous strike in June.

GHANA

21 June 1999 It was reported that an outbreak of cholera in Accra left three people dead and 49 were admitted to the Korle-Bu polyclinic.

23 June 1999 Ghana criticised the announcement by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that it would sell gold in order to be able to provide funds to poor countries. Fred Ohene Kena, Minister of Mines and Energy, argued that the IMF should seek funds elsewhere, since the move will have a negative effect on gold-producing countries.

GUINEA-BISSAU

4 June 1999 Peacekeeping forces from various states in the region began the process of withdrawing from Guinea-Bissau following the 7 May *coup* which overthrew President Vieira. The forces from Benin and Niger have left and those from The Gambia and Togo were expected to follow.

21 July 1999 The European Union (EU) officially opened the process of consultations on suspending the co-operation with Guinea-Bissau following the 7 May 1999 *coup*.

27 July 1999 It was reported that about ten people, suspected of supporting ousted President Vieira, were arrested in Bissau.

GUINEA

5 June 1999 Guinea launched attacks on the Sierra Leonean Popular Army, a rebel group, on its

southern border. The government embarked on the attacks in order to disrupt the activities of the group in that part.

14 June 1999 Political controversy erupted in the country after a proposed Bill by the government to extend the presidential term of office from five to seven years. The government maintained that, even if the Bill was passed, it would not affect the current presidential mandate because it will only come into effect in 2003.

25 June 1999 The Guinean Human Rights and Citizens League appealed to the French government to assist in trying to secure the release of opposition leader, Alpha Conde. Conde is one of the leaders who were arrested after the December 1998 presidential elections.

26 June 1999 President Lansana Conte sacked two high-ranking military officers, Air Force chief, Colonel Cheriff Diallo and the head of the Parliamentary *Gendermerie*, Major Mamadou Ba Syllam. It was rumoured that this move comes at a time when there are discontent and unrest within the army.

12 July 1999 The trial of 20 opposition activists in Guinea began in Faranah correctional court, 400 kilometres north-east of the capital.

THE GAMBIA

23 June 1999 The High Court held a hearing after allegations by the leader of the youth wing of the opposition United Democratic Party, Shyngle Nyassi, that he was abducted and assaulted by government security agents.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

7 July 1999 The government stated that it was making progress in the investigation of the embezzlement of EU funds. The embezzlement, totalling between US \$27 and \$36 million, concerns the services paid for by the ministries of Health and Infrastructure.

LIBERIA

10 July 1999 President Charles Taylor appealed to the international community for aid for post-conflict reconstruction programmes in both Sierra Leone and Liberia. He made the appeal during the UN Secretary-General's visit to Liberia.

19 July 1999 The Liberian Council of Churches urged the government to take part in attempts to restore peace and security in Vionjama, Lofa County, 200 kilometres north of Monrovia. The call was made amid growing reports of insecurity in the area.

27 July 1999 The government announced the closure of the Bong Mining Company that was

operating an open-cast iron ore mine. The company had provided employment to about 2 000 Liberians.

MALI

14 July 1999 The government issued a statement that it would establish a technical committee to look into the Y2K bug. The decision follows the result of a survey that about 185 private and public sector organisations were not ready for the millennium.

18 July 1999 Ethnic fighting between Arabs and the Kunta tribesmen in Gao and Kidal lead to the killing of ten people and the wounding of countless others.

21 July 1999 The National Union of Workers in Mali embarked on a two-day strike in protest against low wages and the high cost of living.

NIGERIA

22 June 1999 The Central Bank authorities stated that Nigeria spent about US \$1 272 billion less on external debt-servicing than the budget provision for 1998.

12 July 1999 The Shell oil company in Nigeria reported that community disturbances in the Niger Delta area have led to major delays in loading oil in its terminals.

26 July 1999 Seventy people were killed in ethnic clashes in the northern city of Kano. Police had to be brought in to restore order.

26 July 1999 Ethnic Isoko youths from Ozoro and Ovrode in southern Nigeria have taken 64 Royal Dutch/Shell workers hostage.

28 July 1999 Former speaker of the National Assembly, Salisu Buhari faced prosecution on charges of forgery and perjury while holding public office.

3 August 1999 The death toll of people killed during the fighting between ethnic Ijaws and Ilajes has risen to 50.

10 August 1999 More than 1 000 workers protested at the National Assembly against what they called huge allowances given to legislators.

13 August 1999 A number of ethnic Ijaws were forced to flee from their homes due to the intensification of violence between them and the Ilaje ethnic group.

NIGER

8 June 1999 Minister of Justice, Laouly Danda announced that the military junta has agreed to an investigation into the killing of President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara.

15 June 1999 Under pressure from trade unions, the military council decided to suspend a move that required civil servants to retire after 30 years of service.

17 July 1999 Violent clashes were reported around the capital Niamey among the members of the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) ahead of the country's referendum.

10 August 1999 Political parties in Niger appealed to the ruling military leader for a postponement of the election scheduled to take place on 3 October on the grounds that they need more time to prepare.

18 August 1999 About 40 000 civil servants in Niger began a 48-hour strike to demand the payment of ten-months' worth of salary in arrears.

SENEGAL

13 August 1999 The government blamed the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) for the abduction of ten people, including civilians and soldiers in Senegal's separatist Casamance Province.

SIERRA LEONE

11 June 1999 Rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), currently engaged in talks with the government, demanded the post of vice-president as part of any future power-sharing arrangement.

23 June 1999 The leader of the RUF turned down the government's offer of three Cabinet posts on the grounds that it wants a government in which it is given the vice-presidency and more seats in the Cabinet.

29 July 1999 Deputy minister of Defence, Samuel Hinga Norman, accused the rebels of attacking pro-Kabbah forces despite the peace agreement. The rebels have since denied the allegations and, in turn, accused the government of delaying the giving of government posts to some rebels as agreed upon.

8 August 1999 The leader of the rebels, Paul Koroma, stated that he had ordered his supporters to free all hostages. The captives are mainly UN military observers and Nigerian peacekeepers.

19 August 1999 It was reported that about 400 armed rebels took to the street in protest against the delay in disarming and reintegrating them into society under the auspices of the UN.

23 August 1999 The government issued a statement that the minister of Agriculture, Harry Will, and two senior officials were arrested and charged with corruption.

WESTERN SAHARA

15 June 1999 The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara opened the process of identifying potential voters on this day. Thirteen centres have since been opened for people of Sahwari to register for the 31 July 2000 referendum.

CENTRAL AFRICA

ANGOLA

9 June 1999 It was reported that Angola and Zambia have signed an agreement in Swaziland aimed at easing the ongoing tensions between the two countries. The agreement will help to resolve the tensions between the two countries over allegations that Zambia is supplying arms to the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

10 June 1999 United States (US) ambassador to Angola, Joseph Sullivan, vowed that the US would honour and implement UN sanctions against UNITA.

13 June 1999 About 30 rebels from UNITA were reportedly killed during a government operation in Cunhinga, 30 kilometres north of the city of Kuito, in the Bie Province.

16 June 1999 According to the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), increasing acts of violence in the country has left thousands of Angolans malnourished. The fighting has also severely affected agricultural activity in most rural areas.

22 June 1999 The Angolan News Agency reported that the country's currency has dropped to an all-time low, since UNITA began fighting with the government forces.

1 July 1999 The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) recaptured Mbazi, a strategic position outside Huambo. The recapturing of this area brought to an end the shelling of the city carried out by UNITA.

7 July 1999 The government was reportedly planning to use about US \$300 million from payments for offshore oil rights to buy new heavy equipment in order to launch an offensive against UNITA.

7 July 1999 Fifteen people were killed and 25 others were wounded when UNITA attacked a Catholic Relief Service (CRS) humanitarian centre in Baixo Pundo, 37 kilometres from Lobito.

19 July 1999 The government blamed UNITA for four mass graves discovered in the Chipeta commune (25 kilometres east of Kuito), from which about 100 bodies were exhumed.

20 July 1999 Eleven people were killed and others were wounded during a UNITA attack on the town of Catete, 60 kilometres from Luanda.

25 July 1999 The FAA launched a hunt for UNITA rebels thought to be responsible for the Catete attack.

1 August 1999 Foreign diplomats and aid workers warned that the government is preparing for an offensive against UNITA, as heavy military weapons were reportedly arriving at Luanda airport.

3 August 1999 The government announced that it has recaptured the town of Cuimba from UNITA, situated along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

6 August 1999 The WFP stated that there are 160 000 children facing starvation in the city of Malanje. The city has been under siege from UNITA, thus making it difficult for humanitarian assistance to be carried out.

26 August 1999 Aid workers in the Uíge province told reporters that at least 5 000 people were displaced or forced to flee from the area due to the continued fighting between UNITA and the FAA.

CAMEROON

19 June 1999 Japan announced the postponement of a loan of about 604 million yen to Cameroon. The aim of the postponement was to allow the country's financial situation to stabilise.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

4 June 1999 The UN Security Council called for the acceleration of the reconstruction process in the Central African Republic. The process involved the implementation of political, social and security reforms contained in the peace plan for the country.

14 June 1999 President Ange-Felix Patasse rejected a call by donors to reform the voting system for the presidential elections by using a single ballot paper. The donors believe that a single ballot paper will help to limit fraudulent activities during elections.

18 June 1999 Parliament rejected an electoral reform Bill, which called for a single ballot paper for the country's presidential elections later this year.

30 July 1999 The minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcel Metefara reiterated his country's neutral

stand in the DRC conflict and its view that the conflict could only be resolved through peace.

13 August 1999 President Ange-Felix Patasse issued a decree postponing the election from 29 August to 12 September 1999. The postponement was said to have been caused by the delays in finalising voter lists and was recommended by the Mixed Independent Electoral Commission (CEMI).

28 August 1999 The president rejected calls made by opposition parties for another postponement of the election date and declared that any postponement would not be accepted by the international community.

CHAD

14 July 1999 Radio France Internationale reported that the Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJT) claimed to have killed 77 government soldiers after trapping them in an ambush.

27 July 1999 The Chadian government announced the arrest of Mbailemal Michel, the leader of the Action Committee for Freedom and Democracy (CALD) on charges of attempting to incite a rebellion in the southern part of the country.

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

5 June 1999 News sources reported that the 'Ninja' rebel group killed 63 people on 3 June near Kinkala, the Pool regional headquarters, and 75 kilometres south of Brazzaville.

7 June 1999 The state-owned radio service reported that the three European 'mercenaries' charged with a plot to assassinate President Sassou-Nguesso have escaped from prison. The three men, French Sarda Richard Jose Maurice, Italian Fabio Vanotti and Croatian Lastric Darton have since sought refuge in the French embassy.

11 June 1999 Military spokesperson, Colonel Frederick Obame, informed journalists that government troops killed 130 Ninja rebels near Mayama, about 80 kilometres north-west of Brazzaville.

22 June 1999 A group of Ninja rebels attacked and wounded civilians and security officers in Djambala, the regional capital of Plateaux, 300 kilometres north of Brazzaville.

10 July 1999 The Congolese army recaptured Sibiti, a town of about 30 000 people. The place was under the control of militia loyal to ousted President Lissouba.

13 July 1999 The Ninja rebel group sabotaged a bridge on the railway line that connects Brazzaville to the southern port and oil city of Pointe-Noire.

20 July 1999 Congolese radio reported that government forces captured the town of Ndole, 100 kilometres from the capital Brazzaville.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

2 June 1999 The Missionary Service News Agency (Misna) reported that war is continuing in the eastern part of the DRC despite the unilateral cease-fire announced by the Rwandan government.

7 June 1999 IRIN reported that rebels loyal to ousted RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba attacked a rival radio station, controlled by the Rwandan-backed commander of the RCD, Jean-Pierre Ondekane, in Kisangani.

15 June 1999 According to a report by the epidemiological monitoring group, 459 cases of cholera have been reported, including 50 deaths.

25 June 1999 The DRC took Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to the International Court of Justice, alleging acts of aggression against its territory. The DRC application states that the 2 August 1998 invasion by these three countries equals the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

11 July 1999 The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a rebel group, declared that the cease-fire agreement is not binding because it is without its signatures.

9 August 1999 Fighting erupted between rival rebel camps in Kisangani, leading to a state of chaos for the civilian population.

14 August 1999 Rwandan and Ugandan troops clashed in the rebel-held town of Kisangani. The two countries are backing various factions who are fighting against President Kabila.

18 August 1999 It was reported that about 8 000 DRC refugees crossed the border into the neighbouring Congo Republic due to the continued fighting.

EAST AFRICA

BURUNDI

3 June 1999 Rumonge Hospital director, Dr Pascal Ntziyimana revealed that 70 cases of cholera were diagnosed in Rumonge, Bururi Province since the outbreak of the disease in May. Another four people died as a result of the disease.

7 July 1999 A Bujumbura-based human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO) reported that at least 30 civilians were ambushed and killed by Hutu rebels in the vicinity of the capital

since June.

9 July 1999 Hutu opposition parties rejected a proposal by President Buyoya that the transitional period should be for ten years and that he should lead in the interim.

17 July 1999 The fifth round of talks between the government and the opposition parties ended in Arusha with no apparent agreement. The talks were mainly stalled by the discussion of how the transitional government should to be constituted.

21 July 1999 Army officials stated that Burundian troops killed ten Hutu rebels in fighting that occurred near the capital.

11 August 1999 Violent clashes erupted between government troops and Hutu rebels in Kanyosha, south of the capital Bujumbura, and 11 people were killed.

12 August 1999 Hutu villagers in Ntovumo and Gacajinshi accused the Burundian army of killing 147 civilians in retaliation for an attack by Hutu rebels in Konyosha.

19 August 1999 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan condemned the killing of civilians in the country and called upon the government and the rebels to cease all hostilities.

29 August 1999 Following an attack by Hutu rebels in the capital city, 58 people were killed, leading to clashes with government troops.

ERITREA

7 June 1999 An Eritrean radio station reported that 49 Eritreans, who were expelled from Ethiopian villages, arrived in Molki and Mai Mene towards the end of May.

11 June 1999 The Eritrean and Ethiopian authorities blamed each other for the renewed fighting. The Eritrean Foreign minister announced that Ethiopia launched the first attack in Buri.

25 June 1999 Eritrea accused Ethiopia of renewed attacks on the Mereb-Setit front. The accusations came after a week-long lull in the clashes between the two countries.

26 June 1999 Eritrean radio reported that the army killed 850 Ethiopian soldiers during the two days of clashes.

8 July 1999 The Cabinet reaffirmed Eritrea's commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict with Ethiopia. The Cabinet also warned that modifications to the OAU framework could harm the process.

13 August 1999 The Eritrean government denied accusations made by Ethiopia that it was backing the Oromo Liberation Front.

30 August 1999 The Eritrean government lodged a formal complaint with the OAU against Malawi over the alleged ill-treatment of its citizens by the Malawi government.

ETHIOPIA

8 June 1999 The government revealed that the number of displaced people increased due to the ongoing conflict with Eritrea. At the start of the conflict, the number was 151 000 and it has since increased to 500 000.

13 June 1999 An Ethiopian government spokesperson held a press-briefing in Addis Ababa where he stated that his country has managed to kill about 8 200 Eritrean troops in the recent fighting.

28 June 1999 The number of Eritreans expelled from Ethiopia increased to 58 000 after the recent expulsion of 152 more from the country.

3 July 1999 The government reiterated its call for Eritrea's withdrawal from all occupied land as the preliminary step towards ending the conflict.

19 July 1999 The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a rebel group, issued a communiqué that it has killed 517 government soldiers and wounded 200 others in a battle that took place in Kotobo, southern Ethiopia.

25 July 1999 The Oromo rebels have reportedly killed about 40 Ethiopian soldiers near Gode and Ceel-Barde.

9 August 1999 The government announced that it was still seeking further clarity from the OAU on the Technical Arrangements Document for the peace agreement with Eritrea before revealing its position on the matter.

KENYA

3 June 1999 James Orendo, a member of Parliament, called on all Kenyans to protest against what he called an attempt by President Daniel arap Moi to control the constitutional review process.

6 June 1999 The Kenyan National Union of Teachers issued a warning that it will take to the street if the Minister of Education, Kalonzo Musyoka, continued with plans to table the *Teachers*

Service Commission Amended Bill.

7 June 1999 The government announced the lifting of visa requirements for tourists from Britain, France, Switzerland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

12 June 1999 Violent clashes erupted between protesters and police during a constitutional reform protest march in Nairobi. Among the people to sustain injuries was leading clergyman, Reverend Timothy Njoya.

18 June 1999 The death toll of people affected by malaria in Kisii district increased to 167, with more than 3 000 others being attended to in hospitals.

23 June 1999 Vice-president, Professor George Saitoti could be facing a no confidence vote over the alleged Goldenberg scandal of 1990. This follows a motion filed by Otieno Kajwang, a member of Parliament.

30 June 1999 Parliament ignored the High Court order that declared the motion of no confidence in Vice-President Saitoti illegal. It was reported that Parliament will go ahead with the debate.

23 July 1999 Paul Muite, an opposition politician was charged by the magistrate court with the theft of 31.1 million shillings (US \$420 611) from two farm companies in 1992 and 1993.

28 July 1999 Violent clashes over cattle-grazing in eastern Kenya has caused 2 000 people to flee their homes. The fighting began when Borana tribesmen wanted to drive out Somalis from the grazing lands in the area.

RWANDA

3 June 1999 The Rwandan government reiterated its decision to observe the cease-fire despite the DRC government's recent bombings of the Bukavu and Uvira towns in southern Kivu.

12 June 1999 It was announced that the country's transitional period would be given another four-year lifespan. The government stated that the extension was necessitated by the fact that the current political climate in the country is not conducive to a democratic election.

16 June 1999 The US promised to give Rwanda US \$10 million in order to include a traditional court system within the judicial system. The aim behind this move is to speed up the trials of about 120 000 genocide suspects still in prisons.

2 July 1999 Nine people were sentenced to death and 16 others to life imprisonment for crimes committed during the 1994 genocide.

7 July 1999 President Bizimungu appointed Augustin Iyamuremye as the country's new Foreign

minister. Iyamuremye replaced Amri Suedi Ismail and the president's office stated that the country's position regarding the DRC conflict would not be affected by this change.

SOMALIA

2 June 1999 The Rahaweyn Resistance Army (RRA) handed over 13 Oromo rebels to the Ethiopian government. They said the rebels were captured during clashes in the Baydhabo.

25 June 1999 A group of Somali women activists based in Kenya made a special appeal to the international community to intervene in their country in order to assist in bringing the ongoing conflict to an end.

