4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Presentation
PRESENTATION
This monograph brings together the lectures, interventions and reports presented in the Fourth Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean, held in Barcelona on September 19th and 20th, 2005. This seminar, organised by the CIDOB Foundation and the Ministry of Defence, was held at an especially decisive moment for the Mediterranean, only two months before the Euromediterranean Summit of Barcelona, that celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Euromediterranean Partnership. This seminar thus became an appropriate context for discussing some of the issues that occupied the agendas of the Euromediterranean leaders who were brought together in that summit.

The 2005 seminar was the fourth in a series of meetings held annually since 2002. The first took place a short time before the Euromediterranean Conference in Valencia and had the opening up of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) toward the Mediterranean as its main focus. Later, the Action Plan approved in the Valencia Conference incorporated different references to the need for progressing in this field.

Our annual meeting aims to become consolidated as a privileged point of encounter at which the countries of the EU, its NATO partners and the countries of the South and East of the Mediterranean converge. We also propose that prestigious scholars and on-the-ground actors debate issues that concern security in the region and develop a fruitful dialogue between the civil and military spheres. These seminars are, therefore, a space for the diffusion and exchange of information in which those questions that have greatest importance for security in the Mediterranean should be dealt with.

This fourth seminar focused on debating measures of confidence, in view of the fact that different events that have occurred in the Mediterranean or its immediate surroundings—such as terrorism, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iraq crisis, among others—necessitated a deep reflection on the construction of a Mediterranean space of shared security. On the other hand, the regular holding of these kinds of seminars becomes, in and of itself, a measure of confidence, which pushes us to deepen relations among the organisers of the seminar in the future.
On the part of the CIDOB Foundation and the Ministry of Defence, we invite you to read the content of this monograph, singularly focused on measures of confidence, but which also offers a global image of the large debates on security in the Mediterranean. It is a work which contains the different sensitivities and positions in the face of a challenge, that of security in the region, which must be an objective shared by governments and societies in the Mediterranean basin.

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4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

10th anniversary of the Barcelona conference: achievements and challenges in the security chapter

Democratic security ten years on
Álvaro de Vasconcelos

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Back to Barcelona

As noted in the EuroMeSCo Report, “Barcelona Plus: toward a Euromediterranean Community of Democratic States”, the Barcelona Declaration has to be the starting point of any assessment of the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP). In 1995, given the prevalence of multilateralism and regionalism and progress with the Middle East Peace Process, the signatories of the Declaration focused on the need to build an area of peace based on fundamental values. In short, political issues were the priority. Ten years on, one does well to remember this, particularly as this founding intention was forgotten over time.

Defence issues per se were put aside because there was a reluctance to take on board NATO and subsequently the US. The fact remains, however, that security was a major concern of the EU and its member States in 1995, particularly in southern Europe, where countries were anxious about signs of instability in the region, particularly in the Maghreb, and its potential spill-over effects. The Barcelona Declaration portrays security as being part of a comprehensive long-term policy that dialectically links democracy, development and security. In this sense, the Partnership is an heir of the European experience with peace through integration and democratisation, rather than of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, which is based on confidence-building measures suited to a bipolar world. The Neighbourhood Policy further reinforces the links between the Partnership and the European acquis, namely with the widening of the European area of peace and democracy to the south and east. A dialogue on defence issues and the potential for cooperation in this area—a new component in the Process—cannot be viewed separately from this strategic orientation.

A Summary Assessment

It is very difficult to assess a long term process like Barcelona and to decide at which point long-term goals should be achieved. Nonetheless, ten years on, one cannot but conclude that the Process has not contributed significantly to promoting security in the region. The ongoing south-south conflicts remained outside the scope of the Partnership. Not
only were they not an object of Partnership initiatives, but EMP political and security cooperation was paralysed by those conflicts, as were other areas essential to the EMP goals (as demonstrated by the difficulties faced by south-south integration and sub-regional cooperation in the Maghreb and the Middle East).

Despite the limitations, the political and security basket of the Partnership was a wide-ranging north-south confidence-building measure at the diplomatic level that aimed to diminish mutual distrust, and it achieved this essential aim. While the southern suspicion that Europe was preparing for a conflict in the Mediterranean was largely overcome, European governments realized that the view that the south was a serious and potential threat was incorrect. Ten years of regular interaction between the diplomatic apparatuses and other state administrative sectors of both sides contributed to this change. And although the confidence-building measures that were launched—the creation of EuroMeSCo, the Malta diplomatic seminars, and the civil protection pilot project launched in 1998—remained isolated initiatives, they still demonstrated the potential inherent in the Partnership.

A Changed Context and Early Progress

What the last ten years have also shown is that there has been a desire to develop strong ties with Europe—initially within the Maghreb and later and increasingly in the Middle East—but that there are also mixed feelings about the EU. The various EuroMeSCo surveys undertaken to date, particularly those prepared after the US intervention in Iraq, show that positive expectations regarding the Partnership and European involvement in international issues are strong. Indeed, there has been a growing sentiment of the need for “more Europe”, although this desire is mitigated by a strong dose of pessimism about the future of the Union as a political and security actor. While the Union is seen increasingly as an indispensable partner, sectors of southern civil societies also criticise the sustenance that the Partnership has given the statu quo and its focus on stability to the detriment of reform. Indeed, the EU is accused of intervening too little when human rights are violated or the promotion of democratic governance put at stake in the south. These surveys also allow us to conclude that there is little information and awareness about the Partnership both in the north and in the south, and that the existing information is restricted to elite/government circles.

The change in US policy after September 11 had a contradictory impact in the Mediterranean. The adoption of a policy based on the use of force and lack of respect for international legality contributed to a tout sécuritaire vision of how to respond to a variety of challenges, but it also led the US to conclude that there was a link between security and democracy and to launch a set of various initiatives to pursue the latter aim. The US

administration has affirmed that promoting democracy and political reform in the Arab states is the best way to prevent terrorism and to counter anti-American sentiments in the region. But the intervention in Iraq, later justified as a democracy-promoting action, had the opposite effect, generating real opposition to so-called democratic interventionism and actually increasing levels of anti-Americanism. The tension generated by US initiatives ended up making European approaches based on inclusion and the use of soft power more attractive and meaningful.

The countries that blocked political and security dialogue in the Partnership concluded that EMP was an alternative to the US approach in the post Iraq context, so that obstacles to a substantive dialogue within the Euromediterranean Committee have gradually fallen away. To date, the effect of this change has been limited to discussions about the terms of reference that might be appropriate in the context of the organisation of diplomatic seminars on proliferation and de-mining. It has yet to acquire greater expression. Another important factor in the change of attitude towards defence cooperation was the development of a European Defence Policy that, after initial hesitations, was incorporated into the Partnership dialogue.

Barcelona 2005 will take place in a particularly demanding international context, but also under conditions that are particularly propitious for the Partnership to make a qualitative leap forward in the security and defence domains. For this to occur it is essential to:

• clarify the specific role of security in the euromediterranean strategy and its relationship with other goals, namely democracy;

• develop a democratic security culture that keeps the values of the Barcelona Declaration;

• clarify the relationship between the Partnership and the Middle East conflict;

• consolidate the role of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the Partnership;

• give a common sense to the already vast range of bilateral cooperation in place, and

• prioritise concrete measures.

**A Clear Link between Security and Democracy**

Although the Declaration does not establish a sequence of priorities where economic development, security and democracy are concerned, the Barcelona Process has done so in practise. The majority of states accepted that economic development had to come first; that it would guarantee security; and that over the long term, it might also foster democratisation. It was implicitly understood that the key security problem was political islam, and that its growth was a result of a social and economic context of underdevelopment. This implicitly understood causality was belied by the
facts, however, as is concluded in the EuroMeSCo report. Indeed, it is important to recognise and to learn lessons from the fact that the development/security/democratisation causal sequence that became the basic strategy of the Partnership does not work. Efforts made to develop the economic pillar of cooperation did not lead to the isolation of political islam, which has become an unavoidable force and a necessary actor in any process of political transition. Nor did such efforts help diminish regional tensions or contribute to democratisation. Indeed, in some cases, economic development was accompanied by regime hardening.

It is now apparent that the Barcelona Process mistakenly adopted a developmental view of security and failed to place politics (democracy and rule of law) at the heart of the agenda, in contradiction to the spirit of the Declaration. According to the spirit of Barcelona Declaration, democracy and respect for human rights and international legality are the basic conditions for sustained security. For the first time, the Commission’s reports about the EMP have underlined the close links between democracy and security, stating that “advancing political reform towards human rights and democracy is key to achieving sustainable security and stability”. This constitutes a significant change in the focus that predominated after 1995 and even before, when economic development was seen as a precondition for security. This change does not come across that clearly in the conclusions of the foreign ministers meeting in Luxemburg, since the latter does not emphasise democracy enough, valuing instead stability as essential, calling for “a peaceful, secure and stable euromediterranean region, which is underpinned by sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights”. The need to focus on political reform, democracy and human rights does not, of course, diminish the urgent need to resolve the severe economic and social problems of the region, or lessen the financial and market-opening responsibilities of Europe. Indeed, it can be argued that those measures are essential to the success of political reforms.

A Democratic Security Culture

If there is one topic of common interest it is combating terrorism. Terrorism which has produced victimis in various euromediterranean countries indiscriminately. In the period following September 11 there were attacks in almost all the countries in the south of the Mediterranean, from Turkey to Morocco, as well as in Madrid and London. The inability to reach an agreement about how to define terrorism conditioned the Partnership, but whatever the definition adopted, what is more important for the future of the Partnership is the need to discuss how to respond to that threat. This is a debate that is closely intertwined with the process of political reform and democratisation in the region. The efficiency of anti-terrorist policies is closely linked with the reinforcement of the rule of law and so it is important to underline how a key achievement of the Partnership is the clear link

2. Tenth Anniversary of the EMP: A Work Programme to Meet the Challenges of the Next Five Years, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 14.04.05
3. Conclusions of the VII Euromediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Luxemburg, 30-31.05.05
(apparent in the Valencia Action Plan) established between security and justice (all Justice and Home Affairs issues were considered within the framework for issues like combating terrorism, once seen from a purely security-based perspective). Finally, it has become possible to discuss the problem of terrorism in ad hoc meetings, including to debate the conditions that favour the recruitment of radicals, as well as to accompany UN level debates on legal and financial issues. This is progress that must be noted.

The debate about the nature of the response to terrorism is also essential if cultural and political pluralism are to thrive in Europe and beyond. European measures to combat terrorism are viewed as examples by some governments in the southern Mediterranean, which are also in the process of reshaping the balance between security and justice as they reform criminal law. European examples may be positive when they affirm a close link between punitive action against terrorism in a context of respect for basic civil rights and justice; or they may be negative, as when Member States distance themselves from key provisions of the European Human Rights charter on the basis that some of its restrictions will diminish their capacity to combat terrorism effectively. Obviously, the impact of the latter on Europeans’ civil liberties and on those of southern Mediterranean citizens whose governments follow such examples is extremely negative.

A second issue at stake is the fate of Muslim communities in Europe with strong ties to the southern Mediterranean. Indeed, one of the most delicate problems facing the Euromediterranean process is the temptation to approve exceptional measures that single out specific communities, notably such Muslim communities. A third, related but separate problem is the nature of the link made between migration and security since 1995. At that time, migration was seen as a problem that needed to be contained. The subsequent growth of xenophobic tendencies in Europe, and the development of mafias linked to migration movements led to the development of a more tout securitaire view of migration and refugees. Migration was introduced to the defence concepts of the US, various EU Member States and NATO as a challenge, and often appears as part of an undifferentiated list of threats to national security, in which migration is listed alongside problems such as organised crime, trafficking in human beings, and international terrorism. Migration cannot be treated as a security problem, however. EuroMeSCo surveys show that for southern citizens a top concern regarding the CFSP is the possibility that it may be involved in dealing with migration.

Over the 2004, in the process of preparing Barcelona 2005, a new attitude towards migrant communities in Europe and migration has been emerging. In this context, the Barcelona Declaration should be amended or, to avoid going against the consensus, deepened with a new declaration on immigration. The fact that the conclusions of the Euromediterranean Conference of Ministers of May 2005 affirmed that “the partners should agree on a strategic approach that aims to optimise the benefits of migration for all partners” is a step in the right direction. This more positive vision is not compatible with an internal or external
security perspective that continues to view migrants and migrant communities in Europe as a threat. It was this change of attitude in some European countries that led to the Franco-Spanish-Moroccan initiative to deal with, inter alia, migration, the social integration of migrants and the circulation of people. It should be noted that the need to review defence concepts and to remove migration from them is not incompatible (much to the contrary, in fact) with the need to protect migrants from clandestine trafficking mafias, and to put an end to the human tragedy that leads many migrants to drown in our shared sea.

The EMP and the Middle East Conflict: What Relationship?

It cannot be denied that the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, constitutes a central obstacle to the development of EMP cooperation, and is a key problem in the Middle East that has multiple repercussions (radicalisation, proliferation, terrorism). Many feel that the sidelining of the political and security issues in favour of the economic basket is a natural consequence of the failure of the Israeli-Arab peace process. Cooperation was indeed held hostage by the Israeli-Arab conflict, particularly the Israeli-Syrian one over Lebanon. The EU Security Strategy itself states that “the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict is a strategic priority for Europe and a condition without which there will be few possibilities to resolve the other problems of the Middle East.” 5 Taking the security debates within the EMP as a point of reference, one has to agree with that view. The fact that there is an ongoing conflict between two members of the Partnership, and given the inability of the EMP to contribute to a solution to that conflict not only constitutes a great obstacle to multilateral cooperation but also diminishes the legitimacy of the Barcelona Process. It is true that there is not much that can be done from within the Partnership at present but Member States can give the issue the attention it deserves in their foreign policies. Indeed, as a member of the Quartet, the EU has specific responsibilities, as do the partners that are directly involved in the conflict.

Despite the overwhelming “presence” of this conflict, the problems facing the Mediterranean should not be reduced to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor should the latter be used as a pretext for paralysis, unlike what has happened in many instances, particularly where political reform and south-south cooperation initiatives are concerned. But the Middle East conflict is not what stands in the way of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) or inter-Arab cooperation; it did not prevent defence cooperation between various southern States and the Union, nor the participation of partner countries in ESDP missions, and nor did it put a stop to Agadir or the 5+5 Dialogue. So it is essential to understand that support for democratic reform and a number of initiatives on sub-regional integration cannot depend on the resolution of the Palestinian question, although the implementation of the two-state solution would certainly be a great boost to cooperation in the Middle East.

Consolidating ESDP in the Partnership

ESDP is now a reality and obviously this has had an impact on euromediterranean relations. Faced with the need to revitalise the Mediterranean dialogue on security that was once conducted by the Western European Union (WEU) outside the Partnership, the EU opted to develop that dialogue within the framework of the Partnership, although it also chose to maintain the highest possible level of flexibility where decision-making formulae are concerned. The conditions are ripe for the countries of the south to participate, if they wish, in the various initiatives that the Union is developing, be they training programmes, closed seminars like that which took place in Athens, or the observation of exercises or participation in Union peace missions (like Moroccan troop participation in Operation Althea, in Bosnia-Herzegovine). The dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its ‘willing’ southern partners can create the conditions for the signature of bilateral security agreements.

A further point that must be made is that any dialogue or cooperation effort will be attentively followed not only by the governments of the region but also by civil societies concerned with the internal repercussions of such cooperation, particularly on processes of political reform. So it must be made clear that under no circumstance is cooperation to focus on internal security; to the contrary, it must be clear that it will contribute to democratic reform within military forces, as occurred during the process of European enlargement. The relationship between European and NATO initiatives must also be clarified. NATO is viewed as a credible institution (viz. the EuroMeSCo surveys) but is also a victim of anti-American sentiment. Explaining what NATO is all about and the growing weight of the Union in its structure is vital.

An important project in this context could be the publication of a White Book on European-Mediterranean security cooperation. In fact, this could become an interesting initiative for the EuroMeSCo network in the context of its new work programme.

Bilateralism as a Powerful Instrument of Multilateralism

There should be no single framework for euromediterranean cooperation. The latter has evolved as a result of various multilateral and multi-bilateral initiatives –such as the Neighbourhood Policy, sub-regional association agreements like the 5+5 or the Forum– as well as through bilateral cooperation between the Member States of the Union and the southern partners. The role of the Barcelona Process should be to make coherent this complex network of initiatives. This is particularly important in the case of the Neighbourhood Policy as underlined in the EuroMeSCo report. EMP should make the aims of that policy its own: “if it does not work towards the constitution of a Euromediterranean Community of Democratic States, the bilateral nature of the Neighbourhood Policy will gradually destroy the regional focus of the EMP.” At the same time, the Neighbourhood Policy is a powerful instrument that allows the most willing to cooperate in all domains, notably defence and security.
Bilateral initiatives are generally excluded from the assessment of Euromediterranean relations, but this is where the largest number of defence initiatives is found. The interesting question is what the Euromediterranean dimension of that cooperation is, and equally important, the way in which bilateral cooperation can serve established common goals. There is a lot of information on bilateral cooperation and it should be a focus of study within the Partnership. Making Euromediterranean bilateral cooperation coherent is a significant challenge, particularly in the area of defence, but at the very least bilateral cooperation must be guided by the same norms and rules that govern the Barcelona Process acquis. Bilateral cooperation can play a particularly important role in supporting processes of democratisation, especially since various states –notably Southern and Eastern European countries– have significant experience in that domain.

First and Foremost, Concrete Initiatives

The attempt to design a grand Euromediterranean Security Charter failed. But its success was not essential because the Barcelona Declaration provides solid guidelines for cooperation in this domain. Security and defence cooperation should be launched anyway, around very concrete initiatives. The Valencia Action Plan points in that direction. It emphasises issues such as de-mining and civil protection, which are eminently practical areas for cooperation. Civil protection against natural and man-made disasters could allow the Partnership to make a qualitative leap. There is already a pilot project to create a Euromediterranean system to prevent and manage natural disasters, which was launched in 1998 under the leadership of Italy and Egypt. This demonstrated the willingness of some partners to engage in projects to address common problems. There is a building project currently being implemented that could give rise to more long-term cooperation in this domain. The devastating effect of the tsunami in Southeast Asia contributed to raising awareness about the necessity of preventing similar tragedies in the Mediterranean. This led to a ministerial debate about a possible early warning system for tidal waves. Maritime security is another domain for cooperation, as noted by Secretary General of the Council Javier Solana. Such cooperation could include the prevention of ecological disasters, proliferation and even terrorism. As advocated by EuroMeSCo for many years, the possibility of establishing a de-mining cooperation programme for the Mediterranean is finally being debated. It should be remembered that there are millions of mines in various Partnership countries, including Algeria (with three million) and Egypt (with 23 million).

Another potentially fruitful domain for cooperation is peacekeeping missions beyond the borders of the Mediterranean. Over the last few years, EMP states have collaborated in various such operations. The fact that these countries are part of Euro-African cooperation initiatives also

6. Speech at the Euromediterranean Ministerial meeting in Luxemburg, 31.05.05
means that Sub-Saharan Africa –assailed as it is by grave humanitarian problems– could be a focus of such cooperation. This kind of collaboration, namely under UN auspices, can contribute powerfully to establishing closer ties between the countries of the Partnership, with potentially strong repercussions on public opinion in those countries. It can also contribute to “externalising” the role of armed forces (away from ‘internal security’), and thereby to support political reforms.

**Security as a Pillar of the Euromediterranean Community**

To sum up, security and defence cooperation must be a pillar of a Euromediterranean Community of Democratic States. Surprisingly, this project has great potential in the current context. It is one that calls on states to abandon the early view that political islam is a common enemy and that stability at any cost has to be the fundamental aim of political cooperation. Political reform, and the universal participation of all political actors that explicitly reject violence in the political arena, whether islamist or not, must be accepted. It is equally necessary to create monitoring mechanisms and clear indicators and benchmarks to assess progress with implementation of agreed goals. A revitalised Barcelona Process can make a unique contribution to the security of a region that is now at the centre of global concerns. Such a Partnership can help to demonstrate that effective multilateralism is a real possibility.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

CFSP & ESDP from a Mediterranean perspective

Rolando Mosca Moschini
First of all, I wish to thank the Spanish Authorities for their invitation and the opportunity they offered me to discuss, in the stimulating professional context of this Seminar, the theme of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), with special reference to the Mediterranean Region. My thanks go also to the CIDOB Foundation, organising this important event together with the Spanish Ministry of Defence.

I understand that, this year, in the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, this Seminar is given the special purpose to contribute to promotion of security and stability in the Mediterranean area, through mutual understanding and transparency in the relations between the EU and NATO Member States, and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. This co-operative and inclusive approach appears to me to perfectly fit into the European Security Strategy (ESS) conceptual framework and, more specifically, to be fully in line with the concrete objectives the EU is striving to achieve. This is one of the main reasons why I believe that what I am going to say in relation to the EU Security and Defence Policy can provide some useful informative and operative contributions to your work in the Seminar. Of course, I will very much concentrate on the military side of the theme, where, as Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), my competences and responsibilities mostly lay.

I will open my conversation with some quick introductory remarks on the Barcelona Process, to move then to an overview of the CFSP and ESDP basic organisation. The key features of the ESS and their relation with the emerging geo-strategic environment in the era of globalisation will follow. Keeping this information in mind, we will be able to elaborate on the military component of the Strategy and briefly address its impact on the ESDP military capabilities. Then, I will illustrate the first two relevant capabilities of the new EU course—the Battle Group and the Civil-Military Cell— and shortly address the ESDP chain of command. At this moment, we will be able to focus on the status and perspectives of co-operation between the EU Member States and the Mediterranean Partners in the area of security and defence. I am going to conclude this conversation with some reflections of mine that you may want to consider, in the context of the information I provide, in the course of the work of the Seminar.
Let me start then recalling that the aim of the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP), which is also called “Barcelona Process”, is to create peace, stability and development in a region, the Mediterranean basin, which is of vital strategic importance for Europe.

As you certainly know, the EMP focuses on three main objectives, also called Chapters or Baskets:

• Chapter 1: Political and Security Partnership, which consists in the creation of an area of peace and stability based on the principle of human rights and democracy.

• Chapter 2: Economic and Financial Partnership, the creation of an area of shared prosperity through the progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and its Mediterranean partners and amongst the partners themselves.

• Chapter 3: Cultural, Social and Human Partnership, the improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society.

By combining all three chapters into one comprehensive policy, the Union acknowledged the fact that financial, economic, cultural, and security issues cannot be effectively tackled separately. Such a multidimensional approach of the EMP is a key feature of this initiative, and, we will need to take it fully into account in our discussion, even though, as I said, we will be mostly concentrating on Chapter 1, the Political and Security Partnership.

We turn now to some basic information concerning the EU structure in support of CFSP and ESDP.

The policy and direction of the ESDP, which is a subset of the CFSP, are ultimately provided by the European Council. The Council is composed of the Heads of State or Government and of the President of the EU Commission. Down the line is the Council of the EU, where Member States are represented at ministerial level. The Ministers of the Foreign Affairs gather every month within the Council for General Affairs and External Relations (GAERC), which is the decision making body for the CSFP and ESDP.

Political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations are provided through the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This body is composed of Ambassadors, permanent representatives from the Member States, and meets twice a week. The PSC monitors the international situation and contributes to the formulation of policies. In the event of a crisis, it plays a central role in defining a coherent EU response and is also responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the military response.

Then we have the EUMC that is a collegial body composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, routinely represented by their Military Representatives. The Committee is the highest military body established within the Council and is co-ordinated by a permanent Chairman, myself.
The EUMC’s mission is to provide the PSC, either at request or on its own initiative, with military advice and recommendations on all military matters. It works on the basis of consensus as the primary forum for military consultation and co-operation among the EU Member States in all the fields of common interest, first of all, in those related to development of structures and capabilities. In fact, let me stress that the identification and prioritisation of military requirements are fundamental responsibilities of the CHODs and, by extension, they constitute very key tasks of the EUMC.

Being the top element of the EU’s military organisation, the Committee has also a leading role and directing functions in crisis management situations as well as in operations.

The Committee is supported by the European Union Military Staff. The EUMS, composed of approximately 200 elements detached by the Member States, provides military expertise to all Council bodies dealing with the ESDP, but it has also got significant operational incumbencies. More specifically, the Military Staff has got the mission to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, including the identification of national and multinational forces, and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the Military Committee.

These are the key elements of the CFSP and ESDP Organisation. How they play and operate in today’s and, possibly, in the future world is dictated by the European Security Strategy and the assumptions on which it lays.

The emerging geo-strategic environment in the era of globalisation is characterised by opportunities, on one side, and risks, on the other one. Opportunities –the favourable face of globalisation– come from the spread of democracy and market economy, which, in turn, would reinforce and speed-up overall human development across the planet. Risks –the threatening face of globalisation– are generated by a wide range of possible negative events and situations: natural and man-made disasters, epidemic diseases, organised crime activities, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), states’ failure, intrastate conflicts, interstate regional conflicts, terrorism, etc.. Most of these risks are not new in their nature. However, in the last years, their effects have gained unprecedented dynamics and scale, and so their impact on society has dramatically increased. The working mechanisms of globalisation use the new information and communications technologies and the world-wide transportation means available today and take the forms of trans-national entities, mostly organised into networks. These same mechanisms, while promoting and supporting democracy and development, can also be easily exploited by threats in a particularly aggressive and pervasive way, or, at least, function as powerful amplifiers of natural and man-made disasters.

This is the kind of geo-strategic environment where 21st Century sovereign states must operate, doing their best to take the opportunities and face the risks brought about by trans-national entities, relying only on their national authority, which is, of course, limited by the borders of their physical territories. Now, if a state decides to defend itself by closing its frontiers to globalisation, it may manage, perhaps, to keep out some of the risks, but it will certainly remain marginalised from the virtuous circle.
of global development and prosperity. Therefore, borders must be kept open, and this will definitely take both the favourable and threatening faces of globalisation, as well as a portion of the frontline of their harsh confrontation, inside each state, within its national sovereign space. Hence, the more democratic and open a state is, the more well-suited it will be to profit from the immense opportunities of globalisation, but also the more exposed it will be to global threats.

Yet, there is not much of a choice here: openness is the only option available in practice, especially for states as the EU Members, which are democracies, strongly interdependent and already well integrated in the emerging globalised environment. I would say that they are “fully connected” to this new common asset for democracy and prosperity. So, openness is an absolute must; and co-operation among states for a collegial global governance is the only possible option for the future. If we look again at the EU states, we realise that, as all democracies, they have no interest in fighting other states and keeping them out of the globalised environment, because this would reduce their “connectivity” and the opportunities of development that it produces. On the contrary, the EU states should have the common goal of promoting their own model and, in any case, associating to it those states that progressively, through the rules of democracy and free choice, get convinced of the great reciprocal advantage of co-operation.

This inclusive approach has a decisive impact on the EU perspective for security and defence. Such an inclusive model associates instead of excluding. So, a third state is not seen as a potential enemy to be kept out of our friendly environment and from which we need to defend ourselves. This is the excluding vision of defence. Security, instead, must be inclusive. More and more states must then be involved in the resolution of the common security problem, while they become themselves active parts of a common globalised environment.

These are the assumptions, significance and scope of the ESS, approved by the European Council in December 2003: “A secure Europe in a better world”. The Strategy stresses the key factor of leverage consisting in the strong interdependence between security and development, on which a decisive effort can be exercised to stimulate development through security. Another pillar of the Strategy is co-operation aimed at creating an “effective multilateralism”, through which the EU and other international organisations, like the United Nations, NATO, the African Union, etc., should work together for the common purpose of stabilising and improving the global environment. But this effective multilateralism should also involve all other kinds of organisations of the civil society and, obviously and importantly, single “isolated” states. To summarize, key mechanisms of the ESS are those of inclusiveness, co-operation and effective multilateralism, security and development interdependence.

The essence of the interdependence of security and development is that, if, through a timely military deployment, a certain critical level of security can be achieved, then this not only may generate in the area some kind of spontaneous recovery from the crisis but it will also permit and support across time and space the deliberate application to the local situation of the further components of the strategy devoted to institution and
economy building. The expected result is the activation of a virtuous loop generated by security and development proceeding together. In this perspective, security is a precondition for development, while real and lasting security cannot be achieved without development. In other terms, especially if development is not limited to its economic dimension, it is development that produces security in the long run, but it cannot even be attempted, if security is not in place. So, security comes first, but —this is really important— only as a component, though key to the overall effort, I would say the “spearhead” of a more comprehensive multidisciplinary approach, where the military is only one of the several instruments of an integrated synergistic strategy of development. As such a virtuous loop progresses, the military commitment in the area is reduced and replaced by local institutional security structures. In our scheme of intervention, globalisation acts as an accelerator for the spread of democracy and market economy, and therefore as a human development facilitator. Yet, at the same time, it functions also as a threat multiplier, and thus it works against security. These are key factors for developing suited military capabilities and properly structuring intervening forces.

The implementation of the ESS in the emerging geo-strategic scenario does not imply defending from a conventional enemy at our borders, as it was the case at the time of the Cold War. Therefore, we do not have to face millions of soldiers, equipped with thousands of tanks and aircrafts and supported by a huge fleet. On the contrary, we need to neutralise subtle and diffused trans-national threats, organised into networks and equipped with unconventional weapons and tactics. The key guiding principle for EU interventions is “think globally and act locally”, as the European Security Strategy reads. This implies that the EU military model organisation is to be centred on knowledge, which, in military terms, is produced by the synergistic combination of information, intelligence, planning and command and control. This will allow the EU to have a constant operational vision of the common globalised environment, which, in turn, will permit to timely identify potential areas of crisis for preventive intervention and, in any case, will facilitate rapid response, whenever necessary. Knowledge, as defined, will also allow for adoption of the multidisciplinary strategy most appropriate to the crisis, with a balanced selection, tailoring and integration of its different components, including the military one.

In short, the EU needs joint forces, perhaps limited in number, but of high quality and readiness, and capable of rapid and decisive interventions at the right place and time for the implementation of a multidisciplinary strategy that pursues human development while establishing or re-establishing stable connections between the area of crisis and the common globalised environment of democracy and market economy. This key concept of quality and integration is reinforced and can be facilitated by a smart implementation of those which are well known as the principles of the “single set of forces” and “the pooling of capabilities” –or “the basket”, as I use to call it.

So, the ESS has dictated a new full set of military requirements, which have been elaborated into a short-to-medium term objective, the Headline Goal 2010. By that time, 2010, the Member States plan to be able to respond with rapid, coherent and decisive action to the whole
spectrum of crisis management operations, ranging from humanitarian and rescue missions, to peace-keeping, combat in crisis management and peace-enforcing, but including also joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in fighting terrorism and security sector reform. The EU should be able to act before a crisis occurs; preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU should retain the capability of conducting concurrent operations, thus sustaining several theatres simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

In accordance with such an innovative approach, a new generation of ready deployable units is emerging: the Battle Groups. The Battle Group is a specific form of rapid response capability, an integrated force, with a national or multinational composition, able to conduct complete missions of short duration, from 30 to 120 days, or to be committed as the entry force for operations of longer timescale. A Battle Group is able to start its mission in the assigned operational theatre within 10 days from the moment the political decision is taken. Battle Groups are to be seen as the spearheads of a full fledged Rapid Response package, from which they are inseparable. In addition to rapid deployable units, a Rapid Response package includes an appropriate command and control organisation, as well as all the necessary force multipliers and enablers, up to the decision making structure at the political level, with the relevant EU collegial and respective Member States national institutions.

Each of the components of an EU Rapid Response package must match adequate requirements to be fully supportive of the leading element, the Battle Group. In particular—and this is what I call the other side of the Battle Group medal—the EU political decision making system must be able to produce unambiguous and complete direction as quick as the Battle Group can react. On the 1st January 2005, an initial Battle Group capability has been activated. Full Operational Capability will be achieved in 2007.

As we said, among the capabilities that the new strategy requires, those related to sharing of information and elaboration of knowledge, as well as those devoted to planning and command and control are particularly significant across all chain of command, from the politico-strategic to the tactical level. As I have mentioned several times, these capabilities should be given a multidisciplinary configuration, which should be incorporated into proper organisational structures able to translate a strategic concept into an effective operational reality. This is now very successfully being actuated, for the first time, in Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, as you know, the EU took over from NATO on the 2 December 2004.

In the central organisational structure of the ESDP, the first nucleus of this emerging EU peculiar capability is the Civil-Military Cell, recently established as a functional component of the EUMS and the appropriate Secretariat DGs, under the Direction General of the EUMS. The Cell’s main functions consist in civil-military planning at strategic and operational level, activation of an EU Operation Centre, qualified augmentation of Member State Operation Headquarters (OHQ’s), and liaison with NATO command and control organisation. This last function will make a significant contribution to the further improvement of the permanent co-operation agreements between the EU and NATO, as defined in 2002 through the so-called Berlin Plus.
This leads us to the EU Command and Control Organisation. As you know, the EU concept foresees two levels of military command above the Service Component Level (Land, Maritime, and Air) HQ’s: the Operation HQ, located in a Member State, and the Force HQ, deployed in Theatre. Both HQ’s are normally provided by Member States, except when the EU works in co-operation with NATO and employs, under the Berlin Plus agreements, NATO assets and capabilities, and, in particular, the Command and Control Organisation, which the Alliance is permanently provided with. This is the case, for instance, of operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The military line of command, which has on top the Operation Commander, is strategically directed, at the political level, by the collegial will of the Political and Security Committee. The Military Committee provides the PSC with its military advice on decisions to be taken.

This concludes my overview of the CFSP and ESDP key capabilities that need to be taken into account for the development of co-operation in the context of the Euromediterranean Partnership. I should not omit to say, though, that the ESDP has recently got an additional strong actor, which is going to play a very significant role in the field of military capabilities development, and this is obviously the European Defence Agency.

The mission of the Agency is to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future. To this end, the Agency will work for the development of defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, the promotion and enhancement of European armaments co-operation, the strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB), the creation of an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) and the enhancement of Research and Technology (R&T). Now, we can build on the platform of information that I have structured so far, in order to address, more specifically, the status and perspectives of co-operation under the Euromediterranean Partnership framework in the field of security and defence.

The organisation I have illustrated was only established in the very early years of this century. Therefore, CFSP and ESDP are quite young instruments in the EU tool-box, and, of course, even younger is their integration in the Barcelona Process. In this perspective, we may say that the results achieved so far in this area should, in any case, be considered more than satisfactory. In these few years, the political and security dialogue has been pursued at regular and ad hoc meetings of Senior Officials of the Barcelona Process. Meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee with Mediterranean Partners on ESDP matters have also taken place. Moreover, an important Seminar on this subject has been held in June 2005 in Athens. The EU-Mediterranean Partners Crisis Management Seminar (Athens, 27-29 June 2005) provided a useful opportunity to engage in substantive dialogue and enhance mutual understanding on civilian and military crisis management between the EU and Mediterranean Partners, inter alia by exchanging views on crisis management procedures, best practices and legal aspects, as well as the development of civilian and military capabilities.
In addition, work on implementation of political reforms, co-operation on human rights and democratisation proceeds in line with the commitments entered into, under the Association Agreements and in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, to which the Mediterranean Partners are also associated. The basic principle supporting all these activities and initiatives is that developing the area of security a defence in a Union enlarged at 25 Members, in the global perspective designed by the European Security Strategy, cannot neglect the fundamental need to improve and reinforce security and stability in the Mediterranean basin. And this can be achieved only through a stricter and more effective co-operation within the Euromediterranean Partnership.

I believe I do not need to touch on the geo-strategic reasons why co-operation in the Mediterranean is vital. Instead, I think it useful to take some minutes to illustrate the current and possible areas for CFSP and ESDP co-operation, which are numerous and all important. Counter-terrorism, notably aimed at preventing financing and recruitment, has recently got particular importance and will hopefully be further extended and deepened. Other significant areas of co-operation are those related to non-proliferation of WMD, drug trafficking, organised crime and illegal migration. Civil protection, notably in the context of a natural disaster situation, is also an area where working together will produce an interesting enhancement of current capabilities.

Yet, most of these areas imply a capacity of EU Member States and Mediterranean Partners to be able to work together in civilian and military crisis management operations and exercises, at political as well as at operational level (military and civilian). For this important issue of future Mediterranean Partner participation in ESDP operations much is still to be done, but, in a positive perspective, we need to recall that Morocco and Turkey have participated in Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina since it commenced on 2 December 2004, and that Turkey is also participating in EU civil crisis management operations (EUPM, EUPOL Proxima and EUPOL Kinshasa). Now, if we refer back to all possible areas of co-operation and compare them to the opportunities and risks I have listed when I introduced the European Security Strategy, we realise that they are almost coincident. This observation generates some interesting thoughts.

The need for an integrated approach to these risks and challenges is fully recognised and integration is meant to be pursued according to two complementary perspectives. This means that those risks and challenges not only should be faced through a multidisciplinary strategy, involving all necessary components –diplomatic, economic, social, military, etc.– but also need to be seen and solved as the different aspects of a single complex and multifaceted problem of social growth and development, since, if not the causes, at least the roots of different phenomena may be the same. And, obviously, it is at the very roots of the problems that a multidisciplinary strategy of intervention must aim, if co-operation is to be successful. This is a general principle, but it holds especially well for the Mediterranean basin, where this closed sea has acted for tens of centuries as a bridge between peoples on the southern, eastern and northern banks, making, through wars, commerce and migrations, several of their cultural and social characters quite similar. Moreover, the coincidence of
the opportunities and risks considered by the European Security Strategy and the possible areas of co-operation in the euromediterranean context underlines the point that EU Member States and Mediterranean Partners are mostly facing the same set of security and defence problems, even though, in some cases, from different perspectives. If this is obvious, as I firmly believe, it should also be quite obvious that the Barcelona Process success must be seen as a fundamental objective in the implementation of the ESS.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

NATO Mediterranean dialogue: analysis and outlooks after the Istanbul summit

Towards an improvement of the civilian-military synergy
Pablo de Benavides Orgaz

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TOWARDS AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY SYNERGY

Pablo de Benavides Orgaz

Spanish Ambassador to NATO

This type of encounters are fundamental. It is of prime importance because, really, the work of governments, without the support of civil society, lacks relevance. Regarding the Mediterranean Dialogue I will begin by telling you that I would like to see a closer relationship between the centres of the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Without civil society, our peacekeeping operations, our conflict-stabilisation operations and our partnership operations lack meaning. Therefore, this is a very clear message, to express my gratitude for this seminar, because without social support our work lacks meaning.

Also, I want to make reference to the support of the Ministry of Defence and to highlight the fact that this work is not only that of military personnel. This is another message for the Mediterranean Dialogue. This work has no meaning if the military is not accompanied by an effort to stabilise countries in crisis, and the objective of the scenarios in which NATO is present absolutely needs the co-operation, of governments, states and public opinion. Let us not forget that in the majority of our countries, operations are decided through the approval of the Parliament, the support of the society is need. In order to get this support, the government’s activity is of prime importance.

Perhaps the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is somewhat less well-known, but it is at a crucial juncture. I want to support Gen. Mosca Moschini when he talks about the indivisible nature of the concept of security. It is, as I have said, a task of a military nature, but it is also one of an economic, social, political and developmental nature. And here also, throwing out an idea, it is time in our country that a military person works in the Spanish Agency for International Co-operation and that an expert from this Agency works in the Ministry of Defence and even with the Chief of the General Staff of Defence. That is, our operations and partnerships in the world have no meaning if the elements of a phase of stabilisation of a country are not interwoven.

Second, I would like to make a brief reference to the new threats, fundamentally the issue of terrorism, but, at the same time, insisting on the human factor and the personal development factor, as well as the role, let us say, of scientific development, and the general development of societies; they are fundamental elements of our dialogue. It is not only a
partnership that has military-military co-operation as an objective, even though it may be the main one. NATO agrees on terrorism as the main source of threat but this phenomenon must be confronted in a complex way. That is why we should develop not only political measures, but also economic, social and even military ones, if necessary. And in this aspect, I believe that the Alliance of Civilisations proposed by the President of the Spanish Government and now adopted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations has a role to play and that NATO will have its additional contribution to this concept.

At the same time, one of the reasons why the Mediterranean Dialogue has become reinvigorated in the past few months is that, obviously, the general situation in the Middle East can be perceived as a beginning of a certain understanding, although the situation continues to be frankly difficult, the truth must no be ignored. What has occurred in Lebanon and the developments in Libya are elements to bear in mind also for a possible enlargement of the current development of NATO when the circumstances are suitable.

