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Protecting Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation in Europe

Stacy D. VanDeveer and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Editors

Conference Proceedings:
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Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation in Europe”
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The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

**Environmental Change and Security Project
East European Studies Program
West European Studies Program**

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PREFACE

Europe's enclosed seas are as diverse as the continent's peoples are diverse. Yet the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas all face similar challenges of pollution that undercut the marine ecosystems and the economic potential and health of surrounding human populations. The attempts to address the environmental quality of Europe's seas also vary in architecture, funding, and effectiveness. By comparing and analyzing the state of environmental management around the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas, scholars and policymakers may draw valuable lessons for replicating success stories and avoiding failed pathways.

It was with this goal in mind that the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars assembled a group of scholars and practitioners on May 14, 1999 at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC. This volume reflects the scholarship and debate featured at that conference, entitled "Saving the Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation in Europe." As the official memorial to the United States twenty-eighth president, the Wilson Center provides a non-partisan, non-advocacy forum for discussion of today's pressing public policy issues. Under the leadership of Lee H. Hamilton, the Wilson Center strives to generate "knowledge in the public service."

As co-sponsors of the *Protecting Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation in Europe* effort, we would like to thank a number of individuals and supporters who made the conference and this publication possible. Robert Ponichtera, formerly of the East European Studies program, provided the critical spark. Aisha Haynes, Jane Mutnick, Jessica Powers, Michael Vaden, Dean Caras, and Alex Hill were all instrumental in producing a successful international conference. Special thanks to Jessica Powers for her diligence working with authors and editing this publication. Many thanks to Karin Mueller for her assistance in publication layout and design. And finally, special thanks to co-editor Stacy VanDeveer, who as a short-term fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, guided us around the politics of European seas.

Generous funding for *Protecting Regional Seas: Developing Capacity and Fostering Environmental Cooperation in Europe* and the May conference was provided by the Woodrow Wilson Center and by the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Population through a cooperative agreement with the University of Michigan Population Fellows Programs.

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Glossary of Acronyms

BSEC – Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSEP – Black Sea Environmental Programme
CCB – Coalition Clean Baltic
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
CI – Counterpart International
EAP – Environmental Action Programme
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECO – environmental citizen’s organization
EIB – European Investment Bank
EMC – environmental management components
ENGO – environmental nongovernmental organization
EU – European Union
FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization
GEF – Global Environmental Facility
GIS – geographic information system
HELCOM – Helsinki Commission
HELMEPA – Hellenic Maritime Environmental Protection Association
IBSAD – International Black Sea Action Day
IBSP – International Black Sea Partners
ICZM – integrated coastal zone management
IGO – intergovernmental organization
ISO – International Organization for Standardization
ISPA – Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
JCP – Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme
MAP – Mediterranean Action Plan
MDB – Multilateral Development Banks
MEDPOL
MNCs – multinational corporations
NAP – National Action Party
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEAP – national environmental actions program
NGO – nongovernmental organization
NIB – Nordic Investment Bank
OMRI – Open Media Research Institute
OSPARCOM – Oslo and Paris Commissions
PABSEC – Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC
PCU – Program Coordinating Unit
PITF – Program Implementation Task Force
PPC – Project Preparation Committee
RAC – Regional Action Center
SAP – Strategic Action Plan
SGP – Small Grants Programme
TDA – Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis
TER – Ecological Youth of Romania (in Romanian)
TIME – This is My Environment
TNC – transnational corporations
TURMEPA – Turkish Maritime Environmental Protection Association
UN – United Nations
UNCED – United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
WBCSD – World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WTO – World Trade Organization

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Environmental Cooperation, Capacity, and European Seas: An Introduction

By

**Stacy D. VanDeveer and
Geoffrey D. Dabelko**

Europe's regional seas are shared between Eastern and Western Europeans and also help to define and bridge the boundaries of the continent. The Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas have been the focus of international environmental concern and cooperation for many years. These seas also served as theaters of Cold War competition and international contact. They have played host to vast quantities of marine resources, shipping, recreation, and pollution loading. These seas separate and link European and non-European states, societies, cultures, and economies.

Beginning in the 1970s, the Baltic and Mediterranean regions witnessed the construction of international organizations and institutions designed to protect marine environmental quality. In the Black Sea region, this process did not get underway until the 1990s. Nevertheless, no one would call these seas "protected" from ecological harm. They are not out of danger. As the title of this report suggests, one of the central concerns of the chapters contained here is explaining how additional international environmental cooperation might be fostered in these regions.

Intense international environmental cooperation will not protect or improve marine environmental quality by itself. States and societies must possess the capacity to protect the seas.

They must be able to meet the international commitments they make – to make and implement public policy and affect private sector and public behavior change. International relations scholars and practitioners have most often focused on states' interests and intent in signing and ratifying international agreements. States' capacity to implement the agreements is too often ignored. Public sector capacity is complex and multidimensional. The concept includes factors related to human resource and organizational and broad institutional dimensions (Grindle, 1996). In varying ways, all of the papers contained here attempt to address these capacity-related concerns. Furthermore, environmental protection efforts are closely linked to a scientific and technical understanding of the natural environment and the ecological impacts of human activities. As such, environmental policy requires minimal levels of scientific and technical capacity to be effective.

During the workshop at which these papers were first presented, Alan Simcock, Head of Marine, Land, and Liability Division of the Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions, outlined a number of aspects of the complex institutional background of marine governance in Europe. There remain substantial differences among European states and societies vis-à-vis environmental protection. Often, political cleavages are apparent between the generally "greener" Northern European states (Germany, the Nordic countries, and, sometimes, the United Kingdom) and those in Southern and Eastern Europe (and Ireland), with greater concern for economic development and restructuring. Furthermore, formal environmental agreements and organizations

have overlapping jurisdiction and membership. There are separate multilateral agreements around the North East Atlantic and the North Sea, and the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas. In addition, states have created a host of fisheries conventions and numerous rivers and lakes agreements. Lastly, the European Union has a number of directives important for marine environmental protection. In the face of such institutional complexity, Simcock highlighted “seven threats to the seven seas,” including: (1) dumping at sea; (2) fisheries and biodiversity protection; (3) land-based sources of pollution; (4) shipping; (5) oil and gas exploration and extraction, (6) coastal development; and (7) climate change. This laundry list of environmental threats highlights the importance of integrating environmental policy across the hydrological cycle and across organizational and jurisdictional lines. For all of these environmental threats, one needs to identify “capacity issues” faced by state policymakers in their attempts to protect ecological quality.

The first chapter, by Stacy VanDeveer, compares the capacity building efforts of the Baltic and Mediterranean regional seas regimes. This chapter outlines various aspects of technical, human resource, organizational, and institutional capacity, which should be considered in designing international capacity building programs. Tamar Gulner’s chapter also examines international environmental cooperation efforts in the Baltic region. Her chapter focuses on the environmental portfolios of three major multilateral development banks (the World Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank). In chapter three, Miranda Schreurs provides commentary on first two chapters. Martin Sampson and Omer Faruk Genckaya examine the Black Seas Environmental Cooperation and the Black Seas Environmental Project, highlighting the votes of World Bank funding, NGOs, and transnational network building in the last two chapters.

Capacity Building Efforts and International Environmental Cooperation in the Baltic and Mediterranean Regions

By

Stacy D. VanDeveer

Introduction

International relations scholars and practitioners often have been preoccupied with concerns about how cooperative international regimes are established and how to enforce and implement such agreements in the anarchic international system. Rather than focusing on whether state officials do or do not comply with international agreements (or whether they intend to do so), this paper examines issues associated with whether or not they are able to meet their international environmental commitments. Do all states in a given cooperation regime really have the capacity to meet their international obligations? How can such capacity be enhanced or “built” through international cooperation?

International cooperation within the environmental protection regimes for the Baltic and Mediterranean seas has produced an impressive array of state commitments and institutional and organizational structures. These marine protection regimes remain effective in facilitating, sponsoring, encouraging, and expanding multilateral interstate and transnational cooperation. Both regional regimes successfully established and promulgated a set of transnational principles and norms for environmental pol-

icy. In other words, both regimes facilitated, encouraged and promoted the transnationalization of regional environmental policy.¹ The two regimes and their central organizations – the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) and the Coordinating Unit for the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) offer sets of minimum environmental policy standards, against which to assess each region’s states. In the Baltic regime, this transnational environmental policy frequently exceeds the requirements and specificity of European Union (EU) policy. Compared to the MAP content, however, EU standards are generally higher and more specific.

As used here, the term “capacity building” refers to efforts and strategies intended to increase the “efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness of government performance.”² In this formulation, responsiveness denotes the links’ communicated needs and abilities to address them. In other words, responsiveness refers to qualities such as adaptability, learning, and analytical abilities of public organizations. In this work, capacity building is used as a general term, encompassing capacity enhancing, strengthening, and development. As such, its use does not imply that a total absence of capacity for particular functions exists in a given location among a given group.³ Capacity building efforts can be focused on any number of “sites” or focal points: government bodies, NGOs and civil society, independent unions, political parties, scientific and technical communities, private sector actors, and publics.

This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first presents a discussion of the multiple dimensions of international capacity building programs and research. The next two sections offer

brief overviews of regional environmental cooperation around the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, highlighting these regimes' accomplishments to date and their records vis-a-vis building capacity at the states level. The last section draws some conclusions from these two cases of regional environmental cooperation in and around Europe.

Capacity Building and Organized Skepticism

“Capacity building” – though widely alluded to in international organizations, assistance programs, and scholarship – often has no clear definition, nor does the term evoke a common set of strategies among its users. Yet, it is often understood to be centrally important among international development assistance practitioners. It remains an important concern for sustainable development and the implementation of the Agenda 21 action program from the 1992 United National Conference on Environment and Development in Rio.⁴ Research on the international environmental protection regimes around the Baltic and Mediterranean seas and the long-range transboundary air pollution regime in Europe uses international environmental standards as primary standards in assessment of domestic environmental policy and science needs.⁵ Existing environmental policies are measured against international standards – usually taken from EU directives and international environmental agreements – in attempts to “harmonize” domestic environmental policy with exogenous standards. State capacity proves to be a key limiting factor on the domestic influence of international regimes and “harmonization” programs in transition countries. In other words, many post-communist

states are incapable of meeting international standards, not unwilling to do so.

Such work confirms findings from other research on the effectiveness of international environmental institutions and foreign aid programs,⁶ which found capacity to be one of three conditions for effectiveness of international institutions (the other two are sufficient concern and solutions to contractual problems). Like most international organizations and regimes, regional seas regimes rely on states, governments, and public bureaucracies to implement their projects and enforce new laws, regulations, and procedures. In most cases of international assistance (or aid) – almost by definition – capacity in the recipient country is lacking. Political science and policy research is therefore interested in administrative capacity and “the ability of non-governmental organizations and domestic political institutions to translate concern...into policy.”⁷ When efforts to build capacity fail, often they do so because of a lack of domestic concern in the recipient country about the policy objective.⁸ Other foreign and international policy-related research also identifies the importance of domestic institutions and capacity to formulate and implement policy.⁹ Such work catalogues numerous cases in which international organizations and programs assisted in building public sector capacity – in post-communist, less-developed, and developed countries – for environmental protection and compliance with international obligations.

Recent research, mostly derived from areas of environmental, economic and social policy, suggests that (at least) four broad types of state capacity exist: institutional capacity, technical capacity,

administrative capacity, and political capacity.¹⁰ Most bilateral and multi lateral capacity building programs focus almost exclusively on the enhancement of technical capacity through such activities as education and training programs. A multifaceted approach to state capacity suggests that these programs are likely to fail if broader administrative, institutional, and political considerations remain ignored or unattended.

Recent work on capacity building takes the quality of public sector human resources, organizations, and institutions as central to good governance.¹¹ Table 1 illustrates these three dimensions of public sector capacity, including examples of foci and specific activities

within each dimension. Grindle and her colleagues have identified many case studies of capacity building programs around the world to illustrate that all three dimensions (human resources, organizations, and institutions) are inter-related. As such, capacity building initiatives which largely ignore one or two of the dimensions in favor of another court failure. While most capacity building initiatives concentrate on one dimension, the other dimensions' impacts on public sector performance cannot be ignored. Furthermore, without careful analysis of actual causes of incapacity in given situations, the initial focus of capacity building programs may be misguided.

Table 1: Capacity Building Initiatives (Grindle, 1997)

Dimension	Focus	Activities
Human Resource Development	Supply of professional and technical personnel	Training, salaries, conditions of work, recruitment
Organizational Strengthening	Management systems to improve performance of specific tasks and functions; microstructures	Incentive systems, utilization of personnel, leadership, organizational culture, communications, managerial structures
Institutional Reform	Institutions and systems; macrostructures	Rules of the game for economic and political regimes, policy and legal change, constitutional reform

Capacity – like incapacity – is contingent on contextual factors associated with the public sector functions under examination. Social science research has demonstrated the importance of critical and/or evaluative social institutions to the reliability, utility, and credibility of knowledge in public decision-making in areas of such

complexity. For example, studies of regulatory decision making in the US illustrate the value of multiple opportunities for diverse participants to critique and challenge the use of expert knowledge in policy making.¹² In areas such as food and drug regulations and environmental and public health standards, such participants form

“critical communities” within “critical institutions” – so called organized skepticism – in the framing, production, validation, and utilization of expertise for policy. In terms of the three dimensional capacity building framework discussed above, the state of organizational and institutional forms of organized skepticism are important to consider. As such, capacity building efforts are advised to assess and evaluate the state of systems for critique and learning within the organizations they target and within the larger institutional environment.

Highly complex policy areas such as public health, occupational safety, economic management, and environmental protection require institutionalized systems of critique and learning if they are to develop and be sustainable over time. Because of the many differences across countries – culture, understandings of risk, organizational and institutional structures, and so on – one should not expect the specific organizational forms of learning and critique (here called “organized skepticism”) will be the same across countries and cultures. One might expect, however, that a number of functions must be accomplished if safe management is to be constructed. Such functions include information sharing, monitoring, inspection, policy and systems critique, and evaluation and use of results of critical analysis. Such functions should be identifiable in all three of Grindle’s dimensions of capacity. In short, if expertise is important to decision-making within all three dimensions, then institutions of organized skepticism are critical in all three.

In the United States, for example, public sector capacity is deeply

embedded in systems of learning and critique – embedded in larger communities of technical and policymaking expertise and analysis. Policy making in democratic societies has developed in tandem with the use of scientific and technical information and institutions of organized skepticism.¹³ Furthermore, personnel and some aspects of programs and organizational structure are subject to periodic assessment, such as employee evaluation or congressional scrutiny. Of course, this does not mean that the US public sector always functions effectively, efficiently, and/or reasonably. Nor does it mean that people or organizations always respond to critique by attempting to improve operations. Sometimes they do and sometimes they do not. Some people and programs are more insulated from critique than others. The existence of critical communities is not a guarantor of highly effective and efficient policy. It is more accurately understood as a necessary condition. Such systems of critique and learning are, of course, not solely responsible for policy outcomes. Yet they remain central to policy-making in the United States and other democratic states and open societies.

Institutions of organized skepticism and associated critical communities contain nodes of expertise (individuals, groups, and organizations) associated with critical communities. Members of such communities often push for greater accountability, effectiveness, efficiency or transparency. They sometimes critique aspects of their organizations’ views and practices, or those of other organizations. In addition, funding protocols, exchange and education programs, and shared formal and informal networks link actors and roles. Individuals often move across or among

the actor groups. Like the other members of the organizations, they belong to numerous technical, policy, or issue networks. All are involved in forms of information production, consumption, and distribution regarding, for example, marine and riverine environmental protection, sewage treatment, and/or habitat protection and management.

Organizations involved in Western environmental protection also exist within larger systems of institutionalized social practices of organized skepticism and critique. Examples of such institutions include public debate, protest, public hearings, investigative journalism, human resource management systems and ideas, academic research and analysis, and environmental impact statement procedures – to name only a few. These practices constitute well-established institutions within US and West European democracy and society. Many do not have well-established or well-functioning analogues in many post-communist and lesser developed countries.

Technical assistance programs – which constitute a large fraction of international assistance within the Mediterranean regime – in particular have been criticized for their frequent failure to increase public sector capacity.¹⁴ What is clear, however, is that “the design of such projects and the context in which they are carried out are primary determinants of success or failure.”¹⁵ In other words, success of technical assistance programs is contingent on much more than whether or not the technologies “work.” To put it differently, if technical assistance programs fail it is likely to be the fault of program design, not the fault of recipients. If such assistance programs

are not sensitive to institutional and organizational context and human resource issues – and hence, designed inappropriately – recipients should not be blamed when programs fail to achieve established goals.

Foreign assistance programs, bilateral and multilateral, tend to be donor driven. They are usually designed by donors, rather than recipients. Analysis of many assistance programs operated by multilateral banks suggests that this frequently results in donors looking around for problems to which to apply their pre-conceived assistance programs.¹⁶ While donors have important roles to play, under involvement of aid recipients often leads to program designs which fail to take local and national context and personnel into account. As problems with technical assistance programs illustrate, capacity building initiatives often fail to assess the actual roots of constraints on the performance of individuals and organizations. Instead, they focus on concrete and obvious (to donors) expressions of incapacity such as the absence of certain technologies or procedures, or failure to perform specific functions.¹⁷ Unfortunately, these types of identified incapacity are often symptoms, not causes, of organizational and institutional dysfunction.

In sum, social science and policy analysis research on capacity building programs demonstrates that:

good governance requires time, commitment, innovative ideas, consensus building, changed behavior and norms for those who work in the public sector, new rules of the game, efficient design and resource allocation in technical assistance... [B]uilding

state capacity also requires effective efforts to develop human resource capacity, particularly among technical and professional staff; organizational strengthening initiatives, particularly those focused on incentive and managerial systems; and institutional reforms, particularly those that address underlying constraints on government to contribute more effectively...¹⁸

With this view of capacity building in mind, a particular awareness of the importance of organizations and institutions for organized skepticism, and the role of technical assistance, the following section assesses the ability and potential of the Baltic and Mediterranean environmental protection regimes to build environmental management capacity in lesser developed and post-communist countries.

Baltic Cooperation

In the environmental protection regime around the Baltic Sea, state parties agreed to two regional conventions designed to protect the Baltic against pollution (in 1974 and 1992). The 1974 Helsinki Convention established the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), cooperation which has resulted in over 175 recommendations on pollution control and environmental management in the Baltic region. In addition, HELCOM participates (often formulating final statements) in regional ministerial-level meetings – which have repeatedly produced declarations with substantial environmental commitments and content. Over time, HELCOM recommendations have become more specific and more stringent. The regime's activities, the scope of its

environmental commitments and the size of the HELCOM organization also have grown substantially over the last 20-plus years.

HELCOM's expansion has critics, however. Some governmental and nongovernmental organization (NGO) participants complain that the organization is too large, expensive, and slow to act.¹⁹ Of particular concern is the number of HELCOM meetings each year. In 1994 there were 45 such meetings, each lasting three or four days. Such large participant time commitments for HELCOM activities mean that the regime constitutes a significant portion of individual participants' professional activities. However, the frequency and length of meetings also demonstrates that HELCOM has the capacity to promulgate its principles, policy norms, and standards to individuals from (and within) member states.

HELCOM has amassed a number of environmental and organizational successes. Oil inputs into the Baltic Sea declined as have concentrations in living organisms of toxic substances such as DDT, PCBs, mercury, and cadmium.²⁰ The numbers of gray seals, ringed seals, harbor porpoises, and some bird species appear to be recovering slowly, though mostly on the Northern side of the Baltic.²¹ International and transnational cooperation around HELCOM greatly increased the likelihood that vessels violating environmental regulations would be caught and held responsible.²² It also increased coordination in combating accidents and minimizing their environmental damage. The exchange of technical information and knowledge became commonplace, intensifying steadily following the 1974 signing and expanding greatly after the collapse of state-socialist governance.

International cooperation has helped to reduce phosphorus or nitrogen loads, though these declines remain far short of those needed to reduce eutrophication and exceptional planktonic algae blooms.²³ Despite a host of remaining environmental challenges, general agreement exists among Baltic officials and members of the regional scientific community, that the Baltic Sea would have deteriorated into a more polluted body of water – with significant ecological and economic costs – in the absence of the 1974 Convention and the ensuing forms of environmental cooperation.

Domestic Influence and Implementation

Significant HELCOM regime influence on environmental policy can be identified in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. HELCOM requirements and recommendations are frequently used in these countries' domestic environmental laws and policies. As in many Mediterranean states, environmental capacity remains a major constraint on Russian HELCOM implementation.²⁴ HELCOM coordinates the Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme (JCP) identifies environmental problems and prioritizes action in all of the countries of the Baltic catchment area. Its main focus, however, rests on the most severely degraded areas in the former communist states. The Programme serves as a long-term outline for curative and preventive environmental action to clean up existing and ongoing ecological damage from point and non-point sources, promote sustainable development, and improve domestic legislation, regulation, institutional capacity, resource use, and financing for environmental activities.²⁵ The JCP covers six component areas of action: (1) policy, legal, and regulatory

reform; (2) institutional strengthening and human resources development; (3) infrastructure investment; (4) management of coastal lagoons and wetlands; (5) applied research; and (6) public awareness and environmental education.²⁶ The total cost of the 20-year program is estimated at 18 billion ECU (approximately \$25 billion). The JCP's six components include activities targeting the multiple dimensions of capacity building discussed above. Rather than a near exclusive focus on technical assistance (e.g. construction, equipment provision and technical training), the JCP seeks to assist recipient states in building state capacities and public awareness and participation.

HELCOM intended the JCP to identify areas of need and legitimize them through expert scientific and technical assessment. HELCOM organizes resource mobilization workshops, bringing together officials and private sector actors in the post-communist states with representatives of bilateral and multilateral donor and lending organizations and prospective foreign investors (see Gutner, this report). A high-level HELCOM task force compiled the JCP based on national plans drafted by all of the participant states, pre-feasibility studies, and special studies of specific ecological areas of concern such as wetlands and agricultural runoff. International NGOs commented on drafts of the pre-feasibility studies and the preliminary version of the JCP, including Greenpeace International, WorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF), and Coalition Clean Baltic (CCB). CCB is a transnational umbrella group for local and national environmental NGOs from all of the Baltic littoral states. It serves as a

vehicle for environmental NGOs in Western Baltic states to support those in transition states.

The JCP calls for the use of numerous domestic, bilateral, and multilateral funding schemes and it identifies a significant private sector role within the context of the privatization, restructuring, and modernization processes underway in the former communist countries. HELCOM and all regime participants have been clear that “co-financing” for environmental projects would be the rule rather than the exception. In other words, local and national beneficiaries of these projects are expected to share costs. The JCP was explicitly formulated to serve as a basis for consideration by the multilateral development banks participating in the task force.

The JCP offers a comprehensive outline of the required steps to improve regional, national, and local ecological quality and state capacity, often addressing specific regions, states, and industrial sectors. In short, the JCP operationalizes the regime’s central principles and norms. The implementation of the JCP, as the operationalization of transnational regime principles and norms, takes HELCOM deeper into domestic political arenas. It has made HELCOM a “player” in the reconstruction of post-communist Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

Co-financing, combining financial resources from numerous international and domestic sources, has been the primary means of funding most hot spot mitigation and development programs.²⁷ International funding sources include the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), Nordic Invest-

ment Bank (NIB), and the EU (through the PHARE and LIFE programs)²⁸ and WWF as well as the governments of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of these, bilateral assistance programs of the donor countries of the Baltic region (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) are by far the largest sources of international funding.²⁹

Scientists, Principles, and Norms

HELCOM’s regional authority and legitimacy was established on the basis of its scientific and technical orientation and its use of related discourses. While regional political changes opened the way for regime change in the Baltic, the nature and direction of the change, during the 1988-1992 period, was shaped largely by HELCOM and ministerial meetings. HELCOM functioned both as the regional knowledge broker, by framing scientific findings within the context of the organization’s principles and norms, and as an entrepreneurial leader, by moving to participate in, and take advantage of, dramatic political changes in the region. HELCOM officials also brokered scientific consensus for state leaders, gradually “renegotiating” understandings of sovereignty and access to information.

The fundamental principles and policy norms of the Baltic Sea environmental protection regime still rest heavily on scientific and technological consensus and authority. However, recent changes in these principles and norms move the regime in a more explicitly political and (environmentally) ideological direction. This shift occurred with the active support and participation of the scientists within the

regime and HELCOM's various bodies. Rather than merely embodying normative consensus (and on some points, a lack of consensus) as outlined in the 1974 Convention, HELCOM and many of the regime participants embarked on a mission to broaden, reformulate, and reconstruct a new regional normative consensus. During the 1980s, consensus on new principles and norms emerged at the elite level – mostly among the region's scientists and across European environmental policy communities. Thus, HELCOM programs now attempt to alter and change the regional consensus on principles and norms for environmental policy among and within its member states. The resulting regional environmental protection regime has expanded well beyond its original scientific and technological focus.

HELCOM attempts to address organizational and resource shortcomings with training seminars and conferences, marshalling World Bank, EU, and bilateral support. The multilateral banks are interested in developing local institutional and organizational capacity and encouraging decentralization, especially in municipal services such as water, waste and power. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank organized a Water Supply and Sewage Utilities Partnership Workshop under their program "Baltic Utilities Initiative," "where the need for autonomous and self sufficient public utilities has been emphasized."³⁰ Environment ministries also recognize the need for more such training and capacity building programs. Multilateral efforts at retraining public officials and individuals facilitate the transfer of

transnational principles and environmental policy norms.

Many international donors are interested in promoting the polluter pays principle and expanding organizational and administrative capacity. For example, the World Bank is organizing a US\$20 million Municipal Services Development Project aimed at financing investments in municipal services and technical assistance to Latvian municipalities.³¹ As in Estonia, bilateral environmental assistance to Latvia is also strongly influenced by the Helsinki Conventions, HELCOM recommendations, and the JCP.³² As the largest sources of funding, these programs are especially important. The level of personal contacts between Latvian and environmental experts from Finland and Sweden is also high, including environment-related advisory, exchange and training programs, conferences, and joint research projects. Their existence helps to explain the transference of scientific, political, and environmental discourses across the Baltic. Activities consistent with JCP implementation, under all six of the program's components, explain much of the transfer of institutions like regional principles and policy norms.