9 June 1999 One of the Somali faction leaders, Hussein Muhammad Aideed, called upon Libyan leader Colonel Moamar Gadhaffi to intervene in attempts to resolve the civil strife in the country.

11 June 1999 In the southern port of Kismayu, 26 people were killed when the Somali National Front (SNF) of Hussein Aideed out-gunned the forces loyal to another warlord, General Morgan.

19 June 1999 Eleven people were killed and 15 more injured when a group of armed men opened fire on a truck in northern Mogadishu.

6 July 1999 The Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) appealed for US \$17.5 million from donor agencies to assist more than one million people in southern Somalia who are on the brink of malnutrition.

14 July 1999 The SNF of Hussein Aideed has alleged that a number of heavily armed Ethiopian troops are backing a rival faction.

25 July 1999 Fierce fighting broke out in Qoryoley district, southern Somalia, when an armed group attacked the bases of Hussein Aideed's group and 17 people were reported dead. This was said to be the first act of violence in the area for about nine years.

2 August 1999 The Digil Salvation Army (DSA) stated that it has taken control of Aw-Dhegleshe, a town south of the capital, from the rebels loyal to Hussein Aideed.

15 August 1999 Six people were killed and ten were wounded when militias attacked the premises of the Islamic Court in the Hodon district.

25 August 1999 It was reported that thousands of Ethiopian troops entered south-western Somalia.

SUDAN

1 July 1999 The government criticised calls by the US to offer military and material support to the outlawed Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan.

8 July 1999 A Swiss-based human rights NGO, Christian Solidarity International said it had liberated 2 035 slaves from southern Sudan. The NGO also stated that the number of slaves it has freed since 1995 have reached 11 000.

22 July 1999 The Nairobi talks between the government and the rebels were reportedly fruitful. Among others, the parties have agreed to the appointment of observers from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the OAU, and the appointment of a special envoy to act as the chairperson of the general sessions.

20 July 1999 Violent clashes erupted between two rival pro-government groups in southern Sudan, resulting in four people being killed and six injured. The rivalry was between the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) and its splinter group, the SSDF United.

5 August 1999 The SPLA rejected the government's cease-fire in the south in order to allow aid to come into the area. The SPLA maintained that this is a strategy of the government to continue its fighting elsewhere in the country.

23 August 1999 The SPLA killed four police officers when they launched an attack on a police post near the Ethiopian border.

TANZANIA

4 June 1999 The government turned down a request by the Burundian government to place forces in Tanzania to hunt down all Burundian rebels who have sought refuge in Tanzania.

17 July 1999 The police arrested the leader of the opposition Tanzanian People's Party (TPP), Aleck Che-mponda, together with five other people for holding an 'illegal' demonstration.

10 July 1999 The minister of Home Affairs, Mr Ali Amer Mohammed said that about 20 000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania should return home because the conditions in their country have stabilised.

16 July 1999 The police in Dar es Salaam have charged 17 people **with** political violence following protests in the capital earlier. The protests started after the opposition Civic United Front lost parliamentary by-elections to the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi.

24 July 1999 The signing of the East African Co-operation treaty was delayed for another two

months. This was announced at the end of a special session of ministers from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in charge of co-operation.

9 August 1999 Amnesty International issued a report in which it blamed the government of Tanzania of human rights violations. The report revealed that conditions in Mbeya prison led to the death of 47 prisoners within six months in 1998.

UGANDA

4 July 1999 President Museveni signed the *Referendum Bill* amid strong opposition from the Uganda Young Democrats (UYD) **who maintained** that the government is making **the** wrong policy decisions. The referendum, to be held next year, would cost 3.6 billion **shillings**.

10 July 1999 The government dispatched a team of Military Intelligence officials to Serere to investigate the alleged existence of a new rebel group, the Anti-Referendum Army, in the area.

17 July 1999 Foreign Minister Amama Mbabazi informed reporters that the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) would only pull out of the DRC once all the critical issues agreed upon during the Lusaka peace meeting were implemented.

17 July 1999 The rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) killed eight people during an attack on the displaced people's camp in Bumadu, Bundibuygo district.

19 July 1999 The two opposition parties, the Ugandan Peoples' Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP) rejected the *Referendum Bill* on the grounds that the passing of the Bill lacked the required quorum and therefore only served the interests of the ruling party.

20 July 1999 Brigadier Smith Opon Acak, was killed during the shoot-out in Lira town where he was reportedly going to lead a new rebel group, the Anti-Referendum Army.

5 August 1999 The Ugandan Army killed seven soldiers in renewed tensions with rebels in the western Ruwenzori mountains.

11 August 1999 An intertribal clash in eastern Uganda led to the killing of 40 people.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

BOTSWANA

4 June 1999 The ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) rejected proposals made by the opposition parties for the country's electoral reforms. The opposition proposals included the introduction of proportional representation and government funding of political parties.

17 June 1999 The government revoked the refugee status of four senior leaders from the secessionist group in Namibia who had sought refuge in Botswana. The status was revoked after the four leaders were accused of absconding from Kagisong Centre, a refugee camp.

LESOTHO

7 July 1999 Five political parties that are part of the ruling Interim Political Authority (IPA) have objected to the call for 100 per cent proportional representation as the new electoral system for the country. The call came from the country's opposition parties.

13 July 1999 The Ministry of Health released a report estimating that there were 7 317 reported AIDS cases in December 1998, a 30 per cent increase in one year.

14 July 1999 About 150 telecommunications workers were retrenched following a decision by the corporation to restructure ahead of a planned privatisation process.

8 August 1999 The police found an arms cache at Leoate farm in Maseru. The ammunition included one mortar rocket, ten teargas ranges, four teargas rockets, four rifles and two magazines.

MALAWI

5 June 1999 Civil rights organisations expressed their concern that many people would be disenfranchised by the government's decision not to allow illiterate voters to use thumb prints in the election as they did before. The country's illiteracy rate is estimated to be above 60 per cent.

9 June 1999 Opposition parties and traditional leaders threatened to disrupt the voting process on 15 June if the Electoral Commission fails to reopen some of the registration stations in the northern parts of the country.

19 June 1999 The Church/NGO Consortium, a civil society coalition, has issued a statement declaring that the Malawian elections were unfair.

25 June 1999 The Moslem Association of Malawi held prayers, following the destruction of mosques as a result of post-election violence. Acts of violence that killed two people and destroyed ten mosques, started when opposition parties challenged the validity of the 15 June election.

1 July 1999 The Malawian Electoral Commission announced the postponement of the local government elections that were supposed to be held in September. The **chairperson** of the Commission, Justice James Kalaile, cited the plan to computerise registration as the reason for the postponement.

16 July 1999 The Malawian High Court ordered the Electoral Commission to make available all voting material from the 16 districts where the opposition parties have challenged the victory of the current President Muluzi.

22 July 1999 The chairperson of the Malawi Chamber of Commerce, Mark Katsonga, said that fiscal discipline is the only solution if Malawi wants to attract foreign investment. He also challenged the government to implement measures to root out corruption in the public service.

16 July 1999 Members of the opposition alliance resolved to boycott President Muluzi's state of the nation address on the grounds that they do not recognise his presidency. The alliance was formed by the Malawi Congress Party and the Alliance for Democracy.

28 July 1999 The Public Affairs Committee, an NGO, issued a report indicating that the recent increase in armed robberies was due to the proliferation of small arms inside the country.

19 August 1999 More than 500 refugees and asylum seekers from Rwanda flocked into Malawi because of fresh violence in their country.

MAURITIUS

6 July 1999 The government expelled 40 French soldiers after the arrest of a Mauritian officer in France on charges of torture. The government also imposed visa requirement for all French nationals.

MOZAMBIQUE

15 June 1999 Jamisse Taimo, chairperson of the National Elections Commission, reiterated his statement that 60 days will be sufficient to carry out voter registration in the whole of Mozambique. The government has declared 20 July to 17 September as the voter registration period despite concerns from the opposition that the allocated time is not enough.

21 July 1999 Maputo expressed its dismay over the alleged deportation of Mozambican nationals from Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe deported about 600 Mozambicans in July despite the fact that the two countries have institutional mechanisms to tackle such issues.

NAMIBIA

13 July 1999 An organisation representing former detainees of the **South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO)**, Breaking the Wall of Silence, has declared its intentions to exert pressure on the government to **acknowledge** its human rights abuses prior to independence.

2 August 1999 Fourteen people, including six police officers and soldiers were killed when clashes erupted between the Caprivi Strip Liberation Army and government forces. The Liberation Army also attacked a local police station and the offices of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation.

23 August 1999 The prosecution of 110 people arrested after the Caprivi Strip violence began in Namibia.

SOUTH AFRICA

22 June 1999 The gold mining industry in South Africa expressed its fears that the proposed sale of gold reserves by the IMF will have a negative impact on the gold price. The minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, also warned that the proposed sale could lead to about 80 000 job losses in the mining industry.

11 July 1999 The South African army was reportedly preparing itself for a peacekeeping role in the DRC following the signing of the draft cease-fire agreement in Lusaka.

20 July 1999 Seven people were killed in Mandela Park, a residential area near Johannesburg, in what appeared to be a politically inspired action. Residents stated that the killing was related to enmity between the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and ANC supporters.

21 July 1999 Public service unions turned down the government's offer of a 6.2 **per cent salary** increment and announced their **intentions to continue with 'rolling mass action'**.

27 July 1999 Public service unions rejected the government's wage increment offer of 6.8 per cent and further threatened to embark on mass action.

30 July 1999 Gun owners criticised the government's proposed legislation aimed at restricting gun ownership in the country. The proposed law, among others, would limit handgun ownership to one per person, a licence would cost R500 and would have to be renewed every five years.

11 August 1999 About 1 000 people took to the streets in protest against the government's proposed new laws to regulate gun ownership in the country.

16 August 1999 Telecommunications and postal service workers went on strike to demand higher wages after negotiations with the government failed to yield positive results.

20 August 1999 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) called for an urgent meeting with the government in the wake of nation-wide industrial action by workers in various public sectors.

27 August 1999 Public service unions and the government failed to reach an agreement over the

wage dispute and the former vowed to continue with strike action until their demands are met.

SWAZILAND

29 July 1999 It was reported that King Mswati has given the Constitutional Review Commission until the end of this year to submit its final report.

ZAMBIA

2 June 1999 The ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia discarded a call made by the opposition to hold the presidential election earlier than originally planned in 2001.

17 June 1999 The *Post* newspaper reported that ten rebels from the DRC were arrested in Kaputa on suspicion of being involved in the Lambwe Chomba attack.

18 June 1999 The Registrar of Societies ruled that the newly formed party, the Zambia Alliance for Progress (ZAP) was illegal.

21 July 1999 The *Post* reported that a split occurred in the opposition United National Independence Party (UNIP), with one faction wanting to oust party leader, Kenneth Kaunda.

24 July 1999 About 500 Zambians residing near the Zambia/DRC border were relocated to Kaputa Boma for security reasons. It was also reported that a number of DRC refugees are still crossing into Zambia.

26 July 1996 A police investigation into the weekend bomb blast in the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) headquarters revealed that the explosion was caused by a hand grenade planted under an anonymous minibus.

29 July 1999 The Civil Servants' Union of Zambia (CSUZ) challenged the government's appeal in the Supreme Court against the Industrial Relations' Court lifting of the wage freeze. The government was against the 8 per cent salary increase that was granted by the Industrial Court.

ZIMBABWE

3 June 1999 The government announced a 30 **per cent** fuel hike **in what** it regards as an attempt to **address** the loss brought about by selling fuel for less than its cost **price**.

18 June 1999 The state-appointed constitutional review commission began its work.

23 June 1999 Political leaders in Zimbabwe remain divided over the constitutional review process. Members of the opposition formed a National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) comprising churches, human rights groups, students and trade unions in order to mobilise against the

Mugabe government.

23 June 1999 The meeting of Zimbabwe bankers under the aegis of the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe (BAZ) decided not to alter the US dollar rate despite hard currency shortages that had negative impacts on interbank trade.

28 June 1999 It was reported that the country's key industrial index has fallen to 0.49 per cent due to investors' lack of confidence caused by a stand-off between the government and producers over food price controls.

14 July 1999 The government stated that it does not have enough revenue to compensate war veterans who were each demanding Zim \$500 000 (US \$13 020) on top of the Zim \$2.5 billion that was paid in 1997.

28 July 1999 The Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) objected to the recent increase in interest rates. The Chamber blamed the government of tightening monetary policy by increasing interest rates.

29 July 1999 The *Daily News* reported that the cost of the country's involvement in the DRC war escalated to more than Zim \$70 million (US \$1.8 million) per month.

10 August 1999 The government decided to deploy riot police in Harare ahead of the planned demonstration by war veterans seeking more compensation from the government.

25 August 1999 President Mugabe declined to approve two Bills and ordered them back to Parliament. These are the *War Veterans Amendment Bill* and the *Public Order and Security Bill*.

UNCERTAIN PROGRESS IN LESOTHO

Roger Southall,
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Lesotho's next election has been set for 8 April 2000. According to the official gameplan, this is good news. The strategy promoted by the diplomacy after the South African-led armed intervention in September 1998 had sought to defuse the country's acute political crisis via a compromise that, alongside the restoration to office of the ruling Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD), saw the creation in November of a 24-person Independent Political Authority (IPA). The latter body was composed of two members of each political party that had participated in the disputed May elections, and was charged with preparing for the new elections in the next fifteen to eighteen months by, *inter alia*, considering measures for 'levelling the playing' field for all parties and persons in a repeat contest. Accordingly, with an election day already fixed, a resolution of the political impasse might seem on the cards, and even better, right on schedule: a triumph for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South African foreign policy and the African Renaissance. However, things are unfortunately not quite what they seem, for the peace process in Lesotho still remains very uncertainly poised. Indeed, given the present state of progress in negotiations between the parties, an early election date seems premature, and although the outcome of a further contest might see a result that the losers could not reasonably or practically dispute, the outcome might well fail to draw them into the political system. A new government might be elected, yet democracy might operate only by default.

The prospects for rooting democracy in as poor and as conflict-ridden a country as

Lesotho are limited at best. The present indications are that the conditions for maximising democratic possibilities in Lesotho are not yet in place, and nor are they likely to be by next April. It is not just more time that is required, but a more concerted peacebuilding effort designed to establish a reasonable degree of consensus between the conflicting political parties.

The Background to the Present Crisis

The bare bones of the present crisis are as follows:

The Basotho National Party (BNP) under Chief Leabua Jonathan won the pre-independence election of 1965, but declined to relinquish power to the victorious Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1970. Years of repression followed, with many leading figures from the BCP fleeing into exile before apartheid South Africa encouraged Lesotho's small army to seize power early in 1986.

A combination of internal and external pressures after 1990 saw the military government reluctantly accede to a return to the barracks.

The BCP, led by its veteran founder-leader Ntsu Mokhehle, won the democratising March 1993 general election by 65 seats to nil. The election was deemed to have been free and fair by international observers, with the unbalanced result a product of the first-past-the-post (FPTP), British-style, electoral system. But the BNP, which had garnered 23 per cent of the vote, never accepted the outcome, and remained convinced that it had been cheated.

Conflicts within the military, and between the military and the government and between the King and the government, saw the monarch dismissing the latter in August 1994. But the 'troika' of Botswana, South Africa and Lesotho forced the young King Letsie to return power to the democratically-elected BCP the following

month.

As time moved on towards the next election (scheduled under the Constitution for early 1998), the ruling BCP was torn apart by a struggle for succession to the leadership of the ailing, octogenarian, Ntsu Mokhehle. By early 1997, this battle had polarised into one faction, led by Deputy Leader Molapo Qhobela, who controlled the party executive, and another that backed Pakalitha Mosisili (who was favoured by Mokhehle) and who enjoyed the support of a majority (35 out of the 65) of members of Parliament (MPs). The inability of the two factions to achieve a compromise resulted in the Mokhehle-Mosisili faction pronouncing themselves a new party, the LCD, and declaring the rump BCP the opposition.

The BCP was confident that it would retain a major segment of the party's historic support, and there was much speculation that a favourable result at the next election could see it forming a government by moving into coalition with the BNP. But the April 1998 election resulted in another major landslide, this time for the LCD – which took 79 out of the now 80 seats with 60.5 per cent of the votes, with the BCP securing a mere 10.4 per cent and the BNP 24.4 per cent.

International and local monitors again declared the election to have been fairly conducted, and ascribed the nature of the landslide to the vagaries of the FPTP electoral system. But neither the BCP nor the BNP nor the other minor parties could accept the result as anything but a 'fix', and accordingly came together in an Opposition Alliance that called for the King to nullify the election (a constitutional power he did not possess). They backed their demand by encouraging thousands of their supporters to gather outside his palace in Maseru. Because the LCD government still lacked control over the military (the bulk of which still favoured the BNP), it was unable to prevent the effective occupation of the capital by the opposition. By late August, the LCD had lost its ability to govern, and the country was gripped by disorder that seemed to threaten a military *coup* when, on 11

September, junior officers arrested army chief Major-General Mosakeng and forced him to read a radio message dismissing 28 senior officers. This seems ultimately to have been the factor that precipitated the intervention by the armed forces of South Africa and Botswana under the auspices of SADC.

The controversy surrounding the intervention (notably whether it was justifiable under international law) was greatly increased by the failure of SADC forces to prevent opposition supporters from looting and burning numerous commercial buildings in Maseru and other outlying towns. However, after unexpectedly fierce resistance by the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), SADC troops reimposed order, and thereby provided the framework for the diplomatic compromise that saw the restoration of the LCD to office and the creation (in November) of the IPA.

The IPA as a Forum for Mediation

The IPA was charged with preparing for new elections by May 2000 by, *inter alia*, reviewing the appropriateness of the electoral system with a view to make it more democratic and representative, considering the structure and functioning of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and recommending relevant changes to the Constitution. Importantly, decision-making was to be by consensus, and the government was to be obliged to implement all decisions of the IPA. The latter were to be binding on all parties that participate in the next elections, and if the IPA were to fail to reach consensus, contentious issues would be referred to a panel of three arbitrators nominated by the President of the Court of Appeal of Lesotho. It was also agreed that a SADC military presence would remain in Lesotho to underwrite the transitional agreement.

For all that the IPA has offered the opportunity for antagonistic parties to reconcile around an agreed set of rules about how elections and politics should be conducted henceforth in Lesotho, it has hitherto enjoyed only limited success. This

is because:

the LCD has refused to accord the IPA legitimacy;

opposition elements have sought to use the IPA for their short-term party and personal interests rather than as an instrument for compromise; and

the IPA mediation process has received insufficient support from external actors, notably SADC and the local diplomatic community.

