



**Beyond Boundaries
in South Asia:
Bridging the Security/
Development Divide
With International
Security Assistance**

By Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas,
and Esha Mufti



The
Stanley
Foundation

STIMSON

Beyond Boundaries in South Asia: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance

The Stimson Center
and the Stanley Foundation

By Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, and Esha Mufti

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	3
Executive Summary	4
Development and Security Flashpoints in South Asia	6
Money Laundering	6
Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation	8
Drug Trafficking	10
UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540: Proven Platforms for Bridging the Security/Development Divide	12
Development and Regional Security Capacity Building in South Asia with Dual-Benefit Assistance	18
Prospects for South Asian Regional Burden and Capacity Sharing	19
Conclusion	22
Endnotes	23
About the Project	30
About the Authors	30
The Stanley Foundation	31
The Stimson Center	31

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the Government of Finland, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Stanley Foundation for their keystone support of the broader initiative from which this report emerges. We are especially indebted to Markku Virri at the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Carl Robichaud and Patricia Moore-Nicholas at Carnegie, and to Keith Porter and Veronica Tessler from Stanley for their unwavering confidence in this initiative. We would also like to thank Heidi Hall, David Slungaard, Hunter Murray, and Emily Hill, interns with the Managing Across Boundaries program, for research and editorial assistance. The content of this report was significantly informed by the first-hand experiences of Umar Riaz, who served as a visiting fellow with the Managing Across Boundaries program in the summer of 2011. Umar is a law enforcement officer who currently serves as Head of Investigations in Peshawar, Pakistan.

In 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki offered a seed grant to the Stimson Center's Managing Across Boundaries program to bring together national governments, regional and sub-regional organizations, and nongovernmental experts in an innovative effort, "The Beyond Boundaries Initiative." Our initial goal was to more effectively and sustainably promote implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which mandates a sweeping array of supply-side efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. We believe that by breaking down the artificial barriers between the security and development communities, whose goals are often similar but whose methods rarely intersect, a more sustainable and ultimately less costly approach to proliferation prevention would result. Over time, that initiative grew into a successful multifaceted outreach effort, stretching from the Caribbean Basin and Central America to East Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Almost six years later, the informal consortium of interests born from that effort has helped to initiate a pragmatic series of regional initiatives that promise to advance the cause of sustainable non-proliferation and counterterrorism in corners of the globe that are increasingly viewed as potential links in the proliferation supply chain. In so doing, we believe that we and our partners have helped breathe new life into not only global nonproliferation efforts but also an array of citizen security and economic development objectives in key strategic regions around the world.

Additional information on The Beyond Boundaries Initiative can be found at: www.stimson.org/research-pages/bridging-the-divide-between-security-and-development-3/. A comprehensive source for information on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 can be found at <http://1540.collaborationtools.org/about>.

Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, Esha Mufti

Executive Summary

Although even the most cursory survey of the human condition today reveals wild geographic disparities in virtually every economic, social, and political measure, at no other point in history have people worldwide lived longer, had greater access to health services, or had more opportunities to acquire a basic education. These unprecedented improvements in the quality of life have driven down global poverty rates in the last half-century.

Yet despite this remarkable improvement in the human condition, not everyone has benefitted equally. South Asia's predicament reveals an especially complex story. Despite a long period of economic growth, the region is home to the world's largest concentration of poor people—more than 500 million continue to live on less than USD 1.25 a day.¹ Moreover, across much of South Asia, economic growth has not been accompanied by corresponding gains in human development. More than 250 million children in the region remain undernourished, of whom more than 30 million are unable to attend school, and more than one-third of South Asian women are anemic largely due to a lack of dietary iron.² Underdevelopment and “soft security” challenges, including money laundering, small arms and light weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking, together conspire to undermine the significant strides South Asian states have made in the last two decades. These trends clearly demonstrate that additional work is required to promote increased security and more inclusive growth patterns across the region.

While these are the security and development issues that dominate domestic and regional dialogue, among Western audiences “hard” security concerns, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons (especially to nonstate actors) and terrorism, absorb much of the discourse on South Asia. It was against this backdrop that the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). Promoted as part of a broader tapestry of formal and informal mechanisms to prevent terrorism and proliferation globally, the resolutions were seemingly ill-connected to the more pressing challenges facing much of the world.

Asking developing nations and emerging economies to divert attention and resources from more immediate national and regional challenges to the seemingly distant threat of WMD terrorism or terrorist attacks on Western targets is not only unreasonable but also unlikely to succeed—if not for a lack of political will, then from a sheer lack of implementation capacity. In the end, however, without the sustained buy-in of countries viewed as prominent potential links in the global proliferation supply chain—either as emerging dual-use technology innovators and manufacturers, as critical transshipment points and financial centers, or as breeding grounds for terrorist sympathies—it is infeasible to exercise sufficient preventative controls over the movement of sensitive nuclear, chemical, and biological materials and/or technologies, or the malicious activities of terrorist entities.

To that end, the growing interconnectedness and interdependence between the traditionally-siloed threat portfolios suggest that effectively addressing regional security and underdevelopment challenges is key to preventing them from metastasizing into international security challenges—especially in a nuclear-armed region that remains home to Al Qaeda's central command. The reality is that the capacity needed to prevent WMD proliferation and undermine the conditions conducive to

The author prepared this report as part of a larger project on regional implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The report has been informed by meeting discussions and contains the author's views and recommendations, and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation.

terrorism is intimately connected to the capacity needed to fulfill economic, development, and human security objectives of national governments throughout the region. Thus, there exists a strong link between implementing Resolutions 1373 and 1540 and overcoming higher priority challenges of South Asian states. This realization offers a unique opportunity to capitalize upon “dual-benefit” assistance that leverages long-term international security and human security and sustainable regional development. As such, our first objective must be to better understand the priority concerns of partners across the Global South.

The effectiveness of this approach has been proven around the globe, most notably in the Caribbean and Central America. For donors and partners alike, the growing confluence of security and development challenges at a time of strained financial resources means that neither can be sustainably treated—or resolved—in isolation. For this reason, bridging the security/development divide in order to foster collaboration and develop common strategies, ameliorate proliferation concerns, reinforce counterterrorism efforts, and provide an agenda of opportunity for all countries involved will be central to not only defending international security in the long term but also to facilitating sustainable economic growth and development. It is this development and security model that this report seeks to communicate.

Project Report

Development and Security Flashpoints in South Asia

Money Laundering

The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body that develops and promotes national and international policies to combat money laundering, financing of terrorism, and proliferation of terrorism, has placed three South Asian countries—Iran, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—on its blacklist of nations that fail to meet international standards with regard to the task force’s recommendations.³ Indeed, widespread money laundering activities permeate both the public and private sectors of South Asia. Countries from barely developing Afghanistan to economically booming India suffer from the deleterious effects of such activities. India alone lost over USD 125 billion in illicit outflows between 2000 and 2008, and total estimated capital flight accounted for approximately 16.6 percent of India’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008.⁴

To the east, the challenge is even more formidable. According to Afghan customs records, nearly USD 3.18 billion has been taken out of the country since 2007. Customs officials believe this declared sum to be only a fraction of the money actually moving out of Afghanistan.⁵ Considering that the declared total is almost 20 percent of GDP in a country where the major sources of money are international aid projects and drug money, it is highly likely that a significant portion of the money leaving the country stems from these sources, and thus, is illicit.⁶ Afghanistan cannot hope to develop any sort of independent capacity to strengthen and develop a formal economy or to fulfill basic security needs, national and transnational, with such gross unaccountability and outflow of cash. On a regional scale, moreover, with such marked losses of capital, it is impossible for any South Asian country to fully reach its economic and development potential.