Institution Building

How are transnational principles and environmental policy norms transferred into Baltic state law and regulation? In addition to changes in the regional discourse regarding Baltic environmental protection, one can cite the many training seminars, conferences, and education programs conducted in association with HELCOM activities.³³ Programs associated with JCP elements 1 and 2 (law and policy, and institutional capacity and human resources) are also important. Finland and Sweden alone

have spent millions of ECU on training and environmental management programs.³⁴ Multilateral sources including EBRD, PHARE, and the Harvard Institute for International Development have supported at least six programs concerning implementation of JCP elements 1 and 2.³⁵ These programs are guided by the basic principles of the HELCOM regime, generally including sessions on implementation of central environmental policy norms and harmonization with EU environmental standards.

Given their generally technocratic nature, both HELCOM and the EU tend to focus their training efforts on those who are supposed to implement and enforce environmental policy, rather than those who draft it. In small countries, however, these individuals are often the same people. For example, Estonian officials participate in HELCOM Program Implementation Task Force (PITF) seminars designed to educate them on the nature and content of HELCOM recommendations and the JCP. In fact, national officials are thoroughly educated about international environmental commitments and standards. As a result of the high level of involvement of Finnish and Swedish environmental officials, Estonian national policymakers are well-versed in Swedish and Finnish policy, as well. Institutional capacity and expertise at local levels remains low, however. Programs organized with domestic and international finances under JCP elements 5 and 6 (applied research and public awareness) also promulgate HELCOM norms in Estonia. Their content is usually strongly influenced by JCP goals and HELCOM recommendations. In particular, programmatic reforms in higher education

programs for environmental management and research influence policy development over time.

While training, institution building, and public awareness activities receive international expert advice and some international financing (from sources like EU PHARE, Finland, HELCOM PITF, Sweden, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency all require substantial support from domestic sources. This is consistent with the co-sponsoring requirements of the JCP. Programs are guided by the fundamental principles and policy norms promulgated by HELCOM, focussing on the application of HELCOM and EU principles, policy norms, and regulatory standards. Thus, multiple mechanisms for the cross border transfer of institutions such as principles and norms can be identified within the many JCP implementation activities. For example, nature protection areas programs incorporate the precautionary principle by assuming economic activities damage the areas when natural resources are extracted from these areas, polluter and user pays schemes are applied.

Environmental policy changes in the Baltic states, particularly Estonia and Latvia, demonstrate that international assistance aimed at institutional and organizational capacity building can work. The knowledge and expertise of Baltic national environmental policymakers and managers have grown rapidly since the late 1980s. Much of this growth resulted from bilateral and international sponsorship of training and assistance programs. Because of lackluster Soviet efforts to implement or publicize HELCOM recommendations, detailed knowledge of them was lacking in the Baltic states. International education and training efforts rectified this

situation. Bilateral and EU assistance programs also raised levels of knowledge and technical expertise concerning EU environmental policies. HELCOM and EU principles, policy norms, and standards shape domestic environmental policy in the Baltic states.

Higher levels of Swedish and Finnish political, economic and historical involvement with Estonia and Latvia – relative to Danish-Lithuanian cooperation – helps to explain Lithuania's lagging environmental policy reforms. Certainly, domestic factors also play an important role in explaining Lithuania's lagging environmental policy reforms. International support in all three Baltic states remains far below the levels required to fully implement HELCOM's JCP and the plan remains unimplemented in the majority of hotspots – especially industrial and agricultural ones. However, feasibility studies and mitigation plans are generally complete or underway. Such reports serve as mechanisms for transnational institutional transfer because they are conducted in accordance with JCP and HELCOM principles and norms.

Both the Baltic and the Mediterranean regimes serve as arenas for environmental negotiation and consensus building among the more developed members. However, HELCOM serves this function with greater frequency than does the MAP, where EU bodies tend to be the fora for these agreements. In the Baltic, western European states most often serve as lead countries in the development of new proposals. They have used the regime to negotiate specific environmental standards for specific industries and waste water treatment plants. In general, developed states built consensus among themselves and then attempted to bring

the communist (now post-communist) states on board. This process helps developed states in the Baltic region avoid or reduce competitive disadvantages stemming from stringent domestic environmental policy. Baltic ministerial meetings amplified domestic environmental concern, creating a kind of international “greenness” competition among states such as Denmark, Germany and Sweden.³⁶ These states often play international environmental institutions and programs such as HELCOM, OSPARCOM, and the EU, off of one another – working to get stronger policies that they support adopted in one forum in order to pressure others. In addition, regime institutions increase information sharing as well as joint spill-combating exercises, research, and monitoring in the region.

Mediterranean Cooperation

In the Mediterranean region, states' representatives formulated the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) and negotiated and adopted the 1976 framework Barcelona Convention and eight subsequent pollution control and environmental management protocols. Over time, these protocols expanded the scope and increased the specificity of international commitments in the region. Regional activities and the number of environmental organizations have grown, as have the number of interstate cooperation programs for research, information exchange, and pilot projects.

To date, parties have adopted thirteen common measures, recently amending the Barcelona Convention and three of its protocols. Amendments expand coverage of the Convention to include coastal areas and incorporate important new concepts in environmental governance and management into

the agreements. State parties developed a highly specified set of rules, procedures and mandates for regime-sponsored conferences, meetings, Med Plan administration, Regional Action Centres (RACs) and other regime programs and activities.³⁷ Other accomplishments include “Action Plans” to protect monk seals (1987), marine turtles (1989), cetaceans (1991) and encourage sustainable development.

Organizationally, the regime has grown substantially in 25 years. Parties established a Coordinating Unit for the Med Plan in 1982, taking the Secretariat and some administrative functions out of UNEP's headquarters (then in Geneva). To date, there are eight RACs that administer various MAP programs and facilitate implementation of the Barcelona Convention and its protocols. With the growth in MAP's organizational structure has come growth in the number of programs, training seminars, consultant activities, meetings, conferences, presentations, and publications. Staff and budgets at each RAC remain small and each RAC's activities fall well short of the list tasked to it upon creation. MAP regime organizational bodies are not well coordinated, nor clearly related within a single organizational structure. Implications of this decentralized structure are discussed below. The MAP regime also includes numerous inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGOs [intergovernmental organizations] and NGOs) in its activities. The numbers and activities of NGOs participating in the regime grew over time. While direct collaboration with the MAP Coordinating Unit remains rare and often vaguely defined, NGOs actively participate and support many regime activities. Their role is less

central than in the Baltic regime, however, where NGOs serve as “lead parties” for policy research and implementation.

Other international level accomplishments include the “refocusing” of regime programs on coastal area management and sustainable development.³⁸ These changes reflect alterations in the views and discourse of the region's environmental scientists in combination with renewed interests among regime participants in reviving the MAP's integrated development planning component. From an ecological perspective, greater focus on coastal areas is significant because pollution remains most chronic there. Politically, the regime has managed to overcome states' traditional reluctance to make international regulatory commitments regarding the use and pollution of coastal water – long considered part of states' sovereign territory and not subject to multilateral decision making.

The success of international cooperation within the Med Plan regime is limited, however. The environmental impacts or “improvements” resulting from all of this international cooperation remain small, few in number, and controversial. Oil spillage and biological contamination of beaches have fallen, but eutrophication, beach tar, and solid litter appear to be on the increase.³⁹ Coastal development remains largely unplanned and unconstrained by environmental concerns and habitat losses continue.⁴⁰ While sewage treatment capacities grow, so do populations, economies, and waste generation. Environmental protection of the region's dune and wetland ecosystems, ancient harbors and historical sites, threatened species and marine parks remains poor or non-existent.⁴¹

MAP has implementation plans for the growing number of international commitments within the regime. In fact, little assessment of national implementation even exists on which such plans could be based. Parties have failed to agree on the annexes and common measures necessary to assess implementation of existing protocols.

EU Influence

The limited success of regional Mediterranean cooperation demonstrates that states, international organizations, NGOs and expert communities can respond to environmental challenges at the international level. The MAP regime is “transnationalizing environmental policy.” Recent MAP agreements are characterized by greater specificity and scope and the regime’s research activities and demonstration projects expand knowledge and participation around the region. Driven by scientific consensus and discourse, individuals and organizations with normative and material interests in international political and scientific participation can establish and maintain regional cooperation. State level implementation remains problematic, however.

The Med Plan regime facilitates environmental cooperation and standard setting among the developed states as well, especially France and Italy. Except in cases where EU standards are already established, however, the developed Mediterranean states have not always demonstrated high levels of cooperation with each other. Recently, this has changed somewhat, with the four EU Mediterranean states cooperating in pursuit of agreement and adoption of new protocols to the Barcelona Convention.

Little “competitive greenness” occurs among the states around the

Mediterranean. EU applicant states have added some of this to the region, however. In need of ways to demonstrate their willingness to adopt EU environmental policies and standards, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia have been quick to follow EU states in adopting new regional protocols. In contrast to the Baltic regime, where the most developed members frequently pushed for higher standards, UNEP is often the driving force in the MAP regime. As in the Baltic region, developed Mediterranean states use the MAP regime as a vehicle to “export” their higher environmental standards around their region. In effect, EU Mediterranean states are sometimes “forced to lead” in the regional regime if they are to reduce competitive disadvantages arising from higher environmental standards imposed by the EU.

In the Mediterranean region, regime influence on national environmental law and regulation varies, but remains generally low. In EU states, the Union’s greater legal and financial capacity to pursue member state implementation of EU directives (since the Single European Act of 1987 and the 1992 treaty of Maastricht) has indirectly resulted in greater implementation of MAP requirements. Despite an impressive list of international accomplishments, the regime has limited influence on domestic environmental policies and state implementation in the region. EU membership and aspirations of such membership are more important determinants of state level implementation of international environmental commitments around the Mediterranean region. Member states France, Greece, Italy, and Spain witnessed growing stringency in environmental laws and policies over the last twenty years. In all four states, environmental policy

development was guided and pushed by EC/EU environmental policy, rather than by the MAP regime.

Among states currently applying to the EU, MAP implementation increased as a result of these states' attempts to introduce environmental policies equivalent to those of the Union. Four non-EU Mediterranean states have formally pursued EU membership: Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, and Turkey. In addition, Croatian officials have announced their intention to apply for membership. Though they remained MAP regime members in good standing, Malta and Cyprus only moved to expand environmental law and regulation in the 1990s following their interest in EU membership. Likewise, Slovenia and Croatia expanded and strengthened their environmental protection policies in parallel with their growing interest in EU membership. All four states avail themselves of the EU assistance and capacity building programs for which they are eligible. Turkey, on the other hand, was influenced by MAP activities in the early years of the regime.⁴² As Turkish interests in EU membership (and its prospects for it) waned in the 1990s, so has state interest in environmental protection. Thus, in EU member states and applicant states, the Union rather than MAP exerts greater influence on states' environmental policy. In the Mediterranean region, regime influence on national environmental law and regulation varies, but remains generally low. In EU states, the Union's greater legal and financial capacity to pursue member state implementation of EU directives (since the Single European Act of 1987 and the 1992 treaty of Maastricht) has indirectly resulted in greater implementation of MAP requirements. Among states cur-

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Scientific Institutions, State Capacity, and Implementation

Scientific collaboration and cooperation is widespread, involving hundreds of scientists and scientific organizations, producing massive amounts of data and hundreds of publications, conferences and conference papers, workshops, training seminars and demonstration projects. Peter Haas outlines national level environmental policy progress in the 1980s in Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey, positing these countries as best cases for demonstration of national level epistemic community influence.⁴³ However, little has happened at the national level since these states' initial interests in domestic environmental policy. Like the regime he studied, Haas neglected critical questions concerning these states' organizational capacity vis-a-vis environmental policy. In the wake of stagnant or declining state environmental capacity, little environmental policy development or implementation has occurred in Algeria, Egypt, or Turkey. Furthermore, collapsing state capacity in Albania, Bosnia, and Lebanon have left these states devoid of comprehensive environmental policy – let alone MAP implementation. Libya and Syria also lack sufficient state environmental policy capacity to comply or implement MAP commitments and state officials have not attempted to build it. In many Mediterranean states, only pilot programs and projects with international

funds appear to be influenced significantly by internationally agreed upon environmental standards. Without a minimum level of state capacity, there is no policy development for experts to influence, nor any place for the institutionalization of environmentally friendlier principles and policy norms to occur.

One group of Mediterranean states clearly lacks the ability to implement comprehensive environmental policies of the kind required under the Med Plan: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. Yugoslavia, a state traditionally supportive of the Med Plan regime, no longer exists as it was. It remains too soon to know what posture the smaller Yugoslavia will take toward the Med Plan regime. In Albania, Bosnia, and Lebanon, state control and authority over the populations and territories within their recognized boundaries remains problematic. The same can be said for Algeria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. If states lack basic authority over their populations and territory, it is unrealistic to expect (or pretend) that they can successfully implement and enforce international environmental agreements.

The Mediterranean environmental protection regime does little to address the lack of state capacity in failing states. Is the organizational collapse witnessed in these states temporary, or longer-term? If temporary, then regime participants might easily choose to wait out crises. If, however, the low levels of state environmental policy capacity found in the region are part of a long-term problem, the Med Plan's ability to protect the Mediterranean from pollution will remain constrained because MAP

relies on states for implementation. Albania, Bosnia, Lebanon possess virtually no state environmental capacity. In general, they lack most aspects of environmental law, regulation, and administration needed to comply with or implement MAP requirements.

Another group of Mediterranean states might best be characterized as "muddling through" in the area of environmental policy. In these states, state environmental policy capacity is not increasing over time despite the increasing number and scope of international environmental commitments. Such states include Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Libya, and Syria. In fact, state environmental capacity in some of these states may be declining. Absent increasing EU efforts to assist and compel Greece to comply with and implement international environmental commitments, Greece also might be considered a "muddling through" state.

Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey are three of the Mediterranean states that embarked on environmental policy and bureaucracy expansions following the construction of the Med Plan regime in the 1970s. All three are among Peter Haas' "strongest cases" of epistemic community influence.⁴⁴ Ongoing civil conflicts, high population growth, and anemic or negative per capita economic growth combined to halt "epistemically driven" environmental policy development in these states. As noted above, Turkey's commitment to environmental policy and regulatory expansion waned with its interest and prospects for EU membership.

"Informed" by epistemic community members, Algeria and Egypt embarked on efforts to incorporate many aspects of the regional environmental discourse into law and policy in the

1970s and 1980s.⁴⁵ These states passed basic environmental laws, ratified international environmental agreements, established administrative bodies for pollution control and participated in numerous Med Plan regime activities. However, domestic political elites “talked the talk” of international environmental protection. Since the late 1980s little domestic environmental policy expansion has occurred, despite a growing number of international commitments. The authoritative information and discourse of scientific and technical experts proved unable to significantly affect law and regulatory policy in these states. Algeria and Egypt lack the material and administrative resources to implement, monitor, and enforce environmental policy. In both states, social conflict and lagging economic growth constrain the ability of states to prioritize medium and longer-term concerns.

In Libya and Syria the story is different. These authoritarian states do not appear to be experiencing general state organizational crisis. However, neither state has witnessed much growth in environmental law, regulation, or administrative bureaucracy. Domestic law, policy, and administrative structures have not kept pace with increasing international environmental commitments. Rather than “muddling through,” both appear to be losing ground vis-à-vis state environmental capacity. Libya and Syria remain minimally supportive of the MAP regime. Their participation at international conferences is sporadic, but generally not obstructionist. Syria acceded to the Barcelona Convention and its first four protocols, signing the Offshore Protocol a year after its adoption in 1994. Syrian officials rarely participate in the preparation or adoption

of the regime's recent multilateral agreements, lacking representation during the preparation of recent protocols.

Libyan officials ratified the Barcelona Convention and its first two protocols and approved the Land Based Sources and Special Areas protocols – all following the agreements' entry into force. Libya did not sign either the Offshore nor the Syracuse protocols. Syria and Libya possess little domestic environmental legislation, regulation, or administration. This situation has changed little in the last twenty years. Libyan and Syrian participation in the regime might best illustrate a “rationalist” or “instrumentalist” approach to international environmental cooperation. Both states remain reluctant to make additional international commitments until such agreements enter into force. Once in force, regime-sponsored compliance and implementation programs begin or expand. These programs frequently offer limited funds for research, planning, information sharing, and participation in meetings and travel. Given each state's small annual contribution to the regime, both Libya and Syria get positive returns on regime participation – especially since neither has aggressively pursued costly domestic implementation.

The regional environmental effects of state collapse in small states remain small. However, the lack of environmental policy progress in states such as Algeria, Egypt, Greece, and Turkey is another story. Both the World Bank and the EU have stepped up funding for state environmental capacity building. But such funds continue to represent a small portion of development assistance given by these bodies. Furthermore, even if World Bank and

EU development assistance were adequately “greened” – a highly questionable proposition – the amount of such assistance relative to domestic and foreign investment is quite small. Without functioning state organizations, there exists no location for the embedding of transnational principles and norms for environmental policy.

Most bilateral and multilateral capacity building programs focus almost exclusively on the enhancement of technical capacity through such activities as education and training programs. Yet, merely increasing the technical skills of a given set of individuals or simply increasing their access to particular types of technology is unlikely to improve science advice to policymakers. Nor will it automatically improve policymakers’ capacities to act on such advice. As such, a few internationally sponsored programs, such as MEDPOL, are unlikely to expand state capacity. For example, neither science-based policy advice nor the actions taken on such a basis are likely to produce effective policy absent domestic institutions to critique and frame scientific and technical information.⁴⁶ Merely funding scientific and technical programs in recipient countries will not create science-policy institutions and institutions of organized skepticism automatically. A multifaceted approach to state capacity suggests that programs focussed exclusively or even primarily on technical capacity alone are likely to fail, if broader administrative, institutional and political considerations remain ignored or unattended.

Regional environmental cooperation and implementation of international commitments is constrained by very limited, often declining, state organizational capacity in many

Mediterranean countries. International scientific and/or policy cooperation produces increased environmental law, regulation, or protection absent adequate state administrative and legal capacity. States facing challenges presented by low levels of organizational capacity, in other words, can not “walk the walk” of increasing environmental protection. The MAP regime has done little to address this problem. With few prospects for increased funding, the regime is unlikely to possess the capabilities to combat lagging state environmental policy capacity anytime soon. Such states do not lack commitment to the regime, its goals, or the commitments they made in international agreements; they lack the ability to operationalize environmental discourse and administer environmental policy.⁴⁷ Other states, including Albania, Bosnia, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria, lack state environmental policy capacity altogether.

In both the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, regional environmental improvements that can be attributed to the regimes remain rare. In the Baltic, dramatic reductions in pollution emissions from the former communist states primarily result from declines in economic output and production since 1989. Notably absent from HELCOM’s regional efforts, however, is serious regulation of fisheries use. In the Mediterranean, few declines in effluent have been recorded. While coastal water environmental quality generally and slowly improves in both regions, regime participants in neither region have yet to improve or even address marine eutrophication, the major ecological threat to both seas. Many species remain endangered and health-threatening levels of numerous

toxins, heavy metals and hazardous waste discharges continue, and ecologically insensitive coastal development continues apace (particularly in the Mediterranean).

Conclusions

In both the Baltic and the Mediterranean regions, international environmental protection regimes and their constituent international organizations have successfully facilitated international cooperation between states with different, often opposing, political and economic systems and with divergent levels of development. The Baltic regime maintained cooperation across the East-West divide while the Med Plan regime managed to cope with East-West and North-South conflicts, as well as Arab-Israeli and Greek-Turkish tensions. A central difference between the regimes, however, is the differing level of bilateral assistance within them. HELCOM activities frequently facilitate, encourage and request bilateral assistance of a financial, expert, implementation and information gathering nature between members. To date, MAP has been less successful at producing a similar bilateral response. In the Mediterranean, only the EU has stepped up bilateral assistance for regime programs.

Regime influence at the national level – on law, policy, and implementation – remains uneven in both regions. In general, national level regime influence is greater around the Baltic Sea than in the Mediterranean region. In both regions it is clear that state capacity and the availability of financial and administrative resources remain centrally important for national level adoption of regime principles and policy

norms and the implementation of international commitments. In the Mediterranean region, state organizational capacity is a primary factor limiting the influence of transnational normative force. Without a location in which to become embedded, the influence of transnational institutions such as principles and policy norms on states remains limited. Both regimes offer insights into effective ways to build state capacity and promote state level implementation, adding to recent research.⁴⁸

Institutional and organizational capacity building: With respect to environmental protection regimes, minimum levels of state institutional and organizational capacity must exist in both science and environmental policy administration to achieve implementation. Regarding scientific capacity, both regimes have been successful in enhancing regional scientific capacity and in applying scientific consensus to policy. In fact, both regimes excel at facilitating the construction of regional scientific consensus and in spreading participation in scientific and technical research throughout their regions. Regime programs in both regions include the provision of needed scientific and technical training and equipment to meet regional research and monitoring goals as established by the respective regimes. However, the lack of a centralized regime organizational structure and limited state administrative capacity have limited MAP's abilities to push state compliance with the international commitments justified by scientific consensus. Furthermore, enhancing national scientific and technical capacity does not automatically enhance science and technology-based policy advice or the capacity of

policymakers to use such advice. These require institutionalized understandings and practices, as well.

Regarding state environmental policy and administrative capacity building, the results are mixed. While some successful programs for administrative capacity building can be observed in both regimes, the scope of such programs and their influence remains greater in the Baltic region. Institutional capacity building has been a higher priority in the Baltic, garnering more resources and attention from other international regimes and programs in the region. Furthermore, the content of state environmental policy development and administrative capacity building programs is extensively influenced by HELCOM. Actors in both regimes realize that increasing state capacity can not be assumed, it must be supported. Low economic development levels in many Mediterranean states and lower environmental commitment in the region's developed states present greater challenges in this area. Certainly, state capacity building efforts in the Baltic region are not an unqualified successes. The Russian state has been little influenced, nor has it received much attention from the regime.⁴⁹ HELCOM has focused more on the St. Petersburg region. Yet without greater environmental capacity and organizational stability in Moscow, such efforts remain severely constrained.⁵⁰ Likewise, local and municipal public sector environmental management and administrative capacities lag in most post-communist states (outside major cities).

International relations practitioners and analysts can not merely assume expanding state environmental management capacity over time. Both regional cases demonstrate that state

environmental policy capacity can remain low or decline over time. Both illustrate the benefits of international cooperative efforts within regimes to expand state capacity in such areas as environmental law, policy, administration, enforcement, and scientific monitoring. Additional research is warranted on the limits of state organizational capacity and on the design and effectiveness of initiatives intended to address these short-comings.

Implementation efforts: Regional international environmental cooperation can be accomplished with relatively few resources. Implementation, however, costs much more. Estimates of the costs of implementation of HELCOM commitments in the transition states of the Baltic region exceed \$20 billion. Roughly the same amount is needed to bring *only four* EU member Mediterranean states into compliance – and this figure does not include the costs of implementing other international environmental commitments nor other expenses to be born by consumers.⁵¹ HELCOM leadership, Baltic regional political changes and the commitment of greater resources and international involvement, produced a Joint Comprehensive Plan for implementation of regime requirements and recommendations. While current funding remains short of estimated needs, numerous municipal waste treatment projects and national policy reform and capacity building efforts have been funded through JCP channels.

The JCP produced a scientifically legitimized laundry list of needed environmental objectives. It put cost estimates on necessary investments, giving international legitimacy to claims by transition state officials that they are unable to “clean up” many areas absent

international assistance. Although the Mediterranean Action Plan offers guidelines for environmental management needs in the region, the MAP regime lacks a comprehensive and specific implementation plan for its protocols. Nor does it possess a concerted effort to assess and increase state environmental compliance or capacity.

In their third decade of activity, the Baltic and Mediterranean regimes for environmental protection are engaged in “Europeanizing” environmental protection principles and policies in their respective regions. Western European principles and policy norms are being regionally standardized around the Baltic and Mediterranean regions. Increasingly, this regionalization is accomplished in conjunction with EU actors and standards, taking advantage of the EU’s position as the primary ideational and economic construction in late

twentieth century Europe. Regional actors and institutions, including the EU are constructing and standardizing the roles of scientific communities and science advice in conjunction with the promulgation of principles and policy norms for environmental protection. Such processes Europeanize states within the two regions, altering their law, bureaucratic structure, content, and practice in a host of Baltic and Mediterranean littoral countries. However, as comparisons of the two regional regimes demonstrate, state structure, law, and behavior do not change automatically to implement international agreements. Without serious attention to multiple dimensions of public sector capacity, state level implementation of the burgeoning set of international environmental agreements, standards, principles, and policy norm remains unlikely.

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Cleaning up the Baltic Sea: The Role of Multilateral Development Banks

By

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Donor aid institutions, both bilateral and multilateral, have been important actors in regional efforts to clean-up the Baltic Sea. This paper focuses on the three major multilateral development banks (MDBs) operating in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)¹ and the types of activities they have undertaken vis-à-vis the Baltic Sea. The World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are major donor organizations in the region, involved to different degrees, in international cooperative efforts for the Baltic Sea. The MDBs not only provide financing for individual projects, but may also be involved in broader agenda-setting exercises and other capacity building efforts at the national or municipal level. These MDBs, along with their smaller counterparts, were participants in efforts to develop and implement the Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Program (JCP) set up in 1992 under the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM).² The JCP identified actions for the ecological restoration of the Baltic, and developed a list of over 130 point and non point-source “hot spots” within its catchment area requiring investments estimated at 10 billion Euro.³ The MDBs have sought to finance specific water and waste water treatment projects in some of the hot spot areas, to help recipient country governments fulfill their HELCOM obligations.

More broadly, the MDBs’ projects typically provide larger amounts of financial transfers (mainly through loans) than their bilateral counterparts. MDB loans also attract additional bilateral, private sector, and recipient government funding, which further increases the size of an individual project. Finally, the World Bank and, to a lesser extent the EBRD, have also been involved in policy discussions and economic reform projects and programs that may have a positive impact on the Baltic Sea.

