

# Transatlantic Nations and Global Security: Pivoting and Partnerships



**Franklin D. Kramer**

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1101 15th Street NW, 11th Floor  
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ISBN: 978-1-61977-003-4

**March 2012**



## About the Author

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The Honorable Franklin Kramer is a national security and international affairs expert and holds multiple appointments, including as an Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow, member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors, and member of its Strategic Advisors Group. Mr. Kramer has been a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs for President Clinton, and previously as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.



This report is a core effort of the Atlantic Council's work to shape the transatlantic policy debate prior to the May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago. Its conclusions were informed by a series of joint workshops conducted by the Council's International Security Program, its Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, and the National Defense University.

For many years, the Council's International Security Program had shaped and influenced the debate on international security by facilitating dialogue through critical analysis and policy-relevant programming concerning the greatest security challenges facing the United States and the transatlantic community. On the occasion of the Council's 50th anniversary, the International Security Program will officially be renamed the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security and will expand the breadth and depth of programming and expertise to address the new array of security challenges and opportunities facing the transatlantic community. The Scowcroft Center will build on the Atlantic Council's rich transatlantic heritage by developing strategies for the United States and its European allies to strengthen and broaden their security relationships with key allies and partners from outside the Atlantic area to best address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

For more information, contact Director-designate of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Barry Pavel ([bpavel@acus.org](mailto:bpavel@acus.org)), or Deputy Director Jeff Lightfoot ([jlightfoot@acus.org](mailto:jlightfoot@acus.org)).



When NATO member states signed up to the idea of a NATO summit to be held in Chicago in the spring of 2012, their goal was to implement the decisions taken at the Lisbon NATO summit in November 2010. But when these leaders agreed to the summit over a year and a half ago, they could scarcely have imagined the shock waves that would soon buffet the transatlantic community and overshadow their plans and vision for the summit.

Since Lisbon, a series of revolts and political transitions have transformed the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa, even as tensions between the international community and Iran have worsened. Defense austerity in Europe has reached such depths that outgoing Secretary of Defense warned of a “dim and dismal” future for the Alliance in his farewell remarks last summer. These challenges facing the transatlantic community were compounded in early 2012 when the Obama administration announced a new defense strategy that prioritizes security in Asia and the Middle East, leaving some allies wondering how the transatlantic partnership fits into future US defense objectives.

These changes—if left unaddressed by the Atlantic alliance—risk producing a dangerous drift between the United States and its partners within the transatlantic community. This report seeks to avoid this outcome by outlining the missing agenda items for this May’s NATO summit. It offers a series of concrete policy initiatives that would ensure a strategic convergence between NATO and the new United States defense strategy. The report correctly emphasizes that the most fundamental challenges of the twenty-first century now lie beyond the transatlantic area in the Greater Middle East and in the cyber realm. If NATO is to remain relevant in addressing these threats, the allies will need to develop a more sophisticated set of interoperable allied capabilities, even in the face of significant budgetary pressures.

I am especially grateful to Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow Franklin D. Kramer, whose vast experience and expertise in transatlantic security policy have served as a tremendous resource to the Atlantic Council on this project and many other efforts over the last decade.

This publication is a flagship effort of the Atlantic Council’s International Security Program—ably led by Barry Pavel—which will soon be officially named the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. We are thankful for the efforts of Assistant Director Simona Kordosova in executing the workshops that informed the substance of this report.

This project aims to reflect the emergent Scowcroft Center’s ambitions to work collaboratively with other Council programs and outside institutes. We are grateful for the efforts of Dr. Michele Dunne, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for Middle East, and Jason Healey, Director of the Council’s Cyber State Craft Initiative, for their contributions to this project. The report’s conclusions were informed by a series of joint workshops conducted in conjunction with these three Council programs and centers and the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University.

We hope that this report will make an important contribution to shaping the policy debate at the Chicago summit by offering concrete initiatives that will ensure the enduring relevance of the transatlantic partnership for a globalized world.

Frederick Kempe  
President & CEO  
Atlantic Council





# Executive Summary

The new United States defense guidance has substantial implications for transatlantic nations that must be addressed at the NATO Summit in May. Specifically, how does the longstanding transatlantic security bargain apply in this globalized world? What are the key security challenges at this strategic turning point? How should those challenges be met in a time of financial constraint? And what are the key actions the transatlantic nations should undertake?

The report makes four recommendations. First, NATO should create a Strategic Consultative Group to establish a longer term strategy for the Greater Middle East, including the areas from Syria to Pakistan and North Africa. Second, NATO should work with the North African countries on issues of the role of the military in a democracy. Third, NATO should focus on cyber as a global issue and help organize the establishment of a Cyber Security Board which can generate both military and critical infrastructure standards. Fourth, NATO should enhance its capabilities by expanding its special operations forces and undertaking an advanced research and development program.

Undertaking these actions would bring NATO strategy into congruence with the new United States defense guidance and make clear that the fundamental nature of the transatlantic bargain includes critical global issues including the Greater Middle East and cyber, and the necessary capabilities to deal with such issues.

**Strategic Congruence and the Greater Middle East.** A critical element of the transatlantic bargain is for there to be fundamental congruence between United States and NATO strategy. The dynamic nature of the Greater Middle East and the new United States defense strategy have raised key questions about whether this remains the case. To achieve congruence at the strategic level, a first action would be to

tie NATO and US strategies together at the NATO summit with an appropriate political declaration. The Alliance should create a Strategic Consultative Group to formulate a longer term strategy utilizing all elements of national power for the Greater Middle East, and particularly two arenas where the alliance or its member nations are most heavily engaged—the theater involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian countries; and the Iranian problem and the issues of deterrence, and proliferation in the Gulf.

