



BRIDGING THE FAULT LINES

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN SOUTHWEST ASIA



EASTWEST INSTITUTE

Forging Collective Action for a Safer and Better World

Copyright © 2012 EastWest Institute

Cover image by Dragan Stojanovski

The lines as depicted in the cover image are strictly abstract and are not intended to have any significance in terms of defining actual political divisions.

The EastWest Institute is an international, non-partisan, not-for-profit policy organization focused solely on confronting critical challenges that endanger peace. EWI was established in 1980 as a catalyst to build trust, develop leadership, and promote collaboration for positive change. The institute has offices in New York, Brussels, and Moscow. For more information about the EastWest Institute or this paper, please contact:

The EastWest Institute
11 East 26th Street, 20th Floor
New York, NY 10010 U.S.A.
1-212-824-4100
communications@ewi.info

www.ewi.info

BRIDGING THE FAULT LINES

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN
SOUTHWEST ASIA

A DISCUSSION PAPER



EASTWEST INSTITUTE
Forging Collective Action for a Safer and Better World

DISCLAIMER

This paper is the result of the deliberations of more than thirty people convened by the EastWest Institute. The views expressed in the paper are not necessarily the views of any single member of this group or of the EastWest Institute (including its Board of Directors and staff).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The EastWest Institute would like to acknowledge the generous support of its Chairman Emeritus, George Russell, and its Co-Chairman, Francis Finlay, who made this undertaking possible. We would also like to acknowledge the support of the members of the study group who gave freely of their intellectual capital, time, and experience over a protracted period. We are also indebted to the senior officials and other specialists, including from Southwest Asia, who were consulted in the course of this work or who participated in related meetings.

ABBREVIATIONS

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
D-8	Developing Eight
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBEC	Pacific Basin Economic Council
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

The judgments in this paper, and indeed its overall direction, ended up somewhere very different from where the team producing it had started. In late 2009, the EastWest Institute convened a small group of eminent security practitioners¹ from the Euro-Atlantic community² to look at ways of promoting greater cohesion among those countries to combat the divisive pressures that had built up as a result of several disputes, including the military conflict in Georgia in August 2008 and its aftermath, and disagreements over ballistic missile defense. This practitioners' group took the view that one way to promote more cohesion on security policy would be to identify an issue on the horizon that was of high strategic importance for the Euro-Atlantic community—and to propose new joint action by Euro-Atlantic states that could serve to create a stronger sense of common purpose. The practitioners' group reached a consensus that an important area for new joint action was how the Euro-Atlantic community would meet the likely cost of maintaining its collective security interests in Southwest Asia.³ The practitioners' group turned to an associated group of experts⁴ to review the policy issues involved and make actionable recommendations that would advance the goals of building security consensus in the Euro-Atlantic community.

The unifying policy question posed by this report is how the Euro-Atlantic partners, especially Turkey, Russia, the United States, and the European Union, could work together better to prepare themselves to manage complex emergencies in Southwest Asia through the end of the decade. At the outset, members of the group adopted the principle that the collective security interests of Southwest Asian states were the baseline from which future Euro-Atlantic security interests would have to be addressed.

¹ In November 2011 this group comprised Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, former Secretary General, OSCE, (France), General Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary General, CSTO, (Russia), General (ret.) Michael Hayden, former Director, NSA and CIA (United States), General (ret.) Harald Kujat, former Chief of the General Staff (Germany) and former Chair of NATO's Military Committee, Dr. Andrzej Olechowski, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (Poland), Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, former Defence Minister, (Poland), Ambassador Nikola Radovanovic, former Minister of Defense (Bosnia Herzegovina), Dr. Elisabeth Rehn, former Minister of Defense (Finland), Goran Svilanovic, former Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia (Serbia), Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin (Russia) participated in several meetings. Ambassador Yaşar Yakış, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (Turkey), participated in meetings of the group in October 2011.

² The Euro-Atlantic Community is the group of states brought together in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This community conducts security policy through a variety of international organizations rather than exclusively or primarily through the OSCE. This report is about the way in which the entire range of organizational and national assets in the Euro-Atlantic community can conduct security policy more coherently and with more consensus.

³ For the purposes of the report, Southwest Asia is the area from the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea in the west to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east. It comprises Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and adjacent maritime areas. Such regional descriptors as Southwest Asia can never be watertight, and there will be important forces that speak against this or that framing, even as alternate regional framings recommend themselves.

⁴ A group of 21 specialists participated in the process at different times. They included Brig (ret.) Ian Abbot (U.K.), Dr. Greg Austin (Australia), Angelika Beer (Germany), Anatoly Chuntulov (Russia), Ambassador William Courtney (U.S.), Prof. Anoush Ehteshami (U.K.), Dr. Vladimir Ivanov (Russia), Prof. Hall Gardner (U.S.), Bruno Gruselle (France), Liza Kurukulasuriya (Russia), Major General Lazslo Makk (Hungary); Dr. Hasan Özertem (Turkey), Dr. Güner Özkan (Turkey), Dr. Rouzbeh Parsi (Sweden), Prof. Tiiu Pohl (Estonia), Simon Saradzhyan (Russia), Dr. John Steinbrunner (U.S.), Adam Stulberg (U.S.), Dr. Frank Umbach (Germany), Dr. Wolfgang Zellner (Germany).

FOREWORD

As large allied armies from outside the region withdraw and local actors intensify their political campaigns to assert power, Southwest Asia will be increasingly at the core of global politics. The region will become even more important for the Euro-Atlantic community, as tensions heighten over energy security, nuclear weapons proliferation, forms of political governance, migration, and unresolved bilateral conflicts. Between now and 2020, the security interests of Euro-Atlantic states in Southwest Asia will probably be more challenged than they are today. Over the course of this study group exercise, a number of Southwest Asian states underwent major domestic political upheavals. These changes added to the sense of urgency that the team felt about the need for fresh analysis and possible security policy adjustments by Euro-Atlantic states.

As mentioned, the goal of this study exercise was to agree on an action plan that could catalyze new approaches and a strong consensus, and to present this action plan to governments and intergovernmental organizations in the OSCE region. Yet the exercise would be ineffective without serious, wide-ranging consultation by Euro-Atlantic states with the governments and other stakeholders in Southwest Asia on proposed new approaches to collective security. As remote powers reframe their security commitments in Southwest Asia, there will be a need for a comprehensive view of how they can better support existing or emerging forms of collective security from inside the region. The purpose of this paper is to provide a solid foundation from a Euro-Atlantic viewpoint for that consultation to continue and intensify. The paper does not capture the full range of important viewpoints from within the Southwest Asian region.

