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This edition of *Conflict Trends* focuses on Nigeria with guest editor Dr. Jimi Peters of the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs

## EDITORIAL

BY HUSSEIN SOLOMON

**T**his issue of *Conflict Trends* focuses on Nigeria. Two reasons account for this. Firstly, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with a population of 123,337,822 million. It occupies a vast area of 923,768 km<sup>2</sup>, within which great natural resources can be found. Its armed forces is one of Africa's largest. Clearly, Nigeria has the potential to make a major contribution to the rebirth of the continent, as is clearly evident from the important role its soldiers play in peacekeeping missions. Thus, Africa needs a stable, prosperous Nigeria. Conversely, a weak and divisive Nigeria is not in the interests of either Nigerians, or Africa as a whole. The impact of an imploding Nigeria would reverberate throughout West Africa, as is clearly indicated by the following geographical realities: Nigeria shares 773 km of its borders with Benin; 1,690 km with Cameroon; 87 km with Chad; and 1,497 km with Niger. It is absolutely imperative for us all to understand the problems being faced by the Obasanjo administration, with a view to seeking a solution to them.

Secondly, the problems this West African behemoth has to face are not uniquely Nigerian, but are African in scope. Nigeria is a microcosm – albeit a large one – of the problems the African continent is confronted with. Consider the following: most African states are heterogenous in character and often have to deal with problems of rampant ethnic chauvinism or religious fundamentalism; Nigeria is more heterogenous than most African states, consisting of more than 250 ethnic

groups, including Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio, and Tiv; Nigeria's population consists of Muslims (50%), Christians (40%) and adherents of indigenous beliefs (10%); and finally, many African states have to manage tensions between central and local government. Such tensions also prevail between the Nigerian federal government and the 36 states which form part of the sovereign space that is contemporary Nigeria. As with several other African states, Nigeria also has border and maritime disputes with neighbouring states.

Consequently, how Nigeria deals with these problems could set the tone for how other African states could successfully manage similar problems. For instance, in its dispute with Cameroon over land and maritime boundaries around the Bakassi Peninsula, the case was put before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In putting the case before the ICJ, the parties clearly illustrated that human suffering and loss of life do not necessarily have to follow such border disputes.

We, at ACCORD, wish Nigeria and its people well as it successfully overcomes these obstacles, and in the process, realises true emancipation, which is the cornerstone idea captured in the concept of the African Renaissance.

On a more personal note, I would like to thank my guest editor, Dr. Jimi Peters and his colleagues at the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, who were partners with ACCORD on this issue of *Conflict Trends*. ▴

# Rebuilding the state of Somalia

The three gruelling three months of talks in Arta, Djibouti, yielded positive results when a Somali Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and a new president were elected. The Somali National Peace Conference – an initiative aimed at ostensibly rebuilding the state of Somalia – resumed on 2 May 2000. The process was initiated by Djibouti's president, Omar Guelleh, but fell under the overall endorsement and support of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The conference drew leaders and representatives from civil society, various clan leaders, politicians and intellectuals based both inside Somalia, as well as those who remain in exile.

The TNA – which will remain in Djibouti until a government is established – consists of 245 members from various clans throughout the country. The Somali leaders who gathered in Arta, agreed on a clan-based, power-sharing system as the *modus operandi* for the TNA. In this way, seats in the TNA were allocated to the four main clans: Dir, Darod, Digil-Mirifle and Hawiye. Further allocations were based on other sub-clans, politicians and members of civil society. The clan-based system is viewed as an appropriate step towards forging unity in Somalia – an important feature for a nation that has had no central authority or government for almost a decade.

The next step after the formation of the TNA was the election of the interim president. The TNA voted for Abdiqasim Salad Hasan, a former deputy prime minister and interior minister of former president, Siad Barre. President Hasan was sworn in on 27 August and has already embarked on three important visits to Libya, Saudi Arabia and New York. During his visit to Libya, the president met with one of the faction leaders, Hussein Aided of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), who was one of the faction leaders who turned down an invitation to attend the Djibouti process. On the recommendation of the president, moves abound within the TNA to form a government. The process of

forming a government will be preceded by the appointment of a prime minister.

Notwithstanding this historic achievement in the life of Somalia, there remain a few hurdles that the Assembly still has to face. Firstly, there is a need to secure the involvement of those political leaders from Somaliland and Puntland who boycotted the peace conference. This is necessary, because any successful transitional process ought to be inclusive. Despite the fact that these two administrations boycotted the first crucial proceedings, they still have a role to play in the long-term nation building and reconstruction initiatives. In the same vein, the new Assembly will have to engage with the warlords inside Somalia, in order to ensure the internal sustainability of the peace process.

The above is particularly important as one of the faction leaders, Hussein Aided, has refused to recognise the new president, seeing him merely as another 'faction leader' who represents the 'Arta group', rather than an impartial representative of a central Somali authority. The success of the new parliament and the future of the government are also dependent on the manner in which the faction leaders (and 'their concerns') are dealt with.

Of further concern is the prosecution of war criminals. This issue is complicated by the fact that some of the members of the TNA are allegedly implicated in such crimes. A possible solution could be a Truth Commission that seeks to reconcile the Somali people, as opposed to merely seeking retribution.

The Somali peace initiative deserves even more support from the IGAD, particularly considering its successes thus far. Also, for this initiative to be sustainable, the international community will have to play its role by supporting the TNA. In this way, the consolidation of the peace process would be ensured. The country's last 10 years remain a firm reminder that anything contrary to this, could drag Somalia into an abyss of civil strife once again. ▀



MANUEL DE ALMEIDA/AFP

Examining the role  
of civil society in the  
Angolan peace process

CONFLICT UPDATE

BY VIRGINIE LADISCH

# Civil society play their role in the **angolan** peace process

**A**fter almost 40 years of seemingly endless war, and several failed attempts to build a sustainable peace in Angola, hope for peace now appears to lie in the hands of Angola's emerging civil society. Non-governmental organisations, such as the Inter-Denominational Committee for Peace in Angola, have called for the involvement of all Angolan citizens in the search for peace and reconciliation.

Despite numerous difficulties and a restrictive political atmosphere, there are various groups in Angolan civil society that are currently working towards achieving peace. These include the Inter-Denominational Committee for Peace in Angola (COIPEA); the Forum on Angolan Non Govern-

mental Organisations (FONGA); the Angolan Group of Reflection for Peace (GARP); an alliance formed by seven opposition parties; the independent media; academics and students. This article will highlight some of the contributions made by these groups, which have worked towards achieving a sustainable peace in Angola.

## The church

The Peace Congress, sponsored by Angolan churches, was held in Luanda from 18-21 July 2000. It was a landmark event on the path to possible peace and negotiation: for the first time in 50 years a congress and debate was held between various sectors of Angolan society, and not just

between the MPLA and UNITA. As a follow-up to the Peace Congress, the Committee of Angolan Churches announced their willingness to mediate between the government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA movement. The committee pledged to help arrange a direct meeting between them.

The peace movement has also called for ordinary people to take part in the peace-building efforts.

### Non-governmental organisations

The Angolan Group for Reflection of Peace (GARP) – an active partner in the Quaker International Affairs Programme – was formed in April 1999 as a coalition made up of churches, intellectuals, trade unions, journalists and other members of civil society. All those who are part of the coalition insist that dialogue is the only way to end Angola's civil war. GARP mobilises civilians to engage in activities that promote a sustainable culture of peace. In July 1999, it produced a Manifesto for Peace, which highlighted its hopes and demands for the peace process. It called for the initiation of an inclusive negotiation process that would be chaired and monitored primarily by an organised Angolan civil society.

### Opposition parties

Seven Angolan opposition parties have formed a joint platform which has called for the dissolution of government institutions and an immediate ceasefire between the government forces and UNITA. In an attempt to form a united opposition against the ruling MPLA party, these parties gathered for a three-day congress in Luanda on 9 August 2000. They gathered under the banner: 'One opposition, unique and indivisible, for a better Angola'. The congress concluded with five resolutions, which included a call for an immediate ceasefire and the creation of a permanent dialogue. The congress also resolved to establish a process of conflict resolution between the government and UNITA.

### Independent media

The independent media, composed mostly of Luanda-based publications (including the *Commercio*, *Actualidade*, *Folha 8*, and *Agora*), has been reporting on a variety of internal issues. However, freedom of the media is being threatened by a draft press law, which would make it almost impossible for journalists to cover the country's



MANUEL DE ALMEIDA/AFP

Thousands of refugees wait for the distribution of relief aid in Munda, near the city of Huambo

political issues without the risk of incarceration. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has appealed to the government to withdraw the bill.

### Recommendations

Based on lessons learned from past attempts at resolving conflict between the warring MPLA and UNITA, several strategic contributions from civil society could give direction to Angola's peaceful future:

- The strengthening of peace initiatives by various civil groups should be supported and encouraged by all stakeholders;
- Reconciliation and direct/indirect dialogue involving representatives from civil society, churches, political parties, and the government should be fostered;
- Those involved should advocate for the withdrawal of the draft press law to allow for freedom of expression.

The path to peace and freedom in Angola may be a long and challenging one, but there is hope that grass roots efforts initiated by Angolan civil society could have a positive impact on the peace process. ▴

### Endnote

Virginie Ladisch served an internship with ACCORD in 2000.



DOMINIQUE FAGET/AFP

Putting Western Sahara's  
unresolved aggression  
into historical perspective

CONFLICT UPDATE

BY SENZO NGUBANE

# colonialism

## lives on in Africa

**S**ituated in northern Africa and bordering the Atlantic Ocean between Mauritania and Morocco, this territory stands out as, ostensibly, Africa's last colony.<sup>1</sup> For more than three decades, the question of Western Sahara's independence has remained unanswered, and the conflict has become a forgotten and neglected international crisis.

Spain occupied Western Sahara during the colonial era. Thereafter, Mauritania and Morocco invaded the territory. Currently, Western Sahara is under Morocco's occupation. For about the last ten years, however, the UN has attempted to conduct a referendum to decide the territory's future.

Interesting parallels can be drawn between the situation in East Timor and the situation in Western Sahara.<sup>2</sup> For instance, both territories were abandoned by their colonial countries, Spain

and Portugal. Subsequently, both territories were annexed by their 'powerful' neighbours – Indonesia, in the case of East Timor; and Morocco, in the case of Western Sahara.<sup>3</sup> Also, guerrilla movements were formed in both territories to wage wars against the occupying foreign powers. In the case of Western Sahara, the *Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro* – better known as the POLISARIO Front – was established to engage in the struggle for independence. In contrast, East Timor recently held its referendum for self-determination, under the auspices of the UN. Meanwhile, Western Sahara still awaits the realisation of such a goal.<sup>4</sup>

### Historical background

The process of self-determination for Western Sahara began in 1974, due to international and



A Sahrawi refugee in a  
refugee camp near  
Tindouf, Algeria

internal pressure on Spain to relinquish the colony. This process began when Spain conducted a census of the people from Western Sahara, with the intention of eventually staging a UN observed referendum. Morocco was among those countries that objected to the proposed referendum, because it excluded the option of Western Sahara being integrated with Morocco or Mauritania.<sup>5</sup> However, a UN fact-finding mission into Western Sahara discovered there was overwhelming support for independence, and firm opposition to the idea of integrating with any neighbouring country.<sup>6</sup>

In an attempt to delay the referendum, Morocco referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for legal advice. The ICJ was asked to consider two issues. Firstly, whether or not Western Sahara was a *terra nullius*<sup>7</sup> at the time of Spanish colonisation. Secondly, if it was not a *terra*

*nullius* at that time, what was the legal relationship between Western Sahara and Morocco, and Western Sahara and Mauritania.<sup>8</sup> On 15 October 1975, the ICJ pronounced its opinion regarding the two matters. With reference to the first issue, the Court stated that Western Sahara was not a *terra nullius* at the time of Spanish colonialism, because the territory was inhabited by tribes who were socially and politically organised by chiefs who were competent enough to represent them. Regarding the second issue, the Court stated that it found no evidence to suggest any relations of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco, or Western Sahara and Mauritania.<sup>9</sup> In essence, the opinion of the International Court was that any foreign occupation of Western Sahara would be inconsistent with international law, and therefore, the people of that territory were entitled to

independence. In other words, the occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco or Mauritania would be contrary to historical facts and would run counter to international law.

In the early 1970s, during an event known as the Green March, Morocco's King Hassan II ordered the invasion of 350,000 troops into Western Sahara<sup>10</sup> and assumed control of the northern parts of the territory.<sup>11</sup> This invasion resulted in a mass exodus of more than 100,000 Sahrawis, who fled into neighbouring Algeria and who have remained there as refugees ever since. The Green March highlighted the extent of nationalist sentiment for a greater Morocco, which also laid claim to northern Mali and some parts of western Algeria.<sup>12</sup> Mauritania invaded Western Sahara in 1976, and took charge of the southern region until its withdrawal in 1979.

Justification for the 1976 invasion by Morocco and Mauritania was based on the argument that, historically, the people of Western Sahara fell under the protection of the Moroccan king. Consequently, they owed their allegiance to him. Prior to its departure from Western Sahara, Spain entered into an agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, which stated that the colony belonged to both countries.<sup>13</sup> This meant the two countries could divide the territory between themselves, in violation of international law.

The Polisario Front's war with Morocco and Mauritania continued throughout the 1970s, and eventually forced Mauritania to relinquish its claims to the territory in 1979.<sup>14</sup> Mauritania's withdrawal left Morocco as the only foreign power occupying the territory.

A number of initiatives have been undertaken to try and resolve the crisis between Morocco and the Polisario Front, and it is to those that we now turn.

### **The role of the OAU and UN in resolving the conflict**

Since the early 1970s, the OAU has called for Western Saharan self-determination and has persistently supported the idea of a referendum. In 1983, the OAU Summit passed a resolution (AHG 104) that called for direct talks between Morocco and the Polisario Front. In addition, the UN General Assembly passed its own resolution (40/50) and also called for direct talks between the two parties. The aim of the talks was to end hostilities and set the stage for a referendum.

A series of diplomatic meetings, facilitated by both the OAU and the UN (but more specifically by the former UN secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar), yielded positive results in 1990, when an agreement for a referendum was reached. The UN-OAU Settlement Agreement, which proposed a six month transition period, had the following key stipulations:

- A ceasefire and exchange of prisoners;
- A reduction of Moroccan troops from 100,000 to 65,000; disarmament and confinement of troops to designated areas;
- The return of about 120,000 Saharan refugees from Algeria and Mauritania;
- The identification and registration of voters, and the organisation of a referendum following a campaign period of three weeks;
- The withdrawal of Moroccan soldiers or the demobilisation of the Polisario Front, depending on the outcome of the vote.

Following the signing of the agreement, the Security Council adopted a resolution to establish the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). In September 1991, MINURSO began its activities with about 200 UN military observers. The referendum was expected to take place in January 1992. However, the process was to suffer a number of setbacks that resulted in its postponement to 31 October 2000.<sup>15</sup>

### **The delayed referendum**

A crucial stipulation of the Settlement Plan was the staging of a referendum, and this became the main cause of disagreements between the conflicting parties. The Settlement Plan envisaged that potential voters for the referendum would be based on the 1974 census, which put the number of Sahrawis at about 80,000.<sup>16</sup> This was meant to ensure that only 'native' Sahrawis participated in the exercise.

