



Situation Report

Date issued: 13 May 2011
Author: Lansana Gberie¹
Distribution: General
Contact: lgberie@issafrica.org

The 2011 elections in Nigeria: a new dawn?

Executive summary

Nigerians went to the polls in April to vote for members of the National Assembly, president and governors in the fourth nationwide elections since the return to civil rule in 1999. The elections have been deemed to be the most organised, free and fair in the country's history, but they were far from flawless. International observers described the votes as a 'significant improvement' over previous ones, which is a correct characterisation. Pre-election violence, including bomb attacks (which killed dozens of people) as well as the cumbersome new voting system used – in which registered voters had to be certified at designated polling booths in the morning and then vote in the afternoon – ensured that there was a low turnout. Of the close to 74 million registered voters (of an overall population of more than 150 million), only 39 469 484 people voted in the crucial presidential elections. There were reports of voting by underage voters in baggy pants (mainly in the north of the country), and there were attempts to steal ballot boxes. A total of 1 259 978 votes were disqualified by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

The incumbent, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, from the impoverished and politically marginalised Niger Delta region, won comfortably, and was certified by the chair of the INEC, Attahiru Jega, as duly elected on 18 April, two days after voting. Violence, already evident in several northern towns, erupted in major cities in the northern half of the country, which was almost entirely won by Jonathan's chief rival, the former military leader general Muhamadu Buhari. Youths chanting 'Only Buhari!' rampaged through northern cities, killing supporters of Jonathan and burning down houses. As many as 1 000 people may have been killed, far higher than the number killed during and after the heavily rigged elections of 2007. That would be noted as a lesson of sorts.

Buhari, who had clearly hoped for a run-off, claimed that the returns in Jonathan's southern strongholds had been rigged and called for a forensic examination of the ballots. Though Jonathan commanded majority support in the country, there are certainly grounds for Buhari's objection. While overall voter turnout was low, hovering around 50 to 60 per cent, voter turnout in some areas of the south was way higher. That could be explained perhaps by the fact that enthusiasm for Jonathan in these areas is very high, although his Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is far from popular there. The official results of the balloting are certainly somewhat suspect – they indicated perhaps some sophisticated tampering by the PDP, which has a notorious record of rigging elections. The results from Cross River state gave the PDP 97,67 per cent, from Rivers state 98,04 per cent, from

* The opinions expressed in this Situation Report do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its Trustees, members of the Council, or donors. Institute research staff and outside contributors write and comment in their personal capacity and their views do not represent a formal position by the ISS.

Delta 98,50 per cent and from Abia 98,98 per cent. Akwa Ibom state in the south of the country gave Jonathan 95 per cent. The mainly Igbo Anambra state, not at all a major stronghold of either Jonathan or the PDP, gave the incumbent 99 per cent. With characteristic modesty, Jonathan gracefully accepted only 99,63 per cent in his home state of Bayelsa. The margin between Jonathan and Buhari in the latter's strongholds were much narrower (See Table 2 on page 5).

The national chairman of Buhari's Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) delivered a formal petition against INEC's rejection of results from 22 states, many in the south, among them Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Rivers, Anambra, Enugu and Lagos. The petition demanded that the 'ballot papers and result sheets ... from these zones and states' be subjected to further 'scrutiny in the interest of peace, prosperity, and free, fair and credible elections'.²

There could be a long legal tussle, although Buhari had earlier rejected claims that he was seeking legal recourse. Although he initially dithered on condemning the spreading violence, to his credit he finally disowned the perpetrators. Buhari has been defeated three times by the PDP in his presidential bid.

The presidential results were very disappointing for the anti-corruption crusader Nuhu Ribadu, of the very progressive Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). Ribadu, who like Buhari hails from the north, received only 2 079 159 votes to Jonathan's 22 495 187 and Buhari's 12 214 853. Initial indications suggested that key governors and notables of his party had made deals with the PDP to support Jonathan in return for future favours. In any case, Ribadu, a newcomer to Nigeria's tough electoral field, never really had a chance even in areas where his party held governorships (mainly the south-west), since as a northerner he was deemed far less palatable than Jonathan, from the minority Ijaw in the south. He also had little chance against the veteran campaigner Buhari.

Now with a mandate of his own, Jonathan is in a good position to enact significant reforms in Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa's largest democracy, its most populated country, and the most strategic in West Africa. It is the continent's largest oil producer, and its most enthusiastic peace enforcer. Nigerians have high hopes that the country, disfigured by decades of corruption and mismanagement, will finally turn the corner by entrenching practices of good governance. This will demand major reforms in all public sectors in the country, which can be guaranteed only by strong and visionary leadership. Entrenched corruption in the oil industry should be a key focus. From the oil-rich Bayelsa state himself, Jonathan must be keenly aware of the ravages caused by rapacious elite exploitation of this key industry, including distorting the country's development, creating an exploitative and unproductive ruling class, causing massive environmental degradation, and impoverishing and oppressing citizens of the oil-producing regions. There is some cause for optimism in Jonathan's apparent respect for the independence of INEC and his fidelity to the democratic process, but most of the groundwork for this was made by his predecessor, the late President Umaru Yar'Adua. Little else in Jonathan's background, and nothing from his campaign platform, inspire much confidence.

He has shown no inclination, apart from pursuit of his own ambition, to upset the powerful interests that underpin the PDP. He, after all, worked patiently (as deputy) with disgraced former Bayelsa Governor Deprieye Alameyesiega, who was, even in the Nigerian context, a prodigy of excess and depravity: on being arrested and placed under house arrest in London for money laundering in 2006, Alameyesiega donned a woman's wig and clothes and, with a forged passport, flew back to Nigeria, only to be impeached by his state's legislators. Jonathan took over as governor, and was picked as running mate to Yar'Adua. On the campaign trail, one of Jonathan's key promises was to build airports in every state in the country that does not have one – the usual kind of prestige projects that guarantee that state governors and allied contractors embezzle hundreds of millions of dollars, leaving the impoverished citizens, few of whom will ever board a plane, as derelict and angry as before. With this background, any hope that Jonathan will initiate major reforms of the country is probably an absurdly forlorn anticipation.

Nigeria, however, does need to refashion its governance system to make it more equitable or, at the very least, to provide jobs for the tens of millions, many young people, who are jobless. The recent post-election violence has drawn much attention to the great poverty of northern Nigeria, but the picture is not much brighter elsewhere. According to all available statistics, the north lags behind the south on almost every measure of development; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) data, for example, indicate that 19 states of the north (all of which were carried by Buhari) have an average annual income of \$718 per person or just about half the figure as in the southern states.³ But Lagos city in the south probably has more unemployed young people than all the cities of the north combined. That should be an immediate concern for Jonathan.

Another important issue is that Jonathan's election has probably made 'zoning' – the elite consensus forged by the PDP to make sure no part of the Nigerian Federation would be politically dominant – irrelevant. This is highly significant politically. Zoning was far from perfect, but the fact that it may be principally responsible for the political stability Nigeria has enjoyed since 1999 – the longest period of civil rule since its independence in 1960 – should be a cause of deep reflection. Nigeria surely needs such consensus if it is to remain together – this is what many Nigerians call the 'National question' or, using another formulation, the 'Federal character' of the country. An important step forward would be for Jonathan to organise something like a national conference to debate the issue and forge an elite consensus to replace zoning. This situation report follows a three-week visit by the author to Nigeria – principally Abuja (the federal capital) and Lagos (the commercial capital) – in March 2011. Extensive discussions were conducted with key stakeholders in the country, and many documents and publications relating to the elections and Nigeria's politics more broadly, were reviewed during and after the visit.

'The 2011 presidential, National Assembly, gubernatorial, and State Assembly elections provide an historic opportunity for Nigeria to become a model for the rest of Africa and the world, especially for those citizens demanding democracy in their countries. All Africans deserve smooth, peaceful, transparent and credible elections. The conduct of the first round of elections indicates that Nigeria is ready to be that example. We stand with the Nigerian people in seeking free, fair and credible elections and I challenge all Nigerians to work together with even more patience and determination this weekend to produce leaders elected by the Nigerian people.' Johnnie Carson is the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (17 April 2011, a day after the presidential polls won by incumbent Goodluck Jonathan).

After two postponements due to technical problems, Nigeria conducted parliamentary, presidential, and gubernatorial elections in that order in April 2011. Though marred by pre-election violence, the elections themselves were largely peaceful, well-organised and, in the opinion of many Nigerians and the international community, fair and reflective of the popular will. Widespread violence, however, erupted after the presidential poll on 16 April, leading to hundreds of deaths.

Balloting for the National Assembly took place on Saturday 9 April, but about 15 per cent of the polling stations did not initially participate because the papers did not arrive in time. INEC had decided to adopt the modified open ballot system used in the 1992–1993 elections. According to the system used since 1999, voters were asked to leave the polling centres immediately after casting their votes – a situation held responsible for the changing of poll numbers and massive rigging. Under the modified open ballot system, voters would be allowed to stay behind and witness the counting of votes and the announcement of the scores at the polling centres. Voters would be accredited and INEC would determine the number of accredited voters in a particular polling station before voting began. The objectives are greater transparency and openness, and an environment in which every vote counts. Although crowd control at polling stations was an issue, the system worked in the National Assembly election, which was widely praised

by international and national observers alike. The usually cynical and sometimes Afrocentric *The Economist* called it 'the first credible election in Nigeria since the end of military rule 12 years ago'.⁴ 'It is off to a good start,' said Johnnie Carson, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 'We have to acknowledge the good work of Jega and the work of Nigerian youth corps members. Nigeria should be extraordinarily proud of these young men and women who managed this process in a fair way.' Added Festus Mogae, the former president of Botswana, chairing the Commonwealth Observer Group monitoring the polls: 'In our experience, the National Assembly election generally took place in a peaceful and orderly manner. The required staff and stakeholders were present and the various stages of the electoral process on polling day – including accreditation, voting, counting, tabulation and declaration of results – broadly proceeded smoothly and transparently ... We believe that an important step forward has been taken in Nigeria with the successful conduct of the National Assembly election.'