The LCD and the IPA

For the LCD, the IPA is an unwelcome imposition. The LCD claims – with considerable justification – to have won the 1998 election fairly and squarely, just as the BCP (from which it emerged) swept to its unambiguous victory in 1993. Consequently, it views the challenge of the Opposition Alliance to its popular legitimacy as emanating from undemocratic elements (in its view, covertly backed by the monarch and sections of the army) which, because they have lost power, are mounting a vigorous rearguard action to secure undeserved privilege and continuing influence. It views the SADC intervention as presenting the opportunity for it to marginalise the monarchy, the chieftaincy (which the BNP represents) and the army (which it does not control) as competing sites for power.

The IPA was born out of pressure exerted by SADC upon the LCD government and the Opposition Alliance to arrive at some compromise whereby daily governance could resume alongside debate about the constitutional future. Whereas the Opposition Alliance pressed strongly for a Government of National Unity, the LCD insisted that its electoral victory gave it an unambiguous moral and legal right to form the Executive itself. Both sides of the argument were induced to concede ground via the creation of the IPA to operate alongside the Executive and

Parliament. Yet, because the compromise was essentially coerced (notably by South Africa), rather than forged by genuine agreement between the parties themselves, the relationship between the government and the IPA has been highly contentious. In particular, the LCD has proved reluctant to participate fully in the deliberations of a body it has viewed as competitive to Parliament (which it dominates).

The Opposition and the IPA

Membership of the IPA is overwhelmingly constituted of candidates in the 1998 election who were rejected by the electorate (while the BCP and the BNP took 10.4 per cent and 24.4 per cent of the vote, respectively, the nine other parties took only 4.7 per cent collectively). To put it another way, the IPA now offers prestigious employment to politically ambitious persons who failed to become MPs. One result was that much of the IPA's initial energies were absorbed by the issue of how much its members should be paid. Whereas its founding Act laid down that the IPA should itself determine the level of members' remuneration, the reality was that it was the government that held the purse strings. After some months, it was resolved that IPA members should receive salaries roughly equivalent to those of MPs – yet, rather than pushing IPA members to compromise, this decision served to provide the majority of IPA members with a financial incentive to drag the negotiation process on for as long as possible. Meanwhile, the dispute between the government and the IPA over remuneration offered an excuse to the latter to delay providing a budget and accommodation for the IPA.

Despite their rhetoric, the opposition parties (including the BNP and BCP) are perfectly aware of their minority status, and the likelihood that the LCD will sweep to a repeat victory in the next election. Again, this serves to extend rather than to shorten the process of negotiations. Likewise, positions with regard to the reconfiguration of the electoral system have been dictated by personal as much as

party interest, with many IPA members concerned to maximise their future chances of being elected to Parliament rather than to devise a viable political solution. Meanwhile, the smaller parties have blocked any attempt to arrive at a workable definition of 'consensus': it has been easy enough to secure the agreement around contentious issues of 11 out of the 12 parties that constitute the IPA, but such agreement has been fundamentally flawed by its failure to include the LCD. In any case, any attempt to forge consensus inclusive of the LCD has been hampered by the latter's deliberate absenteeism from the proceedings for long stretches of time.

External Actors and the IPA

Having negotiated the creation of the IPA, SADC – and South Africa in particular – left Lesotho's politicians to get on with the job of working towards a more stable constitutional future. SADC efforts were directed almost exclusively towards the security arena, notably with regard to restructuring and retraining the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). This was extremely important, but only part of the story.

Opposition politicians were wont to argue that South Africa's real agenda in intervening was to prepare the way for the eventual political integration of Lesotho. This seems highly unlikely, as South Africa has too many problems of its own without absorbing its peculiarly fractious neighbour, even though it now has a heavy investment in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The real challenge will therefore be to find an internal solution to Lesotho's political problems that can be combined with a closer functional relationship which respects the Kingdom's political sovereignty, yet acknowledges the necessity for it to work with South Africa economically. In the shorter term, however, South Africa has failed to follow up its initial diplomatic and military intervention with concerted efforts designed to make the IPA function properly as a body capable of mediating between the conflicting parties. Meanwhile, the other major diplomatic players in Maseru, notably the British and the European Union, have been so disillusioned by the behaviour of the

opposition that they themselves have accorded the IPA extremely limited respect. But there has been one exception.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has come forward as the one external actor that has really tried to make the IPA work. When the government failed to come up with accommodation, it provided facilities in its own building for the IPA to meet. More importantly, when early debates around the electoral system failed to result in consensus, the UNDP played a key role in providing necessary funding and procuring expertise from the National Democratic Institute in the United States, from South Africa and from Botswana. However, external lobbying by key actors from civil society for the expansion of the initiative into a National Consultative Forum (NCF), representative of a broad spectrum of society, was opposed by the government, which reportedly attempted to sabotage the gathering (and thereby discredit the IPA) by withholding funding. In the event, the newly formed Lesotho Network for Conflict Management which was chairing the NCF, secured sufficient credit from the UNDP and the University of Lesotho for the Forum to proceed as planned between 21 and 23 February 1999. The government thus felt obliged to join the Forum that was attended by some 350 representatives of Parliament, the judiciary, political parties, chiefs, civil society and the diplomatic community. Guided by skilful chairing, the NCF reached agreement by consensus that:

there is a need to change Lesotho's present electoral model;

in devising a new electoral system, the IPA should search to realise the principles of political stability, legitimacy, accountability, inclusiveness, affordability, manageability and ease of understanding and applicability;

electoral reform needs to be accompanied by a change in Basotho political culture to embrace tolerance, dialogue, and acceptance of the will of the people as

expressed in electoral outcomes;

the issue of the reform of the Senate (representative of the chiefs, and thus mainly the BNP) should be referred to the IPA; and

the adoption of a new electoral system would necessitate a comprehensive programme of voter information and education prior to the forthcoming elections in 2000.

This minimal agreement was followed by two weeks of discussions within the IPA on electoral alternatives, concluding in a workshop on consensus and consensus-building. Again, an advance was made via provision by the UNDP of a neutral facilitator, and some movement was made towards further agreement on a new electoral system. However, final agreement remains elusive.

Towards a new electoral system?

The 80 + 40 option: Initially, the LCD and BNP both argued for the retention of 80 FPTP constituency seats with the addition of 40 seats elected by proportional representation (PR).

The 40 + 40 option: The other parties (except one) argued for an equal number of constituency and PR seats.

The (insignificant) National Independence Party favoured 80 seats elected by PR.

However, following the NCF, the BNP joined *all* the other opposition parties in now favouring:

The election of 40 MPs by PR, but on a district list rather than a national list system.

Lesotho's ten districts would have the 80 seats allocated between them proportionately according to the size of their population. Basing PR on this district basis is seen as retaining some of the virtues of the constituency system (closer connections between MPs and their electorate), with the possibility of allocating an extra seat or two to any party that might have accumulated votes nationally above a certain threshold.

The LCD thereafter made some movement towards PR by modifying its position to: 80 +40, *or* 80 + 32 *if* combined with a democratisation of the Senate, with all members of the upper house being elected by PR. But this latter suggestion is anathema to the BNP and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), in particular, as election of the Senate would probably replicate the LCD's dominance in the National Assembly.

In sum, although the negotiation process has been very slow, external assistance has allowed for some progress to be made. Yet, more external pressure and facilitation are required for the process to be completed successfully.

Present Prospects

Developments are favouring the LCD as time moves on. The government's case against the rebel officers is moving slowly through the courts. Having made major steps towards restructuring the LDF officer corps, the main body of SADC troops left the country in May, leaving behind only a very small training contingent – but with the big warning that any further political intervention by the military on behalf of the opposition or the monarchy will not be tolerated. The military is being reduced as a factor in Lesotho's politics.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties are having their own troubles. Following the death of their leader Evaristus Sekhonyana, the BNP has elected former military

strongman Justin Lekhanya to lead it – but perhaps at the cost of some of its traditional support among the chieftaincy. More importantly, the BCP has been caught up in internal wrangling, with Qhobela suspending six of his most senior members, including the deputy leader, Tseliso Makhakhe, in April. Even the small MFP has expelled some of its members, who have subsequently gone on to form the New Lesotho Freedom Party. While the LCD is able to cohere around its possession of power and resources, the Opposition Alliance appears to be crumbling – perhaps lessening the threat to the LCD of going for PR and increasing pressure upon the opposition parties to arrive at a compromise with the government before they fragment even further.

A further development of importance has been an initiative that has attempted to unblock the IPA. In May and June, the leaders of the four main political parties (Mosisili for the LCD, Lekhanya for the BNP, Qhobela for the BCP and Vincent Malebo for the MFP) met together with the two co-chairpersons of the IPA under the chairmanship of Bishop Paul Khoarai. A communiqué was issued at the end of the meetings defining consensus within the IPA “to mean agreement by a substantial majority after lobbying of opinions and without a vote” (resonant of the notion of ‘sufficient consensus’ during the South African negotiation process). This represents an important step in that it allows for the minuscule political parties that effectively represent no-one but their representatives to be sidelined within the IPA. But the fundamental division of what form the electoral system should take remains, with the LCD still favouring a mixed system employing components of both FPTP and PR, and the opposition favouring the district-based PR system. And there is still no agreement about what to do with the Senate.

Nonetheless, this latest development suggests that an agreement could be within reach. The continuing divide over the form of the electoral system, the need for the IEC to devise a new electoral register, and the need for intensive electoral education to inform voters about any new electoral system before any further

election, all indicate that the nominated date of 8 April 2000 could well be unrealistic. Consequently, more effort by SADC in particular and the wider international community are needed not just to facilitate an agreement, but to come up with a realistic and viable timetable. Donors are wary of yet again funding an election, only for the result to be repudiated by the losers. They are also getting increasingly impatient with the failure of the parties to agree around a new electoral system – but agree they must if democracy in Lesotho is to have any chance of taking root. A more determined external effort should be directed at bringing about this end.

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MALAWI'S POST-ELECTION WOES

By Senzo Ngubane

Introduction

The 15 June 1999 election saw Malawi's President Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) returning to power amid strong protests from the main opposition parties. The results gave Muluzi 2 442 685 votes against 2 106 790 for the opposition alliance candidate, Gwanda Chakuamba. These results were also reflective of the pre-election analysis that the election would be a closely contested event.

The post-election situation has brought mixed fortunes to Malawi. The main opposition parties, namely the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) contested the legitimacy of the election on the grounds that it was rigged, thus declaring the election as having been unfair.

It is noteworthy that, even prior to the election, opposition political parties and civil society, particularly the Church/NGO Consortium expressed their concern that the election would be unfair. This view, among others, was based on the manner in which the Electoral Commission conducted itself during the run-up to the election. For instance, the election was postponed three times because of the Commission's failure to conduct a balanced and proper registration process.

This article attempts to offer an analysis of the current state of affairs and its impact on the Malawian state at large. It rests on the premise that the post-15 June situation, among others, is indicative of the fact that multipartyism is not a precise yardstick for democracy. The Malawi situation further reveals a lack of political tolerance that impacts on Malawi as a state. Lastly, the situation exposes some constitutional deficiencies that would have to be dealt if the country's democratic process is to be sustainable.

The Pre-election Situation

The election was initially scheduled to take place on 17 May 1999 following a five-year period of democratic governance in the country. The first controversy surrounding the election emerged when this date had to be shifted to 25 May 1999 in order to give all political parties and the Electoral Commission enough time to prepare for the elections. The unfinished tasks of the Electoral Commission involved the registration of voters in a number of districts in the country, as well as the setting up of polling stations.

Another controversy occurred when the Malawi High Court declared the decision by the Electoral Commission not to allow two opposition party leaders to stand as running mates as unconstitutional. Chakufwa Chihana, president of AFORD and Gwanda Chakuamba, president of the MCP, decided to form a coalition against the ruling party through the formation of an electoral alliance. To an extent, the ruling restored the credibility of the High Court as a non-partisan and independent institution.

The credibility of the Electoral Commission was further tarnished when newspaper reports revealed that the Commission suffered from infighting. This occurred when four out of nine commissioners openly distanced themselves from Justice William Hanjahanja's decision not to allow the two opposition leaders to stand as running mates.

Furthermore, the run-up to the election was marked by fierce accusations from the opposition alliance against the Electoral Commission for its inappropriate handling of the voter registration process. These occurrences reveal that the image of the Commission was blemished even prior to the election.

The opposition alliance also lashed out at the state-owned Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), accusing it of foul play for its inadequate covering of their campaign messages when compared with that of the ruling UDF of President Bakili Muluzi.

In the face of such disturbing events, two changes occurred. Firstly, Justice James Kalale replaced Justice William Hanjahanja as the chairperson of the Electoral Commission. Secondly, the newly appointed chairperson announced the postponement of the election to 15 June 1999. This third postponement came after the opposition alliance won a legal battle over what they called a chaotic registration process that was deliberately manipulated in favour of the ruling party. For example, some election monitoring groups observed that, while many districts in the northern region experienced a shortage of registration materials, the southern region, the electoral base of the ruling UDF, had a surplus.

The announcement of the new election date did not remove the dark cloud that hung over the election. For instance, the traditional leaders and members of the opposition alliance in the northern part of the country threatened to disrupt the election if their supporters were not allowed to vote because they did not register.

It was against this background that Malawi conducted its second democratic elections on 15 June, reflecting ground fertile for post-election conflict. The final results gave the ruling UDF 93 seats, while the opposition alliance scooped 95 seats. Interestingly, the voting pattern of this election resembled that of 1994 in the sense that the votes for the main political parties (UDF, MCP and AFORD) were along regional and, to some extent, ethnic lines.

The opposition alliance challenged the legitimacy of the elections and accused the ruling party and the Electoral Commission of election-rigging. Despite these calls, Bakili Muluzi was inaugurated as the country's president and the new government was formed. Hence, it came as no

surprise to observers that the announcement of the election results triggered political violence in all parts of the country, but especially in the northern region, the opposition alliance's stronghold, with opposition supporters attacking mosques and offices of the UDF. What can be gleaned from the post-election events and what impact do they have on the survival of Malawi's democratic process? The following section attempts to tackle some of the issues and lessons that could be learned from the post-election situation.

The Failure of Multipartyism

The Malawian situation exposes the preposterous assumptions of the post-Cold War era that a multiparty system is equivalent to democracy. Malawi makes an interesting case study, because even though there is a multiplicity of actors in the political arena, this has not yet translated into what can be referred to as a democratic state. This is the case as a result of an apparent lack of proper checks and balances to safeguard against the manipulation of power by the ruling élite.

In the case of Malawi, there are reports illustrating the fact that the Broadcasting Commission failed in its part to offer a fair platform to the opposition as it did for the ruling UDF. In the same vein, the institutions set up to ensure that the process of democracy is not tampered with also lost some credibility. In this case, the Malawi Electoral Commission clearly contributed greatly to the problems surrounding the elections. Its integrity was further challenged when some of its members declined to endorse the 15 June election results.

Recently, the Commission announced that the local government elections that were supposed to be held soon after the national election, have been postponed. Bearing in mind that local government elections have never taken place in the country since 1994, the Commission is further losing credibility in the eyes of the people.

Furthermore, the Malawi political situation demonstrates a very crucial point about democracy and democratic processes that represents a shift away from the widely held assumption that democracy is mainly about a change of government through the ballot box. Julius Nyerere recently articulated this view when he stated that "[d]emocracy means much more than voting on the basis of adult suffrage every few years; it means (amongst other things) attitudes of tolerance and willingness to co-operate with others on terms of equality."

The fact that the opposition alliance opted to appeal to the High Court against the election results reveals that the country's political environment is not yet conducive for democracy to flourish. This is the case because the High Court ruling would only be a short-term solution to the crisis. However, in the long term, the country would have to seek a political settlement in order to ensure the future stability of Malawi as a state. A political settlement ought to begin at a level of building and restoring people's confidence in the country's institutional mechanisms.

Such an approach is also important given the fact that the 15 June election was Malawi's second attempt at democracy, which means that the process is still in its infancy. Therefore, wider political initiatives are necessary to ensure the defence of the process and the development of political tolerance. In what appeared to be a sign on the part of the ruling UDF to bring about such tolerance, President Muluzi made a special appeal to the opposition to work with the government during the official opening of Parliament, an event that the latter had resolved to boycott. Given the nature of the outcome of the election, it appears that the opposition is set to ignore this call and continue to challenge the legitimacy of President Muluzi's government.

The Electoral System

It is worthwhile to explore Malawi's electoral system briefly in order to place the current situation into perspective and offer a different understanding of the political crisis and the possible long-term means of resolving it. The voting patterns in the country, among others, revealed demarcations along regional and ethnic lines. President Bakili Muluzi and the UDF obtained most votes from the southern region, the president's home base. A similar pattern was recorded for the other political parties: for instance, AFORD performed well in the northern region which is the base of its leader, Chakufwa Chihana. It is therefore expected that the party that wins the election would have its supporters concentrated in one particular area of the country.

The country's electoral system is more or less modelled along the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, meaning in essence that 'the winner takes all'. Given the regional voting patterns described above, there is a need for a proper constitutional review process to look into this issue critically. The country could consider proportional representation (PR) as a viable option and a way forward for the sake of forging unity in Malawi. This system might ensure that all the political parties are represented within the government in order to ensure that other sectors and ethnic groups in the country are fairly represented. Currently, the country's electoral system is embedded in the politics of exclusion that has contributed to the

current dilemma.

Furthermore, another constitutional matter that the country has to tackle which impacts on the current situation and the future survival of the country's democracy is the requirement that a winner of an election should obtain 50 per cent of the votes cast by all registered voters. According to the opposition parties, President Muluzi did not secure a 50 per cent majority. The opposition alliance holds the view that only 4 663 751 of the 5 071 882 registered voters managed to vote and, on this basis, the alliance declared that President Muluzi only obtained 48.1 per cent of the votes; hence their challenge of the results. The Electoral Commission, on the other hand, insisted that the election was legitimate, because they made use of the *Presidential and Parliamentary Act* that stipulates that a candidate will be declared the winner through a simple majority.

For Malawi to experience peace and the consolidation of democracy, these issues ought to be clarified and addressed. As preliminary steps, an inclusive and participative constitutional review process and wider consultations between the government, civil society and other political actors are essential.

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- 1 A Coalition of civil society groups and the Roman Catholic Church.
- 2 Justice Hanjahanja cited ill health as the reason for his resignation, which according to the opposition was long overdue.
- 3 About 16 000 eligible voters failed to register in the north because they did not have voting material. This is where the majority of the opposition alliance is based.
- 4 Individually, the MCP obtained 66 seats, while AFORD obtained 29 seats, thus totalling 95 as an alliance.
- 5 The reason given by the Commission was that it intends to computerise the registration process for this election.
- 6 Nyerere, J. (1999). Governance in Africa. *African Association of Political Science Newsletter*, 4(2):3.
- 7 There was a national debate on the country's Constitution in 1995. One of the main issues that emerged was the creation of the Senate, but it never really dealt with the electoral system.
- 8 This percentage disputes the one issued by the Electoral Commission that gave President Muluzi 51.37 per cent.

