

Non-state security providers in Kyrgyzstan: druzhina

Aijan Sharshenova

Visiting Research Fellow, Social Research Center (www.src.auca.kg)

American University of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

This paper addresses a very specific recent phenomenon of the Kyrgyzstan's security field: non-state security providers. It focuses on druzhina (voluntary people's patrol), examines its evolution, recent and current activities and the role in the Kyrgyzstani reality. The paper assumes that druzhina represents a state-civil society nexus and, as such, it represents an interest for security sector reform

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the SRC staff for their kind support and to numerous druzhinas for granting the citizens of Bishkek the feeling of security.

Introduction

State agencies have largely preoccupied the attention of security sector reform (SSR); the future lies in addressing the remaining majority — the non-state agencies.

Bruce Baker in Sedra 2010, p.208

This research project addresses the issue of non-state security providers, in particular, voluntary patrol units, in Kyrgyzstan and writes this issue into a broader context of security sector reform (hereinafter referred to as SSR). The research attempts to harmonize the regional imbalance in the bulk of security-related publications: the majority of security-related research papers focus on post-conflict, post-colonial, mainly African, Latin American or Balkan countries (e.g. see Cawthra and Luckham 2003). The research also aims to shift the focus of the local security discourse from state security networks to the emerging non-state security sector.

The paper starts with an outline of the existing research on non-state security sector. It highlights global trends in the development of security sector. This general discussion is followed with an account of the development of civilian policing in Kyrgyzstan. The paper focuses on the history, recent development and prospects of voluntary patrol units in Kyrgyzstan.

The paper is based on the theoretical framework of security studies, and supported with the empirical evidence of the most recent events in Kyrgyzstan.

At the outset, several limitations should be stated. Due to the scope limitations, the research paper focuses only on *druzhina* (voluntary people's patrol) as it has gained a particular urgency in Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of "the *druzhina* boom" of 2010 and in the light of a law on *druzhina*, which is currently being drafted. The research concentrates on *druzhinas* active in the Bishkek city.

Part 1. Security and security sector reform: global trends and Kyrgyzstani context

Out of many academic and informal definitions of security, the Maslow's definition provides more space for interpretation: security is "a condition or feeling untroubled by exposure to harm or fear" (in Lavoix 2010, p.4). This definition reflects the two-fold nature of security: its objective part, which implies the condition of security, and the perceptive part, or the feeling of being secure.

It is possible to distinguish two cornerstone questions in the security studies: security for whom and security by whom. The first question refers to the consumers of the security services. In authoritarian countries, the regime security prevails human security, i.d. security of the current regime and political leadership is given more significance than physical, political and economic security of ordinary citizens. Democracy claims to be more benevolent to people prioritizing people as both the end and means of the state even though such claims can be disputed.

The question "security by whom" refers to the sources of security. Conventional practice of statecraft assumes that *state* shall provide both the condition and the feeling of security. A state usually manages a range of specific agents to provide security for its citizens. The most basic set of state security providers includes army and police.

However, state is no longer the only source of security for citizens. It is also not the case that citizens are the passive consumers of security services. The security sector is now diversified with a broad range of non-state security providers (Sedra 2010). The diversification of security actors is the first relevant to this research trend in security studies.

Non-state security providers can be divided in two large groups: informal non-state security providers and private security providers (Smith & Richards 2007). Informal non-state security providers imply numerous agents including neighbourhood defence forces, volunteer patrol units, youth groups, elders and respected citizens in rural areas, etc (Baker 2005ab, 2005; Baker in Sedra 2010). Private security providers are professional agencies that offer their services legally under contract and for profit. The list of non-state security providers is actually much

longer than the above-mentioned one, and it depends on the scrutiny and patience of a researcher, who composes this list.