Despite the potentially pivotal roles the MDBs may have in actions to address the Baltic Sea’s severe pollution problems, their lending and policy efforts have been mixed. The World Bank has been most deeply involved in investment projects, agenda setting, and policy activities regarding the Baltic Sea, while the EIB has made few efforts to finance projects that address Baltic Sea pollution. The EBRD maintains an intermediate position, more active than the EIB in its Baltic Sea-related work, but with less breadth of activity than the World Bank. This is an interesting finding since on the global scene many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are critical of the World Bank’s environmental activities, whereas environmentalists have only recently begun to scrutinize the EIB.

Yet, even where the banks have funded specific projects to address “hot spots” designated by the JCP, all three have faced numerous challenges in the implementation phase, as they grapple with domestic political, technical, and other issues. These implementation issues highlight the different goals of the MDBs vis-à-vis local municipalities or national governments, and the ways in which policy solutions that are attractive on paper may run into difficulties in the

process of being translated into action. This paper describes major differences in the three banks' lending strategies before turning to an analysis of their involvement in regional efforts to tackle the Baltic Sea's environmental problems. It then looks more closely at some of the individual water projects they have financed, and the challenges they have faced in implementing these projects in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, home of the greatest concentration of MDB water projects tied to the JCP.

MDB Approaches

The World Bank, EBRD, and EIB are among the major donors in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), together providing around \$30 billion in loans to the region in the period fiscal 1991-97.⁴ Environmental aid has been a priority of donor countries working in CEE, in order to help address the environmental damage found in different areas throughout the region, to assist in environmental policy reform efforts, and more recently, to help countries hoping to join the European Union (EU) tackle the enormous costs of bringing their environmental standards up to EU standards. The European Commission estimates the latter effort alone has a daunting price tag of \$130 billion.⁵

The three MDBs have adopted somewhat different approaches to addressing environmental issues in CEE, which can be explained in part by shareholder politics, and by how "bank-like" each MDB is designed to act.⁶ In terms of shareholder politics, external pressure from major shareholder countries (usually supported or pushed by environmental NGOs) has been an important factor in determining the depth of each MDB's commitment to addressing environmental issues. There has been much

stronger pressure from shareholders at the World Bank and EBRD, with the United States often taking the lead relative to the EIB, whose shareholders are the EU member states and the EU Commission. Yet, even where major shareholders have expressed a desire for an MDB to address environmental issues, institutional design and incentive systems play critical roles in determining how these ideas are translated into projects with primary environmental goals or significant environmental components.

In particular, an important aspect of institutional design and incentive systems is how "bank-like" the MDB is designed to be. All MDBs are designed in some ways to behave like financial institutions, in the sense that their primary function is to make loans to creditworthy governments or private sector actors for projects that, at minimum, fulfill the banks' criteria on economic, financial, technical, and legal viability. Yet, at the same time, MDBs have something grafted onto them not found among commercial banks; that is, government functions. As development institutions, MDBs are asked to elaborate, incorporate into their lending, and implement a variety of mandates given to them by their shareholder member states, to help shape policy reform in recipient countries.

MDBs differ in the degree to which they emphasize their banking goals or their non-banking goals. Those behaving more like financial institutions than development agencies will be more driven by client demands and contain fewer incentives for staff to situate projects within broader policy goals, such as the environment, than a less "bank-like" MDB. By contrast, in a less "bank-like" MDB there will be more incentives for staff to seek to influence recipient gov-

ernments to accept particular investments linked to various policy goals. At the same time, this type of MDB may face a greater challenge in selling its projects to recipient countries that have access to alternative sources of financing with fewer non-financial policy conditionality strings attached.

Of the three MDBs, the World Bank is least bank-like, the EIB is most “bank-like,” and the EBRD has a position somewhere between the other two. The World Bank’s primary mission has evolved considerably over the years, moving it increasingly away from the “Bank-as-bank” model.⁷ The World Bank’s stated major emphases are on poverty alleviation and environmentally sustainable development, and it is the only one of the three MDBs that regularly funds projects focusing on issues such as education, health, or nutrition.⁸ It also tends to have the most non-economic conditionality attached to its loans, and undertakes the most policy-related work, from structural adjustment lending (conditioned on macroeconomic policy reforms) to assisting countries in the development of national environmental action programs (NEAPs).⁹ Of the three, the Bank is a major source of policy advice and technical assistance to borrowing countries, and its vast research arm’s budget totals around \$25 million a year.¹⁰ World Bank lending is aimed at government agencies, is based on policy dialogues with governments, and requires sovereign guarantees.¹¹ In terms of global environmental issues, the World Bank is the main implementing agency of the Global Environmental Facility, which provides grants to help poor countries address global environmental issues. It also helps to manage the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund, to finance the incremental costs devel-

oping countries face in phasing out ozone depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol. While ambitious in the scope of its activities and goals, the Bank regularly faces criticism for sometimes running into trouble in carrying them out.¹²

The London-based EBRD was established in May 1990 to help post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and later the rest of the former Soviet Union as well, to build market economies and pluralist democracies. It was distinctive among MDBs in its explicit focus on the private sector. The Bank was directed to target at least 60 percent of its loans and guarantees to the private sector, with the remaining 40 percent going to public sector projects. While such an orientation inherently made the EBRD more demand- and client-driven than the World Bank, in practice it took a few years for the EBRD to jumpstart its operations since the task of designing private sector projects in countries where no private sector existed was an enormous challenge. At the same time, the EBRD was set up to pursue policy initiatives such as the environment in a much stronger way than a private sector bank.¹³ It is the first MDB born with an environmental mandate, albeit a broad one, of promoting “environmentally sound and sustainable development.”¹⁴

The EIB, based in Luxembourg, was created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome to be the European Community’s (now the EU) long-term lending institution, to “contribute to the balanced and steady development of the Common Market in the interest of the Community.”¹⁵ While the EIB is owned by its EU member states and the vast majority of its lending goes to its member states, in fact it is a global actor. It operates in over 120

countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and elsewhere that have signed cooperation or association agreements with the Community. The Bank entered the CEE arena in 1989 and has been authorized to lend a total of 8.2 billion Euro through 2000, with an additional 3.5 billion Euro pre-accession facility for CEE countries and Cyprus.

The EIB is the most “bank-like” MDB of the three, in the sense that it is largely client-driven, and the least proactive in addressing policy issues in CEE.¹⁶ The EIB takes on new policy mandates given to it by the Council and does not engage in its own country lending strategies. Its small staff (under 900) is one-tenth the size of the World Bank’s staff (at 9,300), while in recent years the EIB’s lending has surpassed World Bank lending. For example, the EIB’s loans totaled over \$34 billion in fiscal year 1998, compared with \$21 billion for the World Bank.¹⁷

The EIB has not had a policy voice like the other two MDBs, which makes sense when one considers that its major shareholders are also its major borrowers and therefore have little incentive to create an institution that tells them what to do. The EIB has no separate policy research arm and does not directly promote a particular set of its own policy ideas or innovative types of loan conditionality. In CEE, it offers the cheapest loans of the three MDBs, with the least attached conditionality.

Of the three MDBs, EIB also has the least developed or explicit environmental policy goals, and by far the smallest number of staff whose job is specifically to finance “green” projects. It mainly addresses environmental issues in its work, not by actively seeking to finance specifically “green” projects, but by ensuring that projects within the EU

comply with various EU legislation or national legislation – whichever is higher – and that non-EU projects comply with relevant environmental legislation. Generally, the EIB is much less proactive in identifying projects with significant environmental goals than the other two MDBs.

Although the EIB is the most “bank-like” of the three, it will also one day be the most important (and eventually the only) MDB in pre-accession/accession countries in CEE. As the transition process matures in these countries, and other MDBs move their activities and resources further east, the EIB will remain as Europe’s multilateral bank.

MDBs and Baltic Sea Cooperation

The three banks’ action on Baltic Sea issues can be divided into policy and project activities. At the policy level, the World Bank is the most active of the three – as can be seen in its intellectual leadership within the high-level Task Force that helped to draft the JCP, in assisting recipient countries in the region in the development of NEAPs, and in drafting the Regional Environmental Action Programme (EAP), one of the most visible outcomes of the Environment for Europe process.¹⁸ The EBRD, in turn, has been involved in a handful of policy-related exercises, but over time has focused most of its attention on project lending, where it believes its comparative advantage lies. Both the World Bank and EBRD are involved in the Project Preparation Committee (PPC), a micro-institution created by the Environment for Europe process to facilitate the implementation of the EAP. The PPC is a network of bilateral donors and MDBs that acts as a matchmaker to bring together bilateral and multilateral

assistance for projects that support the EAP's goals.

The EIB is least involved in broader policy exercises and is at most a peripheral player in the policy networks that have developed around the Environment for Europe process. At the same time, however, it has been relatively more active in regional efforts to address the environmental degradation of the Baltic and Mediterranean seas.

The bread-and-butter work of the three MDBs is project lending. Happily for the banks, water sector projects combine their dual interests in identifying "bankable" projects that are relatively easy for them to finance, with their interest in showing the public that they are actively financing "green" projects that have positive environmental outcomes. Indeed the financing of water and waste water treatment projects have long been a part of the traditional MDB portfolio, but can now be categorized as part of an MDB's "green" activities. Of course, not all water projects are environmentally beneficial; for example, they can be environmentally harmful if they involve diverting rivers or draining aquifers in an unsustainable manner. Water projects often require partial environmental assessments due to their potentially important environmental impacts. Additionally, whether or not a wastewater treatment plant relies on mechanical treatment, versus biological or chemical treatment greatly affects its potential environmental impact.

All three MDBs are financing water and waste water projects in the Baltic region in cities and towns identified by the 1992 JCP as "hot spots," or priorities for environmental clean-up. In these "hot spots," wastewater was (is) often dumped, untreated or partially treated, into the Baltic Sea, where it has been a

major source of pollution. These cities and towns either had no waste water treatment plants, old ones that needed to be upgraded, or partially built new Soviet-designed plants that were generally too big for the capacity needed. The poor condition of municipal wastewater treatment resulted in a widespread problem of inadequate or no collection or treatment of sewage. It also increased the likelihood of contamination of groundwater or drinking water, since often the pipes for the waste water and water supply systems were built too close to each other.

The World Bank to date has funded the most water projects in the Baltic region; five projects in the Baltic states and two in Poland. The EIB has funded the fewest in CEE; it has co-financed an EBRD project in Riga, and funded one water project on its own in Warsaw, which has been stalled for the past several years. On the other hand, of the three banks, the EIB is the only one that can finance projects in rich Western European countries, and has done so in northern Germany and Sweden.¹⁹ The following section focuses on the three banks' projects in the Baltic states, which were among the first designed by the MDBs in the region and are generally further along in their implementation.

MDB Baltic Water Projects

The World Bank has made loans to five water and waste water treatment plants in the Baltics: in Klaipeda (\$7 million) and Siauliai (\$6.2 million), Lithuania; in the Haapsalu and Matsalu bays in Estonia (\$2m); and Liepaja (\$4m) and Daugavpils (\$6.9m)²⁰, Latvia. The loans are part of larger financing packages organized by the Bank, which can include bilateral grant contributions,

and contributions from the national government and municipalities. For example, the project cost of the Siauliai totaled \$23 million.²¹ All five projects contain water sanitation and supply components, and with the exception of the Daugavpils project, they contain specific “environmental management components” (EMCs) funded mainly with bilateral grant money. These EMCs, not undertaken by the other two MDBs, focus on issues specifically related to the environment, such as coastal zone management. The goal of all five projects is to reduce the discharge of wastewater into the Baltic Sea through the improvement of waste water and water supply services. The EMC components, in turn, support the development of management plans for sustainable development of nearby coastal areas and wetlands.

In the Baltic states, the EBRD has financed four water projects: in Riga, Latvia (18.1 million Euro); Kaunas, Lithuania (11.9 million Euro); and in Estonia, a project in Tallinn (47.9 million Euro), and a "Small Municipalities Environment Project" that provides investments in water services outside of Tallinn (24 million Euro). The EBRD's approach tends to be narrower than the World Bank's, emphasizing the corporatization of the municipal entity.

The EIB, to date, has financed only one water project in the Baltic states. This is a 15 million Euro investment in the upgrading and rehabilitation of Riga's water and waste water systems, a project the EIB is co-financing with the EBRD, which the latter took the lead in designing.

Capacity Building Efforts

All three MDBs are involved in capacity building at the municipal level in terms of seeking to create water and

waste water plants that can function as profitable entities, through the use and collection of tariffs, as well as implementation of cost cutting measures. As the EBRD has noted:

Generally, the operational and financial performance of municipal water and sewerage companies is poor, revenue generation is inadequate and services are not provided in an efficient and cost-effective way. Many of the presently operated systems are marked by wastage of resources, high levels of physical losses, and lack of financial rationale in operations and investments. Financial performance is hampered by inadequate capacity in revenue administration, financial management, and investment programming and budgeting.²²

Financial performance objectives often involve municipal water utilities increasing tariffs and collecting them, as well as cutting costs to meet the requirements developed by the banks to ensure that utilities can function as self-financing entities. Indeed, the World Bank and EBRD projects have also involved “twinning” the Baltic water utilities with Nordic counterparts, as a means to share technical and management skills.

Capacity building in terms of improving a water or waste water utility's financial performance can have environmental impacts in several important ways. For example, the failure of water utilities to adequately measure water demand through pricing or metering, results in excessive consumption and wastage. Where energy prices have been underpriced, energy consumption is

often higher than necessary and inefficient. In addition, for pre-accession countries, the banks include in their work with the municipal water companies strategies on how to meet EU regulatory standards, which affects and is affected by financial/management capacity building issues.

In terms of capacity building on specifically environmental issues, of the three banks, the World Bank has been most proactive in the ways it has directly addressed broader watershed issues in its work. While the national governments of the three Baltic states are keen on projects linked to the JCP, municipalities tend to be more interested in local issues. This has generally meant that municipalities prefer aid money to improve drinking water, whereas waste water treatment or broader watershed/Baltic Sea issues are less of a priority.²³ As a result, the Bank “sold” the EMCs to recipients not as loans that would have to be repaid, but as grant components supplied by bilateral donors. There was therefore no cost to recipients for agreeing to projects that included EMCs. These EMCs were also a very small proportion of total project costs. For example, the EMCs contributed \$1.4 million of the \$23 million Siauliai project.

At the same time, the water projects designed by the Bank almost always went beyond what the municipalities initially had in mind, as the World Bank tacked on additional components to pursue a broader watershed approach. The Bank had particular leverage to do so with these projects, because most municipalities could not find alternative sources of financing at the time they were designed, even from other MDBs. The World Bank also brought bilateral donors into financing parts of the waste

water and drinking water components of the loans as well.

To illustrate the Bank’s leverage and influence, in Haapsalu, Estonia, for example, the municipality hoped to complete construction on a biological wastewater treatment plant to replace the existing mechanical treatment plant. Construction on the plant began before Estonia achieved independence in 1991, and after that, the Estonians did not want to complete construction on the Soviet-designed plant with Russian technology. Estonia was unable to secure financing for the project from the Swedish aid agency or the EBRD. The World Bank, however, expressed an interest in financing the project if it included an EMC that focused on nearby Matsalu Bay, which itself was on the HELCOM list of priority “hot-spots” as an important wetland and nature reserve.²⁴

The municipality of Siauliai, Lithuania, in turn, wanted to complete its partially constructed wastewater treatment plant, while addressing the problem it faced by its inadequate capacity to handle sludge.²⁵ Siauliai is the fourth largest city in Lithuania, one of its main industrial centers, and home – before Lithuania’s independence – to the largest Soviet military airport in Eastern Europe. The partly constructed Soviet-style plant was to replace an older plant that no longer met the city’s needs.²⁶ However, the design of the unfinished plant was too big for the city.

The World Bank project, instead of confining itself to the completion of the municipality's wastewater treatment plant, added onto the project a number of additional environmental components. These included the EMC that would organize bilateral funding for training, technical assistance, and other support for a Lielupe River Commission where

Lithuania and Latvia could cooperate on issues concerning management and clean-up of the river.²⁷ This component would also provide technical support, equipment, and training for two Lithuanian regional environmental protection offices; assistance in the development of procedures to monitor discharge; a plan for sludge management; and a large study complemented by demonstration activities aimed at improving the practices of large local pig farms in managing agricultural run-off. The Bank argued that better practices by local pig farmers would greatly enhance the project's benefits in terms of reducing pollution to the Baltic Sea.²⁸

Challenges Faced

The MDB Baltic water projects have faced a variety of challenges in implementation. All three MDB projects have struggled to increase tariffs and reduce costs to meet the financial obligations laid out in the loan documents. It has been politically difficult for some municipal governments to agree to increase water tariffs as required under the loans. All of the MDB-financed water utilities also have faced sharper-than-expected declines in water demand, which in turn reduced expected revenues that can be collected from tariffs. As a result, many of the MDB water projects are not performing as well as expected in financial terms.

In terms of the World Bank projects, the EMCs have had mostly small, if any, tangible results. They have produced some studies that may or may not be useful in future policy development, such as integrated coastal zone management plans in Lithuania and Latvia. The Bank canceled the EMC for the Lielupe River Commission, due to lack of local interest, plus the fact that the EU's

PHARE program was interested in funding this on its own. Yet, some of the EMCs are viewed as successful, such as the pig farm study in Siauliai, which produced recommendations on practices that were adopted by Lithuania's pig breeders' association. The EMC for the Liepaja project included the purchase of a reed harvester for Latvia's Lake Pape, a large coastal wetland that is part of the coastal wildlife habitat. The harvester allowed the local municipality to harvest reeds that clog up the lake, and sell them in Denmark and Lithuania, where they are used for roof material.

A number of the MDB projects faced delays, caused by a variety of reasons. The EBRD's Kaunas project, for example, was delayed for over a year, due to difficulty in meeting covenants on tariff increases. The initial project design, inherited from the Soviets, was also determined to be too big, based on optimistic estimates of water consumption. One actor involved in the project noted that the central government was slow in transferring its share of project financing, while others complained that some of the bilateral actors involved in components of the project (such as PHARE) provided poor consultants. Other actors also noted that some delays were caused by constant political changes in the city, reflected by the fact that there were eight different mayors from the time the project was agreed upon in mid-1998. The Tallinn project, in turn, lost around nine months due to slow Parliamentary approval of the project. The EIB and EBRD's project in Riga has also faced delays, due to slowness in the procurement process.²⁹

The World Bank found that its projects in Lithuania were somewhat more difficult to implement than those in Estonia or Latvia. Some of the problems

were outside of its control, such as a rapidly changing group of Lithuanian policymakers at the national level (including three different environment ministers in the space of six years). The Klaipeda project was delayed due to slow procurement tendering after the Ministry of Environment insisted on a re-tendering to involve more Lithuanian firms. Shifting government requirements on waste effluents delayed the project for another 12 months. Disagreements between the Bank and the Lithuanian environment ministry also delayed the water projects. One general debate was over whether or not the waste water plants needed back-up pieces of certain equipment (such as pumps or piping), which were required under the old regime (and by old Soviet standards), since equipment often broke down. Such additional back-up systems add to project costs, and are generally not required in Western-style plants.

On the positive side, the MDB water projects are expected to have, or are already having, important impacts in reducing pollution into the Baltic Sea. According to Tallinn water officials, by 1998, treated waste water going into the Baltic Sea was two to three times cleaner than in 1993. Drinking water was also significantly cleaner after treatment, while further investment is needed in the water network to get the higher quality water to consumers.³⁰ The World Bank-funded plants in Liepaja (Latvia) and Haapsalu (Estonia) are also up and running. Environmentalists in Lithuania have applauded the EBRD's Kaunas project, since Kaunas has been responsible for around 90 percent of the untreated wastewater discharged in Lithuania. Kaunas is Lithuania's second largest city, with a population of 403,000, and before the EBRD project it had no

wastewater treatment. The project financed the first phase of the construction of a wastewater plant (along with new pumping stations, new network, and other components) that included mechanical treatment with chemical flocculation, while biological treatment of wastewater was planned for the medium-term. Its goals were to reduce heavy metals by 70 percent, total nitrogen by 10 percent, total phosphorus by 85 percent, BOD by 60 percent, and suspended solids by 33 percent.³¹

Conclusion

The three MDBs' efforts to reduce pollution to the Baltic Sea from land-based sources highlight some of the broader challenges faced by donors seeking to coordinate regional cooperation and capacity building efforts. The banks' comparative advantage as financial institutions is in the financing of water supply and wastewater treatment plants in the hot spot areas identified by the JCP. Yet, how "bank-like" the MDB is does have an impact on the degree to which it seeks out and finances such projects, as well as its efforts to address broader watershed issues in its activities, versus capacity building contributions more limited to the performance of the water utilities.

Finally, the implementation of these water projects rarely occurs as specified in the project documents, as projects must adjust to political realities, technical delays, and other unanticipated issues. While a number of the MDB-financed utilities are now making a contribution to the reduction of untreated or partially treated waste water into the Baltic Sea, there are clearly many other "hot spots" that need to be addressed.

The demand for water and wastewater projects in pre-accession

countries is increasing as countries work on meeting European water directives. A new EU fund – Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) – will come on-line in 2000, and provide one billion Euros in grants a year through 2006 for projects in the environment and transport sectors. ISPA will provide a new source of co-financing for the MDBs, and may give them the opportunity to expand their work in the HELCOM municipal point

source hot spot areas in pre-accession countries. The degree to which the banks respond to this new initiative will depend on several factors. One of the most important is the extent to which municipalities try to finance their needs through the new grants, avoiding MDB loans. ISPA grant financing can make up a high percentage of total project cost, up to 75 percent in some cases, but cities may find ways to stretch that amount to cover their needs.

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¹ This paper adopts a commonly used definition of CEE countries as Central European countries and the three Baltic states. Unlike the World Bank and the EBRD, the EIB does not operate in the rest of the former Soviet Union, nor does it lend to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and FYR Macedonia.

²The other two, much smaller international financial institutions involved in the Baltic states are the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO). The NIB provides investment for projects of Nordic interest throughout CEE, while NEFCO focuses on environmental investment in CEE, mainly in Poland, the Baltic states, and northwest Russia.

³1 Euro=1 ECU, as of January 1, 1999.

⁴ The breakdown is: World Bank, \$13.4 billion; EBRD, \$8.3 billion; EIB, \$7.9 billion. Note that the World Bank's fiscal year is July 1 –June 30, whereas the other two banks have fiscal years based on the calendar year. Sources: World Bank, EBRD, EIB Annual Reports, 1990-97.

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⁶ For a detailed explication of this argument, see Tamar L. Gutner, "Banking on the Environment: Multilateral Development Banks and Environmental Policymaking in Central and Eastern Europe," Doctoral Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, February 1999.

⁷ Moises Naim. 1994. "The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture." In *Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future*. Washington DC: Bretton Woods Commission: C273-87.

⁸ The EBRD is not involved in these sectors at all. The European Council asked the EIB in 1997 to become involved in lending for health and education in the EU through the "Amsterdam Special Action Programme" to help boost employment in Europe.

⁹ NEAPs describe and assess a country's environmental problems and propose various policy options for addressing them.

¹⁰ Nicholas Stern and Francisco Ferreira, "The World Bank as 'Intellectual Actor,'" in *The World Bank: Its First Half Century*, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (Washington DC: The Brookings Institutions, 1997), p. 523.

¹¹ The World Bank tends to refer to the IBRD and IDA. IDA provides interest free loans to very poor countries. The World Bank Group includes the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which lends to the private sector; and the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which insures private sector investors against non-commercial risks in developing countries.

¹² See for example, Bruce Rich, *Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994).

¹³ For example, it has a municipal and environmental infrastructure team that funds mainly public sector projects, as well as a small energy efficiency unit that finances small energy efficiency projects. It also administers a donor-funded Nuclear Safety Account to improve the safety of CEE nuclear power plants.

¹⁴ EBRD, "Articles Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development," (EBRD: London, 1990).

¹⁵ Treaty of Rome, Article 130, which has become Article 198E under the Maastricht Treaty.

¹⁶ It is, however, less "bank-like" in the sense that it is the most risk-averse of the three MDBs. It seeks double guarantees (both sovereign and EU guarantees) for loans outside of the EU. The EBRD, by contrast, does not even have to pursue sovereign guarantees in its private sector lending, and increasingly, even its municipal lending.

¹⁷ World Bank. 1998 Annual Report. (Washington DC: World Bank); Sir Brian Unwin, "Statement to the EIB Board of Governors," June 14, 1999, www.eib.org/pub/news/agm_st.htm. The World Bank staff figure includes Washington DC staff, as well as local office staff.

¹⁸ The EAP is a set of guidelines, principles, and priority areas for environmental management in CEE, which was endorsed by Eastern and Western environment ministers at the 1993 Environment for Europe conference in Lucerne, Switzerland. The "Environment for Europe" process, in turn, is a loose set of institutional initiatives and regional meetings set up as a political framework for cooperation on environmental protection in Europe. This process was launched in 1991 in response to early failures at environmental aid coordination and prioritization in the region, together with a desire in some corners for a pan-European environmental policy. It has brought together governments from East and West, multilateral development banks, international actors such as the OECD and the European Commission, and environmental NGOs in a process of dialogue, policy development and environmental assistance.

Ironically, in contrast to the JCP, the EAP argued that the level of damage to human health should be the main criterion driving the prioritization of environmental problems, which gave (for the region as a whole) preference to air pollution over water pollution, with an emphasis on airborne dust caused by coal-burning, lead found in air and soil, and sulfur dioxide and other gases emitted primarily by the burning of high-sulfur coal or fuel oil.

¹⁹ EIB. 1995. *Annual Report*. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank, p. 44.

²⁰ The water and wastewater components are part of a larger \$27 million "Municipal Services Development Project" for Latvia.

²¹ World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Lithuania: Siauliai Environment Project," World Bank, November 1995, p. i.

²² EBRD, "Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure: EBRD involvement to date in the MEI [Municipal and Environmental Infrastructure] sector," (London: EBRD, 1999), p. 4.

