



RESEARCH PAPER

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Research Paper

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Editorial

Centree sur les vues exprimées tant à Belgrade qu'à Pristina, cette étude des options possibles pour sortir le Kosovo de l'impasse et définir un statut favorable à tous ses habitants, est le fruit des contacts réguliers qu'entretiennent les chercheurs du Collège de défense de l'OTAN avec des experts régionaux. Chacun pourra voir dans ce travail que les options aujourd'hui possibles font appel à la modération des Kosovars, à leur réalisme mais aussi à des concours extérieurs (l'OTAN via la KFOR, l'ONU via UNMIK, l'OSCE, l'Union européenne, les Etats-Unis ...) pour consolider et garantir toute forme d'évolution vers la stabilité à laquelle aspirent les habitants de la région.

Ce nouveau Research Paper sur les Balkans souligne l'importance pour l'Alliance d'accompagner, à son niveau, la région des Balkans dans la recomposition post-yougoslave dont certains disaient au début des années 90 qu'elle prendrait 25 ans. C'est désormais chose faite avec la Slovénie et c'est en bonne voie avec la Croatie et l'ARYM/FYROM; une étape importante a été accomplie avec le transfert SFOR/Althea. D'autres pourront suivre quand la justice internationale aura fait son œuvre, et les évolutions politiques à venir de la Serbie-Montenegro permettront de clarifier la structure régionale. Mais il est illusoire d'envisager de nouvelles étapes tant que l'épine kosovare restera comme aujourd'hui envenimée.

Le statut final du Kosovo est sans doute l'une des clés de la "nouvelle question balkanique" que les acteurs de la région et la communauté internationale ont entrepris de résoudre depuis plus de quinze ans. Pour l'OTAN, intervenue en urgence pour soutenir une communauté en danger, c'est désormais la capacité à défendre toutes les minorités et à garantir l'ordre public et la paix socio-économique; c'est aussi démontrer son aptitude à participer utilement à la construction et à la consolidation d'Etats viables.

Pour les voisins du Kosovo, c'est éviter que le statut final kosovar ne déclenche un effet "château de cartes" régional en transférant chez eux un modèle déstabilisant, voire dangereux; pour tous les peuples balkaniques, lassés des guerres et des tensions, c'est la recherche d'une formule qui permette d'accrocher le wagon des Balkans occidentaux ex-yougoslaves à la prospérité renaissante de cette partie de l'Europe du Sud-est. Pour la communauté internationale, l'enjeu est crucial: c'est celui de l'avenir des Etats enclavés, dépendants, sans débouchés; c'est celui de la tutelle ou des protectorats à assurer pour reconstruire des Etats; mais c'est par-dessus tout, l'avenir de la multi-ethnicité et du bon voisinage religieux et socio-culturel. A défaut d'y parvenir, c'est la réunification pacifique du continent européen qui sera différée, voire compromise, avec à sa place, la perspective d'un émiettement politique et d'une multiplication d'Etats ethniques qui ne manqueront pas d'émerger des autres conflits encore gelés qui subsistent en Europe et sur son pourtour.

Jean DUFOURCQ, Chef de la branche recherche

N.B. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, both of whom area assigned to the NATO Defense College, and should not be attributed to the College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Les opinions exprimées dans cette publication sont celles de leurs auteurs, tous deux en poste au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN, et ne peuvent être attribuées au Collège ou à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

Kosovo - Strategic Options for the Future?

Cees COOPS and Peter FABER

Because “the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air,” the time for symbolic gestures and rhetoric is over in the Balkans.¹ The status quo has indeed outlived its usefulness, as have recent policies of “constructive ambiguity.”² Nowhere is this truer than in the political limbo that is Kosovo today. In order to consider what alternatives the Euro-Atlantic community might have now in this troubled region, this *Research Paper* focuses on three interrelated themes – 1) the current “facts on the ground” in Kosovo, as seen from Belgrade and Pristina; 2) possible final status options for the area; and 3) recommended next steps ahead for NATO-led international forces (KFOR) operating there.