Thus, the paper has three goals:

- To help the Euro-Atlantic community better appreciate the evolving security dynamics in Southwest Asia that affect their interests
- To analyze, in broad outline, new means of promoting prosperity and peace in Southwest Asia as viewed through a collective security lens
- To provide a departure point for promoting a strong consensus for enhancing security in Southwest Asia through a new understanding of burden sharing among members of the Euro-Atlantic community and states in the Southwest Asian region.

This is not a detailed analysis of what might happen in the region and how states individually might be forced to respond. It is a paper about using preventive diplomacy in Southwest Asia more consistently and according to a shared regional vision to ensure that the costs of security are a whole lot lower—in lives lost, in livelihoods destroyed, and in economic opportunity forsaken. On the positive side, it is about using cooperative security as a unifying principle for states with quite different values to work together to co-create peace and common security.

This study group report is primarily directed at the Euro-Atlantic community. Individually or collectively, its members now play a significant role in the security of Southwest Asia, but they are looking to reduce that role. The report proposes a detailed examination of a new approach to regional collective security in which the states of Southwest Asia commit, on their own terms, to the long-term goal of bridging the main geopolitical fault lines. This goal holds out the promise of embedding the most serious and intractable conflicts in a wider regional vision to create new incentives and mechanisms for reducing tensions. The experience of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe shows that bridging fault lines is not only possible but essential in times of high tension, military confrontation and military build-up.

Southwest Asia now is undergoing greater changes in its security environment than at any time in the last half century. Among the many forces at play is a growing sense among key regional states that their security and prosperity have to be managed much more through their own independent, regional diplomacy than through reliance on outside powers. As those major powers signal a declining willingness to bear the material and human costs of security in the region, regional states have new opportunities to set the agenda rather than be policy-takers subject to pressure from outside. In spite of deep conflicts among some neighbors, the states of the region should consider the opportunity that this weakening commitment by remote powers now presents. Now may be the best chance for countries in Southwest Asia to work collectively to put behind them the violent aftermath of imperialism, colonialism, liberation struggles, and bloody dictatorships. The violence of recent decades was an obstacle to effective decision making for long-term peaceful development. War and violence force states to choose sides and to make new enemies. A new regional security consensus among all states in Southwest Asia is the way to break out of that cycle of crisis, and it is the best protection against untoward ambitions of more powerful states, either from inside or outside the region.

The geopolitical fault lines in Southwest Asia seem deeply entrenched. Characterizations of them would vary depending on where the observer sits, but they clearly involve a number of the most significant states in the region, including Israel, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Yet the goal of policy for the states of the region has to be based around a vision beyond managing or coping with the next round of terrorism, the next war, or increasing military costs. What do the states of the region need to do to accelerate their ambitions for pacifying or normalizing their environment? How do they start bridging security divides rather than entrenching them? This topic has to be raised much higher on the international agenda than it is now. This paper proposes detailed examination of new approaches to regional and collective security in which the states of the region work together to design and operate a system of their choosing. Every region of the world except Southwest Asia has done this.

The challenge this paper poses to Euro-Atlantic leaders is to think beyond current conflict management challenges in Southwest Asia and to imagine and prepare for a time when Southwest Asian states manage their security primarily through consensus with their neighbors. Along with rethinking the entire regional policy framework, states from outside the region will need to be prepared to make significant adjustments in current policies. The Euro-Atlantic commu-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

nity has been living with a westernized and somewhat unreal set of expectations about what this region should be like. Nothing may symbolize these differences more than the question of separation of organized religion from the state. Any interested group of people in the region is just as entitled to form an Islamic Democratic Party or a Jewish Democratic party as groups of people in Europe are to form “Christian Democratic” parties. The resulting political cultures, however, are unlikely to manifest the same sort of division between the state on the one hand and the church, mosque, or synagogue on the other, that has emerged in Western societies. Islamic republics, like the Jewish state, may be a defining characteristic of this region in a way that many Euro-Atlantic states find hard to swallow. Differences among value systems will remain as important as they are contested, but diplomatic approaches to security need to work around differences in political and social culture while building on shared values of human dignity and justice.

This paper makes four broad recommendations to Euro-Atlantic leaders:

- 1.** Create new policy deliberation mechanisms inside the Euro-Atlantic community, possibly built around a core of key actors, such as Turkey, Russia, the European Union, and the United States, to frame new strategies for the region.
- 2.** Reinvigorate the shared commitment to preventive diplomacy through reliance on a broader set of tools, including (a) stronger coordination with regional organizations in Southwest Asia, (b) robust and transformational support for regional economic integration, and (c) mobilization of private sector investment in strategic trans-border economic projects that can promote closer regional integration.
- 3.** Support the rebalancing of state power and democratic sentiment in the region as much through the promotion of the shared values of justice and rule of law as through the promotion of more contested values of secularism in government and liberal pluralism.
- 4.** Breathe new life into the joint commitment to fight against violent extremism of all forms and against the associated trans-border networks and financing by undertaking a joint review of policies and by taking new measures to close down these networks.

CONTENTS

Preventive Diplomacy Needs in Southwest Asia	10
Current Collective Security Models in Southwest Asia	11
The High Cost of Current Collective Security Practices	12
Assessing the Dynamics of Southwest Asia between now and 2020	13
A New Vision of Collective Security in Southwest Asia?	14
The Southeast Asian Experience	14
Building Blocks for the Bigger Vision	16
Need for More Track 2	17
Realpolitik and New Approaches	17
Policy Response by the Euro-Atlantic Community	18
Summary of Concrete Recommendations for the Euro-Atlantic Partners	19

Bridging the Fault Lines

Preventive Diplomacy Needs in Southwest Asia

Among the seventeen countries of Southwest Asia,¹ few are at peace with important neighbors. Several face armed insurgencies (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), while other countries in the region are contributing economic aid or military forces to combat the insurgencies. At least two more countries are facing large-scale social revolt (Syria and Yemen). There are at least three major interstate conflicts or potentially violent confrontations: Israel–Palestine, Iran–Israel, and India–Pakistan (over Kashmir). Well-organized and well-resourced non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah continue to use violence to achieve their political goals. In addition to those conflicts, there is a high degree of distrust between key countries, such as that between Pakistan and Afghanistan, or that between Iran and its neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula. The entire region faces a continuing threat from the forces of violent extremism or terrorism. Two countries in the region (Israel and Pakistan) possess nuclear weapons, and a third (Iran) is in confrontation with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) over its nuclear intentions. There are more than 150,000 NATO troops in the region, supported by non-NATO

troops and powerful naval forces, most involved in active military operations of some sort.