²³ This section is based on personal interviews with municipal water company officials, Bank project implementation units, and municipal officials in Haapsalu, Estonia; Liepaja, Latvia; and Siauliai and Klaipeda, Lithuania; as well as environmentalists and environmental ministry officials in all three Baltic states, June 1998.

²⁴ Official of Haapsalu Water Works, Haapsalu, Estonia, interview with the author, 15 May 1998. "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Estonia: Haapsalu and Matsalu Bays Environment Project," World Bank, March 15, 1995.

²⁵ The city's sludge is pumped directly into lagoons, which were largely filled by 1996, and sludge was not distributed according to levels of toxicity. World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Lithuania Siauliai Environment Project," World Bank, 1995, p. 10.

²⁶ The old sewage treatment plant could only process 60 percent of daily collected water, which meant a daily discharge of around 10 tons of polluted water directly into the Kulpe River, which flows directly into the Baltic Sea. The sewage is highly contaminated with heavy metals, which also means that the sludge removed from the plant cannot be used for agriculture. "Ecological Problems of Siauliai," Siauliai Municipality Environmental Affairs Department, 1994, pp. 12, 15.

²⁷ In fact, Siauliai is the source of most of the pollutant load discharged into the Lielupe. Pollution sources on Latvia's portion of the river tend to be small.

²⁸ According the project's task manager, two of the big pig farms, with 20,000 pigs each, contribute more waste than the entire city of Siauliai. World Bank project manager, interview with the author, April 30, 1998.

²⁹ In addition, the only water project the EIB fully designed itself, in Warsaw, has faced very long delays (of several years), due to a variety of problems, including difficulties in terms of the ownership of land where the new waste water plant would be built, since property rights of the proposed site were contested. Interviews with EIB project official, Polish finance ministry official, official at another MDB working Warsaw, July 1996, October 1997, June 1999.

³⁰Official of Tallinn Water, interview with the author, May 14, 1998.

³¹EBRD, "Lithuania: Kaunas Water and Environment Project," Memorandum to Board of Directors, BDS95-99", 30 June 1995, Annex 5.

Environmental Clean-Up Challenges in European Seas

By

Miranda Schreurs

October 1999 marked the decade anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. The ten-year anniversary of this historic event was a time for reflection. When the Wall was torn down, expectations ran high for the future. The reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the democratization of the Central and Eastern European states were all expected to result in an improvement in living conditions. The normalization of relations between West and East were to expedite the economic and political transformation of the former Soviet states. Aid from the West and democratization in the East were supposed to help improve environmental conditions.

The Soviet era had wreaked havoc on the environment. Industrial plants lacked adequate pollution control equipment and were highly inefficient. Air and water pollution near industrial areas was terrible. Nuclear plants had been built and operated without sufficient regard to safety. Toxic waste was dumped on land and at sea. In many cities, there was either no wastewater treatment or the treatment plants that existed were inadequate. It was not until the Soviet Union collapsed that scientists and the general public learned just how serious the environmental problems of the region were.

A decade later, environmental conditions are improving, but enormous problems remain. Much of the im-

provement in the state of the environment comes as a result of the closing down of highly polluting and non-competitive industries. The shutting down of out-dated plants has improved air and water quality to some extent. Yet, their closure has also contributed to the high unemployment levels and the rise of extremist parties in many central and eastern European states. Furthermore, while environmental movements played an important role in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union, unemployment problems and general concerns about economic conditions now dominate public opinion. As a result, even though some environmental groups are active in the central and eastern European states, their political impact is limited.

The passing of a decade since the fall of communism, calls for an appraisal of Western efforts to assist the central and eastern European states democratize, shift from planned to free market economies, and address the environmental problems that resulted under the Communist period. In hindsight, it is easy to say that the expectations of a decade ago for a miraculous transformation, in conditions as a result of democratization and economic transformation, were unrealistic. In some areas environmental conditions have improved, but in others, little has changed. The environmental clean up challenges remain enormous.

What lessons can be learned by governments, NGOs, and private institutions that are involved in assisting the central and Eastern European countries amend the damages caused by decades of environmental neglect? Do the experiences in international environmental cooperation with post-Communist states

provide any lessons for other developing regions? The chapters by Tamar Gutner and Stacy VanDeveer explore two forms of Western involvement in environmental clean up efforts in the post-Communist states and in the Mediterranean region. Gutner explores the role of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and VanDeveer that of international environmental regimes.

Clearly, there have been some successes. Many new environmental norms and institutions have been created as a result of international cooperative efforts. VanDeveer's comparison between environmental protection regimes in the Baltic Sea region and the Mediterranean Sea area suggests that the collapse of communism has put new steam into the regional pollution control regime in the Baltic region, which may be lacking in the Mediterranean regime. The Baltic Sea is bordered by Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia. There is, therefore, much interest in the part of several wealthy European Union (EU) states in the clean-up of this sea. In comparison, the Mediterranean regime lacks the force of environmentally progressive member states pushing for policy reform. This suggests that an important component of environmental clean up is the level of interest in donor states in those projects.

The first environmental regime for the Baltic was created in 1974 by the Helsinki Convention. After this convention, environmental hot spots were identified and the release of toxic chemicals was reduced. The end of communism resulted in greatly expanded communication and information exchanges among the Baltic Sea's littoral states regarding environmental priorities and

projects. In 1993, a Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme was established. The Helsinki Committee's (HELCOM) recommendations appear to have influenced significantly the environmental policies of Estonia, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. Eager to be accepted into the European Union, these transition economies have embraced many of the norms and priorities established in the Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programme. These norms and priorities heavily reflect the interests of the wealthier European states that are members of the regime and who have actively pushed them in the transition states.

Similarly, Gutner's chapter suggests that the efforts of the multilateral development banks have helped to establish new environmental clean-up programs and reduced the release of effluents into the Baltic Sea. Yet, both VanDeveer and Gutner agree that the accomplishments pale compared with the serious environmental problems afflicting the region. They suggest that effective environmental program implementation depends in large part on the success of capacity-building efforts. As VanDeveer notes, most bilateral and multilateral capacity-building initiatives have focused on strengthening the technical capacity of states and municipalities to address environmental problems. They have paid much less attention to broader administrative, institutional, and political capacity issues. This may explain why many capacity building efforts, although good in intention, have had only limited success.

Capacity building has been defined narrowly by donor institutions and foreign governments, which tend to fo-

cus their attention on technical programs. They too often neglect the context within which new technologies must work. As VanDeveer notes, using the work of Grindle (1997), capacity building must include human resource development, organizational strengthening, as well as institutional reform. There must also be institutionalized systems of critique and learning built into these three dimensions of capacity. This is important if programs, policies, and institutions are to become more effective and efficient. Foreign assistance programs tend to be donor driven and as a result may fail to take local and national context and personnel needs adequately into consideration. Instead, donors may be tempted to shop around for programs and proposals they already have in hand.

Gutner's chapter examines in detail the role played by bilateral and multilateral donor aid institutions in environmental clean-up efforts in the Baltic Sea. Gutner suggests that donor aid institutions have achieved some successes in clean-up efforts, but that in the whole the record is mixed. Implementation deficits result in large part from capacity problems and the lack of priority placed on environmental clean up in some of the Central and Eastern European states. But as Gutner suggests, part of the problem is also with the donor aid institutions. There is room for learning in the West as well.

Gutner contrasts the approaches of the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to international environmental cooperative efforts. Of these three lenders, Gutner suggests that the World Bank and the EBRD are the most involved in environmental clean-up

initiatives. Their level of involvement in environmental programs in the Baltic region is dependent to some extent on the structure of the banks and their relationships with their clients and recipient states. The World Bank has as its main functions poverty alleviation and sustainable development. As the least "bank-like" of the three MDBs, the World Bank was actively involved in environmental institution-building in the region. The EBRD, in contrast, has concentrated more on project lending where its comparative advantage lies. The EIB has been the least involved in regional environmental initiatives primarily because it functions more like a traditional, demand driven bank than do the other two MDBs. All three MDBs have been involved to some extent in capacity building at the municipal level, focusing in particular on the establishment of self-financing wastewater plants. The World Bank also has been involved with broader watershed issues, incorporating the needs of local municipalities into broader water shed protection and clean-up initiatives.

Despite various programs of the MDBs, there have been few tangible results in terms of the development of management plans for sustainable development of coastal areas and wetlands. The reasons are somewhat project specific, but include limited local interest, political difficulties with getting policymakers and citizens to agree to raise water tariffs to pay for treatment facilities, political turnover in recipient municipalities and national governments, and project delays. More successful have been efforts to reduce the levels of pollution entering the Baltic Sea as a result of improvements in waste water treatment.

These two chapters suggest that environmental protection efforts are affected as much by the priorities and programmatic approaches of donors as they are by the capacity and priorities of recipients. Even the best of programs will be limited in their impact if the scale of the programs relative to the size of the environmental problems is small. Sustained commitment on the part of the West will be necessary to improve environmental conditions in the developing states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Where environmental pollution has direct impacts on EU member states, and particularly the more environmentally progressive of those states, there is likely to be greater enthusiasm behind cooperation.

Maintaining commitment in the West, however, may be difficult as a result of donor fatigue. The costs of post-Communist transition proved to be far greater than anyone anticipated. Moreover, as more and more states apply for membership in the EU, the willingness to use funds to assist these states may thin. This should make the successful use of existing funds a high priority. Donors are more likely to support aid when there are signs of success.

Gutner and VanDeveer suggest that there are steps that can be taken by donor institutions and international regimes to improve the effectiveness of environmental program implementation.

Most important may be enhancing sensitivity to the political and social contexts within which programs must be implemented. They must be embraced both by the donor and the recipient. Giving recipient states a greater role in program formulation may increase their commitment to programs in the implementation phase.

Environmental protection is also a matter of example. Donor states have more credibility in pursuing environmental clean up goals in developing states when they have addressed their own environmental problems. In the case of the Baltic Sea, this might mean greater commitment on the part of EU states to address agricultural contributions to the pollution of the seas.

Despite numerous problems, the importance of international cooperation for environmental protection must not be underestimated. While environmental improvements remain limited, International cooperation has helped to turn attention to serious environmental problems in systems that had long neglected environmental problems. It has contributed to changes in recipient state institutions and laws. It has also increased contact among developed and developing states at various levels. In the long run, such contact and cooperation can have many positive consequences – political, economic, and environmental.

Black Sea Environmental Cooperation: Toward a Fourth Track

By

Martin Sampson

The Black Sea Environmental Programme emerged in the 1990s from cooperation among the coastal states of the Black Sea, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the United Nations Environmental Programme, and various other funders and individuals. By far the most ambitious regional environmental undertaking for the Black Sea in the 1990s, the program's energy, ambition, and accomplishments from 1994 to 1997 are a remarkable contrast with the region's prior history of little communication and virtually no cooperation among the major Black Sea coastal states. Despite the program's record, impressive by standards of regional sea programs anywhere for a comparable time period, the GEF declined to provide a second large grant to the Black Sea Environmental Programme to fund three years beyond 1996. Without that funding the program began to diminish into what by 1999 seemed to be a holding action in search of better financial and political underpinnings for a renewed Black Sea environmental program.

The first part of this chapter discusses the environmental problems of the Black Sea and the establishment of the Black Sea Environmental Programme (BSEP). The second section is a brief examination of various parts of the program, some thoughts about what the program has accomplished, and a more extensive discussion of two of the significant problems it could not resolve. The third section assesses

the program from the perspective of Haas, Keohane, and Levy's criteria of contractual environment, concern, and capabilities.¹ The final section observes that, for reasons unrelated to the program itself, a recasting of the program seems necessary to revive the momentum to build upon BSEP's accomplishments.

I. Background

The Black Sea is an odd sea, with an ecosystem particularly vulnerable to the environmental stresses of the late twentieth century. Unlike any other marine sea, the Black Sea has two layers of water between which very little exchange of water occurs. The heavier, lower 90 percent is very salty, anoxic water that has a large hydrogen sulfide content and for centuries has not supported marine life that requires oxygen. "Dead" long before the industrial revolution and the advent of contemporary environmental degradation, this lower layer of heavier water confines the marine life of the sea to the relatively shallow upper strata of water. The lighter, upper ten percent is low-salt-content water, historically rich in fish and other life typical of marine seas. The Black Sea has no major interface with a larger sea that can rapidly replenish its water. Almost entirely landlocked, it links to other seas through the narrow Bosphorus Strait, three-quarters of a mile wide at its narrowest point. The key sources of replenishment for the upper strata of water accordingly are rainfall and river flow into the Black Sea.

The environmental stresses of the late twentieth century have taken numerous forms in the Black Sea. Metallic, nitrogen, and phosphorous effluents, and other pollution from industrial and agricultural production, much of it carried by the Danube River

to the Black Sea; sewage from coastal cities and non-coastal, watershed cities; and dams that reduced the flow of fresh water into the sea are some examples of these stresses. A species of comb jelly fish that ships brought in the 1980s from the Chesapeake Bay devoured fish larvae and by 1990 had reached a biomass of a billion tons, larger than the world fish harvest. Excessive investment in more effective fishing vessels compounded the stress on fish stocks. In the words of a 1999 study, "from the late 1960s to the early 1990s events occurred in the Black Sea that can objectively be considered an environmental catastrophe."² By the last decade of this century, a massive collapse in fish stocks and significant damage from the accumulated effects of years of eutrophication had occurred. Studies appeared suggesting that the Black Sea might be the first marine sea that "dies" in the sense of ceasing to support significant quantities of typical marine life.³ Peoples of the region found the price of fish sky-rocketing and the condition of resort beaches deteriorating. A sea that historically had provided five times more fish per square mile of surface area than the Mediterranean had undergone an appalling change and was widely regarded as the most environmentally stressed marine sea on the planet.

One of the difficulties of rectifying this situation is that the coastal states control only part of the Black Sea's watershed. Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania, the six coastal states, contribute significant amounts of pollutants of various kinds to the sea. Eleven other states control the rest of the watershed, whose most significant single contributor to the environmental stress of the Black Sea is the Danube River. The Danube carries staggering amounts of pollutants as it winds from

Western Europe eastward into the Black Sea in Romania. Environmentally damaging practices of upstream peoples in Western and Eastern Europe obviously cannot be fixed through an environmental program limited to the downstream coastal states and peoples.

Another complication is the diversity of the coastal region and its long-standing political and cultural divisions. Historically the power centers in this region have been the Turkic speaking, Muslim southern shore and the Russian/Ukrainian speaking, Orthodox Christian northern shore. Tensions between these two shores have taken many forms over many centuries. Beside this cleavage, the region has five distinct national Orthodox churches and numerous religious minorities. Linguistically the majority languages of the six states include a Romance language, Slavic languages, an Indo-European language, and a Turkic-Uralic language. The late twentieth century has added other factors, including the dearth of modern communication facilities, the depth of economic stress in post-communist countries, the uncertainty about numerous basic political issues, and the isolation of the formerly communist areas from many important international regimes during the Cold War. The result is an area fraught with excuses for why international environmental cooperation might not occur or succeed.

The Black Sea lagged far behind most other regional seas in the development of a regional organization to foster remedial environmental cooperation.⁴ Curiously, the Cold War is the major reason for both lack of cooperation in the 1970s, when many regional seas programs appeared, and for the beginning of cooperation in the last half of the 1980s.

Turkey belongs to NATO. During the Cold War the other coastal states – Bulgaria, Romania, and the USSR – belonged to the Warsaw Pact. Beginning in 1969, the Soviets made repeated proposals to Turkey for discussions about environmental cooperation among all Black Sea states. Turkey routinely rejected those overtures, which would have pitted it against three Warsaw Pact states and raised unwanted questions about Turkey's commitment to NATO. In the Gorbachev era, the Turkish government changed its stance on the question of Turkish-Soviet environmental talks. Reportedly the Foreign Ministry saw environmental discussions as a low risk avenue for exploring Gorbachev's overall foreign policy intentions as they pertained to Turkey. Constructive environmental talks would point to opportunity for issues of importance to the Foreign Ministry and suggest that the Soviet Union's new leadership was markedly different from its predecessors. Failed environmental talks would be inexpensive and easy to dismiss since the discussions pertained only to the environment. On this basis the Foreign Ministry advised environmental personnel in the Turkish government to talk with the Soviets. However, they rejected the details of the Soviet proposal, instead proposing instead a duplicate of the Barcelona Convention for the Mediterranean (to which Turkey had been a party for over a decade). The move was shrewd in two respects. From the perspective of Turkish bureaucratic politics, the government of Turkey had already endorsed that concept for the Mediterranean. It was unlikely that the Foreign Ministry would object to a Black Sea agreement based upon the Mediterranean provisions already approved. From the perspective of regional politics, proposing an agreement

based on the world's best known regional sea program was a politically neutral stance.

By 1992, the Soviet Union had disintegrated and Ukraine and Georgia had become independent countries. The Turkish leadership had become staunchly supportive of Black Sea cooperation and Ukraine's leadership recognized that Black Sea environmental issues would underscore Ukraine's legitimacy as an independent state. By this time it was also widely evident that significant deterioration in the environment of the Black Sea had begun. In spring 1992, the six coastal states signed the *Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution* at Bucharest (hence the Bucharest Convention). This convention, similar to the Barcelona Convention for the Mediterranean, is a framework treaty that commits the coastal states to reduce the pollution levels of the sea.

Far more was in the air at that 1992 Bucharest meeting than the Bucharest Convention. As early as 1991, discussions involving state representatives, UN officials, outside experts, and experts from the region had been underway to devise cooperation that would be far more ambitious than the provisions of the Bucharest Convention. At meetings in Geneva, Istanbul, Varna, and elsewhere in 1992 and 1993, participants hammered out a set of objectives that drew extensively on the recently completed Rio Conference and Agenda 21. The fruits of this endeavor included the following: (1) the *Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of the Black Sea* of April 1993 (also known as the Odessa Declaration), which proclaims a number of objectives and attaches deadlines to them; (2) an agreement on a project document for a program to alleviate the environmental stress of the Black Sea; (3) GEF funding for three years of that project; (4)

and meetings to enlist regional nongovernmental organizations' (NGOs) help in the program.

In a formal sense, the region had rapidly moved from no regional environmental agreements among the coastal states to three sets of agreements (or "tracks"), any one of which could be the basis for a Black Sea environmental cooperation. The 1992 Bucharest Convention was one track. The Odessa Declaration in spring 1993 was a second track. Broader in scope and far more specific in its expectations of what states would do than the Bucharest Convention, the Odessa Declaration was the first international marine sea agreement to reflect the thinking of the 1992 Rio Conference on sustainable development. The third track was the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Established in 1992, the BSEC exists to encourage trade and development in the Black Sea region through a membership that includes the six coastal states plus Greece, Albania, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. A provision of its treaty refers to environmental protection of the Black Sea. However, except for a few conferences about Black Sea environmental issues, little happened in the BSEC arena during the 1990s. In contrast, between 1994 and 1997 a great deal happened in the BSEP (Black Sea Environmental Programme) arena that was a fusion of Track I and Track II diplomacy and a direct product of the environmental negotiating process involving the six coastal states.

II. The Black Sea Environmental Programme

The BSEP was supposed to support three years of assessment of conditions and development of investment priorities; that

base would then be developed with investments in the subsequent seven years. In June 1993 in Varna, Bulgaria, the six coastal states finalized a project design that established six separate activities, each with a distinct network that would include all six coastal states in an effort to better understand the actual situation of the Black Sea and actions needed. Each state would serve as coordinator and host the Activity Center for one of these networks or activity categories. Bulgaria took emergency response; Romania took fish; Georgia took biodiversity; Russia took integrated coastal zone management;⁵ and monitoring was divided between routine monitoring headquartered in Turkey and special monitoring headquartered in Ukraine. Each activity would include extensive compilation of information and a set of actions to enhance the sustainability of the region. The GEF provided a \$9.3 million grant, eventually tripled through financial assistance from other donors. Overall direction of the program came from the Program Coordinating Unit (PCU) in Istanbul, which opened in early 1994. The PCU director was Laurence Mee, an oceanographer who had written the widely cited *Ambio* article about the Black Sea and was well known to delegates involved in the development of the Odessa Declaration.⁶

It is important to underscore the starting points of the BSEP project. Integrated coastal zone management was a new concept for most of the Black Sea. No overall study had been done of the water quality of the sea. Nor had there been any regional effort to systematically catalogue the area's biodiversity. There were only back-of-the-envelope estimates of the financial costs to the region of Black Sea degradation. The region had no fishing agreement, no effort to

evaluate or coordinate emergency response capabilities, and no impetus for investment in the region to enhance its environmental sustainability. Furthermore, no comparison had been done of environmental legislation in coastal states, nor were there any regional fora for NGOs.

The PCU first concentrated on establishing the six Activity Centers and the associated regional networks. It covered airline fares, furnished computers for e-mail links, hosted conferences, and within a year had nurtured networks that were meeting and producing reports and attending training sessions. It established other network endeavors: support for environmental NGOs in the region; assessment of the economic costs to the region of marine sea degradation; examination of existing environmental laws in the region with respect to possible harmonization of legal policies; and a global information system project to make available the information the program was collecting. NGOs were represented in the steering committee, and from the beginning the program hosted national level meetings to support intra-state organization of the region's environmental NGOs, held annual regional meetings, and issued the first directory of environmental NGOs in the region. Finally, the PCU supported the development of proposals in each state for a preliminary investment project and of plans for subsequent, more elaborate, and expensive projects. The PCU's first year report states that it mobilized "over 582 regional experts...to a total of 43 training sessions, workshops, training sessions, and meetings"⁷ during 1994. The number grew the next year, BSEP reporting that in 1995 it brought approximately 1000 experts to more than 50 workshops, meetings, and training sessions.

All together, the networks linked some 40 institutions around the Black Sea.⁸

In June 1996, the GEF grant ran out as expected. The GEF provided a small bridge grant to continue the program, but as noted below, declined to provide a "GEF II" grant to support another block of years for the program. The obvious marker points for assessing the program's accomplishments, is the 1994 to 1996-1997 era, almost three years after the PCU began operating.

The scope, industriousness, and assessment of visiting evaluation teams of the BSEP merit a discussion of far greater length than is possible here. A comparison of what was attempted and achieved in the BSEP with the first three years of other regional sea programs, is also outside the scope of the present discussion. Instead, what follows are observations about BSEP highlights and disappointments.

In the September 1996 issue of *Saving the Black Sea* the Turkish Ministry of Environment official who served as the national coordinator for the BSEP program said the following about BSEP:

There is a long tradition of environmental protection in Turkey. Now we have a lot of initiatives, such as through municipalities, communities, and NGOs. There is an increased amount of activity, which is of a higher quality than it was before. More actions, more integrated actions, and much more comprehensive actions are being planned and implemented.⁹

In the same article Dr. Sharabidze of Georgia observed that:

Our main problem is pollution from domestic sources. Many of the municipal sewage treatment facilities do not operate any more. Under the BSEP the government has already received a loan from the World Bank for \$18 million to improve domestic waste treatment facilities in Batumi and Poti.¹⁰

The combination of acquisition of investment resources and stimulation of environmental protection activities evident in these two statements echoes the objectives of the program, which in at least three major ways appear to have been met.

One major accomplishment is progress in understanding the water condition of the Black Sea-itself. In June 1996, the PCU issued its *Black Sea Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis* (TDA), the “work of sixteen leading specialists drawn from fourteen countries including all six Black Sea countries together with the five PCU specialist staff...(who) analyzed the thematic reports based upon the work of over 100 Black Sea specialists cooperating through the BSEP network.”¹¹ The study provided the first overall realistic picture of the ills of the Black Sea. In the words of Zaitsev and Mamaev,

The results of the TDA clearly demonstrate that the Black Sea environment can still be restored and protected. The BSEP pollution surveys revealed that the Black Sea is not a deadly soup of toxic waste as suggested by one international newspaper in 1993...Contamination by heavy metals and pesticides appears to be limited to a few sites near coastal sources. Furthermore levels

of radionuclides do not represent a health hazard... In order to identify the origins of pollution, careful studies were made of every significant discharge of liquid waste into the Black Sea, and the cost of reducing or eliminating the most important sources... Particularly urgent attention needs to be given to improving sewage treatment in all six Black Sea countries if human health is to be better protected and the tourist industry fully developed. In the case of nutrients, well over half the load to the Black Sea is transported by the Danube...¹²

The TDA is more than a water quality report. Its overview (or “level one”) information identifies seven major environmental problems of the sea, specifies the economic/social/political root causes of each problem, and stipulates types of action required to rectify the problems. Its “level two” overview of action areas analyzes problems, stakeholders, uncertainties, proposed actions and costs, and “products and milestones” for each of the seven major problem areas. “Level three” of the report, entitled “Detailed Analysis of the Identified Issues,” provides data on water quality and elaborates the discussion of possible actions. Among its other features is a discussion of pollution hotspots, whose amelioration logically became the theme of BSEP’s recommendation for investment projects in the coming years. Other regional seas programs viewed the format and organization of this report as a model of how to present such information. For a two and a half year old program, the *Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis* is an impressive accomplishment.

The second major accomplishment of 1996 was the completion and subsequent signing by all Black Sea states of the *Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and Protection of the Black Sea*. Once the activity networks were established in 1994 the PCU worked to weave input from the activity networks into draft ideas for a Black Sea action plan. Envisioned as a relatively succinct document, the draft was to be reviewed, revised, and eventually signed by the states, pushing the legal structures of Black Sea environmental cooperation beyond the 1992 Bucharest Convention and the 1993 Odessa Declaration. Mid-1995 to mid-1996 became a race to complete the document. With numerous meetings the PCU succeeded in completing the draft by early summer 1996. On 31 October 1996, the Black Sea states signed the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan at a meeting in Istanbul.

