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**Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism**

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# CONNECTIONS

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# Terrorism's Evolution: Yesterday, Today, and Forever

By Andrew Nichols Pratt

In confronting the challenge of international terrorism, the first step is to call things by their proper names, to see clearly and say plainly who the terrorists are, what goals they seek, and which governments support them. What the terrorist does is kill, maim, kidnap, and torture. His or her victims may be children in the schoolroom, innocent travelers on airplanes, businessmen returning home from work, political leaders. . . . The terrorist's victims may have no particular political identity, or they may be political symbols, like Aldo Moro or, perhaps, Pope John Paul II. They may be kidnapped and held for ransom, maimed, or simply blown to bits. One defining characteristic of the terrorist is his choice of method; the terrorist chooses violence as the instrument of first resort.

*William Joseph Casey, US Director of Central Intelligence*<sup>1</sup>

Minoru Yamasaki, who designed the soaring World Trade Center that dominated Manhattan's skyline for three decades, intended this complex as a "living symbol of man's dedication to world peace."<sup>2</sup> On the beautiful clear morning of 11 September 2001, Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda—nineteen Salafi-Jihadist terrorists—simultaneously devastated this compelling symbol of peace while attacking a vibrant center of international cooperation, the cerebral cortex of American security and America's ordinary citizenry. Al Qaeda's actions that morning revealed at once the extent of their hatred for our democracy and our freedoms that this system protects. We must never forget the 2,975 souls from more than ninety nations who perished that day.<sup>3</sup> Like a virtual memorial, this attack should remind all democracies, not just the United States, that the price for freedom may reach as high as those sadly absent Twin Towers. However, of greater significance, 9/11 raised fundamental questions regarding how our societies must address this threat. The answers to these questions necessitate a thorough understanding of the history and causes of the terrorism phenomenon and of the extraordinary chapters that ensue in this text.

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<sup>1</sup> William J. Casey, "The International Linkages; What Do We Know?" *Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism: The Witnesses Speak*, Edited by Uri Ra'an and others (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), 5–15.

<sup>2</sup> Jackie Craven, "The New York World Trade Center," About.com. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://architecture.about.com/od/worldtradecenter/ss/worldtrade.htm>

<sup>3</sup> "Official 9/11 Death Toll Climbs By One," CBS News, 10 July 2008. Retrieved 13 October 2009, from <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/10/national/main4250100.shtml>

Without compromising our ideals, how do democratic societies recognize quite ordinary and unremarkable men, who harbor a virulent hatred for democracy; counter an organization opposed to democratic freedoms, yet which itself mimics Fortune 500 companies; and protect themselves from an ideology rooted in fanatical, seventeenth-century social practices, which today are goaded into lethal action by base and pernicious prejudice?<sup>4</sup> How does a democratic society coexist with a struggling, traditional culture overwhelmed by immoral western influences? And perhaps most significant, how do democracies address the considerable security problem confronting countries with growing immigrant populations, an undetermined percentage of whom are radicalized to the point of threatening violence? How do we defuse these potential terrorists whose nationality inscribed on a passport is of little consequence to the bearer, who identifies himself primarily by religion and a sense of primary allegiance to a transnational community; a question a Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) colleague once posed? Europe contends with a potentially violent fifth column movement, but to date has experienced considerable difficulty in acknowledging this threat, let alone in dealing with this politically charged menace.<sup>5</sup>

While the purpose of this book is to address counterterrorism—its policies, strategies, campaigns, and current patterns and trends—for context, this effort must commence with a précis of the problem. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; challenging to understand whether you are a social scientist, a military commander, a diplomat, an intelligence officer, a political leader . . . or a student. Terrorism is a tactic used to socially, politically, and psychologically fragment a targeted population. These tactics created a line of development beginning in ancient times that can be traced and from which we will gain insights and knowledge. To begin to understand terrorists' behavior and their goals in order to craft counterterrorism policies, we must have a sense of terrorism's history. Terrorism, like a persistent cancer, has invaded our societies in the past; it afflicts us today; and terrorism will destroy our descendants correspondingly if we fail to grasp its fundamentals. Misunderstanding terrorism almost guarantees policy failures.

Of primary importance is our appreciation of how terrorism has mutated from a purely domestic, nation-specific problem into an "existential" threat to national

<sup>4</sup> Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," New York Police Department, 2007. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from [http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths\\_blog/files/NYPD\\_Report-Radicalization\\_in\\_the\\_West.pdf](http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf). Their report uses the term "unremarkable" thirteen times in describing individual perpetrators within today's Jihadi-Salafi terrorist movement.

<sup>5</sup> For more on this Islamist commitment to political activism and the legitimization of violence, see Dr. Patrick Sookhdeo's treatment of the subject in "How to Undermine the Extremist Ideology Behind Al Qaeda" contained in this text.

security and international stability, as described by the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.<sup>6</sup> Terrorists' traditional motivation has been premeditated, political violence designed to influence an audience. The doyen of terrorism studies, Brian Jenkins, noted over thirty years ago, ". . . terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." While his comment became an aphorism, Jenkins in 1999 acknowledged terrorism's dramatic transformation. The most recent attacks in New York, London, and Mumbai illustrate that terrorism's current goal is the achievement of the highest body count possible.<sup>7</sup> Four- or five-digit terrorism, or casualties greater than those of 9/11, appears to be the aim or measure of effectiveness sought by modern terrorists. But, while terrorism's blood craving has grown, terrorism's nature endures. The essence of terrorism remains the acquisition and retention of power. Terrorism is always political, a direct challenge to the polity, and to the state's legitimacy and authority, even when other motives such as religion, criminality, or psychology are involved.

To counter terrorism, one must understand terrorism for what it really is—a deliberate choice—neither the product of inflamed passion, the environment of war, nor of the strength of feeling sustaining a cause. Terrorism is a method, not a description.<sup>8</sup> Since the dawn of history, all acts of terrorism or terrorist campaigns are designed to promote publicity while creating fear, panic, and the prospect to seize power.

But what makes terrorism so imperative for us to understand today as an existential threat, as the former British Prime Minister Blair warned, are the terrorists' modern weapons. In one sense, terrorism's history can be represented in a simple chronological progression that presents the terrorists' weapons of choice: daggers, garrotes, guns, explosives, and at present, weapons of mass destruction. We will commence our sojourn through terrorism's history by talking about the terrorists who discriminately murdered their victims with daggers, and we will conclude with comments about modern terrorists who combine a desire to attack indiscriminately on a global stage with both the capability and the motivation of using weapons of mass destruction.

<sup>6</sup> "Blair Warns of WMD Terror Threat," CNN.com, 5 March 2004. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/03/05/uk.blair/index.htm>. According to Blair, the nature of the "global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real and existential and it is the task of leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political cost."

<sup>7</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 8.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, "What History Suggests About Terrorism and Its Future," in *The Past As Prologue*, ed. Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 218.

## First Quest: Defining Our Threat

We must begin our quest by developing a working definition of terrorism for this text; for use while at the Marshall Center; and—we suggest—for professionals. We will launch with seven simple cases to which we must ask, “Was this an act of terrorism or some other form of violent activity?”

1. From 1933 to 1945, Nazi Germany slaughtered six million Jews throughout Europe and Eurasia;
2. In late December 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army raped and murdered over 260,000 Chinese in a senseless orgy of violence;
3. On 6 August 1945, a lone US Army Air Corps B-29 attacked Hiroshima with an atomic bomb; approximately forty-five thousand Japanese died in a flash and many tens of thousands died later;
4. On 12 October 2000, a small rubber boat with two waving occupants motored alongside the USS Cole (DDG 67), an American warship harbored in the Yemeni port of Aden, and exploded, blowing a hole in its side, killing seventeen sailors and injuring thirty-nine;
5. On 19 September 2006, Robert Redeker, a public high school philosophy teacher and writer near Toulouse, wrote in the newspaper *Le Figaro* that Mohammad was “a merciless warlord, a looter, a mass-murderer of Jews and a polygamist.” He also called the Koran “a book of incredible violence,” comparing Islam unfavorably with Christianity and Judaism and criticizing the hostile reaction to a speech by Pope Benedict XVI. Redeker, his wife, and children immediately received death threats by telephone, e-mail, and on the Internet forum that published photos of him, a home address, directions to his home, and his cell phone number. That day’s issue of *Le Figaro* was banned in Egypt and Tunisia and a contributor to *Al Hesbah* wrote “May God send some lion to cut his head.”<sup>9</sup>
6. On 5 April 2007, Second Lieutenant Joanna Dyer and three other British soldiers perished from a roadside bomb while on patrol in Basra, Iraq. Former Prime Minister Blair labeled the ambush an “act of terrorism,” suggesting its perpetrators were linked to Iran;<sup>10</sup> and
7. On 27 October 2008, Islamist rebels stoned to death thirteen-year-old Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow . . . for being raped. Begging for mercy moments before being

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<sup>9</sup> Elaine Sciolino, “Teacher in Hiding After Attack on Islam Stirs Threats,” *New York Times*, 30 September 2006. Retrieved 15 October 2009 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/world/europe/30france.html>

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Harding and George Jones, “Blair links Iran to brutal act of terror,” *Telegraph.co.uk*, 6 Apr 2007. Retrieved 15 October 2009 from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1547852/Blair-links-Iran-to-brutal-act-of-terror.html>



buried up to her shoulders and her horrific execution, the Somali youngster is said to have pleaded “Don’t kill me, don’t kill me” in front of a thousand-strong crowd.<sup>11</sup>

We shall return to these seven cases later in this chapter.

Defining terrorism has proven to be difficult even for one country, let alone regional organizations or global bodies. A definition overtly describes our approaches to the problem of terrorism and profoundly influences how we respond to it. (Please find examples for a definition in the original version of this article.) If terrorism is always considered a crime (as distinct from war), then in America, the Justice Department and the police are responsible for combating it, and it is difficult legally to call on the military in incidents on US territory, even in situations (such as those involving chemical or biological agents) for which only the military is trained to respond.<sup>12</sup> If terms such as “unlawful,” or “against persons or property,” are found in the text as in the foregoing definition used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we can surmise a “legal” or “judicial” approach will be taken to the terrorism problem. This type of approach entails the application of the rule of law in which evidentiary practices apply; law enforcement means are practiced; and imprisonment will serve to bring the terrorist criminals to justice.

Terms such as “politically motivated violence” or “to intimidate governments” as depicted above imply a political-military approach. Evidentiary practices need not necessarily be followed. While intelligence could fail to meet the higher threshold of evidence, a democratically elected political leader can act on reasonable intelligence that might not meet the highest standards of a court. In fact, a leader may be morally or constitutionally obliged to act. While “politically incorrect” in some circles, the use of overwhelming military force can be a political-military solution to some terrorism, as the campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka has so vividly demonstrated. And while not immediately a matter of definition, we should remember that no campaign intended to eliminate terrorism has ever been successful without first eliminating terrorists.

Concomitantly, a nation’s definition normally reflects its history of fighting terrorism. The United Kingdom’s decades-long campaign against the Belfast-based “Provisionals,” who vowed to use violence as a catalyst for unification, played out in Northern Ireland, in Great Britain, in the Republic of Ireland, as well as in Europe. Consequently, both the United Kingdom’s old and post-9/11 definitions of terrorism

<sup>11</sup> “Stoning victim ‘begged for mercy’,” BBC News, 4 November 2008. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7708169.stm>

<sup>12</sup> Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 11–30 and 164–168.

described “putting the public in fear” locally, as well as “outside” the United Kingdom.<sup>13</sup> One’s experience with terrorism shapes one’s definition of terrorism.

Additionally, geostrategic shifts can impact upon a definitional construction. Russia introduced a Security Council resolution in 2004 that expanded the definition of terrorism to include Chechen and Palestinian groups, enlarging the list of terrorist individuals and groups beyond those linked to al Qaeda and the Taliban by United Nations Security Resolution 1267.<sup>14</sup> Russia proposed terrorism be described as “any act intended to cause death or serious injury to civilians or taking of hostages” to compel action. Such acts “are under no circumstance justifiable by consideration of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or similar nature.” In so acting, Russia abruptly reversed decades of support for terrorists fighting for territory and self-determination. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared, “The time has come to renounce the double standard once and for all when it comes to terror, no matter what slogans it uses.”<sup>15</sup>

Our definitional challenge impels us to arrive at as complete and objective definition of terrorism as possible; one acceptable for academic research as well as for facilitating counterterrorist operations on an international scale.<sup>16</sup> To accomplish this, we can apply a Clausewitzian-like approach to defining terrorism based on three important elements:<sup>17</sup>

1. The aim of the action, which is always political—that is, to gain or to maintain political objectives, changing a regime, changing the people in power, or changing social or economic policies;

<sup>13</sup> Terrorism Act 2000, Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI). Retrieved 13 October 2009 [http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga\\_20000011\\_en\\_2#pt1](http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000011_en_2#pt1)

<sup>14</sup> “Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSR 1267 (1999) concerning Al Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities,” UN.org. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml>

<sup>15</sup> Simon Saradzhyan, “Kremlin Goes on a Western Offensive” *Moscow Times*, 27 September 2004. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8382-3.cfm>

<sup>16</sup> Boaz Ganor, “Proposing a Definition of Terrorism” *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?* International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from <http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/tabid/64/Articleid/432/currentpage/1/Default.aspx>

<sup>17</sup> Dr. Christopher Bassford, in a teaching note written on 3 January 2003, suggested Clausewitz’s trinity comprises three specific elements. The identity of those elements is readily evident to anyone who reads the first paragraph of his description: It is “composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason. . . .” This set of elements is usually labeled “emotion/chance/reason”; sometimes “violence/chance and probability/rational calculation”; or, even more abstractly, “irrationality/non rationality/rationality.”

2. The essence of the action—that is, the use of or threat to use violence to influence a broader audience as opposed to nonviolent protest such as strikes, peaceful demonstrations, or tax revolts; and
3. The target of the action—that is, civilians. Terrorism is distinguished from other types of political violence such as guerrilla warfare and civil insurrection by the intentional targeting of civilians.

As Boaz Ganor has noted during his visits to the Marshall Center, terrorism exploits the relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly” and is not the result of an accidental injury inflicted on a civilian or a group of civilians who stumbled into an area of violent activity.<sup>18</sup> While a literal copy of this Clausewitzian-like approach to defining terrorism is not necessary, any sound definition of terrorism should address these three elements in some analogous manner. Furthermore, as a security official peruses an intelligence report or examines the scene of an attack, applying this definitional approach will be equally beneficial. However, our global community still cannot arrive at a simple definition that satisfies all.

The impasse in arriving at a universal definition of terrorism nurtured over time the myth that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” and to the longevity of this twaddle.<sup>19</sup> This cliché is trite as well as a false dichotomy. The term “freedom fighter” has to do with ends such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s (ETA) secessionist goal of freeing the Basque people from control by Spain. Terrorism connotes the means of achieving this goal. To reiterate, terrorism is a tactic; it is a method. Hence, an individual can claim the mantle of freedom fighter using terrorism to achieve his purposes; however, in reality he is simply a terrorist.

The genesis of this enduring myth is in the United Nations’ “crisis of identity” suffered during the Cold War. This saga plays out in the first pages of Rolf Ekeus’s discussion of the United Nations’ contemporary challenges. A portion of the UN’s membership still adhered to ideologies or doctrines that rejected human rights and supported the absolute authority of the state. The United Nations’ body fractured between the democratic West and the authoritarian East. The upshot found the Security Council evolving into a debating society and the General Assembly transforming into a stage for “a beauty contest in which both sides wooed for political favors from the nonaligned.”<sup>20</sup> Aroused in the early 1970s by a wave of letter bombs, the Lod

<sup>18</sup> Ganor, “Proposing a Definition of Terrorism.”

<sup>19</sup> Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 1 a: silly idle talk: drivel b: something insignificant or worthless: nonsense from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/twaddle>

<sup>20</sup> Rolf Ekeus, “New Challenges for the United Nations,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 517–528.

airport attack in Israel, and, finally, the Munich massacre, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim enjoined the United Nations to define terrorism in order to punish these perpetrators. Simultaneously, “wars of national liberation” were being discussed in New York and were perceived by the Soviet Union and many developing nations as classic cases of “just war.” This argument was accepted, along with a perverted corollary that those “in the right” were released from the normative rules of warfare. Thus, it proved too difficult to outlaw the activities of international terrorists. The United Nations’ Sixth Committee legal commentators at this time such as Mr. Joewono, an Indonesian, and Dr. Abu Lughod, a Palestinian, contended that national liberation movements, because of their legitimate *jus ad bellum*, should be treated as privileged belligerents and absolved from the restraints of the humanitarian rules of war. In a grotesque perversion of logic, they argued, “It would be unjust to expect such peoples to adhere to the same code of ethics as those who possessed more sophisticated means of advancing their interests.”<sup>21</sup>

If one truly appreciates international law, one man’s terrorist can never be another man’s freedom fighter. Although fashionable at conferences and cocktail parties, this expression serves at best as a weak lecture transition sentence or merely an empty witticism between neophytes. Murderers of young children are never “freedom fighters.” If they were ever entitled to such a distinction, we would then have to concede that international law itself was nothing more than an authorization to commit evil in world affairs.<sup>22</sup> So let us return to our seven cases that we questioned earlier.

Words have meaning and the term “terrorism” regrettably for decades has been used promiscuously. Nazi Germany’s slaughter of 6 million Jews throughout Europe and Eurasia represented an unparalleled genocide. The rape of Nanking by the Japanese Imperial Army described a depraved war crime directed from the highest echelons of the Imperial Japanese Army. The first use of the atomic bomb by the United States on Hiroshima, which killed tens of thousands of Japanese, approached the model of war that Clausewitz once defined as “absolute” war and was the Allies’ “best worst option” to end World War II. From extensive research, the United States’ best course of action targeted the mind of Emperor Hirohito and his decision-making

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<sup>21</sup> John Dugard, “International Terrorism and the Just War,” from David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, eds., *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 83–85.

<sup>22</sup> Louis Rene Beres, “On the Difference Between Murderers and Freedom Fighters,” Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, 29 January 2004. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from [http://www.freeman.org/m\\_online/feb04/beres.htm](http://www.freeman.org/m_online/feb04/beres.htm).

structure and not innocents.<sup>23</sup> The year 2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG 67) resists a facile description. The Cole sailed under “Threat Condition Bravo,” the second-lowest condition on a scale of four, so only a handful of sailors were posted on deck as it refueled. Crucially, the weapons systems on the bow and stern were unmanned because of the relatively low level of alert. Reminiscent of TV’s amusing but ineffectual deputy sheriff Barney Fife of *Mayberry*, two sailors patrolled the ship with pistols with two rounds each and instructions not to load their weapons or fire unless fired on, and then only after being given the captain’s permission. Given the nature of the ship’s duties, a terrorist attack best describes this case. However, some critics have pointed out that under US law an attack against a military target does not meet the legal definition of terrorism (see: 22 USC § 2656f(d)(2)). Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the intent of this attack furthered al Qaida’s political goals.<sup>24</sup> The case of Robert Redeker, while not archetypal terrorism, threatened bloodshed for political purposes against civilians, which amounts to an act of terrorism. Second Lt. Joanna Dyer and her fellow British soldiers died fighting a sophisticated, Iranian-supported insurgency, though their deaths were not the result of an “act of terrorism” as suggested by an understandably emotional British Prime Minister Blair. Finally, the gruesome stoning murder of thirteen-year-old Aisha Ibrahim Duhulow before a crowd depicted a horrific act of terrorism by a group of Salafi-Jihadists that was designed to dramatically intimidate local Somali citizens.