Even though this was agreeable to both parties at the time of signing, Morocco expressed reservations about it when the agreement had to be implemented. Morocco argued that there were a number of people who were eligible to vote, but that they would be disenfranchised if the focus was on the 1974 census.<sup>17</sup> The problem started when the (now former) secretary general of the UN, Perez de Cuellar expanded the criteria for eligibility. According to the new changes, all those people with ties to one of the 88 sub-tribes of the ten tribes listed in the 1974 Spanish census would be

eligible to vote, if they could provide proof in the form of official documents issued by Spain, or through oral testimony from respected elders (or sheikhs).<sup>18</sup>

Both Morocco and Western Sahara realised that the question of who was eligible to vote in a future referendum was crucial to the outcome of the exercise. Morocco's image had been blemished by accusations that its government had attempted to shift the demographic balance in its favour, in

order to consolidate its chances of winning the referendum. This had been achieved by trying to include non-Sahrawi people in the referendum. On the other hand, Morocco accused the Polisario Front of wanting to limit the number of eligible voters, in order to tip the scales in its own favour on the day of the referendum. These issues stalled the process of voter identification and disrupted the channels of communication between the two parties.<sup>19</sup>

The turning point came in 1997, when the newly appointed special envoy of the UN secretary general, James Baker III, succeeded in getting the parties to the negotiating table in Houston.<sup>20</sup> The main thrust of the Houston agreement was to ensure the continuation of voter registration and the return of Sahrawi refugees. Following this agreement, the referendum was set to take place in 1998. However, it never materialised due to continued differences between the two parties.

To date, MINURSO has approved (through its Identification Commission) a list of about 86,386 applicants who are eligible to vote in a referendum.<sup>21</sup> However, problems remain with the 130,000 other applicants who were turned down by the Commission, on the grounds that they did not meet the criteria. As a result, Morocco has contested the decision to exclude the applicants.

Considering that the Western Sahara crisis has dragged on for so many years, and that the route to the referendum appears gloomy due to recurring problems and fundamental differences between the two parties,<sup>22</sup> the international community has been forced to look at other alternatives in an attempt to find a solution.

### Resolving the crisis

In his latest report to the Security Council, UN secretary-general reiterated the problems that have been stalling the peace process. In addition, Mr Annan mentioned the possibility of a political solution as a way out of this crisis.

Through his personal envoy, Mr Charles Baker, a political solution was suggested to the parties, with several options included. Firstly, there could be a negotiated agreement for the full integration of Western Sahara with Morocco. Secondly, there could be a negotiated agreement for the full independence of Western Sahara. Thirdly, there could be a negotiated agreement that could fall somewhere between the first two options mentioned above. Lastly, there could be a negotiated agreement that would permit the successful implementation of the Settlement

### HISTORICAL FACTS

**1884** Western Sahara was invaded and colonised by Spain.

**1963** The question of Western Sahara's independence came to the attention of the United Nations (UN) as part of its decolonisation process. During this period, Western Sahara was regarded as a non-governing territory.

**1967** The discovery of one of the world's largest phosphate reserves, which marked the beginning of the mining process.

**October 1964** The UN Decolonisation Committee adopted its first resolution regarding the future of Western Sahara.

**Early 1970's** The beginning of the 1970s saw the emergence of peaceful protests to Spanish rule, which were violently crushed. Of particular importance was the Zemla protest action, when people who participated in the protest were imprisoned.

**10 May 1973** A group of students formed the Polisario Front under the leadership of Cortina Mauri. This marked the beginning of an armed rebellion against Spanish occupation.

**1976** The Polisario Front declared the Saharian Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and formed a government in exile. To date, this government still administers those refugee camps and areas that are under its occupation.

**1984** Morocco withdrew its OAU membership when 26 of its 51 members recognised the SADR. The SADR is now recognised by 76 countries worldwide.



Plan.<sup>23</sup> In the words of the secretary general, the idea of arriving at a political solution is informed by the belief that 'a political solution is far more preferable than a breakdown in the process which might lead to hostilities, something that must be avoided at all costs'.<sup>24</sup>

However, this political solution poses several problems of its own. Firstly, it is unlikely that the parties would agree to any alternative other than the referendum. In fact, the leader of the Polisario Front has already stated that his movement would only accept the UN Peace Plan, and that the holding of a referendum was the only solution to the Western Sahara problem.<sup>25</sup> Thus, it seems that the situation is back to where it started, with an attempt to hold a referendum.

One of the arguments that has been put forward by the Polisario Front, is that the conflict lacks the international support it deserves. Accordingly, the Front has appealed to the international community to put pressure on Morocco to respect and abide by the Peace Plan. For example, during the Southern African Development Community Summit (SADC) in Namibia, the leader of the Front, Mohammed Abdelaziz, appealed for SADC leaders to support their cause.

On the other hand, significant changes have taken place in Morocco, which have some commentators arguing that the conflict could finally be heading towards a resolution. These sentiments relate to the death of King Hassan II in July 1999, and the ascendance to the throne of his son, King Mohammed VI. Soon after assuming the mantle of authority, the new monarch established a Royal Commission to deal with the socio-economic problems of the Saharan people.

In the domestic arena, King Mohammed VI sacked his interior minister, Driss Basri, who was regarded as a hardliner. The king's decision followed the violent reaction of Moroccan police to a peaceful protest in Laayoune.<sup>26</sup> If this is anything to go by, hope has become mingled with fear as the process reaches a deadlock yet again. However, there is hope, because a change in leadership necessarily brings about a political vacuum and opens up new avenues that have never before been explored.

This article began as an attempt to offer a historical perspective on the Western Sahara conflict. In so doing, it reflected on a number of issues that have become major stumbling blocks along the path to finding a peaceful resolution that would finally end the conflict. The main role of the

UN presence is to ensure a referendum is held – anything other than that could create numerous problems. Whilst the UN continues to search for a solution, the international community is required to intensify all its efforts to end the crisis, and a response, similar to those experienced in East Timor and Indonesia, is absolutely necessary. ▀

## Footnotes

- 1 Reinoud, L., 1999, *The Western Sahara: Africa's Last Colony* in Mekenkamp, van Tongeren, P. & van de Veen, H., (eds), *Searching for Peace in Africa, An Overview of Conflict Prevention Management Activities*, p.103, The Netherlands: EU Platform.
- 2 Ruddy, F., 1997, *The Western Sahara: Can the UN Turn Failure Into Success? Congressional Defense and Foreign Policy Forum*, Washington D.C.
- 3 Adekaye, A., 2000, *Sheiks, Soldiers and Sand, The World Today*, Vol.56 No.1, (January), <<http://www.arso.org//01-3-28.htm>>.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p.1.
- 5 Fadel, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 6 Reinoud, *op.cit.*, p.106.
- 7 A term referring to a territory that belongs to no-one.
- 8 Fadel, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 9 Fadel, *op.cit.*, pp.2-3; Bolton, J., 1998, *Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict, Congressional Defence and Foreign Policy Forum*, Washington D.C. <<http://www.arso.org//01-2-54.htm>>.
- 10 Reinoud, *op.cit.*, p.103; Adebajo *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 11 Morocco came into an understanding with Spain that it should recognise greater Morocco in return for fishing and phosphate mining in Western Sahara.
- 12 Adebajo, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 13 Adebajo, *op.cit.*, p.3.
- 14 *Western Sahara: Africa's Forgotten Colony?*, *op.cit.*, pp.55-56; Fadel, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 15 As at the time of writing.
- 16 *Western Sahara: Africa's Forgotten Colony?* *op.cit.*, p.57.
- 17 Essentially this group of people refers to the three ethnic groups whose legitimate attachment to Western Sahara is contested by the Polisario Front.
- 18 Adebajo; *op.cit.*, p.4.
- 19 See Report of the Secretary General, 1995 S/1995/779.
- 20 The Houston agreement was the culmination of a series of diplomatic meetings between the two parties under the auspices of James Baker.
- 21 Goodman, A., *Parties to Western Sahara Dispute Invited to London Talks, Reuters Business Briefing*, 5 May 2000.
- 22 See Secretary General's Report to the Security Council, S2000/683.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p.2.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p.5.
- 25 Polisario Front will only accept the UN Peace Plan, *Reuters Business Briefing*, 20 July 2000.
- 26 Adebajo, *op.cit.*, p.5.

## Endnote

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## Contemporary Conflict Resolution

H. Miall, O. Ramsbotham & T. Woodhouse: Polity Press, 1999, 270pp

The authors of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* explained that it was written to meet the need for a single and comprehensive survey on contemporary conflict resolution. They also felt the book would make a valuable contribution to the management of post-Cold War conflicts. The target audience includes researchers, students, policy-makers, practitioners, as well as those involved in conflict resolution.

Chapter one gives a brief background into the manifestation of conflict around the world. This is done by way of an introduction to conflict resolution. The chapter also includes statistics of deadly quarrels, as well as detailed information regarding conflict resolution and the international community.

Chapter two deals with the foundations, constructions and reconstructions of conflict resolution. This is a very important chapter for those with an interest in the study of conflict, as it explains the development of conflict studies in terms of four different phases. There are the Precursors and Foundations (1950's & 1960's) – which explain the establishment of peace and conflict research with reference to exponents such as Kenneth Boulding, Johan Galtung and John Burton; there are the Constructions (1970's & 1980's) – which explain the development of problem-solving approaches to conflict based on the work of the Harvard School, Adam Curle and Elise Boulding; and finally, there are the Reconstructions (1990's) – which explain some of the criticisms (such as culture and gender) and new developments (such as virtual diplomacy) in the field of conflict resolution.

The content of chapter three gives an overview of theories and frameworks, which enables the reader to understand contemporary conflict including the sources of contemporary international-social conflict, with conflict tracking and mapping.

Chapter four focuses on the prevention of conflict. This chapter includes sections on the causes and preventors of war, with special attention being paid to interstate and non-interstate war. The case studies in this chapter include Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo.

Working in war zones is the focus of chapter five. In this chapter, the problems and realities of war zones are explained, with reference to war

economies and cultures of violence. The preparation of the ground for conflict resolution is also dealt with. The case study for this chapter is Rwanda.

Chapter six deals with the ending of violent conflict. Special attention is given to the challenges involved in ending violent conflict and war. South Africa, Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland are the case studies discussed in this chapter.

Post-settlement peace-building is explained in chapter seven. The definition and challenges of post-settlement peace-building are discussed. Specific attention is given to the post-settlement peace-building standard operating procedures of the United Nations, and an evaluation of these procedures is offered.

Chapter eight takes the form of a conclusion, and focuses on the past and the future, as well as some of the pressing issues regarding the resolution of contemporary conflicts.

This is an excellent book for anyone with an interest in contemporary conflict resolution and is especially valuable for students new to the field of peace and conflict studies. The value lies in its overview of the history, development and theoretical frameworks applicable to peace and conflict studies. The emphasis on the resolution of conflict, and particularly on peace-building, is important as it denotes some of the contemporary thinking on conflict resolution. The use of diverse case studies from more recent conflicts, also contributes to strengthening the focus and value of the book. The fact that examples are included of both successfully resolved and continuing conflicts, also enhances the value of the book, as it serves to underline the importance of the case studies and their relevance within the context of the theories and frameworks of conflict resolution in the post-Cold War world.

Although this book is not all-inclusive, it contains enough of the more substantive and important aspects of peace and conflict studies for it to be recommended to anyone with an interest in conflict resolution. ▴

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YOAV LEMMER/ANP

## Understanding Zambia's role in the DRC peace process

CONFLICT UPDATE

BY JACOMIEN VAN DER BIJ

# zambia & the drc

In spite of signing the Lusaka ceasefire agreement on 10 July 1999, there are still frequent clashes between the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and various rebel groups. The conflict started in August 1998, when rebel groups supported by Rwanda and Uganda, took up arms to oust President Laurent Kabila. While Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe support President Kabila and his government, the rebels – the *Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo* (MLC), the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la democratie-Goma* (RCD-Goma) and the RCD-Kisangani – are backed by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

### Why is Zambia involved in the DRC peace process?

Zambia is one of the countries trying to find a peaceful solution for the DRC. There are several reasons which can explain Zambia's involvement in the DRC peace process. The three main reasons relate to its geographical position, security and values. Firstly, Zambia is landlocked between eight different countries. Consequently, political instability in any of its neighbours poses a threat to its socio-economic and political stability. Secondly, a consequence of the DRC conflict has been a proliferation in arms within Zambia, which poses a

threat to its internal security. The increasing number of refugees in Zambia has also impacted on its internal security and socio-economic infrastructure. Thirdly, as one of the few African nations to have remained relatively peaceful since its independence in 1964, Zambia is driven by its values to try and manage the conflict in the DRC, and thus, enhance peace within the region. Consequently, it has played an active and positive role in the political initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict in the DRC.

### Zambia's main role

In August 1998, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandated Zambian President Frederick Chiluba to mediate the DRC conflict. In 1999, President Chiluba's mediation efforts resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which set the stage for the peace process. On 10 July, the agreement was signed by the DRC regional heads of state, as well as Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. On 31 August, the rebel groups also signed the agreement. The main provisions of the agreement included the immediate cessation of hostilities; the retreat of foreign troops; the establishment of a Joint Military Commission; the deployment of a peacekeeping force; disarmament of militia groups; and the establishment of a Congolese national dialogue and reconciliation debate.

Initially, all the rebels groups refused to sign because they had been excluded from the ceasefire negotiations. After the rebels groups agreed to sign the accord, two of them – the RCD-Goma and the RCD-Kisangani – had a disagreement over who the real representatives were of the rebel forces fighting the DRC government. Together with South Africa, Zambia played an important role in getting the rebels to sign the agreement, which was finally accomplished on 31 August 1999.

During the last two years, Zambia has been an important channel for dialogue through the summits it has hosted. To this end, the international community has applauded Zambia for its role as mediator in the DRC peace process.

### Present situation

The peace process has not been without its challenges. The president of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba, in his capacity as mediator, has had to confront three contentious issues. The first relates to the former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, and his controversial position as facilitator

in the peace process. The DRC government rejected him as facilitator for the inter-Congolese dialogue. Secondly, there have been difficulties with regard to the deployment of peacekeeping troops in government controlled areas. Finally, at the end of August 2000, the DRC government agreed to allow the peacekeeping troops into its controlled areas. However, the DRC government's position remains unclear and the UN is trying to clarify its position before troops are deployed. Thirdly, there have been difficulties with regard to the implementation of the agreement, as ceasefire violations have frequently been reported.

However, Zambia and other concerned stakeholders face a new challenge: the unwillingness of the DRC government to uphold the Lusaka agreement. On 29 August, the Congolese foreign minister, Abdoulaye Yerodia, demanded an immediate amendment to the Lusaka agreement – he wanted Uganda and Rwanda named as aggressors. On 1 September, the Constituent Assembly of the DRC also declared the Lusaka Peace Agreement obsolete.

### The way ahead

Several issues need to be addressed:

- As mediator, Zambia should continue to engage rival factions in dialogue, so that an agreement can be reached regarding who should facilitate the proceedings;
- Zambia should continue with its role as a channel of dialogue, in order to set the ground for a meaningful discussion that could bring about a new dispensation;
- Zambia should push for an intensification of peace-building efforts;
- Zambia should engage in dialogue with rival factions, in order to achieve full implementation of the agreement according to a specific timetable.

With the mediation efforts of Zambia, together with support from the international community, a sustainable peace in the DRC could eventually be realised. ▀

### Endnotes

Conflict Update Series is published under the DFID funded Preventive Action Programme at ACCORD.

Jacomien van der Bij is currently serving an internship with ACCORD.