The ruling PDP sustained major losses, and the opposition appeared to have made unprecedented gains.⁵ Overall, however, the PDP gained a comfortable, but not absolute, majority in the National Assembly.

The presidential poll on 16 April was more challenging. In March 2011, INEC published the following statement on its website: 'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Electoral Act, 2006, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) hereby informs the public that it has commenced the publication of the personal particulars of candidates (Form CF 001) for the offices of president, vice president, governor, deputy governor, members of the National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives) as well as the state assemblies and chairmen and councillors of the area councils.'

Presidential candidates had to be Nigerian citizens by birth, 40 or older, reasonably educated, and belong to a political party. By the end of March, about 20 candidates had emerged.

However, only four candidates campaigned across the country and, therefore, had any serious chance. Leading was President Goodluck Jonathan, flagbearer for the PDP, which advertises itself as 'the largest party in Africa'. It is certainly the richest and most powerful in Nigeria. As president, Jonathan had the enormous resources of his office, as well as a large network of state governors and local councillors, at his disposal for the campaign.

His key challengers, however, were no pushovers. Leading the pack was former military head of state, General Muhammadu Buhari, of the CPC. However, Buhari's brutal anti-graft posture while in office was no selling point for the Nigerian elite, which is entirely rent-seeking (from the country's oil) and economically unproductive. Indeed, this was why, after overthrowing the faltering civilian regime of Shehu Shagari in 1983, Buhari spent fewer than three years in office (to be replaced by the smooth and thoroughly corrupt General Ibrahim Babangida). Moreover, Buhari made only modest efforts to campaign in the south of the country, apparently banking on sweeping the polls in the north, and, with Ribadu, making a strong showing in the south, which would force a run-off between him and Jonathan. Buhari's platform proclaimed: 'Nigeria needs strong leaders to handle strong institutions.' Judging by his actions while president, he clearly represents that strong leadership, but it is not at all clear whether such institutions exist in the country at present.

Also seeking the presidency was the former anti-corruption czar, Nuhu Ribadu, of the unusually progressive ACN. As head of the country's anti-corruption commission, Ribadu embarrassed the government by exposing key governors, and state and national government officials for corrupt practices, and he had to flee the country after receiving death threats. He became a fellow at St Anthony's College, Oxford, and later returned following a conciliatory gesture from President Jonathan. Although a northerner, Ribadu seems to be garnering more support in the south. This, of course, limited his chances. Ribadu's party holds the

governorship in Lagos and four other states, and to very good effect. Lagos city, once so dysfunctional, is now largely well-maintained, with a new, elegant airport terminal, and largely clean streets.⁶ Ribadu's platform is: 'I stand as a symbol of change.'

The fourth leading candidate was Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, the governor of Kano state. Shekarau's appeal, however, is limited largely to the Muslim-dominated northern half of the country, making him a rather long-shot candidate. He performed very badly in the polls.

All Jonathan's key challengers, then, were from the north, which was clearly in his favour. In addition to the minority Ijaw – the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria – Jonathan appealed to other minority groups,⁷ and had the support of heavyweights from all the major groups in the country.

In 2007, Umaru Yar'Adua, who died in office before the completion of his term, won 69,82 per cent of the votes as flagbearer for the PDP.

On 18 April 2011, two days after the presidential votes, Jega made the following announcement:

'By the powers conferred on me by the constitution and the electoral act, I, Attahiru Muhammadu Jega, hereby certify that I was the returning officer for the presidential election held on April 16, 2011. That the election was contested, that the candidates received the following votes:

'That Goodluck Ebele Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, having satisfied the requirements of the law and scored the highest number of votes is hereby declared the winner and returned elected. The result is signed by me the returning officer on April 18, 2011.'⁸

Jonathan had fulfilled the requirements by winning not only the highest number of votes, but 25 per cent of the votes in more than two-thirds of the 36 states. But he failed to carry a single state of the 16 main northern states, which his opponent Buhari comfortably carried. Buhari, for his part, failed to carry or even poll significantly in any of the southern states. Violence erupted in Buhari's stronghold immediately after the results of the polls began trickling in.

Below is the summary of the presidential results released by INEC on 18 April (Table 1, from Nigeria's INEC website, accessed on 29 April):

Table 1: Summary of the 2011 Presidential election results

Party	Votes	Percentage
ACN	2 079 151	5,41%
ADC	51 682	0,14%
ANPP	917 012	2,40%
APS	23 740	0,06%
ARP	12 264	0,03%
BNPP	47 272	0,12%
CPC	12 214 853	31,98%
FRESH	34 331	0,09%
HDP	12 023	0,03%
LDPN	8 472	0,02%
MPPP	16 492	0,04%
NCP	26 376	0,07%
NMDP	25 938	0,07%
NTP	19 744	0,05%

Party	Votes	Percentage
PDC	82 243	0,21%
PDP	22 495 187	58,89%
PMP	56 248	0,15%
PPP	54 203	0,14%
SDMP	11 544	0,03%
UNPD	21 203	0,06%

'Nigerian politics have been, since the military dictatorships, largely non-ideological. Rather than a battle of ideas, they are about who can pump in the most money and buy the most access. Cash is handed out to local leaders, bags of rice are given to women's groups, and promises are made about fixing roads that nobody really believes will be fixed. Debating ideas, spurred by youth participation, might bring more substance. Candidates will no longer merely hold colourful rallies, but will answer questions about important issues such as education and electricity.'⁹

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (famous Nigerian novelist and youth activist)

Although possessing a vibrant civil society, an independent and very vocal press, and a well-trusted judiciary, Nigeria has never been able to forge an acceptable political settlement that ensures open and fair electoral competition free of violence. Elections in the country, Africa's most populous state and (nominally) the world's fourth largest democracy, have always been seriously fraught. This was true even of the last elections that heralded the end of British colonial rule in 1959: these were heavily rigged by the colonial authorities to ensure that power was passed on to pliable northern elites, rather than to the agitating Western-educated elite of the largely Christian southern half of the country.

Allegations of nepotism and anti-democratic conduct dogged the new independent government from the start, and in January 1966, army officers of Igbo origin – from the eastern region – staged a bloody coup in which Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa (a Muslim northerner) and two regional premiers were killed. The coup leaders established a junta under the army commander Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi (an Igbo), who soon after announced the abolition of the federal system. Less than seven months later, in July 1966, officers of northern origin staged a counter-coup, and killed Ironsi. Major-General Yakubu Gowon took over and immediately announced the revival of the federation. About 30 000 Igbos living in the north – mainly traders – were murdered in a pogrom by Hausas, and hundreds of thousands fled to the eastern region. Relations between the northern-dominated federal government and the Igbo deteriorated further as a result. In May 1967, Gowon announced that he would split the Igbo-dominated eastern region into three states to weaken the Igbo. This, as well as the endless stream of refugees fleeing to the east after the massacres in the north, prompted an Oxford-educated Igbo officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, to secede the eastern region from the federation, which proclaimed itself the Republic of Biafra. Civil war, which broke out in July and lasted for two-and-a-half years before the Biafran leadership capitulated, led to the death of more than one million Nigerians, mainly Igbos (and mainly of starvation and related diseases). The federation was saved.¹⁰

Contemporary Nigeria as a political entity is rather new. It was cobbled together, almost on the eve of the First World War in 1914, when the British 'amalgamated' the northern provinces (mainly Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu Kingdom, both heavily influenced by Islam) and the southern protectorates (of mainly the former Yoruba kingdoms and the acephalous Igbo entities), which had been largely Christianised. In 1953–1954, shortly before independence (October 1960), the British conducted a heavily rigged census – in preparation for the final elections

before independence – which gave the northern region 79 per cent of the territory of the new federation and 55 per cent of its population.¹¹ Oil had been discovered in the country less than a decade before, and the British wanted unbroken (and cheap) access to this valuable resource. This might be said to be the beginning of the so-called ‘resource curse’ in Nigeria. This has only worsened with successive military takeovers and choreographed polls that have ensured that the military elite, a colonial creation and its most complete incarnation (it is dominated by northerners), always remained in the background, pulling the strings.

Northerners – civilian and military – have ruled Nigeria for 38 of its 51 years of existence as an independent state. This putative dominance is the cause of the great anxiety that Nigerians cryptically call the ‘National question’, or the ‘Federal character’ of the nation: the idea that no region or cluster of states or related ethnic groups would dominate national politics in the country. It is the reason why Nigeria has progressively tended to be fissiparous, breaking up old political units or states into smaller new ones that are, because non-viable in themselves, wholly dependent on the largesse of the federal government, making secession all but impossible. At independence, Nigeria had three regions and 301 local governments; since 1996, the last time new states were created, Nigeria has had 36 states and 774 local governments.¹² The total population of the federation is estimated at 160 million.

