

FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

DOUG BROOKS AND PROFESSOR HUSSEIN SOLOMON

This is a very special edition of *Conflict Trends* one that is quite contradictory in tone. This contradictory tone, of course, underscores the complexity that is Africa. Hope and despair exist side by side on this troubled continent which is attempting to achieve a Renaissance. On the one hand, we celebrate Africa's most popular state, Nigeria, being awarded the Africa Peace Award as it celebrates its first year under civilian rule in almost two decades. On the other, we lay special focus on mercenaries and/or private security companies and analyse their impact on Africa's on-going conflicts.

Many of those who study the African continent are surprised that there is still any debate about the utilisation of mercenaries in this day and age. One only has to look at the recent history of private soldiers to find numerous examples of ex-Nazis, drifters, and soldiers-of-fortune defiling newly independent African countries. Yet, the market for skilled private soldiers is still strong. And while the clients include ruthless dictators, morally depraved rebels and drug cartels, they also include legitimate sovereign states, respected multinational corporations, humanitarian NGOs and even Western embassies. It is clear that the moral issues surrounding the international private security industry are not as clear-cut as one might expect. And the trend towards worldwide privatisation seems to indicate that the marketing of military services will continue to be a growth industry for the foreseeable future.

The essays in this edition of *Conflict Trends* will examine different aspects of the debate surrounding the private security industry. The authors come from a range of experiences and offer some conflicting viewpoints. The articles will give the reader insight, in order that they may draw their own conclusions on the subject. This introduction will attempt to provide some background about the ongoing debate surrounding the private security industry in Africa.

The recent history of mercenaries in Africa dates from the early 1960s, when the European states dismantled their empires and gave African states their independence. Post-independence conflicts began almost immediately and for the next 20 years, freelance soldiers found employment in the Congo, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Angola and elsewhere. Some of the colourful characters that commanded mercenary bands during this period included the Irishman 'Mad' Mike Hoare, the Frenchman Bob Denard and the Belgian 'Black' Jacques Schramme. The soldiers they commanded were a motley collection of nationalities and backgrounds. While their primary motivation was usually money, it is clear that in many cases there were other incentives involved as well. These motivations ranged from racism and

religion, to anti-Communism, and in some cases, the belief that they could genuinely help to bring freedom to oppressed peoples.

Whatever the driving forces for mercenaries in Africa, there was a great deal of African and international outrage at the external interference of the internal affairs of new African nations. Both the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) passed resolutions that purported to outlaw 'mercenaryism.' Mercenaries were denied the protection of the Geneva Conventions and a number were subsequently executed as a result. Ultimately, these efforts had little impact on the numbers of mercenaries engaged in African conflicts. Mercenaries are attracted to Africa's depressingly large market for violence.

While publicly there was broad international agreement that mercenaries had to be outlawed, privately there was immense disagreement over how this should be done. There are two main reasons why the UN and OAU attempts to outlaw mercenaries have met little success.

Firstly, there has never been a clear legal definition of the term 'mercenary.' The UN definition includes a number of sometimes-vague requirements that must ALL be met before an individual can be termed a mercenary. The definition says that a mercenary is one who: specifically chose to fight in an armed conflict; does fight in the conflict; is motivated by personal gain; is not originally from the areas in conflict; is not sent by another state; and is not a member of the armed forces of the conflict.

Clearly, the UN definition of mercenaries is so restrictive and exclusive, it is very, very hard to find a mercenary anywhere that fits all these criteria. This is especially true since mercenaries have good reason not to wish to fit the definition – including the loss of human rights protections normally granted to combatants and, in some cases, the loss of their citizenship in their home country.

The second reason why efforts to outlaw mercenaries met little success, was because it was clear that many African states were not interested in outlawing all mercenaries, despite their public sentiments. In fact, many African states have proven to be quite willing to use mercenaries to bolster their own forces. Their goal in formulating the anti-mercenary laws was to prevent mercenaries from being used against them.

The result is that current international legislation is imperfect, vague, and ineffective. While the UN has maintained a Special Rapporteur to further attempts to outlaw mercenaries, the legal efforts have had little effect at stemming the use of private soldiers, or their evolution into the modern 'private military company' (PMC).

It is not just the lack of clear legal definitions that hamper the understanding of the private military industry. Moreover, it is the

lack of general definitions. One of the most difficult aspects of writing about the private military industry, is the fact that there are no universally accepted definitions of even the most widely used terms. Academics, NGOs and even companies involved in the trade, disagree on terms as basic as 'mercenary.' Further, it is important to understand that the industry is not just made up of Western soldiers operating in foreign countries. In its broadest understanding, it also includes privately-operated paramilitary groups that operate legally within their home countries. Perhaps the only aspect that most would agree on, is that the private military industry is composed of individuals who provide military services primarily, or substantially, for financial gain.

It might seem obvious to many that a mercenary is 'a foreign soldier who fights for pay.' However, when looking at some of the main private security contracts in Africa, one would see quite a few foreign soldiers doing little more than unarmed consulting on security operations at industrial mining sites. They would vehemently deny they are mercenaries. Other foreign soldiers advise the military leadership in African countries on tactics and strategy, and have never heard a shot fired in anger. There are also a number of companies that provide field training and instruction to African militaries, but because of a lack of combat operations, few would consider them mercenaries. Even companies, such as Executive Outcomes, that have engaged in combat operations on behalf of clients, have often denied the mercenary terminology because according to the legal UN definition (discussed above), they were not in fact mercenaries.

The term 'private military company' (PMC) is perhaps the most widely used term for companies that provide military services (sometimes the slightly different 'private security company,' PSC). Most analysts use the terms to define any company that is willing to do services that would normally be done by regular, national military organisations. These services might include a wide variety of tasks: transportation, demining, supply, training, reconnaissance, and in some cases, even direct combat. Not all PMCs will do military services. However, the term is usually used to cover a company that does any such service.


Finally, it is important not to forget the true freelance or rogue individual who sells military services. Individual foreign soldiers unaffiliated with any organised company will turn up in virtually every African conflict looking for employment. Sometimes they are technically skilled individuals, such as pilots or technicians. In other cases, they have little more than military training from a Western or East European army, together with a willingness to use those skills for pay. These individuals often have few scruples about whom they work for, or about the laws of war. Worse, they are notoriously independent, and thus difficult to control or regulate. They make our understanding of the industry even more difficult because in some cases, they previously served in PMCs.

When discussing the private military industry, there are a number of key arguments around which the contemporary debate focuses.

The most basic question is whether PMCs are a threat to national sovereignty? Do they mean the end of the state, as we know it? When a developing country uses a private military, does it contribute to the erosion of national self-determination? Or can PMCs be used to bolster democratic governments? Are PMCs

merely an extension of the power of multinational corporations? Are PMC's real interests that of private companies, and NOT those of their client states and their citizens? Does it even matter as long as the interests coincide with those of the state? Are PMCs in fact legal entities according to international law? Is there any legal way of controlling their actions? There seems to be a great deal of disagreement on that point, with critics arguing they are illegal and uncontrollable, while defenders point out that they are legal companies in their home states, and thus very much subject to law. How do we ensure that PMCs only work for legitimate states and clients, and not narco-terrorists or rogue states? Ultimately, critics argue, PMCs are only accountable to their share-holders, and not to their clients or the citizens of the states they are supposedly protecting. However, what would happen to the citizenship of a PMC's Western employees, if they worked for criminal entities? Where is the democratic accountability? If a PMC works for a state, how do we ensure their obedience to that state?

PMCs work for money, not idealism. No one denies that. However, does that basic motivation preclude positive results? PMCs will only work when they are guaranteed payment for their services. This means that states which have the money or mineral wealth to mortgage, can afford to hire them. PMC defenders suggest that the international community could certainly help pay for the private rescue of legitimate states, and in any case, PMCs are far cheaper than regular state-run militaries. Currently, most PMCs prefer to keep their client lists confidential, as well as their funding sources. This lack of transparency makes critics wonder about the possible ulterior motives of such companies, while the companies themselves claim they would have no problem with transparency, if their industry was more accepted and allowed to become more legitimate within the eyes of the international community. However, are PMCs more interested in selling weapons to their clients than ending a war? Defenders say PMCs are not arms dealers, but instead strive to end wars and thus, the demand for arms sales. While PMC defenders argue that their corporate reputation is enough to motivate them to end wars quickly, critics point out that the companies are only paid as long as they extend the length of the conflict. How can we ensure PMCs work towards ending conflict in the most expedient manner possible? As most PMCs utilise retired Western military personnel, how can clients be sure that their interests are divorced from their former allegiances?

While PMCs claim to be efficient and cost-effective, critics have raised many questions about these claims. Some claim that even when they successfully end a conflict, 'peace-by-mercenary' is temporary at best, since PMCs fail to address the original, underlying causes of these wars. Further, their human rights record has often been called into question, although PMC defenders point out a lack of evidence of humanitarian atrocities, and illuminate the alternative: the militaries they supplement or replace usually have much, much worse human rights records. What would happen if both sides in a conflict hired PMCs and mercenaries? In many cases, the personnel of PMCs come from questionable backgrounds. As a result, clients must rely on the PMCs to screen their own employees. Can we rely on their judgment to assemble an effective and honourable force? 

CONFLICT WATCH

SENZO NGUBANE

Conflict at a glance – an overview of developments in conflict spots on the continent over the last quarter. This is Conflict Watch. Winds of change are sweeping across the continent. And yet we must be aware of opportunities to work for transformation, to focus our resources. These are the facts... The continent of Africa has been divided into five regions based on the OAU administrative regional division.

AFRICA (GENERAL)

5 January 2000 – The Southern African Development Community (SADC) failed to reach consensus on its Free Trade Protocol after a deadlock over the rules of origin, especially with regard to clothing and textiles.

23 February 2000 – In the face of new initiatives to reach a diplomatic solution, fresh fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia was reported on the eastern front.

8 March 2000 – The OAU barred eight African countries from voting or attending the organisation's meetings because of payment arrears. The affected countries are, the DRC, Central African Republic, the Comoros, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles.

27 March 2000 – The UN Department of Disarmament Affairs reported that 23 African countries are threaten by the proliferation of small arms. According to the Department the following

countries are the most affected by this problem Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, DRC and Guinea Bissau as the most affected countries.

30 March 2000 – The World Food Programme (WFP) appealed for \$16 million in order to feed about 400,000 people in Burundi and Madagascar.

7 April 2000 – The 7th International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) ended in Durban, South Africa, with a call for the protection of workers' rights against the scourge of globalisation.

13 May 2000 – The UN passed a resolution in which it threatens to take action against both Eritrea and Ethiopia if they fail to adopt serious measures to end the war.

NORTH AFRICA



Demonstrators protesting against Algerian President Bouteflika's amnesty for Muslim fundamentalist rebels

ALGERIA


4 January 2000 – A violent attack by Muslim rebels in the village of Haouch Germian, Tipaza province, led to the killing of six people and the wounding of 14 others.

12 January 2000 – The GIA and the Da'WA wal Jihad rebel groups rejected the government's amnesty offer.

17 January 2000 – A total of two government soldiers were killed and several others wounded following an ambush by Da'WA wal Jihad rebels in Tizi-Ouzou province.

23 January 2000 – Violent clashes in western Algeria lead to the killing of 32 rebels and 25 government soldiers, in one of the heaviest battles since the lapse of the amnesty period.

10 February 2000 – Hundreds of civilians marched against the government's amnesty deal with the rebels. The National Committee Against Oblivion and Betrayal (CNOT), and the Relatives of Terrorism Victims' Association, organised the anti-amnesty march.



13 February 2000 – The Le Matin newspaper reported that radical Muslims killed 16 civilians and wounded six others after setting up a series of roadblocks in Medea Province.

20 February 2000 – Addressing the UN Trade and Development Agency Conference, President Bouteflika lamented that the rebel Muslim war against the state had, in a period of eight years, cost the country's economy US\$20 billion.

21 March 2000 – Twenty-three rebels, suspected of being involved in the last month attack on civilians, were killed.

29 March 2000 – Algerian troops uncovered a mass grave of 50 people in Tiaret area, believed to have been killed by Muslim rebels.

3 May 2000 – A total of 19 people were killed when Muslim rebels set up a roadblock south of Algiers.

6 May 2000 – It was reported that government soldiers killed 24 Muslim rebels from the GIA near Algiers. Most of the rebels killed were suspected of taking part in the recent spate of attacks in the country.



EGYPT

12 January 2000 – Communal violence between Muslims and Christians erupted in al-Koshen village, south of Cairo. Police reported 21 people were killed, 33 others injured and 81 properties destroyed.

23 January 2000 – Egyptian prosecutors arrested 19 students suspected of being members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood.

13 February 2000 – Cairo made a special appeal to the international community to assist in removing the landmines planted during the Second World War. According to the UN, there are about 22 million mines in Egypt and 17 million are planted in the Western Desert.

20 February 2000 – A total of three people were killed and another injured after a landmine explosion in the town of Ismailiya.

15 March 2000 – Security officials arrested 48 members of the

Muslim fundamentalist group, the Salem al-Faramaway on suspicion of wanting to impose extremist ideas in Egypt.

1 May 2000 – President Mubarak denied reports that the government wanted to devalue the country's currency as a way of tackling the liquidity problem. Instead, Mubarak stated that the government would put money into the market in order to solve the current crisis.



LIBYA

1 March 2000 – Libya went through a major government transformation that saw the removal of the Prime and Foreign Ministers and the dissolution of 12 ministries. There are now five remaining ministries in the country, which include, foreign affairs, African unity, finance and Justice and Public order ministry.



MOROCCO


18 January 2000 – The government expressed its dissatisfaction with the UN identification results of three ethnic groups in Western Sahara. According to the UN Mission, only 2,130 out of 51,220 members of the affected tribe are eligible to vote in a future referendum.

12 March 2000 – A number of people embarked on a mass action to protest against government plans to extend women's rights and enhance their position in society.

20 April 2000 – The Human Rights Association in Morocco voiced its concern regarding the protection of freedom of expression. This follows a ban on two newspapers which were allegedly critical of the royal family.

3 May 2000 – The government announced that a panel would be established to try and find a compromise on the proposed plan to accord women more rights. The plan was prepared last year and was rejected by most Muslim fundamentalists.

WEST AFRICA



BURKINA FASO

3 January 2000 – Opposition parties in Burkina Faso rejected President Compaore's announcement that the country could hold its parliamentary elections earlier than planned.


8 May 2000 – Opposition parties in Burkina Faso objected to the government's announcement that the municipal elections would be held on 30 July 2000.



THE GAMBIA

15 January 2000 – Gambia's Interior Ministry said the government had uncovered a plot, within the country's army, to overthrow the president. One coup plotter had been shot dead and another arrested for questioning.

5 April 2000 – Ten soldiers, including a former commander of the presidential guard accused of conspiring to overthrow the government, were charged with treason.



GHANA

4 April 2000 – The government announced the release from jail of more than 1,000 prisoners under general amnesty including two soldiers charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government.

12 May 2000 – Clashes between supporters of the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic party were reported in the Asante Akim district.

Ivory Coast

11 April 2000 – The IMF stated that the Ivory Coast should adopt proper measures to reform the economy in order to obtain an interim agreement with the Fund.



GUINEA

11 January 2000 – The government stated that it would take firm measures against those involved in clashes between the Muslims and Christians, which occurred in the western Balizia region earlier this month. A total of 31 people were killed.

15 February 2000 – Guinea’s Parliament makes a special clemency appeal to President Conte to release opposition leader Alpha Conde who was arrested in December 1998.



IVORY COAST

8 December 1999 – A warrant of arrest for former Prime Minister Outtara, a candidate for the upcoming presidential elections, was issued as part of an investigation over his nationality.

18 December 1999 – About 15,000 supporters of Outtara held a rally for the release of 11 leaders of Outtara’s Rally of the Republicans Party (RDR).

23 December 1999 – A number of soldiers staged protest action in Abidjan over unpaid salaries.

24 December 1999 – Former army commander, Robert Guie announced a military coup after a group of mutineers overthrew President Bedie.

25 December 1999 – The country’s new military ruler, General Guei, established a nine-member Public Salvation Council that will be under his direct leadership.

27 December 1999 – Political parties were given 48 hours to bring forward the names of ministers to constitute a transitional government. However, the military junta did state that the defence, foreign affairs, security and interior ministries would be under its control.

10 February 2000 – The Fratenite-Matin newspaper reported that the IMF had expressed its unwillingness to resume its financial aid to the Ivory Coast because of the ruling regime’s failure to embark upon economic reform.

11 February 2000 – Military prosecutors accused four senior army officials with disturbing public order, and rebellion against the ruling military regime.

16 February 2000 – A report by UNICEF revealed that there is an extensive network of child trafficking from Mali to the Ivory Coast, where the children work as cheap labour.

18 February 2000 – The military junta came under pressure from the Ivorian Human Rights League (LIDHO) after its detention of Emile Bombet, a former Interior Minister. Bombet has been detained on the grounds of embezzling funds from the EU, which were supposed to be used for elections.

27 March 2000 – An IMF experts team arrived in the country to review its economic progress since all monetary aid to the country was frozen in 1999 due to mal-administration and corruption under the ousted President Bedie.



LIBERIA

3 February 2000 – The IMF announced that Liberia needs to engage in serious economic reform before the resumption of aid programmes to the country. Besides assistance granted to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the country has not had any significant international

aid since the end of the civil war in 1997.

27 March 2000 – Opposition parties joined independent journalists in voicing their dissatisfaction with the government's decision to close down an independent Radio station.

6 April 2000 – The UN Special Representative to Liberia informed reporters that the UN is going to fund programmes to train former fighters in order to equip them with relevant life skills.



NIGER

21 January 2000 – The government suspended all internal debt in order to work out a new strategy to tackle the country's financial crisis.



NIGERIA

6 January 2000 – Militias from the ethnic Yoruba burned to death 15 alleged criminals in Lagos.

14 January 2000 – President Obasanjo warned the people and authorities in Lagos that he would declare a state of emergency due to the deteriorating security situation. During the past few months, the country has witnessed a resurgence of ethnic tensions in most states.

17 January 2000 – Nigerian police officers told reporters they recently arrested 200 suspected members of the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), a militant Yoruba group.

22 January 2000 – The State Assembly of Kano approved the introduction of Muslim Sharia Law. The introduction of the Law in other Muslim-dominated states has caused unrest amongst non-Muslim people, especially Christians.

15 February 2000 – Health officials in Nigeria estimated that the number of people living with HIV had increased from 1,8% in 1990 to 5,4% in 1999. This follows a health survey conducted between July and September 1999, which ostensibly put the figure of people living with HIV to 2,6 million.

23 February 2000 – Human rights monitors reported that two days of fighting between Christians and Muslims in Kaduna led to massive destruction of property, and more than 50 people were killed.

1 March 2000 – About 400 people were killed in religious and ethnic tensions that have recently erupted in the country.

18 April 2000 – Nigerian police officers arrested more than 40 members of the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) during clashes with the police in Lagos.

30 April 2000 – Militant groups in the Niger Delta region issued a warning that they would attack oil firms operating in the area if the government failed to pass the Niger Delta development bill next month.

5 May 2000 – Fresh violence broke out between the towns of Ife and Modakeke, where two people were killed.

9 May 2000 – Officials from Shell Oil revealed that their production output suffered a setback when it dropped to 800,000 barrels per day, as compared to 840,000 per day the previous month.

12 May 2000 – An attack by militant Ijaw youth led to the closure of one of Chevron Corporation's plants in Niger Delta.



SENEGAL

5 January 2000 – The Opposition Coalition in Senegal accused the government of issuing false voter cards ahead of the country's February presidential elections.

12 April 2000 – Army officials stated that three soldiers and 15 rebels were killed during clashes at a military post near the border with Guinea-Bissau.

26 April 2000 – It was reported that some leaders of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) rejected the peace negotiations on the grounds that it was a Senegalese government-imposed initiative.

27 April 2000 – The MFDC leader, Diamacoune Senghor threatened to take up arms against Senegal after he accused the government of violent attacks on his group.



SIERRA LEONE

9 January 2000 – Sierra Leone officials responsible for the disarmament process revealed that only about 11,300 out of 45,000 former fighters had disarmed. The process is already running behind schedule, since it was meant to end on 15 December 1999.

12 January 2000 – UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, warned of a fragile peace process in Sierra Leone.

26 January 2000 – The Joint Implementation Committee, created to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, lashed out at former combatants for continued cease-fire violations.

13 February 2000 – The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Oluyemi Adeniji accused former rebels of disrupting the peace process by seizing arms from the UN peacekeepers and making roadblocks, thus preventing free movement of UN staff.

23 February 2000 – According to the WFP, more than half of the 34,000 people residing in Lower Yoni area have no access to basic food stuff, since most farmers were prevented from farming last year.

7 April 2000 – The head of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone stated that the deployment of the peacekeeping force in Kono district been delayed because they are still waiting for the arrival of more troops.

18 April 2000 – The UN High Commission for Human Rights issued a press statement on the continuing human rights abuses such as rapes and summary executions against civilians in the country. The statement blamed Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) for these atrocities. Sierra Leone

30 April 2000 – Following a recent exchange of gunfire with rebels, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone reinforced its presence around key areas in Freetown, such as the Central Bank and State House.

4 May 2000 – Seven Kenyan soldiers, who were part of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, were killed after the peacekeepers battled with a group of RUF rebels in the towns of Makeni and Magburaka.

8 May 2000 – Thousands of people demonstrated in front of Foday Sankoh's house. There was an exchange of gunfire and

five people were reportedly killed.

9 May 2000 – In the wake of recent conflict, British troops arrived in Sierra Leone and started evacuating a number of foreign nationals.

9 May 2000 – The UN High Commission for Refugees stated that about 265 people fled into neighbouring Guinea as a result of the intensification of clashes between the government and rebels forces.

14 May 2000 – Fighting was reported between government forces and rebels in the town of Masiaka, which is about 74km east of the capital, Freetown.

14 May 2000 – The country's president urged RUF rebels to release the 500 UN peacekeepers and military observers who were taken hostage at the beginning of May.

CENTRAL AFRICA



ANGOLA

5 January 2000 – The Commander of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), Lt. General Barros Ngutu, maintained that the government forces were going to conquer Savimbi and his UNITA rebels.

14 January 2000 – More than 70,000 Angolans were left homeless following heavy floods in the in Kwanza Norte province.

19 January 2000 – Government officials in Bie Province revealed that a mass grave had been discovered in the Camacupa municipality, after it had been recaptured by the FAA from UNITA.

26 January 2000 – The British based NGO, Global Witness issued a statement that, since 1992, UNITA had made about US\$4 billion from diamond smuggling and the money has been used to fuel the country's civil war.

3 February 2000 – Opposition parties in Angola stated that the political conditions in the country would prevent the planned elections from taking place next year. The statement was in response to President Dos Santos' indication that the country would go to the polls late next year.

17 February 2000 – A number of people took to the street in protest against an increase in fuel prices.

19 February 2000 – UNITA issued a statement claiming that it had killed 118 FAA soldiers during clashes in the Kuando Kubango, Luanda Sul and Kwanza Sul provinces.

14 March 2000 – The UN Sanctions Committee issued its reports on the violations of the (arms) embargo and (diamond sale) sanctions imposed by the international community on UNITA. Among others, the Report had implicated two sitting African Presidents and a number of countries and individuals around the world of abetting UNITA in busting the sanctions.


22 March 2000 – Government officials in Bie Province accused UNITA of killing three traditional leaders as they continue their reign of terror on civilians.

29 March 2000 – Two hundred and fifty seven people in Caxito Bengo Province were left homeless following the recent heavy rains in the country.

12 April 2000 – The WFP expressed its concern about the humanitarian conditions in Kuito where about 200,000 people would have no access to food supplies if the city's airport was not repaired.

25 April 2000 – Humanitarian workers said that 30 people were killed and 17 wounded when their trucks drove over land mines in the town of Negage.

26 April 2000 – UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Angola, Zoraida Mesa warned that the country could be heading towards



a humanitarian catastrophe and appealed for urgent international assistance.

3 May 2000 – It was reported that a humanitarian aid truck, loaded with food and destined for about 30,000 displaced people, was attacked between Cubal and Benguela.

11 May 2000 – UNITA reportedly launched an offensive in Kuvango.



CHAD

21 January 2000 – The Minister of Defence denied allegations made by the Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJT), that the government had unleashed violent attacks on civilians in the Tibesti region.