1. Current Facts on the Ground

For Serbian leaders, last year’s violence in Kosovo (March 2004) served as a “brutal awakening,” although they were not surprised that it occurred. (In their minds, the violence was part and parcel of the on-going ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Serbs by dominant Kosovo Albanians.) This awakening then led to a major “accommodation” of Serbian policy towards Kosovo, which had been characterized by status-quo’ism and, surprisingly enough, a significant degree of political indifference and neglect. In contrast, the dominant Serbian consensus today includes the following beliefs.

- Kosovo is a regional-level political cancer – its final status should be dealt with immediately.
- The policies of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) have been a complete failure. (From Belgrade’s perspective, UNMIK representatives have typically sat on “Pristina’s side of the table” instead of sitting in the middle.)
- The Serbs who remain in Kosovo must be physically protected; economic considerations are secondary to this overriding security concern.
- Because there is no local political will to create a multi-ethnic society, Kosovo will never be one. The UN’s and NATO’s continued belief in this possibility is a dangerous delusion that obscures and marginalizes the core issues surrounding Kosovo’s final status.
- In any final status agreement, Serbia must be able to

maintain some type of formal governmental relationship with Kosovo Serbs, to include possibly controlling them.

- Kosovo Albanians are not Belgrade’s economic or political problems; they are the international community’s problem.
- And finally, Belgrade’s leaders believe Kosovo has become a domestic political minefield for them. In their own eyes, they are in the difficult position of wanting to resolve Kosovo’s final status AND preserve their local credibility and power at the same time. Mixed political signals have resulted, particularly since Serbian leaders have used proxies to “float” potentially dangerous options or ideas, or they have taken dual private and public positions on how to fix Kosovo. Such political dualism reflects 1) a self-alienating isolationist impulse among Serbian elites as they try to deal with Pristina, 2) a belief that the international community maintains an unfair double standard when dealing with Belgrade and its neighbor; and yet, 3) an improved sense of realism in Serbia over how to move ahead.

Given the complicated domestic political climate in Belgrade, political decentralization or de facto partition is not an outdated idea for Serbian elites; if anything, it is a new idea. Also, it is the farthest and biggest sovereignty-yielding concession Serbian leaders can possibly make at this point in time. Total independence for Kosovo remains a non-option as far as Belgrade is concerned. However, just what form decentralization will take remains an open question. It could involve partition or it could involve pursuing a kind of decentralization that is less overt than previously demanded by the Serbians.

If Belgrade’s current approach towards Kosovo is both pragmatic and complicated, then Tirana’s approach towards Serbia is equally bifurcated – i.e., it is open to dialogue, but only while continuing to tout outright independence for Kosovo. Only a minority of Kosovo Albanians are prepared to make concessions at the negotiating table, and they still do not know what form those concessions should ultimately take. Additionally, they consider it the Kosovo Serbs’ responsibility to return to the political table, particularly given their wholesale boycott of last October’s local elections.

¹ See *The Balkans in Europe’s Future*, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, April 2005, pp. 5, 8., available at www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 14.

To summarize then, the Serbians and Kosovo Albanians remain divided over the final status of a troubled land; and yet, positive signs of convergence now exist where none existed before. Serbian leaders have adopted a more pragmatic policy vis-à-vis Kosovo. They remain intensely nationalistic, but they also understand that they need a viable exit strategy for their own domestic political survival, and for Serbia's inclusion into a greater Europe. As a result, they no longer cling to the suppressor-expel options of the past, and they appear ready for near-term rather than long-term political action. However, more pragmatic Serbian thinking must be matched by actual thinking on Pristina's part. The Kosovo Parliament's failure to identify a substantive negotiating position for its own government represents a crippling problem for Pristina at this time.

Finally, both sides must watch themselves closely in two respects. First, while preparing for final status negotiations, they must blunt a growing tendency to radicalize their positions. (The source of this tendency remains unclear – it could be a mere negotiating tactic, or it could reflect a revival of recently dormant passions.) Second, both Belgrade and Pristina must exercise their political imaginations and anticipate not only how they will govern or represent their own people, but also vice versa

2. The Final Status Debate (in Two Parts)

There is no truly rational way to determine Kosovo's final status. Despite this truth, however, it is both necessary and unavoidable to address two key final status issues – determining which previously suggested end states are now viable or not, and deciding what mechanisms need to be in place for the negotiations themselves.

a. The final status debate - eliminating options

Over the years, assorted end states have been suggested for Kosovo. The time for offering and considering final status options may well be over, however. What the principal actors now need to accomplish in this drama is "a process of decision" – i.e., they need to set aside those options that are no longer workable.