ENDLESS NIGHT: CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ANGOLA

By Hussein Solomon

Introduction

Since the 1960s, Angola's traumatised population has known nothing but the anguish, agony and anger of war. After an analysis of the current state of play in this conflict-ridden country, it is noted that prospects for conflict resolution are slim and the suggestion is therefore made that Angolan citizens' nightmarish existence is set to continue.

Current State of Play

Between February 1998 and April 1999, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has transformed itself from a guerrilla movement into a conventional armed force. Two reasons account for this.

The first reason relates to UNITA's acquisition of sophisticated conventional weapons such as six Russian Mi-25 combat helicopters, six MiG-23 aircraft, 50 tanks, 75 armoured troop carriers, major mobile artillery and hand-carried satellite telephones. Most of this military hardware have been purchased from the Ukraine and North Korea. These weapons are flown directly to UNITA-held air bases in Angola from the Ukraine aboard large former Soviet Ilyushin-76 and Antonov-124 cargo planes.

The second reason relates to UNITA forces receiving assistance in 'training and logistics' from South African and Ukrainian mercenaries who also operate the new equipment on behalf of UNITA.

The money for weapons purchases emanates from the illicit diamond trade. Since 1992, UNITA has earned between US \$2.5 and \$3 billion from sales of rough diamonds from mines under its control. Despite the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA) recapture of the main diamond-producing centres in Angola's north-west Lunda provinces in 1998, UNITA still holds mines in the north of the country close to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and around Mavinga in the south-eastern province of Kuando Kubango. UNITA has been able to circumvent a United Nations (UN) embargo imposed in 1998 on the sale of diamonds without a government certificate. This UNITA has achieved by developing a cross-border network that smuggles diamonds to traders in Zambia, Namibia and the DRC, for onward sale to diamond-cutting centres in Israel and Antwerp. In early August 1999, the UN Security Council finalised the formation of two panels of experts to investigate how UNITA managed to evade UN-imposed sanctions and to recommend appropriate action. If recent reports that allude to the fact that UNITA has been building up an arms arsenal for some time are correct, however, the activities of these UN panels may well be a case of too little, too late.

The acquisition of its new weapon systems has given UNITA a tremendous degree of strategic and tactical manoeuvrability. The acquisition of combat helicopters and fighter aircraft allows UNITA to challenge the air

superiority of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) for the first time. The range of these aircraft reportedly places oil-producing areas, such as Soyo, well within reach. This would mean that UNITA technically has the capability to destroy the oil revenue that the MPLA regime depends upon for its political survival. Secondly, UNITA's newly-acquired air power allows it to support its infantry and provide air cover for its artillery. Thirdly, it also allows the rebel movement to use its aircraft for air reconnaissance and therefore to plan its next offensive.

UNITA's tanks, armoured troop carriers and major mobile artillery allow it greater flexibility and mobility that adversely affect the FAA's ability to predict the next UNITA offensive. In the DRC, it has already been witnessed how the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) has used iridium satellite telephones with devastating effect. Similarly, in addition to their contribution to mobility and flexibility, these telephones also enhance the simultaneous command and control of different theatres of conflict by UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi.

In response to UNITA's weapons purchases, the MPLA government has purchased several T-72 tanks. But this is unlikely to shift the balance of forces in Angola in the FAA's favour. Other factors also militate against the FAA. Firstly, it has become too used to fighting UNITA as a guerrilla force and therefore specialised in counterinsurgency warfare. Now that the FAA has to confront UNITA as a conventional force, it is unable to do so. Secondly, government troops are demoralised, poorly trained and often have to fend for themselves. For instance, FAA soldiers are not supplied with food rations and have to live off the countryside. In this context, desertions are commonplace. Thirdly, the FAA only has poor intelligence on UNITA. Finally, there are severe policy disagreements between the MPLA government in Luanda and senior FAA officers on the ground that compromise the FAA's military operations. MPLA politicians in Luanda, for instance, want the FAA to launch an offensive deep into UNITA territory to capture Andulo, Savimbi's birthplace, and Bailundo, Savimbi's headquarters, as well as the home of King Ekuikui, the traditional and spiritual leader of the Ovimbundu. The politicians believe that the capture of the two towns would strengthen their hand at any future negotiations. FAA commanders, on the other hand, prefer to stabilise the perimeter of Huambo and Kuito rather than trying to take Andulo and Bailundo. This stems from the fact that the FAA is aware of how difficult it is to destroy UNITA militarily. It is an awareness borne from recent bitter experience. In December 1998, the FAA's offensive was decisively stopped at the Wama junction, north of Huambo.

The military superiority of UNITA is seen at various levels. In late March and early April 1999, UNITA besieged and shelled the towns of Malanje, 400 kilometres east of Luanda, and Kuito, 600 kilometres to the south-east. Casualty figures could not be obtained because humanitarian staff had been withdrawn. What is known, however, is that since the resumption of fighting late in 1998, almost a million Angolans have been internally displaced by the conflict. Hundreds of thousands more are refugees in neighbouring countries.

In addition to the shelling and siege of Malanje and Kuito, UNITA has conducted hit-and-run attacks on roads in most areas of the country in an eclectic display of its conventional and unconventional warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, there have been three attacks within 100 kilometres of Luanda itself. In one attack, an electricity pylon had been sabotaged near Catate to the south-east. Two other attacks were reported on the road outside Caxito north of the city.

Moreover, UNITA has also resumed mine laying and the destruction of bridges on the main roads of the northern Uíge Province. For example, the bridge over the Kuilo River, near the town of Sanzo Pombo, 110 kilometres west of the border of the DRC, had been destroyed.

UNITA has also captured the northern Uíge town of Maquela do Zombo, situated on the DRC border. The capture of Maquela do Zombo holds great strategic significance for the rebel movement, since it gives UNITA total control of all the frontier regions of Uíge Province. This control has facilitated UNITA's diamond-smuggling operations as elucidated above and also the entry of recently trained UNITA recruits from secret training bases in the DRC.

A regional conflagration?

The spillover effects of the Angolan civil war seriously threaten to engulf several Central and Southern African states in a regional conflagration. For instance, there are currently allegations that UNITA is providing training to the Caprivi secessionists in Namibia to forestall the possibility of Windhoek actively supporting the FAA in the fight against the rebels.

Meanwhile, the FAA has intervened militarily in support of Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville and Laurent Kabila in the DRC in the hope of shutting down UNITA's supply routes and training camps. But this action by the FAA may be counterproductive, since there are allegations that UNITA has forged strategic alliances with the RCD rebels in the DRC. In addition, there are also allegations that UNITA has forged an alliance with the 'Ninja' militia – supporters of former Prime Minister Bernard Kolélas – who are fighting Sassou-Nguesso's troops in the Pool region of Congo-Brazzaville.

As these conflicts in the various countries drag on, the conflict dynamics in each country, from a conflict resolution viewpoint, become increasingly interlocked, forming a single conflict system. Such a conflict system needs to be tackled holistically and in an integrated manner as opposed to any piecemeal effort at resolving any 'national' conflict.

Towards a resolution of the Angolan conflict

Resolving the conflict in Angola is fraught with difficulties at three levels. Firstly, who should participate in negotiations? The Luanda regime has refused to negotiate with Savimbi's UNITA, preferring instead to negotiate with a tiny breakaway group called UNITA Renovada that consists of some UNITA members in the Angolan National Assembly. This was a position reiterated by President Dos Santos at the Maputo SADC Summit in August 1999 when he stated that there would be no further negotiations with Savimbi's UNITA. With this attitude, the MPLA government has probably painted itself into a corner. By refusing to engage in dialogue with Savimbi's UNITA, the MPLA has no option but a military confrontation with Savimbi, one that it is currently clearly losing.

Secondly, there is the problem of who would be able to act as an impartial mediator to the conflict. The UN has

disqualified itself to act as a mediator when the Security Council declared in March 1999 that Jonas Savimbi was the cause of the current conflict in Angola. This followed its decision a month earlier to close the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and withdraw UN military observers from the country. In August 1999, however, the UN announced its plans to boost its presence in Angola and open a new office to “explore effective measures” aimed at restoring peace. It is difficult to see how this new initiative on the part of the UN would work out, given the fact that the modalities and mandate for the UN mission are still unclear. Moreover, if this current UN initiative is aimed to bring about peace between the belligerents, it is difficult to see how the UN can act as a mediator, since it has not recanted from its previous position – holding Savimbi responsible for the resumption of the hostilities.

Similarly, SADC had disqualified itself to act as mediator by declaring Savimbi a war criminal at its June 1998 Summit in Mauritius. The SADC position on Savimbi was reinforced in August 1999 at the organisation's Maputo Summit when it agreed to supply FAA soldiers with uniforms and human and other material needs.

There is also the possibility of track-two diplomacy on the part of Angolan non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While this is a possibility, it does seem to be a viable one. Three reasons account for this. Firstly, there has always been suspicion regarding the neutrality of NGOs on the part of UNITA, in particular. Secondly, Angolan NGOs are weak and do not have the necessary material and human resources to sustain a long-term conflict resolution intervention. Finally, NGOs often compete with one another, engaging in useless (and expensive) duplication, while working at cross-purposes. In July 1999, for instance, unionists and intellectuals launched a 'peace manifesto'. The Catholic Church, meanwhile, did not back the manifesto and set up their own independent 'movement for peace'.

However, this leads to the third problem in resolving the Angolan conflict – is there a willingness on the part of both sides to settle this conflict? Here, one could answer that no such willingness exists on account of two factors. The first is that the conflict has gone on for so long that it has become personalised. As such, there can be no *rapprochement* between the parties as long as Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi remain the main protagonists in this unfolding African tragedy. Secondly, the lack of willingness on the part of UNITA can also be explained by its military superiority on the ground. There is currently nothing that UNITA can derive from sitting at the negotiating table that it cannot get by means of the battlefield.

As the war intensifies across the country, Angolans are dying at the rate of 200 a day. For Angolans, the dawn of peace has not occurred and is not likely to materialise in the foreseeable future. For Angolans, it seems that night has no end ...

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1 Shortly after the establishment of UNITA in 1966, Savimbi and his key officers went to China for guerrilla warfare training.

2 The Ovimbundu is the majority ethnic group in Angola and UNITA portrays itself as the group's representative. UNITA also portrays the MPLA as representing the interests of the Mbundu people and *mesticoes* (those of mixed European and African descent). This assertion was proven false in the 1992 elections when large numbers of Ovimbundu voted for the ruling MPLA.

International Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo After the Lusaka Agreement

By Kwezi Mngqibisa¹

The intervention by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) came at a time when Western attention was captivated by the Kosovo crisis. The peacemaking effort in the DRC was truly an African affair and like any other efforts anywhere in the world had its shortcomings. Africans committed themselves in a way never seen before as they expressed their support to find a solution for the country in a variety of ways. The DRC has been an African show, with over seven countries on the continent involved militarily and a collection of countries and regional organisations expending their efforts to find peace. On 31 August, all the parties had signed the cease-fire agreement that was prepared in Lusaka.

With the signing of the agreement by all the parties, the time has come for the international community to play its role in attempts to find lasting peace. This is not a vote of no confidence in African capabilities to find solutions, although there are limits to noble notions such as 'African solutions to African problems'. The limited nature of the African effort, financially and in terms of influence, will sooner or later emerge, specifically in post-conflict reconstruction, hence the need for an immediate and meaningful international contribution. Whether or not the African effort and response to the conflict were sufficient, are still to be seen. But the international community should not be exonerated of its responsibility that it has carried out impressively elsewhere. Africa must continue with its diplomatic efforts and political processes by playing the prominent role in the national dialogue and the international community could contribute through aid.

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With all the parties having signed the agreement, it came into effect, in most part, within 24 hours. It is hoped that the agreement will not be eroded by minor violations that may occur. With the participation of all the rebels in the cease-fire process, the agreement stipulates that a national dialogue should start after 45 days. The dialogue is to start after other components of the agreement are executed, such as the disengagement of forces, the selection of a facilitator, and the release and exchange of prisoners.

How can the international community support the parties to the conflict in bringing lasting peace in the DRC?

The international community, in the immediate future, has a role to play in peacekeeping in the DRC. Under the aegis of the United Nations (UN), a peacekeeping deployment is required for the implementation of the Lusaka agreement and the maintenance of peace in the country. Such a deployment would entail the supervision of the disengagement of parties and the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the execution of all the necessary activities included in the cease-fire agreement. Furthermore, humanitarian aid must be provided for the multitude of refugees and displaced people as a matter of urgency. The international community should support the national dialogue and any structures that may emerge that are deemed necessary by the Congolese for the stability of their country.

The international community could invite lead groups to visit and observe systems of government in place in other parts of the world, especially success stories from situations with a similar background. The aim of this exercise would be to expose key negotiators to systems of government that are already operational and afford them an opportunity to critique these with the aim to extract what is relevant for their country.

In the medium term, when stability is established, the international community can contribute by raising the peace stakes through aid towards rebuilding the DRC. Support must be given towards reversing trends that threaten human security, such as measures for disease prevention and the alleviation of

poverty. These and other programmes need to be carried out in conjunction with local change agents to ensure local participation and expression of local value systems, but most importantly, continuity once outside assistance has departed.

In the long term, donor countries can help in the development of a robust civil society in the DRC. Through dynamic civil organisations, issues of government accountability and transparency can be thoroughly considered at the level that matters the most. The international community, through funding civil organisations, can assist in initiating regional co-operation and interaction. Civil society organisations in the Great Lakes region need platforms that are non-statist that would facilitate the discussion of common issues and devise strategies to influence their respective governments.

Economic Assistance

The DRC will certainly experience hardships that will test the kind of decisions taken during the national debate. Failure to improve the material conditions of people will assess any form of consensus reached at the national dialogue. It is of the utmost importance that a mechanism is developed to appease the frustrations of people due to the lack of improvement in their conditions. There needs to be regulated post-conflict economic activity that will ensure equal opportunities in economic activities for all, even if such regulation will mean the reversal of the current trend where wealth is associated with the ruling élite. Through the involvement of organisations such as the World Bank, the international community can play a role in the post-conflict reconstruction of the economy of the country. The keys to this particular involvement would be people-driven and people-centred economic growth.

Governance

A progressive democratic end-state will mean that the political authority of the government will be constantly challenged, as there would be high competition for leadership against a background of enormous challenges. Among these

challenges will be the need to address the complex question of nationbuilding and reconciliation so that communities do not revert to communal or ethnic enclaves. This is necessary, because once consensus is challenged, there needs to be a social morality that will act as a stabilising factor that could resist reverting to violent conflict. The main duty of the international community must be to assist in strengthening the DRC state, thus ensuring that the country does not become a failed state as a result of the balkanisation of parts of its territory.

This can be done by assisting in attempts to cultivate a culture of human rights, constructive conflict management and access to decision-making. The creation of strong government structures will bestow legitimacy onto the political processes that the country will embark on.

Human rights need to be the standard with which the international community and especially regional organisations measure worthy membership. Common humanity should compel the international community to contribute towards national consensus that, in turn, should engulf class, race, ethnicity and religion in the DRC. The international community must contribute to the creation of a society that exists in an environment characterised by the search for solutions, where differing views are accepted and properly managed, and where there is a broad understanding of the functioning and value of governance.

Surely, there is a need to pursue justice with regard to the perpetrators of crimes against humanity. However, this should be undertaken with great care so as not to render the country unstable. The principles that founded the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission could be scrutinised and the people of the DRC could decide whether these principles could assist them. South Africa could be of assistance in any capacity that the people of the DRC may require. The international community through the UN can play a role in providing relevant structures, such as a tribunal to investigate crimes against humanity in the region, should this be the wish of the people in the region.

Regionalism

There needs to be a strong regionalisation of the countries of the Great Lakes that will ensure a common security regime able to prevent and contain conflicts. Countries in the region do not belong to a common regional grouping, a fact that does not help in facilitating the discussion of common problems. Such regionalism will have to put institutions into place that will secure the co-operation and contribution of member states to regional security. This is vital for the Great Lakes region as threats to stability are real and could easily reverse the progress already achieved. It is certain that none of the countries in the Great Lakes region will enjoy peace and stability as long as individual countries in the region are not stable. It should be a priority for all to enter into and sustain a dialogue on how to deal with individual conflicts and how to ensure that they do not spill over into the region.

In conclusion, peace will only dawn in the DRC and the region if the above issues are addressed in conjunction with issues such as the reintegration of former combatants, the development of national armies and other challenges. However, for obvious reasons, the efforts of the country and indeed of the region need to be augmented with those of the international community. This project must be treated with the seriousness it deserves, as it can impact greatly on the success of post-conflict reconstruction politically, economically and socially of the DRC. Bringing about a secure country and a secure Great Lakes region is the responsibility of the people of the region, and religious groups, political parties and other structures should influence events and developments there. But the international community should not be allowed to ignore its role in such efforts.

In conjunction with African players, the international community should help with peacebuilding attempts to install democracy in the DRC. The international community, through private business, donor governments and intergovernmental organisations must act, recognising that a military interpretation of the cease-fire agreement without support for attempts to

achieve human security will not deliver stability to the region nor, indeed, to the world.

Mozambique Prepares for Elections

By
Senzo Ngubane¹

With a few days to go before the dawn of the new millennium, African states are indeed en route to political change with elections being held in most countries and others still engaged in electoral preparations. The process of political change through elections has also caused much drama on the African continent. An election hardly passes by without fierce accusations of election-rigging and all kinds of manipulation in favour of the party that assumes authority. From the highly contested election outcome in Lesotho in 1998 to the recent electoral problems in Malawi, the notions of a free and fair election in Africa appear as though they are under pressure. Such events have opened Pandora's box in African politics where people have begun to question the relevance of multipartyism as a guarantor of democracy in Africa.

Notwithstanding this pessimistic background, positive developments along the multiparty democracy route have also been witnessed, with Nigeria and South Africa being cases in point. Africa is indeed a diverse continent and issues of good governance and democracy will remain an important part of its political discourse. It is within this context that another African country, Mozambique, goes to the polls on 3 and 4 December 1999. This article highlights the current political environment in Mozambique and the extent of the country's preparedness for this important election.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

On 1 September 1999, President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique officially announced that the country would hold its multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections on 3-4 December 1999. The decision followed a recommendation made by the National Elections Commission that the elections should be held early in December. The elections were originally

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scheduled to take place in October and the decision to postpone them was made after delays in starting with the registration process.