**North Africa and Military Reform.** A second set of initiatives that should be undertaken involves North Africa and the role of the military in a democracy. An important prerequisite for worthwhile help by the transatlantic nations will be meaningful consultations with the countries toward whom assistance is directed so that the effort is a partnership approach and demand-driven. A multichannel activity utilizing governmental and nongovernmental entities might have a broader appeal than pure government-to-government dialogues.

In the dynamic situation Tunisia faces, a national strategy may be emergent over time—but it will nonetheless be important to articulate and decide key issues including the mission of the military; its relationship to other security organizations such as police or border control; the size, budgeting, and personnel requirements for the military; how to organize the ministry of defense within the government; how to deal with a civilian parliament; and how to create appropriate transparency for the population.

For Libya, the first, most important effort by the transatlantic nations should be to establish a diplomatic approach through which the Libyans choose to engage in programmatic efforts of value. Assuming that there is agreement to consult on questions surrounding the military, an obvious and highly important issue facing Libya will be

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the role of the militias—the critical question will be how to bring the militias within the governance structure.

The Egyptian military currently presents the most difficult case for the transatlantic countries since broad acceptance of the principle of civilian control appears to remain a fundamental issue in Egypt. Given those uncertainties, it is probably premature for the transatlantic countries to undertake new programs for Egypt. The immediate effort should focus on dialogue and one key aspect of the conversation should be with the civilian groups, the elected parliamentarians, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other powerful political elements within the country.

**Cyber as a Global Security Issue.** NATO and the transatlantic nations need to engage on critical global security matters and no issue is more important than cyber security. A key point is to recognize the need for resiliency—understanding that attackers may breach computer and network defenses but that operations must nonetheless successfully continue.

NATO networks themselves are only a small part of NATO's capabilities. National military networks also need resilience. If national militaries are a source of malware and other cyber issues, those networks would have to be cut off from NATO operations—and that would undercut NATO's greatest strength, its interoperability.

A military focus is not enough since it will be impossible to assure security in the absence of electricity or telecommunications. Accordingly, those critical infrastructures must also have resilience capabilities.

Establishing the framework for such a coordinated cyber approach is a critical step for the transatlantic nations. For cyber there needs to be established a joint standards group

with appropriate military and civilian authorities in Europe, the United States, and Canada. Such a step—the creation of an international Cyber Security Board—would be invaluable in achieving effective cyber security.

**Creating Leveraging Military Capabilities.** Force will continue to be a factor in the future global world but diminished resources call for highly leveraged capabilities. Two high value areas are special operations forces (SOF) and advanced research and development.

SOF fit well into an “age of austerity” because their resources requirements are relatively less substantial. A NATO initiative to significantly expand nations' SOF capabilities would have important benefits including enhancing NATO's capacity to undertake effective partnerships with non-NATO countries. It would be doable in the context of the resources the NATO nations are likely to devote to their militaries and would maintain throughout the Alliance a very important land-based sharp end of the stick.

Advanced research and development supports the concept of leveraging capabilities especially since it can have both military and civilian applications. While there can be no certainty that any military-oriented research and development program will have civilian application, that has happened enough—satellites, GPS, the Internet—that an expectation of benefits which could also enhance private sector competitiveness in the global economy is not unreasonable.



# Transatlantic Relations and Global Security: Pivoting and Partnerships

The most fundamental security challenges of the twenty-first century lie beyond both the geography of transatlantic nations and the classic functions of militaries. The upheavals in North Africa and the continuing challenges of the greater Middle East and southwest and central Asia; the insecurity of the cyber realm on which much of globalization depends; the arrival of an age of transatlantic “defense austerity” when other actors may be less constrained; and the significant and growing importance of the Asia-Pacific all pose key issues for future security efforts.

The United States’ recent defense strategy emphasizes a “strategic turning point”<sup>1</sup> and a “broader range of challenges and opportunities.”<sup>2</sup> President Obama’s introduction references the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa, and the Secretary of Defense states that the United States military will have “global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East while still ensuring our ability to maintain defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening alliances and commitments across all regions.”<sup>3</sup> In the strategy itself, early on the guidance is that “while the US military will continue to contribute to security globally, *we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.*”<sup>4</sup>

This article focuses on the implications of the new United States strategy for the transatlantic nations and, specifically, how does the longstanding transatlantic security bargain, as exemplified by NATO, apply in this global world? What are the key security challenges at this strategic turning point?

How should those challenges be met in a time of financial constraint? And what are the key actions the transatlantic nations should undertake?

The May 2012 NATO Summit will offer the transatlantic countries a first opportunity to respond and two key elements will be “pivoting”—expanding the focus on the larger world beyond the European continent—and “partnering”—enhancing the ability to work with multiple entities in partnership.

The new United States strategy underscores both of those approaches. But the United States cannot accomplish its security ends on its own; engaging the transatlantic nations will be a key element if the strategy is to be effective. A transatlantic effort by countries with a close association both by values and in institutions such as NATO, the G-8, and G-20 offers an opportunity to develop new approaches and to act effectively on global security.

