

From the editor's desk

On 14 October 1999, Mwalimu Nyerere succumbed to chronic leukaemia at the age of 77 at St. Thomas Hospital in London. His death was mourned throughout Africa and the world. Obituaries were published in newspapers from London to Lomé; from Beijing to Boston. At the state funeral in the national stadium in Dar es Salaam, no fewer than sixteen heads of state attended and Tanzanians in their thousands paid their last respects to their founding president. Mwalimu Nyerere was finally laid to rest in his home village of Butiama.

What accounts for this deep grief? How could one man's passing be mourned so passionately? Why does Africa feel his death so intensely? The answers to these questions relate to who Mwalimu was and what he stood for.

On a continent noted for territorial aggrandisement by force, Julius Nyerere will be remembered for the peaceful unification between Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Pemba into current day Tanzania.

On a continent noted for its ethnic chauvinism, Nyerere has to be commended for his policies of inclusive nationalism that forged 134 disparate ethnic groups into one united Tanzanian nation. As Africa suffers the scourge of ethnic cleansing once again, this is a particularly poignant lesson for the Rwandas of Africa.

On a continent known for the arrogance of its leadership, Nyerere stood out as a shining example of humility and compassion. It was he who acknowledged his failure to collectivise agriculture (ujamaa) and it was he who abandoned his earlier stance of a one-party state and embraced multiparty democracy. On a continent noted for its leadership tenaciously clinging to power at all costs, Nyerere will be remembered for his realisation that leadership needs to be passed to a younger generation and his consequent graceful exit from power in 1985.

On a continent renowned for its corrupt leadership, Nyerere's honesty, integrity and his commitment to the upliftment of his people were exemplary. In an interview with Anver Versi, Nyerere stated, "No one can insult you more than to offer you a bribe. Even if I have nothing but rags to wear, you cannot buy me. There is not enough money in the whole world worth more to me than myself or for that matter, worth more than any single one of the citizens of my country. Do you think then that I will willingly sell myself, or my country for a few trinkets?"

On a continent acclaimed for its self-serving leadership, Nyerere stood out as the embodiment of the spirit of ubuntu – I am, because you are. As a result, Tanzania under Nyerere assisted and provided refuge to the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It was also Tanzanian troops that emancipated the people of Uganda in 1979 from the excesses of the Idi Amin regime.

Thus, we too join our brothers and sisters across the continent in mourning one of Africa's great sons – Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, a visionary and statesman who reflected the ideals of the African Renaissance.

## UPDATE

The following is a list of important developments that occurred just before Conflict Trends went to press in December:

In strife-torn Central Africa, various peace initiatives are gathering momentum. After extensive consultations with the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), Eastern and Southern African leaders meeting at the Eighth Great Lakes Summit on Burundi nominated former South African President Nelson Mandela as facilitator of the Burundi peace process – a nomination that Mandela subsequently accepted. He replaces the late Julius Nyerere, former Tanzanian president, as talks facilitator.

Similarly, the former Botswana President Ketumile Masire is considering whether to accept the job of mediator in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict. OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim formally nominated Masire noting that both the rebel sides and President Laurent-Desire Kabila were in favour of his mediation.

Peace in Uganda was also given a boost when Parliament passed a bill offering rebels a six-month amnesty in an attempt to end long-running insurgencies by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west of the country and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the north. Given the fact that Uganda and Sudan housed rebels aimed at destabilising the other, it is also positive that these national developments were consolidated at the regional level when Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and his Sudanese counterpart, General Omar al-Bashir signed an agreement that re-established diplomatic relations and aimed to promote peace in the region.

These positive developments were also mirrored in West Africa when some 158 former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) combatants, including 77 child soldiers, surrendered their weapons to the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Thus far, 2 884 of an estimated 45 000 former combatants have disarmed according to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

Meanwhile, separatists of the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) agreed to hold peace talks with the Senegalese government. The MFDC, consisting largely of the Jola ethnic group that occupies southern Senegal, has been waging a secessionist insurrection against the Dakar government for seventeen years on the basis that the government has neglected the area.

In Niger, President-elect Mamadou Tandja was sworn in on 22 December. Tandja is a retired colonel who was elected on 24 November in the second round of presidential polls, capturing 59,9 per cent of the votes.

Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice in The Hague has ruled in favour of Botswana in its territorial dispute with Namibia over an island along the Chobe River.

However, the Court added in its judgement that neither country owned the waters surrounding the island and that it shall enjoy “equal national treatment.”

These positive developments notwithstanding, conflict continued to rear its ugly head in various parts of Africa.

In North Africa, the referendum to decide Western Sahara’s future, originally set for 1992, now seems unlikely to occur before 2002. The reason for the delay was the thousands of appeals against exclusion from the electoral rolls currently being compiled by a voter identification process.

In Central Africa, a low intensity war continues in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). Despite a cease-fire agreement signed between government forces and some opposition militia forces, reports of fighting continued. In the latest incident, two people were killed on the Brazzaville-Kinkala Road when unidentified gunmen ambushed the truck in which they were travelling.

As the war intensifies in Angola, with Angolan government troops set to oust Savimbi’s rebels from their last major stronghold at Jamba in south-eastern Angola, the Namibian government pledged its support for Luanda’s continued offensive against UNITA’s rebels.

Political instability continues to characterise other countries in Southern Africa, notably Malawi and Zimbabwe. In Malawi, an inspection of polling materials began following a Supreme Court ruling to allow opposition parties access to the ballots of the controversial June 1999 general election. In Zimbabwe, opponents of President Robert Mugabe are planning a series of nationwide marches to protest against a new draft constitution which, in their opinion, is biased in favour of his ruling ZANU-PF party.

In West Africa, meanwhile, 1999 began with the successful transition of Nigeria from military to civilian rule and this augured well for democratisation in the region. However, the year ended with a reversal in the form of a military coup in the Côte d’Ivoire which witnessed cabinet ministers being placed in “military custody for their protection” and the formation of a National Salvation Council.

## **Breaking the cycle: Light weapons and conflict in Africa**

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On 18 October 1999, the final phase of an ambitious programme to destroy thousands of weapons used during seven years of civil war in Liberia was completed when a blazing fire consumed both weapons and ammunition in the western Liberian town of Tubmanburg. With the help of weapons experts from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations, nearly 20 000 pistols, rifles and machine guns, and over 3 000 000 rounds of ammunition were destroyed during the three-month destruction programme that began in July in the Liberian capital, Monrovia. The weapons had been collected by troops of the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in 1996 and 1997 as part of the process of disarming former combatants in order to minimise the chances of a renewal of Liberia's devastating civil war, in which more than 200 000 people had already lost their lives.

The weapons destruction programme in Liberia follows similar efforts in other countries to ensure that the ready availability of small arms and light weapons does not pose a significant risk in reigniting conflict in tension-prone areas, or in fueling high rates of crime and social violence in those countries emerging from years of civil war and internal strife. The now famous 'flame of peace' (flamme de la paix) that was lit in Timbuktu, Mali in March 1996, where 3 000 weapons collected from former combatants were destroyed in a public ceremony, was the symbolic beginning of the so-called Mali moratorium on the production, import and transfer of light weapons among ECOWAS member states in West Africa.

The Mali 'flame of peace' has since been emulated in numerous other countries around the world. In Albania, where more than 600 000 weapons were looted from military depots following civil unrest in March 1997, an internationally sponsored 'weapons for development programme' has been initiated that has begun to collect and publicly destroy many of these weapons. Supported in part by US \$500 000 from a trust fund created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Albanian weapons buy-back programme will provide valuable lessons for similar initiatives in other parts of the world, especially in Africa.

Despite the success of such efforts, weapons destruction programmes have only addressed a small part of the problem posed by the global diffusion of small arms and light weapons.

The tremendous quantities of such arms that were distributed during the Cold War and that continue to be produced and traded (both legally and illegally) mean that highly lethal, combat-style weapons are still easily available throughout Africa and all over the world. Reports abound of Kalashnikov and M-16 assault rifles being openly sold for as little as US \$10 to \$20 in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mozambique and South Africa. Such

weapons are bought by political militias engaged in civil war, as well as by criminal gangs and ordinary civilians fearful of ever-increasing crime rates.

As has been tragically the case in Africa in the 1990s, a vicious cycle of violence spawned by the ready availability of combat weapons is evident even in those countries that are not directly involved in warfare. Relatively small numbers of light weapons can greatly increase the levels of civil and criminal violence in countries suffering from the consequences of weak or failed governance. When a state is no longer capable of providing a minimum level of physical security for its citizens – as in many parts of the world today – individuals and groups organise themselves into neighbourhood militias or hire private security firms. Too often, the result, is an ‘internal arms race’ in which fighting between the police, vigilantes, warlords, criminal gangs, and private armies can reach levels associated with full-scale war.

The widespread availability of easily operated, highly lethal small arms has also facilitated the recruitment of children and teenagers into regular and irregular forces in many areas of conflict. It is estimated that as many as 300 000 children under the age of eighteen are now serving in combat units of one sort or another worldwide, and many others have been recruited into armed gangs and militias. According to Olara Otunnu, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, it is “... the development and proliferation of lightweight automatic weapons [that] has made it possible for very young children to bear and use arms.”