The December election would be the country's second democratic election; the first was held in October 1994. The 1994 elections, conducted under a relatively stable environment, saw 14 parties contesting seats in the National Assembly and 12 candidates stood for the position of president. The current head of state and the leader of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) obtained 53 per cent of the votes against Alfonso Dhlakama of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), the main opposition party, that obtained 34 per cent. These political parties have dominated Mozambique's political scene ever since the country's independence from Portugal in June 1975. During the post-independence era, the dividing line between these political formations was that FRELIMO was pro-Communism and RENAMO was created as a strategy to curb FRELIMO's political domination in Mozambique. Ahead of the second democratic elections, a number of problems have been observed that are most likely to have an impact on the overall outcome in December.

PRE-ELECTION PROBLEMS?

The National Elections Commission had set the period between 20 July and 17 September as the registration period. The elementary stages of the registration process were conducted in a smooth manner with more than half of the potential voters having registered by 23 August 1999. To put the figure differently, the Commission stated on 23 August that 4 391 730 (53 per cent) out of about 8.3 million of the electorate had already registered for the election. At the close of the registration period, election officials estimated that more than 80 per cent of eligible voters would have registered.

Despite this positive feedback, opposition parties have voiced their concern that the registration period is too short and would thus disenfranchise a number of eligible voters. The opposition further stated that the extension of the period was necessary because of the nature of the country's

infrastructure, for instance, the lack of transportation and communication facilities, would make it difficult for Commission workers to reach remote areas in time.

The National Elections Commission, on the other hand, was of the opinion that it would be impossible to extend the registration period, given the fact that the elections are to be held before the end of the year. According to the Commission, the electoral legislation in Mozambique states that the electoral process should resume three months before election day and any extension of the registration drive would therefore affect the process. The Commission maintained that the extension of the registration period would mean that the election would not be held on 3-4 December 1999.

Another controversy arose when RENAMO rejected a draft Bill that stipulated that all citizens who turned 18 years of age on election day should be allowed to register as voters. This proposed Bill contradicted the registration legislation that stipulates that only citizens who turn 18 on the last day of registration (in this case 17 September 1999) are eligible to register as voters. The viewpoint of RENAMO is that the alteration of legislation at this stage will disorganise the entire process leading up to the election. For instance, civic education measures would have to be initiated to ensure that those to whom the changes apply, are informed of these changes.

The recently launched Opposition Union has also accused the ruling FRELIMO of election fraud, because the party registered foreigners as voters. According to the Opposition Union, this was a strategy of the government, assisted by the State Information and Security Service (SISE), to ensure that it obtains an edge over the opposition in the December elections. The ruling FRELIMO has since denied the accusations, declaring them to be lies and an attempt by the opposition to discredit its image prior to the election.

One of the key issues that the above problems raise, is that an enabling environment ought to be created in order to ensure that the run-up to the election occurs smoothly. Part of the problem is that an election is understood

to be an event rather than part of a process. Thus, political parties fail to realise that the African political context is at such a stage that the democratic process still needs to be carefully nurtured.

CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE

The political environment, at a broader level, remains relatively stable with both major parties retaining their current leaders as presidential candidates. FRELIMO nominated President Chissano for the second time as its candidate for the presidency and RENAMO, on the other hand, retained its leader Afonso Dhlakama for the presidency.

Furthermore, an interesting development has occurred in the opposition forces, with eleven opposition parties, including RENAMO, having agreed to form an alliance called the Electoral Union for the upcoming elections.² In terms of the agreement, the opposition parties would support a single candidate for the presidency and they all pledged their support to the leader of RENAMO. This is considered to be the best strategy to oust the ruling party and strengthen the chances for the opposition to make a showing during the election. The formation of the Electoral Union led to the disintegration of the Democratic Union (UD) and the Democratic Alliance (APD) when some of its leaders decided to be part of the recently launched union. It remains to be seen, however, whether the alliance would manage to achieve its objectives.

On the other hand, the ruling party appears stronger than before and stands a good chance of winning the elections, especially given the fact that the opposition remains weak. For instance, the recently launched Electoral Union is composed of parties that have no seats in the current national government. Furthermore, the alliance that has been forged, seems to have nothing in common other than the drive to oust the ruling FRELIMO and that on its own

² The parties to the agreement include RENAMO, the Party of National Unity, the Popular Alliance Force, Mozambique's Popular Party, the Free Alliance of Mozambique, Mozambique's Unity Party, the Democratic Renewal Party, the Mozambican Green Party, the Party of National Convention, the Mozambique Liberal Party and the Renovation Democratic Party.

makes it weak in the sense that there are no clear long-term political goals that it intends to offer to the population of Mozambique. At another level, the country's socio-economic rehabilitation under the FRELIMO government showed some interesting progress and it would come as no surprise if the party is returned to power with a majority of votes.

**Anti-virus for the crime plague:
Is an anti-crime movement taking root in contemporary South Africa?**

By Marlene Roefs*

Anti-crime organisations in South Africa have crossed the barriers of geography and race, imitating the waves of crime that have breached the fading boundaries around 'African urban areas' and that are now confronting contemporary South African society at large. Various shapes of 'popular justice' organs, enjoying support among citizens of all colours of the nation, have mushroomed in reaction to what is seen as a rampant, ruthless and ever-growing industry. To what extent is the public willing to mobilise or be mobilised to protest collectively around crime-related issues? Is a mass anti-crime movement developing?

While crime statistics and victimisation studies are widely available - offering useful though unreliable indicators of crime levels in South Africa (see, for example, the SAPS crime statistics, *Nedcor • ISS Crime Index*, 1998) - behavioural intentions toward crime are rarely reported. The aim of this article is to contribute to the study of the public's reaction to crime. In particular, the focus is placed on the willingness of the public to participate collectively in anti-crime protest action and to involve themselves in anti-crime organisations.

Anti-crime organisations in South Africa

During the struggle against apartheid, Black urban communities suffering from poverty and violence, gave birth to self-defence units that acted as community police forces. 'Community courts' were used to enforce law. Since state policing was focused on the oppression of black South Africans rather than on ensuring an acceptable social order for all South Africans at the time, 'organising people's power' was seen as a legitimate cause (Nina 1996). In the early stages of the period of transition to democracy, however, 'self-regulation' was implemented, aimed at redressing tensions between the sovereignty of the state and civil society organs (Nina 1996). Recently, the tensions between the courts, the police, and the government, on the one hand, and the public, on the other, seem to have increased again. People's courts, self-defence units, disciplinary committees and street committees of the past have returned, hidden behind new guises.

As in most countries going through a fundamental political transition, "South Africa's transition to democracy has been characterised by a sharp increase in crime" (Haeefele, 1998:1). Tensions are created as the state and the public lambaste each other. The state accuses the public of a lack of respect for authority, unco-operative behaviour, and taking the law into its own hands. The public sees the justice apparatus as incapable of securing safety for the citizenry. Communities blame the police service and courts for inefficiency, racism, corruption and unresponsiveness. It is widely believed that the government does not give enough priority to crime.

The question occupying many minds is whether the feelings of frustration, antagonism and violation that crime has evoked in the public are strong enough to cause the public to resort to measures other than the criminal justice system in order to guarantee a protected and safe environment. Is crime creating a pool of 'gatvol' (sick and tired) people willing to join in collective endeavours to fight crime?

The line between law-abiding anti-crime organisations and vigilante organisations that 'take the law into their hands' is thin. The most radical public anti-crime organisations are labelled vigilante organisations. The most well-known anti-crime organisation, Pagad (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), based in the Western Cape with tentacles in KwaZulu-Natal and other provinces, is one of those community organisations that makes it difficult to distinguish between criminals and victims. Anti-crime committees or forums elicit a less negative connotation. Neighbourhood watches patrol through demarcated areas. Explicit names are used for specific sectors of society combating crime. Women are mobilised in, for instance, Women Against Violence (WAV), and business in Business Against Crime (BAC). Receiving less attention, though certainly operative, are farmers who also organise radical collective actions aimed at protecting their livestock, and residents in more well-to-do areas who cannot (solely) rely on private security firms.

The following paragraphs are closely related to this question, namely whether people are willing to stage protest action against the state and criminals and whether such protest potential will be utilised in anti-crime organisations. Developments in people's willingness to protest against crime-related issues will be described using national survey data of representative samples of the South African population over the age of seventeen, gathered on an annual basis between March 1995 and March 1999. The second part of the analysis focuses on involvement in anti-crime organisations during the past two years, followed by a consideration of the link between involvement in anti-crime organisations and protest intention. This may provide information about the extent to which protest potential has been organised. Within the limits of the survey data at hand, an attempt will be made to shed some light on the relevance of certain demographic characteristics of people who are willing to fight actively against crime.

Intention to protest over crime-related issues

Respondents were asked: "Can you think of a few issues over which you would probably participate in protest actions in the future?" The answers given to the open question were clustered into several main issues. Protest issues relating to crime covered answers like 'gangsterism', 'drugs', 'rape' and 'abuse', though most respondents identified 'crime/safety'. The answers suggest that, between the inception and the disbandment of the first ANC Cabinet, protest over crime has become much more likely. At the same time, the results show that this may not be a linear trend. On a national level, respondents' intention to join in protest against crime increased most strongly between 1997 and 1998, reaching its zenith in 1998.

Between 1995 and 1996 protest intention went slightly down (from 8.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent), after which the willingness to protest went up by 5.3 per cent between 1996 and 1997 (12.8 per cent). This trend continued in the next year with a 13.3 per cent increase between 1997 and 1998 (26.1 per cent). The following year this figure became somewhat lower with just over one-fifth (21.4 per cent) of respondents' willing to protest.

Important differences were found between the nine provinces. As shown in Figure 1, the intention to protest over crime-related issues significantly differed among the provinces, as well as over time. Most noteworthy are the immense increases witnessed between 1997 and 1998 in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and the Free State, with more than a quarter of the respondents indicating that they would probably protest against crime (53.6 per cent, 32.0 per cent, 30.7 per cent and 26.8 per cent, respectively). In 1999, respondents from Gauteng, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were still most likely to protest though less so than in 1998. Free State residents, on the other hand, did not seem to have changed their minds, with their willingness to protest registering second only to Gauteng (27.4 per cent and 39.5 per cent, respectively).

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Interestingly, these figures only partially overlap actual crime statistics. For instance, in his analysis of reported crimes during 1998, Liebenberg (1999) shows that Durban (murder and theft), Johannesburg (robbery), Queenstown/Umtata (various crimes) and the Boland (rape and assault) rate as the highest risk crime areas. Only in Johannesburg and Durban do the statistics for crime and people's willingness to protest crime match. The Western Cape does not belong to the high-risk category, yet its residents seem willing to protest against crime.

Perhaps a deeper search in crime statistics might shed some light on the congruence between the incidence of certain types of crime and perceptions of crime. A plausible link may be that robbery, burglary, theft, hijackings and forms of stealing are more strongly linked to perceptions of crime than personal violence, for instance, rape or assault. This may be because victims of assault and rape often partially blame themselves, whereas burglary, for example, is clearly a less personal form of victimisation against which the police should protect citizens. Thieves are not after a person or his/her body, but after money and other material belongings. They are seen as belonging to the outside social world, whereas in most cases, rapists are often people from the victim's own neighbourhood, someone the victim knows personally. Secondly, the number of crimes reported - one source of information about the incidence of crime - vary for the different types of victimisation. Reporting theft is more likely than reporting rape, for instance. Reporting rape and assault is mostly not easy for victims. Many times they feel ashamed, indoctrinated by their attackers and disrespected by police officials who lack the proper training to provide assistance to victims. Reporting robbery or other forms of theft is much less difficult. Moreover, the purpose of reporting personal violence serves another goal than that of theft. The former is mostly motivated by the need for protection and assistance in the process of recovery, while the latter is merely a formality for insurance purposes. Personal violence has ruined people's lives for many years - in all likelihood the numbers of reported rape and assault are far less than actual occurrences of these crimes. Organised crime and various forms of theft have undoubtedly increased during the past years, spreading to every corner of society. It also receives ample attention in the media and public discourse, creating particular perceptions in the minds of the public, in contrast to those about personal violence. Further research is clearly necessary to develop a better understanding of the impact of various forms of victimisation and the way in which this affects popular perceptions of crime and reactions toward this evil. In all likelihood, such studies will also provide more insight into the need of people to join anti-crime organisations.

Support for anti-crime organisations

In March 1998 and 1999, in response to the question, "Are you a sympathiser, or a member who regularly attends meetings, or are you an office bearer of an anti-crime group, or none of these?", more than a third of respondents said they sympathised or were actively involved in an anti-crime organisation. The proportion of those actively involved in anti-crime organisations generally dropped from 9.6 per cent to 7 per cent. Sympathy, however, significantly increased from 24 per cent to 32 per cent. A breakdown by province (see Figure 2) suggests that anti-crime organisations received the highest support in KwaZulu-Natal in 1998, whereas high support was registered in the Free State, Eastern Cape and Gauteng in 1999. In these provinces, the increase from 1998 was also the most significant. An impressive 16 per cent of Eastern Cape residents said they were actively involved or office bearers of an anti-crime organisation. In the Free State and Gauteng, however, anti-crime organisations had less active members, but many sympathisers. The only province in which a significant decrease in involvement was found, was the Northern Cape that, together with Mpumalanga and the Northern Province, showed the lowest levels of involvement in 1999.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

In order to assess the importance of provincial versus other demographic characteristics for people with protest intention and organisational involvement, the relative importance of provincial, racial, class, age and gender differences was considered. The study found that gender and age were the least relevant. Provincial differences best characterise the varying levels of protest intention and involvement in anti-crime organisations. The results suggest that it is only within the provinces where race and class matter, even though the relevance of class versus race varies per province. In the 'mixed' provinces, race generally better distinguishes between potential protesters and involved people than class, whereas class seems more important in the more homogeneous provinces.

Involvement in anti-crime organisations and anti-crime protest

Involvement in anti-crime organisations does not seem to have changed significantly in the past two years, while protest over crime-related issues tend to become somewhat less likely. How are the two related? Do people who are supportive of anti-crime organisations want to join in collective protest action against crime more than people who do not sympathise with or are not actively involved in an anti-crime organisation? Statistical analyses revealed that the link between involvement and protest is very weak. However, remarkable differences were found between the provinces. For instance, respondents from the Western Cape and Gauteng were more likely to mention crime as an issue to protest against if they were supportive of an anti-crime organisation. In 1999, people in KwaZulu-Natal also tend to link involvement to protest, though less strongly than respondents in the Western Cape and Gauteng. In the other provinces, a relation between anti-crime involvement and anti-crime protest intention was not found. A strong link between involvement and protest intention would have indicated that people who are involved particularly consider participating in collective protest, which may imply a mobilising function of anti-crime organisations (Gamson and Schmeidler 1983; Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

Interestingly, sympathy with and activism in anti-crime organisations also did not seem to inhibit anti-crime protest. The study did not find a negative relation between involvement and protest intention in any of the provinces. This finding suggests that there is (as yet) no demobilisation effect of organisational involvement. Some

academics argue that the organisation of collective sentiments and interest into a body that protects the collective's interest might lead to demobilisation of potential protest (Piven and Cloward, 1979; also Pretorius (1996) and Shubane and Shaw (1993) on corporatism in South Africa). In the same vein, it could be argued that the demobilisation of the protest of potential crime fighters might result from the institutionalisation and regulation of the anti-crime movement.

A cautionary note must be made, however, since findings obscure the possibility that some anti-crime organisations do have a mobilising and radicalising effect on people, while some have not. The study did take into account some demographic and geographic characteristics of respondents, while other important factors like victimisation, and the presence and support for an actual anti-crime organisation in a certain area at a certain point in time were omitted from the analysis. All in all, a simplistic generalisation of the effect of involvement in anti-crime organisations on protest over crime certainly does not confirm the idea that anti-crime organisations act as vehicles for collective protest actions that target the crime virus.

Concluding remarks

The data presented above suggests that an anti-crime movement has developed. One out of five respondents said he or she will protest against crime-related problems. A third of the population support anti-crime organisations. A much smaller though significant proportion are actually active in such organisations.

The link between involvement in anti-crime organisations and the intention to protest against crime is less clear than one may think. In most of the provinces, involved and uninvolved people would protest. In another study of the (de)mobilisation effect of involvement in political organisations, civics and trade unions during the transition period in South Africa (Roefs and Klandermans, in press), it was found that organisational involvement did not negatively affect people's intentions to protest and that it did not de-radicalise them. However, the effect of involvement in organisations on the number and type of protest issues raised by respondents seems to be more strongly linked to the incorporation of social problems in policy formulation than to involvement in certain types of organisations; the more incorporated the issues, the less likely people seem to protest. Since policy that deals with crime on a local level strongly differs from area to area, it will be difficult to study the effect of involvement in anti-crime organisations on a national level. Larger studies of involvement and policy-making on a local level are necessary for a better understanding of the consequences of involvement in anti-crime organisations on the ways in which crime will be dealt with. This article has tried to shed some light on this link on a provincial level.

Geographic borders are more useful in distinguishing between the potential crime fighters and the passive public than are racial or class boundaries. However, racial and class disparities are still more important than, for instance, age or gender-related dynamics, with race and class still very strongly related in South Africa. Depending on the type of statistical analyses, one of these two demographic factors may turn out to be the most apt descriptive tool. In this analysis, class differences seem to have gained importance, while racial differences are becoming less demarcated. Ironically, one of the most horrible phenomena in South Africa is becoming one of the scarce equalising factors in this divided country.

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- 1 Antoinette Louw remarks that crime statistics "are usually regarded with caution. In South Africa they are treated with outright scepticism" (1998:11). Generally, it is believed that South African crime data is unreliable, suffering from underreporting, especially regarding rape and common assault.
- 2 Private security is a fast growing industry in South Africa.
- 3 Unfortunately, involvement in anti-crime organisations has only been included since the 1998 survey.
- 4 It falls beyond the scope of this article fully to explain why some are more or less willing to protest over crime in terms of socio-psychological dynamics that are related to experiences with and perceptions of crime. Crime statistics show that the incidence and types of criminal offences significantly vary between geographic areas (see Liebenberg for a useful analysis and overview of 1998 HSRC-GIS crime statistics), class and race groups, as well as over time.
- 5 A comparison of crime-related protest issues with work/job-related issues revealed that, in 1998, the intention to protest over crime was as high as over jobs. In 1999, 29 per cent of respondents would protest over jobs.
- 6 This proportion is higher than the number of respondents who sympathised with trade unions or who were involved in unions, which was below 30 per cent in 1999.
- 7 The means presented in Figure 2 reflect the mean score on the answering categories (none =1, sympathiser =2, active member =3, office bearer =4). They provide an indication of degree of involvement.
- 8 Pearson's correlation coefficient of $r=.12$ in 1998 and $r=.16$ in 1999.
- 9 Respectively, $r=.30$ and $r=.17$ in 1998, and respectively, $r=.34$ and $r=.21$ in 1999.
- 10 Pearson's correlation coefficient $r=.13$
- 11 Unfortunately, another big equaliser might be the spread of HIV infections – particularly among the most economically active and the youth - with disastrous consequences for the South African economy.