“Terrorism” loses consequence and gravitas if misused, and words such as “genocide” are, in fact, more egregious. We should examine terrorist cases focusing upon the act itself and neither its perpetrators nor the alleged probity of its cause. Now with our definition of terrorism, we will examine the nature of this pernicious phenomenon.

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<sup>23</sup> Richard B. Frank, “The Best Worst Option,” from “Would You Have Dropped the Bomb?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (July/August 2005), 60. Frank, winner of the 2000 Harry S. Truman Book award for *Downfall: The End of the Japanese Imperial Empire*, argues that a sober assessment of US strategy demonstrates the atomic bombs were the worst way to end the Pacific War except all the others. The grim reality is that no other combination of events would have produced an enduring peace at less cost.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen Robinson, “Bombed US Warship Was Defended by Sailors with Unloaded Guns,” *Telegraph.co.uk*, 15 November 2000. Retrieved 24 August 24, 2009, from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/1374316/Bombed-US-warship-was-defended-bysailors-with-unloaded-guns.html>

## Terrorism's Historic Roots: Today's Antecedents

The events of New York City, Bali, Beslan, Madrid, London, and Mumbai have placed terrorism's brutal realities on center stage before a global audience. An effective way to examine terrorism's nature is to see it as part of an unfolding historical process. Terrorism is a form of political warfare and, like war itself, retains its constant nature, but its causes, objectives, and motivations evolve. The following brief treatment of terrorism's history will illuminate its enduring nature.

With certain irony, the first known terrorist group was a Jewish group called the Sicarii, an extremist offshoot of the religious sect of Zealots who attempted to expel the Romans and their Jewish collaborators from the Judean region and introduced terrorism as a strategy from approximately AD 66 to 73. The name "Sicarii" comes from the short sword or sica, their preferred weapon. Josephus, a first-century Jewish historian, provides our sparse history of the Sicarii and their unorthodox tactics: killing during daylight in crowded places to demonstrate the Roman Empire and Jewish kingdom's impotence; attacking in order to strike fear beyond their immediate targets; and acting in an apparent random nature. The Sicarii's high-risk assaults were conducted to demonstrate the vulnerability of the region's ruling elites. When their tolerance expired, the Romans crucified two thousand people and thus ended our first case.<sup>25</sup>

Next, the Assassins, an offshoot of the Ismaili sect, terrorized the Middle East during the eleventh–thirteenth centuries. Founded by Hassan-es Sabbah in the Elburz Mountains in Persia, this cult later expanded to Syria following the Mongol invasion of Persia. Operating remarkably like today's Salafi-Jihadist enterprise, the Assassins killed apostates: Muslim prefects, governors, caliphs, and even Conrad, the Crusader King of Jerusalem. Twice their leader, known in legend as "The Old Man of the Mountain," attempted to assassinate Saladin. The Assassins preferred the dagger. They courted death purportedly motivated by hashish-induced visions of paradise and were encouraged to believe nothing and dare all.<sup>26</sup> The Assassins were initially suppressed by the Mongols and later destroyed in 1272 by the Muslim leader al-Malik Baybars al-Bunduqdari, an important Mamluk Sultan of Egypt and Syria.<sup>27</sup>

The third terrorist group worthy of mention is the Thuggee. Some question the extent of the religious dimension of Thuggee; however, most contemporary sources

<sup>25</sup> John Gearson, "The Nature of Modern Terrorism," in *Superterrorism: Policy Responses*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford, UK: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd./Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 14.

<sup>26</sup> Philip K. Hitti, "The Assassins," Retrieved 15 October 2009 from [http://www.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/alamut/hitti\\_Ass.html](http://www.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/alamut/hitti_Ass.html)

<sup>27</sup> Bernard Lewis, "The Ismailites and the Assassins," in *A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton and Marshall W. Baldwin, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 130.

have described them as being a Hindi religious cult, devotees of Kali, a Hindu goddess of destruction whose aims were imperceptible. Some revisionist sources consider the Thuggee a specialized form of organized crime or paramilitary activity like a modern mafia lacking any particular religious dimension. The Thuggee's centuries-long campaign ended under British rule in the 1830s, but not before this criminal terrorist group had killed as many as two million people; the group would rivet our attention if only 10 percent of that figure had died. The Thuggee strangled their victims with silk garrotes; murdered travelers who were rarely English; and attacked large areas in an indiscriminate manner. Early attempts at prosecuting and eliminating the Thuggee failed due to the lack of evidence for their crimes. Their *modus operandi* yielded very little evidence: no witnesses to interrogate, no weapons to examine, and no corpses. Furthermore, the Thuggee usually made no confessions when captured. Another obstacle to prosecution was that Thuggee groups did not act locally, but attacked all over the Indian subcontinent, including territories not under British rule. In a survey of political terrorism, the Thuggee rate no more than a footnote except for the sheer number of casualties.<sup>28</sup>

The last historic terrorist group we treat is the Narodnaya Volya. They functioned from January 1878 until March 1881 and arguably represent terrorism's most successful organization.<sup>29</sup> Walter Laqueur writes that the moral and intellectual distance between Narodnaya Volya and contemporary terrorists can be measured in light years.<sup>30</sup> Their motto proclaimed, "Not one drop of unnecessary blood!"<sup>31</sup> Sofya Perovskaya, Narodnaya Volya's most famous terrorist—who directed Czar Alexander's murder—was not unlike leaders of the Bader Meinhof, Red Brigades, or even al Qaeda. A disaffected child of the ruling class with a grudge, she hated her own. Perovskaya wanted the Russian society to compress like an overtightened spring so when it finally popped, it would break.

This was the classic era of anarchist terrorism that lasted from about 1880 to the end of World War I. Some scholars suggest a comparison is warranted between present-day terrorism and its nineteenth-century predecessor.<sup>32</sup> In 1906 alone, approximately thirtysix hundred government officials were killed or wounded by terrorists. Acts of terrorism became so common during this period that many Russian newspapers introduced special sections devoted solely to printing daily lists of politi-

<sup>28</sup> Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 2001), 12.

<sup>29</sup> Walter Laqueur, "A History of Terrorism" in *Confronting Fear: A History of Terrorism*, ed. Isaac Cronin (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002), 6.

<sup>30</sup> Laqueur, 6.

<sup>31</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 18

<sup>32</sup> Richard Bach Jensen, "The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880 1930s," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 2009): 89–109.

cal assassinations and bombings throughout the empire.<sup>33</sup> As we now know only too well, the spring finally did break in 1917 with the Bolshevik revolution, but by then Perovskaya had been hanged for murder.

### **Terrorism: The Tool of the Radical Left and Right**

Political terrorism—not to be confused with criminal terrorism and pathological terrorism—is systematic violence used in the furtherance of political aims, often by small groups dedicated to a specific agenda, usually involving attacks upon the governing authorities.<sup>34</sup> Political terrorism emanates from the left and right political spectrums and from political motivations in between. Thus, distinctions between political and ethnic terrorism occasionally blur as some separatist groups are influenced by, or receive support from, the left, despite being nationalists. Terrorism in an outlying region or colony is often assumed to be separatist in its logic, though loyalist terrorists have been opposed to the exclusion of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom. The left and the right occasionally clash with right-wing terrorists seeking to defend the status quo. This has occurred, for example, in Colombia, where the activities of the leftist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) precipitated terrorist atrocities by the preservationist rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or the AUC, the country's largest paramilitary group.<sup>35</sup> Positioning themselves as a necessary counter to Colombia's leftist insurgents, ordinary Colombians were often victimized—instead of protected—by the AUC. The armed groups displaced indigenous communities from their land, massacred civilians, and kidnapped political figures. As human rights groups have documented, some paramilitaries even charged “taxes” in local areas and regulated how citizens could dress.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Reiss, Tom. *The Orientalist: Solving the Mystery of a Strange and a Dangerous Life* (New York: Random House, 2005). Retrieved 15 October 2009, from <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/random051/2004050928.html>

<sup>34</sup> Sean Kendall Anderson and Stephen Sloan, *Assassins to Zealots*, 2nd ed. (Lanhan, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2002), 3–5. This is an excellent text to keep on hand as it contains a wealth of information regarding major terrorist groups, significant terrorist events, and terrorists' weapons systems of choice.

<sup>35</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed., Revised (Paperback) (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc, June, 2005), 29.

<sup>36</sup> Stephanie Hanson, “Colombia's Right-Wing Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups,” Background, Council on Foreign Relations, 11 January 2008. Retrieved 24 August 2009, from [http://www.cfr.org/publication/15239/colombias\\_rightwing\\_paramilitaries\\_and\\_splinter\\_groups.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15239/colombias_rightwing_paramilitaries_and_splinter_groups.html)



In the United States, prior to the modern era of religiously motivated terrorism begun by terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center complex, the right wing represented American law enforcement's greatest challenge. During the American Revolutionary War, Loyalists suffered being tarred, feathered, and lynched by revolutionary mobs. A form of political cleansing divided entire families with family members who remained loyal to the king escaping to Canada and members loyal to the fledgling revolutionary American government occupying their kin's estates to this day.<sup>37</sup>

America's most infamous right-wing terrorist organization, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), emerged from the American Civil War and was initially led by the South's greatest tactician, General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Initially, the KKK opposed northern occupation, the Reconstruction, and the Black vote with lynching being the order of the day. The Klan became a nationwide phenomenon enjoying its largest political successes not in the South but in Colorado and Indiana and as far north as Maine, attacking not just Freedmen, but Jews and other minorities as well as intimidating and opposing Roman Catholics and labor unions. America contended with other manifestations of terrorism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the Molly Maguires in the 1860s and 1870s; the Ludlow Massacre of Greek, Italian, and other immigrants; and, the infamous West Virginia Miners' Rebellion, which introduced the term "red-neck" as well as the use of close air support by the fledgling US Army Air Corps.<sup>38</sup>

Right-wing extremists and terrorists appear to be experiencing a reincarnation of sorts. Our global economic downturn, the flood of illegal Third World migrants into the First World, and the election of America's first black president are contributing to a resurgence of right-wing extremist groups. In the United States, right-wing extremism had been on the wane since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. However, according to a US intelligence assessment distributed by the Department of Homeland

<sup>37</sup> For granularity on terror and the American Revolution, see: John J. Tierney, "Terror at Home: The American Revolution and Irregular Warfare," *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, No. 12 (Spring 1977): 1–19. Note, however, there is no evidence that statesmen or senior army commanders of the American Revolutionaries endorsed terrorism or allowed it as calculated policy or strategy.

<sup>38</sup> Lon Savage, *Thunder in the Mountains: The West Virginia Mine War, 1920–21* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, September 1990). The West Virginia mine war of 1920–21, a major civil insurrection of unusual brutality on both sides, even by the standards of the coal fields, involved thousands of union and nonunion miners, state and private police, militia, and federal troops. Before it was over, three West Virginia counties were in open rebellion, much of the state was under military rule, and bombers of the US Army Air Corps had been dispatched against striking miners.

Security, this trend has reversed.<sup>39</sup> Europe is also experiencing a similar resurgence in right-wing violence. The German Federal Police Office (BKA) affirmed Germany's far-right threat is increasing, with the number of violent offenses committed by neo-Nazis climbing steeply. Germany is witnessing a revival of indisputable xenophobic violence and racism; not incidents blown out of proportion by a media all too aware that headlines about Nazis sell newspapers. Between January and August of 2006 alone there were some eight thousand offenses by right-wing radicals reported to the BKA—20 percent more than the previous year and 50 percent more than in 2004. While many pundits dismiss the regular reports of xenophobic violence as scare-mongering, statistics published by the German Interior Ministry prove that the far-right's gloves are indeed off.<sup>40</sup>

Addressing the left, the late 1950s and early 1960s heralded the birth of global radical left-wing terrorism due in part to the availability of arms, the spread of mass communications, and the decline of substantive political debate. The world had suffered two world wars and numerous rebellions causing the globe to be awash with cheap weapons. What we call globalization today arguably developed during this period with cheap air travel permitting mobility and instant communications available to millions. Serious political debate succumbed to simplistic sloganeering: "Make love, not war," "Imagine No Religion," and "More power to the people." However, left-wing terrorists shunned this naïveté and were heavily influenced by anticolonial struggles in Indochina, Algeria, and Africa. A shared, loosely fashioned, vaguely defined socialist ideology developed during this period, allowing such odd temporary coalitions as the one that formed between Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) active service units, Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (aka Carlos the Jackal), an affluent Venezuelan-born, leftist revolutionary, and his German partners. Carlos formulated the attack on the headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna in December 1975, leading an all-star cast of terrorists, which included Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann of the second-generation Red Army Faction in the assault seizing over sixty hostages. This liberal socialist ideology did forge ties that still bind to this day. However, anti-Semitism and a pragmatic need for operational and tactical expertise also bound these anomalous bedfellows. Perhaps the most enduring regional relationship was forged by Northern Ireland's Republican terrorist movement and the PLO. This too dated from the early 1970s, when Fatah organized weapons and terrorist training for PIRA and INLA operatives in Libya and Lebanon.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Greg Miller, "Right-Wing Extremists Seen as a Threat," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 April 2009. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/16/nation/na-right-wing-extremists16>

<sup>40</sup> "Germany's Far-Right Rolls Up Its Sleeves," *Deutsche Welle*, 17 October 2006. Retrieved on 24 August 2009 from <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2206348,00.html>

<sup>41</sup> Sean Gannon, "IRA-PLO Cooperation: A Long, Cozy Relationship," *The Jerusalem Post*, 7 April 2009. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1238562940033&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter>

These left-wing terrorist groups mushroomed during this period, organizing themselves hierarchically while normally adhering to severe discipline and command lines. Their extreme security paranoia is best exemplified by the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), also known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council. By 1987, Abu Nidal (the pseudonym of Sabri Khalil al-Banna) had turned the full force of his terror tactics inwards on the ANO itself. Members were tortured until they confessed to betrayal and disloyalty. According to recruits who were able to escape, victims were buried alive, fed through a tube forced into their mouths, then finally killed by a bullet fired down the tube. Some had their genitals placed in skillets of boiling-hot oil. There were several mass purges. During one night in November 1987, 170 ANO members were tied up, blindfolded, machine-gunned, and buried in a mass grave. Another 160 met the same fate in Libya shortly afterwards.<sup>42</sup>

Fortunately for us, left-wing terrorists lost sight of their intended audience and goals. For the left-wing terrorist of this era, terrorism was a tactic that became a strategy and a strategy that over time eventually became their reason for existing—a *raison d'être*. Terrorism moved from being a tool, to an end, to finally a way of life without gaining any lucidity, coherence, or depth. These groups eventually collapsed under the weight of their own inadequacy, unable to accomplish the broad social tasks that their terrorist tactics were never meant to achieve. Left-wing terrorist groups such as the Japanese Red Army, an army of approximately forty terrorists, could never realistically achieve its goal to overthrow the Japanese government and emperor and start a global revolution. The more presumptuous a terrorist group's claim and the more extensive its desired constituency, the greater is the terrorist's chance of failure.

Nevertheless, while suffering from internal pathogens, these terrorist organizations and their successors waged and some continue to wage today a thriving psychological warfare campaign using the media and “. . . the oxygen of publicity.”<sup>43</sup> Political terrorism became a form of psychological warfare waged through the media. On 10 September 1976, in New York City, five Fighters for Free Croatia (CFF) hijacked TWA Flight 355 and journeyed from New York to Canada, on to Iceland, and over London, dropping pamphlets. The flight eventually terminated in Paris, where the terrorists were arrested.<sup>44</sup> At the end of this thirty-hour odyssey, one of the terrorists,

<sup>42</sup> Duane “Dewy” R. Clarridge, *A Spy for all Seasons: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Scribner, 1997); cited in Michael Ledeen, “Dead Terrorist in Baghdad,” *National Review Online*, 20 August 2002. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.nationalreview.com/ledeen/ledeen082002.asp>

<sup>43</sup> Margaret Thatcher, Speech to American Bar Association, 15 July 1985. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106096>

<sup>44</sup> “Bombs for Croatia” *TIME*, 20 September 1976. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946611-1,00.html>

as he was being led away, off-handedly intoned, “Well, that’s show biz.” It certainly was theater. A \$400 investment in five plane tickets from New York to Chicago leveraged millions of dollars of free publicity for the political cause of the Fighters for Free Croatia.<sup>45</sup>

Mass media do not merely cover terrorism; terrorists plan on such coverage. Yasser Arafat, a master terrorist and manipulator of the media, selected the 1972 Munich Olympics as a target to reinvigorate world attention on the plight of the Palestinians as these games were the first “live” internationally televised sporting event in history. The Red Brigades attempted to conduct their attacks to make the deadline for the much-favored Italian Sunday papers. American terrorist Timothy McVeigh selected the Murrah Federal Building specifically because it had “plenty of open space around it to allow for the best possible news photos and television footage.”<sup>46</sup> That bin Laden demonstrated his ability to reach a global audience, foist his picture onto every cable news channel, displace presidential election chatter on nightly news, and garner the attention of the Sunday pundits, astounds. His videos are pure propaganda, designed to weaken American resolve, while fostering recruiting and fund-raising.

As a key component of psychological warfare, the media can also shape the outcome of a terrorist incident because sustained coverage of a hostage situation can protect lives by building international sympathy for the hostages’ plight. However, a government can be pressured to resolve the situation, perhaps prematurely as was the case with the Ma’alot massacre in northern Israel on 15 May 1974.<sup>47</sup> The media can disrupt or even prevent a dynamic counterterrorism operation. During the Hanafi siege in mid-March, 1977, three buildings in Washington, D.C., were seized by twelve terrorists who were tipped off to the hostage rescue force’s actions by live TV media coverage. Conversely, inadvertent assistance to law enforcement agencies by the media is also possible. The Unabomber’s seventeen-year campaign ended when major US newspapers published his Luddite political manifesto, which Theodore Kaczynski’s brother David fortuitously recognized.

Before we leave our discussion of terrorism from the left and right and begin our discussion of “Holy Terror” or killing in the name of God, be aware that religious terrorism also practices psychological warfare.<sup>48</sup> Violent Islamist doctrine requires its

<sup>45</sup> James M. Poland, *Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies and Responses*, 1st ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1988), 45.

<sup>46</sup> Brigitte Lebens Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc. 2002), 12.

<sup>47</sup> Michael Stohl, “Demystifying Terrorism: The Myths and Realities of Contemporary Political Terrorism,” in M. Stohl (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism*, 3rd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1988), 11.

<sup>48</sup> Dr. Jerrold Post, “Rogue Leader Profiles,” Political Psychology Associates, Ltd. Retrieved on 24 August 2009 from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-conf2000/post/sld001.htm>, slide #13.

believers to accept jihad as continuous process warfare: psychological, political, and military.<sup>49</sup> This theme will recur later in this text.