Many of these conflicts are becoming more unpredictable. Over the course of 2011, each month seemed to bring revelations of dramatic innovations in diplomacy and strategy that further redefined regional security dynamics. For the better, there have been reports that India and Pakistan are close to agreement on ending trade bans against each other. On the negative side of the ledger, recent developments have been more dramatic. There were allegations of an Iranian assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador in the United States. Violent suppression of protesters in Syria continues on a large scale. To complicate the assessment of what has been positive or negative, the United States has announced its intention to draw down combat forces in Afghanistan by 2014, while also making it plain that it is planning for a long-term, enhanced strategic presence in the region, including a new military facility in Afghanistan within half an hour's drive of the Iranian border.

Whatever preferences states in the region have on the question of how to manage their own security, they are denied the opportunity to do so because they have been unable to stabilize the region using their own resources. This is the inescapable reality of today. In the past six years, the UNSC has passed more than sixty resolutions to address threats to peace and security in Southwest Asia, a number that does not fully reflect the threats, since the UNSC routinely fails to address some of the most serious ones. This paper addresses the question of how the balance

¹ For the purposes of the report, Southwest Asia is the area from the Eastern Mediterranean, Suez Canal, and Red Sea in the west to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east. It comprises Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and adjacent maritime areas. Such regional descriptors as Southwest Asia can never be watertight, and there will be important forces that speak against this or that framing, even as alternate regional framings recommend themselves.

between external intervention and regional collective security arrangements can be shifted dramatically in favor of the latter in a way that promotes a decrease in violent conflict, a lessening of tensions, and a consolidation of the foundations of peace. The paper asks how the Euro-Atlantic community can support that rebalancing, based on its experience of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention in Europe, a continent that during the Cold War was the potential site of the most deadly military confrontation in history.

This is a legitimate question for states of the Euro-Atlantic community, given their interests and the extent to which countries in Southwest Asia ask for their involvement. That said, it is obvious that Euro-Atlantic states have overstretched their capacities by overreaching in their ambition. Where will the new balance point for their engagement lie?

Current Collective Security Models in Southwest Asia

The states of Southwest Asia recognize the value of forming regional groupings for defense purposes as well as for economic security. Regional arrangements for collective security are expressly recognized in Article 8 of the U.N. Charter.² There is a clear link between the promotion and deepening of economic cooperation and the reduction of security tensions, though there are exceptions, and progress is not always enduring. Table 1 lists the most prominent existing regional organizations either in Southwest Asia or with members from Southwest Asia. Some of these organizations are embryonic or languishing.

² The operative clauses in Article 52 read as follows:

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

In addition, there is no clear sense of how overlapping mandates of different organizations might be rationalized or linked.

Table 1:

Selected Regional Organizations involving Southwest Asian States

- Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA)
- The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)
- Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
- Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
- Developing-8 (D-8)
- Islamic Development Bank
- United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)
- Arab Common Market
- Arab Customs Union
- Arab League

While most of these organizations are directed at economic cooperation rather than classic security cooperation, all states in Southwest Asia recognize the value of economic cooperation as an essential prelude to and cornerstone of regional security. The states of Southwest Asia have deep and diverse experience with international organizations operating at the global level, where they must work with other states of the region despite deep political or security conflicts. Notably, CICA is the only regional organization that brings together Israel, Iran, and Palestine. States that aspire to peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and Palestine should have a view of the regional frameworks in which that might best be consolidated.

There are essentially three models of existing collective security arrangements in Southwest Asia:

1. Those centered exclusively in the region, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
2. Those that extend to non-regional groupings based on different criteria, such as religion (OIC), identity (Arab League), or geography (CICA)
3. Those that involve remote powers, such as the web of agreements that have bound the United States and Israel together since 1952.

Collective security action in this region in the past decade has come at a very high cost in blood and treasure, in livelihoods destroyed and lives broken.

Other major powers from outside the region, such as China, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and India have formal agreements with countries in the region, for instance for arms sales or military basing, that also play into conflicting views of what is needed to stabilize regional security. However, it is clear that the United States is the most deeply committed of any country to formal agreements for collective security in the region.

Formal agreements bring a degree of predictability to security. By contrast, another form of collective security that figures prominently in Southwest Asia is that represented by ad hoc arrangements. These can involve resolutions of the UNSC, decisions of NATO, or temporary military operations by other outside powers, most often in cooperation with NATO. More permanent and institutionalized forms of collective security might offer greater predictability and obviate the need for such regular external intervention.

The economic foundations for regional cooperation have been much weaker in Southwest Asia than in some other regions. This can be seen not least in the very poor land links (road, rail, and landline) across the region. This can be attributed in part to political conflict and in part to low regional trade complementarities, but it is in the main a hangover from colonial era trade patterns that emphasized trade through sea ports to the major powers. This trading pattern was replicated once oil became the leading export from the region. The region badly needs connectivity of the traditional kind. This has become a high priority for ECO. States of the region want to create structures that bring about an end to this sort of physical isolation of certain areas. Though land transportation requires large investments, advances in information and communications technologies are enabling a more rapid transformation of regional communications and interaction.

The High Cost of Current Collective Security Practices

Collective security action in this region in the past decade has come at a very high cost in blood and treasure, in livelihoods destroyed and lives broken. These costs have never been fully calculated, whether in human terms, direct budget costs for defense and diplomacy, or broader economic and social costs.

In the Euro-Atlantic community, separate estimates exist for small parts of the picture, such as the budget costs to the United States and the United Kingdom of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or of lives lost in individual campaigns. Many of these estimates, however, have been faulted by independent analysts, either for their narrow focus on defense budget costs in the theatre and direct new defense costs at home, or, by contrast, for casting too wide a net by including in the human toll death and casualty estimates not directly attributable to the wars. The costs of non-military war fighting policies or other security policies are rarely included in official estimates. Detailed estimates of political costs are rarely combined with detailed analysis of dollar costs.

At the same time, the countries of the region have consistently pointed out that they, and not the external powers, bear the highest costs of collective security in Southwest Asia. This may not be true as much for the total dollar costs of defense expenditure, but it is the case for the human costs (casualties) and broader economic costs (infrastructure destroyed, trade disruptions, and lost opportunities).