8 February 2000 – Fighting between government forces and members of the MDJT were reported near Zouar, in the northern parts of the country.

15 February 2000 – The leader of the MDJT rejected President Deby's invitation to form a political party in the country's capital, Ndjamena.

1 March 2000 – Djimasta Koibla, the mediator in the country's conflict between the Chadian government and the MDJT, stated that the peace negotiations have failed to yield positive results.

15 March 2000 – The government troops reportedly gained control in the northern parts of the country after a recent spell of fighting between government and the rebels.

6 April 2000 – The leader of the MDJT, Mr. Togoimi, rejected the call made by the president to have negotiations with the rebel group and to form a political party. According to Togoimi, peace can only come in the country after the president has been removed from power.



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

7 January 2000 – Three rebel leaders met in Uganda to discuss possible cooperation in their efforts to oust President Kabila. The meeting was attended by the two RCD faction leaders, Emile Ilunga and Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, and Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Congolese Liberation Movement.

9 January 2000 – According to the rebel group led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, 21 government soldiers were killed during clashes near the Port of Nkonya.

27 January 2000 – The Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) accused the government of cease-fire violations following the dropping of bombs at the rebel-held town of Mobambo.

8 February 2000 – The government increased fuel prices by 200% following the Central Bank's devaluation of the Congolese franc from 4,5 to 9 to the US dollar.

8 February 2000 – The African Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO) accused Ugandan troops of killing 5 000 civilians in the DRC since last June.

22 February 2000 – Rebel leaders rejected President Kabila's amnesty offer on the grounds that it runs counter to the spirit of the Lusaka Accords.

8 March 2000 – Ambassador Kemal Morjane, the head of the observer mission in DRC stated the conditions for the deployment of peacekeepers. Among others, Morjane, revealed that the respect of the agreement and a guarantee of non-interference

with the UN staff activity in the country, as the key conditions.

11 March 2000 – A consultative peace forum, attended by civil society groups, ended with a call for President Kabila to allow for free political activity in the country and for the establishment of a transitional parliament.

17 March 2000 – The government launched an appeal through the Security Council against what it calls acts of invasion by Rwanda after two attacks in East Kasai Province.

3 April 2000 – The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that 14 million people in the DRC are without food and proper health care and 1,3 million have been left homeless as a result of the war.

3 April 2000 – Media reports revealed that most of the on-going cease-fire violations in the DRC are taking place around Kasai whilst the security situation in Kananga and Mbuji-Mayi has been reportedly deteriorating.

7 April 2000 – ASADHO accused the government soldiers of human rights violations in areas around Kinshasa. ASADHO has accordingly appealed to the President to withdraw the forces from the affected areas.

12 April 2000 – It was announced that the government has suspended its process of establishing a Constituent and Legislative Assembly in government held territory.

24 April 2000 – DRC Foreign Minister confirmed reports that the government had rejected proposals made by Sir Ketumile Masire on the grounds that they were in violation of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement.

1 May 2000 – The ministry of defence said about 30 people were killed during recent fighting in Equateur Province.

12 May 2000 – While addressing a meeting of political leaders and supporters, President Kabila insisted that a Constituent Assembly would be formed on 1 July 2000. The President also said the establishment of the Assembly would not affect the inter-Congolese dialogue.

12 May 2000 – The UN Mission dispatched an eight-member team of observers to Kisangani to try and calm tensions between Rwandan and Ugandan troops, two former allies in the DRC conflict.

14 May 2000 – While in Kinshasa on his third visit since his appointment as mediator, Sir Ketumile Masire revealed that no progress had been made in setting up the inter-Congolese dialogue. Masire also noted that the international community had failed to release the funds that they had previously pledged.



REPUBLIC OF CONGO

24 February 2000 – The government made an appeal for humanitarian assistance for a number of refugees who have entered the country from the DRC. It is estimated that at least 20,000 refugees have moved into the Congo due to renewed fighting in some parts of the country.

4 March 2000 – Twenty-three children were killed and 40 others have been hospitalised following an outbreak of the measles epidemic in northwest areas of the country.

8 March 2000 – The Committee charged with monitoring the peace agreement in the country urged all the security forces to refrain from unlawfully stopping the free movement of people in the country.

EAST AFRICA



BURUNDI

6 January 2000 – UN officials working in Tanzania announced that at least 30,000 Burundians sought refuge in Tanzania due to renewed tensions in Burundi.

13 January 2000 – Hutu rebels attacked and killed 18 people, and injured 10 others, in an ambush near Bujumbura.

1 February 2000 – State security forces arrested 20 members of the National Liberation Forces (FNL) accused of taking part in violent and criminal acts carried out in Bujumbura market.

5 February 2000 – The government announced plans to destroy 11 out of the 57 regrouping camps in Bujumbura. The government claimed the camps were erected to protect ethnic Hutu civilians.

12 February 2000 – Fighting between Burundian and Rwandan rebels near the capital Bujumbura led to the killing of 19 people.

22 February 2000 – Nelson Mandela, the Burundi Peace Facilitator, informed all parties to the conflict that a peace agreement ought to be finalised within the next four months.

26 March 2000 – The Guardian newspaper reported that a group of terrorists have launched attacks in Makamba commune and a number of houses were burned. The incident comes at the wake of reports that there is a strong presence of rebels in southern Burundi.

28 March 2000 – Mr. Mandela urged the government of Burundi to respect the rights of its people by closing down all existing regrouping camps in the country.

24 April 2000 – An exchange of gunfire between the government and Hutu rebels was reported in Bujumbura. Army officials said about 67 rebels were killed.

29 April 2000 – Army officials said ten Hutu rebels and nine soldiers were killed during recent clashes.

5 May 2000 – The situation in southern Burundi was reported to be deteriorating due to rebel attacks in the towns of Buganda and Budketwa. Houses were burnt and crops destroyed.

24 May 2000 – Humanitarian workers reported that clashes between government forces and rebels erupted in the town of Makamba, located in the southern region of the country.



Burundi refugee children who have fled from Bujumbura towards the Tanzania border play in a stream




COMOROS

18 January 2000 – The National Union of Comoros Doctors embarked on a strike to demand better salaries.

24 January 2000 – The people of the Island of Anjouan voted in favour of their secession from the Comoro Islands Federal Republic. However, the vote was rejected by the OAU and the Island faces international isolation.

3 February 2000 – The OAU imposed sanctions on representatives of the Anjouan separatist group in the Comoros because of their failure to uphold the Antananarivo Agreements. The sanctions entail travel and financial restrictions inside and outside the Comoros Islands.

15 February 2000 – The government issued an order to suspend



the movement of sea freight and controlling the passenger transport from the separatist Anjouan island to the main Comoros island.

18 February 2000 – Lt. Col. Abeid of the separatist Anjouan island set 26 March 2000 as the date for municipal elections. The government from the main island regards the move as an act of defiance that calls for the intensification of sanctions against Anjouan.

23 March 2000 – Interior Minister, Soimadou announced that the failed attempted coup in the country was an isolated act carried about by minority members in the army. The Minister also revealed that most of the suspected coup plotters have been arrested.

26 March 2000 – The Island of Anjouan held its local government elections with low voter turnout. The elections were carried out amid pressure from the OAU and other bodies to isolate the Island.



ERITREA

5 January 2000 – The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) accused the government of killing 15 Bani Amir people in Sahel Atsbisha, during recent clashes between the two sides.

15 February 2000 – Opposition parties in Eritrea voiced their objections to the repatriation of Eritrean refugees from Sudan because of Asmara's forced military conscription.

18 February 2000 – The Eritrean Defence Force announced that 84 Ethiopian troops had surrendered since the beginning of the year.

20 April 2000 – President Isayas Afewerki expressed his concern regarding the deadlock reached at a recent meeting with the Ethiopian government. He also indicated that his government would submit a document to the OAU detailing future peace process proceedings.

12 May 2000 – Asmara accused Addis Ababa of launching fresh assaults along their disputed border. The accusation came after another failed attempt at ending the two-year-old war.



ETHIOPIA

4 January 2000 – A group of heavily armed Ethiopian troops entered Somalia in a bid to hunt down suspected members of the Islamic group, Al-Itahad. The group is accused of attempting to destabilise the border between the two countries.

13 January 2000 – The Ogaden Welfare Society (OWS), a humanitarian group based in the Ogaden region, issued a report that six children, all under the age of five, face death due to famine in the region.

21 January 2000 – The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission appealed for food aid amounting to 820,000 tons, for eight million Ethiopians affected by drought and the country's war with Eritrea.

4 April 2000 – The OWS stated that 14 children die of hunger daily in Ethiopia due to the current food crisis. The government leveled its criticism against the slow response from the international community to assist in the problem.

12 May 2000 – The Minister of Foreign Affairs criticised the

UN's failure to adopt a firm stance against what he called Eritrea's aggression.



KENYA

11 April 2000 – Kenyan opposition leaders accused President Moi of frustrating the constitutional process in the country and called for protest action.

4 May 2000 – Opposition parties called for the withdrawal of Kenyan soldiers from the Sierra Leone mission after seven of them were killed.



MADAGASCAR

15 March 2000 – The UN rescue operation in Madagascar stated that it has been unable to reach all villages affected by recent floods. Latest reports reveal that 150 people have been killed and more than 20,000 were left homeless when the country was hit by two cyclones.

25 March 2000 – The Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (Monima) urged the President to constitute a commission that will look into the creation of new electoral laws in the country.



RWANDA

29 April 2000 – The government rejected reports made by human rights groups which criticised its human rights record, arguing that the aim of the reports was to blemish the country's image.

5 May 2000 – Health Ministry officials revealed that there were about half a million people who were infected with HIV/AIDS. Rwanda's population is about eight million.

9 May 2000 – Rwandan officials accused Uganda of attacking its positions in the DRC, thereby violating the recently signed ceasefire agreement. The officials said Ugandan soldiers shelled Rwandan positions near Bangoka airport.



SOMALIA

5 February 2000 – The RRA crossed swords with Islamic militias in Lower Shabelle region. As a result, 13 people were killed and more than 12 others wounded.

10 February 2000 – Warlords controlling Mogadishu and southern Somalia failed to reach an agreement on the creation of a central authority for these two areas.

11 February 2000 – The situation in the south-central town of Buurhakaba was tense following clashes between the Rahanweyn Salvation Army (RSA) and the RRA.

5 March 2000 – 17 militiamen were killed during clashes between the Digil Salvation Army (DSA) and a rival faction in Qoryoley town, south of Mogadishu.

29 March 2000 – The Somaliland government refused to be part of a Conference in Djibouti to discuss Somalia's reconciliation and peace initiatives.

15 April 2000 – Despite several peace agreements between the Biyo-Mal and Tunnih clans, violence broke out between the two factions in the village of Ababay.

16 April 2000 – People from the town of Baydhabo took to the streets to protest against the planned Djibouti reconciliation

meeting on the Somalia crisis.

16 April 2000 – Traditional leaders and elders from the Habar Gedir clan called on Husayn Aydid to support the upcoming meeting in Djibouti.

24 April 2000 – Health workers in the towns of Dinsor and Qansahdhere reported a cholera epidemic that left 100 people dead.

5 May 2000 – The Minister of Somaliland held a news conference where he criticised what he called Djibouti's intervention in the affairs of Somaliland. He reiterated his view that the peace conference in Djibouti did not concern his state.

8 May 2000 – Husayn Aidid denounced the Djibouti conference as misguided and declared that no government had ever been formed by civil society.

15 May 2000 – The WFP sent relief supplies to drought affected areas in Somalia's south-central region.



SUDAN

16 January 2000 – A rebel attack near the town of Haiya destroyed a pipeline, which carried oil for export markets.

20 January 2000 – It was announced that the on-going peace talks on the Sudan crisis in Kenya were to adjourn for a month, in order to give each party involved in the talks an opportunity to review their proposals. The decision to adjourn the talks came after a deadlock during a recent series of meetings.

21 February 2000 – The WFP had appealed to the international community for humanitarian assistance amounting to US\$58 million, in order to feed more than 1.7 million people in Sudan.

24 February 2000 – Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) suspended its humanitarian flights to Western Upper Nile due to the deteriorating security situation that threatens most of the humanitarian workers.

8 March 2000 – The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the president's earlier decision to dissolve parliament and declare a state of emergency.

12 March 2000 – The cabinet extended the state of emergency, declared by the president late 1999, until the end of the year.

23 March 2000 – Umma Party, the country's largest opposition played down statements that it would enter into a peace deal with the government.

26 March 2000 – The UNHCR issued a statement that a number of Sudanese have been fleeing the country into neighbouring states due to government air raids and on-going factional clashes.

8 May 2000 – The SPLA announced the suspension of peace talks with the government after it accused government forces of staging attacks on civilians.

14 May 2000 – United Nations officials stated that Sudan



A Sudanese soldier stands guard as food aid is offloaded from a UN aeroplane at Kauda, Sudan

was one of the countries in Africa which was facing an AIDS epidemic.



TANZANIA

27 January 2000 – Amnesty International urged the government to intervene in the trial of 18 Zanzibar opposition politicians charged with treason. The group maintains that the accused face an unfair trial and that their basic human rights are not being protected.

2 February 2000 – The Bank of Tanzania (BoT) reported that the country's export earnings fell by 8.1%, to US\$541 million in 1999. The Bank cited low production of key commodities, such as coffee, cotton and tobacco, as a major reason for the setback.

28 February 2000 – A joint statement by WFP and UNHCR warned that declining humanitarian support to refugees in Africa would greatly affect those in Tanzania. According to the statement, about 525,000 refugees could face starvation in the country during the next few months.

1 April 2000 – Article 19, a human rights lobby group called for the release of 18 opposition party members who have been charged with treason in Zanzibar.

6 April 2000 – The Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) warned that about 800,000 people would require food assistance because of poor rains during the maize growing season in the country.



UGANDA

11 January 2000 – Rebels from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacked a refugee camp in the nearby town of Bundibugyo, where 10 people were killed and six taken hostage.

26 January 2000 – The New Vision newspaper reported that government troops killed 16 rebels after launching an attack on one of the rebel camps.

6 February 2000 – President Museveni appealed to rebel groups in the country to accept the government's proposed amnesty offer. Speaking during Army Day, the president reiterated his stance that the country was still not ready for multi-party democracy.

10 February 2000 – A total of five people were killed and 20 others taken hostage by the rebel group, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), during an attack in the village of Habusisi.

7 March 2000 – The state-owned New Vision newspaper reported that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) launched an attack in northern Uganda and killed 12 people and wounded 30 others.

17 April 2000 – Independent NGOs monitoring the referendum process accused the chairman of the Electoral Commission of being biased towards the government.

25 April 2000 – Uganda withdrew some of its forces from the DRC, but left a substantial number which would only be withdrawn once its security concerns were taken care of.

14 May 2000 – President Museveni met with his Rwandan counterpart, President Kagame to find a solution to the differences that persist between the two countries regarding the DRC conflict.

SOUTHERN AFRICA



BOTSWANA

10 February 2000 – President Mogae appealed to the international community for aid to thousands of people affected by the recent heavy rains.

10 February 2000 – Gaborone recently confirmed that a number of Namibians had entered the country due to the deteriorating security situation in Namibia.

16 February 2000 – The Botswana Disaster Preparedness Management Committee revealed that recent heavy rains damaged more than 5,725 houses in the country's eastern district.

10 May 2000 – About 160,000 people were affected and 40,000 houses destroyed during recent floods in the country. However, the government stated that it was unable to assist with reconstruction programmes due to the costs involved.



LESOTHO

8 March 2000 – A political feud was reported between the Interim Political Authority (IPA) and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) over the nature of the country's new electoral laws ahead of the planned elections in May.

3 April 2000 – A commission of enquiry would be set up in Lesotho to look into the causes of political violence and instability of 1998 after the country's general election. The Commission is also tasked with investigating whether there was a conspiracy to overthrow the government.

27 April 2000 – The Minister in the office of the Prime Minister, Mr Motanyane, stated that cross-border crime was still the order of the day between Lesotho and South Africa. Speaking during South Africa's Freedom Day celebration, Mr Motanyane warned that the countries needed to urgently address the problem.

14 May 2000 – It was announced that Lesotho would go to the polls in March 2001, instead of this year as planned, as more time was required to make the necessary electoral preparations.



MALAWI

17 January 2000 – Health authorities in Malawi reported a fresh outbreak of cholera following recent heavy rainfall in the country. Thus far, 363 cases of the disease have been reported.


28 March 2000 – The recent torrential floods in the country destroyed about 30 villages in the northern district of Karonga.

28 April 2000 – The Office of Public Prosecutions accused the country's public service of misappropriating about a third of the state's annual budget. The office revealed that most civil servants thrived on the fact that the accounting and monetary system within the service was antiquated.

19 May 2000 – IMF representatives in Malawi urged the state to adopt new measures to tackle government fraud and corruption in order to accelerate its economic reform initiatives.



Rescue operations taking place in Mozambique during recent flooding





MOZAMBIQUE

8 February 2000 – A total of 43 people were killed and more than 100,000 left homeless due to heavy rains in the country. Aid workers based in Maputo warned the SADC region could also experience a health crisis, as a result of the floods.

11 February 2000 – The opposition Renamo party called for a re-counting of the December election vote. The opposition warned that failure to re-count would force it to constitute its own government in the six northern and central provinces that it won during the December election.

11 February 2000 – Maputo appealed for emergency aid in the amount of US\$2,7 million to assist flood victims.

23 February 2000 – The torrential rains that swept through the country led to the destruction of more than 70,000 hectares of land.

14 March 2000 – Speaking at a meeting of the Democratic Union of Africa (DUA), a political grouping of opposition parties, Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo reiterated his party's call for fresh elections on the grounds that the December elections were rigged.

28 March 2000 – The representative of the World Bank in Mozambique estimated that the government will need more than US\$428 million to rehabilitate its economy and rebuild the infrastructure damaged by the floods.

4 April 2000 – Weather experts warned that Mozambique could be facing a crisis as another cyclone approaches from the northern coast.

19 April 2000 – The Ministry of Finance stated that the country's inflation would increase from 5,5% in 1999 to about 10% and the GDP growth would drop from 8% to about 6% due to the recent floods.

6 May 2000 – Opposition RENAMO threatened to take up arms against the government after some of its supporters were arrested. The threat forms part of the on-going political crisis surrounding last year's election results.



NAMIBIA

24 December 1999 – Security concerns were cited in the country's northern border, following reports that Angolan forces had launched attacks against UNITA rebels from Namibia.

6 January 2000 – State Radio reported that Namibian forces killed seven Unita rebels and arrested four others in the Caprivi region, where foreign tourists had recently been killed.

13 January 2000 – The government denied allegations, made by opposition parties, that Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) were recruiting young Namibians to their ranks in order to fight against UNITA.

14 January 2000 – Namibian police blamed UNITA for the killing of four people in the northern Caprivi region.

20 January 2000 – Defence Force authorities said they had captured 81 alleged UNITA rebels in Rundu town.

26 January 2000 – The Minister of Finance announced an increase in the budget allocation for the Ministry of Defence in order to meet the costs of Namibia's participation in the DRC conflict.


14 February 2000 – President Nujoma met with President Dos Santos of Angola to discuss the worsening security situation in their countries.

29 March 2000 – The UN High Commission for Refugees appealed to the Namibian government to stop deporting Angolan citizens fleeing from the war in their country. According to the Commission Namibia has deported about 700 refugees in the last few weeks.

15 April 2000 – Members of UNITA rebels attacked the village of Thikandoku in Rundu killing six people.

26 April 2000 – Speaking during his annual state of the nation address, President Nujoma stated that his country's forces would accelerate their efforts in fighting UNITA forces accused of cross-border raids in Namibia.

7 May 2000 – It was reported that the Namibian army confirmed that its offices were launching operations in Angola against UNITA rebels.



SOUTH AFRICA

24 January 2000 – A report from a commission of enquiry into taxi violence implicated some members of the South African Police Service. The report stated that there was evidence to suggest that some police officers had, among other things, deliberately allowed the violence to occur.

5 February 2000 – About 13,000 workers from Volkswagen South Africa (VWSA) were dismissed after they embarked on an illegal strike which disrupted the company's production output. VW-SA has since announced its intentions to bring new workers to re-place those who have been fired.

8 February 2000 – Heavy floods in the Northern and Mpumalanga Provinces left 26 people dead and extensive destruction to property. Officials also revealed that most rivers in the affected areas had reached their highest levels in 50 years.

30 March 2000 – The government estimated that the cost of recent floods in the country that damaged a lot of infrastructure could be about US\$380 million.

2 April 2000 – Organised labour in South Africa, COSATU called for a review of government economic policies in order deal with, among other things, an escalation of unemployment in the country.

28 April 2000 – The South African Rand lost its value against the dollar and other major currencies due to fears that the Zimbabwe's land crisis could filter into other countries in the region.

18 April 2000 – Recent figures revealed that about 4,2 million people in South Africa were infected with the HIV/AIDS virus.

10 May 2000 – The labour movement threatened more protest action if the government and private sector failed to heed to its call for job creation. The statement was made during a march against the high unemployment rate in the country, which is currently estimated to be about 4,5 million.



SWAZILAND

14 February 2000 – According to the Disaster Task Force in Swaziland, major damages had been caused to roads and bridges, and the humanitarian situation

was worsening due to recent floods in the country.

17 April 2000 – Members of Parliament called for the introduction of an anti-terrorism bill in the country as a response to four bombings in the last two years.



ZAMBIA

13 January 2000 – According to the UN High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR), 7,547 Angolan refugees entered Zambia during just a few days, bringing the total number of refugees to 20,926 since October last year.

20 January 2000 – Lusaka threatened to attack UNITA if it continued to launch attacks near its border villages. The government also accused the rebel movement of wanting to take their war into Zambia.

9 March 2000 – The government reinforced its troops near the border with Angola following reports that UNITA members have attacked villages in Zambia.



ZIMBABWE

11 January 2000 – The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) warned that the continued drought in the country would have a negative impact on the country's maize grain, which had already suffered due to inadequate rain.

12 January 2000 – The President of the IMF, Michael Candesus declared that government reduction on public spending was one way to restore donor confidence in the country's economy.

14 January 2000 – The government announced that it would float its bond on the money market for three weeks, in an attempt to raise money for the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) to purchase enough fuel and meet some of its debts.

14 January 2000 – The leadership of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions called for a moratorium on the government's proposed 3% AIDS tax until further discussions with all the stakeholders.

2 February 2000 – The Zimbabwean tourism industry was one of the main industries affected by the country's fuel crisis. Tourism authorities revealed that millions of dollars had been lost because potential tourists continued to cancel their trips.

9 February 2000 – The Movement for Democratic Change accused the ruling ZANU-PF of waging a campaign of intimidation and violence against its supporters.

11 February 2000 – Opposition leaders in Zimbabwe intensified their campaign against the leadership of President Mugabe, by appealing to their members and other Zimbabweans to reject the draft Constitution in the upcoming referendum.

8 March 2000 – UN officials observed that a number of flood victims in Zimbabwe have been ignored because of the on going fuel and white farms crisis. According to the officials 500,000 people were affected by the recent floods and 96,000 of them are in need of urgent assistance.

16 March 2000 – War veterans threatened a state of anarchy if they are stopped from invading white owned farms. In the last few weeks war veterans occupied about 500 farms.



Zimbabwe held its first referendum in February since independence in 1980. A 55% NO vote was recorded against the draft constitution

20 March 2000 – Opposition parties called upon the government to restore the rule of law in the country by ensuring that High Court order to evict war veterans from white owned farms is respected.

26 March 2000 – President Mugabe announced that the postponement of the election to May instead of April in order to allow for the completion of voter registration.

7 April 2000 – Western donor countries, namely, the United States, Holland, Norway, Sweden and the World Bank, have frozen \$228 million that was pledged to assist Zimbabwe with the first phase of the land reform programme.

19 April 2000 – Human rights organisations and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) criticised President Mugabe's government of engaging in a 'campaign of intimidation' in the country in view of the fact that some of the people attending opposition gatherings have been attacked by ZANU-PF supporters.

26 April 2000 – A Zimbabwean government delegation met with representatives of the British government in another attempt to find a solution to the continuing land re-distribution crisis in the country.

29 April 2000 – War veterans marched through Harare to demonstrate their support for the ruling ZANU-PF.

15 May 2000 – The British government issued a warning to Zimbabwe against repatriation of whites in the country. This was in response to an earlier announcement that British people with dual citizenship should give up their Zimbabwean passports.

