Political Warfare and Psychological Operations

RETHINKING the US APPROACH

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Foreword

THE POTENTIAL DESTRUCTIVENESS of open warfare between the superpowers has tended to shift East-West competition to the lower end of the "spectrum of conflict," toward political and psychological warfare. While the Soviets have actively waged political war against the West, the United States has, to a large extent, shied away. The negative connotations in the West of the word *propaganda* suggest we have treated political war as incompatible with democratic values and traditions.

This book, based on a symposium cosponsored by the National Defense University, the National Strategy Information Center, and the Georgetown University National Security Studies Program, considers what the United States can do to overcome traditional American aversion to political warfare and compete better in the political struggle that characterizes international relations today. The symposium brought together practitioners—military and civilian—and analysts to address these issues. The papers included in this volume reveal both successes and mistakes of the past, and present possibilities for improving US efforts today and in the future. Although disagreeing on specific issues and tactics, the various authors unanimously believe that the United States must upgrade its performance in the political-psychological arena.

Willing or not, the United States is involved in today's international political-psychological conflict. This book suggests how the United States can act to counter Soviet political warfare, and to build and deploy its own political and psychological capabilities.

Bradley C. Hosmer
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Introduction

Perhaps no other component of US national security policy has been so neglected in recent years as the one that forms the subject of this book. Even the terminology of the field is likely to seem strange to many readers, including many with long experience in the uniformed military and in other agencies of the US government. Psychological operations (frequently abbreviated PSYOP) is a long-standing term of military art designating the employment of certain dedicated communications assets (principally broadcasting and printing equipment and the platforms and personnel associated with it) in support of combat operations. However, the term is sometimes also used in a broader and less technical sense to refer to a range of psychological warfare activities conducted by civilian as well as military organizations. Political warfare is a term that is less well established in usage and doctrine, but one that seems useful for describing a spectrum of overt and covert activities designed to support national political-military objectives.

In the spirit of the adage that it is necessary to crawl before one can learn to walk, the present volume is modest in its scope and intention. Its primary purposes are to stimulate serious thought about a forgotten aspect of strategy, and to lay the groundwork for a revival of psychological-political planning and operations within the larger framework of US national security policy as a whole. It approaches this task in all modesty and with due skepticism, in recognition of the enormous difficulties any such project must encounter given the nature of our society and the particular cultural and political constraints that currently work to limit any American or Western efforts in this area.

Psychological warfare has a long history. An impressive understanding of the psychological dimension of war is evi-
dent in the classic treatise on the art of war by the Chinese
strategist Sun Tzu, written over two thousand years ago.
Highly effective military strategies with a major
psychological component have been employed by imperial
powers such as ancient Rome, the Mongols of the Middle
Ages, and the European colonial empires of the nineteenth
century. At the same time, psychological strategies have often
proven attractive to weak states forced to rely for their sur-
vival on diplomatic maneuver and deception; the Byzantine
Empire is perhaps the classic case. With the rise of militant
religions and (in our own time) of messianic ideologies, new
opportunities and instruments became available for waging
psychological warfare. Indeed, it became increasing possible
to divorce the psychological dimension of strategy from ac-
tual warfare, as ideology and religion proved effective tools
for weakening hostile states and extending one's own power
with little or no military effort.

Psychological-political penetration and subversion of
foreign states and of international organizations and
movements remains a distinguishing feature of the contem-
porary strategic environment. Though taking place in
peacetime (or what currently passes under that term), such
activity is nonetheless intimately linked with violence. Ter-
rorism, revolutionary insurgencies, and the implicit violence
of large military forces in being supply much of the currency
in which psychological warfare today trades. Its primary
practitioner is, of course, the Soviet Union. Increasingly,
however, the techniques of psychological-political warfare
are being mastered and effectively used not only by Third
World Marxist-Leninist movements and regimes (such as the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua) but also by states of wholly dif-
ferent ideological outlook (such as Iran).

Part of the reason for the current neglect of
psychological-political warfare in the United States is the per-
vasive notion that what is involved here is fundamentally a
competition in ideas whose effect on the nation's concrete
security interests is marginal at best. To hold this notion is to
underestimate seriously the extent to which Soviet (and Soviet
surrogate) psychological-political activities form an integral part of Soviet policy and strategy generally—and in particular, the extent to which they support and are supported by the use of force. It also reflects a failure to identify and assimilate the lessons of the chief defeats the United States has suffered internationally in the postwar period. Above all, the Vietnam War was won by the Communists, and lost by the United States, at the psychological-political level of conflict.

The scope and structure of the present volume are intended to help correct these errors. Rather than focusing on more familiar aspects of the broader psychological-political struggle with the Soviet Union, the volume concentrates on those instrumentalities of national policy in this area that are now or have traditionally been the responsibility primarily of US military and intelligence organizations. At the same time, considerable emphasis is given to the overall policy framework that must control the use of these instrumentalities and lend them strategic meaning.

How can or should the United States respond to the long-standing challenge of Communist psychological-political warfare? What opportunities exist in this field for the United States to advance its own political-military interests? What are the lessons of past American efforts? What is the situation today? What are the prospects for the future? What are the conceptual, political, cultural, and bureaucratic obstacles to a more effective use by the United States of psychological-political approaches and techniques?

These are the questions raised and addressed in the present volume. The papers included here were originally presented at a symposium jointly sponsored by the National Defense University, the National Strategy Information Center, and the Georgetown University National Security Studies Program, held at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, 21 and 22 November 1986. This symposium was modeled on a similar conference sponsored by these same organizations in March 1983 on the subject of special operations, out of which grew the book *Special
Operations in US Strategy, published by the National Defense University Press. The more remote inspiration for these collective inquiries in sensitive policy areas relating to low-intensity or unconventional warfare was provided by the series of symposia organized over a period of several years by the National Strategy Information Center under the aegis of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. The proceedings of these symposia, published in a six-volume series with the general title Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s, have been widely acknowledged as an invaluable source of dispassionate analysis and discussion of sensitive and controversial intelligence policy issues.

All of these conferences have been attended by individuals with operational experience in the relevant disciplines, as well as by other experts. The symposium on psychological operations and political warfare was attended by some 100 persons, including former and currently active specialists in military psychological operations and covert action and expert or interested observers from a variety of government agencies, congressional staffs, the media, and the academic world. From the outset, it was hoped that the symposium would lead to a publication that would prove useful for government agencies, service schools and war colleges, and national security studies curricula in colleges and universities throughout the country.

This volume opens with a paper by the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, former under secretary of defense for policy. Dr. Ikle discusses the importance of psychological and political conflict in the current international environment, and argues that such methods are not only legitimate but necessary for the United States if it is to sustain the security of the Free World over the long term.

In the next paper, Dr. Carnes Lord, former staff member of the National Security Council, provides a broad overview of the psychological-political dimension in US strategy. He begins by reviewing the role of psychological warfare planning and operations in US national security in the early postwar years, and then attempts to sort out the
conceptual difficulties that continue to impede understanding of these activities. He argues that psychological-political warfare has been too often identified with the conflict of ideas, opinions, and ideology, whereas it is "also about cultural and political symbols, about perceptions and emotions, about the behavior of individuals and groups under stress, about the cohesion of organizations and alliances."

After a brief discussion of the term public diplomacy and its inadequacy as a general rubric for the activities in question, he goes on to characterize political warfare as a general category of activities that includes political action, coercive diplomacy, and covert political warfare, the latter corresponding roughly to the covert aspects of what the Soviets refer to as "active measures"; and he argues that the term psychological operations should be reserved for use in the purely military sphere. Dr. Lord then proceeds to address the general question of the cultural and bureaucratic factors inhibiting effective engagement in psychological-political conflict by the United States, with particular attention to the current role of the American media. He notes that US efforts in this field in the past have consistently suffered from the inadequacy of integrated strategic planning and decision-making at the national level, as well as from institutional resistance within the national security bureaucracy. He concludes with a discussion of military psychological operations that stresses the need for a fuller integration of normal military activities in a PSYOP framework, as well as greater attention to psychological-political factors in war planning and crisis management.

In response to Dr. Lord's paper, Mr. Paul A. Smith, Jr., former editor of the journal Problems of Communism, raises a question as to the proper terminology for describing psychological-political conflict. He suggests that the term political war is an acceptable general designation for all psychological-political activities directed against hostile states.

General Richard G. Stilwell, formerly deputy under secretary of defense for policy with special responsibilities
in the area of intelligence and military psychological operations, also wonders whether the term psychological operations should not be used broadly to cover nonmilitary as well as military aspects of psychological-political warfare. General Stilwell goes on to discuss the problems experienced within the US government in implementing National Security Decision Directive 130, which called for a revitalization of psychological operations in the Department of Defense within the context of a general review of US international information policy. He argues that there is a need to restructure and improve the interagency mechanism and procedures governing public diplomacy and psychological-political warfare generally.

Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., former commander of the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and until recently director of psychological operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, next discusses the history, current status, and future prospects of psychological operations within the US military establishment. According to Colonel Paddock, a review by Secretary Caspar Weinberger of Department of Defense capabilities and needs in the area of psychological operations led in 1985 to the formulation of a comprehensive PSYOP "Master Plan," which now serves as the framework for an ongoing revitalization of psychological operations within the Defense Department.

The need for comprehensive joint doctrine in this area, for improved planning, for improved education and training, and for a modernized PSYOP force structure are briefly discussed. Colonel Paddock then addresses two issues of particular importance for the future of military psychological operations: the relationship of PSYOP and special operations and the prospective establishment of a Joint Psychological Operations Center. He strongly defends the separation of PSYOP from special operations and its integration with conventional military planning and operations.

Colonel Richard Brauer, commandant of the Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, shares Colonel Paddock's view of the need for a broadened concept
of psychological operations. PSYOP should not be understood to be solely an Army responsibility; it should involve a strategic perspective, and it should make use of a variety of non-PSYOP resources to accomplish its mission. Mr. Barry Zorthian, former director of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office of the US Military Assistance Command—Vietnam, stresses the importance of integration of military and civilian PSYOP programs and personnel in situations of low-intensity or revolutionary conflict.

In the next paper, Dr. Angelo Codevilla, senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace of Stanford University, addresses the general subject of political warfare. Beginning from the premise that political warfare is "the forceful political expression of policy," Dr. Codevilla argues that the chief difficulties facing the United States in this area stem from the inconsistencies and failures that have marked American foreign policy or national strategy generally. Dr. Codevilla defines political warfare as "the marshaling of human support, or opposition, in order to achieve victory in war or in unbloody conflicts as serious as war." As such, political warfare is in a sense coextensive with all international action and is not confined to the tools specifically associated with political warfare operations. Political warfare may be overt or covert, but it must provide foreigners true and convincing reasons why they should identify themselves and their cause with the United States.

Dr. Codevilla goes on to analyze the elements of political warfare as conducted historically by the United States and their relationship to American policy, with particular attention to gray propaganda, black propaganda, agents of influence, and political support operations. He argues that there is a fundamental moral issue involved in providing support for foreign states and movements in cases where the United States lacks the political will or competence to ensure their success. Finally, he addresses the future of political warfare, arguing that while the potential usefulness of the tools of political warfare is great and increasing, there are few grounds for optimism concerning the ability of the US government to make effective use of them.
Mr. Donald F. B. Jameson, a former CIA official with experience in the field of covert action, argues in response to Dr. Codevilla that "what's worth doing is worth doing badly," referring to the success the United States has enjoyed in certain of its political warfare endeavors (notably, in supporting non-Communist intellectual and cultural forces in Europe after World War II) in spite of persisting ambiguities in national policy. Dr. Abram N. Shulsky, formerly minority staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, shares similar reservations concerning Dr. Codevilla's argument. While acknowledging the importance of the link between political warfare operations and policy, he suggests that US policy toward the Soviet Union in particular will almost inevitably lack the kind of clarity Dr. Codevilla seems to demand of it. He further points out that it is far from clear to what extent the United States can be held morally culpable when it provides political and material support to foreigners who oppose Communist regimes for good and sufficient reasons of their own.

Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, next takes up the question of the role of psychological-political strategies in the US approach to revolutionary war. Revolutionary war is distinguished for the purposes of this paper from other forms of limited or low-intensity conflict. At issue is the support the United States can usefully provide either to governments seeking to suppress Communist-oriented insurgent movements or to insurgents seeking to overthrow Communist regimes. Dr. Shultz argues that what distinguishes true revolutionary war from other forms of guerrilla or irregular warfare is precisely the political character of the means as well as the objectives of the struggle. In revolutionary war, the final objective of the insurgents is to replace the existing regime with a new regime; they seek to achieve this objective through propaganda and political action, mass mobilization, establishment of a political-military infrastructure, military and paramilitary tactics, and outside assistance.
Dr. Shultz emphasizes the important role the Soviet Union and its surrogates have accorded to political and psychological measures in the international arena as a form of assistance to insurgent movements. These measures include propaganda, international front organizations, and political action within international and regional organizations.

After discussing the problems with US counterinsurgency and psychological operations efforts in Vietnam, Dr. Shultz proceeds to address recent US experiences in Central America. He suggests that the United States has tended in El Salvador—much as in Vietnam—to encourage a conventional warfare approach by the Salvadoran military and government, with sufficient attention to psychological operations and civic action. With respect to Nicaragua, he argues that the United States has so far failed to assist the Contras in developing an integrated political-military strategy or in legitimizing themselves in the regional or international context. He concludes by outlining the elements of a comprehensive approach the United States might adopt in support of insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts in the Third World.

General Robert C. Kingston, former commander of the US Central Command, agrees with Dr. Shultz concerning the central importance of psychological operations for insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, and emphasizes the need for PSYOP planning and operations through all phases of such conflict. Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., who has written extensively on various aspects of Soviet military thought, calls attention to the importance of understanding the nature and origins of Soviet support for insurgencies and international terrorism. He argues that there has been a general failure within the United States to grasp the long-term, strategic character of these Soviet efforts and to devise appropriate counterstrategies.

Dr. Alvin H. Bernstein, chairman of the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College, next examines the psychological and political dimension of US policy relative to the limited use or threatened use of force. Noting that the ef-
fectiveness of diplomatic coercion and limited military operations depends decisively on a nation’s cumulative reputation for actually employing its military forces, Dr. Bernstein argues that the United States has been handicapped since the Vietnam War by a perceived decline in its credibility in this area. At the same time, recent examples of the successful application of limited force by Western nations (the Falklands War, Grenada, US operations against Libya) indicate that, contrary to a common view, military force remains very much an effective instrument of national policy; and they also reveal the continuing importance of the psychological dimension of conflict at this level.

Dr. Bernstein discusses the specific role of naval and air power as instruments of psychological warfare, as well as the psychological importance of American or Western technological superiority in conflicts with Third World nations, calling attention particularly to the role of sophisticated intelligence collection, communications, and other electronic technologies. He also stresses the importance of direct communication of US objectives and intentions in limited conflict situations.

In response to Dr. Bernstein’s paper, Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, senior fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, addresses the role of the psychological element in warfare generally, arguing that this element increases in importance to the degree to which a conflict offers greater scope for relational maneuver as distinguished from attrition. Properly understood, the discipline of PSYOP is an integral aspect of the conduct of military operations and a general command responsibility.

Regarding coercive diplomacy, Dr. Luttwak emphasizes the failure of the “pragmatic style” of foreign policy characteristic of the United States to pay attention to the psychological importance of a nation’s accumulated reputation for the effective use of its power. Dr. Joseph Goldberg, professor of research at the National Defense University, emphasizes the potential effectiveness of coordinated campaigns of coercive diplomacy and the management of an adversary’s
perceptions of US military power, and discusses the recent case of Libya.

In the final paper, Dr. Henry S. Rowen, senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution and former director of the National Intelligence Council, discusses political and psychological approaches to general war with the Soviet Union, with particular reference to allied strategy with respect to Eastern Europe. Dr. Rowen begins by recalling that the notion of disrupting the enemy's alliances was recognized as a critical element of strategy by Sun Tzu, and that the Soviets have themselves long followed this advice in their planning for a war against NATO. In the contemporary West, by contrast, little has been done along these lines.

Yet the common view that the Soviets possess unchallengeable conventional superiority in Europe rests on the assumption that the very substantial military forces of the East European countries will follow Moscow's orders. Recent turmoil in Poland, among other things, suggests that this may not necessarily be the case; and a number of steps could be taken by the West, Dr. Rowen suggests, to create even greater complications and uncertainties for Soviet war planning in the European theater. For example, NATO could signal its intention to treat as neutrals any East European nations opting out of a Soviet invasion of the West, or not to use nuclear weapons against them. Approaches to the East Europeans could be secret, through diplomatic channels, or public, through Western radio broadcasts. To be truly effective, however, such approaches would require a rethinking of NATO war aims and a more plausible threat of offensive action into Warsaw Pact territory than NATO currently poses.

Commenting on Dr. Rowen's paper, Dr. Alexander Alexiev, senior Soviet analyst for the Rand Corporation, agrees that the opportunities as well as the motives for NATO to undertake such measures are greater than ever. He suggests that NATO might extend these effort to parts of the Soviet Union such as the Ukraine, as well as to Soviet forces stationed in Europe, and stresses the importance of the "information revolution," which is giving East Europeans increasing
access to the West. Finally, Dr. Alexiev cautions that Soviet vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe must not be used as an excuse for ignoring NATO's basic military problems.

Major General Edward Atkeson, former national intelligence officer for General Purpose Forces, also agrees with Dr. Rowen's analysis. He stresses Soviet sensitivity to Western influence on their Warsaw Pact allies, the degree of Soviet dependence on the forces of those allies, and the lack of incentives for the East Europeans to join in any Soviet attack on Western Europe.

We can conclude from the work collected here that the United States and the West can compete successfully in the political-psychological struggle, but that we face a very large task. First, we must do a great deal structurally and educationally to enable ourselves to compete. Then, the competition itself will require intensive effort over the long term by a broad array of people and organizations, inside and outside government. The effort, though, is essential, because the need to compete is compelling.

FRANK R. BARNETT
CARNES LORD
POLITICAL WARFARE

and

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The Modern Context

FRED C. IKLE

Both Psychological Operations and political warfare, or PSYOP and POLWAR (all good concepts must have acronyms), have risen in importance in the last few years. Moreover, it is not merely the Reagan administration's attention to these subjects that has made them important but also the current world situation. In today's world, PSYOP and POLWAR have become constant expressions of international conflict.

Approximate military parity between the superpowers enhances the importance of PSYOP and POLWAR. Major adversaries equally armed and equally capable of destroying each other must turn away from shooting wars to settle their genuine conflicts. POLWAR and PSYOP pose a lower risk of escalation. Our era has become the age of terrorism, insurgency, and limited war because each of these is an essentially political method of struggle. In this era of superpower confrontation, it is no longer facetious to set Clausewitz' dictum, "War is the continuation of politics by other means," on its head. In our modern world, international politics is the continuation of war by other means.

We live in an age of POLWAR and PSYOP. So we need to talk about the contemporary POLWAR-PSYOP struggle with special reference to the United States. In this paper, I will also discuss the means available to a democracy engaged in political warfare and the POLWAR goals a democracy can achieve. But it is crucial to bear in mind that these are but means, not ends, and political warfare can only be undertaken to achieve a legitimate national goal within the overall context of US leadership of the Free World.
Any democracy undertaking POLWAR and PSYOP must face the fact that modern communications and democratic openness combine to ensure that covert operations do not remain covert for very long. Journalists can report instantly from anywhere in the world, and adversary spokesmen enjoy immediate access to American and international media. The Hasenfus incident in Nicaragua illustrates my point. And adversaries of the American political system are able to use its openness to promote their strategic interests. Comandante Daniel Ortega was able to travel throughout our country lobbying even as Congress voted military aid against him.

For the United States, political warfare and psychological operations must be seen within the context of overall East-West conflict. Although not every insurgency is Soviet-inspired, and not every confrontation involves US-Soviet conflict, the critical conflicts of this nature are indeed inspired or supported by the Soviet Union and its clients. Throughout history, Soviet leaders have admitted that the nature of their system is expansionist. In a situation of rough military parity, and driven by the necessity to continue to expand, the Soviet Union and its surrogates have concentrated heavily on the methods of political and psychological warfare. However, this is hardly new, since the Communists, from Lenin on, have been masters of POLWAR and PSYOP. Indeed, that is how they originally took power. While the Communists are obviously professionals at political warfare, the United States, particularly since the Vietnam War, has shunned planned, integrated, and purposeful political and psychological warfare.

The conflict between the United States and its adversaries can be illuminated by recalling the situation of the old Byzantine Empire. The Eastern Empire survived nearly a thousand years after the Barbarians conquered Rome. Defining its goals carefully, fitting its means appropriately to its goals, and using military power only as absolutely necessary, Byzantium was able to maintain its political independence and relative prosperity for centuries in the face of fearsome
challenges. The Byzantine rulers used political warfare, psychological operations, military force, and other elements of national power in a controlled and judicious manner to resist every invader and rival. The Byzantine Empire ebbed and flowed in size but held on to its core. But the rulers of Byzantium made one crucial error. They did not foresee that dedicating a nation’s resources to maintaining stability cannot guarantee indefinite survival.

Yet what have the Western democracies learned from such historical cases? To the average educated American, the adjective Byzantine means “devious and surreptitious.” This reveals our culture’s attitude toward political warfare and PSYOP. Indeed, the Byzantines were masters of both methods. The Byzantine rulers relied on the indirect approach, cleverness, tricks, stratagems, subterfuges, and whatever methods of political warfare and psychological operations could be used in that age of limited technology. But our attitude resembles that of the British Admiral de Robeck, who, safely on his ship at Gallipoli in 1915, watched hundreds of British Empire troops rushing to the Turkish guns to be slaughtered. At the sight, he remarked admiringly, “Gallant fellows, these soldiers; they always go for the thickest place in the fence.”

In today’s world, America cannot afford to “go for the thickest place in the fence.” We cannot afford the casualties, we cannot afford the resources, and we cannot afford the deserved lack of trust and confidence in the government that would result. But practitioners of POLWAR and PSYOP need to be constantly aware that de Robeck’s attitude remains embedded in American culture today, restricting use of these less frontal methods. Despite such attitudes, though, POLWAR and PSYOP methods are by no means inescapably in conflict with the moral requirements of modern democratic government. Democracy’s greatest strength in the worldwide conflict will always be its fundamental moral bases: respect for the individual and for the truth.

POLWAR and PSYOP are merely methodologies, without moral connotation. It was the social context of knighthood
that made the crossbow “immoral”—not any characteristic of the weapon; so it is for POLWAR and PSYOP. POLWAR and PSYOP planners who internalize the morality of democracy become more effective against an ideologically bankrupt adversary. None of these are new observations. Sun Tzu said, “Those skilled in war . . . preserve the law and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.” In his commentary on Sun Tzu’s point, Tu Mu added, “Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments invincible.”

In this connection, we need to remember that every asset of national power must contribute to political warfare. Political maneuvering, diplomatic actions, public diplomacy, economic strategies, cultural appeal, ideology, and military power—and the media and methods by which these strengths can be brought to bear—are all potential contributors to achieving national goals. Yet this list is hardly inclusive. In every case, whatever methods are used, success will depend on planned, integrated, and coherent use of the tools of political and psychological warfare.

In a modern constitutional democracy, integrating and coordinating strategic POLWAR actions is difficult. No one has ever stopped a congressman from speaking his mind, and the statements he or she might make are often viewed as part of US policy by people outside our system. Yet within the present system it is merely difficult to devise a coherent strategy, not impossible. As leader of the Free World, however, the United States faces many problems in which the American people have little interest or knowledge. Our experience in Southeast Asia at least taught us one important lesson: in a democracy, no strategy can long be undertaken without the support of the people. The elected leadership of the country must be able to articulate the issues and clearly explain the goals, rationale, and expected outcomes for every POLWAR situation. Any major or long-term effort will require congressional funding, and Congress, as the Founding Fathers intended, reflects accurately the will of the people over time.
In today's world, no important US political initiative can remain unexamined for long. If the media does not discover it on its own, the adversary will point it out. Then his professional propagandists will spread arguments that are plausible in the context of our democratic debate, to balk the development of a successful counterstrategy. Unfortunately, there may be a Gresham's Law of Truth—perhaps lies drive out truth, just as bad coinage drives out good. Only the dedicated efforts of good men and women will keep truth in the forefront of debate. The healthy functioning of a democracy depends on the truth being available to its citizens. But available truths don't necessarily become dominant in debate.

For example, the Reagan administration took over just after the prior administration had suspended aid to the Sandinista regime because of its illegal support for the Communist insurgency in El Salvador. In 1982 the House Intelligence Committee concurred in this view, concluding that Nicaragua provides the military "life line" for the Salvadoran insurgents. Later, President Reagan showed captured arms from El Salvador at the State Department. Napoleon Romero, a former Salvadoran guerilla leader, stated to the president and the media that the guns had come from Nicaragua. Yet a letter published not long ago in the Washington Post insisted that no credible proof of Nicaraguan support to Salvadoran guerrillas has ever been presented by the government. It is not surprising that it took years for Congress to approve support for the armed resistance in Nicaragua. Perhaps a Gresham's Law of Truth has indeed been in effect.

Yet a democracy cannot afford to respond with Leninist methods. Truth is democracy's best POLWAR and PSYOP weapon. The facts are on our side. Specifically validating Tu Mu's point is the fact that democratic falsehoods strengthen the dangerous argument of moral equivalency. For the goals of democracy can only be accomplished with methods that are compatible with democracy. We cannot maintain stability for its own sake, but must seek to establish a world climate that is safe for all democracies. All true democracies are in-
herently and naturally allies. Were we not ruled by democratic and moral principles, we could "solve" an insurgency situation by "making a desert and calling it peace," as the Russians seem to be trying to do in Afghanistan. But such stability would make us neither safe nor strong. Democracy is best protected by the spread of democracy throughout the world. When we support democratic insurgencies throughout the world, we are protecting ourselves. And we are helping to bring to others the best system of government.

But POLWAR, and its handmaiden, PSYOP, must be undertaken with as much deliberation as any shooting war. The aims of political warfare must be as clearly defined as victory conditions for any shooting war. Goals not clearly defined will never be achieved.

Some commentators believe that the overall US goal ought to be stability. But stability cannot be defined in terms that provide grounds for action. Stability can mean a situation of no change. Stability can mean dynamic equilibrium about a central point. If dynamic stability is the goal, how can any strategist judge any particular change within the overall context of continued stability? Does any particular small change foretell breakdown of the entire system? How is the strategist to decide whether to encourage a particular movement or to resist it with all available means? We have seen in our own time new governments originally believed by reputable observers to be democratic soon proved to be the opposite. Cuba and Nicaragua leap immediately to mind.

By contrast, when goals are clear any event can be examined clearly. If we define our goal today as stability, then the world situation must be a total disaster, for fully one-fourth of the world's countries are at war in one form or another. On the other hand, if our goal is enhancement and growth of democracy throughout the world, the current situation is not a threat but an opportunity. Were Nicaragua stable, there would be no hope for democracy there.

And we face an adversary who sees instability as an opportunity for progress. He balks the goal of stability at every
turn. And by seeking only stability, we become the adversary's unwitting ally.

The use of psychological warfare to induce unbearable tension has been a Communist technique for a long time. Leon Trotsky stated it quite succinctly with regard to the policy of "Red Terror." In *Democracy Versus Dictatorship* he wrote, "The revolution . . . kills individuals and intimidates thousands." We know that Communist insurgencies use violence to build unbearable tension in the target population. At the appropriate time, the terrorist offers, and the victim accepts, a Faustian bargain. To obtain relief from the tension of daily life in an atmosphere of constant and apparently random violence, the victim surrenders his birthright of freedom in exchange for peace—literally, at any price. And the strategist who makes stability his goal hands a perfect methodology to his tormentor, who merely has to disturb stability. Each bombing, assassination, or kidnapping throws the stability-seeker off balance. Two steps forward, one step back—and the stability-seeker plays the tune for this deadly dance.

And each situation of instability is used to probe democracy's reaction. One of Leninism's favorite ploys is to probe with a bayonet until steel is met. In the Angolan situation in 1975, Congress forbade any aid to the anticommunist forces. Recently Congress reversed that vote, and it has provided military aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. The message is clear: the next object the bayonet meets will be steel. For the steel is always the clear intent to resist the thrust, to make further advance cost more than the game is worth—or better yet, to turn the situation of instability into democratic victory. The truest steel is forged of will. Political warfare and psychological operations are among the best ways to make clear American resolve.

For not only can these methods convey a signal, but they actually advance democracy. Backed up by military action when it becomes necessary, as it was in Grenada, POLWAR and PSYOP, within their realm of competence, can turn situations of disadvantage into victory. Victory is the restora-
tion of democracy. To return to one of my earlier points, the best security for American democracy is a world network of viable democracies. Despite the short-term disagreements between democracies, in the long run, all democracies must be partners against totalitarianism—and every present democracy needs to understand that.

I have been discussing in a general way the context, the means, and the goals for political warfare and psychological operations by the United States. The context is that of a complex world with instant communications making every audience broader than the target audience. Within that context, we face an avowedly expansionist adversary. But American democracy is burdened in this battle both by historical ignorance and by a distorted notion of what is acceptable for a democracy engaging in political warfare. Nor can we forget that POLWAR and PSYOP came back into prominence because of the relative military strengths of the contending powers. Without effective deterrence, POLWAR cannot protect us from unleashed might, whether conventional or nuclear.

Moreover, the means available to the political or psychological war planner in a democracy appear at first to be limited by moral scruples. Yet even a casual second glance reveals that these limitations are the source of our greatest strength—the moral differentiation that makes the expansion of democracy not a form of imperialism, but an inherent good and the ultimate protection of all democracies.

Finally, we need to consider goals. To put it crudely, those who aim at nothing are guaranteed to hit it. Goals for political warfare and psychological operations must be as completely and carefully defined as goals for armed conflict. Goals specifically defined guide effective action; generalized statements lead to defeat. Further, mere stability is an impossible goal for the American strategist, and sets the strategist up for his own psychological defeat. He who seeks stability in a dynamic world will see every change as a threat. Eventually, his will to victory is overwhelmed by an endless succession of self-defined defeats. Today, restoring
democracy, as we did in Grenada, or helping in Nicaragua to do the same, are worthwhile and pursuable goals for political and psychological planners.
TO RECALL THE TIME when psychological and political warfare was widely acknowledged by Americans as an important instrument of national strategy requires a certain effort of historical imagination. Such was indeed the case, however, from the early days of the Second World War until roughly the mid-1960s. Although it is now often assumed that interest in these techniques simply reflected the popular mentality of the era of the Korean War and Senator Joe McCarthy, the fact is that the experience of World War II convinced many American political and military leaders that the psychological dimension of conflict had become critical in the contemporary world.

Modern communications technologies and totalitarian regimes specializing in the use of ideology and subversion as tools of aggression constituted a qualitatively new strategic problem for the West. The lessons of recent history (and in many cases direct wartime involvement) had at the same time sharpened the interest of American social scientists in propaganda or political communication generally as a phenomenon of mass society. The postwar years witnessed an outpouring of academic studies in this area, most of which took for granted the necessity and legitimacy of a vigorous American response to the emerging political-ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement.¹

The US government allowed its propaganda and political warfare capabilities to wither in the years of rapid demobilization immediately following World War II. But the
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, as successor to the wartime Coordinator of Information (COI) and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), provided a fresh impetus and an organizational vehicle for covert psychological operations and political action in peacetime. The deteriorating political situation in Western Europe in the late 1940s—with strong Communist parties poised to take power in France and Italy, Communists supported by Soviet allies fighting a civil war in Greece, and a successful Communist coup in Czechoslovakia—created a theater of operations and urgent objectives for the CIA's covert action directorate.

The coming of the Korean War stimulated improvements in US overt capabilities as well. In 1950, President Truman created a Psychological Strategy Board in the White House to provide a high-level focus for government-wide activities in this area. A new International Information Administration was established within the State Department; military psychological operations were given new life (the Army established a Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1952); and a Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee attempted to provide operational coordination among the various involved agencies. It was also around this time that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (originally Radio Liberation) were established by the CIA to broadcast to Communist-controlled areas of Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. In 1953, after commissioning a comprehensive review of US policy and capabilities for propaganda and political warfare, President Eisenhower moved to create the US Information Agency (USIA) as an autonomous agency reporting directly to the National Security Council.

There can be little question that the United States' political warfare effort scored important successes in these years. The reconstitution of democratic political forces and cultural life in Western Europe after the war owed much to CIA intervention. CIA covert operations with a high psychological-political content were successfully mounted in Guatemala and Iran. US international radio broadcasting
built a mass audience throughout the world, which it retains today.

Yet it can be questioned whether the US government as a whole was able at that time to develop an effective doctrine and organizational structure for the conduct of psychological and political warfare. Recognizing that much of the relevant material from these years remains classified and little studied, it would appear, nonetheless, that sharp differences of opinion existed over fundamental questions of strategy toward the Soviet bloc and the role of key agencies such as the CIA and USIA, and that operational coordination among the agencies left much to be desired. The Bay of Pigs disaster of 1961 revealed serious problems of coordination between the CIA and the military in situations of low-intensity conflict. During the Vietnam years, in spite of some notable successes with psychological and political techniques of counterinsurgency warfare, the US military and the government as a whole proved unable to devise and execute an overall strategy that took due account of the vital importance of the psychological-political dimension of the struggle.

It could perhaps be argued that the militarization of the Vietnam conflict was the key factor underlying the progressive atrophy of US political warfare capabilities after the mid-1960s. However, it seems evident that larger issues of governmental organization and national style or culture also figured critically in this development. In spite of the considerable strides made by Truman and Eisenhower in establishing formal decisionmaking mechanisms that would support genuine strategic direction of US policy, such direction was more an aspiration than a reality through the 1950s; and in the 1960s it ceased even to be an aspiration. At the same time, it should have been clear that the assignment of political warfare responsibilities to new agencies would not eliminate—and in certain respects would probably for-
tify—the sources of bureaucratic resistance to the use of this new instrument of national power. Finally, mention must be made of the cultural revolution that took place in the United States beginning in the mid-1960s. The shattering of the foreign policy consensus of the postwar decades as a result of Vietnam meant, in the first place, a questioning of the worth of American values and the legitimacy of a leading role for the United States in the world. Such attitudes could only spell trouble for any strategy that depended on the confident projection abroad of America's political identity and values.

Any attempt to rethink the role of political and psychological warfare in US strategy today must take account of these fundamental and persisting obstacles. Before turning to consider them more systematically, however, it is necessary to sketch briefly the basic features of political and psychological warfare and their relationship to other instruments of national power. This sketch is necessary particularly in view of the conceptual confusion that continues to bedevil discussions of this entire subject—a confusion that owes something to the involvement of a number of powerful bureaucracies with very distinctive outlooks, but also reflects an inherent problem.

The problem is indicated by the general tendency to use the terms psychological warfare and political warfare interchangeably to designate the overall phenomenon, not to mention a variety of similar terms—ideological warfare, the war of ideas, political communication, psychological operations, and more. The uncertainty of reference derives partly from the fact that this sort of warfare is waged to a considerable extent with weapons that are not truly distinctive. There are indeed distinctive psychological instruments—namely, capabilities for the communication of information and ideas, such as radio broadcasting, publications of various kinds, and educational and cultural programs. But because these capabilities are easier to conceptualize and easier to handle bureaucratically, the tendency has been to give them undue weight when it comes to defining the overall phenomenon.

There is a psychological dimension to the employment of every instrument of national power, emphatically including
military force at every level. Similarly, major increments of military and economic power necessarily generate political effects. In thinking about psychological and political warfare, the tendency has been to think about the conflict of ideas, ideologies, and opinions. Yet this conception is in fact seriously misleading. Psychological and political warfare is also about cultural and political symbols, about perceptions and emotions, about the behavior of individuals and groups under stress, about the cohesion of organizations and alliances.

To use the term warfare to describe US psychological-political strategy in its broadest sense, furthermore, is itself problematic. Psychological-political operations need not be directed only to adversaries; indeed, not only neutral but also allied and semi-allied nations potentially constitute highly important targets, since the weakening of US alliance structures is a key strategic objective of the political warfare activities of the Soviet Union. And, of course, psychological-political operations need not be undertaken only in a context of military conflict. On the other hand, to divorce psychological-political operations entirely from the arena of international conflict and national strategy—a natural tendency in the United States and other Western democracies, for cultural as well as bureaucratic reasons—runs the risk of cutting them adrift from any tangible national purpose and destroying their effectiveness.

The English language appears not to include a good term to designate psychological-political operations in their broadest sense. In recent years, but especially since the arrival of the Reagan administration, the term public diplomacy has gained considerable currency in Washington (if not elsewhere). Even though, in the absence of any authoritative public presentation of administration policy in this area, its exact meaning remains uncertain, public diplomacy appears to encompass three distinct though closely related functions. These are international information, international political action (or what may be called overt political warfare), and public affairs. The inclusion of public affairs is
a recognition of the impossibility in a modern democracy of separating sharply the communication of information to domestic and to international audiences; but the domestic function associated with public diplomacy differs from traditional public affairs by its strategic approach and its active effort to shape the domestic political agenda.\textsuperscript{10}

The public diplomacy rubric serves a useful purpose, but it is not and was not intended to be comprehensive. Covert political warfare was excluded from its purview from the beginning. (After some initial hesitation, CIA representatives were not permitted to attend interagency public diplomacy meetings even for purposes of coordination.) Nor does it have any clear relationship to military psychological operations, to educational and cultural affairs, or to the range of US government activities that may be grouped under the general label of international aid and humanitarian affairs.

While recognizing the state of flux of the relevant terminology and current disagreements (in some cases sharp) as to the degree of association desirable or necessary among the relevant activities, I would propose, if only for the sake of the clarity of the discussion, the following anatomy of basic psychological-political warfare functions.

\textit{Political warfare} is a general category of activities encompassing political action, coercive diplomacy, and covert political warfare. In general, the first of these functions is performed by diplomatic personnel, the second by military and diplomatic personnel, and the third by intelligence personnel. \textit{Political action} means a range of activities including certain kinds of multilateral diplomacy, support for foreign political parties or forces, and support for or work with international associations of various kinds.\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Coercive diplomacy} refers to diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use of military force to achieve political objectives.\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Covert political warfare} corresponds roughly to the covert aspects of what the Soviets call active measures, and includes support for insurgencies, operations against enemy alliances, influence operations, and black propaganda.\textsuperscript{13}
Psychological operations, once frequently used in a general sense to designate psychological-political operations as a whole, is probably best reserved for use as a term of art to designate military psychological operations (PSYOP). Military PSYOP can encompass both overt and covert activities in both peacetime and war, and its scope can vary from the tactical battlefield to the operational and strategic levels of conflict. Historically, however, US military interest in PSYOP has focused heavily on tactical applications in wartime. Sometimes battlefield PSYOP is distinguished from consolidation PSYOP, which is geared to securing the loyalty and cooperation of civilian populations in combat areas; consolidation PSYOP is closely related to civic action conducted by military forces in low-intensity conflict situations. Another related function is troop information or education, which serves among other things—much like public affairs in relation to public diplomacy—to counter the psychological operations of the enemy.

