

Security Multilateralism in Central Asia: An extension of Major Power Interests?

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This working paper deals with the puzzle of explaining the factors underlying the multiplication of international organizations in Central Asia since the end of the Cold War, particularly in the security sector. As a matter of fact, a burgeoning number of acronyms in both economic and security affairs now constellate the Central Asian international landscape. What is more, these organizations seem to all have a large external state in the leading role, whether they be economic or security in nature. It is undeniable that Central Asia is an increasingly important region in world politics arousing the attentions of major powers. Powerful incentives exist for large external actors to seek involvement in the region's dynamics.

Economically, the massive endowments in natural resources are responsible for much of the interest the region receives. Geopolitically, the region represents a crucial bridge between Europe and Asia, and could become the site of transport corridors, trade routes, and energy infrastructure, in this way rediscovering the role it once had. Moreover, it provides a pivot between the southern shores of the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean to the East, and the Euro-Atlantic area to the West. The power vacuum left by the retreat of Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's created opportunities for new players to spread their interests in the region. In the security field, the region represents a key locale for the brewing and propagation of so-called asymmetric threats, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, also thanks to the proximity of Afghanistan. While Central Asia is not a "Jihadi time-bomb" waiting to detonate, militant Islam does remain a threat in the region.¹ The social and economic hardship experienced by local populations, and the repressive political systems of their governmental regimes are irritants contributing to the exacerbation of religious identification and militancy.²

In addition, Central Asian states offer the principal route through which Afghanistan's opium reaches its final markets in Europe, Russia and North America. Southern Kyrgyzstan is the main transit point for Afghan opiates, through the porous Tajik border, particularly the Garm province,³ which the UNODC describes as one of the key drug hubs of Central Asia.⁴ The dual threats of terrorism and drug trafficking has been heightened recently by the convergence between radical

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militant groups and criminal syndicates. Reports suggest a growing collusion between terrorists and drug traffickers.⁵

This paper argues that, although Central Asian Republics (CARs) have learnt to pursue their own multi-vector foreign policies, the variety of regional security institutions competing on the Central Asian market represent, at least in their original configurations, instruments for such external actors to engage the region in the attempt to establish themselves as the main patron respectively. The paper analyzes the place of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership framework, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the respective regional policies of Russia, the United States, and China. In all three cases, the issues shown above have a central place in determining the regional and institutional preferences of the three main actors. To illustrate, section I explores the puzzle of the role of regional security institutions in Central Asia since the end of the Cold War, in light of the area literature, and finds that a strong consensus exists among these authors that multilateral frameworks are essentially the instruments of the major powers. Section II reviews the area literature to lay out an analytical reference for understanding security multilateralism in Central Asia. Section III retraces the policy discourse of the three major powers active in the region, highlighting the formulation of their respective preferences linking their regional policy to the individual multilateral security frameworks. As a caveat, this paper will be mainly concerned with the static dimension of institutional design, rather than with the dynamic processes taking place within the said institutions.

I. Perspectives on Multilateralism in the Central Asian Region

In light of the compelling nature of regional issues outlined above, and cognizant of the extensive list of regional organizations active in the region, this section reviews the literature's responses to the multiplication of regional organizations in Central Asia since the end of the Cold War. To be sure, the issue is not new to area specialists. Some focus on questions such as alignment patterns (Fumagalli, 2007), regional integration (Bobokulov, 2006), the emergence of regionalism and regional cooperation (MacFarlane, 2004; Allison, 2004), and a variety of reflections and 'policy-driven' considerations about different frameworks of security governance from a Western (Sperling, 2003; Spero, 2003), regional (Blank, 2008), Russian (Rukhadze, 2007) and Chinese (Ong, 2005; Swanstrom, 2005) perspectives. However, all authors recognise the presence of competitive agendas

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amenable to the three major powers involved in the region: China, Russia and the United States, and the general agreement seems to be that international organizations in the region act as the extension of major powers interests (Flikke & Wilhelmsen, 2008; Weitz, 2006; Brill Olcott, 2005; Kay, 2003).⁶

