NATO-China Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

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April 2012

Abstract

As the U.S. is pivoting east towards the Asia Pacific, China has been pivoting west the last decade on the New Silk Road towards the Mediterranean. NATO’s eastward expansion meets with China’s westward march across the Eurasia continent, compelling NATO and China to finally seek cooperation in Afpak on counterterrorism, Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy, and other emerging security challenges such as energy security and global commons. Ahead of the NATO Chicago summit in May, how NATO and China can cooperate in Afpak post 2014 is a promising starting point for closer NATO-China partnership. In this U.S. Congressional Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the witness argues that U.S. should take this opportunity to exercise strategic leadership within NATO and once again lead from the front, working with European allies and Asian partners, to help shape a balanced NATO policy towards China that furthers NATO interests without compromising NATO’s values upon which the alliance was founded.

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Good afternoon. I would like to thank Co-chairs Bartholomew and Blumenthal for inviting me to discuss the important subject of China’s increasing ties with NATO. Let me begin by relating several broader trends that are converging and compelling NATO to cooperate with China, and then I will provide answers to each of the specific questions asked of me.

President Obama has said that the 21st century is going to be the Pacific Century and U.S. is pivoting to the east towards the Asia Pacific. However, while we are pivoting east, China has been pivoting west in the last decade on the New Silk Road towards the Mediterranean.1 As NATO is expanding eastwards, China is expanding westwards across the Eurasia continent, which brings China into NATO’s traditional area of responsibility (AOR), and the hitherto “NATO Lake” of the Mediterranean Sea. Chinese warships entering the Mediterranean Sea to help evacuate 36,000 Chinese nationals from Libya last March highlighted this emerging trend.

In Asia, NATO’s ISAF campaign in Afghanistan has also brought NATO to China’s border. NATO’s Afghan mission largely defines NATO’s relations with Central Asia region, where it is key for NATO military logistics through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), EU energy logistics of pipelines and sources that bypass Russian control, and overall trade logistics corridors for regional stability based on U.S.’ New Silk Road Initiative launched by Secretary Clinton last autumn.2 Afghanistan and Central Asia is thus a region for practical cooperation between NATO and nonmembers such as China.

In addition to meeting China fighting overland terrorism in AfPak, NATO also meets China in fighting maritime terrorism of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and coast of Somalia. NATO and Chinese navies have been conducting anti-piracy operations in the region since 2008, and have engaged with each other through the multi-national Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) forum for maritime security. All these trends point towards closer engagement and cooperation between NATO and China.

However, these opportunities also present challenges. China as a U.S.’ peer competitor and its ambitions of extending power projection capabilities make it a partner whose importance merits engagement. China and the West have different interpretations of sovereignty and global commons, thus this drives competing global interests and creates political friction. For NATO, the critical question is how to be selective in choosing partners to help secure access to global commons as well as other issues of mutual interests such as counter-terrorism, WMD proliferation, anti-piracy and energy security. Interaction with China will help reconstruct joint engagement and enhance cooperation on areas of mutual interests; but at the same time NATO should remain alert to Chinese intentions and hedge for potential negative spillovers. U.S. can exercise strategic leadership in

2 Christina Lin, China’s Empire Express: Expanding Frontiers and Military Rail Transport on the New Silk Road, Jamestown Foundation monograph, forthcoming; “New Silk Road Road eyed for Afghanistan”, Agence France Press, September 22, 2011.
In this regard by informing other NATO allies and partners of Asia Pacific security concerns vis-à-vis China, and help shepherd a balanced NATO approach towards engaging a rising China.

(1) How has NATO's approach to Asia and China evolved in the past decade? How has NATO directly engaged with China, and what were the objectives and outcomes of specific instances of engagement?

NATO does not yet have a policy towards China, with engagement at the political level and not at the military level. Until the mid 2000, NATO’s interaction with countries outside of Euro-Atlantic region was of low level of importance. NATO had limited and infrequent dialogue with Asian states, such as Japan, with little element of concrete cooperation. But after September 11 attacks in 2001, Afghanistan brought NATO to Asia. Henceforth, NATO increased interactions with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Mongolia that contributed directly and indirectly to NATO ISAF’s Afghan campaign.3

This also brought NATO closer to China, which shares border with Afghanistan via the Wakhan Corridor. China is driven to engage NATO due to Afghanistan, and so is NATO. As such, Afghanistan and Central Asia is a good test case for exploring possible NATO-cooperation with China.