### **“Holy Terror”: Killing in the Name of God**

While other forms of terrorism appear interested in influencing contemporary society through violence or the threat of violence against civilians, religious terrorists exhibit a fundamental difference when compared to their political cousins. Religiously motivated terrorists usually seek little or no dialogue with contemporary society and wish only to eliminate its modernizing influences. For the most part, religious terrorists are hierarchical and authoritarian. The true believer experiences no ethical conflict from his acts of violence because they are sanctified—legitimized—by some form of religious authority.<sup>50</sup> A divine being appears directly involved in determining ends and means or a terrorist’s strategy. This religious stimulus is the inspirational source of most of the terrorist incidents we are experiencing today.<sup>51</sup>

Religious terrorism neither began on 9/11 nor is unique to Islam, having an ancestry arguably stretching back nearly 2,000 years; however, this text will focus on religious terrorism’s more modern and lethal manifestations. We begin our treatment of religious terrorism with an examination of “Islamism,” a set of ideologies holding that Islam is not only a religion but also a political system that emerged as a branch of the Islamic reform movement of the nineteenth century. This movement concluded that its society’s flaws were a result of Islam not presiding over the entire Arab world. Since the 1970s, modern Islamism has become prevalent at once in the Muslim power centers and on the “Muslim street.”<sup>52</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1955; Reprinted 2006), 64.

<sup>50</sup> Dr. Jerrold Post, “The Mind of the Terrorist: When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone,” Lecture, George Washington University, April 2008, Slide #32.

<sup>51</sup> Dr. Tom Mockaitis, a PTSS lecturer, argues there could be a mistake in attributing the increased lethality of terrorist attacks today to lack of restraint brought on by religious extremism. Instead, the explanation may be that today’s terrorists emphasize high body count due to a “threshold phenomenon.” Numbed by decades of violence, people do not shock as easily as they once did. Mockaitis suggests today four- or five-digit casualties like September 11 are needed to produce the same effect once caused by a relative handful of murders. See Thomas R. Mockaitis, *The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007) at [http://books.google.com/books?id=wGanuKh80WsC&dq=The+ %E2%80%9CNew%E2%80%9D+Terrorism+by+Thomas+R.+Mockaitis.&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=I3e8Y3Z9Lx&sig=9fGaLXyJNEcJY6EVbkbicJFIVok&hl=en&ei=xOQ4SrH9GsLJ\\_gaqu4TXDQ&sa=X&oi=book\\_result&ct=result&resnum=1#PPR1,M1](http://books.google.com/books?id=wGanuKh80WsC&dq=The+%E2%80%9CNew%E2%80%9D+Terrorism+by+Thomas+R.+Mockaitis.&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=I3e8Y3Z9Lx&sig=9fGaLXyJNEcJY6EVbkbicJFIVok&hl=en&ei=xOQ4SrH9GsLJ_gaqu4TXDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#PPR1,M1)

<sup>52</sup> Patrick Sookhdeo, “How to Undermine the Extremist Ideology Behind Al Qaeda,” *herein*.

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Middle East erupted in an orgy of political violence and terrorism that continues to this day. The early terrorists' targets were not American or European citizens; rather, they were Middle Eastern citizens. These terrorist incidents were dramatic, riveting events designed to provide maximum publicity to yet unfamiliar violent Islamist groups:

- The seizure by armed Islamic fundamentalist dissidents of the Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca in 1979;
- The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by Egyptian Islamic Jihad's (EIJ) Khalid Islambouli on 6 October 1981;
- The 1981 plot to overthrow the government of Bahrain to install an Islamic Republic;
- The attempted assassination of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, 8 July 1982, in Dujail
- The plot to overthrow the Kuwaiti government in 1982;
- A bloody confrontation between the terrorist group al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah and the post-Sadat Egyptian government that concluded with a suicide attack on the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan by EIJ on 19 November 1995; and
- Islamic uprisings in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria, which all generated considerable news coverage during this tumultuous decade and yet today are forgotten.

Skyjackings of Arab airliners, kidnappings of Arab government officials, assassinations of Arab civil servants, and attacks on Arab businesses and cultural centers became commonplace in the Middle East. Shiite groups like Islamic Amal (Hope) and Hizballah concealing Imad Mugniyah's covert terrorist cell, Islamic Jihad, only began to attract media attention in the early 1980s. Shiites emerged as a new common denominator in terrorism somewhat replacing the Palestinian groups of the "second wave."<sup>53</sup> While this period's growth of religious terrorism is highly complex and is afforded rather indifferent treatment here, certainly the Lebanese civil war contributed significantly as well as other social factors to be addressed below. One point worth noting, as this cycle of international terrorism shifted from one group to another, terrorist attacks became more devastating. As Shiites of both Iran and Lebanon became convinced they had been treated unfairly by the Arab world as well as "colonized" and manipulated by the West, some sought martyrdom through suicide by killing

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<sup>53</sup> David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.

Islamic apostates and western unbelievers.<sup>54</sup> Their anger has spread from the Shiite world of Iran, southern Lebanon, and the marshes of Iraq to the entire Arab world and larger Muslim community. Today, Islam is not the only source of religious terror; however, the vast majority of religious terrorists today are Muslim. This is simple fact, anything else is denial.

Religious terrorism descends from other religious communities as well. One needs only to walk through the mural-covered Catholic neighborhood of Bogside in London Derry where violence between Catholics and Protestants has proven difficult to eradicate to appreciate a Christian contribution to religious terrorism. Arguments are made that “The Troubles,” approximately three decades of violence between elements of Northern Ireland’s nationalist community (principally Roman Catholic) and unionist community (principally Protestant), represent strictly political terrorism. This is more than slightly disingenuous.

Catholic PIRA terrorists were able to take control of their communities by offering the residents protection from the Protestants and establishing their authority through coercion and torture on their own kith and kin. This particularly unpleasant form of confessional terrorism developed into the hallmark of the PIRA and its splinter groups over the past thirty years. Kneecapping—torture with a pistol or an electric drill—became a common punishment for nonconformists in the Catholic Republican areas. This punishment was meted out by appointment, which victims kept out of fear for their lives. Depending on the degree of punishment, one or both knees were destroyed. Sometimes elbows and thighs were included and the victim only survived if his family had made a prior arrangement for an ambulance to arrive on the scene at the time of the shooting. The PIRA preferred its Catholic victims to survive, as they then served as an example to others in the community. Protestant extremists also practiced punishment shooting as a means of maintaining discipline and loyalty. Still, the majority of these victims resided in the Catholic communities. Victims rarely cooperated with the British Security Forces and their distinctive plaster casts served as an effective visual deterrent to those who might otherwise have contemplated rejecting the PIRA’s stranglehold.

Due to the highly developed skills of Belfast’s surgeons, most of those crippled made remarkable recoveries from their traumatic wounds.<sup>55</sup> By way of additional

<sup>54</sup> Apostasy in Islam is commonly defined as the rejection in word or deed of Islam by a person who was previously a Muslim. “Apostate regimes” are leading avowed targets of Islamist terrorists.

<sup>55</sup> Major Alexander C. Roy, Royal Marines, United Kingdom, *The Roots of Terrorism in Northern Ireland* (United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1991). Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/RAC.htm>

examples of the depths to which this base prejudice descends, a highly skilled and legendary British counterterrorism unit commander once told this writer that he “could smell a Catholic” while Protestant farmers once swore “a Catholic can put the evil eye on your cattle.” The third Abrahamic religion, Judaism, also contributes to the annals of religious terrorism and provides some of terrorism’s most despicable and destabilizing attacks. On 25 February 1994, that year’s Purim Jewish holiday, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, an American-born Jew, entered the mosque in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron in uniform with IDF rank insignia, creating the image of a reserve officer on active duty. Goldstein opened fire on eight hundred Palestinian worshipers, killing twenty-nine souls and wounding 150. After being subdued by worshipers and disarmed, Goldstein was beaten to death. His blatant act of terrorism in the heart of the most sensitive religious flash point on the West Bank provoked outrage across all communities. Yet, almost immediately, this horrific tragedy took on a distorted life of its own. A bloody atrocity became the source of conspiracy theories arising from all sides. Goldstein allegedly shot “179 Arabs with allegedly 140 bullets,” convincing some there must have been other shooters and birthing yet another Middle East conspiracy theory. More nauseating, this cold-blooded Kahanist terrorist was described by his community as a tender person and caring doctor.<sup>56</sup> An inscription on his tomb proclaimed Goldstein “a martyr murdered in sanctifying God’s name,” and continues, “The holy Dr. Baruch Goldstein . . . gave his soul for the people of Israel.” Like his coreligionist Yigal Amir, the assassin of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Goldstein was an archetypal true believer who experienced no ethical conflict killing in the name of God.

Religious terrorism blossoms from nearly all denominations if fortified with the necessary conditions such as the following:

- Today’s ethnic-religious conflicts in places like Iraq, Kashmir, Palestine, and Sri Lanka;
- The impact triggered by the modern globalization of western values, economics, and popular culture, and by the extent to which the West, particularly America, captures the imagination particularly of Middle Eastern intellectuals and youths;<sup>57</sup>

<sup>56</sup> The central claim of Kahanism argues the vast majority of the Arabs of Israel are, and will continue to be, enemies of Jews, and that a Jewish theocratic state, governed by Halakha, cleansed by the forced expulsion of Palestinians, from Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, areas of modern-day Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and even Iraq-Eretz Yisrael, should be created. Kahanism is also associated with support for violence against Jewish opponents and against the Arab population generally. For a useful overview, see Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1992): 44–66.

<sup>57</sup> Meyrav Wurmser, “The Roots of Islamic Radicalism,” Hudson Institute, 1 September 2001. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\\_details&id=1084](https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=1084)



- A lack of democratic legitimacy, especially in the Middle East. Sadly, while Latin America, eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia are gradually developing democratic institutions, the one region that has seen little increase in representative institutions over the past forty years, is the Middle East. With the exception of Israel, Freedom House does not list one Middle Eastern nation as “free”;<sup>58</sup> and
- Political repression; economic inequality, and social upheaval, which foster a self-loathing, especially a result of exposure to the malaise of the Arab world.

Yet an inner logic exists that stimulates religious terrorism that we ignore at our peril. Today’s religious terrorists, especially the Salafi-Jihadi variant, perceive a sense of crisis threatening their Muslim identity and consequently, their very survival. As a result, these terrorists use religion as a refuge from which centuries-old concepts such as the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate become modern goals. Their religion is also employed as a physical or spiritual sanctuary against repression as was strikingly demonstrated during the Egyptian trials of the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyah in the 1980s.<sup>59</sup> Religion is exploited as an instrument for activism or political action, which can be frequently seen in various Friday sermons originating in the Middle East.<sup>60</sup> As a result of this religious sanctioning, terrorists maintain that their actions are purely defensive and reactive to the threat from secularization commencing with foreign influences; from modernizing contacts within their own culture; and in some cases within resistance movements themselves. The current bloody struggle between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas on the West Bank and in Gaza for the leadership of the Palestinian people is an unequivocal example.<sup>61</sup> This inner logic also motivates the evolving threat from al Qaeda.

<sup>58</sup> “Map of Freedom 2008,” including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Israeli Occupied Territories [Israel], Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories [Israel], Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara [Morocco], and Yemen, Freedom House, 2008. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7534&year=2008>.

<sup>59</sup> Magnus Ranstorp, “Terrorism in the Name of Religion,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50 (Summer 1996): 47.

<sup>60</sup> The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) archives hundreds of these sermons: see “Palestinian Friday Sermon by Sheik Ibrahim Mudeiris: Muslims Will Rule America and Britain, Jews Are a Virus Resembling AIDS,” Palestinian Authority TV-13 May 2005, MEMRI clip no. 669. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/669.htm>

<sup>61</sup> For a thorough treatment of this struggle see Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

While al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise continued to lose ground, both structurally and before the court of world public opinion, they remain the most dangerous form of religious terrorism today.<sup>62</sup> Al Qaeda, once a model business organization with a multimillion dollar operating budget, has transformed into a hybrid model—a mix of centralized command and control emanating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and global decentralization in which affiliated organizations have a great deal of autonomy. While al Qaeda’s goal—uniting Muslims to overthrow apostate regimes and expelling westerners from Muslim countries—remains unaffected, its methodologies have transformed from an organization that planned and executed attacks to a more nebulous movement aimed at inciting global acts of terrorism. Arguably, the best description of al Qaeda today posits two variants: one nested along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and being remnants of al Qaeda of the 1980s, and the other, the promoter of al Qaeda-ism. This terrorist ideology facilitates interaction and support of like-minded Islamic mercenaries in an international matrix of logistical, financial, and sometimes operational terrorist activity.<sup>63</sup> Practitioners of al Qaeda-ism, an ideology that has bonded together today more than a hundred Sunni affiliates or affinity groups such as al-Ittihad in Kenya and Somalia, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Abu Sayyaf Group in Philippines, or al Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) practice a radical Salafi-Jihadi Islam, which actually predates the original movement.<sup>64</sup>

A classic affinity group, AQLIM, named for their location in North Africa, evolved from the Algerian militant group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). GSPC formed in 1996 as an outgrowth of the once-powerful and extremely

<sup>62</sup> US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, “Chapter 1: Strategic Assessment,” 30 April 2009. Retrieved on 24 August 2009, from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122411.htm>; and “Al Qaeda Network Still CIA’s Top Priority,” Middle East Online, 19 May 2009, retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=32123>. DCI Leon Panetta noted “defeating Al Qaeda remained the CIA top priority as it “remains the most serious security threat we face.”

<sup>63</sup> For example, terrorists in North Africa threatened to execute a British hostage unless the UK released radical preacher Abu Qatada from jail. The unidentified hostage was captured earlier in 2009 in a remote region on the Mali-Niger border where he was attending a cultural festival as a tourist. The Foreign Office confirmed the threat issued by a group known as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The group threatened to kill the British hostage within twenty days – a deadline that expired on 16 May 2009 – and the hostage was murdered.

<sup>64</sup> Eben Kaplan, “The Rise of Al Qaedaism,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 July 2007, Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [http://www.cfr.org/publication/11033/rise\\_of\\_alqae-dalism.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11033/rise_of_alqae-dalism.html)

violent Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA). GIA's popularity plummeted following a series of massacres in which it killed thousands of Algerian civilians, opening the door into the region for the al Qaeda-supported GSPC, which effectively eclipsed the GIA by 1998. Imitation of al Qaeda-ism is also the part of the process of self-radicalization during which individuals reconstruct their worldviews and create new identities linking them to other amoeba-like Salafi-Jihadist groups.

Al Qaeda and its affinity groups can be viewed as a network, a collection of nodes connected through links. Some nodes are more popular and are attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more connected nodes, called "hubs," are important components of bin Laden's international Salafi-Jihadist network. Prior to 9/11, a few highly connected hubs dominated bin Laden's spider-web. Marc Sageman captured this organization perfectly in *Understanding Terror Networks*: a central staff, core Arabs, Maghreb Arabs, and Muslims from Southeast Asia, which were large clusters built around hubs: Osama bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Zein al-Abidin Mohammed Hussein, and Abu Bakar Baasyir. The central staff were connected to their major clusters by lieutenants in the field: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Waleed Mohammed Tawfiq bin Attash, and Abd al-Rahim al-Bashiri for the Core Arabs; Fateh Kamel and Amar Makhulif for the Maghreb Arabs; and Riduan Isamuddin and Ali Ghufrom for the Southeast Asians.<sup>65</sup> Bin Laden's genius lay in tolerating this network's spontaneous and natural evolution, without interference and guided through his "leader's intent."<sup>66</sup> His networks to this day are not static; they evolve over time. Al Qaeda network growth is not a random process; rather, it is one of preferential attachment. Sageman humorously describes in lecture this networking occurring over dietary preferences and meal preparation in the Afghan camps of the 1990s: Arabs preparing kebab; Maghrebis preferring couscous; and, Southeast Asian terrorists gathered around curries. While amusing, Sageman's hypothesis is more than plausible. In Afghan camps run by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence in the 1980s, this author observed Tajiks eating with Tajiks, Pashtuns eating with their fellow tribesmen, and Shiite Hazara, considered kafir [infidels] by their Sunni coreligionist Afghans, eating alone.

<sup>65</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 137–138.

<sup>66</sup> Leader's intent can be defined as the purpose of a chosen action or direction so subordinates have a clear understanding of the desired end state of an assignment. Clear and concise, the leader's intent includes a mission's overall purpose and expected results. With clearly communicated purpose and direction, all can understand what they must do and why. Leader's intent consists of three parts: Task: What it is to be done, or the "objectives"; Purpose: Why it is to be done, or "sense-making"; and, End State: What it should look like when done, or "the goal."

These networks resist fragmentation because of their dense interconnectivity making random attacks rarely effective. Hubs are vulnerable, but must be attacked simultaneously: five to fifteen hubs at once. The price of al Qaeda's robustness is susceptibility that can be observed in the numerous successful drone attacks along the Afghan-Pakistan border today. Al Qaeda sustains casualties; however, there is no knockout punch possible. A more traditional and vulnerable hierarchical network like Jemaah Islamiyah, organized top-down versus bottom-up, broke up when the Indonesian government decided to act after the Bali bombings.

How should we portray the evolving threat from al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise? Clearly, there is no facile answer. Governments must develop their counterterrorism strategies to deal with competing, contradictory evidence; address multiple timeline horizons that deal with the present as well as the next generation; and eventually grapple with the very notion of what constitutes "victory" over this threat. Complicated subjects like how to suppress al Qaeda are rarely black and white, and this is no exception.<sup>67</sup> Al Qaeda and its enterprise capture the lion's share of media headlines and national security focus; however, we need to examine another terrorist manifestation that arguably is just as lethal.

### **Fringe Element Terrorism**

Unlike the political and religious radicals who purportedly seek to transform society, fringe elements or "wacko-perps" have narrowly defined issues around which they are mobilized.<sup>68</sup> It is only their choice of terrorism, not the inherent threat posed by their views, that leads them to be accurately perceived as a threat to society. American terrorist Timothy McVeigh imagined the US government was trampling rather than protecting his individual rights when he detonated a truck bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 fellow citizens and injuring more than eight hundred on 19 April 1995.<sup>69</sup> This date was the second anniversary of a standoff between FBI agents and Branch Davidians, which ended in a fire that destroyed their compound located near Waco, Texas, killing at least 74 people.<sup>70</sup> The

<sup>67</sup> Russell E. Travers, "Evaluating Progress in the War on Terror," *The Intelligencer, Journal of US Intelligence Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter/Spring, 2009): 11–14.

<sup>68</sup> "Wacko-perp" is an FBI term that combines the slang term "wacko" meaning crazy and "perp," a law enforcement agency (LEA) abbreviation for perpetrator. "Wacko-perps" describes an organization of like-minded criminals.

<sup>69</sup> "A Look at the Numbers," Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=5&catid=145>

<sup>70</sup> Justin Sturken and Mary Dore, "Remembering the Waco Siege," ABCNews.com, 29 February 2007. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=2908955&page=1>

Oklahoma attack also occurred on the 220<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the American revolutionary battles Lexington and Concord against British domination. McVeigh's date selection manifested his visceral hate of government.

A similar "wacko-perp" previously mentioned was Theodore Kaczynski, known as the "Unabomber," an American MIT graduate with a Ph.D. in mathematics whose neo-Luddite views led him to carry out a campaign of terrorist mail bombings across the United States from 1978 to 1995. Kaczynski sent sixteen bombs to targets including universities and airlines, killing three people and injuring twenty-three because he considered technology a dehumanizing force that was incompatible with his personal freedom.<sup>71</sup> Kaczynski was finally captured, found guilty, and diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic. While his grievances were in essence nonviolent, his manner of protest was lethal.