What is happening here? The problem has always been mutual distrust. However we must be very careful, because mutual distrust is also instrumentalised on both sides of the Mediterranean to argue in favour of the absence of modernisation and progress. It is true that elements exist that justify this lack of trust. And it is also true that, quite possibly, some great power has lacked a clear policy with regard to this region of the world. But it is also true that the lack of trust is justified as a formula for not progressing toward democratisation and modernisation, which must depend on the societies themselves, since of course nobody is going to impose them.

Another argument of the evolution of the Mediterranean Dialogue is the transformation of NATO itself in a very clear sense. We do not want an Atlantic Alliance closed off inside itself, an Atlantic wall, but rather we are carrying out the policy we call of partnership. The partnership has developed at first toward the east and toward the north of the Alliance, and now it is developing more deeply toward the south, for reasons that are more than obvious.

From the historical point of view, as General Moschini has already commented, in 1994, several allies, with Spain at the fore, posed the need to complement the Mediterranean Dialogue with a contribution from the point of view of security. The reasons were the security problems and threats that I have just mentioned; and the fact that NATO can help in the modernisation of armed forces. The modernisation of armed forces meaning effective, prepared and modernized armed forces capable of confronting not internal problems but rather those of an external nature.

This added value, to say it this way, should be done in a complementary way with the rest of the international organisations. It makes no sense, for us to maintain totally independent mediterranean dialogues on the part of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, on the part of NATO and on the part of the European Union. We must see our synergies, we must see our complementariness, so that each of us seeks our added value and the way to complement the work of the others.
The structures of the Mediterranean Dialogue, are fundamentally of two orders. In the first place, political consultations, and, secondly, practical co-operation. The political consultations are essential because political dialogue is an issue with which currently NATO is confronted. That is, in order to carry out an operation, it is fundamental to rely on a healthy consensus. And healthy consensus, in a multilateral organisation, is reached after a deep, healthy debate. Can you imagine that a country like Spain has, at this time, 1,000 men and women in Afghanistan? How did this occur? Because a political consensus existed in which the Spanish political forces, practically unanimously, understood that the international agenda demands the presence of Spain there, along with that of the rest of the democratic countries. Political dialogue is fundamental in the Mediterranean Dialogue. And we are very satisfied, because in the last meeting of ambassadors in Brussels, we were talking about Iraq with the ambassadors of the seven countries (Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria and Mauritania) with complete liberty. With complete calm. As we can talk about the Middle East, when the time comes, or we can talk about the natural political consultations in the scenarios close to our partners. And this is something that did not exist up until now but that constitutes the basis of trust: greater familiarity and greater common dialogue. Moreover, this healthy consensus is what allows to generate forces available for an operation, the famous generation of forces –and the military personnel spatially acknowledge this condition. Or do you believe that the parliaments are going to authorise the expenses involved in these operations if there does not exist a political consensus that justifies them? Naturally the two things are linked.

Practical co-operation. Practical co-operation is the Istanbul summit, where a “genuine” partnership is established, and thus it is cited, with the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. There is a principle of transfer, of clarity, of accountability, and of non-discrimination among the seven partners of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Secondly, and here there is an important recent new development: self-differentiation. That is, just as there is a dialogue with the seven, the famous 26 + 7, where political dialogue is engaged in, where consultations of a regional nature between NATO and the Mediterranean, to express it this way, are made, there exists the dialogue of 26 plus each one. This individualised dialogue, which, by the way, seems much like the new EU Neighbourhood Policy, establishes programmes tailored to each of the seven countries depending on the interest that each government expresses in these programmes. There is the principle of ownership, the translation of which into Spanish I do not like because we call it “appropriation”. Ownership means that it must emerge from the capital cities themselves. But, in order for it to emerge from them, responses are needed. That is, we have an obligation, and it is at our best interest—it must be recognised frankly—but it is necessary that on the part of the governments interest be expressed in a co-operation of a practical and political nature with NATO if it is considered that there are reasons for this and suspicions are progressively overcome.

I am going to end with some practical examples. Regarding the Istanbul decision I am going to try to synthesise it into nine large programmes of the Atlantic Alliance:
1. Strengthening political dialogue.

2. Public diplomacy. The Secretary-General has already visited all of the capitals of the countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue. This had not been done previously; he has done it in the course of a year, and the last visit will be to Cairo in a few days. This means lectures, seminars like this one, visits to NATO Headquarters by experts on the part of the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue, media relations, etc.

3. Promotion of military co-operation for the inter-operability with active participation in selected military exercises. In training activities this takes place in such a way that they can facilitate the eventual participation of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries in NATO operations; in this case all of them at the request of the United Nations (for example, the case of Morocco in the Balkans). At the same time, there exists an annual work programme for the seven countries, which basically aims to extend the Partners for Peace (PfP) programmes or those of the North Atlantic dialogue to the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. These are fiduciary financial funds, courses, educational activities, exercises and individual programmes. In this context, something has occurred which has already been mentioned this morning: there have already been two meetings of the Chiefs of the General Staffs of NATO and the seven countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. I want to point out that the first meeting was of particular interest because, among other things, we spoke about how to exchange better and intelligently.

4. Modernisation of the armed forces. As I have mentioned before, I believe that any State needs up-to-date technology, a less quantitative and more qualitative army, one that is better trained. And in this aspect also, it needs to update all of the budget area, meaning the Defence budgets, the transparency of these budgets and, above all, the adaptation of them to the real needs of the country. Defence reform in general is another natural added value of NATO.

5. The fight against terrorism: It focuses fundamentally on the exchange of intelligence, in such a way that the intelligence unit of NATO has now allowed the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue to enter and the exchange of information has begun. I also want to point out as a curiosity for you that on May 9 and 10, the heads of the intelligence services of the 33 countries met for the first time in Brussels. In this context also, the famous operation for monitoring terrorism in the Mediterranean, Active Endeavour, now has the participation of Israel and Algeria, and they may join in to support the tasks of intelligence and the interrupting of trafficking in merchandise, people and arms from the coast.

6. Border security co-operation in border security. In relation to terrorism, non-proliferation and illegal trafficking. It deals basically with lending NATO experience in monitoring borders and in the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration.

7. Civil planning for disaster emergencies. In this sense, many seminars and meetings of experts, at a very high level of expertise, have taken place, for a strengthened co-operation in this field. There is a process of consultations between you and us regarding all of the issues of early
warning in civil emergencies and disaster management. At the same time, in this sense, we are developing an inventory of the capacities for crisis management between the two parts of the Mediterranean.

8. Eventual adaptation of all of the PfP programmes in the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. This has not yet been achieved. We are working on the idea that the Mediterranean Dialogue should enter and form part of all of the meetings and different activities that exist in the PfP, beginning as observers. However, consensus has not already been reached. The programmes are converging and we believe that the rapprochement between the two parts make both interlocutors deserving an improved position in the organisation.

9. And finally, scientific programmes. This morning we have referred to this. Scientific programmes have an enormous importance in NATO, because it is fundamentally the attempt to increase security through science and the environment. At this time, there are 35 programmes under way with Mediterranean partners. Fundamentally, they refer to better known things, like the issues of water, water resources and desertification, but I am going to cite some examples so that you can grasp what we are explaining. Among these courses, among this training of experts, I will cite: electrokinetic solutions for contaminated soil, disaster simulations in nuclear powerplants or oil pipelines, the problems of children and armed conflicts and the psychology of terrorism. As you can see, here we also believe that there exists added value that at this time is already offered to your capitals for the development of co-operation. And, if you will allow me to illustrate with an example, in 2000 the number of activities of NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue did not reach 100. In 2004, there are 425. And then, even more interesting, within the volume of these activities that we place at 450, it is interesting to observe the proportion that exists between pure military activity and the development activity cited by Gen. Mosca Moschini, which I support, in the work of the Partnership. Because many times the work of NATO is confused with a labour of a strictly and exclusively military nature.

Let me say something about the Middle East. It is obvious that the Middle East conflict has influenced this dialogue in its step backward or in its progress. We believe that at this time, there are conditions that have facilitated the development of these meetings which, fundamentally, materialised with the first meeting... (It is amazing, because although the Mediterranean Dialogue was created some months before the Barcelona Process, nothing was achieved until December of last year, the date of the 10th anniversary of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. In December, for the first time, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the seven countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue sat down with the 26 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the NATO countries in Brussels for the first meeting of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue at the maximum level.) The role of NATO in the Middle East has been talked about a great deal. For the time being, the conditions do not exist, we have not debated it in depth because the circumstances were not right for it, but, obviously, if some day NATO is asked to go to the Middle East, three conditions must exist. First of all, there must be a lasting, fair peace accord between the two parts. Secondly, the two parts must be in agreement on the participation of
NATO, and thirdly, there must be a mandate from the U.N. Security Council. In these three conditions, one must not exclude the possibility that NATO, due to its work as an interlocutor, could play a role in imposing, maintaining or consolidating peace in the region.

It is already known and public but I will ratify it here that the first contact between NATO and the Palestinian National Authority was made in the margins of the Madrid summit on terrorism and democracy. The meeting was discretely prepared by the Secretary-General of NATO, with the Spanish help. In that meeting, there was the first contact between two high representatives of the Palestinian National Authority and the Secretary-General of NATO. This subject, naturally, was communicated to the rest of the partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and was discussed in the Atlantic Council. On the occasion of this, the first informational contacts have been established between PNA and NATO.

Finally, let us not exclude the possibility of enlarging the current partnership to other countries in the future. We have the case of Lebanon, the case of the Palestinian National Authority, in the future there could be the case of Libya and that of Syria. But, we cannot ignore the possibility of widening the dialogue in an evolutionary perspective. Before, I cited the importance of ownership, in the sense of appropriation, of pertinence of the dialogue and of co-responsibility, and finally, and as I said before, it is fundamental that we work together, NATO, the EU and also the OSCE, because we believe that our efforts are complementary.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

NATO Mediterranean dialogue: analysis and outlooks after the Istanbul summit

A vision from the NATO
Jamie Patrick Shea
I will attempt to make some comments quickly focusing on a few things that strike me as important and then we can start the discussion.

The first thing is that we have lost a lot of time. For too long after 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue in the alliance was something that was pushed by the six Mediterranean allies but without necessarily the attention or the full support of the others. So the Dialogue was there but it did not receive before September 11th the necessary impulse it deserved. The September 11th context has given us a second opportunity and as Ambassador Benavides pointed out, this has been reflected not only in the upgrading of the old Mediterranean Dialogue, but in the launch of the ICI, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. I personally believe that although September 11th may have been the impulse, the need for a NATO-Mediterranean dialogue is based on sound strategic rationale and common interest that predates, naturally, September 11th and of course cannot simply be limited to threat perceptions from the south or from international terrorism. But speaking pragmatically, the lever is there and we now have to make up for lost time and to build upon it.

Second point: NATO is not particularly well-equipped to carry forward that opportunity at the moment. We have no Arabic speakers among the international staff of NATO today, although there are plans to recruit some. Not more than half a dozen officials are professionally involved in conducting the Mediterranean Dialogue. When one thinks of the vast numbers that are engaged in the Partners for Peace (PfP) activities, vis-à-vis the Central and Eastern European countries, we badly need to acquire, not simply the language skills but the regional policy expertise to seriously engage with these countries and it is long overdue. As I have said, we are rectifying it now, but we need to go faster in that direction.

Third point, we need to be patient. Unlike the PfP, which to some degree was motivated by a framework document and a series of mutual political commitments and undertakings, such as a commitment to consult in crisis situations, and unlike PfP, which for some was linked directly to the prospect of NATO membership and was seen as a vehicle
to NATO membership, we do not have the same formal political basis yet with our Mediterranean Dialogue partners and of course even less, as you would imagine, with our Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries. We need, therefore, to accept that it will be, if not slow, at least a gradual process, to build up the trust and the knowledge of each other; the degree of confidence to form a veritable partnership. Therefore we should not be surprised if we do not have miraculous overnight results, but on the other hand, we need to stay engaged in this process.

Fourth point: we need far better coordination with the other international organisations; Ambassador Benavides and others referred to it this morning. We tend to exchange information with the other international organisations. There is a good degree of transparency, but unfortunately there is still far too much duplication. For example, between NATO and the OSCE there is plenty of scope to cooperate or to establish a pragmatic division of labour on issues like the disposal of surplus ammunition stocks or dealing with small arms and weapons on de-mining projects and the rest, for example, through the constitution of trust funds.

The next principle –and again Ambassador Benavides referred to this– we need to enhance the scope of our political consultations. I myself –although I can understand the idea that we should expand the Euro-Atlantic partnership council to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and create a kind of vast mini-UN General Assembly type forum– prefer a different approach, which is that we should focus more on developing the notion of the North Atlantic Council meeting regionally with these countries, and with the same degree of regularity with which we meet the partners from the PfP countries. I believe that a more regional approach would ensure that the agendas would serve common interests, the meetings would be more results-oriented and focused. Although, yes, we have had, as the Ambassador rightly said, meetings of Foreign Affairs ministers for the first time last December over dinner, meetings of intelligence chiefs, we have yet to sustain regular series of political consultations with these countries. There is still too much briefing after the ministerial, as useful as that is. I see opportunities here for the future; for example, Morocco has now sent signals about inviting the North Atlantic Council to visit the country; Egypt, which was rather reluctant to engage in the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue after it was launched in Istanbul, is now showing a much more forward-leaning, positive approach; we can build on that.

Sixth point. It is absolutely critical that we deliver on our partnership commitments. One aspect, and I agree again with the Ambassador, is that we should open up fully the PfP mechanisms to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They are already moving in that direction, with the possibility of concluding individual partnership agreements. But in order to be truly effective, one needs to go further. For example, the establishment of Mediterranean Dialogue liaison officers in military planning cells that shape the opening up of Mediterranean Dialogue missions to NATO could be a successful formula, having already worked for PfP partners. We need also to deliver more on providing results. NATO as an organisation has a great
deal of expertise, we are great at giving advice. We are not so good at delivering the hardware and the technology. Obviously we are a small inter-governmental organisation and we therefore have to go to the nations to look for that and already we see, for example in the case of Jordan, a request that came in a long time ago for assistance with the training and the equipment of border guards that took a long time for us to follow up. If we are going to be credible, either we have got to find a better way of providing that material ourselves through enhanced common funding and bigger NATO budgets, or we are going to have to be better at playing a kind of clearing house mechanism role in assuring that those nations interested in those programmes via NATO deliver that kind of equipment. But we cannot invite these countries to sign up to Chinese menus of practical cooperation activities and then take a long time to respond when we go beyond advice or encouragement to specifically concrete cooperation activities.

Seventh point. We need to show those countries that we are assisting them with practical security issues. Ambassador Benavides mentioned specifically in this respect the Palestinians and Iraq. If in the future NATO with the Mediterranean Dialogue and perhaps ICI countries could be involved in the security sector reform of the Palestinians, who at the moment I understand, have 14 different forms of security forces, to make those forces more efficient, better equipped, to bring them under democratic control; if at the same time we can expand our mission in Iraq to play an even more significant role in helping Iraq to build its democratically controlled security institutions of the future and to train its armed forces; if we can seem therefore to be playing a constructive role in helping Muslim countries deal with their security issues, then I think the beneficial knock-on effect in terms of improving NATO’s image throughout the region will assist of course in our practical cooperation programmes as well.

Then we need to improve our public diplomacy. We are still seen rather negatively by the countries of this region. Part of it, of course, is the fact that these countries naturally during the Cold War didn’t really discuss or debate NATO; it wasn’t really on their radar screens, so it is not so much the type of opposition based on propaganda that one experienced in the former Warsaw Pact or the former Soviet Union; it is more a kind of vacuum in which no information took place for a long time, which makes me optimistic that this is not an insuperable problem. But our initial contacts with the think tanks, with the elites, with the press, with the political classes in these countries does make it obvious that, if our cooperation programmes are to evolve, we need a greater degree of popular demand for cooperation with NATO. We have begun that, but again we need to constantly redouble our efforts. The fact, as Ambassador Benavides said, that the Secretary General is now going to these countries and the fact that we are doing more activities in these countries themselves—at the beginning all the activities were in NATO countries, notably Spain and Italy— is obviously going to help, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which has spearheaded the effort by, for example, having Morocco early on as an associate member and reaching out to these countries is also going to assist.
Final point. Progress is not stand alone. NATO –I say this openly as a NATO official– is not going to be the main player. The EU has far greater resources, particularly linked to development and economic integration, than NATO has, and I think we should respect this while looking, of course, for the “synergies” –the buzzword at the moment– that can make our programmes still more effective. Secondly, NATO’s efforts cannot take place in a conceptual vacuum. To the extent that the United States initiative on the Greater Middle East and Prime Minister Zapatero’s initiative for an Alliance of Civilizations take on concrete shape in terms of dialogue, in terms of civil society programmes, the things that the Ambassador was talking about at the beginning of his remarks, building bridges, building confidence, we are going beyond the sentiment that we are engaging with these countries because we see them as problems to our security, and it is then not only a defensive type of engagement. To the extent that we create an intellectual hinterland of building bridges, then, again, the climate will be improved. As John Kennedy used to say, a rising tide lifts all boats, and therefore NATO has a clear stake in the progress of those other initiatives made in the future.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Euromediterranean partnership: confidence-building measures

A British vision about security at the Mediterranean
Nick Kay
What from this conference would you like to know about the UK approach to some of these issues? I think I can break it down in three things which I’d like to share with you today. The first is the headline message which is “we care”. Now I’ll explain a bit more why that is worthy of a headline. The second is “what do we care about?”. And then third, a little on “what are we doing about it?”.

We care

Why is that a headline? Well, it’s a headline that traditionally the United Kingdom has not cared a lot about Euromed or the Barcelona Process, I will be frank about that. We are starting our caring from a fairly low base. Traditionally our focus in London has been on enlargement of the EU to the east, our focus on former Soviet Union countries, and if we did look at the Mediterranean, it was a focus very much to the East of the Mediterranean, to the Middle East Peace Process, the Arab-Israeli dispute. So we’re coming at this from a low base. I think a further reflection of why it is noteworthy has to do with the UK preference for pragmatic results-orientated engagements and I think the Barcelona Process in the very title reveals some of the things we have found culturally difficult in the UK. It is a process, but what is that about? We are quite keen on objectives and how we achieve them. But this process is difficult. And there are many people in London who bear the scars of Euromed and Barcelona Process meetings over the last ten years, which have not been able to agree, as Ambassador Prat said, by consensus ministerial conclusions until May 2005. So all this meant that our interest levels were pretty low. What is different? Well, it is slightly simplistic, but as Jamie Shea said earlier, it is really 9/11 that has changed that calculation in London for us. After the July bombings in London, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair said the rules of the game had changed, but in fact in foreign policy terms I think the rules of the game changed post 9/11. As an example of that, I should say that Ambassador Prat’s counterpart in the Foreign Office in London, the Ambassador for Euromed coordinator, works in London as a part of “Engaging with the Islamic World Group”, which is a new group that has existed for less than two years. Anyway, the message is that from a low base we care
What do we care about?

We have heard about some of the threats and I will not repeat the litany of security issues that are out there. I think I would classify those as things we know about. But perhaps slightly more interesting is just to share a reflection with you: we also care, actually, quite a lot about the things we do not know about, and those are perhaps more concerning for us. For example, the South-South dynamic: we do not really understand it as well as we should, we do not really understand, for example, that many or some, Magreb countries are now themselves becoming countries of immigration, from sub-Saharan Africa, for a start. We do not really understand how the dynamics of the Sahel corridor works with the Magreb countries. There is a lot on the South-South agenda that we do not understand but we care about. For instance, regarding environment we heard about water resources earlier. I think that goes in the brackets of things we do not really know about or understand about, but we care about. At home in the UK we care about these issues a lot, again, through an issue that we barely understand: the process of radicalisation and recruitment of extremists terrorists. And I think outside in the region, we do care quite deeply about the rosebud effect we heard about from our Jordanian colleague earlier, and that, I think, is what it is all about to some extent. We were told that we should not be peeling open the petals of a rose because we would destroy it and I think we worry about that. But we are trying to find how do we make the rose bloom under the most ideal conditions? Hothousing, greenhousing, fertilizer and, to extend the metaphor further, maybe a marketing incentive for the gardener to produce more roses and to produce them more quickly. But I think when it comes to democratisation in the region, it is that kind of hothousing approach that we worry about.

Also in the list of worries, what do we care about, I think we do care about, at a policy level, the impact of there being a lack of a paradigm or a dynamic for what we are engaged in. We have recognised earlier today, we have all recognised, some of the differences of both Mediterranean Dialogue and Partners for Peace Programme, also Euromed and the Enlargement Process, is the absence of a membership horizon. We recognise, we see it, we note it, but we do not completely understand what that impact is on the dynamic of what we are doing with the region, if there is no membership horizon, or even aspiration to membership.

Finally, on the worry list, I think we do worry about the Euromed partnership. Partnership suggests certain equalities and we look and we dance around the issue but, from at least from a London perspective, very often what we are talking about is a partnership of unequals the EU is who has money that it is spending on the region and creates a dynamic that is difficult to reconcile under a partnership paradigm.
What do we do about it?

Well, let me just run very briefly through some of the things; I have got about four points here. Bilaterally, the UK, as I say from a low base, is re-orienting some of its effort towards the Western Mediterranean; we have opened a Resident Defence Attache recently, last month, in Algiers. This is the first time we have had one, at least in living memory. We are doing a lot with Lybia since its renunciation of its weapons of mass destruction programme, ensuring security and prosperity with Lybia. We are encouraging within both NATO and I think within the Barcelona Process a greater transparency about what individual Member States and partners are doing. There is occasionally a lack of transparency, openness about bilateral programmes and bilateral engagements and I think it is important that we build up a collective picture of what everybody is doing. Multilaterally, obviously the Barcelona Process and the Euromed partnership is a priority for our presidency. The November summit here in Barcelona is, I think, both symptomatic of the greater priority we give to it; it is a summit and that had to be sold, for example to Tony Blair, as being worthy of prime ministerial heads of government attention. And it is also a summit which we are determined will have full work programmes attached to it giving a fairly detailed, concrete outline of where the partnership can achieve things in the future.

What else? Multilaterally, the Mediterranean Dialogue we talked a lot about today is a UK priority as well, under its G8 hat, but I would not over-emphasise it. Certainly for the G8 presidency this year there have been two additional, far higher priorities which are very relevant to the region. One was climate change, and one was Africa. But the Broader Middle East Initiative is there. We also support the Alliance of Civilisations. Our Prime Minister gave his support to Zapatero when he was in London in July and we are looking forward to that being taken forward in the UN.

Operationally, we have heard about Active Endeavour; that is certainly something which we’re very involved with; we are also promoting the Joint Intelligence and Assessment Centre in Naples and its work on forming an agreed intelligence picture of Mediterranean maritime activity. A couple of years ago we were working very closely with a reduced number of partners on operation Ulysses against immigration, as well as two maritime and air operations. We now need to stop seeing the North do things for the South and start being more collaborative; and I like very much the example that we have of the Spanish involvement with Morocco on a joint peace-keeping operation in Haiti. I think the more we can be doing things together, the better, and ideally, not just doing things together but doing things that matter together.

So, just to sum up, the message from London is that we are more engaged, we do take these issues far more seriously than we have before, both through the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dialogue, We care about all the security issues that have been identified and mentioned. We care quite a lot about those things we do not understand and which conferences like this are an opportunity to try to
understand. We are doing a little bit bilaterally, quite a lot multilaterally, we are focusing quite a lot on operational issues as well. And this is all to try to build a better understanding and a coherent narrative or meta-language that we do not yet have, to understand this complex relationship. But there are three things that I will leave you with, that characterize, I think, the UK approach at the moment. One is urgency –we all know the demographics of the region, we all know the socio-economic gap between the north shores and the south shores of the Mediterranean getting bigger; there is urgency, we have urgency. Also secondly, ambition. I think we do have a scale of ambition now that we did not have before and we hope that will be captured in the Barcelona summit in November. We need to aim high. And I think thirdly the thought of virtuous circles is one which has greatest resonance with us in terms of looking at particularly the Neighbourhood Policy and the idea that the EU will be doing more with partners that are doing more. And we will build self-reinforcing virtuous circles in that relationship.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Euromediterranean partnership: confidence-building measures

Confidence building in the Eastern Mediterranean: a Turkish perspective
Ersin Kalaycioglu
Introduction

Eastern Mediterranean has been plagued by three major conflicts: the disputes involving Turkey and Greece over the rights of the two states in the Aegean Sea, the implementation of the 1960 Cypriot Constitution defining the political regime on the island of Cyprus and the ensuing ethnic conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities, and the notorious and intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. Some more recent conflicts, such as the one between Israel and Syria involving the subjugation of Lebanon, have emerged in the region in the last couple of decades. However, since the end of World War I, which coincided with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of various mandate regimes over the Arab communities of the Middle East, no other conflict has been as tenacious as the three conflicts mentioned above. The Arab-Israeli conflict is complicated and protracted enough to warrant a whole paper to address it. I will only focus on the Greek-Turkish and Cypriot issues in this paper.

Greek-Turkish Tensions

The current tensions between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea date back to the 1930s. The Turkish Republic was founded by means of a war of liberation, which was, in part, fought against the invasion forces of the Greek army in the western parts of Anatolia in 1919-1922. The Greek government as one of the victorious parties of World War I (WWI) had launched a military campaign to annex the western regions of the Anatolian peninsula. The Greek government of Prime Minister Venizelos utilized a revisionist and expansionist ideology to lay “historical claims” on the eastern shores of the Aegean Sea as historical “Greek territory” and set out to take possession of western regions of Anatolia by military force. An international treaty (Sèvres) was imposed upon the vanquished Ottoman Empire of WWI in 1920 to legitimize the Greek and other claims over Anatolia. However, when the Turkish nationalist resistance won the war of liberation during the summer of 1922, the Greek forces had to pull out of Anatolia, and a peace treaty between the Turkish nationalist government in Ankara and the victorious powers of WWI, including
Greece, was successfully negotiated and signed in Lausanne, Switzerland, on July 24, 1923. The Turkish Republic was established soon after on October 29, 1923 and the Greek government recognized the new state. The Greek and Turkish governments negotiated a series of treaties, which settled various thorny issues, some even by taking such radical and still debated measures as exchanging populations. They seemed to have buried their hatchets for a while.

However, in 1931 the Greek government made a move to challenge the statu quo of the Aegean Sea by declaring a ten-mile air space over the Greek islands. Formerly, the Treaty of Lausanne had accepted the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey as three miles and the national air spaces in full correspondence with it. Such a declaration created a conic national air space with three miles at its base over the territorial waters of Greece, and ten miles above them. The Treaty of Lausanne had left only two islands Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Gökçeada (Imroz), which are strategically situated at the southern entrance of the straits of Dardanelle, under Turkish sovereignty. The same treaty had also left the possession of the Dodecanese islands in the southeastern part of the Aegean in the hands of the Italians, who had earlier occupied and annexed them with the Treaty of Ouchy in 1912. At the end of World War II (WWII) the sovereignty of Italy over the Dodecanese islands was transferred to the Greek government, which Turkey recognized at the time. The same Greek demand over the conic national air space was extended to include the Dodecanese islands as well in the aftermath of WWII. Meanwhile Greece and Turkey negotiated to revise the clause of the Lausanne Treaty to extend their territorial waters from three to six miles over the Aegean in the 1960’s (Akiman, 1999: 583-584). The Greek claim of ten miles of national air space was still refused by Turkey, and to this day no state, including NATO allies of Greece, has accepted it.

More recently, Greece decided to push for another revision of the span of its territorial waters from six to twelve miles in the 1960’s, which again Turkey refused to recognize. The Turkish objections rest on a simple argument: “Current 6 miles of territorial waters accords approximately 44% of the Aegean Sea as Greek territorial waters, and 8% as Turkish, and the remaining 48% constitutes the international waters of the Aegean. If the territorial waters of Greece are extended to 12 miles, the Greek territorial waters will cover 72% of the Aegean Sea, with Turkish waters consisting of only 9%, whereas only 19% of the waters of the Aegean would then still be designated international waters.” (Akiman Cf. Kalaycioglu, 2005) Such a revision of the national sovereignty of Greece over the waters of the Aegean would create a virtual nationalization of the entire Aegean Sea except for a small part of it right in the middle, which cannot be accessed without crossing Greek national waters anyway. Such a move is considered by Turkey as a move to hinder all Turkish access to international waters from the Turkish western and northern ports.

1. See Hirschon (2003) for an approach to the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey.
In fact, such a move will also bring about a major expansion of the Greek continental shelf in the Aegean. Greek governments have been operating with the presumed information of large oil deposits under the Aegean seabed and have been attempting to explore oil in the Greek national waters, continental shelf, and international waters of the Aegean since 1960 (Akiman, 1999: 584). It did not take long for Turkey to reciprocate and search for oil deposits in the international waters of the Aegean, relatively close to the Greek exploration sites since the 1970’s. The Greek response to such Turkish moves was sharp. The two countries approached a warlike situation for a few times since the 1970’s.

The Greek government started to argue that the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea belongs to the Greek state. The issue was even referred to the United Nations in the 1970’s and the Security Council decided to advise the two countries to develop diplomatic solutions through negotiations to their oil exploration disputes over the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea in 1976. Such a decision was far short of being acceptable to the Greek government, and Greece referred the issue to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The Court decided that it was outside of its jurisdiction. Soon after, the diplomats of the two governments met in Switzerland and decided to postpone any drilling for oil until the dispute over their sovereign rights on the continental shelf of the Aegean is brought to a solution. However, the dispute over the legal status of the continental shelf still continues (Akiman, 1999: 584).

In the meantime new friction emerges over the uncharted and unresolved status of more than 3,000 islets or rocks in the Aegean between the two countries. One such islet, which Greeks call Imia and Turks call Kardak emerged on December 25, 1995. A vessel had run aground at some rocks a few miles off the shores of Turkey and a few miles to a Greek island, on that day. The Greek Coast Guards responded to the S.O.S signals of the vessel first. Eventually, the Turkish Coast Guards responded, and in co-operation they floated the vessel and hauled it to a Turkish shipyard for repairs. However, this incident precipitated a debate over the sovereignty of the two countries over the rocks in question.

In a few days time the mayor of a city of the island of Calimnos, in company of the town priest and the players of the football club landed on the island and left some goats and hoisted a Greek flag. About a day or so later, a Turkish private TV network discovered the incident on the Greek press, flew to the island by helicopter, took the Greek flag away and hoisted a Turkish flag and televised the incident. Almost, immediately afterwards Greece landed a team of commandoes on one of the rocks. The next day, Turkey landed a team of commandoes by stealth on a nearby rock. Hence, the rocks had by then became hot enough to start an exchange of fire between the two armies. The US intervened and threatened each side that whoever fired the first shot would be fired upon by the US armed forces. The diplomats started negotiations, which ended in simultaneous pull back of the commandoes by Greece and Turkey. There is no report about the fate of the poor goats on the rocks.
without any water to survive on. The Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996 showed how fragile peace is on the Aegean, and how easily even a shipwreck can escalate into an international crisis, and even trigger a Greco-Turkish war.

Ostensibly, it seems as if the two parties of the conflict have little trust in the motives of each other. Turkish governments have assumed that Greek governments are bent upon revising the status of the Aegean into a “Mare Nostrum”, and follow a policy of deterrence. The Turkish Fourth army is poised to deter the Greek armed forces from taking any ventures to revise the status of the Aegean Sea. The Greek governments, in turn, present the Turkish policy of deterrence as “threat”, which often fall onto wary ears among the EU and EU member country policy makers. For example, Greece considers the Turkish recalcitrance toward signing the International Maritime Treaty of the United Nations, which entitled Greece to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles, as an indication of Turkish callousness toward international law (Akiman, 1993: 247). The Greek governments followed a foreign policy of brinkmanship, to provoke Turkey to react to their ventures and then claim that Turks threaten Greece. Similarly, Greek governments periodically raise objections to those Turkish warplanes that fly between the outer limits of the Greek conic air space of ten miles and the internationally recognized air space of six miles, which are reported to have violated the Greek national air space. Greek governments have often resorted to media leaks and press blitzes to keep the “Turkish threat” on the domestic Greek and the EU agendas.

Greek foreign policy between 1987 and 2002 seemed to be based upon frustrating Turkish full membership drive in the EU in return for wringing concessions out of Turkey. For example, they had given some support to the PKK’s terror campaigns, gave refuge to PKK activists and even its leader Öcalan, to better coin a “problematic image” of Turkey in the minds of the EU member countries. Of course, such a policy works only if the Turkish drive to join the EU remains credible. If for any reason Turkey loses hope of joining the EU, Greece risks ending up with a hostile neighbor, armed to its teeth, perceiving Greece as a revisionist threat, and doing its best to contain and deter what it perceives to be “Greek expansionism”. Under those circumstances, Greece seemed to have counted on succoring EU support and protection against a Turkish wrath. Consequently, the EU would become sucked into the Greek–Turkish conflict, through Greek efforts and by default, as an ally of Greece. If the design would work, Greek–Turkish conflict would become EU-Turkish conflict.

Turkey also considers the Aegean continental shelf as a shared regional asset of Greece and Turkey, and perceives the Greek government as following a foreign policy of self-indulgence in the Aegean. The Greek efforts to legitimately possess the Aegean continental shelf have not been successful at the United Nations, and the International Court of
Justice. However, Greek governments have shifted their policy to exploiting their ratification of the International Maritime Law, and press hard to have their right to have twelve miles of territorial waters to be accepted by the international community, which in turn would pressure Turkey to accept it. Such a policy could give Greece control over a large swath of the continental shelf, and a similar exclusion of Turkey from the Aegean. It is small wonder why Turkey perceives such a policy as threatening and stops short of signing the International Maritime Law, which obviously, does not bind Turkey.

A simple solution of the matter in the Aegean, though highly unlikely, is for both parties to accept the statu quo, and share the natural resources according to the current proportion of their control. They could even negotiate the extraction of the natural resources through the services of some neutral and mutually respected third party, and the pecuniary benefits could then be shared between Greece and Turkey, according to a fair formula to be negotiated between the two countries.

Turkish full membership in the EU will definitely help, though observing the outcome of such conflicts as in the case of the British “Rock” at Gibraltar and the Ulster issue between Ireland and Britain in the 1970’s and the 1980’s, one should be careful not to assume too much from EU membership of both Greece and Turkey. Any solution that ignores deep Turkish distrust in the Greek motives, or vice versa, is also unlikely to work, though a solution that upholds the formulas of the Treaty of Lausanne, and thus upholds the statu quo, will provide for a solution of the Aegean continental shelf and national waters disputes. A goodwill gesture of Greece could be the adoption of a national air space no different than its current legal territorial waters of six miles. Such a signal would indicate that Greek efforts at revising the statu quo of the Aegean are changing toward the adoption of the statu quo.

There are both Greek and Turkish arms build-up on both sides of the Aegean. There can only be mutual disarmament. In that regard the Treaty of Lausanne can also be a good guide, which stipulates that the Aegean islands be disarmed. Turkey may also consider withdrawal of its troops near the Aegean coastline, if Greece can convince the Turkish government that it is ready to accept the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Turkey has recently decreased its flights over the Aegean and showed restraint by not demonstrating its previous eagerness to engage its warplanes in dog fights over the Aegean Sea, canceled some navy maneuvers in the Aegean, and in spite of all provocations the Turkish commander of the Land Forces has made a historic visit to Athens in 2005. Since Turkey follows a defensive posture of deterrence, Turkish moves have usually been reactions to Greek moves. The onus seems to be on Greece in convincing Turkey that it is not trying to elbow Turkey out of the Aegean and thus revise the statu quo of that Sea in a way Turkey considers inimical to its national interests. A misinterpretation of the Turkish goals and moves is likely to create more problems between the two countries, whether Turkey becomes a member of the EU or not.
Cyprus Crisis

The row over the status of the island of Cyprus also dates back to the 1930's. However, in the fifties the colonial power Britain negotiated a settlement between the Greek and Turkish communities of the island as well as Greek and the Turkish governments. Two accords were signed in London and Zurich and the independent Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 under the guarantorship of Britain, Greece, and Turkey. A constitution was drawn up in 1960, which devised a form of presidential regime where Greek and Turkish communities shared various posts of the new republican government. Unfortunately, the new regime of Cyprus could only be sustained for a very brief period of three years.

The popularly elected president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios and his followers almost immediately after the promulgation of the 1960 constitution argued that the new form of government was too cumbersome to manage the political affairs of the island. In 1963, with the aid of a nationalist organization they launched a two-forked attack on the Turkish political elites and masses on the island. The duly elected Turkish Cypriot politicians were evicted from their political posts and were physically inhibited from entering the government offices upon the orders of the President Archbishop Makarios. Simultaneously, Greek Cypriot nationalist bands began to attack Turkish settlements with the aim of cleansing all Turkish Cypriots off the island, and unite it with mainland Greece (Enosis). The Turkish government reacted to the developments as a guarantor of the statu quo of the island. Turkish saber rattling stopped the massacres on the island though it failed to restore the statu quo for long. In 1964 and 1967 similar ethnic cleansing campaigns were carried out against the Turks and with predictable military reactions from Turkey. In both years the US government intervened to avert a major escalation and war between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. In 1964 Turkey declared the government of Archbishop Makarios unrepresentative of the Turkish community of the island and thus illegitimate.

The colonels’ coup in Greece in 1967 brought about a lull in the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the Greek nationalists on the island of Cyprus. However, in 1974, under domestic political and economic pressure the Greek colonels decided to oust Archbishop Makarios, who was also emerging as a credible opposition figure to the junta in Athens. In the early summer days of 1974 a well-known Greek Cypriot nationalist, Nikos Sampson, with the support from the Greek military made a coup against President Makarios. The supporters of Makarios resisted the Greek army and intra-communal violence broke out among the Greek Cypriot community, where many seemed to have perished.

Turkish press began to report renewed ethnic cleansing activities against the Turkish Cypriots resumed and thousands of Turkish Cypriots were massacred by early July 1974. Turkey again reacted as a guarantor of the statu quo on the island of Cyprus, and started to test the waters for a joint military intervention with the other guarantor, the United Kingdom. British

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3. For a more comprehensive treatment of the subject see Altug (1989: 281-343).
government failed to be persuaded to the urgency of the matters and preferred a diplomatic solution. Turkey then acted alone and landed troops on the island to counter and pacify the Greek troops on the island and resurrect the statu quo ante.

However, the military campaign of the Turkish troops failed to reach their objectives in July 1974. However, it managed to stop internecine conflict in the Greek community, stopped ethnic cleansing activities of the Greek Cypriots and the Greek army in the north, and helped to topple the Greek junta in Athens. As the Greek government began to vie for democracy diplomatic negotiations between Greece and Turkey began in Geneva, Switzerland in August 1974. Turkish diplomats seemed to have the impression that the Greek side was stalling, and the Turkish military, which could not control a large enough territory to provide protection for even themselves, let alone the Turkish Cypriots, was still at risk. Hence, the military felt increasingly vulnerable as time went by, and requested the government to either decide to pull back the troops, or order them to push for a control of a larger swath of land.

The Turkish government opted for the latter and pulled out of the diplomatic negotiations and the Turkish troops moved further south to control about forty percent of the island in August 1974. It was that move that precipitated international reactions to Turkey. In 1975 the U.S. established an arms embargo, and the United Nations made various resolutions against Turkey. A long process of diplomatic negotiations involving the United Nations, the United States, and eventually the European Union, and occasionally Turkey and Greece, but definitely the Greek and Turkish community representatives of Cyprus, continued.

In the meantime, the Greek Cypriot south continued to be recognized as the official government of Cyprus, though they never represented the Turkish community. In the north the Turkish community eventually established their own state in 1983, which has only been recognized by Turkey. The Greek Cypriot government benefited from international recognition and trade, and prospered over the years. Eventually, they were permitted to enter into full membership negotiations with the European Union as the legitimate representative of Cyprus. Turkey could have objected and vetoed such a development, though the Turkish governments refrained from such a move as Turkish rapprochement with the EU gained priority. The EU also invited the Turkish community to take part in the negotiations though only as part of the Greek Cypriot delegation, which the Turkish Cypriot government rejected.

