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Research Paper

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Editorial

Whatever definition scholars or politicians may give to the expression “frozen conflict”, it will certainly contain a notion that the two parties in the conflict are engaged in a standoff: neither party is prepared, willing, or able to break the deadlock. When time goes by, the mere characterization of a conflict as “frozen”, tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. When the label sticks for long enough, the expression almost becomes an epitaph: don't touch it, don't get involved, as a solution cannot be found.

It is therefore remarkable, when an academic, versed in more than one of the frozen conflicts that emerged in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, perceives some light at the end of the tunnel. An article under the upbeat title: “From a Weak State to a Reunified Moldova: New Opportunities to Resolve the Transdnistria Conflict “ cannot be written without a clear conviction and compelling arguments that the conflict ultimately can be solved.

We are therefore delighted to introduce our guest author for this 23rd issue of our Research Paper to you. Jos Boonstra is a Program Manager at the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. The Centre is dedicated to promoting and sustaining democratic processes in defense and foreign policy making across the whole of Europe, and to encouraging informed public debate on security matters. Jos has just successfully concluded a major two-year program dedicated to exploring Needs and Options for Security-sector Transparency and Reform in Ukraine and Moldova (NOSTRUM), funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The program has drawn inter alia on the experiences of new NATO member states that have recently been through periods of security sector transformation themselves: Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia.

A follow-up program (Starlink, funding just approved) will include Georgia as well, and the possibility will be explored for developing related activities in Armenia. The program is designed to help these four countries in making their security sector affordable, preventing it from taking up resources more urgently needed for other purposes; appropriate, or geared towards the countries' current defense and security priorities, and acceptable, both to society at home, and to potential allies abroad. The focus of the Starlink program will be the development and delivery of training materials and courses for key groups and actors involved in the crucial issue of democratic oversight.

With the new CESS program, Jos Boonstra will be in a unique position to witness and further analyze future developments in Moldova. We hope therefore, that this first contribution to our Research Paper will not be his last, and be followed up at some time with another article that in retrospect justifies his upbeat mood on the opportunities that exist for solving an “irresolvable” dispute.

Cees COOPS, Research Advisor, NDC Academic Research Branch

NB: The views expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Les opinions exprimées dans cette publication sont celles de l'auteur et ne peuvent être attribuées au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN ni à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

From a Weak State to a Reunified Moldova: New Opportunities to Resolve the Transdnistria Conflict

Jos BOONSTRA¹

During last April's GUAM² summit in Chisinau, Moldova, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko presented a new plan to settle the Transdnistria conflict. Among other things, the plan called for the inclusion of the European Union (EU) and the United States into the conflict mediation team that presently consists of the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine. Unfortunately, Yushchenko did not coordinate his plan properly with Moldovan leaders and his fellow mediators, thereby dooming its full implementation from the start. And yet, despite this particular setback, one can say that the overall security situation in Moldova has improved considerably. Whereas four years ago it was a neglected country and the Transdnistria conflict was completely deadlocked, today the EU, the US and NATO are all taking an active interest in helping solve Moldova's political, economic, and security problems.

In order to explore possible future options for the Transdnistria problem in greater detail, this *Research Paper* first focuses on the past – e.g., it explores the changing circumstances surrounding the Transdnistria conflict and it describes how these circumstances led to a 180 degree turn in Moldova's strategic orientation. The paper then explains why resolving the Transdnistria problem matters today and what hurdles still block its resolution. Finally, the paper proposes ways to craft a solution that is not only beneficial for Moldova and Transdnistria, but also for Kyiv, Moscow, Washington, and Brussels.

