MALI:
Managing the Damage of a Complex Context

1. INTRODUCTION

The complex nature of the Malian political impasse exacerbated by the intricacy of insurgency in the north has received global attention with divergent explanations and dimensions to the conflict. It is however generally agreed that it has become a cause of grave human insecurity all over the country and beyond as a threat to stability in West Africa since the Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo-led military coup of March 22, 2012.

Prior to the coup the wives and relatives of the Malian soldiers fighting insurgent groups in the north marched to the presidential palace to demand better care and condition for the soldiers fighting the rebels in the northern regions. According to them (the soldier's wives), the soldiers were fighting with very poor arms and ammunitions and therefore vulnerable.

The indicators to the instability through the early warning signs[1] were very evident. Amongst these signs were allegations of widespread corruption in public offices especially around the government circle and nepotism, mismanagement of resources within and among few elites. There was also gross dissatisfaction of the population over deterioration in the socio-economic sphere, obscure and vague information concerning the situation of the conflicts in the north and discrediting of the ousted president, Amadou Toumani Touré, and his government by high ranking military officials. Another source of discontent was disagreement among political parties over the organization of the presidential elections (scheduled for April 2012), growing insecurity in the north trickling down to other regions and the capital city, proliferation of arms which worsened following the "end" of the Libyan crisis, the student union's protests over the state of affairs, the seeming government laxity /lack of proactive measures in addressing the heightened insecurity especially delayed reaction in addressing the rebels issues in the north and letting the ex-combatants from Libya enter Mali without appropriate disarmament/demobilization. All these pointed to a country sitting on a timed bomb and waiting to explode.

In an effort to respond to the early warning information, ECOWAS and the AU convened a joint extra-ordinary meeting of heads of state between the 20th and 21st of March 2012 in the Malian capital to discuss and develop a way forward towards addressing the growing crisis in Northern Mali.

As the heads of state were deliberating in Bamako on the threats in the Sahel region, some junior officers of the Malian Army were planning in Kati on the 21st of March, to mutiny in protest against the deteriorating socio-economic situation in the country, poor political and military management of the protracted Tuareg rebellion in the north, and corrupt enrichment of some senior government officers[2]. The military officers attacked several locations in the capital city of Bamako, including the presidential palace, ministries, state television, and military barracks. They took over power and formed the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDRE), on March 22, 2012. Their coup brought to an end the 21 years of democracy in Mali.

Following the coup was a "unanimous" international condemnation, sanctions by the Economic Community of West

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[1] ECOWAS Early Warning Mechanism – ECOWARN with WANEP as the CSO partner responsible for data collation and analysis (www.ecowarn.org)

[2] See Afrique Asie of May 2012, Sahel, La stratégie du Chaos, page 22Comité National de Redressement de la démocratie et la Restauration de l'Etat

African States (ECOWAS)[3] and other bilateral partners, AU, EU, USA, etc. On 6th April, 2012, ECOWAS and the junta finally agreed to return to constitutional rule and form a transitional government led by the Speaker of parliament, Diouncounda Traoré and the newly appointed Prime Minister Modibo Diarra. In the ensuing days, both President Touré and coup leader Sanogo formally resigned from their positions as heads of State. Subsequently, ECOWAS lifted the sanctions and agreed to work with the transitional government towards organizing credible elections within a timeframe of one year.

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2. BACKGROUND

Mali is a landlocked country in West Africa with an area of 1,240,142 square kilometers and an estimated population of about 14.5 million people, 73% of whom live in rural areas. It is the 24th world's largest country and one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 160th according to the UN Human Development Report of 2010[5]. Formerly French Sudan, Mali gained its independence in September 1960. Most people live in the southern part of the country which has mainly arable land and urban centers. The population is made of Mande, including the Bambara, Malinke, and Sarakole, accounting for 50% of the total population. Other groups include the Peul (or Fulani), accounting for 17%; the Voltaic, making up 12%; the Songhai, constituting 6%; the Tuareg and Moor 10%; and other groups 5%. Bambara is considered as the lingua-franca as about 80% of the population can communicate in this language. The literacy rate in Mali

ranges from 27-30 % to 46%. Cotton is the foremost export, although gold mining is becoming increasingly important (3rd highest gold producer in Africa just after South Africa and Ghana). The country has also a large population of livestock (cattle, sheep and goats) and is self-sufficient in fresh water fish. Lack of adequate transport infrastructure remains one of the major obstacles in economic advancement.