In terms of military expenditures, some countries of this region are in the big spending league. In the 1990s, because of the end of the Cold War, the main global focal point of military expenditures and geopolitical instability was Northeast Asia—which is still home to the highest concentration of conventional military power in the world. The last decade, however, has seen a shift in the center of gravity of military tension and military combat power from Northeast Asia to Southwest Asia, with some states in this region now spending much larger amounts on military and security forces, and policies than they were in the 1990s.

Some conclusions about costs can nonetheless be drawn:

1. The United States has paid a much higher share of direct costs for collective security in this region than it should have.
2. It will not continue to do so, and its political appetite for high-cost engagement in the region is diminishing.

3. European Union members are showing little appetite for paying a higher share of the costs than they have to date.
4. They want to reduce the costs to them, and their political appetite for high-cost engagement in the region is diminishing.
5. Russia and Turkey, both G20 members, have borne comparatively few costs outside their borders in support of collective security in Southwest Asia,³ in spite of tremendous costs that they would have to bear in the event of a major destabilization in the region on their doorstep.
6. The biggest driver in terms of cost-benefit analysis may well be the basic needs of the people of the region: their access to the daily necessities of food, water, energy, and transportation. More attention to these needs instead of the military dimensions of security may well pay dividends in security that to date have eluded all the stakeholders.

Assessing the Dynamics of Southwest Asia Between Now and 2020

We can assess with a high degree of confidence that the fundamental change we have seen in the last decade within the region will accelerate. We cannot have high confidence that, by 2020, the situation will have stabilized, unless fundamentally new directions in policy are explored. There are several powerful factors working against stabilization and only embryonic strands of policy that would underpin positive change.

Positive influences include:

1. Some states in the region, especially in the GCC, are increasingly determined to improve existing collective security arrangements on some issues (though this tendency is still quite weak).

³ Turkey has been paying a large price in its domestic counterterrorism efforts and has contributed forces to operations in the region. Russia has also had a domestic terrorist and separatist preoccupation, while materially supporting collective security efforts in Southwest Asia in a modest way.

2. Most states have easy access to the intellectual, social, and financial capital they need to make a faster transition to durable security.
3. States are slowly strengthening a number of available means of regional cooperation in the economic sphere, such as the OIC, the GCC, the ECO, and the D-8.
4. The GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, remain a beacon of relative stability, are well resourced to support positive change, and are beginning to seek more positive influence over regional developments.
5. Turkey, as the front-line state of the Euro-Atlantic community facing Southwest Asia, is increasingly influential in shaping regional dynamics for the better.
6. Other states in the region, especially the GCC members, are becoming more robust in their diplomacy in support of cooperative security.

Negative influences include:

1. There is only a weak commitment among states in the region to cooperative, multilateral behavior that cuts across serious security divides (there is high polarization in several sub-regions).
2. There is no strong tradition of cooperative security among the states of the region.
3. Political logjams in several key states prevent the emergence of ideas for cooperative security.
4. Most leaders are preoccupied with domestic pressures, and few are prepared to stake their political future on cooperative security.
5. There is little unity among key actors on consistent and comprehensive approaches to reducing the potential for large-scale violent conflict.
6. Levels of domestic political violence in the region will probably increase, not decrease, in large part because of the shift of coercive power from collapsing regimes and states to a number of non-state actors.

We cannot have high confidence that, by 2020, the situation will have stabilized, unless fundamentally new directions in policy are explored.

The appearance of strong demand for democracy, respect for individual rights—including rights to adequately compensated employment, education, and upward social mobility—marks a critical moment for the legitimacy of all governments in the region.

7. Economic growth in many states in the region is not accompanied by standard of living improvements for key sectors of the population.
8. Governance remains very weak in violence-prone regions within several key states.
9. Outside powers are scaling back their commitment to support security in the region with combat forces.
8. The balance of coercive power will shift dramatically away from governments in favor of previously weak actors, whose rise to power will be destabilizing and spark conflicts even if in some cases their agenda advocates political pluralism and peaceful interaction.
9. The appearance of strong demand for democracy, respect for individual rights—including rights to adequate compensation, education, and upward social mobility—marks a critical moment for the legitimacy of all governments in the region, regardless of the character of those governments (authoritarian or liberal).

At the same time, several serious risk factors for stalled or declining prosperity remain in place:

1. The persistence of regional and internal conflicts
2. The potential for violent conflict over nuclear proliferation risks
3. A continuing contest between values of modernization and tradition (especially religious fundamentalism)
4. The high dependence of Europe and Japan on energy from the region.
10. Military expenditures of key states in the region will increase, and their policies will probably become more reliant on the use of military and paramilitary force.
11. There will probably be a higher level of cross-border security operations by the states of the region than we have seen in the past decade.

Forces which have both positive and negative features are the following:

1. Demography of the region continues to change dramatically.
2. The power of local actors relative to external powers will increase.
3. The power of local anti-state actors relative to states in the region will increase.
4. Local actors will be driven much more by the need to respond to democratic sentiment, not always inspired by liberal politics.
5. The region is inextricably bound up in the process of globalization, particularly through advanced electronic communication and information technology.
6. The region constitutes a major crossroads for many commercial and human flows.
7. By 2020, some states in the region will see their borders and control at home come under greater pressure from these forms of transformation. In one or two cases, civil strife could lead to the creation of new boundaries or even new political entities.

A New Vision of Collective Security in Southwest Asia?

The first defense structure in modern times that covered the region was the Baghdad Pact, established in 1955 by a British-American initiative. It was transformed into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) to fill the geographic gap in the perimeter of military containment around the USSR between NATO in Europe and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It was converted to an economic cooperation organization under the name of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 and to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985. However, Southwest Asia is not yet a strategically coherent region, a security community, or a unified geopolitical reality like other regions of Asia.

The Southeast Asian Experience

By contrast, in Southeast Asia, it was some forty-five years ago that five non-communist states staked out their aspirations for region-

al collective security⁴ in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that formed the basis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). That venture did not fully mature until the Cold War ended, but all ten Southeast Asian countries eventually became members, and some seventeen countries from outside the region also became signatories to the treaty. Through this process, ASEAN became the glue of an even wider regional security forum that is judged by its participants to be highly effective: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF includes ASEAN members, Japan, China, the two Koreas, Russia, the United States, India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Australia, and New Zealand, among others.