Though non-state security sector remains underexplored, it is possible to mark out certain experts in the field. Thus, Professor Baker had produced numerous research works addressing the variety of policing agents in African countries (Baker 2005ab, 2006). On the basis of a substantial empirical research, Baker offers the concept of *multi-choice policing*. Baker draws the example of African countries, Sierra Leone and Uganda, to show that the Western blueprints of policing and security, applied to non-Western societies, might fail, when they encounter local peculiarities and gaps.

Due to poor state policing, local people tend to find alternatives and turn to non-state security structures. Baker identifies a three-fold typology of security providers: state structures (e.g. police), state-approved structures (e.g. commercial security companies) and illegal or unauthorized agents (e.g. mob justice, youth groups).

Non-state security structures do not completely replace state structure; they rather exist and operate as *parallel option* for citizens to seek for assistance in specific situations. Most of non-state security agents are not completely and clearly cut away from state. They tend to be related or affiliated with state in one way or another. At the same time, people would rather prefer state policing if the latter were functional. Non-state security structures proliferate in the absence of efficient and democratic police. Nevertheless, their increasing presence is largely ignored by formal state structures and international donor agencies that seek to introduce democratic and efficient security sector. Non-state security agents are rarely included to security sector reform's agenda.

Security sector reform is another global trend in security studies and development agenda. After the collapse of the USSR, security and democratic governance entered development agendas. Initially, generously funded security sector reforms focused on the reduction of military expenses in developing countries with an aim to re-allocate resources to alleviate poverty and stimulate development. Later, the question of security sector governance had become the focus of SSR. By the 2000-s, donors had understood that physical insecurity was the major impediment to development. SSR agendas were reconsidered to assist with building efficient and democratic security forces. At the same time, SSR agenda reflected the growing understanding that conflict prevention was less expensive than recovery after a conflict. Throughout the last twenty years of SSR's discourse development, SSR has been viewed as instrumental to promote democracy and development (Ball in Sedra 2010, pp.29-45).

Security and rule of law become "a panacea for the ills of countries in transition" (Carothers 1998, p.95). Kyrgyzstan is not an exception from this global trend: calls to ensure greater

security and stability for Kyrgyz citizens come both from inside and outside this small nation in transition.

Promises to provide security inevitably accompany any domestic political campaign in Kyrgyzstan. The recent parliamentary elections provide a remarkable evidence for this assumption: security promise has penetrated programmes and statutes of political parties and speeches by party leaders, who run for parliamentary seats.

The following selection of Kyrgyz parties' rhetoric reflects the general perception of the security's importance for Kyrgyzstan. The Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan defines security and order as top priorities and necessary pre-requisites for further development (SDPK 2010). Political party Ak-Shumkar conducted its recent electoral campaign under the motto "Strong state is the path to success". The party programme enlists what a strong state can do, and providing security is the first item in this "must-be" list (Akshumkar 2010). Respublica party's Statute contains the list of tasks to be pursued by the party. The list includes "assistance with consolidation of political stability, enforcement of order, provision of security for citizens and society" (Respublica 2010). The Ar-Namys political party's programme contains a section titled "Three urgent steps" and the public security is the second step to do on the path to address the current challenges faced by Kyrgyzstan (Ar-Namys 2010).

The security-related mottos, security-centred programs and promises reflect the overwhelming concerns and fears of the Kyrgyzstani population in the aftermath of the most recent tragic events of 2010. For the most of 2011, Kyrgyzstanis have suffered the absence of "the condition of security", and have been deprived of the feeling of being secure.

The tragic chain of events started on April 6, when a public unrest in Talas, a Northern province of Kyrgyzstan, spread to the capital city. People protested against the Bakiev's family rule, a steep rise in the price of communications, doubled rate for electricity, substantial inflation in the cost of basic goods and service, political pressure and the absence of free media (Reeves 2010). On April 7, during clashes with police near the Government House, about ninety people died and hundreds were injured. Local marginal people and criminals used the collapse of state security services to loot shops and trade centres on the night following the revolution day. Police, which long has been used by the ruling elites as a tool against political opponents, as well as, other security forces, has been rather invisible throughout the April events. The country's leadership left the country, and beside security crisis, the country went through political crisis.