International communications is another general category that is often applied in very loose fashion. It is perhaps best understood as encompassing international information and international educational and cultural affairs. USIA (at one time the International Communications Agency) performs this range of functions, though other organizations—in particular, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, but also the Departments of State and Defense—perform information functions of political or strategic importance as well.

To what degree educational and cultural affairs should share the more explicitly political aims of US information programs remains a controversial issue, as does the question of the autonomy of the information function itself relative to other strategic instruments and objectives. It should be noted that there are a number of government-administered education and training programs in various areas that are not generally thought of in this context, yet have considerable potential for furthering US strategic interests. Foremost among these are the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program run by the Department of Defense, and training programs for foreign intelligence and security personnel.

A further general category that should be mentioned in this context is what was referred to a moment ago as international aid and humanitarian affairs. This category includes foreign economic and development aid, food aid, humanitarian assistance (rescue operations, disaster relief, famine relief, and the like), and technical assistance of various kinds. Many agencies are involved in such activities, including the Defense Department; the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps are organizations with dedicated missions in this area. Although these functions are bureaucratically scattered and very largely autonomous, they have a very important psychological-political component. Whether intentionally or otherwise, they serve as significant instruments of US foreign policy and national strategy.

Finally, to repeat what was said earlier, a psychological-political component is inherent in every use of the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of national power. The art of negotiation rests on an understanding of individual and group psychology and a sensitivity to cultural contexts. The exercise of military command at all levels similarly involves an assessment of the psychological strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy commander and his forces; deception and surprise are key elements of the military art. A nation's economic and military strength of necessity creates political weight that can be exploited in a variety of ways to advance the national interest.

The impetus for a rethinking of the role of political and psychological factors in US national strategy has come primarily from the renewed attention the Reagan administration has given these matters. Since 1981, a major effort has been underway to modernize and expand US government capabilities in the area of international communications, particularly radio and television broadcasting. The establishment of a radio station for broadcasting to Cuba (Radio
Marti) revealed a new appreciation on the part of the American political leadership of the strategic value of surrogate broadcasting operations to Communist countries. In June 1982, in a major policy development, President Reagan delivered a speech to the British Parliament in which he sketched the outlines of a new US strategy to promote democratic institutions around the world. One result of this initiative was the creation of the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy as a mechanism for overseeing the disbursement of funds for the support of democratic political and cultural institutions abroad. In 1983, the White House announced the creation of the Special Planning Group, a cabinet-level committee chaired by the president's national security adviser, to improve coordination of interagency activities in the field of public diplomacy. Major public diplomacy campaigns were undertaken to promote administration policy in Central America and in the general area of defense and arms control.

In spite of these very considerable achievements, however, it remains doubtful whether the administration has succeeded in overcoming the internal and external obstacles to a thorough revitalization of US psychological-political capabilities and their full integration into national strategy. In many respects, the cultural pressures working against such an effort are as strong as or stronger than ever. In addition to a kind of generic resistance to such activities on the part of Americans as Americans, there has been a wholesale loss of understanding and support of them among American elites in recent years. But perhaps equally troublesome is the resistance stemming from the national security bureaucracy itself, and from the continuing weakness of integrated strategic planning and decisionmaking at the national level.

Painful as it may be to face squarely the question of American cultural inhibitions in the area of psychological-political conflict, the effort is necessary—in order not only to develop intelligent approaches to dealing with them but also to achieve the cultural self-consciousness essential for effective participation in this kind of conflict. It is essential
because Americans tend to assume that people everywhere are much like themselves, with similar fundamental motivations and views of the world. But blindness to differences in national characteristics is apt to be a fatal handicap for anyone attempting to affect the psychological orientation and political behavior of foreign audiences.

Perhaps the most severe single limitation in the American outlook is, indeed, its tendency to discount the relevance to political behavior of nonmaterial factors such as history, culture, and ideas. Americans tend to assume that concrete interests such as economic well-being, personal freedom, and security of life and limb are the critical determinants of political behavior everywhere. It is an interesting irony that such a view is so prevalent in a country as fundamentally idealistic as the United States, while the importance the Soviets attribute to ideological factors stands in some tension with the materialist basis of Marxism.

Connected with this emphasis on material considerations is the fact that Americans, unlike many peoples, are uncomfortable with personal confrontation and argument and do not customarily debate political and ideological questions in their private lives. Americans tend to look on the political realm as an arena not of conflict and struggle but of bargaining and consensus, where strongly held opinions and principled positions are disruptive of the process and to be discouraged. This tendency makes it extremely difficult for Americans to deal effectively in international settings where basic American values are under challenge. Furthermore, American notions of fair play and due process are subject to serious misinterpretation abroad. Americans' insistence on a presentation of both sides of any argument is frequently seen as reflecting a lack of confidence in themselves. In general, the openness and penchant for self-criticism of American society strike many foreigners as manifestations of weakness rather than strength.

Manifest or latent in the attitudes of many Americans toward the practice of psychological-political warfare is a distaste for any sort of psychological manipulation or decep-
tion. The idea that psychological-political warfare is a black art that can be morally justified only under the most extreme circumstances is a derivative of such attitudes. That such activities necessarily involve misrepresentation or deception is in any case far from the truth. (The conveying of purely factual information under certain circumstances can have powerful psychological effects.) But even assuming that some such element is inseparable from effective psychological-political operations, the moral calculus is by no means as clear as it is frequently made out.

Military psychological operations such as battlefield broadcasting, for example, have as their primary purpose the saving of enemy as well as friendly lives. Indeed, such activities make both moral and strategic sense. According to the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. . . . Next best is to disrupt his alliances. . . . The next best is to attack his army. . . . The worst policy is to attack cities." As Sun Tzu puts it, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," which is to say that competence in the psychological-political sphere is of the essence of a rational approach to war.23 Failure to attain such competence within the limits of one's possibilities is a failure that is all too likely to be paid for in blood.

As important as the effect of these general cultural biases is the role of the American media. Developments in the culture and operating style of (especially) the prestige media in the United States in recent years have substantially complicated any effort by the US government to engage seriously in psychological-political conflict. Before the late 1960s, it may be argued, a satisfactory understanding existed between journalists and American military and government officials regarding the proper scope and limits of press coverage of national security and foreign policy matters. In particular, the press in wartime tended to adopt the national cause and to accept broad responsibility not only for protecting sensitive information but also for safeguarding the morale both of the troops at the front and of civilians at home. It was, for example, only late in World War II that photographs of the bodies
of dead American soldiers were seen in American newspapers and magazines. The emotional impact, and hence the political significance, of visual images of suffering and death was generally understood, and such material was accordingly treated with circumspection.

Since Vietnam, of course, there has been a dramatic change. In the general wreck of the national foreign policy consensus resulting from that experience, the media have adopted an increasingly skeptical attitude not only toward the specific policies and actions of the incumbent administration but also toward many of the fundamental assumptions that had underpinned the global position and role of the United States since World War II. The legitimacy of the American defense and intelligence establishments in particular has been sharply questioned, and subjected to scrutiny and exposure by the new style of investigative journalism inaugurated by the prestige press. Most significantly, the media ended their deference to and informal cooperation with an incumbent administration in favor of a posture of neutral observer or critic adjudicating between the government and its domestic—and international—adversaries. One result of this shift has been a general (if not always categoric) refusal to take responsibility for the consequences of media coverage's effect on national security policy outcomes.

This change in media attitudes is worth dwelling on, since the role of the media on the battlefield of the future is likely to decide whether the United States will be capable of conducting effective military psychological operations. In general, the media now acknowledge a responsibility to avoid jeopardizing the lives of American soldiers engaged in military operations. But they do not recognize an obligation to refrain from publicizing information that demoralizes American troops, reveals aspects of American intelligence or military planning, undermines American diplomatic initiatives, or gives psychological aid and comfort to the enemy. This obligation is denied even though the ultimate effect of such disclosure may be to prolong military operations and cost American lives, not to speak of more generally
damaging the international position of the United States and its ability to avoid future conflicts. Nor do the media recognize any obligations with respect to the domestic audience.

Of particular importance in this connection is the wartime role of television. To argue (as media spokesmen regularly do) that television coverage is essential to informed debate on the merits of a particular military action is unconvincing, not to say disingenuous. The information content of TV pictures is typically low or nonexistent, and the emotions such pictures arouse are more likely to defeat than to promote rational discussion. The rapid juxtaposition of images of death and destruction torn out of any intelligible context, so common in television coverage of war, inevitably encourages the feeling that the current war is especially futile, immoral, or absurd. 26

Equally harmful is the practice—pursued well beyond the point of abuse by the networks in Lebanon in 1983—of interviewing American GIs on their feelings and views about the situation they happen to be involved in. To portray soldiers (and if they are looked for they will be found) who are confused, inarticulate, naive, or bitter about the reasons why a war is being fought or the way it is being conducted serves no purpose. The immediate danger to morale and the effect on allied and enemy perceptions are only part of the costs of such behavior. As in the case of media obsession with the families of terrorist victims, the effect is to pander to private concerns and emotions and to mobilize them in a way that greatly complicates the pursuit of rational policies by the US government.

All of this suggests that serious thought needs to be given to restricting or even eliminating at least the television presence on the battlefield of the future, with or without the cooperation of the media. Particularly difficult, of course, is the question of censorship or restraint of the media during limited contingencies or undeclared wars such as in Vietnam, Lebanon, or Grenada. Because the stakes in such conflicts are relatively low, the pressures for preserving peacetime rules
of media engagement are difficult to resist. Yet it is precisely these conflicts in which the political and psychological element in war is predominant, and which are therefore most directly susceptible to influence by media reporting. Devising acceptable arrangements for limiting media coverage of such wars in the future may well be critical if the United States is ever to engage in them successfully.\textsuperscript{27}

The American media have also affected US government international information programs. In spite of the popular image (and standard media treatment) of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as propaganda organs fully comparable to Radio Moscow, anyone familiar with these broadcasting operations knows that they have been profoundly affected by the evolution of the American (and, in the case of RFE/RL, West European) media over the last two decades, as well as by the general cultural climate these media have reflected. Objectivity and balance as understood by the new journalism have become the standards for these radios as well. The point here is not that a balanced treatment of American or Soviet virtues and vices is not in some sense desirable, but rather that the domestic cultural context, instead of coherent analysis of foreign target audiences and of US strategic objectives with respect to them, shapes—to an unhealthy degree—the aims and methods of the US international radios.

Let us, though, leave aside the role of the media and inhibitions deriving from the American character and American culture. The effective conduct of psychological-political warfare by the United States is perhaps more immediately constrained by bureaucratic and organizational weaknesses within the US government itself.

In the first place, as indicated earlier, there is a connection between the inadequacy of US psychological-political warfare efforts in the past and the inadequacy of strategic planning and decisionmaking at the national level. Precisely because the instruments of psychological-political conflict are not altogether distinctive, this arena requires fully integrated planning and coordinated operations throughout virtually the
entire national security bureaucracy. This coordination has always proven difficult for the US government, given the nature of presidential politics and the historically weak institutional structures of the White House and the National Security Council (NSC) system. Particularly in view of the lack of a real domestic constituency for such a function, it is not surprising that it has not received sustained political support at the highest levels of the government. What is perhaps surprising is that the need for a substantial strengthening of US capabilities in this area was not more widely recognized as one of the chief lessons of the greatest failure of US national security policy in the postwar era, the loss of Southeast Asia.

We need not dwell at length on the causes of the resistance to psychological-political warfare throughout the US diplomatic, military, and intelligence establishments; they are apparent to most of those who have had direct experience in this field. The State Department continues to ply its trade very much in the spirit of the foreign ministries of nineteenth century Europe, with only grudging accommodation to the role played by modern communications, public opinion, ideology, and political theater in contemporary international affairs. The military services, in their preoccupation with technology, major weapon systems, and the big war, tend to neglect low-cost approaches to enhancing operational effectiveness, especially at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; and they tend to regard political-psychological warfare as someone else's business.

The failure of either the State Department or the military to assume political-psychological responsibilities might seem to point to the intelligence community as the natural home for such activities. Yet apart from the recent steep decline in the skills, historical memory, and operational doctrines necessary for the effective conduct of psychological-political warfare, the CIA has generally been unwilling or unable to allow the degree of coordination with other governmental entities that is essential for an integrated national strategy in this area. There is also a feeling at the agency that the era of CIA involvement in political or ideological struggles is essentially
past—that in the absence of a domestic political consensus concerning the proper place of such activities in US policy, an aggressive agency role can only jeopardize more important institutional equities.

What, then, would be involved in a revitalization of US psychological-political warfare capabilities? The foregoing discussion is not meant to suggest that fundamental change is a hopeless proposition, only that it is essential that we be conscious of the obstacles to it—particularly the less tangible obstacles that cannot be fixed by organizational rewiring or other short-term measures. At the same time, useful steps undoubtedly can be taken without a thorough revolution in the way Americans behave or the US government conducts its business. As far as the political climate is concerned, there are encouraging signs of growing interest in Congress and elsewhere in strengthening strategic planning at the national level and in improving US military capabilities for low-intensity conflict. Psychological-political warfare will certainly benefit from attention to both these areas.

Perhaps the most promising area for change is in the field of military psychological operations. This very unjustly neglected subject merits some further remarks.

The fact that military psychological operations have generally been treated as a subspecialty of special operations is a good indication of the conceptual and operational limitations under which PSYOP has long labored. Of course, the very identification of PSYOP as a special forces mission has tended to isolate it from normal military activities and bring it under a certain suspicion, which its “black” connotations have further strengthened. But PSYOP has perhaps suffered most from identification with the hardware and missions of the tactical battlefield—that is, leaflet delivery, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting. As a result of all this, PSYOP has had very low priority in terms of personnel, equipment, training, exercising, and doctrine. In addition, it has suffered from low visibility at senior command levels within the military (particularly outside the Army, which owns most PSYOP assets), not to speak of other US government organizations.
This situation is now beginning to change as a result of renewed interest within the military as well as at the national level. However, the rethinking of PSYOP roles and missions is still at an early stage, and basic doctrinal and organizational questions remain to be worked out. The Air Force and Navy appear not yet fully persuaded that PSYOP is a responsibility of all the services and of all higher command echelons. There is increasing recognition that PSYOP need not be limited to the hardware-supported missions of the tactical battlefield but can have important applications at the operational and theater levels, particularly in low-intensity conflict situations. But there is as yet little apparent consensus on the role of PSYOP at the strategic level or in peacetime.

The tendency to think of PSYOP in terms of direct verbal communication is a strong one, and reflects the nature of tactical PSYOP as historically practiced by the United States. However, this is a tendency that must be resisted if the full potential of nontactical PSYOP is to be realized and if the services are to embrace the full range of PSYOP activities as legitimate and proper military missions. The uniformed military generally acknowledge that the overriding purpose of US military forces is not to fight wars but to deter them. But deterrence is, of course, a psychological phenomenon, not a simple reflection of the quantity and quality of military forces; and there is every reason to suppose that foreign perceptions of US military power can be shaped in various ways to strengthen its deterrent effect.31

Even if one accepts that it would be difficult and possibly risky to attempt to shape Soviet perceptions of US power (though this is by no means evident), a strong case can be made for the potentially high payoffs of efforts to shape perceptions of the adversary in conflicts with Third World countries. Within the Third World, decisionmaking is apt to be less disciplined by adequate intelligence or orderly staff procedures, strongly influenced by the passing impressions and phobias of a small leadership element, and subject to sudden internal political challenge. The lessons of the recent
American military confrontation with Libya deserve careful study in this connection.

To detail PSYOP possibilities in this area is beyond the scope of the present discussion. Certainly, publications programs geared to foreign military audiences could have considerable utility. But much could also be accomplished simply through deliberate exploitation of normal US military activities such as exercises, deployments, air and naval displays, and technology demonstrations. At a higher level of activity, with the movement of military forces dedicated specifically to a psychological-political mission, PSYOP measures shade into traditional coercive diplomacy. Certainly, the United States has used both sorts of measures in the past. But activities such as naval port visits and presence missions have generally not been understood as belonging within the PSYOP framework and do not appear to have been approached in a systematic or highly coordinated manner.

A characteristic weakness of the American approach to war and force has been the tendency to draw sharp distinctions between wartime and peacetime. That the Leninist political tradition involves a radically different approach is hardly a secret, yet somehow it remains extremely difficult for Americans to deal with the “spectrum of conflict” as a true spectrum rather than a series of compartments. One result of this difficulty is the penalty it exacts in any transition from peace to war in terms of organization, planning, and general readiness. An important function of psychological-political warfare for the United States could be to compensate for temporary inadequacies in deployed US forces in severe crises or the initial stages of war. In general, a compelling case can be made for reviewing and enhancing the psychological-political component of US war planning and national-level crisis management operations.

The entire area of strategic war planning is of critical importance in this context, since it is the point at which the military, diplomatic, and psychological-political components of national strategy most closely converge. Any effort to enhance and better integrate strategic planning at the national
level, as recommended by influential voices in Congress and elsewhere, needs to focus on the difficult substantive and procedural issues involved in war planning. More generally recognized is the need for integrated interagency planning in crisis situations; but here as well the potential of psychological-political warfare seems not to have been fully realized.

The foregoing discussion should not be taken as an implicit commentary on the relative utility of military and non-military psychological-political measures. Its purpose is only to highlight the part of this field that is the most neglected and at the same time the most susceptible to immediate improvement. In low-intensity conflict theaters such as Central America, there is scope for application of the full range of US psychological-political capabilities. The strategic importance of peacetime political warfare and international communications, with respect to the Third World as well as the Soviet Union and its empire, can hardly be overestimated. We need not enter here into the larger question of long-range US strategy with respect to the Soviet Union. But it seems clear that the best hope for an eventual diminution of the Soviet political-military threat lies in the relentless exposure of the Soviet population to information and ideas from the West. The opportunities for short-term gains vis-a-vis the Soviet empire should not be allowed to distract us from this fundamental strategic imperative.
Notes


7. According to the Jackson Committee report, “The national information program has suffered from the lack of effective central direction. In spite of the establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board, coordination has been lacking and the various agencies concerned have largely gone their separate ways. Opportunities have been missed to take the offensive in global propaganda campaigns. . . . The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate more on the conception, planning and coordination of global campaigns and less
on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations" 
*(Foreign Relations, p. 1840).* For pertinent remarks on the "confu-

sion regarding the mission" of US information agencies, see ibid., 

pp. 1836–38; also of interest is this remark concerning the military 

role: "The contribution of the armed forces to political warfare has 

been limited by the lack of definition of the military role by higher 

authority, and by an inadequate understanding on the part of 

military authorities that they and their commands are full par-


ticipants in the political aspects of the present struggle and must 

conduct themselves accordingly. Military commanders and plan-


ners tend to regard the allocation of military resources to current 

political operations as an unauthorized diversion from tasks for 

which the armed forces are explicitly responsible" (ibid., p. 1860). 

Eisenhower abolished the Psychological Strategy Board on the 

Committee's recommendation, apparently on the grounds that 

psychological-political warfare was too closely bound up with US 

policy or strategy generally for such an arrangement to work effec-


8. See the testimony collected in Sen. Henry M. Jackson, *The 

National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on 
Policymaking at the Presidential Level* (New York: Praeger, 1965); 

consider particularly the remarks of Nelson Rockefeller, 

pp. 167–90. That the Eisenhower NSC system was substantially 

misrepresented by contemporary critics has become clear, however, 

on the basis of material that has since come to light. See, for exam-

ple, Phillip G. Henderson, "Advice and Decision: The Eisenhower 


*The Presidency and National Security Policy* (New York: Center 

for the Study of the Presidency, 1984), pp. 153–86. For a recent 

overview of the history of the NSC system, see the chapters by 

Anna Kasten Nelson and I. M. Destler in Hugh Heclo and Lester 

M. Salamon, eds., *The Illusion of Presidential Government* 


9. Consider, for example, John Franklin Campbell, *The 

Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 

pp. 147–77. 

10. A thoughtful discussion of the functioning of public 

diplomacy under the Reagan administration is provided by Gifford 

D. Malone, "Functioning of Diplomatic Organs," in Richard F. 

Staar, ed., *Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR* (Stanford:


16. The role of "information" as an instrument of national strategy comparable to the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments was emphasized in an address of then National Security Adviser William P. Clark to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, May 21, 1982. Administration studies of international information policy resulted in a presidential directive on this subject (NSDD 130) in March 1983. See "Tune Up for Term Two," *Chronicle of International Communication*, July-August 1984, p. 1.


20. The Special Planning Group was established by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77 in January 1983; it supervises four subcommittees, dealing with public affairs, international
information, international political activities, and international broadcasting. An unclassified text of this directive may be found in Staar, *Public Diplomacy*, pp. 297-99.

21. An Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean was established in the State Department in July 1983, with an interagency staff headed by Ambassador Otto Reich.


27. The controversy arising from the exclusion of the press from the US action against Grenada in October 1982 led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate a review of policy regarding media participation in contingency operations, in the form of a special commission of military and media representatives headed by Gen. Winant Sidle. Although this commission reached informal agreement on the principle of press participation in all military operations to the maximum degree consistent with operational security, the Defense Department has since indicated some reservations on this score, and there is little evidence that any significant movement has occurred on the media side. As one retired admiral is reported to have said, "Operational security is not the problem; the problem

28. Pertinent observations on the role of the State Department in the current administration's public diplomacy efforts are offered by Gifford Malone in Staar, Public Diplomacy, pp. 132–37.


LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET that we owe a debt of thanks to Dr. Lord for having cleared some of the pedantic weeds of the 1970s and rightfully focused our attention on political warfare in the 1940s and 1950s. I think it would have been even better if he had focused it on World War I, about which I will say something in a minute. But first let me disagree on some other points.

I differ with Dr. Lord on one essential point, which is whether there is or is not a good term in English to designate psychological-political operations in the broadest sense. Political war serves this purpose well. It means, quite simply, the use of words, images, and ideas, and associated forms of action, to impose one's will on an opponent. The term can be refined and qualified, but it will serve for general discussion both by decisionmakers and by the public. Let us have done with the jargon of social science. Politics is above all the art of communication, and good communication stands or falls on the use of plain language, understandable by all.

A second point of difference is that political war is a more sharply targeted concept than that advanced by Dr. Lord: it should not apply to allies and inoffensive actors on the international stage. If cannon are the final argument of kings, political war is one of the first arguments. But both are acts of war, and war is power applied with hostile intent.

Political advocacy among allies is a tradition among Western nations, but of another kind. Political advocacy among allies does not seek to compel compliance but rather to elicit it by the search for mutually satisfactory solutions to common problems. It is in the tradition of compromise, cooperation, and common values. Public diplomacy—that is, political advocacy to mass audiences in support of diplomatic negotiations—is a useful term for these activities. Public diplomacy is not political war, however much it may be used in conjunction with it. Public affairs activities, addressed by
a government to home audiences, is not political war, unless of course there is a civil war underway. Promoting soap and proselytizing the faithless are not political war, nor is partisan political struggle within the framework of a constitutional democracy. Such political disputes are not aimed at the destruction of the enemy's will and capacity to resist: there is always the presumption, backed by constitutional rights, that a losing electoral opponent will retain the ability to continue the struggle. War, particularly involving those nations that are the United States' opponents today, offers no such comforting presumptions.

Let us go back another half-century from the 1940s and 1950s Dr. Lord discusses and look at the war of 1914-18. The Allied powers, more especially the English and the Americans, were regarded by their opponents as clearly superior—indeed, lethally so—in their use of the political weapon. The English propaganda, as Marshal von Hindenburg noted in retrospect, was a new weapon, or rather one that had never been employed on such a scale and so ruthlessly. There are numerous such acknowledgments from German leaders both during and after the war. The German High Command was not ignorant of the uses of propaganda, but they simply did not consider it worth using until too late. The conclusions of a German crown council at Spa, after a major Allied offensive accompanied by intensified English and American propaganda, were that Germany could no longer hope to break the war will of its enemies by military operations, and should alter its strategy so as to paralyze its enemies' will by assuming the strategic defensive.

By late 1918, the British were dropping five million pamphlets a month over the German forces. Wilson had articulated his Fourteen Points. This combined strategic and tactical political warfare reinforced a message of both despair and hope: that Anglo-American superiority in both materiel and manpower made further struggle senseless, and that, on the other hand, the aspirations of the German people as well as the subject nations of Austria-Hungary would receive due recognition in a postwar world. That activity
might have shortened the war by a year and saved close to a million lives. In early 1918, when Lloyd George restructured and redirected to serious strategic ends the previously tactical political warfare capability of Britain, the outcome of the war was by no means sure. Russia had collapsed; the French forces were tending toward mutiny; and America was still less than fully engaged. British and American propaganda may not have been the all-powerful weapon, as Hindenburg and some later German leaders thought it to be. But it did contribute significantly toward victory.

Finally, let me touch on a dimension that Dr. Lord does not address directly, though it is there by implication—the fact that no force structure and no resources can compensate for poor or confused leadership, political or military. Lloyd George, in contrast to his predecessor, was a master of the political art with a profound sense of the spirit of the times and a sure strategic instinct. His senior associates in the propaganda operation were Britain's two leading press lords, Beaverbrook and Northcliffe, the inventors of the popular press. They in turn recruited talent like H. G. Wells, who headed the German unit, and Wickham Steed of the Times, assisted by the academic Hugh Seton-Watson, who worked on Central Europe and the Balkans and succeeded in blowing apart the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Faced with the threat of disaster after Russia collapsed and inspired by strong political leadership, the Allies struggled through to victory. They lost or cast away the hopes of peace after the war, but that is another story—which also has much to do with political warfare.
DR. LORD HAS DEMONSTRATED INSIGHT and thoroughness in analyzing the complex reasons at the root of the failure of the United States to exploit the nonintrinsic instruments of national power (or, worse yet, even to comprehend the potential of those instruments for enhancing national security). One must share his pessimism about the prospects for remedying these shortcomings. Indeed, in my own estimate the outlook is even bleaker.

To forego the use of certain tools that would facilitate the pursuit of national objectives is one thing. To fail to recognize—let alone take measures to counter—psychological and political warfare waged against our policies with the intent to undermine them is quite another; here the cost of inaction is real and heavy. Yet the stark fact is that the American public, the media, and even the bureaucracy are generally oblivious to the scope and sophistication of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate campaigns of this genre.

The lamentable situation in South Africa does not today command center stage in Western consciousness because of sober calculation or spontaneous concern about the nature of white rule there. Rather, it is the result of a spectacularly successful (and still ongoing) psychological warfare campaign, carefully orchestrated, replete with misinformation, and aided and abetted by our own gullible media. The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has had similar success: thanks almost exclusively to the efficacy of its propaganda, there is more active support among the American public for the regime there than for the freedom fighters our own government backs. Unless and until we recognize that the integrity of our own political and decisionmaking base is under threat and undertake systematically to expose and neutralize our adversaries' efforts, there can be little hope that we will effectively use psychological and political warfare to further American foreign policy initiatives.

Although there is no excuse for not doing our best in this field, we are very far from that point. How can we begin to systematically exploit this long-neglected tool of statecraft?
To begin with, National Security Decision Directive 130 should be dusted off and made required reading throughout the executive and legislative branches. This landmark document established international information as a major instrument of national security policy, and the responsibility of no single agency of the government. It also assigned a number of specific tasks. It is time for a detailed review and accounting by the relevant agencies of progress in carrying out these tasks. Such an accounting can be expected to show that implementation to date is far from satisfactory across the board.

In this context, I should say that I have one basic disagreement with Dr. Lord's paper. Perhaps because of his concern for tightly drawn definitions and compartments, he assigns psychological operations as such to the military. Certainly, psychological operations are inherent in the conduct of military activity at all echelons of command and in all environments—steady state, crisis, and war. But under any circumstances, the military has limited target audiences and controls only a minute portion of the totality of channels of communication available to the nation as a whole. Surely the business of influencing the beliefs, emotions, and behavior of foreign peoples and governments is a national undertaking, employing all means—including those of the military—that can be marshalled and harnessed to the task.

Without question, the principal reason for the problems in implementing NSDD 130 was a failure to establish as an integral element of that document an interagency mechanism to monitor compliance and, more importantly, to ensure the orchestration and coordination of the totality of the US government's international communications and information capabilities. Such a mechanism is needed, and the logical way to provide it is to restructure and reenergize the long-defunct interagency machinery created by NSDD 77 to oversee activities pursued under the rubric of public diplomacy. This public diplomacy superstructure was faulty in design from the beginning. It excluded the CIA from membership and made no provision for input from or interface with
the intelligence community; it had no full-time staff; it ar-
bitrarily consigned public affairs, international information
(really USIA), political action, and radio broadcasting to
discrete compartments; and it established only ad hoc links
with the regionally oriented bureaus of the key agencies.

The functions of a new, properly configured, and ade-
quately chartered interagency mechanism under NSC aegis
will be extraordinarily important. It must stimulate and later
review the planning necessary to coalesce the capabilities of a
variety of agencies; ensure that those capabilities are applied
in a responsive, disciplined, and coordinated manner; and
bring about redirection of effort as necessary to achieve max-
imum effect. Admittedly, that is the hard part and the area
where all previous efforts have foundered. But we must try
again, and this time with greater determination.

I may be naive, but I believe a major obstacle in the past
has been our focus on means rather than ends, inputs rather
than outputs, hardware rather than software. Terminology
has also created problems because of vagueness of connota-
tion or overlap. But what is the real need to differentiate be-
tween political and psychological actions? The military is
wedded to the term psychological operations, but the non-
military agencies can use any descriptors deemed suitable.
Public affairs channels have immense potential for shaping
the views of foreign audiences.

Consider the following approach. The NSC defines an
objective of sufficient moment to take priority over many on-
going projects in the several departments and agencies, and
prescribes that all available capabilities be brought to bear to
the full extent permitted by law. The designated objective
could be raising the domestic and international cost to the
Soviets of their ruthless aggression in Afghanistan, or thwart-
ing the efforts of the Communists in the Philippines to
muster international support, or rallying regional and inter-
national support behind the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, or
neutralizing the Soviet agitprop campaign against SDI. The
high-level interagency group then develops sub-objectives
and other guidance to trigger preparation of action plans,
assigns responsibility to the several agencies for detailed planning, and ensures that all relevant intelligence is continually available to the planners.

None of this is new. The difference is in the follow-through by the interagency group, which should review, revise, and cross-coordinate the action plans when drafted. The interagency group's work entails attention to the priority given various target audiences; to the appropriateness and credibility of the message to be directed at those audiences; to the adequacy of channels of dissemination (whether word of mouth, audiovisual, or publications, to name a few); to the determination of responsibility for employing these channels (and for complementary actions where nonattribution might be desirable); and to arrangements for the collection and analysis of feedback.

All of the above still falls short of full implementation; it is a beginning, not the end. The payoff comes from the hard work of developing the substantive output, of programming, of adapting to new intelligence and to audience reaction, of emphasizing the themes found successful and eliminating those found wanting. And the process requires continuous monitoring, decisions on redirection of effort, and general oversight that only an interagency group, properly chartered and empowered, can provide. A campaign of this magnitude involves a mixture of political action, psychological warfare, exercise of the channels normally available to our official representatives abroad, covert action, and—we hope—expansion, elaboration, and interpretation of thematic output by the private sector. That is the way it should be if the nation is really serious about fully exploiting our enormous international communications capabilities in furtherance of our nation's security policies.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) may be defined broadly as the planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior. It consists of political, military, and ideological actions conducted to create in target groups behavior, emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment of national objectives. If used properly, PSYOP will normally precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force. This will be carried out under the broader umbrella of US national policy, and the military component of the overall psychological operations effort should be coordinated fully and carefully with other agencies of government.

More specifically, PSYOP can be used to demoralize, disorient, and confuse hostile groups. When hostile groups are targeted, PSYOP is employed as an offensive weapon that can enhance the overall effectiveness of military operations. It can also be used to unite, inform, and bolster the morale of nonhostile groups. When targeting neutral or friendly groups, it is used to support military objectives by developing cooperative attitudes and behavior in the target group.

An Overview of Army PSYOP

The level of interest in military psychological operations during this century has been episodic, rising and falling during and after the major conflicts in which US forces have been committed. Over this period, most of the activity in military PSYOP centered in the Army. The following brief
historical perspective, therefore, will focus on the Army's activities as illustrative of the fortunes of military PSYOP.

While giving psychological warfare only token recognition in World War I, the Army established the Psychological Warfare Sub-Section of G-2 in the War Department and also the Propaganda Section, G-2, General Headquarters (GHQ), American Expeditionary Forces. Military tactical psychological warfare centered on the production of leaflets; radios did not exist as a means of communication and loudspeakers were primitive. Military propaganda concentrated on producing surrender appeals; balloons and airplanes were the primary methods for disseminating leaflets.

From 1918 to 1941 no psychological warfare office existed at the War Department. The lessons of experience were lost, and by 1941 only one officer on the War Department staff had psychological warfare experience in the previous war.

During World War II, most of the Army's operational work in psychological warfare took place at the theater level, where the responsible organization was normally designated a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB). The largest of these, the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ), was activated in North Africa in November 1942 at the order of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and then expanded in February 1944 to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). PWD/SHAEF defined psychological warfare as "the dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters."

The basic Army field operating unit for tactical psychological warfare was the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) company. The equipment for these units was unlike anything conventional soldiers had seen in the field—public address systems, radios, monitoring sets, loudspeakers, typewriters, mobile printing presses, and leaflet bombs. (Radio later became an essentially strategic weapon that had
no place in a purely tactical psychological unit.) MRB units were usually divided by the separate Army groups and field armies into small teams, often to work in direct support of frontline conventional combat units. Five such companies eventually served under PWD/SHAEF. Although these units were the result of improvisation in 1943 and 1944, the doctrinal and organizational concepts they embodied reappeared in the psychological warfare units formed during the Korean conflict.

During 1945–46, Army psychological warfare staffs and units dissipated with the general demobilization of the military establishment. Despite the efforts of a few senior civilian and military officials to retain a military PSYOP capability, when the North Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment—organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1947—was the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the US Army. Sent to Korea in the fall of 1950, the detachment was reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company and served as the 8th Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the conflict. Tactical propaganda, sometimes called combat propaganda, was directed at a specific audience in the forward battle areas and used in support of localized operations. Mobile loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and aircraft became a primary means of conducting tactical propaganda operations in Korea.

To conduct full-scale strategic operations, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized at Fort Riley and shipped to Korea in July 1951. The 1st RB&L Group was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations. Strategic propaganda was intended to further long-term strategic aims and was directed at enemy forces, populations, and enemy-occupied areas. To accomplish these tasks the 1st RB&L Group had the equipment and capability to produce newspapers and leaflets and to augment or replace other means of broadcasting radio propaganda. The group supervised a radio station network known as The Voice of the
United Nations and often produced more than 200 million propaganda leaflets a week to be disseminated by aircraft or by specially designed artillery shells. The leaflets expressed various themes. Some, for example, offered inducements for enemy soldiers to surrender; others were intended to bolster the morale of Korean civilians by proclaiming UN support.

Although the RB&L Group was a concept accelerated to meet the requirements of the Korean conflict, it performed functions similar to those deemed necessary to the conduct of psychological warfare in World War II. Its Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company bore a direct ancestral linkage with the mobile radio broadcasting companies formed under PWD/SHAEF to conduct propaganda operations in North Africa and the European theater during 1944–45. Both the strategic propaganda concept embodied in the RB&L Group and the tactical propaganda idea expressed by the L&L Company were to figure prominently in the psychological warfare capability subsequently formed as part of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.

As originally established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Psychological Warfare Center consisted of a Psychological Warfare School, the 6th Radio and Broadcasting Group, a Psychological Warfare Board, and the 10th Special Forces Group. The mission of this unprecedented center was to conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment employed in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

After an initial burst of activity fueled by the Korean conflict and fears over a possible outbreak of war in Europe, interest in the Psychological Warfare Center began to dissipate. In 1956 its title was changed to the Special Warfare Center, and by the early 1960s the Army’s psychological operations capability had eroded.
Indeed, there was an insufficient base of PSYOP-trained officers to call upon when the 6th PSYOP Battalion was activated in Vietnam in 1965. By 1967 the Army’s PSYOP forces in Vietnam had been expanded to a group (the 4th) with four battalions, one in each of the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). The group was under the control of the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), with the J-3’s Psychological Operations Division exercising direct staff supervision. The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provided US PSYOP policy guidance not only to the civilian agencies but also through COMUSMACV to all military PSYOP elements.

In addition to providing tactical support to field force commanders, the 4th PSYOP Group assisted the South Vietnamese government in its communication effort down to the hamlet level. The group headquarters operated a 50,000-watt radio station and high-speed heavy printing presses, published a magazine for Vietnamese employees working for US government and civilian agencies, and had a capability for researching and developing propaganda materials.

PSYOP battalions had light printing presses, a research and propaganda development capability, personnel to work with the US Air Force Special Operations units for aerial leaflet and loudspeaker missions, and ground loudspeaker and audiovisual teams. Loudspeaker and audiovisual teams operated with US divisions and brigades or with province advisory teams. The 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa provided valuable backup support in printing and high-altitude leaflet dissemination.

During the height of US involvement in Southeast Asia, the Army stationed PSYOP units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and in Germany, Panama, and Okinawa as well as the 4th PSYOP Group in the Republic of Vietnam. By the mid-1970s, however, all that remained in the active component was an understrength group at Fort Bragg with antiquated equipment—a condition that did not improve significantly for ten years.

The mid-1980s saw an upturn for the fortunes of PSYOP. In response to a presidential directive, the secretary of
defense launched a major evaluation of the department's capabilities and needs in the area of psychological operations. This evaluation concluded that military psychological operations capabilities had been allowed to atrophy over the past decade—a conclusion reached by many in the PSYOP community well before this time, but not by senior policymakers. Across the board deficiencies had developed in policy guidance, roles and missions, doctrine, organization, force structure, operational concepts, planning, programming, training, logistics, intelligence support, readiness, personnel programs, and—most important—attitude, underscoring the need for education and heightened awareness at all levels of military and civilian organization.

The vehicle that the secretary of defense elected to use as a framework for the rebuilding of military PSYOP capabilities was development of a DOD PSYOP master plan. Approved by the secretary in mid-1985, the plan is to serve as a comprehensive framework for the phased, fundamental revitalization and improvement of the department's capabilities to employ psychological operations effectively, worldwide, in support of national objectives in peace and crisis and at all levels of conflict.

**The Essential Themes of Revitalization**

Any plan for revitalizing PSYOP must address two broad requirements: how to develop the capability for war and how to prepare for contingencies short of war. The requirement to prepare for war—and the transition from peace to conflict—must remain our first responsibility, but the challenge for the Department of Defense to contribute to our nation's peacetime "war of ideas" with the Soviet Union is growing in importance. The master plan addresses these two requirements.

Underneath this umbrella, the plan specifies a number of remedial actions—over two hundred, in fact—to be implemented over several years. These embody several essential themes.
The first is the need to develop comprehensive joint doctrine for the formulation, direction, coordination, and conduct of PSYOP in peace, crisis, and war. In effect, this should provide the foundation for the revitalization effort. Among other things, the doctrine should enunciate the function of PSYOP as a force multiplier in all types of military activity, establish the conceptual framework for planning and implementation, and delineate roles and responsibilities of the several components. The joint staff and the services are currently hammering out a draft of this much-needed and long-overdue doctrine.