Some of these bizarre causes attract a following. Members of an Oregon-based group of eco-terrorists who called themselves "the family" were indicted in January 2006 for various acts of destruction across the western United States. The federal indictment detailed a story of four and a half years of vandalism and fire bombings on seventeen sites in California, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales noted, "In all, their trail of destruction across the Pacific Northwest and beyond resulted in millions of dollars of property damage."<sup>72</sup>

However, the most lethal "wacko-perps" to date were Japanese. The Aum Shinrikyo cult, which has been renamed Aleph, represented the most lethal manifestation of a New Age apocalyptic religious sect.<sup>73</sup> Aum combined tenets from Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity and was obsessed with the apocalypse.<sup>74</sup> Shoko Asahara, Aum's founder and self-proclaimed "enlightened one," motivated his devotees to engage in bizarre rituals such as drinking his blood and wearing electrical caps that they believed kept their brain waves in tune with his brain. The group made headlines around the world when, on 20 March 1995, its members carried out a chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system. A nerve agent, sarin, was released in train cars, killing twelve and causing an estimated six thousand people to seek medical attention.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>71</sup> "The Unabomber's Brother Tells His Story," NPR, 30 May 2009. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104743973>

<sup>72</sup> Alicia Caldwell, "11 Indicted in Eco-Terror Investigation," Denver Post, 20 January 2006. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci\\_3421918](http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_3421918)

<sup>73</sup> Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons from the Case Studies" in *Toxic Terror, Assessing Terrorist use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2000), 251.

<sup>74</sup> "In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo," Center for Defense Information, 23 July 2002. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aumshinrikyo.cfm>

<sup>75</sup> US Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007," 30 April 2008. Retrieved on 5 September 2009 from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>

While at first blush, we would immediately characterize Aum's followers as "wackopers," their organization and extent dictate our attention. At the time of the 1995 subway attack, the group claimed forty thousand members worldwide, with offices in the United States, Russia, and Japan, according to the State Department.<sup>76</sup> They conducted experiments with sarin, VX, anthrax, botulism, and crude radioactive dispersal devices (RDD). At the time of the Japanese police's much-overdue crackdown, Aum had accumulated as much as \$1.2 billion in assets; purchased molecular engineering computer software; and attempted to recruit Volgograd weapons experts. Official reports from the US and Japanese governments and interviews with law enforcement agencies and intelligence officers conclude that the group staged at least twenty attacks between 1990 and 1995: ten with chemical agents and ten with biological ones.<sup>77</sup> For its terrorist attacks, the Japanese courts uncharacteristically have sentenced fourteen members to hang. Russian officials also arrested several Aum followers in 2001 for planning to bomb the Imperial Palace in Japan as part of an elaborate attempt to free Asahara.<sup>78</sup> Aum Shinrikyo has the distinction of being considered the first nonstate terrorist group to attempt to employ a modern weapon of mass destruction, and their activities benchmark the beginning of postmodern terrorism.

When you attempt to estimate who is most likely to use a weapon of mass destruction, the two groups that may experience fewer moral constraints are religious fundamentalist organizations and religious cults or closed cults sometimes erroneously called new religions.<sup>79</sup> Today, three requirements exist for a terrorist's use of weapons of mass destruction: the ability to acquire a weapon; the capability to disseminate a weapon; and the desire to use one. We are witnessing the confluence of these conditions, and, regrettably, all three conditions exist today.<sup>80</sup> The means and predisposition for a covert or a clandestine operation aimed at creating immense destruction are spreading. A clandestine nuclear attack is one such possible conjunction. Nuclear weapons technology is oozing out of control. Nuclear materials are spreading into hands hostile or potentially hostile to democratic states and into regions where the prospects for effective control to prevent loss and stem the continued spread are highly uncertain. A successful clandestine nuclear attack would have significance extending far beyond the immense immediate casualties.<sup>81</sup> We are in the midst of

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> David E. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo, 1995," in Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror*, 207.

<sup>78</sup> US Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007."

<sup>79</sup> Dr. Jerrold Post, "Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism," in Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror*, 288.

<sup>80</sup> Dr. Peter Katona's first lecture to Program on Terrorism and Security Studies on 20 June 2006 (PTSS 06-5).

<sup>81</sup> Noah Feldman, "Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age," *New York Times Magazine*, 29 October 2006. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29islam.html>

a potentially dramatic change in our current concept of national security. Once our nations were essentially secure from homeland destruction, unless our military was defeated. That may have changed:

For would-be aggressors before 1945, a capacity to destroy always required a prior capacity to win. Without a victory, their intended aggressions were never more than military intentions. This is no longer the case. From the standpoint of ensuring any one state's national survival, the goal of preventing a classical military defeat has become secondary. The implications of this transforming development are considerable.<sup>82</sup>

Terrorist groups, non-state actors, can circumvent armies and deliver a catastrophic strike. Groups such as Avenging Israel's Blood, which sought revenge for the victims of the Holocaust in 1946, to Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, and now al Qaeda, with its stated intent to use weapons of mass destruction, reinforce the notion that we should not be musing whether we are going to be struck, but rather when such an attack will occur again. If we have failed to absorb the lesson to expect the unexpected, then we are losing ground, not gaining ground in this war on terrorism.

### **In Search of "Root Causes" of Terrorism**

The question that should be foremost at this point is what causes a human to strike out at fellow humans using terrorist methods. Thus far, we have scrutinized the nature of terrorism, but what about its root causes? Visualize a beautiful oriental carpet that I will use to introduce the tapestry of terrorism. A carpet is traditionally woven on a loom, a familiar weaving apparatus. The carpet's warp, the threads running the length of the piece, and its woof, the threads running crosswise or at right angles to the warp of the piece, provide the lattice for the carpet's knots, which create the design. These threads are the plinth of a carpet and, building upon our analogy, symbolize the essential root causes of today's more deadly forms of modern terrorism. The warp is the atavistic adrenalin rush, the associated physiological euphoric state that accompanies a terrorist's action. This is not unlike the euphoric state one experiences in combat, in a situation of extreme anxiety, or simply skydiving. Killing another human being—the ability to take life—produces intense excitement, elevating a human to nearly godlike

<sup>82</sup> Louis Rene Beres, "A New Military Reality: Existential Vulnerability Without First Losing A War," *PTSS DAILY* (21 April 2009): 61.

powers.<sup>83</sup> The chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed, Maulana Masood Azahar, described carrying a Kalashnikov in his hands as being “. . . ready to talk to the enemy. The bullet was in the chamber and it was ready to fire and I felt ecstatic.”<sup>84</sup> Committing murder becomes a thrilling decision: a peak experience; an elevation from meaninglessness to real consequence; and the chance to be a hero.<sup>85</sup> To further our analogy, the woof simply reinforces the warp because killing in the name of a divine being allows cold-blooded murder to be morally justifiable; sometimes required; and celestially rewarded. The gravitas of religious authenticity legitimizes an act of primordial murder.

Now we apply the knots to our piece, which represent the variety of preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run and precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism, to borrow the terminology of Dr. Martha Crenshaw.<sup>86</sup> “Root causes” are not the proximate cause of terrorism. Rather, they are factors that establish an environment in which terrorism may arise. A basic distinction exists between root-cause factors that are preconditions and those that are precipitant. The former set the stage and the latter ignite the action. These preconditions and precipitants—our knots—describe: dreadful histories

<sup>83</sup> Celeste Katz and Corey Siemaszko, “NYPD, FBI Heroes Honored After Foiling Terror Plot to Bomb Synagogues,” *New York Daily News*, 22 May 09. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from [http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny\\_crime/2009/05/22/2009-05-2\\_nypd\\_fbi\\_heros\\_honored\\_after\\_foiling\\_terror\\_plot\\_to\\_bomb\\_.html](http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2009/05/22/2009-05-2_nypd_fbi_heros_honored_after_foiling_terror_plot_to_bomb_.html). This article describes how the NYPD arrested a gang of homegrown terrorists. We get a sense of this notion that killing another human being – the ability to take life – produces intense excitement and a sense of grandeur. Committing murder becomes a thrilling decision. The suspects were ordered held without bail and branded anti-Semitic would-be killers who dreamed of basking in the glory of their spectacular attacks. “I hate those motherf-----s, those f-----g Jewish bastards,” suspect James Cromitie told the informant, court papers revealed. “I would like to get [bomb] a synagogue.” Cromitie eagerly anticipated watching the devastation he wrought played out over and over again on TV. “I’m the one who did that,” Cromitie congratulated himself after the planned attacks, an informant told cops. “That’s my work.” The group’s diabolical dream was to create “a fireball that would make the country gasp,” a law enforcement source said. Even though cops called Cromitie the ringleader, David Williams was singled out as the meanest, bragging he would shoot anyone who tried to stop him.

<sup>84</sup> Rahimullah Ysufzai, Harinder Baweja, Amir Mir, et al., eds., *Most Wanted: Profiles of Terror* (New Delhi, India: Roli Books, 2002), 44.

<sup>85</sup> Nira Kfir, “Understanding Suicidal Terror Through Humanistic and Existential Psychology,” in *The Psychology of Terrorism: Volume I, A Public Understanding*, ed. Chris E. Stout (Westport, T: Praeger, 2002), 143–157.

<sup>86</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism.” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981): 379.



accompanied by humiliation; foreign repression; the love for a lost land or era; the lack of democracy, civil liberties, and rule of law; the lack of power sharing, ethnic or religious discrimination; illegitimate governance; a government's intolerance of minorities; extremist ideologies or zealotry; becoming a failed state; rapid modernization; or charismatic leaders, individuals who can whip a mob into frenzy by the power of their oratory or deeds and then set the mob loose to destroy. Two examples of the power of oratory are the Muslim Brotherhood's incitement causing the near destruction of Cairo in 26 January 1952 and the destruction of the US Embassy in Islamabad in 1979 by a mob goaded to believe a fatally erroneous Friday sermon stating America had bombed the al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. The Hebron Massacre mentioned earlier was a knot as was the start of the 28 September 2000 riots and injuries soon after Ariel Sharon's untimely visit to the Temple Mount, an area known to Muslims as al-Haram as-Sharif. An additional knot unique to the Middle East is what Christopher Dobson described in *Black September* as "a fatal flaw" or the Palestinian "disease," which has been woven through Palestinian history like a scarlet thread. Supporting this cultural propensity to violence, Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas who acted as the spokesman for the Hamas-led government in Gaza rhetorically queried in a sharply worded article, published in the widely read Palestinian newspaper *al-Ayyam*, "Has violence become a culture implanted in our bodies and our flesh?"<sup>87</sup>

Certain factors sustain a climate of terrorism, such as: cycles of revenge observed constantly in Chechnya fueled by adat; the need for a group to provide for its members or simply survive, as the remnants of the PIRA are discovering today; the discovery of profitable criminal activities as with the FARC's monopoly of the cocaine trade in Colombia; the perception that there are no exits given the bloodshed of the conflict; or, as Somalia's piracy reminds us once again, ungoverned spaces, failed or failing states. These factors provide a conducive medium for terrorism's root causes to ferment. Shortcomings exist in our current knowledge base on root causes. As context matters, data analysis argues for an interdisciplinary systems approach and access to classified or otherwise restricted material in order for us to recognize factors contributing to a terrorism-spawning environment. The issues of the Taliban in Pakistan are simply not very comparable to those of the PIRA or to those of Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories, or even the current terrorism in Baghdad.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Nidal al-Mughrabi, "Hamas Official: Is Violence Palestinian 'Disease'?" Reuters, 17 October 2006. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://www.memorandum.com/061017/p58#a061017p58>

<sup>88</sup> *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation 2009), xxi–xlix.

Myths imply that terrorism is the inevitable by-product of poverty. However, as Richard Minter reminds us in *Losing Bin Laden*, terrorism is the derivative of individual spiritual poverty, but not mass material poverty.<sup>89</sup> Another myth suggests that terrorism is the result of hostility over the American involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the global war on terrorism. Many argue that terrorism would disappear if only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were resolved. This too is sadly a myth. Some self-absorbed observers suggest that terrorism is encouraged in response to the world's efforts to prevent terrorism. This is merely a political fig leaf that hides wanting capability, or worse, cowardice. These spurious conceptions are regrettably left frequently unchallenged at terrorism conferences and United Nations gatherings. One concluding caution about those who sometimes endorse research to discover the elusive root cause of terrorism: frequently, this is a subterfuge to excuse the inexcusable.

### **Conclusion: Or, Just the Beginning?**

Why have we not been able to bring education to our children on our own? Fathers and parents, I implore you to dedicate your full effort and commitment to see that all your children are educated. Otherwise, they will merely graze like sheep in the field, at the mercy of nature and the world changing so terrifyingly around us.

*Syed Abbas, Supreme Leader of Northern Pakistan's Shia, from Three Cups of Tea*

Terrorism, like disease, is a perennial, ceaseless struggle we will never completely eradicate but must constantly treat. Like skin cancer, we must discover it; surgically incise it; conduct biopsy to determine its causes and malignancy; and scrutinize it constantly. The following chapters in this text will detail some of the necessary policies and strategies to "treat" terrorism. In addition to these prescient recommendations, consider policies that tackle just three issues. A group of thirty Arab intellectuals published the Arab Human Development Report 2002 contained in the annual United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report. Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, a former deputy prime minister of Jordan, and her team identified three deficits within the region: knowledge, freedom, and womanpower.<sup>90</sup> Substantially reducing these three deficits will remove many "knots" from our terrorism tapestry.

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<sup>89</sup> Richard Minter, *Losing bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2003).

<sup>90</sup> United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States, *The Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generation* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2002), 27–29.

Knowledge permits individuals to make informed decisions regarding the intellectual poverty of terrorism and not be led as like sheep as the prescient Syed Abbas warned. Al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise are crystal clear about what they oppose, yet they have made no argument to prove they could offer a better tomorrow. Next, countries with established political freedom have been empirically proven to be less prone to terrorism.<sup>91</sup> The Middle East models all the outward trappings of democracy. Elections are held and human-rights conventions are signed. Yet the great wave of democratization that has opened up so much of the world over the past twenty years seems to have left the Muslim world virtually untouched. Finally, no nation can improve its economic circumstances while disenfranchising over 50 percent of its population. One of every two Arab women still can neither read nor write. Female participation in their country's political and economic life is the lowest in the world. The diehard, self-righteous obscurantists of the Islamic world ensure its deepening malaise as female oppression in Islamic countries is manifestly getting worse.<sup>92</sup> Terrorism is not likely to disappear, but its appeal could lessen if these three deficits are narrowed, enhancing economic growth in the Middle East and reducing its attendant youth unemployment.<sup>93</sup>

Our adversaries in the long war on terrorism are dispersed around the globe. Al Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist enterprise are resilient, patient, ruthless, and dedicated to the mass murder of innocents. Ironically, the very democratic nature of our societies renders our citizens vulnerable. To ensure the continuation of our democratic blessings, we must create a zero-tolerance attitude toward terrorism and collectively defend ourselves. Beyond al Qaeda, we confront a protracted ideological conflict, of which the terrorist campaign waged by disconnected Salafi-Jihadists, is merely

<sup>91</sup> Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and NBER (October 2004): 1. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~aabadie/povterr.pdf>

<sup>92</sup> Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, "Who'd Be Female Under Islamic Law?" *The Independent*, 4 May 2009. Retrieved on 15 October 2009, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/yasmin-alibhai-brown/yasmin-alibhaibrown-whod-be-female-under-islamic-law-1678549.html>. Safa Faisal, "Muslim Girls Struggle for Education," *BBC Arabic Service*, 24 September 2003. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/3130234.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3130234.stm). For a regional discussion of this "malaise" view, see "Algerian Author Anwar Malek: The Arabs Have Lost Their Worth, Their Humanity, and Their Culture," 3 March 2009, MEMRI TV Clip No. 2063. Retrieved 5 September 2009 from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/2063.htm>

<sup>93</sup> Atlantic Council, "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," Executive Summary of the National Intelligence Council report of the same name, November 2008. Retrieved on 25 August 2009, from <http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world>

a symptom.<sup>94</sup> Violent terrorists will always be with us, so we must be capable and motivated to suppress and, when necessary, kill these individuals whose galvanizing dream is to destroy the West and those who emulate free ways of life, through the wonton murder of innocent civilians. When hatred is bred in the enemy's bone, the notion of exercising strategic patience will likely earn us a rest for all eternity. This book may illuminate a more prudent way ahead.

*Professor Andrew Nichols Pratt Since August 1996, Professor Pratt has been the Professor of Strategy and International Politics in the College of International Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he developed the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) and was named its first Director. In February 2008, he served the US Special Envoy for Middle East Regional Security (SEMERS) in Jerusalem and on the West Bank. He resumed the duties of Director, PTSS in October 2009. Prior to his retirement from the Marine Corps after twenty-six years, Colonel Pratt served as director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine War College. Throughout his career, he was privileged to command extensively and at every level, from a CIA Special Operations Group team that conducted covert operations in denied areas in support of US national security objectives overseas, to a Battalion Landing Team deployed in the Persian Gulf. A. N. Pratt graduated from the US Naval Academy and holds two Master of Arts degrees. His involvement with counterterrorism matters began in 1967 and continues apace.*

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<sup>94</sup> Jenkins, 51.

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## International Cooperation as a Tool in Counterterrorism: Then and Now

*By Sebastian L. v. Gorka*

In the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the USSR, there followed a flurry of attempts at describing what the post-Cold War order would be. The lack of certainty was reflected in the variety of scenarios presented. Typically, in a fashion that reflected the rigidity of thought prevalent during the Cold War years, the first attempts concentrated on the identification of new poles to replace the dual superpower poles of the previous decades. Among the alternatives to the bipolar balance of the United States versus the USSR, were a unipolar order (United States alone), a tripolar order (United States, Europe, Japan), and various multipolar variations. Beyond these simplistic options, there developed more holistic and nuanced propositions. Perhaps the two most famous theories or visions were those of the conservative academic Francis Fukuyama and the doyen of nation-state security studies, Samuel P. Huntington. In the early nineties both attempted to give a new overarching appraisal of the coming geostrategic reality. Fukuyama ingeniously entitled his theory with the sufficiently provocative title *The End of History*. While obviously meant to be a controversial title, the thesis itself was less so. The argument essentially was that the twentieth century could be typified by the attempts of two extreme ideologies to destroy the “market democracy” model of state administration: Nazism and Communism. The fact that both were defeated<sup>1</sup> by the last decade of the century meant that democracy had been victorious and thus there was “no new history to write.”<sup>2</sup>

Huntington’s vision, as declared in his article and book *Clash of Civilizations*, was a far darker one. His prediction was that the age of conflicts between nation-states, or alliances of nation-states, would be replaced by an era of conflicts arising between cultures, or civilizations, or along the divides between them, a harking back to more medieval divisions. Wars in this new (or revisited old) age would be caused, or at least exacerbated, by poverty differentials between North and South, West and East, as well as by religious fundamentalism.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Of course, there were and remain exceptions: communist regimes outside of the immediate vicinity of Europe, including North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and China.