Why does NATO want to engage with China? NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said he sees NATO and China have many shared interests and would like to see close ties between the two. He expressed a desire for NATO and China to establish a NATO-China Council, similar to the NATO-Russia Council.4 Although the new strategic concept at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit did not mention China, it is looming large as an emerging issue. He understands China has a non-aligned policy, but views that NATO has partnered with other non-aligned countries so this is not an issue. SecGen Rasmussen names three main reasons why NATO should engage China: (1) China is an emerging power, with a growing economy and increasing global responsibility for security. As such, he would like to see regular political consultations with China; (2) China is UNSC member. NATO operates from UN mandates, so it is important to engage China; (3) China shares NATO interests in Afghanistan, especially in terrorism and drug trafficking.5

SecGen Rasmussen said China was invited to participate in a political discussion to strengthen counter piracy efforts for the first time in 2011. This was an effort to explore further similar security issues for cooperation and to establish regular NATO-China Dialog. He does not see China as a threat and urges that both sides should cooperate.6 Similarly, Masako Ikegami, a professor at Stockholm University, said that it is important for NATO to engage with other countries with different values for confidence building measure and to reduce misperception.7

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3 NATO ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) in Asia Pacific: New Zealand since 2003; Australia in 2006; Singapore in 2008; Mongolia in 2010; South Korea in 2010. Japan is limited by its constitution to engage in combat, so it has contributed to development assistance, naval refueling in the Indian Ocean to support NATO ISAF, support PRT in Afghanistan.
5 In an interview with CNC (Xinhua) at NATO HQ on Nov 24, 2010.
6 Interview with CNC on Sep 17, 2011 at NATO HQ.
From the U.S. perspective, since we already have the bilateral U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to enhance understanding and reduce misperceptions, NATO and China should also have a dialogue similar to the NATO-Japan Dialogue that is already in place.

History of NATO-China engagements. China and NATO contact is a relatively recent development. NATO-China relations were non-existent during the Cold War and for most of the 1990s. The first direct NATO engagement with China was in 1997 when NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and invasion of Afghanistan next to Chinese borders, in 2002, the Chinese ambassador in Brussels visited NATO headquarter with then SecGen Lord Robertson and explored ways for engagements, particularly in Afghanistan. Since then NATO-China have normalized engagements and developed a political dialogue to focus on exchanging information and issues of cooperative security. These issues include terrorism, maritime piracy, international security, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and crisis management. Following the visit of the Director General of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to NATO Headquarters in 2007, the political dialogue on senior staff level has been taking place on a rather regular basis. In May 2007, NATO Military Committee Chairman, General Ray Henault expressed that in addition to political relations, NATO wants to establish direct “military-to-military” relations with Chinese armed forces and shake off the embassy-bombing shadow.

The NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy has visited China twice, looking for non-member partners, with the last visit dating back to July 2010. The political dialogue was further strengthened by the visit of Deputy NATO Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero to China in November 2009. The exchanges with senior Chinese officials, including Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun, covered a wide range of issues such as the stability of Afghanistan and Central Asia, the fight against terrorism and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as maritime piracy. This resulted in the agreement that the NATO-China dialogue can contribute to international stability and prosperity, with both sides working together to increase transparency and co-operation. In contrast to the political exchanges that have been going on for several years, there has been little military-to-military contact between China and NATO. However, in June 2010, a delegation of senior PLA officials visited NATO headquarters. Some saw this first visit by a Chinese delegation as an opportunity to build military-to-military relations to enhance confidence building between China and NATO. In March 2011, Chinese navy engaged with NATO navy conducting counter-piracy missions Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden. Commander of NATO’s counter piracy maritime forces, Commodore Michiel Hijnans of the Royal Netherlands Navy hosted Commodore Han Xiaoh, Commander of the Chinese Counter-piracy task force on NATO flagship HNLMS Tromp at the sea of Gulf of Aden. In January 2012, Rear Admiral Sinan Azimi Tosun, Commander of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, and his Chinese counter part, Rear Admiral Li Shihong paid reciprocal visits to each other’s flagships on the same day, while the Chinese Task Group ships were escorting a convoy and the NATO Flag ship, a Turkish frigate named TCG Giresun, was patrolling through the Gulf of

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Aden.\textsuperscript{12}

Such practical co-operation has included shared access to the MERCURY\textsuperscript{13} maritime information tool and de-confliction and co-ordination of counter-piracy efforts through the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) meetings between counter-piracy mission contributors. China has also signaled its intention to take on areas of responsibility in the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) along the line of the co-ordination guidelines drafted by EU/CMF/NATO.\textsuperscript{14} Both NATO and the EU are seeking to developing co-operation with China and remain open to any opportunity to do so.

