



# RESEARCH PAPER

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### Research Paper

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## Editorial

Since mid-2003 the Schröder government has taken several actions to improve its damaged relations with the United States after having openly opposed the military intervention in Iraq. Since combat operations ended in Iraq, Berlin has repeatedly stated that it has no interest in prolonging the recent transatlantic controversy and has thus toned down its pre-war rhetoric. However, the Red-Green coalition and German society at large still insist that their analysis of the threat posed by Iraq and the negative effects of the military intervention were accurate. Criticism remains strong as to the necessity of going to war, the way in which the Bush administration and the coalition acted in and outside of the United Nations, as well as the poor planning for reconstruction. Since this has remained the basic German position despite different accents within the government, German Foreign Minister Fischer made very clear that his country was not willing to contribute to forces to Iraq in the foreseeable future. Not surprisingly, many German Foreign Policy experts have characterized the current situation as a crisis momentum. The end of a long practiced restraint in foreign policy would surely lead to a marginalization of Germany on the international scene. A series of 'self-inflicted aberrations' based on some kind of *Deutscher Weg* would erode Berlin's capacity to maintain some leverage in world affairs and would be in the end very damaging for Germany's national interests.

But is German Foreign Policy really in crisis? Carlo Masala, one of the permanent members of the Academic Research Branch at the NATO Defense College, opens the debate, providing some strong evidences that this might actually not be the case. After having reviewed the 'pessimist stance' of Gunther Hellmann and Hanns W. Maul, he then looks into the 'optimist view' of Gregor Schöllgen and Werner Link. Far from condemning the recent German policy vis-à-vis the United States and the simultaneous rapprochement with France, Carlo Masala argues that Germany's anti-war policy was neither erratic, nor romantic-pacifist, but actually based on sound political concerns. Referring to Robert Axelrod's works on cooperation and interstate relations, he links the German policy of balancing American hegemonic power with the well-known 'shadow of the future'. Obviously, mutual cooperation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the present and the expectation of reciprocity in future interactions creates an incentive for cooperation. In the current situation, the reality shows us that sideling with Washington has probably been less beneficial than expected for the other members of the coalition. The British limited influence on U.S. post-war policy in Baghdad and Prime Minister Blair's difficult position in the United Kingdom are very explicit indeed.

Germany's representation at the highest level in KFOR and ISAF provides strong evidence of the active participation of Berlin in international missions. The crucial importance of NATO's mandates in Kosovo and Afghanistan has also been underlined at two separate Workshops held at the College in April this year. As for Germany's current agenda on Iraq – offering economic assistance, technical support, but no combat troops – this may well indicate that a new transatlantic working consensus is emerging. In particular, the success of German policies will surely depend on an appropriate mix of foreign and domestic concerns in order to restore and strengthen traditional transatlantic ties which have always been at the heart of German Foreign Policy.

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# German Foreign Policy in Crisis?

Carlo MASALA<sup>1</sup>

*Germany's foreign policy is in crisis has become more or less a common saying among German experts of Foreign Policy. Proof for such a crisis is a perceived loss of influence within the two main fields of German Foreign Policy: NATO and the European Union. Chancellor Schroeder – due to his critics – has diminished Germany's influence in world politics in an unprecedented way. Opponents of such a view emphasize rather the fact that German Foreign Policy has successfully adapted to the new structural environment under which it has to operate since the end of bipolarity. The fact that Gerhard Schroeder tried to de-legitimize the military operation against Iraq was not anchored in a deeply rooted German pacifism. Neither did Schroeder oppose Washington regime change policy for simply domestic reasons (to win a close vote). Schröder's anti-war policy has to be seen in the broader context of the structure of the international system.*

## 1. Introduction

The position taken by the German government towards U.S. actions in Iraq caused a fundamental debate among German scholars of foreign policy about the substance, the style, and the future coordinates of Europe's central power foreign policy, as Hans Peter Schwarz described Germany's geopolitical position in the early 90's after unification.