Nigeria receives the AFRICA PEACE AWARD

HUSSEIN SOLOMON

The death of General Sani Abacha on 8 June 1998, and the appointment of General Abdulsalami Abubakar as his successor, marked a watershed in Nigerian politics. Immediately, the new Head of State made his intention clear that he planned for a return to civilian rule. Word was followed by deed, and General Abubakar soon released scores of political prisoners and normalised relations with the international community – many of which had imposed sanctions during the Abacha period. General Abubakar also laid the groundwork for the transfer of power to a civilian administration.

On 27 February 1999, Nigerians went to the polls for the last stage in a process aimed at re-establishing civilian rule. Two days later the result of the elections were announced by Justice Akpata: Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) polled a total number of 18,738, securing 154 votes against the 11,110,287 votes of his opponent, Chief Oluyemisi Falae of the All People's Party. According to Justice Akpata, Obasanjo's votes constituted 62.78% of the total votes cast, while Chief Falae's votes represented 37.22%. On 29 May 1999, the military formally relinquished power to President Olusegun Obasanjo. This was a great victory for all Nigerians, who entered the millennium under a democratically-elected civilian government.

For 16 years, Nigerians suffered under the yoke of corrupt military oppression. The brutality of the men in uniform came to a head under the reign of General Sani Abacha: justice was perverted as opponents were imprisoned and executed under false charges; a mockery was made of political pluralism as Abacha set up five political parties, all of which had him as their presidential candidate in elections which were to mark the end of military rule; the murder of political opponents by faceless assassins also became the

norm during Abacha's iron-fisted rule; and spiralling corruption reached new levels. Despite the repression, Nigerians were united in their struggle for an end to military rule. Courageous journalists, community organisations, churches and non-governmental organisations stood steadfastly against military rule – often at great personal cost. The ending of military rule and the coming to power of a new civilian government was a victory for Nigerians who had suffered and lost their lives in their struggle for freedom. It is in honour of all Nigerians, therefore, that the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) will present its Africa Peace Award to Nigeria and its people in June 2000.

A peaceful, prosperous and stable Nigeria is essential for the

*'I commend
General Abdulsalami
Abubakar and
members of the
Provisional Ruling
Council for the
leadership they gave
the country in the
last 11 months.
And for keeping
meticulously to the
announced time-table
of handing over to a
democratically elected
government today'*



African Renaissance to materialise on our continent. In a recent memorandum to the National Assembly, President Obasanjo stated that Nigeria spent 2.3 billion naira (US\$ 22.86 million) on peacekeeping operations between October 1999 and February 2000. Thus, Nigeria's liberation from the yoke of military repression is a freedom in which all Africans share.


Poor civil-military relations is, of course, not the only fault-line plaguing this West African behemoth. The new democratic

government faces many challenges. These include:

- To forge a united Nigerian nation out of 250 fractious ethnic groups;
- To limit the power of the military, and at the same time, maintain it as a source of stability in West Africa;
- To inculcate a culture respectful of human rights and the rule of law;
- To increase economic performance, and at the same time, develop an understanding of the need for a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth; and
- To put an end to spiralling levels of crime and corruption through effective, good governance.

Though the challenges are vast, they are not insurmountable and the Obasanjo administration has already displayed the political will to effectively deal with these issues. Consider the following:

- Within hours of Obasanjo being sworn in, the new government announced new heads for the armed forces, police, civil service and central bank;
- In an effort to bring the armed forces under control, Obasanjo announced the removal of several hundred army officers in June 1999, and in August plans were announced to reduce the military in size from 80,000 to 50,000 within four years;
- The reorganisation of the police was also on the cards. The notoriously abusive paramilitary anti-crime units were disbanded in several states and replaced with new units which did not include soldiers;
- The government also appointed a national prison reform committee to advise on prison conditions, and 1,400 prisoners were released soon thereafter;
- A panel was also established to investigate how to alleviate poverty;
- Obasanjo visited the highly volatile Delta area in June 1999, where he held discussions with local leaders. Those discussions resulted in Obasanjo introducing a bill to the National Assembly aimed at establishing a Niger Delta Commission;
- The new government has placed an emphasis on infrastructural development and ecological rehabilitation to help kick-start the economy;
- An anti-corruption bill was passed by the National Assembly, and steps have been taken to reduce corruption in the fuel distribution sector. For the first time in years, Nigerian cities have gasoline freely available at the pump;
- Recognising the need to effectively deal with the past, President Obasanjo set up a panel to investigate human rights violations during the years of military rule. The purpose of



this panel is twofold: to identify those responsible for human rights abuses and to recommend measures which can be taken to prevent history from repeating itself.



On his second day in office, President Obasanjo stated to the nation that 'Not all of us will hold government appointments. But all must contribute to the new dawn.' By offering this Africa Peace Award to Nigeria, ACCORD honours all Nigerians for their contribution to the new dawn of democracy, without whom peace and prosperity is not possible.

FACTS ON NIGERIA

Situated in West Africa, between Cameroon (East); Chad (North-East); Niger (North); Benin (West) and the Gulf of Guinea (South), the Federal Republic of Nigeria occupies about 923,770 sq. km.

The latest estimates put the country's population at approximately 120 million with an expected growth rate of 2.92%. Life expectancy at birth is 53.3 years for the entire population, which breaks down to 52.55 years for males and 54.06 years for females.

Nigeria has about 250 ethnic groups, with the main groups Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio and Tiv. Although English remains the official language, there are more than 250 indigenous languages with the Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo and




Fulani as the most widely spoken. In terms of religion, the Islamic faith accounts for 50% whilst Christianity makes up 40% and the remaining 10% follow the indigenous African belief systems.

Nigeria is a Federal Republic constituted of 36 federal states. The ushering in of a democratic order re-emphasized the existence of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial wings of government. The country's National Assembly consists of a Senate (109 seats) and House of Representatives (360 seats). Members to both houses are elected by popular vote for a four-year term.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE NIGERIAN STATE



October: Nigeria achieved its independence from Britain. Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa was appointed the first Prime Minister.



January: Prime Minister Balewa and two regional premiers were killed in a military coup. A new military government was established under Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi who abolished the federal system.



July: Northern officers lead a counter-coup which resulted in the death of Ironsi. His successor, Major-General Yakubu Gowon, revived the federation.



May 1967 – January 1970: The Biafran War raged during this period.




July 29: Gowon was ousted in a coup led by Brigadier Murtala Muhammad.




February 13: Muhammad was assassinated in a coup attempt. His successor, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, prepared the way for civilian rule.



New constitution and the election of a new president, Alhaji Shehu Shagari.



Shagari was deposed in a coup led by Major-General Mhammad Buhari.



Buhari was ousted in a coup by Major-General Ibrahim Babangida.



Babangida thwarted a coup attempt.



June: Elections took place for a civilian president. Moshood Abiola was the presumed winner, but Babangida annulled the election.



August: Babangida stepped down as president, relinquishing power to an interim government.
November: Nigerian Defence Minister, General Sani Abacha, overthrew the transitional government and banned all political activity.



The Fourth Republic was officially declared on 29 May 1999 when President Obasanjo took the oath of office, thus ending decades of military dictatorship. President Obasanjo's ascension to power came after a national multi-party election was held on 27 February 1999.

The country's economy is one of the most important in Africa. Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing country in the world. Oil makes up 30% of GDP and 90% of foreign exchange earnings and 80% of budgetary revenues.




Recent statistics reveal a GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) of about US\$960. Petroleum accounts for 90% of exports.

The major exporting partners are America (35%); Spain (11%); Italy and France (6%). As of 1998, the country's external debt stood at US\$32 billion.

Nigeria has four military branches: Army, Navy, Air Force and Police Force. The 1999 estimates put military expenditure at US\$236 million.

Affiliation to the following international organisations: United Nations (UN), Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Abacha imprisoned Abiola.

July: Obasanjo and others were sentenced to death in a secret trial. As a result of international pressure, this was commuted to long sentences in October 1995.






November: Writer, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight members of his Movement for the Survival of Ogoni Peoples were hung. The Commonwealth suspended Nigeria, and the United States, European Union and South Africa imposed arms and visa restrictions on Nigeria.

January: Abacha's eldest son was killed and a bomb exploded in northern Nigeria, killing one person.



June: Abiola's senior wife, Kudirat, was killed by gunmen in her car along a Lagos road.

December: Bombs linked to the political crisis blew up an army bus, killing a soldier and wounding many others.

November: Abacha targeted the press. The arrests and intimidation of journalists and their spouses reached new heights.

December 21: Abacha's deputy, Lieutenant-General Oladipo Diya, and ten other army officers and a civilian were arrested for plotting to overthrow the government.

April: All five state-sponsored political parties adopted Abacha as their presidential candidate for the presidential elections in August. General Diya and five other senior officers were sentenced to death by a military tribunal.

May: A total of seven people were shot dead in the south-western city of Ibadan during May Day protests against Abacha.

June 8: Abacha died suddenly of a heart attack.

June 9: His successor, General Abdusalami Abubaker was appointed and made clear his intention to return to civilian rule.


July 7: Abiola died in prison.





February: Presidential elections were held with Obasanjo emerging the victor.

May: The military relinquished power to a civilian government under the leadership of President Obasanjo.



SIERRA LEONE: Impunity challenges the peace

CEDRIC DE CONING

During May, the world was shocked when Sierra Leone rebels killed four UN peacekeepers, and held approximately 500 others hostage. It signalled the death of the Lomé Peace Accord and plunged Sierra Leone back into civil war.

Sierra Leone has become, for many, the symbol of impunity. Rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) have achieved notoriety for their brutal intimidation campaign, which includes systematically and indiscriminately hacking off the arms and legs of innocent civilians, including women and children. Many thousands have also been killed, raped and tortured in the process.

The Lomé Peace Accord rewarded the RUF with amnesty and a power-sharing agreement. The RUF leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh was awarded the powerful position of being responsible for Sierra Leone's mineral resources. However, many commentators believe that he had no intention of allowing his rebels to be disarmed. In what is by now a familiar strategy – Savimbi in Angola; Taylor in Liberia – he wanted to keep his fighting force and diamond territories as a fallback, just in case his political gamble to win the presidency through the ballot box fails. The current crisis was probably sparked off when Sankoh felt he was losing control as UN peacekeepers started moving into the crucial diamond mining areas controlled by the RUF.

The international community was willing to endorse the amnesty-for-peace deal in Sierra Leone, but has now learnt that impunity bites the hand that feeds it. However, the first priority is to prevent another Srebrenica or Rwanda in Sierra Leone. In a move that again proves the delicate relationship between diplomacy and a credible show of force, Britain responded in record time by deploying troops to evacuate their nationals and other expatriates from areas in and around Freetown. London decided, however, to keep the British soldiers in Sierra Leone

for a short period after the evacuation operation ended to strengthen the beleaguered UN force. British advisers have since started training and arming the Sierra Leone Army, and are playing a liaison role between the UN force, the Sierra Leone Army and the British Task Force to ensure a coordinated response to the RUF.

The 'I told you so' brigade was quick to remind us that they had argued all along that the UN peacekeeping force deployed in Sierra Leone was too small and not robust enough for the task at hand. The situation in Sierra Leone is far more complex than is suggested by those advocating more troops. In fact, it is unlikely that the situation would have been any different today if the full complement of UN troops were deployed, or even if double the number of peacekeepers were on the ground. The

UN mission in Somalia serves as a good reminder of what is likely to happen if UN peacekeepers start to use force against one of the conflicting parties. In the eyes of the faction at the receiving end of UN action, the peacekeepers forego their neutral third party role and become an enemy force.

It is up to the UN Security Council to urgently clarify whether it wants the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to continue under its present neutral third party peacekeeping mandate, or whether it wants to change that mandate to an enforcement mandate, under which the UN would

identify the RUF as the aggressor. One problematic factor is that most of the UN troops currently deployed in Sierra Leone are peacekeeping troops, not enforcement or war-fighting troops.

In an ideal world they would be withdrawn and replaced with more robust troops, as was done in the former Yugoslavia when the UN withdrew and was replaced with NATO. There is, however, no political will for a NATO-type force to be established in Sierra Leone at this stage. Consequently, the UN is forced to look at more politically achievable solutions, such as





UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone

creating a temporary international response out of a combination of UN troops, the British Task Force, the potential return of some ECOMOG units and the Sierra Leone Army.

It would appear as if this combination of forces – together with the arrest of Sankoh in Freetown – has persuaded the RUF rebels that their bid to seize power with force has no chance of success. President Charles Taylor of Liberia brokered the release of all the UN peacekeepers by the end of May, despite fears that the RUF may use the UN hostages to demand Sankoh's release.

The RUF still controls much of the countryside and the critical diamond producing areas. It would appear as if Britain and the government of Sierra Leone, with the tacit approval of the UN, have decided to take the war to the RUF. There seems to be two critical requirements for a victory over the RUF: firstly, the government of Sierra Leone would have to take control of the diamond mining areas; and secondly, those neighbouring countries that are supporting the RUF rebels (and who are benefiting from the diamond trade) would have to be persuaded, or pressurised, to stop destabilising Sierra Leone. In the short term, the focus is on training and arming the Sierra Leone Army.

In the longer term, the disarming and hostage-taking of the UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone has, once more, placed the

international spotlight on the apparent shortcomings of UN peacekeeping. In fact, this latest crisis in Sierra Leone occurs at a time when the UN has commissioned a major study of its approach to peacekeeping, as well as the other tools it has to respond to international conflict. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is expected to present a report from a panel of experts to the Millennium Assembly in September 2000.

Another crucial area is to improve the international community's ability to ensure that those guilty of gross violations of human rights and other breaches of international law, will no longer do so with impunity. One of the major objectives of the UN mission in Sierra Leone should be a thorough investigation of the deaths of the four UN peacekeepers, as well as all other atrocities committed after the Lomé Peace Accord came into effect, with a view to collecting evidence for eventual prosecution. With the impending establishment of the International Criminal Court, there is no reason why those responsible for these atrocities should not face justice. Once the Pinochet's and Sankoh's of this world realise that there is no escape from international justice, our world will be a much better place.

Cedric de Coning is Assistant Director and Programme Manager: Peacekeeping at ACCORD. He has served with the UN in East Timor.

AFRICAN PRIVATE SECURITY

PROFESSOR HERB HOWE



Members of the Sudanese Popular Defence Force militia at a training camp in Juba, Sudan

Discussions about 'private security' usually focus on foreign military capability. This disregards – and diverts attention away from – African-originated private security, which has included more personnel for longer periods of time, and has affected African politics much more deeply than the European or American personnel who are more sensationalistic ('the dogs of war'), but often less important than African security.

What Is private African security?

By the use of the word 'private,' I include armed groups who use their coercive power primarily for individual or group gain, rather than for that of the nation. This definition includes some regime-sponsored groups, as well as many insurgent movements.

Private groups connected to the regime usually owe their primary allegiance to non-elected officials, who pursue policies benefiting only a narrow section of the population, rather than all of the country's citizens. These forces are often parallel to the existing armed forces and report directly to the President's office. This crucial division between *state* and *regime* becomes most evident when these 'parallel' militaries defend the regime against the national military, attack regime opponents, or when they drain resources away from the country's armed services. A small number of these forces are private businesses which may use active-duty officers and soldiers, as well as equipment.

Examples of parallel governmental forces include presidential guards, such as Kwame Nkrumah's President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR) in Ghana, Siaka Stevens' Special Security Division (SSD) in Sierra Leone, Mobutu Sese Seko's Division Speciale Presidentielle (DSP), Sani Abacha's Special Bodyguard Service (SBS) in Nigeria, and Omar El Bashir's Popular Defence Force (PDF) in Sudan. Their popular nicknames are evidence of their primary identity with the ruler: Stevens' SSD was known as 'Siaka Stevens' Dogs,' and a Kenyan unit popularly became 'Moi's Old Men.' Regime-sponsored militias include Rwanda's notorious

Interahamwé, or Congo's *Mayi-Mayi*. Private security companies closely allied to the government include Alpha-5 and Teleservices in Angola, Kampala-Saracen in Uganda, and Osleg (a mineral marketing company) in the Congo.

Several units are well-armed or noticeably large: Samuel Decalo, author of numerous works about African militaries, stated that Kenya's General Services Unit (GSU) was 'capable of defeating the entire army by itself.' The Rwandan government's infamous *Interahamwé* contained 15,000 men.

Why does 'private' government security exist?

A basic dilemma between military capabilities and political loyalty has encouraged rulers to form these essentially private forces. Many presidents understandably fear a capable force's ability to mount military coups: some 90 coups, as well as numerous attempts, have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa since 1963. In some cases, a new ruler has successfully 'ethnicised' the country's military by populating it with his own tribesmen: the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia, under President Samuel Doe, proved a leading example during the 1980s. In other cases, leaders have curtailed their militaries' operational capabilities by restricting ammunition, fuel or spare parts (Sierra Leone's Siaka Stevens limited each soldier to one bullet *annually*), or with training expertise (Mobutu deliberately hired trainers from numerous countries, so that units would have different skills and equipment).

With regard to Uganda's Milton Obote, Decalo observes that by 'using classic 'divide and rule' tactics, he [Obote] appointed different foreign military missions to each battalion, scrambled operational channels of command, played off the police against the army...encouraged personal infighting between his main military 'protégés,' and removed from operational control of troops, any officers who appeared politically unreliable or too authoritative.'

Insecure rulers have parallel forces for several purposes. Firstly, they protect the ruler against domestic unrest, especially coup attempts: for example, Kenya's GSU stopped the attempted takeover by the airforce in 1982. Their well-armed presence supposedly lessens actual coup attempts. Secondly, some parallel militaries perform domestic violence, for which the regime can deny official responsibility. This is especially true with state-sponsored militias. Thirdly, some of the parallel forces are commercial companies and, although they may use governmental soldiers and equipment, they primarily pursue economic gain.

Several rulers have recently used their forces regionally for economic gain. A leading example of 'military mercantilism' occurred when several regimes intervened in Congo's war to pursue economic gain. Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) provided significant weaponry and manpower to Laurent Kabila. This led some Zimbabweans to adopt a quasi-mercenary attitude when arguing that 'for what we went to do in Congo, we should be paid, and the only fair way to be paid is in business.'

The war has benefited Zimbabwe's regime and private citizens, but has generally hurt the state. Zimbabwe's Billy Rautenbach has become Executive Chairman of Gecamines, Congo's major mining company. Several Zimbabwean generals have gained lucrative contracts, passing some of them onto

friends and family. Zimbabwean and Congolese officers have established a mineral marketing company called Osleg to market gold, diamonds, and cobalt obtained by the sheer might of their military presence. Zimbabwe's economy has suffered what Zimbabweans term 'the Congo effect,' as government spending shifted from domestic social needs to military spending: international experts believe Zimbabwe's 10,000 man presence in Congo is costing the country more than a third of a billion US dollars annually.

Ugandan officers and politicians have gained handsomely from their country's expensive Congo operations. Ugandan newspapers report that 'the illegal trade between [Uganda's] Entebbe and Kisangani, Congo's third largest city, is monopolised by senior army officers who deal in salt...beer...electronics...[and] timber...', and suggest that two air charter companies owned by General Salim Saleh may be smuggling goods between Entebbe and Kisangani – a suggestion supported by US government officials. One intelligence official confirmed the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force has brought back significant amounts of gold, diamonds, and other resources for Ugandan export. In addition, several Ugandan military officers have apparently gained from contract kickbacks and acquired access to mine production in the Congo. Military mercantilism may increase and destabilise various African states, while profiting individual government officials.

Are they helpful?

Such private security arrangements may benefit individual rulers, but they usually hurt the state. Regarding the Congo intervention, Professor John Makumbe, from the University of Zimbabwe and local director of Transparency International, argues that 'it won't be Zimbabwe as a nation that benefits. Instead, a number of individuals in the political elite will enrich themselves.'

Parallel forces anger the state's existing military because of the president's implicit vote of no-confidence, as well as their freedom from the militaries' normal chain of command and their preferential access to equipment. Resulting military resentment has prompted coups and undercut the stability justification, a major argument for such forces. Ghana's armed forces claimed Nkrumah's creation of the POGR was a major reason for its 1966 military coup. 'We were also aware that members of the [POGR] were receiving kingly treatment,' Colonel A.A., a leader of the coup, recalls. 'Their pay was way higher and it was a known fact that they possessed better equipment. [They] no longer owed any allegiance or loyalty to the Chief of Defence Staff, but to Kwame Nkrumah.' Some Sierra Leone officers bitterly resented the paramilitary Kamajors. The first action of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, upon seizing power in May 1997, was to try to abolish the Kamajors.

Parallel forces weaken the military's professional capabilities by their siphoning of equipment and personnel, and by their often-inferior training. *The Economist* Intelligence Unit writes of 'an uneasy relationship' between Sudan's national military and President Bashir's Popular Defence Force, 'not only because ill-trained conscripts to the PDF are often a liability on the battlefield, but also because they act as informers to the

NIF [National Islamic Front government].’ Uganda’s officially-retired General Salim Saleh owns about 30% of the private security firm, Saracen-Kampala, and he has used governmental resources for his company. Several years ago, for example, he had some 500 active-duty soldiers seconded to his company.

Regime-sponsored militias can create more hostility against their government. When compared to the national armed forces, they usually lack discipline, have less training in universally-recognised rules of war, and are often forced to forage for themselves. Writing generally about such militias, Juan Linz, an expert on civil-military relations, noted that ‘the government is faced with a serious loss of legitimacy...when [it] allows organised groups with paramilitary discipline, whose purpose is to use force for political ends, to emerge in the society. These groups are more prone to abusing civilians, which may play into the hands of the insurgents by increasing anti-government feelings. Such groups are likely to become more and more autonomous, [and may even] develop their own ideology and purposes.’ The *Interahamwé* was Rwanda’s leading genocide shock force in 1994. Gerard Prunier, author of *The Rwanda Crisis*, describes numerous Rwandan *Interahamwé* and *Impuzamugambi* as ‘a lumpenproletariat of street boys, rag pickers, car-washers, homeless and unemployed. For these people, the genocide was the best thing that could have ever happened to them.’ In other words, the economy of war is better than no economy at all.

Non-accountability and the protection of the president’s office, aids dubious activities by some presidential guard units. Steven Ellis, co-editor of *African Affairs*, writes that in Chad ‘the Presidential Guard and its Zaghawa associates are actively engaged in operations best described as predation.’ Western observers believe that Guinea’s presidential guard, the Red Berets, may have smuggled diamonds from Sierra Leone during the late 1990s.

Insurgencies and private gain

Insurgencies are increasingly pursuing private economic gain. Ideology often spurred the liberation struggles of southern Africa during the 1970s, whereas ‘warlordism,’ and the use of rebels to achieve private gain, has flourished during the 1990s. For example, Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou see ‘a direct relation between strategies of war and armed struggle, and the sale or distribution of drugs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and to a lesser extent, in Chad, Rwanda and Burundi.’

Another example is Angola. Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA ran what *Africa Confidential* terms ‘the world’s largest diamond smuggling operation [in Angola] between 1992 and 1998.’ UNITA may have accounted for 75% of Angola’s total diamond production, and it reportedly availed itself to one hundred thousand miners in 1996. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) held onto most of Sierra Leone’s diamond-producing areas during 1998 and 1999, and moved several million dollars worth of diamonds into Guinea and Liberia for eventual sale in Europe. The rapidly increasing phenomenon of targeting relief groups, is partly explainable by the groups’ expensive, but undefended resources: foreign exchange, communication equipment, motorised vehicles and personal belongings (stereos, cameras...), which can act as a potent recruiting appeal. In April 1996,

insurgents in Liberia seized relief supplies valued at \$20 million.

Some observers of the warlord phenomenon, such as Christopher Clapham, editor of the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, note the economic gains of insurgency, and then wonder whether insurgent leaders believe ‘such states are worth capturing at all.’ Other observers acknowledge this possibility, but conclude that such leaders may gain some international (mostly economic) advantages by securing *de jure* political rule.

Economic gain encourages insurgencies to flow across borders and destabilise other states. ‘Warlord rulers and their allies [also] disrupt authority in other states,’ notes William Reno. ‘They ignore the significance of frontiers if they obstruct efforts to control markets, clandestine or visible.’ Charles Taylor assisted the RUF of Sierra Leone to gain diamond revenue for himself and his associates.