The Strategic Action Plan begins with a seven point statement of the problems and a set of principles for addressing them. are far more sophisticated than the 1992 Bucharest Convention version of the problem and how to proceed.¹³ In the core of the Plan, "Policy Actions," the signatories commit to more than a score of deadlines, most prior to 2000. These deadlines refer to activities ranging from adoption or harmonization of standards to establishment of enforcement mechanisms to provision of information or completion of studies.¹⁴ Deadlines of 2005-2006 pertain to amelioration of pollution hotspots identified by the BSEP pollution monitoring activities.¹⁵ One discussion of the Black Sea Action Plan offers the following overall summary:

The Black Sea Strategic Action Plan takes a pragmatic approach to the is-

sue of pollution control which follows the 'paradigm of iterated management'...there has to be recognition (of threat to ecosystems)...The complete removal of the threat would be desirable but is often impracticable in the short/medium term for social and economic reasons and an interim strategy is necessary for pollution control. The...states...as the cooperating partners involved then agree on a short-term target for reduction. In the first iteration, the reduction is agreed on the basis of what can reasonably be achieved within a given time frame. The agreement is made on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities, in this case each partner finds the most economically convenient approach for reaching the agreed target... The partners also agree on a program of research and monitoring to refine the estimate of optimal reductions so that...new targets may be set with lower uncertainty regarding the outcome. The iterations should continue until all partners agree that the environment is adequately protected.¹⁶

An additional category of success is the BSEP's prowess in developing ideas for investment projects. Many of the activity networks, including biodiversity and integrated coastal zone management, focused part of their efforts on potential investment opportunities. From the beginning of the program the PCU supported a program of pre-investment studies that would help countries develop preliminary proposals for the urgent investment project. It was hoped the efforts would be funded and carried out

during the first stage of the BSEP program. Georgia obtained funding for a municipal services project in Batumi and Poti. Russia proposed a Greater Rostov Environmental Strategic Action Plan, Ukraine a wastewater treatment facility in Odessa, Bulgaria a water company project in Varna, and Turkey a solid waste treatment project in Trabzon.¹⁷ For the roster of long range investment projects, the BSEP identified pollution hot spots and 50 locations where investment could reduce those hotspots, mostly through the establishment of waste water treatment facilities or improvement of harbor facilities. An international consultant will use this information to complete a scoping study, leading to a portfolio of investments, (presumably three per country).¹⁸ The BSEP provoked thinking about environmental priorities, provided assistance in preparing investment ideas, and identified investment strategies that contribute to the amelioration of environmental problems of the Black Sea.

While learning about the Black Sea's environmental situation, the PCU strove to make that information available to others. The geographic information system (GIS) became operational and a readily accessible source of complex information about the Black Sea. Information on biodiversity, national priorities, and various other topics was published in a series of studies.

The creation and maintenance of webs of people communicating across national boundaries about specific aspects of the Black Sea environmental agenda also belongs on this list of accomplishments. Whether the results were short run successes or disappointments, each network fostered communication that had not existed previously. These networks were the basis of the work that emerged as the Black Sea Strategic

Action program and as the Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis.

There were both successes and also frustrating sequences of endeavors that fell far short of what was expected when one considers the details of BSEP endeavors by activity group. On the minus side, for example, the Transboundary Diagnostic survey came from data collected for a Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) survey rather than from the all centers of the routine monitoring network. This survey reflected the PCU's efforts to strengthen capabilities but it fell short of the objective of a continuous monitoring program throughout the region. Routine monitoring of the sea continued in only two of the states by 1997,¹⁹ largely because funds were not available to pay for research centers whose equipment had been updated and whose staffs had been trained in an earlier phase of the BSEP program. Lack of funds is an endemic constraint on the spin-offs and core activities of the BSEP.

A different kind of limitation is suggested by contrasting projects where success is primarily in the gathering of scientific information and projects where success is a change in existing state policy. Juxtaposing the Emergency Response and the Biodiversity areas illustrates this point. In 1994, the Emergency Response working party's first report indicated that regional capabilities to handle oil spills and other emergencies were modest.²⁰ Small to medium size problems, close to shore that did not cross national boundaries tested the limit of capabilities. Most states of the region had not signed the majority of the international conventions that pertain to emergency response and no national emergency response contingency plans existed, let alone a regional emergency response contingency plan. Under BSEP

auspices, the Emergency Response network held a number of training sessions, meetings with individuals from the International Maritime Organization, and other similar meetings. Yet, three BSEP annual reports state that the national contingency plans are still in preparation. The 1996 report indicates that additional time is needed for legislative changes, and the 1997 report says that most of the participants in BSEP's emergency response effort are environmentalists while the people in the countries responsible for such issues are transport ministry people.²¹ Thus the emergency response activity brought together people from around the Black Sea, but it made no dent on the policies or allocation of resources that define the Black Sea region's preparedness for tanker collisions or other emergency situations. By the last year of the PCU, the objectives had broadened from emergency response to emergency response plus improvement of port facilities to reduce pollution hot spots.

In contrast, the Biodiversity activity network made major accomplishments within its defined responsibilities. The activity moved from first year preparatory meetings and workshops on standardization of methods to an impressive set of successes. Within a year it produced national reports on each country's coastal biodiversity. During subsequent years, it proposed pilot programs for each country; made recommendations on subjects such as keystone species, protections of shelf areas, and updating the Bucharest Convention; and produced a regional strategy for conservation areas that the states were reviewing in 1997. Clearly this activity network marshaled impressive knowledge and derived numerous policy ideas from that knowledge. A large

part of BSEP's publications are the work of this activity group.

While the PCU was achieving closure on the *Black Sea Strategic Action Program* and publishing its Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis, both nurtured from the activity webs of the BSEP, it was simultaneously waging a fight to maintain its funding. Efforts to obtain an additional, "GEF II" grant occurred in context of extensive praise for the project, arguments by the PCU staff to the GEF that two years was an insufficient time for a region with no heritage of such cooperation, and some confusion within the GEF about its mission in relation to marine sea projects. Ironically the 1996 GEF vacillation about whether to continue supporting the program coincided with the process of the six coastal states deciding in October 1996 to sign the *Black Sea Strategic Action Program*. As noted above, the GEF declined to provide another sizeable grant to the program. Director Mee commented that obtaining more GEF funds was

much more difficult than expected. Firstly, the request came at a time when the GEF operational strategy was still under final consideration and there were frequent changes or reinterpretations of the rules. Secondly, there had been no prior GEF project, which had achieved almost 100 percent implementation exactly according to schedule and was requesting additional funds to develop new avenues and to consolidate the initial achievements. Thirdly, when the request for support was finally cleared by all partners, the new inter-sessional approval mechanism of the GEF council failed since a quorum of comments was not achieved (the

consultation was conducted by post).²²

The result was the end of significant funding for a remarkable program at exactly the time it needed continuing financial resources.

The PCU remained open, and the BSEP kept functioning in late 1996 and 1997 primarily with money from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union Phare and Tacis programs as well as with a small bridge grant from the GEF. With the loss of major GEF funds, a decline in PCU staffing and a decline in the endeavors of the BSEP occurred. The PCU lost an environmental economist, a fish specialist, a regional NGO coordinator, and eventually Director Mee. In 1998 the PCU became the Program Implementation Unit (PIU), “implementation” referring to the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan. Funding from the UNDP plus pledges of \$20,000 from each coastal country kept the office open in 1999, despite four of the six coastal countries not paying their \$20,000 share.

It is possible that the internal dynamics of the GEF process focused on the failure of the states to carry through on their pledge to establish a Secretariat, which was one of their main commitments in the Bucharest Declaration. The PCU worked on this problem but could not resolve it. Although tangential to the BSEP and an issue that the coastal states rather than BSEP should have resolved, this failing is one of the major disappointments in the 1990s history of Black Sea environmental cooperation. Another disappointment is the massive gap between the vigor of the BSEP and the lack of public awareness of its activities, an issue on which BSEP also worked. Both shortcomings merit discussion.

Why did the coastal states fail to establish a regional environmental secretariat?

The 1992 Bucharest Convention clauses for establishing a Secretariat and creating a commission were to be the key mechanisms for Black Sea states’ oversight of environmental cooperation. Turkey had pledged to cover 40 percent of the costs of the Secretariat. In 1994, with BSEP underway, the expectation was that the countries would proceed to appoint commissioners and establish the Secretariat. It did not work out this way. The states’ active enthusiasm ebbed as soon as BSEP began to function. No Secretariat materialized. Some states indicated that they were financially unable to contribute to a Secretariat and that they could not anticipate contributing for the next two years. Subsequently, Russian-Turkish disputes over a headquarters agreement for the Secretariat became an intractable issue, and negotiations about details of a Secretariat headquarters came to a stalemate. The situation had moved from an enthusiastic flurry of state-level activity circa 1991-1993 to a failure by 1997 to establish the Secretariat. That in turn left the PCU with no regionally controlled entity to which it could turn over the BSEP activities it had nurtured. In the words of one Ministry of Environment official of a Black Sea state, “They are trying to hand a program to the states on a silver platter, and the states are not taking it.” The contrast between energetic state efforts to start the GEF program and anemic state support for creating oversight capabilities for the program is striking.

It would be instructive if some defect or fatal flaw in the PCU’s strategy vis-à-vis the region became pivotally important in the issue of whether or not to establish a Secre-

tariat. The evidence suggests, however, that such a flaw is unlikely and that a different strategy by the PCU would not have changed the outcome. The rapidity with which the PCU assembled the networks of people and institutions plus the apparent productivity of those networks over two years suggests that the program was unexpectedly successful, which should have sufficed to encourage state creation of a Secretariat. The explanation instead seems to reside in external factors beyond the control of the PCU. These include the following:

No spectacular disasters. For the duration of the BSEP there were no catastrophic or near calamitous environmental issues involving the Black Sea. A tanker did catch fire at the northern entrance to the Bosphorus Straits, but that event did not have serious consequences. Nothing, in other words, provoked broad public attention that might have encouraged states to point out that they were addressing Black Sea environmental health in the guise of their support for BSEP. Nor did anything dramatic happen that underscored for states the importance of progress on the environmental agenda of the Black Sea region.

No aggressively committed national leaders. After 1993, no state leader in the region energetically pushed Black Sea cooperation. Worried that the end of the Cold War would render Turkey strategically insignificant to the states of Western Europe and North America, President Turgut Ozal of Turkey had played the role of the aggressive leader in the early 1990s. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was his project, which as leader of the only coastal state with a strong economy and capitalist economic institutions, he was uniquely situated to create. The less publicized Black Sea Environmental Cooperation fits the same con-

cept. With the death of Ozal in spring 1993, no leader of any other Black Sea coastal state pushed for Black Sea regional cooperation to the extent that Ozal had done. The Ministry of Environment personnel throughout the region had no top-level support for the concept of a Black Sea cooperation. It also meant that no single leader could cut through the objections of his own government or appeal to leaders of other governments to move forward on the establishment of the BSEP secretariat.

Economic stress. This factor is frequently given as the reason for the failure of the coastal states to create a Secretariat. The Black Sea region states of the formerly communist world failed to match the economic transition and recovery of formerly communist states such as Poland or the Czech Republic. State financial resources diminished. States lent little support to epistemic communities' research and policy efforts, leaving little prospect of scientific ideas affecting public policy. Certainly the unexpectedly stubborn economic stress in the region undermined policies of countries such as Ukraine that originally had endorsed the Black Sea Environmental Programme and saw its existence and success as an element of Ukrainian strategy to underscore its sovereign independence.

While the depth of economic stress in the region was appalling, it does not automatically follow that the \$9 million the GEF put into the BSEP program between June 1993 and June 1996 could not be raised in the region itself. Although the Bucharest Convention does not provide for the creation of a regional funding mechanism, that idea has been part of the Black Sea environmental discussions for a number of years.

From the early days of the BSEP, its Program Coordinating Unit was involved in

discussions about the possible creation of a regional environmental fund that would not depend upon coastal state contributions for financial support of a secretariat or other activities. One of the ideas that emerged from formal and informal discussions of this concept was a proposal to tax Black Sea tankers according to the volume of their oil cargos. That tax would go directly into the Black Sea Environmental Fund. This mechanism would be easy to monitor, simple to understand, symbolically relevant to the pollution of the sea, and potentially lucrative enough to cover costs of a secretariat, the BSEP activities, and even have money left over for each state's environmental ministry.

Apparently with encouragement from local NGOs the PCU pushed this issue by bringing it to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (or "Track III"). As noted above, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation charter has an environmental provision and the organization also has an environmental task force. Since it operates at the Foreign Ministry level, its support for an environmental tax would be a very promising step toward state endorsement of a regionally funded Black Sea environmental fund.

At the Black Sea Economic Cooperation's Meeting of the Working Group on Environmental Protection in Tblisi, Georgia on 27 September 1994, the PCU's economist discussed a proposal for the creation of such a tax.²³ The delegates reportedly recognized the importance of this kind of funding and recommended that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Secretariat should devote further study to the proposal and present specific proposals to the next meeting. At the next meeting, in Athens on 21-22 March 1995, the topic appears in the minutes as an item that was discussed, presumably with no official result.²⁴

However, these discussions were the end of this particular effort to use Track III to resolve a Track I problem. The reasons for the failure are not entirely clear. First, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation had in principle agreed to establish a Black Sea development bank in Salonika, Greece. A Black Sea environmental fund might be an appropriate activity for such a bank. There was pressure to put the fund at that bank, whose location would be a state that was neither a signatory of the Bucharest Convention nor a Black Sea coastal state. Under the auspices of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation development bank rather than the Black Sea environmental secretariat stipulated in the Bucharest Convention, these funds would be subject to decisions of the eleven states that comprise the Black Sea Economic Cooperation rather than the six states of the sea coast and the BSEP. A second issue pertained to shipping. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Greek shipping activity in the Black Sea increased. New investment in Central Asian oil fields and the prospects for the Black Sea to become a shipping outlet for some of that oil may have reinforced concerns of Greek, Russian, and other shipping interests that this tax would interfere with tanker trade and affect the competitiveness of oil exported from the Black Sea region. Third, a PCU official commented a few years later that proposals that necessitate coastal states changing their tax laws can be problematic.

The attempt to secure Black Sea Economic Cooperation endorsement of an environmental fund could have been a win-win situation. A "yes" would have generated funds, while a "no" might have stimulated more effort by the coastal states to resolve this financial problem. At a late spring 1995 BSEP meeting in Istanbul, the coastal

states again discussed and agreed to continue studying the idea of establishing a Black Sea Environmental Fund.²⁵ The UNDP urged the GEF to support a set of meetings to develop this idea, and a number of meetings were subsequently held. As it turns out, the states failed to create a regionally generated fund for environmental purposes. The idea remained in discussions, one of its versions an innovative concept of a regional debt-for-nature swap.

Extraneous political static: tensions between the regional giants. In September 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin dismissed the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, the military used tanks to fire on the headquarters of the Congress, and demonstrators protested in Moscow. Amid the chaos of this unrest in September and October, word slowly emerged that one of the last acts of the now defunct Congress was the ratification of the Bucharest Convention. Russia thus became the key fourth ratifying state, whose endorsement put the convention into effect. Turkey had expected to be the fourth ratifying party, but the sudden death of President Ozal in spring 1993 confronted the National Assembly with other issues, and consideration of the treaty was delayed for reasons unrelated to the treaty itself. Turkey became the fifth ratifying state. In those heady days of 1993 and 1994, there appeared to be ample support in both Moscow and Ankara for the BSEP.

The existence of these problems and the Bucharest Convention specification that the headquarters of the Secretariat would be in Istanbul are not a coincidence. Rumors that Russia in recent years has opposed establishing the Secretariat in Istanbul may be correct. In a larger sense there is no single, clear, unequivocally correct explanation of why Russia's early 1990s cooperative stance

on Black Sea environmental cooperation seems to have shifted. Conjecture includes the following factors, more than one of which may be relevant. Unable to play its appropriate role until on firmer economic ground, Russia would prefer to slow down regional developments. When Russia can again assert its authority, then it would again push for regional solutions to address regional issues of this kind. Conversely, perhaps Russia was unable to play its accustomed role vis-à-vis the south shore of the Black Sea in 1992-1994, and now it is doing so, in accord with a long heritage of Turkish-Russian antipathy. Third, perhaps the environment has largely dropped from the official priorities of the Russian State. Finally, delays and inconsistent positions at conferences may be a function of administrative and political disarray at home, particularly in issues that do not have compelling visibility at the top level of the Russian government.

Resolving the Secretariat host country agreement and personnel immunity details would have been necessary whether or not there was a financial crisis. It is possible the problems would have been as intractable in a healthier regional economic climate. Certainly there has been a deterioration in Turkish-Russian relationships overall during the 1990s. By the latter half of the 1990s, Turkish-Russian relations encompassed a number of difficult issues that had been less serious in the early 1990s. The delicate matter of Turkic speaking groups and/or Muslim groups rebelling within Russia is one such issue, illustrated by the case of Chechnya. Where the proposed pipeline from Central Asian oil fields would exit is another problem: Turkey prefers a southern route that would bring the oil to a port on Turkey's Mediterranean coast, while Russia

favors a northern route that would reinforce its historical benefit from Central Asian oil. Tension over shipping through the Bosphorus Strait is a related issue. The Montreux Convention of 1936 stipulates that Turkey keep the waterway open for commercial traffic. A vast increase in the number of ships using the Straits in the 1990s led Turkey to create rules to ease the congestion in the narrow passageway, which sometimes caused delays for Russian ships. Russia opposed these policies. Turkey also took a very strong stand against increased oil traffic through the strait on the grounds that the waterway is too narrow to safely accommodate super tankers and that a super tanker fire in the Straits could ignite much of the city. Export of oil from Central Asia through Russia, would likely increase the super tanker traffic. Without access to the Straits for this export, one of the easiest ways of moving Central Asian oil to world markets is blocked. All of these matters complicate the milieu in which BSEP operates.

Why did BSEP not receive more attention from the regional population?

Unprecedented state cooperation bridging venerable antipathies of the Black Sea coast, plus the rapidity with which things moved ahead in 1993, augured for great media stories and extensive public interest in BSEP. After all, a recent history saw environmental groups undermining communist policies, the psychological impacts of Chernobyl were vivid, and there was widespread awareness that something was wrong with the Black Sea. The Black Sea Environmental Programme might have been an emblem of the newly emerging Black Sea regional consciousness.

The reality turned out to be quite different. BSEP endeavors to orchestrate regional cooperation for analyzing and rectifying those ecological problems unfolded with very little publicity despite efforts by the PCU. The BSEP, lauded by evaluation teams, was virtually invisible in the media. The media also paid little attention to details of Black Sea environmental stress. Why was there a discontinuity between the quality of the BSEP and the public's awareness of the BSEP? Why did the program not attract more public attention?

Clearly the PCU was aware of the problem. Level One of its *Black Sea Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis* lists "insufficient public involvement" as a "main root cause" of six of seven major problems of the Black Sea.²⁵ The point is reiterated as one of the four key obstacles to Black Sea environmental cooperation listed by departing PCU Director Mee in his commentary in the *1997 Annual Report*. He stated there "is a very poor level of environmental awareness and public participation in all Black Sea countries."²⁶ Previous Annual Reports from 1994 to 1996 and the PCU's publication *Saving the Black Sea* discuss numerous BSEP efforts to educate the public about BSEP.

Early in the process, BSEP devoted considerable effort and expense to building NGO capabilities and communication. It ensured that NGOs were represented in its steering committee. Those efforts continued as long as BSEP had funding, as indicted by a number of projects listed in the 1997 Annual Report. As the BSEP developed, frustration is evident in these reports focusing on NGO isolation from the public. By 1997, the section on NGOs in the *Annual Report* had been renamed "Environmental Citizen's Organizations (ECOs)." The discussion as-

serts that “the failure of NGOs to involve the public or become involved in the environmental decision-making process is often due to weak cooperative spirit among NGOs rather than a lack of money, resources, or people.”²⁷ The *1997 Annual Report* contains an interesting commentary about the transition in the Black Sea region from a vigorous NGO movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s to a declining movement by the end of the decade. In the words of the report,

Since the early 1990s when many foreign environmental grant-making funds made their way to the CIS region, NGOs have multiplied like mushrooms after the rain. In most cases they are small organizations specializing in a specific area and cannot be called grassroots organizations. Nevertheless many NGOs tend to think that they automatically represent “the public” and “public opinion” even though they are only representing themselves and their role is rather limited; hence the limited scale of their activities... The NGOs nonetheless have a crucial role to play in increasing public awareness of the issues raised by BSEP.²⁸

The PCU engaged in a number of educational and other endeavors to make its work more widely known, but this activity did not generate much overall publicity. A small indication of the invisibility of BSEP and its agenda is evident from the data of the Open Media Research Institute’s (OMRI) daily news summaries. Searching for “Black+Sea+Environment” in all news summaries between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 1997 elicited fewer than ten

records. Only one of those pertains to BSEP; a report on 27 July 1993 of the forthcoming GEF grant to clean up the Black Sea. That news coincided with approval or near approval of the BSEP program document by Black Sea states. The search words BSEP or “Black+Sea+Environmental+Program” produced no articles at all.

For the previously communist west, north, and east coasts of the Black Sea the explanation for this lack of attention seems simple. Economic stress overwhelmed people’s environmental sensitivities. This stress worsened as the 1990s unfolded. Without some conceptual key that linked the environment to economic recovery and prosperity, it is unsurprising that peoples and media of most of the Black Sea states paid little attention to BSEP or to the sea’s environmental problems.

As with the Secretariat issue, however, there is also reason to suspect the problem is far more complicated than economic stress. In this case it is instructive that in the one Black Sea country that did not experience unmitigated 1990s economic stress, BSEP was also virtually unknown. Turkey, host of the PCU and location of the Activity Center for Routine Monitoring, was potentially the most newsworthy portfolio of the six original BSEP activities.

Turkey’s economy grew significantly during the 1993-1997 era. Yet between 1993 and 1997, it was remarkable how little Turkish awareness of BSEP existed among an attentive public interested in the politics of the Black Sea region. No systematic studies appear to have examined the Turkish public’s awareness of BSEP, indicating that BSEP was virtually unknown.²⁹ The BSEP’s relative absence from the media ensured that few people could learn about it. There was a stark disconnect between the caliber of

BSEP's performance and public awareness of its activities.

What explains this condition in circumstances of general economic well-being coupled with widespread awareness that the Black Sea had become an environmental problem? Are there processes at work that might have resulted in low level of awareness of BSEP in a similarly prosperous Ukraine or Romania or Bulgaria or Georgia or Russia?

A basic argument of cognitive psychology is that people simplify. Human minds cannot grasp most of the stimuli that we encounter. Human memories are fallible, and we have trouble keeping track of extensive detail. If on a superficial level details seem not to add to something coherent and clear, it is especially difficult to perceive and remember, let alone to make inferential leaps from the details to conclusions about an overall process. From this perspective the lack of attention in Turkey to BSEP, despite the magnitude of environmental degradation in the Black Sea and the quality of the BSEP program, is an interesting problem. Its explanation includes the following:

No disastrous events and no clear, feasible criteria of success. As noted earlier in this discussion, the years of BSEP did not coincide with any discrete, catastrophic event that affected the environment of the Black Sea. This lack of crisis deprived the media and the public of a specific platform that might have dramatized the work of the BSEP.

A related difficulty is that the phrase "Black Sea Environmental Cooperation" does not create an automatic focus on some specific, measurable, meaningful target that the public or media can track. An errant Mediterranean whale in the Black Sea at-

tracts attention. A tanker fire at the entrance to the Bosphorus Straits attracts attention. In both cases there is a simple story of how the whale or the fire is progressing. Media coverage and public tracking of the stories ensue.

BSEP cannot easily provide such a target because the problems of the sea are complex and require years of cooperation in an area that includes the Danube basin where a significant portion of Black Sea pollution originates. Simply laying the groundwork for the networks and trying to start a routine monitoring of the sea was a massive challenge. There is no quick fix for the problems of the Sea. Moreover, the goal of the project was to stimulate municipalities and experts in the region to identify projects that would begin a long process of changing the ways in which the coastal areas are used. This work lacks the elements of sensationalism and promise of rapid change that are the stuff of media coverage and popular interest.

Diffuseness of the effects of environmental stress and shortage. This category is borrowed from Thomas Homer-Dixon's very interesting research on conflict and environmental stress in situations in which violent conflict occurred. Homer-Dixon argues that shortage, not environmental degradation per se, prompts conflict. Homer-Dixon also argues that the link between environmentally-induced shortage and violent conflict is diffuse, often sub-national, and persistent.³⁰ Diffuseness means that what begins as an environmental stress reverberates politically as other kinds of stress, masking the underlying environmental catalyst of the stress. Thus by the time environmentally triggered violence occurs, the situation is a complex of ethnic factors, civil-military factors, intra-military factors, and the like. Finally,

Homer-Dixon argues that states differ in their ability to cushion these kinds of stresses.

Although Homer-Dixon's concern is with violent conflict, his insight about the diffuse effects of environmental shortage suggests a general perceptual phenomenon. It may not be that only angry people are unable to recognize environmental stress as environmental stress. Under less intense circumstances there is ample reason why people might be only vaguely aware of the impact of environmental degradation. Some of the degradation does not take the form of tangible shortage. Some of the tangible shortage blends smoothly with non-environmental understandings people have of supply and demand phenomena. Existing perceptual categories may encompass the effects of environmentally triggered pressures so that people's attention is not drawn to "environment" as a specific category. In other words, the effects of environmental stress may be highly diffuse in regard to people's perception of what is happening. The effects intermingle with many other factors that ask the environmental component. In this way "diffuseness" is a helpful concept for understanding the difficulties of attracting peoples' attention to the efforts to remedy environmental degradation.

This idea seems to fit the circumstances of Istanbul, the major recipient of migration out of Turkey's Black Sea coast.³¹ For example, assume that Black Sea degradation triggers migration among thousands of young residents of the Black Sea coast to Istanbul. Near-collapse of fishing along the southern coast and the closing of fish canneries at places such as Trabzon diminish the economic opportunity for young people. As large numbers of new migrants arrive in Istanbul, the awareness of Black Sea envi-

ronmental stress spreads. People hear why the migrants have arrived. Migrants themselves express hopes of going home if somehow the sea can be fixed and massive quantities of fish and clean beaches reappear. In this kind of scenario, there is ample cognitive space for people to understand the importance of the Black Sea Environmental Programme, even if it cannot rectify the problems of the sea. One can even imagine residents of Istanbul muttering that if only the sea could be repaired then the overcrowding and noise of the city would ease as Black Sea people returned home.