Because this *Research Paper* is deliberately short, the following list avoids specifics. It has pedagogical value nevertheless. It conveniently highlights the major final status options that have been recommended for Kosovo in recent years, and it indicates, even if provisionally, whether these options are workable today or not.³ The recommendations have historically clustered around three basic preferences –

FINAL STATUS OPTIONS

<p>1. Empower a binding international panel to decide Kosovo's final status.</p>	<p>Depending on where you sit, this option not only threatens FYROM and Bosnian sovereignty, it is also a potential Serbian tool for mischief.</p>
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DIFFERENT FORMS OF INDEPENDENCE

<p>2. Accept Kosovo's <i>Divided Independence</i>.</p> <p>3. Accept Kosovo's <i>Eventual Independence</i> through a process of slow dissolution.</p> <p>4. Accept Kosovo's <i>Delayed Independence</i> within existing borders.</p> <p>5. Accept Kosovo's <i>Conditional Independence</i> within existing borders (i.e., accept independence, but only partial sovereignty).</p> <p>6. Recognize/accept Kosovo as a <i>multi-ethnic independent state</i>.</p>	<p>Serbian leaders will not accept the independence of Kosovo Serbs who are not in some way under the governing authority of Belgrade.</p> <p>Allowing de facto independence to evolve slowly into formal sovereignty (through a form of political neglect) would require a long-term international presence and other costly commitments.</p> <p>Most analysts believe that the parties involved have only a narrow window of opportunity to solve the final status issue. Time is on no one's side.</p> <p>It is questionable whether Pristina would accept specific, long-term conditions (protecting minority rights, limiting regional relations, etc.) on its sovereignty.</p> <p>On a formal level, this is a non-option for Serbia; it also has mixed external support.</p>
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³ For a similar and yet different list of final status options, see Florian Bieber, "What Final Status is Possible for Kosovo? Plans and their Critiques," *European Balkan Observer*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1 May 2004), pp. 14-17.

independence, protectorate status, and division/fragmentation.

A general note on independence – Regardless of what form Kosovo’s independence might eventually take, it will require five steps at various points along the way: 1) Turning over war criminals to the International Tribunal for [the] Former Yugoslavia, 2)

conducting direct negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, 3) accounting for Contact Group (and especially Russian) interests, 4) securing UN Security Council approval, and 5) issuing an actual Final Act document. Unfortunately, securing Security Council approval might prove tricky given the unwanted precedents it might set for Russia (Chechnya) and China (Tibet).

DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROTECTORATES

<p>7. Reestablish Kosovo as an <i>autonomous Serbian province (or even a protectorate)</i> with even greater freedoms than those it enjoyed in the 1970s.</p> <p>8. A variation of the above option: Designate Kosovo as an <i>autonomous “European Region” or “Freeland” under flexible Serbian sovereignty.</i></p> <p>9. Establish a <i>EU protectorate</i> under the authority of the UN trusteeship system.</p> <p>10. Formally <i>preserve Kosovo as a UN protectorate.</i></p>	<p>Despite Serbia’s enthusiasm for this option, it is a non-starter for Pristina. (“It merely turns the clock back,” argue its opponents.)</p> <p>See above.</p> <p>The EU presently lacks both the political will and the actual mechanisms to fulfill this option. It also sees itself as a facilitator in Kosovo rather than as an administrator. Finally, pursuing this option would subvert the authority of Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions for Self-Government (PISG).</p> <p>To many observers, this option merely preserves the status quo.</p>
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A general note on protectorates – Those who advocate them need to justify *why* Kosovo should become a

long-term protectorate. The burden of proof is actually on them.