Asking whether the West will be able to incorporate Eurasia into the western system of security governance, Kay notes that “multilateral institutions matter in Eurasia, but multilateral cooperation is highly contingent upon power relationships” (2003: 125). MacFarlane suggests that “outside powers may seek to structure cooperation within a particular region in a manner consonant with their perceived interests”, with an aim at either a) denying influence in the region to an adversary or b) establishing control over the region’s affairs. This somehow mirrors the effect he ascribes to hegemonic power within the region, which “may produce substantial cooperation as the dominant state seeks to design regional structures that institutionalise its dominance and as other regional states seek to avoid the costs of non-compliance. Conversely -he notes- those others may choose to resist and their counter hegemonic reactions may impede the development of regional formal and informal institutions” (2004:447). Spero (2003) has noted that Russian and Chinese-inspired regional structures represent balancing attempts in the face of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. He therefore concludes that the US “in a manner similar to other external powers” seeks to promote structures of multilateral cooperation “in which it enjoys a dominant position”, and is wary of alternative structures where other powers are preponderant (2004: 460). Analyzing NATO, Kay observes, first, that this institution survives thanks to the combination of American power and institutional attributes enhancing cooperation between its members, and, next, that “this transatlantic institutional configuration of power and cooperation has not taken hold in Eurasia, [because] Russia retains a degree of postcolonial hegemonic influence through CIS”, and where American military engagement has the potential to transform the SCO into a mechanism for the renewal of a Sino-Russian alliance (2003: 126).

Hence, Esenov (2003: 28) observes that a regional security system -however defined- has not emerged yet, suggesting that a multilayered system is the most likely option, which could mediate among the multiple actors involved and the sprawling multilateral security institutions. In response, others have emphasized the opportunity that regional states have to play major powers against one another through a “multi-vector diplomacy” (Blank, 2008; Bohr, 2004: 489-92). In this latter regard, the behaviours of regional states have been regarded as instances of either balancing (Allison, 2004) or bandwagoning (Allison, 2004; Spero, 2003) vis-à-vis the “hegemonic” powers.

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This overview of various accounts of multilateralism in Eurasia suggests that “the precise role of institutions in the post-Cold War security architecture remains contested” (Sperling, 2003: 17), in the sense that, particularly in this region, they appear to increasingly represent a way for large outside actors to establish a foothold in the region under the cloak of multilateralism- a form of international governance enjoying a high degree of legitimacy in the international system.

II. Great Power Interests and International Institutions

The issues and criticalities outlined in the previous section contribute to making the region into a new hotspot of world affairs; much like the Middle East has been in the 20th Century. Their consideration is also largely sufficient to explain the compelling interests of major powers in wanting to extend their purpose and influence over the affairs of the region. Since the mid 1990’s many have referred to the emerging dynamics in terms of a new Great Game, giving new life to ideas and concepts that were popular in the late 19th Century.⁷ However, if at that time, the rivalry which was believed to be in the making was the one between Russia and the United States, we are now assisting to a three-way game thanks to the unexpected, but more and more significant insertion of China.

As the previous section has found, the notion that international institutions in Central Asia are an extension of major powers’ interests is not new. This section explores and retraces the character and composition of the interests of the three major powers involved in this modern-day rendition of the Great Game, and relates these interests to the strategic preference to act through multilateralism. This analysis establishes a correspondence between the regional interests of the three powers in question, and their preferences vis-à-vis the international institution they lead, as asserted by leaders and in policy discourse. The analysis therefore stops short of examining the ways in which their greater weight translates in terms of influence in the dynamic processes of everyday institutional operation.

1. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in China’s Central Asian Policy

Regional Interests

China has four types of mutually reinforcing interests: energy security- with a view to diversifying Middle-Eastern sources and sustain its domestic economic growth; economic and trade relations- to

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open up economic opportunities in the former soviet republics;⁸ political stability- first to secure its Western frontiers in the wake of the Soviet collapse, in the context of a contested demarcation with the newly formed states⁹, and successively, to undercut support for Muslim and Turkic separatist Uyghur minorities in China's Western provinces from the CARs, largely sharing similar religious and ethnic features.¹⁰ One analyst has gone as far as to suggesting that the SCO is the outright extension of this latter concern.¹¹

To these factors, should be added a more exquisitely geopolitical agenda the SCO is believed to fulfill: Though China has never expressed an interest in turning Central Asia into its private sphere of influence,¹² it is nevertheless firmly opposed to seeing the region falling under American sway. Conversely, China has traditionally recognised and respected Russia's special interests in the region, coordinating against American and NATO encroachment,¹³ particularly through enlargement plans and democracy promotion.¹⁴ Particularly in the post 911 era, much of China's efforts have been directed at countering what Beijing perceives as an American scheme to encircle and besiege China,¹⁵ short of all-out confrontation¹⁶ in a manner consonant with the soft balancing thesis.¹⁷ Lastly, the SCO would provide an opportunity to lay a "diplomatic foothold" in an increasingly important region, offering it a springboard for establishing linkages in non-security areas, while at the same time acting as a "strong sounding board" to promote security policies and positions at the system level.¹⁸

Institutional Preferences

Although certain nuances are in order, especially in light of the recent evolution of the organization's life and the relative influence of China and Russia therein,¹⁹ the notion that the SCO is the tool of the People's Republic of China has been put forth by many authors.²⁰ What is of particular note is the role the PRC has had in setting up first the Shanghai Five in 1996, and next the SCO itself in 2001. Something making it the first and, so far, only case of a multilateral institution in which China has acted as an entrepreneur.²¹ But it also stems from the fact that China has consistently remained the organization's prime mover.²² More anecdotically, China hosts the organisation's secretariat in Beijing, which has been its seat since 2004, after paying for its construction and leasing the building to the organisation free of charge. Moreover, China has provided the organisation's first Secretary-General for the 2004-06 biennium, in the person of Ambassador Zhang Deguang, succeeded by Bolat Nurgalyev of Kazakhstan.

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Not surprisingly the SCO has developed very much in accordance with Chinese preferences.²³ Various authors give credit to the SCO for being the best incarnation and showcase²⁴ of China's New Security Concept (NSC), the doctrine adopted in the mid nineties- to address the multifaceted challenges of the 21st Century and provide a shield for the 'opening up' process begun in the 1980's.²⁵ At the heart of such new strategic thinking is the objective of building a peaceful and stable international and regional environment to sustain good neighbourly relations,²⁶ a goal in which multilateralism serves a key role.²⁷ The *Shanghai Spirit*, the body of principles, values and norms, to which cooperation within the SCO adheres, closely mirrors of the NSC. Tellingly, the Shanghai Spirit, features mutual trust and benefit, equality, consultation, mutual respect for different civilizations and common prosperity, and is explicitly tasked with infusing new norms in the international system.²⁸

2. The Collective Security Treaty Organization in Russia's Central Asia Policy

As in the case of China, multilateralism has been among Russia's chosen ways to pursue the interests it pursues in Central Asia since the end of the Cold War.

Regional Interests

Since the second half of the 1990's, and under the pressure of growing competition from external powers, Russia felt compelled to provide some sort of leadership in the region.²⁹ In 2004, Putin declared Central Asia a "key national interest,"³⁰ and today, Russia's renewed attention to the region signals its improved standing in the hierarchy of Moscow's foreign policy priorities. According to its current doctrine, Central Asia represents what in Russian discourse is termed the "near abroad."³¹ The 2009 *National Security Strategy to 2020* reaffirmed such orientation, also promoting the convergence between the security and energy dimensions of Russia's foreign policy, with emphasis on Central Asia.³² From an economic point of view, the large resource endowments make the region a coveted landmass. Russia, already the world's second largest oil producer in the world after Saudi Arabia, and the holder of the world's largest natural gas reserves is eager to extend its control over Central Asian oil.