The development of doctrine must be paralleled by major improvements in PSYOP planning—another essential theme. There is insufficient human talent devoted to full-time, meaningful, sustained PSYOP planning at appropriate staff levels, although we've seen some evidence of progress on this major deficiency. Creation of a psychological operations directorate, the first such office to exist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in over twenty years, is an indication of the seriousness with which the secretary is undertaking this revitalization effort. The PSYOP staff element in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) has been upgraded from a branch to a division and strengthened with two additional staff officer slots—no small feat in the current environment. The Department of the Army staff has created a provisional PSYOP division, where before only one officer was devoted full-time to this activity. Among the unified commands, USSOUTHCOM has created a 27-man PSYOP detachment to augment its staff capability.

Much more remains to be done in this area, however. Perhaps the key requirement is that staff officers be trained formally in this specialized area, and that psychological operations be an integral part of the operational course of action in any plan. A few innovative and resourceful staff officers can make a vast difference, if positioned so as to have access to a command's major planning activities. The new Joint PSYOP Staff Planning Course being developed by the Army should go a long way toward helping to provide the trained personnel required in all services.
Development of adequate numbers of PSYOP planners is an area where the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps can make an important contribution to the secretary of defense's revitalization effort. The conduct of psychological operations is not the exclusive domain of specialized units such as those in the Army. Over the near term, it is not likely that the other services will opt to field new PSYOP units. On the other hand, there is every reason to expect those services to develop fully qualified PSYOP planners to meet their own needs and to provide their proportionate share of planners on joint staffs.

A more sophisticated PSYOP planning capability would allow the services to more effectively utilize "psychological actions," those actions carried out primarily for their psychological effect—sometimes called "propaganda of the deed." These activities do not normally involve the use of printed or audiovisual media to disseminate the propaganda message, but are actions planned to have a psychological impact. Exploitation of military exercises, deployment of military forces, contact with foreign nationals through port visits and civic action, and specific types of combat operations are examples of psychological actions that are possible with properly trained PSYOP planners to advise military commanders.

Closely related is the need to educate our officer corps on psychological operations—a third theme. As indicated earlier, the root cause of the atrophy of our military PSYOP capabilities has been lack of understanding of psychological operations, their value, and their application. We have seen some improvement in this critical area as a result of frequent briefings of senior commanders and staff officers by PSYOP personnel, the professionalism of PSYOP units in contingency planning and support of conventional forces on joint training exercises, and the steady improvement in the quality of PSYOP studies and assessments in support of the unified commands and national-level agencies (the last aided considerably by the increased hiring of high-quality civilian intelligence analysts).
Certainly, the PSYOP courses currently being presented or developed by both the Air Force and the Army will help address the deficiencies in this area of PSYOP awareness and understanding. The Air Force’s new Joint Senior Psychological Operations Course, conducted four times a year by their Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, provides selected senior officers and civilians with an awareness of how psychological operations can support US national objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict. This short course, in particular, shows considerable promise as an educational tool.

But as was the case before the Vietnam conflict, PSYOP instruction in our mainstream service school system—where our future commanders and staff officers are trained—is limited or nonexistent. Its absence not only makes the PSYOP community’s job more difficult in educating supported units on the capabilities and limitations of this unique weapons system but also quite naturally has a negative effect when priorities concerning force modernization are being set.

To address this loss of PSYOP institutional memory, the under secretary of defense for policy sent letters to commandants of the senior service and command and staff colleges, emphasizing the secretary of defense’s intention to revitalize our military PSYOP capabilities and offering a presentation by OSD during the 1986–87 school year. The presentation provided an overview of national policy and organization for international information and psychological operations, current PSYOP capabilities, and the secretary’s plan for revitalizing these capabilities. The intent was to stimulate interest in more extensive treatment of PSYOP in service school curricula. To accomplish this, the Army is developing a curriculum package that can be offered to the services. This is just a start—but an important one nonetheless—if understanding of PSYOP is to be institutionalized for the long haul.

The next broad theme encompasses the need to modernize our PSYOP force structure, in terms of both personnel and equipment. Not surprisingly, a considerable shortfall in
PSYOP forces exists. The Navy has a radio and television production capability in its reserves that is very good, plus a 10 KW mobile radio transmitter assigned to its Tactical Deception Group (Atlantic), which can be used to support psychological operations activities. The Air Force has a National Guard squadron of specially fitted C-130 aircraft for support of psychological operations as well as other duties; it also has a handful of officers with PSYOP expertise serving in key positions in the Pentagon, among the unified commands, and at their Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The Marine Corps has two civil affairs groups in its reserves with PSYOP as a secondary mission. Only the Army, however, has active duty forces dedicated solely to psychological operations.

The 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is what remains of the Army's active PSYOP capability following the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam. Today its missions and responsibilities are many and worldwide in nature. The group provides support to all levels of the Department of Defense, from the unified command through the division, and to both conventional forces and special operations forces. In addition it is often called upon to provide support directly to national-level agencies and organizations. If any one military unit can be adjudged a "national asset," surely the 4th Psychological Operations Group fits the requirement.

*Activities and Weaknesses*

Essentially, a military psychological operations unit engages in two broad categories of activity: research and analysis, and operations. The first activity consists of continuous monitoring and assessing of the psychological environment in specific foreign nations to determine how their environment affects the formulation and execution of US policies and actions. This research and analysis results in the publication of unique studies and assessments. These studies
and assessments provide the foundation for establishment of psychological objectives to support US goals as they relate to foreign nations or groups. Research and analysis is therefore essential to the accomplishment of the second broad category of activity, namely, the planning and executing of specific psychological operations campaigns, which employ communications media and other techniques to cause selected foreign groups and individuals to behave in ways that support US national and military objectives.

Thus a military PSYOP unit in peacetime conducts research and analysis of specific geographic regions and target audiences, develops PSYOP plans to support conventional and special operations units, and participates in field exercises that employ these plans. Because of the paucity of PSYOP expertise at unified commands, the 4th Group also provides staff assistance and advice to those headquarters and to other major commands.

It should be eminently clear from the foregoing that one active duty PSYOP organization consisting of a group headquarters, four regionally oriented battalions, and a strategic dissemination company with printing, radio, and television production capabilities is insufficient to support all unified command requirements in mid- or high-intensity conflict. The reserves are therefore a vital component of the "PSYOP community": fully 80 percent of the Army's PSYOP mobilization capability lies in its reserve component (RC) units. Serving as the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM) planning agent under the CAPSTONE program (which links RC units with the units they would support upon mobilization), the 4th Group coordinates with wartime planning efforts of RC units and provides training assistance.

Generally speaking, then, the active component 4th PSYOP Group acts as a "strategic nucleus" for the PSYOP community; it provides the bulk of peacetime research and analysis support, responds to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements, provides direction and guidance to the PSYOP community for wartime planning and participation in peacetime exercises, and provides the active component
command and control nucleus for general or partial mobilization of reserve component forces. The reserve component performs its planning and training responsibilities under the CAPSTONE program and prepares for general or partial mobilization in support of the unified commands.

Paradoxically, the successful CAPSTONE program underscores one of the PSYOP community's most glaring weaknesses: its limited capability to respond to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. As has been stated, for mid- or high-intensity conflict requirements, either partial or general mobilization of the reserve component is required. Conversely, the active component must be relied upon for almost all peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. These are increasing in scope, and many observers see them as the more likely threats to international stability during the 1980s. The most probable demands on PSYOP resources in this environment will be for support of the Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies, staff assistance to unified commands, unscheduled studies and assessments concerning crisis areas, and advisory Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for the military forces of friendly Third World nations. These demands, in addition to the vital task of continuing to plan and train for mid- and high-intensity contingencies, will strain to the utmost the active component 4th PSYOP Group.

The Army is making progress in bringing the 4th PSYOP Group up to its authorized strength, after many years of neglect in this area. Even at full strength, however, this is an inadequate active component force posture, particularly in view of increasing peacetime requirements being placed on the 4th by the unified commands and in support of vital national-level taskings.

Realistically, the reserve component will continue to provide the bulk of our PSYOP capability for mid- or high-intensity conflict requirements. In response to a PSYOP master plan tasking, the Army conducted a major study to determine the number of additional reserve component units needed to meet these contingency requirements. Approved by
the chief of staff in October 1986, the action will add over 2,700 spaces to our RC mobilization capability in the 1990s.

In terms of the quality of PSYOP personnel, the Army's recent development of a PSYOP military occupational specialty (MOS) for enlisted personnel is a welcome development. Initial reports of the high quality of personnel being trained under this new specialty are encouraging.

On the other hand, the Army's decision to reorganize its officer PSYOP MOS from the foreign area officer (FAO) specialty to the special operations functional area is very disturbing. If this decision sticks, Army PSYOP officers will receive a special skill identifier in special operations, lumping them with special forces and civil affairs. These three skills lack any significant commonality and are not interchangeable; the training, education, and experience required for the three are different from each other.

This change is potentially disastrous because it separates psychological operations from the foreign area officer specialty that provides its intellectual lifeblood. The core of the area expertise, knowledge of foreign cultures, and analytic capability of psychological operations is in the FAO specialty. Like intelligence, the strength of psychological operations is in its people. Repeal of this decision is essential if psychological operations are to be revitalized.

With respect to modernization of PSYOP-improved equipment, there are many encouraging initiatives underway in the Army. The 4th PSYOP Group's new media production center represents a quantum leap in military PSYOP capability to operate in a modern audiovisual communications environment. A number of other promising projects to upgrade active and reserve component print, radio, loudspeaker, and audiovisual capabilities are in various stages of progress and must be followed up vigorously. Similarly, the Air Force has allocated funds to modernize its National Guard aircraft dedicated to support of PSYOP.

All of the services, however, need to establish a funded program for PSYOP-related research and development. The
Air Force, for example, needs a device that can rapidly release leaflets in high-altitude operations. A vigorous interservice development and acquisition program aimed at the likely environment of the 1990s and taking advantage of the ready availability of state-of-the-art equipment in the commercial market would be a step in the right direction.

**PSYOP and Special Operations**

One of the more controversial themes of the master plan is the organizational separation of psychological operations from special operations. In general, the current subordination of PSYOP elements to special operations detracts from recognition of the overall applicability of psychological operations in times of peace, crisis, and war. The master plan, therefore, calls for the separation of psychological operations from special operations throughout the Defense Department, including at departmental level and all headquarters and staffs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, the unified and specified commands, and component and subordinate commands. There are several reasons favoring separation.

Planning, particularly in the unified and specified commands, has suffered because the single PSYOP staff planner is usually located in the special operations staff element and is only employed part-time in psychological operations. This subordination detracts from the broader responsibility of planning psychological operations support for the theater's total requirements, particularly in those missions that link military psychological operations and national objectives, policy, and strategy and require in-theater interagency cooperation.

Further, the subordination of psychological operations units to the special operations field, including its command and staff structure, has contributed to military officers' and senior civilian and military leaders' lack of understanding of psychological operations and its uses and capabilities. This
association and subordination causes many to conclude that psychological operations are focused primarily in support of special operations missions.

Indeed, PSYOP does have a mission in support of special operations, both in the unconventional warfare environment of high-intensity conflict and also in low-intensity operations. However, psychological operations also have a much broader application in peacetime and crisis, with or without accompanying military operations, and across the entire spectrum of conflict. Only 10 percent of the Army's psychological operations force, active and reserve, is designated by current contingency plans to support special operations forces in wartime.

In this connection, the argument for separation of PSYOP from special operations is implicit in the Army's and Joint Chiefs' arrangements for wartime command and control of psychological operations. Most of the psychological operations forces in wartime are aligned with a chain of command in the unified commands that is totally separate from special operations forces. PSYOP units are combat support forces and are employed at both strategic and tactical levels from the theater to the division as a matter of routine; special operations forces are employed primarily as strategic assets, on an exceptional basis.

Continued subordination of psychological operations to special operations could cause military psychological operations forces to focus their very limited resources in support of special operations to the detriment, in particular, of the rapidly increasing peacetime role of military PSYOP. For all of these reasons, increased understanding and employment of psychological operations lies with missions other than special operations.

There is a certain irony to this issue of PSYOP association with special operations when one considers the origins of the Army's special forces. With the impetus of the Korean War, the heightening Cold War tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organiza-
tion in the Pentagon—the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). The first head of this organization was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, who was General Eisenhower's chief of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF), and thus emerged from World War II as the Army's foremost expert in this new field.

With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff with responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It was largely as a result of McClure's status and foresight that the Army developed its first capability to conduct unconventional warfare. The inclusion of a Special Operations Division in OCPW and McClure's selection of the key personnel for that office gave officers like Colonel Russell Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Bank the opportunity to form plans for unconventional warfare and for creation of special forces.

To provide the necessary training, material, and doctrinal support for both special forces and psychological warfare units, McClure was able to sell the Army on a separate center at which the functions of the "whole field of OCPW" would be located. The Psychological Warfare Center, created in 1952 at Fort Bragg, was that center—and it was there in the same year that the Army created its first formal unconventional warfare (UW) unit, the 10th Special Forces Group.

This marriage between psychological and unconventional warfare had its detractors, to be sure. Many of the UW advocates wanted a separate existence for special forces. Some psychological warfare officers, on the other hand, believed that the background, education, training, and experiences required for their field were inherently different from those necessary for the handling of special operations. Colonel Donald P. Hall, with psychological warfare experience in both World War II and Korea, expressed the view that few individuals would have had wide experience in both psychological and unconventional warfare. He feared that if the two fields were combined under one hand, one of them "may suffer as a result of particular emphasis given to the
function in which the controlling personnel are especially interested and experienced." This, of course, was part of the anxiety suffered by special forces adherents in 1952; at that time the "controlling personnel," both at OCPW and at the Psychological Warfare Center, were those with psychological warfare backgrounds.

Colonel Hall’s fears were prophetic, but the roles have been reversed since 1952. The tendency indeed has been to combine these functions in a single staff element at every headquarters level, including the Department of Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified commands. Over the years, these staff elements have usually been headed by special forces officers strongly oriented toward their field of expertise. In such an organizational environment, even the most conscientious PSYOP staff officer has had difficulty giving his full attention to the broader responsibilities of psychological operations rather than those oriented toward special operations.

At Fort Bragg, the trend has been the same. The Psychological Warfare Center evolved into the Special Warfare Center in 1956, then the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance in 1969, and most recently the 1st Special Operations Command. Through the years, key staff elements at the center and 1st Special Operations Command have invariably been headed by officers with special forces backgrounds.

All of this argues for a formal separation of PSYOP and special operations. As a prominent retired Army lieutenant general, Sam Wilson, noted at the Special Operations Conference held at the National Defense University in March 1983, psychological operations is a phenomenon in itself; it is so all-pervasive that marriage with special forces results in a case of mistaken identity, which makes it difficult for PSYOP units to carry out their doctrine and support other forces.

Because of its controversial nature, the separation directed by the master plan has been slow in implementation. To be sure, some important initial steps have been taken. The new PSYOP directorate in OSD is separated from special
operations in terms of policy responsibilities. PSYOP has been removed from the Joint Special Operations Agency and is now under the J-3 on the Joint Staff. An important precedent has been established on the Department of the Army staff by the creation of a PSYOP division separate from special operations. And two unified commands—USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM—have made the separation within their staffs.

But for the larger part, separation has not yet taken place outside the Pentagon—among the unified commands, subordinate service headquarters, or at the operational level. This must occur if the master plan’s intent is to be fully accomplished.

The separation issue is closely related to the final major theme of the master plan—creation of a Joint Psychological Operations Center. Psychological operations are sufficiently important to warrant the creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of this unique capability. The new center should become the organizational and intellectual font of psychological operations within the Department of Defense.

The center should have among its responsibilities long-range, strategic psychological operations plans; doctrine and operational concepts; continuing education and training of personnel; research and analytical studies; and development of equipment. It should assist the OJCS and OSD to develop, plan, and coordinate the Defense portion of national psychological operations activities; and it should assist the unified and specified commands in their planning of psychological operations.

The Joint Psychological Operations Center should consist of two separate but mutually supporting elements, one operational and the other developmental, each indispensable to the other. This concept therefore relies on existing psychological operations units and personnel spaces to provide the nucleus of initial manpower requirements, an important and realistic factor in the present resource-constrained environment.
At its inception, the center probably would have to be under Army management because the other services would have little to contribute in manpower. However, as representation from the other services increases to more than token level, the joint character of the center should be emphasized by making its command rotational among the services. Representation from the State Department, CIA, US Information Agency, Voice of America, and the Board for International Broadcasting should also be sought.

The Joint PSYOP Center will enable the Department of Defense to develop more effectively its capability for war and, at the same time, to improve its contributions to interagency peacetime activities. In other words, the center should become the focal point for revitalization and institutionalization of PSYOP within the Department of Defense and also the bridge for integration of our military PSYOP resources with those of other agencies.

**A Recent Complication**

These, then, are the major themes of the secretary of defense's master plan for the revitalization of military psychological operations: formulation of comprehensive joint doctrine, indoctrination of the officer corps, improvement of staff planning, modernization of the force, separation of PSYOP from special operations, and creation of a Joint PSYOP Center.

A very recent development that could complicate implementation of the PSYOP master plan, however, is the congressionally mandated reorganization of special operations forces. Tacked on as an amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) in the closing hours of the legislative session in mid-October, and passed with the Act, was a special operations forces (SOF) reform package sponsored by Senators William Cohen (R-Maine) and Sam Nunn (D-Georgia). The law creates a unified SOF command under a four-star general or flag officer, an assistant secretary of
defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, a board for low-intensity conflict within the National Security Council, and a deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs for low-intensity conflict. Particularly important, it directs the secretary of defense to create for SOF a major force program category for the Five-Year Defense Plan of the Department of Defense.

The new legislation indicates that the activities embraced by the term special operations include psychological operations, "insofar as it relates to special operations." There is no question that psychological operations should and will have an important role to play in support of special operations and low-intensity conflict. But, as the DOD PSYOP master plan points out, psychological operations are significantly broader than special operations, and, for that matter, low-intensity conflict (LIC). In light of this, the key issue to be faced is whether the DOD PSYOP community should be incorporated within the new SOF-LIC organization or whether it should establish an identity separate from special operations—as directed by the secretary of defense's master plan for PSYOP.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Psychological Operations Directorate created in January 1986 reports to the under secretary of defense for policy through the deputy under secretary, the latter an assistant-secretary-level official. It is doubtful that placing this office under the new assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict would give PSYOP policy more "visibility" and "access" than the present arrangement. The historical record would seem to indicate otherwise. And the extensive scope of the deputy under secretary for policy's responsibilities would argue for leaving the policy responsibility for PSYOP where it can be more broadly applied across the conflict spectrum—as intended by the master plan.

Inclusion of the PSYOP community in the Special Operations Command could also jeopardize establishment of a separate Joint Psychological Operations Center—the centerpiece of the DOD PSYOP master plan. This and the
separation issue are more than simply matters of "turf": what must be addressed ultimately is whether the inclusion of PSYOP in the new special operations and low-intensity conflict organizational framework serves the long-term interests of the US government and the Department of Defense in the current effort to revitalize a psychological operations capability that can be employed effectively "in support of national objectives in peace and crisis and at all levels of conflict" (as stated in the DOD PSYOP master plan).

Certainly, PSYOP should be able to provide support to special operations and low-intensity conflict through a Joint PSYOP Center, just as it would provide support to the other unified commands. But, more important, a separate existence would not detract from recognition of the broader applicability of PSYOP—a likely eventuality with continued subordination of psychological operations to the special operations chain of command.

Appropriately, the new law gives the secretary of defense sufficient latitude to determine which forces should be included in the reorganized special operations structure. Quite a few issues will need to be resolved in the months ahead as the details of implementation are decided, among them the question of the placement of PSYOP. Until guidance to the contrary is received from the secretary, the master plan remains the essential directive for the DOD PSYOP community.

My remarks have been focused on the DOD PSYOP master plan because it represents, after many years of neglect, top-down command emphasis on addressing long-recognized deficiencies. It responds to a presidential directive. It provides a vision, a blueprint, to enhance our military psychological operations capabilities. But visions and blueprints have to be brought to fruition by hard work, cooperation, and awareness on the part of senior personnel among all services—and by understanding and support from other government agencies, Congress, and the public.
AS SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED in virtually every aspect of Air Force and joint special operations for the past ten years, I share with Colonel Paddock the belief that the PSYOP master plan is correct on the key issue of requiring the eventual separation of PSYOP from special operations. I'll come back to this later.

As a special operator, I'm a firm believer in capturing lessons learned from the past and applying them judiciously to ensure future mission success. Because Colonel Paddock has dealt in detail with the fascinating (if often frustrating) cycles of PSYOP history, I will refer to the lessons of the past only infrequently, and concentrate on the road map to the future provided by the master plan and our progress along that path (or lack thereof) to date.

One central theme and basic premise of my remarks is that the field of psychological operations should not be the sole purview of the US Army or any other service (or even the Department of Defense as a whole). PSYOP in support of our national objectives must be conducted on an interagency basis using every available means, including military PSYOP resources. Moreover, a significant shift is required from the common concept of PSYOP as limited to leaflets and loudspeakers, toward a broader view of the need for sustained, offensive strategic psychological operations that will respond to the Soviet threat.

Now, let me briefly address my comments to the six major themes within the master plan that Colonel Paddock has discussed.

Without question, there is a fundamental need for joint military PSYOP doctrine that will provide the essential underpinning for all future PSYOP revitalization and, more importantly, furnish the individual services further guidance on which to base their own PSYOP doctrine. Although now nearly a year behind schedule, there has been definite pro-
gress toward this goal. I would agree that the publication of joint PSYOP doctrine is the quintessential requirement for further PSYOP revitalization within the Department of Defense. Yet my practical side warns me that documents such as these are rarely read and more rarely adhered to. Something more tangible is required to ensure maximum realization of the potential of PSYOP. For this reason, I would assign first priority to the establishment of the Joint PSYOP Center, to which I will return in a moment.

Colonel Paddock rightly identifies a lack of planning expertise in PSYOP throughout major military staffs. At the OSD, JCS, and service staff levels, fully half of the two dozen total personnel assigned PSYOP responsibilities function on a part-time basis, often with collateral duties in a wide variety of other areas. On the staffs of the nine unified and specified commands, SHAPE, COMCENTAG, and the Combined Forces Command in Korea, there are now a total of fifteen officers with PSYOP responsibilities, of which three are considered part-time. Some progress in realigning PSYOP personnel with the broader functional areas outside of special operations has occurred, and the new OSD PSYOP directorate is a long-awaited and significant step on the PSYOP revitalization agenda.

The proposed two-week Joint PSYOP Staff Planning Course for mid-level officers and senior NCOs, currently under development by the Army, has also been behind schedule. This course is essential if we are to meet the increased PSYOP staff planner requirements of the master plan.

I wholeheartedly concur with Colonel Paddock's view that PSYOP should not remain the exclusive domain of specialized units such as those in the Army. For too long, because of the traditional perception that PSYOP consists solely of battlefield leaflet and loudspeaker activities, the Army has been asked to bear the burden of both tactical and strategic PSYOP for all the services. As a result, the "not-invented-here" syndrome exists at all staff levels throughout the sister services. Not that it is necessarily desirable for the
other services to field new PSYOP units—the point is that, given the creativity of well-trained and talented staff planners from all the services, non-PSYOP resources can often be used in a manner designed to achieve a specific psychological effect.

Within the discipline of PSYOP, there are many talented and creative staff officers. But they can only be effective if they receive the requisite moral and material support from senior staff levels. All too often, sound PSYOP proposals by our young officers fall on deaf ears.

This brings us to the third major task of the master plan—education. In general, as Colonel Paddock noted, the news is good in this area, with progress starting at the troop level, as demonstrated by the Army's Soviet Psychological Awareness Program (SPAP), which is designed to assist our soldiers in identifying and neutralizing Soviet and Soviet-surrogate PSYOP actions directed against them. I can only recommend that the other services consider adopting similar programs tailored to their needs. For the NCO and mid-grade officer levels, the PSYOP courses conducted at the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and at the Air Force Special Operations School, are continuing to meet the increasing demand for PSYOP training in the joint community.

Of particular note is the new Joint Senior PSYOP Course conducted at the Air Force Special Operations School for senior officers in the grade of colonel or above and their civilian equivalents. The course was established in accordance with the requirements and schedule of the master plan, and is a significant first step in educating our senior leaders. However, concurrent PSYOP educational efforts must be pursued at our intermediate and senior service schools. Colonel Paddock and his OSD directorate are making significant strides in encouraging this level of PSYOP education, despite the reluctance on the part of some senior service schools to expand their curricula.

With regard to modernization of force structure and equipment, the Army has once again taken the lead among
the services. The active duty 4th PSYOP Group and selected Army Reserve components are in the process of an unprecedented equipment upgrade that includes acquisition of modern heavy presses capable of high-speed color printing, programmable cutters to support the presses, computerized photo-typesetters, and a complete upgrade of light and medium mobile printing plants for support of tactical operations. Acquisition of state-of-the-art radio, television, and tactical communications equipment for direct support of PSYOP activities is currently underway, as are other equipment enhancements.

Colonel Paddock has referred to the 4th PSYOP Group's new Media Production Center, which has recently been completed at a cost of slightly over two million dollars. This center consists of a fully-equipped audiovisual studio capable of fixed and mobile recording, with video effects generation, an editing and duplicating facility, and a photolab. As also mentioned, the Air Force has allocated funds for upgrading the Volant Solo EC-130E airborne broadcast platforms. However, improvements planned for the immediate future fall under the general category of airframe and power plant modifications; many of the PSYOP broadcast equipment requirements designed to address current deficiencies are programmed for the out-years at extremely low priority, or worse yet, unfunded. Though PSYOP is not a high-cost, equipment-intensive discipline, we must recognize the importance of acquiring and maintaining state-of-the-art equipment (most of which is commercially available) in support of the PSYOP mission.

On the personnel side, as Colonel Paddock has aptly pointed out, the 4th PSYOP Group, even when fully manned, would be understaffed and sorely strained to meet the competing PSYOP needs of the CINC s, JCS, and OSD. This is particularly true for the research and analysis mission. The 4th Group is currently authorized 38 civilian analysts in its Strategic Studies Division—only 30 are assigned—while 84 is the number that has been identified as necessary to meet the CINC s' annual study requirements. The acquisition of the
PSYOP Automated Data System (POADS) will eventually reduce study production time, but cannot hope to solve the problem.

Let me move on to the fourth and most controversial theme, the organizational separation of PSYOP and special operations. It was hoped that the initial movement of PSYOP responsibility from the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) to the JCS proper would send a signal to the CINCs that the JCS are firmly behind the intent of the PSYOP master plan to effect this separation. The signal must have been weak, however, for only two of the CINCs have so far responded accordingly. I believe separation is essential at every major staff organization in order for the PSYOP revitalization process to continue. A somewhat more difficult issue, particularly for the Army, is the requirement to separate PSYOP forces from special operations command authority. There is no doubt that separation should and must occur, yet PSYOP must have a place to go once it separates.

This brings me to the final theme, the establishment of the Joint PSYOP Center. For reasons of visibility and practicability, and given the long lead times required to establish, man, and equip such an organization, the Joint Staff must, as I argued earlier, give the highest priority to establishment of the center. I firmly believe that this center will be the seedcorn from which an enhanced national PSYOP capability will grow. It is here, however, that I begin to take issue with several of Colonel Paddock's statements.

I totally agree that the center should eventually have under its mantle long-range strategic planning, doctrine and operational concepts, PSYOP education and training, research and analytical studies, and even development and acquisition of PSYOP equipment. However, as with the separation issue, timing concerning assumption of these tasks is critical, and to attempt to accomplish too much too soon with scarce resources would be to put the entire concept at significant risk. I am of the opinion that to burden the center initially with both developmental and operational tasks will result in a false start, or worse yet, a failure.
I believe the center should concentrate initially on addressing PSYOP strategic planning requirements. The 38 civilian analysts in the Strategic Studies Division of the 4th PSYOP Group would provide an excellent initial source of manpower well equipped for the tasks at hand. To seize on the meager manpower spaces currently assigned to PSYOP education and training in the Army and Air Force would detrimentally affect the PSYOP educational base. Similarly, immediate assumption of operational research and development and (especially) acquisition functions would bog down the center in a morass of complex procedures that could stunt its natural growth. Once firmly established, I agree that the center should assume all the functions Colonel Paddock has enumerated. But I feel strongly that an evolutionary approach is far better than a revolutionary one.

I also agree that interagency representation at the center is essential, and I would add both the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency to Colonel Paddock's recommended list. Of equal importance is the need to integrate into the organization, at the outset, personnel from the clinical and behavioral psychological fields. The Air Force Biomedical Science Corps may be a limited source of such expertise.

As to the initial direction of the center, it might prove wiser over the long term to place it initially under other than Army management. Experience has shown that, given the chance, the other services will opt out of their PSYOP tasks. Placing the center under Air Force or Navy management would guard against the perception that PSYOP remains a sole or primary Army responsibility.

It is essential to recognize that the focus of PSYOP has changed from supporting, on the one hand, unconventional warfare forces at the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum, and on the other, the NATO conventional battlefield. National-level policy guidance and directives mandate the use of PSYOP throughout the full spectrum of conflict in an era of what has been called "violent peace." Whether we recognize and approve it or not, the field of PSYOP has
slowly but inexorably matured since earlier times into a discipline that is becoming more joint and even interagency in execution, global in scope, and strategic in character. We should encourage and take advantage of the rapidly growing interest in the psychological dimension of US national strategy.

BARRY ZORTHIAN

I would like to make various observations that are intended to look into the future based on the past. If these comments seem to reflect only my experience in Vietnam, please bear with me. Vietnam was our last major effort of psychological operations under combat conditions, and there may be some benefit in referring back to it.

I find myself in general agreement with the thrust of Colonel Paddock’s paper. I certainly endorse the position that psychological operations deserve more attention and deserve an independent and more prominent position within the military.

Let me emphasize two points that I think are essential. I’d sum them up in two words: integration and integrity—integration of effort, integration of personnel, certainly integration of basic concept; integrity of message, consistency of that message, recognition that the message must be based on reality. These two principles, I think, are basic to any successful effort in the field of PSYOP.
We obviously have a semantic problem that's never been solved. We're not always in agreement on the meaning of terms such as psywar, communications, psychological operations, media relations, political operations. They cover a vast amount of ground. If we put aside combat psychological operations and look at the rest of it as the political dimension—the communications dimension—of a national effort, whether in a context of conventional or low-intensity combat or even in "violent peacetime," then perhaps we can all get together and be talking about the same thing.

I welcome the DOD PSYOP master plan, but I do have some trouble with it. I do not argue with the direction it is taking, but wonder whether it goes far enough. One area where the document and the concept behind it need strengthening is in their attention to integration of the military and civilian components of a national effort. The military does need to look at the most likely form of combat it is going to face. Conventional combat, in the form of campaigns whose primary goal is territory, is possible, but I would think less likely in the world of today than low-intensity combat—political combat. And in that framework, civilian involvement in the conduct of military operations and in the implementation of military actions is a likelihood. In Vietnam, the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was an integrated civilian-military effort. You can criticize the organization for inadequacies of various kinds; but the integration of personnel was real, with layering of military and civilians, each writing performance ratings on the other, and the product a very combined effort.

The fact is that when we approached Vietnam, no arm of the US government was prepared for anything that you could possibly describe as psychological warfare. The military was not prepared for it; it had paid some attention to hardware and equipment, but certainly not to substance. USIA was not prepared for it. The State Department certainly was not prepared for it. We had to start from scratch on the substantive aspects of psychological operations. This sort of inadequacy should certainly be avoided in the future by
anticipating and preparing and training for such contingencies, whether nationally or within a DOD center.

Secondly, the master plan seems to give inadequate attention to the training and preparation of military personnel, not to speak of civilians. PSYOP, I would argue, is as integral to line command as any other element of the military's responsibilities. Time must be devoted in mainstream military training and in the training of other government personnel to this dimension of conflict. Psychological operations cannot be compartmentalized and then simply drawn on as a resource. They must be integral to military activity. If I read our history, particularly our Civil War history, correctly, the military was very political—not in a partisan sense, but in the sense of interaction with civilians and in the sense of a concern with the effect of military actions on civilians from a political point of view.

Colonel Paddock does not, I think, devote enough attention to psychological operations as a staff role. If I had to choose between the implementation of the mission—the running of loudspeakers and transmission of leaflets and so on—and the role psychological operators should play in staff terms, in participating in military decisions, I would take the latter. The important input of psychological operations personnel is in the determination of military action rather than in the implementation of their own program. The latter is certainly important, but the former is critical.

The world has changed considerably since Vietnam, but Vietnam taught us one thing: we live in an age of communications. The isolation of the battlefield no longer exists; communication reaches to the battlefield in all sorts of forms. There has been considerable criticism of our having the same person fill the role of press spokesman and director of psychological operations. But I think this arrangement reflects an important principle that has to be recognized in the future—and that is that you cannot compartmentalize communication. Communication with the media has to be consistent with communication to the enemy, to third parties, to the rest of the world. PSYOP and communication with the media are part of the same whole.
My final point is probably an obvious one, but I'll make it nevertheless. All the psychological operations in the world are not going to change the facts, the reality of our actions. The most important thing in this area of PSYOP is to ensure that our actions, either in military or in national terms, are positive. PSYOP standing by itself without a basis of positive, effective, and skillfully devised and executed policy and actions simply will not have any results. In the past, too often PSYOP was blamed and regarded as inadequate because the policy and actions on which it based its message were not the proper ones.
Political Warfare

ANGELO M. CODEVILLA

POLITICAL WARFARE IS the forceful political expression of policy. We must always distinguish policy from the tools by which it is expressed. The forceful political expression of policy makes sense only to the extent that the policy itself makes sense. I believe that no American is now in a position to describe how to use the tools of political warfare to express and to further the United States' political designs in the world because for many years our policymakers have not been competent at making foreign policy and military strategy.

Political warfare is not the sum of a set of tools employed with a certain intensity. Hours of broadcasting to foreign audiences, dollars spent to support groups abroad, foreign contacts highly enough placed to merit the label "agents of influence" are not fungible quantities; nor do numbers indicating that we do a lot, or only a little, in these fields indicate that more or less political warfare is going on. Politics is the marshaling of human beings to support or oppose causes. Political warfare is the marshaling of human support, or opposition, in order to achieve victory in war or in unbloody conflicts as serious as war.

We can operate radios, dispense money, and pull strings. But unless we do so in a manner reasonably calculated to significantly affect the outcome of a war or similar conflict that we are reasonably trying to win, we are not engaging in political warfare any more than someone engages in masonry who builds unconnected piles of bricks and mortar. Without policy, the tools of policy—but especially secret tools—are worse than useless. That is because incompetent policymakers can use them as substitutes for policy, as evidence to them-
selves and others that they are doing something, and thus as reasons to forestall confronting hard choices. Worst of all, the tools of political warfare can nurture the temptation that is perhaps most common among incompetent officials: to try to have one's cake while eating it too by running a "two-track policy"—one track public, one secret.

In 1981, Professor Adda Bozeman suggested in a widely read paper that since the United States was unmistakably declining in relative military power, it had better pay attention to the political arts by which militarily weak powers—medieval Venice is the best example—can keep stronger enemies divided, perplexed, and at bay. Some officials in the US government have mistaken that wise counsel as indicating that various kinds of propaganda, funding of foreign groups, and the black arts of agents of influence can make up for military insufficiency and irresolution at the top. Nothing could be more misleading than a belief that political warfare is a cheap fix for such fundamental deficiencies. At best, the tools of political warfare can reflect and magnify the effect of otherwise competent policy. But when the tools of political warfare are used by the incompetent, they cause friends to bleed and enemies to laugh.

**Defining Political Warfare**

How, then, does one go about marshaling political support among foreigners? Above all, we must remember that such marshaling must be the objective of all international action, from the delivery of public speeches to the dropping of bombs. Nothing is more misleading than the notion that politics is one aspect of conflict among others—military, economic, etc. In fact, politics is not one part of conflict but the organizing principle of the whole, that which makes sense of all one does in a fight, if indeed there is any sense. So, to begin with, we cannot confine political warfare to the tools we associate with political warfare. Any government that marshals human energies through the tools of political war-
fare must also make sure that its military and economic activities are reasonably calculated to achieve the same ends it seeks through obviously political tools.

The supreme decision in warfare is the designation of an objective as important enough to kill and die for. That act is a quintessentially political one. Any military or economic measures taken pursuant to that decision that are not reasonably calculated to bring about victory are signs either of political incompetence or of a death wish. In other words, the tools of political warfare are only parts of what must be an essentially political, success-oriented plan that also involves everything else the government is doing.

Political warfare, then, is the forceful political expression of what a nation is about in a particular conflict. Success in political warfare means that foreigners come to understand what a protagonist is about in ways that lead them to associate their own lives, fortunes, and honor with it. Hence, though political warfare may make use of deception from time to time, its thrust must be the very opposite of deception. Whether it does so overtly or covertly, political warfare must provide to foreigners true, concrete reasons why they ought to consider themselves on "our side," and concrete inducements for them to significantly enhance our side's chances.

Political warfare, then, is a broad concept involving acts both over and covert. Let us consider in turn gray and black propaganda, support for foreign groups, and agents of influence.

**Gray Propaganda**

The United States has rightly chosen to speak to the world not just through official representatives. Throughout the world, the US Information Agency provides speakers and programs that do not necessarily reflect the views of the US government, so that foreigners will understand both the breadth of responsible opinion in the United States and its
unity on essential matters. Similarly, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty speak, obviously, thanks to US government funds, but on behalf of something bigger than the US government. This semiofficial amplification of the voice of the United States abroad is called gray propaganda.

But in addition to amplification, gray propaganda has offered US officials the pleasures of irresponsibility. The classic case is the stirring broadcasts that in the early 1950s gave East Europeans hope that if they revolted, the US would come to their aid. The US government never formally considered whether or not to communicate officially to anyone in Poland, Hungary, or East Germany the message, The United States believes it is in our mutual interest if your people revolt against the Soviet Union; once you do, we will keep the Soviets from crushing you either by threatening war or by actually sending our own troops to interpose themselves between the Soviets and you. Had this question been raised, a responsible government either would have approved sending the message and then made the necessary plans for intervention, or it would not have sent the message. In making its decision, it would presumably have compared the cost of intervening with the costs of permanently conceding Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, and would have prepared itself to make the best of whatever alternative it chose. But the US government avoided that demanding confrontation with reality as long as it could. When the East German, Polish, and Hungarian revolts forced the US government to choose, the option of intervention had not been studied or prepared. In other words, when the US government communicated through gray propaganda—that is, outside of a responsible policy process—it did not take its own utterances seriously enough to prepare for their logical consequences.

Nowadays the radios do not tell the countries of the Soviet Empire to revolt. However, they still draw truthful comparisons between how bad life is over there and how good it is here. But it is not clear that the US government understands what it is doing any better than it did 30 years
ago. The Western radios' listeners know even better than does the US government how miserable life is under Communism, and their imagination about life in the West is probably too generous. It is not clear that the US government has asked itself what rubbing in this comparison can engender. Revolt? Resentment of the West for gloating? Surely it engenders some resentment against both Communist leaders for their tyranny and against the West for talking but doing nothing about it.