ACCORD participated in a recent SANDF emergency exercise

PEACEKEEPING

BY KWEZI MNGQIBISA

# exercise zenith

**D**uring October, ACCORD was invited to participate in Exercise Zenith, a highly complex emergency exercise undertaken by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Through its Peacekeeping Programme, ACCORD coordinated the participation of numerous civil society organisations, including UNICEF, Save the Children, All Africa Women for Peace, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Ceasefire Campaign and the Institute for Global Dialogue.

Civilian participants were trained to realise that they cannot plan their activities without taking into account humanitarian factors and other organisations working in the field. The participants attended various planning sessions facilitated by military commanders. These sessions were held in syndicate rooms, where participants were trained on how to respond to situations in the field,

according to the exercise scenario. As in all conflict situations, the issue of and response to humanitarian emergencies is vitally important, and the civilian participants were required to offer their expert advice on how the military could effectively work with the humanitarian organisations.

The civilian group viewed the exercise as a step in the right direction, in terms of forging a culture of understanding and respect between the military and non-governmental organisations, public volunteer organisations and international organisations. It is hoped that the interaction between the military and civilian components will help establish realistic perceptions about the military and the way in which it carries out its duties. The exercise gave the civilian group insight into different military concerns and preoccupations. It also enabled the group to incorporate their humanitarian dimension into the planning process. The end result of these

efforts will hopefully be the establishment of a constructive working relationship between the military and civilian components.


ACCORD's participation in the exercise was vitally important in terms of forging alliances between the military and civil society groupings. Its presence was a key factor in the creation of a cooperative environment. ▽



## Lessons Learned from Exercise Blue Crane

South Africa: ACCORD, ISBN 0-620-26435-7


**Exercise Blue Crane was a brigade-level peacekeeping exercise conducted in South Africa in April 1999 by most of the SADC countries. This book highlights various lessons learned from the exercise through reports from the military and civilian components that participated, as well as through observation from the perspective of the international observers and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.**



**The Lesson Learned from Exercise Blue Crane will be invaluable for future field exercises of this nature in SADC, and will be very useful for all planners of future exercises in Africa and beyond.**

**In fact many of the lessons extend beyond the realm of the exercise and could impact on the conduct of future peace operations by SADC countries and beyond.**

**This book will therefore be of special interest to peacekeepers throughout the world. ▽**



who will keep the peace in Africa?

The Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD, has for the past five years embarked on peacekeeping training in an effort to build capacity on the continent. Through the Programme and strategic partnerships, civilian and military peacekeepers have been trained in conflict management skills. Reflecting the challenges of today's peacekeeping missions, ACCORD's emphasis is on civil-military cooperation through joint skills training

**Training tomorrow's  
peacekeepers today**



Examining the origins of  
Nigerian conflict and  
the effectiveness of the  
government's response



GEORGE ESIRI/REUTERS

BY AKIN ALADESUA

FEATURE

# conflict

## in the fourth republic

**O**n 29 May 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed the office of the President of Nigeria for the second time.

He held the office as a Head of State between 1976 and 1979. His assumption of office signaled the commencement of Nigeria's fourth republic, and a new democratic dispensation. However, it appears as if the Obasanjo government and the country's fledgling democracy are being threatened by a series of conflicts and crises. Most of these conflicts are not new: they have been with the Nigerian nation for a long time and were inherited by the new government. However, their recent resurgence has taken on more violent dimensions, and is now of grave concern to the government.

This paper will examine the origins of some of these conflicts; measures taken by the present government to curb them; the effectiveness or otherwise of these measures; and will also make

suggestions for lasting solutions to these conflicts.

### The Kaduna Crisis

The February 2000 crisis was sparked off by the Kaduna state government's intention to implement the controversial Islamic Sharia legal code within the state. Earlier this year, the Sharia legal system was introduced in certain states in the northern part of the country, notably in the Zamfara and Sokoto states. Since the introduction, other governors in the north have either joined, or are planning to join the Sharia bandwagon by implementing it in their states. In planning to implement the Sharia system in Kaduna state, the state government neglected to take cognisance of the fact that about 55% of the state's population are non-Muslims. Among these non-Muslims are southerners and indigenous people who belong to the groups known as the northern minorities. These

minority nationalities, having been dominated politically by the Hausa-Fulani ruling class for a long time, perceived the planned implementation of the Sharia as a form of religious domination.

The riots, which started on 21 February, lasted for almost a week and included the mass burning of churches, mosques and vehicles. Valuable properties were also destroyed or burnt. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed by the state government and soldiers were brought in when the police could no longer cope with the rampaging rioters. Hundreds of people, especially women, children, and southerners, were killed during the riots. In an interview with a news magazine, Governor Alhaji Mohammed Makarfi said about 500 people were killed, and about 3,000 houses and shops were destroyed. While the February riots had their roots in the Sharia controversy, the May riots were a fall-out of a communal conflict between the Narayi and Barnawa areas of Kaduna town. The conflict, which later spread to other areas of Kaduna, is alleged to have been caused by the death of a Narayi man, who is believed to have been killed at Barnawa. Several properties were destroyed and about 300 people were reportedly killed, including a member of the House of Representatives, (Rtd) Major Ibrahim Abdulahi.

As part of measures taken to curb the conflicts, the Kaduna state government instituted a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to probe the February crisis, and to recommend measures to prevent a recurrence. A committee (consisting of an equal number of Christians and Muslims), was also been set up to advise the state government on the controversial Sharia issue. The governor also noted that about 200 people, who were arrested in connection with the May crisis, would be tried. In its reaction to the Kaduna crises, the federal government summoned a meeting of the Council of State to discuss ways of finding a solution to the crises. At end of the meeting, the northern governors promised that they would stop the implementation of the Sharia code, albeit temporarily. However, some of the governors have since denied ever making such a promise. Furthermore, the Sokoto state government commenced with the implementation of the Sharia code at the end of May 2000.

Meanwhile, concerned analysts have stated that promises from the northern governors to not temporarily implement the code would not resolve the problem. They also maintain that the solution to the incessant religious conflicts in the northern part of Nigeria lies in the restructuring of the whole

country. Such a restructuring should grant limited autonomy to the various nationalities that make up the Nigerian nation. Some people call this restructuring pure federalism, while others refer to it as confederalism. It should be noted that Kaduna State has a large population of minority ethnic groups or nationalities who are non-Muslim. In an effort to curb the rising levels of violence, Governor Alhaji Makarfi said that he would support the creation of a new Kaduna State for the people of southern Kaduna if that would guarantee peace, but only if the creation was done in accordance with the various constitutional procedures and provisions.

### **The Niger Delta conflicts**

The root cause of the conflicts in the Niger Delta is the exploration and production activities of the multinational oil companies that are operating in the area. Oil was first discovered in the area in 1956, by the Royal Dutch Shell at Oloibiri. Since that discovery, the effects of the activities of these multinational oil companies have been devastating for the people of the Niger Delta, as well as for their lands, rivers, and environment. Frequent oil spillage in the area has led to hitherto fertile lands being rendered unproductive. In addition, fishes and other water fauna found in the area's several rivers and creeks have also died. Meanwhile, the environment is also subjected to air pollution, due to gas emissions by the oil companies. In 1995, a World Bank Report indicated that almost 10% of the Niger Delta's mangrove forests had been wiped out as a result of the deforestation activities of oil companies such as Shell, Agip, Chevron, Elf and Exxon-Mobil.

What a visit to the area would reveal is severe damage to the environment, underdevelopment, poverty, neglect, unemployment, underemployment and a lack of basic infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools and drinkable water. Most of the farmers can no longer farm productively because their lands have been rendered useless. In addition, fishes can no longer thrive in the rivers and streams as a result of the pollution by oil spillage. It can be safely said that the Niger Delta is a classic example of underdevelopment, despite its huge natural and human resources. The people's perception is that the multinational oil companies are acting in concert with the Nigerian government to deliberately underdevelop the area, particularly given the fact that they do not benefit from the proceeds of the oil produced from their land.





GEORGE ESIR/REUTERS

Smoke rises from burning petrol tankers set ablaze during ethnic clashes in Lagos, Nigeria

Increasingly, these perceptions have coloured the way these people have interacted with their state and federal governments, and violent social unrest is common.

Realising the seriousness of the Niger Delta problem, President Obasanjo visited the area in the early days of his administration. During the visit, he assured the people that his government was determined to find a solution to the problems in the area. In fulfilment of that promise, the government initiated the Niger Delta Development Commission Bill (NDDC). The Bill has just been passed by the National Assembly and is now awaiting presidential assent. The government's aim behind setting up the NDDC, was to make it an agency through which funds would be channelled to the Niger Delta area for infrastructural and developmental purposes. In addition, the government has also implemented the 13% Derivation Fund. Through this Fund, 13% of the country's oil revenue will be allocated to the oil producing areas and states.

The challenges facing Obasanjo's administration

are vast, but much can be done through the principles of tolerance and effective democratic governance. Dynamic partnerships would also need to be forged between civil society, government and the international community. At a more practical level, such partnerships would entail:

- Political socialisation: moving the debate from 'us' and 'them' to 'we';
- Equitable economic redistribution: ensuring that all benefit from Nigeria's vast resources;
- A respect for differences: accepting that we can be Muslim or Christian, Ibo or Yoruba, and still be a united Nigeria; and
- A respect for the rule of law: an end to extra-legal forms of opposition; and a commitment to take our problems to the courts and abide by the judgement reached. ♣

## Endnote

Akin Aladesua served an internship with ACCORD in 2000.



The Niger Delta oil and the  
problem of the Nigerian state

FEATURE

BY DR. DOKUBO


# pouring oil on troubled waters

**T**he Niger Delta has been a troubled region, both before Nigeria gained independence, and ever since. Beginning with the agitation for separate states in the 1950s and 1960s, which led to the establishment of the Minorities Commission in 1956, right through to attempts by minority group politicians in the second republic to organise and wrest political power from the majority, the Niger Delta people have been at the centre of a struggle for a solution to the 'national question'.

The people's major grievance with the Nigerian state is that, although the bulk of crude oil is derived from their lands (which is the country's main source of revenue), the people of the Niger Delta are still impoverished and politically marginalised. They accuse the major ethnic groups of

using oil wealth to develop their own areas, at the expense of the areas from which the oil is derived. Furthermore, they quite rightly maintain that several years of oil exploration, and the hazards which accompany it, has degraded their environment and left their communities desolate. Not only have farming and fishing – the main occupations of these minorities – been decimated, but their territories still exist without basic infrastructure and amenities like electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, potable water and so on. These grievances have been directed at both the state and the oil companies, which have been accused of contributing too little in return for the huge profit they have derived from oil.

The fiscal arrangement under the first republic



allowed the regional governments – which were controlled by the major ethnic groups in the country – to retain most of the revenue generated from the export of cash crops through regional produce marketing boards. Only a small percentage of these revenues ever reached the minority areas for development purposes.

In 1967, General Gowon replaced the four regions with 12 states. This action was an attempt to seek a resolution to the ‘national question’ by creating autonomous states for some of the minorities. Consequently, the territorial base of the majorities was divided, and this was of great significance to the struggle over oil. By creating two states for the minorities of the Niger Delta, an age old wish for autonomy and self determination was fulfilled, and the foundation of eastern domination was finally severed. The Niger Delta minorities believed that since the majorities were suddenly excluded from direct access to their oil wealth, that they would then have exclusive control of the oil. However, history has proved them wrong.

When it came to the allocation of centrally collected revenues, the Gowon and Murtala-Obasanjo governments progressively de-emphasised the long-standing principle of allocation by regional derivation. Instead, these revenues were distributed on the basis of population and interstate equality. Consequently, the new oil rich states were denied the export revenue derived from their territories. This was a very different picture from the 1950s and 1960s, when the oil regions were the primary beneficiaries of commodity export revenues. For instance, in March 1969, 50% of both off-shore and on-shore mining rents and royalties were allocated to the state from where they had derived. By March 1979, only 20% of on-shore mining rents and royalties was allocated on a derivation basis.

The creation of states undertaken by the Mohammed-Obasanjo administration in April 1976, further underscored the growing subordination of ethnic minority to majority interests in the post-civil war period. While Gowon’s plans for the creation of 12 states had included at least six ethnic minority states, the 19 new ones consisted of a total of 12 ethnic majority-dominated states and only seven minority-controlled states. Indeed, key ethnic minority requests for New Cross Rivers and Port Harcourt states were overlooked in the 1976

exercise, while some of the homogeneous ethnic majority states were divided into two or more states. This bias underscored the growing official perception that state administrations were primarily avenues for administrative devolution and resource distribution to broad population groups, rather than as instruments of ethnic minority autonomy and security.



The return to civil democratic rule in 1979 did little to enhance the fortunes of the Niger Delta communities. The re-emergence of military rule in 1984 further aggravated the conditions of the Niger Delta people. Contributing to their distress were such factors as the numerous arbitrary acts of ethnic provocation and religious partiality by the administration of Generals Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani Abacha; the deepening economic crisis and declining political legitimacy of the Nigerian state; the repeated manipulation and eventual abortion of the transition programme to the third Nigerian republic; the continuing impact of previous decades of ethnic minority marginalisation; and the resurgence of ethnic nationalities. This wave of minority discontent and distress has probably been most visible and combustible in the oil producing Niger Delta.

A major feature of the recent agitation in the Niger Delta areas, has been the kidnapping of expatriate oil company workers, followed by ransom demands for their release. Oil installations have also reportedly been invaded and blocked. In 1993, the operation and installation of Shell was disrupted by about a hundred communal disturbances, resulting in the loss of some 12 million barrels of crude oil worth about N3.69 billion. In Ogoniland alone, Shell has lost about 8,000 barrels of crude oil per day since the Ogoni ‘rally of

Although the bulk of the oil is derived from their lands, the people of the Niger Delta are still impoverished and politically marginalised

January 1993'. In total, the company estimates that more than 60% of spills and leakages that affect its installations, are caused by acts of sabotage committed by aggrieved oil producing Niger Delta communities.

The military government's response to the demands of the Niger Delta people has, so far, been a combination of 'some carrots and mostly stick'. For instance, in 1991, the federal government tried to address the developmental problems of the Niger Delta by asking the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and multinational oil companies to allocate 3% of their annual investment to community development projects within their area of operation. This policy announcement marked a departure from the previous practice of discretionary, and often perfunctory oil company investment and involvement in community development. However, these changes were too little, too late.

In June 1992, the federal government announced key revenue-sharing reforms designed to contain the increasingly violent rhetoric that was emanating from the Niger Delta. Firstly, federal statutory allocation for the development and rehabilitation of mineral producing areas was increased from 1.5% to 3% of federally collected mineral revenues. However, the oil producing Niger Delta continued to receive 1% of mineral revenues according to the derivation principle. Secondly, a 12-member statutory agency – the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) – was set up to administer the newly expanded allocation. This put an end to the controversial and ineffectual disbursement of the mineral producing areas' fund through ad-hoc presidential committees. Thirdly, the statutory allocation for the amelioration of ecological problems throughout the federation was increased from 1% to 2% of the federation account. Fourthly, the military government committed itself to the establishment of a new national body to deal with environmental issues and ecological emergencies.

These redistributive concessions to the communities of the Niger Delta did not meet their expectations. To them, OMPADEC was established not to succeed: its chairman was not answerable to the various state governors of the Niger Delta, as he derived his powers from the president and was answerable only to him. Consequently, OMPADEC was faced with many difficulties, which reduced its effectiveness. It was an inappropriate and inadequate response to the yearnings of the Niger Delta people. It was grossly under-funded, politically

unrepresentative and administratively over-centralised.