The historical *hawala* system plays an essential role in the proliferation of money laundering activities. *Hawala* is an informal value transfer system that operates outside the banking and finance sector, avoiding taxes, customs duties, and currency controls. It is most widely used in Afghanistan, where only five percent, at most, of the population uses licensed banks. Rather, an estimated 80 to 90 percent of all money transfers are made through *hawala*. These include foreign fund transfers to and from the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Pakistan.⁷ Traditionally, South Asian expatriate communities have used the system to transfer remittances home; however, the use of formal channels by emigrants has increased exponentially in the last decade.⁸

As such, governments face an array of complex challenges, including capacity shortfalls, the widespread use of informal economies, porous borders, pervasive corruption, and a lack of regional cooperation, in effectively addressing the threat, making the region a particularly fertile environment for money laundering activities. The money laundering industry not only inherently weakens economic development by undermining the financial sector and foreign investment but also threatens security. Nefarious groups take advantage of the challenges facing regional governments to finance illicit activities, including drug and human trafficking, small arms proliferation, transnational organized crime, and terrorism, all of which are major sources and beneficiaries of laundered funds in South Asia.⁹

For instance, criminal and terrorist organizations rely on *hawala* as a means of transferring illicit funds to finance their activities. *Hawala* transactions offer these entities “an extensive but unmonitored (international) network” through which to move critical resources.¹⁰ In addition to using *hawala*, they often prop up charities as fronts, as well as using trade-based money laundering and

physically smuggling cash across borders in order to acquire and circulate funds.¹¹ For instance, Indian authorities have linked Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a charity front for Pakistani-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, to the 2008 Mumbai attack. JuD would seek donations for charitable causes such as building schools at inflated costs and then launder the excess money to fund terrorist activities.¹² While Pakistani authorities did initiate a crackdown on JuD after the UN Security Council placed sanctions against the organization in December 2008, their efforts were seriously hampered by difficulties in tracking and seizing JuD funds. Without adequate legal authority or enforcement capacity, pervasive corruption and lax financial controls create a reinforced loop, making reigning in transnational money laundering across the region a particularly nettlesome challenge. Border insecurity presents an additional obstacle. As noted above, launderers often physically carry cash across national boundaries.¹³ Afghanistan's borders are especially notorious for being fluid and insecure with millions, perhaps billions, of undeclared dollars being smuggled into Iran and Pakistan, where Afghan *hawalas* have branches.¹⁴

Most states, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, have passed anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) laws, and are members of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Nonetheless, measures to counter money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as investigations into both, have been hampered by a lack of capacity and political commitment, which can be directly attributable to the corruption that pervades local and national governments. The low rates of money laundering convictions and terrorism-related suspicious transaction reports throughout the region are difficult to reconcile with the high threat profiles of the countries.¹⁵ Recently however, countries have shown increased initiative on the issue, including acknowledging the need for enhanced regional and global cooperation and seeking increased mutual legal assistance.¹⁶ Specific recommendations among regional stakeholders to improve financial, legal, and technical mechanisms to address money laundering include:

- Co-option of *hawaldars* into formal banking and financial sectors—a strategy that may have helped Pakistan improve the use of formal channels in remittance transfers in the 2000s.¹⁷
- Promotion of advanced anti-money laundering training for police, judges, and prosecutors.¹⁸
- Creation of formal legal mechanisms for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and information sharing across the region.¹⁹
- Improved awareness among key constituencies, including prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement of national and regional anti-money laundering objectives and strategies.²⁰
- Improved interdepartmental cooperation at the national level and sufficient coordination at the regional and international levels.²¹
- Improved communications infrastructures.²²
- Improved personnel and technical capacity at border points, such as more and better-trained and equipped guards as well as surveillance systems and scanners.²³
- Inducements against corruption and lack of political will in government, as well as demotivated staff, to implement current legal and enforcement AML and CFT structures.²⁴

Small Arms and Light Weapons Trafficking and Proliferation

India's statement at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Aspects read in part:

The problem that illicit small arms and light weapons constitute is well known. During the past decade, these weapons have been the weapons of choice in 46 out of 49 major conflicts, most of which have been armed insurgencies and intra-state conflicts, claiming on average 300,000 deaths... In India we are particularly aware of their lethality: in the past twenty years about 35,000 innocent persons have been killed by terrorists, all using illicit small arms and explosives...²⁵

In addition to playing a major role in terrorism and insurgency-related deaths across South Asia, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are also used in killings related to organized crime and drug trafficking, communal tensions, gender-based aggression, and the like. In 2009, there were 32,369 homicide victims in India alone, where 90 percent of gun-related killings are carried out using unlicensed guns.²⁶ Having an extensive number of small arms at large indicates a lack of government capacity and a heightened sense of insecurity that is anathema to sustainable development.²⁷ Indeed, out of the 63 million SALW in circulation among nonstate actors in South Asia, the majority is illegal.²⁸

According to the Small Arms Survey, the number of illegal small arms pouring into South Asia escalated in the latter half of the 20th century. Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand—each with a surplus of SALW provided by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War—are major sources of illicit weapons for South Asian nonstate actors operating especially in Northeast India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh is also a major transit point to India and elsewhere in the region.²⁹ Likewise, the widespread proliferation of small arms in Afghanistan and Pakistan began with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and was compounded by the United States' subsequent decision to funnel weapons to the Afghan mujahideen through Pakistan.³⁰ Even during, but especially since, the end of the Cold War, criminal and/or terrorist actors have taken advantage of inadequate border controls and easy accessibility to trafficking middlemen to quickly and efficiently move these wares. For instance, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 30 percent of the weapons shipped in by the United States were diverted out of Afghanistan for use in other conflict zones, including Indian-administered Kashmir.³¹ The region has thereby become awash in surplus weaponry, feeding both increasingly violent conflict and a growing appetite for even more advanced weapons.

Illicit arms trading operations in South Asia are not restricted to these post-Cold War stockpiles. India supplied the separatist militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka with weapons from 1983 through 1987.³² Iran has smuggled small arms, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, plastic explosives, ammunition, and more to the Taliban since at least 2006.³³ Moreover, one of the largest seized arms shipments to date, worth an estimated USD 4.5 to 7 million, included weapons of US and Israeli origin. Bangladeshi arms dealer Hafizur Rahman testified that the cargo was being imported from Hong Kong to India through Bangladesh by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a major separatist group in India's northeast. He claimed that the ULFA had not shipped the weapons for its use alone. Indeed, over the last decade, ULFA has emerged not only as an importer of illegal arms, but also as a major facilitator in the trade. According to senior Bangladeshi officials, the group buys an excess of arms, and then uses a network of Bangladeshi arms dealers to sell them to buyers in India and Nepal.³⁴

Border disputes, lack of effective border management systems, poorly trained and under-resourced personnel, and lack of regional cooperation on the issue all pose problems for combating the SALW trafficking in South Asia.³⁵ The ready availability, lax controls, and common use of SALW have significantly increased the rate and intensity of violence in the region.³⁶ A significant portion of victims of armed violence worldwide occurs in South Asia, and most of the dead are either accidental victims caught in crossfire or targeted civilians.³⁷ However, SALW do not only kill and injure in the present. The widespread presence and trafficking of these weapons in South Asia threatens all facets of long-term security while increasingly undermining sustainable economic development. Prolonged conflicts and mass proliferation of SALW have rendered the rule of law inconsequential in parts of the region, crippling civil and political rights as well as contributing to a rise in transnational crime, including drug trafficking.³⁸ Karachi, for example, Pakistan's biggest city, houses an estimated two million small arms and is effectively under siege because of rampant ethnic, sectarian, and religious violence and political disputes.³⁹ The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports that 1,100 people were killed in the city alone in the first half of 2011.⁴⁰ In addition to sabotaging human security, the proliferation of violence has greatly affected Pakistan's economy, driving foreign investment down almost 80 percent in the first two months of the 2011/2012 fiscal year as compared to the same time last fiscal year.⁴¹

Despite these grave implications of SALW trafficking, there has been no significant regional or sub-regional response to SALW proliferation in South Asia, as representatives at the last UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) Review Conference in 2006 observed. In the PoA, instituted in 2001, the United Nations outlines steps that nations should take to prevent illicit trade of small arms. To that end, any successful regional approach would require increased political will and an improvement in intraregional trust, information exchange, and cooperation.⁴² The history of government to external non-state actor transfers of small arms in the region, however, undermines any such effort.⁴³ The transborder nature of the spread of small arms, of course, means that the lack of regional and subregional cooperation on the issue has only compounded the problem.⁴⁴

National responses to SALW proliferation have, likewise, been underwhelming. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have submitted at least one report each on PoA implementation to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Countries also have relevant laws in place.⁴⁵ Sri Lanka has even established a National Commission to oversee anti-SALW proliferation efforts in the country.⁴⁶ However, governments have largely failed to enforce these laws on the ground due to corruption, lack of political will, and lack of capacity.⁴⁷ For instance, in early August 2011, the Pakistani government announced that Karachi would be "deweaponized" in phases and, later in the month, offered amnesty for those who voluntarily turned over illicit weapons. The government has initiated similar campaigns since the mid-1980s, most notably after adopting the PoA in 2001.⁴⁸ Sporadic implementation of the programs, however, has led to their eventual failure. A crucial strategic problem with regard to national responses has been limited collaboration between national and state governments, among ministries, and between government and nongovernment actors.⁴⁹ Moreover, politicians and their supporters are more likely than ever to possess illicit small arms in order to stay in power, intimidate adversaries and voters, and/or protect themselves, significantly contributing to the lack of political will to act.⁵⁰

Thus, in order to curtail the growing threat of SALW, regional governments need to recognize these challenges and develop a comprehensive and effective response. Specifically, the following key technical and capacity needs must be met:

- Improved personnel and technical capacity at border points, such as more and better-trained and equipped guards, improved arms-detection gear and techniques, as well as surveillance systems and scanners.⁵¹
- Strengthened judicial and law enforcement systems, which at present are either not enforced or filled with loopholes and, thus, do not sufficiently deter illegal possession and trade of SALW.⁵²
- Engagement of NGOs working on economic, social, and political issues who can play an important role in arms management and disarmament.⁵³
- Enhanced policing and patrolling at key border hot spots.⁵⁴
- Improved export and transshipment laws and controls to limit the influx of small arms in and to the region.⁵⁵
- Arms-stockpile management, protection, and destruction through training and improved technical capacity, as well as coordinated cross-border disarmament activities.⁵⁶
- Systems, hardware, and software to facilitate the marking, tracking, and monitoring of small arms with a view to improving prospects for detections and enforcing national laws.⁵⁷
- Establishment of national coordination agencies on small arms to help bring together relevant stakeholders, including government ministries, civil society, and the private sector.⁵⁸
- Regional harmonization of legal and enforcement systems, as well as improved systems for and frequency of information exchange and joint strategies to combat the illicit trafficking in SALW.⁵⁹
- Research into and public education about the perils of SALW.⁶⁰
- Anticorruption mechanisms and training for demotivated staff to implement current legal and enforcement structures for small arms.⁶¹

Drug Trafficking

South Asia is home to one of the world's largest zones of illicit opium production and trafficking, the Golden Crescent—which spans Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran—and borders another, Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle. Around the world, approximately 16.5 million people use opiates annually, generating yearly revenue of USD 68 billion.⁶² Afghanistan alone produces almost 90 percent of the world's illicit opium, with most of the cultivation concentrated in provinces in the south, including Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul, which remain among the most insecure in the country.⁶³ Although ordinary farmers actually produce much of this opium supply, they earned only 0.6 percent, or USD 440 million, of the total worth of the global opiate market in 2010.⁶⁴ Indeed, it is international criminal networks that generate record profits from the trade.⁶⁵

For instance, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the Afghan Taliban make around USD 155 million by taxing opium cultivation, and Afghan drug traffickers make USD 2.2 billion annually. Drug traffickers routinely provide payments or even material support to insurgents in exchange for protection.⁶⁶ Moreover, many Taliban commanders earn significantly more than the general 10 percent tax they charge because of direct involvement in opiate wholesale.⁶⁷ Neighboring Pakistan's opiate market is worth approximately USD 1.2 billion, and Pakistani drug

traffickers make USD 650 million annually. Extremist groups in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and criminal organizations in the province of Baluchistan are major beneficiaries of this trade.⁶⁸ Beyond Afghanistan's immediate border regions, a significant portion of South Asia's heroin is trafficked through areas in which Maoist separatists are active in India.⁶⁹ Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland together smuggle at least 20 kilos of heroin every day, some of which is for local consumption but the bulk of which is smuggled to other destinations.⁷⁰ In sum, India's opiate market is worth an estimated USD 1.4 billion.⁷¹ As such, South Asia's burgeoning drug trade is intimately connected with organized crime, fostering corruption, instability, insecurity, and stunted economic development.

For instance, drug trafficking is closely intertwined with both small arms trafficking and money laundering. Drugs go out one way and are sold for money that is used to buy small arms that go in the other way.⁷² Criminals who smuggle drugs often use the same infrastructure to smuggle humans, small arms, and other high-value items. To this end, Pakistani officials have expressed concerns that as much as one-third of the country's total *hawala* trade may be related to drug trafficking. Moreover, there is also a growing interconnection between drug traffickers and terrorist organizations. In part because of the success of government efforts to choke off terrorist financing, these groups are financing their operations through an array of criminal activities, including drug trafficking. For instance, the terrorists behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings actually acquired the explosives by trading hashish to a former miner. Spanish police eventually recovered 125,800 Ecstasy tablets and almost USD 2 million in drugs and cash when they raided the attackers' homes and seized their assets. European authorities have also linked drug money to the 2003 Casablanca attacks in Morocco that left 45 dead, and to the attempted bombings of the US and British ships off Gibraltar in 2002.⁷³

Moreover, South Asia's position as a major drug production and transit region has fueled addiction, causing deteriorating social conditions. The UNODC believes there are about 350,000 opiate users in Afghanistan, 727,500 in Pakistan, and up to 2 million in India.⁷⁴ In Iran, opiate dependency is a particularly serious problem with 1.2 million people, or 2.4 percent of the adult population, affected by the addiction. Iranians have smoked opium casually or medicinally for centuries; however, in the past several years, Iranian use of high-potency heroin has risen sharply, especially among young adults who inject the drug. Drug use, in addition to its inherent mal-effects, can also drive the spread of HIV/AIDS when injecting users share needles. Almost 23 percent of injecting drug users are HIV positive.⁷⁵ In Iran, around 70 percent of the 21,000 HIV positive cases in 2010 were injecting drug users.⁷⁶ These statistics create a significant strain on already lacking health infrastructures across the region.

It is highly unlikely that any regional and/or international efforts will be able to stabilize South Asia unless the initiative directly addresses the region's prolific drug trade. In addition to the insecurity that drug trafficking foments, trafficking networks create an enclave economy outside the formal sector. The growth of an illicit economy is decidedly detrimental to the formal economies of South Asian countries, particularly in a country like Afghanistan, where traffickers make nearly 20 percent of the country's total GDP per year.

Border insecurity, again, is a major contributing factor to the burgeoning cross-border drug traffic in South Asia. The vast preponderance of Afghani opium is trafficked directly through porous borders to Pakistan, Iran, and neighboring Central Asian countries. In 2009, traffickers smuggled 160 tons of heroin into Pakistan, 115 tons into Iran, and 90 tons into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.⁷⁷ The border between the FATA region and Baluchistan Province and Afghanistan especially is notori-

ously lawless and ideal for drug trafficking. There are numerous crossing points that are not mapped and thus, are unpatrolled. Even at the three official border crossings, traffic is too heavy for the inadequately trained and underequipped border security forces to inspect every vehicle.⁷⁸ In turn, these neighboring countries are major transit points for a significant proportion of the trafficked heroin to reach the rest of the world.⁷⁹

National governments in South Asia are well aware of the detrimental economic impact of growing drug trafficking and use. Consequently, they are trying to implement measures to reduce drug supply and demand, including increased regional and international cooperation against illicit narcotics smuggling. Almost all regional governments are party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and other UN conventions related to drug trafficking, including the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as well as to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation's (SAARC) Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Additionally, South Asian countries have adopted various domestic laws and policies to combat the spread of illicit drugs, ranging from India's Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, to Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Law, to Pakistan's National Anti Narcotics Policy 2010 and Drug Control Master 2010-14. Iran in particular has invested upwards of USD 1 billion to deter drug smugglers. Moreover, after the post-2001 spike in cross-border opiate trafficking, Iran along with Afghanistan and Pakistan participated in the UNODC-sponsored "Triangular Initiative" in 2007 to increase cooperation among the three governments in order to curtail illicit drug smuggling across their borders.⁸⁰

Nonetheless, South Asia continues to face the following significant capacity shortfalls in fighting this growing problem, and these shortfalls must be addressed to launch an effective counter-drug strategy:

- Lack of personnel and technical capacity at border points, seaports, and airports, requiring more and better-trained and equipped guards, improved narcotics-detection gear and techniques, as well as surveillance systems and scanners.⁸¹
- Lack of effective methods for collecting and sharing information on organized crime groups and drug traffickers.⁸²
- Lack of interdepartmental cooperation at the national level, and insufficient coordination at the regional and international levels with regard to border security, law enforcement cooperation, and intelligence sharing.⁸³
- Inadequate framework for mutual legal assistance and extradition.⁸⁴
- Insufficient support for ameliorating the conditions conducive to growth in drug production and trafficking, including lack of support for most core development priorities of regional governments and international donors, such as economic opportunities. For instance, farmers surveyed in the *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011* pointed to economic difficulties and high sale prices as the main reasons for cultivating opium, which then reaps record profits for traffickers and crime groups.⁸⁵

UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540: Proven Platforms for Bridging the Security/Development Divide

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed the global security landscape. Governments began allocating significant new resources toward denying safe havens and cutting off financial streams of assistance to malevolent nonstate actors. New initiatives designed to facilitate the sharing

of relevant information among governments were promoted, and new mandates requiring all governments to criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to justice have been promulgated. Today, an unprecedented degree of cooperation among governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition, and prosecution of those involved in acts of terrorism is being sought.