The issue of ‘zoning’ has been the latest concrete expression of the anxiety around the ‘federal character’ of Nigeria. It was concocted by PDP. The PDP was launched in 1999 by a group of liberal-minded politicians and activists who detested military rule, especially the obdurate and destructive rule of General Sani Abacha. These politicians were from all of Nigeria’s main ethnic groups and regions, and were motivated chiefly by a wish to keep the unwieldy state together as well as keep the military – which had always claimed to be the key guarantor of Nigeria’s unity – out of politics. They contrived a consensus by which presidential power would rotate, for two terms each, between the mainly Muslim northern half of the country and the mainly Christian southern half. This arrangement was called zoning.

Its first beneficiary was Obasanjo, a Yoruba from the Christian south who had been jailed by Abacha for treason. Obasanjo was chosen by PDP grandees in 1999 to be its first presidential candidate when the praetorian ban on politics was lifted. His running mate was a northerner; they won. Obasanjo was succeeded after his two terms, as the zoning logic dictated, by a northerner, Umaru Yar’Adua. Yar’Adua’s vice, again as zoning dictated, was Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the south. In the event, however, Yar’Adua died in office, and Jonathan – against opposition from the northern elite – became president to complete the pair’s term in office.

Many of the northern elites hoped that Jonathan would give way after serving out that term; instead, he contested, and won by a large margin, the presidential slot on the PDP platform. Northerners had contrived a ‘consensus candidate’ in the form of Atiku Abubakar, who had been Obasanjo’s vice. Jonathan crushed Abubakar in the PDP primaries early this year by a very wide margin, defeating him even in his home state.

Flushed by this victory, Jonathan proclaimed zoning dead in the water, and that competency and personal appeal were now the only criteria for presidential candidates on the PDP ticket. But he was careful also to state that he would not run again if he won the 2011 elections. This has certainly not placated his enemies, some of whom have abruptly abandoned the PDP and joined other northerner-led parties.

Nigeria’s last nationwide polls, in 2007, were so contested that they generated an astonishing 1 250 petitions and 6 180 electoral litigations at the courts. According to one observer, ‘there was unprecedented rigging, ballot stuffing, falsification of results, intimidation of voters and direct assault on the people. In some extreme instances, voting did not take place. This was most prominent in the south-

east, south-south and south-western geopolitical zones of the country, where opposition parties were believed to be most formidable.¹³ Umaru Yar'Adua, who later died in office, won the presidency with 69,82 per cent of the votes in 2007 as flagbearer for the PDP. Other parties that contested the 2007 elections were the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) under another former military leader, the austere Muhammadu Buharu (who won 18,72 per cent of the votes in 2007), the Action Congress (AC) under Atuku Abubakar, Obasanjo's vice president, with whom he messily fell out (Atiku polled 7,47 per cent of the votes); and 15 insignificant ones.

Yar'Adua's election was challenged by Ambrose Owuru of the minor Hope Democratic Party, and to the surprise of many, the Supreme Court on 27 March 2009 ordered the presidential petitions tribunal to establish a panel of justices to consider the case. Earlier, on 24 April 2009, the tribunal had been dismissed by a narrow decision, 4–3, a challenge against Yar'Adua's election by Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, the presidential candidate for the All Progressive Grand Alliance, and the leader of the Biafra secessionists who spearheaded the civil war of the late 1960s. Owuru's petition was also later dismissed.¹⁴

Of the 17 or more elections being held in Africa this year, the elections in Nigeria are undoubtedly the most important, and they are bound to have ramifications all over the continent. They are the most open elections in the country's history, and the fourth since, breaking a cycle of coups and predatory praetorian dictatorships, the country returned to civil rule in 1999. Preparations for the elections were systematic, expensive and well-calibrated.

The contestations resulting from the 2007 elections, and the worldwide condemnation of the rigged polls, impressed Yar'Adua enough for him to admit publicly that the process had been seriously flawed, and that INEC had been culpable. The commission's chairman at the time was the depressing Maurice Iwu, a handpicked friend of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo, who was himself not contesting since he was constitutionally disbarred from doing so, had selected Yar'Adua as his replacement as PDP presidential candidate. He declared the elections a 'do and die affair' for him. Aside from Chairman Iwu, INEC had 12 national commissioners and 37 resident electoral commissioners, one each for the 36 states of the federation and the federal capital territory of Abuja and its immediate surroundings. All commissioners, including the chair, were appointed by the president, and had no guaranteed tenure; they could be sacked at his whim. Two previous chairmen of INEC, professors Eme Awa and Humphrey Nwosu, were summarily removed from office by President Ibrahim Banbagida in 1989 and 1993 respectively. Moreover, funding from INEC came directly from the presidential office.¹⁵

Shortly after this admission, Yar'Adua set up the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) chaired by the respected Justice Muhammadu Uwais to make recommendations about the conduct of future elections. The ERC submitted its report in 2008, but the report was not made public. Then in 2009, the government took the highly unusual step of requesting the British and American governments to arrange an independent electoral assessment team to make recommendations for credible elections in 2011.

Through the UK's Department of International Development (DFID) and USAID, the two governments set up a five-member team led by Kwado Afari-Gyan, the chairman of Ghana's Electoral Commission, to investigate the dynamics of rigging in Nigeria and make recommendations. The team produced a comprehensive report in January 2010, which made ten concrete recommendations based on the 'constitution and laws of Nigeria, international commitments Nigeria has made in various treaties, and good electoral practice'.¹⁶

Among the key recommendations were: INEC should be reconstituted; funding from INEC should be independent of the presidency and should come directly from the consolidated revenue and voted by the National Legislature; INEC should be

transparent and should share vital information with all stakeholders, including all political parties, the media and civil society; election results should be transparently verified; the judiciary should commit to timely adjudication of electoral disputes and allegations of vote rigging 'with possible timeframes specified', and the state-owned media should provide 'equitable, impartial, balanced coverage'.

The government, to its credit, moved quickly to implement a good number of the recommendations. INEC was reconstituted with the respected academic and civil society activist, Attahiru Jega, as chair – although several of the discredited commissioners who conducted the 2007 polls were not removed. Funding from INEC was delinked from the presidency, and shortly after Jega requested, and obtained, more than \$570 million for the conduct of the polls. INEC then hired a temporary staff of about 300 000 (down from the 500 000 it hired in 2007), and introduced voter registration, which was completed early in 2011 at the cost of about \$230 million. It registered close to 74 million voters, said to be 92 per cent of the voting population, and a significant increase over the about 60 million of 2007. *The Economist* called it 'the world's most expensive voting system'.¹⁷

Problems with the registration of voters indicated that forces determined to frustrate a proper conduct of the polls were still very active. Voter registration equipment, including laptop computers and cameras, was reported stolen from the country's main airport in Lagos as they arrived from abroad. INEC quickly assured Nigerians that the theft was not substantial enough to derail the process. That had to be taken on trust. On January 28, however, Jega announced that the voter registration exercise was to be extended by one week. When it finally concluded, Jega stated that there had been some 'double' or 'ghost' registrations, but that these were minimal, under 1 per cent. Again, that had to be taken on trust.

By end of 2010, INEC announced the electoral calendar: votes for the National Legislature were to take place on 2 April, those for the presidency on 9 April, and those for governors on 16 April. A day before the first votes, however, INEC announced that ballot papers and result sheets were not in place for some polling stations, and a new schedule for the elections was announced: National Legislative elections would be held on 4 April, presidential elections on 19 April, and gubernatorial and local elections on April 26. Monday 4 April brought another postponement, as some ballot materials had arrived too late at polling stations. Jega said: 'We cannot proceed with these elections if we want them to be free, fair and credible if there are no result sheets.' The entire calendar had to be revamped.

For the first time since Jega took over as chair of INEC, the electoral body became the subject of intense criticism from even its major supporters, the country's very vocal press and civil society. The Lagos daily, *The Punch*, not at all a rowdy tabloid, came out with a frontpage editorial denouncing the 'sheer incompetence' of INEC, which 'has turned a moment of celebration to a flash of queasy foreboding for an enthusiastic nation'.

The criticism, however, turned to almost undiluted praise from many Nigerians and the international community after the conduct of the polls. Notwithstanding the violence that followed in the north, the elections were certainly a significant improvement over previous ones, in particular the messy 2007 elections. The grievances of northern voters, however, need to be examined properly and measures of redress taken.