<sup>2</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992).

<sup>3</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996).

Since their publication, these theories have prompted much criticism as well as comment. Perhaps most strikingly, their effect upon thinking relating to “hard security” issues was minimal. The question of what impact such theories would or should have—if proven valid—upon the exercise of national security was conspicuous by its absence. This in part has to do with the confusing nature of threat assessment in the period following 1990 and prior to September 2001.

### **The Cornucopia of Threats: A Challenge to Prioritization**

Perhaps only after the fact did it become apparent to the national security community within the western community of “market democracies” that the Cold War had been an eminently workable international system. While the overarching threat—Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)—was ultimate in scale, potentially ensuring for the annihilation of both East and West should World War III have happened, the fact was that the bloc-to-bloc arms race, perceived near parity, and the later developed system of arms negotiations and arms control regimes, together resulted in a system that was for the most part well-balanced and predictable.<sup>4</sup> For those with responsibilities within the national security architectures of the western nations, the enemy and the related responsibilities were quite clear: (1) the USSR, its allies; (2) the prevention of WWII (or, should that not be possible, preparation to win the “hot war”). The enemy(-ies) was a static nation-state, with easily identified points of gravity such as its capital, its industrial base, and its organs of security and defense. How to “take the Cold War” to these targets was relatively obvious, if not easy.

Beyond this overarching challenge, there was, of course, another national security-related task-set: terrorism. From the 1960s onwards countries such as the UK, Spain, Germany, and Italy, as well as several nations in Latin America, had to fight the scourge of political violence. However, here it is important to note that in comparison to the primary threat posed by the Soviet bloc, this enemy was in a fundamentally different class. Whichever group one cares to choose, be it the Baader-Meinhof Gang, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), or the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), while deadly, none had the capacity to strike a fatal blow against the government they were fighting, and thus they did not vitally endanger the given nation’s existence as did the Soviet Union.

With the fall of the Iron Curtain, national security faced a new challenge. As the Soviet Union dissolved into several nations and the biggest, the Russian Federation,

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<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the two most obvious points at which the Cold War could have metastasized into a “hot war” were the Korean War of 1950 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. These represent just two events in a span of forty years, a ratio that underlines the fundamental stability of Cold War bipolarity.



established normalized relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and would even become nominally an ally in later years,<sup>5</sup> other new or newly revitalized threats emerged to challenge western governments and concurrent domestic calls for a post–Cold War peace dividend. These threats ranged from the familiar, such as failed states, to the new and outré, such as information warfare and critical infrastructure defense. (For Detailed Information Please See Original Version of this Article.)

As the number and nature of the new panoply of threats and challenges grew and became more complicated, two obvious questions arose. The first was, given the limits to defense expenditure that exist in most democracies, how should governments now prioritize their national security investments and activities? Which of the enumerated threats should receive greater attention, where should limited public resources be invested so as to best protect the population and the national interests? For many nations the answer was not clear. The second question had to do with capabilities.

In the European half of the Atlantic Alliance defense and security capabilities were very much shaped, understandably, with the scenario of WWII in mind. The national war-planners and the multinational staffs at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium worked on the assumption that should conflict erupt the USSR and its satrapies would execute a massive land attack against the West through the Sibbesse Gap into West Germany and beyond, most likely using chemical weapons, before resorting to tactical nuclear weapons if necessary. It was NATO's *raison d'être* to ensure that the United States would respond to the overwhelming conventional advantage posed by the 2nd Red Army by bringing an intercontinental and intermediate nuclear response to such a land attack. Subsequently, the majority of forces in the European half of NATO were designed to fulfill a largely static territorial defense function, to act as a delaying force inhibiting the rapid invasion of Soviet forces until the transatlantic nuclear response was made. In layman's terms this meant that the armies of most western nations were replete with heavy, slow armor and anti-armor assets<sup>6</sup> fit for nation-on-nation conventional, or Clausewitzian war.

It soon became apparent that the appropriateness of such capabilities was limited in a new threat environment, which included the requirement that a nation be able to project its forces far further afield than its own national territory. As a result, very

<sup>5</sup> This is especially true in formal terms with the creation of the Permanent NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 2001 and especially after President Putin's adroit manipulation of the post-9/11 situation in the White House.

<sup>6</sup> The exceptions to this rule – those nations with more flexible armed forces that could be deployed well beyond the nation's own borders – were, of course, those countries that had had strong imperial histories and still retained quasi-colonial interests. Such countries include the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium.

soon talk of a growing gap between US and European defense capabilities increased, given that the United States, thanks to its geography and the way in which it defined its global interests, had at its disposal a far more flexible and projectable force than any of its allies.

### **9/11: Clarity in Prioritization?**

While the second problem was a factual one that could not be explained away, or would not disappear by itself, the first dilemma regarding prioritization was solved, at least according to some members of the Western Alliance, with the aircraft attacks aimed at civilians on one fall day in 2001.

Among professional students of political violence, there are few scholars who have been able to turn theoretical observations into policy-relevant products. Brian Jenkins, of the RAND Corporation, is one of them. One of his most famous observations—which has since become conventional wisdom within the field—was that “The terrorist doesn’t want a lot of people dead. He wants a lot of people watching.”<sup>7</sup> The inference, of course, is that the heart of terrorism is the desire to inculcate fear in a population and that in the modern age the media have become one of the most prized weapons of the terrorists, since they enable terrorists to further a message of fear to as wide an audience as possible. And in the era of regular hijackings, political assassinations, and high-exposure events such as the 1975 attack in Austria on the OPEC ministers, or the 1972 murder of members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, this adage was proven again and again. However, trends in the 1990s and 9/11 itself seem to point—at least for some observers—to a new, even more frightening trend.

The first observation regarding this new trend is a purely statistical one. Every year the US Department of State publishes a report on the previous year’s terrorist attacks against American targets.<sup>8</sup> After the prose description of the year’s events and those involved, each report contains a series of appendices detailing the names of terrorist groups and mathematical data related to the attacks described. While the publication is admittedly not a comprehensive assessment of all terrorist activities in

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<sup>7</sup> Jenkins, Brian. *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, Research Paper 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Crescent Publications, Los Angeles, 1975. Near the end of the 1990s Mr. Jenkins publicly wrote that this theorem might be less and less true as the character of modern terrorism changed. He was correct – in both cases – in the editors’ view.

<sup>8</sup> For over two decades called *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, since 2005 this publication by the US Department of State is called *Country Reports on Terrorism*. Current and past reports are available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/>, accessed 11 September 2009.

a given calendar year, focused as it is solely upon attacks executed against US interests, the changes identifiable over the twenty-four years that data have been collected have led to one clear conclusion being drawn. While the period since the end of the Cold War has seen a marked decrease in the frequency per year of successful attacks launched against the United States, the lethality of individual events has increased. In other words, more people are likely to die or be injured as the result of one single attack than would otherwise have been the case in previous (Cold War) years.

As a result of this trend, some commentators have extrapolated to conclude that Jenkins's famous observation no longer holds: While the size of audience was the driving factor in the past, now it is the extent of damage, the extent of killing that is more important<sup>9</sup> to the terrorist. We have moved from mass-audience terrorism to mass-casualty terrorism. This has led to the hypothesis that there now exist terrorists who simply wish to kill as many people as possible, and to this end they will attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This nascent category of actor has been christened the hyper-terrorist.<sup>10</sup>

There is, however, one superficial problem with this hypothesis, and that derives from the nature of modern terrorism we have become acquainted with in the latter half of the twentieth century. If the hypothesis is to work, in this author's opinion a differentiation must be made between at least two fundamental types of terrorist.

### **Hyper-Terrorism and the Rational Versus the Irrational Actor**

One important common denominator among the vast majority of those sub-state actors that used political violence in previous decades was that the end-state they wished to achieve was at least theoretically possible. The classic terrorist groups, as typified by the PIRA and the Basque separatist group ETA, were predicated around clearly communicated demands for self-determination, or simply greater autonomy from the governing nation-state. As a result, while the concept of the counties of Northern

<sup>9</sup> In addition to the triple attacks of 9/11, which left almost three thousand dead, the other (somewhat lesser) examples of such hyper-terrorism include the attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building complex in Oklahoma City in 1995, which killed almost two hundred; the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, which killed nearly two hundred and injured more than a thousand; and the 2005 London subway attacks, which killed twelve and wounded almost two hundred.

<sup>10</sup> François Heisbourg, *Europe and the Transformation of the World Order*, prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, November 5, 2001, available at <http://www.eusec.org/heisbourg.htm>, accessed 11 September 2009. Given that al Qaeda killed more people in 102 minutes on 9/11 than the PIRA did between 1968 and 1998, hyper-terrorism seems to be an incontrovertible description of a new phenomenon.

Ireland being reunited with Eire, or the idea of a more independent Basque-land may have been anathema to the governments of London and Madrid, these were demands that could not be thought completely out of the question. Thus, differences between the given group and the relevant government were potentially resolvable via political means<sup>11</sup> and not just demands to be mitigated solely by exposing such groups to lethal force or interdiction by law enforcement authorities.

It is exactly by dint of the feasible nature of the end-state demanded that such groups should quite rightly be deemed rational or pragmatic in their strategy and behavior. It is also clear, therefore, why such groups never resorted to strategies or weapons that would result in truly mass casualties. The end-state to be achieved was a worldly, political one. The “game plan” was to achieve a political victory by forcing a capitulation of the government on a specific issue thanks to the majority of the public exerting (through fear) adequate pressure to ensure for a change in said policy. Any act that resulted in mass casualty, resorting to WMD technology, for example, would rationally and predictably result in two consequences: the loss of all potential support from the elements of the larger population that were sympathetic to the broader goals of the group; and justification for the government to use all means (even shoot-to-kill tactics) to eradicate the terrorist group once and for all. Thus, it would seem that hyper-terrorism—the desire of terrorists to obtain and use WMD capabilities—cannot apply to a rationally thinking sub-state actor who has a feasible (political) end-state in mind. But if hyper-terrorism is an extant phenomenon, then to whom does it apply?

Perhaps the clearest, most scientifically discrete candidate for designation as the modern age’s first specimen of hyper-terrorism is Aum Shinrikyo. This organization is infamous as being the first non-state actor to use a chemical weapon successfully against civilians. In 1995, after years of experimenting with both chemical and biological agents,<sup>12</sup> the cult deployed a weak solution of sarin nerve agent on the Tokyo metro. We now know that the group had a very different end-state in mind from that witnessed in the case of “classic” pragmatic terrorist actors such as ETA or PIRA. Through a series of similar WMD attacks, the cult and its half-blind prophet-leader Shoko Asahara planned to take control of the government of Japan. Once it had es-

<sup>11</sup> It is interesting here to note that, in spite of strident statements in the 1980s by Margaret Thatcher’s government that the British administration would never negotiate with terrorists, thanks to the various memoirs that have since then been published, we now know that such UK government–PIRA talks did in fact take place repeatedly well before the Good Friday Accords. For more information on negotiating with terrorists, see the chapter by James Wither later in this volume.

<sup>12</sup> Aum Shinrikyo even attempted biological attacks (unsuccessfully) prior to the Metro attack of 1995.

tablished itself as the new government of Japan, the cult intended to unleash a global WMD campaign until it ruled the whole planet and could create a worldwide cultic religious state and then initiate End Times. It is clear that such an end-state is not politically feasible and that there is no political solution possible that would bring the cult and its enemies to a possible negotiated compromise. The scenario driving this sub-state actor was not a worldly one, infused as it was with apocalyptic aspects, and thus we may make a distinction in this case and classify Aum as a nonrational, or transcendently informed, terrorist group.<sup>13</sup>

The identification of whether or not a given terrorist group has such a worldview, one where compromise with the government is not just unimportant but impossible and where a transcendental “reality” informs the actions of the perpetrator is significant beyond solely the realm of theory. The question of whether or not we are dealing with a rational or nonrational actor<sup>14</sup> will have distinct implications upon what type of response government authorities can deploy. In the case of the former, the choice of tools is broad, ranging from military force and police action to secret or open negotiations and even third-party mediation or arbitration. If, however, the group is of the latter variety, then we are limited to two fundamental options: arresting or annihilating the terrorist group. Who the enemy is, therefore, dictates the modality of response.

### **Categorizing the Current Threat: Al Qaeda**

It is clear that the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania were designed to exact as many casualties as possible—and most interestingly as regards methodology, to do so without resorting at all to WMD technology. But the question remains: What were the end-state and specific demands of the group responsible for 9/11? Here one needs to look at the communiqués and other items of propaganda disseminated by Osama bin Laden and high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists over the years.

<sup>13</sup> Note that I am not using the word irrational, but nonrational, since there is a logic to the strategic thought of such a group, but it is one devoid of normal cost-benefit analysis since it is transcendently informed.

<sup>14</sup> The provocative strategist Ralph Peters makes a similar distinction between the practical and apocalyptic terrorist, but unfortunately limits his discussion of the latter to Muslim extremists, such as Osama bin Laden, when in fact the group is larger and should rightly include many non-Muslim and non-Arab groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo and potentially even Christian fundamentalists or other ethnically Caucasian groups such as the Branch Davidians. See Peters, *Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books 2002), especially Part I, “When Devils Walk the Earth”; and Sebestyén L. v. Gorka, “2000 AD: Boom Time in the Doom Market,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, January 2000.

In the beginning, before al Qaeda (“the Base”) became well known in the intelligence and academic communities, Osama bin Laden had taken control of the Arab Service Bureau of which he had been a part and which had recruited and trained many of the foreign mujahedeen who had fought against the Soviet troops of occupation in Afghanistan. At that time, the avowed aims of the new organization were clearly defined against the backdrop of a world seen in distinctly Huntingtonian and Manichean terms. For this fundamentalist fighter, by the early 1990s, having won the fight against the then “lead Satan” (the USSR), it was time to fight for oppressed Muslims everywhere and to take the fight to the, until then, secondary Satan: western civilization, led by the United States. The western world was and is seen by bin Laden as antithetical to his fundamentalist view of the Islamic faith, an affront to all that is good and holy and a force that through its soft power, capitalism and globalization, further weakens the hold of the Muslim system over its followers. The end-state depicted by the former mujahedeen is the re-creation of a caliphate, starting with the Middle East and Central Asia, but eventually spreading over the whole world as the West is systematically undermined over years and even decades through a campaign of asymmetric warfare that exploits the very aspects of the liberal democratic system of which its nations and leaders are so proud. In all this, since it is the standard-bearer of the liberaldemocratic, capitalist model, and the source of most that is unholy, the United States stands as the primary “western” target.<sup>15</sup>

As a result of such pronouncements and based upon interviews<sup>16</sup> with captured or reformed members of the terrorist organization, one would be led understandably to the conclusion that al Qaeda fits quite neatly into the category of nonrational terrorist actor. No political resolution is even theoretically possible given the absolute and transcendently informed nature of the desired state-of-affairs (a global caliphate) that al Qaeda wishes to achieve.

It should be noted, however, that since becoming a player on the world stage and after the more successful attacks that culminated in the events of 9/11, bin Laden has complicated matters by inserting other lower-level political demands into the broader palate of existing pronouncements. These have included the removal of US troops from the lands that contain the holiest of Muslim sites (such as Saudi Arabia) and, perhaps most pronounced, the demand made in the prerecorded video statement

<sup>15</sup> An excellent collection of al Qaeda statements was compiled by the former Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and can be accessed by US government employees and contractors through the Open Source Center (which absorbed the FBIS) at <https://www.opensource.gov/>

<sup>16</sup> For examples of information supporting this vision, see the various works by al Qaeda specialist Rohan Gunaratna, such as *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

that was released on the invasion of Afghanistan in which bin Laden stated that there would no peace in the West, nor in America, until there existed a free and independent Palestine. Both of these are feasible demands open to a political approach that fits very nicely into the rational terrorist category. In fact, one of them has already occurred.

Subsequently we are left with the problem of how to classify the threat posed by al Qaeda's version of hyper-terrorism. In my opinion, the conflation of nonrational with rational elements, of political with transcendently informed goals, may in fact be a deliberate ploy on behalf of the leaders of the organization to confuse us, "the enemy," or a crude attempt to forge tactical gains from among the consequences of strategic-level attacks. In any event, the higher-level nonrational demands, or end-state, overshadow the lowerlevel demands, and we can conclude that the group is fundamentally—from our point of view<sup>17</sup>—nonrational, or at worst and for practical purposes, a *sui generis* modification of this category.

Logically if we therefore decide that there does in fact exist a new type of threat, one whereby a nexus has been created between the desire to be a terrorist and the desire to cause as much damage as possible, that hyper-terrorism can exist only in the case of nonrational actors, the obvious question should be: Are we in possession of the requisite tools to fight this new form of political violence? As individual nations, based upon traditional nation-states structures and concepts we are not.

### **The Westphalian Inheritance**

It is often far too easy to take for granted the system of governance and administration in which we live today. If one does not professionally study modern history, or the evolution of international law, one could be forgiven for thinking that the current system of independent nation-states has existed for much longer than it in fact has. Its evolution is quite recent, in historic terms. Most commentators consider the Peace of Westphalia (1648) is considered as introducing the foundations for the creation in the West of a system in which the main actors were states, bodies with independent internal affairs—but which could ally with one another. In the Westphalian system, sovereignty would eventually become paramount.<sup>18</sup> Later, as this concept evolved

<sup>17</sup> It is again important to note that the categorization of rational or nonrational refers to "our" point of view. There exists, undoubtedly, in the mindset of the Aum Shinrikyo or al Qaeda operator, a distinct logic all his or her own. The difference is whether or not the desired endstate is posited in reference to a transcendental reality. As a result one could also use, as I have, the labels "political" and "transcendental" terrorist.

<sup>18</sup> In fact, it was the sacrosanct nature of sovereignty that lay behind the creation of the balance of power system so important to Europe in following centuries.

and as the individual allegiances of the people shifted from local landowner and royal house to professional political elites defined around a national identity, the state would evolve further into the now-commonplace nation-state, with its fundamental aspects of citizenship and nationality.<sup>19</sup>

For our purposes, the most important side-effect of the founding and development of the nation-state as a way to run and define a territorial unit are the ramifications of this new locus of sovereignty on the practice of providing for the security. While humans have been waging war for as long as territory and other forms of expropriable wealth have existed, the modern method for securing the nation-state resulted in a universal division of labor being replicated in practically every nation of the world.<sup>20</sup> The national security systems thus created were quite simply formed around a categorization of threats as being either external, internal, civilian, or military in nature. Since the threats were all relatively discrete in scientific terms (i.e., easily definable and differentiated), it was logical to make the responses reflect the given challenges. If the enemy state wishes to obtain sensitive information of a military nature, then “we” should have a capability to protect such information and to capture its agents. Likewise, if the enemy state intends an act of military aggression, then “we” must maintain a permanent capability to deter such an attack or to meet it head on with force, and so on. Of course, particular variations developed—nations that combined civilian and military counterintelligence into one body, for example—but on the whole, the majority of modern nation-states established a division of labor. (For Detailed Information Please See Original Version of this Article.)