The discussion herein therefore seeks to look forward—so beyond the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the previously taken key decisions such as missile defense, and the existing dialogue (or, perhaps, argument might be the better phrase) with Russia. The focus instead is on newly emergent issues where strategic approaches can at least initially be put in place at the NATO Summit (though there will also be bilateral and multilateral efforts which take place other than through the NATO ambit). Three key areas are:

<sup>1</sup> Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (January 2012)(President Obama introduction message).

<sup>2</sup> Id. (Secretary of Defense Panetta opening message).

<sup>3</sup> Id.

<sup>4</sup> Id. At p.2.



- North Africa: The Military in a Democracy
- Global Challenge: Cyber and the Need for New Approaches
- Defense Austerity and the Development of Capabilities

North Africa offers great promise and is tied by geography and economics to Europe but the success of the revolutions there is far from certain and the role of the transatlantic nations currently lacks strategic direction. The global commons has come to depend heavily on cyber for prosperity, security, and social relations yet cyber is under continuous attack—a threat well-known but more commented on than responded to. The ongoing financial crisis has meant that military capabilities must be significantly rethought.

Precedent to all those questions, however, the discussion considers what should be the fundamental nature of the transatlantic bargain, including not only the challenges of North Africa, cyber, and defense austerity but also the problems of instability in the Greater Middle East, Southwest, and South Asia. Those latter areas present a multitude of threatening circumstances but the engagement of the transatlantic nations is wildly inconsistent—sometimes strong, sometimes not—and key capabilities for dealing with instability are far less effective than desirable.

Each of these arenas poses both risks and opportunities for the transatlantic nations. Understanding the risks and establishing means to take advantage of the opportunities will be crucial to an effective security strategy.

### 1. The Transatlantic Bargain and the Greater Middle East

The transatlantic bargain between the North American and European countries of NATO has always rested on three key pillars: mutual interest, common approaches, and an effective strategy. In each of NATO's first two phases—the Cold War and the subsequent period of enlargement—these were continuously achieved, albeit subject to some notable contentious dialogues.

In the post-9/11 era, however, meeting the criteria has been far more difficult. The United States and Europe have not always seen eye to eye regarding strategic interests; commonality of approach has been undercut by different views as to the efficacy of force; and the strategies pursued in places like Afghanistan or the Balkans, while perhaps the

best available, have not resulted in what most people would deem highly desirable results.

So there are questions on both sides of the Atlantic. From the European perspective, does the United States as the transatlantic leader have a strategic approach that will be effective in the new global world/ and from the United States perspective, does Europe have an interest and the capability to engage in and shape the new security environment?

This question is raised most clearly in the context of the very difficult security environment the NATO nations face to their southeast. The Pentagon's new defense strategy makes clear the importance of this part of the world for the United States. Functionally, when the defense strategy focuses on counter-terrorism, violent extremism and destabilizing threats, including nuclear proliferation, its geographic context is clear: "The primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East"; "US policy will emphasize Gulf security"; and the "United States will continue to place a premium on US and allied military presence in – and support of – partner nations in and around this region."

It could hardly be clearer where the United States will center its efforts and a fundamental issue for the transatlantic nations is whether this pivot will become an enduring part of the transatlantic security bargain.

There are good reasons for the Alliance to orient its activities in this direction. One NATO country—Turkey—faces an immediate, very complicated security environment on its borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Likewise, Afghanistan is an obvious continuing high priority for the Alliance. But the reality is that the entire region from Syria to Pakistan is a cauldron of instability, including energy and maritime security in the Arabian Gulf; nuclear proliferation from Iran; the Israeli-Palestinian problem; internal instability in Iraq; insurgency and civil war in Syria; and, as noted, Afghanistan plus Pakistan, presenting overlapping but differentiated challenges. In terms of "active threat, right here, right now," it is the issues of instability in the Greater Middle East that present the most clear set of problems to Alliance countries.

It would be fair comment by at least some European nations that these issues have not been overlooked. There has been serious engagement in Afghanistan, multiple nations participated in the Libya operation, Iraq has benefitted from the NATO training mission, the Alliance has agreed to missile defense (and its members to economic sanctions) in light of Iranian actions, and multiple countries participate in naval task forces in and around the Gulf. But, while those points

are entirely valid, the real issue is the future—both with respect to intentions and capabilities—and, on this score, there is a great deal of skepticism in the United States as to Europe’s staying power with respect to the region, and in Europe, as to whether the United States can propose a strategy that is more effective and less costly in terms of time, resources, and lives toward accomplishing its ends than has been the case in, for example, Iraq or Afghanistan.

The NATO Summit offers an opportunity to solidify the transatlantic bargain for this part of the world. In theory, this has already been done. The NATO Strategic Concept agreed to at Lisbon provides a framework on which a transatlantic effort in the Greater Middle East can be built. The concept provides that the “Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders [and] ... will engage actively through partnership with relevant countries.”<sup>5</sup> It goes on to state that “Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities.”<sup>6</sup>

The words of the Strategic Concept are entirely congruent with, though not as explicit as, the United States defense strategy. But just as the earlier Cold War concept of flexible response needed periodic enhancement, the words of the current Strategic Concept—while only sixteen months old—are no longer enough. It will be important to establish that NATO and United States defense strategies are, in fact, congruent.

Three steps should be taken in that regard.

The first action would be to tie the two together at the NATO Summit with an appropriate political declaration. In effect, Europe should definitize the language of the Strategic Concept which is geography free and be explicit about the need for continued involvement in the region. A Summit declaration should be undertaken to this effect.