1. Changing Regional Circumstances

Transdnistria may still be a "Soviet open-air museum," but its leaders know the region around

them is changing. As a result, they have become more vigilant and distrustful while their Moldovan counterparts have become more hopeful. For example, Vladimir Antiufeev, Transdnistria's Minister of State Security, recently expressed his displeasure with the "flower revolutions" that have occurred in former Soviet states and has vowed to guard against the influence of Western-supported NGOs and youth movements. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Dniestr River, hopes are high in Chisinau that previously suspended negotiations over possible federalisation will now yield to actual agreements over national unification. But just what are the changing regional circumstances that shape current Moldovan and Transdnistrian attitudes?

First: The EU has stepped up its cooperation with Moldova in general and its attempts to solve the Transdnistria conflict in particular. The reasons for this increased level of activity include the following.

- *EU enlargement* – New EU members support the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova and advocate its future integration into the European community (along with Ukraine).
- *Border control* – Moving the EU's frontier eastwards only compounds the importance of maintaining stable and well-regulated borders, especially in the greater Black Sea area. (Romania's accession into the EU in 2007 or possibly 2008 will only raise the importance of this issue.)
- *Expanding EU security commitments* – The EU's growing Security and Defense capabilities, plus the experience it has gained in neighbouring peacekeeping missions (Macedonia and now Bosnia-Herzegovina), plus the growing need it has to address

¹ Jos Boonstra works as a Programme Manager for the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) in Gröningen, the Netherlands. He would like to thank Colonel Peter Faber for his editorial assistance in writing this *Research Paper*.

² GUAM: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Uzbekistan was a *de facto* member of the organization but withdrew from it on 5 May 2005.

security issues on its rim lands all make Brussels more interested in stabilizing Moldova and solving the Transdniestria problem.

- *The creation of actual mechanisms for engagement* – These mechanisms include 1) the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 2) the EU-Moldova Action Plan, which advocates “a viable solution to the Transdniestria conflict,” 3) the appointment of an EU Special Representative to Moldova, and 4) the soon to be established presence of an EU Commission Delegation Office in Chisinau.

Second: Georgia, which still has two internal “frozen conflicts” of its own, underwent a “Rose Revolution” in December 2003. With the subsequent entry of the Saakashvili administration into power, Tbilisi’s approach to Abkhazia and South-Ossetia became more muscular, as did its approach to Moscow. (In the latter case, Georgia has repeatedly pressured the Russians to live up to their 1999 “Istanbul commitments,” where Moscow agreed to close its military bases and withdraw its troops from Georgian territory.) This revitalized anti-secessionist and pro-sovereignty approach was not lost on the Moldovans. Neither were Georgia’s attempts to develop a robust Individual Partnership Action Plan within NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and its attempts to court any and all international shows of support for its political objectives. (An example of the latter was US President Bush’s visit to Tbilisi in May 2004, where he helpfully stressed the importance of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.) Basically, Georgia’s forward-leaning diplomatic example has boosted Moldovan confidence and aggravated Transdniestrian discomfort.

Third: Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and the interest its leaders have in solving previously “frozen” problems, including those centred on border control. One of the reasons Ukraine is one of the formally designated mediators of the Transdniestria conflict is because it shares a 470 km border with this de facto “statelet.” If the recently concluded agreement between the EU, Ukraine, and Moldova to establish a border monitoring mission on 1 December actually succeeds, Moldova might be able to begin curtailing smuggling activities across the Ukraine-Transdniestria border, and thereby re-establish some control over the area. (The mobile border-monitoring mission will initially last 2 years, include about 50 EU border experts and customs

advisers, and work primarily on Ukrainian soil.) However, whether Ukraine and Moldova, even with EU or OSCE assistance, will be capable to counter the large-scale smuggling of weapons, drugs and other commodities through Transdniestria remains an open question, especially since the agreement limits itself to “checking” border activities and permitting only short term monitoring. Such proposals may seem too little and too late, but no one should forget that the intransigent Kuchma regime is gone and the Yushchenko regime is a Western-leaning and avowedly progressive neighbor. This too has boosted Moldovan confidence and aggravated Transdniestrian discomfort.