The long existing single party dictatorship was overthrown by the military in March 1991 and the following year Mali had multiparty elections. In 1992, the first democratic presidential election was held after several decades of military rule. After

MNLA Rebels (As of Mar. 28, 2012)
Area claimed
Current control
Past control

Map of Mali with the MNLA claims and positions as of March 28, 2012 before the MNLA captured Timbuktu[4].

his re-election in 1997, President Alpha Konaré continued to push through political and economic reforms and to fight corruption. In keeping with Mali's two-term constitutional limit, he stepped down in 2002 and was succeeded by the ousted President, Amadou Toumani Touré.

From 1990 to 1995, a rebellion by various Tuareg groups took place in

Niger and Mali, with the aim of achieving autonomy or forming their own nation-state. The insurgency occurred in a period following the regional famine of the 1980s and subsequent refugee crisis, and a time of generalized political repression and crisis in both nations. The conflict is one in a series of Tuareg-based insurgencies in the colonial and post-colonial history of these two nations. In fact the nomadic Tuareg confederations have come into sporadic conflict with the sedentary communities of the region ever since they migrated from the Maghreb between the 7th and 14th centuries[6]. Some Tuareg demanded an independent Tuareg Nation to be formed when French Colonialism ended in 1960. This combined with dissatisfaction over the new governments led some Tuaregs in Northern Mali to rebel in 1963. This rebellion was short-lived as the military response of the new Malian government was swift and harsh[7].

Tuaregs have historically complained of marginalization by the Malian governments. Due to economic hardship and insecurity, large numbers of Tuareg nomads fled to refugee camps in Algeria and Libya, where Tuareg militants met and planned a rebellion. In Mali, the insurgency began in 1990 when Tuareg separatists attacked government buildings around the region of Gao. The Malian Army's reprisals led to a protracted armed conflict. The conflict relented and died down after Alpha Konaré formed a new government and made reparations in 1992. Also, Mali created a new self-governing region, the Kidal Region, and provided for greater Tuareg integration into Malian society.

[3] The ECOWAS sanctions which included the suspension of Mali from the Community are consistent with the 2001 protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the political principles of the 1993 revised treaty of ECOWAS

[4] Image from Cross Crocodile Press http://crossedcrocodiles.wordpress.com/2012/04/16/the-tuareg-mali-terrorists-oil-and-uranium/

[5] UN Human Development Index Report of 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/datablog/2010/nov/04/human-development-index-equality-matters

[6] See Samuel Decalo. Historical Dictionary of Niger. Scarecrow Press, London and New Jersey (1979). ISBN 0810812290, listings for Rebellion, Tuareg, Kaocen Revolt.

[7] Lt. Col. Kalifa Keita Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel retrieved 4/11/08 from http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps12312/carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs98/tuareg/tuareg.pdf

In 1994, Tuaregs, believed to have been trained and armed by Libya, attacked Gao, which again led to major Malian Army reprisals and to the creation of the Ghanda Koi Songhai[8] militia to combat the Tuareg, leading to civil war. In 1995, moderates on both sides negotiated a peace settlement; weapons were ceremonially burnt in 1996 in Timbuktu as a symbolic conclusion to the conflict. From 1996–2007 Malian Tuareg insurgents took part in a long series of peace processes. The 1995 peace deals which ended the First Tuareg Rebellion promised the repatriation of Tuareg communities forced into resettlement camps in the south of the country and opportunities for Malian Tuaregs to join the central government in Bamako. Unlike the Niger ex-combatants who appeared successfully integrated into national life, significant numbers of Malian Tuaregs remained restive and together with the Kidal region's poverty metamorphosed into cross-border smuggling and crime.