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From a security perspective, Russian officials and analysts came to the conclusion that Central Asia would be a growing concern for the country's internal and external stability, given the presence of Islamic radicalism, terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking.³³

Through multilateralism, the Russian Federation intends to achieve two main goals. First, to provide a common shield under which to promote the reintegration of the former Soviet Union under a system of unified military control. Second, the formal recognition of its role as regional leader, by the CARs and Western powers alike.³⁴

Institutional Preferences

Russia has a history of using multilateralism for influence purposes. Following the demise of the USSR, the CIS was set up to essentially smoothen the political transition to sovereign statehood of the region's former Soviet Republics, and manage a "civilized divorce".³⁵ If by the end of the 1990's, after successfully accomplishing exhausting the above task,³⁶ the CIS had become scarcely relevant, a renewed interest in the pursuit of multilateral and institutional cooperation in the military and security arenas in Central Asia was imparted by the Putin presidency in the 00's.³⁷ Attesting to this change in attitude, Russia promoted the creation of the CSTO in 2002, based on the 1992 Collective Security Treaty. Russia's preference for the CSTO is rooted in the renewed foreign and security policy renewal initiated by President Putin, and the 2000 National Security Concept he spearheaded. The *National Security Strategy of Russia until 2020*, authored under President Dimitry Medvedev in 2008 further strengthened that orientation. The CSTO became explicitly referred to as an area of interest,³⁸ and as a "key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area."³⁹

Russia's domination of the CSTO is an uncontroverted fact for most analysts.⁴⁰ Among the clues suggesting Russia's influence in the CSTO, is the fact that Nikolai Nikolayevich Bordyuzha, who has been the organisation's Secretary-General since 2003, is a close acquaintance of Vladimir Putin, being a former KGB senior official, with responsibility for the Service's Human resources, and the former Chief of Russia's Federal Border guard Service, a branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB), former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and Chief of the Russian presidential administration under Yeltsin. Moreover, the organisation's Secretariat is located in Moscow.

The CSTO is seen at the same time as the instrument and the outcome of Russian power.⁴¹ However, the point is that Russia needs "extensive cooperation from its [Post Soviet] counterparts to

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maintain its former strength and prestige.”⁴² The CSTO hence provides a major forum to coordinate such cooperation, and it has effectively contributed to increase Russia’s reputation as a reliable security partner, particularly after the 2007 Summit in Dushanbe,⁴³ and the increased prominence of the group has been recognised.⁴⁴

Analysts have indicated in the emergence of the SCO one of the driving forces behind Russia’s desire for a new security grouping which it could dominate unchallenged. For this reason, as well as for its greater proactiveness, some have seen the CSTO as the main challenge to the SCO’s credentials in the region.⁴⁵ Another reason is disenchantment with the CIS itself, where many members have demonstrated greater interest for NATO, and the consequent desire to build a more cohesive and loyal grouping,⁴⁶ which would allow Russia restrict cooperation to a more loyal grouping.⁴⁷ Lastly, Russia’s attempts to use the organisation to limit NATO and assert its “special interests” in the region are well known.⁴⁸

3. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership framework in US Central Asia Policy

Just like Russia and China, the United States have turned to multilateral processes to manage relations with the CARs and contribute to stabilise the region from an early stage. The integration of the CARs into Western political, military and economic institutions and practices was the fundamental agenda of the Clinton administration for the region.⁴⁹

Regional Interests

In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the United States were chiefly concerned with ensuring that the Nuclear and biological arsenals inherited from the Soviet Union by the newly independent states did not feed WMD proliferation networks, and/or criminal organisations.⁵⁰

Hence, by the mid nineties, a more detailed set of preferences for Central Asia was formulated within the US policy establishment. These had four main axes:⁵¹

Energy resources: by 1995, the United States main goal had become to ensure that central Asia’s oil and gas would be freely accessible, with General Zinni, Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, declaring that “access to energy drives all US policy in the region.”⁵²

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Free markets and economic reforms: were partly intended to sustain the goal of accessing Central Asian oil and gas as well as opening new markets to US direct investments, goods and services, while also providing a strategy for opening up Central Asian societies.