Likewise, a globalized flow of information and technology highlights the threat stemming from more countries creating, manufacturing, financing, transshipping, or being victimized by a weapon of mass destruction. In response, governments have levied significant new financial resources to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. For instance, since launching the G-8 Global Partnership in 2002, the partner governments (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have allocated approximately USD 20 billion toward targeted nonproliferation programs in the states of the former Soviet Union, a region historically considered the epicenter of the proliferation challenge.⁸⁶ Moreover, in 2004, the revelation that rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had been operating an illicit nuclear network supplying state and nonstate actors with WMD technologies underscored the geographic scale of the threat today. As such, when agreeing to extend the G-8 Global Partnership beyond 2012 at the Deauville Summit in May 2011, partner governments agreed on the need to expand the partnership's focus to include new regions in need of assistance in order to successfully address the evolving global proliferation and terrorism threats.⁸⁷

However, while these “hard security” challenges have taken priority in the Global North, the developing and emerging states of the Global South continue to prioritize “softer” security threats and development needs that are day-to-day challenges for them. In fact, many states in the Global South would prefer, indeed even welcome, capacity-building efforts that address important national needs, such as improved border control, policing, and judicial capabilities, instead of efforts that are explicitly linked to narrow Western-oriented counterterrorism or nonproliferation strategies.⁸⁸ This is especially evident when considering the disparity between global security and development spending. Annual military spending and foreign security assistance totals about USD 1.5 trillion, compared to the USD 127 billion allocated toward global development assistance.⁸⁹ The latter number represents a mere 9 percent of the former, despite the fact that over one-sixth of the world's population lives in poverty or that millions of children every year die of preventable ailments such as pneumonia, diarrhea, and malaria.⁹⁰

The inability to reconcile priorities between the Global North and South has yielded an increasing number of governments unwilling or unable to participate fully as active partners in global nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, despite a few promising innovations and pilot projects aimed at better integrating the “security” and “development” components of national policy, a survey of these “whole of government” approaches finds that governments across the Global North continue to struggle with policy integration, formulating a cohesive strategic vision, creating robust structures of coordination, and initiating new funding streams to ensure sustainability of effort.⁹¹

For instance, nonproliferation strategies designed to address the spread of weapons of mass destruction have traditionally focused on technology denial efforts—including export controls, strengthened and expanded safeguards, sanctions, and even regime change. Consequently, for many recipient partners, donor governments have given little thought to the need for a more comprehensive outreach that would co-opt regional security concerns and development needs. Instead, much of the well-intentioned nonproliferation assistance is viewed as an effort to stymie economic and technological development, rather than an effort to prevent the diversion of sensitive WMD tech-

nologies. This failure to integrate hard security supply-side programming with soft security demand-side incentives has thus far prevented the requisite buy-in from recipient partners that would ensure the sustainability of efforts.

Indeed, the perceived lack of enthusiasm in implementing hard security obligations connected to terrorism and WMD proliferation among governments of the Global South is not a rejection of the threat but rather a result of the delicate balancing of financial and human capacity priorities.

Using scarce resources to implement strategies solely focused on assuaging terrorist activity in the West and WMD proliferation—in many instances seen as distant threats by partner governments—makes little sense for leaders in developing or emerging economies. However, considering the dual-benefit applicability of much of the existing nonproliferation and counterterrorism assistance, untapped opportunities for synergy exist to bridge the gap between the policy objectives of both developing and emerging economies and developed states. To this end, UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (counterterrorism) and 1540 (nonproliferation) offer opportunities to leverage international security assistance to benefit national development needs and security priorities, such as money laundering as well as the trafficking of SALW.

Resolution 1373, adopted unanimously in September 2001, calls on UN member states to deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support or commit acts of terrorism.⁹² Specifically, it mandates that all member states:

- Criminalize the financing of terrorism.
- Freeze without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism.
- Deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups.
- Suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance, or support for terrorists.
- Share information with other governments on any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts.
- Cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition, and prosecution of those involved in such acts.
- Criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to justice.

Resolution 1373 also highlights the link between international terrorist groups and transnational criminal syndicates involved in a myriad of illicit activities, including trafficking in drugs, SALW, and persons; money laundering; and the proliferation of WMD materials. Finally, it also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which monitors implementation of the resolution. Moreover, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which carries out the policy decisions of the committee, was established in 2004.⁹³ As such, five technical groups working horizontally across CTED are responsible for engaging countries on security and development issues including technical assistance, border control, arms trafficking, and law enforcement.⁹⁴

Likewise, in April 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540, which mandates that all member states implement a set of supply-side controls with regard to the nonproliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Specifically, UNSCR 1540 calls upon states to:

- Adopt and enforce laws that prohibit any nonstate actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.
- Develop and maintain measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage, or transport.
- Develop and maintain effective physical protection measures.
- Develop and maintain effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit trafficking.
- Establish, develop, review, and maintain appropriate and effective national export and transshipment controls over such items.⁹⁵

The resolution also established the 1540 Committee to monitor implementation of the resolution in addition to a group of experts to assist member states in raising awareness and executing decisions made by the committee. In addition, the expert group offers technical assistance to countries in need.

The 1373 and 1540 Committees recognize the inherent overlap in their work and cooperate in various ways, including meetings among experts, information exchange, and joint participation at formal UN workshops and regional and subregional meetings.⁹⁶ However, although significant progress has been made toward the implementation of both measures, neither resolution has even come close to achieving global compliance, as evidenced by the lack of submitted country reports on progress (mandated by both resolutions).⁹⁷ At the heart of this limited fulfillment lies an underlying Global North/South divide with regard to priority objectives. For instance, one survey commissioned to provide a comprehensive consideration of CTED's work found that,

[T]he positive contribution of the United Nations to global counterterrorism efforts is poorly appreciated outside New York and Vienna. Many people we interviewed told us that there remains a need for the United Nations to articulate to communities around the world a clearer vision of counterterrorism, differentiating its work from more militaristic, coercive approaches to counterterrorism. Absent such an articulation, we were told, the United Nations will continue to face resentment and litigation—or worse. In particular, we were told time and again, there is a need for a clear articulation of the United Nations' commitment to human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism—which unfortunately remains much doubted in some corners of the globe.⁹⁸


Similar criticisms have been leveled at the 1540 Committee in New York. For instance, the committee has had to face legitimacy concerns with regard to the resolution itself—during the negotiation process and after passage. States have expressed disapproval at the fact that the permanent five members of the Security Council were the primary negotiators of UNSCR 1540, ostensibly excluding the input of the vast majority of UN member states.⁹⁹

Regardless, common ground can be found beyond rhetorical commitments to the broad aims of both resolutions. Recognizing that many states will require technical and financial support in implementing 1373 and 1540, both resolutions include language for assistance mechanisms—states in need request assistance and states with the relevant capacity provide it. A detailed assessment of the

capacities necessary to implement both UNSCR 1373 and 1540, moreover, would suggest that much of the available assistance is inherently “dual-benefit.” That is, counterterrorism and non-proliferation assistance can provide a significant opportunity for poorer countries to tap into traditional security-related support to help them meet their higher priority internal development and human security objectives while simultaneously satisfying their international counterterrorism and nonproliferation obligations. The net result is a durable and sustainable partnership that better meets the needs of both partner and donor states. For instance:

- Preventing trafficking and illicit trade of SALW, drugs, and people relies upon many of the same resources and capacities necessary to detect and prevent nuclear proliferation and combat terrorist activities.
- Trade expansion and business development cannot occur unless borders and ports are safe, efficient, and secure, a key component to prevent the spread of WMD, as well as SALW.
- Denying terrorists safe havens requires an effective and functioning police capacity operating under the rule of law.

Figure 1 illustrates how security assistance proffered under Resolution 1373 and 1540 can help meet “softer” development and human security priorities that threaten the Global South:



Take, for example, the Caribbean Basin, which, in one year, has gone from being a 1540 black hole to a model for implementation of the resolution around the globe. The Caribbean, as a region, has seen a dramatic rise in state reporting and tangible evidence of pragmatic implementation of UNSCR 1540. This progress is not the result of the Security Council dictating legal mandates but rather is a reflection of the countries’ realizing, in a cooperative approach facilitated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) UNSCR 1540 Regional Coordinator, that implementing 1540 can also be beneficial in achieving national priority objectives, as it can bring in new streams of assistance to address endemic security challenges related to the flow of drugs and small arms as well

as to promote national plans for economic diversification through port security and other enhancements to trade.¹⁰⁰

Dual-Benefit Assistance in the Caribbean Basin: A Model for Success

In the 1990s, governments of the Caribbean recognized the need to diversify their tourism-based economies. Considering their strategic location at the mouth of the Panama Canal and at the “third border” of the world’s largest market, the United States, governments around the region began making significant investments in their port and related transportation infrastructures. The initiatives aimed to capitalize on global trade flows as a central component of economic development.