Later, in June, the security crisis reached greater scale. Violent clashes in Osh and Osh oblast destroyed the social and political setup, paralysed the work of state-authorized security forces in the Southern Kyrgyzstan. Apart from these two major crises, the country experienced numerous

minor situations, protest actions, terrorist acts, public disorder and strikes (see AkiPress news archive).

On April 7, during the harsh political crisis, and afterwards, when the Kyrgyzstani state has been unable to provide the full-fledged policing for its citizens, the Kyrgyzstanis had to rely on their own resources and capacities. Those citizens, who were able to hire commercial security companies, had been protected by well-equipped professionals. Others enjoyed the communal security activities provided by the so-called “*druzhina*”, or voluntary patrol units. The role of these agents in providing the condition of security and the feeling of security for citizens can hardly be underestimated.



A police vehicle burns during an anti-government protest in Bishkek on April 7, 2010, photo by Vyacheslav Oseledko

Retrieved from http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/04/crisis_in_kyrgyzstan.html

Part 2. Druzhina: a “blast from the past” or a manifestation of a mature and responsible citizenry

The Oxford dictionary of foreign words gives two definitions of *druzhina* (pl. *druzhiny*). The first definition draws back to the Russian Middle ages when *druzhina* was “the retinue or bodyguards of a Russian prince”. Second definition refers to the Soviet reality: “a military or police unit; *specifically* a detachment of volunteers assuming police powers” (Oxford 1999).

Modern *druzhinas* on the territory of the current CIS emerged immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. The initial task of such civil assistance to the police was to

replace the missing body of the old dismissed tsarist police. Since at the dawn of the Soviet era, the emerging country lacked both human and financial resources, voluntary civilian patrols became a perfect solution of the post-revolutionary security problem. At that time, the main requirement for civilian patrols was loyalty to the Soviet state and commitments to the Communist ideas. In the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, first document fixing the emergence of druzhina was the Statute on the formation of druzhina to fight criminality, issued in October 1958. With the consolidation of the Soviet police and security service, the need for voluntary civilian patrols became less urgent. Post-revolutionary druzhinas faded for some period of time. The next rise of druzhina occurred in 1958, in Leningrad, where workers at a plant organised a voluntary patrol to assist the police and control public order (Djakishev 2004).

In 1959, “voluntary detachments [*druzhiny*] of the public for maintaining public orderliness” were established by the decision of the Communist Party’s Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. Druzhiny had already operated on the voluntary informal basis by the time of their formal establishment (R.S. 1959).

Soviet druzhina had several distinguishable features. Firstly, the enlistment to druzhina was a complex process: an applicant needed to submit his/her application to his/her social organisation (Comsomol, local committee of the trade union etc.). Upon submission, a collective meeting at his/her place of work considered the application and made a resolution



about acceptance to druzhina. Second distinguished feature was the ambiguous voluntariness of participation in druzhina. Virtually each state—affiliated organisation in the USSR had its own druzhina unit, and members of the organisation regularly served in the druzhina unit if they wanted to stay “in collective” and “display team spirit”. Given the collectivist nature of the Soviet state, these reasons were substantial, and absenteeism could have negative consequences for an “unconscious citizen”. Beside, work administration encouraged participation of employees in druzhina by providing them with compensatory leave days and letters of commendation for the most active druzhinniks. The primary task of Soviet druzhina was to cooperate police, monitor streets, report police of any cases of insecurity and have a psychological effect on hooligans, drunkards, traffic offenders and other troublemakers. Druzhina represented small groups of people with a special badge and an identification document (R.S. 1959).