Currently, most academics would agree that German Foreign Policy is in a fundamental crisis. This is due not only to its demeanor during the Third Gulf War where the German government has voluntarily given up its position as a mediator

between Paris and Washington, but also due to a lack of conceptual thinking about the future direction of German Foreign Policy among the political and bureaucratic elite in Berlin. Furthermore, the critics argue that a clear strategic vision about the future direction of German Foreign Policy is lacking in Berlin<sup>2</sup> and that Chancellor Schroeder's Foreign policy is more driven by ad-hoc decisions than by a mid or long term vision. Germany's European and transatlantic policy reveal such a lack of vision as well as a lack of pragmatism.

Contrary to such judgments, some scholars cheered Chancellor Schroeder's stance vis-à-vis Washington in autumn 2003, regarding it as a sign of political maturity (or normalization), which was lacking for the past 50 years. Most of those who applauded the German Government are interestingly enough, scholars, who – with some exceptions– belonged to the strongest critics of the Red-Green Coalition coming into power in 1998. Most of the critics have their normative orientation in common. Instead of analyzing German Foreign Policy from a positivist perspective and questioning if the changes are substantial or only gradual in nature (and if the former should be the case, what has caused these changes?), they evaluate Germany's foreign policy in the light of their own visions of what Berlin should do or not.

The article consists of two parts. In the first part, I briefly review the diverging positions in the debate. I will focus on four authors, which to my knowledge are representative for the diverging assessments of contemporary German Foreign Policy. For the pessimist view, as I will label the position of those

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<sup>2</sup> In some way the current debate picks up on the debate that took place in Germany after unification. At that time scholars as well as editorialists were debating the question if Germany should become a normal power or not, if the basic co-ordinates of Germany's foreign policy have changed and about the future direction of that policy. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Hanns W. Maull, Werner Link, Rainer Zittelmann and Karl Kaiser made major contributions in this debate. For a good overview see: Gunther Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign policy of Contemporary Germany", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, Supplement 1 (April 1996), pp. 1-39.



who believe that German Foreign Policy is in crisis, I will examine the work<sup>3</sup> of Hanns W. Maull<sup>4</sup> and Gunther Hellmann.<sup>5</sup> For the optimists, I turn to Gregor Schöllgen<sup>6</sup> and Werner Link.<sup>7</sup>

The second part considers some empirical evidence for the claim that German Foreign Policy is not in crisis as far as the general orientation of the current government is concerned. In fact, I will argue that the changes we observed in the last few months were caused neither by the incapacity of the political elite nor by the lack of a grand design, or by the fact that foreign policy has become less important or more and more subordinated to domestic politics and public opinion.

## 2. The Debate

### 2.1. The Pessimists

Hanns W. Maull, chair holder for International Politics at the University of Trier and one of the leading experts on German Foreign Policy was among the first who opened the debate on the current state of Germany's foreign policy. His analysis conceded first of all, that German Foreign Policy has changed. "... she has started to unhinge from old ties and adopted a new course, not clearly defined."<sup>8</sup>

Among the most important symptoms Maull identified for this change is the absolute deviation

from multilateralism and the turn to unilateralism undertaken by the government when Schroeder declared that Germany would not support a military intervention in Iraq even in case of authorization by the UN Security Council.

This "unilateral fall of mankind"<sup>9</sup> as Maull called it, stands in clear contradiction to the self-proclaimed goal to strengthen multilateral structures and especially the United Nations, agreed by the Social Democratic Party and the Greens in 1998.

A second development, which stands according to Maull for a substantial change in Berlin's external relations, is the fact that Germany for the first time in its history has given up its traditional "neither...nor policy". For over 50 years of Germany's Foreign policy, it was a part of the *raison d'État* not to choose between Washington and Paris in case France and the U.S. pursued different interests. Schroeder has given up this longstanding German tradition and sidelined with France. Therefore, he has lost considerable influence in Washington.