3. CURRENT CONFLICT DYNAMIC

Taking advantage of the military coup, the Tuareg rebels launched incursions into northern Mali, seizing towns and bases formerly held by government forces. As military forces were engaged in consolidating their hold on the capital, the rebels were able to push southward with little opposition. On 6th April, 2012, MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad) declared the independence of the Azawad (which covers an estimated 2/3 of Mali) and pushed forward with the creation on 07th June, 2012 of the **Conseil transitoire de l'Etat de L'Azawad (CTEA)** made up of 28 members in charge of the provisional development, defense, security,

international relations, education, social cohesion and administration of the Azawad.

The Tuareg rebels have bolstered their army by an influx of combatants/ex-rebels from Libya with heavy weapons and several Tuareg Malian army deserters and took complete control over the northern towns of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, making northern Mali the theater of violent armed conflict, resulting in major looting, ethnic cleansing, oppression of minorities, rape, abduction, and gross human rights violations. The assessment of general insecurity in the northern part of Mali from the perspectives of key policy and decision makers from West Africa and the ECOWAS community underscore how the current very fragile situation makes it easier for criminal groups, international drug dealers, arms dealers and terrorists groups like AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb), Boko Haram, Jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan, who are now all joining forces to train extremist groups from West Africa. . There are very strong indications of the funding of the Tuareg rebels from outside of Mali and thus making them more sophisticated[9].

However, contrary to their previous arrangement to be a unified force, the rebel groups are growing in disagreement, diverging in ideologies. The **Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA)**-the Tuareg name for their home region in the Sahara, the secular Tuareg nationalists seek an autonomous/completely independent, homeland while the Islamist Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith) is demanding the imposition of Islamic law (Sharia) in northern Mali[10]. At the time of completing this brief, Muslim Extremists from the Ansar Dine started destroying the heritage of the ancient Malian city of Timbuktu on Monday 2nd July 2012. The destruction included

razing tombs and attacking the gate of the 600-year-old mosque. At the end of June, the Ansar Dine seized control of Timbuktu after ousting the Tuareg rebel faction with whom they had invaded northern Mali in April 2012. Meanwhile, the military junta now subjected to constitutional rule and the transitional government remains focused on Bamako. The extent of influx of the Malian crisis brings along new political and conflict dynamics almost on a daily basis. Currently there is an ongoing fight between the MNLA and Mujao over the control of Gao and media reports have it that over 20 persons have died and more than a dozen injured.

4. CONFLICT ACCELERATING FACTORS

The following issues are currently influencing the conflict dynamic and trends even as ECOWAS, CSOs and the international community continue to strive to ensure that the country remains a one and united entity.

Violent extremism and free flow of narcotics:

At the rebellion's onset, the Ansar Dine and the Tuaregs joined forces. Reports indicate that the Ansar Dine has taken control together with the Algerian group known as the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The AQIM has garnered resources through kidnapping of Western tourists in Mali and neighboring countries, carjacking and taking over drug and weapon smuggling routes across the Sahara. They are using their resources to buy the support of tribal and clan leaders. Gaddafi's fall in Libya meant that weapons flooded into northern Mali. These weapons were either purchased or seized in battle. The availability of arms gave rise to

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[8] Hershkowitz, Ann. The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The Role of Desertification in Violent Conflict http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/tuareg.htm

[9] The President of Niger Mahamadou Issoufou, a key neigbour sharing a long border with Mali gave this warning when he granted an interview to France 24 on 7th June 2012. He stated "we have information on the presence of Afghans and Pakistanis in northern Mali…They are believed to be working as instructors…They are the ones who are training those who have been recruited across various West African countries… " Read more from http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ihvjJRVHV4iiGHsetVScOXTaicwQ?docId=CNG.2617a5813d3cd45e9f090ff4722280ef.431

[10] "Tuareg rebels attack Mali town of Kidal". Al Jazeera. 6 February 2012. Retrieved 25 May 2012.

[11] http://allafrica.com/stories/201205170270.html

numerous rebel groups, Muslim radicals and Tuareg rebels of all sorts[11].