Fourth: The role of the OSCE has declined in the area while the roles of the EU, the US and NATO are growing. Moscow has little faith in the OSCE as a preferred forum to address the Transdniestria problem. It knows that it is a consensus-based organization that lacks powerful political instruments. It is also quite comfortable with these perceived weaknesses, primarily because they do not challenge Russia’s long-standing role as the dominant player in the area. The EU and NATO also know that the OSCE is not equipped to play a decisive role in helping mediate and solve the Transdniestria conflict. As a result, these powerful institutions are slowly but inexorably beginning to cut into Russian suzerainty in the area on their own terms. This process has recently boosted Moldovan confidence and aggravated Transdniestrian discomfort.

Fifth: Destabilizing Russian diplomacy. As the previous discussion of the OSCE suggests, Russia has gamely sought to defend its interest in the Moldovan “near abroad,” but its recent diplomatic behaviour has not helped its cause. At the 2003 OSCE Maastricht gathering, for example, Russian attempts to bully Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin into accepting its preferred solution to the Transdniestria problem failed. At a subsequent meeting of the OSCE’s Ministerial Council (December 2004), it then acted as a spoiler, but then immediately turned right around and adopted a conciliatory stance at a NATO-Russia Council meeting two days later. Moscow then openly meddled in Ukrainian elections and managed to have its unwelcome agents expelled from Moldova in the weeks leading up to Moldovan parliamentary elections (March 2005). Unfortunately, such rough and tumble diplomacy has had a destabilizing influence in the region. It has raised Moldovan and

even Transdniestrian discomfort with Russian intentions in its near abroad.

If the above circumstances have changed the near-term dynamics of the Transdniestria conflict, the next step in our analysis is to describe how they led to a 180-degree turn in Moldova's strategic orientation (from the East towards the West). This change can best be described in four phases.

2. Moldova's 180-Degree Shift in Strategic Orientation

Phase 1 – Courting Russia (2001): When the Voronin-led communists first came into power, they made it clear that they wanted to solve the Transdniestria conflict through increased cooperation with Russia. The West was thus initially kept at arms length and the communists proactively accused neighbouring Romania of interfering in Moldova's internal affairs. Contact with the EU was also meagre and although Chisinau was a member of the Partnership for Peace and the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, its involvement in these organizations was limited. Unfortunately for the Moldovans, their pro-Russia policy, which led to the signing of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between both parties, soon collided with Moscow's refusal to withdraw its troops and remaining weapon stocks in Transdniestria.

Phase 2 – The Rise and Fall of the Federalisation Concept (2002-2003): In the summer of 2002, the three formally designated mediators of the Transdniestria conflict attempted to revitalize future status negotiations. They drafted a pro-federalisation proposal known as the "Kyiv Document." Unfortunately, Tiraspol wanted a federation made up of two equal parts while Chisinau wanted an asymmetric federation where Transdniestria would not be able to veto future Moldovan policies, including possible EU membership plans. The US and EU subsequently punished Tiraspol for its perceived foot dragging in the negotiations. (They issued a travel ban on 17 Transdniestrian leaders, including President Smirnov). Similar diplomatic fencing continued up to late 2003 when Dmitri Kozak, a senior advisor

to President Putin, unveiled a new Russian initiative that came to be known as the "Kozak Memorandum." Moldova's civil-society (what little there is of it) and most members of the OSCE immediately criticized this unilateral federalisation plan, primarily because it would permit Russia to maintain troops in Moldova for up to 30 years. At the last moment President Voronin refused to accede to this proposal, thereby turning the Maastricht OSCE summit meeting at the time into a political fiasco for the Russians. Because of all these diplomatic imbroglios and Transdniestria's obvious desire to maintain the status quo, the concept of federalisation lost momentum over 2003. The US and EU became more and more guarded in promoting the concept, as did others. They concluded at the time that "a state has to be strong enough to afford a federal arrangement rather than too weak to avoid it."³

Phase 3 – Moldova Turns to the West (2004): As described in Part 1, changing circumstances inspired the Voronin government to initiate a 180 degree turn in its foreign policy. EU integration became a top priority for Moldova. Additionally, ties with Romania improved significantly, the Moldovans deliberately distanced themselves from Russia (because of Moscow's prolonged support of the Transdniestria clique), and President Voronin proposed a Stability and Security Pact for Moldova that advocated changing the existing pentagonal negotiating format and adding the EU, the US and Romania as mediators. As to be expected, Russia reacted negatively to the latter suggestion.