The sober result of this analysis is that due to both developments and a European Policy, which is more interested in pursuing national interests rather than European ones, Germany has lost considerable influence in all multilateral arenas<sup>10</sup> and is less and less able to influence the course of events, which are of importance for Germany's interests.

Most of the changes Maull described, however, were not the result of an intended policy-shift, but rather the consequences of a foreign policy, which is

<sup>3</sup> The familiar romantic argument, that Germany owes the U.S. for being liberated from Nazi-Fascism is not considered here in detail. Relations between countries are, in my assessment, not based on guilt but rather on interest. Therefore, I only discuss those arguments that are raising the question if the policy of the red-green coalition in the past year was in Germany's interest or not. Furthermore, I don't know any serious scholar in Germany who argued that Germany's policy was a disaster due to sentimental reasons.

<sup>4</sup> Hanns W. Maull. "Normalisierung oder Auszehrung? Deutsche Aussenpolitik im Wandel" [Normalization or cachexia? German Foreign Policy in change], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, pp. 17-23; Hanns W. Maull, "Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Aussenpolitik" [The discrete disappearance of German Foreign Policy], *Internationale Politik*, 58, 9, 2003, pp. 19-30. Hanns W. Maull; "Red-Green Foreign policy at the Beginning of the Second Term: International Standing Turned Around?", *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue* 4, 9, 2003, pp. 1-5; Hanns W. Maull, "Germany, Iraq and the Crisis of the Transatlantic Alliance System", Opinion Editorial No. 2, <http://www.Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de>

<sup>5</sup> Gunther Hellmann, "Normality is not in everyone's interest", *International Herald Tribune*, 17.02.2004, p. 6; Gunther Hellmann, "Von Gipfelstürmern und Gratwanderern: 'Deutsche Wege' in der Aussenpolitik" [On crest attackers and tightrope walkers. German ways in foreign policy], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, pp. 32-39; Gunther Hellmann, "Wider die machtpolitische Resozialisierung der deutschen Aussenpolitik. Ein Plädoyer für offensiven Idealismus." [Against the power re-socialization of German Foreign Policy], *WeltTrends* 12, 42, pp. 79-88.

<sup>6</sup> Gregor Schöllgen, *Der Auftritt. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne* [The appearance. Germany's comeback on the world scene], München 2003; Gregor Schöllgen, "Die Zukunft der deutschen Aussenpolitik liegt in Europa" [The future of German Foreign Policy is in Europe], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, pp. 9-16; Gregor Schöllgen, "Das Ende der transatlantischen Epoche" [The end of the transatlantic epoch], *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27. 08. 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Werner Link, "Kooperative Balancepolitik" [Co-operative balancing], *Die Politische Meinung*, 49, March 2004, pp. 37-42; Werner Link, "Grundlinien der ausenpolitischen Orientierung Deutschlands" [Baselines of German Foreign Policy orientation], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, pp. 3-15.

<sup>8</sup> Hanns W. Maull. "Normalisierung oder Auszehrung? Deutsche Aussenpolitik im Wandel" [Normalization or cachexia? German Foreign Policy in change], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, p. 17.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 17.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* p. 19



less willing to create, less effective and less responsible.<sup>11</sup> Germany is the odd one out and its keeping itself aloof from international policy is Maull's critical summary of his analysis.<sup>12</sup> A country like Germany cannot afford to be marginalized and be on the brink of world affairs.

What Germany needs is a renewal of its foreign policy based on two normative columns: 'Never again' and 'never alone'. 'Never again' would commit Germany to focus on state building and the promotion of democracy worldwide. 'Never alone' would imply that the country should stick to its tradition to exert its influence primarily within international organizations or institutions and taking the lead to foster the role of such institutions in civil crisis management.