Democratization and political reforms were seen as a key vehicle for expanding the Clinton Administration's liberal agenda based on human rights and domestic reforms to foster a global democratic space as a course to increased stability. In the specific context of the region, this would also help alleviate the repressive political environments that were seen as a breeding ground for radical Islamist ideology.

Regional stability through the integration of the NIS into the Western security architecture: This objective implied assimilating the CARs into existing international security institutions as NATO and OSCE to foster pro-Western orientations in political and security affairs. This was seen as the most effective mechanism to subtract regional states to the direct and unchecked influence of Moscow and its energy greed, and a platform to intervene in potential conflict situations.⁵³

In the years following September 11, 2001 the domestic political agenda receded somewhat to allow for the establishment of working relationships in the priority area of security and the fight against terrorism,⁵⁴ and reliance on bilateralism became greater.

Institutional Preferences

American leadership of NATO's eastward activities is fairly apparent. In the 1990's, the US have consistently lobbied for an increased eastern engagement in alliance politics, often under the pressure of domestic constituencies.⁵⁵ By all accounts, NATO activities in Central Asia were clearly American creations responding to the very cogent American strategic imperatives at the end of the Cold War.⁵⁶ However, Administration sources suggest that they remain relevant to contemporary US strategy in the region.⁵⁷

The rationale for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) surfaced in the Department of Defence in 1993 and was supposed to provide a provisional alternative to outright membership expansion.⁵⁸ In US plans, PfP was to serve several goals at once. From a geopolitical point of view, it would provide an opportunity for the US to influence the new governments,⁵⁹ redirect Central Asia's regional security references westwards,⁶⁰ and encouraging its integration into Western political and security institutions.⁶¹ Eleven years after NATO begun its relationship with the CARs, one analyst commented that "NATO's presence in the region is a *strategic and geopolitical fact*."⁶²

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From a more practical perspective, PfP was conceived as a socialization device to gradually induct post-soviet states in Central Asia into Western norms and practices, which, at the height of the unipolar and democratic moment, were seen as capable of fostering a peaceful international system by promoting civilian control of armed forces, a western model of civil-military relations, and the diffusion of NATO values. This was considered as a recipe for the stabilisation of a highly volatile, but potentially important region.⁶³ But through the years, NATO's goals in Central Asia have come to encompass other issues, including fragile states, organised crime and corruption, conflict resolution in the Caspian region, human security and Afghanistan, striving to become an effective security provider.⁶⁴

Referring to the State Partnership Program, an "in the spirit of PfP" initiative of the US National Guards, Groves describes five goals that the US pursued: to sensitize to the principle of military subordination to civilian authority, to sensitize to the principle of military support to civilian authorities, to assist in the development of democratic institutions, to foster open market economies and to project US humanitarian values.⁶⁵ For its part, the EAPC was meant to provide an overarching structure for all member states to convene. Warren Christopher, who first proposed the EAPC in 1996, presented the idea as a foundation to build "our New Atlantic Community".⁶⁶

Though it has been observed that the PfP and the EAPC provide mere frameworks for cooperation, which cannot be compared to multilateral organs such as OSCE, or the actual NATO itself- and are unlikely to ever take a life of their own,⁶⁷ others have argued that NATO provided the ideal structure to promote the post-soviet and Central Asian outreach goals favoured by the United States, precisely because of its multilateral and cooperative character, and intangible assets such as its shared norms and politico-military approaches, and other procedures developed over decades.⁶⁸

IV. CONCLUSION

For quite some time observers of Central Asian affairs have considered the panoply of international organizations active in Central Asia to be instances of multilateralism in name only.