In each case, as the nation-state evolved and solidified its structures, the internal architecture of national security was reinforced by the laws and constitutional measures that defined the responsibilities and specific missions of the given organs. As a means to preserve efficiency and to ensure against abuses of power and information, practically every state of the developed West would severely demarcate the spheres of authority of each body. Matters of military intelligence, for example, were to be the sole purview of the body (or bodies) expressly mandated to respond to this threat, and so on. In fact, any intentional or even inadvertent negation of this division of

<sup>19</sup> For a much lengthier and most influential discussion of the evolution of the nation-state, security, and international law, see the recent writings of Philip Bobbitt, especially his book *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).

<sup>20</sup> There are, of course, rare exceptions to the rule, such as Andorra or Costa Rica, but these all have in common either that they are too small to have their own armies or security services, or that they rely upon external and comprehensive guarantees of safety (as in the case of Costa Rica and its treaty relationship with the United States).



labor would, if found out, generally cause scandal and/or investigation.<sup>21</sup> This strict interpretation of missions and the resultant mirror-image response whereby the threat would be matched by a similar domestic body, would simply be further reinforced by the cut and dry, unequivocal threat environment presented by the Cold War.

### **Matching Threats to Capabilities in the Third Millennium**

Whether or not one agrees with the still-influential theses cited earlier of Clash of Civilizations or The End of History, it seems clear that there has been at least one incontrovertible change in the geostrategic environment in which the developed countries of the West now find themselves: The Westphalian system's core presumptions no longer hold.

First, it may have become trite to say so, but that does not lessen the veracity of the statement that democracies do not wage war on one another. In fact, this tenet has in recent years been raised to the level of being a basic element of US foreign policy. Translated into more practical terms, it means that the countries of the western community of nations do not pose a threat to one another. This seems an uncontroversial statement since it is hard to envisage a classic nation-on-nation conflict involving the recognized tools of war erupting between Germany and the United States, or the United Kingdom and France. This fact is underpinned by the nature of new threats that have been identified in recent years. (For Detailed Information Please See Original Version of this Article.)

While this statement seems perhaps obvious, its ramifications in practical terms are highly significant. As we have seen, the national security architecture universally established under the Westphalian system and reinforced by the Cold War was not a multifarious tool. It was originally designed exclusively to deal with external threats that were in the form of (enemy) nation-states. The ultimate purpose was to prevent or win an armed conflict against another country or group of countries, usually in relatively close physical proximity to one's own nation. Today, the transatlantic area is constituted by nations that do not hold grudges against one another that could reasonably lead to an armed conflict for territory or wealth. In fact, continental Europe is now for the most part represented by an institutional form of integration that represents the largest voluntarily unified market and trading bloc the world has ever seen.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> One such example is when the CIA was accused during the Vietnam War of collecting information on American nationals in the United States – an activity that was mandated to the FBI.

<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of the nature of the European Union and how its identity has fundamentally changed with the last round of enlargement this year, see the author's paper entitled "European Union Enlargement: Common Challenge or Internal Divide?" as presented to the German- American Fulbright Commission's Berlin Seminar: "Where Continents Meet," 20 March 2004.

Thus, both the NATO and EU communities consist of nations whose national defense and security structures are wholly out of step with the danger they actually face—dangers that are without borders, capitals, or nation-state-derived governments.

### **Managing the Disjunction: Going “Super-Purple” and International**

With the bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 and the more recent invasion of Iraq in 2003, some commentators have stated that the whole Westphalian system has suffered a death blow. The sacrosanct nature of a country’s sovereignty—irrespective of domestic events—was held previously to be the core operating tenet of the system. The idea that internal behavior deemed by one or more countries as going against the fundamental norms of human rights justifies military action by an otherwise unaffected party, or parties, is truly novel. However, it is important to note that this undermining of national sovereignty is very much limited to those states that can be classified as “failed” or “rogue” in nature. As a result we should posit that the principle of unadulterated sovereignty still applies in the community of developed market democracies.

Nevertheless, when it comes to ensuring the security of these nations, there is a clear disjunction. For centuries the tools of national security matched the threat. Today the threats operate in a milieu that is transnational and not limited by the shell of nation-state architecture. Our foe today moves in a world that is unrestricted by international convention, by physical borders, or the dictates of government. Yet, the successful members of the transatlantic community that won the Cold War inherited a tool box of means to provide for security that has not changed and is very much still bound to the architecture of the Westphalian nation-state. Armies and police forces still serve countries. They are funded out of national budgets and are controlled by national governments. While the enemy has moved to a higher plain of existence we have not and will likely never do so, since world governance is not something that is welcomed either by the majority of citizens who find their identity in the nation-state metier, nor by the entrenched stratum of politicians who would have everything to lose should their domestic authority be replaced by a higher transnational one.

As a result we must look elsewhere for a solution. If we recognize the fact that our internal national security and defense structures were inherited from another age and for another purpose, yet we are unable for various reasons—above all political—to create supranational solutions, then the only viable option is to radically reform the nation-state level instruments so as to make them more applicable to the new tasks at hand, to closer resemble the enemies of today. This means admitting the fact that the old division of labor is out-of-date and that we cannot justify the maintenance of hermetic seals between various agencies and forces. The internal barriers between the police force, the army, and various intelligence services must at least be in part

dismantled so as to facilitate a modus operandi that is as flexible and as effective as that of our new enemies. This would result in the creation of “Super-Purple”<sup>23</sup> structures as flexible and hypermobile as the enemies they needed to neutralize. It would not even be too far-fetched to make the argument that many countries in the current geostrategic environment would be best served by a unitary body conglomerating all the skills of the various separate agencies and units into a new structure better suited to addressing threats like al Qaeda and transnational organized crime syndicates.<sup>24</sup> There even exists a national counterterrorism precedent for such a unified multi-agency approach.<sup>25</sup> Such examples must be revisited and expanded internationally to follow the principle and vision laid out by Dr. Boaz Ganor (detailed later in this book).

Even so, the reality is that such a broad, sweeping reform and restructuring of the national security apparatus of the nations of the developed West will inevitably run into heavy resistance from all those who have an interest in maintaining existing

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<sup>23</sup> “Purple” operations and structures are those that involve all the arms of military service, army, navy, air force, and marines. The US Department of Defense has been emphasizing the “Joint,” or “Purple,” mode for some years now, breaking down the technical as well as mental barriers to interoperability among the services. My proposal would take this approach and apply it across the whole national security structure, not just the armed forces. I am indebted to my good friend Keith Mines of the US State Department for christening my concept so aptly, “Purple” referring to the slang for joint operations (arrived at when the service colors are mixed), and “Super-Purple” referring to interdepartmental and international jointness.

<sup>24</sup> Lest the reader think I am making an argument here for states to follow the US model by creating their own Department of Homeland Security (DHS), I am not. The gargantuan DHS, which brings together over twenty agencies and two hundred thousands federal employees under one letterhead, is not a radical, new multidisciplinary approach, but represents just one more layer of bureaucracy that in its size and functioning reflects a distinctly Cold War approach as opposed to one that reflects the flexibility of, say, an al Qaeda.

<sup>25</sup> In the bloodiest years of the PIRA’s campaign against the UK government, the decision was taken to create a radically new unit that would take the fight to the most dangerous players. Variously called, 14 Intelligence Company, 14 Int., or “The Det.,” this formation employed units made up of local police officers, members of the Special Forces (SAS/SBS), and the intelligence services. 14 Company was very good at its job, overcoming the old divisions and obstacles to effective interagency cooperation. Unfortunately it was too good at its job, being responsible for the deaths of many IRA terrorists and doing so in a way that was unsanctioned in the broadest political sense of the word. As a result, the unit was disbanded. While information on this part of the PIRA/UK struggle is limited, some works have in recent years shed light on 14 Company. See, for example, Martin Dillon, *The Dirty War: Covert Strategies and Tactics Used in Political Conflicts* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

structures and who do not see the necessity for change. Therefore, it is most likely the responsibility of the nongovernmental think-tank community to promote the initial discussion on how best to shape old capabilities to meet new threats and to convince as many members of the general public as possible that the topic should be placed on the political agenda of the various nations. For if we do not begin to discuss and then eventually effect change, the West will continue to suffer in a deadly game of “catch-up,” as those unfettered by limits of the nation-state proceed to exact damage upon our countries and way of life.

In the meantime, the Marshall Center’s Program on Terrorism and Security Studies represents the first and most successful example of the “Super-Purple” approach as applied to the creation of an international network of counterterrorism professionals. As the international and interdepartmental connections built through this program grow ever deeper and wider, it will become easier and easier to eventually institutionalize international jointness and thus take the fight most effectively to an enemy that already thinks and operates in the “Super-Purple” mode.

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## Recommended Readings

Aldis, Anne, and Graeme P. Herd. *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism*. London: Routledge, 2007.

Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*. New York: Random House, 2003.

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## How Terrorist Groups End: Studies of the Twentieth Century

*By Christopher C. Harmon*

Terrorism studies are too young to have their Arnold Toynbee. Scholar Walter Laqueur has perhaps come the closest. At this writing in mid-2009, there remains a need for broad and searching inquiries into why and how terror groups have declined or ended. The project requires detailed knowledge of scores of important groups, extant and extinct, worldwide. The project also demands originality, so for this chapter we have set aside the useful frame I developed in 2003 and worked publicly for five years.<sup>1</sup> It is hoped that a fresh sowing in this vital field will help with the understanding of what we have seen in the twentieth century.

### The Early Twentieth Century

From the nineteenth century, the twentieth inherited several forms of violence that would dramatically influence politics and terrorism. Three that were important, and very different, were labor militance, anarchism, and communism. These three schools of thought and action profited from liberalism and rationalism; they were internationalist, and by degrees each supported workers and the poor. The most honest and credible of the three was the first, Labor—the drive for the rights and wages of blue-collar working men, women, and children, but a drive that sometimes assumed violent means and took innocent lives.

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<sup>1</sup> Scholars must recognize certain intellectual debts, and good scholars enjoy doing so. My debts are happily paid in this and earlier places, especially to Martha Crenshaw. One begins with her essay “How Terrorism Declines,” in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1991), 69–87, and its admirable chart. There was a distinctive direction to my body of earlier work on this subject (e.g., many public presentations in 2004, a speech on Capitol Hill, a webcast from the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on 20 March 2006, a book chapter with Cambridge University Press early that year, etc.). It was to retrace researches I’d made over a previous quarter-century, present a half-dozen leading reasons for terrorist group decline, and then detail examples within each rubric. The present essay’s approach is new, guided more by chronology, and my analysis profits from continued study of the individual named terror groups. Endnotes for Ch. 7 of my book *Terrorism Today*, 2nd ed. (London & New York: Routledge, 2007) indicate other resources I found worthy.

## Labor Militance and Violence

International labor organizations arose from, and sometimes parallel to, older and more local and national models. Their members were overwhelmingly partisans of a fair wage, decent hours, and protection of children from brutal factory work or endless hours. Novelist John Steinbeck wrote sympathetically of the California farmworker unionizers who organized strikes or demands for better wages or improvement in camp conditions. But other activists stepped well over the lines of public pressure and civil opposition. The organization called Workers of the World, or “Wobblies,” conducted strikes but also sabotage<sup>2</sup> of property. Individual militants or groups of organized labor undertook the beating or killing of bosses, night watchmen, or “big capitalists.” Cities as different as Seattle and New York witnessed laborites’ assaults on the innocent. A few representatives for a union of iron workers and bridge builders coordinated an ugly bombing campaign in the United States in the fall of 1910 that took two dozen lives, injured others, and massively damaged property.<sup>3</sup> The labor movements also produced theorists and public advocates (e.g., in France, Georges Sorel). They advocated violence—usually accompanied by other political aims and strategies that might appeal to the sympathetic mind and to the average citizen.

American labor violence succeeded, in its way, according to the best US historian of terrorist movements, Walter Laqueur. “The daily wage of American iron workers (AFL) went up from \$2.00 to \$4.30 (for shorter hours) between 1905 and 1910 as the result of the bombing of some one hundred buildings and bridges.”<sup>4</sup> He adds that Spanish workers, using similar methods, improved their wages during the First World War.<sup>5</sup> To violence, and that powerful display the strike, labor militants added mediation, sweet reason, unions, and other factors. These combinations improved labor conditions and pay. There was steady growth and legitimization of unions. As this occurred over decades, sporadic labor violence did not end, but it came to be seen in the American public mind as separate from political notions such as anarcho-syndicalism

<sup>2</sup> The Dutchman’s wooden shoe, or “sabot,” made a sort of weapon if a laborer wanted to jam it into machinery at the workplace. “Sabotage” normally falls short of “terrorism,” and its perpetrators sometimes intend avoiding human casualties, as do many practicing “ecotage” on behalf of the wild world. One nineteenth-century American form of sabotage by laborers/ militants is the activity of the “Molly McGuires,” who damaged their own coal mines in eastern Pennsylvania from about 1862 – until ten were hanged in 1877.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph T. McCann, *Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten* (Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications, 2006), 33–40.

<sup>4</sup> Labor histories by L. Adamic and G. W. Meaker are cited by Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987), 75.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*



or communism. All these are among the reasons labor violence overturned so few economies and political orders of the early twentieth century.

## Anarchism

Although it often lauded the poor man or hated the rich man, anarchism was never essentially and directly about conditions in the workplace, or the economy. It was obsessed with the state, more than the state of the working man. Anarchism despises political authority as inherently repressive and antihuman; it thus drives to bring down government, all government. The Russian Peter Kropotkin, born a prince before becoming an anarchist, drew a line between his confreres and Communists on the issue of the state: “To this question the anarchists alone give the proper answer: ‘No Government!’ All the others say ‘A Revolutionary Government.’”<sup>6</sup> In the last third of the nineteenth century, and during the early twentieth, anarchism was distinctively international for reasons that were philosophical, first, and operational, second. The important activists often traveled (or fled) abroad, knew one another or corresponded, employed each other at publishing houses and journals, read each other’s broadsides with their internationalist rhetoric, and saluted the others’ violent actions as laudable “propaganda of the deed.” They helped foreign fugitives find haven from the law, find work, or find comradeship.<sup>7</sup>

Violence joined up with philosophical anarchism in Russia at the end of the 1870s. Soon, given the devolution implicit in arguments for both violence and anarchism,

<sup>6</sup> From the Revolutionary Pamphlets, quoted by Mikkel Thorup, “The Anarchist and the Partisan: Two Types of Terror in the History of Irregular Warfare,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 2008), 338. Peter Kropotkin’s *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* are valuable for many reasons, including references to the role of police action (and capital punishment) in Russian suppression of its anarchists. The book was published in English in both the United Kingdom and the United States in 1899, appearing later in Russian.

<sup>7</sup> There are occasional scholars’ assertions that pre-WWI anarchists were not networked internationally. Perhaps not; who can argue that anarchists are well organized! Yet, there are levels of collusion and coordination in some sectors – just as anarchists today organize on the World Wide Web. The scattered indicators include the fact that the number of nineteenth- to early twentieth-century Italian anarchists operating across borders was very high. Entities such as study groups and newspapers fostered networks. Usually, perpetrators were students of the others’ actions: even one of the most autonomous of all the anarchist murderers – a US-born, ethnic-Czech named Leon Czolgosz, who shot President William McKinley – carried in his wallet a folded news clipping about a recent anarchist murder elsewhere, and was careful to purchase the same make of revolver, the .32 caliber Iver Johnson, that an anarchist had used to shoot King Humbert I of Italy. McCann, *Terrorism on American Soil*, 27, ff.

theorists such as Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin<sup>8</sup> praised all actions that destroyed, from petty crime to grave assault.<sup>9</sup> The spiral downward led to adulation for “infernal machines” (usually dynamite bombs). The Russia of the late nineteenth century saw anarchism embedded with both low crime and flaming political idealism. The movement targeted senior defense, intelligence, and police officials, not just political governors. The revolutionary concepts were exported, and the colluders turned up to write, preach, and kill in the United States, Italy, Spain, Germany, and France. Anarchists hid out for periods in Switzerland, supporting themselves in journalism, printing, or other trades; they thus lived ironically—in a prosperous country amidst donors’ money, chemicals for bomb-making, printing presses and newspapers, transportation, and the like, while working daily and nightly to destroy it all for a vision. International anarchists believed they could win. They could at least kill and they could reduce a city to general fear. Historian Barbara Tuchman depicts Paris at one time in the grip of “mad bombers”—streets deserted, shops shuttered, panic evident in the public.<sup>10</sup>

Why did this anarchist movement die? Indeed it did end: incidence of violence fell off dramatically, as in Italy and France after 1900. In the United States, the movement appeared to peak about 1908, and touched another summit in 1919. But one hears little of new lethal attacks after 1920—the year of payroll robbery and murder in Massachusetts by Ferdinando Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. It is also important to recognize that it was a movement—not a freakish wave of public interest, or a political party, or a disciplined formation of cells. Anarchism was international; it was networked (to use a modern term); ideas drove the actors; there were clandestine levels as well as public faces; some adherents were lethal and some were utterly fearless. For these reasons, the movement suggests parallels with the contemporary Salafist Islamic movement, best known for the much-narrower al Qaeda organization. And how it perished is thus doubly important.

<sup>8</sup> The Kropotkin quotation from 1880 is again from Professor Thorup. Bakunin is quoted in 1869, in his *Principles of Revolution*, cited by W. Laqueur, 30.

<sup>9</sup> Sometimes their exultations in the “liberating effects of violence” foreshadow Frantz Fanon, author of *The Wretched of the Earth*—but he would write and work as an insurgent for Algerian self-determination, not as an anarchist. All of Fanon’s books help us understand modern terrorism, yet many post-September 11 academics barely know of him.

<sup>10</sup> Barbara Tuchman, *The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890–1914* (New York: Scribner/Macmillan, 1966).

Until recently, little was asked about the mystery of, and few good answers delineated reasons for, the death of violent anarchism.<sup>11</sup> New studies of the terrorists by Richard Bach Jensen, as well as Ersel Aydinli, demonstrate how state intelligence units, policing agencies, and other governmental offices and legislatures had profoundly important roles. Italy and Russia took leads in multistate action to coordinate border control and extradition. American cooperation with foreign states came slowly, too slowly, but did come. Creating the Federal Bureau of Investigation at home helped: It meant that investigators of anarchists no longer had to borrow manpower from the minuscule Secret Service, and also that a national register could be kept to allow information exchange and coordination across hundreds of local, county, and state jurisdictional lines. Europeans adjusted internal laws, as in banning open anarchist meetings, and enhancing court powers over conspiracy (i.e., revolutionary activities short of attacks). Russian services performed ruthlessly, locking up suspects and executing anarchists. Russian police, much provoked, were very aggressive; after October 1917 their successors set new standards in the use of force. In short, governments worldwide stiffly countered the anarchists.<sup>12</sup> Thus, *The Economist* may well be wrong in its conclusion to a fascinating four-page review of the century-old phenomenon (published in 2005): “So why did their wave of terror pass? Not, it seems, because of the measures taken to deter them.”<sup>13</sup> For *The Economist*, the arrival of The Great War in 1914, and the Russian Revolution soon thereafter, made the difference. And surely these were important, new, and perhaps overwhelming, robbing

<sup>11</sup> In my work of 2004–2007 I argued that not only terrorists – but even their doctrines – might be defeated in some times and places. A majority of communist terrorist groups failed. Anarchist violence alienated most workers, police, and other government forces turned against the movement, jailing the leaders, etc.; e.g., “How Al Qaeda May End,” Backgrounder #1760, The Heritage Foundation (19 May 2004).