DIFFERENT FORMS OF DIVISION OR FRAGMENTATION

<p>11. <i>Partition or at least “cantonize” Kosovo</i> into parallel Kosovo Serbian and Kosovo Albanian political structures.</p> <p>12. Transform Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo into a <i>loose, three-part federation.</i></p> <p>13. <i>Establish a commonwealth</i> (a union of independent states) between Serbia, Montenegro, and perhaps Kosovo.</p>	<p>The preferred synonyms for cantonization (a still popular Serbian option) are “decentralization” and “autonomy within autonomy.” For a brief assessment of the partition option, see below.</p> <p>This is a non-option for Pristina. Montenegro would have an equal voice even though it has less than 1/3 the population of Kosovo.</p> <p>This option is conceptually sound, but Montenegro is currently loath to tie its fortunes with those of Kosovo.</p>
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A general note on division/fragmentation – UNMIK leaders formally believe that territorial division is not an option in Kosovo, but their position could change. Would pursuing this option then provoke the attempted union of Albanian-dominated areas in southern Serbia with Kosovo (Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja), and/or the attempted union of Serb

districts in northern Kosovo with Serbia? Additionally, would 2/3 of Kosovo Serbs, who are scattered across a wide area, have to relocate into protected enclaves? According to their critics, advocates of territorial division do not adequately consider the complications embedded within these questions.

14. *Return Kosovo to full Serbian control/sovereignty*

This “dangerous illusion” is a total non-option for Pristina, as is sustaining the current status quo.

Despite the pedagogical and historical value of listing the above 14 options, only three alternatives are realistic today

Possible Option No.1 – A “hard” version of partition. Advocates of this option argue that Kosovo is inexorably headed towards partition, perhaps through widespread violence. (To some Serbians, partition is indeed a “war option.”) The death toll might be in the hundreds, while those displaced from their villages and homes might be in the thousands. In the wake of such possible violence, the international community would most likely let Kosovo “stew in its own juices” until local criminality and corruption became severe enough to require European-led national rehabilitation. No one likes this option, argue those who reluctantly believe in it, but they also believe Kosovo needs a partition proposal with an ethnic territorial base. (Additionally, a “hard” partition would minimize any hand wringing about where to draw dividing lines, although one could base them on pre-1998 Serbian majority areas.)

Possible Option No.2 – An evolution towards greater sovereignty (i.e., a programmed march through Options 3-5, although the relationship between full sovereignty and full independence could remain ambiguous. If a fully sovereign Kosovo eventually joined the EU, for example, it would necessarily have to compromise its independence, as other EU members do. It would therefore be free and not free at the same time.) Backers of this possible option, including the recent International Commission on the Balkans, disagree that partition is THE logical option for Kosovo. Instead, they advocate a four-step march towards greater sovereignty in Kosovo.⁴ Step 1 would require everyone to accept today’s status quo (de facto separation) as defined by UNSCR 1244. Step 2 would then feature a form of *Conditional Independence*, as defined in Option 5 (i.e., independence without full sovereignty). Step 3 would feature continued oversight by outside powers, but without the sovereignty-inhibiting powers reserved for them in Step 2. (Local self-government would be total here.) Finally, in Step 4 Kosovo would enjoy full sovereignty, and by implication the economic prosperity that only comes with stability and security.

This option may well be doable, but it has three immediate problems that its advocates must consider. First, it appears to be profligate with time, which may

not be available in Kosovo. Second, those who advocate this option tend to ignore the cantonization or decentralization that may be required in any final status agreement. Finally, and as suggested in the previous paragraph, is the studied ambiguity between full sovereignty and full independence within this option helpful, or is it a bad political tactic left over from the past?

Possible Option No.3 – A sustainable multi-ethnic society unified under an as-yet-to-be-determined political arrangement. This final choice is an ideological sentiment rather than an option per se. It may no longer be realistic to some, but it reflects a stubbornly persistent type of political will still held by influential outsiders, and therefore must be taken seriously as an option. It also reflects the lingering analytic divisions that exist between *pragmatists*, as illustrated by the first or second options, and *idealists*, who are not willing to give up yet on the possibility of creating a single, unified, and standards-shaped society in the area. The concern of these idealists is that the first option virtually guarantees the absence of a coherent central authority in Kosovo, while the second one is too profligate with time. For these reasons (and more), the idealists believe that final status talks could *perhaps* be deferred until 2006. The added time would then help those who are working to revitalize the local economy and create a unified multi-ethnic society where none has existed before.

b. The mechanics of final status negotiations

The above three options may now be the most realistic (with the third option admittedly lagging behind the other two), but they are hardly a forgone conclusion. Their success will depend on implementing as many of the following recommendations as possible.