The EU assumed that the Turkish Cypriot political class constituted the intransigent party, which was refusing to take part in the EU and settle the dispute on the island of Cyprus. Consequently, the EU decided to offer the Greek Cypriot government full membership, whether the conflict on the island is resolved or not. Under the circumstances, the Greek Cypriots did nothing to solve the inter-ethnic dispute, brandished their nationalism with pride, and even elected an ardent Greek Orthodox nationalist, Thassos Papadopoulos, as their President. In the meantime, the United Nations General Secretary, Mr. Kofi Annan, who negotiated it with the Greek and Turkish Cypriots many times, outlined a settlement plan. The series of negotiations resulted in new demands from each side. The Annan plan

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was revised three times, and was finally put to a referendum in 2004. In the referendum the Greek leaders, including Papadopoulos, rejected the Annan Plan, though there was no mechanism to halt the entry of the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of Cyprus into the EU, as a full member. The Turkish community voted to adopt the Annan Plan, though they were practically kept out of the EU. The Turkish government, which supported the Annan Plan, has now been compelled to negotiate with the EU that hosts the ardent Greek Orthodox nationalists as the government of a member state.

The faulty assumptions of the EU have resulted in the importation of the ethnic conflict in the island of Cyprus into its own realm. The Turkish government, which has been following the policy of not recognizing the Greek Cypriot state as the legitimate representative of the whole island for the last forty years, still continues not to recognize them. Some EU member countries, such as France, have politicians who now use this mess as an excuse to demonstrate a blatant anti-Turkish bias, which at times comes close to racism, to forestall Turkish-EU membership accession negotiations that are due to start on October 3, 2005.

The gist of the problems between Greece and Turkey, on the one hand, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, on the other, is one of trust. Turkish political elites consider the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments as essentially Greek Orthodox nationalists. Their brand of nationalism emerged in the early years of the nineteenth century, and has been developed as an ethnic nationalist ideology bent upon establishing a Grand Hellenic state, often referred to as the Megalo Idea. Just like all other forms of ethnic nationalist ideologies Greek nationalists have come under the influence of their Orthodox church and have been inspired by the grandeur of their Hellenic past and set out to re-establish a certain yet undefined grand Hellenic Empire the borders of which are to expand against the Ottoman Empire between 1821 and 1922 and later on against the Turkish Republic. Turkish governments still suspect of a hidden agenda of revisionist foreign policy fueled by nationalist and Orthodox religious ideas that keep expanding the sovereign territory of Greece at the behest of Turkey. Most Turkish political elite believe that the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments follow a policy of containment against Turkey by declaring large swaths of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean Seas as Greek and Greek Cypriot national waters, so that Turkish access to international waters will be left at the mercy of Greek governments of Greece and Cyprus. Turkey considers such a scenario as a dire violation of her national interests, and thus declares any move by Greece to extend its national waters beyond the current six miles as casus belli. The goals of Turkish foreign policy have been and still are statu quoist and defensive. However, this requires Turkey to build a military force strong enough to deter Greece and Greek Cypriots from revising the statu quo in the Aegean or the Mediterranean.

The dispute over Cyprus can only be solved through a negotiated settlement of the political system and its regime on the island of Cyprus. There does not seem to be an alternative to a loose federation suggested by the Annan Plan, which is already accepted by the Turkish Cypriots. The intransigent party to that conflict, with all its nationalistic symbolism and rhetoric, is now the Greek Cypriot community and politicians. The problem
then becomes one of convincing the Greek Cypriots to accept the Annan Plan. Turks tend to believe that the EU now has the moral and political responsibility to clear the mess it helped so vigorously to create. Hence, pressuring the Turkish Cypriot community or Turkey does not solve the problem, but render Turkey more recalcitrant.

Some politicians in the EU member countries seem to ignore that the previous policies of the EU had promoted orthodox nationalism on the island, which is hardly a value that the EU may consider worthwhile to promote. It is virtually impossible for Turks to accept the political will of those who massacred them in the past and let themselves be ruled by such religious nationalists, who have defined the Turks as a nuisance on the island. Such a peace settlement will not work. Thus, the question becomes one of marginalizing orthodox nationalists in Cyprus, on the one hand, and pressuring the Greek Cypriots into accepting the Annan Plan, which the Turkish Cypriots have already accepted, on the other. How this is to be done is one major problem, and the burden of solving it primarily falls on the EU, which, due to its faulty expectations and calculations, helped to create it.

The Turkish Cypriot community, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and Turkey share the view that they have taken a huge step in trying to promote peace on the island and endorsed the Annan Plan, which has the full blessings of the UN and the major parties to the conflict, as well as the EU. If they stand with their pledge to ensure that the Annan Plan gets to be implemented, their concerted pressure on the Greek Cypriots should be able to make a difference. If such a line-up of states and international organizations cannot convince the Greek Cypriot community to adopt the Annan Plan, then Turkey will conclude that there is not enough political will to sort out the Cyprus mess. Consequently, all involved parties should gear up to the fact that Cyprus will be engulfed in crisis for the foreseeable future.

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4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Euromediterranean partnership: confidence-building measures

Measures of confidence in the Mediterranean region
Abdallah Saaf
T
here is an observation that is repeated in evaluations of the steps
achieved in the domain of political dialogue and security in the
Mediterranean in general, and in the Barcelona Process in particu-
lar. This observation was already shared from the first time it was stated
in the Mediterranean context: Is not the logic of measures of confidence
(MCs) too linked to the spirit of the Cold War to be applicable to the
Mediterranean situation? Even if these uses can be explained through
reasons of methodological and discursive comfort, it seems rather
doubtful that one can transport the experience of the Comission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the area of security and
arms limitation to the process under way in the Mediterranean.

As MCs, people especially cite information exchanges at the military
level (forces, weaponry, large weapons, equipment systems, information
on plans), defence planning, risk reduction (the mechanisms of consulta-
tion and co-operation...), contacts (base visits, military contacts, military
cooperation, joint manoeuvres), demonstrations of new types of
weapons, prior notification of certain military activities, the establish-
ment of joint calendars, evaluation and inspection activities, etc. Born in
the breathless phase of the Cold War, in a still-bipolar world, the philos-
ophy of MCs pointed toward creating a climate of confidence, to
prevent conflicts due to contempt or misunderstandings of the true
intentions of face-to-face situations: the objective was to achieve a situ-
ation in which the decisions made on each side would be made on the
basis of a good knowledge of the real intentions of the other.

At the end of the Cold War, it was normal to be tempted to use con-
cepts and a methodology that previously could be relatively operational.
Moreover, the birth of the Barcelona Process was too recent, too fresh,
to inspire new concepts and new approaches. Nevertheless, is not pos-
ing the question of the applicability of MCs in this way discounting the
pertinence of an unavoidable process too quickly? MCs cannot be
examined as being neutral; they must be contextualised. Without a
doubt, the euromediterranean situation differs from that of the Cold
War, but MCs can be pertinent in this situation, taking on a different
sense: that of creating confidence, creating the conditions of an envi-
ronment of healthy security, of a certain socialisation, of the
humanisation of the euromediterranean space, of risk reduction, of the
lowering of antagonisms.
The already long history of MCs in the Mediterranean evinces in a concrete way the difficulties that have been encountered so far. These difficulties are embodied first a plan of action defining MCs, security and disarmament in the area of hard security. In the climate of impasse which goes from the Middle East peace process to the middle of 1996, the objective of this setting in motion of MCs came to an end due to their seeming to be impossible to achieve. At this first moment, no other notable initiatives were known of, apart from the birth of the EuroMeSCo network and its work, training seminars, the Egyptian-Italian co-operation initiative for the prevention and management of natural and manmade disasters. At the beginning of 1997, the priorities of the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP), which had placed its stakes at first on MCs, put Partnership Measures (PMs) before them. The PMs, revising the MCs, set an objective of promoting a terrain of common understanding in search of a greater comprehension among member states, as a prior step for any project of co-operation in the area of security. The new approach that stemmed from this new direction in orientations was translated into numerous works carried out to establish a Euromediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.

In Stuttgart in April 1999, the Euromediterranean Ministerial Conference approved the guidelines that pointed the way toward the establishment of the Euromediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, officially adopted “at the moment when the conditions allow for it”, but already put its partners on the road to the measures to take (the progressive conduct of a political dialogue, PMs adapted to favouring good neighbour relations and regional co-operation through networks, bilateral agreements and transnational projects, preventive diplomacy, crisis management and the return to normality following a conflict, the treatment of humanitarian issues, measures in the fight against organised crime, drug trafficking, clandestine immigration, trafficking in human beings, etc.). Numerous mechanisms were established: dialogue, the exchange of information through working groups, round tables, workshops... The Charter was marked by difficult discussions, indeed rather disappointing ones or, at any rate, that were not very propitious for establishing confidence among the members. The November 2000 ministerial conference in Marseilles, which took place at a time of great tension in the Middle East, decided to withdraw the draft Charter. As evinced by a certain number of critical views of this second moment of the attempt to delimit the Charter, this stage revealed the existence of several different cultures of security, conceptual and terminological differences within the EU and between Europe and the countries to the south, the determining question of perception, etc.

The Spanish presidency of the EU in 2002 inaugurated a phase marked by the setting in motion of the Valencia Action Plan. Built on a pragmatic perspective, the Plan concentrated on concrete measures in the sphere of security, defining specific sectors of co-operation, such as co-operation in the framework of the fight against terrorism, the developments of the ESDP, civil defence, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), non-proliferation and others. While the Valencia Action Plan specifically initiated the definition of the modalities of a
Euromediterranean dialogue on the ESDP, this dialogue endeavoured, principally, to surmount the prevailing situation of a lack of information on European defence and security issues in the south. The Mediterranean partners, the EU in the first place, became aware of the fact that the lack of information generated mistrust among the partners and it also became aware of the need to overcome the negative perceptions in the south regarding European defence initiatives (we can recall the dampened reactions of the south to Eurofor and Euromarfor).

Within the framework of the euromediterranean dialogue on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), of particular importance is the practice initiated by the Dutch presidency of the EU through the maintenance of ad hoc meetings among high-level officials with the aim of debating the evolution of the spheres of security and defence in the EU, the introduction of the ESDP and the issues of non-proliferation on the agenda of the political and security dialogue of the EMP. During this phase of “dialogues” and some “joint” manoeuvres of varying degrees, it seems that the MCs, renamed PMs, were consecrated as the pillars of this block. This phase is also distinguished by the establishment of points of liaison between the Mediterranean dialogue of the ESDP and the different waves of NATO dialogues, from that at the beginning of the 1990s to the recent Mediterranean dialogue initiative.

This axis of measures of confidence was equally privileged by the Western EU (WEU) Mediterranean dialogue, at least during the last decade (1992-2000): since 1992, the WEU Mediterranean group maintained a security dialogue on the basis of the principles of regularity, stability, transparency, measures of confidence in conflict prevention, sufficiency of conventional forces, the peaceful regulation of legal disputes, non-proliferation of WMD, resorting to special meetings in that dialogue that were conceived to encourage transparency and participation in seminars. This historical development of the MCs, their rather unconvincing, even relatively limited, characteristics can bear witness to their character which is rather unadapted to the context of the Mediterranean and their anachronism as a perspective for dealing with security between the two shores. It should be added that the MCs have their origin in true military concepts, given that the main intention of them is to improve relations between antagonistic actors, or at least to not let them deteriorate more, but all of this in a quest to preserve the statu quo, through the introduction of objective measures.

A priori, what seemed plausible in the last phase of East-West relations, could not be so for the Mediterranean of the Barcelona Process: in the first place, in an area in which the dynamics of the partnership began, the members’ character of being a real or potential enemy is far from being established. The security challenges of the North toward the South or the South toward the North have had highs and lows since the 1970s and during the 1980s. But, in the end, there is no longer a threat from the south toward the north, the societies of the south know that the Europeans do not threaten them. Perhaps the potential conflict has more of the form of a North-South hiatus on the economic and social plane. Thus, the work carried out both through the Barcelona framework and through Mediterranean politics gives it other configurations.
In the second place, currently what seems to concern the countries of the south more, for example the Arab countries in the case of the Middle East conflict, is not maintaining the statu quo, but rather changing it. The methods of the OSCE do not seem capable of dissipating the historical mistrust of the Palestinians. Today, one would have to add the general atmosphere created by the intervention in Iraq and which, beginning now, constitutes a difficult obstacle to overcome in this search for an improvement in the climate of confidence.

In reality, the problems of the MCs pose the question of knowing how to achieve a better, more effective political comprehension of security and how to create the conditions for this. At least three perspectives could be proposed:

1. The quest for transparency in EU defence policies should not be limited to a certain degree of information, but rather it should open itself up to the search for complementarities and correspondences between the South and the North, through a true levelling of concepts, intentions and activities undertaken (not only manoeuvres, formal exchanges of visits...) in the same sense as the levelling of activities and acts, numerous works were undertaken on perceptions and representations. These must be capitalised upon and deepened, with the aim of arriving at a common global language. Often, the relationship between, on the one hand, the economic, social and political spheres and on the other hand, the security sphere is questioned. But, security is one component among others. The other dimensions are also determining factors. The measures of hard security (precisely measures of confidence and others) are dissociable from soft security.

Also, when ties are established between dialogues of the ESDP, NATO and the members of the Barcelona Process, the identity of the latter is, in a certain aspect, sacrificed. The search for transparency and the concern for information brings with it the risk of dissolution of the nature of the euromediterranean initiative. It is not a matter of opposing the NATO Mediterranean dialogue, but it is necessary to be careful that it does not go against the particularity of this space, its specificity. It is important to protect the autonomy of the Barcelona Process, preserve its identity, its distinctive personality, paying attention to the dynamics of socialisation with which it began (the diplomatic exchanges, the proximity of the actors, partners and its effects on reciprocal perceptions, etc.) and also to the processes of humanisation of security (such as the demilitarisation of certain matters, etc.) granting a place to the institutions that hold effective power and to the different components of civil society, islamist or not.

Notable trends exist in this space, encouraging not only a better articulation of the question of progress to make in democracy (even, for example, the proposal of a project of democratic community in the euromediterranean space), but also projects in the sphere of defence and security. Projection is becoming increasingly more important and is turning out to be more and more significant. In relation to American armed voluntarism and its democratic interventionism, the euromediterranean initiative is more visible and more accepted, and it seems to participate in the identity of the Euromediterranean Partnership based on integration, cultural approximation, the dynamic of pushing for and fostering consensus.
2. The security that is discussed among the countries on the two shores cannot be dissociated from the set of political, economic and social mechanisms anticipated, on the other hand, by the Barcelona Process. It is advisable to integrate MCs as part of security in a political framework.

3. The introduction of confidence signifies a great triumph which is not sufficiently valued. It is not necessary to stay only with what is produced by the Barcelona framework and its institutions: there exists an impressive substrate in terms of accords, relations and initiatives in the area as a whole. One could cite, for example (and it is not a matter of just one sphere), the bilateral co-operation among the armed forces in the Mediterranean, a relatively dense fabric of co-operation agreements among the countries of the euromediterranean geographic area, texts of application, exchanges of all kinds, common practices. The mechanism of introduction of confidence that arose from Barcelona is capable of creating modalities of reduction, articulation and appropriation of these blocks of a regional path of a noteworthy density.

At any rate, currently the euromediterranean region needs both MCs in the sense of “ants’ work” to be developed (encounters, workshops, seminars, round tables, agreements, concrete co-operation on the ground, manoeuvres...) and new political orientations on the whole, a new strategic impulse.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Euromediterranean partnership: confidence-building measures

Suggestions for confidence-building measures
Fred Tanner
Introduction

Confidence-building measures (CBM’s) can be defined as collective or unilateral actions of states aimed at increasing transparency and predictability of other states’ behaviour in the military domain and other security-related fields. CBM’s played an important role in easing East-West tensions during the Cold War and have subsequently served to deepen cooperation between the former adversaries in a number of areas. Of crucial importance in this regard have been the OSCE/CSCE process and the Vienna documents concluded in 1990 and 1992. The two documents, building upon measures agreed earlier, provide instruments such as information exchange on force deployments, major weapons programmes and military budgets, and also include rather detailed provisions regarding the size and frequency of military exercises.

In an area like the Mediterranean, which is characterised by fragmentation, underdevelopment, insecurity and continued hostility, the creation of CBM’s and security partnerships is a difficult exercise. This is why in the Mediterranean region, with very few exceptions, there are virtually no collaborative projects with the purpose of promoting confidence and transparency. At the same time, it is a region where precisely because of its instability, CBM’s are sorely needed. Formal CBM’s structures are best developed in multilateral frameworks, such as the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP) or the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. The EMP identifies projects such as the EuroMesco Network and diplomacy training in Malta as CBM’s or “Partnership Building Measures”. Other examples could include the cooperation in disaster relief that has also been developed under EMP auspices.

The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, in turn, has developed over the last years a framework within which CBM’s could be carried out. These include cooperation in defence education, port visits, joint exercises, joint projects on border security, as well as still timid efforts in the field of joint defence review. While these measures are important and may –in the long-term– become security-enhancing, they do not yet amount to full-fledged CBM’s, given their largely ad hoc and bilateral nature. Outside the EMP and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, security related cooperation has developed in the form of peacekeeping cooperation and joint military exercises.
The weak record of CBM’s in the region is due to a number of reasons. First, some Arab partner states opposed the idea—even during the heydays of Oslo—to engage in collaborative security-related projects that would also involve Israel. Second, over the past ten years, South-South relations have not improved: there continues to be a lack of economic integration and political alignment among the countries of the southern Mediterranean, and the Algerian-Moroccan border remains closed. Third, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime by the US-led coalition and the protracted deadly violence in Iraq has great potential to destabilise the Middle Eastern and Gulf region.

There is, however, a need to review the current weak record of CBM’s in the Mediterranean in light of the changing security environment of the region. The emergence of Islamist terrorism after 9/11 as a primary security threat to both the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries has given rise to a common EuroMediterranean threat assessment. This has led to a cooperative pan-Mediterranean security discourse which has a number of implications. First, the priorities in security cooperation have shifted from defence-related issues towards internal security or justice and home affairs. In fact, the threats of terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and trafficking in humans all reflect the blurring of external and internal security issues. Second, there is an increased willingness throughout the region to engage in security cooperation, particularly in the domain of law enforcement. The move towards more intensive security cooperation has been paralleled by a general agreement that this cooperation should be made more flexible and move away from the principle of “indivisibility of security” that provides each partner state a veto over proposed collaborative projects. For instance, the EMP political and institutional framework has evolved and become more flexible but possibly also less relevant. The EMP policy instruments have been complemented from the EU side by new instruments such as the Action Plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the ESDP Dialogue. The principle of self-differentiation embodied in these new instruments allows the EU to pursue a multi-speed policy in the Mediterranean region and to formulate tailor-made reform packages.

For confidence promotion to be successful it needs to be iterative in order to create mutual expectations of future conduct among partners. To achieve this objective, there is a need for institutionalised measures and relations. When the Barcelona Partnership was launched, the Charter for Peace and Security for the Mediterranean was supposed to create a framework within which such arrangements could be concluded. However, the Charter has been watered down from a blueprint for a comprehensive ‘Stability Pact’ to an arrangement that does not go much beyond the commitments contained in the Political and Security Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. Moreover, at the November 2000 Marseilles Ministerial meeting, the Charter was removed from the agenda of cooperation. In view of the failure of the Charter, the formal base for constructing CBM’s between partner states remains weak. CBM’s in the Mediterranean without a security policy framework also have less of a multiplier effect on the EMP. This does not mean, however, that CBM’s outside the formal EMP framework are not useful. At this conjuncture, it
would indeed make sense to either re-launch (a revised) Charter at the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the EMP or to create a less ambitious security cooperation arrangement. Such an arrangement could take the form, for instance, of a code of conduct in various areas of security cooperation.

**Suggestions for CBM’s**

**Information-sharing**

There is generally an urgent need for information sharing on security-relevant issues in the region. Whereas some information sharing arrangements exist, they are confined to specific sectors, such as the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan (Barcelona Convention and its protocols), which is aimed at protecting the marine and coastal environment in the Mediterranean. In the security domain, it would be important to agree on information exchange on defence expenditures, weapons acquisition programmes and reform efforts in the defence and security sectors. On a politically less sensitive level, the Mediterranean partner states could create a web-based information system, similar to the Information Security Network (ISN) that has been established within the Partners for Peace (PfP) community, and which is open to the public.

**Transparency measures**

Transparency is an essential prerequisite for CBM’s. The continued distrust among states in the region could be addressed by facilitating the flow of information between partner states in the area of peace and security. Example of such measures would include information sharing and reporting. For the time being, the only reliable reporting system in the region are the EU Country Reports, which however are not developed in a collaborative manner. Other contributions to transparency include the publications and reports by EuroMesco and think tanks in the region such as the Cairo-based Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies, or the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Israel.

Within the framework of EMP or NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, the partner states should be encouraged to improve their reporting records with regard to the UN Register on Conventional Arms (UNCAR) and the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. Assistance could also be provided to southern mediterranean states in developing their national defence white papers, which at least conceptually, would prepare the ground for a clearer separation between internal and external security and would also lead to more transparency and accountability in the security sector.

**CBM’s in the domain of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)**

The events of 9/11 2001 have created greater urgency for cooperation in the field of law enforcement, but also judicial and police reforms as well
as the strengthening of border management capabilities. The EU has recently set up a EUR 250 million fund for assisting third countries in preventing irregular migration towards the EU, and in 2004 a project by the European Police College was carried out aimed at training police forces of southern Mediterranean countries in fighting terrorism and human trafficking (Youngs, 2005: 8).

At the level of implementation, the Action Plans of the Association Agreements and the ENP have helped to create institutional (bilateral) dialogues between the EU and partner states, particularly in the “justice and security” subcommittee and the “migration and social affairs” working group. While it remains to be seen to what extent such collaborative projects represent CBM’s, it seems clear that the focus of security cooperation in the Mediterranean is increasingly shifting towards internal security and justice and home affairs.

Security Dialogues

With the deferment of the Charter for Peace and Security, there exists no longer a formal framework for an EMP security dialogue. It is in this context that the EU proposed a dialogue on ESDP after this had become operational. The Valencia Action Plan approved in 2002 provides for a dialogue on crisis management within the framework of EMP.

As a consequence, the ESDP dialogue may have become, faute de mieux, the forum for security cooperation among EMP partner states. The objectives of this dialogue are to share information and to explore the possibility for cooperation in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. The Political and Security Committee met with its Mediterranean partners in 2004, and in November 2004 senior officials and ESDP experts met within the Barcelona framework. It would be useful to increase the number of meetings of defence ministers, chiefs of general staff and, as now practiced in the 5+5 context, Ministers of Interior.

Contribution to peace missions as confidence-building measures

The participation of military and police units in multilateral peace operations certainly has a confidence-building effect. Commanders, officers and troops are being familiarised with working in an international defence environment and they are exposed to military cultures of other troop contributing states. In the Mediterranean context, short of any EMP-related platform, ESDP and NATO provide the frameworks for cooperation in peacekeeping and peace restoration missions.

1. This is evidenced in the relatively large projects on judicial reform have been launched in Algeria (EUR 15 million), Morocco (EUR 28 million) and Tunisia (EUR 30 million) over recent years.
3. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Tenth Anniversary of the Euromediterranean Partnership: A work programme to meet the challenges of the next five years, 2005.
Thus far, the involvement of Mediterranean partners in peace missions is ad hoc and reflects a bottom-up approach; it is security cooperation less by design than by opportunity. Morocco, for instance, is currently contributing to the ESDP mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Althea). For this type of cooperation to gain currency, there is a need to develop joint training programmes and involve potential EMP troop contributors in ESDP pre-deployment programmes, common exercises, pooling of soldiers, and legal training. Peacekeeping cooperation is a promising avenue for security cooperation. Some Mediterranean partners also have long-standing experience in UN peace missions. Jordan has been the leading contributor to UN missions among southern Mediterranean partners, followed by Morocco.

Cooperation in Disaster relief and Civil emergencies

Another area where cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries could be strengthened, also with the aim of building confidence between the countries north and south of the Mediterranean, is in the management of civil emergences. The dramatic pictures of the disaster in New Orleans highlight the necessity of early warning and rapid response to natural or man-made disasters. Over recent years, there has been an increase in collaborative efforts in this field. The Egyptian-Italian initiative for cooperation for the prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters has been launched in the EMP context. In the NATO Partnership framework, in turn, mediterranean states have been invited to participate in civil emergency planning courses at NATO School in Oberammergau, and several seminars on civil emergency planning designed specifically for Mediterranean Dialogue countries have been organised. In 2002, a NATO-sponsored seminar in this field was, for the first time, organised in a Mediterranean Dialogue country, namely Jordan. There has generally been an intensification of information exchange in the field of civil emergency planning within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Joint Exercises

There have also been numerous joint military exercises have been carried out between the countries north and south of the Mediterranean, which are also likely to have a confidence-building effect. Thus far, however, these exercises have for the most part been bilateral in nature, focusing for example on search and rescue operations or control of illicit activities at sea, including irregular migration.

Since 9/11, these activities have also been increasingly aimed at combating international terrorism in the Mediterranean region. For these efforts to have a broader confidence-building effect in the region, they would however have to go beyond their predominantly bilateral nature. Moreover, they should also include other than ‘merely’ operative aspects and aim to create a common ‘security culture’ among the countries of the Mediterranean region.
Training and Education

A final field area where confidence-building measures could be carried out in the future is in the field of joint training in the field of security policy. For instance, the possibility of creating a joint training Centre on peace and security that could function similarly to the George C. Marshall Centre, that has been established to assist transition countries in East and Central Europe, should be considered. This Centre could, for example, be attached to the Alexandria Library, similarly as the The Anna Lindh Euromediterranean Foundation.

Moreover, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), and in particular its “ESDP Orientation Course”, could be opened to participants from the EMP partners. In the mid-term, it should be examined whether this ESDP Orientation Course and possibly other region-specific courses could be delivered by the ESDC in partnership with institutions of EMP partner states. The training and education dimension of the ESDP should also help to create networks among civilians and military personnel of EMP countries in crisis management and peacekeeping. Finally, joint training programmes for civil servants from foreign and defence ministers could be envisaged.

Conclusions

Even in the absence of an encompassing formal framework for security cooperation in the region, given an increasingly shared threat assessment, there is a clear need to strengthen security cooperation between the countries north and south of the Mediterranean. Such cooperation, in particular if it is long-term and multilateral in nature, and goes beyond strictly operative aspects, can serve to foster mutual confidence among the countries of the region. Moreover, it is also imperative to enhance collaboration between the EU and NATO with respect to the Mediterranean. The EU with its EMP and NATO with its Mediterranean Dialogue Partner states pursue similar objectives in the region, in particular in the fields of “soft” security, peace mission interoperability, military-to-military and civil-military relations as well as border security.

For the time being, cooperation and confidence building in the Mediterranean region, again given the absence of a general framework, will have to proceed in à la carte fashion. Nevertheless, great efforts should be made to take into account the evolution of the more general normative environment which encompasses the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean basin.

4. The draft modalities of the ESDC state that (...) « it should also be possible for civil and military personnel from Candidate Countries and, as appropriate, from third states to participate ». 
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

New threats according to the European security strategy

Giuliano Ferrari
Introductory remarks

The European commitment in meeting the new threats in the new security environment did not make its first step with the European Security Strategy (ESS) document adopted in December 2003. I will remind, for instance, the “European Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region” adopted by the Council of St. Maria de Feira, in June 2000. But in that moment the new security environment couldn’t yet be assessed in its full and real dimensions like now; September 11th had not yet happened.

There is a theory, according to which September 11th has not been a turning point in modern history, the end or the beginning of an epoch. I will not deny that there is something true in this theory, nevertheless I am inclined to think that the strategic and security situation, after September 11th, is not comparable with the previous one. But before explaining why, there is the need of a preliminary inquiry about the concepts of “threat” and of “risk”.

Threats and risks

Last year, in this same seminar here in Barcelona, the French representative, my good friend Rear Admiral Coustillière explained, very clearly, the difference between these two concepts. Threats are only those depending on human willpower, and since strategy, according to the doctrine, is dialectics of opposed willpowers, only threats and not risks have strategic meaning. This does not imply that risks are not strategically relevant. In fact, the ESS mentions two of them, specifying that they are not threats “in the normal strategic sense”:

• the rise in temperatures predicted by most scientists for the next decades
• the energy dependence1.

Today, two years later, we could add the virus of the avian influenza, according to the alarm diffused during the recent Malta meeting.

Why are these risks so relevant, and what makes them similar to the threats, considered in their “normal strategic sense”? Obviously, it is because they modify the security environment and even the freedom of action of the states in meeting the challenge of the new strategic threats. Furthermore, some of these risks could also become weapons, and then be exploited as proper strategic threats: it is obvious that the energy dependence can be a strategic weapon in the hands of energy producers, and the avian influenza virus, after minor genetic mutations, could become a biological weapon like any other virus.

Thus, the concepts of “threat” and “risk”, even if distinct, are tightly intertwined. Of course, something similar has always happened: for instance, the weather conditions have always been an important strategic risk, but only after September 11th threats and risks have become tightly intertwined, to the point that they are substantially undistinguishable.

The new threats in the ESS: terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states and organized crime

I will now focus on the threats. The ESS, adopted in December 2003, mentions three key threats:

• Terrorism.
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
• Failed states and organized crime.

Facing all these threats, even the proliferation of WMD, imply a certain interrelation between military and non military means.

Terrorism has always been a non-military threat, but if we take into account the large use of destructive means in the September 11th attack, or also in the Madrid and London attacks, we would wonder if there is some real difference between a military attack with normal air bombers and such terrorist attacks. It is evident that the recent episodes of international terrorism have been perpetrated through a warlike use of non-military means. That is why United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1368, often criticized for that, considers these attacks equivalent to the military ones, at least for the legitimacy of self-defence. We know that this fact reversed decades of contrary doctrine and judicial opinions, like in the famous Nicaragua sentence.

1. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will be 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa. Italy in particular will continue to depend, in the near future, on the energy resources coming from the Persian Gulf and North Africa, areas that are characterized by major instability.
Controversy about the legal response to terrorism is still huge and, apart from the two UN Conventions against terrorism, outside Europe the definition of terrorism itself has not been agreed upon. There is no common definition even within the EU, we might add, taking into account a recent—and widely discussed—sentence this year of an Italian judge about the difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

Notwithstanding some partial concession to the United Sates contained in the ESS document, terrorism and the way to deal with it is still the major deadlock in reaching a broad consensus in the International Law. Of course, in an evolving world situations change, and then also International Law must change. Even customary Law is not eternal. But evolution implies consensus, and the stalled evolutions of International Law on this point, as the last Strategic Survey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) suggests, is one of the major factors of risk that terrorists could easily exploit for their purposes.

According to the ESS document “Proliferation of WMD is the single most important threat to peace and security among nations”. This point is now at the centre of the strategic debate, because of the Iranian problem. Kenneth Waltz, and most of the Realistic School, would disagree with the ESS’s statement. They not only understate the importance of this threat, but also sometimes add that proliferation could be a factor of improved stability. I will not discuss this point, but certainly Waltz cannot deny that Proliferation increases the frightening risk that terrorist groups could acquire WMD.

Last but not least: failed states and Organised Crime. In many parts of the world, bad governance, civil conflicts and others factors have led to a weakening of states and of social structures, and even to the collapse of state institutions, with serious advantages for terrorist or for criminal groups; revenues from drugs can allow terrorists or criminals to stay in power or to gain more power than the state itself.

**An important question: why?**

We should really ask ourselves: why is all that happening altogether, right now? Is the usual explanation, the fall of the Berlin Wall, sufficient?

André Glucksmann has suggested that it happens because too many states have modernized themselves without civilizing themselves. Of course, we should first agree on what “progress” and “civilization” are, and personally I am not fit for such an enormous topic. But Glucksmann’s argument reminds me of what Bertrand Russell wrote about progress: “Modern technology gave rise to conflict between social organization, and then human life, and human nature”.

This is important when we pretend to ensure better security and better stability by enlarging the area governed by democratic regimes. Of course I agree in principle; but too often in recent decades attempts to export democracy and rule of law, or human rights, have failed. We should ask ourselves why.
I do not agree with Montesquieu’s theory, that stresses the importance of the climatic factors, but certainly exporting democracy is not an easy job, and one must also take into account that sometimes ill-rooted democracy can be exploited by non-democratic forces to gain power and to suppress democracy itself: this has been experienced in Germany with the Nazis and was close to happen more recently in Algeria, and could happen again in the near future.

I will not deny that democracy is the correct solution. I fully agree with Michael Novak, when he writes that “democracy is the new name of peace”, but I will be far more cautious in selecting the ways to achieve it.

Some considerations about the new security environment

All this leads me to some reflections, mainly on three points:

1. There is a great vulnerability and complexity in the modern societies, due to the social and technological organization, both of power and of social life. Furthermore, there is a growing complexity in international relations, because of the progressive globalization of the economies and the increased cultural interaction, and that makes it very difficult to analyse events and consequently to precisely identify the possible crisis situations. It is even more difficult to “geographically isolate” these situations within clearly circumscribed areas. Equally complex is the identification of the direct or indirect effects not only of such situations, but also of the possible strategic options to deal with them. Unpredictability is the main character of the next strategic challenges.

This is a serious problem because, as Von Moltke teaches, strategy is knowledge, that is, the application of knowledge to the political or military problem, i.e. to practical life. Then, we must make a great effort to improve our knowledge in the hundreds of fields of which, due to the complexity, the strategic problem consists.

2. Knowledge itself is a complex phenomenon; there is a theoretical knowledge, and today like yesterday it is of great importance; and there is a practical knowledge, even a situational knowledge. Network-enabled capabilities are of vital importance to allow an effective situational awareness. To this purpose, there is the real need to establish a euromediterranean network. I praise this Foundation for the subject of last year’s Seminar: intelligence. I want also to stress the importance of a well-known project of the Italian Navy, launched at the last “Regional Seapower Symposium of the Mediterranean and Black Seas Navies” in October 2004 in Venice: the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic centre (V-RMTC). It is a communication network, allowing real time data exchanges on merchant traffic in the Mediterranean basin, to give a substantial contribution to the security of the maritime traffic and, as a whole, of the countries of the Mediterranean and Black Seas, which depend, to a great extent, on the region’s maritime trade. It is enough to remind that 25 countries actually face these two seas representing only 1% of the global seas’ surfaces, with more than 80 ports and 2,000 connections, and that 20% of the global crude transits there. All these data, given the evident vulnerability of the Mediterranean basin,
make us aware of the serious consequences, not least catastrophic pollution, resulting from possible attacks undermining the maritime traffic’s security.

3. A last consideration refers to the most serious strategic problem connected with the new threats and with their unpredictability: the sunset of the “presupposition of rationality” as a traditional pillar of the strategic subjects dealing with collective behaviour, included non-state actors. Now, and not only because of the fundamentalism emerging in various religions (Islam, Judaism and even Christianity), the “presupposition of rationality” often does not help in foreseeing what the strategic counterpart will really do.

Conclusion

The multilayered and unpredictable nature of the new threats demands the development of new capabilities and maybe also a new way of thinking about many things that in the past were commonly accepted; for instance, the distinction between police forces and military forces, which is an achievement of the modern state, is becoming evanescent, and could be fading in a few years; that means that the armed forces will conduct operations more similar to police operations, first of all abiding by the rule of law, and police forces will conduct operations often undistinguishable from the military ones.

In any case, tomorrow like yesterday, security will be everywhere, and as the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana put it, a precondition for development; and will be a global public good, indivisible by frontiers that are substantially a heritage of the past.

What we should fear most is the incapacity of our minds to adapt to the new circumstances and to understand the new challenges in a continuously evolving world, and the ways to meet them.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

New threats according to the European security strategy

Political and security co-operation: bright spots and shadows of the Euromediterranean partnership

Alicia Sorroza
This presentation will analyse the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), principally in its political and security dimension, from the perspective of the EU in the framework of the review of the Barcelona Process ten years after its being set in motion.

First, it will mention the importance of having incorporated security issues into the euromediterranean agenda and this association’s initial approach in the framework of the EU’s foreign action. Likewise, it will examine the pre-eminence of the Mediterranean region, an area of maximum interest for the EU, in light of the new international and strategic context reflected in the European Security Strategy (ESS), as well as the results of these initiatives ten years on from their being set in motion. Finally, and after analysing European action in this sphere, it will mention some possible lines of action for improving collaboration and co-operation on these questions, which are fundamental for the welfare of the citizens on both shores of the Mediterranean.

The Barcelona Process finds itself in the context of review and therefore of criticism, which is indispensable for being able to improve the existing procedures and frameworks. Nevertheless, one should highlight the importance of having achieved maintaining a dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean despite the vicissitudes of the international reality. This asset will facilitate any improvement or new initiative that it is desired to set in motion. Regardless of the direction in which one may want to orientate the Partnership, the actors are not starting from scratch. In spite of the critical spirit, this “legacy” –understood from a wide point of view– is a success that should not be undervalued.

1995: The Barcelona Declaration and its circumstances

The consensus achieved in order to create the EMP was a combination of many factors, conditions, expectations, needs and circumstances which made it viable at that time. From a European perspective, it responded to the concerns and interests of the countries on the shores of the Mediterranean, seeking a long-term approach that would respond to the needs and risks perceived at the time. In addition, the incipient European foreign policy, which was emerging principally as a
reaction to the destabilisation of the eastern border of Europe and which later would also give impetus to the creation of its security and defence aspect, was beginning to take shape and be established.

Likewise, in the mid-1990s, the initiative of the EMP found itself in an atmosphere tinted with a certain optimism over the possibility of achieving a definitive agreement for resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians (the Oslo Accords). This historic dispute had marked the dynamics of the region during the past few decades and especially the relationships between the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, on the one hand, and Europe and the United States, on the other hand. These promising circumstances were also related to a certain rapprochement between Israel and other Arab countries which was occurring at the time.

Even thus, and despite the good signs concerning the possibility of solving some of the principal conflicts in this region, the inclusion of the political and security chapter in the Barcelona Declaration was in danger up until the last moment. According to the news reports of November 1995, the differences among the Syrian, Egyptian and Israeli delegations were on the point of preventing the adoption of the text with its three chapters. This highlights the fact that achieving a text agreed upon by consensus by all of the states (the only framework on which Israel and the Palestinian delegation agreed) in which commitments in the area of politics and security were included was, in itself, quite a success and it revealed the importance that was given to the Barcelona Declaration at the time.

Concretely, the political and security aspects that were included in the Declaration were:

- Democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms
- State-civil society relations
- Public administration
- Terrorism
- Crime, drugs and corruption
- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Regional security and co-operation in the area of defence
- Crisis prevention

Nevertheless, this high level of ambition was quickly lowered summit after summit. Little by little, the delicate political situation in the region, above all linked to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (the new Intifada would explode in September 2000), impregnated the dynamics of the Process. In this context, the chapter for Peace and Stability in the euromediterranean region was definitively shelved in November 2000 in Marseilles. From that moment on, any initiative in this sphere has been inexorably linked to the development of the situation in the Middle East,
despite the fact that the Partnership is considered complementary and not an instrument that could be able to resolve the conflict in the region by itself. Pessimism would replace the initial optimism.

The political and security chapter, although it was the most controversial, is only one of the three baskets that make up the Declaration, which, in the words of the then-President of the Spanish Government, Felipe González, “(...) are indissoluble, since the exclusion of one of them would affect the others in an irreversible way”. The perspective which predominates in the Barcelona Declaration is the possibility of achieving a political transformation in the region from a process of economic reform and market liberalisation. Over time, human rights, the rule of law and a democratic system would be the consequence of economic development, which, in turn, would generate a space of peace and security in the region (EuroMeSCo, 2005).

In this sense, it is unquestionable that the diagnosis and prescription elaborated in 1995 for the euromediterranean region was pioneering and advanced for its time, since at that moment the area was not perceived as a space of great strategic value other than for the countries of southern Europe. The basis of the approach was the link between security and development, between the need to foster growth and economic development on the southern shore of the Mediterranean as a path to solving the security challenges present in the region, accompanied by a progressive, gradual process of political modernisation. In short, it was considered that in the Mediterranean region, the aspect of security and the existence of non-democratic, autocratic regimes in the states to the south could not be separated (Bryanjar, 1999: 27-56).

**Philosophy of Barcelona, approach, principles and values**

The approach of the Barcelona Process, which seeks to solve the region’s problems from an integral, multidisciplinary perspective, has its foundation in a wider position of the EU which gives impetus to its foreign action. The EU has based a good part of its instruments of foreign action on compromise, socialisation and conditionality, both positive and negative, seeking the transformation of systems of government that are not very democratic as a way of defending its values but also its interests. In short, as a strategic objective. On the international scene, the EU has opted for using its internal model as an instrument of foreign action, above all and especially on its periphery, the area of maximum interest for its foreign policy, as would be subsequently recognised in the ESS.