Nigerian politics revolve around the distribution of the oil money, whether officially (in the form of debates over oil revenue allocation) or unofficially (as military and civilian politicians seek favour with those in a position to reward them with opportunities to 'chop').¹⁹

Oil, whose commercial exploitation by the British company, Shell, started in Nigeria in the 1950s, has shaped the country's character and politics more than any other factor – more than even its extraordinary ethnic diversity (there are more than 250 language groups in the country), and more than its religious diversity

(more than half the population claims to be Muslim, 35 per cent Christian, and the rest are thought to practice various African indigenous religions). Nigeria produces the much-valued 'sweet crude' and it supplies the US with 25 per cent of its oil needs. Nigeria is by far the largest exporter of oil in Africa. The country may have earned more than \$400 billion from its oil and gas to date.²⁰ Oil accounts for 95 per cent of Nigeria's exports and, therefore, hard cash earnings. With rising oil prices, Nigeria now earns \$30–40 billion a year from its oil.²¹

This dominance of a single, extractive commodity has undoubtedly been a curse. The country that produces so much oil can satisfy only ten per cent of the (mains) electricity needs of its main commercial city, Lagos.²² Oil is responsible for the corruption of Nigeria's politicians and has distorted its development efforts in many insidious ways. Because revenue from oil is enough to run the government, keep the ruling elite immensely wealthy and effectively maintain a vast patrimonial network – what passes for governance in the country – Nigeria's rulers have, over the years, neglected the agricultural and even manufacturing sectors. The textile industry, formerly a major employer, is now in a state of collapse; and from being able to feed itself and even export food (in the 1960s and early 1970s), Nigeria has become a net importer of rice and other foodstuffs – it spent \$1 billion in 2010 on the importation of rice alone.²³ Moreover, because wealth, in the form of oil revenues, is totally controlled by the government, competition for access to state offices has become deadly – as the country's former President Obasanjo crudely put it, a 'do or die affair'.

In February 2011, the country's opposition parties accused the government of failing to account for more than \$27 billion of state funds. The money was more than what was supposed to be in the Excess Crude Account (ECA) set up in 2004 by Obasanjo to keep savings from excess earnings from crude oil in case oil prices rose above that set in the national budget. Perhaps in response to this scandal, the government in March 2011 announced plans to abolish the ECA because, Minister of Finance Olusegun Aganga explained, the account 'is not transparent and clear to the Nigerian people, therefore there is a general perception that there is some level of mismanagement'.²⁴ 'Some level of mismanagement': the delicious understatement is the farthest the earnest minister could go to acknowledge official corruption. This was, of course, election season, and corruption allegations tend to be made carelessly, but Jonathan's PDP government made no convincing explanation regarding the use of the funds.²⁵ It certainly resonated with the public, and for good reasons. Successive Nigerian leaders are believed to have embezzled billions of dollars. In 2003, the Auditor General's report of federal ministries and companies revealed the embezzlement of 23 billion nairas through financial fraud. The previous year, the Obasanjo government, to avoid drawn-out litigation, reached an agreement with the family of the deceased former president, General Abacha, and various European banks to return \$1 billion stolen by Abacha to the country, with an agreement that ten per cent of this will be returned to the Abacha family. The government received \$700 million of this. Much earlier, in 1987, the country's general accountant estimated that corruption in the civil service was costing the state between \$1,2 and \$1,5 billion a year.²⁶ Even the pension scheme is not spared. In March 2011, a N13 billion scam involving the country's pension's office was reported in local newspapers.²⁷ Another report suggested that, in 2010 alone, state governors may have embezzled N1,3 trillion (several billions of dollars) in funds released by the federal government in development funds.²⁸

Last year, the respected governor of the Central Bank accused members of the National Assembly of allocating for themselves nearly 25 per cent of the country's annual budget of about \$29,6 billion. This was an exaggeration for effect, but Assembly members took home about \$1,5 million each a year, making them among the highest paid lawmakers in the world. In the budget announced in March 2011, in fact, the lawmakers added close to \$1 billion to their share of what they like to call 'national largess'.²⁹ This is obviously scandalous for a country where 92 per cent of the citizens are, by every international measure, absolutely

poor, earning less than \$2 a day according to the World Bank. Unscrupulous foreign oil companies are inevitably complicit in this widespread and corrosive graft. An audit report prepared by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) noted many discrepancies in reported royalty payments by companies to the government and in actual deposits – several hundred million dollars were unaccounted for. In 2006, the unreconciled difference in royalty payments was \$437 million. The unreconciled difference for crude oil exportation from 2006 to 2008 was 3,1 million barrels of oil, with an estimated cost of \$240 million. The report noted that foreign companies had fleeced the country of hundreds of million dollars during the period.³⁰

In such a situation, moreover, anti-corruption efforts are quite easily stymied. Nigeria was ranked in 2010 as 130th of 180 countries on Transparency International's corruption perception index. This was perhaps partly because of inexplicable quashing of serious corruption cases against many senior politicians and state officials indicted for corruption by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. In March 2011, for example, Bode George, the former chairman of the Nigerian Ports Authority and vice chair of the PDP, who was convicted (along with five others) in October 2010 for embezzling \$500 million, was released from prison. His release was heralded by a big party attended by many PDP bigwigs, including senior ministers. This led to a national outcry. The previous year, Attahiru Bafarawa, former governor of Sokoto, convicted for stealing tens of millions of dollars, was released on bail soon after his arrest. The corruption trials of the following were also quashed last year: Adenike Grange, the former health minister; her ex-minister of state Gabriel Aduku; the ex-governor of Delta state James Ibori; Ezebonwu Nyeson, the chief of staff of Rivers state; Kenny Martin, the ex-chair of the Police Equipment Foundation; and Hammand Bello Ahmed, the former comptroller-general of customs.³¹

Such a deformed system inevitably encourages political violence, as the Afari-Gyan Report noted: the 'widespread extreme poverty amid massive wealth concentrated in the hands of a few creates the context where political elites enjoy enormous advantages over the impoverished public, and where voters and other stakeholders are vulnerable to financial inducements and intimidation'.³²

In March 2011, 63 political parties signed a code of conduct undertaking not to, among others, hijack ballot boxes, use thugs or weapons, use inflammatory language in their campaigns, take provocative actions, or make images or manifestations that incite violence. It was also agreed that INEC would monitor all political rallies.

These frantic commitments speak volumes, needless to say. Hundreds of people have been killed during elections in Nigeria since 1999, which, a British 'hotspot' report colourfully noted, are 'fought down the barrel of the gun', generating 'a general atmosphere of intimidation and threats, assassinations, arson, bombings, random shootings and pitched battles between opposing bands of thugs using sundry weapons'.³³ The report lists nearly 100 political assassinations in the country since 1999. In March 2011, Amnesty International issued a short report entitled *Loss of life, insecurity and impunity in the run-up to Nigeria's elections*. The report noted that hundreds of people had already been killed in 'politically motivated, communal and sectarian violence across Nigeria ahead of presidential and parliamentary polls'.

These assassinations, moreover, remain unsolved. One of the most brazen and significant involved the murder of Bola Ige, the country's former justice minister under Obasanjo. Ige was killed on 23 December 2001 after, critics of the government allege, he signalled to Obasanjo that he would be quitting the PDP to focus on building his own party, the Alliance for Democracy (AD). Ige was former governor of Oyo state (1979–1983). Leaked US embassy cables last year quoted the former US Ambassador to Nigeria, Howard Jeter, reporting Nigeria's then Assistant Inspector General of Police Abimbola Ojomo as saying that 'undertrained and ill-equipped' police bungled the investigation in Ige's killing. Jeter noted: 'Absent a credible

confession or outside assistance, the Nigerian police investigation will fail to identify the assassin or his paymaster because of the lack of preserved evidence and the weak investigative skills of the police'. The police chief dismissed claims that the murder was related to Ige's firm actions against drug barons: 'Possible drug- or organised crime-related motives for the murder have been investigated and rejected, claimed the assistant inspector-general of police (AIG)'. The real motive, the cable suggested, was political, and the culprits were probably associated with the ruling PDP.³⁴ The case remains unresolved.

On 3 March, 'unidentified people' drove by a huge campaign rally of the ruling PDP in Suleja in Niger state and lobbed bombs at it, killing 13 people and wounding scores more. 'Unidentified people': this catch-all police phrase meant only that this is a political crime that will never be solved. Just before the end of last year, three similar bomb attacks happened across the country, leaving dozens dead and many more mutilated: in the capital Abuja (just as the country celebrated its 50th anniversary of independence); in the perennially bloodstained Jos (riven by communal low-intensity warfare), in which 80 people were killed; and in Balyesa, the grimy, oil-rich state from which Goodluck Jonathan launched his presidential career while acting as governor in 2000.

There have also been assassinations of senior political figures on the campaign trail. A candidate for governor of Bornu state, Modu Fannami Gubio, was gunned down in January this year with six of his supporters allegedly by AK 47 rifle-wielding young men on motorcycles. The deputy chairman of Gubio's party (ANPP) had been gunned down by unknown assassins a few weeks before. Blame for the killings was placed on the Boko Haram, an inchoate Islamist sect sometimes known as the Nigerian Taliban – though some analysts contend that the notorious sect is being blamed for atrocities perpetrated by other, more sophisticated political actors.³⁵

Such assassinations and casual political killings, called 'Point and kill', have clearly now become commonplace in Nigeria.³⁶ The assassins usually drive in cars with tinted windows and the shootings are often drive-by. As a result, the government in March 2011 banned all cars with tinted windows, but enforcement was highly problematic and ramshackle.³⁷ By the end of March, no arrest of would-be assassins was reported.

In January 2011, the government announced the establishment of a new army division (called 82), 17 000-strong, to be deployed across the country solely to tackle elections-related violence. This division alone is larger than any other army in the region, and far larger than the UN force deployed in Liberia to help put together the ravaged country. The government also announced in March that all of the country's 370 000-strong police force will be deployed on elections day across the country to prevent or curb violence.³⁸

Nigeria possesses some of the most vibrant civil society groups on the continent. Its newspapers are about the best in West Africa, and it has very diverse radio and TV networks. The newspapers are mainly independent, although some are linked to a political grouping. An examination of about a dozen newspapers by this author over three weeks leading to the elections showed impressive and largely fair and accurate coverage of the political campaigns and the presidential candidates. In many cases, in fact, the papers tended to be more critical of Jonathan, the president running on the PDP ticket, than of his weaker and less well-heeled opponents.