The disastrous effect of the un-constrained availability of small arms and light weapons has also become major development issues and a direct threat to the safety of international relief and aid workers. In countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the emergence of armed militias equipped with merely a few thousand rifles has produced devastating conflicts that have wiped out billions of dollars and many years of investment in economic development efforts. Nowhere has this relationship been more evident than during the seven years of civil war in Liberia from 1989 to 1996. Invading the country on Christmas Eve in 1989 with only 100 lightly armed insurgents, Charles Taylor was able to expand and equip his rebel force rapidly by seizing Liberian mineral and timber resources and selling these for large quantities of small arms and light weapons. Though ill-trained and undisciplined, Taylor’s insurgents nonetheless possessed the firepower provided by modern light arms to topple the government of President Samuel Doe in 1990 and led to a cycle of violence that is only now being brought under control.

Moreover, even when a conflict has been terminated, the presence of large numbers of armed former combatants – typically young men with little education and few skills save gunmanship – can produce an atmosphere of violence and insecurity in which no reconstruction is possible and humanitarian relief workers operate at their peril. As the World Bank and other international aid agencies have recognised, development policies must take into account both the reintegration of former combatants into civil society, and the collection and destruction of those weapons that fueled civil conflict in the first place, and which today are often a major factor in fueling high rates of criminal and social violence in countries just emerging from devastating civil wars.

For these reasons, the international community and regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which highlighted the issue at its 1999 Algiers Summit, have begun to tackle the problems associated with small arms trafficking after many years of virtual neglect.

In September 1999, at a UN-sponsored workshop in Accra, Ghana, calls were made to expand the Mali moratorium into an Arms Register and Database for the whole of Africa. Elsewhere on the continent, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) have started to co-ordinate the efforts of several Southern African governments aiming to stem the flow of crossborder shipments of illegal weapons, and to locate and destroy weapons caches left over from internal conflicts. Easily the most successful operational activity to emerge from this willingness to co-operate across national borders has been Operations Rachel, a joint operation undertaken by South African and Mozambican police to locate and destroy excess weapons that commenced in August 1995. By 1998, four operations have been completed in southern and central Mozambique, netting more than 20 000 weapons and 3 000 000 rounds of ammunition.

However, even these encouraging efforts in Southern Africa and among those countries participating in the Mali moratorium in West Africa are but initial tentative steps towards addressing the problem. As noted in the final report of the UN Commission of Inquiry (UNICOI) on Rwanda, “[most] African governments ... neither monitor nor report on the sale or movement of small arms on their territories or across their borders ... [and] do not have the expertise, training or resources to monitor the illegal flow of arms and some clearly lack the political will to do so.”

These last two points – resources and political will – are crucial. Even with promising initiatives such as the Mali moratorium – fully supported by the UN and the international community – the resources necessary to implement an effective regional ban on small arms and light weapons are woefully lacking.

Despite some financial help from national governments and the UN, the Mali initiative currently has to function with a small co-ordinating office in Bamako, Mali and lacks the personnel and communications and transport equipment to monitor light weapons flows effectively. Finally, given that the Mali moratorium is purely a voluntary undertaking on the part of the states involved, assistance from the international community will be crucial in helping to sustain an active, ongoing disarmament programme.

Elsewhere in Africa, the substantial success of the four Operations Rachel in both collecting and destroying weapons and in promoting close collaboration between the police services of Mozambique and South Africa may not be sustainable. Having cleared southern and central Mozambique of most weapons caches, and with illegal weapons flows into South Africa decreasing, it is questionable whether South Africa will continue to invest the funds and manpower necessary to assist the Mozambican police in completing this task in the north of the country. If an external source of aid is not

forthcoming, Mozambique may find itself unable to complete the task that Operations Rachel began.

Political will, the other major problem inherent in combating the light weapons problem, is even more daunting. As has been evident in the violations by several African states of UN weapons embargoes towards Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola, strong financial and political incentives continue to motivate national governments and black market suppliers into fueling civil conflicts with the weapons of war. To take just two examples, the support given by Uganda to rebels in Sudan and similar support by the Sudanese government to militias in northern Uganda perpetuate a cycle of violence that seems unending at times. Embargo busting is surely a global phenomenon, with countries and governments outside Africa just as guilty, if not more so, of flooding the continent with small arms and light weapons. In the case of Africa, many weapons entering the continent originate from both official and black market suppliers in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Given that several of these same countries seek membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), there are opportunities for Western Europe and the United States to intervene actively in an attempt to shut down this illegal weapons pipeline.

Ultimately, however, embargoes will only be effective if those countries neighbouring a particular conflict have the technical, human and financial resources to monitor borders, airfields and seaports adequately, and the political will to do so. At present, the US government has pledged US \$200 000 in support of the Mali moratorium, and the EU is working with SADC to strengthen regional arms monitoring capacity in Southern Africa, but far more clearly needs to be done.

The international community is also beginning to recognise the importance of severing the links between illegal weapons smuggling and the illicit trade in diamonds and other natural resources that help to pay for these weapons. In Angola, for example, it has been estimated that UNITA forces have extracted and sold up to US \$4 billion worth of diamonds from areas under their control. Not only do such funds make it easy to buy large quantities of weapons on the world market, but the ravaging of a natural resource like diamonds (or timber and iron ore, in the case of Liberia) severely limits the prospects for economic recovery from civil war and hinders long-term development. Given that such resources have to be sold outside the country to raise the cash needed to buy weapons and support troops, UN officials and others are calling for the stricter regulation of diamond and mineral brokers in order to make such illegal transactions more difficult. In Sierra Leone, where it is believed that more than US \$500 million worth of diamonds were smuggled out of the country into Liberia, the current peace accord includes the creation of a commission on strategic resources, headed by S L Abubakar, to help ensure that these resources are controlled for the benefit of the country. The US government is contributing US \$1 million to support the work of the commission, and more such efforts will be needed, both in Africa and in major commodities trading centres, to minimise the extent to which illegally seized natural resources can be bartered for weapons.



Close to the end of the decade of the 1990s, there are hopeful signs that several more of the African civil conflicts that plagued the continent over the last several decades may be resolved. In addition to the end of apartheid in South Africa and negotiated settlements in Mozambique and Liberia, a fragile peace has been signed in Sierra Leone. With support from ECOWAS and the UN, efforts are under way to disarm the 45 000 former combatants who fought both for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and for the pro-government civilian militia. As with the Mali moratorium, disarmament measures in Liberia, and the joint Operations Rachel between Mozambique and South Africa, however, sustained political will and financial and technical assistance will be needed to combat what will be the continuing problem of small arms and light weapons gravitating towards the 'vacuum' of areas ripe for civil strife and conflict.

In sum, none of the above measures, in themselves, will be sufficient to curb the flow of small arms and light weapons into areas of conflict and to reduce existing stockpiles. In combination, however, they provide the basis for a comprehensive system of controls that can effectively constrict the global flood of guns. Much more work will be needed, of course, to refine and implement these measures and to eliminate the obvious loopholes. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the international community has embarked upon a serious effort to control this important, if long neglected aspect of conventional arms proliferation.

## **Water and conflict in an African context**

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The word rival that is in common use in the English language is derived from the Latin word rivus, which literally means to share a river. The whole notion of rivalry is thus intimately linked with the idea of sharing a common source of water. Given the fact that one of the unique aspects of Africa is related to the fact that it has a large number of shared or international river basins – a quirk of colonial history where borders were arbitrarily drawn – an understanding of water and its potential for conflict becomes strategically significant.

It is ironic that on a planet that consists mainly of water, humans have inappropriately chosen to call it Earth. Water is something that one takes so much for granted that the average person never really stops to think of the social and political implications of this amazing substance. It is the flow of water through the landscape that determines a whole host of relationships ranging from ecological to social, economic and political. This becomes critical in the context of developing countries because, at its most basic level, water availability determines the economic growth potential of states. Three specific aspects of this are important. Firstly, it is the availability of water that determines where economic development can take place, the extent of that development and ultimately the limitation to that development. Secondly, it is water that determines the level of food security of a state, both at the strategic and household level. Thirdly, water consumption patterns within a country impact on the health of the citizens of that country. In this regard, there is a statistical link between the levels of water use for sanitation purposes and the incidence of diseases such as cholera. In short, water is a critical determinant of development potential, making it strategically important.

As a country develops, there are three independent variables that government needs to balance out in order to maintain a degree of social stability. The first variable is that of population growth. As the population grows, they demand more water, so water consumption is directly linked to this variable. The second variable is food production. As the population grows, it needs to be fed, so food security becomes a crucial issue if long-term social stability is to be achieved. In fact, in terms of water consumption, it is really food production that is the heaviest component of a national water budget. In some cases, the agricultural sector can consume as much as 80 per cent of the total water endowment of a state. The third variable is economic growth and development. Once more, as the population grows, it needs to be employed in a manner that allows for some degree of wealth creation if long-term social stability is to be achieved. The industrial sector also consumes water. In some cases, approximately 15 per cent of the national consumption goes to this sector with the remainder being allocated to domestic consumption. Thus, water availability, in terms of quality, quantity and reliability,

becomes one of the critical determinants of social stability. The relationship of these three variables is schematically represented in Figure 1.