In February 2012 NATO Director General of International Military Staff, LtGen Jurgen Bornemann, led a delegation to Beijing at the invitation of Chinese military authorities.\textsuperscript{15} The NATO delegation met with MGen Qian Lihua, Chief of Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defense (FAO MND), and General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA. The NATO delegation also visited the 3rd Guard Division of the Beijing Military Division. The Program rounded off by meeting with MGen Gao Jingzhou, Commander of Shan’xi Provincial Military Region. Topics included NATO-China military cooperation; reform of Chinese armed forces; NATO reform; NATO operations; situation in Asia Pacific. The result of this meeting was an agreement to deepen co-operation in the number of fields, especially counter piracy, training and education, and to establish annual military staff talks between IMS and FAO MND.LtGen Bornemann invited MGen Qian to visit NATO headquarters early 2013.

Thus contact between NATO and China has mainly developed on the political level. NATO has not established a formal partnership with China and the political dialogue that has taken place discuss NATO’s existing formal partnerships.\textsuperscript{16} Chinese representatives have participated in a limited number of NATO seminars and conferences, such as NATO’s annual conferences on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. NATO has decided to open courses at NATO education facilities to representatives from countries that have expressed interest, so that for example, Chinese representatives can attend courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany.

In the view of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly that published an October 2011 report on NATO engagements with China,\textsuperscript{17} it would be desirable to strengthen the nascent dialogue between NATO and China. A rising China can play an important constructive role in regional and global security and engage in “co-operative security”, one of NATO’s three essential core tasks in the Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. The report views that China and NATO’s common interests in Afghanistan, Central Asia, maritime piracy and WMD proliferation provide a basis for future cooperation.

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\textsuperscript{13}EU developed MERCURY network, an IT system that allows navies to jointly assess situation on a minute-by-minute basis.
\textsuperscript{14}U.S. led Combined Maritime Force is a multinational naval partnership from Asia, Middle East, Europe and Americas to promote maritime security across 2.5 million square miles of international waters in the Middle East, and is commanded by a U.S. Navy Vice Admiral who also serves as Commander US Navy Central Command and US Navy Fifth Fleet. Deputy commander is a UK Royal Navy Commodore. All three commands are co-located at US Naval Support Activity Bahrain.
\textsuperscript{15}NATO Headquarters Press Release, “NATO Military Delegation Discusses Cooperation with Chinese Authorities in Beijing”, February 2012.
\textsuperscript{16}Assen Agov, “The Rise of China and Possible Implications for NATO”, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, October 2011.
\textsuperscript{17}Assen Agov, “The Rise of China and Possible Implications for NATO”.
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(2) To what extent do NATO’s approaches to China complement U.S. security interests vis-à-vis China? Does NATO engagement complement (or undermine) U.S. interests in light of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, which prohibits the U.S. military from engaging in cooperative activities that might enhance the combat capabilities of the PLA?

As state earlier, China and NATO mainly have political exchanges at this juncture. NATO’s current approaches and objectives towards China as a potential global partner complement U.S. security interests in terms of pooling resources to address issues of mutual concern. These practical areas include maintaining regional stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy/maritime security, counter-narcotics, WMD proliferation and energy security.

NDAA 2000 prohibits the Secretary of Defense from authorizing any mil-to-mil contact with the PLA if the contact would “create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure” of PLA to 12 operational areas (exceptions granted to search & rescue, humanitarian operations or exercise) including advanced combat operations, force projection, logistical operations, surveillance and reconnaissance and military technology transfer. As such DoD has sought areas of cooperation such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, educational exchanges, and dialogues as ways to enhance understanding and reduce misperceptions. NATO is exploring similar issues for practical cooperation with China. Anti-piracy is already an area of cooperative engagement between NATO, China, EU and other naval powers in the Gulf of Aden, and can be a template for further cooperation in other issue areas.

Benefits of China-NATO cooperation. In an age of fiscal austerity, NATO needs to pursue smart defense of pooling resources together to cut cost, as well as seek new partners to spread the cost of operations. With respect to partners who do not share similar values as NATO members, it is useful to use the analogy of the marketplace to define the terms of the partnership. When two competing firms are in the marketplace, sometimes due to high R&D sunk costs, they would enter into a joint venture or strategic partnership on that particular product area, while still remaining competitors in all other aspects in the market place. As such, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism are product/issue areas for practical cooperation between China and NATO.