The approach that the EU has used in its strategy of enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe has achieved significant successes. Nevertheless, the European objective of transforming societies into other more open and tolerant ones finds itself in constant tension with the pretension of not intervening directly in the domestic dynamics of other

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1. To delve deeper into this aspect, one may consult Kienle (2005).
countries and of having respect for other cultures and a great tolerance for other norms. Although these postures are not necessarily incompatible, the balance between the two is very delicate and one tends to be predominant over the other, or, on the contrary, leads to immobilism. Concretely, this is one of the criticisms that is levelled most often at the Barcelona Process, above all in terms of promoting democracy. In practice, this transforming impulse would materialise in the execution of some projects that would indirectly foster political reform but leaving aside those measures (not necessarily intrusive or interventionist) that would most directly foster a political liberalisation of the regimes of the region. The reservations on the part of the EU on the need to directly promote a reform in the countries of the Arab world, putting the maintenance of the statu quo before the promotion of democracy, has given the whole approach and the policy toward the region incoherence and weakness, temptations which the principal powers with interests in the region fall into. The traditional realist approaches have predominated over others of a more normative nature.

The philosophy implicit in the Barcelona Declaration suggested a gradual political modernisation, which in turn would contribute to improving the general conditions of the countries of the southern Mediterranean; a situation that would be reflected in a considerable improvement of problems such as organised crime, migratory movements, the guarantee of electricity supplies, the deterioration of the environment, etc. These presuppositions, while still valid, have taken on a different value in the face of the urgency of combating risks and threats that no longer leave us a wide margin of time. The long-term preventive perspective, for example in terms of terrorism and illegal immigration, is no longer sufficient, although it is in relation to other questions, for example in order to prevent the worsening of the socio-economic situation, which could lead to a collapse in some of the states of the southern Mediterranean, the negative repercussions of which would be more than tangible on the northern shore (Spain is especially vulnerable).

As has been mentioned previously, the European initiative in the Mediterranean region cannot be isolated from the foreign action of the EU. The policy that has been followed in this geographic area responds to an internal model of relationships among states, in which co-operation and integration replace policies of force based on military calculations and zero-sum, which was traditional in European relations until the middle of the past century. The European success in politically managing disputes and differences between its states is its best calling card, by means of which it tries to exercise leadership on the international scene. The success of this model of integration has had a decisive impact on the processes of democratic transition of the member countries of the extinct USSR. This policy is catalogued as successful due to how much it has managed to positively influence these countries, which has allowed for a new, historic enlargement of the EU. Nevertheless, this cannot be translated to the Mediterranean region to the same degree (Emerson y Noutcheva, 2004, 2005).

2. There are many analysis in this respect: (Youngs, 2005), (Balfour, 2004)
For the countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the sociopolitical and economic model exercised with an iron fist by communist dictatorship signified a generalised crisis in the way to organise their State and to generate development and welfare. In this context, the European project emerged as a reference and the sought-after goal not only for the ruling elites but also for the majority of the population. The legitimacy of the reforms and sacrifices to be made in order to be able to belong to this area of welfare was ensured by the consensus that existed in the face of being members of the EU. In this sense, socialisation as a mechanism of influence that drives change was firmly anchored in this positive perception of the European model on the part of all of the social sectors.

These circumstances are not reproduced in the same way in the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The resistance and mistrust that the reforms that Europe promotes are important. The benefits of economic, political and social liberalism defended by Europe raise quite a few suspicions fed by different sectors although for different and varied reasons. In this context, the case of Turkey may be paradigmatic, since although the consensus to form part of the EU is wide, the reluctances and lack of expectations transmitted from Europe may have the opposite effect and limit support for the Government on its arduous path to meeting the criteria established to form part of the EU, since, as different surveys have shown, the percentage of the population that support integration into the EU has gone down in the last year. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a Turkey with an islamist government that meets the criteria of Copenhagen would, foreseeably, have an undoubtedly positive effect on the whole region. Likewise, recourse to conditionality, the other side of the European strategy in its Mediterranean aspect, has not had the same trajectory as in its experience towards the east. After ten years of the euromediterranean process, conditionality, positive as well as negative, has been little effective and its use very limited.

From the perspective of positive conditionality, the incentives have not been considered attractive enough on the part of the partners to the south to promote different reforms and internal changes, not only in the political sphere but also in the economic one. The rewards and aid granted were considered insufficient. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the EU cannot offer its neighbours to the south the chance to form part of the EU, and that probably its neighbours to the south are not entirely willing to maintain a high-level political relationship, either.

3. The (liberal) Turkish newspaper, Milliyet, on the eve of the opening (or not) of negotiations on Turkey’s accession, had the front-page headline “Despite Everything, the EU”. According to the figures it reported, the majority of Turks still supported their country’s entry into the EU, although the percentage in favour of this had diminished. In 2004, 67.5% supported Turkey’s integration, whereas one year later, the percentage was 57.4%. Likewise, 10.3% were against integration, up almost two points from 2004. Furthermore, 61.4% of the population declared that in general it did not trust in the EU, and 81.5% considered that Turkey had met the conditions stipulated by Brussels for beginning negotiations.
But, apart from the little interest shown by the regimes on the southern shore of the Mediterranean in fulfilling the aims of the EMP, the EU also has responsibility for the disappointing results achieved in the area of the first basket. One of the requirements for conditionality to bear fruit is that the conditions be credible, clear and consistent (Emerson y Noutcheva, 2005), a situation that the EU, for internal reasons, is hard pressed to ensure. Given the different perception of the Member States on the needs and importance that the EU policy should have on its southern border, the tendency of the countries to maintain a wide margin of freedom in their bilateral relations and the fact that many of the issues that the Maghreb countries pose are the object of dissimilar perspectives among European institutions and countries (such as the questions relating to migrations), the EU encounters many difficulties in the articulation of its policy toward the region.

On the other hand, the negative conditionality linked to democratisation and respect for human rights has not been utilised by the EU during the last few years, although different circumstances have justified greater recourse to it. The need to maintain a certain stability in the region has taken primacy over the wider, long-term objective of promoting a democratising process and human rights.

The European Security Strategy and the Mediterranean region

The Barcelona Process was set in motion at a time when the region was not receiving the international attention it currently awakens. In its origins, the Partnership sought to confront the questions of security in a region that, although it was not central in the foreign and security policy of the majority of member countries in the EU (except for the Mediterranean ones), it was perceived with a growing concern over affairs that could potentially become a threat. It was considered that a region geographically very close to the EU, in which an important economic backwardness was combined with discontent with government management and the lack of political openness linked to strongly militarised regimes, would be unstable and would generate a number of problems for the EU if they were not resolved with a certain swiftness. The different dimensions of security were focused on from a wide perspective in the three baskets, linking internal conditions (social, political, economic, etc.) and regional instability.

However, the strategic context suffered fundamental changes in the last few years. The September 11 attacks had an important impact throughout the world and especially on this region. The EU has tried to respond to the new international challenges facing it with the drawing up of the ESS, approved in December 2003.

The optimistic denomination of the ESS, –A Secure Europe for a Better World– reflects the success of co-operation and integration in terms of
peace and security that the EU represents. The analysis is clear: the EU has transformed the relations among the European countries, bringing peace and freedom to the region. The progressive yet inexorable spread of the rule of law and democracy has been fundamental for the attainment of the current welfare state that Europeans enjoy. Nevertheless, as the proposal of the White Book on European Defence makes explicit, “Europe is in a situation of peace, but the rest of the world is not”. The threats which it has to face up to are of both a traditional nature and those that are now called new threats.

The Strategy adopts an integral approach, recognising the relation existing among all of the dimensions of security –political, socio-economic, cultural, environmental, military, etc. In this sense, it can be said that the Solana Document reaffirms the Barcelona approach. Moreover, it assumes the creation of security in neighbouring countries as a strategic objective, promoting a set of well-governed countries on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The threats mentioned by the ESS, fundamentally trans-national, involve phenomena that cross national borders and that cannot be controlled directly by national governments. The greatest part of the threats of this nature are interrelated and closely linked to weak countries, without solid legal and regulatory systems, with governmental structures permeable to corruption and to discretionality that are taken advantage of by sectors linked to mafias and networks that traffic in arms, human beings, drugs, etc., and that may also be linked to terrorist networks.

This situation of institutional weakness, linked to authoritarian regimes with greatly deteriorated social and economic situations, makes the vulnerability of the EU acute, above all in areas near its territory, because, as the ESS highlights, in spite of everything, geography continues to be important. This is especially applicable to the Mediterranean region, which reproduces the greater part of the circumstances mentioned by the ESS in its territory, with the repercussion that this situation could involve for Europe as a whole but very especially for Spain.

In the case of Spain, in tune with the ESS, this change with regard to security has been reflected in the new National Defence Directive 1/2004, which considers that in the strategic scenario of the 21st century, together with traditional risks and threats to peace, other new ones have emerged, such as terrorism of a trans-national and global nature. The possibility that WMD may fall into the power of terrorist groups is today considered as the gravest threat to global security. Likewise, in addition to linking European security with Spain’s, it highlights the Mediterranean area as being of special interest to our country, for which reason it specifies that Spain must contribute to increasing security in this area, reinforcing, among other measures, the Mediterranean dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Spain brings together a series of characteristics that make it the scenario for a wide range of challenges, risks and

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threats to security. Being a country that provides a southern border to
the EU allows us to know from a very close range the difficulties in
fighting against irregular immigration and illegal trafficking in drugs,
arms, explosives and human beings. These are phenomena against
which authorities do battle on a daily basis on the external border of
Spain, the same as in many countries on the other side of the border,
due to which we have special sensitivity on these issues and also due
to which it is important that the EU continue to work in the search for
mechanisms of solidarity for collaboration in the management of the
borders of the EU.

In coherence with the ESS, which considers the possibility of forging a
wider partnership with the Arab world, the June 2004 European
Council adopted the final report on the “EU Strategic Partnership with
the Mediterranean and the Middle East”. This document reinforces
the concepts of partnerships and dialogues as axes of this strategy. This
Partnership has as a fundamental objective that of promoting
development, a common area of peace, prosperity and progress both in
the Mediterranean region and in the Middle East, seeking to respond to
the internal demands of these countries and not impose solutions from
a Euro-centric point of view. This report strengthens the EMP as a
framework for relationships with the Mediterranean countries, while it is
considered necessary to develop relations with the rest of the countries
involved in this strategic association (the Middle East). The EU reaffirms
its commitment to facing up to the challenges that the region presents
in questions of security, in terms of regional conflict, terrorism, WMD
proliferation and organised crime, committing itself to utilising all means
at its disposal.

The threats and risks that we face on both sides of the Mediterranean,
due to its multi-dimensionality and its dynamism, demand an action in
which all of the instruments available are combined. The ESS highlights
this need to resort to all means, military as well as political, legal,
intelligence-based, economic, etc., clearly establishing that the “best
protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic
states”, for which one must spread “good government, support political
and social reforms, combat corruption and abuse of power, establish
the supremacy of law and protect human rights”. This approach, which
ratifies the principles on which the EMP is founded, must be at the basis
of the actions of the European countries toward their Mediterranean
partners.

The ESS is forceful in establishing as a strategic objective the
strengthening of security and stability in the area of the Mediterranean,
but without leaving aside the need to promote democracy in this region
which, as some figures reflected in the presentation highlight, presents
a worrisome situation in terms of freedoms and meeting minimum
standards of human rights.

6. Also in the framework of the initiative promoted by the U.S. foreign policy, the Wider Middle East
Strategy.
These two aspects are essential and indissoluble if one wants to form a foreign policy coherent with the principles and values of the EU, which in addition gives us credibility in the eyes of our Mediterranean neighbours. As is established in the ESS, coherence is fundamental, precisely because of the different instruments and policies that must be set in motion in order to achieve the political objectives.

**Results of the EMP: According to the lens through which one looks?**

**Obstacles and difficulties**

As was mentioned at the beginning of this presentation, the difficulties in creating a consensus in the political and security sphere were already significant in 1995. Ten years on, it is difficult to consider the positive results of co-operation among the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean important.

The obstacles which have arisen throughout this decade were difficult to resolve and there seems to be less and less commitment and interest shown from the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The eternal conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has negatively conditioned the whole Barcelona Process, not to mention that it has served to radicalise public opinion and create an excuse for extremist groups. In addition, they continue to be under the control of governments with grave problems of legitimacy due to their inability to provide a minimum of welfare to large sectors of their population. The result obtained, in addition to a process of impoverishment of the population, has been a radicalised opposition and the rise of Islamic structures and movements that promote the use of violence but that act where the State does not.

The limited results of the objective proposed in the financial and economic basket have not benefited dialogue in the political and security spheres. The predominant perception in the south has been that the EU places too much emphasis on security issues, in detriment to economic ones, the only element that attracts the governments of the Mediterranean partners to participate in the Partnership. The positive incentives do not seem to have been well implemented. On the contrary, the sensation is more of resentment, for example in the face of policies like the CAP or the low levels of European investment in the region. There is no doubt that the lack of coherence between European initiatives in development and the maintaining of some aspects of the CAP is more than criticisable, although one cannot exclude from the equation the responsibility of the local authorities in the socio-economic problems that the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean are going through, either.

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8. The lack of involvement of the neighbours to the south of the Mediterranean is recognised, among others, by the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in its March 15, 2005, resolution in Cairo.
Another question that has hampered the deployment of the EMP has been South-South conflictiveness, relationships that are characterised by their mistrust and by nationalist references that seek to divert the attention of the population from their daily problems. This has caused scarce enthusiasm in co-operating and participating in multilateral programmes and activities of any kind, although the pillars of security and economics are where they have had the greatest negative repercussions (Herce y Sosvilla-Rivero, 2005).

One reason that we cannot leave aside for understanding the difficulties of co-operation in the area of the first basket is the mistrust that the consolidation of the European Security and Defence Policy generated. Already in the 1990s, the creation of the European Marine Force (EUROMARFOR) and the ground force, named Euroforce or Rapid Response Force (EUROFOR), raised quite a few suspicions. Also the development of the ESDP helped increase the fear of a European military interventionism on its Mediterranean border, for which reason it would be recommendable to increase and improve transparency and information in these aspects.

And the European Union?

It is unquestionable that in a relationship with various parts, the responsibility of each of them in the successes and failures of the relationship cannot be denied. The lack of commitment and the reticence of the Mediterranean countries to the south have influenced the Barcelona Process very negatively, but the EU equally has not been able to internally manage many questions which have also had negative repercussions in the development of the EMP.

The EU finds itself immersed in a long process of internal reform which has absorbed an enormous amount of resources over the last few years. The apparent culmination of this process, which was anticipated to take place with the passage of the European Constitution, has encountered a difficult obstacle to overcome in the referendums in France and the Netherlands. This situation has meant a delay in the implementation of different measures that would provide the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with greater coherence and capacity to act, not to mention the fact that the inability of the European governments to arrive at a budget agreement for the next period generates quite a bit of uncertainty in this respect. The fear that this crisis may have a detrimental effect on European foreign action is a possibility that cannot be discounted and that fully affects the euromediterranean relationship.

The EU has great difficulties in providing its foreign action with credibility. Its level of influence stemming from its political, economic and cultural capacities is reduced considerably by the lack of coherence of some European policies. This is applicable to those regions and countries in which more than one sphere and various objectives are important to the European powers and the achievement of which is not necessarily complementary. The clearest examples can be seen in EU relations with Russia and China. In this context, both
the Governments of the Member States and the EU are conscious of the fact that they are willing to sacrifice certain positions or approaches (fundamentally in terms of democracy and human rights) in order to satisfy interests in the short term, in this case, strategic issues such as access to energy resources or concrete measures in the fight against terrorism.

Internal differences (and in many cases contradictory ones) on how to orientate a policy or implement a measure, as well as internal approach differences on the fight against terrorism affect euromediterranean relations very negatively. The need of many countries to maintain a high level of autonomy in their bilateral relations with countries in the region limit European initiatives in the area. In short, the lack of political will on the part of the member countries to act under the European umbrella is one of the great weaknesses of the EU which prevents it from exercising an important strategic role in the region and, in general, on the international scene.

Under complex circumstances on both shores and despite criticisms, however, positive results can be attributed to the EMP in general and, in particular, in the political and security spheres. Without entering into too many details in this regard, it can be said that the EMP has firstly achieved the inclusion of a politico-military dimension in the process, a very sensitive issue in the region; secondly, the adoption of a wide approach to the issue of security, integrating the politico-military dimension in a wider framework, in which its link to other issues, basically social, economic, etc., is recognised, along with the combination of those instruments available for foreign action by the EU; thirdly, the adoption on the part of the EU of a co-operative approach to the security challenges that the region represents, taking shared interests into account and not only from a unilateral perspective and based on an analysis of exclusively European threats and risks. Likewise, the socialisation and rapprochement that has occurred among diplomats, high-level government authorities and military authorities on both sides of the Mediterranean, in having to hold periodic encounters, negotiate different documents, etc., is noteworthy. One can also consider a positive effect to be the gradual enlargement of the agenda on this subject, with the inclusion of issues such as co-operation against terrorism, etc., which would have been unthinkable ten years ago.

In the last few years, the EU has set several initiatives in motion in the region tied to the analysed spheres, coinciding with the impulse given to the European Neighbourhood Policy (the implementation of which in itself is recognition of the need for a renewed approach in relations in its most immediate surroundings):

• Institutional and informal dialogues on human rights issues were set in motion.

• The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was revised in 2003 from the point of view of strengthening civil society.

• Since 2002, a new format of co-operation and dialogue in the area
The European Security and Defence Policy is being developed. The dialogue and activities in this area have progressed considerably. For example, Turkey (as a member of NATO) and Morocco are participating in the EU Althea operation. And many other initiatives are under way, propitiated by high-level encounters.9

- The questions of Justice and Interior constitute an essential area in euromediterranean relations, at a regional and bilateral level. The inclusion of these issues in the agenda of the process was promoted fundamentally by Spain, progressively creating a shared awareness of the need to work on these topics. In the bilateral sphere, in the Association Agreements, more and more elements of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice are being included (for example in the case of Algeria). Equally, in the action plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy, priority initiatives were also incorporated, such as legal systems, the fight against corruption, asylum, migrations, the movement of people, readmission, border control, the fight against organised crime, money laundering, trafficking in human beings, as well as police and judicial co-operation. It must be highlighted that in the sphere of migration, such issues as the rights and integration of immigrants in the EU are analysed, addressing a fundamental concern of the countries to the south of the Mediterranean.

- In May 2004, it was agreed that co-operation in the fight against terrorism should be intensified both at a regional and bilateral level. This is one of the most controversial aspects of the EMP, due to the different approaches to it and the lack of agreement on its definition (something on which there does not exist agreement in other spheres, either). Nevertheless, it has been possible to see a certain progress on the declarative level, since after the attacks in Morocco (May 2003) it was accepted that terrorism be an issue regularly dealt with in the political dialogue. Likewise, its was accepted that despite the different interpretations, this should not impede co-operation on those issues deemed appropriate.

- In 2004 the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly was implemented, a line of credit for EMP and Investment was created, and the Anna Lindh Euromediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures was created.

It is unquestionable that, according to the criteria that are used to evaluate the positive results, the Process is a success because it continues to exist and manages to seat at the same table all of the Governments of the Mediterranean countries, among them Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, with all that this involves.

However, the evaluations change radically upon carrying out an analysis in more concrete and tangible terms. Without going too far in length, since very exhaustive analyses and documents exist in this regard10, the gap between the two shores has done nothing but grow

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9. One can consult the reports on the progress of the ESDP approved by each European Council, in which the principal activities carried out in this sphere are detailed, at www.ue.eu.int.
wider. The regional conflicts have not only not been resolved but appear to have worsened and present a future with little promise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GNI (per capita 2004 in dollars)</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>PPP (Purchasing Power Parity in dollars)</th>
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International terrorism is a common threat. Groups with branches in the north of Africa have bloodily attacked the southern shore of the Mediterranean as well as European territory (Avilès, 2005). One must recall attacks such as those in Yerba and Casablanca, or the more recent ones in Sharm el Sheikh and Amman, in addition to those perpetrated in Turkey. The attacks in Madrid and London seem to have taken advantage of groups and organisations closely tied to Maghrebi networks or to people who became radicalised in the heart of immigrant communities established in European territory.

To the pressure of illegal immigration coming from the Maghreb countries must be added the worsening of social conditions in the sub-Saharan countries, which has pushed large masses of migrants toward the north, worsening, if possible, the precarious situation on the southern European borders. In this situation, the differential in income between both sides, which is a determining factor, has a relentless logic.

In addition, the objective of achieving an improvement in the spheres of democracy, rule of law, good government, human rights and fundamental freedoms is far from being attained. The Report on Arab Human Development for 2004, drawn up by the UNDP, emphasises that the acute lack of freedom and good government in the Arab world is one of the principle obstacles to their development.

According to different analyses\(^{11}\) which have been carried out with respect to this region, including that done by the European Commission, the advances in terms of democratic convergence have been very limited and in many cases with backsliding, since it is recognised that the fight against terrorism has, in many cases, meant a greater restriction in civil liberties, despite the fact that the ministerial declaration of November 2004 mentioned that co-operation against terrorism must respect the rule of law. In general, the regimes of the region have taken advantage of the implementation of the fight against terrorism to distract attention from their political reforms (Cebolla, 2005). In this context, and with a view toward the November 2005 Euromediterranean Summit, reaching a consensus on a Code of Conduct in the fight against terrorism is fundamental for unifying the criteria and methods to apply.

Index of the perception of corruption

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Average of rankings in respect for human rights and civil liberties

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Status country: 1 to 2,5= free; 3 to 5= partially free; 5,5 to 7= not free


\(^{11}\) EuroMeSCo Report; European Commission Communication, “Tenth Anniversary of the Euromediterranean Partnership: A work programme to meet the challenges of the next five years”, April 2005; Arab Human Development Report.
It is unquestionable that the action of the EU can be considered weak in its democratizing impulse. Many analysts consider that the European countries, in greater measure since 9-11, were receptive to governmental theses that a greater opening up of their political regimes would propitiate greater instability. In this delicate balance, the necessary stability overcame the decision to foster processes of political opening-up more overtly. This notwithstanding, it must be mentioned that during the last few years, the EU has tried to set more initiatives toward the region in motion to promote democracy and respect for human rights. In some cases, this dynamism is attributed to a reaction in the face of US initiatives, which have taken on a discourse with a high content in the area of promoting democracy and respect for human rights, although in practice they are very far from materialising (Youngs, 2005). Equally, the emphasis that the U.S. policy has placed on the use of force as an instrument of democratisation has caused, in addition to an increase in anti-Americanism in the region, a positive appreciation of the more integral approaches of the EU on the part of countries to the south of the Mediterranean.

It cannot be said that the work of these years has not produced results; the difficulty lies in the fact that after ten years of the EMP, it seems that the instruments and means for achieving the established goals are not the most adequate, and their implementation is clearly insufficient. Once again, rhetoric has overcome facts.

For this reason, adapting the EMP to the new needs and urgencies in the region is so primordial for the welfare of the inhabitants on both sides of the sea. In 2005, the return to the terms posed in 1995 is no longer sufficient, because in the face of challenges that are now being confronted, one must go beyond what was agreed upon in Barcelona ten years ago.

2005: Reinvigorating the Euromediterranean Partnership from the EU

Some ideas

The year 2005 seems to be a fundamental year for the Barcelona Process. From the EU institutions, the British Presidency and the Spanish Government there is a manifest interest in reinvigorating and giving a greater political impulse to the EMP. It is sought to give content and resources to an instrument that continues to be considered fundamental in relations between both sides of the Mediterranean. The need to improve and widen co-operation in all those questions tied to political and security co-operation from a transversal perspective is unquestionable. Throughout this presentation, special emphasis has been placed on the direct link that the ESS establishes between security, democracy and development and the importance of the Mediterranean region. Following this logic, some possible lines of action for the EU on these subjects will be mentioned.
From a wide perspective, one of the great challenges of the EU is to achieve an adequate balance between fighting against the deep causes of the threats that afflict citizens and the achieving of the short-term priorities that are also indispensable for their security and well-being. For this, an EU that is more committed and effective in pursuing agreed-upon strategic objectives is essential. The efforts to provide itself with capacities and to make its foreign action credible and effective are fundamental. The political commitment of all of the European countries (not just those on the Mediterranean) is also primordial in giving greater unity to European decisions and actions.

Likewise, the coherence of European policies toward the region continues to be an unresolved matter that takes away credibility and that is one of the main arguments put forward from the south to justify its lack of involvement in the euromediterranean process. What is criticised the most is the incoherence among the European economic policies, but the difficulties in implementing a coherent European action and also between Member States and the EU on political and security issues are also significant.

One must avoid falling into the temptation of achieving a precarious sensation of security in the short term through the implantation of measures against terrorism, the results of which will not necessarily achieve a reduction in the real threat to our societies but which diminish the possibilities of a process of political opening-up. This does not imply abandoning a pragmatic perspective of concrete agreements with the governments of the Mediterranean countries, but it does differentiate among countries and strengthens a European posture critical of authoritarian regimes, which eventually could be made concrete in the use of those instruments foreseen for these circumstances. Concrete agreements should be fostered, but without leaving aside the approach sustained by the Partnership.

The EU, on more concrete questions linked to the sphere of security and defence, could also give impetus to some initiatives:

• From the point of view of security, in more traditional terms and linked to the need to prevent an increase in conflictivity in the region, deepening the dialogue on the subject of the ESDP (promoted by the Spanish Presidency in 2002) is a possibility that is being well received. The countries of the southern shore are showing receptiveness to those initiatives that allow for improving co-operation and transparency in this area in order to resolve the traditional problems of the south’s mistrust of the north. In the same way, adequate channels must be found for a better and closer co-ordination of EU and NATO initiatives, as well as those of other organisations in the region. Moreover, sub-regional frameworks, like the 5+5 initiative (of which Spain forms part), are an option that could allow for advancing more rapidly in this sphere than in the strict multilateral sphere. However, the difficulty lies in ensuring non-discrimination and transparency toward the rest of the Mediterranean partners. In promoting regional peace, the spheres of co-operation and military aid are an important aspect that could be developed even more from the ESDP.
• Peacekeeping operations, as a means for improving North-South, but also South-South, trust.

• Civil aspects: an area which the EU establishes as being priority, and which considers the existence of common interests in the fight against manmade and natural disasters. The region’s health-care difficulties linked to human-trafficking networks, natural disasters, etc., could, in the not-so-distant future, become a veritable challenge to welfare on both sides of the Mediterranean.

• Joint training: the EU could offer training to foster participation in peace and humanitarian operations in the region through different multilateral and regional organisations. This type of training should be orientated toward the armed forces being formed to give support to the civil society. This type of co-operation should be subject to strict controls and conditioned to progress in other spheres, and to reform in the sectors of security and defence in the countries of the southern shore.

• Fostering co-operation and dialogue on questions such as mine-removal or environmental protection are emerging as a new framework for euromediterranean relations.

• Strengthening initiatives in the area of security sector reform, especially, placing emphasis on the reform of the security and defence institutions of the countries to the south, until now an element absent from the euromediterranean relations in the area of security. The EU has promoted some activities in the area of police reform and the training of police forces, but with the final objective of strengthening these instruments in the fight against terrorism and organised crime and without special emphasis on the integral reform of the sector. It would be fundamental to propitiate efficient and effective security and defence forces that at the same time are respectful of human rights in order to thus avoid the strengthening of the more authoritarian side of the governments of the neighbours to the south. This would be linked to the strengthening of justice, the division of powers and the strengthening of law and order.

• Co-operation in this sphere opens up many possibilities that should be taken advantage of, without leaving aside the close relationship between security and political reform. Politico-military collaboration should always be in the framework of conditionality and not limited to co-operation on anti-terrorism issues, but rather include such central questions as, for example, civil control of security forces12.

• It is necessary to consolidate an integral approach and a structured dialogue in terms of domestic security, linked to the area of Justice and Interior, and to support the countries of the south in managing their borders, their judicial systems, etc. The aspects that the neighbours to the south have historically called for, such as initiatives to facilitate the integration, rights and welfare of immigrants in the European territory should be included with an important political and economic impulse.

12. To expand upon this topic, see Hänggi and Tanner (2005) and Tanner (2005)
• Progress should be made in the establishment of objective criteria for evaluating the fulfilment of objectives in the area of security incorporated into the different Association Agreements and action plans, and the positive and negative consequences in each situation, in line with the European Neighbourhood Policy. Coherence and institutional co-ordination should be transversal to both initiatives and in those instruments that have some kind of repercussion in the region.

• Strengthening of euromediterranean collaboration in the fight against terrorism is a cardinal issue which will undoubtedly focus the next Summit. Many criticisms have been launched in the face of the use of the fight against terrorism as an excuse for regional governments to restrict freedoms and rights13. The temptation to gain compensations in terms of the fight against terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration in exchange for being more permissive when it comes to promoting reforms in the region comes in detriment to a more long-term perspective and to the prestige and coherence of the EU in the region. It is necessary to find a balance between the two perspectives and needs in this context and to achieve a pragmatic approach combined with a clear and forceful determination of the EU in this sphere.

• The multidimensional perspective and the willingness of the EU to use all means at its disposal in the fight against terrorism, acting in close collaboration with the governments of the south, should be strengthened. It would be fundamental to improve the mechanisms that would allow for a greater fluidity of information among the actors involved that would allow for a better exploitation of institutions such as Europol, among others. Reaching an agreement on a co-ordinated strategy in fighting against terrorism, as well as an agreement on internationally accepted anti-terrorism practices and conducts, would be a notable advance and would allow for speaking as a united, committed bloc in the fight against terrorist groups14. Europe should begin to see its Mediterranean partners as true partners and not just as a source of these threats, since, as was demonstrated by the attacks in London, the origins of terrorism could also be sought in our societies.

By way of conclusion, it should be emphasised that in the face of threats and risks, an internally solid EU, which emerges as an important and influential actor on the international scene, is fundamental. In a context in which peace, stability and prosperity do not seem to be adjectives applicable to the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, a EU that is more coherent and more committed to the problems of its neighbours, which are increasingly its own, is more necessary than ever.

13. The “security vs. freedoms and individual rights” debate is present in European societies because of initiatives of different kinds promoted by governments of all political hues.

14. This possibility poses numerous difficulties, since the EU has great difficulties in agreeing on a strategy in the fight against terrorism, which is waiting to emerge at the end of 2005. Likewise, the difficulties in agreeing on a code in the sphere of anti-terrorism are of a great scope when agreement has not been reached on what terrorism is at an international level, a basic question for defining what the appropriate means are for combating it.
With a view to the November 2005 Summit, the EU should work to its utmost to succeed in giving impetus to a process that, no matter how one looks at it, requires the full participation of the governments involved and a clear position on what the sought-after objectives are. The EU should be able to respond to this question without doubts and to apply all its means to fulfilling them. As Javier Solana has expressed, time is not neutral and ten years on from the setting in motion of the Barcelona Process, no more margin remains for speeches and rhetoric.

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4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

New threats according to the European security strategy

Some comments on the European security strategy
Noureddine Mekri
1. The document that deals with the European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies new threats for European security, and for this it reintroduces ideas, analyses and concepts extensively developed fifteen years ago in political discourses and academic writing.

The first impression is that this strategy stems from a process of making a “sanctuary” out of Europe, which sets the principle of “securitization” of Europe without really bearing in mind the international and regional milieu, nor even contemplating the possibility of an interaction with it.

The result is that the threats are enumerated, not so much as risks for the whole international community and therefore with possible joint responses, but rather as so many other intrinsic “phenomena” susceptible of harming the interests of European security.

From this appreciation, it becomes a more or less explicit will to do everything possible to safeguard Europe’s prosperity, stability and security, as if this continent were evolving sheltered from and without interaction with the international environment and the other contiguous geopolitical spheres.

2. These risks and threats, regardless of how real they may be – such as the cases of the planet’s ecological balance or terrorism, at least – appeal to much more strong-willed responses than the measures advocated by the European Union. Regarding these essential, if not vital, issues, the response should be political and not strategic, and it should flow from a strong international consensus, one which is as wide as possible, in the international institutions, particularly in the UN.

The strategic response reactivates the threats, even when it is transparent, like that of the European Security Strategy, and it remains prisoner of a short-term view and of a logic, if not of confrontation, at least of opposition.

What we would like is a frank, constructive political management among members. And in this partnership we have our ideas and our trump cards to play. This is not a call for charity but rather for partnership. Strategic management is a zero-sum game, in which one
wins and the other loses. What we propose is a partnership in which both win. We prefer to be political partners and not the objects of a strategy.

3. On other issues, such as, for example, the cases of non-proliferation and migration flows, the ESS does not contemplate the underlying problem and seems to be more concerned with safeguarding its own security, power and prosperity. The measures postulated cannot guarantee any of the political, economic and social achievements of Europe in the long run, and even less the peace, security and harmonious development of the euromediterranean region as a whole.

To be convinced of this, two simple questions suffice:

• Why would a nuclear weapon be more dangerous in the hands of one, demonised as needed, than in the hands of the other, exonerated a priori from all responsibility?

• Who can –and with what means– detain a young aspirant to immigration from a country of the South whose horizon is closed and who inexorably appeals to the American and European opulence displayed on hundreds of satellite television channels?

The issue of immigration is a problem that fundamentally requires a collective strategy and a joint action founded not on short-sighted police management but on co-operation and negotiation with the countries of the South from a point of view of development and stabilisation of the populations in the South.

4. In a finite world like today’s, totally interconnected and globalized and yet fractured, the problems posed can no longer be dealt with only in terms of threats but also as challenges that must be constructed in a concerted, solidary way for all humanity.

The principal challenge today, readily visible throughout the Mediterranean arc, is the formidable concentration of wealth, power, excessive consumption and waste of resources in Europe and North America; while the immense majority of the planet survives and dies of hunger, ignorance, epidemics, wars and conflicts.

This is a formidable challenge posed in the South, but also by the force of things, in the countries of the North due to the worldization and the interdependence that lead to a world turned into a “global village”.

This global challenge makes up the set of threats that the European Security Strategy poses in a fragmented, incomplete way.

5. Democracy and good government, before being dictated to our countries, should prevail in the relations between nations and states.

In this respect, is it necessary to recall that no western State has appeared through spontaneous generation, already prosperous and democratic? Centuries of misery, totalitarianism, dictatorship, wars, slavery, plundering, exploitation of entire peoples in our countries and
of the working class in Europe and America have prepared and made possible the democracy and good government put forth today as the joy that will make our lives better and our future more secure. Who recalls the sufferings that this old land of Spain went through not so long ago?

The purpose here is not to seek out justifications and pretexts for delaying or postponing the necessary democratisation of our countries of the South.

Today it is considered that this is not only an ethical and political demand but also a condition for economic and social development. Nevertheless, the purpose is to greatly underscore the idea that democracy and development are intimately linked in a dialectical relationship.

We admit that there cannot be development without democracy, but it needs to be admitted –and we have experienced this painfully– that wanting to democratise without developing, without institutional mechanisms that point toward preventing a return to the hardest forms of dictatorship and to a pace which is not that of the historical time of the society concerned, reopens the doors to fascism.

6. The Barcelona Process, as well as the NATO Euromediterranean Dialogue, offer the framework for elaborating a true policy of euromediterranean security, if courage, clear-sightedness and good will prevail in one and all.

From this perspective, I would like to recall that since a little over two years ago, the European Union has opened, in the Barcelona Process, a political and security dialogue on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the partner countries of the South. This dialogue, albeit recent, has generated an important potential for agreement and co-operation that could facilitate a greater understanding of the problems of global security in the Mediterranean. Undoubtedly, it would be useful if this dialogue were not confined to a debate on the ESDP but rather went beyond that, integrating the legitimate security concerns of the countries of the South. In this way, it will surely be easier to agree upon the challenges that are posed in the whole region, their breadth and their treatment.

7. Spain has played a front-line role in the rapprochement between the North and South of the Mediterranean, in keeping with its historical vocation as a bridge between the two shores. It has demonstrated this masterfully, arbitrating the Euromediterranean Conference in Barcelona in November 1995, and it is preparing to host the Summit of the Heads of State and of Government of the Barcelona Process on the 27th and 28th of November, 2005.

We hope that on this occasion it achieves establishing the bases for a renewed dialogue on joint security between the North and South of the Mediterranean. It has the political means, and the international climate lends itself to this.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Ideas for the future of the Barcelona process in the SCOPE of ESDP

Martín Ortega
The presentations and speeches in this international seminar have demonstrated that a basic consensus exists on the need to strengthen the Euromediterranean Dialogue in the area of security and defence. This is the fourth edition of the Barcelona meeting and, year after year, the same tendency is confirmed. Now then, although a general consensus exists, the problem is defining the appropriate measures and the frameworks of co-operation that could work in practice. Everybody believes that it is necessary to go from dialogue to action, but important obstacles persist and the governments do not introduce concrete initiatives that materialise this step.

Instead of giving a summary of the contributions made during the seminar, I will first present the most salient political obstacles for strengthening co-operation on security and defence in the framework of the Barcelona Process. Then I will analyse the internal challenges of this Process. Thirdly, I will make a list of possible, present and future co-operation measures. Finally, I will offer a reflection on the foreseeable evolution of this field in the coming years.

The EU will undoubtedly continue developing its civil and military capacities to manage crises in the foreseeable future. Its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), well described above by General Mosca Moschini, gives rise to a growing number of operations, carried out in close relationship with the United Nations. It is necessary, therefore, that the EU and its member states maintain open information with its Mediterranean partners through the Barcelona Process, and that all of them think about future co-operation in this sphere.

Political difficulties

The political and security dialogue of the Barcelona Process, which constitutes its first basket, encounters the following larger political obstacles: (1) the resolution of conflicts and disputes in the Mediterranean region; (2) the asymmetry of the Mediterranean partners; and (3) the United States’ association with the process and the co-ordination of NATO activities.
Every conflict around the Mediterranean has its own dynamic. From its beginning, the euromediterranean process was not designed as a mechanism for resolving any of these conflicts, but rather as an instrument for creating a favourable political atmosphere in the region as a whole. The day on which the conflicts enter into the path of resolution, the Barcelona Process will demonstrate its great potential for development. But, if the disputes remain, as in the ten years since 1995, the process can only advance very slowly. This is true, above all, with respect to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and Syria, but it is also applicable to other cases which are less cited but equally important, such as Western Sahara. The bilateral conflicts between each Mediterranean country and the EU may continue, but the multilateral dialogue on political and security questions—which is very necessary for all—will be blocked until there is a new atmosphere in the different controversies.

The second external difficulty is the asymmetry around the Mediterranean. On the one hand, there exists an economic and political bloc: the EU. On the other hand, there is a multitude of heterogeneous actors, including the Arab countries, Israel, candidate countries like Turkey and Croatia, and other Balkan countries that have not arrived at defining a form of definitive relationship with the EU. The Union is not a bloc in the traditional sense of an expansive power that wants to create a zone of influence, but rather it aims to help in the stability and prosperity of its neighbours, as the December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) indicates. But, the Union and its member states act almost always as a unit that shares some objectives and methods. On the other hand, across the table of the Barcelona Process sit actors of a different dimension and divided among each other. One has the impression that the political and economic development in Europe during the last 50 years has situated the members of the EU in a very evolved historical phase, while on the other shores of the Mediterranean, history has stopped, since the problems, crises, and debates that the same actors have experienced in one way or another in the past are incessantly reproduced. This dual asymmetry, in size and history, introduces an enormous difficulty into the Euromediterranean Dialogue because it seems as if the different shores speak different languages on questions of internal and international politics.