Gunther Hellmann, Professor for European Studies at the University of Frankfurt strikes out the same sour note as Hanns W. Maull. In a series of articles Hellmann analyses why German Foreign Policy is in crisis and how it can be overcome.

As did Maull, he observes a series of self inflicted aberrations, but differently from his fellow scholar from Trier, Hellmann also points to the changed structure of the international system.<sup>13</sup> The latter is influencing German Foreign Policy but Germany has had and still has only limited bearing on that.

The crisis is manifesting itself in a gap between a growing German demand to design international relations and foreign policy and a decreasing availability of resources to meet these demands.<sup>14</sup> Following up a remark about the "German Way" made by Chancellor Schroeder during the election campaign where he justified his opposition against any German involvement in Iraq<sup>15</sup> Hellmann discusses in detail the perils of any German

*Sonderweg*.<sup>16</sup> What most of the German elite regard as a process of "normalization" is "threatening to further undermine the European Union's fragile foundation", as Hellmann points out in an op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune.<sup>17</sup>

Hellman is making a strong plea for a core Europe that consists of Germany, France and Poland<sup>18</sup> in order to overcome the European rift, which is further deepened by the German-French-British triangle and is regarded by the minor European powers as a kind of directorate in EU Affairs.

According to Hellmann, Germany could show that with the inclusion of Poland first, it respects the vision of an enlarged Europe where the new members are full partners and not subordinated to the western EU-members, where they are equal and not an appendix. Secondly, it could calibrate Germany once again in the position to reconcile diverging approaches between a "Europe of the Europeans" (which Hellmann identifies as the French vision) and an "American Europe" (which is the Polish vision for the future of the EU). Therefore stabilizing the two pillars on which Germany's Foreign Policy was successfully founded in the past and should also rest in the future.

## 2.2. The Optimists

Contrary to these arguments, a minority of Foreign Policy experts in Germany sing a different tune and assesses the events of the past 12-months either as a sign of normalization or as a consequence of the new geopolitical position of the Federal Republic after unification. Gregor Schöllgen, Professor for Contemporary History at the University of Nürnberg-Erlangen, was among the first who applauded

<sup>11</sup> Hanns W. Maull, "Germany, Iraq and the Crisis of the Transatlantic Alliance System", p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Two projects, which were undertaken under Maull's supervision at the University of Trier dealt explicitly with the vanishing influence of German Foreign Policy in different policy areas. The contributions of that projects are published in German Foreign Policy in Dialogue: Newsletter Issue 09/03 and in a book edited by Hanns Maull, Sebastian Harnisch/Constantin Grund (eds.), *Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-Grüne Aussenpolitik 1998-2003* [Germany offside? The foreign policy of Red-Green 1998-2003], Baden-Baden 2003. Regardless if one agrees with the overall conclusions of both projects and the single contributions both publications are the only ones where scholars interested in detailed empirical articles on Germany's Foreign policy will get fine grained analysis.

<sup>13</sup> See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading 1979.

<sup>14</sup> Gunther Hellmann: "Wider die machtpolitische Resozialisierung der deutschen Aussenpolitik. Ein Plädoyer für offensiven Idealismus", *WeltTrends* 12, 42, p. 80.

<sup>15</sup> In the next chapter I will turn back to this.

<sup>16</sup> Radical Critics of German Foreign Policy like Hans-Peter Schwarz argues that if the United States acts Germany should somehow participate. Remark made by Hans-Peter Schwarz at a conference organized by the Hans-Seidel-Foundation. See also, Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Konrad Adenauer und Amerika" [Konrad Adenauer and America], *Die Politische Meinung*, 49, March 2004, pp. 25-30.

<sup>17</sup> Gunther Hellmann, "Normality is not in everyone's interest", IHT, 17. 02. 2004.

<sup>18</sup> See Gunther Hellmann, "Von Gipfelstürmern und Gratwanderern: 'Deutsche Wege' in der Aussenpolitik", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, pp. 38-39.