Second, since words alone are not enough, as a mechanism to give substantive strategic content to the declaration, the Alliance should support the formation of a Strategic Consultative Group for the region. The value of a Strategic Consultative Group will depend in great part on three

factors. First, it will need to look at the whole region and be willing to do so periodically with a regional lens rather than dealing with each different problem as a sort of encapsulated issue. There is overlap among issues concerning, for example, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Strait of Hormuz. Second, it will need to analyze and recommend a full spectrum of approaches—political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, information, and military. The Iranian problem, for example, deserves a multifactor approach even beyond the current economic sanctions and “no options off the table.” Third, it will need to include partners who have capabilities and understandings beyond those within the NATO family. Most obviously, the European Union should be engaged on the political and economic front, the Gulf Cooperation Council on virtually all issues, and the Arab League may be a potential partner as in Libya, and perhaps for the future, in Syria.

A Strategic Consultative Group will not displace bilateral activities nor would it be the only multilateral venue. What it would do, however, is focus the Alliance on a key theater in which its interests are at risk. It would make NATO strategy more congruent with United States strategy. And it would be an affirmation of the transatlantic bargain in the context of the most immediate challenges for both Europe and the United States.

Third, the Strategic Consultative Group can be tasked by the Summit to propose a longer term strategy utilizing all elements of national power for the two arenas where the Alliance or its member nations are most heavily engaged—the theater involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian countries; and the Iranian problem and the issues of deterrence and potential containment in the Gulf. Additionally, it should consider the issues raised by Syria.

On the first, it is true enough that the 2010 Lisbon Summit set forth an overall strategy of transition for Afghanistan but recent developments have made the implementation of that strategy quite uncertain. Moreover, that strategy is very much just an Afghanistan strategy, not a regional one—and it is a regional approach that would be highly valuable.<sup>7</sup> On Iran, this is an area in which European nations have long contributed, not only with respect to nuclear negotiations

<sup>5</sup> Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010), at para. 4(c).

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* at para. 11.

<sup>7</sup> To be sure, the Summit will have to deal with certain very important Afghanistan-specific issues. Most particularly, there needs to be settled the issues of the timing of withdrawal of NATO forces, raised first by the French president but now a key question for many; the question of whether the NATO forces can work effectively with the Afghan forces, raised by the spate of killings of NATO personnel by Afghans in uniform as well as by the riots caused by the burning of copies of the Koran; and the issue of the financial support for the Afghan security forces raised both by the very limited capability of the Afghan government to generate tax revenues to support the forces and by the high degree of corruption in Afghanistan.

but in the maritime arena also—only recently, French and British ships moved through the Strait of Hormuz along with an American carrier. Nonetheless, the Iranian issue deserves much further consideration—and the Gulf nations must be included in those considerations. Finally, Syria is an immediate issue for one NATO member—Turkey—and it raises important issues of stability for the Alliance as a whole.

As a final point, it might be noted that a Strategic Consultative Group would not have to operate at 28. There is great value often in smaller efforts and a working group of the Secretary General and ministers of foreign affairs of some key countries could be a device to undertake significant high level consultations. Effective working level efforts likewise could be led by, for example, the Deputy Secretary General or the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and some national counterparts. The point here is that, if the Strategic Consultative Group is to be effective, the “full table, every country speaks at every meeting” approach needs to be avoided as the general methodology in favor a nimbler, more adaptive effort. This is particularly important, in order to effectively engage in consultations with countries and entities outside the Alliance.

A decision by the Alliance to create a Strategic Consultative Group will go part way to creating an effective “security pivot” for the transatlantic nations. Three further actions will make that pivot highly significant. Those are: focusing on North Africa, enhancing cyber security, and developing key defense capabilities.

## 2. North Africa—The Military in a Democracy

In 2002, the authors of the Arab Human Development Report, all themselves citizens of the Middle Eastern countries, decried the failure of that part of the world to progress, stating “the Arab region is hobbled by a different kind of poverty—poverty of capabilities and poverty of opportunities. These have their roots in three deficits: freedom, women’s empowerment, and knowledge. Growth alone will neither bridge these gaps nor set the region on the road to sustainable development.”<sup>8</sup> Subsequent reports

have continued these themes and added the concept of human security.<sup>9</sup>

Today, however, the dramatic revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt and the unfinished business in Syria and other parts of the region offer the prospect for the freedom, knowledge, women’s empowerment, and human security along with the growth, prosperity, and democracy that the Arab Human Development Report authors have sought. But revolutions can go wrong as well as right. It is very much in the interest of the transatlantic nations for these revolutions to succeed and building security will be one key element of success.

To those ends, multiple steps can be taken. A set of initiatives regarding the role of the military in a democracy could be a valuable contribution to the success of the North African countries.<sup>10</sup> Both the institutions and the culture of their militaries need to be developed. There is no single required formula, though a critical element is the primacy of civilian control within the duly constituted government.

An important prerequisite for worthwhile help will be meaningful consultations with the countries toward whom assistance is directed. As King Abdullah of Jordan has said, “I think everybody is wary of dealing with the West.”<sup>11</sup> Any transatlantic effort will work only if it is a partnership approach and demand-driven, seen as valuable to the country in question. Of course, there are multiple ongoing contacts already but expanding and coordinating them so there might be a generally common set of approaches could be highly valuable—and that is an effort that could be set in place at the May NATO Summit.