None of this is to argue against the reasonable presumption that, all other things being equal, it is better for people inside the Soviet Empire to know the truth that their Communist regimes try to hide. In fact, citizens of Communist countries often know less about what happens in their own countries than do foreigners. It is clearly in the permanent interest of the United States that such citizens be as fully informed as possible about their own countries. But mere facts are not politically significant. Much more important to the audience is, literally, who is in a position to do what, to whom, for whom, and against whom? The Soviet Empire's subjects are interested in how the West feels about them, in what we are able and willing to do that will affect their lives, in how we stand in the daily struggles between themselves and their masters. Above all, they want to know what role, given our means, we are willing to play in that struggle.

Since the US government has not even tried to resolve these fundamental political questions within itself, we can hardly speak to the captive polities of the Soviet Empire without doing ourselves harm. For example, our gray propaganda gives the impression that we consider the peoples of Eastern Europe, certainly, and those of the Soviet Union, probably, as our friends, and that we consider their governments to be both illegitimate rulers and enemies causing us to spend billions of dollars on armaments. On the other hand, the Voice of America no less than the Communist media faithfully, and even eagerly, reports the cordiality of meetings between official representatives of Western governments and Communist governments. And both have faith-
fully reported the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (which is not a treaty submitted to the US Senate) in which the United States agreed that the Soviet Union’s domination of Eastern Europe, and all Communist regimes therein, is legitimate.

Also, both the radios and the Communist media have discussed NATO’s approach to any eventual war on the central front, which is to try to hold the line at the inter-German border while wreaking destruction on the Warsaw Pact’s supplies and reinforcements in Eastern Europe. This message may indeed reassure the Soviet leaders that the West does not intend ever, even under the provocation of war, to threaten Communist rule anywhere. But the targets of our gray propaganda, our friends about whose freedom we sometimes speak but who are to be the targets of our bombs and whose freedom we would not seek in war any more than we do in peace, can be forgiven for being a bit cynical. In other words, our gray propaganda toward the Soviet Empire can hardly be counted as political warfare because there seems to be no point to it. This is not a problem created by, or fixable by, the radios. The problem lies in the political confusion at the heart of US policy.

There is no problem, however, with Radio Free Europe’s principal activities. These are relaying back into the Soviet Empire messages from dissidents abroad, reading *Samizdat* literature, and broadcasting religious services. These activities, however, also should not be thought of as propaganda of any kind. Rather, they are attempts, however feeble, to sustain within the Soviet Empire cultural identities and political groups that the Communist regimes seek to stamp out.

**Black Propaganda**

In the mid-1970s, the Church and Pike Committees revealed several instances of American black propaganda. One of the blacker was clandestinely gathering information about the copious sexual misdeeds of Indonesia’s leftist
dictator, Sukarno, and then spreading them about the world through channels not attributable to the United States. The operation was technically competent. But it could not possibly be termed political warfare because, even as the United States was conducting this "black" assault on Sukarno, it was denying to its NATO ally, Holland, the right to refuel on American soil aircraft that might be sent to block Sukarno’s conquest of Dutch West Borneo. An act of black propaganda does not make a war. And if there is no war, indeed, if we are publicly supporting a foreign regime against major challenges, why should we create small challenges clandestinely? Hence, our first lesson is that, to be meaningful, black propaganda must support, and be supported by, deeds.

In the mid-1980s, some Americans have been dismayed at the success of Dr. Y. P. Velikhov, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in passing himself off to the world’s press as an objective scientific observer, who judges that defense against ballistic missiles is impossible, and who counsels the West to put its trust in arms control rather than in defenses. Velikhov, you see, is one of the leading lights in the Soviet Union’s development of antimissile devices. Some Americans fear that a mere overt campaign by the US government to identify Velikhov for what he is—an agent of disinformation—would founder on the shoals of the media’s distrust of what, after all, would be an obviously self-serving line of argument from the United States. Hence, some reasoned, it would be a good idea to have the truth about Velikhov spread by sources that would not be disbelieved because of their association with the US government.

Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with spreading the truth by black propaganda, and, so long as this is aimed at foreign audiences, there is nothing illegal about it. Indeed, the unmasking of a disinformation agent would seem to be the very definition of the defensive use of black propaganda. But calling Velikhov names, whether to his face or behind his back, is literally senseless so long as the United States does not impeach the substance of his message. Yet the United
States cannot impeach the substance of Velikhov's message without at the same time impeaching its own record on arms control. The United States has told the world that it thinks an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union is both desirable and possible and the Soviet leaders are negotiating in good faith for the same objectives as the Americans. If the United States were now to say publicly that the Soviet Union is sending us a master of disinformation to deceive us into an arms control agreement that would make it easier for the Soviets to threaten war or successfully make war on the United States, the nation would have to explain why it has gone so many miles in this direction before finding out it was the wrong one.

In other words, to gainsay the Soviet Union's intentions with regard to arms control is to gainsay the very basis of US policy. After all, if the Soviet Union's intentions are so bad, what could negotiations possibly accomplish? All of this is to say that Dr. Velikhov's gray propaganda works because it is consonant with Soviet policy, while an American propaganda effort to jinx Velikhov, whether "black" or "white," would be doomed to failure because it would be dissonant with the rest of what the United States says and does. Of course, if the United States were to change its policy toward arms control, jinxing Velikhov would be easy. But on the other hand, if the United States were to change its policy toward arms control, Velikhov would be irrelevant. This is our second lesson.

Our third lesson is that black propaganda, like other measures of political warfare, must actually have a chance of affecting the outcome of the struggle. In the late 1940s, the United States made a major commitment to fighting Communism in Western Europe. In addition to the billions of dollars of Marshall Plan aid and to the hundreds of thousands of American troops in Europe, there was propaganda—white, gray, and black. It is impossible to tell whether the black side played a significant role. But it is difficult to imagine that the Central Intelligence Agency could possibly have generated enough speeches and articles to even be noticeable in the flood that arose spontaneously through-
out the free, pluralistic societies of Europe in response to an obvious challenge.

Similarly, it is not clear how much black propaganda has aided the Soviet Union's massive campaigns to stop the West's neutron bomb, keep Pershing IIs out of Germany, and keep the West from building an antimissile defense. Because the Soviet Union's white and gray propaganda have been enormous, it is enough for us to note that however many articles have been written or placed directly by Soviet agents, the Soviet arms control campaigns could not possibly have been mounted on the basis of them alone.

Where the sources of influence on public opinion and on decisionmaking are more restricted, black propaganda stands a better chance of being significant. In the Third World, an article planted in a newspaper or a story simply spread by word of mouth can cause or calm riots. Thus, Soviet agents needed to inject only a little incitement into Islamabad in November 1979, in the form of reports of American murders of Muslims, to cause a mob to burn the US Embassy to the ground.

However, the channels for black propaganda are important not just for what they can contribute to any given campaign, but primarily because each one that is established is another bunker, another trench taken in enemy territory. Some of these trenches can be of enormous value.

Agents of Influence

Agents of influence are allies in the councils of a foreign power. It is misleading to think of agents of influence as mere creatures of a foreign power, mercenaries, or robots carrying out orders. Because such people exercise influence—indeed this is why they are cultivated—their sympathies cannot be wholly secret. (But the degree to which they coordinate their activities with a foreign power is likely to be secret.) So for a government to maintain or increase the influence of its agents abroad, it must provide them the "cover" that only a certain ambiguous kind of success can bring.
This is a subtle business. Excessive exploitation of an agent of influence risks identifying him as a traitor and destroying everything that the agent has accomplished. One of the better examples is the Soviet Union's "blowing" of its Norwegian agent, Arne Treholt, by using him to achieve an obviously one-sided agreement about its border with northern Norway.

Still, Soviet agents abroad have the advantage of being on the side of a country known for rewarding its friends and, above all, for killing its enemies. In Lebanon, for example, anyone suspected of American sympathies can be killed or "disappeared" literally with impunity, while the few killings of Soviet sympathizers are copiously avenged and Soviet hostages are quickly returned. Since agents of influence are always political hostages, it is essential to remember what Caesar said in his history of Gaul regarding hostages: Rome takes hostages, but does not give them. A government protects its active sympathizers abroad (indeed, it attracts such sympathizers) by its reputation for success and through the awe and respect it inspires in potential opponents.

Our second lesson with regard to agents of influence is related to the first. An agent is worth the trouble of having, protecting, and advancing only to the extent that one has reasonable plans for using him to achieve some success. For example, in Vietnam in 1963 the United States facilitated a successful coup to remove the Diem family from power in order to place in power some generals over which it had more influence. The United States reasoned that these generals would be more attractive to the Vietnamese people than Diem and that their presence would therefore help win the war. But the United States had no plans for using these agents to actually achieve victory. By the late 1960s the United States had largely remade the government of South Vietnam in its own image. But since the consolidation of influence was not intended as part of a reasonable plan, the fulfillment of which would lead to victory, it in fact helped pave the way to defeat.

A third lesson has to do with the soundness of the plan and the extent to which the agent can carry it out. Around the
world, Americans regularly come into contact with persons associated with hostile regimes or parties who lead them to believe that they can increase the influence of the "moderate faction" within their regime or party. The "agent of influence operations" that follow such contacts usually lack seriousness. The first missing element is usually intelligence about the existence and the malleability of the supposed moderate faction. The second missing element is counterintelligence vetting of the supposed agent, and any knowledge whatsoever about who in the hostile regime or party knows about the operation. Finally, the "plan" usually consists of Americans giving something tangible in return for the moderate faction's goodwill. This sort of thing is terribly common in the United States, but it should not be mistaken for policy.

**Support of Foreign Groups**

What propaganda and agents of influence do indirectly, in terms of strengthening or weakening particular factions or groups, may also be attempted directly. We read about this approach, among the most ancient of arts, in virtually every account of conflict since Thucydides. The literature makes it clear, however, that the *sine qua non* for causing latent friendship or opposition abroad to manifest itself in either political or paramilitary activity is the promise of support and protection. Allies in unfriendly or neutral territory cannot be bought (or if they are bought, they cannot be made to stay that way). And seldom has the mere supply of arms or technical assistance led people to engage in hopeless struggles. In a nutshell, recruiting allies to share in victories is easy; recruiting allies to help bear the burden of defeat or to stave it off for a while is well-nigh impossible. The key is to convince the target group that they are joining the winning side, and that by doing so they and their families will be better off. These two elements must be joined—otherwise the groups see their cooperation as merely a price to be paid for a secure retirement in exile.
Hence, our first lesson must be that as one considers approaching potential foreign allies, one should reexamine one's own plans. Is the enterprise for which they are being recruited reasonably planned to lead to victory? Often, however, the questioning is obviated by the fact that foreign groups make the initial approach in the hope of bringing a powerful patron to bear against their domestic enemies. Such groups have usually already concluded that they have no chance of winning without outside support, thus they have nothing to lose by seeking it. If they get wholehearted support, they are back in the game. Some may be satisfied that if they fail to gain such support, at least they will gain for themselves a comfortable exile. Others may simply want to bolster their own bargaining position with their domestic enemies, while still others may be in league with those whom they describe as their domestic enemies and may be pulling a "sting" operation against the foreign "helper" they solicit.

This leads us to our second lesson. Conducting political warfare by trying to build up foreign groups requires reliable intelligence about those groups' motivations as well as about their capacities. Without such intelligence, support of foreign groups is a leap in the dark. When to this external darkness one adds the failure to ask illuminating questions about where this support should lead, how one should know whether the operation is actually getting there, and how to fix it if it seems to be going wrong, then one is engaging in something other than responsible policymaking.

In order to have proper intelligence on a foreign group's political personality, one needs not only agents who are in contact with the group but also the kind of knowledge available only through intelligence collectors who get to know members of the target group and their culture well enough to put themselves in their shoes. Overwhelmingly bound by the narrow culture of US upper middle-class civil servants, agents will be able to understand adequately only groups whose mentality is comprehensible in terms of this very, very narrow perspective. Intelligence about peoples driven by gods,
loves, hates, and needs that are incomprehensible to secular, suburban Americans will continue to elude us.

When the US government has had requisite knowledge and has remembered common-sense precepts, it has been able to use foreign groups to its advantage. When it has had inadequate knowledge and has not followed common sense, it has prepared disasters. In Europe in the late 1940s, the United States recognized that labor unions involved in transportation would have much to say about whether US economic and military aid would actually revitalize Western Europe and help to frustrate the Soviet Union's attempt to keep the Western Alliance from forming. The United States had good intelligence about who was who in these unions because it had intelligence collectors whose experiences allowed them to identify with workers and their concrete concerns. Possessed of good intelligence, the United States encouraged anticom- munist unionists to fight to win control of docks and railroad yards. Both the foreign Communists and the Americans involved knew what it would take to win and fully committed themselves to doing what was necessary. The amount of money that changed hands was miniscule. The key was the assurance that through diplomatic means the United States would protect these unionists against elements in their own governments who would brand their activities as criminal. It was in the United States' power to carry out this promise, and it did.

As a result of this initiative, Communist unionists were confined to their own unions, while the rights of noncommunist labor were protected both by workers themselves and by the police, both to some extent energized by the United States. Similarly, the coup that reaffirmed the influence of the Shah of Iran against Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 could occur only because the United States was willing and able to responsibly promise instant diplomatic recognition in case of success, along with help—such as Greece and Turkey had received—in putting down any remaining resistance. The coup's opponents, including the Soviet Union, saw no point in challenging this resolve.
The trouble with US support of foreign groups since the 1960s, however, has not been an inability to funnel money and arms. In Southeast Asia, the arming of the H'mong tribe against North Vietnam was a masterpiece of logistics and organization. The H'mong fought valiantly and held the northwest corner of Indochina for almost a decade. But today, the few survivors live in the state of Montana or in wretched refugee camps in Thailand because the US government did not take itself seriously in Southeast Asia.

The US government also pursued what it thought was political warfare in Iran throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The US government's objective was to make sure that the Shah's pro-Western government remained in office. To this end, the United States strongly encouraged secularists in the Shah's government to secularize the country. However, because the Americans involved thoroughly misunderstood the situation, they effectively waged political war not on behalf of the Shah, but against him. The US foreign policy and intelligence class, being religiously illiterate, did not realize that by making the Shah a symbol of secularization they were helping to make him a foreigner in his own land.

Nevertheless, the US government figured correctly that the Shah's own partisans in the Iranian Army were so cohesive and well armed that they had the ability to physically destroy any challengers to the Shah. But the US government did not take into account its own role—dispatching the deputy commander of NATO, General Robert Huyser, to convince the Shah's partisans not to shoot, but instead to become a moderating force in the new revolutionary Islamic regime, which promptly executed most of them.

All of this is to say that the US government, while able to exercise influence on foreign groups on the retail level, has exhibited wholesale incompetence, thus that US political warfare has done more harm than good.

Today's debate in Washington about what ought or ought not to be paid to influence Iranian "moderates" has all the realism of a Kafka dialogue. Even if the hearsay about who is and is not a moderate were reliable, there is no
intelligence about who, precisely, is allied with whom and about who is willing to do what to whom with whom. Most important, the United States is in no position to give any contenders for power in Iran what they need most: support against their enemies. One can imagine that if a few of those Iranian officers who took the United States' advice in 1978 are still alive and, somehow, have not developed hatred for America, their precondition for dealing with the United States again would be ironclad assurances that the US government would not let them suffer the fate of their executed friends. No reasonable person could believe that the United States is in a position to give such assurances in Iran today.

The search for the ever-elusive "moderate faction" seems to have become a substitute for knowledge about, and leverage over, foreign situations. In its actions regarding South Africa in 1985 and 1986, Congress has appropriated taxpayer funds for various "antiapartheid" groups; meanwhile, proponents of those appropriations, along with much of the executive branch, have talked much of making contact with moderate factions of the African National Congress (ANC), which is virtually a branch of the South African Communist Party. Of course, the United States is the target of much "information" from members of the ANC that paints them as moderates, for the sake of whose advancement and friendship America ought to do all sorts of things. But the United States has no private, confirmed knowledge about the ANC's internal disputes, much less knowledge that some factions would prefer working with the United States to working with other factions.

As for leverage on behalf of the moderate faction in South Africa, or anywhere else, nothing shows the emptiness of US policies intended to install moderates better than the United States' total unwillingness to even consider helping the moderates to do the one immoderate thing that would allow them to prevail over radicals who threaten their lives: that is, to kill the radicals.

So, in order to promote moderates it does not know and cannot help in the crunch, the United States is helping to
strengthen the ANC as a whole. The US government does this knowing full well that the ANC is not synonymous with South Africa's black population. Indeed, that population is deeply divided into tribes, and the largest of these, the Zulu, are enemies of the ANC for tribal as well as for other reasons. Why not, then, support the Zulus—especially given the obvious moderation of their politics? The answer seems to be that the Zulus are too moderate. They have no kinship with those fascinating folk who burn their enemies' heads with gasoline-soaked tires. These are the very people with whom the dominant culture in the US foreign policy establishment wishes to deal. Hence the eagerness of so many in the US government to confer the label of moderation on head-burners.

By similarly cogent reasoning, the US government sent US Marines to Beirut in 1982 to save the PLO from the destruction that Israel and Pierre Gemayel were about to wreak on it. Despite the PLO's practice of bombing schools, buses, and marketplaces, the United States sought to save the entire PLO in order to enhance the influence of its moderate faction, in the hope that it would be an interlocutor in the "Mid-East Peace Process." Note that both the moderation of any part of the PLO and the Mid-East Peace Process itself are purely creatures of the imagination of the US foreign policy establishment, without reference to reality.

Not surprisingly, the actions taken pursuant to such nonsense proved disastrous. US Marines were sent into a place where Syria and various other enemies of the United States could and did kill them, while the US government was negotiating with Syria to achieve what it thought would be the next step in the peace process—Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. Of course, Israel's withdrawal led only to the expansion of Syrian presence and to an even more baseless search for moderate factions in Syria and Iran. The effect of incompetents holding power is somewhat like that of children getting their hands on power tools.

All of this has a well-known antecedent, which is the search for the moderate faction in the Kremlin. The US
foreign policy establishment has managed to convince itself that every Soviet dictator since 1917 has been a moderate in comparison with those waiting in the wings, and that the United States should make concessions to him in order to strengthen his determination to move along the reformist paths he really prefers. Thus the United States and its allies poured billions of dollars and entire industrial plants into the Soviet Union. The West has also acted to raise the prestige of Soviet leaders by treating them and their proposals deferentially and by not opposing Soviet expansion. In the absence of knowledge about Soviet factions, as well as in the absence of the means and of the will to protect one Soviet faction against another, this blind, impotent wooing of "moderates" in the Kremlin has justified giving to all factions in the Soviet Union the pleasant task of parceling out credit for victories.

I will only touch here on my argument published elsewhere concerning US support of perhaps the most visible factions in the world today, the anticommunist liberation movements of Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. In these cases, the United States is not plagued by lack of intelligence. It knows just about all there is to know about the Nicaraguan and Angolan resistances, and enough about the one in Afghanistan. Above all, the US government has repeatedly stated the geopolitical and moral importance of these causes. Yet the United States supports these movements the way a rope supports a hanged man.

No one in the US government suggests that concrete plans exist for delivering sufficient aid to these movements or for doing the other things (such as naval-air blockades) that would be required to achieve victory. On the contrary, virtually all "responsible" officials tacitly accept that while present policies may delay and complicate Soviet victories, they cannot prevent them. It is significant that no one in the Reagan administration has even proposed any plan for bringing victory to these anticommmunist movements.

Finally, no one in a position of authority denies that when the Soviets finally fully conquer Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua by defeating forces mobilized by the hope of...
American support, they will have achieved far more than if they had simply beaten unorganized resistance forces. The Soviets will end up holding these countries far more firmly than would have been the case without US intervention and, of course, will have taught the world a lesson that, from their standpoint, will be far more valuable than if they had beaten unarmed locals alone rather than the United States as well. Thus, by supporting anticommunist resistance movements half-heartedly, the United States may indeed be waging political warfare—but on whose behalf?

Commitment and Competence

The tools of political warfare fell into disrepute in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s because the US government used them without answering for itself, and for the American people, basic questions about what it was doing. Indeed, it used these tools not only just to achieve ends abroad but also to forestall pressure for resolving internal American disputes. These tools also fell into disrepute because of the sheer incompetence of those who handled them.

The war in Vietnam is the most undeniable instance. While committing over two million men and perhaps a hundred billion dollars to Vietnam over a decade, the dominant faction of the US foreign policy class never dared to call it a war. After all, calling it so while many of its members and their children were openly giving “aid and comfort to the enemy” would have unequivocally branded many of its own as traitors. But the opposing factions within the US government did not behave with equal restraint. Curiously, the faction that believed this country was on the wrong side of the Vietnam War and who worked for the victory of the Communist side did call the war by its name. This faction also did not hesitate to call other Americans the moral equivalents of Nazis. Yet, out of solidarity with this very faction, the faction that thought the United States was on the right side resisted making the political commitment to victory and did not call
the war by its name. It continued to describe its domestic opponents as honorable men.

Thus, those Americans who ran the US involvement in Vietnam committed their fellow citizens' lives and treasure to the war while remaining agnostic enough about the ends for which the war was being fought to remain on goods terms with their opponents. No manual of politics or administration of which I am aware advises commitment to using means while one remains agnostic about the ends.

The tools of political warfare employed in Vietnam were used, for the most part, in ways that should have brought credit upon those who used them. Let us look at how two of these efforts were vitiated by the intellectual and moral weaknesses at the top of the US government. The war in Laos by the H'mong was for an indisputably just cause, was waged competently, and had solid effect. In short, it was something to be proud of, something that a US government committed to victory should have been trumpeting to the Western world. (After all, the North Vietnamese and the Soviets were painfully aware of it.) But it was kept a secret from the American people and from much of the US government because the highest authorities had not mustered the moral self-confidence to argue that the Communist side and all who stood with it deserved to be defeated. They tried to pretend that there really was not a war, or only a little one, and that Laos and Cambodia were not involved.

Thus the pro-war faction of the US government was unwilling to use the war in Laos as a badge of honor, because doing so required arguing in ways that it did not understand or because it wished to avoid a direct confrontation with the pro-Communist faction in the US establishment. Thus, the latter faction was able to argue, effectively and correctly, that the US government had done wrong by waging a "secret war" in Laos. The argument over the war in Laos was confined to its secrecy. Alas, the American people were deprived of the benefit of the full argument.

The Phoenix program involved finding and killing members of North Vietnam's clandestine leadership in the
South. Killing enemy leaders is the ultimate measure of war. The pro-Communist faction in the United States made this program public, and argued that it was murder and that the US government had hidden it from the beginning because it had a bad conscience about it. The second part of the charge was true, of course, but the first was not. If it is just to pursue an objective seriously enough to kill for it, the key question—both from the standpoint of ethics and of military operations—is whom to kill? There is no ethical or operational argument at all to be made for the proposition that it is better to kill enemy soldiers walking along a country road than to kill enemy leaders in their beds. After all, the leaders, not the soldiers, are presumably the principal carriers of the purpose that one aims to defeat by war, and the deaths of a few leaders will end a war sooner than the deaths of many soldiers.

It is significant that no senior official of the United States had the intellectual and moral wherewithal to pound this thought home on television. Of course, to have done so would have engendered the question, Why not, then, try to end the war by really going after the leadership of North Vietnam? But the pro-US faction in the US government had convinced itself that it wanted to avoid doing this, or even discussing it, at all costs. One of the lesser costs was the discrediting-by-default of perhaps the most efficacious and morally justifiable tool of political warfare.

We have an echo of this nonsense in the protests of some at reports that the Afghan Mujahedeen are using US-supplied weapons and information to assassinate high Soviet officials in Afghanistan. One might ask whom else the Mujahedeen should be killing.

The most important example of the US government’s debilitating failure to confront difficult issues concerns the Soviet Union. The US government’s explanation for the variety of actions it has taken with regard to the Soviet Union over the years amounts to “a judicious combination of cooperation and competition.” However, one might say the same with regard to US actions toward Japan. But the United
States is not spending billions to counter Japan's military might; and Japan is not sponsoring terrorism, or trying to take over the Middle East, or arming expansionist client-states in our hemisphere. In fact, the application of such nondescriptive terms to the Soviet Union covers an indefensible attempt to treat it both as what it is and as what we would wish it to be.

The US government has never officially confronted the questions, Do we want the Soviet Union richer or poorer? Do we want its regime esteemed or despised by the people it rules? Do we want to see the regime at peace with itself or riven by bloody internecine conflict? Do we want it to have relations with the rest of the world that are plentiful and good or few and bad? Not having confronted those questions directly, the US government has calculated neither the cost and benefits on either side nor the standards by which to judge whether either of the approaches, once chosen, should be judged as failing or succeeding. Not having thought through the several choices and their implications, the United States has proceeded mindlessly.

The policy of "containment," first conceived in 1947 as a battle plan in political war, is actually the best possible example of mindlessness. The policy seemed to call for treating the Soviet Union and its satellites as pariahs among the nations, enforcing something like a trade boycott, and conveying to the peoples of the Soviet Empire the message that Communist governments are not legitimate. Until 1956 this policy was largely followed, and it did help to keep the Soviet Union poor, backward, and out of the mainstream of international life. But since then, and especially since the Soviet Union built intercontinental missiles, the United States has helped to feed, finance, legitimate, industrialize, and technologize the Soviet Union. All the while, though, the United States has continued to whistle in the dark that it would resist the expansion of Soviet influence and that this "containment" would ultimately doom Communism.

Quite ironically, the US government has explained the transfer of Western resources and technology to the Soviet Union, as well as the various ongoing negotiations on arms
control and human rights, as part and parcel of containment. Enriching the Soviet Empire, you see, would destabilize it by enmeshing Soviet officials in a network of mutually advantageous relations with the West that they would value so much that . . . here, alas, this train of illogic stops. In the context of this double-think, in which the Armand Hammers of this world are frequent guests at the White House, the little operations that the CIA pulls here and there to embarrass the Soviet Union are best understood as pointless, even childish "dirty tricks."

In the realm of political warfare, it is difficult to see the applicability of the maxim that anything really worth doing is worth doing badly. Above all, political war, like military conflict itself, commits the lives and honor of real live human beings. It is simply unjust to risk such things except in the context of reasonable plans for success. Moreover, given the power of reputation in human affairs, to lengthen a record of half-hearted failures is to build an ever-higher barrier to the success of future political or military ventures.

The Future of Political Warfare

If the United States were to choose a *serious* course of action with regard to the Soviet Union, it could begin to plan to use the tools of political warfare to pursue it. But until this happens, the United States will not even be able to confront the procedural issues that stand in the way of effective political warfare. After all, procedural difficulties are rooted in substantive disagreements. Even supposing that a president decided to fill his NSC staff with nonbureaucrats and to fully empower them to command the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, Commerce, etc., in his name, that staff could not resolve the US government's centrifugal forces without a unifying principle that they fully understand and that is internally consistent.

Mere presidential authority will not do, because as everyone knows, bureaucracies very seldom say "No" to
presidential directives; they say "Yes," and then interpret them in their own way. If the president's directives are the least bit ambiguous, the bureaucracy will expand these ambiguous spaces into fortified castles. A president, and his staff, would actually have to know what they want to do well enough to see through bureaucratic reformulations of directives. There is simply no substitute for a president demanding from himself and his subordinates clarity with regard to objectives and with regard to the concatenation of ends and means: Will this actually lead to that?

The potential usefulness of the tools of political warfare is great, and increasing. Although modern technology allows totalitarians to hide better and better more and more of their military assets and plans, modern technology does allow any advanced country to listen in on public discourse in any other country. Hence, some of the most politically important information is now readily available. Soon it will be possible to beam, not broadcast, radio and television signals anywhere in the world. In other words, it will be possible for one people to take part in another's domestic political discussion. But what messages do we wish to send? And to what end?

One consequence of the Soviet Empire's much greater involvement in the world is that its representatives are now to be found everywhere, almost as widespread as Americans. Like Americans, they can be compromised and embarrassed; or, if some of them wanted help against their domestic competitors, one might consider working with them. But there is no reason to hold one's breath. The world is full of political ferment. There is never a shortage of Iranians, or East Europeans, or Cubans, or Africans, or Asians, or Mexicans who are looking for help from abroad to improve their lot at home. But do we want enough to achieve something in their countries to involve ourselves with them and to make sure that we prevail?

No doubt, a number of countries important to the United States—Mexico and Iran are but two examples—are on the brink of important changes. We can be certain that the Soviet Union's gray and black propaganda, agents of in-
fluence, and support for factions will play a role in these countries' political evolution. There is no reason why the United States ought not to use these very same tools in these countries. But it is almost certain that at and near the top of the US government there is not sufficient competence to gather the right intelligence, to make the basic policy choices, and to employ the necessary resources so that our threats will not be contemptible, our promises not hollow, our friends not dead, and our enemies not eating our cake.
Notes


DONALD F. B. JAMESON

Dr. Codevilla's paper shows, I think, intellectual rigor and clarity, and I hope what he has to say will be given the serious consideration it deserves. I would agree that we desperately need effective policy. I do think, though, that in looking at what can be usefully done in political warfare we should bear in mind the reverse of the familiar adage: what's worth doing is worth doing badly. Sometimes, when you don't have a real policy, if you muddle through, you end up ahead of the game despite the frustrations and bureaucratic risks you go through.

Dr. Codevilla refers, for example, to the glorious and tragic episode of the Laotian tribesmen. Certainly, nobody more than the people who were directly involved with them understands the terrible tragedy of our turning our backs on them. But it must be part of the record that what they did was rather fundamental in bringing about the kind of Southeast Asia that exists today, which is basically a vigorous and free community, in which the people with the most serious problems, the people becoming more inward-looking and less able to influence others, are the conquering Vietnamese.

I'd also like to mention that back in the 1960s, when our policy toward the Soviet Union was certainly as ambiguous as it has ever been, some political warfare endeavors of the US government, particularly its sponsorship of a large collection of organizations, mostly in Europe but ranging around the world, really did take center stage away from the Communist-influenced intelligentsia. These organizations had a lot of money to spend. Basically, the wordmakers and speakers of the world are interested in being able to publish, being able to go to conferences, and being able to talk. That money was made available to them so that they didn't have to rely on the World Peace Council and all the other Communist fronts to travel around and write. They had excellent magazines in all the major European countries. And I think all this made a major difference.
I'm not sure anybody in the government ever sat down and figured out how that program fitted into a larger and grander policy other than that, simply, it was a good thing to do. At times, when you can't figure out what it is the top people want to do or whether policies are consistent, if you can figure out something that looks pretty good, and you can get away with it, my feeling is, go ahead and do it. You need to bear in mind that there are ways in which you can survive in ambiguity. I must say, however, that great frustration is in store for anybody who has had the experience of going around Washington trying for one reason or another to explain what is happening in the politics of another country that is crucial to the United States.

When I think of our historical origins, I am reminded of Clemenceau at Versailles saying to Woodrow Wilson, when Wilson seemed to be utterly deaf to the problems of French security in the future, "Mr. Wilson, you come from a country in which on the north you have a forest, on the south you have a desert, on the east fish, and on the west fish. This is not the position of France in Europe." Unfortunately, we are still unable to take seriously our foreign affairs. When you look at the political appointments in key positions that any administration you can think of has made, when you look at the real considerations that go into the passage of foreign policy legislation or its implementation in the executive branch, you can easily come to the conclusion that we still believe there is nothing but fish, forests, and desert out there. We appear to believe that foreign policy problems can be resolved by handling our domestic politics a little better while we pretend that we know what we're doing abroad.

In this connection, I am reminded of one of the most perceptive and intelligent defectors from the Soviet Union, Alexander Kaznacheyev, a Soviet diplomat-cum-KGB-cooptee, who defected in 1959. I knew him well. When he worked with me in the early sixties, Kaznacheyev kept asking, "You know, where in the United States government is it all put together, where they coordinate diplomacy, the military, the trade policies, the propaganda?" And I kept saying,
“Alex, there is no such place.” And he said, “Ah ha, I understand, it’s so sensitive you can’t talk about it.” He asked me that question for three years and I kept answering the same way. Finally, I persuaded him that my answer was true. The next day he went off to study economics, and now he’s a senior executive in a big company. Talk to him about politics!

I think I would like to end my observations by pointing out that, quite by contrast with the American experience, the Soviet Union has survived from its inception on its ability to manipulate the policies of its enemies. It seems to me when we look at the Soviet contributions to civilization, those things that are uniquely Soviet—not Russian, not from some other nationality, but things that the Soviets really evolved to the point where they can export them to other countries and other cultures can adopt them—are these two things: the ability to manipulate the policies of their enemies, and techniques for maintaining order and labor discipline in circumstances of collapsing living standards. These things, they do well. The second principle, maintaining order in poverty, is the one they have taught so well in the Third World. That’s what makes their system so attractive to people like the leaders of Mozambique, the Angolans, the Cubans, and so forth.

In contrast to a sound, internally focused country that works fairly well no matter how stupidly it conducts its foreign affairs (which is basically the history of the United States), the Soviet Union, from the very beginning, has survived by means of foreign policy manipulation. Foreign political operations directed against their enemies were the one thing that kept a crudely managed internal situation from collapsing. Their whole experience in life is, in fact, the reverse of ours. Of course, internal politics also influences their view of the world, and they sometimes get things wrong because they too are insular in their own way. Their own filters of information keep the leadership misinformed; nevertheless, they know that the game is deadly serious because only by playing it well have they survived.

I do think that when mentioning the Soviets, however, it is important to bear in mind that there are limitations to what
they can do. Dr. Codevilla said that if we turn to people in a country and try to cultivate them as moderates, it is questionable what we can do for them. I think it is important to note that today around the world the Soviet Union appears to be recognizing the limits of what it can do for other people. It behooves us to watch very carefully what happens in Mozambique in the near future. So far as I can see, the Soviets have not done anything to try to maintain the Frelimo regime. In spite of our own efforts to try to maintain it, I think it probably will collapse unless it can get a Cuban military force or its equivalent to fight the insurgents, which doesn't seem to be happening. I think the Soviets face the same dilemma, up to a point, in regard to Nicaragua and perhaps other places as well. These situations will certainly offer us some opportunities. Whether, in fact, we take advantage of them is, of course, another matter.

ABRAM N. SHULSKY

DR. CODEVILLA'S PAPER REMINDS ME of something that Senator Goldwater didn't actually say, but might have said, which is that extremism in the pursuit of theoretical truth is no vice. I mean that as a compliment, because in the theoretical sense the paper is very useful and good precisely because it is so emphatic in trying to get to some fundamental points that are often overlooked. The fundamental point, of course, is that all these techniques of psychological warfare have to fit into a strategy for conducting the overall struggle,
and that strategy itself has to be directed toward attaining some desired outcome.

Clearly, one needs a policy; one can't use these kinds of techniques as a substitute for policy, as a way of looking as if one is doing something when one doesn't really have a clear understanding and grasp of the goal one is trying to achieve. But on the other hand, it's politically unacceptable to be seen as doing nothing. So that is a very big danger, and one that is perhaps even magnified by the fact that many of these techniques have to be somewhat secret, so that the problems that arise aren't always looked at carefully.

One can also conclude that there has to be basic policy consistency. One can't have, as Dr. Codevilla says, a two-track policy, one track secret and one public, without there being a real strategy somewhere in the background relating the two. And the goal has to be some kind of victory, something understood as important enough, ultimately, to kill for, or to die for.

This observation also underlines the importance of the context in which these various operations occur. For instance, the PSYOP success stories of the 1950s, against Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala and so forth, are sometimes presented as if these were the acme of the tradecraft of the operators on the ground. In other words, those who did the broadcasting in Guatemala did such a good job that the government fell. I think what Dr. Codevilla says is important in reminding us that it made a very big difference that this was Central America in the 1950s, a time when the memory of previous US interventions in the area was still relatively fresh, a time when the United States was very outgoing in its attention to world affairs and willing to use force in parts of the world much further away than Guatemala. It's not simply a question of the technique of a few radio broadcasts.

Another important point is that the deceptive side of the PSYOP business is really in a way very subordinate. Perhaps because it's fun and interesting and so on, we tend to think of the deception or deviousness as being the key. It is helpful to
be reminded that deception is really quite subordinate conceptually to the basic lines of the policy, which can't be that devious and clever.

By making these very necessary points, then, Dr. Codevilla provides a good foundation for looking at these matters. But I think he perhaps ignores some of the messy realities that have to be dealt with and can perhaps be dealt with by these kinds of means.

The real nub of the problem is the basic issue of what our policy toward the Soviet Union is. Any sort of policy of containment—a policy that says we want to prevent the Soviets from making gains, but don't really have a strategy and a clear intent to win the struggle in a decisive fashion, either because we don't think it's possible, or it's too dangerous, or for whatever reason—any such policy is simply not going to provide the clarity of purpose necessary to support the kind of political-psychological warfare that Dr. Codevilla thinks we should undertake. In other words, if we are going to be using these techniques at all, we're already in quite a bind, precisely because our basic policy toward the Soviet Union is not that clear.

But suppose one were to look another way at the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, take the way suggested in the recent posture statement of the secretary of defense, which talks about competitive strategies and the problem of seeing the relationship as a long-term competition in which one has to be able to compete as effectively as possible, though there may be no final resolution of the conflict. Now that doesn't mean there can't be an answer or can't be a resolution. No regime lasts forever, simply because of its internal situation; and one can always expect or hope that there will be changes that will allow for some resolution of the problem. In fact, the containment policy itself in its classic formulation, you will remember, held out precisely such a hope—we contain the Soviets until the internal pressures bring the moderates to power (though that was a particularly naive way of looking at it). Even a system like the Soviet Union that has developed the art of in-
ternal control to a high pitch is, nevertheless, not immortal. So at some point some change could occur that might be useful. But we have to stay alive in the meantime, and we have to be able to do this in a relatively effective manner.

So I think, from that point of view, various things that from Dr. Codevilla's perspective look either wrong or silly take on a greater importance—for instance, the unrest or distrust within the Soviet bloc that Henry Rowen discusses (see p. 169). Distrust by the Soviets of their East European allies, which could be nurtured by various means, isn't a resolution of the problem, but it might act as a fairly substantial deterrent to the Soviets and hence might be very useful when one looks at the competition over the long run. On the other hand, it certainly isn't the way to victory. Similarly, anticommunist insurgencies of the sort that have been talked about don't hurt either.

Now, there is a serious issue that Dr. Codevilla raises, and it is really a moral issue. He argues that it's not only not good strategy but also simply wrong to encourage people to fight against overwhelming odds when we ourselves are not really willing to back them to the hilt. I think that's the serious issue. In the case of Hungary, that is an important question, although I suspect what the gray propaganda of Radio Free Europe might or might not have said—which is controversial—was really much less important for us than simply the general statement of the Eisenhower administration about rollback. That statement certainly must have had a bigger influence in the long run.

On the other hand, if you look at places like Afghanistan and Angola, I don't think it's accurate to portray these cases simply as our egging people on to fight battles and then not supporting them in a way that they can reasonably expect. In both of these cases, the anticommunist insurgents were fighting their own battles before our involvement. Angola is in a sense the clearest case, because for ten years we had on the books a law that said that of all the people in the world, you, Mr. Savimbi, are the one person we cannot help to fight communism. That was our law, and nevertheless he kept go-
ing, and fairly successfully for all that time. So anything we
give him, while it may encourage him in one sense to fight
longer than he might otherwise have, can hardly make us
morally responsible for that struggle. It's his decision, and we
are not the only moral actor on the scene.