Chancellor Schröder. While Schöllgen also criticized the way Schröder and his team dealt with the issue during the election campaign<sup>19</sup> he welcomes the substance of this policy because it marked an end to 40 year old obedience of German policy vis-à-vis the U.S.<sup>20</sup> For the first time in post-war history, German Foreign Policy is decided and executed in Berlin rather than in Washington<sup>21</sup> which is a clear sign of Germany's post-unification self-consciousness.

The tight Franco-German relationship, which emerged during the Iraq crisis is also a sign of political maturity for Schöllgen. All these developments in German Foreign Policy are possible due to the changing geo-strategic landscape. The democratization of the Middle and Eastern European countries left Germany in a historically unprecedented position similar to the one France enjoyed during the East-West-Conflict and which made it possible for the 5<sup>th</sup> Republic to take a harder stance towards America. With the accession of Poland to NATO and the EU, Germany has now its own *cordon sanitaire*, comprised of a strategic depth of more than 800 km. The flip side of this coin is that Germany is less dependent on American security guarantees and can therefore act with more self-consciousness and according to its own national interest if German and American interests are diverging.

The deepening and strengthening of the European Union especially in the field of security and defense policy becomes (after the end of the East-West-Conflict) the primary area of interest of German politics because it is considered as the necessary precondition to restructure transatlantic relations. Therefore, Schöllgen sees no contradiction between the creation of an autonomous ESDP (even with its own headquarters) and the strengthening of transatlantic security ties. Because what is lacking in transatlantic relations is more Europe, he quotes assenting Chancellor Schröder.<sup>22</sup>

Werner Link, Professor emeritus at the University of Cologne, argues nearly in the same vein. Diverse from Schöllgen, he derives the changes in German Foreign Policy from the changes in the structure of the international system. The turn from a bipolar to a quasi-unipolar system<sup>23</sup> led to a growing awareness among the German elites that the still hegemonic structure of the transatlantic relationship needs to be transformed into a balanced one.

Against this background, German policy during the Iraq crisis has to be seen as an attempt to resist the pressures coming from Washington to steer the course of action. Schröder was fully aware that neither he nor anyone else could prevent the U.S. from taking action against Iraq and therefore the U.N policy of Germany, France and Russia was more an attempt to delegitimize the war rather than to prevent it. Link finds empirical evidence for his interpretation of the Chancellors policy in a speech he gave to the parliamentary group of the Social Democrats in February 2003. Therein, Schröder explained his policy by stating that his stance against a military intervention was caused by the fundamental question of if there should be only one power determining international politics. Later on, he combined his 'no' to a U.S. intervention with the demand to create a *Europe-puissance* and a multipolar world order.<sup>24</sup>

At the core of the creation of Europe as a Superpower is the German-Franco relation, which picked up new momentum during winter and spring of 2003.

Europe will be able to a) develop into an international pole and thereby transform the current structure of the international system and b) transform the current structure of the transatlantic relations<sup>25</sup> only with the creation of a European core, an *avant-garde*, comprising of Germany and France as inner circle members.

Link does not agree with those who raise the warning flag about a renationalization of German

<sup>19</sup> Some high level politicians of the Social Democratic Party compared President Bush with Adolf Hitler or Daniel Coats, the U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, with the former Soviet Ambassador to the DDR Abrassimov. It was noted in the U.S. administration that Schröder waited until the end of the elections before he fired his Minister of Justice, Herta Däubler-Gmelin who compared George Bush with Adolf Hitler.

<sup>20</sup> Gregor Schöllgen, *Der Auftritt. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne*, München 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Gregor Schöllgen, "Die Zukunft der deutschen Aussenpolitik liegt in Europa", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, p. 10.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> For Link the present international system is not unipolar in its overall structure. In the distribution of economic capabilities there is a tripolar configuration between the U.S., the EU (which is a unitary actor in that field) and Japan. For a detailed elaboration of this argument see, Werner Link, *Die Neuordnung der Weltpolitik* [The rearrangement of World Politics], 3.ed., München 2003.