Local groups campaigning for free, fair and credible elections were very active, one of the most active being a network of youth groups called 'Enough is enough', which boasts as a key supporter the famous novelist Chimamanda Adiche. Writing in the UK *Guardian* on the work of the youth groups, Adiche noted:

... a coalition of groups worked to register young voters, using Facebook, Twitter and texts. At voter registration venues, which were sometimes chaotic, young people brought food and water to make sure the staff did their jobs well.

Young women breastfed their babies while waiting in line. Young men spent the night there to make sure they could register ... A friend asked a woman who had come from school why she wanted to vote. The reply: 'Because it gives me the right to complain.'³⁹

In March 2011, NN24, a popular TV station, organised a presidential debate featuring the leading candidates. When President Jonathan failed to show up, he was roundly condemned.⁴⁰

By the end of March, there were 313 accredited domestic elections observer groups monitoring the elections in Nigeria, many of them dominated by youth volunteers. Their work was much praised.

Nigeria also has a well-respected judiciary, hence the deluge of elections petitions and litigations that the courts have had to handle since the 2007 elections. That aggrieved parties look to the courts, rather than resort to violence, to settle electoral disputes, however prolonged the cases are, is an indication that the judiciary remains a trustworthy and largely independent institution in the country. It was independent enough to reject efforts by former President Obasanjo and his utterly corrupt INEC to disqualify the candidacy of Atiku Abubakar (Obasanjo's estranged vice) in 2006–2007, and to have overturned the fraudulent election of several governors, some belonging to the ruling party. The corollary to this, however, is that the courts appear overburdened and pressurised.

Conclusion

The post-elections violence in northern Nigeria should not be viewed as merely a reaction to the suspicion that votes had been rigged in favour of the incumbent, Jonathan, although it was clearly part of the reason for it. The conspiracy theory around the violence emanating from Jonathan and those supporting him – that the violence was orchestrated by disgruntled political figures and was not at all spontaneous – is also true in its own way.

Clearly, disgruntlement runs deep in the north as a result of Jonathan's repudiation of the putative zoning agreement, which in effect has denied the north a chance to provide a two-term president for the country. The fact that Jonathan is Christian, and from an impoverished backwater – albeit oil-rich – state, makes matters worse in the eyes of many northern Nigerians. The violence was perpetrated by young, impoverished people, many of whom probably did not vote. Nigeria is a country where politicians hire assassins to kill opponents, such are the stakes. Inspiring mobs to create mayhem to make a political point or gain political mileage is not at all inconceivable in Nigeria.

This brings in the issue of zoning – the elite consensus forged by the PDP to make sure no part of the Nigerian Federation would be politically dominant. This is highly significant politically. Zoning was far from perfect, but the fact that it may be principally responsible for the political stability Nigeria has enjoyed since 1999 – the longest period of civil rule since its independence in 1960 – should be a cause of deep reflection. Nigeria surely needs such a consensus if it is to remain together – this is what many Nigerians call the 'National question' or the 'Federal character' of the country. An important step forward would be for Jonathan to organise something like a national conference to debate the issue and forge an elite consensus to replace zoning.

An important development during and after the elections was the support thrown behind Jonathan by the violent militants of the Niger Delta state. Yar'Adua had negotiated a peace agreement with the militants in which they were offered amnesty in exchange for laying down their arms. Violence, however, continued in the region, some no doubt perpetrated by the militants, but some perhaps by extraneous political elements wishing to undermine Jonathan, who hails from the region. The Amnesty Office set up by Yar'Adua in Abuja, the federal capital, went up in flames on 3 March 2011. No one claimed responsibility for this. After Jonathan's win precipitated violence in the north, the Niger Delta militants vowed to fight to the death to protect Jonathan's tenure. If their support for President Jonathan holds

and they finally accept the jurisdiction of the federal government over that key oil-producing state, then Jonathan's presidency could have made a highly positive contribution to keeping Nigeria together and stabilising its oil production.

That, however, is only the very beginning of the effort to establish good governance, peace and stability in Nigeria.

Nigeria is Africa's largest democracy, its most populated country, and the most strategic in West Africa. It is the continent's largest oil producer, and its most enthusiastic peace-enforcer. Nigerians have high hopes that the country, disfigured by decades of corruption and mismanagement, will finally turn the corner by entrenching practices of good governance. This will demand major reforms in all public sectors in the country, which can be guaranteed only by strong and visionary leadership. Entrenched corruption in the oil industry should be a key focus. From the oil-rich Bayelsa state himself, Jonathan must be keenly aware of the ravages caused by rapacious elite exploitation of this key industry, including distorting the country's development, creating an exploitative and unproductive ruling class, causing massive environmental degradation, and impoverishing and oppressing citizens of the oil-producing regions.

With an apparently strong mandate of his own, and with his promise to serve out only one term, Jonathan must immediately start to work on these issues, even if that means, once again, going to battle with his PDP.

-
- 1 This report benefited from conversations with dozens of people – diplomats; government, INEC and UN officials, journalists, academics and civil society actors – in Nigeria in March 2011. The author is particularly grateful to the following for providing a facilitating ambience during the research: Dr Abbey Onadipe (UNDP Governance Programme), Dr Oshita Oshita (Director of Research and Policy Analysis at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution at The Presidency in Abuja, Nigeria), Desmond Woode (DFID), Dr Tony Kola-Olusanya (academic), Dr Lawson (academic), and Pasco Temple (Information Attache, Sierra Leone High Commission in Abuja). I thank Mehari Taddele Maru for his comments on the draft versions of the report.
 - 2 Buhari rejects results in 22 states and the FCT, *Vanguard* (Nigerian newspaper), 19 April 2011.
 - 3 The figures are cited in Nigeria's turbulent north, *The Economist*, 28 April 2011.
 - 4 Ibid.
 - 5 Parselelo Kantai, Nigerian ruling party set to lose election, *Financial Times*, 10 April 2011.
 - 6 The city's improved condition has earned the rare praise of Wole Soyinka, the country's Noble Laureate and a perennial critic: 'Lagos,' he wrote, 'is mastering the art of rejuvenation.' (Wole Soyinka blesses a newly crowned beauty queen with a tale of faded glory, *The Nation*, 18 March 2011).
 - 7 See, for example, *The Punch's* (18 March 2011) report on the declaration by a prominent Igbo group of its support for Jonathan, Our support for Jonathan total – Ohaneze.
 - 8 Poll: Jega declares Jonathan winner, *Vanguard*, 19 April 2011.
 - 9 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Comments in the (UK) *Guardian*, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/16/nigerian-revolution-young-people-democracy> (accessed 30 April 2011).
 - 10 For more on the Nigerian civil war, see: A Madeibo, *The Nigerian revolution and the Biafran war*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1980, and J D Jorre, *The Nigerian civil war*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1972. Chinua Achebe's *Girls at war and other stories* (1972) is the best fictional account of the suffering endured by Biafrans during the war. Achebe is Nigeria's greatest writer. He played a significant role during the war, as the key international advocate for Biafra. His great friend and protégé, the poet Christopher Okigbo, was killed in the war while serving as an officer in the Biafran army. Chimamanda Adichie's extraordinarily interesting novel *Half a yellow sun* (2006) is influenced by Achebe's stories, and paints a fully realised picture of the war and the impact on civilians, especially women. The physical legacy of that war is still a palpable danger. In March, a local daily reported that the British government has donated explosive trace detector equipment to the Nigerian government to locate and destroy 50 000 civil war bombs in different parts of the country. See: UK donates explosive detectors to Nigeria, *The Guardian*, 20 March 2011.
 - 11 Daniel C Bach, Inching towards a country without a state: prebendalism, violence and state betrayal in Nigeria, in Christopher Clapham, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, *Big African States*, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001, 63–96.
 - 12 Ibid.
 - 13 J Shola Omotola, Elections and democratic transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic, *African Affairs*, (2010) 109 (437), 535–553.
 - 14 Heinrich Bergstresser, Nigeria, in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klass van Walraven, *Africa Yearbook: Politics, economy and society south of the Sahara in 2009*, Leiden: Brill, 2010, 157–172.
 - 15 Ibid.
 - 16 *Independent electoral assessment team final report, January 2010* (in author's possession).