Phase 4 – The Search for Negotiating Options (2005): Today Chisinau believes that negotiations should be layered. One layer should include the US, EU, Russia and the OSCE, while a second layer would include Ukraine, Romania and Moldova. In theory, the top layer would act as a path clearer and create favourable conditions for the second layer to reach a viable sub-regional understanding on the ground. Meanwhile, other suggested ways ahead have appeared, including the "3-D Strategy" developed by Moldova's civil-society. The strategy is basically a three-stage plan designed to *demilitarize*, *decriminalize*, and *democratize* Transdniestria and eventually unify it with Moldova. (Among the wider international

³ Wim van Meurs, *Moldova ante portas: The EU Agenda's of Conflict Management and 'Wider Europe'* (Munich: Center for Applied Policy Research, 2004), p. 5.

security community, this last proposal continues to enjoy serious attention.)

So at present, Moldova continues to have sour relations with Moscow and to make the ENP Action Plan a top government priority. But does the Moldovan government truly understand the journey it has embarked on? Moldova will for the foreseeable future remain dependent on Russia for its energy. Since its exports will continue to go eastward as well, it is questionable whether Moldova's leaders and bureaucrats are actually able to grasp the idea of Western integration. *Most Moldovan politicians wrongly regard this step as a geopolitical choice and less as a choice to veer towards a community with markedly different political values.* In truth, Moldova is still run by people who are unaccustomed to democratic norms and values, and that have only had limited experience working with Brussels. Moreover, educated young people are either being prevented from entering key ministries or are being pushed out by the old guard. *Moldova's leaders should understand that in contrast to the EU's increased concern with the Transdniestrian conflict, the road to "Europe" for Moldova is something else entirely.* Affirmative statements and draft working plans are not enough. The government has no choice but to marry up its pro-European foreign policy with its domestic policy. In short, Moldova should use the ENP to become a stronger state than it is, and to become democratically and economically better equipped to bring the Transdniestria issue to a satisfactory end.

3. Is Transdniestria a Security Threat?

It may be well and good that circumstances have changed in Eastern Europe and that Moldova has consequently turned its political gaze westward. But what about Transdniestria itself? Is it merely a local security problem or a broader one? As a *de facto* state, Transdniestria should be regarded as a security threat if for no other reason than that there is no outside control – for instance through PfP co-operation or the 1999 OSCE Vienna Document – over Tiraspol's impressive security structures. The elongated piece of land between the Dniestr and Ukraine that is Transdniestria is ruled by a small group of Russian nationals under the leadership of Igor Smirnov. They run a criminal economy that benefits from the current political status quo – independence would bring actual accountability and responsibility, while added

autonomy within the Republic of Moldova would end their lucrative grey market trade arrangements. As a result, Transdniestria's current leaders seem quite satisfied with *de facto* statehood rather than actual independence, assuming that Russian protection is available. (The main reason for negotiations with Chisinau, at least from their perspective, is to avoid further bloodshed and aggression from Moldova. Unfortunately, there are three reasons why such status quo'ism makes Transdniestria a general (rather than local) security threat.