NATO can be an alternative forum for U.S.-China engagement, since it is already evolving as a global security forum for dialogue and cooperation with its global networks of partners. Moreover, NATO’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and engagements with China as well as other navies the past three years through SHADE (Shared Awareness and De-confliction) model of sharing information, has been a successful model of cooperation on maritime terrorism. SHADE can perhaps be an effective template for cooperation on overland terrorism in Afpak. Whereas with SHADE for anti-piracy in Gulf of Aden involved U.S. led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO, EUNAVFOR, and other navies, SHADE for anti-terrorism in AfPak could involve U.S., NATO/ISAF, EU, China, SCO and other stakeholders.

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18 Section 1201 (a) of National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 (PL 106-65); Shirely A. Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress”, CRS Report RL32496, February 10, 2012. The 12 restricted areas are: (1) Force projection operations; (2) Nuclear operations; (3) Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations; (4) Advanced logistical operations; (5) Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction; (6) Surveillance and reconnaissance operations; (7) Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to transformations in warfare; (8) Military space operations; (9) Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces; (10) Arms sales or military-related technology transfers; (11) Release of classified or restricted information; (12) Access to a DoD laboratory.
SHADE can also be a template for central clearinghouse for anti-terror operations. China, U.S/NATO, and Pakistan are concerned about FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) being used as a launching pad by TIP (Turkistan Islamic Party), al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani network to attack Xinjiang, Afghanistan and Pakistan. China is considering setting up military bases in FATA19, where its insurgents are already fighting Pakistan forces as well as U.S., NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. As such, similar to the Gulf of Aden where various navies are fighting piracy and clearing their information through SHADE, various troops fighting insurgents in Afpak could also clear their counter-terror information through a SHADE type forum.

NATO’s objective of working with China to stabilize Afghanistan supports U.S. interests vis-à-vis China in Afghanistan. China’s influence over Pakistan and as a neighbor of Afghanistan plays an integral role in Afpak post 2014 when NATO combat forces depart. China, with its $3.2 trillion war chest, can also contribute to the NATO-ANA (Afghan National Army) Trust Fund or UNDP’s Law and Order trust fund mainly funded by Japan to help train ANSF, since China benefits greatly from an effective ANA/ANSF to maintain Afghan stability and help protect China’s massive investments in the country.20 China is already engaged in limited training with ANA and ANSF for mine clearing, and in 2010 Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie offered Afghan defense minister Abdul Rahim Wardak for PLA to train them after NATO forces depart.21

**Risks of China-NATO mil-mil.** There are of course risks associated with increased Chinese PLA access to NATO, such as possible intelligence and defense technologies flowing to China, especially in light of the recent cyber attack of using a fake Facebook page of NATO SACEUR to target NATO officials’ personal information as well as cyber attacks against NATO ISAF headquarter in Afghanistan that may have compromised NATO logistics and troop movements.22 Joint counter terrorism efforts may require shared intelligence/classified information, surveillance and reconnaissance, and possible military technology transfer which would violate NDAA 2000 restrictions. As such, any NATO-China counter-terrorism cooperation would most likely need to be confined at the dialogue and coordination level, such as what’s been taking place through SHADE with anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

There is also risk of third party transfer of intelligence and military technologies to rogue regimes, state sponsors of terrorism and their terrorist proxies such as North Korea, Burma, Iran, Hamas and Hizbullah. As a further negative spillover, this would increase fears of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, and other countries in East Asia and South East Asia of an altered Asian military balance in China’s favor, and the possibility of threatening U.S. soldiers and military assets with Chinese weapons produced by NATO allies.