<sup>12</sup> *Terrorism and Political Violence* is the journal leading this conversation on anarchism. Richard Bach Jensen made a fine and original presentation on “The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900–1914,” in Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), 15–46. The journal printed a useful and related article by Mikkell Thorup seven years later, and then a further Jensen essay in 2009, “The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880–1930’s,” Vol. 21, Issue 1 (January 2009), 89–109. See as well Ersel Aydinli, Chair of the International Relations Department at Bilkent University, Ankara, “Before Jihadists there were Anarchists: A Failed Case of Transnational Violence,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 10 (October 2008), 903–923.

<sup>13</sup> “For Jihadist, Read Anarchist: repression did little to stop anarchist violence. But eventually the world moved on and the movement withered,” *The Economist*, 20 August 2005, 17–20. The authors’ inquiry led them to such causal factors as the coming of World War I and the Russian Revolution – which surely played roles in the expiry of this movement. But they neglected US Supreme Court decisions on labor issues and other factors a magazine had no particular duty to cover.

anarchists of public interest. But two titanic events do not displace all quieter workings of history: being much provoked, states focused, and then responded, and with good effect.<sup>14</sup>

## Communism

The October Revolution brings our account to the third and final school of thought bridging the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and relevant to terrorism. After labor militance and anarchism, there came communism. It had been visible, by degrees, in Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), a Russian terrorist group of the late 1870s. Its Central Committee believed that if a dozen pillars of government and security would collapse, the whole of government would tumble as the masses rose up. But the group's ideology was hazy—as much anarchist or pro-farmer as communist. Purer political revolutionary forms, such as those filled by Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and Social Revolutionaries, attended to how government would be reformed and would work, not only to how it initially would be destroyed. They dreamed of new gleaming towers but also had the maturity to plan for them. Communists often debated the issue of terrorism, and later students of such debates have an inappropriate tendency to fix on deprecatory remarks of famous Bolsheviks about the foolishness of individual terrorism—as Vladimir Lenin suggested in titling a booklet *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*.<sup>15</sup>

Such vanguardsmen of the era as Trotsky and Lenin did make the argument, in the course of a career in politics, that terrorism could be stupid or self-defeating. But these same communists used terror, and argued for terror, when it served their revolutionary purposes. What they ridiculed was not “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for a political end.”<sup>16</sup> What they opposed was

<sup>14</sup> Numerous anarchists' cases could be cited. Consider Sergei Gennadevich Nechaev, the young Russian author of the 1869 *Revolutionary Catechism*. He committed a murder in Moscow and fled to Geneva, but the Swiss extradited him back, and he died in Russian prison. Significant here are both the Swiss act of extradition and the Russian willingness to punish with a lengthy jail term. James Joll, *The Anarchists* (New York: The Universal Library, 1966), 93–96.

<sup>15</sup> During the second term of the Reagan-Bush presidency, in the late 1980s, a US historian of Russia and the USSR took me aside after a speech to advise that, despite what many might think of communists, Lenin opposed terrorism. My own readings to that time, in primary sources and in Chapter 2 of Roberta Goren's *The Soviet Union and Terrorism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984) had indicated that his view was predominant but errant. I thought of the irony: “simple” politicians such as Ronald Reagan were more correct than “sophisticated” academics on the question of Bolshevik support for terrorism.

<sup>16</sup> This most useful definition of terrorism was proposed and used in publications by The Jonathan Institute, a think-tank, at the end of the 1970s.

individual terrorism uncontrolled by their tight party. The Lenin who could mock bomb-throwers as “infantile” penned a letter to the “Combatant Committee” of St. Petersburg in 1905 urging revolutionaries to robbery, arson, and other terroristic acts, insisting that they stop blathering about bombs and begin using them.<sup>17</sup> Leon Trotsky, commander of the Red Army, thrilled to the power of both communist dictatorship and terrorism against counterrevolutionaries, penning a book exalting both, three years after the revolution. When the Soviet secret service murdered Trotsky in exile, it served as one more demonstration of how, once in power, Bolshevik communists viewed terror as they had while rising to power: through the eyes of cold utilitarianism.

After 1945 a new chapter opened for communism—one of both remarkable state power and renewed interest in expanding the revolution abroad. Terrorism kept some of its roles. International terror had some links to communists, their international organizations, and certain of their capitals.<sup>18</sup> Rulers of communist East Germany criticized terrorism during the high Cold War, but for years they funded *Konkret*, the radical newspaper in Berlin to which Ulrike Meinhof contributed, and both parties helped this relationship grow into provision of counsel and safe-haven to her Red Army Faction (RAF).<sup>19</sup> Serious communists, like serious anarchists, long for the state

<sup>17</sup> See also Lenin’s pamphlet *Where to Begin* of 1901, which explains that, when local revolutionary organizations are weak, the “individual attack” can be highly useful.

<sup>18</sup> This is clear – but it was much debated at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. See for example the documents in Ra’anan, Uri, Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., Richard H. Shultz, Ernst Halperin, and Igor Lukes, *Hydra of Carnage: The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations: The Witnesses Speak* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986). There is considerable evidence in the books and other works of Ray Cline, Paul Henze, Michael Radu, and others.

<sup>19</sup> East German support to the RAF was detailed early on by Jillian Becker, *Hitler’s Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang*, 2nd ed. (St. Albans & London: Granada Publishing Ltd., 1978), Chapter 9. Her brilliant volume never attained the full attention it deserved, and now seems almost forgotten, even during a revived interest in the RAF that peaked in 2008 with the new movie “The Baader Meinhof Complex.” Years ago, a popular German newspaper also reported on East Berlin’s subsidization of *Konkret*. And American journalist Claire Sterling wrote a book about these and similar linkages (see below, n. 48). She was often derided for unthinking anti-Communism. But as the wall came down, a wave of records followed to show how the Bloc had supported terrorists operating in Western Europe and other regions. These confirmations and revelations were widely reported, as in the *New York Times*, over a number of years. Thanks to the George C. Marshall Center and its translators, I have been able to obtain and study a 3 May 1979 example prepared in Berlin, Stasi document MfS - HA XX11, Nr. 18613, 16 pp. long in German, “INFORMATION on Activities by Representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Movement, in Conjunction with International Terrorists, to Involve the GDR in the Preparation of Acts of Violence in Western European Countries.” That document discusses the free movement in Eastern Europe of Palestinians, their allies such as Carlos, and the Germans of RAF and 2nd of June Movement, and the Stasi’s “goodwill and loyalty” shown to them.

to disappear; many in both schools are certain that much violence is required to bring this about. Study of only tactics may confuse; thus, some observers imagine that the German RAF was more anarchist than communist—a myth easily dispelled by reading their communiqués. While the two movements differ on what happens after the revolution, the communist knows that anarchism, revolutionary spirit, and terrorism all have their virtues; their utility will depend upon timing and circumstance, and upon who becomes damaged and who benefits. And so the German Democratic Republic was just one of many communist bloc states supporting terrorist cells abroad.

The twentieth century lived with and endured communism. Witnesses, participants, and victims saw its stages of nascence, its rise to power, its dangerous status as deliberator over half the world during the high Cold War, and its sudden decline in authority by 1990. During eight decades in which its adherents governed important states, terrorism, whether guided by, or aided by, communists, took unnumbered lives. A minority of these perished in classic, archetypal international terrorist attacks by communist groups with communist state sponsors. Many died in other kinds of violence when communists were seeking power. Many more died in communist states after power was successfully taken. The human damage has been chronicled (e.g., by a man such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, or in long lines of zeros, as added by the team of French academics who compiled the *The Black Book of Communism*, 1997).<sup>20</sup> In the end, among the many and diverse classes of victims were individual industrialists and arms-makers and top politicians in Europe; tens of thousands of village leaders hunted down over time in Indochina from 1940 to 1975; peasants in Asia caught up within insurgencies; and certain whole villages in Colombia and Peru, which dared to resist the revolutionaries via poorly armed militias. Communist terror came to dozens of other places and in myriad conditions. In four or five years, gunmen with a revolutionary dream could turn a pristine, admired city of one million such as Montevideo, Uruguay, into a war zone of urban strikes and daily gun battles, as the Tupamaros did by 1970.

No scholar has thoroughly studied and described the many ways that late-twentieth-century communist terror groups came to their ends, but it is errant to assume that they fell when the Soviet bloc did, in 1989 and 1990. First, many communist militants did not fall; they fought on, as Revolutionary Organization 17 November did in Greece. It was never touched by the Greek state and was indeed only broken

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<sup>20</sup> Harvard University Press; ed. Stephane Courtois.

by a bomber's accident in 2002, allowing a wave of arrests.<sup>21</sup> Second, other communist state-supported groups fought on and live even now; for example, the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia long ago became self-supporting. Today has outlasted the Soviet bloc by two decades and keeps several thousand men and women in the field. Third, certain communist groups did not fall with the Kremlin but perished well before. This was true of the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells. Most Italian leftist terror groups disappeared before 1990. Law enforcement was the usual primary reason.

The German Red Army Faction (RAF), or Baader-Meinhof group, did not quickly disappear, but it too failed. RAF did not announce its dissolution and failure in a communiqué until April 1992, proximate to the world-shaking fall of the wall. But the group's real end was signaled as early as 18 October 1977. On that day, four of the imprisoned RAF leaders—including lovers Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin—attempted suicide (three of four succeeded). The Lufthansa jet their comrades had hijacked to bargain for the freedom of the prisoners in Stammheim jail was recaptured by elite West German border guards (GSG-9), who shot all the hijackers in the action. With only a handful of quarrelsome confreres still operating inside the Federal Republic, the RAF experienced despair. The wiser of them understood that after eight years of terrorism they had made astonishingly few allies among sixty million normal Germans, people whose lives were democratic, whose self-governance centered in Bonn and more local places, and whose economy was a shining success. The RAF thus tottered along after 1990 and 1992, but few new members joined, and nearly all who did were uncovered by diligent police work.<sup>22</sup> The Federal Republic

<sup>21</sup> There are two good English-language accounts (known to me) of the precipitous fall of Nov. 17th. A gifted student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC, aviation security expert Mr. Paris Michaels, wrote an unpublished 2003 paper for our course. George Kassimeris of the Univ. of Wolverhampton, England, published a detailed article, "Last Act in a Violent Drama? The Trial of Greece's Revolutionary Organization 17 November," in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 2006), 137–157. The group's head of operations is quoted saying the group was finished as a terrorist organization yet could return in some other form: "perhaps, in ten to fifteen years' time, a new generation of fighters for the people might re-launch the struggle." (153). It may be relevant that several Greek cities faced protracted rioting in late 2008, following a police shooting, and that since 2003 a terrorist group called Revolutionary Struggle has emerged.

<sup>22</sup> I have often spoken in past lectures of the roles of Horst Herold and German police in the attrition of RAF cadre. Introducing "computer profiling" and diligence with detail allowed federal authorities to find, one by one, the RAF militants. As there were never more than a few dozen weapons-carrying members, arrests reduced the group to nothing. In recent years, nearly all members have been released from jail. The unrepentant Hans Christian Klar, guilty of 20 murders or attempted murders, won early release in late 2008, prompting debate in Germany and this comment by Bavarian justice minister Joachim Hermann: "Klar deserves no sympathy as long as he continues to show none for his victims." *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 Dec. 2008, and *BBC News*, 19 December 2008.

was no oppressor, and there were no profound “roots” to terrorism requiring excision, but only a shallow and shoddy malaise in some elites. In a tribute to how democracy may calmly mobilize, active security forces, operating carefully under the law with enhanced intelligence, they eventually reduced all remnants of the minuscule Red Army Faction.

Similar diligence by security forces and governments in France, Belgium and Italy undercut and effaced those countries’ “Fighting Communist Organizations.”<sup>23</sup> Regional cooperation by authorities developed as well.<sup>24</sup> Proper extraditions of fugitives thus gradually trumped older presumptions of the “asylum rights” of political terrorists, making foreign refuges challenging to find. When EUROPOL was born, it confirmed the best tendencies in European politics as well as developments since the Maastricht accords reduced national borders in 1992. If this maturing organization comes to move firmly against transnational terrorists—in the way that INTERPOL has done recently under Secretary General Ronald Noble<sup>25</sup>—the healthy effects of international action will be enjoyed more by European society.

Today communism is exhausted in most locales. But it has not died. “Naxalites” dominate great parts of central-eastern India. Counterparts of a Maoist calling have reached a peak of power in Nepal, entered parliament, and taken the Prime Ministry, shelving terrorist methods—at least in most places, at least for now. Their terrorism has been placed on “pause” while they share power. Colombia has badly damaged

<sup>23</sup> This appellation, often self-applied by the terrorists, was taken up by two scholars as a subtitle for their fine book: *Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*, by Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky (London: Frank Cass, 1992). They include several post-1990 RAF documents, such as the aforementioned confession of failure dated 15 April 1992. 1998 occasioned yet another confession of failure from an RAF hand, so that year, too, appears in print sometimes as “the end of the Baader-Meinhof organization.”

<sup>24</sup> One careful listing of relevant regional and subregional offices and organizations is by Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime: South Eastern Europe Collective Approaches,” in *Bilten Slovenske Vojske*, the journal of the Slovenian Armed Forces (Sept. 2008), 37–58.

<sup>25</sup> In its first decades, the Lyon-based INTERPOL explicitly kept its distance from terrorism cases because its new authority might not be helped by political quarrels. But now INTERPOL handles terrorism acts more and more as they do other crimes. Also, governments’ use of the agency’s capacious data bases has dramatically expanded, for terrorism cases as well as others. Mr. Noble was unanimously elected to a second term of office in 2005 and came to Garmisch to address our Program on Terrorism and Security Studies on 23 May 2008.



ELN and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)<sup>26</sup> regions, but neither insurgency is at an end. Peru's Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, decapitated by 1992 arrests, is reportedly attempting a "comeback" after a decade and a half of impotence. But in Europe, the United States, and some other regions, factors including the collapse of the Soviet Union have persuaded most that communism has little future, and thus that its violent methods cannot be justified. Mainland China seems only to underscore the decline of communism's foreign meddling of militant sorts. In the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese advisors serviced at least a dozen militant groups in Asia and Africa, including the genocidal Khmer Rouge.<sup>27</sup> Today, Beijing presides over new economic strength and military power, but this parallels a decline in ideological commitment. Beijing seeks allies and oil; few if any official Chinese actions include direct support to violent sub-state groups. This apparent absence of Beijing's state support for violent revolution has been one reason for notable declines, in some regions, of terrorism. In other areas—where indigenous Maoist revolutionaries might perform better if they could only have Beijing's aid—the lack of foreign state assistance is important.

## Racism and Nationalism After World War II

Fierce nationalisms lay behind two global wars of the twentieth century and myriad attacks of smaller scale. The wars of nationalism include many long-simmering low-intensity conflicts featuring terrorism and insurgency in the post-World War II era.

<sup>26</sup> Teaching case studies of counterinsurgency success long ago convinced me that defections are a superior metric for decline. When Colombia's Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo wrote "Pourquoi le Temps Joue Contre les FARC" for *Le Figaro*, 23 January 2008, he reported that 1,454 FARC members had quit in 2007, the double of the previous year. As this occurred in the context of much-enhanced skills and professionalism by the Colombian armed forces, I took it to be highly significant. A few months later, the Ingrid Betancourt hostage party was rescued in a Colombian special forces operation – another case in which years of negotiations failed but surgical force worked brilliantly.

<sup>27</sup> Maoist China aided armed groups in Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, according to Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 55–56; available at [http://books.google.de/books?id=tKmnESFGY8MC&pg=PA48&lpg=PA48&dq=cHINESE+support+to+revolutionaries&source=bl&ots=KmXYGUlmk2&sig=brvvnvcMlzOlhRI6ZjqouAg8g&hl=de&ei=t0HYSuL4GoOJsAaXwdTyBg&sa=X&oi=book\\_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CBQQ6AEwAjge#v=onepage&q=cHINESE%20support%20to%20revolutionaries&f=false](http://books.google.de/books?id=tKmnESFGY8MC&pg=PA48&lpg=PA48&dq=cHINESE+support+to+revolutionaries&source=bl&ots=KmXYGUlmk2&sig=brvvnvcMlzOlhRI6ZjqouAg8g&hl=de&ei=t0HYSuL4GoOJsAaXwdTyBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CBQQ6AEwAjge#v=onepage&q=cHINESE%20support%20to%20revolutionaries&f=false). Aid may or may not include shipping arms. For example, I cannot document arms shipments by Beijing to the Filipino Huk communists or the New People's Army of a later generation.

The Allies' crushing of fascism—a doctrine built upon racial and national exclusivity and superiority—could not prevent the rise of later racist or hypernationalist figures and movements. So while organized neo-fascist parties and movements of post-1945 years have often been small, they have had support of malcontents, reactionaries, and others.

A riveting example of “terrorist as political reactionary” was the Secret Army Organization (OAS), a last-ditch attempt by French and other Europeans to defend status quo European power in Algeria in the face of success by the indigenous National Liberation Front (FLN). Men of the OAS imagined themselves to be counter-terrorists, protectors of many decades of French improvements in the Maghreb. In fact they swiftly descended into nihilism. Their quick end in failure has obscured some of their very real strengths, however. OAS was formed by savvy leaders, enjoyed considerable financing, conducted hundreds of plastique bombings and assassinations, and had international sanctuaries (especially in Spain). OAS was also defending the status quo—which is normally easier than overthrowing it. But it was defeated in less than two years by a combination of Charles de Gaulle's government efforts and a near-absence of public support for the OAS except in limited and white circles in Algeria. Political forces labeled them as “neo-Nazis” and “assassins.” At the operational level, in France as well as North Africa, police and government outsmarted the rightists: “It has been estimated that ten determined men fought and won the battle against the OAS in France. What they brought to the struggle was intelligence, political acumen, level-headedness, and personal toughness,” according to Paul Henissart's history *Wolves in the City*. IBM computers were exploited, as well as networks of human sources. “In addition to using police tipsters, double-agents, and anti-OAS groups, [police] received information from thousands of private citizens loyal to the government.”<sup>28</sup> The Secret Army Organization was born in December 1960; it died in July 1962 when all but .02 percent of voting Algerians said “Oui” to independence.

It is not surprising that the OAS had found supporters among rightist European farmers and businessmen worried over loss of economic status in a prospective FLN-run Algeria. Similarly, many extremist and reactionary groups of the twentieth century have seen their ranks swell with economic crisis. The history of this pattern in Italy and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s is clear, and the rise of fascist street gangs of those days was clearly “terrorism.” Waves of immigration into Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall have had their own roles in spawning violent new racist or nationalist organizations. Today, smart analysts think about how the early twenty-first-century economic recession is affecting prospects of rightist and other terrorists. Economics

<sup>28</sup> Paul Henissart, *Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria* (London: Rupert Hart Davis, 1971), 300–301.

is merely one driver of politics. Many times, social trends or legislative changes have added to economic worries, and thus added volume to the calls to action. One further and recent example in US history is when the 1983 “Brady Bill” making guns harder to acquire had this effect on some right-wing Americans already angered by general recession and an acute farm crisis.