Economic gain for both sides, rather than political resolution, may prolong some wars. This has often been suggested about the Angolan struggle, where Savimbi gained some four billion dollars from diamonds and Angolan officers gained significant profits from weapons purchases: a pro-government newspaper in late 1999 reported senior officers received \$320 million in commissions. Heike Behrend, professor at the University of Cologne, notes that the Ugandan government’s struggle against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) ‘became a business which was more profitable than peace. They [the government and the LRA] thus developed an interest in keeping the war going, and extending it to other areas, such as Rwanda or Zaire.’

Conclusion

The use of security forces for private gain will likely continue as long as African states have non-representative governments. Accountable political systems place some checks and balances upon the privatising of a country’s military, and its possible deployment overseas. Some governments have realised this – Nigeria is a case in point. The Nigerian military became increasingly unprofessional under successive despotic governments (officers paid more attention to business than military affairs, and no unit larger than a company received any field training between 1996 and mid-1999). The military’s deployment in Liberia and Sierra Leone under ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group) generally failed militarily, and its sometimes larcenous behaviour helped ECOMOG gain the informal title of ‘Everything Covered or Moveable or Gone.’ The democratically-elected Olusegun Obasanjo, who gained office in 1999, has worked hard to ‘re-professionalise’ the military (including the removal of some 200 poorly-regarded officers, and the acquisition of western advice). The country’s new constitution also places strong restrictions upon any regional deployment of the military. However, until such accountability occurs, narrowly-based African regimes will continue to call upon domestic, as well as foreign private security groups, to protect their interests.

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VIGILANTES, CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES AND MILITIA GROUPS

The other side of the privatisation of security in Africa

DR. COMFORT ERO

Much has been said about the involvement of private out-of-state actors, from outside the continent, in African wars. In this article, however, the focus is on vigilantes, civil defence forces (CDFs) and militia groups as aspects of the privatisation of war and the security debate in Africa. In essence, this article is concerned with indigenous, private self-defence units that provide security and engage in warfare on the continent. These groups are mobilised to defend their communities against violence, but as is discussed, they are also complicit in much of the violence and armed internal conflicts, causing massive loss of life and widespread damage.

Private out-of-state actors

Briefly speaking, private out-of-state actors have played a significant part in contemporary African warfare. They are not specific to Africa, as the Balkans bears testimony, nor are they a phenomena of this age. In Africa, these private out-of-state actors gained prominence in the 1960s. Then they were labelled mercenaries or 'dogs of war.' The activities of the often quoted Bob Denard, 'Mad' Mike Hoare and Jacques Schramme set the scene for perverse and insidious characters to engage in civil war conflicts at the request of a particular warring faction. Apartheid South Africa also exported various mercenary forces, either to destabilise those who challenged its existence, or to exacerbate tensions in other war zones.

In contemporary world affairs, these mercenaries have assumed a corporate identity, and in the process, acquired the more sophisticated and glamorous title, private military companies (PMCs). The posting of activities on internet web pages has added to this corporate identity. The London-based Sandline International, for example, parades its *raison d'être* quite eloquently at <http://www.sandline.com>. These PMCs claim to be

cost-effective and with the vacuum left by international peacekeepers, notably in Africa, they argue that they are a necessary option for maintaining peace and security. African leaders need to quell the tide of conflicts that threaten their leadership, and some African leaders regard PMCs as able and willing forces in the battlefield. However, the resumption of civil war in Angola and Sierra Leone – countries where PMCs were deployed – exposes the limits of their involvement in civil wars.

The debate about whether or not PMCs should be involved in Africa's wars still rages on, and no satisfactory answer offers a solution to respond to their presence. There are others well versed and deeply ingrained in the debate, who lay out the pros and cons of whether PMCs should be involved in internal conflicts, so I will now turn to a more compelling and possibly dangerous tide in Africa's security dynamics.

The militianisation of war and security in Africa

Some analysts have defined this compelling tide as the 'militianisation' of Africa's war, and also by extension, Africa's future security apparatus. In essence, the discussion in this article is about the presence of vigilantes, CDFs and militia groups, not just in Africa's wars, but in security-related matters. These actors are part of the African landscape, but again, they are not distinctive features of contemporary security and warfare in this part of the world. Colombia, Sri Lanka, Cambodia and the islands of Indonesia have their own story to tell about local militia groups and CDFs. The first thing, however, is to explain how they have come about, and how they fit into the discussion on the privatisation of war and security in Africa. Within this, a definition or classification, as well as examples of their activities, will offer clarification on the various dimensions of these groups.

In order to define and understand vigilantes, CDFs or militia groups, it is imperative that one understands the social context

that gives rise to these forces. Without wanting to generalise, one thing seems apparent in several African societies – law and order has broken down entirely in certain societies, even in those we label as conflict-free zones. Civilians are increasingly the victims of armed robbery, harassment, theft, thuggery, rape and other unspeakable offences. Civilians are also suffering from the indiscriminate use of force. Violence and criminality, sometimes leading to armed internal conflict and eventually open warfare between state and society, has marred numerous regions on the continent. On the West African coastline, the Niger Delta (Nigeria), Liberia and Sierra Leone societies have witnessed the indiscriminate use of force against citizens. Further south, violence and internal armed conflict have gripped citizens living in Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

States, or more specifically, the regimes and rulers of these states are often the sources of violent and criminal behaviour, meting out summary beatings or using force arbitrarily against citizens who protest or show opposition to the regime's policy. The state's security apparatus, namely the police, are often complicit in the violence, and also in looting and extorting goods from citizens. In essence, they inflict rather than protect their population from criminality and violence. In other instances, state security forces are unable to respond to outbreaks of violent behaviour. Sierra Leone, Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC have one thing in common – conventional state security structures have been in decay for several years. In addition, the lack of training and effective management have undermined their capacity to respond to violent disorder in their societies.

The daily task of living has become unbearable for many that see security, or the idea of living in a secure area, as a priority. In several of these societies, populations are growing frustrated at the violence that threatens their daily lives. Their response is to search for security from outside the formal security structures of the state. For the ordinary citizen, creating a defence mechanism against insecurity has become a necessity and not an option. Often, the answer has been to create private self-defence units. Thus, we have the era of vigilante groups, CDFs or local militia groups – alternative strategies to survive the daily violence that their public servants exact or fail to prevent. The willingness of these groups to use force against force, or to fight in war zones, marks a dangerous phase in Africa for citizens who are not only deciding to abdicate from the state, but who are also adding to violence in already volatile environments.

Vigilante groups

Let us begin with vigilante groups, for they are far easier to explain, and the societies from which they arise are not usually in a state of warfare, but do have serious problems in managing internal security. Take South Africa, for example. South Africa is unusually placed in this article, for most of the countries discussed here are facing armed internal conflicts. Yet, South Africa is an important example, for it explicitly demonstrates how vigilante groups have risen not only as alternative security structures to the state, but also as additional threats to law and order.

Vigilantism is not specific to South Africa, or Africa on a

whole. The Guardian Angels were exported to Britain from the United States in the 1980s to arm citizens with extra security where the police were said to be failing to protect the population. However, they received a muted response. Citizens in the United States, finding themselves targeted by criminals and armed robbers, created their own private security apparatus to defend their lives and property.

South Africa has also seen a growth in vigilante groups due to increasing crime waves, caused primarily by poverty and unemployment. South Africa is challenged by two basic facts: the country has high crime waves and with it, an unresponsive, inefficient and ill-disciplined police force. In 1999, the brutal, corrupt and incompetent practice of some South African police officers came under fire after a damning exposure from the lens of cameramen working for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

Since its second post-apartheid election victory in June 1999, the ANC government of President Thabo Mbeki has tried to address the problem of poor policing by creating a new squad of policemen known as the Scorpions. Set up in July 1999 within the office of the national prosecuting authority, its main brief is to tackle crime. The Scorpions are part of the ANC government's attempts to seriously address criminal and violent behaviour. The fact that it was established outside the police services, adds to the growing problems of police reform in South Africa. The police force is going through a crisis of confidence that could adversely undermine internal security. In May 1999, the South African Police Service released new statistics that showed 74 members of the 120,000-strong police force were killed in the first half of 1999.

The inability of South Africa's police units to effectively stamp out criminal behaviour, has led to the development of civilian-based security organs, aimed at tackling crime and violence in their own provinces. In a previous issue of *Conflict Trends* (Issue 4, 1999), Marlene Roefs drew a distinction between law-abiding self-defence units, or 'popular justice' organs, and radical vigilante groups prepared to use force to respond to rampant criminality affecting mainly urban communities. Vigilante groups such as Pagad (People against Gangsterism and Drugs) reside at the extreme end of the anti-crime organisations in South Africa. Based in the Western Cape, with units in KwaZulu-Natal and other provinces, Roefs noted that Pagad's radical stance makes 'it difficult to distinguish between criminals and victims.' What should make the situation of private self-defence units less worrying in South Africa, is that the country is not in the midst of a civil war or armed conflict.

However, Pagad is not just a vigilante group set up to address criminal disorder. Some South Africans also regard Pagad to be a political organisation hostile to the ANC government, both because of its failure to combat crime and because it sees the ANC as primarily promoting black interests, and not those of Coloureds or Indians. The danger, as Pagad has demonstrated, is that vigilante groups are able to transform themselves into politicised groups that can fuel political violence. Between 1998-1999, Pagad attacked local ANC leaders and activists reportedly involved in organised crime and corruption. Throughout 1999, Pagad activists allegedly carried out bomb



South Africa: Muslim militant members of PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs)

and gun attacks, not only wounding locals, but also Western tourists. Pagad has shown its capacity to destabilise an entire region, but has also successfully competed with the police to tackle law and order.

The presence of vigilante groups in South Africa is mentioned only to highlight the problems that occur when weak and ineffective internal security structures are unable to impose a semblance of order, even in stable and conflict-free environments like South Africa. A harsh reality that has confronted post-apartheid South Africa is that promises of tougher police policies have continually been challenged by growing violence and criminal behaviour. Rather than rely on state security to provide an answer, groups of citizens are likely to continue creating vigilante units. It is not inconceivable that the spate of vigilantism could develop into full-blown violence, thus fuelling further public tension. The easy access to firearms has also heightened the danger of violence in several provinces of South Africa, thus increasing the perception that the country continues to be a battle zone for vigilantes and criminal gangs. Added to this are the continuing social and economic tensions which could produce unnerving levels of violence in South Africa.

While vigilante groups like Pagad are confined to a limited space in the south of the country, their links with political and destabilising violence also illustrates the problems posed by supposedly privately run self-defence units. Other parts of Africa have, however, shown the dangers posed when private self-defence units, political violence and civil wars become inextricably linked.

Civil defence forces

CDFs are, in essence, substitutes for conventional defence forces. These forces are not new features in the African landscape. Take, for example, the CDFs in Sierra Leone – Kamajoisia (Kamajors), the Tamaboro and Kapras. The CDFs were part of the traditional defence structure which stemmed from the pre-colonial period in Sierra Leone. CDFs or traditional militia hunters and warriors, as they are usually known, are common to most African societies. Their function in the pre-colonial and colonial period was to provide communal


policing and defence. Heroism and bravery were trademarks among these hunter groups when defending their communities against potential enemies. These militia hunter groups are usually structured around the ethnic identity of their community. The Kamajors from the south are comprised of the Mende, in the north-east and south-east, while the Tamaboro and Kapra are drawn from the Temne, Konos and Kissis. CDFs swear allegiance to their communal or tribal leaders, or civilian patrons.

It is the involvement of the CDFs, notably the Kamajors during the eight-year civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-1999), that provokes necessary debate about the indigenous aspects of the privatisation of security in Africa. The CDFs were a response to immediate local security dilemmas spurred by the war. When war began in 1991, they mobilised communal forces to support the army in defeating the main rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). By 1998, these militia groups had virtually supplanted the remaining elements of the army, and became key in reversing the RUF and dissident elements of the Sierra Leone army – the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which led a coup in May 1997.

After a general breakdown of civil authority and law, and with the presence of a depleted state army and ineffective Sierra Leone Police (SLP), the CDFs claimed to be filling in the vacuum to protect citizens from the brutality of the RUF/AFRC war campaign. In a sense, their response was ‘a plague on both your houses’ – to the RUF and AFRC, for their brutality, and to the Sierra Leone army, for failing to protect the population.

The involvement of the British-based PMC, Sandline International, is often cited as the most controversial aspect of Sierra Leone’s civil war. This is primarily because of claims that the British Labour Government privately sanctioned their involvement in the civil war. While critics of PMCs protest about their presence in civil wars, CDFs pose many similar problems by using private and unaccountable security structures to bolster the fortunes of a weak government. The links between the Kamajors and their self-styled paramount chief, Sam Hinga Norman, raised questions as to their future role in the security apparatus of post-war Sierra Leone. Sam Hinga Norman has been Deputy Minister for Defence since the election of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in February 1996. Rather than push for peace to end the conflict, the presence of CDFs exacerbated and prolonged the conflict before a peace agreement was signed in Lomé, Togo, on 7 July 1999.

The use of CDFs in the civil war ensured political violence and partisanship continued to plague Sierra Leone. The CDFs contributed to the general chaos in Sierra Leone through looting, rape and terrorist attacks. In addition, the CDFs inflicted widespread atrocities and reprisal attacks against those suspected of supporting the RUF/AFRC, participated in extracting mineral resources, and fought for control of the informal and clandestine trading networks around the mining regions. Reports emerged that a large shipment of 5,000 arms with ammunition were provided to the Kamajors to use against the RUF/AFRC. When fighting resumed at the end of 1998, it was mainly between the Kamajors and the RUF/AFRC. The Nigerian-led West African intervention force, ECOMOG, aided the Kamajors by training them for aggressive combat.



L: Armed Kamajor 'traditional hunters' protect their homelands from RUF rebels and the Sierra Leone military. R: Sierra Leonean soldiers patrol the diamond rich cities of Bo and Kenema during recent clashes between the army and Kamajor 'traditional hunters'

As a consequence of their efforts to protect the Kabbah regime since 1996, the Kamajors expect to receive substantial reward. This will inevitably mean that old style patrimonial politics, which plagued the country since independence in 1961, will continue to reign over the socio-political life in Sierra Leone. Their total allegiance in the face of a decaying and disloyal army, meant that President Kabbah was prepared to defer the future of post-war security to the Kamajors. However, primarily because of their distrust of the army, the CDFs are unlikely to form part of any national army in post-war Sierra Leone. More worrying, as the disarmament process is demonstrating in Sierra Leone, is that the CDFs are not prepared to turn over their weapons, thus challenging attempts to control and monitor the flow of weapons in Sierra Leone. Some of the CDFs question why they should give up their arms, when their prime purpose is to use them to protect their communities in the face of rebel attacks. Their *raison d'être* is to protect their community – it is a survival strategy.

Their brutal campaign during the war has virtually given them the status of a private militia army in several parts of the country. This, however, poses a central challenge, not only because they rule by near autonomy and also appear out of control, but also because they are able to recruit forces to join in political violence and instability. More worrying, as was demonstrated throughout the war years, is that they can successfully recruit and arm youths to inflict damage throughout regions, especially in the southern and eastern areas, against populations still suspected of supporting the RUF.

Yet, their association with Hinga Norman and, by default, the government of President Kabbah, ensures that they maintain a visible presence, offering private security based primarily on tribal or regional affiliation. While their original involvement in the war was essentially to defend their communities, one of the

most bitter observations is that they were successfully mobilised by government forces to use extreme coercion to fight against rebel forces. In the end, they are part of the political problem confronting Sierra Leone. The heavy reliance of the Kabbah administration during the war, inevitably challenges and undermines programmes aimed at restructuring Sierra Leone's armed forces in the post-war climate.

Party militia groups

The link between militia groups and politicians can also be seen in Congo-Brazzaville, where militia rivalry has taken on violent proportions in the country's political life. While the war rages on in the DRC, hard core militiamen backing various political leaders continue to spread violence in the neighbouring state of Congo-Brazzaville. It is apparent that three militia groups (the Ninja, Cobra and Cocoye) have been at the heart of major political violence, first from 1993 to 1994, and again since 1997. All three were created to serve as the private armies of the country's main political leaders: President General Denis Sassou Nguesso, Pascal Lissouba and Bernard Kolélas. Politicians recruited, trained, and provided their militia groups with large stocks of weapons. Young people were initiated into political violence and the result has been devastating for the population of Congo-Brazzaville.

Those in the government were previously rebels, and vice versa. General Denis Sassou Nguesso ousted President Pascal Lissouba in October 1997, with the military assistance of the Angolan government and his Cobra militia force. The brutal military tactics of the Cobras have been achieved through the mass killing of youths thought to be potential guerrillas. Lissouba and his rebel militia group, the Cocoye (also called Zoulou), are now fighting in the bush. However, Nguesso's power-base is highly fragile, and is largely dependent on his

militiamen and the Angolan military.

Together, the armed forces and rebel militia groups have committed an equal amount of atrocities against a population that has quickly abandoned its villages. As in Sierra Leone, the various militia groups lack any discipline and have been accused of widespread human rights abuse against unarmed civilians. About half-a-million people have been made homeless and been forced to live deep in the jungle, while weapons continue to flow into a country that is fast becoming another graveyard on the continent. Many young militiamen were also heavily involved in the looting of commercial goods in Brazzaville, and other parts of the country.

Government and rebel forces signed a peace agreement in the port of Point Noire, Congo-Brazzaville's base for the offshore oil industry which funds the present government. In December, the government passed an amnesty bill in parliament for rebel militia groups, but not for their political leaders, Pascal Lissouba and the former prime minister, Bernard Kolélas, who was ousted in 1997. Yet, the Cobra militia group continues to mount attacks against Sassou Nguesso political opponents. The militia groups of Congo-Brazzaville are a serious threat across the country, and without a resolution to their extreme acts of brutality, it is difficult to foresee an end to the instability plaguing the country.

The entrenchment of the militia, notably in Congo-Brazzaville, has been fuelled by several factors, which include worsening socio-economic conditions, widespread unemployment and political upheavals stemming from the failed promises of democratisation. Anarchy reigns over the south, where armed gangs have used the government's inability to control violence to terrify the population, causing more to flee further in the jungle. A 1999 UN report spoke of a whole generation of youth who have resorted to a life of plunder and extortion, and suggested a bleak outlook for the country.

Soldierless wars in Africa

The number of militia groups fighting in Africa is an indication that the continent's wars will, in the future, be 'soldierless' – wars fought by groups that are provided with a soldier's uniform, but who lack basic military training and a knowledge of the rules of war. These militia groups are made up of irregular guerrillas who shift from using the most basic weaponry (e.g. cutlass or machetes), to handling sophisticated and conventional war machines. The brutalising aspects of militia wars were clearly exposed in Rwanda, when the Hutu government of President Juvenal Habyarimana mobilised forces into the extremist Hutu *Interahamwé* militia group to carry out the genocide of April 1994 with the former Rwandan army, Forces Armées de Rwanda (ex-FAR). Once in exile from Rwanda, the *Interahamwé* continued to operate from various bases in central Africa, but in particular the DRC. The destabilising effects of the extremist *Interahamwé* group can be seen in the outbreak of internal and regional conflict in the DRC. The *Interahamwé* became instrumental in helping DRC President Laurent-Désiré Kabila in his war against the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition.

It is likely that militia groups will continue to grow and serve as alternatives to state armies and police forces, and may also

continue to provide an extra security force for African leaders, as is the case of President Charles Taylor's militiamen, the Special Security Unit (SSU) in Liberia. To an extent, what we are witnessing is the militarisation of the society, where the instrument of coercion is not just in the hands of national militaries, but has gradually filtered down to diverse groups who have private and destabilising agendas. This phenomenon constitutes a great threat to long-term peace and stability on the continent, but their presence is inevitable in environments where the militaries are often beset with internal divisions and factional fighting, as is the case in Sierra Leone. Leaders in search of regime survival are more likely to create private forces that can protect their regimes. The presence of militia groups serve to exacerbate ongoing conflicts, but they are also evidence of a dangerous phase in the annals of power politics in Africa, in that leaders will go to any lengths to maintain their grip on the State House.

Concluding remarks

Should anyone be alarmed by the diversity of the local militia groups and CDFs that are involved in conflicts? As stated before, there is nothing wrong with the idea of wanting to create a secure environment and South Africa, despite the aggressive stance of vigilante groups like Pagad, highlights the importance of setting up self-defence units when conventional security agencies seem incapable of dealing with serious crime waves. Vigilantes need to be understood differently, and were only used to illustrate one face of private self-defence units in Africa.

However, a more serious concern, and one which raises similar dilemmas and controversies as those surrounding the involvement of foreign PMCs like Sandline, is the growth of CDFs and local militia groups on the continent. Firstly, they are operating in highly unstable social and political environments. These groups are active in murky arenas, where states are ineffectual and unaccountable. Secondly, is the link between local militia groups, politicians and individual makers of wars: the 'big' or 'strongmen,' or to use the popular euphemism, the 'war-lords' who are able to recruit armed wings or private militias, and train them in extreme coercion to inflict damage throughout society, as in Congo-Brazzaville.

Much more research needs to be done about the role of CDFs and local militia groups in war zones, with particular focus on their modus operandi, objectives, backers, constituency, structure and line of command. Alongside the issue of whether foreign private military companies should be involved in conflicts, local militia groups that evolve or are set up essentially for the private ends of some political leaders, cannot lay the basis for lasting peace in war-torn African states. Just as some of us criticise PMCs for exacerbating conflicts through misguided interventions, the same charge can be levelled against indigenous private structures, especially if these structures are later transformed into the national armies of several states, as is happening in Congo-Brazzaville.

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Africa's security in the new millennium

State or Mercenary Induced Stability?

EMMANUEL KWESI ANING

The growing importance of private security companies (PSC) and their role in the conflicts of the developing world (Angola, Bosnia, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone), are steadily becoming central to contemporary analyses of transformed mercenaries in African conflicts. This has resulted in a growth of literature on the privatisation of security, both at national and regional levels. While diverse definitions of what constitutes privatisation have been offered, in this paper, privatisation of security is situated within the broader discussion of rolling back the African state. This encompasses state policies and an involvement in the diverse social, economic, and security activities of the 1980s. In spite of discussions to minimise the role of the state in security issues, post-independence African politics has almost become synonymous with the group of non-state actors who, in popular parlance, are characterised as mercenaries. According to Laurie Nathan, they are soldiers hired by a foreign government or rebel movement to contribute to the prosecution of armed conflict – whether directly by engaging in hostilities, or indirectly through training, logistics, intelligence or advisory services – and who do so outside the authority of the government and defence force of their country.

If suspicion characterised the activities of these unattractive and shadowy figures during the Cold War, the situation has dramatically transformed since 1990. Gradually, mercenaries have moved from the periphery of international politics into the corporate boardroom, and have almost attained legal status. This has been achieved through two mutually reinforcing dynamics: firstly, their participation in and increasing control over a complex web of legitimate economic activities in which they now form an integral part; secondly, the expanding

demands for mercenary services by legitimate governments, as well as the collaborative ventures with regional security organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone. Until recently, only the turbulent attributes of their operations occupied the public mind. Now, however, the networks of intricate corporate financial deals, that give such activities a veneer of respectability and credibility, are coming to the fore.

Mercenary activities in Cold War Africa

Thus far, the historicity of the mercenary has been established, as well as the archetypes that exist. One case of mercenary activity that attained publicity, and contributed more than any other to the negative perception of these sub-state actors, was the case of Congo-Kinshasha (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in the early 1960s. Situating the rise of vagabond mercenaries within the context of Congolese independence is critical for several reasons: firstly, their recent actions represented their re-entry into contemporary politics of post-independence African states; secondly, they have re-emerged in the 1990s in a more vicious, efficient and endemic manner; thirdly, their operations are habitually presented in the international media as settling knotty security issues which African states are incapable of resolving; fourthly, the perception that they rescue European humanitarians assisting disaster victims, and who themselves, have become casualties in the irrational disorder of African politics, has become a fixture in the media. Finally, their supposed superior military know-how and presumed understanding of their area of activity, added to their oft-vaunted expertise and effectiveness, have also become a seductive aphrodisiac to African rulers, rebels and observers alike.