However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, these plans were immediately jeopardized when the international community raised the mandatory security standards for cargo traffic. As a result, Caribbean governments, whose ability to invest in yet further infrastructure enhancements was exhausted, saw their economic development strategies eviscerated by a changing international security environment.

Assistance available under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, however, has provided these governments with new access to financial and technical resources that comply with UNSCR 1540 while also salvaging their economic development plans. As such, new streams of nonproliferation funding promise to provide much-needed infrastructure support in an era of fiscal restraint, thus allowing Caribbean states to remain internationally competitive.

A similar model has been implemented in Central America.¹⁰¹ The Central American Integration System (SICA), a subregional organization, has hired a full-time regional coordinator to assist members with reporting, devising national implementation strategies and, where necessary, identifying novel streams of assistance to meet in-country needs related to small arms trafficking, the drug trade, youth gangs, and other high priority security and development concerns.

Likewise, dual-benefit assistance opportunities exist in virtually every corner of the globe.¹⁰² In the Middle East, for example, numerous countries are pursuing or at least considering civilian nuclear power to meet the rising energy demand. International and regional proliferation concerns and domestic under-capacity in key technical and human sectors, however, pose challenges to the development of domestic nuclear power capability across much of the region. As such, through international collaboration under the auspices of UNSCR 1540 and the assistance provision therein, Middle Eastern governments could not only backfill capacity shortfalls, they could do so while affirming to the international community their willingness to adhere to globally accepted nonproliferation standards.

Moreover, in Southeast Asia, piracy threatens both regional security and prospects for continued economic growth, as it interferes with the secure flow of goods. In response, donor nations can use their security assistance funds and bilateral cooperation to simultaneously address mutual security challenges and regional development needs. Philippine President Benigno Aquino, for instance, recently met with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in Tokyo to discuss maritime security and economic growth strategies.¹⁰³ Japan is considering offering communication systems and ships to the Philippine coast guard, which would secure the interests of both the Philippines and Japan in mitigating maritime security risks. Additionally, the increased safety of regional waterways would benefit

economic development by facilitating safe trade routes. Tokyo's collaboration with Manila is merely the most recent example of Japan's approach; however, Japan has long been working with governments around the region to improve port security and the safety of regional waterways.

Just as in the Caribbean Basin, Central America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, important dual-benefit opportunities exist for win-win progress in South Asia.

Development and Regional Security Capacity Building in South Asia With Dual-Benefit Assistance

Since 2001, all South Asian countries have complied with the most basic implementation step of Resolution 1373 and submitted at least one report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (and numerous states have submitted several follow-up reports).¹⁰⁴ In 2010, the Counter-Terrorism Committee made the following South Asia implementation assessment:

South Asian States have suffered greatly from terrorism and all have introduced counter-terrorism mechanisms. However, the lack of counter-terrorism legislation conforming to international standards and specialized counter-terrorism operational capacity limits the effectiveness of those mechanisms. Improvements in financial regulations are reflected in the establishment of the FIUs, but greater regional cooperation at the operational level is required at various levels. One positive development in this regard is the recent signing of the SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. There has been notable progress in the legal framework of one visited State, which has passed both an Anti-Terrorism Act and a Money-Laundering Prevention Act, since the previous survey. Still, much remains for South Asian states to meet all of the provisions established under UNSCR 1373. Regional coordinators and relevant partners must encourage States to take adequate steps to protect their nonprofit sectors from abuse for the purposes of terrorist financing. Further development of specialized counter-terrorism expertise among law enforcement personnel, judges, prosecutors and lawyers, with due regard for international human rights obligations will likely prove critical for the successful implementation. Additionally, states must strengthen mechanisms to promote counter-terrorism cooperation at the operational level among law enforcement officials in the region.¹⁰⁵

This assessment was based upon an evaluation of five programmatic areas connected to Resolution 1373 compliance: legislation, counter-financing of terrorism, law enforcement, border control and international cooperation. The CTC offered priority recommendations on how countries of the region can advance implementation of Resolution 1373, including shoring up the legal framework for counterterrorism offenses and enhancing border security through regional policing and closer coordination.¹⁰⁶

Similarly, comprehensive implementation of Resolution 1540 remains a challenge in South Asia. All South Asian countries have submitted 1540 national reports, with varying degrees of compliance. Reporting disparities among South Asian states have made it difficult to determine the extent to which states have implemented the resolution and where additional gaps may exist. For example, India and Pakistan have submitted implementation reports that differ on obligations and enforcement of export control laws. Reports from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, moreover, provide insufficient information to gauge the effective or full implementation of the resolution.¹⁰⁷

To ensure effective implementation of both resolutions around the globe, there is a need to demonstrate the potential benefits of the resolutions by linking assistance with urgent domestic concerns

of partner states in order to build a foundation for effective and sustainable buy-in. Of course, meeting states' national security and development objectives should not be a *quid pro quo* arrangement but instead a starting point for developing a package of assistance that will both strengthen states internally and simultaneously enable them to support broader counterterrorism and nonproliferation objectives.

As discussed before, for South Asia governments, the triple threat posed by money laundering, small arms and light weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking cannot be overstated. Together, these scourges inflict relentless levels of violence and suffering in addition to perpetuating the cycle of poverty. Identifying novel means of building capacity will be critical to ensuring regional security and promoting more holistic economic growth.

Assistance proffered under UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 is not a panacea for all of South Asia's security and development ills. But if implemented more innovatively using a "whole of government" approach, the assistance available can be used to develop processes and capabilities that satisfy global concerns over terrorism and proliferation while building national capabilities to combat money laundering, small arms trafficking, and the regional drug trade.

Consider for instance the strengthened border capacity necessitated by Resolutions 1373 and 1540. Meeting this objective requires improved personnel and technical capacity, such as more and better-trained and equipped guards, surveillance systems, and scanners—all of which check the illicit flow of money and goods. Similarly, requisite training for police, judges, and prosecutors to address the regional priority issues identified in this report would provide clear knock-on benefits to overcoming the challenges of global terrorism and proliferation.

As noted above, those focused on the prevention of money laundering have called for the development of formal legal mechanisms for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and information sharing across the region, improved interdepartmental cooperation at the national level and sufficient coordination at the regional and international levels as well as enhanced communications infrastructures, all designed to prevent money laundering across the South Asian region. There can be little doubt that these measures would provide direct benefit to a governments' ability to implement 1373 and 1540. Likewise, with regard to small arms countertrafficking, enhanced policing and patrolling at key border hot spots, enactment of export and transshipment laws and controls to limit the influx of small arms in and to the region, and regional harmonization of legal and enforcement systems, provide direct benefit to these Security Council resolutions. Vice versa, assistance provided under both resolutions could provide direct value to national efforts to manage the small arms threat.

In short, demonstrating the direct benefits implementation could yield for higher order regional security and development priorities: anti-money laundering and the prevention of narcotics and small arms trafficking, and more astutely directing foreign security assistance for counterterrorism and nonproliferation, will not only help ensure the full and effective implementation of UNSCR 1373 and 1540, it will also foster a self-interested inculcation of their standards by South Asian governments.

Prospects for South Asian Regional Burden and Capacity Sharing¹⁰⁸

Resolutions 1373 and 1540 stress the value of region-wide implementation efforts. Support for such an approach to both resolutions resides in the Counter-Terrorism and 1540 Committees, and there is a record of endorsement among many UN member states and the Secretariat. For instance, in 2006, Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized that implementation of Resolution 1540 was part

of the burden-sharing concept between the United Nations and regional organizations.¹⁰⁹ The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, independently, and in cooperation with other organizations and governments, has hosted regional workshops in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. For its part, the CTC has worked directly with, among others, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the Pacific Island Forum, and notably the SAARC.¹¹⁰

Regional implementation is logical because of the transnational nature of several of the resolutions' provisions, which entail cooperation between neighboring countries. The regional perspective can ensure consistency so that efforts are not duplicated, already scarce resources do not go to waste, and one country's advances are not immediately undercut by a variance in its neighbor's implementation. Lastly, the regional context provides an opportunity for states to, among other things, settle and establish cost-sharing plans, exchange model legislation, and collaborate on enforcement mechanisms.

For any given regional organization to assist its membership with implementing Resolutions 1373 and 1540, it is advantageous if: (1) the body's scope and work include a mandate for international and/or regional security; (2) the regional organization has, or is willing to build, infrastructures to support 1373 and 1540 implementation work; and (3) it is certainly helpful, although not necessary, if the regional organization has some experience connected to the work required to implement Resolutions 1373 and 1540—most notably in the areas of nonstate actors or the proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, although capacities related to public health, legal development, financial networking, or any other of the array of dual-benefit capacities relevant to 1373 and 1540 is clearly beneficial.