- Pass a UNSC resolution that abrogates Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. With UNSCR 1244 providing a legal foundation, the UN Secretary General could personally direct this desirable first step towards negotiations.
- The UNMIK Standards Process currently underway in Kosovo should no longer function as a *precondition* for future status talks. Since meeting these standards is objectively undoable in the near-term, final status talks should occur *contemporaneously* with fulfilling the only Standard

⁴ For an EU-centric argument favoring the following four steps, see *The Balkans in Europe’s Future*, pp. 20-24.

that now matters – i.e., ensuring Kosovo Serbs are treated fairly and properly. However, to meet that standard alone, Pristina will have to reverse its current thinking about its responsibilities towards Kosovo Serbs.

- Begin resolving the following issues, perhaps by assigning them to formally sanctioned preparatory committees.
 - *War criminals* must be turned over to the International Tribunal for [the] Former Yugoslavia. Various “sticks” could be used to facilitate the process, including 1) withholding World Bank or IMF funds, 2) threatening KFOR’s withdrawal from Kosovo, 3) holding back Partnership for Peace or EU assistance and/or membership opportunities, 4) scaling back existing stabilization programs, and more.
 - *State, private, and church property*: Identify who owns what and whether they have the right to sell it or not. For example, only a fraction of 400 state and worker-owned enterprises have been privatized in Kosovo thus far. (A major added problem with expediting this particular process is that the appropriate archives are in Belgrade and not readily accessible.)
 - *Financial compensation*: Determine everyone’s obligations and requirements in this area.
 - *Border disputes*: Begin resolving those disputes that remain (between Kosovo and FYROM, for example).
- Pressure (or merely encourage) Kosovo’s neighbors to provide mutual concessions and security guarantees to each other prior to the start of negotiations. These confidence-building measures could include a pledge from Albania not to unify with Kosovo in the future, or from Serbia never to send its military forces back into the area. Such pledges would not only provide political “breathing space” for the negotiators, they would also help *shape* domestic expectations rather than merely *react* to them.
- Determine when final status talks should actually begin. Should they begin, for example, *after* Montenegro resolves its own uncertain relationship with Serbia, either through direct negotiations (the preferred option) or a referendum?
- Make sure that Pristina’s representatives are not drawn from its Provisional Institutions for Self-Government (PISG). (Being dual-hatted in this case would only complicate negotiations.) They should actually come from the more representative Kosovo Assembly.
- Determine who should be the head negotiator. The current Senior Representative for the UN Secretary General? A US envoy supported by his or her EU counterpart?
- Determine the actual form of negotiations. Should it be a mix of new and old negotiating principles, for example? Should it include “three pillars” – Kosovo’s

final status, Serbia’s prospects for EU membership, and Kosovo’s long-term relationship with the European community, including the EU?

- Determine who should actually sit at the negotiating table.
 - Should things remain simple – i.e., should only the US, the EU, Belgrade, and Pristina sit at the table? (In this case, the US and EU could act as surrogates for the UN Security Council, which would be the ultimate authority on Kosovo’s final status.)
 - What about the influential six-nation Contact Group? What should be its formal place in the negotiating process? What consultation mechanisms should members of the Group establish with the US and EU?
 - What roles should Albania and FYROM play in the negotiating process?
 - Finally, what about the Kosovo Serbs themselves? Should they be at the negotiating table part of the time, or should they just be intimately and quickly informed about developments as they occur?

3. KFOR’s Role In Kosovo – Broad Philosophic Factors and Immediate Needs

After describing Belgrade and Pristina’s current attitudes towards Kosovo, highlighting which final status options remain possible there, and identifying contextual improvements that will improve the odds of successful negotiations, this *Research Paper* closes by looking at NATO KFOR’s future role in Kosovo, both from a philosophical and practical perspective.

The NATO Alliance clearly remains in the *idealist* camp when it comes to Kosovo – i.e., it continues to sustain a theology about its mission that embodies the following principles.