Changing perceptions and post Cold War re-definitions

What dynamics and processes have resulted in the contemporary credibility given to mercenary activities? How have public and international perceptions changed to reflect the new prominence given to corporate mercenaries? A point of departure in this paper, which stands in sharp contradistinction to the mainstream arguments concerning mercenaries, is that the transition to the corporatisation of mercenary activities should be located earlier than 1990. A critical question that deserves to be probed is why the pre-1990 attempts at enabling market dynamics to determine the securitisation of African issues failed? Two mutually reinforcing dynamics were at play then: firstly, the bipolar nature of international relations. During this period, the shadow of bipolarity impacted on conflicts in Africa in different ways which, by extension, came to have a proxy character; secondly, bipolarity established a spurious sense of ethics and morality in international relations that continued to be informed by the disreputable notion of mercenary activities, despite the privatisation thereof.

The paper argues that the interconnectedness reflected the transformation of mercenary activities away from the previously disorganised individual actions of vagabonds, into legitimate departments of blue chip companies. To appreciate how these transformations occurred, certain multiple logics that prevailed in such circumstances need to be comprehended: firstly, in the unpredictable political milieu engendered by the end of the Cold War, several highly skilled military specialists were made redundant and disengaged into an unsuspecting free market. They were keen to continue using their military skills to fight foreign wars; secondly, in an increasingly globalised world, the ability of capital and other transnational sub-actors to move freely – especially when ensuring natural resource exploitation, capital investment and political protection for the maximisation of resource and capital – was seen in a positive light; thirdly, the world was witnessing what William Reno described as the privatisation of war, or privatised peacekeeping in the promotional material of Executive Outcomes (EO).

EO, Angola and the corporatisation of mercenaries – coming in from the cold?

The increasing perception that PSCs can and do provide state stability through competitive tendering is winning an impasse. EO argues that it compete[s] in an international market and therefore [its prices are those] applicable to the market within which it operates, [as compared with] MPRI, Vinnell, Sandline

and Betac. Accordingly, the company's wide range of services is presented as a cost effective and realistic appreciation of its expertise, as compared with what can be provided by the UN. Yet another group, the Military Professional Resources Incorporated of the US (MPRI), claims to be the world's greatest corporate military expertise outfit – capitalising on the experience and skills of America's best seasoned professionals.

In EO's promotional material, it claims to provide a highly professional and confidential military advisory service to legitimate governments, by rendering sound strategic and tactical advice. It simultaneously furnishes the most professional training packages available to armed forces. Such services include clandestine warfare, armoured warfare, and combat air patrol.



Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers protect citizens in Liberia

By examining the career trajectories of EO officials, this paper puts into proper perspective, what it considers as EO's misinformation propaganda. Eeben Barlow, the former leader of EO, has had a long experience of misinformation propaganda and counter-intelligence experience. During the apartheid era, he served with the Directorate of Covert Collection and the Civil Corporation Bureau (CCB) in 1989. As its Director of Operations in Europe, he used phantom companies based in Cyprus and other European countries for his activities.

Yusuf Bangura has recently argued that the closing years of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic increase in new modes of conflict. According to Bangura, 'the narratives or doctrines of the major world powers no longer define the ideologies and objectives of warring groups.... In countries that are rich in natural resources, such as diamonds, gold, timber, agricultural produce, drug-generating plants, and oil, the political goals of war often interact with the multiple logics of resource

appropriation, the drugs trade, the looting of private property, and vandalism.'

These wars defy ideal typical notions of modern warfare. Although Bangura's argument deals with warlord activity, the analysis has wider analytical and empirical utility if one substitutes warlords with transnational sub-actors, of which corporate mercenaries are one. The supposed irrationality of contemporary civil war is due to the complicated interrelationships of resource allocation, exploitation and the presence of corporate mercenaries. However, how does one untangle the complicated web of corporate finance, military adventurism and regime security in Africa? Part of the shield of international respectability and decorum that cloaks modern day mercenary activities in Africa and elsewhere, should be seen within the struggle of market forces over strategic spaces, especially those containing mineral resources like gold, diamonds and oil. The privatisation of security issues followed a lack of response by African governments to the demands of Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1980s, which unleashed market forces in several African states. Subsequently, the privatisation of state activities were seen in the context of effectiveness, rationalisation and rolling back the state. An essential part of these processes argued that specific aspects of state security could be better provided through privatisation and sub-contracting. Thus governments, in carrying out unpopular macro economic policies, either reduced or totally removed subsidies to which the military, among others, had become accustomed. Sceptical of the loyalty of these forces, and in conjunction with their external partners, some African governments (especially in Sierra Leone) found new and innovative means of utilising the services offered by the new security consultancies that had multiplied in the post Cold War era. The rationale for state implementation of such dubious strategy is strongly supported by Herbert Howe, who specialises in the privatisation of armed conflict in Africa. Howe has argued that by employing private security firms, the US gets the best of two worlds: it obtains influence at less political and economic cost.

Towards an international compliance regime?

Implementation of the constitutive principles and norms under the OAU Convention against Mercenaries will be difficult, if not impossible. This is because its drafters, unable to use the rich history of the continent's experiences with the incidences of mercenary activity in Angola, Benin, Congo and Guinea, only conceive mercenary activity as enduring due to its use of illegitimate actors. Presently, with the change in the international system and the increasing perception of legality and credibility surrounding corporate mercenaries, such activities can only be controlled through the goodwill and decency of individual governments.

Even this slim hope is already being undermined for two major reasons: firstly, since 1990, most of the daring mercenary actions in Africa have occurred under the legitimate purview of sovereign governments like Angola and Sierra Leone; secondly, the far-reaching tentacles of corporatised mercenary activities and their impact on the legislative processes, even in countries prepared to tackle this problem, are not fully realised. As part of

EOs propaganda to legitimise its activities, it claims that during the legislative discussions towards the enactment of the Bill on the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance (B54-97), the South African parliament unwittingly incorporated 28 of the 36 proposals presented by EO into the bill. According to EO, it participated in this process because of the company's dedication to ensur[ing] that proper legislation was drafted for the regulation of Foreign Military Assistance. Encouraging as the South African action is, its impact is limited in two main ways: firstly, the Bill seeks to ban South African citizens from participating in such mercenary activities. The immediate effect of this would be minimal because about 70% of EO operatives are de commissioned and underpaid mercenaries from African and European countries; secondly, there is the need for a change in perception from African leaders, and the larger international community, regarding the employment of mercenary services. This is because in situations where regime interest and security are considered more important than international ethics, enforcing the above international conventions or following the South African example would be difficult.

Conclusion – whither African security towards the millennium?

What implications does the Sierra Leone example have for mercenary induced stability, and the prospects for eliciting international compliance with regulations against mercenaries? The cycle of violence unleashed in Sierra Leone, compounded by EO and Sandline International activities, will probably continue in the foreseeable future. The combination of corporate mercenary activities in Sierra Leone and the successful, but incomplete, restructuring of the political space for the reinstated Kabbah government, have worsened the recurrence of widespread poverty, social fragmentation and the criss-crossing refugee movement in Sierra Leone. As mercenaries come and go, the destructive forces of a violent culture unleashed in the countries where they operate, do not simply disappear with them. In many cases their presence actually proliferates and worsens the underlying causes of instability, affecting communities with rising levels of violence. The ongoing cycle of violence in Sierra Leone is only one example of the disorder and insecurity that takes place when unresolved societal, economic and political problems mix with the presence of corporate mercenaries.

Such a situation has thwarted the consolidation of a fragile democracy in the country, endangering the reconstruction and reconciliation process in war-torn Sierra Leone. Similarly, it has succeeded in impeding social and economic progress, and has unravelled the few accomplishments prior to their arrival. The introduction of corporate mercenaries into the socio-economic and political equation in Sierra Leone, has created a volatile situation which only supports the dire warnings that West Africa, especially Sierra Leone, will be the locus classicus of Afro-pessimism superficially coined as 'The Coming Anarchy'. In most conflicts there is a heart of crisis, in which the signs of an emergency are most viable. In West Africa, this centre point of emergency has moved temporarily from Liberia to Sierra Leone, with the potential to move to Guinea, Senegal or Guinea-Bissau.

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Write a Cheque, End a War

Using Private Military Companies to end African conflicts

DOUG BROOKS

Have mercenaries become Africa's best hope? From a professional military perspective, African wars can speedily be ended – either through armed peace enforcement or through outright military victory. Private companies can provide post-conflict security, offering a window of peace for political negotiation, state building and democratic change. In addition, they can do it faster, better, and much cheaper than the United Nations. All it takes to end Africa's most enduring wars is a small, but willing chequebook.

We exaggerate the military complexities of African conflicts: professional soldiers can easily bring peace to Africa. African wars are characterised by comparatively small, lightly armed, undertrained, and poorly managed armies. Once a political decision is made to end a war, by either imposing a peace or by choosing sides, it is then a relatively simple task for professionals to do the actual military operation. Private Military Companies (PMCs) can assemble the small professional armies, trainers and equipment necessary to end the conflict in a remarkably short period of time, and they can do it at a very affordable price.

PMCs are clear about their abilities and capabilities. Time and again they have encouraged international oversight of their operations. Once a war has been ended by the PMCs, then international organisations such as the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), or a more regional organisation such as ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), can step in to work out the political solutions for a durable peace. PMCs can continue to provide long-term security, allowing reconciliation and state building to take place. This is not a flight of the imagination; this is a workable solution to Africa's seemingly intractable wars. We have few alternatives in Africa. However, using PMCs does require a basic moral reassessment about mercenaries. By using private armies, we can end the slaughter of Africans.

Reality check

PMCs have proved their ability to end wars. The much maligned South African PMC, 'Executive Outcomes' (EO), actually brought two African wars to an end, and they did it cheaper and

faster than would have been possible using multinational organisations. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG (the Cease-Fire Monitoring Group of ECOWAS) spent hundreds of millions of dollars over several years, losing a war that EO had won in ten months for only 35 million dollars. Before that, in Angola, the UN spent 1,5 billion dollars in its failed attempt to solidify a peace under the Lusaka Protocol that EO had created in a year's fighting, for only eighty million dollars. In both cases, the PMC had done the hard combat, but the subsequent peace was lost because the international organisations were unable to provide the effective post-conflict security necessary to establish a long-term settlement. In both cases, EO (or another PMC) could easily have continued to provide the necessary security that would have permanently ended those wars.

Obviously, PMCs have distinct limitations. From a political perspective, African conflicts are complex and nuanced. It is unrealistic to expect PMCs to solve the larger political issues. A PMC can stop the killing and provide the essential window of peace that will allow reconciliation, and free and fair self-determination. State building should come from multinational political organisations with established political legitimacy. Ultimately, only Africans can provide the enduring political solutions to Africa's seemingly endless wars.

Nevertheless, of all the tools currently available to end organised African violence, only PMCs are capable of quickly bringing peace to the African continent. They should not be dismissed as mere 'mercenaries.' They have proven their ability to push low-intensity conflicts to settlements, and they have shown their willingness to enter seemingly intractable conflicts, where Western powers dare not tread. They have a unique and remarkable ability to act as a force multiplier, working with local forces and nullifying problems of scale. PMCs can be used to pacify areas of ethnic tension, provide peacekeeping services, oversee truce monitoring operations, protect NGO programs, undertake humanitarian rescue operations, and if necessary, even conclude wars decisively.

While the principle of self-determination is a keystone of international order, in Africa, the principle has been undermined and distorted beyond recognition. Too many of Africa's

governments have gained political control through foreign meddling, superior firepower, and butchery. The world stands by and watches while ruthless insurgents take control of African governments as a result of their terror against citizens. Similar to 'donor fatigue,' the increasing reluctance of the First World to use military assistance or intervention to right wrongdoings, means that Africa can look forward to even more governments being founded on firepower instead of freedom. Unwilling to stand up to warlords or offer the necessary military commitment to back up their threats, the international community can only watch glumly.

In the meantime, the UN is sponsoring an ongoing peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, and African leaders have been demanding an even more ambitious mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Sierra Leone has been problematic, with rebels refusing to disarm, and intimidating and robbing UN forces of even their armoured vehicles. The number of peacekeepers was increased to more than 11,000 by February 2000, but the success of the mission is still doubtful. For the DRC, suffering from a much more complex conflict, a UN peacekeeping mission – or more correctly, peace enforcement mission – would require a much larger, more robust, and (hopefully) more competent force. The DRC is almost 33 times larger than Sierra Leone, with ten times the population! The breathtaking scale of the project will require some creative solutions to avoid a long, gigantic bloodbath.

Most African states simply do not have the military resources and capability to end the conflicts on the continent. Even with logistical support from the UN or Western militaries, few states are capable of providing robust peacekeeping forces, much less attempting complex and difficult peace enforcement. Regional organisations like ECOWAS and SADC have attempted to create military wings more capable of successfully carrying out the necessary military missions. However, undesirable results in Sierra Leone and Lesotho demonstrate the current limitations of these organisations. South Africa's army, perhaps the highest quality military on the continent, is still suffering transitional pains from the apartheid force it once was. Its intervention in neighbouring Lesotho was just one sign of how far it must go, before it is again a viable force that could be useful and effective for external operations. With few exceptions, African militaries suffer from training deficiencies, strategic inadequacies, and a poor understanding and regard for the rules of war and human rights. In countries suffering from war, civilians cannot tell the difference between the opposing forces when all sides murder, rape and loot with impunity. In addition, African militaries are all too often used by imperial presidents and warlords as a means of personal enrichment. They are hardly the ideal tool for bringing peace to Africa.

Failure of the West

But what are the other options? Despite its current world dominance, the West has shown great reluctance to send its own militaries to Africa, especially after the tragic results of the Somalia intervention. The United States continues to enjoy its status as the world's sole superpower, but is reluctant to use its own military might for humanitarian or peacekeeping efforts in Africa, this despite Nelson Mandela's recent personal plea for US involvement in DRC peacekeeping. In previous humanitarian

interventions, Americans have been stung when their involvement inevitably raises cries of 'neocolonialism' and 'imperialism', no matter how benevolent their intentions. To maintain the political viability of an operation, the US military is compelled, by domestic opinion, to avoid casualties at all costs, which means its tactics rely on minimum risk through maximum firepower – hardly ideal procedures in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. As for other Western militaries, it was painfully revealed in Kosovo, that most Western nations have let the militaries atrophy to the point where few are capable of expeditionary operations without substantial American military and political support.

One answer is to create a Western-trained and equipped, pan-African military force. For example, the Americans are working with African states to create a more effective African military force through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). They are training units from a number of African nations to work together, using standardised equipment and tactics provided by the US military. Human rights and a concern for civilians are key aspects of the training. Eventually they may be able to assemble a viable and useful force for smaller interventions and peacekeeping, but the reality is that even the ACRI is years away from achieving the needed potential. Western support for ECOMOG and SADC (Southern African Development Community) military organisations can only help, but it is unlikely that regional military organisations will be able to successfully undertake complex missions in the immediate future.

This leaves Africa with few realistic options for ending its wars, and this is where PMCs can offer new and useful alternatives.

Practical matters

How do we ensure that PMCs do what they are supposed to do, and behave the way we want them to behave?

Again, it is important to differentiate PMCs from freelance mercenaries: PMCs behave like normal companies. Their primary motivation is long-term profit, and they are constrained by domestic and international laws. Freelance mercenaries are motivated by short-term profit or adventure. They are often stateless and show little regard for rule of law. These differences are critical.

PMCs engage in operations in a similar manner to other industries. Before undertaking an operation, PMCs do a feasibility study to determine requirements and costs. The client sets the terms of contract – and they are free to include requirements such as transparency, humanitarian needs, legal recourse and issues of chain of command. PMCs are profit-making entities, and will factor any desired requirements into their cost proposals. Promoting competition would be essential in order to spur the PMCs into offering the best combination of services. Therefore, a number of PMCs would be asked to bid on a conflict and present their proposals. The state or organisation sponsoring the PMC would select a company based on merit of proposal, reputation and cost.

Since mercenaries have been legal pariahs for so long, it is important to boost the confidence of all actors (ahead of an operation) by establishing a legal framework for handling liability, criminal behaviour of employees and grievance procedures. Ideally, there would be no cause for legal cases, but PMCs are often criticised due to their seeming immunity to legal challenges. They often work for weak states that are loath to risk losing the

security provided by the PMCs, and are thus willing to overlook isolated criminal acts. While PMCs are generally subject to the laws of their home countries, legal challenges have been rare. Such a legal framework would help legitimise the operations of PMCs and encourage cooperation by actors who have previously shunned private soldiers.

When drawing up guidelines, it is important that PMCs be allowed a good deal of latitude in their operations. The key to their rapid and cost-effective operating procedures is their ability to innovate solutions, and use clever techniques, to overcome problems that state militaries would find insurmountable. The initial contract should only provide a framework in terms of goals, and spell out a list of acceptable and unacceptable techniques. Basic humanitarian principles and international laws of warfare are sacrosanct, but military operations need creativity for the greatest degree of success. Therefore, strategy and tactics should be innovated by the PMC, with minimal interference by political bodies. Once the decision has been made to use private force to end a conflict, the operation should be allowed to proceed with all haste to be most effective.

International oversight of PMC operations is critical for all parties concerned. Observers should be present at all phases of PMC operations to ensure the contract is followed, the laws of war adhered to and humanitarian standards maintained. Observers would also add their legitimacy to the undertaking. PMCs have already indicated their willingness for experienced military observers to accompany them on their missions. The British PMC, Sandline International, produced a document that stated:

Very few PMCs would object to the attachment of an observer team deployed alongside them in the field. This team would work in the same way as the referees at a football match, ie: not interfering with the action, ensuring their own personal safety by avoiding being hit by the ball (or a player), yet having the authority to caution participants if they are in breach of the regulations. Clearly, the analogy is not ideal as, in the case of PMCs and their clients, there are lives at stake and it would be hard to imagine an observer carrying sufficient weight to ensure the removal from the field of personnel who break the ground rules (eg: the terms of the Geneva Convention). However, the PMC would be fully cognisant of the fact that their actions were being constantly monitored and would not want to be banned from 'playing in another game' in the future or, perhaps, find themselves in front of an international tribunal.

The reports of the observers would ensure that the mission was progressing satisfactorily, that the laws of war were being scrupulously followed, and that the PMC took appropriate action against employees and companies that deviated from accepted norms.

Moral dilemmas

The greatest obstacles in using PMCs to end African wars are moral. Many African leaders have condemned mercenaries and attempts to outlaw them have been festering in the UN for years. Certainly, the old-style freelance mercenaries have deserved much of the condemnation. Few would wish to defend the actions of the infamous mercenaries of the 1960s and 1970s, who engaged in indiscriminate killing and looting in Africa. It would also be fair to question their military effectiveness in many instances.

Nevertheless, the modern PMCs have very different motivations and much greater professionalism than the old freelance mercenaries, and it would be wrong to ignore their potential.

PMCs cannot be morally worse than the armies of untrained conscripts and children who are so characteristic of modern African conflicts. It is no accident that African wars kill, proportionately, more innocent civilians than any other conflicts in modern history. Too many African wars are older than their participants. Thus, promises to address 'underlying causes' and political grievances have had little impact in persuading the combatants to lay down their weapons. Political solutions to these seemingly endless conflicts will only work when backed by a credible force. In Africa, only PMCs are willing and truly capable of providing such a credible force.

It is easy for academics to take the moral high ground and condemn PMCs, while ignoring the potential that they could bring peace to Africa. But it is reprehensible to insist that African wars can only be ended by complex, long-argued multinational conferences and discussions. Such questionable moral stances are costing the lives of thousands of Africans. It is not worth it. Let the PMCs end the wars and provide post conflict security. Once the violence has ended, then bring in the African solutions to solve the underlying political problems. The real moral debate should not be whether to use mercenaries in Africa or not. It should be why we have not used them thus far.

Conclusions

Africa has the military capability to sustain endless wars, but lacks the military capability to end them. Calling for 'African solutions to African problems' makes sense only when the capabilities are available for the solutions. With the reality that the West is reluctant to commit its militaries, the only way Africa is going to acquire the military capability to end its many conflicts is to contract the services from elsewhere. Fortunately, these private services are readily available at a remarkably affordable price. Unfortunately, misplaced morality has thus far ensured that the services are not utilised, and that the wars continue for bloody year after bloody year.

Ultimately, for all our talk about the theoretical niceties of 'state sovereignty' and 'self determination', we cannot stand by idly while Africans are butchered in the hundreds of thousands. Multinational peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions have been a terrible disappointment on the continent, and current calls for more such missions promise further disappointments. We have to recognise the limitations of the militaries that are asked to do these difficult tasks. Then we have to find militaries that are capable and willing to do what needs to be done to end the violence. Private militaries are the best hope for millions of Africans trapped in the deadly cycle of warfare.

While some still argue whether private militaries should even be tolerated, the key debate has moved from questioning their existence, to exploring their utility and means of regulation. PMCs have become permanent fixtures of the post Cold War era and it is a horrendous tragedy that we are NOT using this willing resource to bring peace, stability, and political freedom to the African continent. All it takes is a willing chequebook, and a small one at that.

Keeping the NEW DOG OF WAR on a tight leash

Assessing means of accountability for Private Military Companies

PATRICK CULLEN

Academic interest in the subject of mercenaries has traditionally been limited for a number of reasons. For the most part, scholars have assumed that mercenaries have gone the way of the Barbary Pirates and dueling: that they have largely been removed from the international scene altogether. Another reason is the fact that many academics find the subject matter distasteful. Coverage and criticism of the activities of men, such as Gilbert Bourgeaud (alias Bob Denard) and 'Mad' Mike Hoare, were therefore left to the popular media. Moreover, since this mercenary activity was relatively marginal in absolute terms, and since the sensationalised exploits and misadventures of these men had been roundly criticized, there seemed to be no reason to engage in academic inquiry or debate.

However, the re-emergence of mercenaries in the form of private military companies (PMCs) in the post-Cold War security environment, is pushing a small, yet passionate and expanding debate, regarding the nature of these companies and the activities they engage in. Criticism has come fast and furious from a variety of directions. Newspaper and magazine articles with titles like 'Diamond Dogs of War' and 'Have Gun, Will Prop Up Regime,' led the charge by instantly capitalising on the headline grabbing activities of PMCs such as Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International. However, as the coverage has begun to expand in form from investigative reporting to longer term, qualitative analysis of these companies, a

debate has developed between those who, broadly speaking, advocate the benefits of PMCs and those who seek to eliminate them from the international scene altogether.

Critics argue these PMCs are little more than a slick re-packaging of the old right wing, reactionary mercenaries who sought to undermine African states newly liberated from the yoke of colonialism. They claim that while these PMCs may have traded in the 'wild geese' image for mobile phones and corporate websites (and have even traded the term 'mercenary' for the more innocuous acronym PMC), these military entrepreneurs are a threat to human rights, and constitute the vanguard of neo-colonial economic exploitation. As a result, many have made it their mission to expose PMCs as a major threat to the sovereignty and independence of developing nations. To this end, they have attempted to document human rights abuses committed by these companies, reveal and highlight their hidden links to oil and diamond mining concessions, as well as point out the dangers that they see as inherent to the outsourcing of the security function of the state.

Others, however, have taken a more benign view of these companies, claiming that PMCs can have a positive role in the African post-Cold War security environment. Advocates of PMCs, contrary to their critics, see a strong distinction between these companies and the mercenaries of yesteryear. They argue these private military companies have a corporate nature, carefully screen and select their employees from a large pool of

available recruits, and maintain a strong interest in positive public relations that can serve as a major constraint on potentially negative behaviour. Proponents of PMCs dismiss attempts at the elimination of mercenaries as utopian, and argue in favour of the international community's positive engagement with these companies in the form of recognition and legislative regulation.

In particular, PMC accountability has emerged as one of the major issues in the debate regarding the relative merits and disadvantages of these companies. Contrary to some of the more ideologically inspired opinion pieces on the subject, PMCs are neither totally accountable nor unaccountable for their actions. Much of the problem regarding the analysis of PMC accountability has been caused by the conflation of accountability with legitimacy. The two are analytically distinct and need to be treated as such.

Accountability is primarily an issue of oversight and control. While democracy has convinced most of us that accountability is also a political good, combining the two analytically – especially if we ignore certain types of accountability when we perceive it as illegitimate or insufficient – is inherently problematic. While this article will attempt to outline the shortcomings of PMC accountability in the world today, it also seeks to outline the various ways in which states and the global market contribute towards PMC accountability.

PMC accountability operates within a spectrum of technical and practical, as well as formal and informal, modes of accountability. A common criticism of PMCs is that they effectively have three different masters: their home government (the country they operate from and have connections with), their host or employing government, and the market. Yet it is this very triad of interests that can provide us with an effective framework for understanding the different forms of accountability that a PMC is forced to operate under.