The importance of appropriate consultations cannot be overstated and an important issue will be whether a relatively smaller contact group should be utilized or whether there is value in NATO taking the lead. It should be recognized that prior NATO initiatives such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative have not been great successes. A more tailored set of efforts is in order, and NATO as a full institution might do best to do no more than to help in coordination and potentially to provide resources if requested—with meetings at 28 nations plus generally to be avoided.

<sup>8</sup> Arab Human Development Report (2002), at pp. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> Arab Human Development Reports 2003 (knowledge society), 2004 (freedom), 2005 (women’s empowerment), and 2009 (human security).

<sup>10</sup> This could be part of larger initiative regarding democracy, market capitalism, and security sector reform which would then include US civilian agencies and also European civilian agencies, perhaps led on European side by the European Union.

<sup>11</sup> Washington Post, October 24, 2011.

One approach that should be considered is how to engage all elements of society, not just the formal security branches of government—though those are, of course, critical players. An effort utilizing governmental and nongovernmental entities, including appropriate think tanks, might have a broader appeal than pure government-to-government dialogues. Ultimately, there likely should be multiple channels—and governmental efforts will be indispensable but processes that will engage broader society—civil society plus a full range of government including parliamentarians—should be a key aspect of the overall approach.

Whichever consultative mechanism is utilized—and this is discussed further below in the context of each country—the importance of Turkey’s position should be recognized. Turkey has moved from a military-dominated state to a civilian government and while there are issues as a result of this transition, Turkey is not only prosperous but has to date maintained a generally secular approach to governing in a Muslim society.<sup>12</sup> Turkey is, of course, already active in the Middle East in general and with the North Africa countries in particular and should have insights and judgments that will be valuable to its transatlantic partners.<sup>13</sup>

One key added value that the transatlantic countries can bring on the security side is to help the North African states develop the appropriate role of a military in a democracy. In going forward with such an effort, it would seem to fair to say that the military establishments of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt each have significantly different issues and the internal politics of each will be an important factor. One size will not fit all but some preliminary thoughts can be offered:

—**Tunisia:** The Tunisian military’s unwillingness to continue to support the old regime was a key factor in the success of the revolution in that country. The fundamental need there is how to organize the military within the context of the emerging democratic institutions. This is, of course, up to the Tunisians but the experience of the transatlantic nations in assisting the transition of the Central and Eastern European countries may have worthwhile relevance.

An important starting point for any country is to understand and define its national security strategy. From those conclusions, a defense strategy—and the role of the military—can follow. National strategy can be enshrined in a document but this is not a necessity, particularly at

a nascent stage. Much more important is an effective consensus between and among the government, key groups, and the populace as a whole as to the broad intent of the strategy. In a necessarily dynamic situation as Tunisia faces, a national strategy may be emergent over time rather than delivered whole cloth—but it will nonetheless be important to articulate and decide key issues. The defense strategy also likely will emerge over time but there are crucial questions that will have to be wrestled with, including the mission of the military; its relationship to other security organizations such as police or border control (including whether, for example, a quasi-military element such as the Italian carabinieri should be created); the size, budgeting, and personnel requirements for the military; how to organize the ministry of defense within the government; how to deal with a civilian parliament; and how to create appropriate transparency for the population.

The transatlantic nations can provide assistance through a variety of mechanisms, both multilateral and bilateral. Those include strategic dialogues, advisory and organizational consultations, education and training efforts, joint operations, resource provision, and potentially over time formal mechanisms such as treaties or partnership agreements. To underscore what was noted above, such interactions need to be with a broad range of society—and need not all be governmental led.

In the development of the role of the militaries for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the transatlantic effort included both bilateral and multilateral actions, including significant efforts through NATO. It is important to note, however, that not all actions ran through NATO. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France, among others, all undertook significant bilateral efforts—and this was particularly true with respect to the provision of resources, whether in funding or in the provision of in-kind assistance (such as training and advisory efforts). NATO did, of course play a key role, and especially NATO’s Partnership for Peace activities were focused toward this end—and NATO was used to provide a clearinghouse to help coordinate efforts by nations.

The North African arena in 2012 is different from that of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, and care should be taken not simply to mimic what worked once and to assume that it will work equally well in an entirely different context. To

<sup>12</sup> This is not to overlook significant issues of free speech and due process that have arisen in the context of, among others, Turkish journalists and the military accused of crimes.

<sup>13</sup> The current US Administration has developed close contacts with the Turkish government with mutually beneficial results; the suggestion here is to make Turkish insights and judgments more broadly available and to recognize the leadership that Turkey can provide.



be sure, in generic terms, bilateral and multilateral assistance will be available at some levels. Various NATO and national institutions such as the NATO Defense College and the US Marshall Center, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies can play worthwhile roles. But, as underscored above, it will be critically important to consult with the Tunisians on what they would like to accomplish and how they would like to do it.

What the NATO Summit can do is to endorse the role of NATO and the NATO countries in undertaking such actions—and endorse and authorize the development of programs in consultation with the Tunisians. What should be avoided is automatically giving the lead position to the all-too-frequently very cumbersome NATO bureaucratic approach. The reality is that not all NATO nations will want to focus on North African issues and any such effort often will much better be undertaken by a smaller group of interested countries—and potentially nongovernmental groups—ready to provide consequential assistance. Utilizing such a small group or groups and in full consultations with the Tunisians, an agenda could be established, and then appropriate tasks could be undertaken on some combination of a national or NATO basis.