There is no one-size-fits-all template when considering a regional approach, but there are precedents and opportunities in more than one subregion throughout the world, including, as previously noted, in the Caribbean and Central America. A regional approach through CARICOM and SICA makes particular sense because many governments in those parts of the world are in dire need of the financial, technological, and human capacity to move toward 1373 and 1540 implementation. As such, CARICOM and SICA are useful analogies for how regional bodies, even those composed of relatively small, resource-strapped countries, can use increased and novel streams of security assistance to build capacity toward regional priorities, while fulfilling international counterterrorism and nonproliferation obligations.

Across the South Asian region, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation may be able to play a partnering role in implementing the proposed dual-benefit model.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

With the exceptions of Burma and Iran, SAARC is the single wholly inclusive regional organization in South Asia. Its peace and security mandate is spelled out in the 1985 charter, which calls for “aware[ness] of the common problems, interests and aspirations of the peoples of South Asia and the need for joint action and enhanced cooperation within their respective political and economic systems and cultural traditions.”¹¹¹ As outlined within the charter, SAARC members have signed on to cooperate across a host of programmatic and technical areas, including biotechnology, human development, security, and regional trade.

Importantly, Article 1 states that SAARC members shall “strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.”¹¹² The SAARC mandate also extends to

continent-wide objectives relating to trade and development, to energy, science and technology, and to the improvement of public health. Thus, it is perhaps the most logical entity to assist region-wide implementation of the proposed dual-benefit approach to meeting the intersecting challenges described in this report.

SAARC has and continues to demonstrate political commitment in the counterterrorism and non-proliferation sphere. Member states have expressed their strong condemnation for terrorist activities, which pose a significant threat to the region's stability and prospects for further development. Moreover, SAARC members have confirmed their commitment to implementing the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, which was signed on November 4, 1987, and came into force on August 22, 1988, following its ratification by all member states. The convention criminalizes all "acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and deplores their impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political stability, regional, and international peace and cooperation."¹¹³

Since the 9/11 attacks, member states have felt the pressure to intensify their activities against extremist groups throughout the region. In 2006, SAARC members ratified the Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, which, among other things, strengthened the convention, particularly by criminalizing "the provision, collection or acquisition of funds for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and taking further measures to prevent and suppress financing of such acts."¹¹⁴ In addition, SAARC has promoted the comprehensive integration of regional legal frameworks to prevent terrorist activity. In 2009, the Ministerial Declaration on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism was adopted, which was intended to build trust, collaboration, and coordination of counterterrorism efforts among South Asian states.¹¹⁵

The organization also has a growing history of promoting compliance with international counterterrorism treaties. SAARC members recognized the utility of the proposed UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, noted the progress made during the recent rounds of negotiations and called for an early conclusion of the convention.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, by identifying the intersections among terrorism and illegal trafficking of drugs, people, and weapons, SAARC has taken nascent steps toward meeting security challenges in a comprehensive manner and capitalizing upon a "dual-benefit" approach. With regard to nonproliferation, member states voiced their commitment to universal disarmament at the 10th SAARC summit in 1998 and at the 11th summit in 2002.¹¹⁷

Despite political commitments and the aforementioned initiatives, however, practical results and progress on the ground has been slow and has suffered repeated setbacks. SAARC continues to be constrained by a lack of resources and organizational capacity that is made particularly clear in the face of the significant challenges that confront the region. The coordinated terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008 constitute one of the most recent and most jarring failures in counterterrorism and regional cooperation, considering that the attacks were purportedly planned and directed by Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan. Still, it remains a prospective vehicle to leverage the resources, assistance, and support to bridge the security-development divide in South Asia.

SAARC routinely gathers the leaders of member states at summits, allowing for high-level dialogue on priority regional concerns. In addition, ministerial representatives meet several times a year in order to assess previous actions, develop new plans of action, and recognize new areas of cooperation. For instance, in 2010, SAARC interior ministers came together to discuss the facilitation of an Interpol-style police structure to combat transnational threats.¹¹⁸ It is therefore imperative that

SAARC strengthen its own capacities with regard to regional cooperation and implementation of SAARC conventions and international mandates, including Resolutions 1373 and 1540, in order to assist member states in achieving international security, human security, and development objectives.

Conclusion

The progress made in the Caribbean Basin and in Central America demonstrates the potential advantages of proliferation prevention when a wide variety of stakeholders cooperate in striving for mutually beneficial assistance. In April 2011, the mandate of Resolution 1540 was extended for 10 years. One month later, it was announced that the G-8 Global Partnership would be renewed and extended geographically beyond the traditional boundaries of the former Soviet Union. If the Global Partnership is to offer implementation assistance under this expanded mandate, it would do well to target relevant human security and development needs of potential recipients, rather than focusing impractically and exclusively on the “Northern agenda” of counterterrorism and WMD nonproliferation. Many of the areas where these laudable objectives coincide with security and development ends—including countering drug trafficking, small arms trafficking, and disaster mitigation—have been identified at recent G-8 summits as important priorities of member states with regard to development assistance.¹¹⁹ As such, the G-8 should leverage funds it has earmarked for security assistance to simultaneously meet its identified development priorities, in concert with the assessment of needs categorized by countries seeking assistance. If the current inflexible framework can give way to an adaptable approach driven by the domestic priorities of the recipient partner—borrowing from the successful model in the Caribbean and Central America—sustainable counterterrorism and nonproliferation engagements could result.

Those rightly preoccupied with the enduring twin threats of WMD proliferation and catastrophic terrorism will do well to remember why we have prioritized this issue: to save lives. Yet in the West, it is easy to lose sight of this objective as we face the urgency of keeping nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons out of the hands of terrorists or proliferate states. For one billion of our new nonproliferation interlocutors in the Global South, one bad cold, the loss of a job, the illicit acquisition of a small arm by a criminal, or one unfortunate interaction with a corrupt law enforcement officer can mean great suffering and even imminent death. In such an environment, the terrorist activity against Western targets and proliferation of WMD is meaningless and abstract. For people who live in these desperate circumstances, moving out from under them is rightly their all-consuming struggle. Unless and until we can tailor our nonproliferation and counterterrorism programming to recognize, to validate, and to respond to these pressing concerns, our engagement will not only be unsustainable, it will ultimately be doomed to failure.

Endnotes

- ¹ The World Bank, “South Asia Regional Strategy Update 2012,” April 2011, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21265405~menuPK:2298227~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html>.
- ² United Nations Development Programme, “South Asian ‘Growth Miracles’ Can Wipe Out Poverty and Hunger by 2030,” February 2011, <http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2011/february/south-asian-growth-miracles-wipe-out-poverty-and-hunger-by-2030.en>.
- ³ Reuters, “Pakistan, Indonesia, Ghana join money-laundering blacklist,” Feb 16, 2012, <http://news.yahoo.com/pakistan-indonesia-ghana-join-money-laundering-blacklist-173108562.html>.
- ⁴ Karly Curcio, “Corruption in India Stifles Economic Growth, Fosters Violence Against Whistleblowers,” September 13, 2010, www.financialtaskforce.org/2010/09/13/corruption-in-india-stifles-economic-growth-fosters-violence-against-whistleblowers/; Global Financial Integrity, “The Drivers and Dynamics of Illicit Financial Flows from India: 1948-2008,” November 2010, <http://india.gfip.org/>.
- ⁵ Matthew Rosenberg, “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash from Kabul,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704638504575318850772872776.html>.
- ⁶ Ibid.; Nathan Hodge and Matthew Rosenberg. “Audit Highlights Afghan Aid Woes.” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 21, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904233404576457793195376636.html>.
- ⁷ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2011 INCSR: Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern-Afghanistan through Greece,” March 3, 2011, www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol2/156374.htm.
- ⁸ Tatiana Nenova, Cecile Niang and Anjum Ahmad, “Bringing Finance to Pakistan’s Poor: Chapter 5,” *World Bank*, January 5, 2009, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/293051-1241610364594/6097548-1242706658430/Ch5BringingFinancePakistanPoorMay192009.pdf>.
- ⁹ US Department of State, “Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” March 2011, www.state.gov/documents/organization/156589.pdf.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² Declan Walsh, “WikiLeaks Cables Portray Saudi Arabia as a Cash Machine for Terrorist,” *The Guardian*, December 5, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding.
- ¹³ US Department of State, “Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.”
- ¹⁴ Rosenberg, “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash from Kabul.”
- ¹⁵ US Department of State, “Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.”
- ¹⁶ T Ramavarman, “India Seeks Global Ties to Curb Money Laundering,” *The Times of India*, July 19, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-19/india/29790686_1_money-laundering-act-financial-action-task-force-laundering-and-terror-funding.