Home state accountability

The home states of PMCs effectively have two methods of exercising accountability over these companies. The first is the formal and technical means of domestic legislation. The United States, for example, monitors the activities of PMCs based in its territory via the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). This requires PMCs that export arms or military related services, to register with the US government and receive a license for each contract. In 1998, South Africa, another major supplier of PMCs, passed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance

Act in an effort to regulate the provision of foreign military services along the same lines as the United States. The United Kingdom has also taken a step towards regulatory legislation regarding PMCs – largely in response to the 'Sandline Affair,'

instigated by the British PMC Sandline's involvement in an alleged breach of an arms embargo in Sierra Leone – by planning to release a Green Paper on the subject of mercenary regulation later this year. Domestic legislation, however, can fail to create a successful measure of formal accountability if it does not carefully deal with the problematic definition of a mercenary. This is a problem characteristic of even the most recent legislation, such as that passed by South Africa.

A great amount of attention, on an international level, has already been paid to similar shortcomings of such legislation regarding PMCs. Again, this has to do with the largely ineffective legal definition of what constitutes a mercenary. As a result, attempts at international legislation, such as: (1) Article 47 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions; (2) the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa of 1977; and (3) the United Nations International Convention against the

Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 1989 (which is yet to be ratified), have fallen short of practical effect. At a political level this can also be explained by the fact that the international community simply does not want tough legislation on this issue, with both strong and weak states often preferring to keep this private military option open for future availability. This is quickly illustrated by the fact that many of the signatories of the OAU convention have, since signing, actually hired mercenaries themselves.

The second form of accountability utilised by the home governments of PMCs, while informal in nature, is perhaps in many ways more influential than formal, legal methods of accountability. It consists of the myriad networks between the PMCs, and the military and intelligence services of their home states. Advocates have argued, for example, that the privatised patriots that comprise or control Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Vinnel and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) – some of the largest American PMCs that have also been regarded as vital to the



Left: Head of Executive Outcomes, Eeben Barlow



Above: British mercenary, Tim Spicer, head of Sandline International who provided arms, manpower and military expertise to Sierra Leone

implementation of US foreign policy, by proxy, in places like the former Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia – will not seek to take on jobs with foreign governments disapproved of by the United States. While this in turn has raised concern regarding those who wish to see formal US accountability, it did not bother the Bosnian Foreign Minister who hired MPRI, not in spite of, but rather because of, the implicit ties MPRI has with the US military. Media coverage confirming British government links to Sandline's 1997 operation to re-instate the democratically elected Tejan Kabbah to power in Sierra Leone, indicates that British PMCs have the same informal relationship with their home government as American PMCs have with the US government. This is corroborated by Sandline's website, that states they try to keep their activities broadly within the scope of approval of 'key western governments.'

However, there is evidence to suggest these informal methods of oversight have not always worked as efficiently as PMC advocates have, at times, implied. For example, it was reported that Sandline had made plans to sell arms to the Kosovo Liberation Army, and had to be informed by the British Foreign Office that this was not acceptable. It was also reported that MPRI had requested a license to assist President Mobutu in 1997, but this was denied by the US State Department. If informal oversight had done its job, one could argue these actions would not have happened in the first place. Moreover, reports that two other American PMCs – AirScan and Ronco – have been involved, respectively, in supplying arms to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army rebel group and breaking a UN arms embargo in Rwanda (the latter with unofficial Pentagon approval), call into question US capability to control American PMCs, and the utility of the Arms Export Control Act to monitor their activities.

The difficulties of accountability/oversight in the form of informal connections between the PMC and its home state, become even more pronounced when a government is somewhat weaker and has a problematic relationship with a PMC. For example, the South African government largely tolerated the emergence of Executive Outcomes as an almost wholesale privatization of certain apartheid-era elite battalions. Tolerance was demonstrated mainly because EO offered a convenient way to employ potentially dangerous elements within the state during the fragile transitional period to democracy, rather than out of a calculated foreign policy. The kind of trust implicit in the relationship of the United States with MPRI was lacking between EO and South Africa, and helps to explain why EO decided to end operations a few months before the new South African legislation regulating PMC activity was to take effect. Without strong PMC and home government links, one cannot assume any real degree of home state accountability of PMC activity via informal oversight.

Host state accountability

One of the most commonly overlooked aspects of accountability by critics who claim PMCs operate within an 'oversight vacuum,' is the legal accountability of the hiring state. Host states are often formally accountable for the activities of the private military companies they hire. In order to avoid any potential

legal difficulties, a host state will often officially enlist PMC soldiers into the state's armed forces for the duration of the contract. For example, Sandline's contract with Papua New Guinea (PNG) revealed that all Sandline personnel would be granted status as 'Special Constables' in order to legally perform their roles. Any human rights abuses committed by a PMC employee, under circumstances such as these, would therefore technically be held accountable to the PNG government and treated in the same way as if committed by a regular PNG soldier. A PMC, operating as a deputised member within the armed forces of a host country, would also be formally accountable to the national law of that country. In the case of Sandline's PNG contract, adherence to 'the laws and rules of engagement relating to armed conflict' were also specifically mentioned.

However, this formal/legal mode of host state accountability, may at times find itself reduced to a mere technicality, given the nature of the relationship between a host state and the PMC it hires. Legal and technical accountability are not the same as practical oversight, and the fact that a PMC is able to transport men and material across national boundaries without passport or customs controls, is a severe curtailment of a state's ability to effectively monitor the PMC it hires. Moreover, a weak state that hires a PMC, while technically accountable for its actions, may not be in a powerful enough bargaining position to enforce this accountability in the form of punitive sanctions against the PMC. It is debatable, and perhaps doubtful, whether a PMC would even allow its employees to be tried in a weak state's judicial system, if such a violation were to occur. A weak state may also be forced, out of strategic necessity, to overlook human rights abuses committed by the PMC in its effort to complete its military operation in the most efficient manner possible. For example, the introduction of indiscriminate weapons, such as the devastating fuel-air bomb (that has an indiscriminate one mile kill radius) used by Executive Outcomes in Angola, did not elicit a response from the government. The problem of accountability becomes an even greater concern when the host state government itself condones, or even encourages, violations of human rights. When Valentine Strasser's government of Sierra Leone heard that EO pilots were having difficulty distinguishing between civilians and rebels through the thick canopy jungle, the government ordered the pilots to shoot everyone.

Market constraints

The third mode of maintaining accountability, in the most informal sense, is through the constraints of self-regulating market mechanisms. PMCs have often dismissed accusations that they would work for 'rogue' governments, prolong conflicts for financial gain, work for two warring parties simultaneously, or commit heinous human rights abuses, by referring to the constraints of the market. A PMC that intentionally prolonged a conflict for financial gain would, it is argued, hurt its long-term financial interests, as future contracts would be lost. The same argument applies to the threat of working for both sides of a conflict at the same time – the loss of credibility would hurt the PMC's ability to garner future contracts. Also, since the future of PMCs seems partly dependent upon the acceptance of these companies as legitimate by the international community, the

importance of their public image forces them to obey principles of human rights. There is evidence to suggest PMCs do self-regulate as a response to 'market pressures' incurred in the form of international concern over human rights abuses. Executive Outcomes seems to have learnt through negative publicity generated from their earlier operations in Angola, resulting in a much better human rights record in Sierra Leone. Sandline has even made public overtures for the creation of an international body that could regulate the activities of PMCs, and hence legitimise their activity.

However, whatever ability the market may have to create an atmosphere of self-regulation, and a degree of PMC accountability, one can readily find examples of its failure. Executive Outcomes' alleged role in the former Zaire is particularly worrisome, because it provides a direct rebuttal of the arguments in favour of market regulation. According to reports, Eben Barlow, former director of Executive Outcomes, stated explicitly in 1997 that EO would not work for the Zairian government, since Zaire was supporting hostile acts against its employer at the time, Angola. Barlow also pointed out that the government of Zaire was 'politically suspect' and that if EO became involved with this state, they would lose general credibility, as well as its contracts with Angola. Nevertheless, and totally contrary to the logic of the 'market constraints' argument, Executive Outcomes appears to have contacted President Mobutu for work. In this instance, the accountability supposedly offered by market constraints failed – Mobutu turned down Executive Outcomes, not the other way around. According to various sources, other South African PMCs, such as Stabilco and Omega Support Ltd., found themselves negotiating contracts on opposite sides of the civil war between 1996-97. In this situation of Stabilco negotiating with Mobutu, and Omega working with Kabila, any semblance of market accountability was reduced to absurdity.

While analyzing PMC accountability in terms of formal and informal state control is rewarding, this approach does not have the flexibility to account for one potentially disastrous trend that is developing in Africa: namely, the joint ownership of PMCs with the governments of weak states. Many states have legislation that limits the ability of a foreign owned PMC to operate within their territory for extended periods. However, a PMC may set up a subsidiary within that country to provide its services. Such was the case with Defence Systems Limited (DSL) in Colombia, when it created the subsidiary Defense Systems Colombia. For its African contract in Angola, DSL operated in much the same way, until it was ejected from the country by the government. While this action was explained in terms of illegal dealings by DSL, it appears that the real motivation for the removal of DSL was to eliminate its competition with other PMCs jointly owned by key officials in the Angolan military and government. The two PMCs involved, TeleServices and Alpha 5 (allegedly created in partnership with Executive Outcomes and Angolan Chief of Staff, Joao De Matos) are reported to have a near monopoly of the private security market in the oil and diamond producing areas.

At best, we can interpret this as a case of corruption – given the anarchic nature of much of the state – on the part of Angolan

government officials who recognise a need for PMCs in Angola, and have decided it is better to control these companies (while simultaneously making a huge profit) by ownership, than leave them in foreign hands. At worst, it constitutes PMC compliance at the beginning of the disintegration of the public/private distinction within Angola, and the potential creation of a veritable private kingdom controlled by a partnership of foreign PMCs and Angolan strongmen, masquerading as rulers of a state that effectively no longer exists.

Conclusions

Unfortunately, attempts to increase formal accountability via international legislation will remain problematic. States – both weak and strong alike – simply do not want to limit their ability to hire mercenaries, or PMCs, when it suits their needs. Domestic legislation, if written in a legally effective manner, can have, and has had, a significant effect on the monitoring of PMCs. Yet reports of PMCs, such as Ronco violating a UN embargo by supplying arms to the US allied Tutsi government in Rwanda, reveals the difficulties of implementing effective legal restrictions in the face of state acquiescence. From this example, it seems we can expect a state to use domestic legislation to limit any PMC activity it finds politically incompatible with its foreign policy goals, yet may simultaneously ignore its own legal oversight of these companies when it suits its purpose. The fact that the US Congress has given broad leeway to the executive branch, regarding the technical aspects of AECA implementation, may serve as a case in point. However, as the public storm that was created in Britain during the Sandline Affair reveals, any strong state that does not tread carefully in its relationship with private military companies, may face a huge political backlash.


Consequently, the accountability of private military companies seems to rest on the ability, both of the PMC's home and host states, to implement various formal and informal constraints. The nature of PMC accountability, as outlined in this essay, is largely tied to the informal networks that a state has with its PMC. Where these links are strong, as in the United States and Britain, a large amount of informal accountability exists. Where they are weak, as in South Africa, the government will have much less control over the activities of these companies. Most important, however, is the strength of the actual state itself, rather than the strength of the links with these companies. The United States is qualitatively in a much stronger position to exert control over its PMCs than is South Africa, where reports of PMCs continuing to illicitly support UNITA rebels, abound. While the host state employing the PMC is often legally accountable for the PMC, we have seen how this can be reduced to an unenforceable technicality due to the host state's weakness, and its fundamental reliance on the PMC for military support. If the international community fails, as it has thus far, to create effective international law regulating PMCs, accountability of PMCs will be left to the formal and informal devices of the individual state. ▀

BOOK REVIEWS

SEARCHING FOR PEACE IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

EDITED BY MONIQUE MEKENKAMP, PAUL VAN TONGEREN AND HANS VAN DE VEEN, (1999), EUROPEAN PLATFORM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND TRANSFORMATION IN COOPERATION WITH ACCORD, THE NETHERLANDS, 528PP

Reviewed by Roland Henwood, Lecturer: Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa



This innovative book is one about conflict prevention and peace building in Africa. It is a survey of the specific activities of conflict prevention and management in Africa. It is not an analysis of conflict as such, but is aimed at providing information on conflict, its management and peace building. In this sense, it is a hands-on analysis and explanation of developments on the African continent. It also focuses attention on the 'good

news': what good has been done, and what good can be done, to solve the dire problems and consequences of conflict in Africa. The book, *Searching for Peace in Africa*, consists of three sections. These include the following:

The first part is an introduction entitled Reflections, which aims to contextualise conflict in Africa. This section includes five chapters and explains developments in Africa that may influence the thinking on conflict management and prevention on the continent. It contains sections which focus on the meaning of the African Renaissance, the discourse on war in Africa, the analysis of conflict, the prevention and resolution of conflict, as well as a chapter dedicated to the networks of peace building that are developing across Africa.

Part two is entitled Surveys of conflict prevention, and represents a sub-regional approach to conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. The focus is on 31 violent conflicts which are covered regionally in North Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa.

This section is very interesting and has been structured in a logical and friendly-to-use way. All the chapters in part two follow the same pattern, and this contributes to the usefulness of this book. In essence, the analysis on each of the sub-regions

start with two introductory chapters to contextualise the most recent developments and issues particular to that conflict/s and region. A country-by-country analysis and explanation on the history of the conflict follows. The dynamics of that conflict, the conflict management process and multi-track diplomacy in the internal and external environments, as well as the prospects and recommendations for conflict-resolution in each case, are also discussed.

Part three is entitled Directory and contains the profiles of 120 African and international NGO's. They are all role players who are actively involved in conflict resolution and peace management on the African continent. The organisations in this section are identified as those with a focus and involvement in Africa, and those with an involvement in a particular country. The section includes a brief description of the focus and activities, as well as contact details, for each of the organisations.

Searching for Peace in Africa also contains a number of very useful appendices. These include a listing of internet web sites on conflict and its prevention, a selection of newsletters and journals, a selection of literature on conflicts and an index of organisations.

Another interesting feature of *Searching for Peace in Africa*, is that it is available on the internet through the website of the European Centre for Conflict Prevention. This publication is also an ongoing process, as it will be regularly updated. The publishers invite interested parties to submit new and relevant information, and to make proposals to ensure the publication remains up-to-date and valuable.

In my mind this book cannot be, and does not attempt to be, the final word on conflict in Africa. Instead, it serves as a tool to inform and empower those who involve themselves with the issues of conflict prevention and management in Africa. As such, this publication is not aimed at a limited readership. It aims to reach a broad and diverse group of practitioners, scholars, students and anyone else who is interested in the topic. The difficulty is to provide value to such a diverse readership. *Searching for Peace in Africa* does achieve this objective, as it covers the relevant issues sufficiently. It is informative to those who have insufficient knowledge and understanding of conflict in Africa, and is specific enough to serve as a source of information and act as a link to other relevant sources, thus it is of value to the needs of more specialised users too.

One of the important advantages of this book is that it is based on the insights and experiences of people who are actively involved in peace building and peace management. From a practical point of view, one must accept that a book such as *Searching for Peace in Africa* cannot be all-inclusive. Thus, some aspects that may be expected, will not be found in this publication. However, the book follows an easy-to-read format and layout. It includes an index on organisations, but unfortunately


does not include a general index of the book's content.

The next edition will be eagerly awaited, as it may address some of the issues raised and should include a number of important new developments that influence the search for peace in Africa.

PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: AFRICAN PRIORITIES FOR THE UN MILLENNIUM ASSEMBLY

EDITED BY P. MATHOMA; G. MILLS AND J. STREMLAU,
SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS (SAIIA), 2000, PP.129

Reviewed by Senzo Ngunane, Research Officer, ACCORD



The twenty-first century, Africa's 53 countries stood out as the stage of unending conflict, where death and poverty became the order of the day. Visuals of malnourished Angolan children show the result of an ugly civil war; thousands of human skeletons exhumed after the Rwanda genocide, which was all due to the politics of identity; and civilians with amputated limbs in Sierra Leone – all these

images and many more will forever serve as a reminder that the twenty-first century was not kind to Africa.

Perhaps it was for this reason that leading African politicians and intellectuals did not hesitate to declare that the twenty-first century should be an African century. This assertion was borne out of a realisation that much of the damage and human suffering imposed upon African people was a result of human activity, and could therefore be resolved. The question is what can Africa expect from the new millennium? What should African leaders prioritise, or how should they conduct their activities to ensure that the twenty-first century, is indeed, an African century?

The book, *Putting People First*, goes some way to provide answers to these questions. The book consists of eight chapters and is a collection of papers delivered at a conference organised ahead of the UN Assembly. The theme of the conference was African priorities for the UN Millennium Assembly.

The chapters cover broad, but interrelated themes, beginning with John Stremlau's *Putting People First: Priorities for Africa in the New Millennium*, where it is argued that the UN Assembly should afford African leaders an opportunity to bring to the fore issues that focus on a people-centred approach to security, development and human rights (p.1). The second chapter, on *Global Realities and African Priorities: A View from South Africa* by Greg Mills, offers an excellent discussion of the differences between the old and new world orders, or what he

terms an old and new environment. The chapter highlights important facts and figures about the world in general, and Africa in particular, thus making it highly informative and very interesting to read. Ogaba Oche's chapter on *Human Security: An Agenda for the new millennium*, correctly argues that conflicts in Africa have become intra-state in nature, and civilians have increasingly become victims. This is one of the reasons why people, and not the state, should be the reference point when it comes to security.

The problem surrounding African states is also dealt with in the chapter entitled *Nations, States or Nation-States*, by Abdoul Aziz M'Baye. Apart from attempting to outline the difference between a 'State' and a 'Nation,' the author goes even further and suggests that what Africa needs are stronger regional structures in order to allow cooperation to flourish when facing the challenges of the states. In chapter five, Shadrack Guto discusses *African State, Human Rights and Refugees*, and vehemently opposes the view that re-drawing African (colonial) borders could help reduce conflicts on the continent. Guto holds the view that boundaries throughout the world are not natural, but have a historical construct forged through a process of struggle and conflict, and are therefore bound to be arbitrary.

The chapter by Shyley Kondowe on *Sovereignty, Intervention and Democratisation in Small African States*, criticises the concept of sovereignty in as far as it serves to protect African leaders and states that have consistently failed to serve as 'protectors' of their subjects. In this vein, Kondowe holds the view that international intervention in such cases is necessary, and that civil society needs to be empowered in order to play a meaningful role in challenging such leadership.

The penultimate chapter by Paul Omach deals with *Domestic Factionalism and Internationalisation of Conflicts in East and Central Africa*. The chapter is very interesting in that it successfully indicates how a conflict in one country leads to destabilisation in another. The problem of spillover effects is not necessarily limited to east and central Africa. In fact, the entire continent faces this problem.

In his last Chapter, Bassey E. Ate explains the role of ECOMOG in the maintenance of peace and security in west Africa. The action taken by ECOMOG (led by Nigeria) in Liberia was to serve as a sign that African states were ready and willing to ensure stability in their neighbours. According to the author, one of the issues crippling the development of regional peacekeeping operations in Africa, is that they are too costly (Nigeria spent US\$8 million during the Liberian operation). However, this problem does not mean that regional security initiatives should not be undertaken. What it does mean is that emphasis should be placed on collaboration and partnership in order to build capacity in this arena.

The book would have done well with an index section to allow for easy and quick referencing. That notwithstanding, most of the authors in the book attempted to match their analysis of the African problems and priorities with concrete recommendations. In addition, consistent reference was made throughout the book to the fact that any form of intervention or cooperation - be it economic or political - would not succeed if it continued to eschew the concepts of human security which puts people first.

MOUTHPIECE

EAST TIMOR: A NEW BEGINNING

CEDRIC DE CONING

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: PROGRAMMES, ACCORD

It is incredible to think that under the right conditions, you can destroy a country in two weeks. This is what happened in East Timor. Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975, and ruled it for 24 years. The UN supervised a popular consultation on August 30, 1999. East Timorese had the opportunity to choose between independence or greater autonomy. The people voted overwhelmingly for independence, and in response, the Indonesian troops and their pro-autonomy militia proxies launched a violent rampage of killing, looting and house-burning. In the two weeks that followed, they looted everything they could carry, they stole every car and motorbike they could lay their hands on – including many UN vehicles – and burned or destroyed everything they could not take with them. Hardly a building survived, regardless of whether it was a traditional bamboo hut in the countryside, or a modern concrete high-rise in downtown Dili.


The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is systematically uncovering evidence of the human rights abuses that took place during this period, and in the years before independence. A number of mass graves have been discovered and thousands of people have been reported missing or dead. In one case, more than 50 people who sought safety in a Maliana police station, are suspected of having been murdered and it is believed their bodies were dumped at sea. The UNTAET Human Rights Unit, together with a number of international and local NGOs, is investigating these human rights abuses with a view to preparing a body of evidence for eventual prosecution.

However, the focus should not only be on those who have been murdered. There is hardly a person in East Timor who did not have to flee for their life into the mountains, or into West Timor. Almost everybody lost a relative or friend, and there are very few people who did not lose everything they owned. Many hundreds of women were raped or sexually assaulted.

Yet still, there is a feeling of achievement in East Timor – for despite the intimidation and killings, East Timor has chosen and won, what was for them, the unthinkable – independence.

Although it is perhaps premature – UNTAET is only six months into an approximate 36 month mission – a number of first impressions come to mind.

The first is the remarkably short time it took the international community to muster and deploy an intervention force – only 12 days. The standard response time for a UN peacekeeping force is between three to six months. How did the Australian-led Intervention Force for East Timor (INTERFET) manage to



deploy in such record time? The most important factor that made this quick response possible, was political will, spurred on by real national interest, and coupled with the military capability, anticipation and preparation of a strong and willing lead nation. The close proximity of the lead nation to the conflict, and the ability of those involved to put together a credible multinational force, also contributed to the quick response. The intervention was costly to Australia, involving almost its entire operational force capabilities for five months. Despite the cost, however, the intervention had popular support – even when a one percent special surcharge on income tax was introduced to fund the operation. At the same time, there is no doubt that Australia benefited from its role in INTERFET. Apart from stabilising the sub-region – a pre-requisite for sub-regional growth and prosperity – Australia's intervention raised their profile as a responsible and credible middle-order-power in the region, as well as internationally. Australia was the main source of procurement for the INTERFET force (which withdrew from East Timor and handed over to an UNTAET peacekeeping force in February 2000) and will probably supply the bulk of resources needed to sustain the UNTAET mission, as well as many goods and services that will be needed to rebuild East Timor. Consequently, there will also be long-term economic benefits for Australia.

Some of the early lessons which can be drawn, are that although many people have pointed to INTERFET as a model for future interventions, one has to take into account that it was a very specific set of geo-political circumstances that made this intervention possible. In addition, these kinds of interventions are not only costly, thankless sacrifices, but they can also deliver

tangible political and economic benefits to the participants. In this regard, there seems to be a relationship between the profile of the participant (for example, Australia as lead nation) and the benefit derived. As America has learnt from several missions, this profile is a double-etched sword, for when things go wrong, the blame follows the same rule.

The UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) that supervised the popular consultation, was replaced with UNTAET on 25 September 1999. In short, East Timor gained independence on August 30, but was placed under UN transitional administration for approximately three years. UNTAET will hand over power to the elected government of East Timor once elections have been held and the necessary state institutions are in place.

Before that special day arrives, however, UNTAET has to assist East Timor to rebuild the country. In the first two months, UNTAET was essentially an emergency humanitarian mission, with almost 90% of the effort devoted to emergency food relief, basic health care and the provision of emergency shelter to hundreds of thousands displaced people and returning refugees.