—**Libya:** The official Libyan military, of course, resisted the revolution, and it was the militia groups that were successful with the assistance of NATO and its partners. The governance situation in Libya is far less settled than it is in Tunisia and the role of the militias is likewise unsettled. Public order remains an issue, there are border issues particularly in the south, and the future shape and role of the military is far from concluded.

It is not at all clear that NATO or the transatlantic nations will be welcome, at least in the near term, in the Libyan environment notwithstanding the role NATO and a number of its member countries played in ending the Qaddafi regime. And it is equally unclear, given the uncertain governance situation, just what role outsiders could effectively play.

The first, most important effort by the transatlantic nations should be to establish a diplomatic approach which will authorize over time programmatic efforts of value to Libya. Some such efforts are ongoing and they will be critical to dealing with the specific issues noted below. As noted above, there may be important actions that can be taken by both governmental and nongovernmental actors. But allowance of an appropriate amount of time to let internal issues be resolved may be an important element of diplomacy.

Assuming that there is agreement to consult on questions surrounding the military, an obvious and highly important issue facing Libya will be the role of the militias. The NATO nations have experience in dealing with such matters in as diverse places as Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and several African countries—but not all those experiences have been positive. Dealing with armed groups in an uncertain governance situation is highly complicated. It is fairly easy to state as a general principle that the central government ought to have a monopoly of violence within a country—but in practice that calls for an effective central government to exist and for it to have fairly broad allegiance from the population.

In the current circumstances in Libya, the focus of the transatlantic nations ought to be on assisting governance but it does appear that establishing governance will require creating some order in connection with the militias. Depending on how the Libyans themselves establish their governance mechanisms, there can be a variety of approaches to the militias—but there are a number of cautions in this regard. Most importantly, the militias are not insurgents—at least not at this time. They are, in fact, the winning army (or parts thereof). Moreover, there are potentially significant divisions within the country and the militias to some extent reflect those divisions. None of this is to suggest that the ongoing public disorder is in the slightest bit appropriate—but it is to say that resolving the problem is much more political than it is technical.

A potential useful way to approach the militias would be to bring them within the governance structure but precisely how to do this will be a key question. In Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army was transitioned to a Kosovo Protection Corps. In other situations, militias have become part of security sector activities, sometimes with their links to local, rather than central, government. But key questions will remain. One previous analysis noted:

“Where militias . . . play a role in generating a secure environment, several key issues must be addressed, all of which go ultimately to the issues of control and the longer-term existence of these types of forces. At the broadest level, it will be important to establish the relationship between non-state security actors . . . and the host nation [central] government, including host nation security forces. That set of relationships likely will be created in significant part by several prior considerations. First, what benefits do the forces potentially bring, and, can they be demobilized without significant downsides? Second, if they are to



continue to exist, how will their roles interface with actors in the formal host nation security sector or external security forces? Who will advise the non-state security actors, what mandates and authorities will those advisors exercise, and who will direct those advisors? Third, who will pay the non-state security actors, and what will be their compensation?”<sup>14</sup>

If the governance issues are to be resolved, Libya will have to face much the same type of issues as does Tunisia. Establishing the appropriate role of the military will likewise mean creating an agreed understanding of its missions and then working out a structure to accomplish those missions. But even more so than in Tunisia, Libya’s strategic analysis may need to be an emergent effort over time. For example, a variety of force structure models would be possible, ranging from a land-dominated standing force to a reserve-based force—any of which could incorporate the militias in a variety of ways—but it will likely be the political environment which will determine what will be best for the country, at least in the near and probably medium term. Political issues also will factor heavily into matters such as the amount of the budget to be devoted to the military, questions of education and training, as well as the relationship of the military to the parliament and to the population. All these issues need to be decided not only at the technical level but, most importantly at the broad governance—or one could say, political—level.

In that connection, the Libyan governance structures will have to determine which, if any, of the activities mentioned would usefully be undertaken with the assistance of outsiders. In the past, the United States has undertaken full-fledged strategic analyses of military requirements with a number of countries, and done so in a partnership model where the country was fully engaged. Training and education efforts have been accomplished by multiple nations, and, of course, by NATO. But whether and how those efforts will fit the Libyan environment needs to be evaluated. Once again, a small consultative group (or groups) working with appropriate Libya leaders would be a useful way to organize the right kind of effort.

The Egyptian military currently presents the most difficult case for the transatlantic countries. As of this writing, the actual course of the revolution has not been resolved as only the parliamentary elections have been concluded, and the writing of a constitution and presidential elections are yet to come. Unlike Tunisia and Libya where there seems to be a broad acceptance of the principle of civilian control,

that appears to remain a fundamental issue in Egypt. Given those very substantial uncertainties, it is probably premature for the transatlantic countries to undertake new programs for Egypt. Moreover, even existing programs are very much in question, especially given the charges brought against several democratically-focused non-governmental organizations and their employees, including a number of Americans.

The United States has had ongoing and very significant contacts with all elements within Egypt. The issue of the NGOs currently tops the immediate agenda and there is high uncertainty as to how that will be resolved and whether the long-standing American aid program will continue and, if so, in what form. Given this turmoil, until there is some resolution the most worthwhile efforts will probably be maintaining a continued dialogue.