First: The uncontrolled production and illegal sales of armaments. Transdniestria has arms plants (such as the Elektromah and Tochlitmash works) that produce weapons for the Russian military. Some of these small and light weapons – without serial numbers – have turned up in conflict areas around the world. In addition to the Transdniestrian production of weapons, remaining Russian military stocks are apparently being pilfered. (There is, about 25,000 tons of Soviet-era military material that remains in the Transdniestrian village of Colbasna and near Tiraspol airfield, both of which are being guarded by the remnants of the Soviet 14th Army.) It remains difficult to prove that the men who run Transdniestria are both stealing and selling arms. Still, EU security professionals worry about such threats because of their possible relationship to terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional conflicts, and organised crime.

Second: The smuggling of various commodities, mostly from East to West. Illegally produced cigarettes are brought into Transdniestria from Ukraine and eventually find their way to Moldova and Central and Southeast Europe. There is also significant evidence of money laundering and the trafficking of young women from Moldova and Transdniestria. In all these cases, smuggling severely threatens and weakens the Moldovan economy. It contributes significantly to the weak-state status of Moldova, which then affects the security of NATO members and the European Union.

Third: The complete lack of international control of Transdniestrian security forces, which include armed forces, ministry of internal affairs troops and border control troops from the Ministry of State Security. (These 7,000 or so personnel do not include 3,000 Cossacks that can be mobilised on short notice, additional "National Volunteers," and members of the local gendarmerie.) Although

the chances of Transdniestrian aggression towards Moldova are limited, there are other ways in which these forces can threaten regional peace and security. For example, when tensions mounted in June of 2004 between the Georgian government and the separatist leaders of South Ossetia, Transdniestria's leader stated that he would provide military assistance to South Ossetia in case of Georgian aggression. (In making this promise, Smirnov cited a 1994 agreement between Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria to assist each other.)

4. Issues to Tackle on the Road to a Unified Moldova

If it is appropriate to stress that Transdniestria poses a security threat to its neighbours, it is equally important not to exaggerate that threat. Tiraspol understands that it has to behave within certain limits if it wants to avoid attracting too much attention to itself and losing Russian support. Its ability to operate within the current status quo is one stumbling block to resolving the Transdniestria conflict, but there are three others as well. Overcoming them would eventually decrease the security threat posed by Tiraspol while increasing the viability of Moldova as a whole.

Stumbling block No.1: The absence of adequate controls over the Transdniestrian segment of the Ukraine-Moldova borders. Although the internal border between Moldova and Transdniestria demands attention, the illicit trade occurring over the Ukraine-Transdniestria border is an even bigger problem at this time. Ukrainian officials know this all too well, which is why they recently agreed to establish the joint EU-Ukraine-Moldova monitoring mission this December. This mission, however, is a limited one. It represents a helpful first step towards controlling the Transdniestrian portion of the border, but it does not represent a major step towards solving the Transdniestria problem in general. It remains questionable just how much control Kyiv in particular has over its own border. Because certain business interests in the Odessa region might be at odds with the central government over just how to "solve" the illegal trade problem. Moldova needs to enhance

its own capacity to manage its borders. The Moldovan border guard department, customs department, police, and Information and Security Service should exchange information with each other and adopt a unified approach to the border problem.

Stumbling block No.2: The continued presence of Russian forces in Transdniestria. For most political and security leaders in Chisinau, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldovan territory is THE prerequisite for solving the Transdniestria problem. This problem, however, has two parts – munitions stockpiles guarded by Russian troops and the Russian-Moldovan-Transdniestrian peacekeeping mission, which has become a problem in itself. In the case of the munitions, NATO, the EU and the US should maintain pressure on Russia to remove them (and their guards) from Transdniestrian territory.⁴ In the case of the peacekeeping force, a new arrangement is necessary. If the EU and US formally join the negotiating process, an EU-Russia peacekeeping mission – limited in size and duration, and with OSCE support – would be appropriate. The mission would 1) promote European-Russian cooperation, 2) commit Moscow to collective decision-making processes, and 3) acknowledge its near-abroad interests at the same time. Russia might then adopt a more constructive approach to its role as mediator and peacekeeper in the area.