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Additionally, there is a risk of China using its access within NATO to drive a wedge between U.S. and its European allies. A UPI article in 2008 revealed an internal Chinese document of such a plan to take advantage of NATO’s “internal contradictions”, especially via targeting France and Germany, strengthening China-Europe economic and trade relations, and split Europe from U.S. to acquire EU support on Taiwan, technology transfer and lifting of EU arms embargo.\(^{23}\)

There are also risks to NATO with China cooperating with NATO members bilaterally, not under a NATO banner. As such, NATO members need to be aware and exercise due diligence that their interactions with China do not conflict with NATO regulations and concerns. For example, China’s air combat exercise with NATO member Turkey in October 2010 poses a risk to NATO, although it was not under a NATO banner. It risked NATO combat tactics and intelligence flowing to China. China has also targeted Eastern European NATO members such as Poland and Romania or those in the waiting room such as Macedonia for military cooperation.\(^{24}\) For example, in 2009 Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich inked accord with Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie to cooperate in military training, medical services and research, and to observe each other’s military exercises, as well as cooperate in peacekeeping and aid missions. In February 2010 Romanian Defense Minister Gabriel Oprea, Secretary of State for Defense Policy and Planning Viorel Oancea and chief of General Staff Admiral Dr Gheorghe Marin received a delegation headed by General Ma Xiatian, deputy chief of General Staff of PLA. Talks agenda included integration of Romanian armed forces into the military structures of NATO and EU, as well as armed forces modernization, and mutual teaching and training of exercises.

**(3) How do NATO efforts to protect the global commons (space, cyberspace, maritime space, the Arctic) reflect and address relevant developments in China?**

NATO’s efforts to protect the Arctic and cyber space were originally driven by Russia. Russia in 2007 staked Arctic territorial claims by placing a flag in a titanium capsule on the ocean floor, and resumed strategic bomber flights in the region.\(^{25}\) It views the energy sources as a centerpiece of its next generation energy policies.\(^{26}\) China is increasing its military activity with four Arctic expeditions since 1999 and seeking to be an observer of the Arctic Council, but as a non-Arctic state it is difficult to advance its national interests in the region. As regards maritime policy, China is not viewed as challenging NATO’s immediate concerns in North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and increased piracy in Gulf of Aden, but NATO does acknowledge China’s increased aggression in the Asia Pacific Rim and South China Sea.\(^{27}\) NATO envisions playing a role to help politically to shape rules that are being challenged, and help keep Global Commons secured and their access assured.\(^{28}\)


NATO factors China more in its addressing space and cyberspace, although NATO currently does not have a space policy.29 It has focused more on cyberspace. NATO began to address cyber defense after suffering attacks from Serbia, Russia, and China in 1999 during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.30 These incidents included denial of service attacks and defacements of the webpage for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe as well as U.S. military, after NATO’s accidental bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

In 2002 NATO adopted the Cyber Defense Program and issued subsequent guidance, but it was not until the 2007 Russian cyber attack that disabled the Estonian government for 3 weeks that NATO stood up institutions31 and enhanced capabilities to counter cyber attacks. In 2011 NATO started to formulate a rapid reaction team concept to assist member states under attack.32 The creation of this team was the result of NATO cyber defense policy revised by defense minister in June 2011 after Estonia and Georgia experienced cyber attacks from Russia. However, NATO is cognizant of cyber attacks from China and increasingly paying heed to this threat, such as the 2009 NATO Review video entitled “China and the West: keyboard conflicts?”.33

(4) How does China view the role of NATO as it begins to draw down its operations in the Af/Pak theater?

China does not want a permanent NATO military presence in AfPak, but envisions NATO still playing a residual role to address the continuing threat of terrorism. China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated in the December Bonn conference on Afghanistan that China would like SCO to play an increasing role as NATO is decreasing its role, and Chinese scholars have even proposed NATO-SCO cooperation in counter-terrorism, as well as having an alternative forum for U.S.-China engagement in AfPak and Central Asia.34

A Chinese scholar from Shanghai Academy of Social Science recently proposed a NATO-SCO mechanism to enhance U.S.-China cooperation and reduce conflicts in Central Asia. The liaison mechanism is to begin with coordinating anti-terrorism issues between US/NATO and the SCO, which could be progressively upgraded to SCO + U.S. (SCO + 1) dialog or SCO + U.S., EU (NATO), Japan (SCO + 3) dialog, and eventually upgraded to SCO Regional Forum (SRF) like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).35 NATO already has cooperation with all SCO members except China (e.g., PFP with Central Asia and NATO-Russia Council with Russia), so it seems logical that NATO engages with China as well in AfPak.