So while the moral consideration is important and
necessary, part of politics is simply the fact that different
people do come together to pursue their own interests, which
are not necessarily the same but are sufficiently congruent
that they can cooperate for a time. If our interests as we see
them and the Afghan freedom fighters' interests as they see
them are congruent for now, it makes sense for us to support
them, even though we may not be willing to do everything
that they would like us to. In other words, they are going into
it with their eyes open.

This same sort of thing applies, I think, to the deception
question. It's very difficult, as we've certainly seen once
again, for this country to try to base very much on deception
or on doing things covertly that we're denying overtly; and it's
certainly true, as Dr. Codevilla said, that you can't have two
policies. You've got to have one policy, and you've got to be
clear what that policy is. Nevertheless, in principle at least,
certainly various kinds of deception or secrecy cannot be
ruled out.

I can't resist one last comment on the "moderates." It is
difficult to escape the impression that we fooled ourselves
about the availability of moderates in Iran. On the other
hand, I think it is true that there can be cases in which
thoroughly extreme and disreputable parts of a society can be
at each other's throats. And if that's true, it may be possible
for us to help one or the other in ways that will also be useful
to our interests. The mistake comes because of a sort of
moralism of our society that leads us to believe that the group
we decide to help for whatever Realpolitik reasons has sud-
denly become moderate. If we convince ourselves of that,
we're in big trouble.
The purpose of this paper is to address the question of what political and psychological operations the United States might pursue as part of a policy that seeks to either counter or support movements employing revolutionary warfare strategies. One of the United States' foremost specialists and former practitioners of counterinsurgency and paramilitary operations observed at the beginning of this decade that in the 1980s the United States was likely to react to revolutionary warfare challenges "much like a counterpunching boxer," focusing on "combatting armed clandestine organizations whose primary goal is to impose their will in the countries where they are attempting to seize power." This observation was made in 1981, as the Reagan administration entered office. Since that time, the administration has broadened the US role in revolutionary warfare and low-intensity conflict. American policy in Nicaragua and El Salvador implies that the administration views revolutionary warfare both as a threat and as an opportunity. In other words, depending on the conflict, the United States may pursue a policy of supporting or countering an insurgency.

This paper addresses both of these policy issues and identifies the contribution psychological and political action has to make to each. However, it is first necessary to describe revolutionary warfare strategy as it has evolved and to examine how those parties and movements which have followed this course of action integrate psychological and political warfare measures in their overall approach.
With that completed, the remainder of the paper addresses the following questions: One, how has Soviet strategy developed over the last two decades both in promoting insurgency and in assisting newly established Marxist-Leninist regimes to consolidate power and defeat insurgent threats? And how much importance do the Soviets place on political and psychological measures as part of this strategy? Two, what has the US experience been in revolutionary warfare? And what lessons has the United States learned from prior involvement, and are these reflected in current policy and strategy? Three, what kind of policy and strategy might the United States develop to respond to revolutionary warfare challenges? And how do psychological and political warfare measures fit into these recommendations?

**Revolutionary Warfare:**
**The Post-World War II Experience**

The American national security community has frequently misunderstood the concept of revolutionary warfare, often equating it with irregular military tactics, which may be part of revolutionary warfare but are not synonymous with it. Consequently, guerrilla warfare and revolutionary warfare, inappropriately, are used interchangeably in the lexicon of American national security. This usage reveals the degree of misunderstanding.

Guerrilla tactics have been employed throughout history; their roots lie in ancient times. Robert Asprey’s two-volume study of *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* describes this in great detail. For example, guerrillas hindered Alexander the Great in his two-year campaign in Persia. Similarly, guerrillas plagued both Hannibal during his epic march from Spain to Northern Italy and the Roman army in its pacification of Spain. In each of these instances, irregular and predominantly indigenous forces carried out paramilitary operations in enemy-held or hostile territory. These were not a mirror image of revolutionary warfare.
The military history of the United States is dotted with involvement in guerrilla conflicts. American soldiers executed guerrilla actions during the War of Independence as well as the Civil War. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the US Army conducted counterguerrilla actions against various Indian tribes. At the turn of the century, it faced guerrilla challenges in the Philippines and in Mexico. In the Second World War, guerrilla forces organized in the Philippines provided MacArthur with invaluable assistance in his retaking of the islands. Similarly, during 1943 the OSS trained and organized the Kachins of northern Burma into guerrilla units, and American officers led them in operations against the Japanese. After the war, American advisers assisted the Greek army in defeating a Communist guerrilla movement. Finally, during the Korean War, special operations forces were employed and gained a permanent status within the American military. None of these experiences was synonymous with revolutionary warfare.

Why is guerrilla warfare, or the related concepts of jungle, irregular, partisan, and unconventional warfare, not the equivalent of revolutionary warfare? The answer lies outside of the military tactics employed.

**The Parameters of Revolutionary Warfare** Revolutionary warfare employs ancient military tactics in conjunction with political and psychological techniques in order to acquire political power as a prelude to transforming the social structure. The objective is to impose a new regime on the society through a strategy of protracted conflict. Herein lies the difference between revolutionary warfare and other forms of irregular or guerrilla combat. Revolutionary warfare strategists combine unconventional military tactics with political and psychological operations in order to establish a competing political and ideological structure. This form of protracted conflict is principally a post–World War II phenomenon, the roots of which can be traced to the strategy developed by the Chinese Communists during the 1930s.

The French were among the first in the West to grasp the meaning of revolutionary warfare and to articulate a counter-
strategy. Many of the French originators of the concept served in Indochina, where, Bernard Fall notes, "they learned their Mao Tse-tung the hard way." French military analyst Colonel Georges Bonnet advanced the following equation to explain revolutionary warfare:

\[ RW = G + P \]

where \( RW \) stands for revolutionary war, \( G \) stands for guerrilla tactics, and \( P \) stands for political and psychological activities.

Bonnet and other French officers concluded that in revolutionary warfare the military tactics of the guerrilla are secondary to the central strategic objectives that are to be achieved through political and psychological means. The principal goal is to destroy the legitimacy of the target government through the establishment of a counter-ideology and counter-institutions. Thus, for these French officers, it was the objectives sought, and the central importance placed on political warfare and psychological operations in achieving them, that differentiated revolutionary warfare from other forms of irregular combat. This concept was first systematically espoused by Mao Tse-tung. His theoretical framework, in turn, has been adopted by many others. Although there are important differences among these practitioners, the broad assumptions of the Chinese approach have been adopted by parties and movements throughout the Third World.

**The Principles of Revolutionary Warfare** Drawing on both theoretical statements and practical applications, one can identify five basic tenets that underlie the strategy of revolutionary warfare. Although differences exist among theorists and practitioners, the generalizations described below demonstrate that political and psychological measures lie at the center of the strategy.

The first of these principles is the *primacy of propaganda and political action*. Unlike conventional conflict, revolutionary warfare does not focus until its final stages on
climactic military engagements. Its primary targets lie within the fabric of society. Because of the initial sharp imbalance in the correlation of forces, this political focus is essential if the insurgents are to advance to a point where they may seriously challenge state power. In light of this requirement, the party concentrates on the formation and propagation of a competing or counterideology, not seeking to redress particular problems, but instead challenging the regime’s basic legitimacy and right to govern. The objective is to politicize the conflict and establish a competing value structure. Ideology contains guidance and justification for revolutionary war. It is a vehicle used to build support and mobilize elements of the population. Ideology must promote a cause that is plausible, compelling, and appears to be fulfillable.

Although the leadership of movements employing this strategy have on the whole been based on a variation of Marxism-Leninism, the ideology they have formulated has blended the “idealistic” elements of Communism with attention to the resolution of indigenous economic, social, and political inequalities. It will emphasize nationalism, deplore existing circumstances, and hold up a locally attractive alternative. In communicating this ideology, the insurgents and those who support them will focus their propaganda and political action tactics on targets at home as well as those in the regional and international arenas.

An examination of successful insurgent movements will demonstrate that many of the reforms articulated in the movements’ ideology are not implemented after power is achieved. The current situation in Nicaragua is only the most recent example of this pattern. Properly articulated, the failure of, for example, the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions to carry out these changes could serve as a powerful political message in other Latin American societies facing revolutionary warfare. Of course, pointing out promises not fulfilled cannot stand alone. It must be part of a comprehensive and integrated political-military strategy.

A second general element of revolutionary warfare strategy is mass mobilization. Through this measure, in-
surgents attempt to alter the political as well as military balance of forces. In light of its importance, successful revolutionary movements have employed a host of programs and techniques to accomplish this. For example, within the party structure (from the top to the local level), one of its major committees has responsibility for mobilization. It is staffed by cadre skilled in two activities: the indoctrination of party personnel, and the production and distribution of propaganda materials and development of other political action programs. Cadre include correspondents, translators, writers, painters, printers, actors, dramatists, musicians, and broadcasters. Propaganda is conveyed through a variety of techniques, most importantly face-to-face or word-of-mouth contact. The objectives are threefold: to attract elements of the populace, to attack the enemy through psychological warfare, and to utilize indoctrination measures to maintain allegiance. This process is an ongoing one.

A related aspect of this process is mass organizational work. Professional cadre at all geographical and societal levels are responsible for proselytizing, recruiting, and mobilizing target audiences that include youths, students, intellectuals, peasants, workers, women, and so on. The establishment of mass organizations allows the insurgent leadership to institutionalize support gained through propaganda, expand the source of political cadre and guerrillas, and neutralize support for government programs.

While revolutionary warfare theorists and practitioners stress the importance of what might be termed positive psychological operations, they also employ negative incentives. For example, if a significant part of the population that may be inclined to back the government can be kept neutral, this is a victory for the insurgency. To accomplish this, various negative incentives may be employed. These range from threats and intimidation to the use of terrorism. Is this part of the psychological weaponry employed by insurgents in a protracted revolutionary war? The answer is an unequivocal yes.

In many ways, the first two elements discussed above are aspects of the third element—"the establishment of the
**political-military infrastructure.** The classic statement on this can be found in Lenin's 1902 pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?* The adaptation of Lenin to the strategy of revolutionary warfare resulted in an expansion in the size of the overall revolutionary organization or political-military infrastructure. This is especially true of the hierarchy of mass organizations controlled by the vanguard party. These include popular associations (labor, women, farmers, youth), special interest groups (journalists, minorities, teachers, veterans, artists), and political parties. They become part of a political infrastructure or parallel hierarchy controlled by the vanguard party that serves as a shadow government. In the regional and international arenas, this shadow government seeks to become a recognized and legitimate alternative to the existing regime. In many ways, this activity at the international level is a mirror image of the political-psychological warfare campaign carried out internally.

The final two elements or general tenets of this protracted strategy include *military and paramilitary tactics* and *acquisition of outside assistance.* The importance of the latter is often downplayed by both theoreticians and practitioners. In reality, the question of whether foreign support constitutes a decisive factor has been a most controversial issue. Those who have used this strategy reject the proposition. However, a review of the last twenty years suggests the opposite. While indigenous factors remain important causes of internal war, in many instances its growth and exacerbation stem directly from the active involvement of external powers. Certainly, the Sandinista victory owes much to Cuban and Soviet political and paramilitary assistance. The same was true for the MPLA in Angola during the mid-1970s. The growth of other insurgent movements in Central America, Southern Africa, and the Middle East can also be attributed in significant part to external aid.

Assistance can be divided into two general categories. Propaganda or psychological operations and political warfare campaigns by outside powers can and often do play an important role in both legitimizing the revolutionary insurgency
in the international arena and discrediting and isolating the government under attack. Paramilitary aid, on the other hand, contributes to the effectiveness of the insurgents "on the ground." In the West, insufficient attention has been paid to the former. The extent to which the Soviet Union and its allies and surrogates employ political and psychological measures to promote the cause of insurgent movements in the international arena has generally been overlooked; the focus has been, rather, on arms transfers and other forms of logistical support. This is surprising in light of the Soviets' ideological commitment as well as the extensive organizational and financial resources they devote to the use of political and psychological operations as instruments for policy. 7 It is to these issues that we now turn.

The Soviet Bloc and Revolutionary Warfare

Support for national liberation movements or revolutionary warfare has been a basic element of Soviet foreign policy since the very early days of CPSU rule, although theoretical precepts and the priorities of policy have not always been in harmony. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, Soviet policy shifted, and by the end of the decade Moscow was in the midst of an unprecedented involvement in Third World conflicts. This involvement included the promotion of insurgencies and terrorist violence. While it is unclear precisely when the USSR decided to undertake this change in policy, it was set forth officially in Brezhnev's report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971. His pledge to "give undeviating support to the people's struggle for democracy, national liberation and socialism" gave authoritative endorsement to a policy already being implemented in the field. 8 This was reaffirmed by Brezhnev at the 25th and 26th Congresses. However, at the 26th Congress, held in February 1981, while maintaining the Soviet commitment to the revolutionary warfare process, Brezhnev was more cautious in his address. 9

What was the reason for this shift? In part, it may be explained by what we might term the "burden of empire." Dur-
ing the 1970s, the USSR and its surrogates were employing political and paramilitary means to assist insurgent movements and radical factions. By the end of the decade eight of these had successfully seized power. Success may be attributed to many factors, but Soviet assistance certainly played an important role. However, a by-product of these developments was a new requirement for Soviet bloc aid, involving security assistance and advisory support to help newly established Marxist-Leninist regimes consolidate power. A number of these regimes have proven to be vulnerable to indigenous insurgent threats. By the early 1980s, at least four major guerrilla movements opposed to totalitarian rule emerged, challenging these Soviet-backed states.

Recognizing these vulnerabilities, the USSR has provided various means to sustain its allies in power. One of these means is the development of an internal security infrastructure that can quell indigenous opposition, mobilize the population, and insulate the opposition leadership cadre. Additionally, to protect against resistance movements employing insurgent strategies, the Soviet bloc provides counterinsurgency military and paramilitary advice and support.

In effect, by the 1980s, Soviet policy toward Third World conflict had acquired a double focus. On the one hand, it seeks to assist certain revolutionary insurgent factions to gain power through protracted war. On the other hand, Moscow provides military and security support to ensure that those who successfully seize power maintain control. In pursuit of the former, the Kremlin employs a complex and integrated political-military strategy, encompassing both political measures (foreign propaganda, international front organizations, political activities within international and regional organizations) and paramilitary activities (arms and logistical support, political-military training, advisory assistance, deployment of forces). In terms of support for insurgent movements, both elements of Soviet strategy are important. However, for present purposes we will focus on the political measures.
A major element of Soviet support for movements following a strategy of revolutionary warfare is to use political and psychological operations (PSYOP) to champion the cause and objectives of the insurgents in the international arena. A brief comment on these measures and the extent to which they are employed by the USSR and its surrogates will demonstrate the importance of PSYOP within Moscow's overall strategy for assisting revolutionary insurgent movements.10

The political component of Soviet strategy constitutes an array of overt and covert techniques. Here, we are concerned with the former (realizing they are supported by covert techniques). Foreign propaganda is a major tool employed by Moscow to promote insurgent movements in the international arena. Escalation in propaganda coverage of an insurgent movement often indicates it has become a more consequential policy issue for Moscow. It also triggers the initiation of a broader political warfare campaign in which other instruments are brought into play.

A second major technique for promoting the cause of insurgent movements is use of Soviet-directed international front organizations. Their techniques include propaganda and international conference diplomacy. The latter is the more political action-oriented of the two and can take a number of forms. For example, it is not unusual to find an international conference, involving the United Nations or a related regional organization, which one of the Soviet fronts either participates in or cosponsors. The purpose of this and related techniques is to reach a much larger audience than the Soviets could hope to influence on their own.

Finally, since the early 1970s, Moscow has carried out political action campaigns in the United Nations and other regional organizations on behalf of certain insurgent movements (e.g., PLO, SWAPO, MPLA, ANC). With the encouragement and direct involvement of the USSR and its surrogates, the increasingly militant Afro-Asian bloc has taken the initiative in the UN to support and assist such movements. One important result, among many, has been the
granting of permanent observer status in the UN to SWAPO (the South-West African People's Organization) and the PLO. In sum, the Soviets approach the UN and other international organizations as arenas for conducting psychological and political warfare. Between the USSR and its surrogates, Moscow maintains a large presence in the UN to help carry out these activities.

The West has largely ignored the importance that the Soviets place on the use of multiple political warfare measures to promote the legitimacy of insurgent movements internationally. This is surprising given the fact that few insurgencies have been unaffected by the international environment. Since they are almost always weaker than the incumbents, one way to offset this disadvantage and allow the insurgency to expand is by acquiring various forms of international assistance. This assistance is important during each stage of insurgent development. During the initial period, when recruitment and cadre cell expansion lays the foundation for the political-military infrastructure, international political support can be replayed internally to advertise and popularize the movement. This support may also encourage uncommitted nations to back the insurgency. Such assistance also may be directed at isolating the incumbent regime. Finally, political support may lead to other forms of military assistance from outside powers. This military aid will be of particular importance once the insurgents increase the scale and intensity of their activities.

Soviet support also takes the form of political and military training of insurgent cadre. While significant attention has been paid to the military training, it is also important to recognize that the Soviet bloc provides political training. For example, an interview with a former Soviet official who was on the faculty of Patrice Lumumba University and, more importantly, the CPSU higher party school provided a detailed description of the kind of training senior party cadre from revolutionary insurgent movements received. This training took place principally at the higher party school, where an entire course of study is provided on how to plan for and seize power through illegal means. Political and psychological warfare training is part of that process.
The US Experience In Revolutionary Warfare

The American experience with revolutionary warfare has not been a very successful one. From 1961 to 1972, the United States was involved in a protracted insurgent conflict that evolved during the period into the advanced stages of this form of warfare. A number of books have been written on the Vietnam War as it relates to the US attempt to develop an effective counterinsurgency strategy.\textsuperscript{12} Most of these studies conclude that, for a number of reasons, the United States was unable to implement this policy. This was true when the war was protracted and low level as well as when it escalated. During the initial years, different counterinsurgency plans were contemplated. However, they were not easily adopted by the US military establishment, which approached the conflict in a fundamentally different way.

As the war intensified during 1964 and 1965 and the enemy employed both revolutionary warfare and conventional tactics, the United States adopted for its own forces a conventional "attrition" strategy; counterinsurgency and pacification became the primary responsibility of the South Vietnamese. There is no question that as the enemy increasingly employed conventional tactics, the United States and its South Vietnamese ally required more and diversified military capabilities. Nevertheless, this did not negate the need for the political, social, economic, developmental, and psychological aspects of counterinsurgency.

Almost without exception, the literature and manuals on counterinsurgency strategy stress the important contribution of psychological operations. One recent assessment, for example, asserts, "psychological operations are absolutely essential in insurgency and counterinsurgency where success depends on the support of the population . . . to defeat the insurgent, the government must retain, gain or win back the support of its people." The study goes on to note, "this usually includes protecting the people from the insurgents, providing essential government services, implementing required government reforms, and neutralizing the insurgency."
PSYOP is required for each of these functions because the government must convince the citizens that it can provide a more desirable alternative.”13

**PSYOP and US Policy in Vietnam** How effectively did the United States employ psychological operations in Vietnam? It would appear that its record parallels the experience with counterinsurgency. A number of factors undercut the US effort. First of all, the personnel assigned and the amount of funds appropriated for PSYOP, when compared to the overall war effort, were not very substantial. The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) employed 250 Americans and 600 Vietnamese in its various divisions. At its peak, the total US personnel commitment to PSYOP in Vietnam was 1,200 Americans and 750 Vietnamese. The annual budget of JUSPAO was $12 million.14 When contrasted with the deployment of over half a million Americans and an annual budget in the billions, the assets devoted to PSYOP can only be seen as exceptionally modest.

Beyond personnel and budgetary issues, a number of other factors contributed to the US inability to employ psychological operations as effectively as it might have in Vietnam. To begin with, the American response to revolutionary warfare took place within the context of our traditional or conventional approach to war. The emphasis was not placed on the political and psychological dimensions of this form of conflict, but on firepower and technology. If the social and political aspects of revolutionary warfare are de-emphasized, then the contribution of PSYOP is likewise downgraded.

PSYOP in Vietnam was an ancillary element of policy and strategy, and as the US military effort grew, psychological operations became even less attractive to military personnel. Like special warfare, PSYOP was not career-enhancing and there was insufficient emphasis placed on it in the Army schools. One study sums up this attitude in the following way: “Psychological operations was not a route to promotion in the military. . . . Because infantry and
artillery combat requirements in Vietnam were so heavy, of-

ficers from other branches of the Army were put in

JUSPAO—armor, chemical, and the like. Inexplicably, the

Navy provided a disproportionate percentage of submarine

officers, probably because of temporary overages in this
category within the Navy."15

A second factor contributing to our less than satisfactory
psychological operations effort in Vietnam was the govern-
ment of Vietnam (GVN). Gunther Lewy notes that its per-
formance "remained the achilles heel of the allied effort . . .
progress in building a viable political community was painful-
ly slow, and it was not far reaching enough to create the sense
of purpose necessary for successful defense against the com-
munist enemy."16 This poor performance had a debilitating
effect on the overall PSYOP effort. Propaganda and political
action supports and promotes an indigenous government’s
reform and development efforts; it cannot serve as a
substitute for these efforts. Neither can it make a bad policy
acceptable.

Additionally, the United States sought to substitute its
own psychological operations program for that of its Viet-
namese ally. Harry Latimer notes that as the United States
lost patience with the Vietnamese, it “began to communicate
with the Vietnamese people in the name of the Vietnamese
government.” In effect, the United States “tried to do the job
for them.”17 Can effective political communications be con-
ducted by a third party on behalf of the host government?
The Americans believed it could. However, this meant
substituting other channels for the face-to-face approach the
enemy relied on. We depended on leaflets and various other
publications as well as radio and television broadcasts. The
output was impressive, but its effectiveness uncertain.

For example, in 1967 the United States dropped five
billion leaflets in Vietnam. In 1969 the distribution of
magazines, newspapers, posters, and pamphlets totaled 24
million copies. A four-station radio network was created with
coverage of 95 percent of the population around the clock.
Likewise, a four-transmitter television network was estab-
lished, with six hours of daily programming at its peak. While these media efforts can complement oral communications by the host government with its populace, they cannot substitute for it.

Finally, the United States lacked a national-level organization for PSYOP, and its effort in-country was fragmented. The former particularly hurt our efforts in an arena where we could have played a major role—addressing the international community on issues related to the Vietnam War. Contrast this to the Soviet effort to promote internationally the cause and legitimacy of revolutionary insurgent movements. In-country fragmentation only deepened the problems resulting from the lack of emphasis on PSYOP within overall US strategy.

Following the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the will and commitment, hence policy, strategy, organization, and capabilities, for responding to perceived low-intensity threats were greatly reduced in American policy. Successive administrations in the period between the 1973 American withdrawal from Vietnam and the 1981 inauguration of President Reagan paid little attention to revolutionary insurgency and how it might affect US interests in the Third World. This neglect resulted in drastic cuts in special operations and low-intensity conflict capabilities, including PSYOP. By 1975 overall spending had declined to approximately $100 million. The Reagan administration, inheriting these reduced capabilities, sought to revitalize them. However, criticism exists over how much of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) revitalization is devoted to low-intensity conflict and revolutionary warfare challenges. Congress has been quite critical and in 1986 took legislative steps to remedy the situation.

In spite of what some believe to be continuing shortfalls in doctrine and capabilities, the United States has recently become engaged in several revolutionary wars, sometimes as a supporter of insurgents and other times seeking to assist friendly governments under siege. Have we learned from Vietnam, and do current efforts reflect a better under-
standing of the unconventional environment? A brief comment on US policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua suggest that we have not learned as much as we might have.

**El Salvador** Since the defeat of the “final offensive” (modelled on the strategy that brought the Sandinistas to power) of the Salvadoran guerrillas in 1981, the insurgents have reverted to protracted revolutionary warfare. This allows the FMLN to avoid large-scale losses of men and equipment and, in those areas where the government presence is limited or nonexistent, to deepen its roots through psychological operations and political mobilization. Since 1981, the Salvadoran military has undergone a marked transformation from an institution that was racked by disunity and lack of professionalism to one that is now capable of providing a defensive shield to permit the government to carry out reform in parts of El Salvador. Among the important changes were the following: reorientation from a defensive to a more offensive perspective, emphasis on small units and longer operations, improvements in military education to enhance professionalism and eliminate many of the abuses of the past, and integration of the military into the national reconstruction plan.

It has been argued that US support of this effort avoided the Vietnam pitfall of Americanizing the armed forces of the host country. However, there also is evidence that US security assistance has tended to conventionalize the Salvadoran military. In many ways this repeats the security assistance pattern we have established in many parts of the Third World. If a country is facing conventional security problems, this approach is appropriate. However, revolutionary insurgency results in a number of unconventional problems for a host country.

In El Salvador, the Salvadoran army holds the urban areas, lines of communications, and parts of the countryside, while some six to seven thousand guerrillas control more remote rural areas. The insurgents’ return to protracted war and small unit actions makes it difficult to conduct sustained
military operations against them. While assaults on guerrilla areas have occurred, emphasis on larger air mobile efforts have often telegraphed the operations. What this suggests is that our security assistance is overemphasizing conventional capabilities that are inappropriate for counterinsurgency, and that we may be returning to the firepower technology emphasis discussed above in the Vietnam context.

Have other aspects of a counterinsurgency-focused security assistance program been reflected in the reoriented Salvadoran army? Preliminary evidence suggests that civic action, rural development, intelligence, psychological operations, and related factors require more attention. The Salvadoran army has received PSYOP education, and in certain areas it is being employed successfully in a PSYOP role. However, PSYOP will only be successful in a larger sense if undertaken by an integrated civilian-military organization that supports and promotes a national-level counterinsurgency plan.

Nicaragua While the United States has made progress in assisting a reform-minded Salvadoran government to begin to counter effectively the revolutionary insurgency it faces, the situation in Nicaragua has not advanced nearly so far. This resistance or insurgent movement is one of at least four such movements that have emerged over the last decade to oppose the rule of Soviet-backed Communist regimes. Under the Reagan administration, support for anticommunist insurgent movements challenging these regimes has become an established part of US foreign policy. However, while the administration has a general policy, many have asked whether it also has a unified strategy to assist these movements in developing political and military structures to achieve legitimacy and mobilize support among elements of the population.

Currently, the United States does not possess the means with which to develop such a strategy. There is no core of experts who could develop an integrated doctrine and strategy and corresponding assistance programs that would provide
the appropriate political and military training and advice. As matters stand, the resistance in Nicaragua has yet to develop a strategy and establish the political and psychological means to mobilize the population to support it on a larger scale. Additionally, in the regional and international arenas it continues to lack legitimacy and credibility.

_Psychological Operations and Revolutionary Warfare: Redefining US Policy and Strategy_

It can be argued that the Reagan administration, in conjunction with the legislative branch, has established a policy that expands the US role in revolutionary warfare in the Third World. Although there are both congressional and executive limits on this policy, it nevertheless marks a departure from the 1970s. It is not difficult to outline the parameters of this new course; however, its implementation and the development of appropriate doctrine, strategy, and capabilities has, as noted previously, been quite difficult. This is particularly true with respect to psychological operations and political warfare.

What is the new US policy? On a selective basis, the United States is currently assisting friendly governments threatened by revolutionary insurgent movements as well as supporting revolutionary insurgent movements that are challenging either pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes or Soviet or Soviet surrogate occupation. El Salvador is an example of the former; and in Peru, Guatemala, and elsewhere in Latin America, the United States likewise seeks to provide security assistance to governments threatened by similar guerrilla insurgencies. In the years ahead, the same is likely to be the case in the Philippines. Over the last few years, executive and legislative initiatives have also resulted in US assistance to insurgent movements in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.

What follows is a proposed framework that outlines policy options for the United States with respect to revolu-
tionary warfare in the Third World. Particular attention goes to the contribution of psychological operations, but within the context of broader policy options. Three specific scenarios can be identified:

1. US assistance and advisory support to host governments threatened by revolutionary insurgent movements.

2. Direct US action against radical or insurgent factions in which support to a host government is not involved.

3. US support for noncommunist insurgent movements challenging Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World that are supported by the Soviet bloc.

If political and psychological warfare plays an important role in revolutionary insurgency, the same can be said for counterinsurgency strategy. The objectives of such a strategy include denying the insurgents access to the population, establishing and maintaining government legitimacy, mobilizing the population, and delegitimizing the insurgents and those governments that support them. To achieve these goals, a number of interrelated measures can be undertaken. One recent study suggests the following categories of measures: a national-level reform program, defense and insulation of the population, professionalization of the armed forces, and counterguerrilla military operations.\(^22\) Integrated into a national-level program, each of these nonmilitary and military measures is essential in a conflict or war defined as a "battle for minds."

Psychological and political actions are used to promote this national-level plan in the international arena as well as to mobilize support for it from among elements of the indigenous population. The United States and the host country need to develop international and national-level psychological and political programs that are understood as integral elements of the overall counterinsurgency plan. The overall objective is to build national and international support for the programs and activities of the government under attack
and to discredit the insurgents and their state patrons. In con-
junction with the host country, the United States can develop
a counterinsurgency plan that responds to the indigenous en-
vironment and also provides guidance for aiming counterin-
surgency PSYOP at the following target audiences:

1. States and groups in the international and regional
   arenas.
2. States and groups either directly or indirectly
   assisting the insurgent movement.
3. The indigenous population.
4. Insurgent cadre and support structure.

How can the United States and the host government
coordinate their international and national-level communica-
tions and information activities to address each of these au-
diences? It was noted above that when the Soviet bloc ex-
pands its assistance to a revolutionary insurgency, an array of
political and psychological instruments are used to promote
the cause and legitimacy of that movement in the interna-
tional arena. Similarly, the United States and the host
government should employ communications, diplomacy, and
political action on a bilateral and multilateral basis both to
gain international support and to isolate the insurgents and
their patrons. The State Department and US Information
Agency have a major role to play in these activities.

Revolutionary insurgent movements almost always
assert that their success is the result of indigenous problems
and inequalities caused by the government they seek to
replace. While this approach obviously contributes to the
emergence of internal discontent, which insurgent cadre often
take advantage of, over the last 15 years external assistance
has been crucial to the expansion and growth of a number of
revolutionary movements in the Third World. This develop-
ment can be employed both nationally and internationally to
demonstrate the dependency of insurgents on external
patrons as well as to point out the cost of this reliance once
they seize power.

Earlier, I alluded to the failure on the part of the many
contemporary postrevolutionary governments, like that in
Nicaragua, to implement the promises of the revolution. Frequently, these new regimes become surrogates for their prerevolutionary patrons and establish totalitarian forms of government. They also may become a base from which the Soviet bloc promotes instability in the region in which the new regime is located. These realities can be amplified internationally to isolate those powers supporting revolutionary insurgent movements and to portray the end result of their assistance. The same theme should be propagated regionally and to the indigenous population by its government.

A prime objective of host country psychological and political action is to gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for its programs. This is not a function that the United States can perform for the host government. Even if we become directly involved in-country, this function cannot become our responsibility. The United States can provide advice, training, and technical support. But it is the indigenous government's responsibility to carry out face-to-face mobilization and recruitment. Much can be learned from insurgents about these activities, at least with respect to the positive programs they employ.

Finally, the insurgent cadre and support structure are targets for political and psychological operations. The following areas are especially ripe for exploitation: the ideological and political system of the insurgent organization, the central organizational infrastructure, and the support apparatus. Based on up-to-date intelligence, a variety of operations could be directed against each of these targets. These include deception, psychological warfare, and political influence actions. In each of these activities, it is important to adhere to the most basic principle of strategy, the identification of the appropriate vulnerabilities. Among the more apparent of these are the ideological base (divisions and competition among leaders), personnel and logistical soft spots (dependence on a small group of leaders, personal corruption, weak supportive services), reliance on clandestine activity that imposes serious organizational problems, and problems of infrastructure defense and internal security.
Each of the audiences just discussed should not be approached separately but integrated into an international and national-level political and psychological program. This program should combine objectives, plans, guidance, requirements, and approaches. A unified effort requires a unified organization. Avoiding the pitfalls of Vietnam, a single agency at the national level should have responsibility for coordinating and integrating all civilian and military PSYOP. Likewise, the US effort in support of the host government should be unified.

Thus far, I've examined the role of psychological and political operations within the context of an integrated US-host country counterinsurgency strategy. However, it may not always be the case that US interests are threatened by radical factions employing a variation of revolutionary warfare in which a Third World ally is directly challenged. PLO and Shi'ite groups operating in the Middle East are cases in point. In many respects, they are the practitioners of a form of revolutionary warfare. One of the instruments of this strategy—terrorism—is frequently directed against the United States.

Are these groups potential targets for US psychological and political operations? Similar to any radical faction, these groups have weaknesses that can be targeted both psychologically and otherwise. This is certainly true of elements of the PLO. Their weaknesses include no visible record of major successes, disapproval of their extremism outside the Middle East, latent opposition within parts of the Arab world, deadly factional infighting, emerging younger leaders who may be more violent and less controllable by current PLO leaders, reliance on increasingly cruel tactics directed against innocent targets, leaders who often live extravagantly, cadre that face either death or imprisonment when they conduct actions outside the Middle East, and a self-deluding tendency to exaggerate their effectiveness and to see innocent targets as soldiers.

While these radical factions also have strengths, their weaknesses could be targets for political and psychological
operations. Their vulnerabilities are similar to the ones discussed above. They include the radical or insurgent organization itself (leaders and followers as well as support groups and state patrons), tensions and conflicts within these factions, disillusionment among support elements, and international concern over growing state-sponsored terrorism.

Previously, I noted that in the 1970s and 1980s newly established pro-Soviet Communist regimes in the Third World have proved to be vulnerable to indigenous insurgent movements that oppose their form of rule. In many respects, as a result of the emergence of these opposition elements, conflict in the Third World has taken a new turn. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s insurgent warfare was directed against colonial powers and pro-Western or noncommunist governments, by the early 1980s at least four major insurgent movements challenged Soviet-backed Communist regimes in different regions of the Third World.

Recognizing the vulnerabilities of these regimes, the Soviet Union has provided various means to sustain them in power against armed internal threats. The goal is to ensure that regimes that come to power through Leninist means remain in power. This maintenance is achieved through the development of an internal security infrastructure that can quell internal opposition, mobilize the population, and insulate the leadership cadre. Additionally, in order to counter this new form of internal threat, the Soviet Union provides military and paramilitary advice and support.

Under the Reagan administration, support for anti-communist insurgent movements has become an established part of US foreign policy. But while the administration has a general policy, many have asked whether it also has a unified strategy to assist these movements to develop political and military structures that will afford them the opportunity to achieve legitimacy and mobilize support, both among elements of the indigenous population and in the regional and international arenas. It appears that the United States currently does not possess these means.

What role should the United States have in these conflicts? Policymakers need to develop requirements for as-
sisting democratically inclined insurgent movements in a more sophisticated, comprehensive, and effective manner. Psychological and political operations are integral elements of such a policy. For instance, the United States could employ these measures internationally, regionally, and at the state level to convey information on the following questions: How have the policies and programs of the postrevolutionary leadership inspired political unrest and opposition? Are these trends increasing or decreasing? How has Soviet bloc internal security, military, and other forms of assistance contributed to the postrevolutionary leadership’s consolidation of power and establishment of totalitarian forms of government?

US psychological operations and other information activities could also be used to present a balanced assessment of the growth and development of the resistance or insurgent movement challenging the Marxist-Leninist government. Other aspects of US assistance should be directed toward aiding the insurgent movement in making the transition to a legitimate political movement capable of mobilizing support among elements of the population. As with governments faced with insurgent challenges, revolutionary or resistance movements likewise require an integrated political-military strategy. The United States can provide assistance and advice in the development of such a plan. This includes advice concerning the employment of psychological and political actions in support of a political organization that seeks to become a viable alternative to the existing regime.

If this occurs, then psychological and political operations can be targeted against many of the same audiences discussed in the previous sections. US advice, support, and assistance could contribute to the development and implementation of the strategic PSYOP plan that supports an integrated political-military strategy.

**US versus USSR Effectiveness**

In the post–World War II period, insurgent movements employing revolutionary warfare strategies have played an
important part in the politics of the Third World. A central element in the success of these movements has been the use of political and psychological warfare both domestically and in the international and regional arenas. The Soviet Union, recognizing the potential for geostrategic gains if these revolutionary insurgencies come to power, has aligned itself with a number of such movements. To this end, it has developed an integrated policy to help insurgencies come about and succeed. A key aspect of this policy has been the use of propaganda, psychological operations, and political warfare to promote the cause and legitimacy of what the USSR terms national liberation movements.

The US experience with revolutionary warfare, on the other hand, has not been a happy one. The United States has not always understood insurgency and counterinsurgency and the place of psychological operations within these forms of conflict and war. Vietnam is the classic example, but by no means the only one. Can US policy respond more effectively to these threats and opportunities? The Reagan administration has produced advances in some areas. But a great deal remains to be accomplished if the United States is to respond effectively to revolutionary warfare threats and opportunities in the years ahead.
Notes


11. Oral History Interviews with Michael Voslensky. This is part of the Oral History Project of the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The subject investigated concerns specifically Soviet decisionmaking as it relates to the panoply of protracted and low-intensity operations, including arms transfers, training and advisory support, intelligence, psychological warfare, disinformation and active measures, and the use of surrogate forces. The primary objective is to determine, through the information and insights provided by those who were either directly or indirectly involved, how the Soviet Union's decisionmaking and operational apparatus plans these activities, integrates East European bloc and other surrogate (Cuban, Nicaraguan, etc.) capabilities, and implements them "in the field." The goal is to ascertain how policy and process proceed from the "center" in Moscow, through the East European bloc, through the other surrogates, and are implemented "on the ground." Clearly, however, this sharply defined target cannot be attained without a simultaneous effort to shed light upon the broader parameters of politico-military doctrine and strategy within which specific Soviet and surrogate operations play their respective roles.

To accomplish these rather ambitious objectives, the ISSP faculty developed a research design based on reasonably structured interviews with individuals possessing direct or indirect knowledge of different aspects of the USSR's decisionmaking process and operational apparatus. The interviewees are divided into the following two categories: (1) former intelligence, foreign ministry, and military officials, as well as members of the institutes concerned with international affairs, from the USSR, East European bloc, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Afghanistan, who have "come in from the cold"; and (2) emigres from the USSR who were engaged in sensitive work pertaining to science and technology, especially as it relates to defense applications.


15. Ibid., p. 29.


18. Ibid., pp. 23–24.


21. This legislation deals with US Special Operations Forces; the bill that passed was a compromise version of Senate Bill 1224 and House Bill 1011. The legislation establishes a Unified Command, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, a Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for Low Intensity Conflict, and a Low Intensity Conflict Board at the NSC.