The real story differs from this sketch. The corrected version creates virtually no cognitive space for awareness of BSEP. Many young people who recently migrated to the big city from the Black Sea region would have sought adventure or wealth in the city anyway, had there been no environmental problem in the Black Sea. Large numbers of their relatives migrated to Istanbul in the 1980s from the Black Sea region even when the Black Sea appeared to be healthy and the fishing industry was booming. Most of the migrants, whether they came in the 1980s or the 1990s, prefer to remain in Istanbul. Accordingly neither the newcomers nor their predecessors infuse the city with stories of environmentally forced migration that underscore the condition of the sea. Nor does the city population hear stories of how a polluted sea tragically precludes the return of innocent victims to their original homes. Thus, massive Black Sea environmental degradation has not been linked to what is happening in the urban area that receives a large number of migrants from the Black Sea coastal region of Turkey.

One might add that the impact of Black Sea degradation is further diffused by the existence of migration to Istanbul from

other parts of the country. Istanbul reportedly grows by 500,000 people a year, including 300,000 new immigrants. No one can precisely estimate the contribution of Black Sea environmental woes to the congestion of a city that grows by two or three hundred thousand emigrants a year. The impact of Black Sea degradation on migration is lost among other stimuli including economic conditions in poor parts of Turkey, the civil war in the South East, and the usual dose of youthful preference to experience the city. Were the Black Sea's environmental condition suddenly rectified, what would change in Istanbul? Experts do not know the answer to such questions, which pertain to very complicated systems in which people can do many things to adjust to adversity and to opportunity. Thus, the Black Sea's environmental degradation has no prominence as a cause of problems that worry people; its rectification also has no prominence as remedy for what troubles people.

Ask residents of Istanbul about super tankers plying the Bosphorus and one immediately hears fears of fire engulfing the city in the aftermath of a super tanker accident. In a city whose houses traditionally were wood and where fire was far more worrisome than outside invasion during centuries of Ottoman Empire rule, this is a society that remembers fires. Its people have cognitive schemas that link fire to the destruction of the city.³² Those schemas are deeply rooted, and the new fact of super tankers links readily with the venerable concept/schema of fire and destruction. Ask a resident of Istanbul about the pollution in the Black Sea and typically there is no diagnosis of the relationship of that problem to the person's life in Istanbul or prescription of what might happen because of that pollution,

even though the person would express dismay over what has happened to the sea.

Thus, there is not an obvious cognitive niche into which the Black Sea Environmental Programme can fit. Lack of publicity and attention follow from this cognitive lapse. The problem actually is far worse because something else has occupied the cognitive niche of cooperation among Black Sea states that have previously not cooperated.

Coaptation of the Black Sea Label: The Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Another entity, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), has a label that sounds deceptively similar to that of BESP. Its success in gaining publicity has also rooted the economic cooperation label deeply enough to become the schema of the novel phenomenon of Black Sea state cooperation.

In 1992 President Ozal of Turkey successfully formed the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) around a treaty signed by 11 regional states. The objective of the BSEC (not BSEP) is a free trade zone in the Black Sea region. Its members are the six coastal states plus non-Black Sea states Greece, Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation's annual meetings are extensively publicized because Foreign Ministers and other cabinet level officials attend. The conferences rotate among various member countries, publicizing the concept of Black Sea cooperation by echoing the name Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Photo opportunities, days of coverage, and reports on the discussions, are the media's standard treatment.

In English "BSEC" and "BSEP" look quite similar. In Turkish "economic" (*ekonomik*) and "environment" (*cevre*) are more distinct words than they are in English, but

as in English they follow the adjective Black Sea. Mention “Black Sea Environmental Programme” to someone who follows the politics of the region, and the response frequently assumes that you meant Black Sea Economic Cooperation and either mis-spoke or actually said economic program. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation appears to have acquired the symbolism of “Black Sea.”

Under these circumstances the BSEP faced a virtually impossible publicity task in 1993-1996. It could not trade on the novelty of Black Sea cooperation because that information was already part of public awareness of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Its initials could not provoke surprise (positive or negative) for the same reason. Probably it also did not help that the organization that co-opted the symbolism of Black Sea governmental cooperation was often far more an official formality than an active program. Someone understanding the concept of Black Sea state cooperation on those grounds, would likely lead one to overlook the energetic details of the quite different BSEP program.

Momentum was beginning to build on the publicity front just as the GEF was deciding to not refund the program. The PCU was involved in a host of projects, but their main sponsors were other institutions. In 1996, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation hosted a meeting of Parliamentarians of the Black Sea to discuss Black Sea environmental issues. In 1997, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation also hosted a meeting of over 1,000 business people, primarily from Turkey, to discuss Black Sea environmental issues. The meeting attracted Rami Koc, one of the richest people in the world whose family business is one of the largest in Turkey.

Except for Turkey, the majority populations throughout the Black Sea states are Eastern Orthodox Christians, divided into national churches for Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia. For centuries the leader of Eastern Orthodoxy has resided in Istanbul. Although the Patriarch does not have the leverage over the Eastern Church that the Pope has over the western Catholic church, he is the most important leader of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

The current Patriarch is deeply interested in environmental issues. In 1997, His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I organized a boat trip around the Black Sea to dramatize its environmental problems. In September 1997, he and 250 other people traveled by boat from Trabzon, Turkey to a number of other Black Sea ports and then to Thessaloniki, Greece for a conference. Designed to be a symbolic juxtaposition of religion and science under the auspices of the Patriarch, the ship's passengers included the Director and the former Associate Director of the BSEP-PCU, people from various ministries of the environment of Black Sea states, a large array of environmentalists including Sylvia Earle, the Aga Khan, the President of the Commission of the European Union, the Bishop of London, and other religious leaders. The Patriarch proclaimed that religion can provide the ethical context and direction for activism. He also called for scientists and theologians to set aside their differences and work to improve the environment. Sylvia Earle commented,

Combining the knowledge of wisdom and science with the sensitivity of diverse religions will create a new and effective ethic for caring for nature starting with the greatly stressed

Black Sea environment. In fact, the thoughtful responses of the unlikely but congenial mix of Patriarchs, Holinesses, Highnesses, Excellencies, scientists, economists, policymakers, businessmen, press, and others during the days of deliberation while sailing over these troubled waters suggests that the process is already well underway.³³

Metropolitan John of Pergamon's concluded at the end of the Thessoloniki meeting that

The gravity of the environmental situation, in a context of extreme economic hardships of societies in transition, obliges us to question whether conventional approaches are adequate. The intellectual effort to find a new synthesis between science and religion is an expression of a new state of mind motivated by human concern and a profound sense of concern of the incompleteness of either language...³⁴

The trip generated extensive publicity in the region. The National Action Party (NAP), a right wing, staunchly nationalist Turkish political party demonstrated in Trabzon against what they regarded as an effort to unite the Black Sea's Orthodox Christians against Turkey. Coverage of that demonstration amplified awareness in Turkey of the actual purpose of trip, generating praise for the Patriarch's commitment to the environment.

Capacity, Concern, and Contractual Environment

There is a marked disjuncture between the BSEP's energetic creation and networks around particular activities and external funding agency support, for this program. The effort was ripe for more years of progress even if political tensions in the region obstructed aspects of interstate cooperation. With more financial resources and assurance of more years of existence, much might have happened. The GEF decision not to fund a second grant truncated those possibilities for the 1990s.

If one looks at the GEF era of the Black Sea Environmental Programme from 1994 to 1996, from the perspective of an interest in capacity building, concern, and contractual environment, what initial judgments are appropriate?³⁵ Employing a counterfactual, would things that happened since 1993 have been highly unlikely had there been no BSEP?

The counter-factual question of how would the situation differ without BSEP has some answers that are straightforward. The water quality appears to be slightly better at the end of the decade. For the most part that improvement is largely unrelated to BSEP and would have happened had there been no Odessa Declaration or GEF funding. The key cause of this improvement are the economic downturn in the coastal and Danube states.³⁶ A more prosperous economic era may reverse that again. BSEP's early activities then, have not had much effect on the sea water or its life.

It is equally clear that BSEP's existence has profoundly affected the growth of knowledge about the Sea. Judging from the lack of enthusiasm among the states for establishing an environmental secretariat and the trajectory of Russian policy in the latter half of the 1990s, without BSEP there would have been far less progress in the under-

standing of the Black Sea and less scientific awareness of whether the condition of the sea in fact is improving. Without BSEP, there would have been no Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis that brought together data on the condition of the water and the social/economic/legal factors that contribute to the pollution of the sea. There would have been no systematic identification of pollution hot spots, at least some of which might be remedied by financial resources and the construction of sewage systems. Furthermore, there would have been no GIS-available information about the sea. Nor, is it likely that work on biodiversity would have flourished to the extent that happened under BSEP auspices.

Without the BSEP there would have been no *Black Sea Strategic Action Program*, let alone a program that drew upon extensive work in a variety of activity areas that linked all countries of the Black Sea coast. The Strategic Action Program, moreover, is an apt indicator of how far some things had moved since the 1992 Bucharest meeting. Concise and ambitious, the plan asks the states to follow through on their obligations of Bucharest to establish a secretariat and a full fledged environmental commission for the Black Sea. It recommends that the commission create seven subsidiary Advisory Groups (the six activity groups endorsed at Varna in 1993 whose work contributed to the *Strategic Action Program*), plus a group on information and data exchange. Those seven functions had been in place and underway for more than two years prior to the signing of the *Strategic Action Program*.

On a more basic level, the creation of networks, the provision of communication equipment to facilitate the Black Sea dialogue, and the training sessions to impart

common measurement standards or nurture common understandings would not have happened. The BSEP has increased the likelihood that monitoring of water quality in the Black Sea could expand very quickly were financial resources made available to the focal point institutions in each state that were part of the original routine monitoring network. Were that to happen, cooperation would be possible that would not have been possible prior to the BSEP. Researchers know one another, have reached agreements about measurement standards they would use, and have similar kinds of equipment. BSEP has progressed to the point at which it is plausible that a disastrous tanker collision on the sea that resulted in a mammoth oil spill would galvanize cooperation among states. Such cooperation did not come together under the efforts of the BSEP to support the Emergency Response network, but the BSEP provided groundwork that could support impressive progress if the state leaderships wanted that progress to occur.

Two and a half years have brought numerous types of progress and some disappointments. The finalization of the *Black Sea Strategic Action Program* has enlarged the contractual environment. The failure to establish a Black Sea Environmental Secretariat has left a different aspect of the contractual environment in abeyance (which is more a commentary on what else would not have happened without BSEP than a commentary on BSEP's shortcomings.)

Capabilities have grown in two general ways. First, far more is now known about the situation. Second, far more capacity can now be brought to bear on the situation. Perspectives encompass the entire coastal region. Networks of people have gotten to know one another. The diversity of perspectives on the sustainability problem

has resulted from substantively distinct activity networks. Research equipment and training provide know-how that helps produce research results are comparable across studies.

In the category of concern, BSEP appears to have contributed little to overall regional awareness about environmental problems or their solutions, except for people who have participated directly in the BSEP education and publicity efforts. The BSEP has honed the concerns of the few policymakers and scientists who are professionally involved with the Black Sea. Its work has begun a process of clarifying and articulating what the problems are and what might be done to solve them.

Other aspects of what BSEP has done are more difficult to defend or to reject as significant contributions. It is difficult to judge what successes might have occurred if financial resources were provided or if some catastrophe-driven surge of concern had focused public attention. For example, the integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) network began slowly and received help from people associated with the Split Center that is part of the Mediterranean Action Program. By 1997, this activity group was at a point of preparing national ICZM policies. According to the 1997 Annual Report, there was recognition that all the coastal countries face very similar problems. That report also refers to “the increasing number of people (who) are becoming involved in the ICZM process...”³⁷ in the context of welcoming more NGO participation. How does one judge this endeavor by the standards of changing levels of capability or concern? It would appear difficult to do so; potential is in place that was not there before, but the prowess of that potential is difficult to gauge. An infusion of financial resources

for ICZM investment projects would be a suitable test.

Toward Track IV

With time as the horizontal axis and program activity/accomplishment as the vertical axis, a graph of the Black Sea Environmental Programme from 1994 to the late 1990s would have a sharply rising curve for the 1994-late 1996 era and then a tapering off that tumbles into a more rapid decline. Clearly much has been accomplished and much potential is in place, but those gains are vulnerable to decay and deterioration unless the program can retrieve its vitality. The formula or template of Bucharest and Odessa, labeled earlier in this paper as Tracks I and II, appears to have served its usefulness because the mechanisms for giving control of the program to the coastal states have not worked. There is no indication that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Track III, can solve the problems that have beset this formula. Accordingly a Track IV is needed.

A Track IV is needed because of changes in the international funding environment, changes in the political dynamics of the region, and a lack of change in the economic stress of the Black Sea’s western, northern, and eastern shores. The political base of the Bucharest Convention and the Odessa Declaration has proved too narrow to deal with the Russian policy toward the region in the late 1990s, in which Russian-Turkish sensitivities show no immediate sign of easing. The funding base similarly needs replacement. Unlike the Mediterranean, which has the support of France, Italy, and Spain, the Black Sea region has no economic powerhouses who can provide significant funds if they choose to do so.

Something that brings financial resources from another part of the world to the Black Sea states has to be identified to replace the GEF, hopefully with a far longer commitment to the environmental cooperation of the region.

A Track IV is also needed that moves the program from a coastal states focus to a Black Sea basin focus. There are clear advantages in a group of six states compared to a group of seventeen states if the six states can work effectively. But, the marine resource shared by the six coastal states is profoundly affected by activities in the other eleven states. Furthermore, solving the pollution problems of the Danube is one aspect of solving the pollution problems of the Black Sea. Black Sea states can make much progress on their own. But, there is

also much that has to happen among the Danube basin countries that do not border the Black Sea. A Track IV can make provision for that linkage.

It is unsurprising that by late 1999, momentum for creation of a Track IV is evident in many quarters. The hope is that the European Union can be a more effective source of funding than the GEF was for BSEP I. A second hope is that the endeavor will bracket the Danube and Black Sea states in ways that more broadly address the problems and can also maintain momentum even if a major country such as Russia opts for awhile to play a passive role. A third hope is that there can be legal mechanisms that circumvent the obstacles in creating a Black Sea regional oversight entity as specified in the Bucharest Convention.

Endnotes:

¹ Robert O. Keohane, Peter Haas, and Marc Levy, "The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions," pp 3-26 in Haas, Keohane, Levy, ed., *Institutions for the Earth* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).

² "Eutrophication in the Black Sea: Causes and Effects." Summary report by the Joint ad-hoc Technical Working Group between the ICPBS and the ICPDR. May 1999 p. 6. AICPBS "stands for International Commission for the Protection of the Black Sea", which is otherwise known as the Black Sea Commission. The ICPDR is the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River.

³ See Laurence Mee, "The Black Sea in Crisis," *Ambio* 21:4 (June 1992): pp 278-286. This article is the basic source for information about Black Sea environmental degradation in many World Bank and UN publications, including the 1993 GEF brochure for the program entitled Saving the Black Sea.

⁴ The following paragraphs are a condensed version of a more extensive assessment of the beginnings of the BSEP in Martin Sampson, "Black Sea Environmental Cooperation: States and the Most Seriously Degraded Regional Sea," *Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic, and Administrative Studies* 9:1 (1995) pp 51-76. This journal is published by Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey.

⁵ Eventually this intercoastal zone management endeavor became an important part of the PCU's strategy for developing investment projects and perhaps the BSEP's most important mechanism for the involvement of Black Sea peoples in environmental decision making. It is ironic that Russia sought and provided the leadership of this activity. As a member of the Baltic environmental program, the Soviet Union previously was uncomfortable with outside investigation of its coastlines. Whether the Russian's choice was the idea of individuals in its delegation to the 1992-1993 meetings or reflected a larger policy objective or drew upon some kind of Russian academic explorations of coastal land use policy is not known to the author.

⁶ Neal Acherson, *Black Sea* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp 270-271 describes the “display of human will” to save the Black Sea and comments that at the 1993 Odessa meeting “....all the Ministers happily let themselves be steered by discreet UN advice from off stage - something which could never happen at a conference on the North Sea, where governments, especially those of Britain or France, are notoriously touchy about maintaining the appearance of sovereignty.” Mee himself modestly observes that the Odessa Declaration was written with UNEP help. See “The Black Sea Today” in *The Black Sea in Crisis*, ed. Sarah Hobson and Laurence David Mee, pp 5-6. Singapore: World Scientific, 1998.

⁶ Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme. 1994 Annual Report, “The Black Sea Environmental Programme in 1994: An Overview,” p. i

⁸ Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, Black Sea Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis, 1996. p. iii.

⁸ Gareth Jenkins, “National Coordinators Evaluate the First Phase of the BSEP,” *Saving the Black Sea 4* (September 1996), p 14. *Saving the Black Sea* is the title of an occasional magazine the PCU issued to publicize BSEP’s activities. It should not be confused with the 1993 GEF brochure of the same name.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p 14.

¹¹ Transboundary Diagnostic Assessment. p. iv.

¹² Yu Zaitsev and V. Mamaev, *Biological Diversity in the Black Sea*. (New York: United Nations Publications, 1997), pp145-146.

¹³ Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and Protection of the Black Sea, 1996, sections 1-17.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, sections 36-66.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, sections 29-35.

¹⁶ “Eutrophication in the Black Sea: Causes and Effects.” p. 11

¹⁷ Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, 1996 Annual Report, pp 24-26.

¹⁸ GEF, 1997 and Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme. 1997 Annual Report, pp 23-24.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, “The Black Sea Environmental Programme 1997: a Personal Overview,” p ii. Since the 1997 Annual Report is the last issued under PCU Director Mee, his published list of obstacles to subsequent environmental cooperation in the Black Sea region is particularly helpful.

²⁰ See the Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, Summary Report of the First Meeting of the Emergency Response Working Party. Varna, Bulgaria, May 16-18, 1994; pp 17-22.

²¹ 1997 Annual Report, pp 2-3.

²² 1996 Annual Report, p v.

²³ Handbook of Documents (Istanbul: Permanent International Secretariat of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation), p 289.

²⁴ Ibid, p 293.

²⁵ Christopher E. Cosslett, "Impact of Economic Transition on the Black Sea Environment," Saving the Black Sea, 3 (October 1995), p 5.

²⁵ Black Sea Transboundary Analysis, p 2. "Insufficient public involvement" is further defined here as "lack of general awareness of environmental issues, deficient public participation, and lack of transparency." Lack of awareness of BSEP presumably blends with these problems.

²⁶ 1997 Annual Report, p iii.

²⁷ Ibid, p 30.

²⁸ Ibid, p 25.

²⁹ The author spent spring 1993 and fall 1995 at Bogazici University in Istanbul teaching courses including a class on international environmental cooperation, and returned at least once a year through 1999. In general, university faculty, students, and business people in civic groups with which the author had contact were aware of BSEC but had not heard of BSEP, despite the quality and vigor of its endeavors.

³⁰ See Thomas Homer-Dixon "Project on Environment, Population, and Security: Key Findings." *Environmental Change and Security Project Report 2* (1996), pp 45-48.

³¹ According to data from the PCU, in 1990 the net balance of migration into and out of Turkey's Black Sea coast was 208,311 people leaving. See Table 3.3, page 19 of Global Environmental Facility: Black Sea Environmental Programme, Black Sea Environmental Priorities Study National Report, June 1996, draft.

³² The author is unaware of any systematic studies of this tendency, which in the author's experience is widespread. For a discussion of how people use schemas and analogical reasoning to relate potential dangers and problems to prior experiences, see Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), especially chapter 8.

³³ Press release from the Religion, Science, and the Environment Symposium II, "The Black Sea in Crisis", 20-28 September 1997. Available at: <http://www.seaweb.org/black.html>.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Keohane, et al, 1993.

³⁶ Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and Protection of the Black Sea, paragraph 6, which attributes improvement to "reduced economic activity in the region" and "to a certain degree of protective measures taken by governments." The relationship of those measures to BSEP and the actual magnitude of improvement attributable to those measures are unknown to the author.

States and Non-State Actors in Environmental Policy Making: An Overview of the GEF-BSEP NGO Forum

By

Omer Faruk Genckaya

“Present environmental governance depends on easily accessible information about environmental quality and environmental policies, transparent actions by international organizations and government, the continued participation in environmental diplomacy by non-state actors, sustained levels of public concern in major countries, and improved national capacity for environmental protection.”¹ This chapter discusses state and NGO actors with the Black Sea Environmental Program in terms of these important factors. The paper begins with a discussion of recent ideas and scholarly literature concerning state and NGO actors in international environmental politics.

State and Non-State Actors

The first major international attempt to bring all the nations together to solve the global environmental problems was the 1972 Stockholm Conference organized by the United Nations (UN). The major contribution of this Conference was that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for the first time were recognized by the state actors internationally. Two decades after the Stockholm Conference, the relationship between the UN system and NGOs evolved in a multi-dimensional way and many levels at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or the Rio summit.² Both the UNCED pro-

cess and Agenda 21 encouraged the establishment of environmental NGOs and included them on environmental management issues.

Following is a discussion of the rise of non-state participation in environmental policymaking, which will provide the framework for this chapter. After a brief discussion of non-governmental participation on environmental issues, this paper will outline the state of environment in the Black Sea. Next, there will be a sketch on environmental cooperation developed by the state actors regionwide and finally a discussion on the achievements of the Global Environment Facility-supported nongovernmental activities in the region.

Non-state participation in environmental policymaking

Global environmental governance requires the participation of non-state actors, including NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and market-oriented actors, (e.g. multinational corporations), in solving the global environmental issues.³ Besides state actors, both IGOs and NGOs have been playing an increasingly key role for regional institutions, participating in many activities, previously known “states-only” activities.⁴ Because of the reluctance of national governments to take effective measures against the environmental issues, non-state actors appeared to be the leader of environmental activities at local and global levels. While participating in formulating, promulgating, and enforcing rules, non-state actors affect the behavior of a wide range of actors.

Non-state actors carry an instrumental function, especially in information gathering, policy development, and

policy assessment⁵ for the states' regulatory actions. The unique capacity of NGOs in mobilizing local institutions on advocacy and awareness of global environmental problems essentially comes from "their singular attention to environmental issues; lack of territorial and sovereign allegiances; and their transparency."⁶ Global scale environmental problems, like climate change, are mainly determined by individual sources⁷ so that, the success and failure of global environmental politics is dependent on the behavior of the ordinary citizen, (i.e., compatibility of *bottom-up* and *top-down* institutional arrangements). In this respect, environmental NGOs stand in a unique position by linking the global and the local.

The functions of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in international institutions are complex. They link and translate norms, practices, and information between national and international levels.⁸ The special significance of NGOs lies in their ability to gain media attention, mobilize support, provide information, offer or withhold legitimacy for governmental policies, and operate transnationally in cementing the contribution of IGOs and the scientific community.⁹ NGOs lobby states and advocate their interests within and across societies. Additionally, transnational environmental activist groups enhance accountability, participation, and continuing momentum for political reform involving "world civic politics".¹⁰

An emerging global civil society paradigm emphasizes the networks of private and voluntary organizations and institutions (global civil society actors) in international environmental politics as a bottom-up arrangement.¹¹ Global civil society actors with their normative constructs, seem to overcome the structural

constraints of the ENGOs, which can severely limit what an NGO can do¹², in the long-run. For example, it is evident that democratic political order facilitates the effectiveness of the NGO activities. Besides, "an environmental policy proposal by an NGO which would affect the vital interest of powerful organizations is unlikely to be accepted."¹³ However, global civil society actors may replace the elitist structure of the ENGOs by the voluntary participation of greater public, who are directly affected by ecological changes on the one hand and may boost the influence upon the governmental authorities in decision-making process, on the other.

Another influential, non-state actor on environmental politics, relatively autonomous from the state's control, is the business sector. It is argued that about 70 percent of world trade is controlled by 500 multinational corporations (MNCs), one percent of which controls half of the total foreign direct investment.¹⁴ On the one hand, it is generally accepted that both local and international business use developing countries as "pollution havens," by benefiting from the lower environmental standards.¹⁵ It is also evident that the MNCs bring more advanced technology to developing countries compared to the local businesses, which can foster the development of local standards.

On the other hand, in order to keep their competitive advantage and promotion in a global market, the business sector, especially MNCs and TNCs (transnational corporations), wrap themselves in "green flags" by supporting "eco-efficiency" and "green competitiveness".¹⁶ According to the "green and competitive" argument, the most successful companies are those that use the most advanced environmentally sound

technologies.¹⁷ The positive relationship between the economic and the environmental performance of industry was also observed by the greening of the industry literature emphasizing a wide range of determinants of the environmental performance of industry.¹⁸ The literature that emphasizes which companies are the sources of pressure in applying environmental standards is a critical factor in successful compliance by other MNCs.

The MNCs' interest in the environment has been institutionalized around UNCED. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) was formed by a group of approximately 120 MNCs in 1995.¹⁹ The WBCSD lobbies both the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop environmentally sound standards in industry and trade. Many MNCs have already developed some "industrial guidelines and codes of conduct for environmental practices."²⁰ Therefore, the business sector should be included in the analysis of present global environmental politics. This is especially vital for the developing and transitional economies, where the regulations are not yet set to counter the negative impact of national and foreign business practices on the ecosystems. With the inclusion of the business sector in the national and international environmental fora, a partnership can be formulated for sustainable development.

At present, the IGOs and ENGOS with their elitist structure and top-down arrangements are still influential in international and national environmental politics.²¹ The scope of NGO interaction with the UN system contributes to the global governance at the same time.²² Contrary to the general wisdom, the power and importance of non-state ac-

tors may not increase at the expense of state power. "States do not necessarily lose and in fact often gain through the enhancement of NGO access and participation."²³ Under the present international system, which is based on sovereign states, the non-state actors are founded, maintained, and charged with advancing state goals in the case of IGOs, and are under the strict legal scrutiny of the state actors in the case of NGOs.²⁴ The state actors have the ultimate power of approving all national and international actions.²⁵

In fact, international cooperation requires both the participation of state and non-state actors in order to effectively regulate the private sector as well as state sector actions. As state actors face important economic and political issues, that are transnational in nature, "effective cooperation is decentralized and non-hierarchical, a mode of cooperation whose possibilities are just beginning to be understood."²⁶ The development of multi-actor governance in decision-making for sustainable development stands as an example of this kind of cooperation. Taking the governmental sector, the business sector, and the NGO sector as major components of political interaction, one can determine four alternative modes of interaction among these sectors.²⁷ Despite the difficulties, the multiparty environmental governance is the key towards promoting liberal and pro-market regimes in developing countries.²⁸ However, there is a potentially negative effect on world civic politics as domestic economic, political, and civic organizations integrate into the global system.²⁹ Because the global system imposes its own criteria and regulation as the model and the local systems, due to their financial and technical weakness, generally attempt to

adapt themselves to them without questioning if the model fits to their reality.