Stumbling block No.3: Moldova's weaknesses as a state and the time required to overcome them. The ultimate solution for the Transdniestria problem is democratization, but on both sides of the Dniestr River. Moldova has to make itself more attractive for Transdniestria if the two are going to reconcile. As long as it remains poor, unemployed, corrupt, and only partially democratic, there is little incentive for Transdniestrian elites to change the status quo, or for their people to demand added transparency and influence. Therefore, the Moldovan government needs to implement the ENP Action Plan as vigorously as possible; it needs to solicit *focused* assistance from the EU; it needs to pursue defence reforms in cooperation with NATO and other PfP members; it needs to tap the

⁴ In 2003, Russia withdrew about 15,000 tons of munitions back to its own territory. Further removals stopped when Transdniestria decided – supposedly by itself (!) – to block further trainloads from transiting its territory.

reform-minded, “been there, done that” expertise of new EU members and Romania; and it needs to democratize, primarily through education and the growth of a genuine civil society. These steps will make Moldova more attractive to Transdniestria, but the latter needs to change too. It needs to democratize, play by the rules (especially economically), attract honest investment, and discourage Russian allies who claim that democratization is destabilizing and that “flower revolutions” are nothing more than Western plots.

If we collectively resolve the above threats and stumbling blocks, the Transdniestria problem will arguably solve itself. Smirnov’s gang might pack their bags if democratization takes hold or if their profit margins decline substantially. The remaining Transdniestrian elites would then have to choose between a “soft landing,” where they cooperate with Chisinau and outside mediators, or a “hard landing,” where they rely on Russian support to cope with EU and US sanctions.

5. Some Needed Final Steps for Conflict Resolution

As noted earlier, the circumstances for resolving the Transdniestria conflict have improved. If federalisation is not the generally preferred option right now, other possibilities remain on the table (broad autonomy for Tiraspol, slowly removing the pillars of its criminal economy, unification through democratization, etc.). To facilitate these options or others, however, some additional things need to be done.

First, those involved in the conflict need to de-link Transdniestria from the other three frozen conflicts in the broader region (including Nagorno Karabakh). Approaching Transdniestria as a unique, stand alone problem will 1) help lower

Moscow’s anxieties about its diminished influence over former territories, 2) lower its concerns that any decisions it makes about Transdniestria will provide unwanted precedents (or domino effects) elsewhere, and 3) undercut the solidarity currently enjoyed by “we-against-the-bad-outside-world” separatists. (In the last case, the time has come for the separatists to understand that they are in fact alone and that blocking progress is not in their long-term interest.)

Second, the major players should pursue additional near-term fixes. Although the recent inclusion of the EU and US as observers at the negotiating table is a positive development, is there a next-step format for the talks that the current mediators and conflicting parties need to consider, if any? Also, what issues should they first discuss? (Trying to impose a new state structure on Moldova would be unhelpful in these discussions, as would additional out-of-the-blue Russian proposals and Serbia-Montenegro-like solutions sponsored by the EU.) Another near-term fix, as mentioned earlier, would be to build upon the limited EU border monitoring presence agreed to recently by the EU, Ukraine, and Moldova. Lastly, a third near-term fix could be to withdraw Russia’s troops from Transdniestria and replace its current peacekeeping mission with a transparent EU-Russia force.

Finally, the major players involved need to pursue a long-term fix – the democratization of greater Moldova. The EU should pursue this goal through the ENP, the US should pursue it through greater symbolic and financial attention, NATO should pursue it through PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Moldovans should pursue it through genuine domestic reform. Only when all these players fulfill these necessary ends will the future burn brightly for the people of Moldova and Transdniestria.

NDC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Visiting Fellows

Ms Oksana KOZLOVSKA, Ukraine, PfP Fellowship Programme, Oct. 2005-Jan. 2006.

Col. Oleg KULAKOV, Moscow Military University, NATO-Russia Programme, Sept. 2005-Feb. 2006.