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THERE ARE REALLY THREE TOPICS that Dr. Shultz focuses on: What is revolutionary warfare? How are we doing at it? What is wrong? This goes right to the heart of the matter. His definition of revolutionary war, which includes the combined use of military, political, and psychological techniques to change the social structure, I like very much. There is one addition I would make, and that is to underscore that this is a long-term proposition. Too often when a situation like this arises, we think of it as a recent phenomenon, ignoring the fact that there may be twenty, thirty, or forty years of effort by the Soviets in establishing the base underlying the revolutionary warfare that is going on today.

The five principles of revolutionary warfare Dr. Shultz spells out are a good encapsulation of what is contained in any fundamental text of Marxism-Leninism. He also recognizes the recent change that has come about in the use of insurgencies and terrorism to force revolution. Because revolutions have not been as spontaneous as they would have liked, the Soviets have been led to adopt more forceful measures to speed on the historical process. In looking at these changes, Dr. Shultz says that they are unmistakable beginning in the 1970s, and then raises the question of when they originally occurred. I would say that one has to go back to the period immediately following Stalin’s death, when there was a recognition of the need to modernize the tactics and strategy of the Communist movement with respect to the Third World. The specific use of terrorism in this regard is present certainly by 1955, and I think you could probably tie it down to the July 1955 meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The use of insurgencies and terrorism grew under Khrushchev and was recognized in this country, at least by the White House, by 1961, when the Kennedy administration
began actively to address how to meet these challenges. Indeed, this was one of the topics discussed in the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, with Kennedy complaining about Soviet activities and Khrushchev responding that this was a function of conditions in the Third World, that the Soviet Union was not instigating uprisings. And of course that’s the general line that has come from the Soviets ever since.

Has the United States learned much? In looking at our experience not only in Vietnam but also in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Dr. Shultz concludes that we have not learned as much as we might have, which is, I would say, the understatement of the year. This belief came home to me very clearly in a joint State-Defense Department report of 1984 on the problems in Central America. Reading through that report, one got the impression that the whole problem was Fidel Castro. The Soviet Union was mentioned only a few times, and then in connection with propaganda support. And Eastern Europe was mentioned only as an adjective referring to the types of equipment that were being shipped into Central America. It struck me that that has been one of the main problems in the administration’s efforts to obtain support for aid to the Contras.

In addressing the question of aid to anticommunist insurgencies in general, Dr. Shultz hits the nail on the head when he says that support for these insurgencies may be our policy, but that there is no real strategy for administering that support and no means to develop one. We are engaged in a war, but somehow we can’t admit that to ourselves. This goes to the heart of some of the problems raised by Jean-Francois Revel in his provocative book, *Why Democracies Perish*.

When you look at it, there is very little perception of or appreciation for Soviet strategy in Washington, not to speak of the rest of the country. The general approach seems to be to view the Soviets as opportunists rather than strategists and planners, and to disregard the role of ideology. A case in point is the joint CIA-FBI report prepared for Congress in the mid-1980s on Soviet “active measures.” The report debunked the idea that the enormous Soviet propaganda
effort has any effect, or that there is any vulnerability to Soviet disinformation and deception on the part of the American media. Moreover, in spite of Claire Sterling's excellent work in this area, there is still a widespread lack of understanding or acceptance of the Soviet role in international terrorism.

Certainly, there has been a lot of talk about active measures, propaganda, political warfare, and the like. But I often wonder how much of it reflects genuine appreciation of the realities and how much is just lip service. From what we can observe, there are fundamental problems of establishing strategy and coordination in these matters within the US government; no one is really in charge or wants to be in charge. If there is any point where I would take issue with Dr. Shultz, it is his conclusion that we need to redefine US policy and strategy. Rather then redefining, what we need to be thinking about is something more in the nature of radical surgery. Basic institutional changes seem to be needed if we are to gain recognition of this threat and develop the means to cope with it effectively.

I wish to state from the outset that I think Dr. Shultz has provided an outstanding paper. I agree with most of what he says, and instead of overanalyzing it, I would instead like
to present some of my thoughts on US psychological operations, our current capabilities, and what I consider to be some of the deficiencies in our capabilities.

One of Dr. Shultz's more important points is that psychological operations are absolutely essential in the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. I'd like to emphasize and reinforce that by stating that I believe PSYOP could be the essence and the core of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. PSYOP planning and operations should blanket all phases of political-military operations, starting with international tension and going through all pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases. We've learned that the Soviets, the North Vietnamese, and other Communist adversaries completely understand and are very good at psychological operations. They have used them effectively against us many times both in peace and war during my years in the military.

Of course, one of the examples that comes to mind immediately is the North Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968, in which they turned a resounding military defeat into a political victory by the astute use of psychological warfare. Nor do our opponents hesitate to use PSYOP in peacetime. I would refer to the Soviets' successful campaign concerning the deployment of enhanced radiation weapons in Europe, and more recently, the Greenham Common protestors against nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom. I don't believe we fully understand the potential for peacetime overt psychological operations.

Many people in this country think that PSYOP equates to the "Big Lie," suggestive of Goebbels and Hitler, and that we should not use it. US peacetime information programs cannot be and are not based on half-truths or lies. Nor should they be if we wish to retain our credibility with those we are trying to influence. But that still leaves considerable scope for peacetime psychological operations. The conduct of PSYOP in peacetime is where our practitioners should be getting training and education so that we can conduct PSYOP effectively in wartime.
Today, we in the military have an insufficient base of trained personnel to draw upon if we are to expand our psychological warfare capability. All the services other than the Army have a lack of knowledge and organization to conduct psychological operations adequately. Even the Army lacks sufficient linguists and cultural anthropologists to satisfy current taskings. There is a reluctance within—and outside—the military to be involved in the conduct of peacetime psychological operations. Currently, there is no place within the military structure from which central guidance or tasking may emanate. We lack joint psychological warfare doctrine. The Department of Defense has recently taken steps to rectify some of these problems, but much remains to be accomplished. There are deficiencies in PSYOP doctrine, organization, training, personnel policies, and, most importantly, in attitude—which means we have to start an educational program.

General Dick Stilwell, when he was deputy under secretary of defense for policy, initiated the revitalization efforts in Defense. He established the requirement for creating a structure for policy development and civilian oversight at both the DOD and NSC levels. The JCS has established a psychological operations division, and the Army has taken steps to do so as well. Thus far, the Army has shouldered responsibility for most operational PSYOP activities within DOD. I believe it is incumbent upon the other services to establish a modest capability in order to satisfy their own operational requirements and to train their psychological operators and planners to provide their share of fully qualified personnel to the Joint Staff. Moreover, if we are really serious about rebuilding our PSYOP capabilities, I think there is a need for a central joint agency, something more than exists today, to assist the JCS in refining joint doctrine, reeducating the officer corps in the value of PSYOP, integrating with other agencies of the government, and a myriad of other tasks. We must get on with our attempt to revitalize PSYOP, and the emphasis, as always, must come from the highest levels.
LET US BEGIN BY ACKNOWLEDGING the breadth of this subject and noting that the phrases psychological operations and political warfare describe operations, whether tactical or strategic, on the battlefield or in the theater, in peacetime or in war, directed primarily at our adversary’s mind rather than his body—though of course the two are not mutually exclusive. This paper examines psychological warfare as related only to coercive diplomacy and limited (but not revolutionary) war. Coercive diplomacy uses the threat of force to influence the thinking and behavior of an adversary. It is therefore in itself a form, perhaps the most effective form, of political-psychological warfare. Limited war uses force for essentially similar purposes and should also be seen as a preeminently political and psychological instrument. Clausewitz specifically distinguished limited war from just plain war by observing that the former is waged not in order to disarm an enemy or occupy his country but “in order to make the enemy insecure, to impress our greater strength upon him, and to give him doubts about his future.”

In his book on the Roman Empire, Edward Luttwak analyzes a limited military operation for its likely psychological effect. He looks at the siege of Masada in 70-73 A.D. from the Roman viewpoint. Luttwak shows how the Romans, when faced with the resistance of a few hundred Jews on a mountain in the Judaean desert, eschewed their two most obvious alternatives. They did not blockade the rebels by posting a proportionate number of legionnaires to wait until the Jews ran out of supplies, nor did they storm the
mountain fortress, as they might have done if they were prepared to take some casualties. Instead, at a time when their army had a total of only twenty-nine legions to garrison their enormous empire, the Romans sent an entire legion to besiege Masada. Gradually, the troops reduced the fortress by an extraordinary engineering feat that included the construction of a massive ramp reaching the full height of the mountain. That operation tied up the legionnaires for three years.

An inefficient use of manpower and resources? No, says Luttwak, because of the psychological impact that the action must have had on the other Eastern provinces. It would prove cost-effective in the long run. Here, as in many successful psychological operations, it may be impossible to prove the negative, but common sense indicates the deterrent effect that Masada must have had on those bystanders who might otherwise have been tempted to revolt. The Romans had demonstrated that they would pursue rebellion anywhere, even to mountain tops in remote deserts, to destroy its last vestiges. To ensure that the lesson was well publicized and remembered, the Romans installed Josephus in Rome (as they had the Greek author Polybius almost three centuries earlier for a similar purpose). Josephus wrote a detailed account of the siege, which was then published in Greek, the language of the Roman East: a nice bit of first century media manipulation.

When we examine coercive diplomacy and limited military actions as forms of psychological warfare, we should bear in mind what the Romans instinctively understood: the effectiveness of any psychological operation depends on our enemy's perception of what will happen to him if he fails to do as we wish. This perception is determined at least in part by how we have already behaved in similar situations. Estimating accurately the likely psychological effects of any of our future deployments or limited operations requires relearning what Vietnam and Beirut have driven us to try to forget. Diplomacy coerces and limited military operations succeed largely because our earlier actions have earned us a reputation for following through and for using force promptly and effectively. When such actions fail, the failure cannot
be self-contained. It makes success in the future more difficult, no matter what we say to our enemies in our leaflets or over our radios.

Our experience with coercive diplomacy and limited war in the last twenty-five years contains some conspicuous failures, so that today we may expect our enemies to continue to test our resolve as they did in Lebanon in 1983. The high-water mark in our use of coercive diplomacy came in the Cuban missile crisis, when we sent a convincing signal to the Soviet Union by judiciously deploying military assets without having to use them. The ploy worked mainly because the United States was not yet known for making threats it did not carry out and because the realities of military power in the confrontation were overwhelmingly in our favor. Calling our bluff could have spelled disaster for our adversaries, and the American troops in Florida stood ready to show where obduracy would lead.

In Vietnam, between 1965 and 1968, we used both air and ground forces for psychological purposes, not so much to effect a decisive outcome on the battlefield as to persuade Hanoi of our determination to prevail. It did not work because, in reality, the North Vietnamese were more determined than we, and because it was clear that we did not intend to threaten in a serious way Hanoi’s existence.4 Just as our success over Soviet missiles in Cuba gave us an exaggerated sense of the effectiveness of crisis management,5 so our failure in Vietnam unduly hurt our confidence in what force could accomplish, and our enemies were able to read our mood.

Since then, we have used our armed forces to intimidate, but often we have done so reluctantly, without conviction, hence, more often than not, without credibility. Our agonizing over the hostages in Iran revealed how the seizing of a group of Americans could bring American foreign policy to a grinding halt. In a stroke, it created a cancer that has since spread throughout the Middle East. That, too, was a psychological operation, but the wrong kind. The subsequent fiasco at Desert One and the 1983 disaster at the Marine head-
quarters in Beirut confirmed the message of Vietnam for many, further diminishing our confidence in coercive diplomacy and the usefulness of force as an instrument of policy. Our enemies, who regularly contemplate using unorthodox forms of violence against us, could hardly have missed the point.

If they had any doubts, we have gone some way toward removing them with the publication of the Weinberger Doctrine. That doctrine, which reflects the views of many senior military officers concerning the constraining effects of domestic public opinion on the employment of force by the US government in the aftermath of Vietnam, arguably raises the preconditions for use of force so high as to put them out of reach for almost all conceivable scenarios.

For present purposes, it is well to remind ourselves that there are important differences between revolutionary wars such as Vietnam and the use of force or the threat of force in other Third World settings. If there is anything that saps public support for foreign wars in a democracy, it is the prospect of protracted US involvement with no clear criteria for victory or defeat. These features are by no means characteristic of all Third World intervention scenarios, as the examples of Grenada and Libya are sufficient to show. (On the other hand, the Marine presence in Beirut could well have become a domestic political liability over time given the uncertainty and apparent futility of its mission.) It is not at all clear, then, that public opinion will fail to support limited and prudent applications of force by the United States when such operations are competently conducted and serve readily understandable political purposes. However, it is difficult if not impossible to initiate an operation of this kind with any assurance of public support, particularly since (as in the case of Grenada) complete surprise may be essential to the successful execution of the mission.

There are several reasons why as a nation, despite all our power, we have increasingly fumbled our use of military force in limited operations, undermining our credibility in the process. Since Vietnam we have become more isolationist and
self-absorbed, not very good at gauging accurately the perceptions and determination of others. We concentrate on our own actions rather than the likely reactions of the enemy. We are more concerned with our image, both in our own eyes and in the eyes of others, than we are with the realities of power, a focus that commonly exacts a price. We conveniently forget the extent to which the image is determined by the realities of power. How else explain the interminable jawboning that hardly ever issues in military action?

We also have a concomitant tendency to engage in wishful thinking, overestimating the impact on the enemy of the mere appearance of our impressive hardware and the effect of our threatening rhetoric, while underestimating the importance of having the appropriate resources on the spot to carry out threats. The Cuban missile crisis seemed to give us an unwarranted confidence in the power of gestures, as we forgot the very real need to use our military assets on occasion to exact a cost that makes our opponents unwilling to call our hand. What is more, in exercises of coercive diplomacy our liberalism (in a broad sense of that term) inclines us more toward the diplomatic than the coercive, for we prefer to persuade rather than to compel.

Finally, we worry too much about the negative diplomatic effects of military operations on friendly or unaligned regional powers. In fact, recent experience has shown very little lasting negative fallout when the United States has used force against a Third World nation, because other states usually have no real alternatives to us. Even when we used force unsuccessfully (as in Southeast Asia and Lebanon), the regional powers, while they may have leaned toward a reluctant neutrality, did not actually fall away from us in anger or dismay. The conversion of SEATO to ASEAN does not seem a very severe diplomatic punishment for the Vietnam debacle.

This doubt or delicacy is natural for a country that instinctively prefers being loved to being feared. We must acknowledge, however, that this cultural proclivity places severe restrictions on our military’s ability to use coercive diplomacy as an effective psychological weapon.
Vietnam and Lebanon notwithstanding, though, it would seem that firmness is gradually coming back into fashion. The United States, if not the West generally, seems to be regaining some of its former confidence in the limited application of military force as an effective instrument of national policy. That limited force can be applied effectively to achieve important psychological and political purposes can be considered, in retrospect, an important lesson of the Falklands or Malvinas War between Britain and Argentina.

That war saw the British employ a very clever psychological operation, which may well have been a decisive element, not so much in their winning the war, but in reducing the cost of their final victory. We all know how, after the sinking of the Belgrano on 2 May 1982, the Argentine surface navy played virtually no active role in the war. There were good reasons for this. Carlos E. Zartmann, a retired Argentine naval captain, in a revealing article published shortly after the Argentine surrender,7 argued that two concurrent factors kept the fleet in home waters, factors that no other navy had faced in wartime before: nuclear attack submarines and electronic surveillance satellites. His view deserves quotation in full:

The first [nuclear attack submarines] posed a threat to the very existence of Argentine naval power, which was very difficult to accept because the conflict was limited in nature and possession of the islands at stake did not represent an objective upon which the survival of Argentina depended. The naval command had to weigh carefully the necessity of risking the destruction of the nation's small and costly surface fleet. Not to incur any unnecessary risks was a wise strategic decision. . . . The second factor, the United States intelligence support to Britain, was the most important United States contribution to the conflict. . . . It proved to be decisive for the naval surface actions because it deprived the Argentine fleet of any chance of obtaining a tactical surprise over the British. (Admiral Woodward, the British on-scene commander, was quoted by the press as saying that he always knew exactly where every Argentine ship was, except
the submarines.) British naval superiority was overwhelm-
ing, but United States support made it so lopsided as to
become crushing. In such a situation one would not expect a
fleet to go out only to be spotted by satellites and
slaughtered by nuclear submarines that had no trouble in be-
ing at the right place at the right time.

Not only Admiral Woodward but also the British media
in general made similar claims at the time regarding the
nature of satellite aid received from the United States.
However, there is reason for not taking these media reports
as gospel. American sources do not corroborate the claim
that the United States provided the kind of "real time"
photographic reconnaissance suggested by the statement of
Admiral Woodward and assumed by Captain Zartmann. In-
deed, a careful reading of the British White Paper on media
relations during the Falklands War suggests precisely the op-
posite. It notes that relaying live satellite photography to
Britain directly from the South Atlantic would have required
a slight tilting of an American satellite, but that the British
abandoned the idea of requesting that this be done when in-
formal approaches met a negative American response. The
British nuclear submarines were a real enough danger, but it
appears that they would have had to hunt for Argentine sur-
face ships in the traditional manner rather than have them
located in advance by American satellites.

What lessons can be drawn from this history? In war
even more than in life, men are afraid of the unknown. Third
World military forces have every reason to be afraid of the
military advantages provided a first-class adversary like Bri-
tain or the United States by high technology and by advanced
weapons systems whose operational characteristics they
understand imperfectly if at all. Just as the British exploited a
traditional fear of the competence—and (in the case of their
Gurkha contingent) the savagery—of British troops, so they
exploited an up-to-date fear of the competence of contem-
porary technology. And this psychological operation proved
extraordinarily successful. For the United States, this sug-
gests, among other things, that systematic thought should be given to the ways in which the existence and characteristics of US intelligence collection systems can be utilized in a limited contingency to induce fear and caution in Third World military commanders and political leaders.

Grenada provides another recent example of the useful psychological effects of limited military action. Our operation on the island in October 1983 provoked almost universal condemnation at the time. But it has become clear since that virtually all the islanders, with the exception of those who had just murdered the Bishop cabinet, were delighted by the US action, and that Grenada’s Governor-General had actually requested the intervention. The majority of those who first condemned our action as illegal and immoral—most conspicuously, many of our own media and our NATO allies—have now fallen silent, though very few of the critics have had the good grace to say they were wrong.

The rescue of Grenada was a success partly because it was over quickly, and partly because there was no force in the area available to thwart us. One of the most important effects of the action has been to unsettle other left-wing revolutionaries throughout the Caribbean and to put back into their calculations the possibility of an American intervention. Though Castro seemed genuinely fond of Maurice Bishop and annoyed with the Coard faction that murdered him, he was helpless to aid any Marxist regime in Grenada, as he said at the time. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua did not miss the lesson. They noticeably raised the volume of their claims that any analogous invasion of Nicaragua would turn into “another Vietnam.”

The April 1986 bombing of Libya seems to be yet another instance of a reluctantly acknowledged success. Contemporary reactions predicted disastrous consequences: “The use of such force is much more likely to promote and expand terrorism” (an editorial in the Nation); “What we’ve really done is weaken the moderate pro-American factions within the Libyan elite” (a Harvard Middle East specialist and professor of government); “We can expect Qaddafi to go all out in
seeking revenge. We have not seen the end of this” (a high-ranking official in the FBI).9 Certainly, none of these predicted consequences have materialized.

First of all, our attack fell far short of making Qaddafi the “hero of the Arab world.” Rather, it seems to have increased his isolation there. The other Arabs did not lift a finger—barely even raised an eyebrow—on his behalf. Within two weeks, Saudi Arabia rejected a Libyan appeal for more foreign aid; two other Arab countries, Jordan and Tunisia, did not even run editorials on the action. Even his Syrian friends sounded less than supportive. Neither Iraq nor Tunisia bothered to issue any complaints on Libya’s behalf, while the response of Egypt, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates was noticeably mild. A Libyan call for an emergency Arab summit meeting resulted in four countries—Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia—publicly stating that they would be unable to attend. Even the Soviets, rather than give the colonel more guns, as was also predicted, have been giving him a series of lectures about the evils of terrorism; one high-ranking Soviet official was quoted as saying, “Qaddafi is a madman on top of a pile of gold.”

Second, the raid may even have hurt Qaddafi inside Libya. The predicted upsurge of national unity behind the colonel has not materialized. Instead, his temporary disappearance into the desert, subsequent return, and barely coherent blusterings on television suggest not only that he was personally shaken but also that he may actually have been weakened politically by the attack. Qaddafi has retreated into Bedouin seclusion before and managed to survive—he has an excellent bodyguard trained by the Cubans and supervised by the East Germans10—but his recent ramblings have produced what appears to be an unenthusiastic public reaction.

Finally, the six months following the 15 April bombing certainly saw far less terrorism with a Libyan stamp on it than the six months prior to it. It would be premature to claim conclusively that the raid has saved lives, since Colonel Qaddafi, though down, is certainly not yet out. But those who said the bombing would lead to an escalating spiral of
violence have few grounds for claiming they were right. Even the fears of the Reagan administration seem to have been a bit pessimistic. Its most realistic expectation—a short-term wave of retaliatory terrorist activity—did not occur either.

There were, however, several reasons why so many American and European commentators predicted dire consequences. The Libyan bombing raid, like our Grenada operation, was a calculated risk. The conventional wisdom since Vietnam has been that risk-taking almost always turns out badly. In addition, the Europeans seem increasingly reluctant to give the Reagan administration the benefit of any doubt. The main reason for the bad press in Europe, though, was the fear, carefully cultivated by Qaddafi himself, that he would hit back at Europe if attacked by the United States.

The most gratifying effect of the raid was that it immediately made the previously uncooperative Europeans feel more exposed to criticism concerning the laxity of their attitude toward terrorism, and indeed more exposed to terrorism itself, now that the United States had suddenly made itself a less attractive target for terrorist states. Accordingly, there followed a flurry of reluctant antiterrorist activity by the Europeans. The French, who condemned the raid, somehow found themselves at the Tokyo summit approving a tough antiterrorist communiqué of a kind they had consistently rejected at all earlier top-level meetings. Even Italian Prime Minister Craxi's protests were followed by a move to transfer Italy's oil dependence from Libya to Nigeria and the North Sea, and generally to decrease his country's economic dependence on Qaddafi's regime. Here, if anywhere, was a successful psychological operation.

All this is good for us and bad for those states against whom we might wish to use violence. Such successes begin the arduous task of rehabilitating our confidence in the use of limited military action as an instrument of policy and our adversaries' respect for the threat our power implies. The bombing of Libya at least put the terrorists on warning and enhanced the credibility of any future psychological operation or diplomatic exercise that intimates that American force
may be used. Reprisal works, provided the targets are judiciously selected and escalation is—and is perceived to be—more dangerous for our enemy than for us.

Unfortunately, however, the Libyan lesson has had only limited effect so far on the other major terrorist states, Syria and Iran. Because we have yet to demonstrate that we are capable of using retaliatory force when our citizens are taken hostage (rather than murdered outright), hostage-taking remains an attractive option that will continue to be used against us. It is also not clear that the United States is prepared to use force openly and directly against Syria or Iran in view of the potential for Soviet involvement in support of those states, not to mention US hopes for eventually repairing its relationship with the regime of the mullahs.

In brief, then, the cornerstone of success in coercive diplomacy and limited conflict is the demonstration of America’s will and ability to use its power effectively in support of its interests and the larger interests of international decency and order. At a more operational level, many interesting questions arise concerning the use of the military instruments available to the United States for projecting its power into the Third World. There is, of course, a long tradition of the use of naval forces as an instrument of direct political influence or compulsion. Naval port visits, combined exercises with allied fleets, firepower and other operational demonstrations, and special deployments are all routine tools for establishing an American presence in foreign seas, and for signalling American concern over adverse international developments and support for allied and friendly states. Unfortunately, the very significant role that such activities play for the US Navy and for the nation’s overall foreign policy is underappreciated and understudied, and is not supported by a systematic body of doctrine and training.

What is true of the Navy is, if anything, more true of the other services, which are unaccustomed to thinking of the assets available to them as capable of having an independent and measurable psychological-political effect. In fact, however, air power has many of the same characteristics as
naval power in terms of its presence, mobility, and ready availability throughout the world. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft has in recent years acquired much of the direct political significance of aircraft carriers as a result of its frequent use to signal support for Third World allies threatened by a powerful regional enemy. The occasional employment of conventionally armed B-52 bombers in combined exercises sends a message analogous to that of a battleship off hostile shores.

Apart from the psychological impact of these major air and naval weapons systems, however, there is considerable scope to exploit a wide range of military capabilities for the purposes of political-psychological warfare in the Third World. The psychological dimension of military high technology was mentioned earlier. It is important to keep in mind the immense advantage the United States enjoys in this respect when compared with the Soviet Union. Every effort should be made to impress on Third World Soviet clients the unreliability and obsolescence of Soviet equipment when matched against American equipment in the hands of the US military or friendly states such as Israel. The unwillingness of the Libyan Air Force to present even a pro forma challenge to US carrier-based aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra in the most recent US-Libyan confrontation is a direct consequence not of just the Libyans' own recent experience, but of an entire history of unequal combat between Arabs and Israelis involving late-generation Soviet and American military technology.

Nor is this aura of Western technological superiority limited to weapons; it also extends to areas such as intelligence and command and control. As mentioned earlier, Argentine beliefs about the nature of American space reconnaissance technology and practices affected the course of the Falklands War. The United States enjoys an immense advantage over Third World countries in the sophistication of its communications and other electronic technologies. The nation should be able to exploit that advantage to considerable effect, both psychologically and operationally. Interruption of sensitive enemy command links, for example, could be
expected to have an unnerving effect on commanders preparing to challenge US military forces. Tactical deception techniques and procedures need to be thought through in terms of their effect not only on their immediate targets but also on the entire enemy command structure. Ways need to be devised to ensure that the political leadership of a Third World adversary is fully and painfully aware of the precise military consequences likely to result from a decision to engage or persevere in a conflict with the United States.

Some final remarks may be in order on the use of direct communications or propaganda in Third World contingencies. The crises that will call us to engage in coercive diplomacy and limited use of military force are unlikely to provide the time necessary to develop elaborate communications channels and messages. Nevertheless, it is worth giving serious thought to possible requirements for communication both with the adversary's armed forces and with the civilian population.

In a situation where the application of force, if it occurs at all, is likely to be extremely constrained and surgically restricted to military targets, there is every reason to make special efforts to assure both military units and the general population that the United States has no interest in harming them, that its real enemy is the regime. In cases of protracted US involvement in a Third World country, such as the Marine presence in Beirut, efforts should be made to maintain continuous contact with the local population and to explain as clearly as possible the US role and the reasons underlying it.

This is not to say that it is always desirable to reassure potential adversaries that our intentions are pacific. The language our policymakers use when dealing with the tactics of adversaries in the low-intensity conflict arena too often confines the options available to the United States by invoking the self-limiting analogy of domestic law enforcement. We know that duly constituted governments have directed the attacks, but treat these acts as simple legal infractions that require strict rules of evidence for conviction and deserve only a
strictly proportionate response. This approach is likely to cripple many if not most psychological operations conducted at the tactical level.

Before we can fashion effective psychological strategies for the various contingencies of subconventional conflict, we must in each case ask ourselves the most basic of questions: Are we at peace or are we at war? When American citizens have been killed at the direction of heads of state, we should consider abandoning the restrictions we have imposed on ourselves by using the model of domestic law enforcement. We should admit that a state of belligerency exists between us and those states that kill our citizens. The very best psychological operation, we should remind ourselves, is the reputation of a great power for acting like one.
Notes


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Psychological warfare is the attempt to influence an adversary audience’s behavior by shaping its thinking. Leaders of nations, like individuals, often act in terms of what they believe will provide them the greatest amount of benefit. Again, in the same way that individuals may err in what they understand to be beneficial for themselves, so too may leaders err in their understanding of what is beneficial for their nations. Decisions may be in error because leaders are wrong as to what constitutes their proper objective, or decisions may be defective because they are based on insufficient or erroneous information. Whatever may account for failures, the behavior of adversaries and their decisions are influenced by their understanding of reality, and the manipulation of their perception and interpretation of reality is the concern of psychological warfare.

As Professor Bernstein has argued, the success of any psychological operation depends upon the believability of what is being conveyed. His concern, of course, has been with coercive diplomacy—the threat of force as an influence on behavior—which requires the enemy to believe that force can be and will be used to accomplish military and political objectives. Successful coercive diplomacy requires the promise of force with the adversary acting in the desired manner without its actual use.

Psychological warfare does not depend solely on speech or the printed word. An enemy is as concerned with what he sees or does not see as with what he can read or hear. Disinformation, or the attempt to mislead an adversary by supplying false information, should be distinguished from perceptions management. Perceptions management is the attempt to lead an enemy to certain conclusions by carefully fashioning what he perceives. For example, the significance of the movement of a carrier fleet or the redeployment of troops is
learned through analysis and not by perception. If an adversary construes such movements as threatening and the threat results in a modification of that enemy's behavior, then a potentially dangerous situation may have been defused at a cost significantly less than military confrontation.

Disinformation campaigns, perceptions management operations, and coercive diplomacy can be effective as independent operations or can be used effectively together. For example, Professor Bernstein has called our attention to the American bombing raid on Libya as a response to Libyan state-sponsored terrorism. The immediate target was Libya, though most antiterrorist analysts will acknowledge that the message that the United States would not tolerate such support for terrorist actions was directed at Syria and Iran as well. Furthermore, antiterrorist experts did not envision this raid as ending terrorism forever. That objective was fabricated after the fact by critics of the bombing raid who hoped to demonstrate that the raid was either futile or counterproductive.

The clear intention was to deter—if not force elements within Libya to rethink—Libya's involvement in terrorist activity. In that regard, if the raid had encouraged anti-Qaddafi factions within Libya to replace him with more moderate leadership, the indirect consequences of the raid would have been even more fruitful. I believe that Professor Bernstein is correct in suggesting that terrorist activity in the region did diminish following the raid—contrary to the predictions of critics—and that other Western nations have recognized, despite the difficulty of doing so, that the raid provided some significant benefits.

Four months after the raid, American newspapers reported that Qaddafi was once again about to embark on new terrorist activities that, if carried out, could result in new US military retaliation. A Wall Street Journal article (25 August 1986) reported, "the Pentagon is completing plans for a new and larger bombing of Libya in case the President orders it." Of course, such contingency plans probably did exist in some form. On 2 October 1986, Bob Woodward of
the Washington Post reported that the accounts were part of a plan initiated by the National Security Planning Group to encourage internal opposition to Qaddafi and bring about his removal. According to this report, the intention of the campaign was to nurture anti-Qaddafi elements within Libya with hopes that he would be overthrown.

Despite the fact that Qaddafi's regime has hardly been hospitable to American objectives and principles, and that Libya has not been the recipient of praise from the press, the limited air strike and the attempt to undermine Qaddafi's domestic support received, on the whole, negative press coverage. The intent of the operation was not to provide false information to the American public, however, but to deceive the Libyans. That deception did not have the opportunity to reach its objective because of the Woodward disclosure. What this episode demonstrates is the extreme difficulty that democracies have carrying on psychological warfare in conditions of less than declared war.

What distinguishes warfare in the present period (and probably the future) from its past is, as Professor Bernstein has argued, the likelihood that wars will be limited, will often involve irregular or guerrilla forces, and will often be linked with terrorism. For psychological operations, these trends pose particular problems and opportunities. Not the least of the problems concerns the sine qua non of psychological operations—intelligence collection and analysis.

Intelligence collection on irregular forces and terrorist groups—especially terrorist cells—depends on intelligence sources in the field. Such information is difficult to acquire and often will require many years to develop. Once established, however, the character of terrorist groups makes them very susceptible to psychological operations. Terrorist groups, such as the various factions of the PLO, have established their authority through violence. Fatah's claim to being the leading segment of the PLO has rested on its use of terror. Yassir Arafat's leadership position depends on his demonstrated loyalty to the cause as well as its means—terror. The PLO, like other terrorist groups, is disposed toward
internal divisions over ideological purity, leadership rivalries, and its relationship with supporting states. As a consequence, the PLO has been vulnerable to the conflicts within the Arab world, and the terrorists have devoted as much energy to internal combat as to the war against Israel.

Because of the instability of the PLO and its susceptibility to manipulation by external forces, it is a likely target for psychological operations. In addition, those states that continue to provide aid to PLO terrorist factions are themselves vulnerable to manipulation in various ways. As in the case of the Falklands War, the United States has been identified as a supplier of intelligence information to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Whether true or not in this particular case, development of a reputation as a supplier of choice intelligence to key players in the region is something the United States can exploit psychologically in a variety of ways to advance its interests. Of course, the capabilities of the United States in this and other military areas are well known. What must be demonstrated is the ability and willingness of the United States to use such capabilities to best advantage in situations where the direct application of force by this country is severely constrained.

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I THINK THERE IS A VERY CLEAR distinction between psychological operations in war, even if limited war, and the
psychological dimension of the conduct of diplomacy. In war, a particular discipline regulates psychological operations, and that is their contribution to the conduct of the fighting. The psychological element is equivalent to the logistic element, or engineering support.

Of course, the content and importance of the psychological element varies greatly according to the style of war. If the style is close to pure attrition, when one is just trying to grind down the enemy (treated as a mere array of targets) by the application of firepower, then one does not much care what the other fellow is thinking as he is being ground down. But if there is a high relational-maneuver content in the conduct of war, then the psychological element becomes much more important and may even be decisive.

That psychological element can take the form of explicitly PSYOP activity, such as distributing leaflets. But much more commonly, it is an integral part of the operation as a whole. When two or three of Rommel’s tanks break through the desert, take up a position on the coastal road, and start shooting up British transport, and the British, thinking they are cut off, abandon their forward positions to leg it down the road to Alexandria, those tanks are not functioning as instruments of destruction but rather as very persuasive leaflets, carrying the message, “You are surrounded; your best bet is to abandon your ammunition and fuel stocks and bug out.”

The greater the content of relational maneuver, the more the psychological element counts as a dimension of warfare. Whatever else one does or does not do, there is more scope for the use of explicitly PSYOP instruments such as radio broadcasting or leaflets. And, of course, the greater the relational maneuver content as opposed to attrition, the more the outcome depends on the accuracy with which you have the enemy figured out. In maneuver, even if your game is just a very simple outflanking move, you’d better know exactly what the enemy’s dispositions are; otherwise, you might drive right into a prepared killing ground.
Similarly, insofar as one relies on the psychological element, one must understand the soul of the enemy—and not just know his order of battle or dispositions. If you want to induce Russians to surrender, you will have to act differently than if it is the Germans or the Italians who are your enemy. The side that practices relational maneuver must first of all study the enemy he wants to relate to, and the psychological element depends on a close fit between the specific action and the specific enemy, whether it's an explicitly psychological operation one is dealing with or the psychological dimension of the combat operation as a whole.

So the discipline of PSYOP is the discipline of the conduct of warfare in its totality. It's part of the plan and the entire operation; it is a general command responsibility. The only thing that varies is that attrition-minded commanders and attrition-oriented forces will tend to neglect the psychological dimension. (They will, incidentally, also tend to look down on any explicit PSYOP units or officers they may have attached to them.) The more maneuver-oriented will naturally give greater attention to the psychological dimension. Of course, one cannot simply say that one of these ways of waging war is good or bad. In some situations, a straightforward attrition approach is the best way to deal with the enemy; in others, there is more scope—or need—for maneuver. If one is in really desperate circumstances and very weak, only relational maneuver can yield success, and then one must rely very heavily on the psychological dimension.

As far as diplomacy (which I regard as a completely separate phenomenon) is concerned, the chain of command is the leadership structure of the nation's foreign policy. Then the fundamental difference from nation to nation is in the overall method of statecraft, which is practiced differently according to culture, traditions, and, to some degree, the directing personalities.

There is what one might call the pragmatic method, which is generally though not always favored by Anglo-Saxon culture: one issue at a time, no complications, a firm focus on the matter at hand, and so on. Then there is the
other method that stresses long-range thinking, planning, and calculation—what one might call the classic method. The pragmatic style fails, of course, because its practitioner disregards other relevant factors and has a very short-term view. The strategic style also fails, however, when one sets the wrong goals; one is then punished by the very discipline with which those goals are pursued over the long run.

In regard to the psychological element, the contrast between the two methods is clear. Those who follow the pragmatic method tend to disregard the essential psychological mechanism involved, which is, as Dr. Bernstein points out, the role of reputation as the equivalent of capital. Think of yourself as a banker who makes money by guaranteeing deals. Perhaps you can work for your entire career without anybody ever calling a guarantee. Very profitable, yes, but not comfortable because you have to treat every problem in terms of what it will do to your accumulated reputation—and not on its own merits.

Take the example of the United States and Iran, the last time around. President Carter saw the problem as one of getting fifty-odd hostages out of Iran—as if there were only two countries in the world, Iran and the United States, no other goal but regaining the hostages, and no future beyond the moment when the hostages would come back. Obviously, what this approach does for capital accumulation is to nullify past achievement from 1776 to the present. When one is as pragmatic as Jimmy Carter (and he was not so different in that respect from most other American presidents, only perhaps more extreme), one ignores that aspect of statecraft. Following the classic method, on the other hand, you focus on the accumulation of capital no matter what is the issue at hand.

Soviet leaders have been very good at accumulating capital. When the Soviet embassy in Iran is threatened by a mob, the Soviet chargé d'affaires telephones the Iranian foreign ministry and says that if the mob enters the embassy, Tehcran will become a smoking ruin—and the mob stops, as if miraculously. But it is the Mafia families that are the most professional practitioners of the classical method. Hundreds
of people do their bidding even though each family only has a very poor mechanism of supervision and control, and of course has the whole legal system standing against it. Conditions are very unfavorable, but the families overcome that by relentlessly focusing on their reputation, not short-term cost and benefit: if you steal fifty dollars from a Mafia family, it will cheerfully spend half a million dollars to find you. Their game is to accumulate the maximum leverage to obtain real results with a minimum use of actual force.

Let me give you a specific example in a quasi-combat situation, which relates to some of the things the British did in the Falklands. In 1982, when the Israeli army invaded Lebanon, it had to cross the UNIFIL lines on the Litani River. One crossing was a very high bridge over a deep ravine, held by Norwegian UN troops. The Israeli division commander had absolutely no authority to use force, but he wanted the bridge and was in a hurry. After the UN commander refused to let him by, the Israeli commander drove right up to the Norwegians on the bridge and gave the order to rev up the tank engines. The Norwegians—with their typical Scandinavian attitude about warfare, that it is terrible and so on—simply scattered.

Another Israeli column came to a bridge that was held by Gurkhas from Nepal. The Gurkha officer on the bridge told the Israelis how splendid it was that a war would be fought, and how delighted the Gurkhas would be to have a chance to participate in it—which would assuredly happen if the Israelis attempted to drive across the bridge. His men were dug in, grinning, and eager. The Israelis spent six hours building another bridge to bypass the position. The Gurkha officer was using accumulated reputation—as it happens, not that of a country but of a particular ethnic group—and obtained real power over events that will only increase the group’s reputation in the future. The classical method is economical, but it does require a constant discipline—and the occasional act that seems irrational if viewed in a one time, one place, one issue perspective.
Hugh Seton-Watson, in a posthumously published article in *Encounter*, describes the cultural unity in Europe that had emerged by the end of the nineteenth century despite divisions among the churches and the rise of national identities and emotions. This community was ruptured by the Bolsheviks when they assumed power in Russia through what amounted to a de-Europeanization of that country. The shift to the west of Soviet power during the Second World War subjected the East Europeans, according to Seton-Watson, “to manipulation by conquerors whom they despise.” He tells us to “stop thinking of the Soviet colonial empire as permanent and stop speaking of the EEC’s neo-Carolingian empire as Europe.”