There are two major sources of water that are significant in terms of development. The largest volume of water that is used in any political economy is derived from surface water or rivers. These rivers can be either within the national border of a country and therefore under the total sovereign control of government (called endogenous water), or can originate in a catchment area that is outside of the borders and therefore under the sovereign control of another state (called exogenous water). The second source is groundwater - water found in underground aquifers - that is harnessed by drilling boreholes or wells. This source of water is of lower volumes, but of critical importance for many millions of people who live in rural areas. In some cases, groundwater is found in shared aquifers making them international in nature. A classic example of this is the aquifer found under the occupied West Bank that is shared between both the Palestinian and Israeli citizens.

Conflict over water is derived from the fact that, under conditions of increasing scarcity, competition levels also increase. Under conditions of water deficit, when all of the locally available water has been harnessed and new sources of supply have to be developed from outside the geographic entity concerned, conditions become ripe for the process of resource capture to occur. Resource capture refers to the process whereby powerful individuals or social groups control access to the critical resource, which they then use to maximise their power positions. The mobilisation of water for the support of the former regime in South Africa was a classic example of this. When this happens, structural scarcity is the result, introducing strong cleavage lines into society and thereby acting as determinants of social and economic power.

Water competition and potential conflict are derived from a number of factors, and manifest at a number of levels in society. Probably the most significant of these relates to the development of water sources under conditions of water scarcity. By definition, when a social entity is facing water scarcity, locally available water is insufficient to satisfy local demand. This gives rise to the so-called hydraulic mission of government, which is manifest as a drive to develop water resources that are increasingly more distant from the locus of consumption. What effectively happens under these conditions is that water resources that are available elsewhere are captured by the more powerful central authority and delivered to a geographic location that is far removed from the area of capture. Many examples of this exist, some of which are international in dimension. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project is probably the biggest in magnitude. The North-South Carrier in Botswana, the Eastern National Water Carrier in Namibia, the proposed Matabele-Zambezi Water Project in Zimbabwe and the Thukela-Vaal Project, Orange-Fish Project, Mooi-Mgeni Scheme and Orange River Project are but a few Southern African examples. All of these take water from a catchment that is better endowed with the resource, and then deliver the water to an area that is facing water deficit. Stated simplistically, they reallocate water in society and, as such, determine privilege and the potential for progress and development. The water-related conflicts that tend to emerge from this are driven by the dynamic that emerges from the interaction between those who are disadvantaged versus those who are advantaged as a result of these projects.

Resource capture usually has an element of hostility, whether it is presented as a patently hostile act or not. Imagine large urban entities such as the city of Los Angeles that have the economic power to simply build huge siphons and thereby suck surrounding rivers dry. In the latter case, the city of Los Angeles has captured entire river basins. Water management officials there even spoke at one time of defying nature by making a river flow backwards and of building a pipeline from Alaska. Environmental activists have stopped this plan. The Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal area in South Africa is a similar case, where complex water transfer schemes capture the water from surrounding river basins. The process of resource capture can be presented as an iron fist that is clad in a glove of velvet, in which case concessions can be negotiated between donor and recipient river basins provided that the people living in the former areas have the necessary negotiation skills available to them.

Linked with the above, but manifesting at a more localised level, are conflicts that relate to the development of large dams. Traditionally, dam construction has been linked with the need to relocate people who previously used to live in the areas that are destined to be inundated when the dam fills. Some dams have a major impact in this regard. In the case of the Three Gorges Project in China, the orders of magnitude of displaced persons reach into the millions. The proposed Epupa Falls Dam in Namibia is a good example where inundation will affect a large group of nomadic Himba, depriving them of access to traditional burial grounds and rangeland. Kariba Dam provided an excellent local example. Studies that have been done all over the world show that, in almost all cases, people who have been displaced seldom ever return to the level of prosperity that they experienced in their former dwellings, even two generations after the move took place. This issue is thus deeply debilitating for the affected community who are often marginalised and therefore without an effective voice. With the advent of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) concerned with such issues, however, this situation is rapidly changing. One need look no further than the Himba case noted above where a strong international NGO (Survival) has taken up their case in a powerful manner.

At the ecological level, there is now a strong international lobby that is contesting the indiscriminate construction of dams. The World Commission on Dams is an example of this trend. There are also a number of NGOs, such as the International Rivers Network and various other ecologically-oriented special interest groups, that are funded by the growing environmentalist constituency. This means that where most new dam projects are being planned, these NGOs are contesting the decisions of government in a manner that can lead one to conclude that the sovereignty of the state is under attack.

At the international level, water-related conflict can erupt as a result of plans by one country within a shared river basin to develop the water resources to its own benefit. In this regard, international law is of limited use. Existing international law refers to such concepts as equitable use, without defining what this means. There are also conflicting principles such as prior appropriation (which gives the state a right to water if it has mobilised that water previously and thus become dependent on it for survival) and riparian rights (which gives the riparian state the right to use water that flows through its

sovereign territory). The best example of this is the 1959 Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters that gives Egypt and Sudan exclusive rights to the waters of the Nile. The principle used in this case is prior appropriation, thereby denying upstream users the right to develop the same water resources in terms of the doctrine of riparian rights. Significantly, this principle is encapsulated in the wording of the agreement, where the use of the words 'full utilisation' effectively implies that there is no room for any other upstream riparian state to use the water in terms of the riparian principle. Clearly, this goes against the legal notion of equitable use, showing how inadequate international law is in this regard. One of the manifestations of this type of conflict is an upstream/downstream dynamic. Traditionally, the down-stream riparian is in a weaker position unless it has superior economic or military power as in the case of Egypt. A Southern African example of this is to be found in the Okavango Basin. Botswana is a classic downstream riparian state, almost totally reliant on the whims of upstream riparians for almost all of its water. The Okavango is the only river of any consequence that flows across Botswana soil. The same holds true for Namibia, where the only well endowed portion of Namibia is found in the Caprivi Strip where the Okavango, Kwando, Chobe/Linyanti and Zambezi Rivers are found. There are increasing signs of secessionist intentions among certain political groups in the Caprivi, exacerbating the purely water-related interstate tensions that already exist. Namibia recently announced its intention to develop the Okavango River in order to augment water supply to Windhoek. Botswana objected to this, stating that the downstream consequences would be excessively negative. This is now the subject of considerable dispute between the two countries. Significantly, this dispute will test the recently formulated SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems. Ironically, the conflict potential will be exacerbated once peace comes to Angola, as this will enable the Angolans to develop the headwaters of the Okavango Basin, leading to reduced downstream quantity and quality of water for both Namibia and Botswana.

The question that begs an answer is whether there will be a water war as levels of water scarcity increase. The answer to this is an emphatic no. Despite many claims to the contrary, water wars remain at present in the realm of rhetoric. A comprehensive international study that was recently completed by Professor Aaron Wolf of the United States indicated that the statistical possibility of a water war is almost insignificant. This is not to say that hydraulic installations will not become targets of war. There are countless numbers of cases to show that this is indeed true, but attacks on hydraulic installations as legitimate targets of war differ fundamentally from water scarcity as the cause of war.

Significantly, one of the reasons mitigating against water wars is the trade in so-called 'virtual water'. It takes around 1 000 tonnes of water to produce one tonne of wheat, therefore importing a tonne of wheat is like importing 1 000 tonnes of water. Research that has been conducted over a number of years by Professor Tony Allan of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London has shown that it is virtual water that has prevented the much prophesied Middle Eastern water wars from actually happening. The reason for this is simple. By providing a politically silent option to political decision makers that is less costly than war, the threat of actual war is

attenuated. Patterns of trade in virtual water in a SADC context are revealing. Figure 2 shows that the importation of wheat (and therefore the importation of virtual water) is increasing, whereas the actual production of local wheat is declining. This effectively means that water budgets are increasingly being balanced by importing virtual water rather than by mobilising water itself, thereby reducing the conflict potential. This is a significant strategic development that acts as a mitigating factor in the case of Southern Africa, but in turn opens up a whole new range of other issues such as food security and economic dependence, often on the former colonial powers.

From the perspective of potential conflict, research reveals that distinct patterns are likely to be encountered. Firstly, the likelihood of violent conflict tends to increase the closer one gets to the individual person and decrease the closer one gets to the level of the state. In other words, an aggrieved farmer is more likely to grab a Kalashnikov assault rifle and try to do something violent in response to water scarcity than a government. Secondly, violent conflict over water is more likely to occur at the intrastate level rather than at the interstate level. Thirdly, water quality issues are increasingly likely to become relevant as pollution makes available water unusable. In this regard, water scarcity should not be understood as being only a quantitative issue, but also a qualitative one. Examples of this are mercury in some of the rivers in Zimbabwe (caused by the prospecting for alluvial gold) and arsenic in some of the aquifers in Namibia. These are increasingly likely to become public issues as deterioration in human health occurs, as has been the case in Bangladesh.

From a conflict resolution perspective, this needs to be taken into consideration. This is not to say that conflict between states over water resources is unlikely to occur. On the contrary, conflict is likely to become increasingly heated but probably not violent. The implications are that diplomatic staff will need to be trained in specialised conflict resolution skills. What makes this training so complex, is the fact that water scarcity brings together various disciplines such as engineering, politics, economics, environmentalism and law. In fact, no single discipline can deal with the problems of water scarcity in an effective manner on its own. This means that diplomats will need to be equipped with a whole new range of skills and concepts, each accompanied by new jargon that is currently not part of normal diplomatic terminology. Those involved in conflict resolution efforts will also need to be able to distinguish between the different types and scales of conflict, with a distinction being drawn between political posturing, rhetoric and the actual threat of armed conflict.