PUBLIC SECTOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

By Pravina Makan-Lakha

Transforming the Public Service into a dynamic, needs-based and proactive instrument, capable of playing an integral and strategic part in entrenching good governance on the continent of Africa continues to remain the overall objective of ACCORD's Public Sector Conflict Management Programme (PSCMP). While much of the activities in the initial phase focused on building capacity, the next phase will see concrete steps towards building mechanisms to deal with recurring conflict, in other words institutionalising conflict resolution.

The KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Department of Health participated in a pilot initiative in 1998 that was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). As a result, 40 senior officials were fully trained in conflict management skills, and the Department committed itself to a three-year intensive programme. The programme intends to provide skills training in conflict management for approximately 300 health officials, over the three-year period with the aim of making the working environment more co-operative and participatory. The programme will further result in officials utilising their skills to deal with conflicts in a constructive manner and being supported by mechanisms that will be developed to deal with recurring conflict.

In a previous issue of *Conflict Trends*, the start-up of the first phase of the Department of Health programme, planned to commence in May and end in August 1999, was reported. The first phase has been completed and has resulted in 84 health officials being trained in four courses: basic conflict resolution, advanced conflict resolution, facilitation and participatory decision-making. The first group of participants varied from regional directors to medical superintendents, matrons and hospital administrators of at least 27 institutions across KwaZulu-Natal's eight regions. The attached table displays the composition of the participants.

The varied approach to the composition of the first group of participants has ensured that at least three persons from one institution will return with the necessary conflict management skills, thus enabling an environment or forum for sharing and dialogue. Programme staff and trainers at ACCORD encouraged participants to share and use their accumulated expertise through

informal forums formed by themselves to extend their learning.

The benefits of this capacity-building process have already begun to be felt in the Department and Bheki Dlamini, the Deputy Director of the Directorate of Labour Relations, confirmed this. He said that the Department is already witnessing a decline in cases of disputes referred to the Directorate and that institutions are using their acquired skills to resolve minor conflicts locally, as opposed to referring them to the Directorate's provincial office.

While the second phase of the capacity-building component is planned to begin in the first quarter of 2000 with a group of 100 participants, intensive consultations will commence with regard to the process of institutionalising conflict resolution in the Department of Health. The current pool of expertise that has been generated in the Department will strengthen the institutionalisation process.

As the institutionalisation of conflict resolution is next in the Department's programme, it will also be a priority area for the PSCMP at ACCORD for the next five years.

The broad purposes of mediation offices, irrespective of their location, will be to provide efficient access to dispute resolution services at provincial, departmental and local level. Although they will differ in size and location, and will operate within different governmental cultures, their activities could be grouped into two categories:

service centres where staff members provide dispute resolution services by working directly with public officials in the resolution of problems; and

resource centres that provide information and expertise, but do not directly mediate disputes.

Over the last three years, the PSCMP has been monitoring and understudying a similar process in the United States (US) that started some fifteen year ago. Conflict resolution practitioners – Bill Drake, Robert Jones, Howard Bellman, Chris Carlson, Wallace Warfield and Peter Adler – who have been instrumental in developing the process in the US, have offered their experience and expertise to the South African initiative. The lessons learned from the US experience will be scrutinised and

carefully discussed with South African partners.

The US practitioners, through the United States Information Service (USIS) have had the opportunity to travel to South Africa and assist in and observe the capacity-building phase. Recently, the manager of the programme at ACCORD, with the assistance of an USIS grant, travelled to the US to engage in further dialogue with practitioners on the process. This was supplemented with visits to actual state-wide offices in three states and the engagement in activities of these offices that provided hands-on experience.

The model for institutionalising conflict resolution will be borrowed from the US example of state-wide offices of mediation and will rely, to a large extent, on the expertise of US team members. As an initial step, a roundtable meeting of practitioners from different backgrounds – offering more than a total of 120 years of experience – took place in Pasadena, Los Angeles. The meeting debated a number of strategies for the initiative. This is developed into a paper that will be available in the near future.

The expansion of the PSCMP, arising from the successes of the KwaZulu-Natal initiative, is eminent. Intensive final negotiations are currently taking place with another province for a three-year programme, starting in the first half of 2000. The current proposed programme will be instituted at provincial level and will encompass all departments within the provincial legislature. The preliminary phase, consisting of an overview of conflict management training for the leadership of these provincial departments, has been completed. A refresher course for this team will introduce the implementation of the full programme.

The PSCMP will further also focus on taking the programme beyond South Africa's borders over the next two years. It is envisaged that the programme will be launched in two other Southern African countries as a first phase and then expanded further onto the continent.

PEACE, PROFIT OR PLUNDER? THE PRIVATISATION OF SECURITY IN WARTORN AFRICAN SOCIETIES

Edited by Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (1999), Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 245 pages

You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you – Leon Trotsky, quoted in Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-war*, 1993

Conflict – the unenviable, yet inevitable thread flowing through history from pre-modern to modern times (and now through post-modern times, if some are to be believed) – continuously threatens individual and community safety and sometimes even world peace and stability. But violence is not only spreading; the horror image carried in graphic novels of a privatisation of security together with 'global' (read 'capital') interests is coming perilously close to reality.

Ironically, the much acclaimed movement towards liberal democracy and the free market (*the end of history?*) and the destruction or disintegration of a bipolar world into multiple polarities and merging, exploding and converging polarisms did not bring more peace, stability or justice (not to speak of a more equal distribution of wealth). In a multipolar world dominated by a few rich countries that not only call the shots, but continuously fire them one-sidedly, what is glibly referred to as 'globalisation' became more than just a sinister phenomenon. Globalisation, as a sustained political practise towards disempowering the already poor, more or less always affected the so-called 'third world', but now also affect countries previously pejoratively labelled the 'second world'. For many, globalisation became a practise meant to ensure that power and wealth remain in Western hands (read 'Christian' and/or 'capitalist', if you wish). The consequences are no longer only widespread, but have also spawned many new faces. One of these faces is the spectre (if not already the reality) of privatised war and oppression on a global scale.

Various observers and theorists uncritically accept that globalisation has to be the dominant contemporary discourse. Following from this, it is assumed that the only way to assist (force?) poor states to be responsive to its citizenry is through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs are mostly imposed from above. From earlier experience, it has been noted that the post-colonial African state is either too weak or too distant from the people whom it is meant to serve. The notion

of 'the suspended state' has been used by some analysts. The latest 'global' imposition of SAPs comes after tortuous attempts by African states to experiment with nationbuilding along the lines of first and second world models, while burdened by economic dependency from the dominating first world economic cores.

Theorists like Francis Fukuyama somewhat deterministically declared that *The End of History* was near, and that the logical march of liberalism was to herald a new era or usher in a new global order. Liberal political scientists such as Larry Diamond, in the wake of this argumentation, declared that the democratic revolution – referring to the advent of multipartyism and free market politics in Africa and elsewhere – was at hand. The successive leaders of the United States – the world's self-appointed policeman – such as Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton, propagated a 'new world order'. (Bill Clinton went even further: during a much publicised visit to Africa in 1998, he declared that the 'USA wants to put Africa on the world map'.) The latter was progressively pushed forward not only through propaganda, but also through military intervention on the globe.

What remains uncontested, is that globalisation (in whatever form it exists or is expanding) also implies the globalisation of violence. As the capitalist system is entrenching itself, so are the measures for its maintenance. Part of this is through the blatant projection of military power. In other cases, it takes the form of privatised security interests. Such a globalisation of violence, albeit interstate or intrastate in nature, or as a result of the clash of civilisations, has become a pervasive phenomenon. It spans all continents: Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

What role are multinational corporations playing in this? How do techno-industrial complexes fit into this picture of globalised violence? What interaction exists between privatised security, the accumulation of wealth and the weak or disintegrating state? In which states did privatised security outfits intervene and to what effect? What were the consequences of such intervention? And on whose behalf did such interventions occur? To answer all these questions in one reader is a tall order.

However, *Peace, Profit or Plunder*, edited by Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, is a worthy attempt to answer at least some of these questions with specific reference to Africa. The book appeared following a collaborative project between the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an independent policy research institute in South Africa

and the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security based in Ottawa. Papers delivered at a conference in March 1998 in Pretoria, followed by further commissioned research, resulted in an expanded and updated published book. The preface states that, “[r]ather than analysing the trend towards an increased role for the private security industry in Africa from a theoretical or ideological perspective, considerable care was taken in the choice of contributors to ensure that the issues will be discussed and presented from different angles.”

The mercenary-soldier as a phenomenon is perhaps as old as civilisation. The Greek and Roman civilisations made use of mercenaries; so did Genghis Khan and various European powers in the 1800s, including Napoleon. In the Anglo Boer War (or Second South African War), some of the 'Free Corps' fighting on the side of the Boers were little less than adventurous mercenaries. (Some of the units conscripted from the poorer parts of the British isles were perhaps little more than 'enforced mercenaries' who died on South African battlefields to sustain British colonial expansion.) In Africa, the 1960s still call to mind mercenary involvement in the Congo. In the 1970s, Callen and his cohorts gave a sinister twist to mercenary involvement in Angola when they took to butchering more than war in support of Holden Roberto's FNLA. Mercenaries were used as late as the 1980s by the authoritarian apartheid state to ensure 'political' friends of the regime – *inter alia*, through attempted *coups d'état* in the Seychelles and Comoros. But the romantic notion of the adventurous mercenary ('soldier-of-fortune') if there was any, has been substantially transformed over the past decade. They became sophisticated, privatised agents of security, focused on enhancing the accumulation of wealth on behalf of multinational corporations or unrepresentative kleptocrats. Security, the privatisation of war and the accumulation of scarce resources (minerals, capital, wealth) became synonymous with globalisation and the 'freeing of the market'. This book gives the first tentative steps in analysing the contribution of privatised security to the endemic 'African condition'.

The book comprises eleven chapters (list of abbreviations and preface excluded) and 245 pages. The chapters cover general areas: an introduction to the phenomenon of private security in war-torn African countries (Jakkie Cilliers), Africa, military downsizing and the growth of the security industry (Peter Lock), the crises in external response (Mark Malan), as well as the much spoken about collapse of the African state (Richard Cornwell). Case studies include Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African private security outfit involved in Angola, Sierra Leone and elsewhere by journalist Khareen Pech, studies on Angola and Sierra

Leone (Sean Cleary and Ian Douglas), and a consideration of private security in relation to international law (Yves Sandoz). The book concludes by trying to tease out the question whether Africa is moving out of an age of the **privatisation of security** towards the **privatisation of war**.

I found the chapters by Cilliers, Malan and Pech very informative. Cilliers discusses the trends around the privatisation of security in an accessible and neutral manner. He is correct in his observation that disempowered states or 'suspended states' have but little choice in the absence of military capacity to buy in foreign-based security outfits. What remains unsaid, is that the world's military might remains American and Western-based, and that SAPs do not only disempower poor people, but also render the state in Africa a mere charade. And if the state in Africa is suspended, partisan SAPs contribute to the further erosion of the civil society and communities (which, in most cases, are very weak indeed). Earlier works by Onimode, Wallerstein and Hoogvelt would have informed the reader here and later works by Anyonge would also be informative. Malan's chapter on the crises in external response in Africa is worth reading – a more than competently written chapter. What Khareen Pech misses in analytical capability, she makes up for in splendid investigative journalism in her case study of EO. But much more remains to be explored in this area.

The chapter on the military as business by Cilliers and Douglas points out that the old-styled mercenary outfit in the age of globalisation became a new powerful animal with much more at stake than just adventure and a rush of adrenaline. Privatised security holds both good and bad consequences. It is argued that accountability, transparency and codes of ethics may be of use in controlling this new animal. But riding the tiger may not be easy. Robin Luckham, a theorist knowledgeable about military regimes, asked rhetorically whether new approaches to civil-military relations could yield results. Can an epitaph be written for the Frankenstein monster of military interventions, military regimes and *coups* in Africa? If this was a tall order for a continent plagued by military interventionists, the phenomenon of privatised security and potential privatised war make it even taller. If the political scientist, Nordlinger, brought the sobering (if not optimistic) observation that "military regimes are notoriously unstable ... and rarely lasted longer than five years", the times are indeed changing. Through privatised security, direct intervention by global Western powers is no longer necessary, simply because the suspended state can now be propped up (more or less endlessly) by privatised security specialists. No wonder African leaders and citizenry are opting

away from imposed Afro-pessimism towards reconstructing the state and empowering communities. Valuable groundwork for future research is offered here by Cilliers and Douglas. It remains critical for researchers to carry the ball from here. Or shall we rather say 'to pick up the spear from here'?

Cleary's case study of Angola is useful, although it could have offered more rigour in analysis and in contextualising the Angolan war as a battle for scarce resources. Angolans have been at war since the 1960s when the liberation movements – the FNLA, UPA (later to become transformed into UNITA) and the MPLA – started their protracted guerrilla campaigns against the Portuguese colonial power. During the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa intervened on behalf of UNITA, headed by Jonas Savimbi, and contributed to the long-term destabilisation of Angola. As the country fell apart in civil war in 1974/75, Cuban forces and some Russian advisors in support of the socialist-oriented MPLA entered the picture. Apart from the ideological divide that the Cold War brought (and the legacy it left), Angola as a rich African country retained value for capital accumulation by big business. Cleary underestimates the need for capital accumulation in Angola by consortiums as essentially contributing to the continued civil war. (The manipulation of 'ethnic' forces to attain access to products needed for the accumulation of capital is but one of the morbid side-effects.) Cleary is correct in observing that "a new war (or continuation of it?) can only contribute to economic exhaustion of the region" (p. 167). He is also correct that it is an imperative to dissuade the warring parties from prolonging the war. But I differ with him that it is not only the task of the 'international community', but also of various multinational corporations that have invested in Angola to assist in taming the tendency towards privatised war. It would be a good start if multinational corporations accept that they have contributed to war-mongering and, following such an admission, involve themselves in putting pressure on such outfits by not making use of them.

If the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in South Africa on the role of 'big business' are anything to go by, one cannot expect any hindsight (the foresight never was) from big business and monopoly capital in resisting oppression. Through capital gains and through the exploitation of scarce resources – even by using privatised security – big capital is a major stakeholder and conflict-monger. What remains unsaid, is that the globalisation of violence will remain a threatening phenomenon as long as monopoly states, techno-industrial complexes and big business are not confronted by communities (the 'other' civilisations?). The 'others' in this case are those who are negatively affected by the globalisation of power, the

continued accumulation of wealth and the universalisation of violence and oppression. In attempts by the 'rich few' to globalise and dominate, resistance can only come from those who are negatively affected by the 'profit through exploitation' process and more resistance should be expected sooner than later.

The chapter by Vines about Gurkha involvement on African battlefields at first sight looks a bit misplaced. The Gurkha brigades from Nepal, somewhat modelled on the French Foreign Legion, have a military tradition of hard soldiering covered by a tripartite treaty between Britain, India and Nepal. (And, as soldiers, they earn hard currency for the rather poor Nepalese government.) It was the same Gurkha soldiers who contributed to British victories in North Africa during World War II and in countless neo-colonial wars for the 'Empire'. More recently, they fought on the side of 'democratic forces' (G-8) in the three-months war against Serbian 'racists' – without much acknowledgement. However, Vines argues that, as a result of the changing face of private security and its links with big business, the Gurkhas have been caught in a hard place, despite their long military tradition. And they may end up blamed for mercenary adventures rather than the countries or companies they are called in to defend. For this reason, this very readable chapter is informative, but not misplaced in a work of this nature.

The book reads well. Language editing and layout are well done. The list of abbreviations at the beginning of the book is very helpful to the reader who is not *au fait* with the acronyms in the field. An index would have added value to the book and would have enhanced its capacity as a reference work. Various maps and accessible tables contribute to a readable and informative work. It certainly lays the foundations for future research in this field. A wide spectrum of readers, both practitioners and academics, would find it worth reading. For those interested in a better understanding of 'new forces' active in the interplay between state, security and big business, it is essential reading.

For those interested in conflict studies (mediation, second-track diplomacy, arbitration and early-warning, among others) and those pondering the potential for a continental reconstruction – call it a (re-)awakening or Renaissance if you wish – the book provides splendid background reading on current conflicts, the actors involved in Africa and the potential outcomes or consequences of such conflicts.

For South Africans aware of the destructive consequences of interstate and intrastate conflict – and especially the suffering it caused in Angola – the book is a

reminder that the privatisation of security, globalisation and one-sided new world orders go hand-in-hand with the universalisation of violence. Fernando Alvim, an artist who lived through Angola's hard times reminds us "that when ideologies clash and people are dehumanised and stripped of their common dignity through mindless violence to such an extent that submission becomes the last line of resistance (existence?), then solitary resistance/protest becomes a necessity." But since the violence in Angola and elsewhere is now stateless, whither the resistance? ***Peace, Profit or Plunder*** – whether you agree with it or not – provides more than a few clues.

Undoubtedly, a conservative professor somewhere would think that a review like this is a childish lament in empathy with Noam Chomsky. The reality is that the form of globalisation described in ***Peace, Profit or Plunder***, will not be disarmed by the 'newsspeak' of greater market freedom for the rich but by its antagonist, 'crimethought'. This crimethought represents the argument for a forceful (re) negotiation of human security, economic sustainability and social justice for those who are disempowered in the former 'second' and 'third' worlds.

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1 Ken Booth, University of Wales, UK, in a recent keynote address to the South African Political Studies Association (Saldanha, 29 June 1999) convincingly made the point that the 'few rich' (countries) are more and more imposing their paradigm (political and economical liberalism) on the 'other'. He referred to the one-sided NATO version of events in justifying their forceful intervention in Kosovo in order to enhance their hegemony in greater Europe.

POWER, WEALTH AND GLOBAL ORDER: AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TEXTBOOK FOR AFRICA

Edited by Philip Nel and Patrick McGowan (1999), University of Cape Town Press,
South Africa, 340 pp

Dedicated to the thousands of students in Africa who, often under difficult conditions, study International Relations, and commissioned by the Foundation for Global Dialogue, this publication is a collaboration by contributors from a number of South African and United States institutions.