Reflecting on the failures of its redistributive and reorganisational policies, the Abacha administration increasingly resorted to regulatory and repressive solutions to ethnic minority agitation within the region. These 'solutions' included the proscription or banning of ethnic associations; official declaration of ethnic minority agitation for autonomy as a seditious offence, punishable by the death penalty; and the arrest and imprisonment of outspoken ethnic minority elites. However, the arrests did not stop the unrest. Clearly, strong-arm tactics would not work.

Although the recent passage of the Niger Delta Development Commission Bill – which increased the derivation principle from 3% to 13% – did, in some ways, assuage the demands of the Niger Delta communities, for many, it was still too little, too late. In the Niger Delta, there are two schools of thought regarding this bill: one advocates total control of oil proceeds, while the other believes the derivation principle should go back to the pre-civil war level.

Since policies of reorganisation and half-hearted attempts at readjusting revenue allocations have met with failure, the other alternative is to make the Niger Delta communities actual stakeholders in the country's oil economy.

What is meant by stakeholding? It means designating particular oil wells to be managed by the communities, so that proceeds or dividends will come straight back to the community's 'Oil Company'. If the communities have a stake in the oil exploited from their areas – and in which they have invested, in some cases, with international capital – the recurrent problems of hostage-taking, of raiding oil platforms and of sabotaging oil pipelines will be a thing of the past. 'Stakeholding' will redress most of the issues of marginalisation and deprivation, and will give these communities a sense of belonging, so that the goose that laid the golden egg could also benefit. Clearly, such holistic, long-term thinking is needed to resolve a conflict which is taking on increasingly intractable dimensions. ▴

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## Endnote

Dr. Dokubo is a Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos, Nigeria. He is also a member of the Negotiation and Conflict Management Group (NCMG), a Lagos-based NGO.



GEORGE ESIRI/REUTERS

Nigeria's post-transition conflicts come in the shape of ethnic, communal, religious and political crises

FEATURE

BY OSITA AGBU

# post transitional conflicts in **nigeria**

**F**ollowing the inauguration of Nigeria's fourth republic on 29 May 1999, many believed Nigeria's long years of crisis would finally end. However, it appears that this is not the case, as recent conflicts in the country seem to indicate. The post-transition conflicts come in the shape of ethnic, communal, religious and political crises.

Nigeria possesses immense potential, and is a large country made up of about 250 different ethnic groups or nationalities. More than 300 distinct languages are spoken. Located on the west coast of Africa and roughly four times the size of Britain (its former colonial master), it accounts for about 25% of Africa's total population.<sup>1</sup> Considering Nigeria's role and influence in the west African sub-region, it is clearly important to put into focus the various low intensity conflicts which have the potential of implicating neighbouring countries.

The country has experienced the most formidable problems in terms of national unity, both from the nature of the former federated regions (now states) which it inherited from the colonial past, and from the ethnic and religious divides within the population.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, it is not surprising that contradictions amongst the various groups and segments of the population have refused to disappear, even with the establishment of democracy.

Conceptually, wherever there are scarce resources, there is bound to be competition. This is generally true and is clearly evident from the nature of conflicts besieging the African continent. Unfortunately, Nigeria is no exception. In Nigeria's case, the struggle for access to economic resources – predominantly proceeds from oil sales – has intensified the competition, often resulting in conflicts of significant proportions.



A man walks in the ruins of the 'Cherubim and Seraphim' church in the far northern city of Sokoto. Churches were burnt down over demands for the imposition of Islamic Sharia law

Since the transition to democratic governance under President Olusegun Obasanjo in mid-1999, many Nigerians (including whole communities) have misinterpreted democratic freedoms for unbridled freedom beyond the rule of law. Violent agitations now proliferate the Niger-Delta area of the country, the cause of them being efforts at seeking redress after long years of marginalisation and environmental degradation under succeeding military regimes. Some of the interest and pressure groups opposing the government in the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta have now metamorphosed into ethnic militias, who liberally engage in sabotaging oil pipelines, piracy, abducting government and oil company officials, and above all, appear militarily prepared to engage federal troops in shoot-outs. These militant groups are too numerous to mention, each representing a particular

ethnic interest in the Niger-Delta. They include the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Niger Delta Volunteer Force and the Movement for the Survival of the Itshekiri Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN). The Niger Delta is made up of ethnic groups comprising the Ijaws, Urhobo, Ibibio, Ibeno, Eket, Annang, Ikwerre, Efik, Ogba, Isoko, Itshekiri, Edo, Ogoni, Andoni, Okirika and Kalabari. Apart from their demand for economic restitution and ecological rehabilitation, there are also various inter and intra-community conflicts between them. A recent communiqué of the Union of Niger Delta<sup>3</sup> supported the call for the convening of a national conference of all ethnic nationalities. It abhors the present distribution of power between the federal government and federating units, and supports a restructuring of the federation into six political zones.

Another low intensity conflict is the internecine Ife-Modakeke communal conflict, which has been raging for many years. Even the federal government appears frustrated and incapable of solving the crisis. The conflict has disrupted economic life in and around Oyo State, and has led to a massive loss of life. Many who lost their lives were merely innocent victims. In addition, the federal government has had to grapple with numerous other ethnic conflicts since the inauguration of the fourth republic. For instance, there was the Shagamu tragedy in July 1999 between the Yorubas and the Hausas, which was caused by the purported defilement of the traditional 'Oro' festival by a Hausa lady. Hundreds of lives were lost, with retaliatory killings in Kano, in northern Nigeria. Consequently, there has been an increase in the activities of ethnic militias like the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), purportedly representing Yoruba interests, and the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), established to protect northern interests. Even the Igbos of south-eastern Nigeria, who have been crying marginalisation since the end of the Nigerian civil war (1967 – 1970), is not left out of this cycle of ethnic violence: a group, calling itself the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), has been established to fight Igbo marginalisation and to protect their lives and property.

The question is where is the democratic government located in all this? Does it mean that it has lost control, or is incapable of providing security for its citizens, with the result that they have taken it upon themselves to do so? I believe that the government is still capable of managing the situation, provided that it puts the welfare of its citizens foremost in its calculations. Obviously, managing a country as vast and diverse as Nigeria is no easy task. Nonetheless, it behoves the president and elected officials to exhibit the highest level of understanding and tolerance in approaching the contentious issues that are breeding these conflicts. In addition, even after the government tried to regain its credibility following its mistakes at Odi and Choba in the Niger-Delta – where government forces were accused of unnecessary killings and rapes – the Kaduna crisis did erupt and is still threatening. Kaduna is a cosmopolitan city in the north and is the political headquarters of northern politics. The crisis, which involved the minorities of Southern Kaduna and the Hausa/Fulani, caught the government by surprise, especially in its depth and ferocity. Though initially a religious riot over

the imposition of the Sharia legal system in Kaduna State, it quickly became political, as disgruntled politicians capitalised on the crisis for political gain. Casualties – particularly of southerners – were so heavy during the first riot in February, that reprisal attacks on Hausas took place in Aba and Umuahia in south-eastern Nigeria. The gravity of this crisis, and perhaps its similarity to events leading to the 1966 crisis in Nigeria, prompted governors of the south-eastern states to demand for the establishment of a confederate arrangement in Nigeria. The situation had not significantly abated when another conflagration engulfed Kaduna in May, leading once more to the mass exodus of people. One cannot imagine the tragic loss of human life, nor the enormous economic loss attributed to this crisis. Once again, the government was caught by surprise, within only a few months of the first crisis.

In the immediate future, it appears that the main problem which the Olusegun Obasanjo administration has to tackle is how to resolve the various inter and intra-ethnic, communal, religious and political conflicts plaguing the nation. Consequently, for the sake of Nigeria's fragile democracy, there is a dire need for the elected officials and presidency to re-examine the various demands made by the different groups. In addition, constructive engagement of fundamental ways of restructuring and devolving powers for the survival of the Nigerian state need to be facilitated. The need to recognise ethnic differences, the need to discuss them and the need to nurture ways of ensuring enduring cordial relations amongst the various nationalities cannot be over-emphasised. ▀

## Footnotes


- 1 It is also the most populous country in the black world, with an estimated population of about 110 million people, according to statical projections of the 1991 national census. It is estimated that by the year 2035, Nigeria will be the third most populous country in the world, after China and India.
- 2 Martin Dent, *Conflict and Reconciliation in Nigeria: The Approach to the Elections*, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. The country has a predominantly Muslim population in the north and a predominantly Christian population in the south. The northern part of the country alone, contains a population greater than that of any other nation in Africa.
- 3 *The Guardian (Nigeria)*, March 31, 2000, p.51.

## Endnote

Osita Agbu is a Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Lagos, Nigeria.



*Conflict Trends* spoke to Mr Vasu Gounden, Founder and Executive Director of ACCORD about why Nigeria received the Africa Peace Award



BY SEAN CALLAGHAN

INTERVIEW

**Conflict Trends:** What is the Africa Peace Awards?

**Vasu Gounden:** The Africa Peace Award was instituted by ACCORD in 1993 to recognise those communities, institutions or individuals in South Africa through whose efforts conflict was turned to peace. In 1995 the Award was extended to the whole of Africa, in the hope that it would promote peace, create role models and instill a sense of pride in the people of the African Continent.

**Conflict Trends:** How does ACCORD choose the recipients?

**Vasu Gounden:** The governing principles for selection of the Africa Peace Award are the protection of and respect for human rights, peaceful settlement of disputes, and good governance of public affairs. The Africa Peace Award is presented biennially to a community, institution or individual that embodies these principles.

**Conflict Trends:** Why did Nigeria receive the award in 2000?

**Vasu Gounden:** In early 1999 Nigerians voted in the first democratically-elected civilian Government to rule their country in 16 years. The 1999 democratic transition was a victory for all Nigerians. For many years courageous journalists, community organisations, churches, and NGOs have stood united for change – often at great personal cost. It is in their honour that ACCORD presented the Africa Peace Award to the people of Nigeria. By awarding the Africa Peace Award to Nigeria, ACCORD honours all Nigerians for their contribution to the new dawn of democracy, without which peace and prosperity are impossible.

**Conflict Trends:** Do you think that Nigerians will live up to the principles of the Award?

**Vasu Gounden:** The new administration has already displayed the political willingness to effectively deal with the legacy of the past. Within hours of President Obasanjo's swearing in, the new Government announced new heads of the armed forces, police, civil service and central bank. The Government has also released political prisoners, established a panel to investigate poverty alleviation, laid emphasis on infrastructural development and ecological rehabilitation and passed an anti-corruption bill through their National Assembly.

President Obasanjo set up a panel to investigate human rights violations during the years of military rule, in order to identify those responsible for human rights abuses and to recommend measures to prevent them from occurring again.

**Conflict Trends:** Who else has received the Africa Peace Award?

**Vasu Gounden:** In 1993 the inaugural Africa Peace Award was given to the community of Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal for the brave and significant contribution they made to peace.

The 1995 Award honoured Nelson Mandela's pivotal role in the South African miracle. As 'the single most vital symbol not only of liberation from the tyranny of apartheid, but of a new way of life', he is a remarkable testimony to the power of negotiation and peaceful resolution of disputes.

The 1997 Award went to the Nation of Mozambique for their efforts towards peace, respect for human rights and good governance.

The next Africa Peace Award is due to be given in 2002. ▽



PIUS UTOMI EKPE/AFP

Nigeria's Kaduna State  
ignited a powder keg when  
it adopted the Sharia Law

FEATURE

BY OGABA OCHE

# religion & politics

**O**n Monday, 21 February 2000, the northern Nigerian city of Kaduna was convulsed by violence and killings of a magnitude that had not been experienced within the country since the civil war, that lasted from 1967 to 1970.

The events that caused this large scale carnage can be traced back to late 1999, when the Kaduna State House of Assembly decided to establish a committee to examine the possibility of adopting the Sharia Islamic law within the state. This decision came after several other northern states had indicated that they intended adopting the system.

The decision was taken, despite the fact that Kaduna State, with a population of about four million people, is almost equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Kaduna State also constitutes a 'geo-political fault line' between the two major religions in Nigeria, and has a history of serious sectarian violence.

The decision of the Kaduna State House of Assembly received the support of Muslims within the state. This support was expressed through the staging of several pro-Sharia rallies within the city. When the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)



decided to hold a peaceful protest march in opposition to the planned introduction of the Sharia on 21 February, Muslim groups intervened in an attempt to disrupt it. The clash between the two groups rapidly escalated into violence and eventually led to the loss of more than a thousand lives. In addition, there was massive destruction to property.

The violence in Kaduna triggered off a chain-reaction of counter-violence in other parts of the country by members of ethnic groups that had experienced a severe loss of life in Kaduna. One of the first places to experience such reprisals against its Muslim community was in the town of Kachia, located about 50 km south of Kaduna.

Consisting of predominantly Christian ethnic minorities, who had been consigned to the margins of political activity in Kaduna State, the reprisals in Kachia were overwhelmingly vehement. On 21 February – the day after the upheavals in Kaduna – 90 people (mostly Muslims) were killed and virtually all property owned by Muslims was destroyed.

Violence also rapidly spread to the Igbo townships of Aba and Owerri, in eastern Nigeria. On 29 February, youths in Aba and Owerri burnt mosques and destroyed property owned by Muslims in an angry response to those Igbos who had been killed in Kaduna. Estimates put the death toll at 60. Indeed, the extent and severity of violence that erupted as a consequence of the Kaduna crisis introduced a severe rift between the Christian and predominantly Muslim communities in northern Nigeria.

In March, the pendulum of sectarian violence swung back to northern Nigeria once again. In the north-western city of Sokoto, students of the Usman Danfodio University defied the spread of anti-Sharia sentiments by organising demonstrations on 7 March, which eventually became violent and resulted in the loss of at least one life. Property was also reportedly damaged.

Even greater violence occurred in the north-eastern town of Dombua: on 30 March, Muslim youths, who were incensed about the construction of a church in the town, attacked and destroyed the building. The resistance by some Christians, who attempted to prevent the destruction, snowballed into fighting between Christians and Muslims. More than 20 people were killed and thousands were compelled to flee the town in search of safety.

The spate of violence that was unleashed on

Kaduna earlier in the year, ran its full gruesome cycle when, on 22 May, the city was once again the scene of more religious violence. Although not of the magnitude witnessed earlier, the violence did lead to the killing of more than 100 people, as well as the widespread destruction of property. The violence served as a macabre manifestation of the residual animosities and tensions that had been generated by the attempted introduction of Sharia law in the state of Kaduna.

The genesis of the violence over the introduction of Sharia law can be traced back to a campaign promise made by Ahmed Sani, the eventual governor of Zamfara State. During his campaign, he stated that if elected, his government would ‘give the people the opportunity to practice their religion’, and that this would be facilitated by the introduction of Sharia law. He argued that he was simply following the will of the vast majority of Muslims in Zamfara State who, according to him, were disillusioned with the rampant corruption of military rule, and frightened by the rising crime rates. The governor also promised that in the course of implementing Sharia law, the rights of Christian minorities and non-Muslims would be fully protected.

The build-up to the eventual announcement by the Zamfara state governor, led to heated debates across the country over the legality – or otherwise – of the act within the framework of the Nigerian Constitution. The proponents of the Sharia based their support on four main arguments. Firstly, that the introduction of the Sharia was an outcome of a campaign promise made by the governor of Zamfara State, which he was beholden to fulfil. Secondly, that most states in northern Nigeria possessed a majority of Muslims, who deserved to live according to the dictates of their religion. Thirdly, that the provisions of the 1999 constitution guaranteed that the freedom of religious worship would be upheld. Lastly, that Sharia is fundamentally God’s law and, as such, is prior and superior to any law codified by man and, therefore, should not even be the subject of debate.