- Prioritizing UNMIK Standards and accelerating everyone’s compliance with them is both necessary and appropriate. (Some of the prioritized standards include providing needed security; establishing and maintaining rule of law; protecting minorities and their freedom of movement; providing for the return of displaced persons; and political decentralization.)
- Complying with Standards is a prerequisite for creating a unified and multi-ethnic Kosovo, which remains a preferred end in itself. (To support this belief, KFOR must promote ethnic cooperation and help overcome inter-ethnic conflict.)
- The Standards must function as a dynamic, achievable roadmap. Under no circumstances should they become a bureaucratic obstacle course.
- International institutions must continue transferring the services and competencies they provide to local institutions, which must then combat the lingering primacy of “mahalla politics” – i.e., putting an emphasis on local/neighborhood issues before all others.
- Political decentralization must continue within Kosovo (to protect and preserve minority rights).

- And finally, KFOR must continue suppressing the “bad guys” – i.e., anyone who opposes the ongoing peace process.

These principles certainly provide a foil to the Greater Albania concept, but they also box KFOR into a corner, not only in terms of its idealist program for Kosovo, but also in terms of its future options. This is unfortunate, particularly since KFOR needs to modulate and evolve its role in Kosovo - i.e., it needs to adjust its presence to new political realities, which include the following.

- The UN will gradually reduce its presence and tasks there.
- Local institutions directed from Pristina will fill the void and assume greater control of Kosovo.
- Regional organizations like NATO and the EU will continue to perform residual responsibilities, with the EU *eventually* in the lead role. (Just when the EU will step into that role is an open question though, particularly since Albania and Serbia believe that it has already failed to accomplish its “classic” tasks within Kosovo.)

Given the above theology and the shifting involvement of external institutions, it is important to conclude this paper by describing KFOR’s immediate needs in Kosovo.

In the near-term, KFOR should continue providing general stability in Kosovo, and thereby help restore the local population’s confidence in its own security.

In several respects, NATO KFOR is more capable of providing stability and security today than it was prior to March 2004. It has evolved, for example, an overarching regional approach to the Balkans, which it now sees as a joint and single operating area. As a result, KFOR provides *area security* today with universally assignable brigades. These over-the-horizon reserve forces are agile and flexible. They support forward operating units that have “small footprints,” and yet provide a visible security presence in an area. However, if violence were to recur in Kosovo, both types of forces would react systematically rather than improvisationally. (Since the violence in March 2004, KFOR planners have developed clear contingency plans for at least 10 pre-designated high-risk areas.)

The above is the “good news” story – KFOR has capable forces, they are specifically designed to promote local solutions to local problems, but they are also responsive and potent enough to step in and act where necessary. The “bad news” story is that there may not be enough of them to defend ethnic minority communities from future attack. The pre-designated high-risk area contingency planning system developed

in 2004 is admittedly a triage system. KFOR will most likely not be able to provide “comprehensive” security if general violence breaks out in the future. Therefore, it additionally needs to accomplish the following.

- Conduct a holistic Internal Security Sector Review by outside experts on Kosovo’s future security and stability challenges.
- Develop a unified strategy with the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe that provides for comprehensive political and economic capacity building in the area. (Since this type of inter-organizational planning is the wave of the future, Kosovo represents an opportunity to develop next-step working methods and arrangements between the Alliance and other organizations.)
- Develop needed contingency plans focused at the *regional* level.
- Deploy sufficient forces to support these plans when necessary, which means a Combined Joint Statement of Requirements that does not emphasize *minimum* force generation requirements.
- Improve intelligence collection and sharing, both within KFOR and with civilian agencies.
- Finally, pursue a five-phased program for KFOR involvement over the mid-term – i.e., 1) meet immediate/daily requirements; 2) manage the interim period leading up to future status negotiations (by promoting closer coordination and cooperation between UNMIK police forces, the Kosovo Police Service and KFOR at all levels; by expanding the power and influence of the Kosovo Security Advisory Group; by training and equipping a *multi-ethnic* Kosovo Police Service that is genuinely capable of performing civil disturbance operations, etc.); 3) prepare for and support on-going future status negotiations; 4) oversee, monitor, and assist in the implementation of a final status agreement; and 5) transform KFOR into a force best described as “Political NATO.” (In practical terms, this means trading actual weapons for political ones. It might also mean using the PfP Program to promote a wide variety of security sector reforms, or using the EAPC to promote border security as a way to enhance regional security.)