- 17 Nigeria's most successful elections, at <http://www.economist.com/node/18560577> (accessed 14 April 2011).
- 18 *A paradise for maggots* is the title of a book published on the work of the anti-corruption campaigner and now presidential candidate Nuhu Ribadu in 2010.
- 19 Human Rights Watch, *The price of oil: Corporate responsibility and human rights violations in Nigeria's oil-producing communities*, 1999; cited in Daniel C Bach, *Inching towards a country without a state: prebendalism, violence and state betrayal in Nigeria*.
- 20 The estimate by 2005 was \$350 billion. See: Nicholas Shaxson, *Poisoned wells: The dirty politics of African oil*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 9–26. For more on Nigeria's oil industry, see Sarah Ahmad Khan, *Nigeria: The political economy of oil*, Oxford University Press, 1994. For a very good journalistic account of Nigeria's politics and the role of oil in its corruption, see Karl Maier, *This house has fallen*, London: Penguin Books, 2000.
- 21 Political violence reaches new heights, at <http://www.economist.com/node/18561189> (accessed 15 April 2011).
- 22 See Govt needs N15 trillion to generate 40 000mw: ACN opposes nuclear power plant project, *The Guardian* (Nigerian daily newspaper), 18 March 2011.
- 23 Nigeria spent N155bn on rice importation in 2010, *The Punch*, 18 March 2011.
- 24 Basse Udo, Minister explains plan to abolish excess crude account, *Next* (national daily), 10 March 2011.
- 25 *Africa Confidential*, 4 March 2011.
- 26 The cases are cited in Daniel C Bach, *Inching towards a country without a state: prebendalism, violence and state betrayal in Nigeria*.
- 27 See Fraud without end, *The Nation* (Nigerian daily), 18 March 2011.
- 28 Did governors fritter N1,3 tr in allocations? *Sunday Mirror* (national newspaper), 20 March 2011.
- 29 See Experts fault National Assembly for increasing its budget by N121 bn, *The Punch*, 18 March, 2011. An 'expert' quoted by the paper noted: 'The increase in the allocation shows how they [National Assembly members] are using money in a careless way. That amount makes Nigeria the most "overgoverned" government. If the legislature is getting 4,7 per cent of the total budget, then it has to be the highest in the world.'
- 30 Sulaimon Salau, An oily affair, *The Guardian* (Nigerian daily), 2 March 2011.
- 31 These cases are cited in Heinrich Bergstresser, Nigeria, in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klass van Walraven, *Africa Yearbook: Politics, economy and society south of the Sahara in 2009*.
- 32 *Independent electoral assessment team final report*, January 2010, 5.
- 33 *Election 'hot spot' analysis: A study of election-related violence ahead of the 2011 elections in Nigeria* (a report for DFID written by Sam Unom and Jide Ojong, December 2009). *The Economist* (14 April 2011) put it rather more elegantly: 'Results in Nigerian elections come in two separate columns. One records the votes cast at polling stations; the other the number of people killed around the time of the election. Violence is an integral part of Nigerian politics.' At <http://www.economist.com/node/18561189> (accessed 15 April 2011). The magazine left out one or two other columns of results: petitions and electoral litigations.
- 34 See A cold case, *Next on Sunday* (Nigerian national newspaper), 20 March 2011.
- 35 See Mustapha Shehu, Fish out the killers please, *The Politico* (a Nigerian political magazine), 14 February 2011.
- 36 See Steve Ayorinde, Curbing the politics of point-and-kill, *National Mirror*, 10 March 2011.
- 37 See Tinted glass: Motorists accuse police of harassment, extortion, *The Punch*, 18 March 2011.
- 38 See Police deploy entire 370 000 force to collaborate with military, customs, immigration, FRSC, *Nigerian Tribune*, 18 March 2011.
- 39 Chimamanda Adiche, The political awakening of my country's young people could transform Nigeria's rotten democracy, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/16/nigerian-revolution-young-people-democracy> (accessed 30 April 2011).
- 40 See Why president didn't attend the TV debate, *The Guardian* (Nigerian daily) 20 March 2011.

Table 2: State by state summary of the 2011 Presidential election results

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Gombe	CPC	459 898	59,73%
	PDP	290 347	37,71%
	ANPP	5 693	0,74%
	ACN	3 420	0,44%
	BNPP	1 764	0,23%
	PDC	1 423	0,18%
	FRESH	983	0,13%
	PPP	926	0,12%
	PMP	924	0,12%
	NMDP	720	0,09%
	NCP	677	0,09%
	NTP	589	0,08%
	APS	541	0,07%
	ADC	470	0,06%
	ARP	428	0,06%
	HDP	328	0,04%
	MPPP	315	0,04%
	SDMP	199	0,03%
	UNPD	187	0,02%
LDPN	187	0,02%	
Taraba	PDP	451 354	61,07%
	CPC	257 986	34,91%
	ACN	17 791	2,41%
	PDC	2 163	0,29%
	PMP	1 622	0,22%
	BNPP	1 382	0,19%
	ANPP	1 203	0,16%
	PPP	800	0,11%
	FRESH	647	0,09%
	ADC	622	0,08%
	NCP	567	0,08%
	NTP	498	0,07%
	UNPD	445	0,06%
	APS	420	0,06%
	NMDP	392	0,05%
	MPPP	286	0,04%
	HDP	274	0,04%
	ARP	265	0,04%
	SDMP	182	0,02%
LDPN	166	0,02%	

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Yobe	CPC	337 537	54,26%
	ANPP	143 179	23,01%
	PDP	117 128	18,83%
	ACN	6 069	0,98%
	ADC	3 230	0,52%
	APS	2 263	0,36%
	PDC	1 885	0,30%
	BNPP	1 870	0,30%
	PPP	1 395	0,22%
	PMP	1 384	0,22%
	NMDP	1 182	0,19%
	FRESH	1 061	0,17%
	NCP	702	0,11%
	NTP	669	0,11%
	UNPD	597	0,10%
	ARP	548	0,09%
	MPPP	452	0,07%
	HDP	426	0,07%
	SDMP	320	0,05%
	LDPN	218	0,04%
Borno	CPC	909 763	77,25%
	PDP	207 075	17,58%
	ANPP	37 279	3,17%
	ACN	7 533	0,64%
	BNPP	2 677	0,23%
	PDC	1 803	0,15%
	FRESH	1 536	0,13%
	ADC	1 435	0,12%
	NMDP	1 225	0,10%
	APS	1 196	0,10%
	PMP	1 189	0,10%
	PPP	1 126	0,10%
	NCP	944	0,08%
	NTP	576	0,05%
	HDP	543	0,05%
	ARP	513	0,04%
	MPPP	377	0,03%
	UNPD	330	0,03%
	LDPN	292	0,02%
	SDMP	234	0,02%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Kebbi	CPC	501 453	54,26%
	PDP	369 198	39,95%
	ACN	26 171	2,83%
	PMP	3 918	0,42%
	ANPP	3 298	0,36%
	PDC	3 112	0,34%
	BNPP	2 331	0,25%
	PPP	2 215	0,24%
	FRESH	1 943	0,21%
	NMDP	1 866	0,20%
	MPPP	1 692	0,18%
	NTP	1 328	0,14%
	NCP	1 133	0,12%
	ADC	882	0,10%
	HDP	808	0,09%
	APS	806	0,09%
	UNPD	552	0,06%
	ARP	512	0,06%
	LDPN	499	0,05%
	SDMP	382	0,04%
Adamawa	PDP	508 314	56,00%
	CPC	344 526	37,96%
	ACN	32 786	3,61%
	PDC	3 716	0,41%
	PMP	3 045	0,34%
	ANPP	2 706	0,30%
	BNPP	1 993	0,22%
	PPP	1 430	0,16%
	NMDP	1 229	0,14%
	ADC	1 214	0,13%
	FRESH	990	0,11%
	NCP	986	0,11%
	NTP	977	0,11%
	APS	788	0,09%
	UNPD	698	0,08%
	MPPP	681	0,08%
	SDMP	487	0,05%
	ARP	481	0,05%
	HDP	392	0,04%
	LDPN	267	0,03%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Jigawa	CPC	663 994	58,21%
	PDP	419 252	36,75%
	ACN	17 355	1,52%
	ANPP	7 673	0,67%
	PDC	5 093	0,45%
	PPP	4 964	0,44%
	PMP	4 165	0,37%
	BNPP	3 230	0,28%
	NMDP	2 341	0,21%
	FRESH	2 094	0,18%
	ADC	1 746	0,15%
	NTP	1 733	0,15%
	MPPP	1 244	0,11%
	APS	1 218	0,11%
	UNPD	1 164	0,10%
	NCP	1 047	0,09%
	HDP	682	0,06%
	ARP	675	0,06%
	SDMP	624	0,05%
	LDPN	472	0,04%
Cross River	PDP	709 382	97,67%
	ACN	5 889	0,81%
	CPC	4 002	0,55%
	ANPP	2 521	0,35%
	PDC	1 203	0,17%
	SDMP	880	0,12%
	PMP	697	0,10%
	PPP	357	0,05%
	UNPD	214	0,03%
	ADC	172	0,02%
	NTP	141	0,02%
	NMDP	138	0,02%
	NCP	136	0,02%
	FRESH	120	0,02%
	LDPN	110	0,02%
	MPPP	105	0,01%
	APS	76	0,01%
	BNPP	73	0,01%
	HDP	68	0,01%
	ARP	57	0,01%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Katsina	CPC	1 163 919	70,99%
	PDP	428 392	26,13%
	ACN	10 945	0,67%
	ANPP	6 342	0,39%
	BNPP	3 942	0,24%
	PDC	3 751	0,23%
	PMP	3 249	0,20%
	FRESH	2 687	0,16%
	PPP	2 480	0,15%
	NMDP	2 303	0,14%
	NCP	1 808	0,11%
	NTP	1 698	0,10%
	MPPP	1 577	0,10%
	APS	1 174	0,07%
	ADC	1 146	0,07%
	UNPD	991	0,06%
	HDP	982	0,06%
	ARP	824	0,05%
	LDPN	701	0,04%
	SDMP	621	0,04%
Rivers	PDP	1 817 762	98,04%
	ACN	16 382	0,88%
	CPC	13 182	0,71%
	PDC	1 646	0,09%
	ANPP	1 449	0,08%
	PMP	775	0,04%
	PPP	685	0,04%
	HDP	319	0,02%
	FRESH	289	0,02%
	ADC	276	0,01%
	NCP	253	0,01%
	LDPN	156	0,01%
	BNPP	148	0,01%
	NMDP	144	0,01%
	NTP	134	0,01%
	UNPD	118	0,01%
	SDMP	104	0,01%
	APS	102	0,01%
	MPPP	99	0,01%
	ARP	93	0,01%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Delta	PDP	1 378 851	98,59%
	CPC	8 960	0,64%
	ANPP	2 746	0,20%
	FRESH	1 595	0,11%
	ACN	1 310	0,09%
	PDC	1 209	0,09%
	PMP	822	0,06%
	PPP	630	0,05%
	NCP	482	0,03%
	ADC	361	0,03%
	UNPD	196	0,01%
	NTP	194	0,01%
	BNPP	193	0,01%
	LDPN	174	0,01%
	MPPP	174	0,01%
	ARP	170	0,01%
	NMDP	170	0,01%
	HDP	126	0,01%
	APS	121	0,01%
SDMP	95	0,01%	
Zamfara	CPC	624 515	66,25%
	PDP	238 980	25,35%
	ANPP	46 554	4,94%
	ACN	17 970	1,91%
	BNPP	2 569	0,27%
	PDC	1 919	0,20%
	PPP	1 491	0,16%
	FRESH	1 421	0,15%
	PMP	1 384	0,15%
	ADC	1 297	0,14%
	APS	947	0,10%
	NCP	632	0,07%
	NMDP	595	0,06%
	NTP	573	0,06%
	MPPP	503	0,05%
	ARP	384	0,04%
	HDP	369	0,04%
	UNPD	206	0,02%
	SDMP	196	0,02%
LDPN	174	0,02%	