As the time passed, druzhina had been becoming less and less efficient and voluntary. By the 1980-s, druzhina was rather a mandatory formality for employees of state-owned establishments (Djakishev 2004). At the same time, for young people and enthusiasts druzhina had become a

sort of a social network. Thus, a veteran of druzhina noted that throughout the 1980-s young people had been joining druzhina to have an opportunity to learn martial arts and common wisdom from elder fellows. Mature enthusiasts of druzhina had an altruist motivation: to educate and foster the younger generation and contribute to the public order and morale.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, druzhina faded away in the reality, but remained in the memory of numerous people – those, who served in druzhina, and those, who consumed its security services. The narratives of the druzhina community and practices have been transferred to younger generation in stories and pictures of the Soviet generation. Thus, the author personally has never served in the Soviet druzhina, yet knows what druzhina is and how it works. This social continuity still exists and has been revived in Kyrgyzstan in the light of recent security crises.

In the context of the contemporary Kyrgyzstan, druzhina usually refers to voluntary people's patrol units formed by citizens to protect their compatriots, business and residential areas.

The first unexpected and spontaneous appearance of voluntary civilian policing appeared in the immediate aftermath of the March revolution of 2005, when a looting night followed the revolution day.

During the April 7 events in Kyrgyzstan, druzhina movement has become a mass, grass-roots phenomenon: dozens of druzhiny appeared with the common task of protecting the Bishkek city, suburban and rural areas and citizens. Some druzhiny had clear affiliation with political parties (Zamandash or Ak-Shumkar); others were established on the basis of common background. Thus, Azamat-Spartak druzhina initially consisted of professional sportsmen and sports amateurs gathered under the leadership of Orzubek Nazarov, world boxing champion and a former Member of Parliament (BPC 2010).

Since the majority of druzhiny have more or less similar story, tasks, activities and experience, it would be reasonable to discuss the phenomenon of the Kyrgyz druzhina in detail through the narratives of the Patriot druzhina. There are two main reasons for the researcher to focus on this particular voluntary patrol unit. Firstly, this is one of the largest and most notable voluntary patrol units. Secondly, after eight months since “the druzhina boom”, it is rather difficult to find anyone in charge, who can comment on the development of voluntary civil policing in Kyrgyzstan. The researcher has been able to approach the leader of Patriot, who is now a Member of Parliament, and obtain a firsthand account of the druzhina experience, problems and prospects for the development of voluntary civil policing.

Druzhina Patriot was created on April 7, 2010, with the purpose of containing the threat of looting and providing physical security for citizens at large. The druzhina members were of different social background, gender, age and from different residential areas (both urban and

rural). Daniyar Terbishaliev, the leader of Patriot, when commenting the selection criteria for volunteers, noted that there were only two requirements for those, who wished to join the druzhina: volunteers needed to be older than 18 and have a valid passport. On the day of the Patriot's creation, the druzhina consisted of about 100 members, mostly friends and acquaintances of the leader. By April 8, it consisted of more than a thousand people (VB 2010). At the peak of its activity, Patriot consisted of eight thousand citizens. All druzhina members were registered, but these lists still need to be put in order.

Remembering a noticeable absence of police officers in the aftermath of the April events, I asked Daniyar what he thought of the police having been dysfunctional during the turmoil. He replied that the police was there protecting the city side by side with druzhinniks. They just had to put aside their uniform, and carried out their duties in plainclothes within different groups of voluntary patrols. In his opinion, druzhina is a "manifestation of civic will and civic unity" (VB 2010), and a feature of the emerging mature civil society (interview with Terbishaliev 2010).

Druzhini have played a positive role in stabilising the security environment in April during clashes between the Bakiev's government and opposition supporters. However, druzhini have not terminated their activities. Druzhini were active throughout 2011: in May 2010, when the Bakiev's supporters attempted to restore his authority; in June 2010, during interethnic violent clashes in the Southern Kyrgyzstan; during the Referendum day on June 27, 2010; on the Parliamentary elections day on October 10. More recently, some druzhinniks cooperated with police to provide security during sittings of the trial against officials and officers accused for the April 7's bloodshed (AkiPress news).