While Bamako has launched several initiatives to counter the insecurity affecting the North of the country and committed itself to Algeria's efforts to encourage the involvement of Sahel countries in the struggle against Islamist terrorism, there is no denying that Mali is trying to avoid finding itself alone in the front line in the armed struggle against rising violent Islamist extremism[12]. Mali, which shares borders with seven countries[13] is very limited militarily with only 7,750[14] soldiers who are not motivated to fight a war and do not seem to have sufficient operational capacity to fight the insurgency groups. The army has been divided either along ethnic or interest lines and loyalty and motivation with a central army that could fight the armed groups has been jeopardized and now seriously put at risk. The wide territory of northern Mali makes it significantly difficult to control the flow of arms and narcotics in the region.

Youth and Unemployment:

Young people represent more than half of the Malian population[15], providing grounds for conflict actors to entice and recruit them in various forms of unlawful and criminal activities. The security crisis in northern Mali has been moving ever closer to the heart of the political agenda. In part this has been for economic reasons, in that the resurgence of Tuareg rebel activity and the rounds of kidnappings by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb have an impact far beyond the confines of the Sahara. Tourism has slumped, with severe consequences for employment in the capital city of Bamako, and cultural destinations such as Mopti, Timbuktu,

Djenné and the Dogon country, particularly for young people who are generally involved in this activity.

Humanitarian Crisis:

According to OCHA[16], there are 20,175 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and 197,954 refugees in neighboring countries of Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Algeria[17], excluding the unregistered IDPs and refugees. Furthermore, bilateral missions and aid agencies are continually pulling out, citing insecurity and the absence of a democratic space to work. Little relief aid provided through mobilization at national and international levels for IDPs and affected local populations in northern Mali are often looted or redirected by rebels groups or criminal groups leaving the population in a critical and emergency situation.

Whereas there is urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis by negotiating access for the delivery of aid, this is understood as an urgent response to alleviate the suffering of IDPs. However, it does not constitute the long term and sustainable solution to the problem. Greater emphasis must be placed on a speedy and well coordinated political response to ensure sustainable peace and security for all Malians. In an interview granted on Radio France International on 2nd July 2012, the Mayor of the city of Gao, Sadou Diallo put the emphasis on the urgent need for a political solution and not a humanitarian intervention[18].

Public and Private Finances:

the private sector lost 30%[19] of businesses since the Coup, public finances have lost 57% of revenues in taxes and customs (representing millions of US dollars lost in revenue for

public service; Destruction of public service infrastructures, including health centers, schools, ministerial compounds etc[20]. There is widespread looting and armed attacks of civilians, violence against women and girls etc. with bandits profiting from the situation to conduct atrocities. There are also allegations of the unseen hands of "oil lovers" fueling the secession agenda as Mali recently discovered oil in commercial quantity in the northern part of the country.

Mismanagement and Manipulation of Information:

key actors, including some police officers, gendarmes, some political parties, and some media have been fingered as negatively contributing to the acceleration of conflict in the way and manner information is managed. The public is manipulated and fed with propaganda. High level of illiteracy in the country provides grounds for conflict actors to manipulate the majority of the population and convey their views to the people in Bambara - the most spoken language which gives them the edge over international actors including the regional actor; ECOWAS. Some conflict actors cognizant of this dilemma inculcate ideologies, fear and panic, scaring the public and thus espousing other hidden agendas.

5. SCENARIOS

In light of the foregoing, this policy brief envisages the following scenarios in relation to the conflict dynamics and stabilization of the state.

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[12] Two years ago, army chiefs staff of Mauritania, Mali, Algeria and Niger have set up CEMOC (Comité d'etat major opérationnel conjoint) in Tamarasset

[13] Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal

[14] Jean-Pierre Filiu, Could Al-Qaeda Turn African in the Sahel?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2010, p. 8. Online: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/al_qaeda_sahel.pdf. Niger has 5 300 combatants. By way of comparison, Algeria has 178 000 soldiers and Libya, 76 000.

[15] In 2007, an estimated 48% of the populations were less than 15 years and 49% were 15-64 years old

[16] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Mali Complex Emergency Situation Report n06. 29 May 2012.

[17] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Mali Complex Emergency Situation Report n06. 29 May 2012.