Given the fact that SADC has a Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems, coupled with the fact that in many cases within the region, water scarcity is becoming increasingly apparent, there is a distinct need to place the issue of water-related conflict squarely on the agenda. Water scarcity need not necessarily result in heated conflict and, in fact, can instead become the catalyst for increased co-operation. SADC has the legal instrument to do this even if it is flawed in many respects. What really needs to be done, is to empower this instrument to become one of peace and co-operation rather than one of conflict and division. How this is done, depends on the way the respective roleplayers interact. In short, indications are that water scarcity need not necessarily become a limitation to economic growth potential, provided that conflict can be effectively managed and that

co-operation can be stimulated in the one issue-area that confronts all citizens of the SADC region. In this regard the propensity towards co-operation will be the determining variable in the overall hydropolitical equation.

## **Managing conflicts in Africa: Building the capacity of the OAU**

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In 1998 alone, Africa experienced seven major conflicts, 33 lower intensity conflicts and 37 violent political conflicts.<sup>1</sup> Of 48 recorded genocides since 1945, twenty took place in Africa and claimed an estimated eight million lives. These conflicts, fuelled by underlying socio-economic factors such as poverty; poor access to food, health care and education; an inefficient infrastructure; rising ethnic tensions; the proliferation of weapons; and repercussions of colonialism, challenge the well-being of every African. While the African continent overflows with natural resources, cultural wealth and a rich history, its citizens cannot realise the potential of these endowments as long as they have to grapple with such violent conflicts.

As the prominent regional security mechanism, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are well positioned to address the conflicts and other challenges facing the African continent. The OAU was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, when its Charter was signed by the heads of state and government of 32 independent African states. Its goals are to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; defend the sovereignty of members; eradicate all forms of colonialism; promote international co-operation based on due regard for the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and co-ordinate and harmonise member states' economic, diplomatic, educational, health, welfare, scientific and defence policies.

In May 1999, the Conflict Management Group (CMG), in partnership with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the OAU, organised a week-long programme in Durban, South Africa to help strengthen the conflict management capacity of the OAU and its members. This project brought together 32 distinguished ambassadors and delegates from across the continent with the aim of critically analysing past efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping, pinpointing why these efforts have not always been successful, and determining how the OAU might build its capacity. It was also focused on analysing how the OAU could collaborate more effectively with other individuals and organisations in order to fulfil its conflict management mission. In addition to distinguished permanent representatives to the OAU, participants came from the foreign ministries of several countries such as Tanzania, Ghana and Zambia; non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as GERDESS, the Center for Conflict Resolution, the Nairobi Peace Initiative and InterAfrica Group; and subregional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Programme organisers designed a syllabus which included presentations of theory and tools, in addition to case studies on the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The goal was to create a relaxed



atmosphere in which participants could speak and interact in a personal, rather than professional capacity; this type of forum would be most conducive for critical analysis and the generation of recommendations for the future. In the words of one ambassador, “people were free to speak and not restrained by what they represent.” The organising team focused on infusing this ‘meeting of the minds’ with tools and theoretical background that might prove useful in the analysis of conflict and the distillation of lessons which might help to explain the pervasiveness and intractability of chaos on the continent.

Many useful recommendations and lessons were generated during the course of the week-long programme. These dealt with conflict analysis, preparing for negotiations, the negotiation process and ways to strengthen the capacity of the OAU.

Participants unanimously recognised the need for thorough research and analysis of every conflict situation. They learned to see conflicts as occurring in systems that traverse country borders to occupy entire geographic regions. They recommended mapping relationships and levels of influence between all parties involved as part of every early conflict analysis.

Prior to the negotiation, the participants suggested that it is crucial to formulate clear profiles of the negotiators and mediators. They also discussed the importance of confidence and trust-building activities in this phase and brainstormed about inviting the appropriate people to negotiations and choosing the right venue. They agreed that during the negotiation process itself, it is necessary to utilise both formal and informal channels for dialogue. The need to improve the quality and depth of communication, using processes such as facilitated joint brainstorming, was also discussed.

Participants formulated a series of recommendations regarding the implementation of negotiated agreements. Some of them were:

Plans should be as detailed as possible and include a specific timetable.

Guarantors and monitors should develop standard policies for procedures such as disarmament and reconstruction.

Parties responsible for enforcing agreements should adopt a systematic approach for both implementing agreements and condemning violations.

In specific discussions about the role of the OAU, the following recommendations were generated:

The multiplication of peace initiatives should be avoided at all costs: when they do occur, an effort should be made to co-ordinate them.

The OAU should clearly define its specific role in each intervention.

There is a need to diversify its conflict management strategies as the ‘summitry approach’ is not always effective.

There is a need for the OAU, subregional organisations, NGOs and civil society actors to collaborate more closely.

Databases and other information about potential collaborators and resource persons will greatly facilitate the growth of new relationships and networks.

According to one participant, “the workshop was well-conceived and very important, in terms of enabling the high-level diplomats working with the Central Organ and senior NGO heads to reflect on their activities and approaches to peacemaking and negotiation.” Another commented that “the insight, illumination, and camaraderie we have built can be seen as steps towards building a peace in Africa.” Participants offered some constructive criticism as well. “The theories are well known to Africans. What is needed is a standardisation of norms and lessons learned.” In response to this feedback, CMG will utilise the papers presented, along with the lessons and recommendations generated during the programme and publish a manual that will be made available to all participants and other interested groups for use in their conflict management and peacemaking efforts.

The words of one of the ambassadors captured the overall spirit of the week: “The importance of the meeting is in bringing together the OAU, subregions, and NGOs. [This type of meeting] should be institutionalised because until there is peace in Africa, there need to be ways to reflect on capacity.” Many thanks to the US Institute of Peace, the Virginia Wellington Cabot Foundation, the Dutch Foreign Ministry, and the OAU for making this programme a reality.

#### Note

1 Jongman, A J & Schmid, A P. 1998. Mapping dimensions of contemporary conflicts and human rights violations.

## **Women, security and human rights in Southern Africa**

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Women are the invisible victims of the 1990s, the faceless masses filling the background on canvases of terror and hardship. Most of the casualties of war are women and children. Most of these women are struggling to care for and protect their children. Human rights violations against women are rampant partly because they remain largely hidden.<sup>1</sup>

Human security, it is now commonly observed, consists not only in the absence of military conflict, but in a broader range of conditions that must be met for people to live full and fulfilling lives in the absence of fear and threat. What is less commonly acknowledged, is that the legacy of conflict impacts on men and women in very different ways and notions of security are heavily gendered.<sup>2</sup> In the post-colony, this takes two primary forms. Firstly, the legacy of colonial conquest, as well as the legacies of anti-colonial struggle and post-colonial conflict, typically leave behind highly militarised societies with states whose democratic practices are at best fragile. Such societies tend to be saturated with modes of masculinity associated with subjugation, command over resources and conquest. Secondly, where anti-colonialism and neo-colonialism have been the focus of attention, the notion of tradition becomes elevated as a standard of vernacular truth to stem the invasive tide of meaning imposed from without. To question tradition in this context is thus a highly delegitimised practice. Both of these aspects of the legacy of conflict in Southern Africa have deep implications for the extent to which women have been able to enjoy the fruits of an expansion of human security that is thought to go hand-in-hand with democratisation. This article attempts to show that men and women's security, defined as their ability to lead full lives in the absence of threat and fear, are not affected equally by the decisive moves towards constitutionalism that have been made by many of the regimes in Southern Africa.

Discussions of human rights typically distinguish between 'first generation' civil and political rights and 'second generation' or welfare rights. Sometimes a third category incorporating 'development' is added. A glance at the constitutions of many Southern African states would seem to suggest that women enjoy equality and access to first generation human rights across the region. In the constitutions of most countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 'discrimination on the basis of gender' is specifically prohibited. (The exception is Tanzania whose constitution prohibits discrimination based on nationality, origin, political affiliation, colour or religion, but does not mention discrimination based on gender, age or disability.) Yet, many governments do not have the mechanisms in place to enforce these constitutional provisions effectively and women are still subject to widespread practices of discrimination, violence and inequality. The idea that there are universal standards for human rights is often rejected and governments have tended to take a particularly

selective view of women's human rights, arguing that these are to be seen as contingent upon local custom.

Southern African women thus commonly have a dual legal status, on the one hand enjoying the same civil rights as men, but on the other hand subject to laws attributed to traditional practices which limit their rights. Traditional marriages, for example, are often governed by uncodified laws and customs which render women's rights unclear and subject to change according circumstances. In Angola, for example, while the constitution and Family Code provide for equal rights without regard to gender, "a portion of the Civil Code dates back to colonial times and includes discriminatory provisions against women in the areas of inheritance, property sales and participation in commercial activities."<sup>3</sup> Similarly, in Botswana, a woman married under traditional law is held to be a legal minor, requiring her husband's consent to buy or sell property, apply for credit, and enter into legally binding contracts. A Basotho woman is considered a minor during the lifetime of her husband and cannot enter into any legally binding contract, whether for employment, commerce or education without her husband's consent. A woman married under customary law has no standing in court and may not sue or be sued without her husband's permission.