The third difficulty is of a different nature and refers to the role of the United States in the Mediterranean region and to its possible association with the initiatives of the EU. It is not necessary to sum up the important presence of the United States in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Now it is a matter of knowing to what degree ties should be established between the co-operation schemes directed at the Mediterranean and sponsored by the EU and those in which the United States is involved. Some members of the EU desire to maintain the autonomy of the European initiatives at all costs, for which reason they vehemently oppose any attempt to have the United States join in. In the same way, for this first current, the Barcelona Process and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue should continue in parallel, without any co-ordination or distribution of tasks between them. On the other hand, another approach maintains that the economic, trade and financial relations between European and Mediterranean partners, and also the social and cultural ones (second and third Barcelona baskets), should be limited to the participants, but the political and security dialogue (first basket) shares common points with
other initiatives in which the Europeans and their Mediterranean partners participate, along with the United States. According to this school of thought, an explicit co-ordination between the Euromediterranean Dialogue and co-operation in the area of security and defence and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue should be found, with the aim of defining an adequate synergy between the two frameworks. Until this dilemma is resolved—which concerns the trans-Atlantic allies above all—euromediterranean co-operation on the ESDP cannot be taken to its ultimate consequences. To tell the truth, the current state of trans-Atlantic relations does not augur an explicit co-ordination in this area.

Internal challenges of the Barcelona Process

The progress of the Euromediterranean Dialogue and co-operation in the area of the ESDP also encounters problems in the execution of the process itself, among which one can highlight: (1) the adoption of a pragmatic approach; (2) the definition of concrete measures; and (3) the existence of different frameworks of co-operation, depending on bilateral, sub-regional or multilateral participation.

If one looks at the evolution of the euromediterranean relationship in the area of security and defence over the last few years, a change in the conceptual approach to pragmatism can be observed. Since 1995, the ambassadors of the Barcelona Process worked on the defining of concepts and arrived at a project for a Charter for peace and stability in the Mediterranean in the Stuttgart Conference in April 1999. The adoption of this Charter was deferred until a later time in the Marseilles Conference in 2000 and, since then, a more modest, pragmatic approach has been followed. This means that they agreed on the concrete measures of dialogue and action that were acceptable to all participants in the process, without desiring to establish more ambitious conceptual frameworks. For example, at the same time as the EU developed an ESDP and operations for managing crises, the Union was dialoguing with its Mediterranean partners on these matters. This pragmatic approach is realist and effective, and the desires to return to the Charter or to “strategic concepts for the Mediterranean”, which still finds advocates, seem destined for sterility—unless political circumstances change a great deal.

The Dialogue has a usefulness in itself, because it helps in getting to know one another better. People in authority from the north and south, and from the east and west of the Mediterranean have met on formal and informal occasions to debate political, security and defence issues, and these exchanges are always profitable. This seminar in Barcelona is a good example. Now the challenge is to go from dialogue to action through concrete measures which are of interest to the different participants in the Barcelona Process. Further on, a list of possible measures is offered. But, in more general terms, it is important to go from dialogue to action. The indefinite continuation of a dialogue that does not materialise into tangible measures produces frustration. On the other hand, specific actions give a content and meaning to the dialogue. The participating governments, and in particular the governments of the EU Mediterranean countries that have always supported this aspect of
the process, should invest new efforts in presenting and promoting concrete measures.

The last challenge of the Barcelona Process in the field of security and defence is the co-ordination of the different existing frameworks of cooperation. In the first place, there exists a rich network of bilateral relations between the countries to the North and South of the Mediterranean, some with a long history behind them. Thus, the bilateral co-operation in the area of defence between Spain and Morocco or between France and Tunisia is well established, in the same way as the co-operation between Jordan and the United Kingdom, to cite only a few cases. Dialogue and multilateral co-operation in the framework of the Barcelona Process, in the second place, add to these bilateral relations but do not replace them. This regional portrait covers the entire Mediterranean region. Between these two frameworks there appears sub-regional co-operation, which is useful for some concrete purposes. The challenge still pending is to co-ordinate these three levels, bilateral, sub-regional and regional, so that the different measures do not overlap unnecessarily, and so that they all go in the direction of rapprochement and regional stability, in accordance with the spirit of the Barcelona Process. For this, it would be interesting to create an inventory of measures (maintained by the secretariat of the Council of the EU in Brussels, or by future institutions of the Euromediterranean Partnership, whenever they are created) that would allow for at least a faithful knowledge of the most important actions that are being carried out in this area.

The sub-regional initiative of the Ministers of Defence of the 5+5 Group is of great interest. Since December 2004, the ministers of these countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, plus Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) have met and established a monitoring committee to study marine, air and civil protection measures in the western Mediterranean. This initiative, which is explicitly declared compatible with the Barcelona Process, demonstrates the great potential for co-operation in this geographic area and seems destined to be strengthened in the future.

**Specific co-operation measures**

The following fields demonstrate the great possibilities for co-operation that exist in the area of security and defence, if the indicated obstacles can be overcome.

1. **Transparency-building.** The civil and military authorities of the EU in Brussels are committed to presenting information on the ESDP to the Mediterranean partners in the Barcelona Process. It is important that this flow of information continue to occur and that it be enriched with greater information coming from the partners of the EU.

2. **Seminars.** The seminars for authorities in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defence and for members of the Armed Forces (such as this one organized by the CIDOB Foundation and the Ministry of Defence, that has been taking place in Barcelona since 2002) should
continue. The EU Institute for Security Studies organised a seminar in Paris on May 10 in this same sense. The Secretariat of the Council and Greece organised another euromediterranean seminar in Athens from June 27 to 29 on crisis management. Other similar initiatives in different countries are also very useful. As has been indicated, perhaps it would be convenient to prepare an inventory with a description of these activities.

3. **Civil defence in the face of natural catastrophes.** Within the Barcelona Process there already exist programmes of co-operation in cases of catastrophes, and more recently in case of seaquakes, in which the action of the Armed Forces could be necessary.

4. **Participation in peace operations.** The fact that the EU is carrying out a growing number of civil and military crisis management operations, through the ESDP, opens the door to a productive exchange with its Mediterranean partners. The participation of a military contingent from Morocco in the *Althea* operation in Bosnia is a very important precedent.

5. **Landmine removal.** The EU, its member states and the other participants in the Barcelona Process could co-operate in this area, above all with respect to the remains of mines and munitions from the Second World War.

6. **Security sector reform.** The constant exchanges will allow, in the future, for a deeper dialogue on the security and defence structures of each country concerned, with the aim of co-operating on reform and on good government in the military field.

7. **Maritime space.** The Barcelona Process should pay more attention to the maritime space found in its centre. The Armed Forces should have a crucial role in this sense, since they could co-operate to control illegal traffic in the Mediterranean Sea, as is demonstrated by the declarations of the Ministers of Defence of the 5+5 Group.

8. **Environmental protection.** The fight against the deterioration of the sea, land and atmospheric environment around the Mediterranean basin should have the support of the Armed Forces, although all of this should be done in close co-ordination with the existing programmes for protecting the environment in the Mediterranean.

9. **The fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.** The EU gives great importance to preventing a proliferation of this kind of weaponry, and it has initiated a dialogue with its Mediterranean partners in this regard, which also should continue.

### Looking toward the future

Although there exists a long list of possible measures that could be negotiated and agreed upon among the euromediterranean partners, it does not seem likely that new accords on co-operation in the area of security and defence will be reached in the upcoming conference in
Barcelona in November, when the tenth anniversary of the process is celebrated. The internal and external obstacles to the process, indicated above, remain. Moreover, the preparation of the November conference has not been able to overcome these difficulties, either. Up until now, there have been no new initiatives introduced that would allow for a qualitative leap to be made in the first basket of the Barcelona Process.

Preparation of the conference has been led by Spain and the United Kingdom, which have devoted a considerable amount of energy to it. However, Spain has placed emphasis on organising a meeting of the highest political level, and this always involves many difficulties in the Mediterranean sphere. The British Presidency of the EU, for its part, seems to have set its sights on objectives that are not very ambitious in this field, concentrating its efforts on co-operation in the fight against terrorism and in foreign affairs. Under these circumstances, one cannot expect notable advances to be made on the tenth anniversary, which is not good news for those who think that it is necessary to strengthen the Process.

The question we all ask ourselves on the relative worth of the Barcelona Process and the EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy, which covers countries from Morocco to the former space of the Soviet Union, remains up in the air. Some EU member states, among which is Spain, have clearly manifested the validity of the euromediterranean framework, despite the Neighbourhood Policy. Other members seem to prefer a homogenisation of all the neighbours, through a “bilateralisation” of relations within the new Neighbourhood Policy. The official language is that the Barcelona Process and this policy are compatible and reinforce each other, however this opinion is not shared by everyone. It is very likely that the tenth anniversary will not serve to clarify this issue, either.

If, on its tenth anniversary, the Barcelona Process unfortunately will not see the relaunching that it needs, when will this take place? In order for the Euromediterranean Dialogue to enter a new phase, which would include a deeper co-operation in the political, security and defence fields, its is necessary for several different conditions to occur. It is not clear whether these requirements are going to be met in the next few years, but the Europeans should at least work in this direction.

The first condition is that the controversies and disputes around the Mediterranean enter a new stage of resolution. This does not mean a definitive solution of all of them, but rather a dynamic of pacification and a new atmosphere that would allow for hope to be felt in the region. In particular, the controversy between Israelis and Palestinians has entered a new phase since August 2005, when the Israeli government decided to force its settlers to withdraw from Gaza. The EU is seriously committed to the stability and economic development of Gaza, even with measures of aid to the Palestinian police and border patrol. The year 2006 will be crucial in the fate of this conflict, since a new political atmosphere on both sides could make it progress toward resolution or could mean a return to the past.

The second condition is that the EU and its Member States take the Barcelona Process more seriously, not only in the economic sense,
granting substantial trade advantages to the Mediterranean countries, but also in political aspects, demanding true democratic advances.

Finally, the third condition is a new commitment on the part of the societies and political systems of the south to modernisation and reform. The majority of the EU’s Mediterranean partners cannot achieve the economic and human development their populations demand if they do not carry out notable transformations in their political systems. Likewise, relations among them should enter a new co-operative phase, particularly in the Maghreb.

While awaiting these developments, an important step toward strengthening the Barcelona Process could consist in the institutionalisation of some of its aspects. Although the institutions of Brussels make assurances of the continuity of the Partnership, its visibility and effectiveness would increase if an office or permanent secretariat could be created, with a presence in the different participating countries. It remains to be seen if this or other ideas find resonance in the tenth anniversary conference in November 2005. The 2006 Barcelona seminar will, again, be an ideal occasion for evaluating the course of the Process.
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Reports

Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: current status and prospects
Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde and Balder Hageraats
Introduction

This report on Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: current status and prospects was born out of an initiative of the CIDOB Foundation, which responds to a sustained interest for quite some time in matters of security and defence in the Mediterranean. A part of this dedication is reflected in the international seminars on security and defence in the Mediterranean which have been celebrated annually in Barcelona ever since 2002. On its fourth edition it has become possible to work out an idea that had already been floating around during the past years, namely to present –both to the participants as well as to the wider security community involved in the region—reports that offer updated information as well as basic analysis that stimulates thought and debate on issues of interest.

There can be little doubt as to the importance of dedicating a significant amount of time and energy on the study of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Among the main issues that draw the attention of actors involved regional security there is, besides international terrorism, the specific nature of the threat of WMD. Not only does it affect all Mediterranean countries, but it also carries its destabilizing effect much further than this specific region.

From this perspective, the following pages are intended to be the starting point of sustained analytical efforts with the eventual goal of achieving a Mediterranean region free of WMD. We are still far away from this objective, especially given the fact that there exist powerful trends that point in a very different direction. This does not mean, however, that we should halt our aspirations in this respect. In order to make our goals feasible, it seems necessary to involve governmental actors as well as international organizations and civilian actors of all kinds. This would allow us to establish as precisely and objectively as

1. The term “weapons of mass destruction” was introduced by the United Nations in August 1948 when the Commission of the UN for Conventional Weapons had to decide which types of weapons it would not cover.
possible where we currently stand (without forgetting where we came from) and with which variables we can develop this future that should serve as stimulus to all those who desire a Mediterranean region that is more just and more sustainable.

This report, therefore, needs to be understood as a contribution that adds to the already existing work in this area, and it will only become fully effective when it will be followed-up on during the years that follow. Counting on the cooperation of those who can contribute to illuminate the dark corners of such a controversial area, the report aims to:

- Contribute to the advancement of a climate of regional trust, starting a process of regular analysis which is open to participation and exchange of information about these issues among countries involved in Mediterranean security.

- Establish a rigorous foundation on this matter –limited by the availability of public information– which serves as a basic tool for analysis of security in the Mediterranean related to this area.

- Highlight the main aspects of the foreseeable developments in this area, both in general regional security terms as well as related to the main thematic issues and the specific countries that are associated with those matters.

- Identify and analyze the main proposals and initiatives that are being developed with respect to non-proliferation of WMD in the region.

- Create the roots of a future project of permanent updating of the information included in this initial report.

Accepting that in this first report it will not be possible to satisfactorily achieve all the goals mentioned above completely, the following pages focus on collecting and briefly analyzing the information offered by the various sources on WMD in the Mediterranean, on the dynamics that drive the various actors in the region and lastly on the failure of non-proliferation diplomacy. With this in mind, the current state of the WMD arsenals and programs of the three sub-regions in the Mediterranean (Maghreb, Near East and Middle East) are described without losing sight of the fact that the Mediterranean as a whole is a single strategic reality. Future prospects of the region are discussed allowing for the possibility of a new order of Mediterranean security concerning the reality of WMD, while at the same maintaining the desire –mentioned above– of one day achieving a region without these weapons.

It seems logical, on the other hand, to place the investigation in a context of a security that needs to take into account some initial premises (Section I), conceptual, methodological as well as with respect to content. Similarly,
a number of determining factors that directly influence the evolution of security and defence policy of countries cannot be ignored with respect to WMD (Section II). The point of reference for this second category—notwithstanding historical trends of the past decades—is obviously 9/11. It signified an abrupt change in security policy that ended the post-Cold War period of hope and that currently dominates both the rhetoric as well as the practical implementation of security and defence policy worldwide.

It is similarly important to point out that the majority of the sources and references used in this report are Western in origin, including Israeli ones. Although this would be a serious weakness in any other case—as it consequently does not reflect Arab perspectives that could balance Western ideas—any criticism has to be tempered by the fact that there is an absence of other sources because of the continual refusal of those governments to share information and analyses on these matters with the public at large. Often the rhetoric is supposed to substitute—without much success—proper analysis. Consequently, analysis and badly understood considerations about national security end up eroding the debate on issues that should not be kept at the sidelines of national and international public opinion. This issue can be recognised without becoming self-indulgent about the West given that there continue to be many bad examples of the same problems among Western countries (with Israel being a clear example). However, this is an issue that needs to be remedied as soon as possible, something that can only be achieved through internal reform in order to enhance transparency within those nations and to consolidate an atmosphere of mutual trust between them.

It is therefore possible to miss more and better information about certain countries and about certain projects but that should be interpreted—beyond reflecting weakness of its authors—as an additional call for cooperation to improve the final product that is, or should be, in the interest of all concerned. In short, this report is by definition “not possible to prove”. Despite that fact, the whole matter is valuable precisely because it develops awareness about the issues and about the necessity to open the doors that remain closed if we want to truly improve security in the region. Only if one can repeat this experience in the years to come and if others cooperate it will become possible to move forward in this area.

I. Starting premises

Within the time-span of hardly fifteen years there has been a change from being overwhelmed by the dangers that WMD represented—the prevailing sentiment during the Cold War—to an unfounded sidelining and poor memory when it comes to these weapons during the 1990’s, to a new belief that they represent, together with international terrorism, the principal danger to the world today. It is easy to agree that we live in a world—in terms of security—which for decades to come will still need to pay significant attention to WMD as the first and foremost source of power and risks. Their importance when it comes to overall strategy can in no way be downgraded given that the risks are obvious. On the other hand, one should also be careful in not inflating the issue—as is being attempted by certain actors—to such an extent that it becomes oversimplified.
In more precise terms: WMD are neither the only nor the most important threat that we need to deal with at the present time. This is the case when considered by itself as well as in combination with international terrorism, notwithstanding attempts that make us believe this is in fact the case by those that are driving the incorrectly named “war on terror”. It is sufficient to remember the analyses of the past decade when the end of the Cold War allowed a broader approach to security that included multidisciplinary issues and led to the conviction that the security agenda should include matters such as poverty, exclusion, environmental deterioration, the destabilising effects of migration flows, pandemics, drugs trafficking, and organised crime, among other things. It was not possible, nor is it at present, to establish a ranking of the order of importance between these threats and the risks to international security. All of them, including WMD, need to be addressed in equal measure if the goal is to improve the climate of international security. Unfortunately, judging from the dominant voices in this area at the moment, it seems that the message has not come across sufficiently. It is easy to observe the difference in efforts that focus on the dangers of terrorism and WMD –mostly oriented towards fighting the clearest symptoms, without paying equal attention to the more profound causes– while there is no sign of similar attention and dedication when it comes to the other issues that are on the lists of current threats.

At another level of analysis it is important to point out –as other experts do– that it is increasingly less useful to employ the traditional concept of WMD as one that groups nuclear weapons together with those of a chemical or biological nature. Although this text uses the general concept and includes information about the latter two types of weapons (as well as radiological weapons and missiles, which serve as main delivery systems for the other types), most attention of this report is dedicated to the nuclear weapons, which are considered to be the main area of interest in any analysis about international security and WMD. Not only are they more dangerous because of their lethal load but they also play the largest part in defining the security and defence agenda in relation to the rest. (Despite other considerations, the nuclear commitment of Israel has been feeding and stimulating the security and defence policies of its neighbours for a long time, either through attempts to possess their own nuclear arsenal or by the development of a sufficient deterrence through chemical or biological weapons.)

3. The Agenda for Peace (UN, 1992) and the New Strategic Concept approved by NATO in Washington in 1999 are only two examples.

4. In one report published in June 2005 (“Deadly arsenals: nuclear, biological and chemical threats” by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), its authors (J. Cirincione, J. Wolfsthal y M. Rajkumar) call for the abandonment of the concept of WMD itself given the unrealistic nature of grouping nuclear weapons –by far the most powerful and dangerous– together with chemical and biological weapons.

5. Although arsenals of chemical and biological weapons already existed, it was not until 1946 that the concept of WMD began to be used. The General Assembly of the UN, in its first resolution (A/RES1(1) on the 24th of January of that year, established a commission to deal with problems that were caused by the discovery of atomic weapons. Among the tasks that were assigned there was the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from military arsenals and any other “weapon of mass destruction”.

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All of this obviously does not mean in any way that WMD present no real and important danger. As such, it is only common sense to be concerned with their evolution and the dynamics that feed the dangers they represent. In military terms one can say that while poverty and the other factors identified above constitute elements of the most likely hypothesis with respect to the actualization of threats (as is demonstrated by its incalculable victims on a daily basis), WMD by themselves represent the most dangerous hypothesis (clearly justifying the necessity to consider their situation).

With respect to the Mediterranean the issue is by no means rhetorical. The weapons already exist in the arsenals of various countries, and everything indicates that others are equally determined to have them. Similarly to what is happening in other parts of the world, WMD in the Mediterranean cannot be considered a matter independent of other factors. The current situation and future possibilities are the direct result of a highly destabilizing environment, characterized by the persistence of latent and open conflicts—with the Arab-Israeli situation above all else—, by significant asymmetry between the different armed forces, and by the persistence of a double standard in judging the behaviour of actors that cause the desire for compensation, if not regional hegemony.

With respect to the geographical profile of the region that we analyze here, from a security perspective it is clear that the Mediterranean consists of an area that exceeds its physical limits. One really needs to include—as this report recognizes—the EU, the Balkans and Russia as its northern neighbours, together with all the countries that stretch from Mauritania to Iran, i.e. the Maghreb, Near East, and Middle East, to the South of its basin.

The region, as is common knowledge, has accumulated nuclear as well as chemical and biological arsenals (and a large variety of delivery vehicles) while at the same time developing various programs to increase these capacities in the future. The main current focus of concern is with respect to the development of specific nuclear programs that are advancing in various Southern countries (headed by Iran now that the apparent threat from Iraq has been eliminated). It is important to remember, however, that other states that are involved in the region such as France, Russia and the United States (which is not a Mediterranean country in the strict sense of the word, yet has an obvious importance when discussing this matter) have already fully developed their capabilities. Israel, on the other hand, continues

6. From a historical perspective, its Mediterranean importance began in the 19th Century. In any case, and with the current situation as clearest example, it is sufficient to point to the permanent presence of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf. The former has its headquarter at Gaeta (Italy) and is composed of 40 ships, 175 airplanes and roughly 21,000 personnel. The 5th Fleet, stationed in Manama (Bahrein) contains 20 ships, 103 airplanes and roughly 19,000 personnel. Each of them is sufficient evidence of the American involvement in Mediterranean affairs. Its fundamental elements are power projection which is occasionally strengthened by other forces whenever the situation requires it.
shielding itself by its traditional policy of ambiguity, albeit with increasing difficulty.

Although it is true that nuclear weapons have never been used during conflicts in the region, the same cannot be said about chemical or biological weapons. During the first Gulf War (1980-88) Iraq employed chemical weapons extensively on the battlefield against citizens and Iranian forces, whereas Egypt had already used them in the 1960’s during the civil war in Yemen.

Before turning to the next sections, it is important to point out that issues affecting the countries on the northern coastline that possess WMD (understood to be the United States as well as France and Russia) have been left on the sideline in this first report. The reasons is not only because of constraint of space or because of the fact that each of these countries has dimensions that surpass the Mediterranean, which would make it an artificial exercise of little use to limit the analysis to only those aspects that are directly related to the region itself. There is no attempt to hide the fact that these countries have contributed at different moments in recent history to the increase of regional insecurity through their role as proliferators and their support for the proliferation efforts of others. Nor can it be denied that among the sources of unrest and instability of the region it is important to assess the behaviour of these countries, especially when analysing Mediterranean security from a southern perspective. Rather, the decision was based on the choice of priorities.

It seems a sufficiently confirmed reality that the principal variables that explain the current level of conflict within the region are related to the dynamics of a South/South nature (whether it is the already mentioned Arab-Israeli conflict or the rivalry for hegemony between neighbours). There exists no hypothetical scenario of Mediterranean conflict in which northern countries of the region, with or without WMD, are the principal cause for concern. It is obvious that all of them have clearly identified and direct interests in the region, and that they will defend those interests in case of a threat. However, it would be highly unlikely that that would lead to violent conflict provoked by one of them. It is left to future studies, therefore, to deal with these nations in detail. This permits us to dedicate more space to those issues that seem to be the most urgent in the current situation.

As a final matter to be mentioned before moving to the next section it is important to remember that all of the information gathered for this report comes from publicly available sources. This forces the recognition of certain limits right from the beginning given that certain other, possibly more precise and accurate, sources remain outside of our reach. These could have helped adjust and improve the analysis presented here and even possibly

7. These cases, in which chemical and biological weapons were used in a “conventional” manner once again highlight the inconvenience of using the concept of WMD. At the same time, there are conventional weapons with a destructive power that would practically make them “non-conventional”. See Section IV for greater analysis of this issue.
contradict certain issues that are discussed in this text. This is, in any case, a risk that was taken in order to achieve the goals that were stated above without having to wait for the numerous obstacles that currently make information gathering and knowledge sharing so difficult with respect to these issues to be overcome.

II. Determining factors of WMD in the Mediterranean

As was argued above, the development of WMD in the Mediterranean can only be properly understood in the global context of security of the region. It is a shaken region that is among the most militarized areas of the planet, subject to open conflicts that cause global attention and suffering from inequality gaps that only exacerbate the space between its coasts. Meanwhile, the region is still waiting for the political and economic reforms of unsustainable models in the medium term. Currently the region resembles a laboratory complex in which there are experiments and designs for the set of rules of a new world order/disorder. In these experiments and designs, the southern and eastern countries resemble reactive parts of a mechanism that is driven by exogenous forces that cannot be controlled. In the middle of these dynamics, the WMD occupy a prominent place that is explained by both internal as well as external reasons as a result of the lessons learned during the past decades and accelerated by all that has been provoked by 9/11 both here as well as in other regions in the world.

The Mediterranean is, and has been in the past, a region of continuous instability in which the failures to find solutions between the North and the South overshadow other failures, no less important, in South/South relations. In this climate of permanent difficulties of internal coexistence and local rivalry—and in which the marks of a badly designed and worse executed decolonization process are still visible—there exist dynamics that have traditionally encouraged military options. These options have shaped the security and defence policies of the countries in question. Their aim has become the development of the capacity to deter any enemy—internal as well as external—and with the chief argument of becoming a regional leader that can prevail over its neighbours and attract the attention of the main global powers. The development of WMD or the desire to possess them in the future is within this militaristic approach of the countries on the south and east coast of the region. Among the factors that have conditioned this evolution, the following are especially significant:

The Arab-Israeli conflict

This is by a wide margin the element that has been most influential in the policies of security and defence in the Mediterranean during the past decades. With respect to Israel, its fear of being defeated by its neighbours which, according to the conventional interpretation would signify the end of its existence as a state, has for over four decades driven its policies with respect to WMD. Although its nuclear program has been the best known and debated, Israel has opted to keep the doors open to biological and chemical weapons. Its arsenals in such weapons,
albeit withdrawn and publicly avoided by those who are politically and militarily responsible, are far superior to those of its Arab neighbours. In this situation, Israel understands that it can guarantee its own survival and confront any type of military threat that its neighbours may pose until at some future point in time its existence will be recognised and accepted by all, creating secure and stable borders. The five Arab-Israeli wars and the two Palestinian Intifadas have not changed this image of superiority either at the conventional level or with respect to WMD. Israel has managed to come out of these armed conflicts successfully without requiring the use of its non-conventional capabilities. Despite this, it understands that it is not sufficient to maintain its conventional advantage, but that it needs to continually improve its nuclear capacity. This provides a mechanism of double security with respect to its defensive necessities when it comes to its own survival.

There is nothing that indicates that the current policymakers in Israel are willing to significantly modify this strategy. On the contrary, rather than thinking about reductions in its arsenals or abolishing these types of weapons altogether, the debates about their military importance in the current regional environment are highly worrisome; the current discussions seem to indicate a movement towards no longer maintaining them only as weapons of last resort, but also to use them at other stages of any hypothetical armed confrontation.

Arab nations, on the other hand, have acted mostly in a reactive manner. Any argumentation defending their positions at a strategic level usually starts by denouncing Israeli behaviour - and, as an extension, the behaviour of those powers that support and tolerate such an exceptional situation –as a proliferator and destabilising factor in the region. According to the traditional analytical framework, some Arab countries have entered into the race for WMD simply as a reaction to the threat of the Israeli arsenals. It often happens that other factors that feed this dynamic are ignored. This is the case, for example, of those reasons that are related to the advantage that WMD might give in disputes with other neighbouring countries or to the desire to become a primus inter pares. Beyond the plans and declarations that are more or less justified, it is clear that there is no real comparison between Israeli military capabilities and those of its Arab counterparts in the Mediterranean, neither in conventional weaponry nor in WMD. None of the Arab nations has so far managed to equip itself with nuclear weapons (although there are some who might have tried) and their chemical and biological capabilities, as well as missile programs, are in no way superior to those of their neighbour.

It is foreseeable in the current conditions that some of these countries maintain both their critical rhetoric as well as their eagerness to compensate for Israeli superiority by intending to develop WMD. In the majority of cases, such an effort does not imply their own development of the necessary infrastructure to achieve the stated objectives but rather the acquisition of this type of capabilities at global markets that are much less regulated than would be desirable.

It is difficult to imagine in the current climate that real steps can be taken with respect to non-proliferation, arms control or disarmament of WMD without having eliminated the possibility of using the Arab-Israeli conflict...
The blocking of the Euromediterranean Partnership with its chapter on political and security cooperation is a perfect example of this. Ten years after its launch in Barcelona it remains impossible to approve a Letter of Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean which was conceived as a set of principles oriented towards the creation of trust between countries of the Partnership. Everything is on hold until the political conditions (the Arab-Israeli conflict) are right for approval. An overview of the Euromediterranean Partnership can be found in Jesús A. Núñez (2005): Las relaciones de la UE con sus vecinos mediterráneos, Enciclopedia del Mediterráneo, Barcelona: Icaria Editorial-CIDOB Edicions.
by purely commercial reasons as well as by attempts to consolidate alliances during the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War, some states in the region have developed a military capacity that clearly exceeds purely defensive necessities. This dynamic, which did not stop before the WMD threshold, has resulted in a region every time more unstable and a situation of direct competition between states, provoking immediate conflict and/or reactions along similar lines.

In the present situation, in which WMD are already a reality in various countries of the region, the only thing left is to observe the negative consequences of a process stimulated at various levels by the world’s main powers. As will be analysed during a later stage, most of the WMD arsenals are the product of direct purchases from traditional producers (with hardly any ad hoc adjustments) or the development of programs based on the expertise of these same producers.

As a result of this behaviour it is not possible to argue that, besides the regional dominance that Israel displays, a clear leader among Arab countries can be identified or accepted by all. On the contrary, in the Maghreb Morocco and Algeria maintain their differences and leadership aspirations, while Egypt does not seem to achieve settling its predominant position among the Arab community. At the same time, Iran is attempting to become a dominant force in the Middle East now that its eternal rival Iraq has disappeared for the moment.

Lessons Learned

After the recent events, every country in the region has perfectly understood the message: those who have WMD possess a safeguard in the face of possible threats and is recognised as a country of special status.

In short, the recent events have made it abundantly clear that obtaining WMD is profitable in many different ways. Examples stressing this point include Iraq, North Korea and India. The first of these cases, a country that did not possess any type of WMD suffered a direct attack that led to the fall of its regime (a brutal dictatorship, on the other hand). At the same time, the crisis with North Korea—which can be classified along similar lines—is being handled in a very different way. With respect to India, this nuclear state, which continues to refuse to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has not only recently reached agreement with the United States on the exchange of technology and nuclear fuel9, but will in all probability also become a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN during its next round of reforms. This does not seem to be the best way to deal with a proliferator which now is picking the fruits from its efforts and is becoming more important in the international arena without having to give up anything significant.

9. This was the most notable result from the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, to Washington in July 2005. Some reactions have pointed out that the behaviour of the Bush administration equals the complete delegitimization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty simply in order to befriend India at all costs to balance Chinese efforts.
Now that these double standards have been on display once again –already notorious in the Mediterranean with respect to Israel, which pretends that the law should only be applied to its enemies– they grant allies and friends a wide margin to manoeuvre according to their aspirations and necessities. One of the most frequently seen reactions to this perceived injustice –apparently based on nothing else but the law of the strongest– is a renewed attempt of criticised countries to arm themselves. (“Why can’t we become nuclear powers if Israel is permitted to be one?” is one of the most frequently heard questions posed by Arabs).

**Mimicry**

In similar fashion as in other areas, it seems fundamental to understand that some regional actors attempt to imitate the models and behaviour of those that are seen as global points of reference. These attempts are not necessarily made independently, but often are simply an increased responsiveness to stimulants that for decades have come from external actors who turned into political, social, economic and military “educators”. It is worth mentioning that they have proved to be good students that have simply tried to reproduce, and even improve upon, the models learned from their teachers.

In similar fashion it is possible to understand the decisions made by a country as mimicry of things done by others in the region, especially if it is motivated by neighbourly competition or a struggle for regional hegemony. Many cases in, for instance, Iraq and Iran correspond to such a model in the Middle East and Morocco and Algeria in North Africa.

In this context of students and teachers, statements objecting to WMD access for such nations are not easy to defend given that such arguments do not correspond to the “rational” norms of WMD dynamics.

**Unstoppable Inertia**

History is full of cases in which stubbornness in a certain direction has led to counterproductive decisions, even if afterwards such decisions could be considered a simple mistake. Either not to be arm-twisted or not to submit in front of others, positions are often taken that eventually do nothing but feed the instability. Other national actors, such as the national scientific community or the military establishment, defending their own interests, behave along similar lines even if they often disguise it as national interest.

Iran is perhaps one of the cases in which this is most clearly on display, at least partly, in the present situation. Without it being possible to reach any definite conclusions about such process as controversial as is experienced by that country –firmly attempting to dominate the atom– there are indications that point in such a direction. Ever since the early days of the Islamic Revolution, those in power in Iran set out a course that was motivated both by their own calculations as well as external factors. Having arrived at the current situation, it is difficult to imagine that the new government would renounce such a course. Not only...
would this be seen as an international defeat with respect to Washington, it would also be difficult to explain to the public opinion and a ruling class heavily involved in achieving the stated objective. We find ourselves, therefore, at a point at which both principal actors (the EU cannot be said to be at the same level) are pushed towards a forward flight, trapped in a drama of which neither one completely controls the script that they are acting out.

To this fact one should add that for Teheran the nuclear option (even without necessarily taking the final step that would make it available for military purposes) offers major possibilities to finally become a regional point of reference now that Baghdad seems incapable of defending its own interests.

In similar fashion it is relevant to understand that Iran is using one of its few strong points at the negotiating table in order to return to the international arena after a large period of punishment and marginalisation. If it were to cede to the demands of the United States and the EU without getting anything relevant in return, it would leave itself without leverage in the future, possibly even more important, stakes.

During a moment in which the most conservative movements in Iran – with the recent presidential election victory of Mahmud Ahmadineyad– have managed to gain complete control over all the politically powerful institutions, it is reasonable to assume that all these inertias will only exacerbate, increasing tensions in the region for a long time to come.

**Repercussions of 9/11**

The tragic events of 9/11 provoked an acceleration of trends that had already been visible among the team led by George W. Bush ever since his electoral victory at the end of the year 2000. What happened afterwards demonstrates the determination of a government to create new rules in international relations that are clearly reactive, militaristic and unilaterally oriented. The “war against terror” has become slogan to mobilise the immense national resources and those of circumstantial US allies in the same way as the “fight against communist expansion” was witnessed during most of the Cold War.

For the Bush Administration, the scenario has been clearly defined in terms of a war (which moreover is announced to be spanning a long period of time) which the United States is decided to fight even alone if it were necessary. From this point of view we are only at the initial chapters of a long story. After the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq –both of which are still in progress– and while the Arab-Israeli conflict continues without the attention it so badly needs from the most important global power, other countries in the region feel directly branded by Washington.

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10. On the 21st of September 2004, President Bush proposed to the United Nations “a new definition of security” that justifies intervention in order to liberate countries living under tyranny as an essential part of the “war against terror”.
Syria stands out in equal measure as Iran in this respect. Without going into an evaluation of the accusations made, it is necessary to point out that the existence by itself of those accusations adds a new factor of resistance to those who feel directly threatened by the American superpower. In this way it is possible to understand that those who refuse to accept a “pax Americana” which directly questions the political model of these countries choose to employ all available means (including those which perhaps in reality they do not even have) in order to resist the pressure.

On the other hand, as a function of the conclusions from the subsection on Lessons Learned, one cannot ignore that those who are feeling the pressure are even more eager to possess WMD in an attempt to better shield themselves from any possible temptation of launching an attack against them.

**Militaristic nature of some states**

One of the most powerful determining factors –albeit not one of the most obvious— that explains the militaristic focus, including WMD, of some countries in the region, is the nature of their governments. When power depends to a large extent on the capacity of control and repression over its own population and as part of the sustained rearmament in the face of external threats, it becomes inevitable that the military establishment turns into a domestic actor that invades other (civil) sources of powers and grows out of its natural dimensions11. Frequently it becomes the only operational institution, guarantor of the strict adherence to the national designs and mandates and the basic pillar of the whole state apparatus.

In such cases, the armed forces themselves end up pushing forward decisions that augment their power over time and drag a country towards militaristic development options that do not exclude access to WMD. It is telling to note that among the south and east coast nations of the Mediterranean the expenditure on defence generously exceeds the percentage of expenditure of that of their northern neighbours. In the Maghreb, the average hovers around 3% of GDP, while in the Near East the military budgets are even higher, with Israel above the rest (over 10% during the current decade). In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is the high-flyer in this respect with around 10% of GDP, practically double the regional average12. In these circumstances the option of WMD becomes one of the paths to explore in order to enhance, theoretically, the level of national security.

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11. Compared to the current 356,000 personnel in the French military, according to the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies and SIPRI, Iran has some 520,000 individuals in its armed forces, followed by Turkey (515,000), Egypt (450,000), Syria (289,000), Israel (186,500), Saudi Arabia (171,500), Morocco (145,500), Algeria (127,000) and Jordan (100,700). All of this without taking into account the reserves, which have various degree of mobilization (it is sufficient to take the case of Israel, with 445,000 available and truly mobilizable).

12. See Table IX in the Annex for the numbers of all countries in the region.
Treaties and Conventions on non-proliferation of WMD

Contrary to developments with respect to all the conditioning factors up to this point—which share a common feature, namely the stimulating effect on proliferation of WMD—the existing set of treaties on nuclear, biological, chemical or missile non-proliferation is, despite all its imperfections and limitations, the most powerful factor in reducing (and, ideally, eliminating) the danger that these devices represent. Even if the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is without any doubt the most relevant as it affects nuclear weapons—a fundamental pillar when it comes to the threat of WMD—the picture would not be complete without mentioning, at a minimum, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). All of these constitute, as imperfect as they may seem, a real show of the current capabilities of the international community through a multilateral approach to face up to the dangers of a proliferation process which for a long time advanced because of those nations that first acquired such technologies.

Already since the Cold War have the possibilities of the various methods of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation been tested, albeit with mixed results. The first, essentially of a normative nature, aspires to the


14. Intended to achieve the prohibition of the development, production, storage, transference, and the use of chemical weapons, it is already celebrating its tenth Conference of Member States (planned for November 2005). Open to signing since January 1993 and in force since the 29th of April 1997, it already has 171 member states. The organization responsible for its development and maintenance has a website (www.opcw.org) permanently updated.

15. This is the oldest treaty in force with respect to WMD. As stated on the website of the organization responsible for its development and maintenance (www.opbw.org), since its beginnings on the 10th of April 1972 (in force since 26th of March 1979) already 169 countries have signed (of which 153 have already ratified the Convention).

16. The Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization has an updated website (www.ctbt.org), currently focussing on the next conference in order to facilitate the entry into force of the treaty (New York, 21-23 September 2005). It is important to point out that the treaty does not enter into force until it has been signed by 44 states that are listed in its Annex II (those that have nuclear reactors or nuclear research programs). Of those, 41 have already signed but only 33 have ratified so far (among those that have not done so are the United States as well as China, but also Egypt, Israel and Iran). In more general terms, it is interesting to note that 177 states have signed the treaty, and a 122 of those have ratified so far.

17. This is an informal and voluntary association of countries created in 1987 (initially by the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Germany and Italy but currently it has 34 member states). Its principal objective, as stated on its website (www.mtcr.info) is to avoid proliferation of unmanned vehicles for WMD by coordinating export policies with respect to such technology.

reduction and elimination of WMD by means of a framework of treaties, agreements and organizations that oblige the states of the international community to comply with specific objectives. These are usually in the form of prohibition of certain processes, and of which the compliance is monitored over time. The second, which is of a clearly coercive nature, can be considered reactive in the sense that it attempts to respond to a reality of proliferation that is in development or has already materialized. This can even reach a situation of physical destruction of such programs in developments or accumulated arsenals if it is considered necessary.

In contrast to the former, this latter case is hardly concerned with multilateral responses, instead depending on unilateral military action by those who feel most threatened by the proliferation. There is no doubt that a future with no further proliferation is impossible without the use of both methods, but there is an unfortunate tendency at the moment towards counter-proliferation. Meanwhile, non-proliferation continues to lose strength as a result of its marginalization on the international security agenda and the attacks and delegitimization that it suffers from those who are supposed to be its principal defenders. The weakness of the instruments of non-proliferation is, in any case, one of the arguments that can go some way in explaining the growing inclination of the actual US government towards counter-proliferation.

The current status of the NPT is a good example of the above, of which the recent VII Review Conference (New York, 2-27 of May, 2005) offers us an up-to-date and gloomy picture of its development. Presented as a weak and inefficient tool to accomplish its objectives, it seems to move towards becoming an instrument in order to defend the interests of those nations that are most powerful. This movement fits into a wider picture with similar behaviour intended to weaken the set of multilateral mechanisms of security whenever they seem to resist subordination to those pretending to lead the international scene. The path chosen in this case combines the accusations of the inability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid the violations of the treat and impose truly effective sanctions against its perpetrators, together with the application of double standards with respect to the behaviour of certain nations (the examples of Israel, India and Pakistan –countries that never signed the NPT– are probably the most notorious).

Thus, it seems to be forgotten that the NPT is, simultaneously, a system of deterrence (promoted by nuclear states as a method of achieving greater stability in general) and abstinence (which attempt to convince non-nuclear states to renounce their original rights to develop these weapons and to convince those who already possess nuclear weapons to eventually renounce them). From this point of view it is obvious that there exists a

19. The Nuclear Posture Review of June, 2001, and the National Strategy to Combat WMD, of December 2002, are public documents that in a clear manner capture the thinking of the actual administration with respect to these matters.