<sup>24</sup> See Werner Link, "Grundlinien der aussenpolitischen Orientierung", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 11/2004, 8. 03. 2004, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> See Werner Link, "Kooperative Balancepolitik", *Die Politische Meinung*, 49, March 2004, pp. 37-42.



Foreign Policy or call Schröder's policy an anti-American adventure. The direction of Germany's Foreign Policy, according to Link, is an adequate answer to the new strategic circumstances under which Berlin is forced to act and interact with other states. Furthermore, it confirms one of the oldest laws in international relations: That overwhelming power will be balanced. This is exactly what German Foreign Policy is all about.

### 3. The Reality

After having sketched the main differences in the debate I will now turn, very briefly, to empirical evidences for the main arguments mentioned.

1. At the center of the pessimist reasoning is the so-called "*Deutscher Weg*" [German Way] as Schröder has described his policy towards the United States. A closer look reveals instead that the German Chancellor never used this, historically heavily used phrase to describe his opposition to the U.S. policy towards Iraq. In his speech during the election campaign in 2002 in Goslar, Schröder didn't pull together his opposition to U.S. policy with the German Way. What he did instead was to label his social and economic policy as the German Way. Unfortunately, the latter followed directly after the first, so that he created the impression that his stance against the U.S. is the 'German Way'.
2. Most pessimists believe that Germany has lost influence in NATO and towards Washington. In some respect that is true but it applies to all NATO countries, which were opposing the war. The loss of influence resulted from the fact that the U.S. has issued an ultimatum to its allies. "Either with us or against us" which forced EU members either to side with the U.S or to oppose its policy.
3. While it is definitely true that in its starting phase Germany's policy was a disaster and therefore created the impression that Schröder was ready

to sacrifice long standing German traditions in Foreign Policy to save its hide in a neck and neck election race, this management disaster should not create the impression that there was no political substance behind that policy. As Werner Link has convincingly shown, Schröder's anti-war policy was driven by more fundamental concerns far from domestic politics. It was basically motivated by structural reasons, in particular by a phenomenon, which in International Relation literature is well known as the "shadow of the future"<sup>26</sup> If the U.S. would succeed in getting a second U.N mandate and therefore legitimize its Iraq policy, as well as strengthening the unipolar moment<sup>27</sup> by deepening it, Germany, as well as other countries, at least in their self-perception, would have been reduced to vicarious agents.

4. To bandwagon with the U.S in order to get an influence on Washington's plans and policies wouldn't have been an alternative as some have argued in Germany.<sup>28</sup> Ex post one sees very clearly how Great Britain which sided with the U.S in the expectation to influence at least the post war reconstruction of Iraq was confronted with the bitter truth that they received only minor influence on U.S. post war policy in Baghdad.<sup>29</sup>
5. Another issue that has been raised concerns the tight German-Franco interaction. For most of the pessimists (not for all of them) Germany made a mistake and put herself under French (and Russian) leadership.<sup>30</sup> Or to put it otherwise: Paris led Berlin. There is no empirical evidence for such a conjecture. The reason that France and to some extent Russia took the lead in the U.N during winter 2002/03 and early spring 2003 has to be found in the nature of the Security Council of the U.N. Both are permanent members while Germany became in January 2003, a non-permanent member (on a rotating basis). As everyone knows, only permanent members have a veto right and can therefore avert a SC-

<sup>26</sup> See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York 1984. Specialists of cooperation theory will notice that I use Axelrod concept in a slightly different way. While Axelrod emphasize that the shadow of the future will lead to more cooperative behavior, I insist on the fact that the perception of future behavior of other states can also lead to non-cooperation if the defector perceives more gains than losses from his non-cooperative behavior for his future policy.