At the same time, the UN had to re-establish itself after most of its installations were destroyed. As can be expected, UNAMET was specifically targeted by the Indonesian troops and militias, and most buildings and other UN equipment were destroyed or looted. Towards the third month, UNTAET shifted its focus from emergency relief to transitional governance. How can the UN best support East Timor in establishing basic government systems and structures? How can the UN best assist East Timor in establishing a viable and sustainable economy? The challenge is daunting – every single policy people in a stable state take for granted, has to be developed, debated, accepted and implemented in East Timor. Some of the first steps have already been taken. UNTAET, in very close consultation with the National Consultative Council, has promulgated the legal system (Indonesian law without some of the suppressive acts), and trained and appointed a number of judges and prosecutors. A new currency (the US dollar) has been introduced. Many schools have been re-activated and teacher salaries are now being paid. Basic water and electricity systems have been renovated and re-connected in the major towns. Major hospitals are currently run by the ICRC and NGOs like MSF (Doctors without Borders). UNTAET now has to decide what kind of long-term health system East Timor needs, and can afford, and then re-build the necessary hospitals and clinics. Civil servants who will staff these facilities, also need to be appointed and trained. The list is almost endless, with the same total re-design needed in every sector: agriculture, immigration, customs, trade regulation, the criminal-justice system, etc.

An interesting example that gives one insight into the complexities faced by UNTAET and the Timorese people during this period of transition, is the question of the official language. Older generation Timorese have been educated in Portuguese, whilst the younger generation have been educated in Indonesian. Many people, especially in urban centres, also speak Tetum, the language of the largest ethnic group in East Timor. However, Tetum is not a popular choice. If one had the luxury of time, the decision could be delayed until a national debate moves the Timorese closer to consensus. Unfortunately, the official language issue

underlies all else: in what language(s) should children be taught in school, in what language should the government publish its promulgations, etc. At this stage the leading East Timorese politicians have insisted that the official language be Portuguese, but it has not yet been promulgated, which is an indication that there is considerable internal opposition to the idea.

Regardless of the official language issue, or the many other obstacles that need to be overcome in East Timor, the country is on track to become an independent state in approximately three years. UNTAET is well positioned to assist East Timor along this path. Along the way, we hope to learn from the experience, so that the international community can be in an even better position to intervene the next time the UN is called upon to act in similar circumstances.

SUDANESE WOMEN STUDY TOUR TO SOUTH AFRICA

27 FEBRUARY – 3 MARCH 2000

KEMI OGUNSANYA
SENIOR TRAINING OFFICER, ACCORD

Since 1996, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has been working in the Sudan with an ongoing UNIFEM-sponsored training project, involving women from Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. These women have become fledging conflict resolution trainers in their own countries, and have become part of our international resource network. The aim of the network is to build capacity and African empowerment – by Africans in Africa – in the field of conflict resolution.

Since 1998, ACCORD has continued to work in the Sudan with the Netherlands Embassies in Nairobi and Khartoum. The primary aim of the work has been to facilitate the participation of Sudanese women in their country's peace process. Fortunately, the effort has enjoyed the support of parties in the Sudanese conflict. The 37 leading Sudanese women, drawn from the north and south of the country, and representing many of the groups embroiled in Sudan's 45-year-old civil war, were in South Africa for a training and study tour from February 27 to March 8, 2000. This was the first time these groups have come together in such large numbers.

Consultation with women from various political groups in the Sudanese conflict, highlighted the need for training in conflict resolution, negotiation, mediation, facilitation, collaborative decision-making, preventive diplomacy, lobbying and advocacy. The first phase of training with the Sudanese Women Working Committees was held in Kenya and Egypt. Women, from both the north and south, were trained in conflict resolution, negotiation, facilitation and collaborative decision-making.

The second phase of the training focused on team-building and greater gender awareness, with the purpose of building better relationships between groups and individuals in the future. The

programme comprised of formal and informal learning experiences. It employed a range of methodologies, including seminars, skills training, art-based approaches, case studies, role plays and interaction with key groups in peacemaking and peacebuilding in South Africa. Empowering women for their vital role in conflict resolution and peace building was the primary aim of the training initiative. ACCORD facilitated the training in mediation, preventive diplomacy, and also offered a comparative analysis of the peace process in Angola and South Africa. ACCORD trainers used the skills and services of its 'associate and fraternal' NGOs in Cape Town to enrich the learning experiences of the delegates in the areas of advocacy and lobbying. This training was facilitated by The Gender Commission, IDASA, and the rural-based NGO, Khululekani Institute for Democracy.

The women were keen to talk with South African leaders regarding the processes used to make peace and reconcile parties in the post-conflict situation. They were also interested to learn how women engaged themselves in peacebuilding, and about their roles during the negotiation process in the country prior to the 1994 elections, and thereafter. This formed part of the informal learning experience of the delegates. To facilitate these learning experiences, contact sessions in KwaZulu-Natal and Cape Town formed part of the programme, when various NGOs and government parastatals were invited to share their experiences of the peace process in South Africa.

In KwaZulu-Natal, the NGOs that were represented included Mike Foster of the Diakonia Council of Churches, Sayed Iqbal of the Organization for Civic Rights, Ms. Dlamini from Survivors of Violence and Futhi Zikalala from the Commission on Gender Equality. Dr. Meshack Hadebe, the first co-recipient of ACCORD's Africa Peace Award, represented the KwaZulu-Natal Peace and Security Initiative.

The Cape Town session was held on Robben Island. It included a two-hour tour of the Island, and delegates were permitted to take photographs in front of Nelson Mandela's cell. The session was held in the Church of the Good Shepherd, which was built by lepers in the 18th century. The Sudanese delegation was the first group to use the church after its repairs in 1999. NGOs represented included the distinguished Rev. Michael Lapsley from the Anglican Church, who preached on forgiveness and reparation. Also present was the Imam of Claremont Mosque, who pioneered 'Gender Jihad' in his mosque: he permitted women to preach in his mosque, and also allowed men and women to sit alongside each other to pray. Other NGOs were Rev. Terry Crawford of the Coalition for Defence Alternatives, Fr. John Pearson of the Catholic Bishop's Conference, Ayanda Mvimbi from Gun Free South Africa, Jasmine Nordien from the Urban Monitoring and Awareness Committee (UMAC), and husband of the Deputy Minister for Defence in South Africa, Jeremy Routledge, who represented the Quaker Peace Center.

On arrival in Cape Town, a working dinner was organised for the delegates to meet with the Mayor of Cape Town, Mrs. Normaandia Mfeketo. Mrs. Mary Burton, a former member of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, was also present to share her experiences. The role of amnesty, and the painful cost attached to the truth for such amnesty, were issues she discussed.

The climax of the Cape Town training was the meeting of the



Sudanese women with women parliamentarians. Delegates expressed their concerns and were able to give publicity to the Initiative. A resolution passed at the session, was that South African women parliamentarians would support the women from Sudan in their goals regarding the Sudanese peace process. A delegation of South African women parliamentarians will visit northern and southern Sudan to learn how to better manoeuvre decision-making in the Sudanese Parliament. The Sudanese delegates were also invited to parliament for a Women's Day celebration, the first of its kind in Parliament.

A memorandum was drafted by the Sudanese delegates and handed to Comrade Lulu Mbuyasi, joint member of the Monitoring Committee on Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women in Parliament, during a welcome reception for the Sudanese delegates in Cape Town. Others who attended the reception were Sylva van Rosse, staff of the Royal Netherlands Embassy, Khartoum, ministers, women parliamentarians, political party leaders, members of the business community, and members of Cape Town-based NGOs. Prof. Jakes Gerwel, Chairman of ACCORD's Board of Trustees, handed over certificates of attendance to the Sudanese delegates.

The study tour was an overall success and the Sudanese delegates departed with a greater understanding of the requirements for social transformation in Sudan. The tour was further enriched by the sharing of experiences and different ideologies, which characterise both countries. The Royal Netherlands Embassies in Khartoum and Nairobi offered human and financial resources to further the initiative, as well as the recognition of the Sudanese women's role in peacebuilding. This support enabled the women to participate at the International Conference, held in Maastricht in April this year, and which will be recognised by IGAD.

INDONESIAN STUDY TOUR TO SOUTH AFRICA.

SOUTH AFRICA AND INDONESIA: CONFLICT RESOLUTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

DAN WOHLGEMUT, CANADIAN INTERN AT ACCORD

ACCORD, along with the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), hosted an Indonesian delegation on a study tour of South Africa. The delegation was interested to learn about the South African experiences in conflict resolution, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The members of the Indonesian delegation came from a wide range of organisations, both from the public and civil sectors.

The study tour began with a week-long seminar in Durban, which included presentations from TRC Commissioners, media representatives, ACCORD staff, and other civil society and government representatives. The speakers challenged the delegates to learn from the triumphs and pitfalls that South Africa had experienced in its transition to democracy, in order to make their own transition as smooth as possible.

The first of these speakers was Yasmin Sooka (TRC Commissioner). She spoke on 'The Challenges of Transitional Justice' and reminded the delegates that the struggle for democracy is never over – that it is, in fact, an ongoing commitment. As in South Africa, Indonesia's transition to democracy has not been through military means and, as such, Ms. Sooka impressed upon the delegates the need for truth and reconciliation as a 'bridge to national unity.'

Graeme Simpson (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation - CSVR), chaired a session on the perspective of civil society and its role during the transition to democracy. Mr. Ivor Jenkins (IDASA) spoke about the difficulties of adjusting to the new dispensation, and stated that the main challenges were moving 'from a role of criticising to supporting policy,' and 'from protest to cooperation [with the government].' Professor Jacklyn Cock (University of the Witwatersrand) emphasised the importance of demilitarisation and defined it as 'a shift of power away from the military to social development.' She said that 'a nation's power must be expressed through its ability to serve its people, and not through its military capacity.' Dr. Maulana Fariid Essack (Commission for Gender Equality) spoke on the role of religious communities, and said that they needed to 'retain their prophetic voice' and work against injustice.

The following day was spent discussing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), both its benefits and drawbacks. Mary Burton (Former TRC Commissioner) introduced the delegates to the TRC and its committees. Acting Judge, Denzil Potgieter (TRC Commissioner & Amnesty Judge), outlined the workings of the amnesty process, as well as the criteria used to determine whether a person is eligible to be granted

amnesty or not. Following this, Professor John Daniels (University of Durban/Westville) spoke about the investigative unit and the volume of work they were asked to handle, as well as some of the difficulties they have experienced trying to obtain documents. He also mentioned the difficulties created by the destruction of such documents. Advocate Jan d'Oliveira (Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions) spoke about the interaction between the TRC and the criminal justice system, and called their relationship 'tenuous.' He emphasised the importance of communication between the two.

The afternoon session focussed on victims and survivors, and Yasmin Sooka (TRC Commissioner) stressed the importance of reparations to the TRC process. In her view, 'providing reparations is part of the search for restorative justice.' Father Michael Lapsley also emphasised the need for reparations, and stated that 'reparations are key to the process of the TRC and without them, then there is only impunity for the perpetrators, which will create much anger among victims.' Brandon Hamber (CSVR) gave a psychological perspective on the process and stressed that, for the victims, the telling of their stories was only one step on the path to healing. Thandi Shezi (Khulumani Survivors' Support Group) gave the delegates some insight into what her organisation did in the area of group counselling, with the aim of aiding the healing process by providing 'every victim with a place to be heard'.

The next morning Professor Karthy Govender (Human Rights Commission – HRC) took the delegates through the formulation of interim and final constitutions, as well as the role and powers of the HRC. His session was followed by a panel discussion, with representatives from the media speaking on their role in the TRC process. Max du Preez spoke on the role of television, and emphasised that 'citizens should be witnesses to the process and have the opportunity to look the perpetrators in the eye.' Mzi Malinga (Managing Editor of Business Day) stated that the media needed to recognise 'their role as bystanders in supporting apartheid by not actively speaking against it.' Angie Kapelianis, a radio journalist, spoke about the affect the process had on those reporting it, and said that 'no amount of planning or preparation could have prepared us for our role in reporting on the TRC process.' Fiona Lloyd spoke about the critical role that community radio could play in informing communities.

The final two days of the seminar were dedicated to presentations by ACCORD staff. Advocate Karthy Govender presented a session on Preventive Diplomacy, which was followed by a presentation on Conflict Analysis and Strategy Design by Cedric de Coning. Jerome Sachane then conducted a session on Multi-track Diplomacy. Finally, Vasu Gounden closed the seminar with presentations on the South African negotiations process, Conflict Management and the Global Community.

Following the seminar, the delegates went to Cape Town and Johannesburg to further explore issues surrounding the TRC. The seminar provided an opportunity for the delegates to ask questions and obtain answers to many of their pressing questions about the transition process. In addition, the ACCORD staff and other sponsors were able to learn much from the Indonesian delegation too.

RENAISSANCE BAROMETER

SENZO NGUBANE

The continent is abuzz with talk of an African Renaissance. What will these changes mean? How do we chart their progress? Renaissance Barometer provides a quarterly update on the most significant events in civil society, government and business sectors for the continent, with a particular focus on the growth in Africa's ability to manage its conflicts.

AFRICA (GENERAL)

29 December 1999 – The European Union (EU) appointed Rino Serri, Italian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as its envoy to work with the OAU in mediating in the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict.

6 January 2000 – The governments of Sudan and Eritrea agreed to re-open their borders after concluding a cooperation agreement, according to which flights would also resume between the two countries.

13 January 2000 – It was announced that eight African states, namely Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome, Burundi and Chad, would take part in a military exercise in Gabon from 17-29 January. The aim of the exercise was to enhance the deployment of a rapid-response peace force to assist refugees in crisis situation.

19 January 2000 – African Heads of State, who gathered in Gabon for a two-day Summit on poverty, declared their collaboration on measures aimed at combating HIV/AIDS and the reduction of poverty on the continent. The leaders also pledged their support to the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, a new loan-issuing scheme.

6 February 2000 – The Summit of the Community of Sahelian-Saharan States (CED-SAD) declared its support for the oil extraction project in Chad.

7 February 2000 – A meeting of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) backed Djibouti President's peace proposals for Somalia. Among other things, the Djibouti peace plan calls for a Somalia Reconciliation Conference to be held in Djibouti from 20th April-5th May 2000.

9 February 2000 – Defence and security officials from Zambia and Angola agreed to cooperate in order to deal with border issues that threaten to destabilise both countries.



Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika meets with European Union representative, Javier Solana to discuss the Africa-Europe Summit

9 February 2000 – Egyptian and Algerian Ministers of Foreign Affairs met with EU envoys to iron out the specific details of the planned EU-Africa Summit.

18 February 2000 – Chad and Libya agreed to several joint economic initiatives, including a joint oil venture and the forging of cooperation with foreign companies.

3 March 2000 – The leaders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone concluded a non-aggression agreement in order to curb cross-border attacks in their countries.

11 March 2000 – Interior Ministers from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger agreed to cooperate in order to combat cross-border smuggling of weapons and drug trafficking.

17 March 2000 – The African Development Bank (ADB) issued an amount of \$1,5 million to Mozambique, Madagascar



Algerian president and Saudi Arabian minister arrive at the opening of the two-day annual conference on terrorism and drugs



Kabila met with several presidents of other African countries involved in the DRC's ongoing civil war

and Zimbabwe to assist with fighting epidemics like cholera and malaria due to recent floods.

23 March 2000 – Benin and Togo entered into an agreement with international donor agencies of \$150 million in order to fund the upgrading of the two countries' power supply.

28 March 2000 – ECOWAS heads of state agreed to continue with their regional economic integration initiatives and also to initiate steps to have a common regional passport.

4 April 2000 – Presidents Mubarak of Egypt, Gaddafi of Libya and al-Bshir of Sudan met during the Africa-EU Summit to discuss the Egyptian-Libyan initiative in the Sudan.

6 April 2000 – The Africa-Europe Summit held in Cairo, Egypt, ended with a call for greater cooperation on issues of the aim of tackling the issues affecting the African states among them democracy and development.

14 April 2000 – The UN Security Council passed a resolution to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) for another six months.

25 April 2000 – Presidents Mbeki, Nujoma and Chissano held a meeting with President Mugabe to deliberate on Zimbabwe's political crisis.

29 April 2000 – ECOWAS resolved to come up with measures to exclude those Member States with abhorrent records on democracy, human rights and governance.

30 April 2000 – A Summit of six African Heads of State from the DRC, South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria, Mali and Algeria issued a statement calling for an immediate deployment of UN peacekeepers to the DRC.

4 May 2000 – Health Ministers from the SADC region held their annual two-day conference where it was stated that the region would have to deal with issues of poverty in order to redress current health problems.

4 May 2000 – It was announced that Tunisia and Sudan had reached an agreement to renew their diplomatic relations.

NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA



11 January 2000 – The rebel group, Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) disbanded after the government granted a general amnesty to its guerrillas.

19 January 2000 – The government announced that 80% of the rebels surrendered under the Civic Concord Law of July 1998 and the remaining 20% rejected the Concord.

28 March 2000 – An armed movement linked to the Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) rebel group had reportedly surrendered to government forces in Bordj Menaïel town.

2 May 2000 – A three member delegation team of Amnesty International (AI) arrived in Algeria for the first time in five years. AI is one of the human rights groups invited by the country's president as part of his peace efforts with Muslim rebels.



EGYPT

5 February 2000 – One of the leaders of the Egyptian (militant) Muslim group, Osama Ayub, urged members of the group to lay down their arms against Egypt. Ayub was sentenced by the Egyptian military court to 40 years in prison before he obtained political asylum from Germany.

12 April 2000 – A bilateral agreement between Egypt and Canada cemented cooperation between the two countries with regard to environmental technology. Canada also agreed to support small and medium business in Egypt.

12 April 2000 – Government enacted a new electoral law that would ensure judges monitor polling stations ahead of the country's election later this year.


10 May 2000 – President Mubarak held a meeting with John Garang, leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), to further discuss the situation in Sudan.



LIBYA

2 December 1999 – Italian Prime Minister, Massimo D'Alema completed his visit to Libya, where he met with key government officials. In a joint statement, Italy and Libya expressed a need to work against international terrorism.

25 March 2000 – A four member delegation from the US arrived in Libya for a visit aimed at assessing the situation in the country before the government makes a decision regarding the imposed ban of US citizens' travel to Libya.



MAURITANIA

16 March 2000 – The 'Paris Club' agreed to reduce by 90% the Mauritanian debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

19 April 2000 – Mauritania would receive 14,43 million euros from Germany for poverty alleviation measures in the country.



TUNISIA

15 December 1999 – The Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LTDH) welcomed the release of Mohamed Moadia, former leader of the opposition party, from house arrest.

31 December 1999 – Parliament approved the 2000 budget, which places the country's spending at 10,510 million dinars.



WESTERN SAHARA

28 February 1999 – The Polisario Front released 186 Moroccan prisoners of war. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, some of the released prisoners had been held for 25 years

WEST AFRICA



BENIN

17 February 2000 – The European Union issued two grants of more than 28 billion FCFA (US\$41 million) to Benin for road infrastructure upgrading and construction in the country.



BURKINA FASO

3 February 2000 – The government adopted a bill to change the country's electoral code in order to allocate more powers to the Independent National Electoral Commission.

10 February 2000 – Burkina Faso signed an Open Skies Agreement with the United States that will allow for uninterrupted service by the airlines of each country, to the other's territory.

11 April 2000 – The government voted in favour of a constitutional reform to reduce the presidential mandate to five years instead of seven and to limit incumbents to a two-term maximum.

20 April 2000 – A new bill aimed at changing the country's Electoral Law was adopted by the National Assembly. The bill includes changes to the country's Independent Electoral Commission and the demarcation processes.



THE GAMBIA

22 December 1999 – It was announced that 26 Gambian police officers had left for East Timor to join forces in the UN Peacekeeping operation there.



GHANA

4 April 2000 – Ghana would obtain \$11 million from the World Bank for urban infrastructure development in to improve service delivery in urban areas.

27 April 2000 – The Minister of Finance outlined economic measures to curb the continued drop in the country's currency.



GUINEA-BISSAU

18 January 2000 – The group of foreign election observers in Guinea-Bissau, who include UN and European Union (EU) representatives, declared the election as having been free and fair.

21 January 2000 – The leader of the opposition, Kumba Yalla, won the presidential run-off elections in Guinea-Bissau with a landslide victory. Yalla obtained 72% of the votes when he defeated Malam Bacai Sanha, who was interim president during the country's military rule.

19 February 2000 – The newly elected President of Guinea-Bissau, Kumba Yalla, pledged to work towards promoting tolerance and reconciliation in the country.

20 February 2000 – The country's new Prime Minister, Caetona N'Tchama, named his cabinet which comprises 24 members, including some members of the opposition.



IVORY COAST

28 December 1999 – The Ivorian military ruler met with foreign diplomats in an attempt to prevent hostile responses from the international community against the recently staged coup.

30 December 1999 – Former Prime Minister, Outtara returned to the country after the cancellation of his warrant of arrest, issued prior to the military coup.

4 January 2000 – General Robert Guei, the country's military leader, appointed his transitional cabinet, which includes members of the opposition parties.

5 January 2000 – The Ivory Coast military junta imposed a temporary suspension of all payments of external debt to enable it to pay the salaries of the country's civil servants and army.

13 January 2000 – A total of two members of the opposition, the Ivorian Popular Front, were appointed as ministers following the party's reversed decision not to join the new regime.

19 January 2000 – Assistant UN Secretary-General for political affairs, Ibrahim Fall met with the country's military ruler in Abidjan and expressed the UN's willingness to assist in the country's transition to democracy.

2 February 2000 – General Robert Guei made his first visit to Nigeria to meet with the country's President Obasanjo.

17 February 2000 – The military junta set up a 16-member commission that will be in charge of the constitutional referendum in the country.

16 February 2000 – The African Development Bank (AFDB) stated that the Ivory Coast had made a payment of US\$20,8 million towards the settlement of its loan.

10 March 2000 – Following a recommendation from the Constitutional and Electoral Consultative Committee, the government decided to extend voter registration for the referendum to 17th March 2000.

15 March 2000 – Government assured the Ivorians and the international community that the referendum will go ahead as planned on 30 April 2000.

19 April 2000 – The country's military ruler met with party leaders to discuss the country's draft constitution and new electoral code.

12 May 2000 – The military junta announced that parliamentary and presidential elections would be held on 19 and 17 September 2000 respectively. A referendum on the draft constitution will be held on 23 July 2000.



Ivory Coast's military ruler, General Robert Guei



Ivory Coast's military ruler, General Robert Guei (2nd L), seated with Junta members during a meeting with leaders of the Ivory Coast's main opposition party, the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)



LIBERIA

5 January 2000 – President Taylor said his government would go-ahead with the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), despite a lack of significant international support.

11 February 2000 – Monrovia re-opened its border with Guinea, which were closed six months ago because of cross border rebel activity between the two countries.

6 April 2000 – The UN Office in Liberia pledged to finance the training schemes for former civil war ex-combatants in order to ensure their proper reintegration into society.

5 May 2000 – President Taylor dispatched a special negotiator - former Foreign Minister Museleng-Cooper – to try and bring about a solution to the current crisis in Sierra Leone.



NIGER

25 January 2000 – Niger's democratically elected President Mamadou started a three-day visit to France, to hold discussions with French authorities regarding the resumption of aid to Niger. Most of the international donors withdrew from the country following a coup in 1999.

16 February 2000 – Niger concluded an aid agreement with France amounting to 6 billion francs. The grant will assist the

government to re-pay, in retrospect, the salaries of civil servants.

9 March 2000 – The United States resumed bilateral trade to Niger which was suspended last year.

25 March 2000 – Opposition parties ended their parliamentary boycott following a meeting with the country's President Tandja Mamadou.

23 April 2000 – The government unveiled a policy aimed at putting the country's economy back on track. The programme, which will run until 2004, will focus on stabilising the economy and balancing state finances.



NIGERIA

17 December 1999 – The Lower House of Parliament passed an anti-corruption bill which seeks to up-root blatant corruption in the country. In terms of the bill, any officials found guilty of corruption would face a jail sentence of seven years.

22 December 1999 – The National Assembly passed the proposed bill to develop the Niger-Delta region, and to meet the concerns of communities in the area.

3 January 2000 – The government refused to issue payments of more than 500,000 (US\$5,000) Naira to civil servants, without prior approval of their respective ministers. The decision is said to be in line with the government's attempt to deal with corruption in the civil service.

8 February 2000 – The Nigerian Chief of Staff, Major General Victor Malu, declared his country would dispatch 2,000 more soldiers to be part of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

15 February 2000 – The Health Committee in the House of Representatives provided for the establishment of 27 health centres in the country, in an attempt to enhance health care delivery. The total estimated cost for the creation of each centre is N5 million (US\$50,150).

17 February 2000 – Nigerian Vice-President Atiku Abubakar

and US Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in another effort to improve relations between the two countries.

23 February 2000 – It was decided Nigeria would receive US\$106,000 from Japan. The money will be used to promote public health and good governance, and infrastructural development, among other things.