- ¹⁷ Jason Miklian, “Illicit Trading in Nepal: Fueling South Asian Terrorism,” *International Peace Research Institute, Oslo*, 2009, www.niaslinc.dk/gateway_to_asia/nordic_webpublications/x506055212.pdf; Tatiana Nenova, “Bringing Finance to Pakistan’s Poor,” *The World Bank*, January 5, 2009, <http://sitere-sources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/293051-1241610364594/6097548-1242706658430/Ch5BringingFinancePakistanPoorMay192009.pdf>.
- ¹⁸ Financial Action Task Force, “FATF 40 Recommendations,” October 2003, www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ International Federation of Accountants, “Anti-Money Laundering, 2nd Edition,” March 2004, www.apgml.org/issues/docs/23/Int'l%20Federation%20of%20Accountants_AML%202nd%20Ed.pdf.
- ²¹ International Monetary Fund, “Annual Report 2007: Making the Global Economy Work for All.”
- ²² Financial Action Task Force, “FATF 40 Recommendations.”
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Dipankar Banerjee and Robert Muggah, “Small Arms and Human Insecurity: Reviewing Participatory Research in South Asia,” *Regional Centre for Strategic Studies*, July 2002, [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-RCSS%202002%20human%20insecurity.pdf](http://fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-RCSS%202002%20human%20insecurity.pdf).
- ²⁶ Anil Kohli, “Mapping Murder: The Geography of Indian Firearm Fatalities,” *Small Arms Survey*, September 2011, www.india-ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB2-mapping-murder.pdf.
- ²⁷ Humanitarian News and Analysis, “Guns Out of Control: the continuing threat of small arms,” May 2006, www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34289.
- ²⁸ Ibid.; Humanitarian News and Analysis, “Guns Out of Control: the continuing threat of small arms,” May 2006, www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34290; Kaikobad Hossain, “Implementation and Evaluation of Small Arms & Portable Lethal Weapons Control Activities in Bangladesh,” www.unrcpd.org.np/uploads/conferences/file/SWplW%20Seminar%20Nepal.pdf; Vappala Balachandran, “Chapter 6 Transnational Trends: Middle Eastern and Asian Views,” Stimson Center, July 2008, www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stimson_ch6_1.pdf.
- ²⁹ Dipankar Banerjee and Robert Muggah, “Small Arms and Human Insecurity: Reviewing Participatory Research in South Asia,” 19-20.
- ³⁰ Humanitarian News and Analysis, “Guns Out of Control: The Continuing Threat of Small Arms.”
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Banerjee and Muggah, “Small Arms and Human Insecurity: Reviewing Participatory Research in South Asia,” 19-20.
- ³³ “Chapter 3 Country Reports: State Sponsors of Terrorism,” US Department of State, August 5, 2010, www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm.
- ³⁴ Binalakshmi Nepram, “India and the Arms Trade Treaty,” *Oxfam International*, September 2006, www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bn_india_att.pdf; Subir Bhaumik,

- “Where do ‘Chinese’ Guns Arming Rebels Really Come From?” *BBC News*, August 3, 2010, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10626034.
- ³⁵ Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, “Regional Seminar on Peace and Security in South Asia: Issues and Priorities for Regional Cooperation on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control,” November 8-9, 2009, www.biiss.org/salw.pdf.
- ³⁶ Banerjee and Muggah, “Small Arms and Human Insecurity: Reviewing Participatory Research in South Asia,” 27.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.
- ³⁸ Banerjee and Muggah, “Small Arms and Human Insecurity: Reviewing Participatory Research in South Asia,” 18.
- ³⁹ Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, “Karachi: De-weaponisation Dramas,” *South Asia Intelligence Review*, August 29, 2011, www.satp.org/satporgrp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_8.htm.
- ⁴⁰ BBC, “Karachi: Report Says 1,100 Killed in First Half of 2011,” July 5, 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14032082.
- ⁴¹ Reuters, “Pakistan’s Violence Drives Jul-Aug FDI Down 76.9 Pct,” September 16, 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/pakistan-investment-idUSL3E7KG1QE20110916.
- ⁴² Malik Qalim Mustafa, “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Case Study-South Asia,” *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=343; BBC News South Asia, “India PM says trying to tackle Pakistan ‘trust gap,’” May 24, 2010, www.bbc.co.uk/news/10146278.
- ⁴³ Tara Ashtakala, “Update on the Small Arms Situation in South Asia,” *South Asia Partnership*, 3.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ Mustafa, “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.”
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷ Mark Magnier, “Gun Culture Spreads in India,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 2012, www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-india-guns-20120221,0,977361.story?page=1.
- ⁴⁸ Mohanty, “Karachi: De-weaponisation Dramas.”
- ⁴⁹ Small Arms Survey, “India’s States of Armed Violence: Assessing the Human Cost and Political Priorities,” Issue Brief, Number 1, September 2011, www.india-ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB1-states-of-armed-violence.pdf.
- ⁵⁰ Ashtakala, “Update on the Small Arms Situation in South Asia.”
- ⁵¹ F.X. De Donnea, “The Role of Parliaments in Strengthening the Control of Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons and Their Ammunition,” *Inter-Parliamentary Union*, January 13, 2006, www.ipu.org/conf-e/114/1Cmt-dr-rpt.doc.
- ⁵² Biting the Bullet, “Implementation of the PoA in South Asia,” *University of Bradford*, September 16, 2011, www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/BtB-South-Asia-briefing-jun06.pdf.

- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ Mustafa, “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.”
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Biting the Bullet, “Implementation of the PoA in South Asia.”
- ⁵⁷ Mustafa, “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.”
- ⁵⁸ Biting the Bullet, “Implementation of the PoA in South Asia.”
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Mustafa, “Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.”
- ⁶¹ United Nations General Assembly, “General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms,” August, 1997, www.un.org/depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html.
- ⁶² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011,” July, 2011: 7, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf.
- ⁶³ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2011 INCSR: Countries Reports-Afghanistan through Costa Rica,” March 3, 2011, www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol1/156359.htm; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Opium Production in Afghanistan shows increase, prices set to rise,” October 11, 2011, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/October11_UNODC_Opium_Survey_Press_Release_ENG.pdf.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., 16.
- ⁶⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “World Drug Report 2011,” 2011: 77, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf.
- ⁶⁶ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2011 INCSR: Country Reports-Afghanistan through Costa Rica.”
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 30.
- ⁶⁸ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011,” 35.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., 64.
- ⁷⁰ Binalakshmi Nepam-Mentschel, “Armed Conflict and Small Arms Proliferation in India’s North East—Part II,” *The WIP*, June 15, 2007, www.thewip.net/contributors/2007/06/proliferation_of_small_arms_in.html.
- ⁷¹ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011,” 64.
- ⁷² Robert McMahon, “Afghanistan: UN Official Describes Effort to Track Al-Qaeda,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 28, 2002, www.rferl.org/content/article/1098606.html.

- ⁷³ Gretchen Peters, “Feeding the Fix,” *Hindustan Times*, September 10, 2009, www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/BigIdeal/Feeding-the-fix/Article1-452431.aspx.
- ⁷⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Executive Summary,” 2006, www.unodc.org/pdf/india/publications/national_Survey/06_executivesummary.pdf; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011,” 15.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.
- ⁷⁶ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2011 INCSR: Country Reports-Honduras through Mexico,” March 3, 2011, www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol1/15636.
- ⁷⁷ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011,” 28.
- ⁷⁸ US Department of State, “Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control,” *2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, September 15, 2011, www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol1/index.htm.
- ⁷⁹ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011,” 5.
- ⁸⁰ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “2011 INCSR: Country Reports-Honduras through Mexico.”
- ⁸¹ Ehsan Ahrari, “Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” NBR Reports, December 2009, www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=192.
- ⁸² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Central Asia-The Situation,” www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/central-asia.html.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁴ Subhashis Mitra, “Policing Inter-State SAARC Crime,” *The Navhind Times*, www.navhindtimes.in/opinion/policing-inter-state-saarc-crime.
- ⁸⁵ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, “Opium production in Afghanistan shows increase, prices set to rise,” October 11, 2011, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2011/October/opium-production-in-afghanistan-shows-increase-prices-set-to-rise.html.
- ⁸⁶ United Nations Office of the Spokesman, “G8 Leaders Agree to Extend Global Partnership Beyond 2012,” June 3, 2011, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/164962.htm.
- ⁸⁷ G8 Summit, “G8 Global Partnership-Assessment and Options for Future Programming,” May 26-27, 2011, www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/the-2011-summit/declarations-and-reports/appendices/g8-global-partnership-assessment-and-options-for.1354.html.
- ⁸⁸ James Cockayne, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe, “An Opportunity for Renewal: Revitalizing the United Nations,” Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2011: 28, www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Opportunity_for_Renewal_Final.pdf.
- ⁸⁹ United Nations Economic and Social Council Economic Commission for Africa, “Progress Report on Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development,” March 24-27, 2011: 5, www.uneca.org/cfm/2011/documents/English/ProgressReport-ontheImplementationMonterreyConsensus.pdf;

- Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail and Carina Solmirano, "SIPRI Yearbook: Chapter 5 Military Expenditure," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/05.
- ⁹⁰ Global Health Council, "Causes of Child Death—Global Causes of Newborn Deaths, 2008," http://old.globalhealth.org/child_health/child_mortality/causes_death/; Black et al., "Global, regional, and national causes of child mortality in 2008: a systematic analysis," *The Lancet*, Volume 375, Issue 9730, Pages 1969-1987, June 5, 2010.
- ⁹¹ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown. "Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States," *International Peace Academy: New York*, 2007, www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/GREATER_THAN_THE_SUM%20E-Book2.pdf.
- ⁹² United Nations Security Council Press Release SC-7158, "Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution, Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation." August 28, 2001, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm.
- ⁹³ United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, "About the Counter-Terrorism Committee," November 14, 2011, www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/aboutus.html.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid.
- ⁹⁶ United Nations Security Council Committee, "Tables on Areas of Cooperation between the Monitoring Team of the Security Council Committee." November 11, 2010, www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2010/2010_11_11_table-cooperation-areas.pdf.
- ⁹⁷ United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, "Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) by Member States," 2001, www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/gis-2009-09_en.pdf; United Nations Security Council, "Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee to the President of the Security Council." February 1, 2010, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/52.
- ⁹⁸ Cockayne et al., "An Opportunity for Renewal: Revitalizing the United Nations Counterterrorism Program," 3.
- ⁹⁹ During Security Council meetings and in their reports to the 1540 Committee the following states have raised concerns with UNSCR 1540 not being negotiated in a multilateral forum or called for such negotiations: Algeria, Chile, Benin, Peru, New Zealand, India, Singapore, Switzerland, Cuba, Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Republic of Korea, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Namibia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Brazil, and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
- ¹⁰⁰ For more information see: Brian D. Finlay, "Bridging the Security/Development Divide with UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Case Study Approach," *Stanley Foundation*, September 2009, www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/working_papers/Bridging_Divide_Finlay.pdf
- ¹⁰¹ Brian Finlay, "WMD, Drugs, and Criminal Gangs in Central America: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs with UN Security Council Resolution 1540," *The Stimson Center and The Stanley Foundation*, August 6, 2010, www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/CArpt710_1.pdf.
- ¹⁰² Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, and Veronica Tessler, "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," *The Stimson Center and The Stanley Foundation*, September 2010, www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/MERpt910.pdf.

- ¹⁰³ Business World, “Maritime security, economic cooperation among Aquino’s agenda in Japan visit,” September 23, 2011, www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Nation&title=Maritime-security-economic-cooperation-among-Aquino%E2%80%99s-agenda-in-Japan-visit&id=38826.
- ¹⁰⁴ See Counterterrorism Committee website to view reports submitted between 2001 and 2006. In 2006 a decision was made not to make future reports to the Committee public. www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373.html.
- ¹⁰⁵ United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, “Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) by Member States,” 2001: 21, www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/gis-2009-09_en.pdf.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 22.
- ¹⁰⁷ Nuclear Threat Initiative, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Database: South Asia,” April 2011, www.nti.org/analysis/reports/south-asia-1540-reporting/
- ¹⁰⁸ This section reflects the authors’ previous work with regional organizations in the Caribbean, Central America, the Middle East and to a lesser extent East Africa. See Brian Finlay, “Bridging the Security/Development Divide with UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Case Study Approach.” August 2010; “Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations,” Ed. Lawrence Scheinman, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, (Geneva, Switzerland) 2008; Johan Bergenas, “A Piece of the Global Puzzle,” December 2010, *The Stimson Center*.
- ¹⁰⁹ Kofi Annan, “A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities,” Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, 2006, www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20S2006%20590.pdf.
- ¹¹⁰ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, “SAARC Charter,” 2009, www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Charter/5/.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹¹² Ibid.
- ¹¹³ The Member States of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), “SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism.”
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁵ Sixteenth SAARC Summit, Thimphu Silver Jubilee Declaration, “Towards a Green and Happy South Asia,” April 28-29, 2010, www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/16thSummit-Declaration29April10.pdf.
- ¹¹⁶ Sixteenth SAARC Summit, Thimphu Silver Jubilee Declaration, “Towards a Green and Happy South Asia.”
- ¹¹⁷ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,” Inventory for International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2007, <http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/saarc.pdf>.
- ¹¹⁸ Tomislav Delini , “SAAR—25 Years of Regional Integration in South Asia,” *KAS International Reports*, 2011, www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21870-544-2-30.pdf?110209123437.
- ¹¹⁹ G-8 Summit, “The Priorities of the French Presidency for G8,” May 26-27, 2011, www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/priorities-for-france/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency-for-g8.815.html.

About the Project

The goal of this project is threefold: (1) to identify new sources of assistance to address endemic threats in the developing world, such as poverty, corruption, infectious diseases, and economic underdevelopment; (2) to expand a successful new engagement model that treats the root causes of proliferation, rather than its symptoms; and (3) to reinforce the legitimacy of the United Nations as an effective mechanism to address transnational issues. A joint initiative of the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, it aims to develop scalable, sustainable, and replicable pilot efforts that pragmatically pair states in need of development assistance with those states willing to offer such assistance under the auspices of national security.

Unlike traditional assistance measures, this effort helps bridge the gap between “soft” security (development) and “hard” security (nonproliferation) objectives, thereby addressing identified in-country needs of the Global South while building state capacity to manage and ensure the sustainability of nonproliferation and global security efforts. The result is less duplication of effort and more efficient utilization of limited resources for the global good. Further information can be found at www.stimson.org/mab/next100.

About the Authors

Brian Finlay is a senior associate and the director of Stimson’s Managing Across Boundaries (MAB) program. Prior to joining Stimson in January 2005, he served four years as executive director of a lobbying and media campaign focused on counterterrorism issues, a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution, and a program officer at the Century Foundation. Finlay was a project manager for the Laboratory Center for Disease Control/Health Canada, and worked with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He sits on the advisory board of Trojan Defense, LLC, and is a member of the Board of Directors of iMMAP. He holds an MA from the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, a graduate diploma from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and an honors BA from the University of Western Ontario.

The Managing Across Boundaries program works to address an increasing array of transnational challenges—from WMD proliferation and the global drug trade, to contemporary human slavery, small arms trafficking, and counterfeit intellectual property—by looking for innovative government responses—at the national, regional, and international levels—and for smart public-private partnerships to mitigate these threats. Our experts and researchers work to conceptualize and catalyze “whole of society” solutions to the most pressing transnational challenges of our day.

Johan Bergenas is a research analyst and deputy director of MAB. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, he worked for the Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) analyzing regional and international proliferation issues and trends. Before CNS, he was a member of Oxfam America’s humanitarian policy and communications teams, covering development and conflict issues in the Middle East and Africa. Bergenas has also been a reporter and a freelance journalist for numerous publications, covering a wide range of international and U.S. domestic issues including presidential politics. He holds an honors MA from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and an honors BA from the University of Iowa.

Esha Mufti is a research assistant with MAB. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Mufti was an intern with the Asia and Common Defense Campaign programs at the Center for International Policy, analyzing South Asian politics and security and examining US national security policy and the defense budget. She holds an honors BA from the University of Oklahoma.

About the Stanley Foundation

The Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. It brings fresh voices, original ideas, and lasting solutions to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation, located in Muscatine, Iowa, that focuses on peace and security issues and advocates principled multilateralism. The foundation frequently collaborates with other organizations. It does not make grants. Online at www.stanleyfoundation.org.

The Stanley Foundation encourages use of this report for educational purposes. Any part of the material may be duplicated with proper acknowledgment. Additional copies are available. This report is available at <http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org>.

About the Stimson Center

Founded in 1989, the Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach.

The center's work is focused on three priorities that are essential to global security:

- Strengthening institutions for international peace and security.
- Building regional security.
- Reducing weapons of mass destruction and transnational threats.

Stimson's approach is pragmatic—geared toward providing policy alternatives, solving problems, and overcoming obstacles to a more peaceful and secure world. Through in-depth research and analysis, we seek to understand and illuminate complex issues. By engaging policymakers, policy implementers, and nongovernmental institutions as well as other experts, we craft recommendations that are cross-partisan, actionable, and effective. Online at www.stimson.org.