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Niger	CPC	652 574	64,03%
	PDP	321 429	31,54%
	ACN	13 344	1,31%
	ANPP	7 138	0,70%
	PDC	3 278	0,32%
	BNPP	3 160	0,31%
	PPP	3 112	0,31%
	PMP	2 892	0,28%
	FRESH	2 049	0,20%
	NMDP	1 392	0,14%
	ADC	1 349	0,13%
	NCP	1 348	0,13%
	NTP	1 221	0,12%
	APS	1 151	0,11%
	MPPP	1 071	0,11%
	HDP	710	0,07%
	UNPD	586	0,06%
	ARP	581	0,06%
	SDMP	430	0,04%
	LDPN	352	0,03%
Abia	PDP	1 175 984	98,96%
	ACN	4 392	0,37%
	CPC	3 743	0,31%
	ANPP	1 455	0,12%
	PMP	504	0,04%
	PPP	404	0,03%
	FRESH	354	0,03%
	NCP	261	0,02%
	SDMP	141	0,01%
	ADC	134	0,01%
	NMDP	132	0,01%
	PDC	126	0,01%
	UNPD	125	0,01%
	NTP	110	0,01%
	LDPN	104	0,01%
	BNPP	88	0,01%
	MPPP	83	0,01%
	HDP	71	0,01%
	APS	63	0,01%
	ARP	59	0,00%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Kano	CPC	1 624 543	60,77%
	ANPP	526 310	19,69%
	PDP	440 666	16,48%
	ACN	42 353	1,58%
	BNPP	5 515	0,21%
	ADC	5 355	0,20%
	PDC	4 216	0,16%
	PPP	4 030	0,15%
	FRESH	3 153	0,12%
	APS	3 133	0,12%
	PMP	2 740	0,10%
	NMDP	2 720	0,10%
	NCP	1 922	0,07%
	NTP	1 278	0,05%
	ARP	1 068	0,04%
	MPPP	1 043	0,04%
	HDP	990	0,04%
	UNPD	934	0,03%
	SDMP	683	0,03%
LDPN	576	0,02%	
Bauchi	CPC	1 315 209	81,69%
	PDP	258 404	16,05%
	ACN	16 674	1,04%
	ANPP	8 777	0,55%
	BNPP	2 694	0,17%
	FRESH	1 378	0,09%
	PDC	1 235	0,08%
	PMP	883	0,05%
	PPP	796	0,05%
	NCP	640	0,04%
	NMDP	609	0,04%
	ADC	599	0,04%
	NTP	415	0,03%
	APS	339	0,02%
	ARP	319	0,02%
	HDP	306	0,02%
	MPPP	288	0,02%
	LDPN	232	0,01%
	UNPD	163	0,01%
SDMP	134	0,01%	

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Benue	PDP	694 776	66,31%
	ACN	223 007	21,29%
	CPC	109 680	10,47%
	ANPP	8 592	0,82%
	PDC	2 623	0,25%
	ADC	1 936	0,18%
	PMP	1 685	0,16%
	PPP	888	0,08%
	NCP	769	0,07%
	UNPD	710	0,07%
	BNPP	613	0,06%
	APS	435	0,04%
	NTP	367	0,04%
	FRESH	329	0,03%
	MPPP	288	0,03%
	NMDP	286	0,03%
	ARP	225	0,02%
	SDMP	187	0,02%
	HDP	161	0,02%
	LDPN	152	0,01%
Bayelsa	PDP	504 811	99,63%
	CPC	691	0,14%
	ACN	370	0,07%
	PDC	241	0,05%
	ANPP	136	0,03%
	PMP	131	0,03%
	PPP	67	0,01%
	FRESH	50	0,01%
	ADC	31	0,01%
	UNPD	23	0,00%
	NCP	20	0,00%
	SDMP	18	0,00%
	MPPP	18	0,00%
	LDPN	17	0,00%
	NMDP	14	0,00%
	ARP	13	0,00%
	NTP	12	0,00%
	HDP	11	0,00%
	BNPP	10	0,00%
	APS	9	0,00%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Kwara	PDP	268 243	64,68%
	CPC	83 603	20,16%
	ACN	52 432	12,64%
	ANPP	1 672	0,40%
	PDC	1 565	0,38%
	PMP	1 124	0,27%
	PPP	850	0,20%
	ADC	646	0,16%
	UNPD	615	0,15%
	NCP	478	0,12%
	NMDP	474	0,11%
	NTP	463	0,11%
	BNPP	459	0,11%
	FRESH	408	0,10%
	MPPP	354	0,09%
	APS	336	0,08%
	LDPN	305	0,07%
	ARP	257	0,06%
	SDMP	238	0,06%
	HDP	232	0,06%
Ebonyi	PDP	480 592	95,57%
	ANPP	14 296	2,84%
	PDC	1 794	0,36%
	PMP	1 289	0,26%
	ACN	1 112	0,22%
	CPC	1 025	0,20%
	ADC	435	0,09%
	PPP	394	0,08%
	APS	316	0,06%
	NTP	256	0,05%
	MPPP	225	0,04%
	NMDP	183	0,04%
	ARP	148	0,03%
	UNPD	139	0,03%
	NCP	132	0,03%
	BNPP	126	0,03%
	HDP	123	0,02%
	SDMP	116	0,02%
	LDPN	96	0,02%
	FRESH	93	0,02%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Plateau	PDP	1 029 865	72,98%
	CPC	356 551	25,27%
	ACN	10 181	0,72%
	ANPP	5 235	0,37%
	PDC	2 601	0,18%
	PMP	1 717	0,12%
	PPP	870	0,06%
	BNPP	719	0,05%
	FRESH	622	0,04%
	NCP	396	0,03%
	ADC	383	0,03%
	NMDP	370	0,03%
	APS	353	0,03%
	NTP	337	0,02%
	UNPD	263	0,02%
	ARP	181	0,01%
	HDP	138	0,01%
	SDMP	121	0,01%
	LDPN	118	0,01%
	MPPP	96	0,01%
Kaduna	CPC	1 334 244	51,92%
	PDP	1 190 179	46,31%
	ANPP	17 301	0,67%
	ACN	11 278	0,44%
	BNPP	3 321	0,13%
	PDC	3 098	0,12%
	PMP	1 759	0,07%
	FRESH	1 691	0,07%
	PPP	1 399	0,05%
	NCP	1 308	0,05%
	ADC	693	0,03%
	NMDP	681	0,03%
	NTP	547	0,02%
	APS	530	0,02%
	ARP	421	0,02%
	HDP	409	0,02%
	MPPP	369	0,01%
	SDMP	281	0,01%
	LDPN	248	0,01%
	UNPD	206	0,01%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Edo	PDP	542 173	87,28%
	ACN	54 242	8,73%
	CPC	17 795	2,86%
	ANPP	2 174	0,35%
	PDC	1 179	0,19%
	ADC	597	0,10%
	PMP	597	0,10%
	PPP	573	0,09%
	NCP	327	0,05%
	FRESH	316	0,05%
	UNPD	188	0,03%
	BNPP	140	0,02%
	NTP	139	0,02%
	NMDP	136	0,02%
	APS	126	0,02%
	MPPP	125	0,02%
	LDPN	116	0,02%
	ARP	88	0,01%
	SDMP	81	0,01%
	Nasarawa	HDP	80
PDP		408 997	58,89%
CPC		278 390	40,08%
PDC		1 398	0,20%
ACN		1 204	0,17%
ANPP		1 047	0,15%
PMP		715	0,10%
PPP		452	0,07%
NCP		413	0,06%
FRESH		379	0,05%
ADC		292	0,04%
NTP		202	0,03%
NMDP		194	0,03%
MPPP		141	0,02%
BNPP		135	0,02%
ARP		132	0,02%
APS		127	0,02%
HDP		88	0,01%
UNPD		88	0,01%
LDPN		78	0,01%
SDMP	55	0,01%	