The insistence on the recognition of 'traditional law' is also reflected in the approach of many African states to the ratification of international human rights legislation. While African nations have a better record of acceding to international human rights codes than some northern countries, notably the United States, ratification is often undertaken with declared reservations. Some 29 African states have ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Signatories are obliged to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms and pursue a policy of eliminating such discrimination.<sup>4</sup> But many countries have either signed the Convention subject to their stated reservations or have failed to address existing domestic legislation which is in conflict with the Convention. Malawi, for example, has declared a specific reservation stating that the country "will not consider itself bound by such of the provisions of the Convention as require immediate eradication of ... traditional customs and practices."<sup>5</sup>

Some countries in the region have begun to address the problem of the traditional legal status of women. Namibia's President Nujoma has argued publicly for women to be treated better in traditional communities and some of the country's chiefs themselves have denounced traditional practices that permit family members to confiscate the property of deceased men from their widows and children. Similarly, in South Africa, the recently enacted Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill, addresses the inequities of property arrangements under some customary laws. However, the universalisation of legal norms is only one of many steps that need to be taken in order for women to benefit from the human rights to which they are entitled. Even where constitutions eloquently proclaim women's civil rights, few women in the region are in a position to take full advantage of these rights because they lack the basic necessities of life – health care, adequate food, shelter and personal security.

Women in Southern Africa still have primary responsibility for child care in the overwhelming majority of cases. In formal economies, they are rarely compensated equally for equal work and tend to be clustered in low paid, marginal, part-time jobs. Because women are responsible for finding food, fuel and water, they are more likely to be the victims of landmines in countries like Angola where unexploded mines in the countryside are part of the ongoing legacy of war. Equal protection under the constitutions of the region has done little to combat pervasive discrimination against women. In practice, women seldom have access to the same opportunities as men. They have significantly lower levels of literacy, education, political representation, employment opportunities and access to resources such as land, housing, training and credit facilities. Few rural women in Southern Africa have been able to complete even a primary education and are therefore at a serious disadvantage in finding employment. Women often are the first to be dismissed during times of economic recession and are subject to discrimination in hiring because of potential absences for maternity leave.

#### Employment

Only 30 per cent of economically active African women are in waged or salaried work compared to 42 per cent of economically active men.

Nearly 80 per cent of the economically active women in sub-Saharan Africa work in the agriculture sector.<sup>6</sup>

In Malawi, women comprise less than five per cent of the managerial and administrative staff. Customary law, preventing women from entering into contracts, obtaining a loan or leasing property, severely limits the ability of women in Southern Africa to engage in normal market practices. In Mozambique, for example, the legal domicile of a married woman is her husband's house, and she may work outside the home only with the express consent of her husband. According to customary law, an unmarried Swazi woman requires a male relative's permission to obtain a passport.<sup>7</sup>

Mozambican women, like women elsewhere in Southern Africa, are the primary cultivators of family land in rural areas, where over 80 per cent of the Mozambican population live. However, under customary law they often have no rights to the disposition of land. While the Tanzanian government advocates equal rights for women in the workplace, it does not ensure these rights in practice. In the public sector, which employs 80 per cent of the salaried labour force, certain statutes restrict women's access to some jobs or hours of employment. Discrimination against women is most acute in the countryside, where women are relegated to farming and raising children, and have almost no opportunity for wage employment. Custom and tradition often prevent women from owning property such as land, and these factors may override other laws that provide for equal treatment. The situation for women is even less favourable in Zanzibar where concessions have been made to customary and Islamic law. Under Zanzibari law, unmarried women under the age of 21 who become pregnant are subject to two years' imprisonment.<sup>8</sup>

African women who do find employment in the formal economy are routinely subject to sexual harassment. A 1996 Zimbabwean study conducted by the Training and Research Support Centre (a Harare-based non-governmental organisation)<sup>9</sup> found that one in three

working women at all levels were subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. Women's powerlessness in this situation is compounded by the fact that they are clustered in the lower echelons of the work force.

#### Health

The rate of maternal mortality for African women is over 300 times that of developed regions.

The average birth-rate for African women is 6.2 births per woman.

In Angola, the maternal mortality rate in 1996 was estimated at 1 500 deaths per 100 000 live births (the average for the developed world is 27).

In Malawi, females in the 15 to 24 age bracket are six times more likely to be HIV-positive than men.<sup>10</sup>

#### Education

#### Violence

Legal protections have been particularly ineffectual in protecting women from direct physical violence. In almost every country in the region, violence against women is described as either 'widespread', 'common', 'frequent' or 'a serious problem'.<sup>12</sup> Domestic violence is an area of particular concern. In a significant proportion of homicides perpetrated against women, their spouses are the perpetrators. According to Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), domestic violence accounts for more than 60 per cent of murder cases tried in the Harare High Court. Many Mozambican women believe that their spouses have the right to beat them, and cultural pressures discourage women from taking legal action against abusive spouses. There is no civil law that defines domestic violence as a crime in Mozambique.

An underlying factor contributing to the high rate of domestic violence in Southern African countries are systems of customary law and common practice in which men have the right to 'chastise' their wives. In Tanzania, women may be punished by their husbands for not bearing children. It is accepted for a husband to treat his wife as he wishes, and wife-beating occurs at all levels of society. Cultural, family and social pressures prevent many women from reporting abuses to authorities. The Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs reports that an average of 10 000 cases of wife-beating are reported annually and a large number of women are killed by their husbands or commit suicide as a result of domestic battery.<sup>13</sup>

Domestic violence is seldom openly discussed by women, and few countries in the region boast adequate confidential shelters or facilities for the treatment of women who suffer physical or sexual abuse. Police are rarely called in to assist with domestic violence cases and, when they are, may be reluctant to respond. Some countries in the region are attempting to address problems in their criminal justice systems which make it difficult for women who are victims of various forms of violence to obtain adequate redress. The national police force in Botswana has begun training its personnel in handling domestic violence problems to make them more responsive in such cases. Under common law in Lesotho, wife-beating is a criminal offence and defined as assault.

In March 1997, the National Assembly of Mauritius passed legislation outlawing domestic violence. In South Africa, a new domestic violence law facilitates the serving of

protection orders on abusers, provides places of safety for victims, allows police to seize firearms at the scene and arrest abusers without a warrant, and compels medical, educational and other practitioners working with children to report abuse immediately. In Namibia, longer prison sentences have begun to be handed down to convicted rapists and abusers, and more women have started to come forward to report cases of rape and domestic violence. A special course in gender sensitivity has been introduced at the police training centre and centres for abused women are staffed with specially trained female police officers to assist victims of sexual assaults.

Rape is another issue of grave concern to some countries in the region, notably South Africa, that has registered among the highest incidences of rape in the world. In a single year – 1998 – approximately 36 400 South African women reported being raped; of those, one per cent were raped by a spouse. Police in Zimbabwe's second largest city, Bulawayo, report that an average of one woman is raped daily in the city. One third of the victims are between the ages of one and 15 years.<sup>14</sup> In many countries, police sources believe that a majority of rapes are still unreported. It is not uncommon for men in the region to regard rape as a minor offence, while women are inhibited from reporting such crimes by a sense of shame and helplessness, especially where incest is involved. For those rape cases that are reported, conviction rates are usually notoriously low. In Zambia, according to official statistics, over 4 700 rape cases were reported to the police between 1991 and 1998. Of these, approximately 30 per cent resulted in conviction and five per cent in acquittal. The remainder were either dismissed or remain unresolved.<sup>15</sup>

#### Righting wrongs

In recent years, governments in the region have begun to make some moves towards incorporating women's rights into their policy and institutional framework in a more systematic way. The Fourth International Conference on Women held in Beijing in September 1995 has acted as a spur to debates on legal reforms in support of women's rights in several cases. The Mozambican government's post-Beijing Plan of Action 1997-2000, outlines several objectives: relief of poverty and inequality among women, relief of domestic violence and rape, and assistance to war victims. In the political arena, goals include 50 per cent representation of women in Parliament, 40 per cent in government bodies, and 30 per cent in local governments. In 1996, the Lesotho government stated its commitment to implement the plan of action that had emerged from the Beijing Conference and during that year, created a Ministry of Gender Affairs.

The post-apartheid South African government has set up a Commission on Gender Equality (CGE), a constitutionally mandated body which is authorised to investigate allegations of gender discrimination and make recommendations to Parliament on any legislation affecting women. In Angola, a series of national conferences on women's rights in 1997 called on government to amend the Civil Code to end women's legal inequality, create a social welfare programme, and strengthen the enforcement mechanisms of existing legislation.

A Ministry of Women was created in 1997 to deal specifically with violence against women. In 1997, Swaziland's Ministry of Education launched an initiative to promote gender sensitisation of school curricula. Malawi's Law Commissioner has undertaken a

review of legislation that discriminates against women and has proposed legislation to bring the law into compliance with new constitutional standards. In 1997, Parliament passed an affiliation bill that raised the minimum level of child support, and a wills and inheritance bill has increased the rights of widows. Zimbabwe has a gender affairs office in the Office of the President headed by Minister of State, Oppah Rushesha.