Conclusion

Kosovo’s security remains a moving target, but the political “art of the possible” is currently in the air. By understanding 1) the latest political views from Belgrade and Pristina, 2) which final status options are currently viable or not, 3) what contextual changes are needed for effective negotiations, and 4) how KFOR’s mission may improve and evolve in the future, the possibility of resolving one of Europe’s remaining “frozen conflicts” is higher today than it has been in recent memory.

NDC ACADEMIC RESEARCH BRANCH ACTIVITIES

Internal activities

Visiting Fellows

Dr. Leila ALIEVA, (Azerbaijan), Director, Centre for National and International Studies, Baku.

Research Topic: *"The Nature of Post-Soviet Integration of the Caucasus and its Implications for Security"*.

Col. Ahmad Majed AL AITAN (Jordan), Faculty Member, National Defense College, Amman.

Research Topic: *"Revisiting US Greater Middle East Initiative from a Regional Perspective"*.

Internship

Ms Christina THWAITES, February-May 2005.

Research Talks

With Egyptian Security Experts (independent analysts and members of government-sponsored organizations), ARB/NDC, 16 May 2005.

Lectures at NDC

David YOST, *NATO Ballistic Defense Issues / NATO Nuclear Deterrence*, Delegation of Norwegian Policy Makers, NDC, 27 April 2005.

External activities

André BANDEIRA

Attendance to the Mediterranean Special Group Conference, NATO's Parliamentary Assembly, 5-7 May 2005, Dead Sea, Jordan.

Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP

Le nouveau rôle de l'OTAN dans l'espace euro-méditerranéen, Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée, 27 April 2005, Rabat, Morocco.

L'OTAN du XXIème siècle, entre hésitations et transformations, Faculté de Sciences Politiques, 28 April 2005, Salé, Morocco.

Jean DUFOURCQ

Security and Defense Burden Sharing between NATO and the EU, NATO Studies Center, 26 April 2005, Bucharest, Romania.

OTAN et UE. Comment aborder le 21ème siècle?, 161ème IHEDN R, 29 April 2005, Arras, France.

La Méditerranée et le bon voisinage stratégique, Associazione dei geografi italiani, 24 May 2005, Formia, Italy.

Carlo MASALA

NATO and Military Intervention. In and Out or In and Stay?, German Council on Foreign Affairs Conference on

50 years of German Membership in NATO, 10-11 May 2005, Berlin, Germany.

ESDP and German-Franco Relations, 5th Annual Meeting of the German-Franco Dialogue, 18-20 May 2005, Saarbruecken, Germany.

Misreading Structural Realism – In Defense of Kenneth Waltz, Postgraduate Programme in International Relations University of Trier, 23 May 2005, Trier, Germany.

Carl Schmitt and International Politics, PhD Programme in International Relations, University of Bonn, 24 May 2005, Bonn, Germany.

Lionel PONSARD

NATO-Russia Relations / NATO-Ukraine Relations / NATO and the South Caucasus, NATO Studies Center, 4-5 May 2005, Bucharest, Romania.

Russia and Instability in the South Caucasus, Conference on "South Caucasus Security: Challenges and Opportunities", 20 May 2005, Baku, Azerbaijan.

External Publications

Carlo MASALA

Kenneth N. Waltz, Einführung in seine Theorie und Auseinandersetzung mit seinen Kritiken, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, Germany.

André BANDEIRA

The Twofold Spiral of Pre-emption, Nação e Defesa, January 2005, n.109, pp.9/39, published by the *Instituto de Defesa Nacional*, Portugal.

Para uma Etologia do Terrorismo, Revista Militar, n.31, April 2005, pp.269/291 published by the Ministério da Defesa Nacional, Portugal.

NDC Publication

Next Issues

RP 20, June 2005: *NATO and the Middle East Peace Process: Scenarios of Possibilities and Risks*, by Heba NEGM.

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NDC OP 7: *Long-Term Possibilities for NATO-Russia Naval Security Cooperation*, by Col. Igor TARASENKO (NATO-Russia Fellowship Programme).