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Oyo	PDP	484 758	56,14%
	ACN	252 240	29,21%
	CPC	92 396	10,70%
	ANPP	7 156	0,83%
	ADC	6 541	0,76%
	PDC	3 321	0,38%
	PPP	3 149	0,36%
	UNPD	2 902	0,34%
	PMP	2 072	0,24%
	NCP	1 749	0,20%
	APS	1 295	0,15%
	SDMP	1 154	0,13%
	NMDP	794	0,09%
	FRESH	742	0,09%
	BNPP	712	0,08%
	NTP	669	0,08%
	ARP	623	0,07%
	MPPP	569	0,07%
	HDP	416	0,05%
	LDPN	286	0,03%
Ekiti	PDP	135 009	51,56%
	ACN	116 981	44,67%
	CPC	2 689	1,03%
	ANPP	1 482	0,57%
	ADC	1 314	0,50%
	PDC	821	0,31%
	UNPD	817	0,31%
	PMP	596	0,23%
	PPP	520	0,20%
	APS	506	0,19%
	SDMP	172	0,07%
	NCP	158	0,06%
	NMDP	134	0,05%
	NTP	129	0,05%
	MPPP	113	0,04%
	ARP	112	0,04%
	BNPP	94	0,04%
	HDP	89	0,03%
	LDPN	70	0,03%
	FRESH	52	0,02%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Imo	PDP	1 381 357	97,98%
	ACN	14 821	1,05%
	CPC	7 591	0,54%
	ANPP	2 520	0,18%
	PDC	946	0,07%
	PMP	453	0,03%
	FRESH	353	0,03%
	PPP	292	0,02%
	ADC	233	0,02%
	NCP	175	0,01%
	LDPN	147	0,01%
	UNPD	146	0,01%
	SDMP	143	0,01%
	NMDP	128	0,01%
	NTP	108	0,01%
	MPPP	100	0,01%
	BNPP	99	0,01%
	ARP	94	0,01%
	APS	80	0,01%
	HDP	64	0,00%
Akwa Ibom	PDP	1 165 629	94,58%
	ACN	54 148	4,39%
	CPC	5 348	0,43%
	ANPP	2 000	0,16%
	PDC	1 221	0,10%
	ADC	882	0,07%
	PMP	650	0,05%
	UNPD	528	0,04%
	PPP	476	0,04%
	NCP	229	0,02%
	NTP	151	0,01%
	NMDP	147	0,01%
	APS	146	0,01%
	MPPP	144	0,01%
	BNPP	143	0,01%
	FRESH	137	0,01%
	LDPN	123	0,01%
	ARP	113	0,01%
	SDMP	95	0,01%
	HDP	85	0,01%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Sokoto	CPC	540 769	59,44%
	PDP	309 057	33,97%
	ACN	20 144	2,21%
	ANPP	5 063	0,56%
	PMP	4 183	0,46%
	PPP	4 012	0,44%
	PDC	3 756	0,41%
	FRESH	3 163	0,35%
	BNPP	2 946	0,32%
	NMDP	2 726	0,30%
	ADC	2 373	0,26%
	APS	1 971	0,22%
	MPPP	1 952	0,21%
	NTP	1 802	0,20%
	NCP	1 476	0,16%
	HDP	1 091	0,12%
	ARP	915	0,10%
	UNPD	887	0,10%
	SDMP	786	0,09%
LDPN	736	0,08%	
Lagos	PDP	1 281 688	65,90%
	ACN	427 203	21,96%
	CPC	189 983	9,77%
	ANPP	8 941	0,46%
	PPP	7 479	0,38%
	PDC	7 361	0,38%
	ADC	5 339	0,27%
	PMP	2 826	0,15%
	NCP	2 752	0,14%
	FRESH	1 988	0,10%
	UNPD	1 834	0,09%
	BNPP	1 285	0,07%
	APS	1 190	0,06%
	SDMP	922	0,05%
	NMDP	899	0,05%
	ARP	827	0,04%
	NTP	751	0,04%
	HDP	661	0,03%
	MPPP	660	0,03%
	LDPN	455	0,02%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Anambra	PDP	1 145 169	98.96%
	CPC	4 223	0,36%
	ACN	3 437	0,30%
	PDC	1 282	0,11%
	ANPP	975	0,08%
	PMP	535	0,05%
	PPP	347	0,03%
	ADC	266	0,02%
	NCP	118	0,01%
	FRESH	107	0,01%
	NTP	98	0,01%
	APS	97	0,01%
	UNPD	96	0,01%
	MPPP	86	0,01%
	LDPN	83	0,01%
	NMDP	82	0,01%
	BNPP	80	0,01%
	ARP	56	0,00%
	HDP	54	0,00%
	SDMP	48	0,00%
Kogi	PDP	399 816	71,17%
	CPC	132 201	23,53%
	ANPP	16 491	2,94%
	ACN	6 516	1,16%
	PDC	1 231	0,22%
	PMP	972	0,17%
	PPP	661	0,12%
	NCP	603	0,11%
	ADC	596	0,11%
	BNPP	442	0,08%
	APS	347	0,06%
	FRESH	343	0,06%
	NMDP	341	0,06%
	UNPD	272	0,05%
	NTP	244	0,04%
	MPPP	178	0,03%
	ARP	150	0,03%
	HDP	140	0,02%
	LDPN	129	0,02%
	SDMP	109	0,02%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Osun	ACN	299 711	58,46%
	PDP	188 409	36,75%
	CPC	6 997	1,36%
	ADC	5 172	1,01%
	ANPP	3 617	0,71%
	UNPD	1 755	0,34%
	PPP	1 285	0,25%
	PDC	1 268	0,25%
	PMP	965	0,19%
	SDMP	614	0,12%
	APS	513	0,10%
	NCP	378	0,07%
	NMDP	323	0,06%
	NTP	321	0,06%
	ARP	300	0,06%
	MPPP	267	0,05%
	BNPP	267	0,05%
	FRESH	219	0,04%
	HDP	217	0,04%
	LDPN	116	0,02%
Ondo	PDP	387 376	79,57%
	ACN	74 253	15,25%
	CPC	11 890	2,44%
	ANPP	6 741	1,38%
	PDC	1 909	0,39%
	ADC	888	0,18%
	PMP	800	0,16%
	PPP	551	0,11%
	UNPD	382	0,08%
	NCP	315	0,06%
	NMDP	248	0,05%
	NTP	226	0,05%
	APS	217	0,04%
	SDMP	216	0,04%
	BNPP	174	0,04%
	MPPP	150	0,03%
	FRESH	141	0,03%
	LDPN	140	0,03%
	ARP	122	0,03%
	HDP	98	0,02%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Enugu	PDP	802 144	98,54%
	CPC	3 753	0,46%
	PDC	2 642	0,32%
	ACN	1 755	0,22%
	ANPP	1 111	0,14%
	PMP	648	0,08%
	PPP	405	0,05%
	FRESH	228	0,03%
	ADC	186	0,02%
	NCP	161	0,02%
	NTP	149	0,02%
	UNPD	120	0,01%
	LDPN	117	0,01%
	SDMP	101	0,01%
	BNPP	94	0,01%
	MPPP	89	0,01%
	NMDP	88	0,01%
	APS	85	0,01%
	HDP	75	0,01%
	ARP	58	0,01%
FCT	PDP	253 444	63,66%
	CPC	131 576	33,05%
	ANPP	3 170	0,80%
	ACN	2 327	0,58%
	ADC	2 036	0,51%
	PDC	1 468	0,37%
	BNPP	674	0,17%
	PPP	650	0,16%
	PMP	590	0,15%
	NCP	420	0,11%
	FRESH	404	0,10%
	NTP	229	0,06%
	APS	219	0,06%
	NMDP	199	0,05%
	ARP	166	0,04%
	MPPP	158	0,04%
	HDP	154	0,04%
	UNPD	76	0,02%
	LDPN	75	0,02%
	SDMP	59	0,01%

STATE	Party	Votes	Percentage
Ogun	PDP	309 177	56,86%
	ACN	199 555	36,70%
	CPC	17 654	3,25%
	ANPP	2 969	0,55%
	ADC	2 356	0,43%
	PPP	2 042	0,38%
	PDC	2 039	0,38%
	PMP	1 748	0,32%
	UNPD	1 650	0,30%
	SDMP	1 106	0,20%
	APS	505	0,09%
	NCP	461	0,08%
	MPPP	420	0,08%
	NTP	410	0,08%
	NMDP	333	0,06%
	BNPP	310	0,06%
	ARP	286	0,05%
	FRESH	266	0,05%
	HDP	243	0,04%
LDPN	185	0,03%	

Copyright ©2005–2011 INEC. | Designed and Maintained by ITS1