[18] See http://www.franceculture.fr/personne-sadou-diallo

[19] UN Country Coordination Office Press Review of 1 June 2012

[20] "Amnesty warns Mali is 'on brink of major disaster'". BBC News. 5 April 2012. Retrieved 5 April 2012.

A. Worst Case Scenario:(Plausible)

The interim president, Dioncounda Traoré upon his return from France, where he has been receiving treatment following an attack on him by a group of pro-coup demonstrators that left him unconscious after suffering a head injury[21] is incapacitated and unfit to carry on with the running of the transitional government. The President is also afraid of his life due to lack of security of his person, resistance from the pro-coup demonstrators and the military junta, thus making it impossible to fulfill his mandate as the interim president and organizing the presidential election at the end of his one year term. Meanwhile the Tuareg rebels continue to carry out ethnically-motivated attacks in the northern regions, leading to widespread regional violence, significant number of deaths, huge displacement of Malians into neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria. The military then declares a state of emergency again, justifies their prolonged presence and meddling in state affairs in the name of national security, and delays their exit from power while the population in the north continues to endure suffering and protracted conflict.

B. Realist Case Scenario: (Very Plausible)

The interim president, Traoré, upon his return, receives robust security protection from ECOWAS, the AU, and other partners to enable him perform his duties of organizing elections within a year as negotiated and determined by ECOWAS. Disagreements as to the choices of political parties that could be allowed to become eligible and present their candidates to run for president continue to fester. The transitional government continues to grumble over lack of means and support to realistically organize credible elections in a year's time and suggest extension of the term in order to avert the consequences of rushing into elections only to further aggravate the conflict. Growing dissatisfaction and tensions in light of the military junta's perpetual control over the country at the expense of politicians who are excluded in the

scheme of affairs continue to exacerbate the conflict.

The regional Inter-Governmental body - ECOWAS through His Excellency Alassane Ouattara, President of Cote d'Ivoire and official mediator of the Malian political crisis, Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso prevail over the decision of CNRDRE to adhere to the principles of democracy, by allowing every eligible party or citizen to present their candidate and run for election. The international community through ECOWAS backs the process and supports the interim president by all means; they remain united and are able to contain resistance and demonstrations. The military junta understands the supranationality security arrangements within ECOWAS and accepts to align to the side of ECOWAS in exchange of a viable reform of the defense and military, granting amnesty to all members of CNRDRE and their allies, as well as giving Captain Sanogo, leader of the junta, the status of an ex Head of State. The elections are organized in the name of restoring democracy and peace in Mali.

C. Best Case Scenario: (less plausible)

Neighboring country of Algeria accepts to reevaluate its stance on the Malian crisis and in coordination with ECOWAS, provide military and logistical support to the transitional government to combat the rebel groups, liberate the north and allow Mali to regain its territorial integrity. The transitional government, assisted by ECOWAS through the deployment of ECOWAS Standby Forces, in agreement with the governments of Algeria and Mauritania, join hands with all the other neighboring countries in the region to continuously protect and safeguard northern Mali against any form of terrorist or rebel groups. The UN Security council backs efforts of ECOWAS via a Security Council Resolution and the international community supports the peacekeeping operations to consolidate peace and elections are held without much incidents of violence. The IDPs return to their respective regions and national reconciliation efforts start to heal the

country.

6. OPTIONS FOR RESPONSE

In view of the above scenarios, this policy brief proposes the following options for response as short term, medium term and long term measures for addressing the conflict and ensuring stability.

A) To ECOWAS and the Wider International Community

the West African Regional Body under the Chairmanship of President Alassane Ouattara and President Blaise Campaoré in his capacity as the mediator of the Malian crisis should lead the International Community to explore the possibility of negotiating with the Tuareg rebels in the north to cease fire and abandon their claim of usurping the northern part of the country. The Mediation process should take into consideration the root causes of the conflict, the formation of an inclusive government representing all the regions of the country, and the development of a sustainable roadmap of the northern regions so as to bridge the lingering ethnic, political, and socio-economic divide and development gap in the country.