The West has come to regard the Soviet colonial empire in the East, as a practical matter, as permanent. At least there is no plausible path that is now foreseen for its ending. Moscow sees the maintenance of its control over Eastern Europe as being of the highest importance, and it has the military power to enforce it. But none of this changes the fact, as Seton-Watson put it, that “the division is permanently unacceptable for more than a hundred million Europeans.”

The movement toward the west of the limit of Soviet political control inserted Soviet military power into the heart of Europe. This shift provided a defensive glacis and an offensive base against the rest of Europe. Analysts divide on “defensive” versus “offensive” interpretation of Soviet intentions, but Soviet military dispositions in Central Europe clearly serve both purposes. The Soviet military presence in and on the borders of the East European countries is essential to maintenance of the Communist regimes. This
military power has been used on several occasions for that purpose and has deterred any conceivable Western interventions in support of these popular revolts. It also poses a serious threat to Western Europe. The Soviet Union has long been seen as having a dominant military position in Europe, one that could only be held in check by an armed Western Europe, an American military presence, and the threat to respond if necessary to a Soviet—and in due course a Warsaw Pact—conventional attack by use of nuclear weapons.

A crucial part of this strategy, the threat to use nuclear weapons first, is increasingly perceived as having been overtaken by the Soviet nuclear buildup. Changes in NATO's strategy are widely held to be needed. An altered strategy should address explicitly the importance of the role the East Europeans would play in a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, on the deterrent value of their potential defection from Moscow's ranks in the event of such an attack, and the contribution of possible defections in defeating such an attack were it to occur.

The Degrees of Success in Anticoalition Strategy

In Europe, two alliance systems face each other, one voluntary, the other coerced. There is strength in collective security, but there are also potential vulnerabilities—a perception expressed early in recorded history. The goal of disrupting the opposing alliance was placed well up in the ranking of policies by Sun Tzu, the great Chinese strategist. It is worth reminding ourselves that his counsel for an offensive strategy against an enemy included the advice "to disrupt his alliances." Sun Tzu's advice is even more applicable to the nuclear age than to his own. The Soviets have long followed and practiced the advice of the Chinese sage. For instance, at Stalingrad they found the Romanians and Italians to be weak links, which they exploited. Later, in 1944, the German 6th Army was lost through Soviet pressure on the Romanian forces on its flanks.
Soviet authorities clearly perceive the NATO alliance as vulnerable to political, and potentially military, fragmentation. There is a substantial Soviet literature on “coalition warfare,” which is based on the concept that a primary strategic objective is the dismantling of the enemy’s coalition while holding one’s own together. In the 1940s and 1950s, Moscow used the Communist parties of Western Europe to try to prevent the consolidation of a Western alliance in which both the United States and Germany would play crucial roles. It has tried to undermine the Western will to resist by playing up the idea that any conflict would become nuclear and inevitably escalate to the genocidal level. It has harped on the theme of basic divergences between European and American interests and of the reckless behavior of the United States. It has made promises and threats (for instance, to the Dutch) that the rejection of NATO missiles will cause them to be spared if war comes and vice versa. It has given financial support to peace groups in the West, and so forth.

This is in peacetime. Soviet writings are also explicit on how to proceed in war. Retrospective Soviet analyses of the battle of Stalingrad, for example, regularly point out that the main axes of attack were selected so as to exploit the relative weakness of the Romanian and Italian troops holding key positions of the German line. This is seen as a lesson for war against NATO. It seems highly likely that the Soviet Union, to achieve the goal of the military and political defeat of NATO, would seek to force the withdrawal or defeat of individual members of the Western alliance.

In addition to sound Leninist reasons constantly to press one’s adversaries, the fact that the peoples of Eastern Europe are permanently irreconcilable gives Moscow an added incentive to weaken and dominate the region beyond.

There is no parallel in the West, either in doctrine or in practice, to this Soviet strategy of promoting divisions in the enemy camp. The West’s activities, notwithstanding some brave “rollback” rhetoric at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, have largely been limited to radio broadcasts, help for emigres, cultural exchanges—and economic
subsidies. Western subsidies to the East can be viewed as a form of subversion—but if so, they are an exceptionally subtle form; they can more plausibly be regarded as propping up inefficient and detested regimes. But these economic projects do bring people in the East into dangerous contact with Westerners, and the boom created in Poland in the 1970s, with the help of Western money, did help to create conditions in which Solidarity emerged. But in the end the Soviets have managed to contain the problems that have been created.

The US policy of “differentiation” among the East European countries and between them and the Soviet Union also has the flavor of an anticoalition strategy. But it has involved weak actions. It is often hard to know who is being rewarded and who is being punished, and with what means, under this policy.

In short, the West has more or less accepted a double standard: what’s yours is yours and what’s mine is negotiable. We accept that the Soviet Union can engage in overt and divisive threats against the West, while we regard anything that smacks of actions stressing the Soviet coalition as provocative. (Although what is provocative depends on where you sit. Our radio broadcasts, free press, in effect all our democratic institutions, are provocations as seen from Moscow.)

The West’s governments have failed to make an important distinction. We backed off from support of dissidence in Eastern Europe during the first half of the 1950s on practical and moral grounds; especially after 1956, most of this support was seen to be ineffective and dangerous. But we also came to neglect Sun Tzu’s advice even with regard to our own security.

Assessing The Present Situation

The West has accepted these asymmetric ground rules in large measure out of fear of Soviet power. But of what does this power consist? The Soviets’ vast array of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is impressive, but it has largely
just a canceling effect on US and other Western nuclear forces. At least as important is the formidable alignment of ground and tactical air and missile forces of the Warsaw Pact. The numbers are familiar—around 90 divisions in Eastern Europe and the Western part of the Soviet Union versus less than half that number in Western Europe, including quickly available reinforcements from the United States. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact forces are seen as being under central Moscow control, whereas the NATO governments would each decide in a crisis whether, and how, to participate in the collective defense.

The principal means of preventing this superior force from moving into Western Europe has long been the presence of several thousand US nuclear weapons, a commitment to use them first if needed, and 300,000 American troops. But the nuclear commitment, in the view of many serious analysts, has become ineffective. This view is debatable, but there can be little doubt that the set of circumstances in which an American president would use nuclear weapons first has shrunk greatly. Nor has that shrinkage been offset by an apparently greater willingness of the authorities in France and Britain to use their nuclear weapons in the defense of Germany or of other parts of Europe. So we have the familiar question—how to assure the security of Europe? The familiar American answer—build up the Alliance's conventional strength, a sound policy—meets with a European response that this is too costly (meaning that Europe's welfare programs are more important), or that it will weaken the deterrent effects of the threat to use nuclear weapons first, or that it is unnecessary.

The belief in Soviet conventional superiority rests, however, on the assumption that the members of the Warsaw Pact would follow Moscow's orders in military operations against Western Europe. But should they, when there is overwhelming evidence that the East Europeans despise their conquerors and long to be free? Three reasons are offered why they will, or might, obey Moscow:

1. Their leaders, true believers or not, are beholden to Moscow for their positions and even their lives.
2. The fact that Soviet forces are stationed in or on the borders of their countries gives these leaders little choice.

3. Moscow has a system to control directly their military forces.

So perhaps, or probably, or very likely—so judgments by analysts run—the East Europeans, or various of them, would join with Moscow in a war with the West.

This is the point where Western thinking on this subject has stopped. Western planners take the position that since we can't count on non-Soviet defections we have to assume that the full weight of all the members of the Pact would be felt. Others of a more hopeful persuasion take comfort from the thought that the Poles or others might not join in, or that they and other East Europeans might not try very hard or fight very well. They conclude, therefore, that the military balance is not in bad shape, and even that NATO might get away with spending less.

There is a curious passivity along this optimism-pessimism spectrum on the "reliability" of the East Europeans. It is as though we are predicting the weather. We might agree or disagree on whether raincoats should be worn, but we don't expect to influence the weather. Similarly, virtually no one has seen the behavior of the East Europeans in East-West crisis or war as a possible object of influence; one looks in vain through the Western literature on the Warsaw Pact to find any substantial discussion of what the West might do to affect the behavior of the East Europeans in circumstances when our security is at stake.

Much depends, of course, on how important the role of the East Europeans is in a war with NATO. If the non-Soviet forces are useful for Moscow to have on its side but not vital, then our neglect of the behavior of the East Europeans is perhaps excusable. But this is an empirical matter.

There are two main measures of the importance of the East Europeans: the weight of their military forces and the security of the Soviet lines of communication that run for long distances through their territories.
If one simply counts units in place today west of the Soviet Union, in the northern tier the non-Soviet forces make up 50 percent of the ground and air forces (somewhat less if counts are weighted by modernity of equipment). The non-Soviet share of military manpower is 70 percent. The total number of active duty troops in this part of the Pact today is about equal to the number of NATO troops in the Federal Republic of Germany alone. This comparison, which does not count the forces back in the USSR on the one hand and in the United States, Britain, and France on the other, is pertinent to an attack designed to catch NATO's forces unawares—a classical, Pearl Harbor-like, Sunday morning strike. Such an attack presumably would feature Spetsnaz units operating behind the NATO lines and other fast-moving units trying to get inside and around NATO's unprepared formations. It might work if the signals of attack preparations were wrongly interpreted or the defender's response was sluggish—as they were at Pearl Harbor and in several other sudden attacks since World War II. So this clearly is a case to take seriously.

But look at this case from the Soviet perspective. It necessarily assumes little prior reinforcement from the Soviet Union; therefore, most of the attacking soldiers would have to be non-Soviet. Could the Soviets afford to take the chance of putting Czech, Polish, or GDR units up front where their collapse or defection would open gaping holes in the front? Could they trust these forces in the second echelon role to arrive on schedule if the Soviet formations in the van get stalled? Could they leave them unattended in the rear when they could be a threat to Soviet lines of communication?

The Soviet General Staff doubtless has given a lot of thought to these questions and to ways of answering them—perhaps to its satisfaction. The Soviets have followed the advice of Sun Tzu not only to try to disrupt the enemy's coalition but also vigorously to try to assure the cohesion of their own. Their exhortations on this topic and their efforts toward this end are so vehement as to betray a deep concern about the problems in their coalition.
They cannot tolerate a principle fundamental to any independent state, which is that each nation reserves to itself the decision to go to war. The Soviets have created a command structure in which the power to take most of the East European military forces to war resides in Moscow. Although Romanian President Ceausescu has openly and forcefully rejected such an arrangement, the other leaders of the Warsaw Pact nations, whatever their reservations, have evidently acceded to the Soviet demand that their forces be put under direct Soviet command.

The Soviets use a number of tools to try to make such control effective. These include training and indoctrination of East Europeans in Soviet military schools (over 1,000 officers by now have graduated from the Soviet General Staff military academy), Party membership requirements for advancement in the military, recruitment of agents, Soviet theater-level command of coalition forces, and Soviet assignment of officers to each of the defense ministries and throughout the hierarchy of non-Soviet forces down to the divisional level. In addition, the Soviets are likely to break up allied units into small parcels and sandwich them among Soviet units to prevent a critical mass of "friends" collapsing or defecting and opening a gaping hole in the line of contact with the enemy.

Would all of this work? The specialists on the region reply that it all depends on national character and attitudes (Poles and Romanians are unreliable, Germans and Bulgarians are reliable), on the nature of the events precipitating the crisis (with particular reluctance to get involved in crises originating in the Third World or China), on prior conditioning (the crisis requires defense against revanchist Germans), on which Eastern national units are in contact with which Western ones (Germans should not be allowed to face Germans), and on allowing the East Europeans too little time to generate resistance (a proposition not easily reconciled with the need to whip up enthusiasm). Where is the evidence that Western thinkers have given thought to how to make all of this more difficult for Moscow? This apparent
neglect of a strategic parameter as important as the role of the non-Soviet forces—especially in light of the opinion held by many specialists on the region that poor performance and defections are likely under certain circumstances—is powerful testimony to the lack of seriousness about strategy and the widespread defeatism that exists in the West.

A familiar conclusion from Western analyses is that if Pact forces get the jump on NATO with little effective warning, they will rapidly succeed in occupying the Federal Republic of Germany. But if defections or delays were to occur among the Soviets' allies, the Pact advance would likely slow; if there were widespread defections, the Pact would have more difficulty in advancing; if there were also serious trouble in the rear that disrupted and diverted Soviet reinforcements, the Pact attack might stall or be driven back. Simple nonparticipation or significant delays in responding to orders by Moscow's allies would have a double effect: Not only would the Soviet generals be deprived of needed combat forces, but they also would have to divert some of their own forces to watch, surround, and disarm the defectors and to guard the road and rail lines through their rear area.

A nightmare for the General Staff must be the possibility of serious trouble erupting in the rear, especially in Poland, while a battle in the West is in the balance. Most of the main East-West rail lines and road routes run through that country. To support their attack with reinforcements and supplies, the Soviets must run 300 trains a day west and an equal number east. If they are seriously delayed, the campaign would suffer. These routes pass through many Polish cities and towns, through long stretches of countryside, and over many bridges. In a sudden attack, one mounted with little advance movement of Soviet forces, these routes would have to be operated by Polish workers—many of them members of Solidarity—and guarded by Polish troops. Suppose that, at that point, many Poles decide that they don't want to get into a war, don't support Moscow, and oppose the massive Soviet intrusion into their territory. Soviet forces could, no doubt, occupy Poland, reopen the lines of communication, repair
damage, and guard the routes. But this would take time, and the war in the West meanwhile might become a disaster for them. Such a contingency, which is not a prediction of Polish (or Czechoslovak or East German) revolt in such a case, cannot be wholly discounted by the General Staff in Moscow. In effect, the General Staff might have a view of the Polish army like that of a former SACEUR who used to ask his staff on which side of the balance Polish forces should be entered.

One might infer that the Soviets would not launch an attack with such uncertainties. Precisely. That is the reason for addressing the subject. We should want the Soviet General Staff to believe, correctly, that the East Europeans would not come to any such war, or that it is very doubtful that they would, or that they would take long enough in making up their minds that a Pact attack would be weak and fail. As a result, the Soviet military would decide not to attack at all or might decide to reinforce heavily with Soviet forces in advance in order to dilute the effect of the East Europeans and render less likely their defection. But doing this would also give the West time to reinforce.

Sun Tzu has another salient observation. He says that of the five fundamental factors affecting war, the first is moral influence. "By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril." The Soviet leadership has not always had moral harmony even with its own people; still less does it have it with the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe.

This analysis leads to two central questions. How do we strengthen deterrence of Soviet attack on Western Europe by reinforcing in the minds of the Soviet General Staff the notion that any military move against the West would be too dangerous because of the East European factor? And how might we minimize the likelihood of East European help to Moscow in the unlikely event that deterrence fails and an attack occurs?
An Enlightened Policy of Influence

Important elements of a NATO strategy with this aim are in place. There is a wide recognition that the East Europeans present a “reliability” problem to the Soviets. What have been lacking are Western policy goals and programs of action to support them.

An obvious goal is that the people of Eastern Europe act independently. If they can act in their own interests, almost none of them will support the Soviet Union in any military action against the West; to help Moscow would be to risk destruction and extinguish any hope of freedom. Also, there is no basis for conflict between the two halves of Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany has renounced claims on Eastern lands lost, although displaced Silesians and others probably make it impossible to dispel fears in Poland that perhaps some day Germany will try to recover these lands. But these are no longer central concerns. (One might say that ancient animosities have receded because of the division of Europe; this is the beneficial aspect of an otherwise deplorable situation.) A large majority of people in Western Europe, but not in the East, clearly find the status quo acceptable, even if it is not the best of all imaginable worlds; the problem is how to assure that Moscow does not try to change this status quo into something much worse.

This Western objective of promoting independent decisions by the peoples and armed forces of Eastern Europe if the Soviets try to drag them into war can be contrasted with two alternative positions: one is the current one of passivity; the other is rollback or liberation. The former leaves much to chance; the latter has consistently been rejected by the West, and there is no disposition to change it.

The point of departure for a Western effort is the more explicit expression by governments and private groups in Western Europe of the shared values in history, religion, individual liberties, and a desire to avoid conflict. For the Germans there is the unique inter-German relationship; for the French, historic ties to Poland; for the United States, Polish
and other ethnic group ties. Much is done now and more should be done to foster cultural exchanges, help for emigre groups, and an improved effort at communications to the East.

Of particular relevance is the Federal Republic of Germany's Ostpolitik. It consists of an accommodating line toward the East on many matters, it supports arms control, and it involves subsidies to the East, especially to the GDR. In return, the Federal Republic obtains some emigration of people from the GDR as well as other benefits. It is accompanied by an unenthusiastic attitude toward such manifestations of the human struggle for freedom as Solidarity. There are obvious dangers for the Federal Republic in such a line, but there are also potential strategic benefits, particularly in getting closer to the people of the GDR. The Soviet leadership evidently believes that its military power enables it to control this process, but it must view Ostpolitik with mixed feelings as it sees the two halves of Germany coming closer together.

There is a community of interest between the two halves of Europe on the nonuse of force within Europe. There is a basis for an understanding here that Europe should not allow itself to be dragged into a war by outside powers. This idea might be thought to encourage the existing tendency of some West Europeans to adopt an equidistant, plague-on-both-your-houses stance toward the United States and the Soviet Union. But the United States is not going to try to drag the West Europeans into a war; and the peoples of the European democracies are most unlikely to decide to abandon an alliance so central to their interests.

The main point here is that this concept is only latent in the present situation; the West has done too little to signal to the peoples in the East a recognition of the common interest in averting any conflict. Today, the expectation must be widespread among them that if war comes they will inevitably be attacked and destroyed. There have been signs recently of resentment on their part of the stationing of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles on their territories. For instance, Prime
Minister Strougal of Czechoslovakia publicly expressed unhappiness on the occasion of his government "accepting" Soviet INF missiles. These peoples have not been told that if they can manage to stay out of any Moscow-induced conflict they would be spared great destruction, whereas, if they were to join in a war they would surely suffer greatly.

This could be a powerful message. It implies that the governments of Western Europe (and the United States as well) would treat as neutral any East European country opting out of a conflict. Further, they would treat in a similar vein groups within any country—military units, worker groups, and others—that signaled their intent to stand aloof even if their leaders were obeying Moscow. To be sure, the certainty of being spared all damage cannot be assured to the East Europeans and should not be promised, because Soviet forces are already on their territory and more would move in. (To the Soviets there are no neutrals, certainly not in this region; if you are not for them, you are against them.) If the Soviets attacked the West despite the standing aloof of their allies, NATO forces would certainly attack those Soviet forces. All the Western powers could reasonably promise is their best efforts to avoid nonhostile forces. But a chance of survival is better than near certain devastation. Moreover, delivering on these promises would enable NATO commanders to concentrate their effort against Soviet forces and would encourage defections from the Pact.

There remains the matter of nuclear weapons. Here, too, the Soviets have been active and the West neglectful. The Soviets offer threats of nuclear attack and promises of withholding attack to Western nations. In contrast, the West has not made explicit a policy that is strongly in its interest, which is to promise not to use nuclear weapons against any Warsaw Pact country that succeeds in opting out and also to assert that, if their neutrality is violated, NATO would restrict any use of nuclear weapons to use against Soviet forces.

This discussion has not made much of a distinction between the values and incentives of the leaders of Eastern
Europe and the peoples. This assumption is not always wrong, as the examples of Nagy and Dubcek show, and even such a tyrant as Ceausescu derives popularity at home from his anti-Soviet stance. It is safe to say that the leaders of these states, all of whom are in place on Soviet sufferance, would feel a tension between patriotic sentiments and those of loyalty, habit, status, and personal vulnerability to the Soviets. What would they do if faced with a Western offer that combined an olive branch in one hand and a missile in the other versus a Soviet order backed up by tanks in the neighborhood (or even Spetsnaz troops in the courtyard)? The tanks being closer, it is reasonable to expect that most would go along with the Soviets. But some might not. Perhaps one should expect most to try to temporize, to find excuses of any kind not to commit. Of course, delay in responding to Moscow's demands would provide much of what NATO would need.

Those people who are not in the East European equivalent of the nomenklatura—the middle managers and those below, such as in the military, in the worker groups, and among students—are less directly accessible to Soviet coercion and are likely to be less responsive to Moscow's directives. They are more likely to want to stay out and perhaps better able to do so.

It should be a central Western aim to prevent the Soviet control system from working. The East Europeans should be given the option of avoiding war and destruction in the (unlikely) case that conflict comes. We should encourage Polish or East German or Czechoslovak commanders, who receive orders from Moscow to put their troops into the trucks and drive them West, to consider other possibilities before acting. And the troops and the workers and everyone else should also be so encouraged.

**Early Efforts at Influence**

This analysis underscores the importance of Western communications to all of these people. Although secret
diplomacy would have a role in a crisis, this is not an enterprise for secret diplomacy only. What might be communicated would vary with circumstances. In peacetime, it is the sort of material now offered, including news and developments concerning both the East and the West, the transformation taking place in China, cultural programs, and entertainment. To these might be added activities that bear on shared security interests along the lines already discussed.

To understand the possibility and limits of affecting the attitudes and behavior of the East Europeans, and therefore affecting Soviet decisions, a review of the history of such efforts is useful.

As alarm mounted in 1946 and 1947 about Soviet intentions, part of the American strategy that emerged, which included many other elements, was the mounting of a political action campaign. Activities undertaken in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, both covert and overt, included information gathering, support for people trying to escape, help for resistance groups, and the supply of information to people in the East by radios (and for a short period, pamphlets carried by balloons). Early aims were ambitious; for instance, NSC 58/2 (December 1949) said that these aims were to “reduce and eventually to eliminate dominant Soviet influence in the satellite states.” An overt and clandestine “offensive” was to be launched to isolate the “true” Communists in Eastern Europe. This approach resulted from a widespread belief that the Soviet rule over this region was shaky and that one way or another it might be removed, although at no point was the use of Western military forces seen as the means to that desired end.

An important component of this program was a major effort in communications, especially the creation of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (later Radio Liberty) as covert (or more accurately, unacknowledged) organizations to broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively. In 1953, President Eisenhower created the US Information Agency; the Voice of America became one of its priority instruments. Similar broadcast activities were carried out by the BBC, the German stations, and others.
In the early days of the radios, in the late 1940s, there was a widespread assumption, or hope, that the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe would, or might, be temporary. RFE, especially, was the voice of emigres who hoped to return soon to countries free of Soviet occupation. That hope slowly receded and then fell drastically as the result of the US failure to respond to the uprising of German workers in 1953, to the troubles in Poland in 1956, and, most of all, to the general revolt in Hungary in that year. The functions of the radios became those of providing news about the West and, more importantly, news about developments in the East European countries.

The radios have played especially important roles during crises. For example, RFE was an important source of news to the Poles during the Poznan unrest in Poland in 1956; its coverage was tightly disciplined and designed to avoid exciting the Poles. In the Hungarian uprising, which occurred a few days after, RFE was a key source of information for the Hungarian people, although it had a difficult task in sorting out the facts because of the turmoil in that country. Given Eisenhower’s decision not to interfere in any way (recall that these events occurred simultaneously with the Suez crisis), it clearly was not the function of RFE directly to influence events inside Hungary. In the investigations that took place after these events, the judgment was that RFE had behaved in a disciplined and responsible way on the whole, with only a few lapses.

The radios have continued to play a key informational role in crises, notably in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland in 1980-81, and in 1986 in connection with the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. It was no doubt largely because of Radio Free Europe’s reporting that the emerging leadership of Solidarity realized the nationwide dimensions of the protests that were taking place. On Chernobyl, RL’s Ukrainian broadcasts were an important source of information to the Ukrainian people about what had happened and precautions to take. This was equally true of RFE’s broadcasts; many people in Eastern Europe called in to RFE to get more news and to express appreciation.
The mission of RFE and RL is to communicate information and ideas to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Although they also provide world news, unlike the VOA and other nations' radios, their distinctive mission is to broadcast news and information back to these peoples on their own societies.

According to formal policy guidelines developed by the Board for International Broadcasting, they are to avoid programming that could "legitimately be construed as inflammatory or conducive to irredentism," or "reasonably construed as incitement to revolt" or provision of "support for illegal and violent actions." No information on "how to defect" will be broadcast, nor should there be any "suggestion that might lead audiences to believe that, in the event of international crisis or civil disorder, the West might intervene militarily."

Given the history of the past forty years, together with the fact that the policy of the radios must be highly sensitive to West European as well as American opinion, these policy restraints could hardly be otherwise. But despite these constraints, which are observed rigorously, there are regular protests from the East. The very operation of these radios and of the other national broadcast media is a challenge to the desired Soviet monopoly on news and, therefore, to Soviet power.

Even within these constraints, though, more could be done to express common security interests. For instance, a program might be directed at the East European military. This would be a factual and professionally oriented program on military developments in the West and in the East (including the Soviet Union). Its basic purpose would be to strengthen the link with an especially important group in the East. In the event of a crisis or conflict, this communication link might become of great operational importance.

Outside of broadcast communication, but still within the realm of "communications," other actions need to be pursued. For example, a useful step has been the visit of American officials to East European capitals after the
Geneva arms control talks in early 1985 to report on these talks. The Americans and the West Europeans should meet regularly with the East Europeans to discuss with them the status of these negotiations and exchange views. Also, Western military officers should visit their counterparts and invite them to visit the West. In addition to the useful symbolism of such exchanges, these officers have much to discuss. Our military should not be timid about expressing views on shared security interests; indeed, they should be instructed to do so.

*Examining a Crisis Scenario*

Perhaps no fundamental changes are feasible, or desirable, in communications policy toward the East in non-crisis periods or during a crisis confined to the East. This condition would presumably change, however, during a crisis in which Western security becomes endangered. And if a crisis were to occur, Moscow would mount a campaign charging the West with planned or actual aggression, would work to arouse fears of war in Western Europe, and would try to elicit among its Warsaw Pact allies active support and ready participation in any action.

Consider a likely course of developments if the West were to detect military movements in the East, which then grow in scale and increasingly seem oriented toward the West. The West would feel a powerful impulse to interpret the evidence as nonthreatening, at the beginning almost certainly seeing this activity as only exercises or perhaps actions attributed to a local security problem that requires military action. As data accumulated about the mobilization in the Eastern countries and movement of Warsaw Pact forces to the west, the psychological pressures on NATO governments to cling to a benign interpretation would grow—in correspondence to the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. This psychological phenomenon caused Stalin to reject mounting evidence of German preparations for attack in
1940, American leaders to do the same vis-a-vis Japanese military preparations in 1940 and 1941, and the Israelis the same with respect to the Arab attack preparations in 1973. Western political leaders would be under similar pressures not to interpret the situation as one of attack, whatever the reality. At some point, assuming this was a real attack, they would learn otherwise, perhaps after enemy troops attacked their territory, as did Stalin, Roosevelt, and Golda Meir.

But until the perception switched, the Western line toward the peoples of the East would probably be something like this:

1. Western governments are concerned about the military preparations in the Warsaw Pact.
2. Western governments have no intention of interfering in the East.
3. The Warsaw Pact should pull back its forces.

When perceptions tipped to the point of regarding a Warsaw Pact attack as a serious possibility, then Western aims, and policies, would become very complicated. On the one hand, diplomatic efforts to prevent war, which by then might seem imminent, would be frantic. A component of this effort to prevent war might be a last-ditch effort to try to detach the East Europeans from the impending attack. At some point the West might encourage and actively support sabotage and active resistance in the East. But the primary purpose of this stage still would be to deter Soviet attack by doing what could be done to weaken the ability of the Warsaw Pact to act against us.

If a crisis were to occur, some of our messages would become highly operational. We would want the East European commanders who receive orders from Moscow on the “Red” telephones to then pick up the “Green” ones and talk to their national bosses, peers, and subordinates before deciding what to do. Conceptually, we should think of a third telephone, a “Blue” one, also on the desks of these commanders, through which they would exchange views with their Western counterparts. At that stage we should also be in touch with many other groups such as railroad, electricity, and telephone workers, among others.
In short, we should think of the situation as a competitive one in which the Soviet marshals and the NATO generals and the politicians on both sides would by vying for influence, using promises and threats, over the behavior of the East European forces and populations.

Policy Considerations when Crisis Evolves into Conflict

Suppose, nevertheless, an attack occurred. What would this event imply for the approach to the Eastern leaders and peoples? The most obvious observation to make at this stage is that the West's strategy of deterrence, including such efforts as might have been made to persuade Moscow that it would not have allies along with it, had failed. It might have failed because of Moscow's assessment that it had sufficient strength; the perception of a divided NATO might have played an important contributing role; perhaps to Moscow the alternative of not attacking, for whatever reason, seemed worse than going ahead; perhaps it believed that its allies would go along or, alternatively, Moscow's purpose might have been a campaign of such short duration and limited geographic scope as to make the behavior of its Warsaw Pact allies irrelevant.

The primary Western aim regarding the behavior of the East Europeans would be a decision by their leaders to resist any Soviet use of their territory, which would make them in effect de facto allies of the West. However, this response seems most implausible, although it would probably be the preference of many people in the East if they thought that the Soviets would be driven out. It is most implausible, for one thing, because some of the key leaders are integral members of the Soviet apparatus. Probably more important is the danger of such a stance. Those who adopted it would be the object of attack by the KGB and (to an uncertain degree) its East European security force counterparts, Soviet Spetsnaz units, and regular Soviet forces. Obviously, these leaders would have to prepare for their personal protection, or
evacuation to the West, unless they were prepared to sacrifice themselves.

Less implausible, though perhaps only marginally so, would be Eastern leaders' declarations of opting out of the conflict (together with an appeal to the West not to attack their territory) while not resisting Soviet use of their territory. This stance would be hardly less dangerous from the East European perspective because it would grant the Soviets immediate access to them. But it would have the benefit of causing NATO military operations to be directed only against Soviet forces. There would be collateral damage for misidentified targets and other errors and spillover effects, but damage to people and property in the East might be much reduced. (How much would depend on the responsiveness of NATO forces to this East European posture.)

Most likely would be the standing aside or defection of groups of soldiers and individuals, footdragging in compliance with orders, and sabotage. Western planners should aim to maximize such acts, and their effect in the aggregate might be substantial. Western communications, broadcast and covert, could be directed at disrupting pipelines, logistics, and the movement of Soviet forces on rail and road lines, as well as encouraging defections that might open up gaps in the Warsaw Pact front.

War aims would be a vital factor. For example, the Allied goal of unconditional surrender in World War II did not facilitate German or Japanese defections (and was abandoned at the end with respect to the Emperor of Japan). The Soviets' strategy would certainly be designed to divide the Western alliance. They would attempt to do so through threats (e.g., of nuclear attack) and promises (of being left alone) delivered selectively to different countries. The Soviets would also employ the full panoply of their active measures.

What about the West's aims? Declared NATO peacetime aims are to defend NATO territory and no more. Tactical counterattacks are permitted, but not strategic counterattack into Warsaw Pact territory. This approach is a far cry from Churchill's statement on 13 May 1940 in the House of Com-
mons, "You asked, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: it is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however hard and long the road may be." 

NATO has not adopted anything like such an aim, despite its apparent utility in deterring a Soviet attack, for several reasons: the aim of victory would seem to entail having much larger military forces (or at least giving the NATO military authorities a powerful argument for them) than people want to pay for; West Germany is sensitive about being associated with anything that looks "aggressive" toward the East, even if only with the purpose of deterring attack on itself; the West believes (though the belief is not warranted by the evidence) that such an aim would result in a stepped-up arms race with the Warsaw Pact; the West desires to do nothing that would suggest a Western intervention in Eastern Europe during the uprisings and troubles that are endemic there; and perhaps the West believes that such an apparently strident aim would be incompatible with various aims of diplomacy. (This reticence is not, however, matched by similar restraint in Soviet political indoctrination and propaganda.)

Ironically, the same leaders who have adopted this restrictive stance have backed a policy of threatening wholesale slaughter with nuclear weapons in retaliation to an attack; this policy, of course, they never expect to see carried out. The NATO threat to use nuclear weapons if conventional defense fails is an action but not an aim. As generally portrayed by Western governments, and by much of the Western literature on nuclear war, it is a threat to inflict large and indiscriminate damage on the Soviet Union; it therefore amounts to an act of suicide. This is not an aim to be taken seriously.

So NATO is not in good shape with respect to war aims. Imagine the situation of the planners who, at some point, would presumably be desperately trying to persuade East Europeans—-from political and military leaders to workers in key facilities to soldiers and airmen to wide publics—not to follow Moscow's orders and instead to opt out, to commit
sabotage, and to defect to the West. NATO's position implies that if the East Europeans succeeded in helping to frustrate Moscow's attack on the West, little would be done for them. They would not be freed; instead they would be suppressed and many of them killed. This implication, one can assume, would be well understood in the East.

Clearly, something would have to be done about NATO's war aims if the goal of fragmenting the Warsaw Pact at this stage were to have much of a chance. But why wait? To change aims after an attack has already occurred would be late in the process, arguably much too late. It would be far better to affect Soviet and East European expectations much earlier so as to prevent the attack.

There is a parallel here from World War II. Only after the German attack on Poland and the declaration of war by Britain and France did Britain declare the aim of liberating the peoples occupied by the Nazis (in a statement by Neville Chamberlain on 20 September 1939). Churchill repeated this aim after the fall of France and after the fall of Yugoslavia and Greece. The pertinent analogy here would be the president of the United States declaring the aim of liberating Europe only after its occupation by the Soviets. But such a declaration would seem to be accompanied by no credible means of accomplishment and, being voiced too late, would have no deterrent effect.

These observations are perhaps brought more sharply into focus by an early recorded example of efforts to dislodge members of an opposing coalition. According to Herodotus, when the Persian King, Xerxes, invaded Greece in 480 B.C. with a force that included Greek Ionians whom the Persians had conquered, the Athenian commander, Themistocles, sent Athenian ships along the coast to cut inscriptions on the rocks saying,

Men of Ionia, you do wrong to fight against your own fathers, and to give your help to enslave Greece. We beseech you therefore to come over, if possible, to our side. If you cannot do this, then, we pray you, stand aloof from
the conquest yourselves. . . . If neither of these things be possible, and you are hindered by a force too strong to resist from venturing on desertion, at least when we come to blows, fight backwardly, remembering that you are sprung from us, and that it was through you we first provoked the hatred of the barbarians.

Herodotus attributed to Themistocles the reasoning that Xerxes would distrust the Ionians and would not allow them to participate in the sea fights.

The battle of Salamis followed. Herodotus said of the Ionian performance, "a few only followed the advice of Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far otherwise." A year later, however, the Greek fleet sailed across the Aegean and confronted the Persians at Mycale. Before the battle, the Greek commander, Leotychides, repeated Themistocles' plea. Herodotus said,

When the Persians . . . thought of the advice which had been offered to the Ionians, their first act was to disarm the Samians, whom they suspected of complicity with the enemy. . . . After disarming them, the Persians next dispatched the Milesians to guard the paths leading up to the heights of Mycale. . . . Their true object, however, was to remove them to a distance from the camp.

In the battle, "The Samians . . . although disarmed . . . seeing from the beginning of the fight that victory [for the Persians] was doubtful, did all that lay in their power to render help to the Greeks. And the other Ionians likewise . . . revolted and attacked the Persians." The Milesians, guarding the mountain paths, "guided the flying Persians by wrong roads which brought them into the presence of the enemy; and at last they set upon them with their own hands."6

The attempt to persuade the Ionians to defect in 480 B.C. failed, while in 479 B.C. it succeeded. The obvious difference between the two cases is that in the former the Persians were on the offensive and had a superior force; in the latter the
Persians were on the defensive and their allies abandoned them.

We can draw two inferences from these ancient events for our present situation. The first is that the existence of potential cleavages within the Eastern camp do not, in themselves, contribute to NATO’s security. Those cleavages are likely to remain potential and not be expressed unless the outcome of any conflict is at least in question; they are most likely to be expressed if the West looks like a winner. This important observation bears on the argument of those in the West who have correctly noted the potentially fragile character of the Warsaw Pact but have reached the unwarranted conclusion that NATO therefore can afford to do less. Their conclusion neglects the role of expectations as to outcome in influencing the behavior of people in the middle.

The other related inference is that the direction in which the forces are moving, or seem likely to move, can influence alignments. The Ionians “fought backwardly” only when the Greeks came to their territory. So the chance of East European defections would increase if NATO forces were to come to them. But several cautions are in order here. For one, NATO is a defensive alliance; its purpose is only to protect its territory and not to reverse the outcome of World War II. The rearming of the Germans in the 1950s and their participation in NATO reinforced the importance of assuring ourselves and everyone else in both halves of Europe that there would be no rollback, no liberation, no German revanchism. Western governments have never exploited uprisings in the East from the first one in 1953, and they predictably won’t in the future.

There is also the practical problem: it has seemed beyond the bounds of feasibility for NATO forces to manage a strategic counteradvance; providing a forward defense looks difficult enough. The belief is widespread that NATO is so outnumbered and outgunned that it, at best, can only manage an orderly retreat and would soon have to use nuclear weapons. In reality, an interactive feedback process is involved: the belief that NATO is doomed to lose produces a defeatist mind-set; this mind-set could lead to tactics that minimize the likelihood of East Europeans—who are likely to
be temporizing and fence-straddling—tipping toward resisting Moscow's orders. Conversely, greater confidence in NATO's potential for defense and counterattack would create and communicate a sense of possibilities that would reinforce the likelihood of getting volunteers from the East in a conflict—and that greater likelihood would help to justify these favorable expectations. All of these possibilities should help to make the Soviets more cautious.

But we still must consider the question of the Soviet response to such a counteradvance in the unlikely event that it ever had to be carried out. If successful, it could put in question Party control of the Soviet Union itself. Might the regime, if so challenged, unleash a nuclear holocaust? We should not expect this response from Leninists under stress—people who should never be confused with Hitler in the bunker. But the main point is that the purpose of this line of policy would be to keep any conflict from happening. The likelihood of such a conflict would be reduced if the NATO authorities weighed seriously the potential payoffs from non-Soviet defections in the Warsaw Pact and drew the appropriate conclusions.

To proceed further along this line of inquiry requires assuming that, at some point before it was too late, the Western governments would alter their aims so as to give the East Europeans a stake in deviating from Moscow's commands. Let us make that assumption.

The essential messages would have to be those of hope and control over one's fate. The element of hope would stem from the postulated change in NATO's war aims as discussed above. Similarly, that of control over one's fate would derive from the conviction that action by individuals and groups of people could make a difference to themselves personally, to their families and friends, and to their nation. For those in a position to defect—for example, pilots, troops at the front, sailors—these themes have most obvious application. For those less favored, the message would also be that their actions could make a difference because Soviet victory is not assured and their contribution (in foot-dragging or sabotage) would affect the outcome.
Deciding What to Do Now

One of the crucial questions in all of this is how much to do now and how much to do later. For reasons discussed above, the instinct of most politicians and bureaucrats, who might agree with the actions proposed if an actual attack should come, is not to rock the boat now. But NATO faces a crisis of strategy; doing nothing is becoming more dangerous. One alternative is to massively build up NATO conventional forces, a hard choice. Another (one that is by no means an adequate substitute for a buildup) is for the NATO governments to shift their stance toward Eastern Europe in the way suggested here.