Among other non-state actors, NGOs' access and participation in environmental politics are mainly determined by the states. Even at the Montreal Protocol negotiations, where the NGOs' participation marked a new era of participation, the governments excluded the non-state actors from the consultative group, by introducing the so-called forum of informal *informals*.³⁰ In other words, NGO participation is dependent on the political actors; however, the NGOs can provide high-quality advice and support the state's regulatory practice technically and politically through participation. With the establishment of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) under the initiative of the World Bank to deal specifically with global environmental issues, NGOs found a greater participation in the workings of international fora.³¹

The GEF, as the first IGO to specifically address global environmental issues, mainly climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, and maritime pollution,³² included the competent and relevant NGOs.³³ NGOs are an important partner in the design and in the implementation of GEF projects.³⁴ NGOs are also eligible to receive financial aid from the GEF's Small Grants Programme (SGP) according to the certain criteria.³⁵ The major purpose of the GEF SGP is to enhance public participation in environmental preservation with an idea of sustainability. By emphasizing NGO participation as way to provide valuable information and skills, beneficial to the states, the GEF has paved the way for expanding potential participants, including business NGOs. Thus, a broader NGO representation will provide

both a greater flow of information to states and help critical local actors to join international fora.³⁶

Environmental Issues in the Black Sea

One common element that creates more interdependence among nations is the threat of a deteriorating global environment. National security and sovereignty concepts have lost importance but are being redefined to include environmental consequences.³⁷ This global issue strengthened regional cooperation for environmental protection. Regionalization includes both *de facto* regionalization of economic affairs on the one hand, and *de jure* regionalization of relevant matters, like the environment.³⁸ In this regard, regionalization and globalization are mutually reinforcing processes, especially with recent agreements, programs, and action plans adopted for regional cooperation schemes from Southeast Asia, the Baltics, North America, and the Mediterranean Sea.³⁹

The Black Sea occupies a great basin strategically situated at the southeastern extremity of Europe. The shores of the Black Sea lie within the territory of the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the north, Georgia on the east, Turkey on the south, and Bulgaria and Romania on the west. The Black Sea connects to the distant waters of the Atlantic Ocean by the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, the Dardanelles, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. It is permanently without oxygen below 150 to 200 meters, accounting for 90 percent of its total volume of 537,000 cubic kilometers.⁴⁰

The Black Sea is one of the most polluted bodies of water in the world. Pollution mainly comes from the

surrounding countries' runoff, including rivers, discharges of cities, and industrial wastes and shipping. Its vulnerability stems partially from its isolated geography and partially from the total size of land-based sources of pollution. Among others, eutrophication-over-fertilization of the sea by nutrients from land-based sources, is the biggest problem⁴¹, leading to the decline of the Black Sea fisheries. Upstream dams, and diversions for irrigation and hydropower reduced the flow and quality of river water and eventually increased coastal erosion. Another source of pollution is marine-based pollution, including oil, garbage from ships, and dumping of toxic waste.⁴² Due to development, forestation, and unregulated housing, continuing degradation of the wetlands scattering around the rim of the Black Sea, could eliminate the natural buffer quality between the polluted rivers and the Black Sea. For example, since the explosion of Chernobyl reactor, nuclear particles have been deposited into the Black Sea through Dnieper River.

The environmental degradation of the Black Sea has had enormous social costs, such as health problems, migration, and unemployment, as well as great economic losses, e.g. fisheries.⁴³ With this in mind, any environmental policy should cover primarily human health, the effect of economic activities, like tourism and fishing, and protection of natural resources.⁴⁴ In general, the ecosystem of the Black Sea will have to be rehabilitated. To develop a sustainable policy for environmental protection of the Black Sea, an eligible coordinating structure, a long term common regional program, an investment strategy, and effective management tools and networks for

exchanging environmental information are also required.⁴⁵

Toward a Common Regional Approach: Bucharest Convention and Odessa Declaration

With the idea of central planning which emphasized quantity rather than quality of products, most of the former Soviet Union states as well as Eastern European states, did not pay attention to environmental concerns in industry and energy production.⁴⁶ Agriculture and housing also negatively affected the pollution of the Black Sea. After the introduction of a market economy and the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) with the encouragement of international organizations, including the UN and World Bank, the coastal countries of the Black Sea committed themselves to rehabilitating natural resources for sustainable development.⁴⁷ Article 15 of the Summit Declaration on BSEC encouraged the participating states to take appropriate steps, including promotion of joint projects, for the protection of the environment, particularly the preservation and the improvement of environment of the Black Sea, and the conservation, exploitation, and development of its bio-productive potential.

Realizing the need for close cooperation with competent international organizations based on a concerted regional approach for the protection and enhancement of the marine environment of the Black Sea, the six bordering countries⁴⁸ signed the Bucharest Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution and its three protocols⁴⁹ on 21 April 1992. Within this legal framework controlling marine

pollution, the Black Sea Commission with a permanent Secretariat was tasked with promoting the implementation of the Convention and elaborating criteria pertaining to the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution (Articles 17 and 18). The Convention defines the types of pollution (Articles 6-14) and the ways of scientific and technical cooperation and monitoring (Articles 5, 15, and 16).

About one year later, the ministers responsible for the protection of the marine environment of the Black Sea coastal states, met in Odessa. In the light of the UNCED decisions and recommendations, aiming at the implementation of Agenda 21 in the Black Sea region and reasserting the provisions of Bucharest Convention, under the auspices of UNEP they adopted the Declaration on the Protection of the Black Sea, known as the Odessa Ministerial Declaration, on 7 April 1993. The Odessa Declaration enhanced the desire to establish explicit environmental goals and in an unconstrained timeframe in order to concentrate national, regional, and international resources on the most effective measures. As a final step in this institutional development towards the rehabilitation and protection of the Black Sea ecosystem, the Strategic Action Plan (SAP) was signed by the six Ministers of the environment in Istanbul on 31 October 1996. Aside from its technical priorities and requirements, the SAP underlines the importance of public participation, particularly NGO participation in environmental decision making (Articles 73-80).

To accomplish the identified principles, approaches and priority actions, the Odessa Declaration urges bilateral and multilateral cooperation, in-

cluding cooperation with relevant international organizations. In this regard, a three-year Program for the Environmental Management and Protection of the Black Sea, namely the Black Sea Environment Programme (BSEP), with the technical support of UNEP and the participation of the other Global Environment Facility (GEF) partners was signed on 29 June 1993.⁵⁰ UNEP and GEF set aside US \$9.3 million for three years⁵¹ and the international community also contributed some US \$17 million.⁵²

NGO Involvement in the BSEP

The successful implementation of the objectives of the BSEP required the active participation and involvement of a broad range of partners – nationally, regionally, and internationally. NGOs were key actors in this overall process. The BSEP sought to promote closer links both between NGOs and the communities, and between NGOs and other partners (government agencies, business, etc.), in addition to fostering collaboration among NGOs on a national, regional, and international basis. The underlying principle of the BSEP has been the inclusion of nongovernmental actors, including the private sector, local communities, labor unions, non-profit foundations, organized associations, and the public-at-large, into planning, programming, and implementation of environmental strategies.⁵³

The development of NGOs in the Black Sea countries, except in Turkey, is a relatively new phenomenon. Environmental groups in former Eastern-bloc countries were spontaneously organized, single-issue protest groups without official approval.⁵⁴ Foundations in Turkey have a centuries-old tradition

going back to the Ottoman Empire and that associations also have a long history dating back to the Republican period.⁵⁵ Although the Turkish NGOs have the same financial constraints as all NGOs in the region, the Turkish legal system offers relatively uncomplicated procedures for setting up an NGO. The Turkish government also provides structural funds to selective NGOs to promote their activities.

Environmental catastrophe in the former Soviet Union also reinforced ecological demands with nationalist appeal resulting in the disintegration of the Union.⁵⁶ Recently organized “Ecoglasnot” and/or “Ecology and Peace” movements contributed to the development of democracy and opened the political system in these countries. However, due to chronic funding problems, environmental groups in these countries are losing their grassroots character and are becoming a professional bureaucratic institution with the support of foreign donor assistance.⁵⁷ Hence, NGOs’ credible position between the public and the government is deteriorating.⁵⁸ As in the former Soviet Union, the legal framework for NGO activities and the lack of financial resources have created significant obstacles in many of the Black Sea countries for effective NGO participation. Therefore, without effective legislation that emphasizes the role of the public and of NGOs, “the development of NGOs will remain somewhat erratic and confrontational, not encouraging a partnership approach.”⁵⁹

The BSEP has directed its efforts to support NGO activities in various areas.⁶⁰ First of all, the BSEP has supported NGOs and representative networks of NGOs, through capacity

building, by small grant programmes, and by inclusion of NGO delegates into the BSEP Steering Committee meetings and Donor Conference. Secondly, the BSEP functioned as a means of channeling donors support “for the strengthening of the Black Sea NGOs.” Thirdly, with the strong commitments of the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan to enhance public participation in the Black Sea countries, a new form of partnership with various stakeholders including the local populations was initiated, parallel to the BSEP’s principles. Finally, the BSEP organized several international conferences in which the NGO representatives actively participated.

Thus, the Black Sea NGOs learned from the experiences and activities of other international NGO networks. The publication of a Black Sea NGO Directory, which included only those NGOs with a clear commitment to addressing Black Sea environmental issues, also helped the organizational development and public relations of these groups. (*See Chart 1.*)

In 1993, in Samsun, Turkey, a preliminary meeting was organized by the UNDP as a first step toward setting up an International Black Sea Environmental NGO Forum with the participation of Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine. Though the undertaking did not bring about the results anticipated, it was instrumental in initiating this process and sensitizing NGOs to the above issues. In 1994, several National NGO Fora were organized in the Black Sea countries, with support and assistance from the BSEP in collaboration with World Bank and the EU-TACIS programme to enable the implementation of these activities

Black Sea NGOs included in the environmental projects designed by the

European Union (EU) as the main component of environmental awareness, participation, and democratization. Thus, the EU, which has been a collateral partner of the BSEP, through the Phare/TACIS programmes – while the Phare Programme supports democracy for a stable Europe, the Tacis Programme promotes both democracy and free market economy in the newly independent states and Mongolia⁶¹ – provided technical assistance and allocated small grants to NGOs.⁶²

In fact, the EU assistance is more significant in those Eastern European countries that have applied for EU membership than those that have not. The Black Sea PHARE 92 Regional Environmental Programme, had already raised public awareness of the activities of Romanian and Bulgarian NGOs associated with environmental issues in the Black Sea. An international meeting, funded by the PHARE was held in Varna, Bulgaria, from 26-28 June 1994, to exchange results and relate experiences, improving the flow of information. This in turn created even more awareness of the problems facing the Black Sea and led to a recommendation for further NGO collaboration. The participants also proposed the establishment of national foundations/information centers to support and strengthen NGO activities.⁶³

Following the meetings of national NGO Fora between June-October 1994, the First Regional NGO Forum Meeting was held in Constanza, Romania, between 8-10 November 1994 with the participation of the representatives of NGOs from Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia, in addition to representatives from Birdlife International, Coalition Clean Baltic, the Danube NGO Forum,

and the International Black Sea Club.⁶⁴ The participants discussed the nature and scope of the Forum's structure, cooperation among the multipartite sectors, and the involvement of the international community and then outlined an agenda for future action.⁶⁵

Black Sea NGO Forum

The Black Sea NGO Forum is an informal association of nongovernmental organizations in the Black Sea countries with the aim to raise awareness of the Black Sea environmental issues; promote public participation procedures in decisions which are likely to have an impact on the Black Sea environment; support cooperation and coordination among organizations concerned with the state of the Black Sea environment; and develop mechanisms of communication, locally, nationally, and internationally with regard to Black Sea environmental related aspects.⁶⁶ Black Sea NGO Forum meeting are held annually shortly before the BSEP Steering Committee meeting with the aim to review and plan the NGO activities, articulate the NGO view on the development of the BSEP, and appoint two NGO representatives in a rotational basis to attend the BSEP Steering Committee meeting and other regional meetings of relevance. (*See Figure 1, which is a chart of the Forum.*)

Two Black Sea NGO Forum Representatives are appointed in a rotational basis annually with the responsibilities to attend the BSEP Steering Committee, representing the NGO positions; work towards a two-way communication with the BSEP; present the activities of the Black Sea NGOs; coordinate the NGO Forum Focal Points activities; represent internationally the Black Sea NGO Forum and its

objectives; and review and report on the NGO Forum activities and projects.

The Black Sea NGO Forum acts via working groups in the areas of environmental awareness raising, public participation, communication and information exchange, environmental education, and NGO management training. Specific activities are developed in a coordinated way by the Black Sea Focal Points in each of the six Black Sea riparian countries. Each country has taken a regional role for one working group. Working Group Focal Points are responsible for managing regional activities and projects as well as ensure a two-way communication flow with other local and national institutions working with the BSEP.

National Black Sea NGO Forum meetings are organized as often as necessary to review, evaluate, and plan NGO activities and projects; outline local and national NGO trends on environmental issues; appoint national Black Sea NGO Forum Working Group Focal Points to support the regional NGO Forum; and mandate two representatives per country to participate at the regional Black Sea NGO Forum.

National Working Group-Focal Points are agreed upon and appointed at the national level in each of the six Black Sea countries and for each of the regional working groups in order to support organization, management, and implementation of national and local activities and projects in the priority areas identified by the Black Sea NGO Forum; provide coordination at national scale within the regional framework; provide in-kind logistical support for the Black Sea NGO Forum; identify opportunities for activities and project development; effectively communicate nationally and internationally; review,

evaluate, and report on the progress at local and national scale; and participate at the national Black Sea NGO Forum meetings.⁶⁷

What has been achieved?

In 1995, the Black Sea NGOs were active not only in strengthening national coordination mechanisms, but also in engaging in the concrete projects such as wetlands conservation and management.⁶⁸ The national Black Sea NGO Forums were organized in collaboration with the World Bank and the EU Phare/TACIS programmes. These associate partners also supported the training and education projects in Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria.⁶⁹ Some pilot projects on public awareness in the Black Sea countries, including a drawing competition, and a slide-show, were implemented.⁷⁰

Meanwhile the third Black Sea NGO Forum meeting was organized in Gurzof, Crimea, Ukraine, on 16-18 October 1995. Some representatives from international organizations, namely Coastwatch Europe and Milieukontakt Oost-Europa and from the Ministry of Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine also attended the meeting. The meeting confirmed that “the NGO Forum will be sustained in the long term, in the form of a network and through the implementation of common projects. The meeting elected two delegates to represent the NGO Forum at the BSEP Steering Committee and at any other regional/international events. The meeting also decided to implement some short term projects varying from infrastructure development to concrete regional projects, like training and education on wetlands management.⁷¹ The BSEP provided some financial

support for five concrete projects which were carried out in each country except Russia.⁷²

In 1996, the Black Sea NGOs initiated a series of basin-wide and local NGO training events. Prior to the Black Sea NGO Forum meeting, national Black Sea NGOs organized their annual meetings to plan the next year's activities. The fourth Black Sea NGO Forum Meeting organized in Tblisi, Georgia, 27-31 January 1997. The main task of the Tblisi meeting was "to develop a basin-wide strategy for NGO involvement in the implementation of the Black Sea SAP."⁷³ The Black Sea NGO Forum also participated in the European Seas Conference in Lisbon, Portugal in 1996.

In collaboration with some international organizations, such as the Know How Fund of the United Kingdom, the Forum organized a series of training workshops on the training of trainers in public participation techniques, project management, and NGO development skills. Within the framework of NGO Small Grant Programme two projects on "coastal management" and "Monk Seals" which were initiated by the Turkish NGOs, were supported.⁷⁴ Moreover, Black Sea Environment Information, Education, and Resource Centers were founded in Varna, Bulgaria and Constanza, Romania with the support of the EU-Phare programme. To promote public awareness, an exhibition of children's drawings was held in Tblisi, Georgia on 15 November 1996. Finally, the First International Black Sea Action Day (IBSAD), which was first proposed at the Black Sea NGO Forum meeting in 1995, was inaugurated and will henceforth be celebrated on 31 October

on the anniversary of the signing of the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan.⁷⁵

In coordination with the BSEP-PCU (Program Coordinating Unit) and the UNDP Field Offices, all six coastal Black Sea countries organized broad media coverage on national and local levels "to raise public awareness of the nature and scope of the Black Sea SAP and mobilize the coastal municipal authorities and the NGOs to participate in the implementation of the plan."⁷⁶

During the final year of the BSEP, the Black Sea NGOs were concerned about more practical activities such as the preparation of the national BS SAP, Integrated Coastal Zone management (ICZM), Geographic Information System (GIS), and monitoring as well as education and public awareness.⁷⁷ Training on public participation and organizational management for BS NGOs was given a special emphasis in the 1997 activities. In February 1997, the Field Studies Council and the Ecological Youth of Romania (TER) organized a four-day training program for NGO officers from around the Black Sea.⁷⁸ As a follow up activity, between May and September 1997, six national seminars were funded by the Environmental Know How Fund of the UK, the BSEP and the British Council, to increase capacity building in public participation.

Within the framework of the GEF-SGP, the national NGOs implemented several projects of public awareness on Black Sea environmental issues as recognized by the Black Sea NGO Forum held in Tblisi in 1997.⁷⁹ The Second International Black Sea Day took place on 31 October 1997 with several campaigns, competitions, and events throughout the six countries. To encourage the Black Sea-SAP, the Bulgarian Black Sea Environmental Educational

and Resource Center and the Environmental Information and Sustainable Development Center (“Rio”) of Georgia initiated public hearings and publication campaigns simultaneously.⁸⁰

The Black Sea NGO Forum was held in Varna, Bulgaria on 6-7 December 1997. The NGO representatives expressed their ideas on the further institutionalization of the Forum, especially with the need for a secretariat, a funding strategy, and more effective networking. The main concern of the representatives was what would happen to the Forum after the termination of the BSEP PCU, since the Istanbul Commission would concentrate on governmental activities (BS-SAP Article 18-25) when it replaced the PCU. Hence, the NGOs will need their own secretariat. However, the representatives did not reach a common strategy about the secretariat and its role and responsibilities.

Another substantive question raised during the Forum was “who will fund the NGOs in the future?” Having left these questions to uncertainty, the Forum also appointed six working groups coordinated by members from five countries; the Black Sea Action Plan, Environmental Education/Public Awareness, the Forum, ICZM, oil/gas extraction, and transportation and river problems including the Danube Basin.⁸¹ However, the PCU decided to help with fundraising and information for the continuation of the Forum activities in the future. The year 1998 was a critical period for the Forum. On the one hand, uncertainty about the future institutionalization of the Forum and on the other monetary issues led some NGOs to develop new strategies regarding the coordination, communication, and cooperation of the NGOs in the Black Sea.

Quo Vadis the Black Sea NGOs ?

After four years of the BSEP supporting developments originating from the initial networking of the Black Sea NGOs, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with communication, implementation, vision, management, and finance.⁸² Although many objectives have been achieved and a variety of activities were organized in a very short period of time by the BSEP and its partners, some of the NGO representatives expressed the opinion that “unfortunately there is no action, only meetings.”⁸³ Another urgent question raised by the Black Sea NGOs was future of the Forum after the BSEP? “The support of the BSEP has been, and will continue to be, vitally important, “but it was the time to organize themselves independently.”⁸⁴

The first initiative was led by the Society of Peace with Nature, a Turkish-based NGO, which organized a series of meetings, including the Black Sea Unity for Strength Conference in Istanbul, Turkey on 22-24 June 1998.⁸⁵ About 27 NGO representatives, businessmen, academics, and representatives of the municipalities from around the Black Sea countries came together and declared the establishment of the Network of “Black Sea Partners,” as an international NGO with the aim of forming “a regional network of information exchange and common action for supporting the rehabilitation, restoration, and protection of the Black Sea within an ecologically sustainable framework.”⁸⁶ The main structure of the International Black Sea Partners (IBSP) included a regional office, a Steering Committee, and an Assembly in for both state and non-state actors including unions, academicians, businessmen, and

municipalities to be represented equally at national and international levels.

Following these activities, the BS NGO Forum was convened in Istanbul on 25-27 June 1998. During the meeting, the legal entity of the Forum was questioned. Actually it was the first Black Sea NGO meeting which was not funded by the BSEP and its partners. On the other hand, the participation of the representatives of Counterpart International (CI) at these meetings was not a surprise because the President of CI, Stanley Hoise, had expressed an interest in forming a partnership with the Black Sea NGO Forum back in 1997, when he attended the Black Sea in Crisis Symposium.⁸⁷ CI, a Washington D.C.-based non-profit, international human development organization, was interested in establishing an office in the region with the primary task of coordinating forum activities, communications, and fundraising and NGO capacity building. It already had ongoing programs in Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine based on partnership.

During the Forum meeting, a general agreement on a possible operational structure for a CI office was reached. However, only Turkey and Ukraine supported the idea of integrating the Forum into the Black Sea Partners.⁸⁸ The Forum also decided to provide training and technical assistance to the Black Sea NGOs. Moreover, each country, except for Russia was entitled within the framework of Black Sea Action Day to organize special hotspots areas, which could be funded by the World Bank.⁸⁹

Another international cooperation initiative was led by Bulgarian NGOs. During the Black Sea NGO Forum of 1998 it was announced that the TIME (This is My Environment)

Foundation from Bulgaria with the support of a Dutch development agency NOVIB, mainly involved in catalyzing NGO lobbying efforts by using the EU's social funds, proposed an international workshop to strengthen BS NGO networking and lobbying capabilities.⁹⁰

Following the Forum meeting, a seminar for Black Sea NGO representatives organized by the TIME-Foundation with the support of NOVIB was held in Varna on 1-5 September 1998. About 23 representatives of the 10 Black Sea NGOs from the Black Sea countries participated in the seminar. The workshop carried "the need of creating a new comprehensive and independent international structure to raise the efficiency of NGO networking."⁹¹ The NOVIB had already been supporting some NGO activities in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Ukraine and promised to find funds for Romania, Russia, and Turkey. According to one Turkish NGO representative, the NOVIB later announced that it could provide some fund for other countries, too.⁹² CI also attended the meeting. The workshop selected the contact person for each country to organize and conduct national NGO meetings.

The country meetings organized during November and December 1998 covered the discussion and drafting of National NGO Action Plans for Preservation of the Black Sea, Bylaws of the Network, nominations of country board members, discussion of the possibilities for fundraising at the national level and operational and legal aspects of the Network functioning at the national level. The international process began with a draft of the Network Bylaw and the first regional board meeting, which was convened in Sofia, Bulgaria on 29-31 January 1999, adopted its final

version. Thus, an independent International Black Sea NGO Network with the participation of ten individual representatives of the NGO community in the five BS countries, namely Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia was eventually founded (Bylaw Chapter I, Article 1).

Although the Turkish NGOs attended the Varna meeting, the Turkish national delegation was opposed to this initiative from the beginning since neither the TIME foundation nor the NOVIB had indicated any interest in the initial years of the Forum. Additionally, they opposed the initiative since the Network was being based on a purely bureaucratic structure with high costs and randomly selected representatives of the NGOs from the region who considered the Forum inactive and decided to form a new establishment.⁹³ Some of the representatives of the Turkish NGOs also claimed that while the EU politically supports this initiative for its own purposes that petroleum companies, like Chevron, were supposed to penetrate the region through NGO activities and the CI might have acted as its partner. Then the Turkish NGOs decided to be represented at the Network as observers. With these developments, the Turkish NGOs met in June 1999 and selected a Steering Committee for a national NGO Forum consisting of seven persons, dealing with the coordination, communication, and cooperation.

The Network whose operating Regional Office was located in Varna, Bulgaria, has been under review by the Bulgarian legislature. The Network was based on Country Network Offices, a Regional Office, a Country Assembly, a Network Board and a General Assembly (Bylaw Chapter V), as the operational structure. Although an NGO from one

of the Black Sea countries can apply through the respective country Network Office, a non-Black Sea organization is entitled to apply for membership directly to the Regional Office and the Board has to certify new members within one week (Bylaw Chapter IV, Articles 2,5,7).

Concerning the membership of a non-Black Sea organization in the Network, it is not clear how can this member be represented at the decision-making process. This may be problematic if and when a non-Black Sea organization, like NOVIB or CI, who essentially raised funds to the Network, wants to be a member of the Network.

Until now, the Network mainly dealt with the setup activities for the Regional Office. Moreover, two issues of a monthly *Network Newsletter* were distributed. Besides, four NGO projects on “green tourism” with the participation of two Bulgarian, one Georgian one Ukrainian NGO were funded as pilot projects for sustainable local practices.

The establishment of the Network was supposed to create a degree of disintegration in the Black Sea NGO community as pro-Forum and pro-Network groups mainly. The Network leaders explained the discrepancy among the Turkish NGOs towards the Network organization by indicating that there is a division between the resourceful, large NGOs based in Istanbul and those lacking resources that are small Black Sea coast NGOs. The former had established close links with BSEP PIU.⁹⁴ It is also argued that issues of personal priorities in environmental concern, money, leadership problems led to this confrontation between Bulgarian and Turkish NGOs. Others argued for a “wait and see” policy, thereby taking no action on the Black Sea developments.

Meanwhile, Sergey Arzumanov, an NGO trainee at the BSEP, mentioned that the BSEP, as the coordinating unit, has good relations with the TIME Foundation as well as other NGOs and the Network will understand that the BSEP's goals overlap with the Network.