In the first chapter on *the study of International Relations* (IR), McGowan and Nel introduce the student to the subject matter of IR. They refer to state and non-state actors in IR and the scientific study of this field.

The interface between IR and economics is introduced by Leysens and Thompson in their chapter. They base their discussion of the global political economy on the approach of Susan Strange, who explains the global political economy in terms of four primary and secondary power structures. This chapter also reviews the historical development of the global political economy and the transition from the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Nel's chapter on the theories of IR introduces the reader to theory and its application in the study of IR. Various IR theories, such as realism, liberalism and transformative theory are discussed.

The origins and development of the modern interstate system are discussed by Adar. He also discusses the units of the modern interstate system, as well as related concepts such as nations, states, sovereignty, power and national interests.

Vale and Mphaisha define foreign policy in their chapter on analysing and evaluating foreign policy as "the sum total of all activities by which international actors act, react, and interact with the environment beyond their national borders." Four policy-making environments are discussed, as well as the goals of foreign policy. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of foreign policy-making, the characteristics of foreign policy-making and ethical questions regarding foreign

policy-making.

Murphy's contribution deals with international institutions against the problem of co-operation among sovereigns. The reader is introduced to international law and its facets. The main focus of the chapter is on regimes, multilateral conferences, global and regional organisations. This is followed by Vincent's chapter on non-state actors in IR, ranging from intergovernmental organisations, liberation movements, secessionist groups, terrorists, criminal organisations, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational social movements, multinational corporations and individuals. The strong focus on Africa and Southern Africa, in particular, is one of the major strengths of the book. Osaghae's chapter positions Africa in the global system from 1600 to the period of decolonisation. This is followed by Southall's contribution on Africa in the contemporary world. He discusses the impact of the Cold War on Africa. Africa's economic problems are also addressed under a section on structural adjustment and political liberalisation. Schoeman discusses the features of the African state. This determines the patterns of Africa's IR. Osaghae's second contribution to the book is on the post-colonial African state and its problems. He asks why the post-colonial African state is so weak, and points to external and domestic factors playing major roles.

In their contribution on *making foreign policy in South Africa*, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk concern themselves with the processes that underpin and inform the making of foreign policy in South Africa. South Africa's foreign policy settings are discussed, as well as the actors involved. The decision to normalise South Africa's relations with the People's Republic of China is presented as a case study in foreign policy decision-making.

The chapter dealing with *South Africa in the context of South-South relations* by Alden, outlines the rise of the South, its institutions and South Africa's position in it. This is followed by a consideration of the regional subsystem of Southern Africa by McGowan. He traces the historical development of the region and its current structure, as well as the main features of the regional subsystem. Building on the previous chapter is Ahwireng-Obeng's contribution on the *dimensions of sustainable development in Southern Africa*. The development question and challenges in the region are discussed.

Power, wealth and global order contains two very useful appendices. The first

appendix (by McGowan) provides useful information on using the Internet to gather information on IR. The appendix compiled by Lamprecht offers students insight into possible careers in IR. An elaborate glossary is also included. The textbook has a friendly and modern layout, including maps and graphics. Each chapter includes a chapter outline, a list of key concepts, as well as a list of suggested reading material.

If there is any criticism against the book, it is that there is a lack of African contributors from outside South Africa. Perhaps a concluding chapter on power, wealth and global order could have been added. The question of Africa's marginalisation is not addressed satisfactorily. Another useful contribution could have been on African conflict and efforts to resolve it. The book is also silent on both the Muslim and the African Renaissance. This notwithstanding, it offers a sound introduction to global political and economic relations. The strong focus on Africa and Southern Africa makes it a must read for anyone interested in Africa and particularly in Southern Africa.

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RENAISSANCE BAROMETER

By Senzo Ngubane

AFRICA (GENERAL)

3 June 1999 Ministers of the Interior and Justice from the continent adopted a draft *Convention Against Terrorism*. The Convention was to be presented at the Algiers Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and expressed a need for co-operation among member states in dealing with terrorism.

4 June 1999 Religious leaders and medical experts from most African countries have agreed to the creation of a body known as the International Religious Alliance on HIV/AIDS for Africa. The decision was taken at a three-day workshop held in Dakar, Senegal.

24 June 1999 Member states of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa convened in Equatorial Guinea to discuss ways of strengthening their economic union. The group comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

11 July 1999 African heads of state and other leaders gathered in Algiers, capital of Algeria for the 35th OAU Summit.

21 July 1999 The OAU appointed an Algerian Senior Army General to chair the Joint Military Commission (JMC) of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

23 July 1999 The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has agreed to issue a US \$106 million grant for humanitarian assistance to 1.8 million refugees and

displaced people in West Africa.

28 July 1999 The European Union (EU) representative to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Robert Collingwood, signed an agreement with SADC Executive Secretary Kaire Mbuende. In terms of the agreement, the EU is to grant 2.65 million Euros to assist in the Lusaka peace process that is aimed at bringing an end to the war in the DRC.

2 August 1999 It was announced that Libya would host a summit of African leaders from member states of the OAU in September. The summit is expected to deal with the *OAU Charter* that was adopted in 1963.

7 August 1999 In Gabon, the meeting of six African leaders from Congo, the DRC, the Central African Republic, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, agreed to the creation of a Humanitarian Crisis Unit in order to deal with the problem of refugees in Africa's war-torn regions.

12 August 1999 A joint communiqué was issued by the Defence ministers of Tanzania and Burundi at the end of a meeting where both ministers committed their governments to collaborate on security matters.

13 August 1999 An agreement was signed by Mali, Senegal and Mauritania to establish an operational security unit, composed of each country's police force, to monitor their common borders.

16 August 1999 African heads of state from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) gathered in Maputo for the regional group's summit.

16 August 1999 The United States announced its intention to hold a conference of African energy ministers in December. The aim is to have discussions around co-

operation in terms of investment in energy.

19 August 1999 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appealed to the international community for financial support for the ongoing democratic process in Niger.

NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA

1 June 1999 Media sources in Algeria reported that a new political party called the Democratic Front, was formed. The party is under the leadership of former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali.

3 June 1999 Algerian radio reported that the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) asked President Bouteflika to support the cease-fire that was declared about two years ago. The organisation also pledged to abandon its armed struggle if Bouteflika agrees to honour the cease-fire arrangement.

27 June 1999 President Bouteflika called for a referendum to endorse a peace agreement with the Islamic Salvation Army rebel group.

27 June 1999 In its first serious attempt to deal with ongoing acts of violence, the government approved a draft amnesty Act for Moslem rebels. The draft *National Harmony Law* provides for the granting of amnesty to members and supporters of various rebel groups.

11 July 1999 The Algerian Senate endorsed President Bouteflika's amnesty Act for (Islamic) rebels. The government subsequently announced that a referendum on the matter would be held before the end of September.

27 July 1999 President Bouteflika expressed his willingness to continue with efforts aimed at normalising the relations between Algeria and Morocco that he started with the late King Hassan II.

11 August 1999 It was reported that the government was to reopen its border with Morocco in a bid to improve relations between the two countries.

23 August 1999 President Bouteflika retired about half of the country's provincial governors in a move aimed at rooting out corruption in Algeria's civil service.

26 August 1999 A three-week peace campaign began in Algiers ahead of the country's referendum on 16 September 1999. The aim of the campaign was to raise people's support for the upcoming referendum.

EGYPT

19 July 1999 President Mubarak, declared 26 September as the date for a referendum on his nomination for a fourth six-year term in office as the country's president.

LIBYA

18 June 1999 Libyan leader, Colonel Moamar Gadhaffi arrived in Khartoum, Sudan, for a three-day visit to discuss issues of mutual concern with Sudanese President, Omar el Bashir.

MAURITANIA

8 July 1999 Officials from the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture began preparations

for a study on developing fisheries in Mauritania. The study will be conducted jointly with Mauritanian organisations in the field of fisheries.

22 July 1999 Mauritania and Egypt announced that they would hold the first meeting of the Higher Joint Committee for co-operation before the end of the year.

MOROCCO

26 June 1999 The Ministry of Justice issued a statement that King Hassan II pardoned 501 prisoners while 495 had their sentences reduced. This customary practice is in honour of the Prophet Mohammed's birthday celebrations.

23 July 1999 King Hassan of Morocco died of a heart attack and his son, Sidi Mohammed, was formally crowned as the new King.

19 August 1999 King Mohammed VI pardoned 425 prisoners on the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the King and Peoples' Revolution.

TUNISIA

8 June 1999 Tunisia signed a memorandum of agreement with the United Nations (UN) in which it agreed to take part in and contribute to future UN peacekeeping operations.

13 June 1999 The African Development Bank (ADB) granted three loans to Tunisia amounting to US \$215 million. The loans are to be used to fund three projects in rural electrification, and the upgrading of road and railway transport.

28 June 1999 It was announced that the European Investment Bank (EIB) would grant a loan of 45 million Euros in order to start a pollution project in the

Mediterranean Gulf of Gabes.

5 August 1999 The Central Bank issued a report showing that the country's economic growth was 5 per cent in real terms in 1998.

10 August 1999 The governments of Tunisia and Libya signed co-operation agreements that would see joint projects in the sphere of electricity and oil exploration.

WEST AFRICA

BENIN

8 June 1999 Two groups of Benin soldiers returned from Guinea-Bissau following the government's decision to withdraw its 140 member group that served in the subregional peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau.

BURKINA FASO

2 June 1999 President Blaise Compaore created a committee of 16 'wise men' to act as advisors on the political and social crisis that emanated from civil unrest after the death of Norbert Zongo, an opposition journalist, in 1998. The Committee includes three former heads of state and religious and traditional leaders.

17 June 1999 The committee of 16 'wise men' recommended the arrest of all suspects implicated in the death of Norbert Zongo. The committee further recommended the rotation of judiciary officials in order to restore confidence in the system after allegations of bias.

2 August 1999 The committee of 'wise men' submitted its report to the president.

Among others, the report recommended the formation of a government of national unity.

GHANA

3 June 1999 At the end of the Ghana-Germany bilateral talks in Accra, Germany agreed to issue DM90 million to finance development projects in Ghana. These projects include a decentralisation programme, the rehabilitation of water supply systems in some parts of the country and the promotion of micro-businesses.

10 June 1999 A new political party, the Traditional Congress Party (TCP), has been launched in Ghana under the leadership of Anthony Toku, a Ghanaian educationist. The party aspires to bring about socio-political reform in the country.

11 June 1999 Delegations from Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire held a meeting to deliberate on the recent developments in the world cocoa market. The delegation agreed to create an *ad hoc* committee to draft strategies to tackle the challenges of the market.

7 July 1999 Minister of Finance, Kwame Peprah and Ambassador Fernando Corral of Spain signed an agreement in which Ghana will receive US \$36.9 million in credit. The money would be used in various projects, including rural electrification.

13 July 1999 The country's vice-president urged investors to take a more human approach when it comes to investing in the country's economy. The vice-president was speaking at a two-day trade and investment conference for the Western Region at Takoradi.

17 July 1999 The government announced that it would not resort to arms in order to resolve border conflicts with Togo because of ongoing consultations with the

Togolese government.

26 July 1999 The government, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), initiated a Common Country Assessment Programme in order to garner support from Ghana's development partners.

28 July 1999 The National Reform Party, a breakaway group from the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), was recognised by the Electoral Commission as a political party.

GUINEA-BISSAU

23 June 1999 The interim government released 177 prisoners of war during a ceremony at the Army headquarters. The government maintained that this was a step towards national reconciliation in the country.

GUINEA

7 June 1999 The vice-president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea left Guinea after a week-long visit. The vice-president held discussions with various ministries and the agreements signed during the meetings will be submitted to the Korean-Guinean Joint Committee.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

7 July 1999 Laurent Gbabgo, the leader of the main opposition party, the Ivorian Popular Front (IPF), announced his party's preparation to contest the country's general elections in 2000.

18 July 1999 The government has finally released the population census results of

1998. The result revealed that the country's population stands at 15.4 million and is growing at 3.3 per cent per annum.

21 July 1999 Four senior civil servants were to appear before the Magistrate Court to answer questions on alleged involvement in the embezzlement of a EU aid grant.

LIBERIA

7 June 1999 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that the government had sought the assistance of the UN and ECOWAS to destroy all ammunition surrendered by the former rebel groups.

1 July 1999 An Anti-Terror Unit (ATU) was deployed in Monrovia, close to the United States (US) embassy and other foreign representations. The move follows the reopening of the US embassy that was temporarily shut down together with other five African embassies because of security threats.

17 July 1999 The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) announced that the Liberian mission would end on 26 July 1999.

19 July 1999 The government announced that the verification mission to destroy arms collected from all factions during the country's civil war has been completed. The government further stated that the destruction site has been identified and the technical team has finalised its inspection of the area.

26 July 1999 The destruction of arms and ammunition went ahead in Tubmanburg, Bomi County, 70 kilometres west of Monrovia. The event took place under the joint supervision of ECOWAS and the UN.

MALI

26 June 1999 The UN representation in Mali announced the end of its four-year programme of aid in northern Mali. The representative of the programme in the country, Arnauld-Antoine Akodjenou, revealed that 132 000 of the 140 000 people registered as displaced during the rebellion have returned home.

2 August 1999 The government of Mali announced that it has withdrawn some of its troops who were part of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force from Sierra Leone.

17 August 1999 Mali signed a protocol of understanding with Canada granting the country CFA1 billion that will be used in an environmental rehabilitation project and for food security.

NIGERIA

4 June 1999 President Obasanjo submitted a list of nominees for ministerial portfolios to a joint sitting of the country's 469-member National Assembly.

10 June 1999 President Obasanjo sacked 93 high-ranking military and police officers who have held their positions since 1985. In a separate incident, the president revoked all key government appointments and contracts made by the Abubakar regime since the beginning of the year.

23 June 1999 The Nigerian Senate approved 42 out of 49 ministerial nominees who were submitted by President Obasanjo. The decision gives the president an opportunity to form Nigeria's first civilian government in 15 years.

1 July 1999 President Obasanjo tabled a Bill in the National Assembly aimed at establishing a Niger Delta Development Commission for the region. The aim of the

Bill is to tackle the socio-economic problems of the region.

8 July 1999 The government began preparations for the withdrawal of its troops from the ECOMOG intervention mission to Sierra Leone. The announcement was made after the signing of the Sierra Leone peace accord.

10 July 1999 President Obasanjo held talks with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on a number of issues, including the role of the country in contributing to the processes of Africa's reconstruction.

14 August 1999 The meeting of leaders of the Ogoni people agreed to hold a meeting with Royal/Dutch Shell in order to improve relations between the Ogoni people and the corporation.

17 August 1999 The minister of Defence, Theophilus Danjuma, stated that the government intends to cut the army from 80 000 to 50 000. The minister further stated that the downsizing of the army is aimed at saving the country's money.

19 August 1999 President Obasanjo submitted 103 names to the upper house of Parliament for approval as ambassadors. The list contained 59 political nominees and 44 career diplomats.

25 August 1999 Nigeria announced that it would withdraw 2 000 of its 12 000 troops from Sierra Leone who are part of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force.

NIGER

5 June 1999 The military junta delegated additional powers to Prime Minister Ibrahim Assane Mayaki. The prime minister was made the head of government, which means that he is in charge of the functioning of the executive.

18 June 1999 Political parties reached an agreement on the new Constitution, which will take effect after the current council hands over power to an elected government later this year.

18 July 1999 A referendum for Niger's new Constitution proceeded peacefully, though amid low voter turnout.

22 July 1999 The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) announced the final result of the referendum on the draft Constitution of Niger's Fifth Republic with the 'yes' vote winning by 89.57 per cent.

5 August 1999 The State Court officially proclaimed the results of the 18 July constitutional referendum as approved by the majority of the population.

9 August 1999 The Military Junta proclaimed into law the country's new Constitution following the referendum in July.

17 August 1999 The CENI declared that the presidential election has been postponed to 17 October 1999.

25 August 1999 A peace awareness operation for the Fulani and Toubou communities began in Boure District. The aim is to find peaceful solutions between the communities of Diffa and Zinder.

27 August 1999 Nominations for the country's presidential elections closed with eight candidates on the clearance list for the presidency.

SENEGAL

23 June 1999 Despite a planned peace negotiation meeting with the government, a meeting of Senegalese separatists continued in Banjul, The Gambia. Delegates from different factions of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance hope to find common ground before they meet with the government.

SIERRA LEONE

14 June 1999 ECOMOG authorities revealed that 14 rebels surrendered to the regional peacekeeping group, in support of the ongoing peace initiatives with the government.

24 June 1999 The disarmament plan began in Sierra Leone, with about 254 former soldiers being returned to their communities.

7 July 1999 The peace agreement between the rebels and the government was signed in Togo by President Kabbah and rebel leader Foday Sankoh.

17 July 1999 Rebels have handed over about 200 children who were abducted during the civil war. The children were handed over to representatives of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in the country.

19 July 1999 It was announced that the process of disarming rebels and members of the defence force would begin on 18 August 1999.

22 July 1999 Parliament approved a Bill, which was part of the peace agreement, that rebel leader Foday Sankoh would preside over the National Commission on Natural Resources, Reconstruction and Development.

5 August 1999 The rebel forces submitted the names of people whom they want to serve as ministers in the new government following the July peace agreement.

10 August 1999 The rebels released all remaining hostages, including about 200 civilians and 20 Nigerian peacekeepers.

17 August 1999 The rebels have reopened an important highway connecting Sierra Leone and Guinea which they had shut down about six months ago.

TOGO

16 August 1999 Four opposition parties merged to form the Pan-African Patriotic Convergence in order to challenge President Gnassingbe Eyadema in the country's elections next year.

CENTRAL AFRICA

ANGOLA

2 June 1999 The minister of Science and Technology, João Baptista, has stated that Angola will spend US \$2 million to deal with the Y2K bug.

16 June 1999 The representatives of Angola's National Vaccination Programme announced that about 40 000 children were vaccinated against poliomyelitis in the previous week.

18 June 1999 The EU marked 10 million Euros for humanitarian assistance, especially for internally displaced people (IDP).

22 June 1999 Fred Eckhard, the UN Secretary-General's spokesperson, released a statement that President José Eduardo dos Santos agreed, in principle, to a small UN mission in Angola. Although the agreement was not finalised, the mission

would include political, information and humanitarian components.

8 July 1999 The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave, a rebel group, finally released two Portuguese and two French citizens who were taken hostage in March.

15 July 1999 The meeting of the Standing Committee of Angola's Council of Ministers decided to implement emergency strategies to resolve the country's refugee problem.