The International Community under the leadership of ECOWAS while pursuing dialogue should immediately put in place the standby force that will prevent a total takeover of Mali by insurgent groups while ensuring that there is no reemergence of insurgencies or the regrouping of AQMI or other extremist groups spilling over from Libya and neighboring Algeria. Initiatives including an efficient Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of ex-combatants and child soldiers into civilian life should be put in place; mechanisms to deter the military from engaging in future coup d'état and thus undermining the country's democratic process should form part of the way forward for recovery and reforms while ensuring a comprehensive security

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[21] "Interim president of Mali injured, witness says". Associated Press. 21 May 2012. Retrieved 21 May 2012.

sector reform

The International Community, with the leadership of the regional grouping, ECOWAS should continue its stance on the organization of credible, fair and transparent elections within a realistic timeframe (irrespective of the one year time frame already given) and deploy election observers to serve as deterrence against any attempt at systematic electoral fraud and as reassurance to the Malian populace that the election would be credible.

B) To the Political Parties- Political parties should play a pivotal role in appeasing the population. They should put their differences aside and join hands to unite Malians beyond the current political divide and negative affiliations. Well-off and popular political parties should use some of their resources to conduct national reconciliation efforts and show a united front in restoring peace and security in Mali.

C) To the Military- The military should commit to their traditional roles of guarding the country against external aggression and internal insurrection and resist any urge to continue meddling in politics. They should maintain impartiality and refrain from taking hostage the democratic process every time there is divergence within the government. The military should not resort to the use of excessive force in the name of maintaining peace and instill fear in the population. Deployment of security agents at public places should not be overbearing so as not to intimidate the population and create distrust. Security sector reform should be initiated.

D) To the Civil Society- Malian Civil Society, especially traditional and religious leaders, women's groups, the youth and the media with the support

of NGOs, should play their roles as an oversight body, representing the interest of the Malian people. With the capacity of mobilizing a critical mass, the Malian Civil Society should intensify their campaigns of non-violence, unity, democracy, peace and security above any political, parochial, and ethnic interests. Malian women's groups have a key role as mothers, wives, sisters, pressure groups, to urge the actors and their supporters who are mainly men to preserve the peace and stability of the country. The women and youth should mobilize a critical mass to ensure that their voices and positions are heard and considered in the establishment of law and order, returning to democratic values, national reconciliation, and attaining sustainable peace, security and development. The women of Mali should particularly consider engaging in community dialogue and mediation through the engagement of women from all sides of the divide.

E) The media, whether electronic or print, private or public, local, national or international is the opinion-molding institution and wields so much influence in society; thus as a stakeholder in conflict prevention, the role of the media is central to the success or failure of any peacebuilding effort in Mali. The media should disseminate conflict de-escalating messages and avoid sensationalism while ensuring accurate and timely information is given as measures to mitigate conflicts in the communities.

7. CONCLUSION:

The protracted disputes and wrangling around northern Mali has been going on for decades and this period presents an opportunity to tackle the conflict from a holistic, comprehensive and collaborative dimension. Mali is West Africa's gateway to Europe through North Africa; the north is a wide desert and bigger than most European countries in size, a hub for extremist groups like AQIM, Al-Qaida in the Maghreb, training grounds for Boko Haram, Pakistani and Afghan jihadist, a passage for narcotics destined for Europe and other places, a hub for dealers of arms from Libya etc.

The Malian crisis, though predictable and longtime coming, has brought serious implications for the unity, economic development, and sustainable peace and security for the country. The transitional government will be the test for the Malians' tenacity to preserve and protect its values as a united and peaceful nation. The social, political, and ethnic divide is increasing, challenging the return to democratic process and long-term national reconciliation.

The roles of the neighboring countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger in this conflict should be carefully examined. This is a complex dilemma and can have **'tache d'huile'** effect on other fragile and post-conflict countries sharing border with Mali including fragile Cote d'Ivoire in the south, which then could negatively affect the rest of the Mano River Union as Guinea Conakry, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, which are post-conflict countries. It is imperative for all the stakeholders, including primary and secondary actors to ensure that the country stays peaceful and stable against all the odds.