Aside from the major opposition of the Turkish NGOs towards the Network, there were other significant objections about the Network by the wider and more experienced NGO community in the region. First, the Forum activists denied the founding premise of the Network (i.e., that the Forum was inactive and unsuccessful, therefore another organization was needed). Secondly, none of the National Forum member organizations attended the Network but rather a select group of NGOs, who expressed their support for and joined the Network. Financial reasons may have been a crucial factor among others also. In other words, the Network stood as a new organization denouncing the experience of the Forum. Thirdly, two Dutch organizations as well as NOVIB support the Network financially and the International Center for Water Studies (ICWS) strongly backs the initiative. The latter has been a member of the Consortium that was managing the EU Phare/TACIS programmes in the region, especially in Bulgaria and Romania.⁹⁵ Fourthly, there is a high possibility that the "lion's share will go toward overhead and organizational costs" in light of past experiences with the EU's Phare/TACIS projects. Finally, there were serious objections to the management style of the Network: "information is disseminated after the decision is taken."⁹⁶

General Evaluation and Prospects

The BSEP provided an opportunity for public participation and partnership dialogue among the different sectors of the society. The principal efforts of the BSEP for NGO strengthening were directed toward organizational development through national NGO forums, capacity building through know-how exchanges and training, and partnerships through project developments.⁹⁷ Aside from its limited financial support to the NGO community, the GEF-BSEP channeled several donors, including the EU TACIS/Phare Programmes. The GEF small grants program also supported the Black Sea-NGOs in dealing with short-term practical issues, like ICZM. The BSEP, in collaboration with other governmental and intergovernmental organizations, integrated the local NGOs into an international event ranging from public awareness, to campaigns and summer schools. And, last but not the least, the publication of the BSEP-NGO Directory with its limited entry, facilitated the identification of communication problems.

In short, the BSEP, in a very cost-effective way, let the BS-NGOs be involved in a process of participation and partnership. Recently emerging initiatives towards restructuring the scope and mandate of the Black Sea NGOs indicate the fact that now the "ball is in their court" in enhancing environmental management in the Black Sea countries⁹⁸. Naturally they face several obstacles as well as opportunities in dealing with future objectives.

According to the findings of a questionnaire survey aimed at assessing the impact of the BSEP-NGO activities among the Black Sea NGOs, the major constraint was the lack of effective communication to facilitate the flow of information between local, regional, and

national NGOs.⁹⁹ The response rate to this survey, seven out of 40 NGOs proves that there are serious infrastructural problems concerning communication in this region. Secondly, fundraising and project development was considered as vital to the survival and integration of the NGOs in the region. On several occasions, the representatives of the Black Sea NGOs raised similar views.¹⁰⁰

Nongovernmental organizations are a new phenomenon in the region. There is also a great diversity in terms of history, structure, and objectives of the NGOs from country to country. With the support of the Western funds, the number of NGOs, who claim to represent “the public opinion” has been increased amazingly.¹⁰¹ In reality, however, there are very few truly “grassroots” and community based-organizations in the region.”¹⁰² At present there are 116 ENGOs, which were registered in the Black Sea NGO Directory.¹⁰³ This does not reflect the actual number of NGOs in the region, but instead that those who are specifically interested in the environmental issues in the Black Sea are very limited. There is a growing number of NGO participation from Georgia, Ukraine, and Romania through the BSEP activities. Surprisingly the Russian NGOs are not represented sufficiently in the Directory. Unfortunately, due to lack of communication or irregularity of the NGO operations in this region, the number of NGO entries in the next edition of the Directory will radically drop down to 65. This is also indicative of the fact that especially small and coastal Black Sea NGOs really need help to survive.

NGOs are key actors in gathering and mobilizing communities. Although all the Black Sea countries adopted legislation allowing the formation and op-

eration of NGOs, especially since governmental authorities are unwilling to include them into the decision-making process¹⁰⁴ the greater public is suspicious of NGO activities. Among other things, registration of associations in most of the former and eastern European countries is prohibitively expensive and bureaucratic.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, they have a limited capacity for membership. By implementing IBSAD and training in the public participation projects, the Black Sea NGOs showed their potentials. However, the lack of cooperation among NGOs made them fail to “involve in the environmental decision-making process” effectively.¹⁰⁶

The 1990/91 World Values Survey¹⁰⁷ indicated that three of the Black Sea countries, namely Bulgaria, Russia, and Turkey, listed at the higher rankings concerning “public support for environmental protection.” According to this study, there is a moderate or no relationship between values and support for environmental protection in these countries, but natural disasters, like Chernobyl have made the public more aware of environmental problems. In fact, non-state actors, including business and the religious institutions, have been actively trying to raise public awareness concerning environmental problems in the Black Sea Region. On the one hand, TURMEPA (the Turkish Maritime Environment Protection Association) and its Greek counterpart HELMEPA organized the “Revelation and Environment” Cruise in September 1995 as a private sector involvement. Later, from 20-28 September 1997, about 300 religious leaders, scientists, decision-makers, and environmentalists accompanied by journalists assembled “the Black Sea in Crisis” symposium.¹⁰⁸ Following a boat trip visiting several Black Sea ports to publi-

cize the environmental problems of the Black Sea, the symposium made certain commitments towards future action, including fund-raising, public awareness, an education center for Orthodox clergy, and strong support for Black Sea SAP.

Despite the widening and deepening of the environmental concerns in the region, ineffective management by the state actors on environmental issues with the idea of rapid economic growth and national security,¹⁰⁹ constitute a serious obstacle towards achieving sustainable policies. To overcome this obstacle, NGOs may develop multi-stakeholder projects at national and regional levels and replicate them. Thus, while these projects stimulate NGOs to work together instead of competing for limited funds, they may promote public involvement in the decision-making process. In other words, BS-NGOs with their distinctive peculiarities and in collaboration with community-based organizations and the public can enhance public participation, as it was stressed in the Black Sea SAP.

At present, governmental authorities must legitimize NGOs and encourage their activities, and include them into the preparation of the National Black Sea SAPs. Mass media will also play a critical role in this process. A good example of this has been recently experienced in Turkey. A spontaneous civic resistance developed against the governmental authorities and the EURO-GOLD a multinational corporation in Bergama, Izmir when the newspaper coverage warned the people about gold mining with cyanide.¹¹⁰ Hence, not only must the governmental authorities (as the signatories of the international environmental treaties), adhere to the international requirements, but so must the foreign investors and local businesses

also comply with the requirement. The principles of environmental ethics are a part of the global society, making a distinction between short-term and long-term profits.

Although there is no reliable inventory indicating how many of the businesses, either local, national, or multinational, in the Black Sea countries are abiding by environmentally sound technologies or taking environmental precautions, it is obvious that both governmental and private enterprises are the main polluters in the region. The Black Sea NGO community has been integrating with the global environmental network slowly but gradually. However, due to their chronic struggle for funding to survive, some of them are losing their grassroots origins and transforming themselves into bureaucratic organizations. International institutions' grants did not reach to local NGOs fully, simply because of technical reasons, like the size of these NGOs.

Meanwhile there is a growing interest in this region because of its transregional location and the natural resources in the neighboring countries, such as oil and natural gas. Both governmental and IGOs, MNCs and international NGOs with special objectives, have been increasingly penetrating the region's countries. The Black Sea NGOs, which are hungry for money, easily become a partner of the international initiatives to overcome "bureaucratic" obstacles in these countries. In other words, the concept of an NGO has been losing its essential meaning in these countries, and NGOs have deteriorated.

The EU, through its Phare /TACIS-funded projects, has already contributed to the public awareness activities of the Black Sea NGOs, espe-

cially in Bulgaria and Romania. However, some NGOS argued “not only the EU assistance was not channeled to the BS NGO Forum, but regrettably, the Forum representatives in many countries found it almost impossible to get information about what is going on.”¹¹¹ Moreover, the approximation of the EU Environmental legislation by the 10 Central and Eastern European countries, including Bulgaria and Romania, who have association agreements with the EU were completed.¹¹²

Furthermore, a new EU Phare /TACIS-funded project, entitled the “Funds for the Black Sea Environmental Programme” was launched. It cost 1.5 million ECUs and will run for 18 months on a wide range of activities in five coastal Black Sea countries, excluding Turkey. The ICWS, which is familiar with the region, will manage the coastal zone management program in consultation with other European firms.¹¹³ A sub-component of this program concerning Environmental Education and Public Awareness cost 250,000 ECUs and was coordinated by the TIME-Foundation in Bulgaria, Romania, and Georgia. Both the priorities of the EU, like Black Sea tourism and the contractor/subcontractor relations in this chain remind us of the traces of “ecoimperialism.” In other words, the EU both prepares, organizes, and finances the entire environmental programs for the region whose countries, thus, have less freedom to set their own priorities.¹¹⁴

This is not particular to the EU-led programs. There is always the danger of NGOs losing autonomy vis-à-vis the donor institution, in formulating policies. Aid plays an important role in the creation of environmental regimes and forces NGOs to promote far-reaching objectives such as democracy and good gov-

ernance, well outside the scope of their environmental goals. Because of the governmental weaknesses in most of the transitional countries, the international organizations have been able to more easily to penetrate these countries through partnerships with the local NGOs rather than the government. It is open to question, however, to what extent the priorities of the donor and the environmental concerns of local public can be matched. In other words, concerns of the donor and the recipient, including NGOs, are very important as well as capacity and contracting in the effectiveness of environmental aid.¹¹⁵

International organizations may help Black Sea NGOs in enhancing their capacity in promoting public awareness, networking, and training. Foreign donors can solve the difficulties experienced by local NGOs in harmonizing activities by investing in infrastructure and computer technologies for local NGO administrators and can help to increase technical skills concerning networking. Simply put, foreign institutions should supply a new form of NGO small grant programs. Projects with a great amount of money may not be compatible with the capacity of the NGOs, may create competition among the NGOs, and support bureaucratic tendencies, which is the main handicap of NGOs as volunteer organizations.

Instead of subcontracting NGOs in great environmental projects, foreign donors may request the inclusion of NGOs with them on an observer status. Otherwise, NGOs may lose their essential identity and become a real entrepreneur. Therefore, the international effort must be channeled to improve the capacity of small NGOs, not to use them as subcontractor of super NGOs of the region with high tech and bureaucratic

structure. As a regional intergovernmental organization, the BSEP Secretariat and the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABSEC) through its subcommittees have greater responsibility to strengthen NGOs' participation into the decision-making process as it was conditioned by the Ministerial Declarations and the Black Sea SAP.

If money were the sole problem, the Black Sea NGOs might encourage local individuals and businesses to donate money to local NGOs. The IBSAD can be an effective mechanism for fundraising activities. In return, the Black Sea NGOs must function as vehicle to voice public demands and build a mass appeal on practical not theoretical grounds. Most of the Black Sea NGOs have been either established or run by academic people. Therefore, their activities were limited to their own objectives and not disseminated to the greater public. In this respect, NGOs, by gaining sufficient infrastructure facilities, must link business, academia, central and local governments, media, and other interested parties and inform them "what is happening in the region." According to effectively.

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the interviews led by the author of this article during the last three years the Black Sea NGOs are hungry for information as well as in need of money. Through the regular and reliable flow of information, the Black Sea NGOs can perform their major function of public awareness, education and training. Also, they may keep a wider network of multi stakeholders, providing money, skills and expertise, at local and regional level.

Finally, NGO activities primarily require dedication, unity, and cooperation. Recent NGO developments in the region, due to the uncertainty about the BSEP activities and financial constraints, signaled a temporary disintegration. The Black Sea NGOs have sufficient experience to move forward. The future of the Black Sea environment needs impersonal, improvised, and integrated efforts of the regional non-state actors. In this respect, not only ENGOS, but also scientific communities, local administrations, mass media, and especially business circles are to be integrated into the decision-making process

Chart 1

BLACK SEA ENVIRONMENTAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS*

NAMES OF THE ENGOs	A	B	C	D															
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	12	13	14	15			
BULGARIA																			
Bulgarian National Association on Water Quality	6	2	NA																Y
Bulgarian Society for the Protection of Birds	12	5	1,3,4,5		Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y						
Bulgarian Society of Scientists-Varna	8	4	1,4	Y		Y													
Burgas Black Sea Club	7	NA	NA				Y												
Burgas Branch of Bulgarian Nature Exploring Society	NA	1	1,4	Y															
Burgas Ecological Association	8	NA	NA																
Burgas Ecology Man Foundation	8	1	2	Y									Y						
Burgas Movement of Ecoglasnot	8	1	3,4		Y	Y													
Centre of Environmental Information and Education	8	1	3,4	Y	Y														
ECO-CLUB 2000	5	1	NA	Y															Y
Environmental Saving of Burgas Society	10	3	1		Y														
Green Balkans -Burgas	9	1	NA																Y
Independent Society Ecoglasnot Burgas	10	3	3,4	Y															
Independent Society Ecoglasnot Varna	11	NA	NA				Y												
National Ecological Club	10	2	6																
Society for Bird Protection-Varna	12	1	3,4		Y								Y	Y					
Student's Center for International Cooperation	5	1	1,3	Y		Y													
Varna Movement of Ecoglasnot	7	1	1,3,4	Y	Y														
R. of GEORGIA																			
Acharian Association of Young Ecologists	8	3	NA	Y				Y											
Adjara Regional Organisation of Georgia Greens	10	3	1,2,3	Y	Y														
Black Sea Youth EcoAcademy	4	1	5	Y				Y											
Centre for Studies and Protection of Small Animals	6	1	2,3	Y		Y													
Eco-Centre	6	1	2																Y
Eco-Film Studio	5	1	2		Y														
Ecological Law Club	5	1	2		Y							Y							
Environmental Information Centre	4	2	2			Y													
Environmental Protection and Cultural Revival Fund "Vazi"	4	1	1,2,3		Y														Y
Environmental Relief Impulse	6	1	2	Y															
Fund "Mission"	5	1	2		Y		Y												
G.Nikoladze Alpinist Club of Tbilisi State U.	45	3	1,7	Y				Y											
Georgia Greens	12	5	1,2,3		Y														
Georgia Youth EcoMovement	7	3	2		Y														
Georgian Geoinformation Centre "G. Info"	6	1	5				Y												
Georgian Society Tusheti	5	NA	2		Y														
Historical Ecological Assoc. of Zugdidi Mafalu	5	1		Y															
Human Ecology Centre	6	3	1,2,3	Y	Y	Y													
Jvari (Cross)	5	NA	2	Y															Y
Marine Association "Poseidon"	6	2	1,2,3,8										Y					Y	
Regional Fund for Environmental Protection	8	NA	2	Y	Y														
Sitsotskhle (Life)	5	NA	NA	Y	Y	Y							Y						
Society of Friends of Nature "Tskhratskaro"	5	1	2																Y
Society of Young Ecologists "Green Cross"	5	1	2		Y								Y	Y					
The Biological Farming Association "Elkana"	7	1	1,2				Y						Y						Y
The Ecological Group of Terjola	5	1	2																Y
The Georgian Centre of Transition Economic Systems and Sustainable Development	6	1	2	Y		Y													
Vashlovani	6	1	2																Y
Vita Center		1	2	Y															Y
ROMANIA																			
Anaconda	7	1	1,6		Y														
Danube Delta Friends Foundation	9	4	5		Y														Y

Earth-Kind Romania	NA	NA	NA	Y		Y						Y					
Eco Black Sea	7	NA	NA	Y		Y						Y	Y				
Eco Mar	8	1	3,6		Y		Y										
Ecological Association of Divers-DOLPHIN	10	NA	NA		Y	Y											
Ecological Cooperation Group	10	1	5,9	Y													
Ecological Society for Study and Protection of Wild Flora and Fauna	7	1	5	Y	Y	Y		Y				Y					
Friends of the Earth-Galati	9	1	NA		Y												
Group for Underwater and Speleological Explorations	19	1	2,3,6,10		Y	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y			
Mare Nostrum	7	1	5,6	e	Y	Y											
Oceanic Club Constanta	8	2	3,6		Y	Y											
Pro- Delta Club	8	1	NA	Y				Y				Y					
Rom Coast	6	1	NA									Y					Y
Romanian Foundation for Democracy	NA	NA	NA	Y		Y	Y										
Romanian Naval League-Contanta Branch	10	4	1,6		Y									Y			
Romanian Ornithological Society	10	5	1,3,6,11	Y	Y	Y											
The Black Sea University Foundation	8	NA	NA	Y													
The Ecologist Youth of Romania	10	4	5,7	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y		Y					
The Silvic Progress Society	114	4	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y						Y				
<i>RUSSIA</i>																	
Acvatori	6	1	None														
Center for Information and Environmental Modeling of Rostov State University	9	1	5,7			Y	Y							Y			
Cooperative Complex Geophysical Expedition Magnitude	12	1	NA			Y											
Environmental Centre of Sochi "ECOS"	6	1	NA	Y		Y						Y					
Green Don	11	1	None	Y	Y	Y											
Public Committee of Economical Control	12	1	NA														
The Fund of Alternative development of the Azov and Black Sea Basin	10	1	NA	Y		Y											
Ecos	6	1	NA									Y					
<i>TURKEY</i>																	
Environment Foundation of Turkey	22	1	5,7,12	Y		Y											
Environmental Protection Association of Zonguldak	9	4	NA	Y	Y		Y						Y				
Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of Cultural and Environmental Heritage	9	1	4	Y	Y												
Society for the Protection of Nature	15	5	1,3,5,6,13,14		Y	Y							Y				Y
Society of Peace with Nature	7	3	1,3,5,13	Y	Y	Y						Y					
SOS Environment Volunteers-Turkish	10	5	1,3	Y	Y	Y						Y					
The Black Sea Environmentalists	8	3	1	Y	Y	Y											
The Research Association of Rural Environment and Forestry	12	1	1,3,4				Y						Y				Y
The Turkish Foundation for Combatting Soil Erosion, reforestation, protection of natural habitat	8	5	5,15		Y							Y					Y
Trabzon Province and Countries Education, Culture and Society	14	3	1,3	Y	Y	Y	Y										Y
Turkish Association for the Protection of Nature	45	5	1,3		Y		Y						Y				
Turkish Environment and Woodland Protection Society	28	NA	1,3,4,7			Y											
Turkish Environmental Protection and Research Foundation	9	1	3,7	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y		Y	Y				
Turmepe	6	1	1,3	Y	Y	Y							Y	Y			
Wildlife Conservation Society of Samsun	20	3	1,3	Y	Y												
<i>UKRAINE</i>																	
Association EUROCOAST-Ukraine	6	3	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y										Y
Crimea Republic Association "Ecology and Peace"	12	3	2,4,6	Y	Y	Y						Y	Y				
Dniepropetrovsk "Green World"	12	3	NA	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Ecological Foundation-NGO	8	3	6,11			Y							Y				
EcoPravo	7	1	2	Y	Y	Y						Y					
EcoPravo East, Filiation Kharkiv	7	1	2	Y	Y							Y					
EcoPravo-Lviv	6	1	5	Y	Y	Y						Y					
Envinet-Ukraine	6	1	2		Y	Y											
Greenpeace Ukraine	10	5	3	Y	Y	Y						Y	Y			Y	

Independent Ecological Security Service	5	1	2,8	Y	Y			Y			Y	Y				
INECO of the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine	7	1	16	Y		Y	Y				Y			Y		
Institute of Ecology, South Branch	5	1	2,4		Y						Y	Y				
Kherson-Ecocentre Organization	9	1	3	Y	Y						Y	Y				
Movement for the Black and Azov Seas Salvage	9	4	1	Y			Y	Y								
Natural Heritage Fund	8	1	2,6	Y		Y						Y				
News Agency "Echo-Vostok"	8	1	2	Y		Y					Y					
Nikolaev Regional Environmental Association	12	2	2	Y	Y		Y				Y		Y			
Nikopol Association "Zeleny Svit"	11	3	2,3	Y	Y	Y	Y									
Nongovernmental Ecomonitoring Station	7	1	2,6	Y					Y							
Odessa Socio-Ecological Union	13	1	2,3,6		Y	Y					Y	Y				
Out School Profile Association	19	1	1,2	Y	Y			Y								
Sevastopol branch, Geographic Society of Ukraine	14	3	2	Y	Y	Y										
The Youth Environmental Organization	12	1	1	Y		Y		Y								
Ukranian Union for Bird Conservation	6	5	1,6	Y	Y	Y					Y	Y				
Ukranian Ecological Academy, BlackSea Regional	6	1	11	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y					
Unicorn Environmental Publishers	8	1	2,7	Y	Y	Y										
Union Rescuing from Chernobyl UEA Greenworld	11	4	2	Y	Y	Y	Y									
World of Water	6	3	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y					Y				
Yalta Regional Dept of Crimea R. Association	11	3	6	Y	Y	Y					Y	Y				
Zaporozhye Ecological Club	10	2	3	Y	Y	Y		Y								
Zaporozhye Nature Education Centre XXI century	7	1	7			Y		Y								

EXPLANATIONS: * These ENGO are listed in GEF-BSEP, *Black Sea NGO Directory*, 1995 and 1996 editions, which include only those NGOs or ENGOs who responded the questionnaire survey from the participating countries.

- A. Life-span in terms of years
- B. Number of Members: (1) 1-50; (2) 51-100; (3) 101-500; (4) 501-1000; (5) more than 1000
- C. Funding sources: (1) Membership Due; (2) Grant; (3) Donation; (4) Project; (5) International sources; (6) Sponsors; (7) Self Financing; (8) Other Income; (9) Cotizations; (10) Services; (11) Contracts; (12) Income from the assets; (13) Fund Raising Activities; (14) Miscellaneous; (15) Private Sector; (16) Governmental Agencies
- D. Activities: (1) Education, training, workshops, institutional development, organizing summer schools; (2) Public Awareness campaigns, lobbying, international cooperation, media campaign; (3) Information, data, publication, research, survey; (4) Policy development and regional development; (5) Ecotourism, camps, diving; (6) Monitoring; (7) Legal assistance, environmental legislation; (8) Project; (9) Protection, preservation, biodiversity; (10) Water treatment, marine culture, naval culture, fisheries, ships related environmental engineering; (11) Determination of OA priority areas; (12) Coastal management dynamics and (13) Forestry
- E. (NA) not available

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 - ⁴⁵ Ibid.: 18
 - ⁴⁶ De Bardeleben and John Hannigan, 1995; Jancar-Webster, 1995.
 - ⁴⁷ Gençkaya, 1993; 55.
 - ⁴⁸ The six countries that surround the Black Sea are Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine.
 - ⁴⁹ The three protocols are Against Pollution by Land Based Sources, Against Pollution by Oil and other Harmful Substances, Against Pollution by Dumping.

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- ⁵⁰ GEF, 1995c.
⁵¹ Goyet, 1997: 5.
⁵² Ibid: 22-3 and UNDP et al, 1998: *i*.
⁵³ op.cit., and Goyet, 1997: 1.
⁵⁴ Stewart, 1992: 191-5; Lauber, 1994: 259-63; and VanBuren, 1995.
⁵⁵ Ural, 1995.
⁵⁶ Stewart, 1992; UNDP et al, 1998: 25; and Vari and Tamas, 1993.
⁵⁷ Jancar-Webster, 1997: 31 and Goyet, 1997: 2.
⁵⁸ UNDP et al., 1998: 25.
⁵⁹ Goyet, 1997: 4.
⁶⁰ Ibid.
⁶¹ EU, 1999.
⁶² UNDP et al., 1995: 3; UNDP et al., 1996: 26; UNDP et al., 1997:29 and UNDP et al, 1998: 25-33.
⁶³ UNDP et al., 1995: 31 and GEF, 1995a.
⁶⁴ Ibid.: 32 and GEF, 1995c.
⁶⁵ Ibid.
⁶⁶ GEF, 1995b: 37-40.
⁶⁷ GEF, 1995c: 37-38.
⁶⁸ UNDP et al., 1996: iii.
⁶⁹ Ibid.: 26.
⁷⁰ Ibid.: 25.
⁷¹ GEF, 1996b.
⁷² GEF, 1995b: 70-81.
⁷³ UNDP et al., 1997: 31.
⁷⁴ Ibid.: 29.
⁷⁵ Ibid.: 28.
⁷⁶ Ibid.: 28-29.
⁷⁷ UNDP et al., 1998: 26-36.
⁷⁸ Ibid: 27.
⁷⁹ Ibid: 28.
⁸⁰ Ibid: 29.
⁸¹ Black Sea NGO Forum, 1997.
⁸² Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998: 5.
⁸³ Ibid: 4.
⁸⁴ Nenciu, 1998: 7.
⁸⁵ Çilingirolu and Özarlan, 1998: 9.
⁸⁶ IBSP, 1998.
⁸⁷ Nenciu, 1998:7.
⁸⁸ Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998: 7.
⁸⁹ Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998: 9-11.
⁹⁰ Black Sea NGO Forum, 1998.
⁹¹ TIME, 1999.
⁹² Çilingirolu, 1999.
⁹³ Çilingirolu and Dartsimelia, 1998 a and b.
⁹⁴ TIME, 1999.
⁹⁵ BSEP, 1998:12.
⁹⁶ Kirvalidze, 1999.
⁹⁷ Goyet, 1997: 8.
⁹⁸ Goyet, 1997: 11 and UNDP et al, 1997: *i*.
⁹⁹ Gençkaya, 1996.
¹⁰⁰ Göktepe, 1997 and Petroune, 1999.
¹⁰¹ Kirvalidze, 1998: 10.
¹⁰² UNDP et al., 1997: *i*.
¹⁰³ BSEP, 1996c.
¹⁰⁴ Goyet, 1997: 10 and Kirvalidze, 1998: 10.

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- ¹⁰⁵ Zhilikov, 1995 and Petroune, 1999.
¹⁰⁶ Kirvalidze, 1998: 10.
¹⁰⁷ Inglehart, 1995.
¹⁰⁸ Topping, 1998: 5-6.
¹⁰⁹ Sampson, 1995b: 73-4.
¹¹⁰ Mater: 1997.
¹¹¹ Çilingirolu and Dartsimelia, 1998.
¹¹² Jancar-Webster, 1997: 5-10.
¹¹³ Savulescu, 1997.
¹¹⁴ Jancar-Webster, 1997: 32.
¹¹⁵ Keohane et al., 1996.