While the above-stated account represents rather political and personal vision of the role and place of druzhina, Erkinbek Mamyrov, the Head of the Legal Department at the President Administration, kindly shares his professional legal opinion. He draws attention to the legal framework of the druzhina's activity. During the period of the Osh events, lawyers of the Provisional Government have drafted *standing order on druzhini*, which was adopted by the decree of the Provisional Government of June 12, 2010. The standing order sets forth the purpose, tasks, functions, composition, and organisational structure, leadership of druzhina, as well as rights and responsibilities of druzhinniks. According to the standing order, the voluntary people's druzhina (in Russian: *добровольная народная дружина*, or, abbreviated DND) is created to enforce public security and fight against criminals. Laws of the Kyrgyz Republic, decrees and resolutions by the Provisional Government, and the standing order guide the activity of DND. The standing order emphasizes the necessity for close cooperation between the formal police and voluntary patrol units. Ministry of the Interior carries out the primary guidance of DND's activity (art.1), and acts *only* in cooperation with full-time police officers (art.4).

The document also identifies state-approved activities for druzhina to carry out, which include patrolling streets, squares and other public sites; assisting police officers; conducting explanatory work with citizens; and, using mass media outlets to prevent minor offences and crimes. The decree on the creation of DND contains a provision, which allows for armament of druzhiny in the case of need.

The Decree on druzhina and the standing order currently constitute the only legal documents directly related to the regulation of druzhina. At the time of their adoption, these two documents have played a crucial role as they have brought the activity of druzhiny back into legal framework (Mamyrov 2010).

Legal experts agree that druzhina might need to have a normative and legal basis, a *framework law*. Terbishaliev also believes that it is necessary developing detailed normative acts to regulate the status of druzhina and druzhinniks. Social Democratic Party fraction in the Parliament currently prepares a draft law on druzhina; the draft law will contain provisions about druzhina's status, tasks, functions, structure, operational mechanism and social benefits for druzhinniks (Terbishaliev 2010).

Police officers, the primary partners of druzhina, expose mixed feelings about the status of druzhina. On one hand, they welcome the civilian assistance and appreciate the readiness of citizens to assume responsibility for the public security. On another hand, the police notes that it is necessary to limit and precise the rights and powers of druzhina in order to avoid any misunderstandings or power abuses from the part of druzhinniks. For example, the police warns under no circumstances druzhinniks shall be given the right to have and use weapons. Firstly, civilians might have insufficient skills and training to use weapons, and secondly, certain civilians might misuse weapons and become a source of threat to the society.

In place of a conclusion: non-state security agents and SSR agenda

SSR is an attempt to achieve effective democratic control of the institutions that exercise force on behalf of the community. As such, SSR shall include non-state security providers as well as conventional security agents, police and army. If non-state security agents are left to their own devices, they might pose a certain danger to the public security. Some regulation is crucial for the further positive development of these agents under the umbrella of the state and society. At this point, it might be reasonable to pay attention to druzhiny, in general, and, in particular, to the draft law. The majority of rule-of-law projects and SSR menu include writing and re-writing laws and normative documents. If the draft law on druzhina goes through a detailed professional discussion, receives a substantial feedback, and sustains legal expertise, it might serve as a basis for the development of democratic and properly regulated civilian policing for emergencies.

Druzhina apparently has reached a turning point in its development. It is either going to be incorporated into security sector reform agenda and go through refinement process, or it would cease to exist.

Incorporation of non-state voluntary security forces might contain certain benefits. SSR agenda in Kyrgyzstan might be turned into an all-inclusive enterprise, which would serve to connect the state security sector and the emerging civil society. In this case, Kyrgyzstan would become one of few states, which address the remaining majority of security sector – the non-state agencies.