The decline and transformation of external intervention was a paramount factor in the process of deepening regionalization that occurred in Southeast Asia after 1992, but the levels of violence before that were very high. In 1967, there were active insurgencies based on political extremism in several countries, and the insurgencies were proxy wars for three competing great powers from outside. The cost in human terms was massive. Hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers and hundreds of billions of dollars worth of foreign military equipment were a fundamental part of the picture. States who signed the original ASEAN treaty had territorial claims against each other. This was one of the three most militarized parts of the world, with more people dying in wars and genocide there in the decade from 1967 to 1977 than in any other region of the world. In 1976, one year after the end of the Vietnam War and the withdrawal of United States ground forces from continental Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Secretariat was established, marking the first strong move by the states of the region toward active policy coordination. By 1992, after the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia four years earlier, the withdrawal

of Soviet naval forces from Cam Ranh Bay by 1989, the end of the Cold War in that year, and the withdrawal of American naval forces from their Philippines bases in 1992, the stage was set for the Southeast Asian region to take its own course, even as individual countries retained strong ties, including military ties, to great powers such as China and the United States. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. In all of that time, the United States has maintained an over-the-horizon military presence that has been accompanied by useful interventions from other great powers, such as the contribution of a police contingent by China in the U.N. operations in Cambodia in the 1990s.

The emergence alongside ASEAN of parallel and geographically more expansive organizations covering the Pacific basin buttressed the consolidation of ASEAN, whose members depended heavily on investment from and trade, first with the United States and Japan, and later also with China. These larger, parallel organizations included the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) for business leaders set up in 1967, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) set up in 1980, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) set up in 1989. The last, which was heavily backed by ASEAN states, made history in 1991 by including, for the first time ever in the same international body, China and Taiwan—as “economies,” not as states. Track 2 processes also played a very important role in the consolidation of new visions of collective security in Southeast Asia, principally through the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), set up with leadership from people in a group based around ASEAN, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The rock on which CSCAP was built was a grouping of ASEAN think tanks: an Institute of Strategic and International Studies in each of the five original member states.

Southwest Asia today is in a much stronger position politically and economically than Southeast Asia was in 1967—or perhaps even in 1992—but it is a region still disadvantaged by interstate confrontations, terrorism, and violent extremism. It is economically challenged in quite severe ways, with some of its most wealthy states now facing questions of large youth unemployment or questions over future access to fresh water. A number of

Every region of the world except Southwest Asia has an inclusive, over-arching regional security or economic partnership organization, regardless of or in spite of any political divisions among particular members.

⁴ The central idea of collective security, which inspires various forms in practice, is that two or more states commit themselves to the security of another or others. There are ideas for universal collective security embodied in the existence and practice of the UNSC that co-exist with conceptions of smaller regional groupings, such as NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), or the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and its successor, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Initially rooted more in the needs for collective military defense, the idea of collective security has become much wider in its application to include, as the OSCE example illustrates, both economic and human dimensions.

The effective articulation of new, non-traditional security challenges may in fact be the best tool available for bridging the most contentious political divides in this region.

states in the region are politically or physically isolated from their neighbors. Every region of the world except Southwest Asia has an inclusive, over-arching regional security or economic partnership organization, regardless of or in spite of any political divisions among particular members. These overarching regional organizations sit alongside a number of subregional arrangements and/or extraregional treaty relationships.

In Southwest Asia, such a model as the ASEAN treaty may be useful in broad terms. That is for the states of the region to decide. The steps needed to arrive at that point may include the consolidation of smaller, subregional groups. The intensity and protracted nature of some of the conflicts in Southwest Asia would appear to prevent an early move to a region-wide organization. Even so, emerging commonalities and linkages across Southwest Asia mean that events in one part have international impacts bounded, more or less, by the borders of the region. At the same time, states in the region are linked strategically and economically to the outside in quite diverse ways. A stronger sense of collaborative action and mutual interest among the states of Southwest Asia will be essential to bolster their security more economically and more effectively. A treaty of amity and cooperation in Southwest Asia on the ASEAN model would complement existing regional arrangements for economic and social advancement.

Building Blocks for the Bigger Vision

There is no standard formula for building a large regional organization like ASEAN or OSCE. In the case of Southwest Asia, there may be value in avoiding for now an ambition to create a region-wide, all-encompassing organization that would in some way have to be values-based, as is the case in all other regions. Instead, a treaty that bound all states in some narrow sphere of economic or technical cooperation, the way the European Coal and Steel Community did at first, might be more appropriate. One view is that the best the region can aspire to is a series of subregional agreements between small sets of countries. These arrangements would represent only an incremental gain in both practical cooperation and longer-term ambition. A contrasting, more ambitious view is that Southwest Asian states must demonstrate a political commitment and vision to bridge

the divides between them and their neighbors. There is a need, according to this view, to call a region-wide conference of states to kickstart the process, much as the Helsinki consultative process beginning in 1972 and formalized in a conference format in 1973 resulted in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975.

Elements of this grander vision exist, both in the various existing regional organizations and in the common, long-term strategic purposes jointly articulated by most countries in the region in various political declarations in the OIC, the ECO, or the Arab League. In October 2011, there was a breakthrough toward convening a conference to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This breakthrough demonstrates the positive potential of such actions, but the Finnish government, nominated as the convener, encountered immediate political difficulties in getting the process moving, leaving no doubt that the road to region-wide collaboration will be long and hard.

This example demonstrates the need for states to bring the idea of military confidence building measures to center stage and apply it in subregional situations as widely as possible as a prelude to wider regional cooperation. Transparency should be highly valued, with governments ideally committing to increased openness about basic military posture.

A key building block of a new vision of collective security will be a commitment to working in economic, business, social, and technical fields across the major geopolitical fault lines in the region. This is already happening to a limited degree, either directly or through proxy arrangements. However, among the seventeen countries in Southwest Asia, there are only a handful of very small countries that are prepared to work across all of the geopolitical fault lines to foster the economic and human exchanges needed to underpin long-term peace. Outside the region, Turkey, Russia, and China are the only major countries prepared to support a similar approach, though India seems to be edging closer to that position. States which refuse to trade with their neighbors usually pay a high economic cost. One of the best examples of this in the region may be Pakistan, which pays as much as three times as much for key imports

from remote countries as it would pay for similar products from India.

At the same time, high social mobility of elites across the region is transforming international business relationships there. The dynamic demography of the region is also underpinning a reorientation of business transactions across borders.