The opponents of the Sharia, on the other hand, argue that the Nigerian Constitution already recognises Sharia law, as it makes up a substantial body of the country’s customary law. Consequently, it would be illegal and unconstitutional to elevate the Sharia to the level of state law. Secondly, they argue that tenets of the Sharia (at least those that are recognised by the constitution) should be voluntarily submitted to – even by Muslims – and not

The clashes between the Muslim and Christian groups eventually led to the loss of more than a thousand lives

imposed upon citizens. Thirdly, the imposition of Sharia law, with its prescriptions of 'cruel and unusual punishments, such as the amputation of limbs and public floggings', is seen as a violation of the fundamental human rights of both Muslims, who are subject to it, and non-Muslims, who would be required to alter their way of life to accommodate it. Lastly, opponents argue that Nigeria is a secular state and not a theocracy, thereby precluding the adoption of a state religion by any of the component states of the Nigerian federation.

The decision by the Zamfara state governor to fully implement Sharia law, the attempt by the Kaduna state governor to introduce Sharia, and the intensity of the controversy surrounding the Sharia project as a whole, are all factors that have aggravated the existing mistrust and suspicion between the two major religious bodies. These are the very reasons for the spate of conflicts that Nigeria has experienced in the past few months.

The question is why the federal government was unable to prevent the crisis, or at least stem the magnitude of violence that took place. With respect to this, there has been widespread criticism of the attitude that the Obasanjo administration adopted towards the crisis. When the governor of Zamfara State first announced his intention to introduce Sharia law, President Obasanjo failed to treat the matter with the seriousness that it deserved, on the assumption that it would 'fizzle out'. Subsequent events proved otherwise and the Attorney-General of the Federation stated that although the Sharia had been unconstitutionally introduced in Zamfara State, the federal government lacked the *locus standi* to initiate court action against the state government. He contended that only individuals whose rights had been violated by Sharia law, could exercise the legal option.

However, on 29 February, President Obasanjo took the initiative by convening a meeting of the National Council of States, where he and the governors of Nigeria's 36 states discussed the crisis. During the meeting, the northern governors apparently agreed to suspend the full implementation of Sharia until legislative debates could determine whether or not Sharia law was commensurate with the Nigerian Constitution. While Christians in the north and south welcomed this new 'consensus', prominent Islamic leaders, such as former military ruler Muhammed Buhari and former president Shehu Shagari, immediately expressed their reservations regarding the outcome of the meeting. Shortly thereafter, most of the northern governors

who had attended the meeting, decided to renounce the decision to suspend the Sharia.

Despite opposition to the implementation of Sharia law by Nigeria's Christians, and despite the tensions and conflicts that have arisen as a consequence of its attempted implementation in some states, the northern governors have expressed their uncompromising resolve to implement Sharia law to the letter. In the words of Governor Ahmed Sani.

There is no going back. The process has been laid. The process is not my personal opinion. It is a resolve of the people.

Regardless of the resolve with which it is implemented by the northern governors, or the intensity of opposition that is mounted against it, the fact is that it poses a very serious danger, not only for Nigeria's federalism, but also for her nascent democracy. The very issues and demands that


have been thrown up by the crisis attest to this. Vocal individuals and groups have accused President Obasanjo of not having displayed sufficient political will and decisiveness in handling the crisis. The calls for a redefinition of power relations between the federal centre and the states are increasing. Within Kaduna State itself, the predominantly Christian indigents of the southern part of the state have intensified their agitation for a re-demarcation of the boundaries of the state, in order to separate them from the Muslims in the northern part. The mainly Christian inhabitants of Nigeria's middle belt states have, through public pronouncements, renounced further political and symbolic identification with the north. Governors from the eastern and southern states have united into blocs, demanding for the adoption of confederalism. Civil society and the opposition party, Alliance for Democracy – which controls all of the south-western states – continues with their call for a national conference to discuss Nigeria's major political, economic and social problems.

With its far-reaching ramifications, the Sharia issue has the potential to destabilise Nigeria's nascent democracy. Whatever solution the Obasanjo administration comes up with, it must have at its core the preservation of Nigeria's secularity in order for it to have any lasting viability. ▴

The question is why the federal government was unable to prevent the crisis

## Endnote

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ALEXANDER JOE/AFP

Reflections on the mediation efforts during the Burundi peace process

FEATURE

BY ELISA RENDA

# mediation

## efforts in Burundi

**T**he Burundi Peace Negotiations – under the facilitation of Nelson Mandela since December 1999 – is a continuation of the mediation process started in 1998 by President Nyerere of Tanzania. The recently deceased, former head of state brought most of the conflicting parties to the negotiating table for all – round talks in Arusha. The management of this ‘external’ peace process (‘external’ is a term used to distinguish this type of process from the internal dialogue between a government and its opposition, which is called an ‘Internal Partnership’) required the deployment of an articulated institutional framework, which had been largely maintained by Mandela. The Dar es Salaam-based Burundi Peace Negotiations Office (BPN) was responsible for the logistical and political direction of the mediation activities related to

the Arusha peace talks. It also provided an organisational framework for the facilitator’s team, which was the same group of people who were in charge of supporting and representing Nyerere. In between sessions, the BPN arranged consultations with all the parties, and also ensured all logistical requirements were provided for.

The structure altered somewhat during the formal negotiations in Arusha, where the Burundi staff consisted of the secretariat of the peace conference. The secretariat was supported by an extended structure: on the one side were the conference officers, who were contracted by the secretariat in accordance with UN-based standards; and on the other side, the committee office bearers, as well as the 18 Burundian parties which presented their delegations. The former dealt with the



technical aspects of the negotiations, whereas the latter were directly involved with activities of mediation and negotiation. Their work fell within the framework of four committees:

- Committee One: the Nature of the Conflict and Problems of Genocide and Exclusion, and their Solutions;
- Committee Two: Democracy and Good Governance;
- Committee Three: Peace and Security for All;
- Committee Four: Economic Reconstruction and Development.

A fifth committee was subsequently created along the lines of the June 1998 Peace Plan, with the aim of discussing guarantees for the implementation of the eventual peace accord.

Some of the committee office bearers (chairpersons, vice-chairpersons, rapporteurs and advisors) worked with the secretariat on a permanent basis, whereas others intervened only for preparatory consultations or during the sessions. This was the case regarding the Roman-based Community of Sant' Egidio, whose Father Matteo Zuppi chaired Committee Three.

The present paper was made possible by observing a session of first and third committee negotiations, which were held in Arusha from 5-17 July 1999 and facilitated by Mwalimu J. Nyerere. During the sessions, the negotiations experienced a serious impasse that threatened to disrupt the whole process.

By that stage, however, all four committees were engrossed with the task at hand, working simultaneously towards a common goal. Committee One proceeded with an elaboration of a common text. Committee Two divided its extensive task into seven different topics (Political Parties and the Party System; the Legislative; the Executive; the Judiciary; the Electoral Systems; the Administration; and the Transitional Arrangements), and seven individual working groups discussed each topic. Committee Three made extensive use of inter-party consultations, and Committee Four concluded its tasks within the first week of the session. Formal negotiations took place in the conference centre, while more informal sessions were held at the Novotel Mount Meru, where some of the Burundian delegation leaders were hosted. Negotiations were also held in the nearby residence of 'Mwalimu' Julius K. Nyerere.

Clearly, peace negotiations involve a wide range of intensive and often frantic activities:

committee meetings; consultations between the facilitator and heads of delegations; and consultations between the members of the facilitator's team and delegates at all levels. It is very important that the facilitating team is constantly aware of the interests of all parties – particularly of their minimum and maximum targets – in order to provide for avenues of negotiation that may overcome deadlocks. However, the facilitating team must also take steps to maintain an intensive and productive level of consultation – sometimes this might even require additional encounters between the parties outside the formal context. Mediation is a full-time commitment and requires attention to detail, including those of a technical nature.

### **Negotiations as a creative process**

Peace negotiations constitute an incremental process, whereby agreements are enriched at every session. Within the framework of a peace programme, the facilitation includes such activities as research, documentation and editing. These activities help speed up the search for a settlement. With regard to the various committees, the facilitating team ensures that at every round of negotiations a new text is made available, containing all points of agreement already achieved between the parties, as well as a list highlighting the points of disagreement which require new debate. The decisional method of consensus requires that specific mention be made when a party disagrees with the common view. Some delegates might contest the synthesis provided by the facilitation, on the grounds that it does not accurately reflect their party's point of view. This should not be viewed as a sign of weakness on the part of the facilitation. Indeed, some vagueness in editing a text represents an opportunity to change and progress. At the same time, it allows for some 'face saving' on the part of the delegations. They might modify their point of view, or soften their position, without appearing to do so. The elaboration of a common text is a lengthy task, requiring both patience and acuteness on the part of those facilitating the sessions.

In some cases, other work might be necessary: knowledge of theoretical models, different contexts and alternative solutions can represent important assets to the negotiation process. This is the reason behind the presence of so many 'resource people' at the Burundi Peace Negotiations. Their role is to offer their expertise whenever it is required by a delegate or member of the facilitation team. This explains the presence of six refugee observers/





YQAV LEM MER/APP

resource people in Committee Four, which discusses Economic Reconstruction and Development. In Committee Three, the diplomatic skills of Padre Matteo Zuppi were supplemented by the valuable experience of the vice-chairman, General Masondo – a South African personality who, after spending many years in prison during the apartheid era, was one of the key actors in reforming the army. In the same committee, the role of Tanzania's General Mbita was also valuable in terms of his lifetime experience in the military field. In Committee One, Mozambican minister, Francisco Madeira, became a 'resource person' based on his role as a government representative during the Rome negotiations of 1990-1992, which led to the Mozambican peace agreement. These personalities can be called upon by the chairperson to speak, or may be called upon by the delegates for clarification. Sometimes their participation on the podium can be very helpful, because they might offer a different perspective of the issues under discussion.

Seminars and official visits are another resource available to the facilitating team. In fact, on 5 July, Committee Four organised and chaired

presentations for all the delegates in Arusha. Representatives of the European Commission discussed some aspects of the European Rehabilitation Programme for Burundi, and representatives from the World Bank discussed 'The World Bank, Peace Dividend and Demobilisation in Burundi'. These kinds of presentations are extremely valuable, especially when one considers the role that positive incentives can play in a peace process. It is very important that a realistic, but hopeful vision of the future is placed in the minds of those who are negotiating a peace settlement for their country. Secondly, the visits to Tabora, Kibondo and Ngara – organised by Committee Four during July – were also important instruments of enquiry into the moods, conditions and needs of refugee populations, which should be included in any future peace settlement. In between sessions, official visits to Bujumbura also contributed to the process by creating another level of exchange between the mediators and the Burundian actors (including civil society). In August 1999, following the difficult July session, such a visit to Bujumbura clarified many controversial aspects of the process.

Sometimes specific seminars or research work

Former South African president, Nelson Mandela (L), chief negotiator in the Burundi peace process, speaks to the press while Burundian president, Pierre Buyoya (R) listens on

African heads of states attend the Burundi peace talks in Arusha. An accord aimed at ending seven years of civil war in Burundi was signed late in August in the presence of African statemen and US President Bill Clinton, but without the participation of some of the key players



are required on topics that are closely linked to the discussion. On 12 July, a seminar on 'Democratic Transition' was organised by Committee Two, which provided the delegates with valuable information prior to the discussions on transition. A research work on Truth Commissions, which compared different post-conflict contexts, was also presented during August. It provided a basis for the September discussions on genocide and exclusion.

In general, mediation includes a variety of delicate activities aimed at restoring channels of communication. Mediation also helps negotiating parties reach agreement and create new conflict management systems. It helps overcome the stereotypes perceived between enemies, and also helps to clarify the real interests behind stated priorities. In addition, mediation helps parties understand the dynamics of the conflict and negotiation process, and also promotes a favourable bargaining climate. At the same time, it can help parties reach verbal agreement, provide technical support and offer different perspectives regarding the issues under discussion. For this purpose, it is essential that all activities undertaken are well coordinated, and that they are timely enough to help resolve the conflict, without putting too much pressure on the delegates. The complexity of the task can explain the difficulties that were experienced in getting the Arusha peace process started. One must realise that for the committees to achieve some progress, it is necessary to analyse the problems, have a complete picture of the interdependent issues and be active outside the formal meetings. Every aspect must be carefully prepared and organised, from the choice of the facilitator and his team, right through to deciding on who will chair the various

committees, as well as when the seminar and sessions will be held.

### The Community of Sant' Egidio and Mediation

Sant' Egidio joined this particular facilitation after the third round of negotiations. The team joined the Committee on Peace and Security for All, which had not yet convened. The Community of Sant' Egidio became involved in the Arusha peace process due to the role it played in Mozambique. Its knowledge of the Burundian conflict, and its expertise during the Rome negotiations between September 1996 and March 1997, were another two reasons why they were included in the process. By the time Sant-Egidio joined the proceedings, representatives of the Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) had reached an agreement on the agenda for the negotiations, and were also deciding on ceasefire dispositions. However, the premature disclosure of the meetings, which had initially been kept secret, disrupted the entire process.

Padre Matteo Zuppi was nominated chairperson of Committee Three, while General Masondo from South Africa was elected vice-chairperson. Tanzania's General Mbita was appointed a 'resource person'. It is very important that the expertise and personal experience of military senior officers is made available at this point. The issues of security and reforms to the army are highly sensitive, due to the protective role attributed to the military by the Tutsi minority. Like the problem of excluding the Hutu majority, the issues of security and army reforms are highly problematic due to the already

large size of the Burundian army. As highlighted by vice-chairperson of Committee Two, Professor Hottinger of Switzerland, the judiciary can somehow be facilitated because it appears seriously understaffed in Burundi. Thus, inclusion can be achieved through education and recruitment. However, the same is not true for the army, the size of which is already very large.<sup>1</sup>

Items under debate included the Mission of the Security Forces; Composition; Recruitment; Dimensions; Military Service; the Rebellion and the Issue of Demobilisation; and the International Environment. Principles regarding the organisation of the defence and security forces had already been discussed during the July debate.

The podium was used mainly to coordinate the negotiations between delegates. In fact, the workings of Committee Three were based very much on informal consultations, aimed at reducing the issues at stake and opening spaces for compromise. The chairing style of the Italian diplomat and the South African general diverged, and this was particularly noticeable when some pressure needed to be exercised on the negotiators. It was a different approach, with activism on the part of the generals and a greater search for dialogue on the part of Sant' Egidio. The more patient and sensitive attitude of Padre Matteo was particularly helpful when negotiations stalled due to tactical problems. During the parties' informal consultations, the delegates would form two or more separate groups. Padre Matteo would move from one group to another, helping delegates with any difficulties that arose. The other podium members were also available to discuss any doubts or respond to any complaints. The method – introduced under the chairmanship of General Masondo in May 1999 – enabled the delegations to agree on the order to follow regarding the content of the negotiations. The formal meetings of Committee Three provided opportunities for doubts to be clarified and complaints to be heard. Further consultations were also arranged during these meetings.