However, greater attention to the issue of women's rights from governments notwithstanding, the impetus for correcting the wrongs in women's lives must undoubtedly come from women themselves. Across the region, women have begun in diverse ways to organise either to pressurise governments into doing more, or to work with governments to realise goals in practice which, to date, have had little more than a legal, constitutional existence. From a regional perspective, however, these efforts remain somewhat disparate, localised and spasmodic. Their relationship to state structures is ambivalent and the likelihood that self-help and co-operative initiatives based in local communities have the potential to influence public policy and effect changes in social mores remains to be seen. To date, the great majority of women in Southern Africa have been left somewhat on the margins of moves towards democratisation in the region. While in isolated cases, like South Africa, levels of women's political representation are comparable with the highest in the world, public office, equal work for equal pay and higher education have remained the province of a privileged élite of African women. For most women, their impressive legal status and an array of protections for their civil rights have not gone hand-in-hand with real changes in their way of life. To the great majority of Southern African women, the distinction between first, second and third generation human rights is academic. Women still take care of the children, collect the firewood, fetch the water, eat less, work more, are raped and assaulted frequently, and educated little. This means that they are often too busy, too tired, too ill or too frightened to seek redress when they are wronged.

The states of Southern Africa, for the most part, have been quite successful in appropriating the discourse of women's rights for their own ends. In part, this is a legacy of the anti-colonial struggle in which women were seen as cadres fighting a common cause and any mention of their discrete rights was seen as a divisive and distracting indulgence. To date, few women have been able to articulate the extent to which they were and continue to be affected in ways very different to men by both the actual experience of war and its aftermath. Even in the scant autobiographical accounts that have emerged from Southern African women, there is a tendency to focus on public 'events' and 'works' rather than on the minutiae of everyday life which, for so many women, is the real terrain of suffering. In the same way, both analyses of conflict and the resolution of conflict which focus on the larger public picture tend to obscure the detail of women's lives. While a few privileged women have gained conditional access to the halls of power, the patriarchal and often militarised state in Southern Africa has succeeded in casting the articulation of ordinary women's experience as illegitimate, ideologically dubious and disloyal. Women need to win back the ideological terrain which casts 'traditions' that threaten their well-being as elements of a true African identity which act as bulwarks against Western corruption. Women need to win the argument that patriotism and loyalty to a political party need not imply unquestioning acquiescence to every



policy. Once women are able to see their concerns as licit will they begin to engage critically with the dominant gender politics of these states.

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- 6 Ibid.
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## **A new lease on life for the SADC Organ**

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A hastily convened and under-reported Southern African Development Community (SADC) meeting at the end of October in Swaziland, revitalised the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and may radically alter the way SADC deals with conflicts in future.

The group of ministers agreed to recommend to their heads of government that the SADC Organ should be part of SADC, thereby breaking an impasse that immobilised SADC's ability to respond to conflict since the Blantyre Summit of 1997.

The SADC Organ was established in Gaborone on 28 June 1996 to fill the gap left by the Front-Line States (FLS). SADC is mainly focused on economic development, and the SADC Organ was established to create a forum for political, defence and security co-operation with a focus on conflict management.

A fatal clause in the communiqué that was released after the Gaborone Summit approved the establishment of the SADC Organ, read that the Organ shall "function independently" of other SADC structures. Zimbabwe, the chair of the SADC Organ since it was established, interpreted this to mean that the SADC Organ should function totally independent of SADC proper. The main thrust of the Zimbabwean argument was that SADC proper was a donor-funded economic development body, and that the subregion could not entrust its political and security functions to it. South Africa, the SADC chair at the time, argued that the clause referred to the intention that the SADC Organ should not function like the other SADC sectors (under SADC, member states are each given responsibility to co-ordinate specific sectors, such as tourism, water and transport). South Africa argued that conflict management is too important to all members for it to be allocated to any one member as a sector, and that is why it should operate differently from the way the rest of SADC functions.

Although denied at the political and diplomatic level, most commentators agree that the stand-off was unfortunately further compounded by the fact that Zimbabwe and South Africa, the traditional power rivals in the region, were the respective chairs of SADC proper and the SADC Organ at the time. Many suspected that a Mandela-Mugabe tug-of-war for subregional power underpinned the debate.

The SADC Organ impasse would have been little more than an embarrassing footnote in SADC's history if it were not directly responsible for SADC's inability to respond to the conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho in a cohesive manner. The impasse resulted in a small group of countries deciding, in the name of SADC, to intervene in the DRC on the side of President Kabila. The Zimbabwean,

Angolan and Namibian intervention force in the DRC are still known as the SADC Allied Forces.

The ongoing impasse, and the differences in approach especially to the DRC conflict, have resulted in the greatest challenge to the continued cohesion and existence of the SADC subregion that it has experienced in its short history. In 1999, two critical events created an historical opportunity for this crisis to be resolved.

President Mbeki replaced President Mandela and South Africa passed the SADC chairpersonship to Mozambique. Within weeks of President Mbeki assuming the South African presidency, moves were afoot to improve relations with Harare. At the SADC level, the August 1999 Maputo Summit decided that all SADC institutions, including the SADC Organ, need to be reviewed in six months, thereby creating a sense of urgency and momentum that set the scene for the Swaziland meeting.

Another important element is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The ISDSC existed and functioned well prior to the establishment of the SADC Organ, and continued to do so despite the SADC Organ impasse. The ISDSC has been blessed with a particularly active and energetic current chair – Swaziland.

The result is that the ISDSC has played a particularly active and positive role over the past year, including a significant contribution to lessening the tensions between Angola and Zambia over the latter's alleged support for UNITA. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this initiative probably prevented a war between two SADC countries that would have been the death of SADC as it is known.

Instead, the ISDSC chair had the courage to tackle what is essentially its own superior institution, the SADC Organ. After intense behind the scene diplomacy, an extraordinary meeting of Foreign, Defence and Security Ministers were gathered in Swaziland from 26-27 October 1999. The sensitivity of the meeting can be seen in the complex co-facilitation arrangement that saw Mozambique as SADC chair, Zimbabwe as the SADC Organ chair and Swaziland as the ISDSC chair, all playing an equally important role.

Eventually, the spirit of the Maputo Summit, and the momentum created by the Mbeki-Mugabe initiative to improve relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe bore fruit. Somehow, the ministers gathered in Swaziland found the common ground that eluded their counterparts over the past three years.

In the end, the Swaziland meeting agreed that the SADC Organ shall be a structure of SADC and shall report to the SADC Summit; the Organ shall be chaired by a head of state who shall operate in consultation with the outgoing and the incoming chairperson of the Organ (this arrangement is referred to as the Troika); the chairperson is elected on an annual basis; under the Organ there shall be a Committee of Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence, State Security (Intelligence) and Public Security (Police); below the Committee of Ministers shall be the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and a Ministerial Committee on Politics and Diplomacy; the country that chairs the Organ shall also chair the subsidiary structures of the Organ; and as an

interim arrangement, the country that chairs the Organ shall provide the secretariat for the Organ. The meeting also decided that there is a need to give further consideration to a draft protocol, a draft mutual defence pact and the issue of a permanent secretariat.

The protocol governing the work of the SADC Organ and mutual defence pact should rightly be the next focus. Together, they will give flesh to the bones of the new SADC Organ structure and should express policy on issues such as how SADC will respond to a military coup in one of its member states, what steps need to be taken prior to a peacekeeping mission being undertaken under SADC auspices and how SADC will relate to the OAU and the UN.

The Swaziland decisions reflect more than just a compromise on the SADC/SADC Organ chair dispute. The decision to maintain the ISDSC and add a Ministerial Committee on Politics and Diplomacy is pragmatic in that it retains a well-functioning security committee, but adds a much needed political and diplomatic dimension. It is also a compromise because instead of integrating the two, and placing the defence and security element firmly under political control – thereby affirming a conflict management policy that favours political rather than military solutions – it creates two separate bodies that report to one superior amalgamated body (a confusing mechanism that sees ministers at the one level reporting to themselves at the next level), while at the same time, leaving leeway for each to report to the Troika directly. Finding a mechanism to address this unresolved tension between the military-security establishment on the one hand and the foreign policy-conflict management community on the other, may prove to be the SADC Organ's grand future challenge.

If the SADC Summit rejects the Swaziland recommendations, the best opportunity in years to operationalise the SADC Organ will probably have been missed. If, on the other hand, the SADC Summit approves the recommendations, it should radically improve the way in which the subregion deals with conflict. If one considers that the SADC Organ is the body responsible to formulate and co-ordinate a common SADC response to conflicts such as those currently raging in Angola and the DRC, the importance of these decisions for the whole of Southern Africa become apparent.

## **Mouthpiece**

### **Facilitating participation by Sudanese women in the peace process**

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Civil war has raged in Sudan for more than thirty years, starting in 1955, a year before its independence. The country enjoyed relative peace between 1973 and 1983. The present war, which began in 1983, has had far-reaching effects on the lives of the people and their social, political and economic environment. The civil war has affected men and women in Sudan differently. Both men and women have participated in the war, as well as in efforts to manage and solve conflicts but in different ways and to varying degrees. Whereas men generally have been dominating the political and military conflict, women have participated on a smaller scale.

During meetings with Sudanese women from various communities over recent years, the main concerns that were raised and documented, to some extent, were instability, loss of property and lives, displacement, human rights abuses, deterioration of their economic situation, malnutrition and a rapid increase in households headed by women. As a result of the war, the responsibilities of Sudanese women to cater for their families and communities, as compared to men, have increased. At the same time, it has become more difficult to meet basic needs.

As a follow-up to the Beijing Global Platform for Action, which stresses the need to involve women as major stakeholders in mechanisms for conflict management and resolution, the Netherlands has initiated a facilitation process in support of the many existing peacebuilding efforts by Sudanese women and men.