One avenue for greater regional cooperation that may be particularly promising is the area of water security. In other regions, the shared interests of states to maintain sufficient water resources have spurred cooperative behavior. More than half of the countries in the region are facing or will face severe water crises, either nationally or in critical localities, because of the depletion of aquifers and the changing climate. The effective articulation of new, non-traditional security challenges may in fact be the best tool available for bridging the most contentious political divides in this region. On the other hand, there is a view that approaches based on territory and open borders may be less satisfactory than a stronger emphasis on human security and the promotion of individual opportunity, freedoms, and protections. Other proposals include a regional organization for energy security or for regional transportation, especially rail, the latter with heavy private sector involvement.

The Need for More Track 2

There is very little Track 2⁵ work in Southwest Asia, and almost none of it has a broader regional focus or has arisen from within the region itself. One 2008 study concluded: "Those who have sponsored Track Two in the region to date are entitled to ask when regional leaders will emerge to begin to play a greater role."⁶ There are some innovative processes created in the region, not least by Friends of the Earth Middle East, based out of Israel. Also, the entire Oslo peace process originated from and was sustained in part by Track 2 efforts. But outside of the Palestine–

Israel issue, there has been little effort to develop Track 2. Except in a few cases, there has been little crossover between unofficial Track 2 efforts and official diplomacy, a situation that undermines the value of Track 2 processes, leaving little but the building of networks of like-minded people.

There is even less Track 1.5⁷ activity, though one major exception is the Manama Dialogue. This meeting, which began in 2004, attracted some thirty official delegations from countries in Southwest Asia and elsewhere to its 2010 convening. The Manama Dialogue provides an opportunity for side meetings between participating ministers and officials from the region. Even though this dialogue process has not yet borne fruit in reducing tensions, it is a very promising forum that can serve as a foundation for promoting new approaches to regional security, including through new collective means. It may in fact emerge as the foundation of new collective security arrangements in the region, but to do so, it may have to limit or eliminate the participation of external powers. As in the case of some of the most active Track 2 processes, this dialogue has been operated by an organization from outside the region, in this case the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Realpolitik and New Approaches

Some observers see the main political obstacle in bridging the fault lines as the positioning of Iran and/or Israel, who are clear outliers in the region. Some also believe that Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain may have moved recently into the "obstacle" category. The intensity of the animosity in many of the conflicts is so deep, and the strategic demands of the conflict parties so incompatible, that it is hard to imagine that the geopolitical fault lines will be bridged in this decade.

As important as the goal of reducing tension and confrontation is, the countries of the region cannot ignore the need to conform to international standards and expectations. When there are conflicts over such norms, enforcement action or retaliation of some sort can only be expected. The character of

It is challenging to picture a time when Israel and Iran are significant trade partners and have normalized political relations. But to imagine that this should never happen, or could never happen, would be strange.

⁵ There are many definitions of Track 2 diplomacy. It is used here to mean informal dialogues involving academic specialists, government officials, and sometimes business leaders, in which the officials are understood to be participating in a private capacity in order to develop new and viable policy approaches to problems that have stalled at official level.

⁶ Peter Jones, "Filling a critical gap, or just wasting time? Track Two diplomacy and regional security in the Middle East," *Disarmament Forum*, 2008(2), p. 10, <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2726.pdf>.

⁷ This is a variant that lies somewhere between official diplomacy and Track 2, where the meetings are more visibly intended to engage officials but where the setting is more informal than traditional intergovernmental conferences or discussions.

Both Turkey and Russia have articulated useful approaches, but these have not been taken up and seriously combined with or reconciled with other approaches from the United States and the European Union.

such enforcement produces an inevitable increase in tensions. This has clearly been the case in the confrontation between Iran and the international community over that country's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As much as individual states aspire to cooperative arrangements with their neighbors, acts or policies which others see as threatening their security and breaching global norms will provoke reactions that may involve the use of force. Such use of force may or may not be sanctioned by a consensus view of international law. *Realpolitik* coexists with *détente*.

In the long term, however, the policy of isolating certain governments is not compatible with a new vision of cooperative, inclusive regional diplomacy. While this suggests that building a region-wide collective security framework will be a protracted process, it also suggests that the only alternative may be to increase the pace of innovative diplomatic approaches. For example, it is challenging to picture a time when Israel and Iran are significant trade partners and have normalized political relations. But to imagine that this should never happen, or could never happen, would be strange. The tough question is how to drive toward such outcomes more vigorously in a way that satisfies the evolving security concerns of stakeholders.

It seems that the states of the region have a choice. They can continue paying a high price for collective security that is delivered largely by remote powers in an unpredictable, ad hoc, and reactive manner. Or the states of Southwest Asia can come to terms with a long-term vision of regional peace and lay the foundations in a deliberate, self-managed fashion. Given the severity of the conflicts in the region, informal approaches may be the most productive route for promoting a new vision of collective security, but that process will need to be led by a state from within the region that is prepared to mobilize around it a group of other states that support the broad vision.

Policy Response by the Euro-Atlantic Community

For better or for worse, the states of the Euro-Atlantic community are principal actors in the collective security of Southwest Asia and will remain so for the next decade. There is a

reasonable degree of consensus in the Euro-Atlantic community about the broad lines of desirable security policy in the region. For example, all of the members want an end to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, elimination of safe havens for terrorists in Yemen, stability in Pakistan, an Israel–Palestine peace agreement, no nuclear proliferation, and uninterrupted energy supplies from the main producers. Recent years have seen high levels of coordination among leading states of the Euro-Atlantic community to address some of these challenges. But there is no strong unity on how to implement specific, concrete policies that promote the broadly agreed goals. To the extent that unity at one point existed, it is beginning to fray at the edges. There is a sense of disarray and retreat rather than a commitment to continual reassessment and policy innovation. More importantly, perhaps, economic assistance policies for this region do not have a wide regional sweep. There seems to be little support for creating the necessary regional economic infrastructure to serve as a foundation for peace, especially when it comes to land transportation and advanced communication links such as landline cables.

Leaders of the most influential Euro-Atlantic states should regroup and offer a collective response to the fact that Southwest Asia is undergoing greater changes than at any time in the last half century. The leaders should build awareness in the Euro-Atlantic community of these changes, their potential security risks and opportunities, and possible impacts in the region and beyond. The high level of uncertainty about future outcomes in this region suggests that the Euro-Atlantic community should agree on some common diplomatic principles, a set of priorities, and a common posture for maximizing its collective security interests in Southwest Asia. The first step might be to articulate these principles and interests more strongly than has been the case so far.