During the sixth round of negotiations, which took place from 5-17 July 1999, the difficulties of this approach became apparent. On 15 July, the delegates were divided in two groups, with the majority agreeing on a list of items to discuss. However, one delegation demanded the exclusion of some items. When faced with such a dilemma, there are three options available to the facilitating team: one can pressure all delegates to negotiate on the common items; one can vary the order of

discussion presented by the majority; or one can negotiate with the minority regarding the items they do not wish to debate. The ideal order of discussion should allow the parties to move from less sensitive to more controversial issues, thereby achieving incremental agreement. In this case, failure to enter the debate prevented any progress during the July session. According to some commentators – likes Ambassador Aldo Ajello, EU special envoy to the Great Lakes region – much of the difficulty stemmed from the separateness of the committee negotiations. The committee structure leaves little space for 'linking' between issues. Consequently, such progress can only be achieved outside the talks' formal framework, among members of the facilitating team and the heads of delegations.<sup>2</sup> To ensure prompt action and positive results, quality communication is required, and this is an extremely complex and highly demanding task, requiring a continuous flow of information between all members of the facilitating team. Minimum and maximum targets must be carefully mediated, in order to provide the ground for further progress on all issues. In spite of all the difficulties, some development in the Arusha peace process could be observed by the end of July. In the words of a Committee Three Burundian delegate, 'the July session has not shown progress, but some steps forward have been made since the process started. [In the beginning], the different delegations would not even talk to each other.'<sup>3</sup> Thus far, creating the ground for all-round negotiations has been the main achievement of the Burundi Peace Negotiations in Arusha. The next step will be the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement.

### Negotiating on...

Committee One discussed genocide and exclusion, and their possible solutions. All the Burundian leaders maintained that this was a crucial topic of the peace conference. Following the discussions, it appeared that both ethnic groups had an interest in blaming each other for the genocide. In so doing, they could then justify their own violent reactions. Tutsi leaders defined 'genocide' as specifically being anti-minority, whereas Hutu leaders claimed that genocide could only be committed by state powers. Consequently, all attempts to define the

**It is essential that all formal agreements reflect the willingness of all parties to commit themselves to a peaceful settlement**

crime in terms of the Burundian context, resulted in endless accusations and counter-accusations.

The debate's aim was to achieve a synthesis of the opposing positions, as well as an accurate reconstruction of the most dramatic chapters in the country's history. The task was daunting, and at times seemed almost impossible: 'sentimental walls',<sup>4</sup> in a situation of ongoing civil war, kept the parties from revising their perspectives on the conflict. Telling the story of genocide in Burundi does not only require those involved to listen to the relevant facts – it also requires the selection of the relevant facts. This activity constitutes a historical interpretation. A unique interpretation might emerge only when complete reconciliation is achieved, when a sustainable peace and mutual trust has been established between enemies.

As Professor Prunier said during a July meeting of Committee One, 'it is impossible to achieve an agreement on the points under discussion. What the delegates should do is to speak about the massacres committed by their own groups'. It was an interesting provocation, and not welcomed by the delegates, which revealed a contradiction of the stated aim of the discussion. In fact, one could wonder if the stated aim of recording history actually held ulterior motives or objectives for some involved in the process.

On the part of the facilitating team, it was clear that the debate could only achieve a constructive result in determining 'solutions' to the issues of genocide and exclusion. In other words, agreement could be reached on the development of independent organs responsible for the ambitious historical reconstruction. Debates on genocide and exclusion were goals in themselves, and offered both parties a way to express the drama of their own people.

Nevertheless, by observing the actual proceedings of the meetings, one witnessed how the committee provided the parties with a strategic tool to keep the process going at the right pace, thereby avoiding the possibility that other committees might overrun their readiness to engage in agreements. As a platform for extensive debate on the issue of violence, it offered a legitimate ground for recriminations from all sides. At the very beginning of the July session, G8 (the grouping formed by the Tutsi-based parties) accused the Burundi authorities of conspiring with Hutu rebels to 're-launch genocide'. The accusation was later used by the institutional delegates to slow down the scheduled debate. On 13 July 1999, head of the secretariat, Ambassador A. Nyakyi, spoke of

'coordinated manoeuvres' to hold back the process.

As for the accusations of connivance between the government and the rebel faction, Jean Bosco Ndayikekgurukiye of CNDD-FDD, said they were very concerned about the legitimacy of the government. The apparent inability to stop the massacres, accompanied by reprisals against both rebels and civilians, gave the impression that Buyoya was consciously using a strategy of terror aimed solely at strengthening his hold on the country. This suspicion has constantly found confirmation in rumours surrounding the activities of the Hutu-based party's internal wing, Frodebu, which has participated in the 'Internal Partnership' – a partnership desired by Buyoya. Frodebu's president, Nzojibwami, is actually a cousin of Jean Bosco Ndayikekgurukiye – a detail that does nothing but strengthen suspicion. Keeping Jean Bosco's faction outside the formal negotiations has undermined the entire process: the climate of suspicion and mistrust between all parties, and within the parties themselves, has increased. The secessionist faction of CNDD might have been included earlier, had all parties consented to it. However, despite attempts by Nyerere, Bujumbura refused any proposed solutions.

Doubts about the government's commitment to the process are well founded. According to Mr Ajello, by July 1999, the Arusha process preoccupied the minds of Bujumbura authorities at a time when the 'Internal Partnership' had reached a stalemate. The process initially seemed a way of attributing the achievements of the internal peace process to more parties, but it later appeared as a successful scheme capable of autonomous developments. Prior to the July session, such success was measurable in emotional terms, with the development of new dialogue between all parties. A new climate of cordiality and trust was emerging. Moreover, the grouping of all parties into three coalitions (G3, G8 and G7) seemed to provide the scope necessary for concrete steps to be taken in the negotiations.

On many occasions, the July session saw deliberate attempts to disrupt the process. Procedure was often abused for this purpose. On the night of 15 July, the facilitating team and delegation leaders finally engaged in the task of editing a united text, which listed all relevant facts relating to the genocide. The finalised text would be presented to the committee for approval on the very last day of negotiations. However, G8 (grouping of Tutsi-based parties) and G3 (grouping of institutional representatives) signed a new version, thereby creating a

decisional stalemate. Simply agreeing to a synthetic text on genocide proved impossible. As already noted, the only way to find an agreeable 'solution' would be to give an independent institution the responsibility of unveiling the country's bloody history. In fact, Committee Two could not conclude its workings, and agreed with the UN Security Council that an international Commission of Judicial Enquiry and the creation of a National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation were the only solutions.

### Some 'technical' aspects

The payment of 'per diem' (daily allowances) to all delegates was a problematic issue throughout the negotiations. Although everyone agreed it was imperative that all parties could afford to be involved with the Arusha sessions, there were some doubts about the convenience of this system in terms of the overall process. In fact, those allowances could be viewed as a good source of income. Consequently, the conclusion of negotiations might have been viewed by some delegates as a sudden 'resignation from a good job'. As cynical as that might sound, the fact remains that the monetary benefits may well have entered into the calculations of some delegates. In reality, however, the majority of the delegates used their allowances to help support their political activities outside Arusha.

Daily allowances amounted to \$110 for each delegate. Some delegation leaders received smaller sums if they decided to stay at the Novotel, Arusha's most luxurious hotel. Those who stayed at the hotel, had their rooms paid for. Delegates representing each party were limited in number, and the number of representatives depended on each party's political weight. Consequently, Mr Karumba, head of the Frolina delegation, said it was safe to assume that the institutional delegations obtained more funds, in addition to the fact that they also had access to public ones. Also, some smaller parties invited more delegates than they were authorised to. This meant that many of them were not allowed into the committees and did not obtain any allowances. Consequently, delegates accepted to share their 'per diem' in order to have more support for their party during the negotiations. This practice can provide more ideas for negotiation, especially when one considers the costs of alternative forms of communication between party members.<sup>5</sup> However, it can also be disruptive: members who don't participate in

committee debates could, with their opposition to agreements, weaken the consistency of the debates.

In addition, delegates who were present in Arusha represented parties that hadn't undergone any electoral test since 1993. This means that it was not possible to assess the real power and support enjoyed by each party. The significance of each party depended solely on their control of the conflict, or on their capacity to disrupt a possible settlement. In addition, the peace conference also represented – especially to those parties in exile – a meeting point for the political elite and could have been viewed as a major platform for political campaigning.

### Conclusions

The aforementioned observations of the Burundi Peace Negotiations holds relevance not only to the Arusha Peace Process but also to other mediations efforts in other conflict situations. The most important of these observations (or lessons learned if you wish) are the following:

- It is essential that all formal agreements reflect the willingness of all parties to commit themselves to a peaceful settlement;
- It is also important that their ability to fulfil their commitments is correctly evaluated.

The latter point is particularly important to emphasise since if an evaluation of parties' abilities to fulfil their commitments is undertaken it would result in belligerents not having undue expectations from the other. A concomitant of this is that failure to meet commitments would not simply be ascribed to malevolence or recalcitrance. ▀

### Footnotes

- 1 Conversation with Professor Hottinger at the Novotel Hotel, Arusha, 9 July 1999.
- 2 Conversation with Ambassador Ajello at the Sheraton Hotel, Dar es Salaam, 28 July 1999.
- 3 Conversation with Madame Marguerite Rohoza in the Arusha Conference Centre, 20 July 1999.
- 4 Reyckler, L., (ed), 1998, *Democratic Peace Building: The Devil is in the Transition*, Leuven: Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies (CPRS). Working Papers 1, p.87.
- 5 Conversation with Mr Joseph Karumba, Dar es Salaam, 9 August 1999.

### Endnote

Elisa Renda participated in the activities of the Burundi Peace Talks which were held in Tanzania under the facilitation of President Nyerere.

## conflict watch

# NORTH AFRICA




## ALGERIA

**29 September 2000** – No less than 13 people were killed in three separate attacks by Muslim rebels in Algeria.

**14 October 2000** – Eleven civilians were killed in a raid by Muslim fundamentalists on the villages of Blida and Ain Defla in the western provinces. More than 100 people were killed in the previous weeks in similar attacks.

**25 October 2000** – Two separate attacks by Muslim fundamentalists in the district of Bati resulting in the death of 13 civilians, including an 11 day-old baby. The attacks follow a series of attacks that have occurred in the past few weeks in the province of Medea, where the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) has a stronghold. The GIA, and particularly its Appeal and Struggle faction have repeatedly refused the signing of a peace plan drawn up by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, dismissing it as a sell-out.

**25 October 2000** – Interior Minister, Yazid Zerhouni reported that Algeria will retain 50,000 militiamen to support the state security forces in their daily fight against armed Muslim fundamentalists.



## EGYPT

**21 September 2000** – About 25 suspected members of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood were jailed during a crackdown on the movement. The action was taken shortly before the country's elections.

**30 October 2000** – Supporters of the Islamist election candidates violently protested second round election results in the towns of Abu Kebir and Sandoub by rioting, throwing stones, burning

tires and snatching ballot boxes. Aside from these incidents, election-related violence has been relatively minor compared to protests in 1995 which resulted in a death toll of 60.



## MOROCCO

**15 September 2000** – Fruit and vegetable export companies called on the government to devalue the country's currency in order to balance the negative impacts its appreciation had had on exports. The last time the government devalued the currency was in 1990. Since then, it has resisted all calls for such a move to be taken again.

**28 September 2000** – It was reported that the talks between Morocco and the Polisario Front ended without any conclusive agreement between the two parties.



## WESTERN SAHARA

**28 September 2000** – Another round of negotiations between Western Sahara and Morocco were held in Germany, however, no apparent agreement was established between the two parties.

**29 September 2000** – The Polisario Front turned down a proposal by Morocco to grant autonomous status to its territory within the Kingdom of Morocco. The Polisario Front maintains that a referendum is the only solution to the Moroccan crisis.

**30 October 2000** – The UN Security Council extended the length of its mission in Western Sahara until February 28 in hope that Morocco would offer some 'devolution of governmental authority' in the Western Sahara region over the next four months.

conflict watch

# EAST AFRICA




## BURUNDI

**3 September 2000** – President Buyoya said the agreement signed by various political parties was the beginning of a process to bring peace to the country. He stated that the next crucial step was to enter into a ceasefire agreement with the country's rebel groups.

**16 September 2000** – Six civilians and two government soldiers were killed during clashes between the government and Hutu rebels.

**26 September 2000** – Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report that Burundian women who took refuge in Tanzania were subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence in the refugee camps. The HRW criticised the government of Tanzania, and the UN, for not taking the necessary steps to protect female refugees.

**29 September 2000** – About 18 civilians were killed when Hutu rebels battled it out with the army near the capital of Bujumbura. According to government officials, five rebels were killed and four soldiers were wounded during the clash.

**29 September 2000** – Nelson Mandela called on Hutu rebels to stop killing innocent civilians. The slaughtering of civilians has continued, despite the signing of the ceasefire. He also announced that the negotiating team would be moved from Arusha in Tanzania, to Bujumbura in Burundi.

**17 October 2000** – Owing to continued clashes between rebels and government troops, thousands of refugees fled across the border, from the eastern province of Cankuzo into Tanzania.

**18 October 2000** – Recent clashes between the rebels and army have led to the displacement of more than 8,000 people in the vicinity of

Rutana Province.

**25 October 2000** – The UN Security Council noted its concern over the ongoing conflict in Burundi. It called upon all the parties – particularly the rebel groups – to desist from using force.



## COMOROS

**7 September 2000** – According to reports, separatist authorities in Anjouan Island arrested more than 100 people for allegedly opposing the signing of the agreement with the federal government.

**21 September 2000** – Various leaders from the Grande Comoros Island rejected the Fomboni Declaration. The declaration, entered into last month by the separatist island of Anjouan and the Comoros government, committed the signatories to the establishment of a new Comoros Community as a way to end existing tension.



## ERITREA

**15 September 2000** – President Isayas held a meeting with the director of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to discuss the current measures aimed at tackling the food security issues in the Horn of Africa.



## KENYA

**12 October 2000** – The World Food Programme (WFP) reported that the deteriorating security situation in most parts of the country was of major concern, and that it could affect their emergency operations within the country.



**RWANDA**

**21 September 2000** – Dr. Okali, the registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), visited Rwanda in an attempt to establish an information centre to support genocide survivors.

**22 September 2000** – President Kagame held a meeting with President Museveni during his recent visit to Uganda. The two heads of state discussed the regional security situation and reiterated their commitment to bringing peace to the region.



**SOMALIA**

**5 September 2000** – Clashes between the Hawadleh and Galje’el clans resulted in the death of 25 people. No less than 18 others were wounded during the clashes, which took place in the town of Jowhar.

**24 October 2000** – Disputes over land ownership resulted in clashes between rival clans in the town of Qoroley. A total of 10 people were killed and 15 others were injured.



**SUDAN**

**19 September 2000** – Violence broke out in Khartoum, when women took to the street in protest against a decree barring them from working in some public places. The governor of Khartoum issued the decree, which was criticised by human rights activists as a violation of the women’s constitutional rights.

**16 October 2000** – The US Committee for Refugees accused the government of bombing two civilian areas in Ikotos and Parajok, both of which are located in southern Sudan.

**21 October 2000** – The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) accused the government of violating the ceasefire so that humanitarian agencies could carry out a polio vaccination programme. According to the SPLA, government troops bombed the town of Nimule in Eastern Equatoria.

**24 October 2000** – A statement by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) claimed the SPLA had released 109 child soldiers to their custody. Currently, there are approximately 9,000 children fighting on both sides of the conflict.



**TANZANIA**

**2 September 2000** – Tanzania withdrew from the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) because of the group’s proposed ‘free trade area pact’ within the region. The government was concerned that the agreement would impact negatively on its revenues, which in turn, would affect its industries.

**19 September 2000** – The OAU electoral observer team in Zanzibar expressed concern about the growing threat of violence ahead of the October elections. The team cited the undisciplined conduct of the security agencies as one of the factors that could lead to violence.