When addressing the issue of the relation between non-state security sector and security sector reform, one need to take into account the existing bulk of research and local security context. Discourses of the increasing policing diversification does not provide substantial explanation of the existence of fragmented, many-fold, multi-layered policing. Some situations might simply lack a “clear-cut diversification away from the state”: non-state security agents are often state-approved, state-initiated or state-funded (Baker 2005). Moreover, non-state policing might represent rather a compulsory measure, which could temporarily alleviate a security crisis under a condition of state policing collapse. In this regard, the Kyrgyz experience of druzhina is exemplary, but also unique. Though druzhina of the sovereign Kyrgyzstan represents a spontaneous and voluntary movement of pro-active citizenry, it is still informed by the practices and experience of the Soviet state-centred past. The very idea of collective communal defence is deeply rooted in the Soviet reality and, to a certain extent, represents a social continuity from the past. State approval and cooperation with formal state agencies remain a strict requirement and state budget so far constitutes the only formal source of funding for druzhiny¹ (see the Decree of June12, 2010, par.9).

However, if an observer steps back from categorical labelling and considers druzhina as a potential *nexus* between state and citizenry, security forces and civil society, druzhina might represent something more than a “blast from the past”. In this case, druzhina would rather represent a manifestation of a mature civil society. A strong and proactive civil society provides the necessary impetus for democratic change. Voluntary patrol units might play a positive role in the process as they represent a proactive part of the citizenry, who are willing to volunteer for the sake of greater public security. In the long run, the development of such civil society could become a fundament for sustainable stability and further democracy consolidation in the country.

¹ One should bear in mind that the amount of state funding is miserable and clearly does not reimburse the time and effort contributed by druzhinniks.

List of references

- Akshumkar 2010, *The official website of the Akshumkar political party*, available at <http://www.akshumkar.kg>;
- Ar-Namys 2010, *The official website of the Ar-Namys political party*, available at
- Baker, B. 2005a, “Who do people turn to for policing in Sierra Leone?”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol.23, No. 3, pp.373-390, Routledge;
- Baker, B. 2005b, “Beyond the state police in urban Uganda”, *Afrika Spectrum*, Vol.41, No. 1, pp.55-76, Institut fur Afrike-Kunde, Hamburg;
- Baker, B. 2006, “Multi-choice policing in Uganda”, *Policing and society*, Vol.15, No. 1, pp.19-41, Routledge;
- Bishkek Press Club (BPC) 2010, Орзубек Назаров: «Среди мародеров были не только приезжие, но и хорошо одетые городские ребята» (Orzubek Nazarov: “Among looters there were not only city guests, but also well-dressed urban young people”), *BPC*, April 09, 2010, available at <http://bpc.kg/news/9924-09-04-10>;
- Born, H., Caparini, M. & Fluri, P. (eds.) 2000, “Security sector reform and democracy in transitional societies”, *Proceedings of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Workshops at the 4th International Security Forum*, November 15-17, 2000, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces;
- Brooks, D 2002, Protecting people: the PMC potential, comments and suggestions for the UK *Green paper on regulating private military services*, available at <http://www.hoosier84.com>;
- Carothers, T. 1998, “The rule of law revival”, *Foreign affairs*, Vol.77, No.2, pp.95-106;
- Cawthra, G & Luckham, R (eds.) 2003, *Governing insecurity: democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies*, Zed Books, London
- Davis, D.E. 2009, “Non-state armed actors, new imagined communities, and shifting patterns of sovereignty and insecurity in the modern world”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.30, Issue 3, pp. 221-245;
- Desch, M.C. 1998, “Culture clash: assessing the importance of ideas in security studies”, *International Security*, Vol.23, No. 1, pp. 141-170, The MIT Press, available at the JSTOR Archive;
- Djakishev, A.U. 2004, “Исторический опыт взаимодействия органов милиции Кыргызстана с общественными формированиями в охране правопорядка (1924-1990)” (“The historical experience of cooperation between the Kyrgyzstan’s militia and public formations in public order (1924-1990)”), *AUCA Academic Review* 2004, pp. 47-56;