17 July 1999 A group of Angolan citizens, comprising journalists, trade union leaders, students and politicians, issued a seven-point peace plan for the country. The group was seeking to obtain 10 000 signatures by 15^t August 1999 in order to continue with their cause.

19 July 1999 President Dos Santos met with President Obasanjo of Nigeria. The two leaders agreed to strengthen economic ties between their nations.

30 August 1999 A delegation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrived in Luanda for a meeting with the Angolan government. This was the first meeting following a breakdown of talks at the beginning of the year.

CAMEROON

28 June 1999 A delegation from the EU arrived in Cameroon to look into the relations between the organisation and Cameroon. The team will also evaluate the functioning of EU aid programmes in the country.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

7 July 1999 Former president and leader of the National Unity Party (PUN), Jean-Paul Ngoupande, was nominated as a presidential candidate for the 29 August election. Ngoupande called for an opposition unity against President Ange-Felix Patasse.

28 July 1999 Former prime minister, Enoch Lakoue became the sixth presidential candidate when he was nominated by his party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD).

10 August 1999 A body consisting of 45 people from the ruling and other parties was formed in order to monitor the activities of the Independent Joint Electoral Commission during the country's elections scheduled for 29 August 1999.

CHAD

3 June 1999 The minister of Communications, Moussa Dago, confirmed the arrival of Chadian troops who had been withdrawn from the DRC.

20 July 1999 The joint Libyan-Chadian Committee for co-operation on security issues ended its meeting in the capital Ndjamena. Both countries agreed to strengthen their co-operation for the future stability of the entire region.

8 August 1999 President Idriss Déby dispatched envoys on a reconciliation mission to the northern part of the country. The envoys were expected to hold discussions with the rebel leader, Youssouf Togoimi.

25 August 1999 A group of about 100 Chadian rebels from the National Resistance Alliance (ANR) surrendered their armed struggle. The group was led former Colonel Souleymane Garfa and it expressed its commitment to the country's democratic process.

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

12 June 1999 The EU agreed to grant US \$2 million in assistance to the civilian population who have been displaced by clashes in the country.

28 June 1999 The town of Pointe-Noire was brought to life again when the electricity supply was restored after a six-month spell. Rebels supporting former President Pascal Lissouba had destroyed pylons supplying electricity to the city.

6 August 1999 A group of at least 285 pro-Lissouba rebels surrendered to government forces between 4 June and 24 July in Buenza region.

12 August 1999 The chairperson of the National Transitional Council, Justin Koumba, held talks with a representative of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on co-operation between the two states.

20 August 1999 President Sassou-Nguesso expressed his willingness to hold talks with the opposition activists in exile in order to resolve the country's conflict.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

1 June 1999 Mwenze Kongolo, the DRC minister of Justice and Amama Mbabazi, the minister of State, issued a joint communiqué promising to establish a committee of experts to look into all aspects for the implementation of the peace treaty signed by presidents Kabila and Museveni of Uganda.

14 June 1999 President Laurent Kabila began talks on the DRC situation with other officials from SADC ahead of a planned summit in Zambia later in June.

13 August 1999 The vaccination programme of ten million children against polio

began in the DRC. The programme began after an appeal by the UN to warring parties to cease their fighting in order to allow health workers to carry out the programme.

23 August 1999 A three-day UN sponsored Human Rights Seminar opened in Kinshasa. The Seminar aimed to find ways of improving respect for human rights.

28 August 1999 President Laurent Kabila met with the UN human rights investigator, Roberto Garreton. The president pledged his commitment to investigate alleged arbitrary arrest and other forms of human rights abuses by his government.

EAST AFRICA

BURUNDI

2 July 1999 The Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) called upon all its followers to support the reconciliation process currently taking place in the country. The party also urged the rebels to stop fighting and join in the Arusha negotiations.

26 July 1999 The meeting of the Burundi-Rwanda Joint Commission began in Bujumbura and the two countries were expected to consolidate their co-operation on issues of common concern.

28 July 1999 Joseph Warioba, Special Envoy of Julius Nyerere, held informal meetings with representatives of various political formations in Burundi in preparation for the next round of talks in September.

31 July 1999 President Pierre Buyoya issued a decree in which he appointed Darius Nahayo as the minister of Commerce and Tourism.

5 August 1999 The government, together with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), organised the repatriation of more than 250 Burundian refugees from Tanzania.

19 August 1999 The UNHCR informed reporters that 101 Burundian refugees, who were stationed in Tanzania between 1993 and 1995, returned home.

24 August 1999 President Buyoya reiterated his government's commitment to continue with the country's peace process taking place in Arusha, Tanzania.

COMOROS

5 June 1999 Two leaders from warring factions on the island of Anjouan pledged their unity in order to end political divisions among themselves. The statement was made by Foundi Abdallah Ibrahim and Chamassi Said Omar at the end of their meeting.

1 July 1999 Representatives from the three islands (Grande Comore, Moheli and Anjouan) of the Federal Republic of Comoros held a meeting in Moheli to discuss the future of the country.

3 August 1999 It was announced that the island of Anjouan would hold two rounds of parliamentary elections on 15 and 22 August. It was also announced that an electoral commission was set up to run the elections.

15 August 1999 The first round of legislative assembly elections went ahead in relative peace on the island of Anjouan.

ERITREA

14 June 1999 Eritrea and Sudan signed an agreement aimed at harmonising the relations between the two countries. Both countries agreed to the creation of a joint committee to resolve key issues, particularly those concerned with security.

20 June 1999 Eritrea and Italy signed two agreements approving 127 million Euros to be used for a co-operative programme on human resource development, entrepreneurial and economic development and social services.

23 June 1999 The Italian Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Senator Rino Serri left Eritrea after holding talks with leaders from Eritrea and Ethiopia. He informed media sources that his mandate is to facilitate the implementation of the OAU agreement.

14 July 1999 Asmara announced its acceptance of the modalities for the implementation of the OAU framework agreement.

26 July 1999 President Isayas Afewerki held talks with the OAU delegation in Asmara and reassured them of his country's commitment to the OAU peace framework.

ETHIOPIA

5 June 1999 The WFP agreed to provide food worth US \$40.5 million to about 1.2 million people in drought-stricken areas of the country.

17 July 1999 Ethiopia received an amount of US \$13.52 million for emergency food assistance for approximately five million people affected by drought. Food supplies would be provided to malnourished children and pregnant mothers.

22 July 1999 The Council of Ministers issued a statement in which it accepted the OAU peace proposal that was hammered out during the 35th Heads of State Summit.

10 August 1999 It was announced that the EU would supply Ethiopia with 46 000 tons of relief food for people affected by the drought in the north-western, central and southern parts of the country.

24 August 1999 Addis Ababa observed a National Malaria and Social Mobilisation Week in order to raise public awareness about the dangers associated with the disease.

KENYA

9 June 1999 Kenya reached an agreement with Ethiopia to co-operate in fighting terrorist groups along their common borders. The Ethiopian-Kenyan joint border committee also informed journalists that the two countries would collaborate in exchanging information in order to combat terrorism in their countries.

5 July 1999 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) decided to increase its current aid to victims of the bomb attack on the US embassy in 1998. The announcement came after the granting of US \$1 million from the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

23 July 1999 In an attempt to rid the civil service of blatant corruption, President Daniel arap Moi appointed Richard Leakey as the head of the civil service.

RWANDA

7 June 1999 The Cabinet accepted a draft Bill on the establishment of a national

commission that will be charged with initiating the process of constitutional review.

23 June 1999 President Bizimungu made a plea to the UNHCR to assist his government in bringing back about 70 000 Rwandan refugees who are outside the country.

12 July 1999 A seminar on Traditional Justice began in Kigali and was opened by Vice-President Major-General Paul Kagame. The aim of the seminar is to devise the means to incorporate the traditional system of courts into the current criminal courts in order to speed up the trials of 1994 genocide suspects.

14 July 1999 Members of Parliament (MPs) held a meeting in which they endorsed the proposed Bill to extend the term of office of the transitional government. The government, which originally was meant to be in power for a five-year period, has since been extended for another four years.

27 July 1999 A South African delegation arrived in Rwanda in a bid to have the Rwandan government influence the Congolese rebels to end their disputes and endorse the cease-fire agreement.

25 August 1999 A Roman Catholic Bishop, Bishop Augustin Misago, accused of crimes against humanity during the 1994 genocide, failed to have charges against him withdrawn.

SOMALIA

24 July 1999 It was reported that a meeting was held between Hussein Aideed and a rival faction leader, Uthman Hassan Ali Ato. The purpose of the meeting was to reach common ground and to cease the ongoing clashes between their factions.

SUDAN

5 July 1999 Dr Machar, chairperson of the Co-ordinating Council for the Southern States (CCSS) announced that Nairobi was chosen to host the planned meeting between the government and rebels on 18 July 1999.

16 August 1999 More than 1 000 tons of food were distributed by the UN Food Aid Agency in southern Sudan in order to assist about 60 000 people.

16 August 1999 President Omar Hassan al-Bashir announced the lifting of the state of emergency in Western Darfur imposed six months ago after violent clashes in the area.

23 August 1999 A Joint Security Committee between Sudan and Eritrea met in Kassala. The Committee was established in order to deal with border tensions between the two countries.

23 August 1999 It was reported that the Information minister, Ghazi Salahuddin, would lead the government's delegation for a planned peace talk with the opposition parties. The aim of the talks is to arrange for a national dialogue to promote reconciliation in the country.

TANZANIA

1 June 1999 A meeting between presidents Museveni of Uganda, Bizimungu of Rwanda and Mkapa of Tanzania held in Dar es Salaam called for an immediate end to the DRC conflict.

10 June 1999 Two political parties, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF), signed a reconciliatory agreement on the island of

Zanzibar. The agreement ends a four-year political stalemate over a contested election result.

19 June 1999 The deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Mwambulukutu stated that the government of Tanzania would not forcibly deport refugees to their countries of origin, as this would be a violation of their human rights.

24 June 1999 Following a peace deal signed with the ruling party, the Zanzibar opposition suspended its four-year long parliamentary boycott.

19 July 1999 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Western diplomatic missions in Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding on the co-ordination of donor support for the Tanzanian general election in October 2000.

27 July 1999 The UN pledged its support for the Tanzanian election scheduled for 2000 and the organisation is currently engaged in a process of identifying areas where it could offer assistance.

UGANDA

29 July 1999 Uganda held talks with Zimbabwe in an attempt to convince the latter to withdraw its troops from the DRC in order to give the cease-fire agreement a chance.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

BOTSWANA

18 June 1999 The Principal Officer for Political Affairs in Botswana, Sanoto Ross, stated that about 200 Namibian refugees, stationed in the Dukwe refugee camp,

registered for voluntary repatriation to Namibia.

23 July 1999 The Botswana Defence Force released a statement that Botswana and the US would be holding joint military exercises in Botswana in August. The aim of the exercises is to prepare both countries and regional groups to respond effectively to crisis situations in Africa.

24 July 1999 The Parliament of Botswana was dissolved ahead of the country's general election to be held in October this year.

27 August 1999 It was announced that Botswana would hold its eighth democratic election on 16 October 1999.

LESOTHO

2 July 1999 A meeting between the members of the Lesotho Defence Force, the Lesotho Mounted Police Service and the National Security Service was held in Maseru. The purpose of the meeting was to devise strategies to deal with crime and to restore law and order in Lesotho.

4 August 1999 Foreign ministers from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana arrived in Lesotho in an attempt to assist in speeding up the resolution of the country's political problems.

MADAGASCAR

2 August 1999 The government announced that the country's municipal elections will take place on 14 November 1999.

MALAWI

9 June 1999 The OAU dispatched a ten-member delegation to observe the Malawian election. The former Nigerian Foreign minister, Major-General Joseph N Garba, lead the team.

19 June 1999 President Bakili Muluzi was declared the winner of the 15 June elections, although with a narrow victory. The president won with 2 442 685 votes representing 51.37 per cent of the 4 755 442 votes cast. The opposition leader, Gwanda Chakuamba, obtained about 2 106 790 votes, representing 44.3 per cent of the registered voters.

1 July 1999 The inauguration ceremony of the 26 Cabinet ministers proceeded as planned in Blantyre.

6 July 1999 Malawi, together with Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique, are collaborating in the Mtwara Development Corridor Project. The project aims to increase trade and investments for landlocked countries in Southern Africa.

10 August 1999 It was announced that Malawi and Zambia would re-examine their borders in order to come up with new demarcations between the two countries.

19 August 1999 The government plans to open diplomatic representation in Libya, Egypt and the Republic of China.

25 August 1999 Deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Mekki Mtewa held discussions with the Eritrean envoy following the deportation of 25 Eritreans to Ethiopia.

27 August 1999 Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania would chair meetings in October aimed at finding a lasting solution for the strife between the government and the opposition after post-election violence in the country.

MAURITIUS

30 July 1999 Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam played host to Namibian President Sam Nujoma on a three-day visit to Mauritius.

MOZAMBIQUE

11 June 1999 France signed two aid agreements with Mozambique. The agreements stipulated that France would provide FF14 million to Mozambique for the upgrading of health services and municipal development.

15 June 1999 Mozambique and Chile concluded a memorandum of understanding that will allow both governments to strengthen bilateral co-operation in the spheres of public works.

1 July 1999 The government announced its lifting of a ban on elephant hunting with effect from August. It will start to sell 1.8 tons of ivory confiscated from poachers.

2 July 1999 Eleven opposition parties, including the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), decided to participate jointly in the country's presidential and parliamentary elections later this year.

20 July 1999 Voter registration drives began in Mozambique ahead of the country's presidential and parliamentary elections. The process will run from 20 July to 17 September .

26 July 1999 A country-wide vaccination drive against polio began in Maputo. Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi stated that the government's plan is to vaccinate

3.3 million children below the age of five.

2 August 1999 The US reopened its embassy in Maputo after it was shut down for two weeks for security reasons.

NAMIBIA

10 June 1999 The Namibian town of Grootfontein announced its intentions to launch a fund for underprivileged children that will be known as the Children's Welfare Trust Fund. This initiative will be launched on 16 June 1999 to mark the Day of the African Child.

3 July 1999 President Sam Nujoma and Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji expressed their willingness to strengthen their economic and trade links.

9 July 1999 Dr Albert Kawana, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, stated that Namibia was waiting for the report from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) on pre-independence crimes committed by South African troops against Namibia.

9 July 1999 The regional representative of the UNHCR told reporters that about 237 Namibian refugees were ready to return home voluntarily from Botswana.

25 August 1999 The government lifted the state of emergency imposed after the Caprivi Strip attack at the beginning of the month.

SOUTH AFRICA

1 June 1999 The TRC Amnesty Committee granted amnesty to two former members of the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we

Sizwe (MK). Rodney Lawrence Wilkinson and Heather Wilkinson were charged with the bombing of the nuclear power station, Koeberg, in 1982.

2 June 1999 South Africans went to the polls in their country's second democratic national and provincial elections.

4 June 1999 The South African Civil Society Observation issued a statement that, despite minor problems, the general election was conducted in a free and calm environment.

8 June 1999 The official result of the elections gave the ANC an outright majority of 66.4 per cent, thus securing 266 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly. The Democratic Party was declared the official opposition with 9.55 per cent of the total ballots cast.

25 June 1999 President Thabo Mbeki pledged that his government would work towards achieving the goals of an African revival by being responsive to the needs of the continent. Addressing both houses of Parliament, he unveiled his intentions to call upon all senior statesmen in Africa to assist in the continent's renewal.

7 July 1999 Speaking at the opening of the annual Southern African Economic Summit, President Mbeki assured delegates that his government would ratify the regional free trade agreement to enable its implementation in 2000.

9 July 1999 In an attempt to combat crime, a new special police unit was introduced by the government. The unit will consist of 2 000 special agents and investigators who will also have a cross-border role.

25 July 1999 President Laurent Kabila of the DRC was in South Africa on a private visit and was expected to hold talks with President Mbeki.

6 August 1999 The minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel said that the government allocated R1 billion meant for poverty relief and job creation to the construction of roads and other infrastructure.

8 August 1999 President Mbeki held talks with the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania in another attempt to resolve the DRC crisis.

17 August 1999 The Public Protector, Selby Baqwa, cleared the ANC of nepotism after conducting an investigation based on a request by the New National Party (NNP).

21 August 1999 Foreign minister, Dr Nkosazana Zuma, left for the Great Lakes in a series of diplomatic attempts to secure the signatures of the rebels for the cease-fire agreement.

26 August 1999 The minister of Defence, Patrick Lekota announced that the government intended to cut the planned US \$5 million arms deal with European defence contractors.

ZAMBIA

11 June 1999 At the end of the Zambia-Denmark annual bilateral co-operation meeting, it was disclosed that the two countries had signed an aid agreement. Under the agreement, Denmark agreed to grant Zambia about US \$140 million for development and technical assistance.

18 June 1999 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that the government accepted the proposal by its Angolan counterparts to put the past behind them and start reconciling their relations.

27 June 1999 The DRC peace talks in Zambia were boosted when the military leaders were able to finalise a draft cease-fire document. The document, which was submitted to the ministers for ratification, called for the withdrawal of all six armies involved in the conflict.

7 July 1999 Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs from the six countries that are part of the DRC conflict, signed the draft cease-fire agreement in Lusaka.

10 July 1999 Various heads of state and government arrived in Lusaka for the signing of the DRC cease-fire agreement.

17 July 1999 The government issued aid grants of about K300 million to a group of farmers in Chibombo district to enable them to drill boreholes.

20 July 1999 It was announced that the ministers from the belligerent countries who met in Zambia have established a Joint Military Commission (JMC), as well as a political committee to be in charge of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

23 July 1999 An agreement worth US \$23 million was signed between the Kitwe City Council, the ADB and the World Bank. The agreement would create, among others, about 3 000 jobs in the Nkana Water and Sewerage Company.

12 August 1999 An opposition alliance, the Zambia Alliance for Progress (ZAP), was formed after the dissolution of the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC). The alliance aims to strengthen the opposition in the country.

ZIMBABWE

21 June 1999 Thousands of people convened in Chitungwiza for the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). The convention will generate recommendations for a people-driven constitutional review process.

8 July 1999 President Mugabe stated that the successor of the late Vice-President Joshua Nkomo would be named at the end of the year. Speaking to journalists, the president also stated that the decision would be informed by the current constitutional review process.

11 August 1999 President Mugabe promised protesting war veterans that his government would consider their demands.

16 August 1999 The Constitutional Commission spokesperson, Jonathan Moyo, told journalists that the process of wider consultation for constitutional review would begin. He stated that 100 teams were expected to have more than 4 100 consultative meetings.