<sup>27</sup> Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs*, No.70, 1990-91.

<sup>28</sup> See Andreas Jacobs/Karl-Heinz Kamp, "In dubio pro Francia/pro America?", *Die Politische Meinung*, 49, March 2004, pp. 63-72 (the part Karl-Heinz Kamp wrote pp. 68-72).

<sup>29</sup> Even former Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd wrote recently "In Iraq we subordinated ourselves to the postwar policy of the Pentagon which in its first months proved crude and dangerous", *Financial Times*, 05. 04. 2004, p. 13.

<sup>30</sup> See Karl Feldmeyer, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19. 03. 2003.



Resolution. Therefore, it was a sign of realism that Germany – in close cooperation with Paris and Moscow – has given the lead in the U.N to the two permanent members.

6. One of the heaviest accusations is that Schröder's early determination prevented a common European position and provoked the rift among EU member states. This is only partly true. While there are persuasive reasons to think that prior consultations could have taken place and perhaps lead to a common European policy, there is considerable evidence that this would not have happened. Some countries, like Spain and Great Britain, were as early determined in their actions as Germany, but in a different direction.
7. As wrong as the accusation of German unilateralism is the supposition that the German policy was driven by a pacifist mood. To say this means to neglect the fact that the Red-Green Coalition participated in Operation Allied Forces in 1999 and sent troops to Afghanistan where German Special Forces (Krisenreaktionskräfte) were involved in heavy combat operations. It also neglects the fact that Germany is currently participating in seven military missions (with 7.000 soldiers) and is the second largest contributor of forces in international missions. With the COM KFOR (GL Kammerhoff) and the DCOM ISAF (GM Korte) Germany makes available also two high level command posts. This doesn't rule out the supposition that Schröder "played" with radical pacifist tendencies

within the German democratic left but governmental actions were definitely not driven by any pacifist considerations or moods.

#### 4. Summary

The aim of this brief analysis was to describe and analyze a debate among German scholars of International Relations and Foreign Policy, which is of particular importance. The consensus on foreign policy among the strategic community, which prevailed for more than 50 years, is eroding. Today we have two diverging evaluations of German Foreign Policy. It is important to note that the different appraisals of recent events are not tied to any kind of party affiliation. Conservatives are applauding while liberals are more pessimistic.

A closer look – undertaken in chapter 3 – revealed that most of the arguments of the so-called pessimists do not hold out against the empirical record. This does not lead to the conclusion that German Foreign Policy is not in crisis but it reduces the question to a normative level, and therefore becomes a matter of perception of each individual scholar.

Whether Berlins Foreign Policy is in crisis or not depends more on the fact of how individual scholars would like to see the future course of Berlin's policy rather than on observable and measurable fact. Nevertheless, the strategic community in Berlin is shifting from consensus to brisk debates and disputes. This shows as a matter of fact that at least this part of German Foreign Policy is not in crisis.



## NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE PUBLICATIONS 2003-2004

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- Vladimir LEVANOV, *La Réglementation juridique de la solde du personnel militaire sous contrat en Russie: particularités, problèmes et perspectives.*
- Leonid Y. KOSALS, *Criminal Influence/Control over the Russian Military-Industrial Complex in the Context of Global Security.*

#### No. 2, April 2004:

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- “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Security Issues in the Mediterranean Region”, 1<sup>st</sup> Med Workshop, Rome 2003.
- “Gestion des ressources naturelles et questions de sécurité en Méditerranée”, 6<sup>th</sup> Med IRS, Rome 2004.

### Partnership for Peace International Research Seminars

- “Ukraine and Regional Co-operation in Security: Looking ahead”, 11<sup>th</sup> PfP IRS, Rome 2003.
- “Security and Defence Reform in Central and Southeast Europe”, 12<sup>th</sup> PfP IRS, Rome 2003.

### Fellows' Research

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