In that connection, it is worth underscoring the point that one key aspect of the conversation should be with the civilian groups who have important roles in Egypt. That would include the elected parliamentarians, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other political elements within the country. The channels to the military are well-known but discussion with the non-military side needs emphasis. As an example, it might be valuable for the transatlantic countries to offer to the new parliament opportunities to discuss key issues of civilian control including how to think about determining the missions of the military, its size, and the budgetary and acquisition processes. As discussed above, those efforts can be in governmental and non-governmental channels. And while it is premature to determine what those missions might be, it is worth noting that, given Egypt’s economic concerns, a military partially directed to Corps of Engineer infrastructure projects as well as other economic projects might have high value. The Egyptian military is already heavily involved in business activities and while that normally would be quite undesirable, it may be that such involvement could be creatively used to help the economy move forward.

### 3. Cyber Security and the Need for New Approaches

Cyber as a critical facilitator of the global world is well recognized and the concomitant importance of a safe and secure cyber system is equally understood. But the continued and highly successful attacks on cyber systems

<sup>14</sup> Kramer, Dempsey, Gregoire, Megahan, and Merrill, “Succeeding in Irregular Conflict: Effective Civil Operations,” in *Civil Power in Irregular Conflict* (2010), at pp. 20-21.

in recent years have undercut any sense of real security. Just to state a few: the US Department of Defense has publicly acknowledged intrusion into secure systems; the most knowledgeable information technology companies like Google have been successfully attacked; and key cyber security firms like RSA have similarly been penetrated. Critical infrastructure, such as the electric grid, has had its vulnerability demonstrated by the STUXNET virus, and WIKILEAKS has shown the power of the so-called insider threat.

In response to the very critical nature of the problem, NATO leaders to their credit have identified cyber as a key issue, most notably in the 2010 Lisbon Summit declaration and in 2011 the Alliance adopted a revised cyber security concept and associated action plan.<sup>15</sup> But rather than develop a response that meets the magnitude of the issues, the NATO effort thus far has been bureaucratic and essentially ineffective. It has these limitations for three reasons: its “principal focus” is on the NATO networks, which are only a small portion of the networks on which the national forces that comprise NATO’s military arm rely; it undertakes to develop only “minimal requirements” for the national systems that constitute almost the entirety of the NATO military capability; and it offers to assist only “if requested” nations with respect to key critical infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid and telecommunications, that are as critical to military readiness as weapons systems and personnel.

This is a problem that can be fixed but it will take leadership and new methods of action. It will require changes in technical approaches to hardware and software as well as changes in organization, processes and personnel. It will require overcoming the technologists’ inclination to say the problem lies in the governance and organization of the cyber realm and the governance authorities’ tendency to look for a technological silver bullet. Both are required, and both are entirely doable. Specifically:

On the technical side, NATO needs to establish standards for resiliency—that is, the understanding that attackers may breach computer and network defenses but that operations must nonetheless successfully continue. There is no doubt that breaches must be anticipated—the vulnerabilities

discussed above underscore the point. Resilience means that the networks can operate well enough despite such breaches.

From a technical perspective, there are existing techniques that can be deployed to accomplish resilience. These include methods, among others, of integrity assurance, redundancy, non-persistence, safe languages, and encryption.<sup>16</sup> Requiring NATO networks to utilize machines and software with such capabilities is an imperative and a necessary prerequisite to cyber resilience.

But, as noted above, NATO networks themselves are only a small part of NATO’s capabilities. National military networks (including hardware and software in host machines and servers) also need to meet the much more significant standards that are required for resilience. If the national networks do not meet such standards, they will be a source of cyber attack and can be utilized to defeat NATO capabilities.

If national militaries cannot meet such standards and are a source of malware and other cyber issues, those networks would have to be cut off from NATO operations—and that would undercut NATO’s greatest strength, its interoperability. In the recent Libyan operation, aircraft from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States flew together but if one or more of those country’s networks had been infected, those nations could not have been included in NATO’s combined air operations unless resilience capabilities were present.

To achieve adequate resiliency will require going beyond the hardware and software of the host machines and servers. It will require that the networks themselves contribute to resiliency. Network operators have great understanding of what flows over their networks and the capacity to affect those flows. Accordingly, the Internet service providers—that is, the telecommunications companies—need to be part of the resiliency solution.

Moreover, since it will be impossible to assure security in the absence of electricity or telecommunications, those critical infrastructures must also have resilience capabilities. The telecommunications companies are, of course, the Internet

<sup>15</sup> See *Defending the Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber Defense*, [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2011\\_09/20111004\\_110914-policy-cyberdefence.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefence.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> In “Building Secure, Resilient Architectures for Cyber Mission Assurance” (2010), Harriet Goldman lists the following capabilities valuable for creating resilience: diversity, redundancy, integrity, isolation/segmentation/containment, detection/monitoring, least privilege, non-persistence, distributedness and moving target defense, adaptive management and response, randomness and unpredictability, and deception.

service providers noted above but the multiplicity of electric power generators, transmitters and distributors is a vast and complex set of entities. Understanding the critical nature of these entities to security and their particular vulnerability to cyber attack underscores the need for a new paradigm to provide resilient security. Rather than a purely governmental focus, what will be necessary is a partnership between and among governments and private entities. Most obviously, since these sectors are not in any way under NATO's guidance, there needs to be established a joint standards group with appropriate military and civilian authorities in Europe, the United States, and Canada.

Organizing the capacities of network operators and electric power entities to contribute to resilience is a new task. It has been discussed in numerous fora; various companies have taken such measures as they deem appropriate; and some useful but nonetheless insufficient standards have been developed such as by the North American Reliability Council in the United States which is the self-regulating group of electric transmission operators. None of these meets the magnitude of the problem.