- Fluri, P.H. & Malek, M. (eds.) 2008, *Defence and security sector transition in Central Asia*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces;
- Global facilitation network for security sector reform 2007, *A beginner's guide to security sector reform*, available at <http://www.ssrnetwork.net>;
- Holmqvist, C. 2005, "Private security companies: the case for regulation", *SIPRI Policy Paper No.9*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at <http://www.sipri.org/>; <http://www.ar-namys.org>;
- International Crisis Group 2002, "Central Asia: the politics of police reform", *ICG Asia Report No.42*, Osh/Brussels;
- Lavoix, H. 2010, "Enabling security for the 21st century: intelligence and strategic foresight and warning", *RSIS Working paper N.207*, p.4, available at the website of the S.Rajartnam School of International Studies <http://www.rsis.edu.sg>;
- Ministry of Internal Affairs 2010, "Minister of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic issues an order "On additional payment during the emergency period in Osh and Jalalabat oblasts" and "On the conditions of payment for the activity of voluntary people's patrols", *MVD news*, available at <http://www.mvd.kg>;
- OSCE 2010, The official website of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, available at <http://www.osce.org/bishkek>;
- Provisional Government 2010, *Decree of the Provisional Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the formation of voluntary people's patrols*, June 12, 2010 VP N.66, retrieved from Toktom Jurist Pro at <http://www.toktom.kg>;
- R.S. 1959, Voluntary militia and courts, *Soviet Studies*, Vol.11, No.2, pp.214-217, retrieved from JSTOR at <http://www.jstor.org>;
- Reeves, M 2010, "Breaking point: why the Kyrgyz lost their patience", *Open Democracy*, available at <http://www.opendemocracy.net>;
- Respublica 2010, *The official website of the Respublica political party*, available at <http://www.republic.kg>;
- Richards, A. & Smith, H. 2007, "Addressing the role of private security companies within security sector reform", Saferworld;
- Rural Development Fund (RDF) 2010, "DND Patriot",
- Sedra, M. (ed.) 2010, *The future of security sector reform*, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada;
- Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan 2010, *The official website of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan*, available at <http://www.sdpk.info>;

- Speake, J. (ed.) 1999, *The Oxford Essential Dictionary of Foreign Terms in English*, Berkley Books, *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. KLIC - Library Information Consortium of Kyrgyz, available at <http://www.oxfordreference.com>;
- Standing orders of the voluntary people's patrol 2010, Attachment to the Decree of the Provisional Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the formation of voluntary people's patrols, June 12, 2010 VP N.66, retrieved from Toktom Jurist Pro at <http://www.toktom.kg>;
- The Sarajevo Code of Conduct for private security companies* 2006, available at The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) website <http://www.seesac.org>;
- Vecherniy Bishkek (VB) 2010, Данияр Тербишалиев: дружина от слова «дружить» (Daniyar Terbishaliev: Druzhina stems from the word "to be friends"), No.170 of June 17, 2010;
- Wulf, H. 2004, *Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, available at <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>.

Interviews

- Interview with a former member of the Soviet druzhina (requested to stay anonymous), 01.12.2010, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;
- Interview with a police officer of the City Police Direction (GUVD – Gorodskoe Upravlenie Vnutrennih Del), 28.03.2011, Bishkek;
- Interview with Almazbek Kurmankulov, veterean of druzhina since 1982, 18.03.2011, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;
- Interview with Daniyar Terbishaliev, member of the Parliament, the fraction of Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, 08.12.2010, Bishkek
- Interview with Erkinbek Mamyrov, Head of the Legal Department of the President's Administration, 08.12.2010, Bishkek;
- Interviews with staffers of the Police Assistance Program, OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;