This working paper has highlighted a link between the regional interests around Central Asia of China, Russia and the United States, and their preferences for the three institutional frameworks considered. This suggests their ability to draw regional states into cooperative frameworks which they strive to lead. While this is not sufficient to say that the abovementioned institutional frameworks

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might be their outright instruments, and an observation of the everyday operation of these organizations might further nuance this claim; however, it does suggest that the three outside powers are the authors of the rules of the game regulating multilateral security cooperation in Central Asia. This is regardless of the fact that such cooperation has yielded so far few tangible results, and that multilateralism is by no means the exclusive tool but rather a complement to bilateralism, which remains a very important channel.

¹ Jason D. Söderblom, 'Central Asia: Terror and Militant Islam.' *World International Community Experts*, July 2004

² Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, 'Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU.' *Silk Road Paper*, Silk Road Studies Programme, July 2006.

³ Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanström, 'The Eurasian Drug Trade. A Challenge to Regional Security,' 20.

⁴ International Crisis Group, 'Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm,' *Asia Briefing*, N 79, 14 August 2008: 12; Nicole J. Jackson, 'The trafficking of narcotics, arms and humans in post-soviet central Asia: (mis)perceptions, policies and realities,' *Central Asian Survey*, 24 (1), 2005: 40.

⁵ Svante E. Cornell & Niklas L.P. Swanström. 'The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security', 20.

⁶ This author dedicates particular attention to the SCO and CIS.

⁷ See Nick Megoran & Maria Sharapova. 'On the Centenary of Halford Mackinder's Geographical Pivot of History,' *Central Asia and the Caucasus journal of social and political studies*, 4 (34), 2005 Special Issue; Charles Clover. Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland. The Reemergence of Geopolitics. *Foreign Affairs*, 78 (2), March/April 1999: 9-13; Zbigniew Brzezinski. *The Grand Chessboard*, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998.

⁸ P. Stobdan. 'Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges to China's Leadership,' *Strategic Analysis*, 32 (4), 2008: 527.

⁹ Ancy Joseph. *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Offshoot of Chinese Diplomacy*. MA Dissertation, Stella Maris College, Chennai. April 2007; Marc Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power* (London: Routledge, 2005): 138.

¹⁰ Dru C. Gladney. 'China's "Uyghur Problem" and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.' *Paper prepared for the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission Hearings*. Washington, DC, 3 August 2006; Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*, 138.

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¹¹ Henryk Szadziewski. 'How the West Was Won: China's Expansion into Central Asia,' *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 3 (2), Spring 2009: 212-13; Stobdan, 'Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges to China's Leadership', 527; Martin Andrew. 'Beijing's Growing Security Dilemma in Xinjiang,' *China Brief*, 5 (13), 2005. Moreover, Human Rights Watch has expressed concern that the SCO has helped China gain approval and support for its repressive policies in the Xingjiang. See: Human Rights Watch. *Eurasia: Uphold Human Rights in Combating Terrorism. Shanghai Cooperation Organization Must Not Punish Peaceful Dissent*, June 13, 2006. Online: <<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/06/13/eurasia-uphold-human-rights-combating-terrorism> > [Page accessed 22. 12. 2009].

¹² Mark Burles, *Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics*. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999): 51.

¹³ Russell Ong, 'China's Security Interests in Central Asia,'

¹⁴ Ramakant Dwivedi, 'China's Central Asia Policy in Recent Times,' *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 4 (4) 2006: 144.

¹⁵ Bobo Lo. *Axis of Convenience. Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2008); Willy Lam. 'Beijing's Alarm over New "U.S. Encirclement Conspiracy"'. *China Brief*, 5 (8), April 12, 2005; Willy Lam. 'Hu's Central Asian Gamble to Counter the U.S. "Containment Strategy"'. *China Brief*, 5 (15), 5 July 2005; Adiljon Umarov and Dmitry Pashkun The Prospects for Chinese Influence in Central Asia. *CEF Quarterly Journal*, Winter 2005.

¹⁶ Bates Gill, *Rising Star. China's New Security Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2007): 10.

¹⁷ In this regard, Gil has pointed out that the Shanghai Five process itself was launched only shortly after the start of NATO's Partnership for Peace and enlargement initiatives (*Op. Cit.*, 37).