**30 October 2000** – Clashes erupted between the police and protesters in Zanzibar after Tanzania’s general election. Media reports stated that the protesters demanded a re-election after votes were annulled in 16 of the 50 constituencies in Zanzibar Island.



Workers from St Mary’s Lacor hospital on their way to bury an Ebola victim



**UGANDA**

**29 September 2000** – The central bank opted to issue US\$8 million to the currency market in order to assist the ailing Ugandan shilling. It was the third time the bank had intervened in the market. Official figures show the shilling has dropped 14% in the last 12 months.

**18 October 2000** – According to the Ugandan ministry of health, the Ebola fever has claimed 39 lives. A total of 94 cases have been reported in northern Uganda.



conflict watch

WEST AFRICA




**BURKINA FASO**

**6 September 2000** – Campaigns for the 24 September elections resumed amid reports that some opposition parties would boycott the event. Most opposition parties did opt to boycott the elections, on the grounds that the country faces pressing political challenges that need to be resolved before an election can be held.

**9 September 2000** – A UN team began its investigation of Burkina Faso's alleged involvement in illicit diamond trading and the sale of weapons to Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels from Sierra Leone.



**GAMBIA**

**27 September 2000** – The foreign minister announced Gambia's withdrawal from mediating Senegal's secession conflict with Casamance.



**GUINEA**

**8 September 2000** – According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Guinea soldiers regained control of Pamelap, a strategic border town that had been under the control of rebel fighters from Sierra Leone.

**18 September 2000** – The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) threatened to reduce its presence in Guinea, after one of its workers was killed. Another worker was also kidnapped.

**30 September 2000** – The main opposition

party in Guinea, the Union for Progress and Renewal (UPR), threatened to boycott the November elections on the grounds that the electoral commission was not acting independently.

**19 October 2000** – The United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) urged the international community to provide relief assistance for about 400,000 refugees in Guinea. Many of the refugees are facing a worsening security and humanitarian situation.



**GUINEA-BISSAU**

**19 October 2000** – The president of Guinea-Bissau stated that his government would never allow its territory to be used by rebel groups involved in conflicts with neighbouring states. The statement followed unconfirmed reports that separatist rebels in Casamance were using Bissau as a base.



**IVORY COAST**

**12 September 2000** – Six people were reportedly killed when fighting erupted between migrant farmers from neighbouring Burkina Faso, and the local Ivorian Krumen ethnic group.

**26 September 2000** – Seven African leaders recommended the postponement of elections for at least two months, in order to reduce political tensions. In the interim, the leaders proposed the establishment of a government of national unity.

**24 October 2000** – Following the dissolution of the National Electoral Commission, the interior minister announced that General Robert Guei had

won the recent presidential elections with a 52.7% majority. The announcement contradicted earlier results released by the commission, which showed the opposition leader as being ahead in the presidential race.

**25 October 2000** – Violence broke out as thousands of people took to the street in protest of the announcement that General Guei had won the country’s presidential elections. There were also reports of clashes between government troops and mutineers.



## LIBERIA

**1 September 2000** – President Taylor said his country did not need to establish a Liberian version of a truth commission in order to investigate those suspected of committing crimes during the civil war. Reacting to an earlier proposal, which called for such a commission, the president stated that Liberia did not need to reconcile through a truth commission.

**25 September 2000** – The Liberian minister of information called on the UN to intervene in the ongoing cross-border attacks with Guinea. The two countries have been at loggerheads following sporadic cross-border clashes in September.

**16 October 2000** – Representatives of the *Action Contre la Faim* (ACF), who visited the northern county of Lofa, said the security situation in the area was still volatile. The team also stated that a number of people were displaced as a result of recent attacks in the area.



## NIGERIA

**5 September 2000** – Nigerian police were deployed to monitor the situation in Zamfara’s state capital, Gusau. This action followed two days of violent clashes between supporters of the All People’s Party (APP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

**17 October 2000** – A number of people were forced to seek refuge in army barracks following violent clashes between the Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups in Lagos.

**24 October 2000** – Tension between Cameroon and Nigeria was reported to be on the increase, following claims that Cameroon attacked Nigerian

nationals in the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Nigeria and Cameroon have both laid claims to the Bakassi Peninsula, and thus far, the case remains unresolved.



## SIERRA LEONE

**5 September 2000** – The West Side Boys captured the village of Magbini, which had been occupied by pro-government militias. A total of three militiamen were killed in the process.

**11 September 2000** – The UN mission in Sierra Leone decided to tighten its security in the vicinity of Freetown. This decision followed the successful rescue of British paratroopers, who had been held by the West Side Boys.

**20 September 2000** – The state radio reported the army’s capture of three bases (Magbini, Masumana and Masiaka) from the West Side Boys.

**21 September 2000** – The government expressed its disappointment with the announcement that Indian troops were to pull out of UNAMSIL. India’s contingent made up almost a quarter of the UN peacekeepers in the country.

**28 September 2000** – It was announced that the Sierra Leone government would submit its proposals to the Security Council regarding the special war crimes court, which would try Foday Sankoh and other members of the RUF. This announcement followed the establishment of an international court designed to put RUF members on trial for war crimes. The court is composed of experts taken from Sierra Leone and the international arena.

**4 October 2000** – According to the UNHCR, numerous Sierra Leone refugees were forced to flee the Fatoumata kaba refugee camp in Guinea, following a cross-border attack by armed militias from Sierra Leone.

**11 October 2000** – The special representative to the UN mission in Sierra Leone said the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme was being affected by a lack of contact with RUF rebels.

**27 October 2000** – The Commission for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement appealed for humanitarian assistance for about 10,000 Sierra Leonean returnees stationed in the districts of Kenama and Bo.

## conflict watch

# SOUTHERN AFRICA




## MALAWI

**13 September 2000** – Malawian tobacco farmers expressed fear of having to diversify their crops in order to reduce the country's dependence on tobacco. Commonly known as 'green gold', Burley tobacco makes up about 70% of the country's foreign exchange.

**18 September 2000** – Two opposition parties, the MCP and the Alliance for Democracy (Aford), requested a further postponement of the local government elections. The elections have been put off since 1994, but are now scheduled to take place on 21 November. The ruling UDF has disregarded the postponement and plans to go ahead with elections as scheduled.

**29 September 2000** – Parliament's public accounts committee (PAC) claimed five ministers and 12 MPs were responsible for the embezzlement of millions of dollars of government money. The PAC estimated a loss of US\$2,5 million to false contracts for the education ministry.



## MOZAMBIQUE

**7 September 2000** – Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi made a public statement that Mozambique may be forced to borrow money from the World Bank for flood relief. To date, only US\$100 million of the US\$200 million promised for post-flood reconstruction has come through.

**30 September 2000** – Two officials from the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), Manuel Pereira and Ussufo Momade, stated that their party intended to divide the country along the Save River. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) would administer the southern region,

and Renamo would govern the central and northern regions of the country. The office of the attorney general and the public prosecutor plan to determine whether or not the statements pose a threat to state security.



## NAMIBIA

**9 September 2000** – Security forces detained 82 suspected Angolan rebels from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Namibia has blamed the UNITA rebel movement for more than 50 deaths in Namibia. These deaths have occurred since a decision was taken last December, which allowed the Angolan army to launch an offensive on UNITA from Namibian soil.

**3 October 2000** – *The Namibian* reported that fighting broke out between Namibian police and Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) during a rescue mission of six Namibians, who were allegedly kidnapped by Angolan forces.

**9 October 2000** – Following an Immigration Tribunal decision, immigration officials announced that more than 150 illegal immigrants were deported from the town of Oshakati.

**27 October 2000** – Namibia's deputy minister of defence denied reports that Namibia had deployed its troops into Angola. He stated that Namibian troops had only engaged in follow-up operations against UNITA rebels in Angola.



## SOUTH AFRICA

**7 September 2000** – The shooting of a magistrate, who was known for trying

terrorist cases, prompted Cape Town police to increase security at the courts and for court officials. In the last two years, Cape Town has been the target of 18 terrorist bombings. At least three people have been killed and about 100 others injured.

**29 September 2000** – The Economic Empowerment Commission (BEEC) urged South Africa to speed up land reforms in order to reverse racial injustices and avoid violent take-overs, such as those witnessed in Zimbabwe. The commission said that in the last five years, redistribution had benefited only 1% of intended beneficiaries. The target goal is 30%.

**18 October 2000** – A pipe bomb explosion in Cape Town resulted in the death of four people. Several others were injured.

**20 October 2000** – A total of 2,175 cholera cases were reported in KwaZulu Natal. Since its outbreak a few weeks earlier, the disease has claimed 24 lives.

**30 October 2000** – Sixty-nine new cases of cholera were reported in KwaZulu-Natal, which brought the number of reported cases to 4007 in the province.



## SWAZILAND

**28 September 2000** – The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) embarked on a one day, nationwide strike to protest the Industrial Relations Act and the threat of removal from the GSP. Business slowed, particularly in the lumber/pulp and sugar industries.

**30 October 2000** – The Swaziland Monarch came under pressure from various political activists who called for a political transformation in the country and a move towards multi-party democracy. Free political activity in Swaziland was banned by royal decree almost 27 years ago.



## ZAMBIA

**26 September 2000** – More than 7,000 Angolan refugees entered Zambia in an attempt to escape renewed fighting between Angolan government troops and UNITA rebels. Zambia has borne much of the burden of the refugee crisis in southern Africa – it is home to approximately 224,000 refugees from Angola, Namibia and the DRC.

**18 October 2000** – According to *The Times of*

*Zambia*, the Zambian army launched cross-border attacks into Angola following the alleged kidnapping of five Zambian nationals by UNITA rebels.

**24 October 2000** – According to Zambian army officials, about 90 Angolan soldiers from UNITA-controlled towns in Angola surrendered to Zambian army officials after heavy clashes between the two forces.



## ZIMBABWE

**1 September 2000** – International donors (led by Britain) who supported the idea of land reform in Zimbabwe, but objected to Mugabe's approach, vowed not to renew their aid to the country. Mugabe's government stated that it would acquire a further 410 farms as part of its land reform programme. It also reiterated that white farmers would not be compensated for their land.

**4 September 2000** – The headquarters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were attacked, but fortunately, no injuries were sustained. MDC officials blamed the attack on ZANU-PF militants, but the ruling party denied responsibility for the accident.

**2 October 2000** – The leader of the opposition MDC, Morgan Tsangirai, called for nationwide action to oust President Mugabe. In response, ruling ZANU-PF officials vowed to take harsh measures against any attempts to oust the president.

**3 October 2000** – The World Bank announced the inclusion of Zimbabwe on its list of countries classified as bad debtors. This announcement followed Zimbabwe's failure to re-pay its debt for more than six months. Zimbabwe's outstanding payments to the bank totals US\$47 million.

**17 October 2000** – Protest action against rising food prices continued in and around Harare. In most areas, police clashed with protesters who had destroyed and looted shops.

**17 October 2000** – The *Herald* newspaper reported that about 800 war veterans invaded four farms in the Mwenezi district. However, the invaded farms were not on the government's land resettlement list.

**27 October 2000** – The Zimbabwe speaker of parliament received a motion from the MDC to impeach President Mugabe. Subsequently, it was reported that parliament had agreed to set up a special committee to look into the whole impeachment process.

conflict watch

# CENTRAL AFRICA




## ANGOLA

**20 October 2000** – The country's health ministry reported that 92 people had died from an outbreak of malaria.

**25 October 2000** – Twenty-five people were killed and 40 injured when an armed group attacked the Cambulo diamond field in Lunda Norte.

**27 October 2000** – In an interview with *IRIN*, the UN secretary general's special advisor to Africa warned that the spillover of Angolan conflicts into neighbouring Zambia and Angola could have dire humanitarian effects for both countries.



## CAMEROON

**1 September 2000** – Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture accused government security agencies of killing about 50 alleged criminals in the city of Douala earlier this year.



## CHAD

**9 September 2000** – Government officials announced that a former state security chief, Nodji Moise, who was leading a rebel movement in southern Chad, was killed during clashes between rebels and government soldiers.



## DRC

**5 September 2000** – Reports claimed that diamond traders in the Congo declined to sell and trade with the Israeli-based IDI Diamond Company, the only company granted permission by Kabila to export diamonds from the DRC.

**11 September 2000** – It was reported that about 9,000 Congolese civilians took refuge in the Central African Republic, in a desperate attempt to escape the ongoing war in their own country.

**22 September 2000** – The UN mission stated that it was denied freedom of movement in government and rebel-held towns. Spokesman for the mission also said they were prevented from providing supplies to UN members stationed near the government-held town of Mbandaka.

**24 September 2000** – A joint communiqué, issued at the end of President Patasse's visit to the DRC, called for the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops from the DRC, so that peace efforts in the country could proceed.

**29 September 2000** – The UN mission reported that the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), with the support of Uganda, was advancing in the northern parts of the country.

**18 October 2000** – The UN special rapporteur for human rights, Roberto Garreton, criticised the detention of 15 NGO workers and human rights activists in South Kivu.

**24 October 2000** – The Goma-based Assembly for Congolese Democracy (RCD-Goma) accused the government of bombing its positions in Katanga Province. A total of nine people were killed and several others were injured.



## REPUBLIC OF CONGO

**4 September 2000** – The main opposition parties rejected President Nguesso's invitation for talks because a similar gesture had not been extended to the country's exiled politicians.

## renaissance barometer

# NORTH AFRICA




## ALGERIA

**16 September 2000** – Algerian Minister of Energy Affairs, Chakib Khakil, and Japan's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Kiyohiro Araki, held talks aimed at strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries.

**23 September 2000** – Algeria and South Africa concluded an agreement to cooperate on economic issues aimed at enhancing bi-national investments and trade exchanges. Trade relations between the two countries currently stands at about US\$21,96 million.



## EGYPT

**27 September 2000** – President Mubarak met with his Syrian counterpart for bilateral talks and discussions on the ongoing Middle East peace initiatives.

**18 October 2000** – First round parliamentary elections were held for 150 seats in the 454-seat People's Assembly. These elections were the first of three rounds of balloting. Elections were held in three stages because Egypt does not have enough judges to monitor the polls on one single day.

**29 October 2000** – Second round parliamentary elections were held. Eight winners were from President Hosni Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), seven winners were independents, and a run-off poll was called to determine the inconclusive results of the remaining 119 seats for the second round.



## LIBYA

**12 September 2000** – The four hostages who were held in the Philippines, were handed over by government officials to their respective government representatives. Libya was one of the countries that mediated and secured the release of the hostages, who were held hostage for almost six months by Abu Sayyaf rebels.



## MAURITANIA

**6 September 2000** – The government granted South African-based De Beers Consolidated Mines a permit to explore diamond mine fields in the northern parts of the country.



## MOROCCO

**22 September 2000** – The European Union granted Morocco US\$72,82 million for a road construction and rehabilitation project. The project will be carried out in the northern parts of the country.



## WESTERN SAHARA

**1 September 2000** – The representative of the Polisario Front, Mr M'hamed Khaddad, met with the special representative of the UN secretary general, William Eagleton, to discuss issues relating to the implementation of the referendum.

renaissance barometer  
**EAST AFRICA**




**BURUNDI**

**11 September 2000** – One of the Tutsi ethnic parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), agreed to sign the Burundi Peace Agreement. The PSD was one of six parties that initially rejected the agreement. Since then, three of the six parties have signed.

**25 September 2000** – Leaders from various political parties held a follow-up meeting in Tanzania after the signing of the Peace Agreement. The purpose of the meeting was to elect party representatives to the Implementation Committee, which was established to oversee the agreement.