There will be challenges to this. On the one hand, states in the region may see a stronger articulation as an unwanted imposition by outsiders. On the other hand, a common posture, as a set of general principles, may be a distraction from the necessary decision making under pressure of fast-moving events and complex political and moral choices involving war and peace. Yet Southwest Asia is a region in dire need of a positive movement toward

collective security that can only be delivered through a common strategy or at least more collaborative efforts.

At an individual level, Euro-Atlantic leaders need to know more about this region and to recognize the positive changes that have already occurred. There have been so many positive and enduring achievements engineered by countries of the region that don't quite penetrate the crisis management agenda pursued by outside states.

All states need to accept as a high priority the practical goal of reducing distrust and promoting confidence throughout the region. The current diplomatic practice by some states of vilification and demonization of others must be delegitimized by members of the Euro-Atlantic community. The same is true for the apparent disinformation campaigns conducted by some states against others. A return to diplomatic civility based on honest representation of the facts is essential.

Only a multifaceted improvement of the current regional situation (political, military, economic, and social) will allow the development of broad confidence building measures. Security guarantees from the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia will remain most important for now, but, in the long run, guarantees by regional states toward each other will be more important, especially including joint efforts to combat transnational terrorism, drug trafficking, and other cross-border security challenges.

Four broad policy directions of a long term strategy by Euro-Atlantic states for supporting collective security in Southwest Asia can be called out:

1. Create new policy deliberation mechanisms of a collective character inside the Euro-Atlantic community, possibly built around a core of key actors, such as Turkey, Russia, the European Union, and the United States, to frame new strategies for the region. Both Turkey and Russia have articulated useful approaches, but these have not been taken up and seriously combined with or reconciled with other approaches from the United States and the European Union.

2. Reinvigorate the shared commitment to preventive diplomacy through reliance on a broader set of tools, including (a) stronger coordination with regional organizations in Southwest Asia, (b) robust and transformational support to regional economic integration, and (c) mobilization of private sector investment in strategic trans-border economic projects that can promote closer regional integration.
3. Support the rebalancing of state power and democratic sentiment in the region as much through the promotion of the shared values of justice and rule of law as through the promotion of more contested values of secularism in government and liberal pluralism.
4. Breathe new life into the joint commitment to fight against violent extremism of all forms and against the associated trans-border networks and financing by undertaking a joint review of policies and by taking new measures to close down these networks.

Summary of Concrete Recommendations for the Euro-Atlantic Partners

1. Invite small groups of countries in Southwest Asia to join in a variety of new security dialogues aimed at developing incremental, practical measures to enhance collective security and address common transnational threats, such as terrorism and illicit trafficking.
2. As part of these dialogues, conduct formal, disciplined joint reviews to identify and assess current and potential security threats and means of averting or reducing them.
3. Develop more ambitious security sector (judiciary, law enforcement, and armed forces) reform assistance programs in countries where political and economic development should have the most impact.
4. Offer new programs of joint military and law enforcement training and exercises with states in Southwest Asia undergoing political and economic transformations. Activities might focus initially on transnational

Consider support for the creation of a permanent Southwest Asia regional security organization which would foster dialogue and develop and implement confidence building measures and other mechanisms that promote collective security.

Promote the idea of regional economic integration, and develop clear focal points for joint activities that will help consolidate the several competing organizations in Southwest Asia.

threats, such as countering terrorism and illicit trafficking in narcotics and WMD materials.

5. Undertake joint critical reviews of current diplomatic approaches to nuclear proliferation issues in Southwest Asia, asking whether they are too narrow to address fundamental security concerns of regional states or the long term interests of the Euro-Atlantic community.
6. Work with states in the region to promote fruitful outcomes from the Middle East regional conference in 2012 on establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.⁸
7. Strengthen international efforts to raise the political costs of proliferation and to advance international negotiations to end the production of fissile material on a verifiable basis.
8. Fund independent Track 2 initiatives by think tanks and others to discuss and make recommendations for addressing regional security concerns in Southwest Asia.
9. Create a Southwest Asia information fusion center, bolstered by a wider network of specialists, to receive and assess all-source information related to regional security conditions and threats.
10. Encourage research and exploration of new ideas on how best to pool economic and institutional resources within the Euro-Atlantic community to support collective security interests in Southwest Asia.
11. Consider support for the creation of a permanent Southwest Asia regional security organization which would foster dialogue and develop and implement confidence building measures and other mechanisms that promote collective security (regional communications, information sharing, and early warning). The organization would build on the political momentum of the Manama Dialogue and avail itself as needed of assistance from the Euro-Atlantic community.

Recommendations for social and economic partnerships:

1. Promote the idea of regional economic integration, and develop clear focal points for joint activities that will help consolidate the several competing organizations in Southwest Asia.
2. Dramatically increase the number of undergraduate university places available to students from Southwest Asia, and create special programs for postgraduate research by regional scholars on public policy challenges of Southwest Asia.
3. Develop programs with Southwest Asian countries that dramatically enhance labor mobility for professionals within the region and between the region and Euro-Atlantic countries.
4. Fund new executive training programs at leading universities both inside and outside the region for leading officials from Southwest Asia who are involved in general governance, law enforcement, health, social, and economic sectors.

⁸ This was supported by consensus of all states-parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

EWI Board of Directors



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Francis Finlay (U.K.)

EWI Co-Chairman
Former Chairman,
Clay Finlay LLC

Ross Perot, Jr. (U.S.)

EWI Co-Chairman
Chairman, Hillwood Development
Company, LLC;
Member of Board of Directors, Dell, Inc.

Armen Sarkissian (Armenia)

EWI Vice-Chairman
Eurasia House International
Former Prime Minister of Armenia

OFFICERS

John Edwin Mroz (U.S.)

President and CEO
EastWest Institute

Mark Maletz (U.S.)

*Chair of the Executive
Committee of EWI*
Board of Directors
Senior Fellow, Harvard
Business School

R. William Ide III (U.S.)

Counsel and Secretary
Partner, McKenna
Long & Aldridge LLP

Leo Schenker (U.S.)

EWI Treasurer
Senior Executive
Vice President, Central
National-Gottesmann, Inc.

MEMBERS

Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)

Former President of Finland

Tewodros Ashenafi (Ethiopia)

Chairman & CEO
Southwest Energy (HK) Ltd.

Jerald T. Baldrige (U.S.)

Chairman
Republic Energy Inc.

Sir Peter Bonfield (U.K.)

Chairman
NXP Semiconductors

Peter Castenfelt (U.K.)