17 March 2000 – Shell re-opened its plant in Niger Delta that was shut down after an attack by the militant youths.

1 April 2000 – US Defence Secretary, William Cohen pledged \$10 million to re-structure the Nigerian military and to ensure that it is under civilian control.

4 April 2000 – A Consultative meeting of governors from 19 states decided to create a committee of Muslims and Christians to examine the introduction of Sharia law into the current penal code.

25 April 2000 – The federal government introduced a new revenue-sharing strategy to deal with the recurring violent activities stemming from the oil producing regions in the country. The first grant, amounting to 13% of oil revenues, has already been distributed to nine states.



SENEGAL

18 December 1999 – The ruling Socialist Party (PS) named its leader, President Diouf, as its candidate for the February 27 elections.

26 December 1999 – Peace talks between the government and the Casamance separatist leaders resumed in The Gambia, and both parties have called for an end to the on-going war.

31 December 1999 – President Abdou Diouf signed a decree to release 40 members of the separatist Casamance province.

26 January 2000 – The government and the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance (MFDC) issued a joint declaration, in which the former agreed to lift restrictions imposed on the latter. The declaration grants members of the MFDC rights to freedom of movement and assembly.

22 February 2000 – Election monitors from the La Francophonie arrived in Senegal ahead of the country's general elections. Other election observers will come from the OAU, ECOWAS, EU and G-8 countries.

22 February 2000 – The Observatoire National des Elections (ONEL) stated that the opposition parties in the country had accepted the voters roll after an independent committee declared the list valid.

29 February 1999 – Provisional election results indicated that a presidential run-off would take place because none of the candidates had secured a clear 51% majority victory.

26 March 2000 – Abdoulaye Wade won the presidential run-off with 58,49% of the vote whilst erstwhile President Abdou Diouf came second with 41,51% of the vote according to the final result as released in the country.

4 April 2000 – Prime Minister Moustapha Niasse announced the country's first multi-party government composed of 27 cabinet members.

21 April 2000 – The government announced that a committee would be set up to draft the country's new constitution.



SIERRA LEONE

2 December 1999 – About 200 former combatants based at the Okra Hill military camp handed over their weapons to ECOMOG peacekeepers in Masumana.

8 December 1999 – A group of Kenyan soldiers arrived in Sierra Leone to take part in the UN peacekeeping mission.

19 December 1999 – The IMF granted a loan of US\$35 million to Sierra Leone for post-conflict reconstruction projects.

20 December 1999 – Sierra Leone and Liberia reached an agreement to form a security committee in order to cooperate in halting rebel activities across their borders.

21 January 2000 – A Catholic development aid group, Children Associated with War (CAW) reported that rebels had released more than 200 child soldiers.

24 January 2000 – Foday Sankoh, former rebel leader and current chairman of the National Resources Commission banned all mining activity in the country. According to Sankoh, current and prospective miners will have to seek permission from the commission to gain access to the mines.

25 January 2000 – It was announced that the UN Peacekeeping Force in Sierra Leone had recently disarmed more than 600 former fighters. This brings the total number of disarmed combatants to 15,000.

6 February 2000 – Vice-President of the World Bank, Mats Karlson, stated that the World Bank would issue US\$130 million to assist the Sierra Leone peace process.

7 February 2000 – The Security Council endorsed the recommendations of the Secretary General to increase the UN Mission from 6,000 to 11,100 troops, thus making it the largest UN field operation.

16 February 2000 – The WFP distributed food aid to more than 4,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Port Loko, northern Freetown.

23 February 2000 – The government endorsed legislation to create the country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The commission will be made up of three international and four national commissioners.

18 March 2000 – Vice-President Demby stated that the government was finalising the plans to set up a peace and reconciliation commission in the country.

22 March 2000 – The WFP announced that it would issue \$36,655 million in food aid to Sierra Leone to provide basic food stuff to about half a million internally displaced people.

1 April 2000 – UN peace mission officers in Sierra Leone revealed that about 240 rebels have recently handed over their weapons to the peacekeepers.

27 April 2000 – President Kabbah appealed to his nation for calm and reconciliation, and called on ex-combatants to cease attacks on civilians.



TOGO

2 December 1999 – Political parties agreed to form the country's Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI).

CENTRAL AFRICA



ANGOLA

12 January 2000 – Robert Fowler, Chairman of the UN Sanctions Committee, met with the Commander of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to find ways of tackling UNITA's continued weapons supply.

10 February 2000 – The government endorsed a financial programme to pay civil servants. The programme will also partly meet the country's external debt, that currently stands at about US\$12,5 billion.

4 April 2000 – The IMF and Angola signed an agreement to implement economic reforms including reducing state expenditure and expanding investments on infrastructure and welfare.

30 April 2000 – Hundreds of people took part in a 'march for peace' in Luanda. The event was organised by the Party for Democratic Support and Progress in Angola (PADPA). The people pledged their support for the peace efforts of the Inter-Ecclesiastical Commission, a convocation of various church groups.

10 May 2000 – The government reinstated government administration in all areas after it recently fell to the FAA following an intense assault on UNITA rebels.



CAMEROON

7 December 1999 – The OAU gave US\$1 million to Cameroon to help fight the locust invasion that has devastated the country's crops.

7 February 2000 – Prime Minister Musonge held talks with the leaders of the separatist Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) to discuss the prospects for peace and unity in the country.

27 March 2000 – The UNESCO International Programme for the Development of Communication issued \$40,000 to a group of women involved in Community Radio Stations.




CHAD

5 January 2000 – President Idriss Deby of Chad and President al-Bashir of Sudan held bilateral talks on trade, political and cultural cooperation between the two countries. The two countries already have an agreement dealing with boundary demarcation and agricultural trade.

7 January 2000 – The IMF approved a grant of US\$49,9 million for poverty alleviation and economic growth. The grant is a three-year loan and the first payment of US\$7,1 million was due to be released immediately.

10 April 2000 – President Deby reiterated his commitment to a negotiated settlement of the country's current conflict.



CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

5 January 2000 – It was announced that UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, had proposed the establishment of a new UN Peacebuilding Support Office in CAR. The Office, which will have both a military and civilian



Democratic Republic of Congo prisoners are directed by a rebel soldier

component, would ensure UN presence in the country beyond the termination of the current peacekeeping mission.

18 January 2000 – The UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) resumed its second phase of withdrawal from the country, with the departure of 126 Chadian and 125 Ivorian forces. The mandate of MINURCA expired on 15 February 2000.

15 February 2000 – The last UN peacekeeping force, consisting of 300 Egyptian and Senegalese soldiers, is due to leave the Central African Republic following the end of the UN mandate.

30 April 2000 – The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan arrived in the Central African Republic for a meeting with the president and other leaders. Mr. Annan reiterated the UN commitment to building peace and alleviating poverty in the country.



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

30 December 1999 – According to the Joint Military Commission, Zimbabwean and Namibian troops trapped in Ikela had recently received humanitarian assistance.

12 February 2000 – The DRC Peace Facilitator and former Botswana President, Sir Ketumile Masire, held a meeting with President Kabila in Kinshasa.

22 February 2000 – The government announced the creation of a general commissariat to act as a liaison between itself and the UN mission in the country.

24 February 2000 – A summit of regional and rebel leaders involved in the DRC conflict set 1 March as the deadline for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

28 March 2000 – It was announced that the Security Council has agreed in principle to send a mission to the DRC of 500 UN observers and 5 000 troops for logistical and security support to the UN Staff in the country.

28 March 2000 – The government of Norway contributed \$1.2 million to the UN Trust Fund to support the peace process in the DRC.

1 April 2000 – The government announced that the legislative assembly elections will be held by 10 May 2000. The statement said that the members of the assembly would be elected from

areas under the government control and co-opted from areas held by rebels.

10 April 2000 – Parties to the DRC conflict meeting under the Joint Military Commission (JMC) adopted a disengagement plan in order to redeploy their forces to new defensive positions.

18 April 2000 – According to the UN Observer Mission in the DRC, the recent ceasefire agreement was still intact. The mission also revealed that the verification process would be resumed.

26 April 2000 – Diplomatic relations at an ambassadorial level were established between the DRC and the state of Qatar.

5 May 2000 – A Status of Forces Agreement was signed between the DRC and the UN. The agreement was signed by the country's foreign minister and the representative of the UN Observer Mission to the DRC.

6 May 2000 – The Joint Military Commission (JMC) held a meeting in Zambia with the US ambassador to the UN, Mr Holbrooke, as well as other member countries of the Security Council.



REPUBLIC OF CONGO

6 January 2000 – Parliament approved a budget of 671,3 billion CFA for the year 2000, a 23% increase from 1999. The increase is aimed at re-igniting the government's three-year reconstruction plan in the country.

22 February 2000 – The Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released a report that more than 40,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) had returned to their homes because of the improved security situation in the country.


20 March 2000 – A group of army officials, led by Victor Mbala from the post-conflict follow-up committee, met with former rebels in Zananga district in an attempt to strengthen reconciliation in the country.

22 February 2000 – Frederic Bitsangou, leader of the rebel group, Conseil National de Resistance, urged his followers to surrender their weapons as agreed upon in the cease-fire agreement. Bitsangou also released five prisoners of war and surrendered seven rifles in Kindamba.

6 April 2000 – Government unveiled a three-step transitional plan for sustainable peace in Congo that will involve a national dialogue, adoption of a new constitution and the holding of elections.

20 April 2000 – President Sassou-Nguesso and Angolan President Dos Santos issued a joint communiqué committing themselves to measures aimed at enhancing cooperation between their two countries.

25 April 2000 – The process of deploying joint patrols of soldiers went underway in Niari. It is estimated that more than 1,500 former rebels have been disarmed.



GABON

23 December 1999 – President Bongo trimmed his government to 32 members from 42, in an attempt to reduce government spending.

26 January 2000 – The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) committed to issuing an amount of US\$14,7 million to Gabon, in order to help the country upgrade its road transport infrastructure.

EAST AFRICA



BURUNDI

31 January 2000 – The government released more than 80,000 people who were stationed in the 10 re-grouping camps.

6 February 2000 – President Buyoya met with Mr. Mandela ahead of the planned consultations in Arusha, which were scheduled for later in February.

20 February 2000 – UNICEF Executive Director, Carol Bellamy visited Burundi to discuss with government officials the Fund's future operations in the country. UNICEF operations were suspended after the killing of the country's representative last year.

21 February 2000 – Mr Nelson Mandela arrived in Arusha, Tanzania, to lead the fresh round of negotiations to end the country's civil strife.

20 March 2000 – Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, the leader of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) announced that he will join the current negotiations on the country's conflict.

27 March 2000 – The Burundi peace talks resumed in Tanzania with a statement from President Buyoya that he was willing to have a cease-fire dialogue with the armed groups in the country.

15 April 2000 – Government officials from Tanzania and Burundi met to discuss ways of improving security on their common border.

26 April 2000 – The government issued a statement calling for the cessation of all hostilities with the rebels ahead of Mr Mandela's expected visit to the country.

28 April 2000 – During his first visit to the country since assuming the role of Burundi facilitator, Mr Mandela held various private talks with President Buyoya, the High Command of the Army and a group representing the Burundi soldiers.

13 May 2000 – A group of civilian and army officers left for Rome, where they were expected to have talks with the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), which is one of the opposition groups in the country.

20 May 2000 – The committee tasked to produce a list of guarantees needed to implement the peace agreement, adjourned and announced that it would reconvene on 12 June 2000. According to the chairman of the committee, Mr Guebuza, some issues remain unresolved, although the committee has made important progress.

22 May 2000 – Mr Mandela held separate meetings in South Africa with two rebel groups from Burundi: the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPETHU) and the Front for National Liberation (FROLINA).



COMOROS

11 March 2000 – The World Bank announced that it will soon release \$30 million in frozen loans to Comoros. The decision was made after a World Bank delegation that visited Comoros was content with the country's economic reforms.



Nelson Mandela opens the peace talks on Burundi in Arusha



Kenya's president Daniel Arap Moi expresses the need for an end to war in Africa so that people can rebuild their lives



DJIBOUTI

14 January 2000 – The President of Djibouti and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia met to discuss the on-going Somalia civil war and to seek solutions for a lasting peace in the country.

2 February 2000 – The World Food Programme (WFP) initiated a US\$2,7 million operation to provide food aid to more than 100,000 people affected by drought in Djibouti. Reports from WFP indicated that insufficient rainfall had crippled the country's economy because a number of livestock had died and the people's purchasing power had significantly decreased.

6 February 2000 – President Omar met President Bouteflika of Algeria to discuss bilateral relations, as well as the volatile situation in the horn of Africa.

7 February 2000 – The government and the rebel group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), signed a cease-fire agreement. The agreement calls for greater decentralisation of power and democracy in the country, among other things.

15 April 2000 – The UN unveiled plans to develop Djibouti's port and road infrastructure because of the need to bring in more supplies to prevent starvation in Ethiopia. The port's handling capacity will be increased from 100,000 to about 145,000 tons, at a cost of US\$2,7 million.

24 April 2000 – The US Agency for International Development (USAID) announced that a shipment of about 85,000 tons of food aid and other relief supplies had arrived in Djibouti for distribution to various humanitarian groups in the country.



ERITREA

8 January 2000 – President Afewerki met with British Members of Parliament and, amongst other things, the leaders discussed the on-going conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

25 January 2000 – The European Union committed to supply 5,480 tones of wheat to Eritrea as part of food aid to the country. The food will be dispatched through the WFP.

15 April 2000 – The EU issued 20 million Euros to assist in Eritrea's electrification projects around the country.



ETHIOPIA

11 January 2000 – The Ethiopian Electoral Board announced that 99 political parties would take part in the country's general election, to be held on 14 May 2000.

8 February 2000 – Special Envoy of the European Union (EU), Rino Serri, held a meeting with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in an attempt to find ways of resolving the on-going border dispute with Eritrea.

16 March 2000 – The United States issued 400,000 tones of food to Ethiopia in aid to the drought stricken people in the country.

24 April 2000 – Israeli relief commodities, including medicines, food and blankets, arrived in Ethiopia to help avert famine in the country.

14 May 2000 – Ethiopians went to the polls in their first multi-party elections, where about 20 million people registered to vote for the Lower House of Parliament.



KENYA

24 January 2000 – Kenyan officials and an IMF delegation began a series of meetings to look into a possible resumption of financial assistance to the country.

8 February 2000 – Following its two-day visit in the country, an IMF assessment team said that Kenya had made partial progress towards dealing with corruption in the country.



RWANDA

10 February 2000 – Rwandan Vice-President, Paul Kagame, pledged his country's full cooperation with the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The statement follows a meeting with the war crimes prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, which was aimed at improving relations between the two parties.

9 March 2000 – The EU signed an aid agreement with Rwanda totaling \$181 million for development and humanitarian assistance.

17 April 2000 – The joint session of the Rwandan Assembly

voted Paul Kagame as the country's new president with 81 out of 86 votes cast by the members.

7 May 2000 – Rwanda reiterated its commitment to a peaceful settlement of the DRC conflict and the cessation of all hostilities. The statement was made after President Kagame met with members of the UN Security Council.

12 May 2000 – President Kagame and Kenyan President Arap Moi held a meeting aimed at strengthening bilateral relations and resolving regional issues.



SOMALIA

19 December 1999 – Mogadishu faction leaders issued a press statement, which pledged their commitment to form a joint administration in their spheres of control.

11 February 2000 – Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) resumed its activities in the Kismayo region, which were suspended in December 1999 due to security concerns.

30 March 2000 – The tenth meeting of the standing committee on Somalia that supports the IGAD peace initiatives in the country took place in Ethiopia where the Djibouti peace plan was discussed.

2 May 2000 – A conference, focussing on the future of Somalia, began in Djibouti. About 300 participants, including traditional and community leaders, participated.



SUDAN

13 December 1999 – A government and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) delegation met in Geneva for discussions on how to provide humanitarian assistance to war-affected people in the south.

25 December 1999 – The leader of the Umma Party, Sadeq al-Madhi, stated that the situation in the country was ripe for reconciliation dialogue between the government and opposition. The statement was made after a meeting with Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amr Moussa.

4 January 2000 – Political groups in Southern Sudan presented a petition to President al-Bashir, which called for a referendum on the secession of the South from the North. The petition was signed by the National Congress Party, the United Democratic Salvation Front and the Union of Sudan African Parties.

13 January 2000 – Ali al-Nimeiri, Minister in the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, said that Sudan was to resume her diplomatic relations with Uganda in an attempt to improve the strained relations between the two countries.

22 January 2000 – Khartoum re-opened its land route with Eritrea, which was closed in 1994 during the height of political tensions between the two countries.

26 January 2000 – The Sudan News Agency reported that Sudanese and British officials met to discuss the possible revival of bilateral and diplomatic relations.

22 February 2000 – IGAD resumed another series of Sudanese peace talks in Kenya. The focus of this round of talks is the possible separation of religion and the state in Sudan.

23 February 2000 – UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) began a programme to immunise 77,000 children against polio in the Nuba mountain region.

4 March 2000 – The State owned al-Anbaa newspaper reported that a joint Sudanese-Ethiopian ministerial committee has met for the first time in six years.

26 March 2000 – A five-member delegation led by Kenyan diplomats, Daniel Mboya, arrived in Sudan for another series of peace talks with the government.

3 April 2000 – Another series of talks between the government and the rebels resume in order to find a solution to the country's civil war.

23 April 2000 – State television announced that parliamentary and presidential elections would be held in October.

29 April 2000 – The government announced an extension of the ceasefire with rebels in southern Sudan. The ceasefire has been extended for another three months in order to allow for humanitarian activity in the area.

7 May 2000 – An agreement to ensure safe passage of relief supplies around the country was signed by the government, rebels and UN representatives.



TANZANIA

4 February 2000 – Fish exports from Tanzania to the European Union (EU) resumed, thus ending a nine-month long ban imposed by the Union. The ban was imposed after it was discovered that fishermen in Lake Victoria made excessive use of chemicals in the Lake.

29 March 2000 – Zanzibar's main opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF) welcomed the intervention of the Commonwealth in an attempt to resolve a political impasse with the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi.



UGANDA

16 March 2000 – Following a visit by a World bank team and its subsequent approval of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Plan, it was announced that the country stands to qualify for debt relief measures.



Sudanese president, al-Bashir and Ugandan president, Museveni shake hands after signing an agreement to improve relations between the two countries under former US president Carter's mediation

SOUTHERN AFRICA




BOTSWANA

12 February 2000 – Parliament endorsed an increase in the budget for the Consolidated and Development Programme Funds for the year 2000/1. The approved budget amounts to 1,436.6 million Pula.

17 February 2000 – A project to study one of the HIV/AIDS subtype viruses, the HIV-1C virus, was launched in Botswana. The study is part of a project by a US pharmaceutical company to help the fight against AIDS in southern Africa.

29 February 2000 – Gaborone agreed to provide 15 million litres of fuel to Zimbabwe, a country which is currently facing fuel shortages.

10 May 2000 – President Mogae said that African countries needed to review their electoral system based on the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system, and consider Proportional Representation (PR). Speaking during a SADC election conference, the President said that PR was inclusive as it accommodated minority groups.



LESOTHO

3 December 1999 – Political parties signed an agreement to establish a new electoral system in Lesotho.

11 January 2000 – Following a visit by Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Bertie Ahern, it was announced that Lesotho would receive six million pounds from Ireland for developmental projects.



MOZAMBIQUE

20 December 1999 – President Chissano won the country's second democratic elections by 52,3 %, while opposition candidate, Mr. Dhlakama obtained 47,7%. President Chissano's Frelimo party obtained 133 parliamentary seats against the 117 seats won by Renamo.

14 January 2000 – Opposition Renamo members, who had earlier threatened to boycott Parliament, decided to assume their roles in Parliament.

23 February 2000 – The UN launched an international appeal for US\$13 million to assist flood victims in Mozambique.

29 February 2000 – Britain announced the cancellation of bilateral debt amounting to US\$150 million, owed by Mozambique. The decision, which was supposed to take effect in April, was brought forward due to recent floods in Mozambique.

29 February 2000 – Donor countries pledged US\$13,5 million towards humanitarian assistance in Mozambique.

8 March 2000 – The Irish government donated US\$787,000 to Mozambique in order to purchase medical supplies needed because of the floods.

11 March 2000 – According to foreign ministry officials Mauritania would issue US\$100,000 to Mozambique in aid of the recent floods.

12 April 2000 – The IMF issued a statement that an agreement has been reached with Mozambique for a debt relief measure to



Mozambican president Chissano visits a field hospital at a displaced peoples camp in a town north-east of Maputo.

Rescue operations continue in flood ravaged Mozambique



enable the government to cope with reconstruction initiatives as a result of the recent floods.


21 April 2000 – In an attempt to help Mozambique recover from the recent floods, the World Bank endorsed a US\$30 million credit to the country.



NAMIBIA

4 December 1999 – The US Ambassador to the UN met with President Nujoma to discuss the scourge of HIV/AIDS in Africa, and the DRC cease-fire agreement.

6 December 1999 – President Nujoma and his SWAPO party returned to power with 76% of the vote, thus giving the party a two-thirds majority victory.



SOUTH AFRICA

3 December 1999 – An arms deal, amounting to R30 billion was concluded with Swedish-

based Saab. According to the deal, South Africa will purchase war material, which will include three submarines, 30 helicopters and four navy corvettes.

17 December 1999 – The European Union agreed to implement a free trade agreement with South Africa, which came into effect on 1st January 2000.

29 December 1999 – Following a series of bomb blasts, the Scorpions Anti-crime Unit seized a number of bomb-making materials in Cape Town.

16 January 2000 –


The government launched its National AIDS Council which is tasked with the co-ordination of South Africa's efforts to curb the spread of the disease in the country.

17 January 2000 – The cabinet began a two-day meeting to discuss, among other things, the country's economic policy ahead of the Presidential State of the Nation Address.

8 February 2000 – The Minister of Labour announced seven key areas of the Labour law that needed to be transformed in order to allow flexibility and job creation. These include dismissal and retrenchments, bargaining and small businesses, as well as measures to enhance the functioning of the Labour Court and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).

6 March 2000 – The Human Rights Commission resumed its public hearings into alleged racism in South Africa's media.

4 May 2000 – President Mbeki addressed the nation on the Zimbabwean crisis and highlighted his government's attempt to resolve the situation through quite diplomacy.



SWAZILAND

17 April 2000 – Swaziland Defence Force purchased three helicopters from South Africa that will be used in the fight against crime in the country.



ZAMBIA

21 January 2000 – President Chiluba informed Parliament that the country's economy experienced a 2% growth last year.

3 February 2000 – Zambia received US\$4,5 million from Japan in debt relief measures. According to the Japanese Ambassador, Yoshihiro Nakamura, the grant will be channeled towards improving telecommunications infrastructure in Zambia.

16 February 2000 – The US government granted Zambia an amount of US\$300,000 for humanitarian and refugee relief measures. Zambia is currently home to approximately 200,000 refugees from around the region.

2 March 2000 – The World Bank would issue \$375 million to Zambia in a new aid over the next two-three years.

16 March 2000 – Zambia launched a council and a national secretariat to coordinate all attempts to deal with the HIV/AIDS problem in the country.

3 April 2000 – Government signed an agreement to sell 70% of Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), a state subsidiary, to Anglo-American mining cooperation.

5 April 2000 – Zambia would receive a loan of \$63 million from the World Bank to assist the country with its broad eco-



Tsvangirai, opposition leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) speaks at the first congress of the recently formed labour political party



National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) supporters celebrate after the governments defeat in the referendum for a draft constitution

nomie reforms.

13 April 2000 – WFP will provide \$2,6 million in food aid to about 30,000 Angolan refugees currently residing stationed in Zambia.



ZIMBABWE

15 February 2000 – Zimbabweans rejected the government's draft constitution. The Constitutional Committee released the results, in which 55% of the electorate voted NO to the draft and only 45% voted YES.

7 April 2000 – President Mugabe stated that President Obasanjo of Nigeria is going to serve as a mediator between Zimbabwe and Britain over the land feud.

18 April 2000 – It was reported that about 26,000 landmines were demined in Zimbabwe in the last 18 months. This cleared up about 20km stretch of land near the Victoria Falls and another pieces of land in the Zambezi Valley.

19 April 2000 – British Foreign Office announced that the Zimbabwean government has agreed to meet with the British government over the land crisis.