However, to go beyond current efforts and achieve adequate resilience will require coordinated regulation by the NATO countries far beyond current approaches. It should be clearly recognized that the required legislative and regulatory authorities do not exist for the most part.<sup>17</sup> And, beyond the authorities themselves, no concept of operations has been developed that meets both security needs and private sector requirements. All of this means that a new approach to cyber security will be necessary, one that is much more inclusive and require a combination of military, civilian governmental and private industry actions. The necessary rules extend beyond NATO's authorities and will require national action entwined in an international governance approach.

Establishing the framework for such a coordinated cyber approach is a critical step for the transatlantic nations, and effective implementation will require continued high level attention. This will not be an easy task, but there are instances—for example the Basel accords in the financial arena—where such agreements have been created that affect both governmental and private operations. Such a step—call it the creation of an international Cyber Security Board—needs to be undertaken in the cyber arena also.

## 4. Defense Austerity and the Development of Capabilities

Military capabilities have long been used by the transatlantic nations to create a context to support democracy and prosperity. The development of the European Union occurred under the security umbrella of NATO and the more recent Libyan action by NATO is in support of a nascent democratic effort. Effective militaries require adequate resources and the transatlantic nations face economic challenges that will make more difficult the provision of such resources. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' well-known concerns and the gaps in European smart munitions; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities; helicopters; and logistics as demonstrated in Libya and Afghanistan underscore the need for adequate top-line funding. But within that context, there will be high value in developing capabilities that meet the austerity criterion but have high leveraging capacity. The Alliance has discussed a "smart defense" effort heavily reliant on pooling capabilities. That could be highly useful, but two approaches that would provide high leveraging effect that have not been focused on are expanded special operations forces and advanced research and development.

**A. Special Operations Initiative.** NATO nations have special operations forces (SOF) capabilities and NATO itself has a Special Operations Headquarters. However, the campaigns in Libya and Afghanistan, the desire to enhance preventative capacities (sometimes called "phase zero"), and potential benefits from training and supporting host nation militaries all underscore the value of expanded SOF.

SOF has very high leveraging value. In their classic roles of supporting less well-trained and resourced local forces, they have historically generated results far in excess of their numerical involvement. Those results derive from a combination of their very high fighting skills, excellence as trainers, and cross-cultural expertise. Their cross-cultural capabilities have made them excellent forces to utilize in preventative and phase zero approaches. But such outstanding results can also occur under conditions of war or in a less-than-war conflict environment and SOF therefore have high value in counter-terror, counter-insurgency, and conventional efforts.

<sup>17</sup> The proposed cyber legislation in the United States would be a useful step forward, but it falls short of what will be necessary to protect the electric grid.

Beyond their functional capabilities, SOF fit well into an “age of austerity” budget approach because their resources requirements are relatively less substantial. That is because both of their leveraging approach—i.e. fewer forces are necessary—and because they have relatively fewer highly expensive equipment demands.

A NATO initiative to significantly expand in size nations’ SOF capabilities and to continue to improve their capabilities to work together would have important benefits. Such an initiative would support NATO’s capacity to undertake effective partnerships with non-NATO. It would look forward to the more likely types of conflicts that NATO might be engaged in. It would be doable in the context of the resources the NATO nations are likely to devote to their militaries in the near and medium term and would maintain throughout the Alliance a very important land-based sharp end of the stick. This last is a critical to equitable risk sharing, which is an underlying principle of the Alliance.

**B. Advanced Research and Development.** One of the great advantages of the transatlantic countries has been the application of advanced technology to military operations. There are numerous examples: stealth; precision-guided munitions; fusion of intelligence and operational data; and space. But one of the fundamental issues for the transatlantic nations generally is whether they will continue to be the center of technological innovation that has been true essentially for the West for the past 600 years.

Advanced research and development supported by defense budgets can have both military and civilian applications. Satellites were initially a military endeavor but space now is an integral element of everyday life as communications and navigation systems, such as GPS, demonstrate. Likewise, it is by now a cliché but still entirely true that the Internet’s inception was a defense-driven effort and this was similarly true for much of the early work on computers themselves.

In an age of defense austerity, advanced research and development that supports the concept of leveraging capabilities or creating new ones is a highly efficient use of funds. Moreover, while there can be no certainty that any

military-oriented R&D program will have civilian application, that has happened enough that an expectation of benefits is not unreasonable, especially in new arenas such as nanotechnology.

It has always been the case that cooperative production programs have been difficult to undertake on a transatlantic basis. While some have succeeded, both competitive and political issues have often led to difficulties for such efforts. Research and development is somewhat more easily undertaken on a cooperative basis since the larger industrial questions usually are not in the forefront. That is particularly true when the issues are at the cutting edge of technology.

A major transatlantic advanced research and development effort could fit the budgets of the NATO nations and if successful, could also enhance private sector competitiveness in the global economy. It is the type of partnership that the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has long undertaken and a model the US has extended to the intelligence community and other arenas. It is the type of new partnership for the twenty-first century that would support the transatlantic nations in a globalized world.

## Conclusion

A reinvigorated transatlantic bargain should be the focus of the May NATO Summit. New efforts such as a Strategic Consultative Group, assistance to the North African countries, enhanced cyber capabilities and processes including a Cyber Security Board, and focus on special operations forces and advanced research and development all would be valuable. Undertaking such actions will go a long way toward ensuring that the transatlantic nations are effective producers of security in the twenty-first century.

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ISBN 978-1-61977-003-4



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