Chairman
Archipelago Enterprises, Ltd.

Maria Livanos Cattau (Switzerland)

Former Secretary-General
International Chamber of Commerce

Mark Chandler (U.S.)

Chairman and CEO
Biophysical

Angela Chen (U.S.)

Founder and Managing Director
Global Alliance Associates
Partner, Epoch Fund

Michael Chertoff (U.S.)

Co-founder and Managing Principal
Chertoff Group

Craig Cogut (U.S.)

Founder & Co-Managing Partner
Pegasus Capital Advisors

David Cohen (U.K.)

Chairman
F&C REIT Property Management

Joel Cowan (U.S.)

Professor
Georgia Institute of Technology

Addison Fischer (U.S.)

Chairman and Co-Founder
Planet Heritage Foundation

Adel Ghazzawi (U.A.E.)

Founder
CONEKTAS

Melissa Hathaway (U.S.)

President
Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC;
Former Acting Senior
Director for Cyberspace
U.S. National Security Council

Stephen B. Heintz (U.S.)

President
Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Emil Hubinak (Slovak Republic)

Chairman and CEO
Logomotion

John Hurley (U.S.)

Managing Partner
Cavalry Asset Management

Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)

Chairman
Munich Security Conference

Anurag Jain (India)

Chairman
Laurus Edutech Pvt. Ltd.

James L. Jones (U.S.)

Former United States
National Security Advisor

Haifa Al Kaylani (U.K.)

Founder & Chairperson
Arab International Women's Forum

Zuhal Kurt (Turkey)

CEO
Kurt Enterprises

Christine Loh (China)

Chief Executive Officer
Civic Exchange, Hong Kong

Ma Zhengang (China)

President
China Institute of
International Studies

Kevin McGovern (U.S.)

Chairman
The Water Initiative

F. Francis Najafi (U.S.)

Chief Executive Officer
Pivotal Group

Ronald P. O'Hanley (U.S.)

President
Asset Management and
Corporate Services
Fidelity Investments

Yousef Al Otaiba (U.A.E.)

Ambassador
Embassy of the United Arab
Emirates in Washington D.C.

Admiral (ret) William

A. Owens (U.S.)

Chairman
AEA Holdings Asia
Former Vice Chairman
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Sarah Perot (U.S.)

Director and Co-Chair
for Development
Dallas Center for Performing Arts

Louise Richardson (U.S.)

Principal
University of St Andrews

John R. Robinson (U.S.)

Co-Founder
Natural Resources Defense Council

John Rogers (U.S.)

Managing Director
Goldman Sachs & Co.

George F. Russell, Jr. (U.S.)

Chairman Emeritus
Russell Investment Group;
Founder, Russell 20-20

Ramzi H. Sanbar (U.K.)

Chairman
Sanbar Development
Corporation, S.A.

Ikram Sehgal (Pakistan)

Chairman
Security and Management Services

Kanwal Sibal (India)

Former Foreign Secretary of India

Henry J. Smith (U.S.)

Chief Executive Officer
Bud Smith Organization, Inc.

Pierre Vimont (France)

Executive Secretary General
European External Action Service

Alexander Voloshin (Russia)

Chairman of the Board of Directors
OJSC Uralkali

Charles F. Wald (U.S.)

DoD Director, Federal
Government Services
Deloitte Services LLP

Zhou Wenzhong (China)

Secretary-General
Boao Forum for Asia

NON-BOARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Laurent Roux (U.S.)

Founder
Gallatin Wealth Management, LLC

Hilton Smith, Jr. (U.S.)

President & CEO
East Bay Co., LTD

CHAIRMEN EMERITI

Berthold Beitz (Germany)

President
Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und
Halbach-Stiftung

Ivan T. Berend (Hungary)

Professor
University of California
at Los Angeles

Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Germany)

*Former Vice Chancellor
and Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Germany*

Donald M. Kendall (U.S.)

Former Chairman & CEO
PepsiCo., Inc.

Whitney MacMillan (U.S.)

Former Chairman & CEO
Cargill, Inc.

Ira D. Wallach* (U.S.)

EWI Co-Founder

DIRECTORS EMERITI

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland)

Chief Executive Officer
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A.
Former Prime Minister of Poland

Emil Constantinescu (Romania)

*Institute for Regional Cooperation
and Conflict Prevention*
Former President of Romania

William D. Dearstyne (U.S.)

Former Company Group Chairman
Johnson & Johnson

John W. Kluge* (U.S.)

Chairman of the Board
Metromedia International Group

Maria-Pia Kothbauer (Liechtenstein)

Ambassador
Embassy of Liechtenstein
to Austria, the OSCE and the
United Nations in Vienna

William E. Murray* (U.S.)

Chairman
The Samuel Freeman Trust

John J. Roberts (U.S.)

Senior Advisor
American International
Group (AIG)

Daniel Rose (U.S.)

Chairman
Rose Associates, Inc.

Mitchell I. Sonkin (U.S.)

Managing Director
MBIA Insurance Corporation

Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway)

*Former Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Norway*

Liener Temerlin (U.S.)

Chairman
Temerlin Consulting

John C. Whitehead (U.S.)

Former Co-Chairman of
Goldman Sachs
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State

* Deceased



Founded in 1980, the EastWest Institute is a global, action-oriented, think-and-do tank. EWI tackles the toughest international problems by:

Convening for discreet conversations representatives of institutions and nations that do not normally cooperate. EWI serves as a trusted global hub for back-channel “Track 2” diplomacy, and also organizes public forums to address peace and security issues.

Reframing issues to look for win-win solutions. Based on our special relations with Russia, China, India, the United States, Europe, and other powers, EWI brings together disparate viewpoints to promote collaboration for positive change.

Mobilizing networks of key individuals from both the public and private sectors. EWI leverages its access to intellectual entrepreneurs and business and policy leaders around the world to defuse current conflicts and prevent future flare-ups.

The EastWest Institute is a non-partisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit organization with offices in New York, Brussels and Moscow. Our fiercely-guarded independence is ensured by the diversity of our international board of directors and our supporters.

EWI Brussels Center

Rue de Trèves, 59-61
Brussels 1040
Belgium
32-2-743-4610

EWI Moscow Center

Bolshaya Dmitrovka Street
7/5, Building 1, 6th Floor
Moscow, 125009
Russia, +7-495-2347797

EWI New York Center

11 East 26th Street
20th Floor
New York, NY 10010
U.S.A. 1-212-824-4100

www.ewi.info