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31 Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA) and Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) in 2008.
32 NATO Cyber Defence Rapid Reaction Team operational by end 2012”, Cyberwar Zone, March 30, 2012.
Moreover, Chinese writings have referred to Central Asia as China’s Dingwei, or Lebensraum as espoused by Hitler on being entitled to having additional living space for its population. So China does not want NATO to leave abruptly, but has an interest in NATO maintaining residual capabilities and support to ANA/ANSF to combat terrorism as SCO transitions in while NATO transitions out. This NATO-SCO cooperation mechanism would allow China to maintain border stability in Afpak – its strategic frontier zone – which affects both its internal security of Xinjiang as well as external security of Central Asia. As such, SCO would allow China to expand influence on its new “Xinjiang” of AfPak – “Xinjiang” means “new frontier” in Chinese. Masako Ikegami from Stockholm University has observed China’s different concept of sovereignty from the West. The Chinese concept of an expansionist sovereignty is based on the “strategic frontiers doctrine” of flexible territorial borders that expands or contracts according to national power projection, which differs from the western Westphalian concept of sovereignty based on stationery borders. Thus as SCO increases its role in AfPak, this would allow China to project influence on its Dingwei.

(5) The Commission is mandated to make policy recommendations to Congress based on its hearings and other research. What are your recommendations for congressional action related to the topic of your testimony?

Based on the analysis above, I would like to submit the following recommendations:

1. U.S. within NATO needs to be proactive in shaping NATO’s approach towards China.
   - With China’s rise on the global stage coupled with U.S. and European fiscal austerity, it’s inevitable that NATO will need to engage China. Given this, it is incumbent upon U.S. within NATO to help set the terms of reference and engage European allies and partners regarding U.S. and East Asian partners’ concerns vis-à-vis China in the Asia Pacific and Central Asia regions.

2. Use NATO as a global security forum for U.S. and Asian partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Mongolia and others to have a dialogue with European partners to help them understand security issues in the Asia Pacific.
   - Europeans and the U.S./Asian allies tend to have a threat perception gap regarding China. Europeans do not have a security stake in Asia similar to U.S. as a security guarantor, and tend to view China through economic lens while U.S. views China through a security lens.
   - Japan has already been proactive in educating NATO regarding Asian security concerns via the NATO-Japan Dialogue, and this type of dialogue could be expanded to include other Asian partners. This will help reinforce NATO members and partners solidarity as a value-based alliance and approach China via a policy that furthers NATO interests without compromising NATO’s values upon which the alliance was founded.

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3. AfPak is a good case for NATO-China cooperation, especially in counter-terrorism. The successful SHADE model for counter-piracy cooperation in Gulf of Aden could be a model for counter-terrorism cooperation in AfPak.
   - U.S./NATO and China cooperation in counter-terrorism in AfPak could be based on the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) approach currently being employed in the Gulf of Aden. Initially China refused to cooperate with the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on antipiracy efforts, but Beijing became more willing to participate once the issues were addressed within a multilateral SHADE forum that brought in the EU, India, Russia, Interpol, and various oil companies alongside the U.S. and NATO. The SHADE model can offer best practices and lessons learned that can apply to a SHADE type model of cooperation in counter-terrorism in AfPak.

4. At DoD, U.S. EUCOM/NATO should submit Chinese defense contact requests to OSD and coordinate with OSD/USDP on China policy. These contacts can be included in the annual China military power report to Congress.
   - DoD should establish cross-COMC coordination with PACOM-CENTCOM-EUCOM/NATO working group and coordinate with OSD/USDP on China. Whether it’s fighting piracy in Gulf of Aden, maritime disputes in South China Sea, or fighting insurgents in AfPak, CENTCOM and EUCOM/NATO can benefit from coordination with PACOM.
   - U.S. military within NATO should be cognizant of NDAA 2000 restrictions so it does not violate U.S. domestic law regarding Chinese defense contacts. U.S. should ensure NATO allies understand NDAA 2000 restrictions for U.S. military and de-conflict defense contact requests by China.

Asian states such as China need to consider cooperation with partners at the global level to address regional problems associated with globalization. In this regard, partnership with NATO should not be excluded. Also, if NATO is going to engage with the Asia region as part of its new strategy of addressing emerging security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and energy security, any engagement strategy should follow a balanced approach that not only targets China, India and Japan, but other interested parties via regional organizations. China’s increasing ties with NATO presents a good opportunity for the U.S. to exercise strategic leadership and lead from the front once again, and help shape the trajectory of an Asia whole and free in the 21st century just as it helped shape an Europe whole and free in the 20th Century.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, I welcome your questions and comments.

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About the Author of this Issue

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Remarks: Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

This Congressional testimony was presented before the U.S. China-Economic and Security Review Commission, in a hearing on “China-Europe Relationship and Transatlantic Implications” on April 19, 2012, at the U.S. Capitol Visitor Center in Washington, D.C.