20. These concepts are those used by William Walker in “Nuclear order and disorder”, International Affairs, Vol. 76:4, October 2000.
disequilibrium between the efforts to avoid the emergence of new nuclear states (traditionally known as horizontal proliferation) and those that try to avoid the further development of weapons by those states that already possess them (the so-called vertical proliferation).

In this respect it is helpful to point out that with the exception of Russia, involved together with the United States in a process of bilateral negotiations on real reductions (although insufficient and currently halted), both France as well as Great Britain and China have shown a distinct lack of interest in applying the rules of the NPT to their own cases. The most visible consequence of this is an extreme weakening and delegitimization of multilateral efforts that attempt to halt other potential proliferators.

This does not mean that all responsibility should be on the shoulders of a single country, especially when there are others that show a similar attitude or even move away from any type of commitment. Nor is this an attempt to deny the imperfections of the treaty which have allowed countries such as Iraq (during some period of time), North Korea and Libya (with Iran’s case still in need of clarification) to develop programs aimed at obtaining nuclear weapons regardless of being signatory states of the NPT. Rather, this is a call for ending the use of a double standard which makes the problem not the possession of nuclear weapons in itself, but rather the profile of the proliferating state. This practice is destroying the efforts to improve the multilateral instruments which are at our disposal at the moment.

It is undeniable that the NPT is a treaty with significant margin for improvement and that, in similar fashion, the IAEA requires changes in its operations in order to make it more effective. However, none of this should make us forget that its historical balance from today’s perspective is much more positive than its promoters thirty-five years ago could have imagined. Indeed, faced with the gloomy perspective of a world that had been predicted to contain almost forty nuclear states by the end of the last century21, at the moment we can verify as members of the nuclear club the five official nuclear powers with hardly any new additions, namely Israel, India, Pakistan and, very recently, North Korea22. During this process, there has been the aban-

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21. This is from a well known report published in 1977 by Le Nouvel Observateur, according to which there would be at that moment 39 countries capable of joining the nuclear club. Of those, only Israel, India and Pakistan have de facto joined this group (and North Korea in this decade), while doubts remain with respect to Iran (even though according to that report it would only take the country five years to take the final steps).

22. Parallel to this, with respect to the nuclear capacity of the United States and Russia, significant reductions have been achieved. This has been the result of negotiations on arms control and disarmament achieved through strictly bilateral efforts. As a consequence, the current estimates (SIPRI Yearbook 2005) estimate that around 13,000 nuclear warheads are currently operational worldwide. Of those, 4,500 are American (according to the negotiations they will be 3,700 by 2007 and 1,700-2,200 by 2012). On its part, Russia has currently around 3,800 which are forecasted to be reduced to 1,500-2,000 by 2007). At some distance the others can be found: China (400), France (350), Israel (200) and Great Britain (185).
Abandonment of nuclear programs by various countries and attempts by countries to purchase nuclear devices directly. Such countries vary wildly in their defence policies, ranging from Argentina, South Africa and Spain to Libya, to name a few. In a similar way success has been achieved through the approval of the Additional Protocol of the NPT. This is a good example of what multilateral diplomacy can achieve, increasing the capabilities of the IAEA to perform more intrusive and unexpected inspections in countries that are suspected of violating the NPT.

These are obviously advances in the right direction that cannot solely be attributed to the NPT or the IAEA, but neither would have been possible were it not for the help of these international mechanisms23. Now, while all the attention is centred exclusively on the cases of Iran and North Korea, there seems to be a distinctly pessimistic atmosphere as the direct result of the already mentioned VII Review Conference. Similarly to former occasions, it was ended without even an official statement. Seen from a historical perspective, a clear movement backward can be observed when this conference is compared to the expectations generated in 1995, when it was agreed upon to maintain the validity of the NPT indefinitely, or when compared to the year Review Conference of 2000.

In 1995, the image of a world free of nuclear arms did not seem that utopian in the framework of a renewed optimism stimulated by the end of the bipolar confrontation. On that occasion the idea of maintaining the NPT as point of permanent reference was introduced. In time all the mutual commitments were renewed to further strengthen its basic pillars: negotiation, in good faith, between nuclear states in order to quickly advance the reduction and elimination of their arsenals and the renunciation of others with respect to future nuclear plans. Simultaneously, agreement was reached with respect to submitting civil nuclear programs to international scrutiny in exchange for receiving nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Thanks to this same momentum a specific resolution was advanced with respect to the Middle East, in which a region free of nuclear weapons was forecast as well as, afterwards, the approval of the Additional Protocol of 1997, already mentioned.

The Review Conference of 2000 served to emphasise the global commitments of complete nuclear disarmament. All of this could be achieved in spite of the negative effects caused by the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan (1998) as well as the rejection by the United States Senate (1999) of the ratification of the CTBT (forgetting that it had been exactly this country that had pushed most vigorously for this treaty during its negotiation process in Geneva of 1994-96). The most promising result from this meeting was the development and approval by its 188

23. A good analysis of the reasons why countries take certain decisions with respect to nuclear weapons can be found in K. Campbell, R. Einhorn, M. Reiss (eds) (2004): The nuclear tipping point: why states reconsider their nuclear choices, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC.
member states of a list that set out a detailed process to achieve progressive and systematic nuclear disarmament through thirteen stages.

One has to interpret the events of the VII Conference in a very different light. As indicated above, 9/11 has become a catalyst accelerating a reaction that was already put on the agenda by those in charge of the US government. This provoked an effect that pulled the international security agenda towards its current obsession with international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as basically the only threats that needs to be addressed. The conference did not manage to avoid the negative consequences of such a climate of a return to reactive, militaristic and unilateral options that end up considering the preventive, multidimensional and multilateral approaches to be irrelevant (if not counterproductive). As if this was not enough, the withdrawal of North Korea from its NPT obligations (in January 2003) and the scandal provoked that very same year by unmasking the involvement of high-ranking Pakistanis in a truly global market in nuclear products and technology—with a clear agenda of proliferation—completely ended any hope for improvement of the control mechanisms in this area. The lack of a final document is, among other causes, the immediate result of the impossibility to fit together the agendas of Iran—that refused any explicit reference with respect to its own situation—, Egypt—which during a number of days blocked debate and demanded the creation of a subsidiary of the IAEA specifically for the Middle East, in line with the repeated objective of the creation of a WMD-free zone—and the United States and some of its western allies—pledged, without success, to employ the existing mechanisms to accommodate its own particular interests. Consequently, none of the three commissions active during the conference (nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament; security measures and matters of regional security; peaceful use of nuclear energy) managed to reach an agreement.

Looking to the future it is not clear how it will be possible to overcome the current blockade. It is evident, however, that there are significant

23. A good analysis of the reasons why countries take certain decisions with respect to nuclear weapons can be found in K. Campbell, R. Einhorn, M. Reiss (eds) (2004): The nuclear tipping point: why states reconsider their nuclear choices, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC.

24. Essentially, this involved: 1. Rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 2. Test moratorium pending entry into force of CTBT. 3. Negotiate a treaty banning fissile material production for weapons. 4. Establish a body under the Committee of Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament. 5. Acceptance of irreversibility of nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. 6. Commitment of nuclear weapon-states to weapons elimination under NPT Article VI. 7. Steps by such states to achieve elimination including early emphasis on non-strategic weapons, great transparency of procedures, reducing operational status of systems and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. 8. Early entry into force of START II, the negotiation of START III and related treaties and preserving and strengthening of the ABM Treaty. 9. Completion and implementation of Trilateral Initiative between the US, Russia and the IAEA. 10. Placing of excess fissile material under IAEA or other international verification and disposition of such material for peaceful purposes. 11. Re-affirmation of the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. 12. Regular reporting within the NPT framework. 13. Further development of verification procedures required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament procedures.
dangers in the rejection of the CTBT, as maintained in Washington, and the lack of institutional strengthening of the IAEA (without neither administrative nor executive capacity to respond to urgent matters). Nor would it be surprising if the current situation, and the way that the attitude of the United States is perceived in certain circles, would impede the development of proposals such as Resolution 1540 of the Security Council of the United Nations\textsuperscript{25} or the Proliferation Security Initiative\textsuperscript{26}, both directly promoted by the US. The current situation seems to indicate that what has been achieved, in any case, by countries such as the US, Great Britain, or France, is the termination of the disarmament agenda in thirteen stages developed in the year 2000. With respect to reductions and priority to consider, it only needs to be confirmed that the truly valid agenda is the one that stems from fear of the rise in the number of nuclear states (with Iran and North Korea on the foreground) and from the fact that these weapons could be used by terrorist networks. Meanwhile, the countries remain with their backs turned towards the dangers to global security of the arsenals that are already in the possession of nuclear powers.

With respect to the other treaties and conventions on arms control and disarmament of WMD, none of them seems to be in particularly good health. It is only important to point out that, as a general consideration, they suffer from similar problems as the NPT and that, in spite of their limitations, they also helped achieve—within their respective areas—the halting of what was uncontrolled proliferation during the Cold War.

Finally, and without any pretension of completeness, the pages above first of all try to show how WMD in the Mediterranean respond to processes and conditioning factors that put very diverse variables into play. These are all interconnected in such a way that it is impossible to analyze the issue of WMD without taking them into account. There is little use in approaching this matter in a simplistic fashion that attempts to show that the behaviour of countries within the region is based on structures that are ungrounded or based on irrational arguments. This leads to ineffective discrediting based on supposed “axes of evil” which in no way contribute to the solution of problems that may exist. Instead, it is an attempt to impose limits and controls that will not be accepted by other actors. Considering the issue in such a way does not lead to a revision of one’s own role, assigning to oneself a certain pretence of superiority that is not only founded on one’s military might but also in a supposed moral superiority and a rationality that acts as a safeguard against any type of criticism.

\textsuperscript{25} Approved unanimously on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of April 2004, it structures the attempts to avoid that terrorist groups could get access to WMD. It demands from the states that they provide the capacity to guard and control the technology, instruments and sensitive materials, in order to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.

\textsuperscript{26} Announced by President Bush on the 31\textsuperscript{st} of May 2003, this is a multilateral mechanism through which the eleven founding member states (and those who afterwards join its activities) commit themselves to the development of legal, diplomatic, economic and military instruments to short-circuit the transfer channels of WMD towards state actors or non-governmental proliferators.
On the other hand, what defines these conditioning factors is the behavioural field in which we have to move in order to modify the negative trends that stimulate the proliferation of WMD. Looking at the few positive results so far it is important to point out that the strategies based on deterrence, including counter-proliferation, seem to require greater efforts with respect to the immense capacity of politics, diplomacy and economics to modify models and apparently unmoveable considerations. Responding to the attempts of proliferation of WMD exclusively through the use of force —either as much or more than that it is aimed at— without modifying the conditioning factors that feed the process, confuses the aims and only contributes to exacerbating the level of insecurity in which we already live.

III. Data analysis and examination of the Mediterranean

In the history on the 20th Century, the first use of chemical weapons occurred during the First World War, while biological weapons were introduced by Japan against China during the Second World War. Nuclear weapons have, since 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki as sad moments of reference which are commemorated annually. The Mediterranean is in no way a region unaffected by such violent dynamics. This was already shown in 1917 of which there is written evidence of the use of chemical gases against tribes that rebelled against Great Britain in order to unify and rule what is now known as Iraq. Afterwards, other countries —such as Egypt in the 1960’s (also using chemical weapons during the civil war in Yemen) and Iraq during the early 1990’s— have imitated the former colonial powers. This has been the case —as we shall see below— of Israel (practically from the inception of its creation as a state) as well as of Syria and many other countries in the region that have chosen a door towards proliferation —albeit to different extents— that has remained open ever since.

Understood as simply another element of policies of security and defence structured primarily in such a way as to attend to their own internal problems and their troubled relationships with their southern neighbours (and not so much of an offensive policy towards their northern neighbours), the WMD are a tangible reality in the region. The abundance of openly armed conflicts, both in the past as well as the present, increases the perception of danger as their use could be considered as an option by an actor involved in such a conflict. In any case, it is a fact that until now, and contradicting alarmist message frequently propagated, also in this part of the world the rules of deterrence and of rational constraint with respect to an element so definitive as WMD, have worked properly.

Purely for descriptive purposes, while keeping in mind that security of the region can only be understood properly if analysed together with the developments in its three main sub-regions and its Northern coastline, the pages that follow will continue to present a general picture of

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27. See the Annex for the following tables (with the complete list of the countries mentioned in the section): I. CWC and BWC Treaties; II. Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs; III. Treaties on Nuclear Proliferation; IV. Weapons of Mass Destruction; V. Chemical and Biological arsenals; VI. Nuclear Programs and Capacities; VII. Nuclear Installations; and VIII. Missiles.
WMD and the attempts of proliferation in the Maghreb, the Near East and the Middle East.

The relative tranquillity of the Maghreb

In comparative terms there can be no doubt that—despite the internal tension, the difficult relations among neighbours, and the survival of the Saharan conflict—the five countries that together form the Maghreb present an image that is less worrisome than that of the rest of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. This fact is clearly reflected by the lesser extend of arms accumulation of the sub-region. The main sources of destabilisation are—and have been for a long time—more socio-political and economical than military. This is the result of a widespread incapacity to consolidate models that adequately reflect the necessities and desires of the growing population in the area. In any case, with respect to the matter of military threats, and more specifically those related to WMD proliferation, most of the attentions has been fundamentally centred on Libya and, until recently, Algeria.

It is widely recognised that neither Morocco nor Tunisia, both signatories of the main treaties and conventions on WMD (as can be seen in Tables I and III), pose any type of risk in this matter. The only thing that is worth reviewing is that the former announced already in 1992 its intention of developing its first nuclear centre to be ready by 2010, whereas the latter started in 1990 with its first nuclear reactor.

With respect to Mauritania, the moderate unrest that was generated among its surroundings during the past decade was not so much provoked by a true eagerness for proliferation but rather as a result of structural weakness. Besides the opinion one can have about the intentions of its leaders, one of the direct effects of this extreme fragility has been the difficulty in having the means, both human as well as technical, to adequately attend to its exterior compromises, accrediting personnel for international organisations and attending to the legal requirements that regulate international relations. On the other hand, this deficiency was likely to be taken advantage of by other actors to their own benefit, risking a situation in which the country would become a piece to be moved around by other governments (as when there were rumours, never confirmed, that it could be the destination for Iraqi missiles which Saddam Hussein intended to save from the hands of the UN inspectors after his defeat in 1991).

It cannot be said, however, that Mauritania has dispelled all doubts, not only because its policy of security and defence remains an unknown after its regime change, but also because of the matters that are still to be dealt with when it comes to proliferation of WMD. It was only at the end of 1993 that the country decided to deposit its application in order to adhere to the NPT and still to this day it remains at the sidelines of the

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28. It needs to be pointed out that some sources do not mention the construction of this first reactor. See for example Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies: (www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/toc.html#Charts).
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. In spite of all that, when it comes to the three countries mentioned so far in this section, none of them can be said to have any type of WMD nor are there any indications that such a program is in development.

The main regional concern during the beginnings of the past decade came from the outbreak of the Algerian crisis and a suspicious direction towards proliferation. Currently—with the crisis seemingly dampened, although unsettling doubts remain and continue to be pending the reforms that would permit the country to take on its future with greater hope—Algeria remains attempting to completely dispel the unknowns about its aspirations to obtain WMD, especially in the nuclear arena. Albeit with a significant dose of ambiguity and resistance, the matter experienced a very positive development in 1995 when finally the Algerian government decided to adhere to the NPT and the Convention on Chemical Weapons in 1993, followed by the CTBT in 1996.

Until this moment, mistrust was directed towards the behaviour of certain politicians with the armed forces as a powerful actor in the shadows, who seemed to aim for WMD as a priority in their attempts to overthrow the competition in order to achieve hegemony in the Maghreb. This drift, combined with a hypothetical scenario in which a radical Islamic group obtained power, significantly augmented the fears of western foreign ministries which were attempting to force the country to renounce the programs it had in development.

The most important of such programs was the construction of the nuclear reactor of El Salam (Ain Oussera, 125 km to the south of Algiers), operational since the 21st of December 1993. Added to this was the discovery of important uranium deposits in the surrounding of Hoggar, to the southeast of the country. The step from the small research reactor in Nour (of 1 Mw), inaugurated in 1989 with the help of Argentina, to the reactor of Ain Oussera built with Chinese technology, had a significant impact on the threat assessment of the region. Algeria was in those days not a member of the NPT and the reactor was situated in a no-fly zone, without connections to the national electricity network and estimated to have a capacity of 15Mw (in any case inferior to the 40 that some sources estimated29). Clearly, this was a situation that did not soothe concerns in the middle of a violent situation which the country was experiencing. When the accusations of its secret construction were repeated (it was the American CIA which made its existence public in January 1991, even though estimations put the initial construction activities around 1983-84), the unrest only increased. It seemed to be a project that, in similar fashion as the situation in Iran currently, did not fit a country with immense wealth in hydrocarbon and which, in principle, did not seem to require such a technically as well as economically demanding effort in order to cover its energy needs.

Now that Algeria seems to have left behind its dark decade, the situation with respect to WMD is developing into a more positive profile,
even if there are still certain steps taken that seems to indicate a resistance to completely abandon this phase. This is demonstrated by the fact that only in 2001 the country started adhering to the BWC, whereas the world has had to wait until 2003 before the CTBT was finally ratified (since its initial signing in 1996) and until 2004 to see that NPT Additional Protocol approved. Perhaps all of this explains the fact that Algeria still continues to appear in the analyses of WMD as a country that could possibly have active unknown programs with respect to chemical and biological warfare. However, even in the hypothetical case that such programs exist, they would be very far from their objectives and, therefore also far from being a credible threat to the region. The same can be said about the limited Algerian capabilities of launching possible WMD (currently there is no evidence that long-range missiles exist in its arsenals and only its ten Su-24 bombers and its forty Mig-23BN could potentially serve as delivery vehicles).

Summing up, and without acknowledging the complete disappearance of proliferating tendencies, it can be affirmed that Algeria no longer steers up the anxiety it once did.

**Libya**, on its part, is only starting to overcome the international ostracising that it has suffered during the last twenty years. Both of a result of its own mistakes as well as judgements not always well-founded with respect to its initiatives and intentions, the country has been perceived to be a clear proliferator in practically all the areas of WMD. One look at the past presents us with a regime that, despite its status of signatory of the NPT since 1968, seems to have attempted to access nuclear weapons in various ways (partially financed through the Pakistani nuclear program; paying part of the Indian external debt in exchange for components; technology and even the bomb itself; attempting to hire or contact nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union or some western company...). Despite these signs, neither the existence of a nuclear reactor of 10 Mw of Soviet origin –situated in Tarhunah 30 (50 km east of Tripoli) and operational since 1981– nor a project of apparently less capacity in the coastal area of the Gulf of Sirte, change the idea that Libya is still very far away from developing nuclear weapon capabilities.

In any case, it is perhaps the country’s attempts to obtain chemical weapons and its palpable interest in missile systems that are needed to use these types of arms that drew most attention during the past decade. Once again it was the United States in 1990 that made it public that Libya was developing chemical weapons in its plant at Rabta. More specifically, in 1994 it was estimated that its chemical arsenal could already contain 50MT of mustard gas and around 20-30MT of Sarin gas. The concern about this plant –made operational through companies of satellite countries of Moscow, but also with the assistance of suppliers

30. The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, on the other hands, mentions a reactor at Tadjoura of 5 Mw: (http://www.tau.ac.il/ccs/balance/Libya.pdf) and Global Security.org refers to chemical installations (not nuclear) at Tarhunah (www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/tarhuna.htm).
from Argentina, Brazil, China and North Korea— was exacerbated by sus-
picions about another, subterranean, facility in the area of Tarhunah, as
well as by other news on Iraqi technology acquisition for the construc-
tion of a biological weapons factory. In short, the picture was rather
destabilising, especially when taken into account the repeated efforts to
acquire missiles of ranges longer than 1,000 km. —such as the North
Korean Nodong-1— that were much superior the Scud-B and other simi-
lar missiles in the Libyan arsenal (all of which had a reach less than
1,000km)\textsuperscript{31}.

The combination of such proliferation behaviour and a foreign policy
perceived as erratic and destabilising explains the negative image that
Libya presented during the early years of that decade. This image —not
to mention its connection with international terrorism (such as
Lockerbie, for example)— fundamentally came from Libya’s resistance
to integrate into multilateral non-proliferation frameworks, from its
accumulation of conventional arms (much more than simply for defen-
"sive purposes), from its chemical arsenals (deployed as operational
components of its armed forces and already used in 1987), from its
biological weapons research programs, and from its incessant search
for missile capabilities. Perhaps because of all this, the surprise was
even greater when on the 19\textsuperscript{th} of December 2003 the Yamahiriya
regime announced its intention to abandon its WMD efforts and to
work together with Great Britain and the United States to completely
stop those programs.

Once the Lockerbie case was overcome, it became possible to end
nine months of discrete negotiations between the three countries. It
was a clear example of the qualities of diplomacy and the political
sense of the Libyan government which understood the urgent necessi-
ty to modify its course as a consequence of 9/11. This decision —as
well as others that are not part of this report— resulted in an instant
improvement of its image, facilitating its reincorporation into the
international community, and freeing itself from the pressure it had
been under for its supposed support to international terrorism as well
as its WMD proliferation. Besides opening its doors to British and
American experts in order to carry out the destruction of its programs
and arsenals through verifiable methods and with international wit-
nesses, Libya has also been quick in joining the main non-proliferation
frameworks (the CWC and the Additional Protocol of the NPT in
2004, as well as depositing its adhesion to the CTBT, which it had
already signed in 2002).

Summarising, it can be safely stated that the five member states of the
Maghreb Arab Union do not pose a serious proliferation risk at present,
not at a Mediterranean level and even less at a global level. However, it
is important keep in mind that none of them —similarly to other regions
worldwide— is completely free from the traditional motives that feed the
desire for proliferation.

\textsuperscript{31} See Diagram I in the Annex.
Israel and its Arab neighbours

The only real initiative, although without any true results, attempting to halt armament proliferation in the Middle East has come from the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group as part of the multilateral negotiations of the Peace Process initiated in Madrid (1991). During the short period of time in which it was active, its work never went further than the failed attempt to create confidence and security building measures, without any possibility to advance non-proliferation of weapons (not even of conventional weapons, let alone WMD) because of strong Israeli opposition. This is the harsh reality that needs to be taken into account when we analyse such a difficult area as the one of Israel and its neighbours.

With all the difficulties that are involved in identifying one country as the principal regional proliferator, in the Mediterranean there seems to be a consensus on awarding this title to Israel. For very distinct reasons and with the repeated denials or official ambiguity in this regard32, Israel is currently the main military power in the region. This is based not only on its obvious conventional superiority (not so much in numbers but rather measured in battlefield performance) but also on its chemical and nuclear arsenals to which one can add a wide array of delivery vehicles that are fully operational. This has makes Israel the main point of reference in the Near East (and even the Maghreb and Middle East) when it comes to such issues as rearmament, and the other nations can consequently be regarded as reactive proliferators (although not everything related to WMD can be exclusively explained in terms of Arab-Israeli opposition).

Presently, now that there seems to be a return of expectations and hope—albeit not very well founded—about peace in the region after the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from Gaza, it is useful to remember that time has hardly altered the perception of threats between the two opposing sides. The same can be said about their policies of security and defence. It is true that open warfare between Arabs and Israeli has become very unlikely, but it is similarly unlikely that the multiple sources of destabilising tensions can be turned around in the foreseeable future. These tensions, among other things, are an important motivator of WMD proliferation.

Broadly speaking, the situation in this sense is characterised by the Israeli nuclear monopoly that has been comfortably introduced among the other global nuclear powers through the unquestionable support of Washington. On their part, Arab governments seem to move between on the one hand continuously denouncing the threat this monopoly signifies to the region, while on the other had attempting to compensate for this strategic disadvantage through their own procurement of chemical and biological weapons. In this way there exists, for decades already, an incessant proliferation spiral that has made the Mediterranean in its totality the most militarised region on the planet.

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32. Since 1969 there exists an agreement between Israel and the United States in which the former refuses to declare whether it possesses nuclear weapons or not, while renouncing nuclear tests. All of this done in order not to stimulate further proliferation.
Israel justifies its behaviour of proliferation with the idea that it cannot, without exception, depend on others to guarantee its permanently threatened existence. It is very much aware that—knowing that its existence with clearly defined and secure borders has still not been accepted by its neighbours—it is impossible to make its frontiers invulnerable and that its territory (especially before 1967) is strategically weak. All of this, combined with a point of view still burdened by a Cold War mentality, has lead to sustained and very costly efforts with respect to human resources, economics, science, and, obviously, the military. In its own analysis, Israel seems convinced that this urgent necessity of maintaining strategic superiority with respect to all its neighbours would be too costly and, possibly, insufficient as a deterrent, if it is only based on conventional armed forces. As a result, and ever since the early days of its existence as a state, Israeli leadership saw the nuclear option as the best way to achieve its national objectives within a framework of almost permanent confrontation. On this basis, and for a long time already, Israel has adopted an approach to national security that obliges it to maintain a nuclear monopoly in the region at all costs. A consequence of this mindset is that Israel is impervious to the idea that its own approach is actually creating insecurity and instability in the region, stimulating its Arab neighbours to resort to proliferation.

In any case, the facts clearly show the fallacy of this supposed military autonomy. On one hand, Israel enjoys powerful external support from Washington, which guarantees a military defence much superior to its own armed forces. At the same time, its military potential—including WMD—would never have been what it is without direct support from military powers such as France and the United States, not to mention South Africa, in order to develop its programs and nuclear arsenals. Throughout the years, Israel has known that Washington—its ultimate guarantor of security will support it in any conflict that may threaten Israel’s existence in order to avoid the use of WMD. In this way, the Israeli nuclear arsenal does not only constitute an important factor of deterrence with respect to the Arab nations, but also acts as a guarantee of US support.

Parallel to these dynamics, Israel maintains its course that it has been on for many years. It continues to refuse adherence to the NPT and its Additional Protocol and to the BWC (although it did sign the CWC in 1993, without ever ratifying, and the CTBT in 1996) based on the premise that such frameworks cannot be applied to a region that suffers from a conflict as the one that Israel has with its neighbours. In its scarce declarations on this issue, Israeli policymakers defend the idea of a world free of WMD, but at the same time repeat that it would be

34. It is sufficient to cite the example of what happened in 1981, when Israeli fighter planes bombed the nuclear reactor in Osiraq, Iraq, at a moment when Saddam Hussein was still a strong ally of the West. In similar fashion serves the example of the emphasis that has been put by Israel on combining international efforts in order to keep Iraq and Iran from obtaining WMD.
impossible to apply to this specific region. In this respect, they can count on majority support from its internal public opinion. This was shown once again with the liberation of Mordejai Vanunu—known for his revelations about the nuclear arsenal that Israel possessed until the 1980’s in 2004 after eighteen years in prison. Similarly, there exists a practically unmoveable consensus on this matter between the different political forces. In their own opinion, Israel has always been a responsible international actor and they do not perceive their country in any way as bearing responsibility for the arms race that exists in the region. The idea that its possession of WMD stimulates a process of imitation by its neighbours is rejected. In such circumstances, nothing should be expected from the periodical visits that IAEA inspectors make in order to incorporate Israel into the dynamics of non-proliferation. These inspectors are considered completely ineffective by Tel Aviv, given their inability to halt cases such as those of Libya, Iraq and Iran. In the other direction, it also seems very unlikely that Israel manages to become part of the Committee of Governors of the Agency.

On the other hand, Israel considers that a hypothetical renouncement of WMD would only create greater instability in the region as its neighbours would feel that a direct attack on the country—-they still consider their enemy—would have a greater chance of success. For the Israeli strategists, the types of threats have not changed significantly (if before they were coming from Egypt, Syria or Iraq, now they come from Iran) and thus the necessity to possess a weapon of the last resort has not changed, as it is likely to prevent the actualisation of the eternal nightmare of being expelled from what is considered its land. Consequently, the trends do no indicate a renunciation of such capabilities in order to reduce tensions and generate a mutual trust that has been inexistent up to now. On the contrary, the recent indicators seem to point to Israel—highly concerned with what is already considered a fact (Iran’s imminent access to nuclear weapons)—being inclined to start following Washington by considering nuclear devices as an adequate weapon for certain combat situations (as can be deduced from its Comprehensive Strategic Review of 1999). Likewise, it is considering making its nuclear capabilities public at some point in the future, something which could show its second-strike capacity after a nuclear attack.

Lastly, and despite the well-known obstacles of climbing the official wall of silence and ambiguity, the international community assumes that Israel possesses both operational nuclear weapons as well as those of a chemical and biological kind. At the very least it has active research programs on chemical weapons and the offensive use of the biological types, albeit with an unknown level of progress (report cited above of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace refers to an ambitious

35. During his last visit to the region (from the 6th to the 8th of July 2004, the first visit since 1998), the head of the Agency, the Egyptian Mohamed El Baradei, could hardly reiterate his eternal request that Israel incorporates into the NPT without being met with a repeat counterarguments well-known already. In practice, the IAEA—of which Israel is a member since its creation in 1957—inspectors were confronted once again with limits on their movement during the inspection of the Nahal Soreq reactor, without even the possibility of getting close to Dimona.
program that would allow it to already make use of anthrax and other advanced agents, as well as toxins). Practically all of the consulted sources indicate that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of roughly 200 warheads\(^\text{36}\). The Dimona complex\(^\text{37}\), built with French help and permanently upgraded ever since its activities started in 1963, as well as the capacity to put satellites in orbit\(^\text{38}\) and to build its own missiles (it is estimated that the country possesses, among other ballistic and cruise missiles, around 50 Jericho-I with a range of 600 km., and up to 100 Jericho-2, with a range of 1,500 km) are sufficient evidence of Israeli power of WMD, to which one should also add the Shavit missile, with a capacity to transport a load of 1,000 kg. over a distance of 4,500 km\(^\text{39}\).

Despite what can be understood as an initial approximation of the Arab perspective with respect to this situation, it is certainly not easy to identify common grounds between those nations with respect to their posture besides the traditional rejection of Israel (which also differs significantly between the various cases). It is therefore highly problematic to speak of an Arab point of view with respect to VMD\(^\text{40}\). Egypt is, in any case, the country that has more than any other country introduced ideas and proposals intended to serve as a common strategy, although they have not always been met with the support of other Arab states. In its efforts to lead the Arab world, it has attempted to mobilise the rest of the twenty-two nations that constitute the Arab League, or, at the very least, mobilise Israel’s immediate neighbours, in order to force the latter country as well as the international community, towards accepting its ideas.

According to the way it prefers to view the situation, regional security from an Arab perspective is based on the conviction that the Israeli nuclear monopoly is the main threat to be considered. Consequently, the minimum objective needs to be to break the current subordination for some and humiliation for others that is caused by this. It also needs to be considered that there exists a widely held consensus that the international community (the United States and the United Nations as its main points of reference) applies a double standard when it comes to

\(^{36}\) A classic analysis and still very relevant about the Israeli nuclear capabilities can be found in: Seymour Hersh (1991): The Samson option: Israel’s nuclear arsenal and American foreign policy, Random House, New York.

\(^{37}\) Estimations about its capacity vary between 15 to 40 kilos of plutonium annually, which would permit up to six warheads per year. The Israeli nuclear system is completed by the already mentioned research reactor of Nahal Soreq, which has a capacity of 5 Mw and has been operational since 1960.

\(^{38}\) The first successful launches with the Offeq I and II rockets were in September of 1988 and April of 1990.

\(^{39}\) All of this without even mentioning its F-15, F-16, F-4E and Phantom 2000 airplanes which, due to the Israeli capacity to refuel in midair can transport nuclear loads over even larger distances if that were necessary. Furthermore, there are indications that its Popeye cruise missiles, as well as its Dolphin Class submarines, can equally carry nuclear loads (Cordeman, 2002).

judging the acts committed by both sides of the conflict. This is especially evident when it comes to demanding the application of resolutions on the matter. All of this feeds a mixed sentiment of impotence and rebellion that eventually results in a disdain for international law, considered to be ineffective with respect to solving pending problems. Moreover, it causes options based on the threat of violence as well as its actual use to be viewed as the only paths worth considering.

Despite repeated attempts, usually spearheaded by Cairo, this general attitude has never led to specifying a plan of action with well defined dimensions. As has been witnessed once again during the most recent NPT Review Conference, Egypt does not seem able to persuade the other Arab countries to form a common front against Israel. It shows the divergence of internal positions and its traditional suspicions as well as the capability of Washington to use its influence in order to break any agreement within the group. On the other hand, if such a plan would actually one day be put into action, one of the most obvious results would be the acceleration of the arms race, not only to emulate Israel (which would increase the level of risk even more), but also as a reflection of inter-Arab rivalries.

With respect to the capabilities of Arab countries in the field of WMD—and without having any doubt about the overwhelming superiority that Israel has over each separate country individually as well as combined—there is an equally wide range of positions. Whereas some countries, such as Jordan or Lebanon41, do not even appear on the horizon, others, such as Egypt or Syria cause concern given their clear option of proliferation.

Although it follows in Israel’s footsteps by officially denying evidence, it is a convincingly demonstrated fact that Egypt not only possesses chemical weapons in its military arsenals, but that it also—at least during the 1960’s—had capacity to produce them (with the help of, among others, China, North Korea and Iraq, as well as France, Great Britain and Argentina). Whereas the nuclear option only seems to have been contemplated seriously until the second half of the 1970’s42, its interest in chemical43 and biological44 weapons is characteristic of Egyptian attitudes with respect to security, attempting to compensate the Israeli forces in one way or other. Combined with its missile capabilities (from the Frog-7, with a range of hardly 40 km, to the Badar-2000, with

41. Although this country is one of only ten countries that has not yet signed the CWC, as well as refusing to adhere to the NPT Additional Protocol or the CTBT, it is common knowledge that this posture is much more the effect that Damascus has over Beirut, rather than an unthinkable Lebanese desire to proliferate.

42. Egypt, part of the NPT since 1981, is likely to have abandoned its program after its defeat in 1967 and currently only has two nuclear research reactors, both situated in Inshas, with a capacity of 2 MW and 22 MW respectively.

43. It was the first country in the Near East to possess and use them. Its arsenals have never been confirmed to be destroyed, because of which they are assumed to still be conserved.

44. Its program was set up during the sixties and during the seventies Washington took it as given that Egypt had operational capabilities.
roughly 1,000 km, without ignoring the more classic Scud-B of 300 km. and the subsequent development of the Scud-C), the eventual picture that emerges is one of hardly a credible deterrence to its potential adversaries.

Even though it is true that, as was mentioned above, Egypt is a signatory to the NPT, it has been an important advocate of the Pelindaba Treaty\(^\text{45}\) and that it has defended the idea of a Near East free of WMD on various occasions, it has also maintained a posture of rejection to the majority of recent efforts of non-proliferation as a way to force Israel to cede ground. As a consequence, Egypt has been on the sidelines of the NPT Additional Protocol and the CWC (although it signed the CTBT in 1996, without having ratified it so far). So far, it has also decided not to deposit its adherence to the BWC which it signed in 1972.

Syria, no longer recipient of the support it used to receive from Moscow, is facing difficulties in adapting to the new situation the world is in. Part of the reason is that its transition does not seem to get rid of structures and approaches that were already in decline, as well as a regional context in which it is under heavy pressure to, on the one hand, abandon its leadership—mostly symbolic—in the rejection of Israel, and, on the other hand, that it ends its control over Lebanon. All of this is happening while it still attempts to compete with Egypt for regional leadership between Arabs and, at the same time, intends to free itself from Turkish pressures. Moreover, it is trying to re-establish its relationship with Iraq, a traditional rival. Together these may be too many things to handle for a country without sufficient resources to sustain such projects.

However, its WMD capacities cannot be easily dismissed. First of all, and mostly the result of its posture towards Israel and its counterweight with respect to Egypt, Syria attempts to play a double role. Politically and diplomatically, it also launches its own proposals on the complete elimination of WMD in the Mediterranean and, using similar arguments as those of Egypt, it refuses to simultaneously adhere to the NPT Additional Protocol and the CWC, CTBT or ratifying the BWC. On the military side, in the meantime, it maintains significant efforts to keep its chemical capabilities. For a long time already, it has had devices deployed among its armed forces without abandoning its flirtation with biological and even nuclear weapons (even though it has only one small research reactor, situated in Damascus). Similarly, it is maintaining missile capabilities though the addition of the Chinese M-9 and the Russian SS-23 to the Scud-B and C already in its arsenals. In similar fashion as other countries in the region that are caught up in this proliferation dynamic, the Syrian arsenals consist more than anything of external acquisitions (with Russia, China, India and North Korea its principal suppliers) rather than its own

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\(^{45}\) Signed in Cairo on the 11th of April 1996, it establishes a zone free of WMD in Africa. It is expected to enter into force when it is ratified by 28 African members, something which has not yet happened. With respect to the countries of this report, only Algeria (11/2/1998) and Mauritania (24/2/1998) have deposited, whereas Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt itself have only signed (on the day of the treaty’s inception).
weaponry. This is a clear reflection of the insufficient scientific and technological resources within the country. In any case, its resources with respect to WMD make it necessary to consider Syria to be relevant in any regional calculations.

Summarising, and going beyond the real capabilities that each can bring to the table, there exists a fundamental difference between Israelis and Arabs with respect to the use of WMD. Whereas it is conceivable that Israel might use its nuclear arsenals in a case in which its own existence was at stake, it is much more difficult to find a future scenario in which Arab countries would take the same decision (with chemical and biological weapons that are in no way of the same level, neither as a deterrent nor with respect to purely destructive power). It is not only a matter of technical problems with respect to managing their use, which could lead to autodeterrence, as was the case with the Iraqi threat towards Israel in the second Gulf War (1991), nor the fear of Israeli reprisals, but above all the fact that any type of WMD on Israeli soil would convert the Palestinians from the Occupied Territories (of around 3.5 million) and Israel itself (around one million) into direct objectives of such arms. The human, social and political costs that this would represent to any Arab nation make it unthinkable that WMD would be used against their common adversary.

Even if accepting this situation and assuming that there is no possibility of resolving the current problems through military means, that does not mean, as was already indicated above, that there are no reasons in the region to maintain an attitude of open proliferation. Both the calculations with respect to threats other than those stemming form Israel, as well as the combined effect of the conditioning factors mentioned in Section II are sufficient explanations for such behaviour. Put differently, to imagine that the hypothetical solution to the conflict between Israelis and Arabs would translate in an immediate abandonment of proliferating strategies is clearly mistaken, given that such variables also are a response to other factors (in which national, regional and even international issues come together).

While waiting to see what the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will bring, and while understanding that the security problems that the Palestinian might pose are of a very different nature than those involving WMD, it is important to note that so far there have been no significant changes in the attitudes or strategies on either side. The only hopeful sign that is currently available is the already mentioned Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, paralysed ever since the middle of the past decade, given that it achieved (in 1994) a certain consensus about the principals for peace and security in the area, including the possibility of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Although it turned out to be impossible then to commit to the advances made, there still exists hope

46. A chronological overview of the activities of this group can be found in Joel Peters (1994): Building bridges. The Arab-Israeli multilateral talks, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. For an Egyptian interpretation, see Mahmoud Karem (1995): “The Middle East existing status of regional efforts and arrangements”, Arms control and security in the Middle East and the CIS republics (Theodore A. Coulombis/Thanos P. Dokos, eds.), ELIAMEP, Athens, pp. 95/120.
that progress can be made along these lines whenever the political conditions permit.

For it to come true, it would be necessary for Israel to abandon its traditional position that any advance in this area is only possible after the consolidation of peace in the region (learning from cases such as the SALT and START agreements, which were achieved in the middle of the Cold War, and the Pelindaba Treaty which was signed in the African context of continuous conflicts). According to such calculations, it would be from that moment on (which under the last labour government was calculated to be two years after the entry into force of all peace agreements with its neighbours) that it would be possible to start negotiations on a system of arms control and disarmament of all categories of weapons. Similarly, Arab countries would need to shift their usual positions that it is Israeli behaviour that constitutes the principal threat in the region. Only after its renunciation could a process be developed which leads to this ideal. The present dynamics in the region do not favour such significant changes which an agenda of substantial reduction –let alone elimination– of the accumulated arsenals requires. It seems to be more comfortable for those involved to hide behind the inflexibility of the opponent, and use the persistence of conflict as an excuse for further paralysis, rather than to adventure in undesirable waters to those who continue to depend on Cold War schematics.