Col. Yuri KRUPNOV, Russian Navy Staff, NATO-Russia Programme, Sept.-Dec. 2005.

Dr Mehdi TAJE, Tunisia, Mediterranean Dialogue Fellowship Programme, Sept. 2005-Jan. 2006.

Internships

Ms Lavinia RICCI, Italy, Sept.-Oct. 2005.

Ms Svetlana YUDINA, Russia, Oct.-Dec 2005.

Departure

Ms Anna PEEL, Research Assistant, UK Civilian

Attendance to the conference: *"Une ambition extérieure pour l'Union européenne?"*, co-organized by the Ecole nationale d'Administration (ENA) on the occasion of its 60th anniversary and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monday 10 October 2005, Paris, France.

Jean DUFOURCQ

Lecture on *"The EU Strategic Planning"*, Baltic Defense College, 19-20 September 2005, Tartu, Estonia.

Three lectures on *Strategic Prospect*, Moscow State University for International Relations (MGIMO), 12-13 October 2005, Moscow, Russia.

Lecture on *"Reforming Military Culture"*, ISKRAN, 13 October 2005, Moscow, Russia.

Carlo MASALA

Lecture on *Managing Protectorates: External Constraints and Limits of Foreign-Led State Building*, and commentator on panel "New approaches to Security Studies", German Political Science Association (International Relations Study Group), 7 October 2005, Mannheim, Germany.

Panel Chair: *Germany's National Interests*, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, 12 October 2005, Berlin, Germany.

Leader of a Working Group during the Conference on *The Transatlantic Link*, 24-26 October 2005, Wiston House, Wilton Park, United Kingdom.

Lionel PONSARD

Presentation on *"Security and Defense Policies in Central European Countries"*, Conference organized by the Slovak MOD, Bratislava, Slovakia.

Presentation on *"Prospects for NATO-Russia Joint Peace Support Operations"*, NATO-Russia Workshop, Moscow, 10-11 October, Moscow, Russia.

Lecture on *"Current Challenges for European Security"* at Moscow State University for International Relations (MGIMO), 13-14 October, Moscow, Russia.

David YOST

Lecture on *"Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy"* to the Nuclear Course at the NATO School, 13 October, Oberammergau, Germany.

External Publications

Jean DUFOURCQ and Carlo MASALA

"OTAN: pour un nouveau rapport Harmel", *Politique étrangère*, 3/2005, pp. 641-651.

Lionel PONSARD

"Russian Political Culture", *Zeszyty Naukowe, Akademia Obrony Narodowej*, Warsaw, September 2005.

"Homeland Security and the Russian Approach", *Information and Security*, Sofia, September 2005.

David YOST

"France's Evolving Nuclear Strategy," *Survival*, vol. 47 (Autumn 2005), pp. 117-146.

INTERNAL ACTIVITIES

13 September 2005

"Kosovo Talks": The present situation in Kosovo and expectations for the immediate future were discussed at the NDC with Prof. Dr. James Pettifer, Visiting Professor at the Institute of Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki (Greece), and Research Fellow of the European Research Institute, University of Bath (UK).

21-22 September 2005

"Developing the NATO/PfP Education and Training Network". Forum organized in cooperation with Allied Command Transformation at NDC, Rome.

23 September 2005

"Security Strategies and their Implications for NATO's Strategic Concept". Yearly Anciens' Seminar, NDC, Rome.

14 October 2005

Carlo MASALA, *"The Future of NATO"*, Graduation Lecture to IPOC, NDC, Rome.

21 October 2005

Carlo MASALA, *"The Future of NATO"*, Graduation Lecture to GFOAC, NDC, Rome.

24 October 2005

"Peace in the Middle East after Israel Disengagement". Debate with Professor Dan Schueftan from Haifa University (Israel) at NDC, Rome.

EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP

Presentation of the 2006 NDC programme at the Mediterranean Dialogue Military Cooperation Program Meeting at NATO HQ, Brussels, 22 September 2005.