**29 September 2000** – Nelson Mandela announced that the Burundi negotiation process was to move from Arusha to Bujumbura.

**4 October 2000** – Japan's permanent mission to the UN stated that Japan had issued an amount of US\$110,000 to assist the Burundi peace process.

**27 October 2000** – Nelson Mandela met with President Museveni of Uganda to discuss the Burundi peace process. Mandela informed Museveni that an implementation committee had been established to follow-up the agreement reached in Arusha.



**COMOROS**

**2 September 2000** – The government removed all sanctions against the separatist island of Anjouan, permitting renewed movement of people and goods between the islands. The decision came after a meeting between the Comorian government and Anjouan movement leaders. The meeting's main objective was to discuss the Fomboni Declaration.



**ERITREA**

**12 September 2000** – Opposition forces accused Asmara of resuming conscription campaigns in different areas in Eritrea.



**ETHIOPIA**

**25 September 2000** – Prime Minister Zenawi met with former exiled leader of the Afar Liberation Front, Ali Mireh. Their discussions focused on the state of affairs in Afar Regional State.

**17 October 2000** – Ethiopian president, Negaso Gidada, said the government had secured a US grant of US\$60 million from various international financial institutions that supported its programmes to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS.



**KENYA**

**12 October 2000** – Kenya and the US were scheduled to undertake a joint military training exercise, the focus of which would have been peacekeeping. The exercise, which would have been facilitated by the African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI), would have required the US to provide US\$5,6 million for military equipment and other needs.



**RWANDA**

**28 September 2000** – The government requested the return of about 30,000 children who were taken to Europe by various NGOs in 1994, which was at the height of the genocide. The request was made through the Italian

representative to Uganda and Rwanda. Italy took 165 of the children.

**4 October 2000** – Rwandan radio reported that Rwanda was included on the list of African states that qualified for US trade benefits under the recently enacted Africa Growth and Opportunities Act.

**19 October 2000** – President Kagame opened a three-day conference on unity and reconciliation. During his opening speech, he stated that the country was progressing towards meeting its security and judicial problems. The conference formed part of a process aimed at restoring peace and stability in the country.



## SOMALIA

**12 September 2000** – UNICEF started a country wide polio vaccination programme for about 1,4 million children.

**16 September 2000** – A demobilisation programme, which will form part of the peace-building efforts in Somalia, began with the demobilisation of at least 300-armed militiamen. Businessmen, linked to the country's newly elected president, are reportedly financing the programme, as well as the demobilised militias, who will join the country's new police force.

**23 September 2000** – It was reported that one of the militia leader, Hussein Aideed, signed a reconciliation agreement with Somalia's new president, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. The agreement was signed during a meeting in Libya.

**6 October 2000** – More than 2,000 militiamen were demobilised and are currently undergoing re-training at various camps in Mogadishu. The demobilisation process was coordinated by the Committee of National Security (CNS), which was established by the new government.

**13 October 2000** – The newly appointed prime minister of Somalia, Abdullahi Derow Isak, together with other elected parliamentarians, arrived back in the country from Djibouti. Their arrival marked the beginning of a process aimed at the establishment of a new government for Somalia.

**17 October 2000** – The new government established a committee to mediate with the faction leaders in Mogadishu.

**21 October 2000** – President Abdiqasim Salad Hasan met with various members of the Arab

league in Egypt, in an attempt to obtain their support for the Somali reconstruction initiative.



## SUDAN

**17 September 2000** – According to the ICRC, the SPLA handed over seven members of the Sudanese army. The handover took place in the rebel-controlled town of Kurmuk.

**21 September 2000** – The government extended the ceasefire for another two weeks in order to foster a favourable atmosphere for ongoing negotiations in Kenya.

**26 September 2000** – President al-Bashir held a meeting with the leader of the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in Eritrea. The two leaders agreed that a political solution, as opposed to a military confrontation, was the only solution to the country's crisis.

**27 September 2000** – The General Elections Commission announced that the country's parliamentary and presidential elections would be held between 11-20 December 2000. Of the 360 available seats in parliament, 90 have been reserved for women, businessmen, teachers, farmers and herders.

**16 October 2000** – A UNICEF representative in Sudan said the government and the SPLA had agreed to cease all hostilities between 21-23 October and 17-18 November. The agreement will allow UNICEF to carry out a polio vaccination programme on 4,5 million children.



## TANZANIA

**3 October 2000** – The National Electoral Commission started distributing voting material to different voting centres ahead of the country's general elections on 29 October 2000.

**3 October 2000** – The Bank of Tanzania reported that gold and diamond exports earned Tanzania an estimated US\$111,8 million during the financial year which ended in July. This compared well with last year's earnings, which amounted to US\$25,1 million.

**29 October 2000** – Tanzania went to the polls for its second multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections. The main contest was between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF).



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**GENERAL**

**24 September 2000** – Eight African heads of state from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Togo held a meeting to deliberate the state of affairs in the Ivory Coast. The meeting, which was held in Togo, was organised under the aegis of the OAU.

**16 October 2000** – The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) started a polio immunisation campaign, which aims to immunise about 70 million children in 14 west African states.

**23 October 2000** – The 16th annual World Conference of Mayors ended with a request that the US and other donor countries provide debt relief for all democratic states in Africa. The conference took place in Abuja, Nigeria.

**26 October 2000** – Ministers of justice from the Economic Unity of West Africa States (ECOWAS) endorsed a list of 14 people who will form part of an ECOWAS Regional Court of Justice. The court will be established next year.



**BURKINA FASO**

**29 September 2000** – The National Electoral Commission announced the result of the 24 September municipal elections: the country’s ruling party, the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), won 45 of the 49 urban communes. According to the commission, there was 68.4% voter turnout.



**GHANA**

**27 September 2000** – Britain pledged to provide 40 million pounds sterling to Ghana to assist the country with the implementa-

tion of its social sector and poverty reduction strategy for 2000-2001.



**GUINEA**

**27 October 2000** – According to the UNHCR, improved security around Guinea’s border with Sierra Leone and Liberia facilitated the resumption of humanitarian work to assist thousands of refugees in the area.



**GUINEA-BISSAU**

**14 September 2000** – *Lusa News* reported that President Yallah had reinstated four ministers from the Guinea-Bissau Resistance (RGB). The ministers had previously been removed from the coalition government.

**27 September 2000** – Germany granted Guinea-Bissau US\$150,000 to assist with the demining process in Bra. It is estimated that there are 20,000 mines planted in Guinea-Bissau, with 11,000 of them in and around the capital.



**IVORY COAST**

**10 October 2000** – The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that it had provided humanitarian assistance to about 12,000 victims of ethnic clashes. The committee only started its operations in the country in August.

**26 October 2000** – Laurent Gbagbo was inaugurated as the new president of the Ivory Coast, after the country’s supreme court stated that he won the election with a 59.4% majority. His main opposition, General Guei, clinched 32.7% of the votes cast.



## MALI

**14 September 2000** – It was announced that Mali qualified for debt relief in the amount of US\$870 million because it fell under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. This announcement came after the World Bank and the IMF agreed that the country was on the right path in terms of its economic and social programmes.

**26 September 2000** – Mali entered into a military cooperation agreement with Turkey. The agreement will facilitate future training of Mali army personnel by their Turkish counterparts, as well as other related joint military activities.



## NIGERIA

**19 September 2000** – President Obasanjo informed a joint delegation from the World Bank and the UN AIDS Programme that his government would make provisions for a separate vote in its 2001 budget to meet the targets for its HIV/AIDS programme.

**29 September 2000** – The Nigerian Anti-Corruption Commission was officially established in Nigeria to investigate serious economic offences. Speaking at the inaugural ceremony, President Obasanjo appealed to commission members to discharge their duties in accordance with

the country's laws.

**10 October 2000** – The Delta State Ministry of Women Affairs announced the resumption of a loan scheme to assist women involved in small business initiatives. The scheme is part of a US\$1 million project funded by the US, which seeks to support empowerment initiatives for women.



## SENEGAL


**12 September 2000** – President Wade informed reporters that the referendum for the country's new constitution was scheduled to take place on 27 November 2000.



## SIERRA LEONE

**18 October 2000** – Nigerian soldiers, who were part of the UN mission in Sierra Leone, provided relief supplies to the Save Our Souls (SOS) Children's Village in Freetown. The gesture was made during the country's commemoration of its 40th year of independence.

**20 October 2000** – Reports claimed that schools were reopened in the government-controlled towns of Bumbuna and Kabala. Reports also showed that the *Medicines Sens Frontieres* reopened a government hospital in Kabala.



ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP

Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo (R) shakes hands with former military ruler Robert Guei (L), who has been in hiding since he was ousted in November

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# SOUTHERN AFRICA




## BOTSWANA

**18 September 2000** – Botswana's Export Development and Investment Authority said it had attracted more than 50 million pula in direct foreign investment since its formation in 1999. The new investment has created 3,000 jobs, with more expected in the future, as other companies express interest in doing business with the diamond-rich country.

**23 October 2000** – The Foreign Minister of Botswana, Mompoti Merafhe, met with his South African counterpart, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for discussions on regional and bilateral affairs.



## LESOTHO

**27 September 2000** – The Minister of Law and Constitutional Affairs, Shakane Mokhehle, submitted new electoral legislation to parliament. The new legislation seeks to amend the constitution in order to make provisions for a new electoral system.

**28 September 2000** – Justice Leon, chairman of the Commission of Enquiry into the political turmoil of 1998, announced that the proceedings would be adjourned until 15 January 2001. According to the chairman, the move would give all those implicated some time to prepare for the enquiry.



## MALAWI

**9 September 2000** – The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) granted more than one billion kwacha (approximately US\$14,5 million) to Malawi for edu-

cation, health, agriculture and poverty reduction.

**16 September 2000** – The governments of Malawi and Mozambique signed a lake service agreement aimed at promoting trade between the two countries. In terms of the agreement, the citizens of both countries will have free access to the lake for social and economic purposes.

**27 October 2000** – The supreme court ruled that the result of the June 1999 elections, which were won by the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF), was legitimate. The ruling puts to rest a 16-month dispute over the legitimacy of the election result.



## MAURITIUS

**13 September 2000** – The opposition alliance between the Socialist Militant Movement (MSM) and the Mauritanian Militant Movement (MMM) won the country's general elections. The result showed a landslide victory of 54 out of the 62 seats.

**16 September 2000** – President Cassam Uteem appointed the country's cabinet under a newly-elected prime minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth.



## MOZAMBIQUE

**20 October 2000** – It was reported that the Mozambique parliament had resumed its session with both the ruling FRELIMO party and its opposition, RENAMO. It was the first time that the parties were in session together since the disputed elections last year.

**27 October 2000** – The National Disaster Management Institute (INGC), together with other

international agencies, started preparations for possible floods in Mozambique. There are fears that another flood disaster could occur, as some of the land in the southern river basins is still water-logged.



## NAMIBIA

**3 September 2000** – It was reported that the spread of HIV/AIDS had dropped in the country, and that Namibia's infection ranking had changed from third to fourth position.

**26 September 2000** – The Swedish ambassador to Namibia donated \$750,000 Namibian dollars to the Namibia Nature Foundation. The Swedish Local Environment Fund will also provide small grants to individual citizens, which will enable them to address environmental issues within their own habitats through wildlife care and development.



## SOUTH AFRICA

**1 September 2000** – South Africa ushered in legislation to combat racism through its Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.

**2 September 2000** – A four-day national conference on racism ended with a message from Deputy President Jacob Zuma, who said that individual action was needed to end racial prejudice. The Johannesburg conference was organised by the statutory Human Rights Commission, and about 1,000 people attended.

**11 September 2000** – The leaders of the South African Communist Party, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the African National Congress (ANC) pledged to meet regularly to settle social and economic policy disputes in order to strengthen their coalition.

**29 September 2000** – Denmark awarded Zambia with a US\$110 million aid package to support capacity-building within the country. The Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEEC) began a two-day conference to discuss the integration and participation of the black population within the mainstream economy. The BEEC proposed a Commercial Equity Act, in which the private sector would be required to invest in black business developments, education, and would also be required to adopt affirmative action policies.

**6 October 2000** – It was announced that a new HIV/AIDS vaccine called Alphavax would be tested on humans in South Africa in February 2001. Alphavax is aimed at the type C-HIV virus that affects about 90% of HIV positive people in South Africa. The experiment will be carried out in KwaZulu-Natal and involve about 50 volunteers.

**24 October 2000** – Speaking at a business conference in Cape Town, President Thabo Mbeki reiterated his promise that the government would not permit the invasion of white-owned farms, as had been witnessed in Zimbabwe.



## SWAZILAND

**2 October 2000** – Prime Minister Sibusiso Dlamini said the US had agreed to withhold its earlier decision to exclude Swaziland from the General System Preferences (GSP) because of its Industrial Relations Act. According to the prime minister, the US has given Swaziland time to amend and improve its labour laws.



## ZAMBIA

**14 September 2000** – Denmark awarded Zambia with a US\$110 million aid package to support capacity-building within the country.

**25 September 2000** – Zambia's ruling Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) won all eight parliamentary by-elections, thus securing a large majority in parliament.



## ZIMBABWE

**5 September 2000** – Denmark awarded Zambia with a US\$110 million aid package to support capacity-building within the country. Four African presidents – Mbeki, Mugabe, Muluzi and Nujoma – met with UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. The leaders discussed Zimbabwe's land reform programme.

**22 September 2000** – Denmark awarded Zambia with a US\$110 million aid package to support capacity-building within the country. Zimbabwe's supreme court declared the state broadcasting corporation's monopoly invalid, and ruled in favour of a private company bent on challenging President Mugabe's government.

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# CENTRAL AFRICA



## GENERAL

**3 October 2000** – The Republic of Congo and the DRC pledged to renew their efforts to restore security on the Congo and Oubangui waterways. Clashes between DRC troops and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) led to a complete shutdown of any activity in the Oubangui River area.



## ANGOLA

**1 September 2000** – The UN reported that a humanitarian disaster was unfolding in the isolated town of Luau, where 10 people are dying from malnutrition every day. The town's population is rising daily, due to large numbers of people fleeing the conflict in neighbouring Lunda Sul Province. The conflict in the Congo is another reason why people have sought refuge in Luau.

**17 October 2000** – The European Union (EU) issued US\$10,5 million towards the UN World Food Programme's (WFP) initiatives in Angola. WFP representatives said the grant would help enhance its distribution of 14,000 tons of maize to people around the country.



## CHAD

**21 September 2000** – It was reported that President Idriss Deby held a meeting with 30 opposition parties to discuss the country's electoral system. It was the first meeting between the president and opposition parties.

**26 October 2000** – The World Bank approved a loan of US\$67 million to assist Chad with its food

security distribution. According to the bank, the lack of proper road infrastructure in Chad has negatively affected the distribution of consumer goods and the outflow of agricultural products. Consequently, the funds will be used to re-construct the country's major roads.



## DRC

**12 September 2000** – According to the National Valuation Centre, a government-owned mining company, *La Minière de Bakwanga*, mined 704,087.5 diamond carats during August – apparently, this was the best production in the last three years.

**3 October 2000** – The transitional parliament convened for its ordinary session in Lubumbashi. Two of the main issues discussed were the country's draft constitution and the 2001 budget.



## GABON

**24 October 2000** – The IMF approved a US\$119 million credit to Gabon to assist the government with its economic development programmes.



## REPUBLIC OF CONGO

**25 October 2000** – The mediator in the Congolese crisis, former Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, stated that a national reconciliation conference would be held in the country before the end of the year.