The Persian Gulf in the middle of the hurricane

It is obvious that, from a purely geographical perspective, none of the countries in the Persian Gulf can be considered Mediterranean. However, it is also clear that one cannot analyse the security of the region without taking them into account as actors directly involved in everything that happens in the Mediterranean. Besides the connections with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict there are other, no less important, links that explain the difficult relationships between the various neighbours. Similarly, there are transnational issues (such as the Kurdish people, spread across various countries), perceptions with respect to extra-regional nations with interests in the area (such as the United States, Russia and China), and a permanent tension between those who aspire to lead the greater region –such as Saudi Arabia, formerly Iraq, and currently Iran– and the others who do not seem convinced by such dynamics. In any case, and given the fact that these pages are centred on the Mediterranean, only those variables that are directly linked to Mediterranean affairs will be taken into account. This, however, does not make any judgement about the importance of other variables that have been left out of the analysis for that reason.

From the perspective of WMD it is well-known that –at least since the late 1980’s until 2003– Iraq had become a true obsession. There is little point, therefore, to repeat the reports by UN inspectors that attempted to lower the level of concern by affirming that the arsenals and programs had been mostly dismantled during the past decade47. In reality, with the Iraqi inten-

47. Please note that the military campaign against Iraq and its false pretenses, as well as the current situation that is highly destabilizing and insecure, fall outside of the scope of this report.
tions deactivated, it is Iran that seems to have become the principal nightmare of the region as a result of its supposed attitude of proliferation at the nuclear level especially. The other countries of the Gulf do not represent worrisome profiles given that their general military weakness does not put them in the category of potential threats, however much their behaviour sometimes seems counterproductive to the regional security.

Before focusing on Iran, it must be highlighted that presently there is no other country in the Gulf with alarming programs that are linked to WMD. Iraq is clearly on the sidelines in this area and, at least for some time, will be controlled by the American presence that will ensure that no new attempts are made⁴⁸. Although this is true, it is important to remember that a problem posed in this area cannot simply be solved through the destruction of its arsenals and programs. If the causes behind such behaviour are not changed, the maximum that will be achieved is a certain delay. With respect to Iraq, it is sufficient to realise its significant economic resources and highly skilled technical and scientific community —with a long experience in this field— (estimated to be around 7,000 during the former decade)⁴⁹ to understand that if the geostrategic conditions do not radically change, it will not be long before proliferating tendencies will be renewed.

On their part, the United Arab Emirates (maintaining short-range missiles and who have not signed the BWC), Yemen (with short-range missiles –Scud-B and SS-21 –and without having signed the NPT Additional Protocol), Bahrain (equipped with short-range missiles), Qatar, Oman and Kuwait are likewise on the sidelines of proliferation dynamics that have been provoked by Iran. In the calculations about future destabilizing scenarios it is, however, important to keep a place for Saudi Arabia, even though for now not much more can be done than pure speculation. Riyadh already disposes of missiles that exceed the 1,000 km range (the Chinese CSS-2) and is refusing to sign either the NPT Additional Protocol or the CTBT. The practical inexperience of its scientific community with regards to WMD need not be, in theory at least, an insurmountable obstacle for a country with such economic resources that allow it to find other ways to reach its objectives in the medium term. With the necessary caution that matters of such sensitive nature require, one could easily imagine that its future direction largely depends on how its relationship with Washington develops (from the rift that has opened between the two capitals since 9/11, Riyadh might conclude that its security is no longer guaranteed by its traditional protector, leading to the perceived necessity of more decisive defence capabilities). Similarly, Saudi Arabia will closely study the results of the Iranian effort in nuclear proliferation, as it seems unlikely that Riyadh would remain unperturbed in the case of Teheran finally possessing nuclear capabilities.

In clear contrast to this image, Iran continues to draw growing global attention as it is directly being accused of developing an extensive program that could provide it with a nuclear weapon in the short-run. It is therefore

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⁴⁸. Iraq does retain a short range missile capacity and, in August of 2005, has still not signed the CWC.
justified that in the pages that follow this report dedicates significant
attention to the main features of the behaviour of this traditional proliferator (labelled as such because of its declared chemical programs50 and the
evidence –always denied by Teheran– of having accumulated various
chemical and biological components within its arsenals). It is accepted,
however, that there are significant risks in analysing such a controversial
topic in which it is difficult to come up with definitive opinions, but which
in any case are testing the frameworks on which international relations
and global security are based.

As indicated above, the nuclear aspirations of Iran became clear decades
ago. In fact, already during its former regime, with the Shah a loyal ally of
the principal western powers, there was a clear desire for leading the
region that, among other motivations, seemed to require a military armed
with devices of mass destruction in order to move above its neighbours as
well as to deal with external threats (in a mostly Arab environment which
was not inclined to accept Persian diktats). This goal was generously sup-
ported by Washington –which supplied large quantities of military
materials at very favourable conditions–, by Paris –which signed an agree-
ment with Iran in 1977 to construct two nuclear power plants (with the
aim of expanding this number to four during the time that followed)–, and
by Bonn –which the Shah asked for help with the construction of two
other plants as part of the ambitious aim of eventually reaching to twenty
of such installations. Those were times in which –similar to current sugges-
tions emanating from Washington– nuclear weapons as such were not
seen as intrinsically bad, but rather the bad aspects depended on the pro-
file of some regimes which were not to be given access to such weapons.
Nor was the question asked –contrary to the situation today– if it made
sense to support the development of nuclear energy in a country which
was one of the principal producers of gas and petrol worldwide.

Although the initial plans of the Shah did not become reality, the path that
had been opened has been followed ever since without pause. This has
been done by those who overthrew him –after overcoming certain reli-
gious qualms by Ruhollah Khomeini that nuclear weapons were not
compatible with islam– and has been followed up on by leaders ever since.
Now, with the recently elected president, Mahmud Ahmadineyad, it seems
that a new era has begun, albeit not necessarily more positive. The reli-
gious regime (velayat e faqih) is not facing an easy task of on the one hand
improving the accumulated balance of the last 25 years and on the other
modifying the course that was set by previous decisions. Iran’s image is
one in which the regime seems incapable of satisfying the demands of its
own population (both economic as well as social and political) and that has
not been able to fully reinstate itself at the international stage.

The combination of this perception –which translates into a permanent cli-
mate of failure and blockades– together with the foreseeable conservative
attitudes of its leaders (with its supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the
already mentioned Ahmadineyad at the top), makes it unlikely that its
nuclear programs will be completely abandoned. The rhetoric favouring a

50. Iran’s own representatives did so in 1998, during a session of the CWC.
nuclear program—often spiced up by direct appeals to its militaristic nature—has turned the matter into more than just a strategic issue to be decided by the specialists. Rather, it has become a question of national interest that can count on overwhelming public support and the various political actors. It has become a matter of national pride, international justice, sovereignty, and autonomy faced by external enemies (during these past decades often identified as the United States in the collective imagination of Iran).

Once that they had publicly recognised that there was a nuclear program in development (restarted in 1987, during the final phase of its war with Iraq), Iranian leaders have attempted to simultaneously convince the international community of its peaceful purposes and its public opinion of the potential benefits of the program. Besides defending the right that it has, similar to any other country, the message has focused on the innumerable benefits—strategic as well as political and socioeconomic (improved living standards, electrical supply, medicine…)—and the possibility of receiving high dividends from its uranium reserves through enrichment and reprocessing in order to sell them to other countries (and thus becoming an important exporter of nuclear power). In these conditions, it would be very difficult—in the unlikely scenario of a sudden urge of appeasement by the Iranian leadership—to convince public opinion of the necessity to abandon a project that has been defended for so long.

If the current position is supported by internal circumstances, it suffices to state that—with respect to the external factors—none of the reasons to start the program have disappeared, with the momentary exception of Iraq. On the contrary, the reasons behind the nuclear attempts only seem to have grown: Iran’s experiences during the war with Iraq (1980-88), the military campaigns against Iraq led by the United States (1991 and 2003), the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the negative signs coming out of Israel all seem to validate Iranian intentions. The recourse to nuclear armament would, according to this perspective, be an unmistakable challenge to the international order as being led by Washington and a warning to its adversaries and neighbours as well as an important tool in establishing regional and ideological hegemony51.

From all of this it can be concluded that, in short, the most probable scenario is one in which a country that has a strong community of specialists in this area, with important natural reserves of uranium, with some external assistance and with significant economic resources permitting the technological efforts until the objective is achieved, is unlikely to back down unless it desires to do so itself52.

51. In spite of the nuclear tests that Pakistan carried out in May of 1998, this country cannot be included among Iran’s competitors. There are good relations between two nations, as was demonstrated by the fact that Pakistani officials warned Teheran of the imminence of these tests as well as the contacts that exist between their scientific communities.
As its leaders are very much aware, Iran’s nuclear program has been accompanied by a flood of criticism from the international community. These, mixed with threats more or less direct, have turned into a game of action-reaction in which it is not easy to predict the ending. It is even within the realm of possibilities to foresee an increase in tensions and even military action at some point in time. Without going back to far in time, fears about the reach of its nuclear program rose significantly in 1994 when the then director of the CIA, R. James Woolsey, let it be known that Iran would be capable of building its own nuclear bomb within a time period of 8 to 10 years. It was also claimed that it had attempted to shorten this time by trying to buy nuclear weapons directly from other countries. In this way, Iran’s government was meant to be unmasked, exposing its false legal claims with respect to article IV of the NPT. In an attempt to deny these allegations, Teheran did not only point out that its country had been part of the NPT since 1970 (with the safeguards treaty signed in 1973) but also that, likewise, it had deposited its ratification of the BWC in 1973 and that it was ready to sign the CWC (even though it did not deposit its ratification until 1997) and the CTBT (which it finally did in 1996). Simultaneously, it reiterated its offer to facilitate the IAEA inspections both in the declared facilities as well as in any other that they want to check. This offer only seemed to contain elements of truth only much later, on the 18th of December 2003, when the Additional Protocol was signed (which, in any case, still needs to be ratified).

Since then, tensions have only mounted, and with a clear acceleration since 9/11. Iran was named by Washington of part of the “axis of evil” and as such was labeled to be one of three main threats to global stability. In 2002 Iran admitted to having been involved in secret activities (enrichment of uranium and production of plutonium) which, although permitted by the NPT, had not been communicated to the IAEA as was mandatory. In a certain way it took responsibility and offered, as a way to rebalance the situation, to allow the IAEA to inspect its research facilities. On the other hand, in a new example of secretive behaviour, it denied access to certain undeclared installations. During the summer of that same year, detractors of the regime denounced the existence of suspicious facilities in Natanz (for uranium enrichment) and Arak (for the production of heavy water). All of this constituted –as was officially confirmed by the IAEA in 2003– a violation of the NPT (to the extent that these activities had really been observed and to which the Agency added a series of illegal imports of materials related to the nuclear program, especially centrifuges).

53. Already before, the report mentioned above had been known through an article in Le Nouvel Observateur (1977), which included Iran as being one of 22 countries that would be capable of obtaining the bomb within ten years.

54. Those same sources claimed that there was sufficient evidence that in 1991 three tactical nuclear warheads had been purchased from Kazakhstan.

55. This article recognizes the right of signatory states to develop research, production and energy programs for peaceful uses, including uranium enrichment.

56. It is worth pointing out that the two special visits since then by this organization –in February of 1992 and November of 1993– determined that there had not been any violation of the NPT.

57. The existence of centrifuges Pak-2 is one of the clearest pieces of evidence that Iran had been –already since 1987– one of the clients of the commercial network of nuclear materials created by the Pakistani “father of the bomb”, Abdul Qadeer Khan.
The accumulation of such proof has put Iran—which has always denied the accusations and repeated its willingness to follow the program—at risk of being sanctioned if its case is brought before the UN Security Council. Some argue, spearheaded by the United States, that the known facts are sufficient to activate this mechanism, whereas other such as the EU and the Agency itself, have so far preferred to continue exploring the possibilities of dialogue. These differences (to which one can add the positions of Russia and China) are being well used by Teheran which seems to know exactly how much space it has to maneuver with respect to halting and reinitiating the uranium enrichment program. It is, however, a danger game that it is playing, and does not dispel doubts about its end.

The intentions of Washington clash with obvious obstacles. As has been argued here, the NPT—both in letter as well as in spirit—permits Iran to enrich uranium and develop a civil nuclear program. Taking that argument into consideration, one can deduce that it will not be easy for the US to obtain support from the Agency. This is the case with respect to its prohibition (which would be an arbitrary measure and not provided for by the treaty) and even more so when it comes to American demands of allowing US inspections—without any restrictions—on Iranian soil (which would, on the other hand, mean a marginalization of the IAEA). The same can be said about the proposals of the US president with respect to the prohibition of the sale to any country of technologies that permit uranium enrichment and reprocessing (except for the twelve that already possess them), while at the same time guaranteeing that all can purchase nuclear fuel that they may require at reasonable prices.

It also does not seem as if the representatives of France, United Kingdom and Germany—who spearhead the EU on this matter—are in an easier position. In October 2003 they managed to reach an agreement with the government of Iran. It would suspend its uranium enrichment activities as a result. However, less than a year later it became obvious that Teheran had broken its promises. Although in November of 2004 a new agreement was reached—practically with the same terms—it is well-known that the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) decided on the 5th of August 2005 to urge the government to continue with the program. All of this leads an increasing number of voices within Iran to imitate North Korea directly and leave the NPT. The initiative by the parliament was followed-up on by the government which on the 8th of that same month reinitiated its enrichment activities. In the short-term the waiting is for a new step by Teheran, presenting a new proposal that would not close the door on the continuation of its program, and the subsequent reactions from Washington and Brussels which are becoming increasingly divergent. The US is not willing to give Iran more time and room to act in order to de facto enter the still very selective nuclear club, whereas the EU seems at times more preoccupied with not being seen as a mere emissary of Washington or as irrelevant, rather than with the potential implications of the emergence of a new nuclear power in an unstable region such as the Middle East.

58. As the director of the IAEA stated, the proposal already contains two problems right from the start. On the one hand, many countries can already develop such technologies on their own and, on the other, it would only increase the perception of double standards in international relations.
In spite of all of the above, it is important to stress –remembering the words of the director of the IAEA in November 2004– that at the moment there exists no evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear program of a military nature. It is, obviously, a judgement made with authority, even when taking into account the limitations and imperfections of the Agency, as well as remembering the cases of Iraq, Libya and North Korea (which, being members of the NPT –and thus subject to regular inspections by the IAEA– still managed to hide their military intentions from their visitors). In similar fashion, yet without denying that Iran is attempting to obtain nuclear weapons, a recent report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)\(^{59}\) indicates that it would take at least another five years before Iran can achieve its objective.

With respect to facts and accepting a significant level of uncertainty, the Iranian nuclear inventory consists of two research reactors –of 5 and 30 Mw, situated in Teheran and Isfahan respectively– a calutron of Chinese origin, and situated in Isfahan, a cyclotron at the medical research centre of Karaj, and, of course, the nuclear reactors of 1,000 Mw in Bushehr, of which construction is almost finished. It is also known that there are various programs at different stages of development (those of Natanz and Arak mentioned above) and others which depend on Chinese and Russian assistance\(^{60}\) (the main exterior backers, once that India abandoned its cooperation in 1991 under heavy pressure from Washington).

Besides the problems caused by the enrichment facilities, the issues that is probably causing most concern with respect to the future are with respect to the reactors at Bushehr. After the years of the project’s paralysis after Germany abandoned its construction, the revolution, and the damage caused by Iraq during the first Gulf War, it was restarted with the help of Moscow. In January of 1995 an agreement was signed to complete the work on the two nuclear plants (Bushehr I and II). Both facilities are subject to IAEA inspections and, despite strong pressure from the US to withdraw from the project –which includes the future supply of nuclear fuel and another contract for the supply of the two reactors that will be situated in the Gorgan region– Russia has rejected this possibility. (For Moscow, its participation is not just for strategic reasons but also economic considerations in the sense that it wants to cash in on the international market for its renowned expertise in this sector without ceding grounds to competitors, the US included).

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59. Made public the 6th of September this year, (Samore, Gary (ed.) (2005): Iran’s strategic weapons programmes: A net assessment, Strategic Dossier, IISS, London), list as most important technical difficulties the impossibility of producing sufficient fission material within five years and the uncertainties about its capacity to build a nuclear warhead that can be mounted onto its ballistic missiles. It does recognize, however, that Teheran will be developing new versions of the Shahab-3 missile in order to increase its range (putting Israel, Turkey and parts of Russia within its range).

60. There exists an agreement, signed in 1990, in which China commits itself to supply two research reactors within ten years and to transfer nuclear technology.
In order to complete the picture of Iranian capabilities in this area it is important to highlight that facilities for the extraction of uranium –discovered in Saghand– are already operational. With respect to its missile capabilities, it has already been quite some time since the first launch of the Shahab-3 (the 22nd of July, 1998), of which at the moment there are around 100 operational (developed from the North Korean Nodong). With its range of 1,300 km it significantly improves on the capabilities of the 300 Shahab-1 and the 150 Shahab-2 (based on the Scud-B and C, respectively) which have been present in the Iranian arsenal for a long time. Much more recently (August of 2004) there was news about the launch of a new ground-ground missile prototype (Shahab-4) which, with a range of 3,000 km, increases the covered area even more of this military giant in the Middle East.

Summarising, with respect to Iran there are unmistakable signs of a secretive and proliferating behaviour that are mixed with signs of appeasement, although this latter category could be the result of purely tactical considerations in which time is in Iran’s favour. The other actors involved in this crisis are lacking consensus which, as on other occasions, always confers advantages upon the proliferator. At the moment, and waiting for what the immediate future brings, the only other thing to add to the above is that Iran obtaining nuclear weapon capabilities would put in motion a destabilising spiral of incalculable consequences. The possibility that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and even Egypt might react in similar fashion points towards an evolution of the regional security agenda that is highly worrisome.

Without the willingness of Iran to reduce tensions, it becomes practically impossible to find a way out of the current situation. The limited organisations and instruments that are available (the IAEA and the NPT) cannot go much further than they already have. The compensation that the international community is willing to offer Iran does not, perhaps, cover the costs for Iran of abandoning a goal that is among its prime ambitions. Military force seems also not to be a solution to resolve the problem (neither has it worked in other cases, nor is Iran defenceless with respect to outside threats). To assume, on the other hand, that at some point a resolution such as 687 in the case of Iraq will be approved by the UN Security Council is also not very realistic. In conclusion –and while on the one hand there is a combination of offers of dialogue and messages of strength and, on other hand, a practically continuous development of the nuclear program– the only thing left to do is to hope that both sides understand the necessity of leaving their maximalist positions, which are so counterproductive.

61. The Iranian case exactly shows –with greater clarity than ever– the necessity to enhance the multilateral instruments which the international community depends upon to halt the dangers of our time. The NPT and the IAEA are not, as some would like to argue, part of the problem, but rather essential components of the solution. What is needed is to strengthen its clauses and responsibilities so that they can fulfill their original objectives. The observed results from the already mentioned Review Conference, however, do not permit great optimism in this respect over the short-term.
IV. The failure of non-proliferation diplomacy

The Mediterranean’s long history with WMD has not been matched by an equally impressive chronology of non-proliferation diplomacy. In fact, efforts to reduce or abolish WMD programs in the region have been scarce and overwhelmingly ineffective (as is shown by the box at the end of this section which highlights some of the most significant efforts in this respect). Whereas Section II gave an overview of the political reality in which diplomacy has to occur, it is important to also analyze the more fundamental reasons behind this striking failure. Whereas political realities are continuously changing, proliferation efforts seem unmovable and the region no-more safe than before.

The first important step in breaking this paralysis needs to be the clear separation between nuclear weapons and the rest of the so-called WMD. As mentioned above, this is not only useful from an analytical perspective but also reflects a reality in which nuclear weapons have a diplomatic and military impact that is very different from chemical or biological weapons, as well, of course, missiles. If this distinction were made, the first important positive consequence would be that the possibilities of creating a nuclear weapons free zone (NFZ) would be significantly higher. On the other hand, the objective of creating a NFZ could be better defined, freeing the concept of issues that only slow down its development, as is in fact happening in reality. Given that these weapons are fundamentally different in nature, the practical consequences of such a step would also be fundamentally different.

Unfortunately, this separation is not often made. Whereas currently most attention has been going towards nuclear weapons –and Iran specifically– official strategies generally still mention WMD, without any further specification. The result has been that progress in areas where it would have been possible (chemical weapons, for example) has been hampered, whereas the more difficult, nuclear side of the diplomatic arena has often been clouded by too many unrealistic targets and strategies.

In order to contrast the differences between nuclear weapons and the other types of WMD, it is helpful to stress the exceptional nature of the former category. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not simply a unique event because it was the only time that nuclear weapons were deployed during wartime. They were also unique because of the exceptional circumstances in which the decision was made to make use of this type of destructive power. Even before their deployment, there was no doubt left about the allied victory in the Pacific. Moreover, the victory was total, in the sense that it had become clear that negotiations with Japan about its surrender (similar to the German capitulation) were going to be symbolic. The post-1945 world was going to be one in


63. A perfect example of this is the refusal of Egypt to sign the CWC treaty in protest against Israeli refusal to participate in the NPT.
which Japan and its allies had no bargaining position left. As such, the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a choice, rather than a perceived necessity.

There is no realistic scenario today that would replicate the same situation as the one in 1945. The use of nuclear weapons in a conflict in the 21st century would lead to incalculable costs to any country choosing such option. Whereas then the diplomatic costs to Washington were very low and the military costs practically zero, now the implications of such an attack would be completely reverse. Put differently, it is highly unlikely that history will repeat itself even if nuclear weapons could possibly be used again. Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be used as points of reference for current situations with respect to nuclear arsenals. Their example serves, of course, as a reminder of the importance of non-proliferation and the elimination of such weapons, but their usefulness as a valid model for modern-day conflicts is likely to lead only to blinding the analysis.

The exceptional nature of those circumstances forces the question of what, assuming that Hiroshima and Nagasaki will not be repeated, the likely scenarios are in which nuclear weapons might be used. The answer to this question leads the analysis towards the necessity to formulate more sophisticated than to simply argue for a struggle against proliferation at all cost. Unfortunately, this issue has been sufficiently addressed neither in the Mediterranean nor in more general terms. The obvious result is that the matter of enhancing regional and international security remains stuck in anachronistic and hardly operational frameworks.

Before actually answering the question posed in the paragraph above, it may be helpful to clarify the problem with the blanket response. The most obvious of such unsophisticated diplomacy is the continuous call for a NFZ as the unique issue on the agenda. Whereas this aim is noble and certainly desirable, it is also a long term ideal rather than a door to contemporary solutions. If it were accepted as such, sufficient room could be left to deal with the more immediate problems that threaten the region when it comes to nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, not only is the NFZ the main discussion point of any current attempt at regional cooperation, it is also the only real solution offered by diplomats and strategists alike. Not only does this mean that any other type of regional cooperation is effectively sidelined, it also creates an unnecessary and often harmful atmosphere of failure, accusations and animosity between discussion partners any time that no agreements are reached.

This is obviously not to say that there are no advantages to a NFZ. Firstly, the potential destruction that nuclear weapons might cause will only be completely eradicated in an arena in which they do not exist. As such, it is important to keep a shining light of purpose and long term goals alive at any discussion in order to avoid falling into a case-by-case type of diplomacy without seeing the broader picture. Secondly, in the short-term, the ideal of a NFZ keeps pressure on governments not to stray in the opposite direction. Even if the NFZ is not possible in the foreseeable future, its ideal forces governments to contemplate the results of their actions and their long-term strategies. These advantages are not to be ignored, and as such it would be wrong not to have the NFZ on the table.
On the other hand, there are significant disadvantages with this approach that depends too much on a long-term ideal, rather than the present situation. To begin with, there can be no question that the NFZ is an ideal—however useful that may be—rather than an attainable reality in the foreseeable future. Even if progress is booked in the Israeli-Arab conflict, Israel will continue to feel insecure about its surroundings for quite some time to come. Nuclear weapons, more than anything, are seen as the strongest guarantee of survival of the state which is for obvious reasons the first and foremost priority of its people.

Moreover, it is often conveniently ignored that even in the unlikely scenario that Israel, Iran, and the Arab nations were to give up their nuclear aspirations, the region could still not be considered a NFZ; the United States as well as of course France and Russia have a permanent presence in the region, and its arsenal will continue to affect the strategic and diplomatic balance in the Mediterranean. Especially those nations that feel threatened by US interests such as Iran, Syria, and perhaps in the medium term even Saudi-Arabia, would have a clear strategic interest in following the path of North-Korea. Finally, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that countries such as Iran have interests beyond the Mediterranean (Pakistan, or Russia and the Caspian Sea, for example). The military balance with those nations is clearly dependent on the possession of nuclear weapons or the lack thereof.

Besides these questions about the practical attainability of a NFZ, there is also another problem of no lesser importance. By making non-proliferation and, if necessary, counter-proliferation the main mechanisms behind the diplomacy of WMD, not only is there an overly simplistic division of the “good guys” and the “bad guys”, it also creates the same problems as with other types of prohibition: countries that do decide to develop nuclear programs will become alienated from the world community—making any type of regulation extremely difficult—leading to even greater distrust and instability⁶⁴.

The issues mentioned above may not be persuasive enough to abandon the whole notion of non-proliferation or a NFZ. As has been argued already, it can be very useful to have an ideal direction to steer towards, both for a region as well as the international community at large. However, diplomacy has been far too transfixed on such notions, and as a result has not been effective in progress either on the WMD front or other regional issues. The obvious failure of WMD diplomacy so far and the stubborn insistence of regional policy makers with respect to the issue can only be explained by the unsophisticated “Hiroshima” attitude discussed above. By focusing on the (technologically) potential destruction rather than the realities surrounding nuclear weapons, the question posed at the beginning of this chapter is not being asked, creating both a failure in the achievement of specified goals as well as the creation of unnecessary problems. In other words, we challenge the attitude with

⁶⁴. This has clearly been the case in Iran, and it can be argued to be one of the catalysts behind the 2003 war in Iraq: distrust and a panicky approach to the whole theme of WMD allowed it to become a pretext for the United States to intervene.
respect to the idea that more stability and security is only possible if WMD disappear from the Mediterranean region. It is possible to enhance the level of security by changing the approach that is taken.

Let us therefore return to answer the initial question. What situations, assuming the existence of nuclear arsenals, would cause their real use in the Mediterranean? In this way, by focusing on reality rather anachronistic considerations, it seems more probable to find answers to the challenges that the region is currently facing.

It was already stated above that Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not a likely scenario. The idea that a nation would use nuclear weapons in a situation in which it has a strong strategic position is preposterous in the 21st century. The costs would simple be too high, even if the direct opponent has no nuclear capabilities of its own. In fact, it can safely be argued that nuclear weapons in a wartime situation will only be used as a last resort. Even in a scenario where the conventional armed forces have been defeated, nuclear weapons will not be in the interest of any government that feels that it is not on the brink of extermination or annexation. Therefore, the first likely scenario is one in which there are no longer any other military or diplomatic means to save a nation from complete defeat65.

A second case to consider would be an accident, either human (including some solitary military commander not following orders) or technological. In order to prepare for such an eventuality, transparency and a climate of cooperation and mutual trust are key elements (at the very least to avoid an uncontrollable escalation). Transparency requires permanent dialogue and a strengthening of mechanisms of inspection and vigilance, without any type of discrimination. The examples that we can observe from the current proliferators clearly show the dangers of distrust and secretive behaviour.

The final supposition is the one in such weapons are used by non-governmental actors, such as terrorist groups. This was already considered in the 1980’s, but so far it has been shown, fortunately, to be something much more difficult to achieve for such groups than was assumed previously. Even if such an event would happen, it would not necessarily lead to a larger scale conflict between nations. It is clear, however, that the lack of cooperation or regulation and secretive behaviour increase its possibility. The creation of illegal markets, maintained both by individuals as well as governments, generate tremendous risks. On the other hand, as far as we know, everything indicates that it is states, rather than terrorist organisations, that have so far been on the receiving end of such transactions.

With different levels of probability, each of the three scenarios mentioned above also requires different solutions, for obvious reasons. However, analysed from a perspective of which are the most adequate

65. It should be noted straight away that this would be common knowledge in such a situation. Consequently, the winning side of any armed conflict would be unlikely to push for a victory beyond a certain line, exactly in order to avoid a desperate nuclear attack from its opponent.
to face up to the risks involved, clinging on to the idea of a NFZ as an immediate objective seems ineffective by creating unnecessary antagonism between the potential proliferator and the international community. Given that this has, broadly speaking, happened in the Mediterranean, one could argue that the defence of traditional dogmas has substituted common sense and flexibility, contributing as such to the failure of diplomacy dedicated to WMD in the region.

The balance is even worse when the effect that this has had on other types of WMD is analysed. More than any other region during the past decades, the Mediterranean has suffered directly from the effects of chemical and biological weapons. It is also here where the diplomatic treatment of these weapons has been most extreme, putting on par with nuclear weapons. In this way, it has become impossible to differentiate between approaches, and thus not taking into account the specific characteristic of each separate category. The result has been that, because of the diplomatic inertia with respect to nuclear weapons, advances with respect to chemical and biological weapons have also been halted. In spite of the fact that their strategic importance is increasingly questionable, it has not proved possible to move towards their regional elimination. Given that their continued existence does still have a destabilising effect, and that terrorists maintain a clear interest in such weapons, this is another significant failure of a badly developed strategy with respect to regional diplomacy.

Clearly, the diplomacy surrounding WMD has been hugely unsatisfactory. On the one hand there has been a distinct failure in reducing the threats presented by such weapons in their totality, rather than as separate categories, whereas on the other hand there has been too much belief in the idea that it is only possible to advance the issue to the extent that regional regimes are willing to follow western initiatives without question. A similar belief has been witnessed recently with the concept of democratisation, which would supposedly lead to the elimination of those obstacles that are on the path towards a NFZ. The result has been a vicious circle of increased political tension, proliferation and greater instability.
The creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East has been on the agenda for most of the past three decades (when Israel came to be considered as having a nuclear arsenal). The region has also been strikingly unsuccessful in achieving this stated goal, as has been argued in the section above.

Iran—supported by Egypt—became in 1974 the first nation to publicly call for a NWFZ in the region at the United Nations General Assembly. Although abstaining from the vote then, Israel came with its own plan in 1980 which was based on direct negotiations rather than a region-wide agreement. Israel withdrew its draft after negotiations with Egypt, and all regional participants voted in favor of a more generic Egyptian plan. In 1989, Egypt submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly calling for declaring the Middle East as NWFZ and which was approved, calling for all states of the region to join the NPT.

In 1991, a UN report (2) explored the issue further and proposed a number of incremental measures to create the right conditions for a NWFZ. At the same time, Egypt—worried by the apparent Israeli arsenal of chemical and biological weapons—called for the expansion of the term in order to include all WMD (3). UN Security Council Resolution 687 in 1991 embraced both concepts and even included the issues of missiles capable of WMD delivery. However, during the years that followed the Security Council did not follow up on this issue. The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group—part of the Madrid Peace Process—showed the difficulty in progressing the issue and it eventually failed in 1995, most notably because of differences between Israel and Egypt. The former was not willing to accept the demands by Egypt to accede to make nuclear proliferation an important agenda point, instead preferring to postpone that issue to a later date (Baumgart & Müller, 2004).

From another angle—the 1995 NPT Review Conference—another attempt was made by calling on all states of the region to take practical steps to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East as an important step for riding the region of other WMD, including biological and chemical weapons. The year that followed saw the creation of the Pelindaba Treaty (4), creating a NFZ in Africa but no further progress made with respect to the Mediterranean (5).

Attention in the years that followed shifted away from a NWFZ, until in 2003 Syria attempted to revive the issue by introducing a new draft resolution calling for a Middle East free of all WMD (6). The attempt found little support, however, given the situation in Iraq (7) as well as insufficient solid support.

Although the issue never left the diplomatic arena (it once again resurfaced this year with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed El Baradei (8), discussing its possibilities), the issue of a NWFZ has consistently failed to become a serious possibility, for reasons mentioned above. The fact that only a few nations (Egypt in particular) have been persistent in their diplomatic efforts seems to be an indicator of its feasibility. Rather, over the years it has been employed as a tool for other goals, rather than an end in itself.

(1) For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, see Baumgart & Müller (2004).
(3) See for example Shaker (2004).
(4) For the complete text, see http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/aplanwfs.pdf
(5) Even though another UN resolution (51/41) was passed in December of 1996.
(6) http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/a56069d35d1a58fe85255e14006f0aab8?OpenDocument
V. Concluding Remarks

Without pretending to have exhausted the issues mentioned in these pages and with the intention to continue the analysis in future reports, this brief overview of the situation of WMD in the Mediterranean permits, at the very least, a selection of its conclusions so far. Both summarily as well as provisionally, it is possible to summarise the following themes:

- As accurately underlined, albeit perhaps with a certain delay, by Robert McNamara, we should strive to completely eliminate all WMD as we are dealing with immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary and terribly dangerous weapons. They are, besides the ethical considerations, a product of the Cold War with no place in the current world.

- The tradition of considering nuclear weapons as equivalent to chemical and biological weapons under the header of WMD is unsustainable and, furthermore, it is counterproductive to put two very different cases of proliferation at the same level with respect to its reach and its possible consequences. The true concern in this area can only be nuclear devices, leaving all others at a secondary level, albeit with biological weapons above those of a chemical nature. With respect to missiles, during the past 20 years there has hardly been any increase in the number of countries that possess those with long-range capabilities, and are currently, as recognised in the report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2005), a lesser threat to the United States than 25 years ago.

- Nuclear weapons represent, by themselves, the most dangerous hypothesis that can be considered because of their brutally destructive capabilities. However, they are neither the only nor the most important threat facing global security.

- It is trivial to understand that WMD are already an unquestionable reality in the Mediterranean. The will not disappear from the military arsenals in the medium term and, on the contrary, there are new candidates that could enter the restricted club of countries that possess them. Consequently, it does not seem realistic nor effective to focus efforts on their immediate elimination, something which would make this aim the only standard to judge progress by. It seems more sensible to concentrate in the short-term on perfecting the regulatory mechanisms in order to avoid that its possession directly translates into a threat.

- The maximalist objectives of non-proliferation and the creation of a NFZ should be kept as guides or points of references on the long-distance horizon instead of what has happened until now, namely as mechanisms to improve regional security in the short- and medium-term.

- Along these same lines, the proposal for a NFZ should be supported, even if its creation will not occur until there is a climate of trust that is as yet absent from the region. The difficulties are clear given that, contrary to that what is happening in other regions of the planet, the issue is not to avoid their introduction but rather to achieve their elimination. The problems grow when one tries to define to which countries this should
apply, taking into account that France, the US and Russia could be affected by such limitations.

- The most urgent efforts will have to be focused on the creation of regulatory mechanisms, channels for dialogue that enhance trust and transparency, as well as the development of cooperation in those areas in which this is possible. It can be said that there currently exists a sufficiently general interest in avoiding the use of nuclear weapons as the result of one of the three most realistic cases. This should be the basis from which the tasks ahead gain significance and become meaningful, making use of the lessons learned from frameworks of other fields\(^6\).

- In order to achieve such necessary transparency, it is fundamental to overcome the strong forces of resistance that are present in some countries against sharing information in this field. Even if responsibilities are divided, it is the Arab countries, as well as Israel and Iran, which most need to modify their secretive attitude. Similarly to the way this was possible during the bipolar rivalry between the two superpowers, also here the desire should be to break the silence in which these matters are shrouded. Only by the spread of ideas and considerations on security and defence policies, as well as regular exchange of data and analysis between political, military and academic communities, will it be possible to eliminate the suspicions that feed this confrontational approach.

- Simultaneously, as a result of the weaknesses of the instruments at the disposal of the international community to deal with proliferation, a fundamental effort will have to be made to perfect and strengthen those mechanisms, avoiding their manipulation by individual states and avoiding the consolidation of its use through applying double standards (which are used to distinguish between allies and adversaries at the time of application). What should not be allowed to happen, under no circumstance, is the dismantling or elimination of such mechanisms because of inefficiencies by transferring its functions to one particular country or a group pretending to act on behalf of the whole international community.

- The NPT and the IAEA, similarly to the other treaties and conventions already mentioned, continue to be fundamental pillars of any future success. Its necessary improvements need to be focussed on a greater capacity of intrusive inspections, on an authentic universality in their respective fields, and the adoption of sanction mechanisms with greater coercive capacities. In our days, this can only be achieved with the agreement of the nation-state, the primary actors in international relations. The conviction that none of them can satisfactorily deal with its surrounding threats should, according to logic, lead to a renewed effort to perfecting the multilateral response mechanisms.

\(^{161}\) The frameworks followed by the EU as part of the Euromediterranean Partnership, with compensation and advantages reserved only for those who decide to advance the reforms, seem a good path to explore as long as they are implemented with clear criteria and avoiding discrimination. In any case, it needs to be understood that the objective cannot directly be prohibition and elimination as such, but rather control and regulation.
- The use of force cannot be the principal method to avoid proliferation of these types of weapons or to control who has access to them. The specific elimination of such arsenals and programs, if the conditioning factors that stimulate the weapons race do not change, can only aspire to postpone the access to them. Similarly as what is happening to international terrorism, it is insufficient to simply attack the most visible symptoms of the problem. Rather, it is necessary to take the roots causes into account. Understanding this task as such, that seems to oblige the international community to revise its behaviour (proliferation is not only explained by demand, but also by supply), its concept of security (handing the greatest importance to preventive frameworks, accepting that all have a right to it and that it goes beyond simply military matters) and its priorities (social, political and economic inequalities that feed conflict, both at an intra- as well as an inter-state level).

- In the Mediterranean there is, obviously, a space for non-proliferation, and even counter-proliferation, but there are others as well to unite willingness and capacities to overall development in a region that has deteriorated to such an extent. The most direct path towards peace and security goes through the resolution of basic problems that become sources of instability both internally as well as externally in the region. The necessity of profound social, political and economic reforms in the majority of countries is undeniable and, even if most of the burden will have to be carried by themselves, international cooperation will prove fundamental in their success. This is not simply a matter of justice, but also a way to best defend one’s own interests. It allows development in such nations that translates into greater stability and security for all. This would consequently also lead to less necessity for the use of force.

- The multilateral formulas developed so far in the Mediterranean to reduce the levels of instability (initiatives of the dialogue of the NATO and the former WEU, as such developed during the Process of Barcelona), has hardly allowed a movement beyond mere contact, and has been hardly sufficient to timidly initiate the process of developing a climate of mutual trust. This is needed to make progress possible in such delicate areas as the arms race. Beyond the obvious differences in orientation and international weight of the countries, which make any multilateral enterprise only more difficult with respect to security, it is not unlikely that as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains active, it will be difficult to progress in other areas.

- Israel appears as the common element between the three sub-regions studied with respect to proliferation. Although in many cases it is little more than a mere excuse which hides more diverse motives, its resolution needs to have the maximum priority for the international community in order to avoid WMD proliferation at the current pace.

- With respect to the direct actors involved in this dispute, the moment seems to have arrived to rethink the sense in strategies that have been followed until now. For the Arab countries there is a lack in sense when it comes to standing firm in the belief that Israel only talks of peace when there is strategic parity. This has lead to unstoppable proliferation which will always give an advantage to the latter. Israel, on the other hand, by maintaining that peace negotiation is only possible when it is convinced that there is no military threat against its territory, only stimu-
lates its own arms race and leads to threatening behavior in order to avoid being challenged in its superiority. This is obviously a difficult path for both parties, and can only be taken once there is a mutual renunciation of maximalist positions.