The aim of the Netherlands initiative is not only to give support to the efforts and contribution of Sudanese women and men in bringing about a culture of peace while promoting non-violent forms of conflict resolution, but also to increase the actual participation of Sudanese women in the peace process and the influence of Sudanese women in this process. The initiative will encourage and facilitate Sudanese women to work towards a fundamental peace agenda.

For practical reasons, the Netherlands initiative is administered from both Nairobi and Khartoum. The structure of the initiative makes room for women from all regions and parties of Sudan. Working committees, representing eight different constituencies, have been established, and a moderator has been selected for each one of them to consult women at the community level on their views on war and peace.

Sudanese women, participating in the initiative, mentioned a lack of education and training and limited access to information as some of the main constraints to achieve success with their peace activities. Women want to mobilise, organise, articulate and

influence the peace process and negotiations. They need to have certain skills and political awareness and insight to achieve this.

The Netherlands facilitator therefore decided that training is a first priority, and selected ACCORD because of its experience (particularly in Africa), its methodology, and its gender-sensitive approach. Forty women, representative of each participating group, took part in the training that were offered in Nairobi and Cairo.

The training proved to be an enormous stimulant to act. The opportunity to concentrate on the issue of peacemaking and women's role in peacemaking, was inspiring. At the same time, the trainees felt empowered by the acquired knowledge and skills.

## SIX SUDANESE WOMEN'S VOICES

### JULIET AMAL

Sudanese – 36-years old – mother of three teenagers – designer – peace initiator – active member of SWAN – living in Nairobi

The training in conflict resolution, though broad, mainly assisted me in trying to understand the conflict and basic steps of understanding the situation in order to arrive at the most suitable solution to the problem. It also enlightened me on how to manage and deal with conflict and how to solve it. I learned that my vision of a problem may not necessarily be the vision of my opponent(s). I therefore need to understand their perspective in order for me to assist in problem-solving. Though the Sudanese situation has been dominated by men, women can really play a big role in this peace process, so the training in conflict resolution by ACCORD can strengthen the role of women in peace and its activities, it can promote peaceful conflict resolution and encourage peace research that involves women.

In my work, it developed my skill to participate in the peace process. I believe that the people who really need this training to assist greatly in conflict resolution are leaders in civil society, civil authorities, women's groups, youth groups, elders, opinion makers, rain makers, and other interested individuals.

### MAGDA M ELSANOSUI

Masters degree in Gender and Development – masters degree in Rural Development – committed to gender and human right issues – member of the Civil Society Group formulated under the Netherlands Initiative to Facilitate the Participation of Women in the Peace Process – published nationally and internationally on women in the Sudan – editor of The tragedy of reality: The Southern Sudanese women appeal for peace, published in 1999

I have benefited from the capacity-building training in conflict resolution conducted by ACCORD for the period between 12-23 July 1999 in Cairo. As a person, the training has widened my understanding of the concept, the stages of conflict and the tools required for negotiation and facilitation. As a woman, the training has put me in a better position to demonstrate my right to participate in the peace process with more confidence. I believe that women are the agents of peace when the enabling environment is created for them. At my work, I have become more open to listen, understand and respect other viewpoints and provide different techniques to narrow conflict gaps.

At the initiative level, the training has equipped me with the basic skills that are required to enable me to play a better role in the peace process and to try to identify gaps that have to be filled in order to make women key actors in and beneficiaries of the peace process. I have also recognised that the full engagement of the Sudanese in the peace process requires a high feminist consciousness in order to break through gender discrimination in the political domain. From this standpoint, working with other women's groups formulated under the initiative has been one area of my focus and challenge where I call upon women's solidarity for peacemaking.

#### PHILISTER BAYA

44 years – married – Assistant Manager Administration, Ivory Bank, Khartoum – Diploma in Development, College of Arts & Technology, Torquay, Britain, 1984 – Secretarial Diploma, Kianda College, Nairobi, Kenya 1978 – Co-ordinator, Humanity Task Force (Human Rights Monitoring Group)

The capacity-building training in conflict resolution by ACCORD has enhanced my capabilities to analyse, manage and resolve conflicts within our women's groups, families and communities satisfactorily. Upon our return from the training, my colleague Mary Hillary and I conducted similar training in conflict resolution for the leaders of women's groups of the Association of Hope Networking for Development and Peace. The training was well received by the women. After the training, one of the women remarked: "Had I acquired these skills earlier, I would have resolved some of the previous conflicts of our groups."

As an administrator in the Bank, I find these skills very useful and relevant to settling disputes between employees, and between employees and the employer. I am proud to say, it has made a great difference in the performance of my duties.

It has also assisted the initiative to facilitate the participation of women in the peace process. It has resulted in all the women's groups participating in the initiative to understand it better, especially commonalities and diversities, and to facilitate interaction and wider co-operation. Some of the colleagues in this training have expressed the desire that we should form a pool of trainers in conflict resolution. This is thanks to the unique expert skills training of ACCORD and the Netherlands initiative to promote the

participation of women in the peace process. I am sure that Sudan will soon witness dramatic advances in women's capacity for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

#### NYABENYI TITO TIPO

Sudanese – married

The conflict resolution training was a useful empowerment for me as a person and it enabled me as a woman to participate actively in many women's or community activities, e.g. during the IGAD peace talks on the Sudan conflict which were held in July 1999 in Nairobi. I was one of many women who came together and wrote a very strong document to all participants in the talks. The document was mainly to show our view as women in the peace process.

At the level of the initiative's aim to facilitate the participation of Sudanese women in the peace process, the working groups of SPLM-United was able to organise a workshop immediately after the training in which we extended what we have learned in the training to the other members of the group, some of whom are based in Nairobi and some from the field. In this workshop, we were able to draft our plan of action for a period of six months. We also managed to send two members of the group who attended the training in the field in order to assist the moderator and explain more about the initiative to the authorities and communities.

This training is very necessary for leaders of the movements because, in my view, it will help them to have a vision of what they want for the future Sudan. It will help them to articulate issues and be consistent when talking to the international community about the conflict in Sudan. Delegates of the different parties in the peace process, mediators and members of the International Partners Forum (IPF), who are actively involved in the peace process, must be trained. Some community leaders, influential people in the community, leaders of women's groups and local authorities, as well as movements' military commanders must be trained. The youth must be involved as well.

#### OMJUMA DURMAN KAFI

35 years

I benefited from the conflict resolution course, especially in the initiative to facilitate participation by Sudanese women in the peace process through the application of the methodology of conflict resolution in organising meetings. I obtained good results and conclusions.

I gained experience for my work as a mediator. Before the training, I collected data and information from women without a strategy, but after having learned how to listen sympathetically to women, obtaining the necessary information became easy for me.



During my work among women's communities, I find that the students' sector is one of most important sectors that can help in implementing peace processes in Sudan. Therefore, I think that training in conflict resolution is vital, especially for girls.

Sometimes, conflict resolution helps to solve problems if the parties concerned follow its approach. The case is different in Sudan as there are no agreements existing between them on the main issues and interests. Positional bargaining has always been hard between the two parties.

#### NAGAT MOHAMMED SATTI

Born in 1969 at Omdurman – graduated from Omdurman Ahlia University, Faculty of Management Economy – member of Women's Committee, Omma Party – Deputy Manager of Peace – member of the Netherlands Initiative for Peace

The initiative provides a chance to meet African women who help to train Sudanese women. The training equips us with basic skills for the peace process in academic and systematic ways. The training enables us to exchange benefits, experiences and ways to participate effectively in the peace process.

## **Book Reviews**

### **From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies – Peace Support Missions in africa**

edited by Jakkie Cilliers and greg Mills  
(1999), saia/iss, johannesburg, 176 pages

reviewed by Kwezi Mngqibisa

Peacekeeping Programme Officer, African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

The main thrust of this book is the pursuit of consensus around a standard African peacekeeping doctrine. In the first article, Cilliers and Mills do an excellent job in introducing the reader to the harsh realities that characterise conflicts and their resolution. The article paints a picture of distress and waning interest in peacekeeping throughout the world, specifically in Africa. A point is made of how violent conflicts have increased while a sharp and consistent decrease in the commitment of human and financial resources towards their resolution is recorded. The authors further analyse the impact of this phenomenon on subregional peacekeeping and South African participation in particular.

Malan's article provides the background and institutional arrangements of peace-keeping at international, regional and subregional levels. What Malan captures well are the discouraging and impossible conditions that frustrate regional security efforts. The author proposes that, in order to meet challenges posed by conflicts, membership to regional arrangements is reconsidered, organisational focus is looked into and organisational structures are revisited.

Neethling gives a clear analysis of the role of the United Nations and regional organisations in maintaining security within the UN Charter. The article portrays the incapacity of the UN as having led to the inevitable option of forging regional partnerships. The conditions of the partnership are that regional organisations execute the hardcore peacekeeping functions while the UN will play a limited role of observation and monitoring. The author cites the ECOMOG scenario as best reinforcing his hypothesis and analysis.

A probing article in the book is penned by Landsberg who boldly charges against wholesale acceptance of conventional peacekeeping as characterised by huge coalitions of multilateral and regional forces. Citing different cases, the author convinces the reader that, for different reasons, the financially able countries are unwilling to undertake peacekeeping, whereas the financially unable are much more willing. The author proposes that smaller and ad hoc coalitions are considered that would complement the already existing regional arrangements. On a note of restraint, Landsberg cautions that this option would work well when supplemented by other arrangements aimed at addressing conflicts comprehensively. The author then suggests the revisitation of the

idea of a Conference on Security, Stability and Development Co-operation in Africa, considering the political hurdles it would encounter.