¹⁸ Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*. 139.

¹⁹ Stobdan. 'Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges to China's Leadership', 527 – 547; Fred Weir. 'Russia, China looking to form 'NATO of the East'? 'A six-member group, seeking to balance US power, meets in Moscow Wednesday'. *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 October 2005; Dmitri Trenin. 'Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Difficult Match'. *CEF Quarterly Journal-Special Edition: The SCO at One*, July 2005; Alexander White. 'Guiding the 'Near Abroad' Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization'. *CEF Quarterly Journal-Special Edition: The SCO at One*, July 2005. Also, Russian authors and analysts tend to speak of the SCO as a Russian venture, and regard its role in it as prominent.

²⁰ Alexander Cooley, 'Cooperation Gets Shanghaied,' *Foreign Affairs*, 14 December 2009. Online:

<<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65724/alexander-cooley/cooperation-gets-shanghaied>>. [Page accessed 19. 12. 2009]; Nicklas Norling and Niklas Swanstrom. 'Sino-Russian Relations in Central Asia and the SCO'. *CACI Analyst*, 10/03/2007; Jason Kelly. 'Anti-Terrorism with Chinese Characteristics: Peace Mission 2007 in Context'. *China Brief*, 7 (20), October 31, 2007; Ancy Joseph. *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Offshoot of Chinese Diplomacy*; Ramakant Dwivedi. 'China's Central Asia Policy in Recent Times', 139-159; Chin-Hao Huang. 'China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Post-Summit Analysis and Implications for the United States', *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 4 (3), 2006: 15-21; Ariel Cohen. 'After the G-8 Summit: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 4, (3), 2006: 51-64; Dru C. Gladney. 'China's "Uyghur Problem" and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization'; Chong-Pin Lin. 'Beijing's New Grand Strategy: An Offensive with Extra-Military Instruments', *China Brief*, 6 (24), 2006; Chien-peng Chung. 'China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization'. *Problems of Postcommunism*, 53 (5), 2006; Roger McDermott. 'China Advances its Interests in Central Asia Through SCO'. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 3 (75), April 18, 2006; Ariel Pablo Sznajder 'China's Shanghai Cooperation Organization Strategy.' *Journal of IPS*, 5, Spring 2006; Peter Mattis. 'A Victory for China's New Security Concept: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization', *CEF Quarterly Journal-Special Edition: The SCO at One*, July 2005; Niklas Swanström. 'China and Central Asia: a new Great Game or traditional vassal relations?'; Chien-peng Chung. 'The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia'. *The China Quarterly*, 2004; Sun Zhuangzhi. 'New and Old Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Sino-Central Asian Relations.' *The Review of International Affairs*, 3 (4), Summer 2004: 600 – 612.

²¹ Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*, 136.

²² Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*, 135-37.

²³ Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*, 136.

²⁴ Gill, *Rising Star. China's New Security Diplomacy*, 10; Joseph, 2007: 37; Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*, 115.

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²⁵ Guangcheng Xing, "China and Central Asia," in *Central Asian Security. The New International Context*, eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001): 152; Marc Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*, 115; Bates Gill, *Rising Star. China's New Security Diplomacy*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*

²⁷ Guoguang Wu (ed.) *China Turns to Multilateralism. Foreign Policy and Regional Security* (London: Routledge, 2007); Lanteigne. *China and International Institutions. Alternate Paths to Global Power*.

²⁸ See also: Stobdan. 'Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges to China's Leadership', 535; Shanghai Cooperation Organization. *Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO*. Shanghai, 15 June 2001. Online: <http://english.scosummit2006.org/en_bjzl/2006-04/20/content_85.htm>. [Page accessed: 19. 12. 2009].

²⁹ Jos Boonstra, 'Russia and Central Asia. From Disinterest to Eager Leadership,' *EU-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM) project*, Eurussia Centre, October 2008: 70; Conrad Namiesniowski, 'Russia: Defending its Interests,' *CSIS Commentary*, No. 56, April 1995.

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