VI. Bibliography, documents and references of interest

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PETERS, Joel (1994): Building bridges. The Arab-Israeli multilateral talks, Londres: The Royal Institute of International Affairs


Reports


Statistics/Databases

WMD Hot Documents -
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/hotdocs.htm

Countries of Nuclear Concern (SIPRI)
http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/cnscindex.htm

WMD Around the World (FAS)

ISIS Country Studies - http://www.isis-online.org/publications/index.html#country

Middle East Military Balance (Jaffe) - http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/


Organisations of Interest

Arms Control Association - http://www.armscontrol.org/

Australia Group - http://www.australiagroup.net/


Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Proliferation: WMD)
www.basicint.org/nuclear/nucindex.htm

CDISS - http://www.mideasti.org/countries/countries_main.html

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org

Federation of American Scientists – www.fas.org

Global Security – http://www.globalsecurity.org

Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies - http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/index.html

Monterey Institute of International Studies - http://cns.miis.edu/

Nuclear Threat Initiative - http://www.nti.org/


Proliferation Security Initiative
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm

Saban Center (Brookings Inst)http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/sabancenter_hp.htm

Stratfor - http://www.stratfor.com


Washington Institute for Near East Policy
www.washingtoninstitute.org/
### Table 1. Mediterranean Countries in Treaties on Chemical and Biological Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>BWC (1972)</th>
<th>CWC (1993)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magreb</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania*</td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>S (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia*</td>
<td>S (1972)</td>
<td>S (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Near East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt*</td>
<td>S (1972)</td>
<td>SPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel*</td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>S (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D (1975)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>S (1972)</td>
<td>SPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D (1975)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria*</td>
<td>S (1972)</td>
<td>SPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran*</td>
<td>S (1972)</td>
<td>S (1993)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Member of the Conference on Disarmament of the UN  
S = Signed; D = Deposited; WFP = Without Formal Participation

**BWC**: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.  

Sources: UNTD, FAS, NTI

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67. For the complete names of the sources cited, see the table at the end of the bibliography.
Table 2. Current Situation of Biological and Chemical Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country*</th>
<th>Biological</th>
<th>Chemical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magreb</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Research; possible production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Research; without evidence of production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Research; possible production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Research; possible production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Irán</td>
<td>Probable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Countries without significant programs: Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Explanation of Categories:

**Known** - where states have either declared their programs or there is clear evidence of chemical or biological weapons possession.

**Probable** - where states have been publicly named by government or military officials as "probable" chemical or biological weapons possessors or as producing chemical or biological weapons.

**Possible** - where states have been widely identified as possibly having chemical or biological weapons or a CBW program by sources other than government officials.

**Research** - Research work has been done without producing in a significant amount

Sources: CNS, FAS, JCSS, NTI

68. Terminology used by the CNS, http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm
Table 3. Mediterranean countries’ positions regarding Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magreb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>S (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel*</td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>M (1957)</td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>S (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>S (1968)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>SPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria*</td>
<td>S (1968)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>SPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D (1968)</td>
<td>M (1963)</td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>SPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D (1979)**</td>
<td>M (1994)</td>
<td>SPF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Member of the Conference on Disarmament of the UN
S = Signatory; D = Deposited; M = Member; IF = In Force; A = Approved;
WFP = Without Formal Participation
NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Arms
CTBT: Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
I-AP: Additional Protocol of the NPT

Sources: IAEA, UNTD, FAS, NTI

69. The IAEA Additional protocols require approval by its board, which can then be followed by becoming a signatory and, finally, putting the protocol into force. Indication in the table of the latter, therefore, implies completion of the first two requirements.
70. Libya has pledged to apply its Additional Protocols pending entry into force.
71. Iran has pledged to apply its Additional Protocols pending entry into force.
72. Deposited with the government of the Russian Federation (in 1979 USSR). In 1986, Yemen also deposited with the government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
### Table 4. The Overall Situation of Countries with WMD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Biological</th>
<th>Chemical</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Ballistic Missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magreb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Development?</td>
<td>Research</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
<td>U: 1987</td>
<td>Research &quot;y&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Development?</td>
<td>Stockpiles</td>
<td>U: 1963-67</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Production Capability</td>
<td>Production Capability</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Development?</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
<td>Research</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Deployed</td>
<td>U: 1984-88</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>None?</td>
<td>Research?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None?</td>
<td>None?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explanation of Categories**
- **Deployed** - Nuclear, biological, or chemical WMD weapons integrated in military forces and ready for use in the event of conflict.
- **Stockpiled** - Produced significant quantity of WMD weapons, but these are not stored in close proximity to military units that would employ them.
- **Weaponization** - In the process of integrating nuclear explosives or chemical/biological (CB) agents with delivery systems, such as aerial bombs, missile warheads, etc.
- **Production capability** - Able to produce significant quantity of fissile nuclear material or CB agents, but not known to have done so.
- **Development** - Engaged in laboratory- or pilot-scale activities to develop production capability for fissile material or CB agents.
- **Research** - Engaged in dual-use research with peaceful civilian applications, but that can also be used to build technical capacity and/or infrastructure necessary for WMD development and production.
- **U** - Used

**Fuentes:** CNS, JCSS

73. Actualmente parado.
74. Terminología usada por CNS, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/capable.htm
### Tabla 5. Chemical and Biological Arsenals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country*</th>
<th>Biological</th>
<th>Chemical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.-Africa</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>- Mustard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tabun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lewisite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near-East</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sulphur Mustard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Nitrogen Mustard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Phosgene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Hydrogen Cyanide</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Sarin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- VX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Psychotomimetic glycolates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>- Mycotoxins</td>
<td>- Sarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rift Valley fever virus</td>
<td>- VX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tetanus toxin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Encephalitis viruses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>- Unknown</td>
<td>- Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>- Anthrax</td>
<td>- Mustard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ricin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Access to:</td>
<td>- Mustard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Hydrogen Cyanide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cyanogen Chloride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Phosgene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Chlorine Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Plus other theoretically weaponisable pathogens</td>
<td>- V-Series Nerve Agents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Countries thought to have no significant stockpiles: Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen.

** In process of destruction.

Sources: CDI, CNS, JCSS
### Table 6. Nuclear Programs and Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>P. *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magreb</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Suspected intentions; but not identified</td>
<td>15 MW thermal heavy water moderated reactor at Al Salam “probably upgraded to 40 MW allegedly serves a clandestine nuclear weapons program”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Recently terminated (announced)</td>
<td>No identified arsenal, although Libya does possess advanced blueprints (mostly Chinese). Weapons infrastructure is currently being dismantled by the US and UK under IAEA supervision.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Program/consideration to have ended before 1970*</td>
<td>Two research Reactors* and in the process of constructing a Nuclear Power Plant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons to develop second strike capability from sea (status unclear)</td>
<td>100-200 nuclear explosive devices, possibly some thermonuclear; Two main research Centres*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Suspected intentions; but not identified</td>
<td>Currently not capable. The 30 KW nuclear research reactor in Dayr al Jajar is under IAEA safeguards**</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Suspected program</td>
<td>Various research facilities** Five research Reactors, two power reactors under construction. The Bushehr nuclear reactor expected to go online this year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Suspected Intentions**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In possession of Plutonium or equivalent

Sources: FAS, JCSS, ISIS, NTI, Perkovich et al. (2005), SIPRI

75. CSS, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Algeria.pdf
76. However, in 2004 the IAEA revealed the discovery of unexplained plutonium particles in the vicinity of an Egyptian nuclear facility, the origin of which is currently being investigated. Moreover, there is some evidence of clandestine “nuclear” contacts with Libya since 2002. (Source: NTI)
77. Argentine-supplied 22 MW light water research reactor, Soviet-supplied 2 MW research reactor
78. The program is active since 1950s, controlled by the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and based at Negev Nuclear Research Centre at Dimona (32-40MW) and the Soreq Nuclear Research Centre (SMW) nearby Tel Aviv.
79. There exist widely varying estimates given the lack of official information. The figure stated in the table is based on conclusions by Cirincione (2002:221)
80. Illeged deal with Russia for a 24 MW reactor. Deals with China for a 27 kw reactor and with Argentina for a 3 MW research reactor, are probably cancelled (Source: JCSS)
81. Including the Nuclear Research Centre in Tehran, (TNRC), the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC), Nuclear Research Centre for Agriculture and Medicine, and the Beneficiation and Hydrometallurgical Research Centre (BHRC).
82. Saudi Arabia signed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “Small Quantities Protocol” on June 16, 2005. However, the signing of the protocol has not removed the suspicion regarding Saudi Arabian’s ambitions in the nuclear field (see, for example, Dvali, 2004)
### Table 7. Nuclear Installations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reactor/Research Facility</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magreb</td>
<td>Power Reactor</td>
<td>15 Mw (alleged 40 Mw)</td>
<td>Ain Oussera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>1 Mw</td>
<td>Draria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>10 Mw</td>
<td>Tajura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near</td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>22 Mw</td>
<td>Inshas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>2 Mw</td>
<td>Inshas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Heavy Water Reactor</td>
<td>150 Mw</td>
<td>Dimona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plutonium Reprocessing Facility</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Dimona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>5 Mw</td>
<td>Soreq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>30 Kw</td>
<td>Tehran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>3 Mw</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Research Reactor</td>
<td>1.000 Mw</td>
<td>Bushehr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>VVER Power Reactor (under construction)</td>
<td>1.000 Mw</td>
<td>Bushehr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uranium Enrichment Facility</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Natanz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy Water Production Facility</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Arak</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Selected: those countries with significant installations

Sources: CNS, GlobalSecurity.org, JCSS, NTI
### Table 8. Missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country*</th>
<th>Ballistic</th>
<th>Cruise</th>
<th>In Development</th>
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<tr>
<td>Magreb</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Scud-C Variante**</td>
<td>SS-N-2c Styx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 Scud-B</td>
<td>Otomat Mk2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-21 Scarab</td>
<td>Exocet (AM-39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>100+ Scud-B</td>
<td>AS-5 Kelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~490 Project T</td>
<td>Harpoon</td>
<td>AS-1 Kennel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HY-2 Silkworm</td>
<td>Otomat Mk1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FL-1</td>
<td>Exocet (AM-39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-2a Styx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>~50 Jericho 1</td>
<td>Harpy UAV</td>
<td>SLV modernización</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~50 Jericho 2</td>
<td>Deliah/VSTAR-1 UAV</td>
<td>Unconfirmed : Jericho 3 Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lance Missiles</td>
<td>Gabriel-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shavit SLV</td>
<td>Harpoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Popeye Turbo**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>60-120 Scud-C</td>
<td>SS-N-3b Sepa</td>
<td>Endogenous production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 200 Scud-B</td>
<td>SS-N-2c Styx</td>
<td>capability for accurate M-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200 SS-21 Scarab</td>
<td>Tupolev Tu-243 UAV</td>
<td>[CSS-6 o DF-15] missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scud-D**</td>
<td>Malachite UAV</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>R-17E (Scud B)</td>
<td>HY-4/C-201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200-300 Shehab-1 (Hwasong-5, Scud-B)</td>
<td>Harpoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100-150 Shehab2 (Hwasong-6, Scud-C)</td>
<td>SS-N-22 Sunburn</td>
<td>Shabab-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-100 Shehab-3 (Nodong)</td>
<td>HY-2 Silkworm</td>
<td>Shabab-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-5 Shehab 4/5 Prototypes</td>
<td>YJ-2/C-802</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-9 Kyle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-11 Kilter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>60 CSS-2**</td>
<td>&quot;East &quot; Wind&quot;**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>18 Scud-B</td>
<td>SS-N-2b Styx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 SS-21 Scarab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Selected: Countries with significant ballistic missile programs or arsenals except France
Source: ACA, CNS, GlobalSecurity.org, JCSS, NTI

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83. According to JCSS, Scud-C missiles “have been removed” (http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Libya.pdf)
84. Submarine launched, capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
85. Operational according to GlobalSecurity.org: (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/missile.htm)
86. Also referred as DF3.
87. Saudi CSS-2 missiles now operational according to Flight International, 6-12 June 90, pp. 12-13
Diagram 1. Missile Range of Selected Countries
### Table 9: Financial Military Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>26.85</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-16.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Near East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>8.93</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-3.63</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>10.93</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>9.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Syria</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>6.08</td>
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<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
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<td>40.1</td>
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<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td><strong>Saudi-Arabia</strong></td>
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<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
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<td>21.14</td>
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<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Yemen</strong></td>
<td>Defence Expenditure ($ bn)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Real Change in Defence Exp. (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Exp. /GDP (%)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA: Non available

Sources: JCSS, IMF, SIPRI

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88. Published defence expenditure data apparently does not include $1.3 bn annual foreign military assistance from the USA
### Sources Used in Tables

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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Website</th>
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<td>Arms Control Organization</td>
<td><a href="http://www.armscontrol.org">www.armscontrol.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Center for Nonproliferation Studies</td>
<td>cns.miss.edu</td>
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<td>CDI</td>
<td>Center for Defense Information</td>
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<td>FAS</td>
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4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Reports

Confidence and security-building measures in the Mediterranean: a practical proposal for the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process
Jaume Urgell
“On the twelfth of June, 1812, the forces of Western Europe crossed the Russian frontier and war began, that is, an event took place opposed to human reason and to human nature. Millions of men perpetrated against one another such innumerable crimes, frauds, treacheries, thefts, forgeries, issues of false money, burglaries, incendiarisms, and murders as in whole centuries are not recorded in the annals of all the law courts of the world, but which those who committed them did not at the time regard as being crimes.” (War and Peace, Leo Tolstoy)

The goal of this paper is to briefly review the theory and practice of Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM’s) regimes in Europe in the past three decades (since the approval of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the creation of the CSCE, later OSCE), and to evaluate the possibilities of building similar regimes for the whole of the Mediterranean region. Larger issues of confidence and security as well as the institutional and diplomatic arrangements to cope with new and emerging threats are also dealt with, especially regarding the EU and NATO strategies and instruments. The paper ends with an outline of three possible scenarios for CSBM’s regimes in the Mediterranean region within different frameworks, which are intended to help contribute to the discussion about alternative strategies and their implications.

I. Preliminary remarks on war, security and confidence

“War is the continuation of politics by other means”, Klausewitz once wrote. According to Tolstoy’s opening phrase in this paper, war can be said to be the intensification of crimes and wrongs committed in a short period of time, so that the intensity of harm and injustices –both felt and perpetrated– is enormously higher than in normal times. Do these or other classical definitions of war help us understand the challenges that the world is facing as far as the security of individuals and states is concerned?
Since the UN forged the term of human security in 1994, this concept has become increasingly used in the international community. Nowadays, international actors use the term human security to refer to freedom from fear and freedom from want, without which a safe environment for a healthy life cannot be assured. Human security is also about the security of individuals as opposed to the security of states. Not that states do not matter any more; rather, states have a renewed responsibility to ensure that each one of their citizens can be said to live free from fear and free from want — probably a much harder task than before.

In addition, international and regional organizations are starting to review what they consider to be the most important threats to security in the 21st Century. In this sense, the EU issued its European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003, which identifies as the new threats: terrorism, failed states, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also issued a new official document on “Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century” in December 2003. According to the OSCE, these new threats are inter-state and intra-state conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, discrimination and intolerance, threats of economic nature (economic and social disparities, lack of rule of law, weak governance, corruption, widespread poverty and high unemployment), environmental threats (unsustainable use of resources, mismanagement of wastes, pollution and ecological disasters), and threats of a politico-military nature (accumulation of conventional weaponry, illicit transfer of arms, and proliferation of WMD).

A number of high level commissions and panels working for national governments as well as international organizations have created new visions and strategies that try to adapt the use of force to the realities and needs of today. Most notably, the Government of Canada commissioned a document in 2001 on the “responsibility to protect”, which deals with the duties of governments to protect individuals, and identifies a series of criteria for intervention in third countries when their governments are not meeting this responsibility. More recently, the UN has presented the result of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a document that deals with the “shared responsibility for a more secure world”. These works emphasize the need for the international community to engage in countering threats to security not only affecting citizens as individuals in a particular country, but human beings as such across the world.

If we use the human security approach, we have to conclude that confidence linked to security in the international arena is not so much related to what states perceive other states’ behavior to be, but rather to the trust of citizens as individuals in a secure future, in which they are free from fear and from want. In a similar way, according to the European Security Strategy, confidence would be related to the new threats identified, and in particular, the trust of European citizens as individuals that terrorism, failed states, organized crime and WMD are being dealt with and are a priority concern of national and European governments. The same can be said as far as the threats identified by OSCE are concerned.
II. Building confidence and security and the new threats to security

Building confidence and security in order to set the conditions for peace and avoid war and violence (that jeopardize the freedom and security of individuals) has long been one of the goals of multilateral institutions such as the EU, NATO, OSCE and others, as well as the cornerstone of a variety of multilateral treaties and politically-binding documents. When talking about building confidence and security, we have to refer especially to the regimes developed by the CSCE/OSCE, both in the area of CSBM’s as in arms control and reduction. It has traditionally been accepted that confidence and security building measures are those intended to reduce the danger of armed conflict, to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities, and thus to contribute to stability. CSBM’s regarding conventional forces in Europe have primarily been adopted in the context of CSCE/OSCE, while measures dealing with nuclear forces (both strategic and sub-strategic) have been dealt with either in international treaties (e.g. the NPT) or through bilateral agreements (this has been the case especially of nuclear arms reduction).

Some of the new threats identified have led organizations to restate or redesign their strategies to combat those threats to security. The EU, following the European Security Strategy, was supposed to enshrine the new European vision for security in the constitutional treaty. This treaty is—or, rather, would have been— an enabling text for the common foreign and defense policy, that is, the provisions contained in the Constitution do not hinder the development of this policy (as opposed to the treaties approved since the Maastricht Treaty). One of the decisions taken by the EU was to create a “terrorism czar” and a special department to deal with this new threat.

NATO, an essential consultative forum for its members on all aspects of their defense and security, approved in 1999 the Strategic Concept, “committed to contribute actively to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as confidence and security-building measures.” NATO is also developing new programs to fight against the new threats to security. OSCE’s counter-terrorism activities “focus, inter alia, on border security and management, policing, the combating of trafficking and suppression of terrorist financing”, according to the OSCE Strategy to Address “Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century”. The same is true for myriad other areas now more directly related to security, such as immigration policies, tolerance and non-discrimination policies, and so forth.

III. CSBM’s and the OSCE

Confidence and security building measures is the term that has been used in the last 30 years to refer to a set of principles and practices that a number of state actors have agreed upon in order to improve security and cooperation among them and among their populations. The term is usually associated with the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975, adopted by the then Conference for the Security and Cooperation in
Europe. The signatories of this Act, a politically-binding document, were the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The Helsinki Final Act came at a time when the world was still divided by the Iron Curtain, and the risk of nuclear attacks between super-powers was a menace. Its content was partly addressed at creating the conditions for a more secure international environment, one in which actors would acknowledge their responsibility to promote understanding and cooperation between nations, and at the same time respect state sovereignty. In practice, it was meant to reduce the tensions between the two blocks by having states share information about their military plans, capabilities and activities. The set of CSBM’s negotiated and agreed upon in 1975 have been revised and broadened in several documents, the last of which is the Vienna Document 1999, currently in force. This document, and the previous versions of CSBM’s, have to be seen as the maximum level of military cooperation that all the OSCE participating states are willing to accept. One has to bear in mind that OSCE was not built around a common political arrangement and that all decisions require the consensus of 55 states, among which there are countries which have tensions and conflicts with each other, such as Russia and Georgia or Armenia and Azerbaijan.

During the 1990’s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, several important agreements have been reached by the OSCE, although the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act has always been praised and renewed. The Paris Charter for a New Europe confirmed the need to maintain the then CSCE after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the regimes created, in order to guarantee security in Europe. Other relevant innovations in that decade include: (i) the signature and ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990, which established limitations to conventional arms in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, with a definition of quotas according to different groupings of countries, always under the two-block logic, and which are still in force awaiting the ratification by OSCE states of the revised version of the treaty which redraws borders associated to quotas along state lines; (ii) the update of the regime of CSBM’s (the last of which is the Vienna Document 1999), including increased openness and the reduction of thresholds on account of the lower level of military activity in Europe and the changes in military and defense technology; (iii) the signature in 1992 and later ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies, which establishes the regime for the conduct of observation flights by OSCE countries over other OSCE countries, including the technology to be used and the system of passive and active quotas; (iv) the creation of the Forum for Security Cooperation in 1992, and the establishment of Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings to overview the application of the Vienna Document 1999; (v) the approval of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in 1994, which calls for civilian control over armed forces, respect of the international humanitarian law and proportionate and adequate use of force; (vi) the creation of a Communications Network that allows participant countries to share online the information required by the CSBM’s regime; and (vii) the regionalization of CSBM’s, encouraged by the Vienna Document 1999, and which has seen a rise in the interest in sub-regional and bilateral agreements among states that have tensions, such as the Black Sea agreement.
The issue of sub-regional and bilateral CSBM’s and similar agreements is not new. Thus, France and Germany signed the Treaty of the Elysée back in 1963, covering a wide range of areas, including strong security cooperation. Turkey and Greece also have agreements in several areas aimed at increasing confidence between the two countries. The 5+5 Agreement can also be considered as a sub-regional arrangement to increase security and exchange information and visits between 5 European and 5 Southern Mediterranean countries.

The increased transparency and confidence in the OSCE area, together with the changes in threats to security, have brought new tools to the forefront. Thus, the control on small arms and light weapons (which account for most deaths in violent conflicts and are widely used in organized crime) is a priority for OSCE countries. This implies regulating manufacturing, marking and record-keeping (in order to be able to trace these weapons), establishing common export criteria and controls, managing stockpiles and eliminating surpluses, and the reductions of these arms on the field, in areas of conflict. CSBM’s in areas not included in the traditional definition are also being developed, and the concept is now even extending to intrastate relations. This is the case, for instance, of confidence-building measures in certain OSCE countries between the police forces and the population.

An important aspect in the work of OSCE is the collaboration with other regional security organizations. The Istanbul Charter for European Security 1999 created, among other things, the Platform for Cooperative Security to encourage this objective. In this sense, OSCE and NATO have a fluid cooperation, including sharing notes, mutual invitations and other mechanisms. The Annual Security Reviews are usually attended by OSCE participating states, by NATO and by OSCE partners. Relations with the EU, and particularly with its defense and security administration, are not so developed as with NATO. Political will in the EU has not allowed so far a deeper relation. As an example of this, a recent initiative of OSCE to develop a joint OSCE-EU-NATO dialog with Mediterranean partners has not succeeded.

IV. Security and confidence in the Mediterranean region

This section deals with the security pillar of the three main Mediterranean dialogs or partnerships currently in place: the Euromediterranean Partnership (EMP) of the EU (a.k.a. Barcelona Process), NATO’s Mediterranean Dialog and OSCE’s Mediterranean Dialog.

The Euromediterranean Partnership

EU Mediterranean partners are ten in number: Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Syria. The year 2005 was marked by the Tenth Anniversary of the Barcelona Process, which provided a yet again missed opportunity to review the political and security pillar within the EMP of the EU, one that has not yielded the expected results. The Communication of the
Commission on the Tenth Anniversary of the EMP, when addressing the political and security pillar of the Barcelona Process, identifies the following partnership-building measures that are already up and running: the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, the Malta Diplomatic Seminars, co-operation in Civil Protection and Disaster Management, and the EUROMESCO network of foreign policy institutes. The Anna Lindh Foundation is also considered to be partnership-building measure, although it is usually under the social pillar.

Negotiations to develop and adopt a Euromediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability started with the Barcelona Process, although, according to a working paper of the Euromed Secretariat, “since 2001, due to Arab/Israeli tension, the pace of negotiations of [the Charter] has decreased, but Ministers have reaffirmed their commitment to the aim of adopting the Charter as soon as the political situation allows.”

The relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partners have been institutionalized and managed through the Association Agreements which the EU has signed with each partner (the Syrian agreement awaiting signature). Financial instruments until this date have been under the MEDA programs. The Association Agreements include as the first of their aims to “provide an appropriate framework for political dialog”. The political provisions contained in these agreements (except the one with Palestine, which does not include a political chapter) state that the agreements are “based on respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights” and that a regular political and security dialog between the EU and partner countries is established in order –amongst other things– to facilitate rapprochement or develop a mutual understanding and an increasing convergence of positions on international issues and to contribute to consolidating security and stability in the region. In the case of the Association Agreement with Israel, article 5.1 establishes that political dialog shall take place by, (d) providing regular information to Israel on issues relating to common foreign and security policy, which shall be reciprocated. The agreements also contain provisions regarding dialog between the European Parliament and national parliaments in partner countries. In addition, they include articles related to cooperation in order to prevent and fight organized crime (one of the new threats identified by the European Security Strategy) as well as to prevent and control illegal immigration and readmission following extradition. Finally, the agreements signed with Algeria and Egypt include an article establishing that parties shall cooperate in the fight against terrorism, focusing in particular on exchange of information on means and methods used to counter terrorism, exchange experience in respect to terrorism prevention, and joint research and studies in the area of terrorism prevention.

It is commonly accepted that cooperation between Southern Mediterranean (“co-operation South-South”) countries lags behind the level of cooperation reached by the EU and each individual country. This is true of economic integration in the region and also of security cooperation.
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialog

The partners of the Mediterranean Dialog of NATO are seven countries: Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria and Mauritania. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of 2004 was adopted in order to “undertake a new initiative in the broader Middle East region to further contribute to long-term global and regional security and stability while complementing other international efforts.” In the field of confidence-building, article 7b talks about the promotion of military-to-military cooperation.

NATO regularly cooperates with OSCE in matters related to the Mediterranean region, through meetings, exchange of information, verifications, and other instruments.

Regarding confidence and security-building measures, the NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997 includes a regime of CSBM’s.

The OSCE Mediterranean Dialog

There are several instruments within OSCE that address Mediterranean security issues. The Mediterranean Contact Group is the main forum for these matters: its members are OSCE participant states as well as the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

In addition, these partners participate in meetings of the Permanent Council of the OSCE, as well as in the Forum for Security Cooperation. The Sofia Ministerial Council decision includes furthering dialogue and co-operation with the Partners for Co-operation and exploring the scope of a wider sharing of OSCE norms, principles and commitments with others. Note should be taken also on the considerations of the delegations of the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation for the attention of the members of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, which stress the need for further cooperation and for voluntary implementation by partners of OSCE norms, principles, commitments and values. Finally, guides of best practices in the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Affairs have been translated into Arabic and several partners, as well as other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, have shown an interest in these case studies.

Some actors and some declarations point out that the time has come for a stronger collaboration between OSCE and its Mediterranean partners, including the implementation of CSBM’s. It might also be reasonable to enlarge this partnership, particularly bearing in mind that the Barcelona Process includes nearly double as many partners. However, the OSCE approach is never an aggressive one and decisions are always taken by consensus. This means that a piece-meal strategy might be the best suited to the region. Although partners are already invited to several fora and meetings as observers, and some OSCE participants have even invited them to take part in visits and military exercises, not all of them seize these opportunities, nor have they ratified all international conventions dealing with the new threats.
A Mediterranean Seminar on Addressing Threats to Security in the 21st Century was held in November 2004 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, which served as a forum for the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation to exchange views on the matter. In this seminar, several proposals were made in the field of regional security, including the creation of a Mediterranean conflict prevention center, a regional code of conduct, and a permanent security forum in the region.

V. CSBM’s at a crossroads?

Some of the pressing issues concerning CSBM’s regimes in general and with Southern Mediterranean countries in particular are: If the concept of security is changing and shifting towards what is now called human security, with an emphasis on individual security, are CSBM’s still of any use? Is confidence possible between two countries when one of them is acting against human rights or the rights of minorities? In view of political declarations calling for an increased spending in defense in Europe, are CSBM’s and treaties that limit armament an obstacle for adapting European capabilities to the new threats? Some voices have expressed a desire for a new wave of CSBM’s in the 21st Century, one which includes measures related to information on human rights protection in each country. Be it as it may, CSBM’s as they are currently conceived seem to be of great importance in maintaining the long and complicated process of confidence-building among countries with different security concerns and priorities.

CSBM’s and the revised version of the CFE represent a lowering of the threshold for armaments of different types. However, the limits established are still compatible with an increase in defense budgets in Europe, and particularly with the development and procurement of more modern defense and security technology and knowledge. It is true, nonetheless, that transforming certain politically-binding documents into legally-binding treaties (for instance, the small weapons agreement within the OSCE) is a difficult task, often vetoed by a number of countries.

VI. Developing a CSBM’s regime model for the Mediterranean

In adapting the CSBM’s doctrine to the Mediterranean area and carving a realistic and effective system of measures to increase confidence and security, a number of strategic issues need to be addressed, some of which are interconnected. We assume that if modeled (which is not the goal of this paper), it would most probably be shown that these variables have an impact in the outcome. These variables are:

Type of conflict. CSBM’s can be designed in a context of active warfare (e.g. Israel-Arab conflict) or in one of latent conflict that represents a real threat (as was the case with the CSCE during the Cold War).

Balance of forces and political clout. The opposing parties in a CSBM’s regime can be of comparable importance and have an equivalent might in the international sphere, as was the case of the
CSCE, or, as far as military force, India and Pakistan. However, in other cases the actors are unbalanced, and this might account for less effectiveness in the CSBM’s arrangements because it is harder to achieve trust and confidence.

**Number of actors.** The main actors that are willing to increase confidence and security among themselves should be identified. In the case of the CSCE and later the OSCE, the actors were, originally, the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the former USSR republics that achieved independence also joined this institutional body and ratified its norms. In the case of the Barcelona Process, the actors are the EU-members and the 10 Mediterranean partners. In other CSBM’s arrangements there are fewer actors, as in the case in a number of bilateral agreements: Turkey and Greece, India and Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, and others. It is plausible that bilateral CSBM’s agreements are less effective than multilateral ones, since there is less collective pressure to comply. This has happened in the past between India and Pakistan.

**Type of actors.** We assume that actors should be public institutions of states willing to set up a scheme of CSBM’s, but we ought not to take for granted that these actors are necessarily national governments. Legitimate actors can also be supra-state institutions (e.g. institutions within the UN system or EU bodies like Europol), or institutions other than governments, such as parliaments. This last possibility would be particularly appropriate from the point of view of the human security approach, which emphasizes security of individuals.

**Degree of integration between the participants.** The degree of integration and the existence of different “sides” or of strong ties between two or more of the actors can lead to different “geographies” or “speeds” of CSBM’s. Thus, for instance, within the OSCE NATO members do not carry out inspection visits among each other, although they have a right to do so. In the case of the Barcelona Process, one side is formed by a group of states that share common political, economic, social and cultural systems and principles, while the states in the other side share a language and culture but do not generally have useful cooperative schemes among themselves.

**Institutional framework.** CSBM’s have to be part of an institutional framework, be it a covenant-like document or an organization. Several possibilities come to mind: the CSBM’s scheme is set up in the framework of a new institutional body (as was the case with the CSCE, created by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act); the CSBM’s scheme is set up within an already existing organization (e.g. within the EU’s EMP), or the CSBM’s scheme is set up within the framework of several existing organizations (e.g. EU, NATO and the OSCE, or a combination thereof).

**“Reason why” and related expectations.** It is not a minor issue to identify the main purpose of a scheme of CSBM’s, in other words, its “reason why”. The range of possible purposes and expectations are best considered and understood as questions: Are these measures supposed to help prepare the path for a permanent solution of a long-standing conflict between the actors? Are they, on the contrary, bound to
deepen confidence and trust among actors that have already a history of cooperation? Is the outcome of such a scheme of CSBM’s going to directly meet its goals? How important are the expected results to the overall security needs of its actors and their constituencies?

VII. Options for the Mediterranean

In this section we consider three alternative scenarios that can help us visualize what a viable CSBM’s regime in the Mediterranean region could look like and some of its implications. It is important to note that these scenarios are hypothetical and are only intended to help visualize possible developments on the basis of realistic considerations.

Scenario 1

The EU and its 10 Mediterranean partners take the lead in the implementation of a CSBM’s regime. Initially, though, participation in this regime is not compulsory, but those partners who do choose to participate have more favorable conditions under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument and other financing programs of the EU. This regime is part of the EU’s Barcelona Process, and negotiations are launched at a Special Summit on Mediterranean Security in Cyprus in 2006.

The CSBM’s regime is not part of the Association Agreement, but rather a separate multilateral document, the Euromediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. However, this regime leverages on the provisions contained in the Association Agreements signed between the EU and partner countries, which mention political dialog, security cooperation and dialog between the European Parliament and national parliaments.

The Charter negotiations, which began in 1997 but were hostage to the Middle East peace process, have resumed thanks to a lessening in the tensions following the Gaza withdrawal and further developments. In addition, full plenipotentiary diplomats and decision-makers from the EMP countries have now taken over responsibility in the negotiations and a Charter is finally approved by the countries involved.

The Charter includes:

1. A definition of common security threats

2. A code of conduct on police, intelligence and military aspects of security that sets forth principles guiding the role of these communities in democratic societies.

3. A set of CSBM’s in the areas of policing, intelligence and armed forces based on the exchange of information and access to government plans and policies dealing with main security threats (terrorism, organized crime, failed states and WMD). This includes: annual exchange of information on resources, plans, expenditures and forecasts in areas of government related to main security threats; information on
movements of military forces; intelligence-sharing that is relevant to
other countries’ security concerns; access to police and military
premises; exchanges of police, intelligence and military officers, as well
as workshops and “diplomatic seminars”.

The detail of CSBM’s concerning police services, intelligence and armed
forces would be decided in Ministerial Meetings involving Ministers of
Interior, Justice, Defense and Foreign Affairs of the countries involved.

The follow-up mechanism for the implementation of this regime
would be a competence of the Euromediterranean Parliamentary
Assembly. A special Commission of this body would have to approve
every year the Annual Report on the Progress of the provisions
contained in the Euromediterranean Peace and Stability Charter. In
addition, and within the framework of the dialog between the
European Parliament and national parliaments of partner countries, a
special commission formed by members of these bodies has to give its
opinion on the aforementioned progress. Funding for this regime
should come from the European Neighborhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI).

Scenario 2

The CSBM’s for the region are set up as part of OSCE’s Mediterranean
Dialog. Cooperation of OSCE participants with Mediterranean partners
already started in 1975, but has seen substantial improvements in the
past decade. A Mediterranean Contact Group was created in 1994, and
nowadays partners can take part in meetings of the Permanent Council
and the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). In accordance with the
Charter of Paris (1990), the Helsinki Document 1992 and the Budapest
Document 1994, cooperation with this region is an essential issue for
OSCE. Decision 571 of the FSC encouraged the extension of the OSCE
acquis to other countries, and some of the Mediterranean partners have
adopted some of the measures included in the “menu” that is available
for them. Therefore, a step further has been taken in order to establish
a regime of CSBM’s among European and Southern Mediterranean
countries.

The set of CSBM’s contained in this regime is adopted by OSCE
countries and its Mediterranean partners in Cairo in 2007, and includes
measures in the same areas as the Vienna Document 1999 (although
measures themselves are less ambitious). The Palestinian Authority,
which has not participated in the OSCE, is given observer status in the
framework of this cooperation agreement. Measures are taken in the
following areas:

1. Annual exchange of military information: information on military
forces, data relating to major weapon and equipment systems,
information on plans for the deployment of major weapon and
equipment systems

2. Defense planning: exchange of information, clarification, review and
dialog
3. Risk reduction: mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities, voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities

4. Contacts: visits to air bases, military contacts and cooperation, military cooperation (joint exercises), demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems

5. Prior notification of certain military activities

6. Observation of certain military activities

7. Annual calendars

8. Constraining provisions

9. Compliance and verification: inspection, evaluation,

The CSBM’s regime also establishes a timeline including periodical revisions and additions such as measures concerning police strategies and policies in participant countries, building on the OSCE police-related activities set by the Istanbul Charter for European Security 1999 (police monitoring in order to ensure non-discrimination procedures and police training in order to improve capabilities, skills and respect for human rights, as well as multicultural police forces).

A Conflict Prevention Center is opened in Tunisia to deal with confidence and security-building training, assessment of the measures contained in the Cairo Document 2007.

The Document containing CSBM’s calls for the initiation of a process that will eventually lead to a formal treaty signed by participating states and partners.

**Scenario 3**

A Conference on Security in the Euromediterranean Region (CSEMR) is convened, under the auspices of the UN as well as the EU, the OSCE, NATO and their Mediterranean Partners, in order to address the most pressing issues of security in the region. This Conference is made possible by the window of opportunity that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 has opened in the Middle East conflict. It is also inspired by the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), an initiative negotiated by Asian countries (including Turkey, Russia, Iran, China, and others) and promoted by Kazakhstan which has resulted in a catalog of measures adopted by the CICA Ministers of Foreign Affairs in October 1994 in Almaty1. [This Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures (CICA) is actually in place.]

The CSEMR is created in Barcelona in 2006 under the leadership of Egypt and Morocco, and an agreement is adopted by participating countries at a meeting in Barcelona in 2009, giving birth to the
Barcelona Final Act, signed by the 25 EU members, the United States, Canada, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and all 10 Southern Mediterranean partners of the Barcelona Process.

Negotiations leading to the consensual adoption of this Act have been difficult at times, but progress in democratization in the region and bilateral agreements signed by some of the countries concerned (Morocco and Algeria, as well as Egypt and Israel) have enabled a catalog of measures more ambitious than the one agreed by CICA—which does not mention human rights—, for instance including election-monitoring.

VIII. Note on sources

This paper is based on documents, declarations and treaties that can be found in the following websites:

www.osce.org
www.nato.int
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/

The author has also incorporated inputs from a variety of published works. In addition, the author has also met with officials at the OSCE Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center, and with members of the delegations to the OSCE of France, Greece, Morocco, Spain, Turkey, and the US.

1. This Conference is actually in place
4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean

Ten years of the Barcelona Process: Results and new aims

Seminar programme
The Spanish Ministry of Defence and the CIDOB Foundation share the goal of continuing promoting security and stability in the Mediterranean, through initiatives aiming at promoting mutual understanding and transparency in the relations between the EU and the rest of the country members of the Euromediterranean Partnership, as well as with the international organizations of security and defence, NATO and OSCE.

Since this year is the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Conference - which gave rise to the project of the Euromediterranean Partnership -, the 4th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean intends to carry out a complete analysis of the evolution and achievements of the Partnership, and to determine both the new challenges to be faced by the euromediterranean region and the course to be followed in order to speed up the attainment of the proposals and goals established in the “Mediterranean Peace and Stability Charter”.

More specifically, this Seminar intends to be both a means to assess the state of the “Mediterranean Security Dialogues”, and a forum to exchange information and discuss about security initiatives and confidence-building measures in the Mediterranean.
SEPTEMBER 19TH, 2005

09:45 Credentials

10:30 Opening ceremony
   Mr. José Bono Martínez, Spanish Minister of Defence

11:00 Opening Lecture: 10th Anniversary of the Barcelona Conference: Achievements and Challenges in the Security Chapter
   Speaker: Dr. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Institute for Strategic and International Studies (IEEI), Portugal
   Moderator: Mr. Juan Prat, Spanish Ambassador for Mediterranean Affairs
   Discussion

12:00 Coffee break

12:30 CFSP & ESDP from a Mediterranean Perspective
   Speaker: General Mosca Moschini, Chairman of the Military Committee of the European Union
   Discussion

14:00 Lunch break

15:30 NATO Mediterranean Dialogue: Analysis and Outlooks after the Istanbul Summit
   Speakers: Mr. Pablo de Benavides Orgaz, Spanish Ambassador to NATO
             Mr. Jamie Patrick Shea, Director of the Secretary General’s Policy Planning Unit, NATO
   Discussion

17:00 Break

17:30 1st Round-Table: Euromediterranean Partnership: Confidence-building measures
   Speakers: Mr. Nick Kay, Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy, Madrid
             Dr. Ersin Kalaycioglu, Isik Universitesi, Turkey
             Dr. Abdallah Saaf, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales, Rabat
             Dr. Fred Tanner, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva
   Moderator: Mr. Jesús Val Catalán, Major General, Head of Studies, ESFAS, Ministry of Defence, Spain
   Discussion

19:30 End of first working day
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09:00 2nd Round Table: New Threats according to the European Security Strategy (ESS)
Speakers:
Mr. Giuliano Ferrari, Major General, Italy
Ms. Alicia Sorroza, Real Instituto Elcano, Spain
Mr. Noureddine Mekri, Colonel, Director of the Algerian Institute for National Security Studies
Mr. Mohammed Abd Elsalam, Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, El Cairo
Moderator:
Mr. Leopoldo Stampa Piñeiro, General Director for Institutional Relations

Discussion

11:00 Coffee break

11:30 Debate on “Ideas for the future of the Barcelona Process in the scope of ESDP”
Speaker:
Mr. Martín Ortega, Institute for Security Studies of the European Union (ISS.EU), Paris

Discussion

13:00 Closing of Seminar
Representative of the European Union
Mr. Narcís Serra, CIDOB Foundation President
Mr. Leopoldo Stampa Piñeiro, General Director for Institutional Relations

13:30 Reception