An article by Ero looks at the advent of subregional peacekeeping by looking at ECOMOG. The article provides an understanding of the problems faced by the regional force around consensus among member states. The debate around the 'able-willing' issue comes to the fore again to illustrate the problem of decision-making around participation or involvement. The article also looks at the role of ECOMOG in the resolution of the civil war in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. The author concludes with the declaration that, despite many problems that besiege the group, it will remain intact, as it is an embodiment of the belief that Africans are able to mobilise own solutions to own challenges.

Kwesi Aning's article traces the evolution of the balance between economic and security agendas within ECOWAS. The article provides an analysis of the ECOWAS institutional development path in preparation for effective response to conflicts. The article sheds light on the complicated task of synchronising the efforts of the different and individual units into a coherent and effective organisation towards unity of effort and purpose. According to Kwesi Aning, a few institutional attributes led to failed decision-making, among them institutional structures themselves. The author commends efforts to strengthen the organisation, and points to future areas of concentration as early warning, the understanding of local dynamics and risk-mapping.

Hutchful, in his article on Ghana's army in Liberia, specifically looks at 'mean peacekeeping' as the new characterisation of peacekeeping. The limited supply of resources, the lack of decisive cohesion and disunity among regional players are advanced by the author as the main reasons why the latest trend in peacekeeping is towards 'backyard' peacekeeping. The article makes some suggestions on the positive impact that participation in ECOMOG had on the Ghanaian army, including healthy civil-military relations and the overall institutional recomposition of the army. Exploring lean peacekeeping, Hutchful observes that the call for regional peacekeeping will or is polarising the peacekeeping community into two camps, one providing the labour and the other the resources.

Sibanda's article articulates the intricacies of the UN Verification Mission in Angola and reasons for its success and shortcomings. The author, based on experience, asserts the important and supreme role that the UN should continue to play in theatres of conflict and encourages more commitment to its contribution towards global security. The next article in the book is by Nhlapo who maps out South Africa's peacekeeping policy. The article outlines the country's progress with promulgating policies, building capacity and institutional structures for peacekeeping. The author also unveils the country's peacekeeping policy as contained in the white paper on the country's participation in peace missions. According to the author, the policy prescribes, as a means to resolve conflicts, reliance on preventive diplomacy and the addressing of the root causes of conflicts should these get out of hand.

Another thought-provoking article is by Cilliers who declares subregional peacekeeping as a project driven by the United States. The author deduces that the rush of offers for peacekeeping capacity-building to developing countries is aimed at equipping these countries and regions to do their own backyard peacekeeping. The author further observes that these capacity-building projects, when reaching fruition, will bypass the UN in order to take action. The author rejects these projects as unsuitable for Africa because of their state-centric nature; instead, he seems to suggest a back-to-basics approach looking at domestic security through healthy civil-military relations and the construction of sound justice systems. Furthering this argument, the author is of the opinion that regional security should not be forced upon regions as is the case now, but should be a project pursued after the achievement of domestic security and the creation of chances of mutual need and benefit.

Williams' article deals with how non-consensual peace missions pose challenges to Southern African countries. The author looks at the development of African peacekeeping capacity-building ventures and responses to these by African countries. The most important part of the article is the articulation of South African peacekeeping philosophy and motivations behind it. The author does this by tracing the development of the country's White Paper on Peace Missions and outlining the key principles that will determine participation. Williams concludes that, with the above setting the stage, it is unlikely that South Africa will take part in peace missions where consent has not been secured.

The book is an excellent offer that draws attention to a continental search for a peacekeeping doctrine relevant to the African theatre of conflict. It provides insights into institutional issues in need of attention to ensure capability to operationalise such a doctrine. The book should be of good use to all those concerned with meaningful peacekeeping capacity-building with the aim to meet the challenges of the unrelenting African conflict scene. The book will be of value to observers of peacekeeping, specifically in the Southern African region. The book raises points of discussion on methods of keeping, enforcing and making peace and therefore should shape future debates on the subject.

## **Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader**

edited by E. Michael Brown, R. Owen Cote, Jr.; Sean M. Lynn-Jones and E. Steven Miller (1998), The Mitt Press, London

reviewed by Senzo Ngubane

Research Officer, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

This book deals with the theoretical issues around the concepts of war and peace. The first section of the book, entitled Realist theories of war and peace begins with a chapter by Mearsheimer that focuses on post-Cold War Europe. The section deals mainly with the question whether Europe would be able to maintain its peace and stability in a post-Cold War era. The analysis is done within the context of the bipolar world (Cold War) versus the multipolar world (post-Cold War). Drawing from the neo-realist theory of international relations, the first article presents four different scenarios for a post-Cold War Europe. The author concludes that Europe would face incredible destabilisation due to multipolarity as there would be no clear (military) power to 'moderate' the activities of other states. It is the absence of this great power that leads to anarchy with states pursuing their own national interests. The author seems to suggest that this could only be avoided if the United States and Russia continue to play the role of superpowers in Europe in order to maintain stability.

Van Evera's article attempts to strike the balance between offensive and defensive measures among states with the aim of offering greater comprehension of the notion of power and national interests. According to Van Evera, the distribution of power should not be the only yardstick by which to measure the probable cause of war. Instead, the offence-defence balance which involves factors such as the nature of diplomacy and domestic political factors, among others, need to be considered.

The last article in the section authored by Glaser reveals the major dilemma that most realists face, that is, how to offer a proper understanding of state behaviour in an evolving international system. The author argues that, contrary to popular opinion about realism, the theory is able to explain international peace and state co-operation.

The second section deals with a counter-theory to realism – idealism – and how it is connected to democracy, peace and state co-operation. The section offers an in-depth analysis of the theory that democratic states do not go to war with each other. The first article defends the proposition and demonstrates that, historically, democratic states, because of their shared belief in liberalism, have avoided war. This view, however, is immediately challenged by Layne in the second article, who argues that in cases where democratic states avoided resorting to war, the decision was based on national interests rather than the notion of promoting democracy. He does this by referring to different

examples, among them, World War I, a war fought by states that were perceived to be democratic (p. 183).

Part three of the book deals with ethnicity, nationalism and war and how the latter two factors, in combination or separately, lead to war. The entire analysis of nationalism and ethnicity is mainly focused on the international political environment in post-Cold War Eastern Europe and how the West, especially the United States, could respond to such issues. In this section, the authors seem to agree that one of the key solutions to such wars would be international intervention in states in order to protect minorities. The recommendations made by the authors, however, appear to be blueprints, which have been tried and proved inadequate elsewhere.

The fourth section of the book tackles the issue of international institutions and their role or relevance within the international system. A thought-provoking article is that of Mearsheimer who defends the realist arguments that international institutions, empirically speaking, do not possess the capacity to deal with issues of war, or to safeguard international peace. The rest of the articles are a direct response to and a critique of Mearsheimer's views. Of particular note is the article by Keohane and Martin (pp. 391-393) that attempts to prove that there is historical and empirical evidence to show that international institutions do, in fact, matter and that they have played a pivotal role when it comes to issues of war and peace.

Indeed, nation-states have invested much time and money in international institutions that continue to exist as platforms to deal with international issues that cannot be tackled by individual states. This view is clearly demonstrated by Keohane and Martin in their explanation of the continued existence of institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The section successfully demonstrates that the theory of collective security as it relates to the notion of lasting peace would always remain a bone of contention in international relations discourse.

The fifth and last section of the book deals with the issues of war and peace in an evolving international system. The main argument offered by the first article, which is a review essay, is that war among the (industrialised) countries of Europe is no longer possible. According to Kaysen, this is the case because the leaders in these countries have realised that there is more at stake in terms of economic and political factors, in comparison with past centuries. Put differently, Kaysen's view is that in the latter part of the 20th century, it is no longer profitable for states to go to war, at least those of (industrialised) Europe. However, the essay does not adequately address the question why states go to war and why European states do not at this particular point in history.

An important observation that could be made, is that the means of destruction have become so advanced that a war among European states could mean the end of the world. The existence of nuclear weapons and other technologically advanced means of destruction make a total war among these states incomprehensible.

The second article by Copeland is also thought-provoking as it attempts to offer insight into the notion that economic interdependence reduces or increases the likelihood of war among states. His conclusion is that economic interdependence result in wars among states when they want to maintain their dominance over resources. Using World War I as an example, Copeland argues that Germany went to war with other states in Europe in order to gain greater access to international markets (pp. 486-488). The last article looks at environmental issues and their possible effects on the international system, that is, whether scarcity of natural resources could lead to conflicts or not.

This book goes a long way to show that there is a rich tradition within international relations methodology and discourse. This rich tradition is composed of various schools of thought that ensures that the future of international relations as a discipline remains intact. The above observation is informed by the richness that this book reflects about various international relations theories and how they relate and/or differ from each other, thus showing the depth of the debates within this discipline. At this level, it is an important book for international relations scholars interested in understanding present-day realities through the lens of international relations theory. However, the book would have been more useful had it concentrated on issues affecting Europe, as well as the rest of the world, because the changes taking place currently affect all states.