The main changes in Western policy that such a shift would entail are explicit recognition of the mutual interest of the West and the East Europeans in avoiding a conflict, a Western declaration of respect for the neutrality of those countries that would stay out of any conflict with the West, and an abandonment of NATO's doctrine of doing no more than restoring the status quo ante in the event of an attack. Supporting this overall strategy would be continued efforts to engage the peoples of Eastern Europe in many ways.

None of these changes would alter the fixed conviction of Western publics and governments that they will not intervene in the recurring eruptions in Eastern Europe. The (noncrisis) policy guidelines for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty would remain unchanged.

Finally, this line of argument by itself is no solution to the defense of Europe. One simply cannot be confident of the effectiveness of an anticoalition policy aimed at deterring conflict. But one can say the same about some other elements of Western strategy, including the assumed political cohesion of NATO in a crisis and the credibility of our nuclear threat. We live with a lot of uncertainty.

If such a policy were to be adopted, it would be only a component of a larger strategy. The main emphasis in that larger strategy should be on building a stronger nonnuclear defense, a goal clearly within the technical and economic
capacity of the NATO states. It is also necessary to have a protected and controllable capacity to use nuclear weapons against an invader, if only to deter him from using these weapons.

To follow the advice of Sun Tzu, to disrupt the opponent’s alliances is only prudent, but it is not enough.
Notes

ALEXANDER ALEXIEV

DR. ROWEN'S PAPER deals with a subject I have been interested in for quite some time. It is a subject in which I have somewhat of a personal interest, since I had the dubious privilege of serving in an East European army. I really don’t have any disagreements with Dr. Rowen’s paper. What I would like to do is elaborate on some of the points he has made, and emphasize both the opportunities that are present and the need for some caution in addressing this overall issue.

Let me start by saying that, in spite of the opportunities Dr. Rowen has documented for us, virtually nothing has been done along these lines. Yet the case for doing something has, if anything, become stronger. In Western Europe you have a trend toward a growing decoupling of the NATO allies from the United States. You now have established West European parties, like the British Labor Party, arguing for unilateral disarmament, and the German Social Democratic Party is not far behind with a de facto renunciation of NATO doctrine. You also have a situation in which, if the nuclear arms control agreement of which there has been so much talk actually comes to pass, the Soviet preponderance in conventional forces will become even more politically important. So the situation in Western Europe does not look good.

On the other hand, in Eastern Europe you have a trend that could not encourage the Soviets very much. You have a growing disillusionment with the Soviet system as such—the economic system has proved a failure not only to the peoples of Eastern Europe but to their leaderships as well. You now have in Eastern Europe what I would call the institutionalization of dissent. Solidarity, despite the fact that it was suppressed, is not dead; in fact, you have a very active underground in Poland. And not only in Poland: you have peace movements in various countries; you have underground church movements in a number of East European countries; you have new ecological dissent movements,
and so forth. In other words, you have further decoupling, at least psychologically of the East Europeans from the Soviet Union. This would seem to be the kind of climate that might be conducive to policy efforts on our part to get the East Europeans to collaborate with us if push came to shove.

Let me sketch out what I think are the most important elements of a US or Western policy to exploit this situation. We clearly should attempt to exploit these cleavages, certainly before a conflict breaks out but also during a conflict. Several different kinds of cleavages should be kept in mind as we design our policy.

Of course, cleavages at the top are crucial. These are the problems that stem from the coercive nature of the Warsaw Pact alliance, which in fact is not a real alliance but rather a Soviet-imposed system of political conformity. Soviet aims in a war against Western Europe don’t really have anything to offer to the East European Communist leaders. These are strictly Soviet aims, and that’s important to keep in mind.

Then, you have cleavages between the regimes in Eastern Europe and the peoples of Eastern Europe; I won’t elaborate further on that. And then you have cleavages within the East European societies themselves.

A policy to exploit these cleavages has a political dimension, but it also needs some specific instrumentalties to make it effective. The essential message that we need to give to the East Europeans is that there is something in it for them. In other words, if they want to engage in the kinds of behavior Dr. Rowen has described, it is in their own interest; conversely, if they fail to do so, they will pay a very heavy price in terms of the destruction of their own countries. We need to let the East Europeans know that if they were not to cooperate with the West in preventing the Soviets from pursuing an aggressive policy, they themselves would be much worse off.

I think the East Europeans clearly understand that. To give one example, some six months ago a Polish general wrote an article in a military newspaper in which he said that in the event of war he expected about 300 nuclear bombs of a megaton each to be dropped on Poland, adding that a one megaton bomb would completely destroy a Polish city of half
a million people. Now, the message to the Polish people from that article is that there will be no Poland left. Whether this was done on purpose or not is a different matter, but they clearly understand what it would mean to be involved in a general war. What we need to tell Eastern Europe is that this is not necessarily going to be the case.

In fact, I think we need to go beyond Dr. Rowen’s list of targets for influence and include areas of the Soviet Union that are really part of Eastern Europe. The Baltic states are certainly much more like Eastern Europe than like Russia proper. I would go so far as to include the Ukraine. I would even go so far as to include Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. At the Rand Corporation, we have recently done a study of the reliability of the East Europeans based on interviews with former East European and Soviet servicemen. One of our most surprising findings was that a considerable number of Soviet soldiers have tried to defect from their units in East Germany. We talked to East German border guards who confirmed this to us. So it’s not that the Soviet army itself is that monolithic—and that may be another area we need to look at.

We also need to institute a number of policies beyond the basic message that Dr. Rowen described. We need to design policies that would serve to counteract efforts the Soviets are now pursuing to enforce cohesion and prevent unreliability. In the study I just mentioned, one of our findings was that while there is a great deal of fragility in the East European armies, there is also no reason to expect that they will simply rise up and come over to our side without our doing anything to encourage it. Many factors militate against this, such as the massive indoctrination to which soldiers in Eastern Europe are subjected, which works to some extent. Many of the people we talked to were certainly no friends of the regime, but were still convinced that there was a threat from the West to their particular countries. They had no idea of the real balance of forces. They had no idea that NATO has no offensive capabilities.
GENERAL WAR

Let me give you one example of the Soviets’ vulnerability. In the early 1960s, the second edition of Marshal Sokolovskiy’s seminal work on Soviet military strategy included a minor change. According to the new edition, it was now possible that after the outbreak of war there would be a short period during which the war would be localized, even if it were nuclear. The East Europeans—in this particular case the Czechs, many of whom we interviewed—looked at that and said, “Look at this—what they’re trying to tell us is that they will use us as cannon fodder, then try to make a deal with the Americans.”

This circumstance led to very serious dissatisfaction within the officer corps in Czechoslovakia beginning in the mid-sixties, and within two years you had a major problem in their military, when they started looking at the Warsaw Pact as something that might not be the best for them. In fact, anyone familiar with the Prague Spring knows that the military were in the forefront of the reform movement, at least partly because of their dissatisfaction with Soviet doctrine, which they believed would sacrifice their own men for Soviet purposes. Messages about this aspect of Soviet doctrine would, I think, still find a very receptive audience.

Let me say just a few words about the instrumentalities of the kind of policy I am discussing. What we need to do now is convince the Soviets that we’re not only talking about these things but also serious about doing something about them. Unless they’re convinced that we are prepared to execute certain policies, they’re not going to be bothered much. Talk is cheap, and they know that the West’s talk is sometimes cheaper than anybody else’s.

Dr. Rowen mentioned the crucial role of radio communications—Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Not long ago, a Soviet propagandist gave a lecture in which he admitted that 60 percent of the Soviet population listens to Western radio and, what is even more important, that the number of people below the age of 30 that listen to it is two to three times higher than the number of those above 30. That fact has definite implications for us.
Another important trend in Eastern Europe, as well as in the West, that offers great opportunities for influencing these people is the so-called information revolution. Again, not long ago there was a series of articles in a Polish newspaper authored by the military political administration (and therefore from the top) called “The Information War.” Personal computers are a great worry for them—according to these authors, there are some 150,000 personal computers in Poland that the government cannot control. More important is the influence of Western TV. They tell us that in Poland now, with a very simple antenna, you can receive twelve Western TV stations—with reception of at least some as good as reception of Polish TV, and with more attractive programs. But they say this is nothing compared to what will happen when they put a geostationary satellite above Poland—then they’ll be in big trouble. This business of satellite TV has become a serious concern in all of Eastern Europe, and it’s not something they can do much about.

Above and beyond these instrumentalities for communication, there are some areas that are much more operational. I’d prefer not to discuss them here, but to give one example, as I mentioned at the outset, you have in Poland an effective underground that has been functioning for five years, and the regime has not been able to do much about it. And it’s not just in Poland—in Lithuania you have an underground church operating now for close to twenty years, and the same thing has happened in Czechoslovakia, in the Western Ukraine, and so on. Everybody talks about the vaunted Soviet Spetsnaz; but right here in this country we have ethnic Americans who could be used in a variety of capacities.

Before I finish, let me sound a note of caution. All these things are important, and it is high time we took a close look at them and did something about them. But at the same time, we should be very careful not to present these kinds of potential Soviet vulnerabilities as a panacea for our military problems with the Soviet Union, as is often done. Some people look at the East Europeans and conclude that we don’t need
to worry about them. The German Social Democrats, after their latest congress at Essen, essentially renounced NATO nuclear doctrine, while at the same time saying that there wasn't enough money for conventional defense; and shortly afterward they came up with a paper arguing that the Soviets are not that much of a threat anyway because all the East Europeans are unreliable. So we have to be concerned about that. Political warfare is only effective if you have adequate military power to back it up.

EDWARD ATKESON

I CAME TO THE THESIS of Dr. Rowen's paper with some degree of skepticism. Dr. Rowen was formerly my benevolent boss on the National Intelligence Council. One day he called me up to his office and asked me to bring my estimate of Soviet general purpose forces. We sat down and he said, "Now, talk to me about the reliability of East European forces." I began leafing through the estimate, but could find only one short paragraph with perhaps six sentences in it, essentially saying that we don't know much about this subject. He told me that I needed no further instructions but should come back when I had something more interesting and instructive to say on the matter.

I saw Dr. Rowen about ten months later, after much bureaucratic blood had been spilled. We must have worked
six days a week during most of that period. It was an enormously educational experience, not just for me, but for the entire intelligence community. I'm not sure that we all came out a whole lot wiser, but we came out somewhat more humble about our preconceptions about the role of the East European forces in the Warsaw Pact. The one thing that particularly impressed me when we had finished the exercise was that there ought to be a policy document to match the intelligence estimate. I have never seen one. The closest thing I've seen to a matching policy proposal is Dr. Rowen's paper.

Early on in his paper, Dr. Rowen points out the basic asymmetry between Eastern and Western strategies regarding the promotion of divisions within the opposing camp. I think he makes a very persuasive case that the West has missed an opportunity to arm itself with a potentially effective device for enhancing deterrence and its overall security posture. Particularly important, I think, is the point that Soviet planners are far less likely to advocate resort to arms for the subjugation of Western Europe in a time of crisis if the specter of the disintegration of their rear area hangs over them.

Three additional points might be made to strengthen his case. First, there is solid evidence that the Soviets are acutely aware of and sensitive to Western influence with their East European allies, modest as that influence has been in recent years. Just last year, General Gribkov, deputy commander and chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, had this to say: "From the first years of its existence, the Warsaw Pact has been subjected to constant attacks by bourgeois ideologists striving to distort its genuine goals and nature and to ascribe intentions to it which are in no way compatible with the spirit and letter of the Pact. The intentions of our ideological adversaries are clear. They would like to undermine the unity and cohesion of the Warsaw Pact member states, and to destroy the combat community of the fraternal countries and their armies, in order to weaken the combined might of the socialist defense political alliance."

I think the general protests too much. There have been few such "attacks." But whatever did go across General
Gribkov’s desk apparently struck a raw nerve, suggesting very keen awareness on the Soviets’ part of the true nature of their “alliance”: It is an organization run by Russians for the support of Russian interests, and with the potential for dangerous developments should the West adopt a strategy of the sort Dr. Rowen suggests.

Second, I believe Dr. Rowen may have understated the degree to which the Soviets depend on the forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states. The Warsaw Treaty Organization dates from 1955, but it was not until the beginning of the succeeding decade that the Soviets began to take their own creation seriously. The first combined exercise was held in 1961, in response, John Caravelli has suggested, to a growing perception on the Soviets’ part that there was a need to increase their defensive (or striking) posture in Eastern Europe in light of heightened tensions over Berlin and in the Far East.

The Soviets appear now to have many more military problems to deal with than they did then. There is Afghanistan, and the whole matter of the Persian Gulf and the southern theater of military operations. There is renewed participation by France in NATO planning. There is the development by the United States of a far less passive and defensive tactical doctrine, with its concept of AirLand Battle; NATO, too, has developed the notion of deep attack against follow-on forces. There is the qualitative upgrade of NATO forces underway with the Leopard II and M-1 tanks, and much other new equipment. There is the addition of Spain to the alliance—admittedly not much in the way of ready forces, but a lot of additional terrain for Pact planners to worry about.

In short, if the Soviets felt a pinch for forces in the mid-1960s, they are certainly aware of a need for help from their allies today. Matters are now probably well past the point where a Soviet unilateral attack on the West would be a feasible option, even if the Soviets were administratively supported by their allies. The Soviets have become more dependent on the military contribution of their allies, particularly
those of the northern tier, just as their allies have been showing less basis for Soviet confidence in their reliability. We should not be surprised to see more Soviet writings now dealing with the notion of protracted conflict.

Third, and finally, I would add a remark to Dr. Rowen's point that there are really not many reasons that East European states would want to participate in an attack on the West in the first place. Perhaps the East German regime harbors dreams of controlling the Ruhr—it sounds a little far-fetched, but I suppose anything is possible for the doctrinaire mind. As a practical matter, however, the East European peoples have many more issues for dispute among themselves—and with the Soviet Union—than they do with the West. After Bonn's acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line and adoption of Ostpolitik, there is simply not much left to inspire East European hatred or fear of the West. On the other hand, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania can all look back at territories taken from them by the Soviet Union. The Romanians and Bulgarians have the issue of southern Dobrogea between them; the Romanians and Hungarians have Transylvania. And I don't want to guess about possible differences between East German and Polish views of the ideal order of things in Pomerania and Silesia.

Christopher Donnelly, of the Center for Soviet Studies in Sandhurst, has pointed out that many of these people hate each other, and if there is anyone they hate more, it is the Russians. In any event, there is simply not a great deal about the West to raise the ire of the broad populations of Eastern Europe. There would have to be some sort of stimulus to arouse hostility, such as fear of West German military resurgence. Although there is little practical prospect for invasion of the East by any Western army during the early days of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, it is not at all clear that all East Europeans would necessarily oppose such an invasion, depending, of course, upon the circumstances and the particular nationalities involved.

So the Soviets are in a bit of a dilemma. If they cry wolf very often over the "threat" of Western attack, they may
encourage those in Eastern Europe who would welcome a Western liberation of the East. On the other hand, if they don't, they may be left with little persuasive justification for prodding their allies for further heavy defense expenditures and intensification of Pact military training.

I believe Dr. Rowen describes a useful option for the West, and one that has happily arrived as the traditional deterrent formula is becoming frayed under the impact of changes in the military balance and growing popular allergy to nuclear weapons. Clearly rejecting the simplistic and highly provocative "rollback" of the 1950s, he offers a reasonable, feasible, and effective tool for the Western alliance in dealing with the Pact. I must also say that his thesis is not one that is likely to be readily embraced by our own allies. It is going to take time and patience to put it across to them. Nevertheless, I believe it merits that effort.
Some may think it odd that a conference on such sensitive matters as Soviet practices of diversion, camouflage, and deception should involve people and entities outside government. Surely, however, the valid reason for private sector concern is that one major target for Soviet PSYWAR is public opinion. Anti-tank weapons hurt soldiers; but Moscow's "PSYOP bombs" disorient Main Street civilians as well as policymakers.

The Kremlin, whose leaders have studied the manipulative arts of Sun Tzu and Pavlov, routinely acts to enervate the national will of opposing states. By alternating the strategy of terror with promises of detente, the Politburo seeks to induce neurotic mood-swings in noncommunist elites. What democracy can sustain a grand design in foreign policy when its leadership groups are moved first from alarm to euphoria, then back through despondency to febrile hope, by a cycle of Soviet-engineered threats and thaws, invasions and reforms, insurgencies and glasnost, and double jeopardy disarmament games?

From Lenin's "New Economic Policy" through Khrushchev's "Peaceful Coexistence" to Gorbachev's "New Thinking," Western thought has been so entranced by the caress of velvet semantics it could not discern the unvarying components of Soviet statecraft: blood and iron; ideology, guile, and propaganda; the primacy of Party, army, and secret police. Whoever is even somewhat aware of Soviet active measures in the field perceives that in time of so-called peace, inside our own democracy and in other vulnerable
societies (e.g., Britain, Mexico, New Zealand, the Philippines, West Germany, Japan, South Korea), ideological radiation is constantly inflicting casualties among civilian opinion-makers. So the private sector must study Soviet PSYWAR to help protect itself and, should it have the creativity, to innovate some positive countermeasures in the battle of ideas.

Some would argue that the ethics of democracy preclude too strenuous a concern with propaganda. Proponents of this school have long maintained that the Voice of America should be a dispassionate news service rather than an ideological combatant against Communism. Such an ideal is superficially attractive. But in a world wherein falsehood is aggressively disseminated by advanced technology, is it not both necessary and moral to propagate the truth with equal vigor and persistence, even though such structured activity constitutes a form of propaganda?

Theory aside, history reveals that America has waged effective propaganda once the enemy was officially identified. For example, the superiority of the Anglo-American propaganda campaign in World War I was a result partly of Woodrow Wilson's creation of the Committee on Public Information in August of 1917. Its civilian chief was George Creel, but its other members were the secretaries of state, war, and navy—an unusual mix of directors for what was to become the equivalent of a ministry of propaganda.1 That "ministry"—by recruiting editors, press agents, scholars, and journalists—managed America's transition from an isolationist, antimilitary democracy to a militant war machine that sustained the AEF with a draft law, Liberty Bonds, and food rationing.

The Creel Committee engineered "voluntary" censorship of all war news. It financed patriotic ads. It inflamed passion against the Kaiser by inspiring cartoons, sponsoring war exhibits at state fairs, producing pro-war buttons and window stickers, and generating rumors. It commissioned scholarly

books, trained teachers, prepared fillers for school newspapers, made films, and maintained a national cadre of "Four-Minute Men" who agitated civic clubs with oratory prepared by the committee. It was certainly effective; but for modern tastes the Creel Committee (or CPI) was too zealous, too indifferent to the nuances of the first amendment, and too prone to overstate (even fabricate) the "Atrocities of the Hun." In many quarters, there was a sigh of relief when the CPI went out of business in June 1919. For more than twenty years, America's propaganda weapon was again sheathed and left hanging on the wall.

Then, largely avoiding the excesses of the CPI, during World War II the teams of Elmer Davis and Wild Bill Donovan, together with the British, played a professional propaganda game versus the Nazis. At the war's end, Washington and New York City were home to hundreds of alumni of OWI and OSS. The political climate, chilled by the Red Army's imposition of Russian hegemony on the nations of Eastern Europe, hardened against Moscow's further ambitions. With his conspicuous cruelty, Stalin was almost as effective as Hitler in creating a moral consensus to oppose him. In consequence, the onset of the Cold War enlisted the energies of such prominent figures as Allen Dulles, David Sarnoff, Francis Cardinal Spellman, and Lucius Clay. Gordon Gray lent his patrician prestige to the chairmanship of the Psychological Strategy Board, which had direct access to the president. The legendary C. D. Jackson, publisher of Fortune and Eisenhower's top wartime adviser on PSYWAR, was busy setting up Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—in those exhilarating days called Radio Liberation. Perhaps this was the golden era for American PSYOP.

In the presidential campaign of 1952, candidate Eisenhower and his future secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, promised to abandon the passive policy of containment in favor of a roll-back of the Iron Curtain from Eastern Europe. In auditoriums in Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and New York, tens of thousands of Americans—with Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Baltic, and Ukrainian origins—cheered
senators from both parties who spoke in honor of "Captive Nations Week." Rhetoric was underlined with legislation. In the Mutual Security Act of 1951, a bipartisan vote authorized $100 million to create—from Iron Curtain exiles of military age—a Legion of Freedom to be attached to NATO for paramilitary and PSYOP objectives.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom financed hundreds of European scholars and journalists who articulated the case for NATO. Later on, the Asia Foundation supported the cause of freedom in the Pacific theater. In 1951, the author worked for the "American Friends of Russian Freedom," a private committee set up by Eugene Lyons of the Reader's Digest and a young Wall Street lawyer named William J. Casey. Its aims were to provide jobs and visas to assist the defection of Russian troops in Berlin and to drive a propaganda wedge between the Russian people and their Leninist overlords.

The congenial climate for American PSYOP was polluted in the seventeen years that followed 1956; not until President Reagan's Westminster speech was there again much sunshine. The theme of "liberation" was consigned to the dustbin by the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution, the winterizing of the Prague Spring, and the erection of the Berlin Wall. The brutal mismatch between raw Soviet power and ineffectual diplomatic protest was plain to see. And how could commitment to the eventual freedom of captive nations survive the Bay of Pigs, the Soviet share in the Helsinki Accords, and the illusions of detente?

We did have a robust PSYOP program during the Vietnam War and some heroic practitioners in the field, both military and civilian. But American PSYOP in Southeast Asia was tactical and largely limited to the immediate theater of conflict, while Communist PSYOP was strategic and global, as well as diverse, disguised, and emotionally strident. The occasional State Department White Paper sent to European capitals—or the earnest foreign service spokesman dispatched to the American campus—met negation in a rip-tide of anti-Vietnam hysteria. We were trying to win the
hearts and minds of various ethnic groups in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Our enemy was aiming to stir the souls and passions of statesmen, students, editors, and television producers throughout Europe and the United States. We sought defection from guerrilla ranks in the Southeast Asian jungle. Hanoi—aided by Moscow and its world network of Communist parties and front groups—was intent on severing the political life-support system for Saigon precariously sustained by US public opinion and the Congress.

Why was the PSYOP contest so asymmetrical? One might assume that a "battle of ideas" should have been won by a superpower that had more communications consultants, advertising executives, information and media specialists, political advisers, public relations professionals, and psychologists than the total number of infantry soldiers in Hanoi's army. It would not be sufficient to answer that US media (and political) elites were divided over war aims, or even that acknowledged American skill in marketing products or entertainment ideas does not necessarily translate into competence in a serious ideological conflict. The most important reason for the Hanoi-Moscow "ideo-military" victory was that American PSYOP in Vietnam had no moral or political grounding in the deepest levels of White House policy. Against Hitler, Washington was certain that its cause was just and America was in the fight to win. In Vietnam, the feckless objective of stalemate through attrition helped to dissipate those assets of political elan and rectitude with which anti-Nazi PSYWAR was intermeshed.

In short, cheerleading in favor of a tie score, for a team whose opponents are perceived as morally equivalent even by many hometown fans, is an exercise in self-stultification. The fault sometimes may lie not in our PSYOP but in our policy; no magic communications can for long make credible a flawed objective. In Nicaragua, unhappily, we may be on the verge of re-proving that melancholy thesis of realpolitik. The polls indicate that President Reagan has not persuaded a majority of the US citizenry to support aid to the Contras. Does that suggest a failure at public education by the White House
or artful Soviet-Cuban-Sandinista disinformation at work? Probably a little of both. Another explanation, however, lies in the disparity between the magnitude of the alleged threat and the insipid prescription.

If the Sandinistas are, in fact, the myrmidons of the Soviet Empire, and if they harbor the zeal both to grant the Russians a military base on our doorstep and to export further Communist revolution up the ladder of Central America into Mexico, then why are we entrusting so vital a matter of our own national security to a smallish band of exiles, however brave the Contra volunteers may be? The means don't square with the premise of the peril. Or consider the message of our uncertain trumpet from the acoustical angle of the Contras. It is one thing to risk one's life to overthrow an illegitimate Leninist regime and establish a free Nicaragua; it is quite another to be asked to die for a remote Washington game of merely needling Ortega until he cuts off supplies for Communist rebels in El Salvador.

Given such a paltry goal, how can American PSYOP create any "bandwagon" effect for the Contra cause and encourage mass defections of those impressed into service by Managua? Yes, Soviet active measures have spawned misleading myths about the issues in Nicaragua; but exposing those myths will not pave the way to democracy in that country unless the US objective can command the passion and intelligence of honorable men.

Granting that even brilliant PSYOP is no substitute for sound policy, one should not minimize the urgent need to upgrade American sensitivity to the whole spectrum of non-military warfare. No treaties to limit this mode of conflict are even proposed. No arms control agreement seeks to reduce Soviet arsenals of propaganda weapons; no verification would be possible of KGB cutbacks in deployment of subversive agents across borders; no promised dismantling of Communist active measures production lines could be enforced. But on our side, especially if we move into the era of born-again detente, unilateral self-denial of PSYWAR options will be fostered by societal ignorance or disapproval.
To overcome that ignorance and remove the disapproval, we need persuasive (bipartisan) tutorials on the realities of US-Soviet competition. We need consciousness-raising about the Kremlin’s disinformation tactics and PSYOP gambits precisely because we may be on the eve of a series of arms control agreements that will reduce nuclear stockpiles and perhaps even conventional forces. If the terms are equitable and can be verified—and if we respond to violations by Moscow with meaningful sanctions, not just “protests”—the West should welcome this process. It is manifestly worth testing whether glasnost is a simple facelift or deep therapy that will permanently alter the behavior of Mother Russia. But the democracies must understand that, especially as some nuclear missiles are dismantled, psychological weaponry could become even more decisive than in the past. Satellite TV connects with the entire globe; and Secretary Gorbachev—a protege of Andropov and Suslov—is a veteran of ideological combat who has armed himself with communications arts that are effectively transcultural.

We cannot yet judge whether glasnost will lead to structural and irreversible changes in the Leninist monopoly of power over the Soviet Empire that would truly enhance our security. What is almost certain is that the “spirit of glasnost,” made palpable by media hype, will create among the democracies too optimistic an estimate of future defense needs. While negotiating prudently about “zero options,” we must recognize that, in a climate of hopeful credulity, Soviet PSYOP can replay up-to-date versions of its historical themes of peaceful coexistence, redesigned this time to denigrate the Pentagon, SDI, US Special Forces, and NATO modernization. The presumed benign intent of glasnost, for example, has not yet inhibited Gorbachev’s regime from inciting Africans to believe that US defense factories generated the AIDS virus, or from inflaming India with the rumor that Washington hatched the plot to assassinate Mrs. Gandhi. These canards seem so irrational as to be self-defeating. But, owing to our passivity in rebuting Moscow’s myth-making, Soviet PSYWAR has created among Third World students
and politicians a Pavlovian antipathy to anything that can be labeled a product of American imperialism.

In addition, with Gorbachev leading the Soviets, we face the "modernization" of the war of ideas. Just as the hardware of missiles can be modernized, so can the software of PSYWAR. Stalin's primitive propaganda bombs were aimed at the "working masses" of America in a crude effort to foment revolution against Wall Street. Today, new Soviet PSYOP warheads are precision-guided and independently targeted not on the masses but on the elite: scientists, educators, lawyers, physicians, businessmen, congressmen. From blatant polemics in the Daily Worker to low-key, plausible KGB lobbyists on Capitol Hill, there is a disquieting evolution in PSYWAR software. Even the deportment and elocution code of the Soviet agent has been modernized. The Stalinist robot dressed and talked like a Bulgarian Al Capone; the Gorbachev salesman looks and behaves like the dean of a liberal arts college.

This modernization in PSYOP helps to ensure that Soviet twilight war in the Third World is effectively coordinated with an umbrella of active measures in Europe and the United States. Moscow's aim is to interdict the battlefield—not with air strikes but with political warfare that discredits anticommunist resistance and dries up its logistical support from natural allies in the Western democracies.

Gorbachev's new PSYOP executive team—headed by Alexander Yakovlev—are rather like cultural anthropologists who have developed shrewd insights into the mores of the American media and the vanities of the American establishment. They are aided by Soviet market research and opinion polling (unthinkable in Stalin's era). With up-to-date analysis of our societal delusions, they no longer need to rely solely on forcing alien concepts into our system. Now, they troll our mainstream for useful bits of idiocy—and simply repackage them. (For example, the "nuclear winter" hobgoblin, so exploited by peace groups, was not invented by Moscow, but recycled.)
Now let us spend a minute on the centrality to successful PSYOP of moral passion and the conviction of a just cause. In the Third World and in Europe, Leninist agitators arouse emotional frenzy—not just intellectual dissent—over such shibboleths as neo-Fascist revival in West Germany and the American military-industrial complex. Communist PSYOP, in short, does not simply reach for hearts and minds; it activates envy, fear, and anger by stirring primal emotions. In the subsoil of hatred, Soviet active measures take easy root and gain nutrients. How easy it is to believe something sinister about someone we already have been induced to despise.

By way of contrast, Communism's manifold crimes against humanity are often cited by Washington in tones of British understatement. Such moderation may suit the preference of the foreign service, but it will never produce street theater outside Soviet embassies. Lest this observation be misunderstood, let me make clear I do not suggest that America borrow the tactics of Goebbels or Suslov. We should never manufacture lies, and hatred is scarcely democracy's export product. But one of the hallmarks of Western civilization has been the capacity of its peoples for moral indignation toward dictators who choke human freedom and squash self-determination for small nations. It is neither uncivilized nor antidemocratic to mobilize legitimate revulsion against tyrants guilty of conspicuous, provable cruelty.

Let us agree to detest apartheid and revile Hitler's holocaust. But where is the equivalent emotional disgust for the Communist wardens who supervise today's holocausts in Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan? Why need we smother outrage about contemporary concentration camps in Cuba and Vietnam? Effective PSYOP must arouse the passion that generates commitment. We are entitled to righteous wrath.

So, in the PSYOP combat with Moscow, we need to add a linguistic barb to our insipid semantics. We refer to the Politburo gang as "adversaries" or "competitors." Such terms
are more suitable to the context of the Olympic Games. The men whose underlings have severed Europe with 1,100 kilometers of barbed wire and mine fields—from the Baltic to the Adriatic—are not opponents; they are barbarians. And Red Army troops who drop booby-trapped toys in Afghanistan as lethal gifts for children are savages and war criminals.

If we gloss over Communist atrocities, we should not be surprised that much of the world adopts the posture of moral neutrality between Moscow and Washington. We will not animate many audiences by observing, “East German security personnel collaborate in assisting the Soviet mission in Africa.” We could, however, put the case more bluntly by saying, “The reborn Gestapo is alive and well and policing Moscow’s colonies in Africa.” This is crude by racquet club standards—but it’s true and may increase the flow of virtuous adrenalin. This is not to suggest that the president or secretary of state should use that language; but senators, editors, professors, lawyers, and labor and business leaders are not strangers to acerbic slogans.

Our mission, of course, is not to list tiresomely all the cultural and historical factors that favor Moscow, but rather to innovate ideas that may help narrow the gap in PSYWAR capabilities between the Leninist bloc and the open societies. To do so, we need not emulate the totalitarians. We are not entirely strangers to intense ideo-political combat in our culture—we only need to think of Democrats vs. Republicans in election years. Staying well within the limits of our tradition and the law, we need not treat the Politburo any more indecorously than American partisans treat each other during a presidential campaign. It is not so much the constraint of ethics that hampers our psychological contest with the Soviets. It is perhaps that most of those Americans with natural instincts for political warfare are preoccupied with electing clients to the Senate and White House or negotiating between management and labor. We lack neither aficionados of politics nor matadors; their priorities are merely centered more on struggles in Detroit and Iowa than on contests in Angola or Poland.
How will we know when we begin to redress the balance in the PSYOP arena? There are, to be sure, hundreds of ways. Let me, as an agent provocateur, list twelve:

1. When the curricula of our staff and war colleges—plus those of our allies in Europe—include adequate instruction in ideology, PSYOP, "active measures," and subversive war. (In the modern military arts, Lenin and Mao are as relevant as Clausewitz.)

2. When career foreign service officers and USIA professionals are sensitized to the same subject matter in their own institutes and training programs, since perhaps 70 percent of the official PSYOP mission should be the responsibility of civilian agencies.

3. When DOD contracts to a task force of Russian scholars and East European specialists, together with clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and carefully screened Iron Curtain defectors, to prepare sophisticated audio cassettes for clandestine distribution in time of crisis to diverse national troops in the Warsaw Pact. The same expertise—based on a discriminating knowledge of Polish history, Hungarian culture, Ukrainian national pride, etc.—should be available for messages on black radio and *Samizdat Underground Video*. (The substance and uncertain delivery system of army leaflets need to be upgraded to become state-of-the-art PSYOP.)

4. When professional US PSYWAR specialists attend future Helsinki, Geneva, Vienna, and Reykjavik type conferences to neutralize the current Soviet PSYOP edge ensured by the presence of Yakovlev and Arbatov.

5. When, on a NATO-wide basis, as there are now periodic meetings of foreign and defense ministers, there will be annual meetings of information and education ministers to discuss Psychological Defense, including joint subsidies for the translation...
and distribution of relevant books that now are published—often for very limited readership—in Spanish or French, German or English, but for want of small grants to cover translation costs never see the light of libraries in other languages.

6. When the defunct Institute for Propaganda Analysis—set up in the late 1930s to monitor Nazi themes—is reconstituted to study and expose Soviet PSYWAR gambits.


8. When American college students—in addition to building shanty-towns to protest racial apartheid—erect Gulag prison huts to protest the abuse of dissident Soviet writers doomed to drug-induced psychosis by the wardens of Soviet clinics. And when American “physicians for social responsibility” show social outrage against the Politburo for this unspeakable perversion of medicine.

9. When more American schools of journalism and communications emulate Boston University and offer courses on how to safeguard US media against Soviet disinformation.

10. When another dozen or so of our professional societies form their own in-house committees to mobilize private sector talent for the PSYOP game. The American Bar Association and the International Confederation of Reserve Officers have taken that step. The officers have a committee on psychological defense with a program focused on European public opinion. The ABA has a Blue Ribbon Committee of Lawyers that has trained thousands of teachers in Communist propaganda strategy and that refutes Soviet disinformation about SDI and Central America.
11. When, if the Warsaw Pact assaults NATO, the US Army and perhaps our German and British allies can quickly deploy trained specialists for "deep strike" commando missions athwart Red Army supply lines in Eastern Europe—their aim being to incite sabotage, defeatism, and revolt among Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and East Germans who despise Russian hegemony. The necessary prelude to such a contingency plan could be a variety of subtle, "peace-time" PSYOP targeted on a selected handful of East European military and political elites. That job will require finesse, cultural empathy, and linguistic skills—talents that lie in America's melting-pot society.

12. Finally, we can claim some success when American PSYOP—both private and governmental—have together created an "opinion climate" that will permit, even applaud, the reversal of the Brezhnev Doctrine, whether by diplomatic pressure, ideological assault, aid to freedom fighters, or a combination of all the above. Grenada was too small to be decisive. Afghanistan may be too close to the USSR and too invested with Red Army divisions to allow for a complete reversal. (Of course we should try even there, especially owing to the impact of Afghanistan's fate—one way or the other—on the future of Iran, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf.)

Other opportunities for nullifying the Brezhnev fallacy—that "the tide of tyranny is irreversible"—lie in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Libya. All those prison states are distant from Mother Russia. All have seaports vulnerable to blockade or quarantine. None have armed forces up to the quality or numbers of those in Vietnam or North Korea. In every case, there is a substantial resistance potential. Morally, each is an "outlaw" nation whose leaders specialize in everything from terrorism to Stalin's old technique of genocide through forced starvation (Mengistu, for example).
Liberation of even one of those outer islands of the Gulag Archipelago will not be casualty free. But if we do liberate one, it may spare us blood and treasure elsewhere in the Third World, whence lie the oil, cobalt, chrome, and manganese that underpin the productivity of Europe, Japan, and the United States. Someplace, we need to put the Soviet bandwagon of proxy warfare in the ditch. Someplace, we must prove to wavering Third World leaders—fearful of Moscow’s juggernaut—that the future no more belongs to the dogma of Brezhnev than it belongs to disproven Marxist economics.

Moreover, there is a strategic bonus to be derived from helping to liberate Angola or Libya, Nicaragua or Ethiopia, Mozambique or Afghanistan. Even one such success would send seismic political shockwaves back into Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Mongolia. The Politburo and Red Army marshals would be even more unsure of Warsaw Pact allies. The liberation of a Third World satellite—plus vigorous PSYOP in both Western and Eastern Europe—would be another deterrent in another dimension. He who cannot trust the troops in his unstable coalition is less likely to put things to the test in the fog of war.

It will not be easy to do any of the above. Distaste for PSYOP, even in the defensive mode, will make it difficult to familiarize Western political, diplomatic, and military elites with this unorthodox dimension of conflict. Some foreign policy establishments will see proposals for US initiatives or counterattack in the PSYOP arena as provocative. Then too, predictably, Soviet PSYWAR weaponry will launch preemptive strikes against the blueprint and R&D phases of even protective NATO measures in this field. For example, training of Western editors to analyze Moscow’s ongoing disinformation campaigns will be branded as an atavistic urge to refight the Cold War.

Must we, therefore, abjectly concede that we can do nothing to prevent the intellectual climate from being polluted by borrowings from Goebbels and Pavlov, Lenin and Mao? The encouraging answer is, no. Over the past fifteen
years, a growing number of scholars in the security field have illuminated the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The subject matter of Intelligence is now taught in at least 100 American universities. A dozen European think-tanks have recently added the topic of Soviet disinformation to their portfolio of studies. More journalists are writing about this area with depth and sophistication. In our government, a new DOD directorate and interagency committees address themselves to this subject matter, while Congress is pressing the Pentagon to devote more funds and personnel to low-intensity warfare.

Many Third World nations are no longer beguiled by Marxist economic dogma, and Lenin's theses have become boring—especially to Russians, East Europeans, and the Chinese. On human rights issues, Western diplomats (and private groups of emigres and civil libertarians) have become more resolute and adept at debate; Soviet propaganda no longer prevails at human rights conferences. Books on Soviet disinformation have appeared recently in Greece, Italy, and West Germany; reserve officers in Scandinavia have put Communist PSYOP on their study agenda; a seminar on PSYWAR was held earlier this year in The Hague; the press in London is newly alive to the same subject; and the most anti-Leninist intelligentsia in the world publish prolifically in Paris.

Obviously, all these initiatives must be multiplied and expanded into new dimensions if the democracies are to safeguard their policies from Communist PSYOP and disinformation. But good people are in place on the fortress walls and good programs are underway. We are not alone. While we negotiate strenuously with Moscow for equitable reductions in military hardware, we can immunize our social order against political disorientation, thus avoiding incremental defeat in the twilight zone of PSYOP by reviving those skills America employed with such finesse on behalf of freedom several decades ago.
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