### **Ghosts in the American Experience**

Both immigration and economic trouble have been connected in the United States to the long run and continuing life of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). This organization was founded in the mid-nineteenth century, prospered, and moved readily into the twentieth. The KKK was in Canada, as well as many US states, where membership peaked from 1915 to 1925. The first of those years marks the opening of the D.W. Griffith film *Birth of a Nation*—initially released as *The Clansman*, a powerful film seeming to idealize white supremacy and anti-black violence. The second date, a decade later, was that of a powerful political display: in Washington, DC, an estimated 40,000 Klansmen marched. Nor would the KKK disappear after the Second World War. Some American racists doubtless joined such groups as the KKK precisely in personal reaction against post-1945 liberalism, tolerance, and internationalism. US civil rights improvements and new laws could infuriate the serious kind of racist who joined the Klan; that paradox is instructive as to the nature of terrorism.

Mike German, a young FBI agent, penetrated several KKK and neo-fascist terror groups in the United States. He offers valuable research into how the Klan was forced into decline—though not defeated—beginning in the late 1920s. The complex of reasons includes (1) political infighting, which fractured the organization and has continued to do so even today; (2) scandals—as when violent episodes shocked the public, or an individual Klansman’s actions tarnished the image of “protector of southern values”; (3) a change in American values, whereby the public’s tolerance for racism declined, and many were moved by the exposure of fascism’s atrocities and death camps overseas in the early 1940s; (4) federal government actions, especially a 1946 tax decision that damaged Klan business enterprises and the 1954 *Brown vs. Board of Education* Supreme Court decision on education that ended school segregation forever; and (5) the Klan murders of three civil rights workers in Mississippi in 1964, which horrified the US public. The cumulative effect was to thoroughly discredit an organization that since the 1880s had often lynched and terrorized with impunity.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Mike German, *Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 139–146. Now with the American Civil Liberties Union, Mr. German addressed our colloquium at Marine Corps University of April 2007 on “Terrorist Group Vulnerabilities.”

During the last half-century, the KKK has not possessed half the powers it once had in America. Together these are a veritable roster of terrorist group vulnerabilities—and they should suggest all kinds of possibilities to clever counterterrorism specialists.

Unfortunately, racism and terrorism from the extreme right in America have never been limited to the KKK network. There is a lengthy and distressing chronicle of maiming, menacing, and occasionally even murder of the innocent by other US groups preaching narrow or eccentric forms of white power religion and politics. Tiny political minorities, and even “lone wolf” actors, militants—usually male—tend to imagine themselves to be heroic defenders of the racial majority in the fifty states. Consider only the last generation, and only lethal actions, often against black or Jewish victims. Among the earliest of these murderers was Gordon Kahl of Posse Comitatus in February 1983, in North Dakota. Richard Wayne Snell, of the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord (CSA), killed in Arkansas in 1983 and in June of 1984.<sup>30</sup> Members of The Order, a white supremacist group, killed a man in June 1984 in Colorado. Neo-Nazi David Tate of The Order killed in April 1985.<sup>31</sup> In Oregon, White Aryan Resistance–inspired skinheads of East Side White Pride beat a man to death in November 1988. A gap in lethal incidents followed, yet the far right returned: Timothy McVeigh, racist and anti-federalist, bombed and killed scores in April 1995 in Oklahoma. Militants hoping to found an Aryan Peoples Republic killed in Arkansas in 1997. A free member of the prison gang Confederate Knights of America, John William King, murdered in Texas in June 1998. Ben N. Smith of the World Church of the Creator killed twice in July 1999, in Illinois and Indiana. Buford O’Neil Furrow committed an August 1999 murder in California. In a testament to the significance of ideas—not just personalities—in terrorism, at least five of these latter acts are linked to the ugly racist novel, *The Turner Diaries*.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Although this shooting (of a black state trooper) is missing in one comprehensive FBI booklet, the 30 June 1984 act is related in other sources, including Louis R. Mizell, Jr., *Target USA: The Inside Story of the New Terrorist War* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 186–187. The perpetrator was scheduled to be executed on 19 April 1995, which apparently helped settle Timothy McVeigh on this date for bombing the federal building in Oklahoma City.

<sup>31</sup> Mark S. Hamm, *Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to Al Qaeda and Beyond* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 109–110.

<sup>32</sup> *The Turner Diaries*, a 1978 novel by William L. Pierce (writing under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald), is linked to at least five killings or nonlethal terrorist incidents of 1995–2006; see the 2nd edition of my book *Terrorism Today* (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), 18–19. Other incidents in the present text are documented by the Dept. of Justice/FBI publication *Terrorism in the United States: 1999: 30 years of Terrorism, A Special Retrospective Edition* (n.d. [Oct. 2001]), by Southern Poverty Law Center publications, and by media reports.

What social and political forces contain and resist this modern-day terrorism from the racist right? One is federal leadership from Washington, be it in federal statutes or action against entrenched resistance in some states and localities.<sup>33</sup> We return to the KKK: after the Civil War of the mid-nineteenth century, federal intervention had controlled or suppressed many indigenous patterns of racist behavior. This activism by Washington (including locking up thousands of Klansmen) was abandoned after 1882, with deleterious effects; when resumed after World War II, it proved again to be a vital element in the desegregation of the 1950s, and in the successful prosecution of terrorists in courts. Successive US presidents, the Justice Department, and other organs of federal power used law, administration, rhetoric, and occasionally the deployment of soldiers to check violence and dampen the resistance of white citizens and institutions opposed to racial equality. Federal power has not ended the Klan or most related organizations, but it damages their prestige, discourages activists, and demonstrates these organizations' weaknesses.

Majority public opinion has been yet more important. It was not revolution but evolution that made Americans move toward fuller racial equality. Education, religion, and common sense played their parts. The decline of racism was indirectly recognized by William L. Pierce, propagandist, author of *The Turner Diaries*, and founder of the white racist National Alliance, when he told admirer and terrorist Robert Matthews that "White people are just not in a revolutionary mood now."<sup>34</sup> Indeed, what is most remarkable about American racists' public demonstrations of the most recent decades is not that they occur, for that is simply an unsavory aspect of a large country with political liberty; it is instead that whenever a racist organization's march permit becomes known, ten times as many citizens turn out on the named day to counter-demonstrate against racism or neo-fascism. This phenomenon has been common all across America.<sup>35</sup> Racism is publicly despised.

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<sup>33</sup> This answer reveals the difference between "pro-state" terrorism and right-wing terrorism. The former is exercised by agents or partisans of state power, but in the US case it was precisely federal power that was most active against the racists. Right-wing terrorism of the KKK sort was by substate actors who hated the federal government's intervention in southern American affairs.

<sup>34</sup> Report circa 1984 of an earlier conversation, quoted in Morris Dees, *Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1996), 146.

<sup>35</sup> This also happened in Cologne Germany. In September 2008, a few dozen rightists appeared to rally against "Islamisation and immigration invasion." Forty thousand counter-protestors swamped the scene, and the initial marchers literally fled. See Jess Smee, "Anti-Islamisation' Event Abandoned After Protests," *The Irish Times*, September 20, 2008, available at <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2008/0920/1221835126595.html>, accessed 6 September 2009.

A third factor in the “containment” of such terrorism in the United States is the private legal suit. In singular victories that have come in a slow and compelling parade, civil suits are now used by public interest groups—usually in federal courts—to break individual terrorist organizations and hate groups. One leader of this legal offensive is Morris Dees, who in 1981 launched “Klanwatch”—now known as the Intelligence Project—at his Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Alabama. Three decades of work have provoked several murder plots against the attorney. It was a Dees suit, for example, that ended the reign of terror, hate-speech, and bogus religious rites conducted from a compound of Aryan Nations in Hayden Lake, Idaho. A woman and her daughter passing via automobile stopped near the compound, showed more than necessary interest, and were fired upon from within. In this case of assault, Dees beat the group in court, and Idaho took away Aryan Nations’ legal status, money, and land.<sup>36</sup> Today the Hayden Lake complex has been leveled and the twenty acres are “Peace Park.” With the death of Richard Butler, the group’s leader, and the arrest of a purported chief financier, it can be said that the Aryan Nations gang has been broken, peaceably, by domestic legal means. The Southern Poverty Law Center takes credit for similar claims of decisive action against Imperial Klans of America with chapters in eight US states, and the White Aryan Resistance started by Tom Metzger.

Outside the United States, racism, neofascism, and extreme nationalism have many other homelands, and occasionally spawn terrorism. The Czechs, Poles, and Russians have each had unprecedented opportunities for liberal democracy since 1990, but that has not prevented race persecution, beatings, stabbings, and occasionally deaths, especially in Russia. The group Blood & Honour keeps alive the Nazi flame with members or affiliates in a number of European Union countries and the United States.<sup>37</sup> Germany had a hundred cases of bodily injury from right-wing attack in the twenty-four-month period 2006–2007, though perhaps no homicide. In Italy, where a center-right government is strongly against illegal immigration, an unforgivable pattern of individual attacks is also visible, causing one local newspaper

<sup>36</sup> According to the Southern Poverty Law Center website, “SPLC civil suits would eventually result in judgments against forty-six individuals and nine major white supremacist organizations for their roles in hate crimes. Multimillion-dollar judgments against the United Klans of America and the neo-Nazi Aryan Nations effectively put those organizations out of business. Other suits halted harassment of Vietnamese fishermen in Texas by the Knights of the KKK and paramilitary training by the White Patriot Party in North Carolina.” See <http://www.splcenter.org/center/history/history.jsp>, accessed 6 September 2009.

<sup>37</sup> Europol, E.U. Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague: March, 2007), at [www.europol.europa.eu](http://www.europol.europa.eu), accessed in 2008.

headline to declare “a racism emergency.”<sup>38</sup> These facts and fears evidence continued dreaming by right-wing supremacists, a dream which for most passed forever in May 1945. Rightist extremism has by no means ended in Europe, although it is much less dangerous than some newer forms of terrorism.

### **More from the Left: Revolutionaries of the 1960s and Beyond**

Some Italians now fear a revival of their own militant left. This is unlikely, but it does speak to how vividly Italian adults recall the communist and anarchist terror groups of four decades ago. Much of Europe remembers. Those were times of violent upheavals, squatter communes, cocky splinter parties, and anarchism. Such things mixed and flourished in the German north in Frankfurt and West Berlin. French cities including Paris and Toulon saw riots and “Aux Barricades” cries beginning in May 1968. The late 1960s were years of racial and antiwar turmoil in the United States; many around the world were mesmerized by the communist-led turmoil and purges inside China. In the narrower field of pure terrorism, 1968 was above all the year of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, including founder George Habash and foreign allies such as Hans Joachim Klein and Vladimir Ilich Sanchez (“Carlos the Jackal”). They opened new fronts with international air piracy and lethal attacks in Paris. Many of the European groups networked, holding terrorist summits, meeting under foreign state auspices and in Middle Eastern training camps, buying arms from the same dealers, and occasionally carrying out joint missions, as against North Atlantic Treaty Organization targets.

Most of these later twentieth-century communist organizations failed—for two fundamental reasons. They could not successfully challenge the post–World War II success of capitalism and democracy. The second reason is that, as Lenin and Mao predicted, sporadic violence by small cells was unlikely to enjoy strategic success unless fully integrated with broader political and economic plans. For Lenin, this meant clandestine organization, a vanguard party apparatus, and understanding the perfect time to strike; for Mao, it meant protracted war and competition with the regime on multiple levels until, gradually, the strategic balance of power shifted and the long drive toward state power could conclude. Both men won. But their insight and prescience were not shared by Che Guevara. His school of simple “focoism” that stressed the mobilizational capabilities of small roving armed bands was a failure, after the singular victory in Cuba. Scores of Guevarist-type groups came and went, unsuccessfully and swiftly, especially on the Latin American scene.

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<sup>38</sup> Rachel Donadio, “Italy’s Attacks on Migrants Fuel Debate on Racism,” *The New York Times*, 12 October 2008.

Two of the continent's most celebrated terrorist groups, in Uruguay and Argentina, respectively, initially enjoyed years of success, until the military intervened and conducted systematic repression with all available assets. That is, powerful terrorists were defeated by greater power. Uruguay's bout with the communist Tupamaros led by Raul Sendic Antonaccio began in 1962, with their first manifesto appearing in 1965. Bank robberies paid for intelligence nets, a huge network of safe houses, weapons, and even underground medical clinics. Armed attacks bedeviled this liberal and admired country, sometimes called the "Switzerland of Latin America." After a few years of revolutionary work, the peace of the capital was in tatters, US personnel came under the gun, and British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson suffered an infamous and long period in a "people's prison." The group was a founder of modern terrorism in more respects: its partnership with the criminal underworld;<sup>39</sup> playing Robin Hood distributing cash and food to the poor; large numbers of female members; and the presence in Tupamaro ranks of substantial numbers of professionals and well-educated graduates.<sup>40</sup> The Uruguayan armed forces intervened in April 1972, later formally taking state power. They soon captured key revolutionary leaders as well as hundreds of cadre, and killed many Tupamaro gunmen. This was decisive; after 1973 the movement was never able to reorganize; after 1976, it had no serious presence at all. The Tupamaros had a successful run for about a decade and disappeared. Uruguay's armed forces defeated them and, years later, withdrew and handed power back over to civilian authorities. A once-flourishing democracy was thus returned to the democratic fold.<sup>41</sup>

Full-blooded state reaction also crushed the Montoneros in Argentina. These terrorists' ideology blended nationalism with Marxist-Leninism and populism, finding a balance of motives that accorded well with political trends in that country. Abroad

<sup>39</sup> Some analysts and writers relatively new to terrorism keep reporting the "news" that terror and organized crime have linkages. Perhaps they always have had such linkages, and for the reasons they do now, but certainly the pattern is very old and has often been described. A facilitator of the relationship, globalization, is also not new.

<sup>40</sup> An indicator of this legacy of the Tupamaros outside their country is the testimony of Russell Little. This former terrorist admits to the enthusiasm his Symbionese Liberation Army in California had in the early 1970s for the Tupamaros and the movie they inspired *State of Siege*. Mr. Little mentions most of the factors I touched in the text above while speaking for the Robert Stone documentary film *Guerrilla: The Taking of Patty Hearst*, (Magnolia Pictures, 2005).

<sup>41</sup> When freed from jail in the mid-1980s, Tupamaros leader Raul Sendic refounded his movement as a legitimate political party – the Movement of Popular Participation – and that too is part of how some terror groups end. On such groups as the Tupamaros, the best single source is Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990).



they opened offices and conducted propaganda; at home they infiltrated Juan Peron's political organizations and conducted bold armed operations, drawing upon as many as five thousand armed guerrillas. These tactical successes stung and bled the authorities, while generating fantastic sums of money, especially via kidnappings of industrialists, including one ransom of \$60 million;<sup>42</sup> some money would end up in Cuba, a patron state. But the Montoneros also evidenced vulnerabilities, especially an internal split between leftists and rightists that led even to gun battles. A series of spectacular actions occurred in 1974, but this marked the apex of success for the revolutionaries, as it led directly to a military decision for intervention. The generals took control of all civilian policing efforts in February 1975, and effected a full political coup in March of 1976. The successive months saw multiple and often ugly methods deployed to exterminate this powerful underground. Civilian authorities did not regain power; that would come only with the military despots' blunders and defeat in the Falklands War of 1982.

The Latin world of the late 1960s and the 1970s saw the rise and fall of many other groups, including the National Liberation Action (ALN) organization of Carlos Marighella. He turned from mainstream Brazilian communism into terrorist underground work, and published the 1969 pamphlet *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Then he perished almost immediately in a gun battle with police. His successor lasted only months and the ALN disappeared. The fall of many such short-lived groups makes clear the pattern. Force was met with force, be it legal, covert, or martial. Latin America saw some cases of state appeasement of terrorists, but few instances of successful negotiation leading into satisfactory settlements. Most of the challengers to government were advocates of "absolute war"; they were serious revolutionaries in a hunt for state power, not compromise, and not limited reforms in favor of the poor or the workers. Terrorist parties of this time were creative, exciting to some citizens, and often well led, by charismatic figures or well-educated propagandists, or both, making them strong enemies. As such, Latin states tended to reply slowly but ultimately with great harshness. In Guatemala and Argentina, especially, the government offensive came with free use of torture<sup>43</sup> and extrajudicial killing. Attrition of the terrorists and victory for the state were normal outcomes. The pattern would remain during

<sup>42</sup> The \$60 million ransom came from the kidnapping of businessmen Juan and Jorge Born in September 1974. See Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier, 1900–2001* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2003), 299.

<sup>43</sup> Of the chronicles of torture in Argentina, one thorough account in English is Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), e.g., 150–159. The book was given to me by a gifted and humane military officer of that country who wished that others avoid his country's mistakes while waging the "global war on terror."

much of the 1980s and 1990s, as we shall see, but with two notable differences: efforts at negotiation would become more common; and in certain cases, large numbers of Latin undergrounders would fold pacifically into overt political parties, shaping their ambitions in more legitimate fashions. The Colombian M-19 and Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) cadre would do so, following defeats in the fields.

Events in Latin America had strong parallels in Western Europe by 1968 and 1970. Anarchism appeared, after decades of absence in major cities, and to a degree not known in Latin America. Michael “Bommi” Baumann’s June 2 Movement in Germany helped reopen wars of youth, radicalism, and criminality against order. His mindless book of those days, *Terror or Love?*, suggests the lack of strategy in his political circle in Berlin, and thus anticipates the decline and failure of that dimension of the urban and student movement. Joschka Fischer and Daniel Cohn-Bendit did not do notably better in Frankfurt. These self-declared Sponti, or spontaneous ones, unrestricted by Leninist ideas of planning and revolutionary organization, attracted attention and sympathy, and police brutality on occasion, but never persuaded the German people they were all “latent fascists.” A concentrated multiyear effort to infiltrate a large factory for Opel cars and bring about workers’ rebellion flopped due to immaturity of technique.<sup>44</sup> Anarchism failed in northern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, unless a loosening of lifestyles and culture is taken as the only standard of success. Yet Fischer’s career is a notable example of one way terror groups end: folding into pacific life. He moved away from the violent underworld and sympathies for armed terrorism, toward the Green Party and elections, and even became the federal republic’s foreign minister (1998–2005). Both Fischer and Cohn-Bendit remain regularly in the newspapers, but as personalities and politicians, rather than street fighters.

Europe’s communist terrorist groups were more successful, longer-lived, and found more mainstream supporters, than competing anarchist groups. Italy’s communists make for remarkable study. *Prima Linea*, or *Front Line*, was a large terrorist organization and force of the underground. Trotskyite and Maoist parties abounded, inside and outside the law. *Lotta Continua*, or *Permanent Struggle*, boasted some two hundred thousand adherents. The *Red Brigades* had “columns” in Rome, Florence, Turin, and Milan, even if the last of those turned restless and broke away, taking money and guns with them. Incident levels in Italy rose in the 1970s to shocking heights. There was chaos, perceived and actual, in the country through the early 1980s. Such power in terrorist hands is always to be judged in relation to other political power; in Italy, central government was weak, after decades of tumultuous parliamentary

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<sup>44</sup> Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fisher and the Making of the Berlin Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

politics, enhanced Communist Party strength, and voter disillusionment with such matters as organized crime. Instead of teaching the value of democracy and the mechanisms of rule of law, some social science faculty were poisoning students with contempt of country. A powerful press like the Milan-based *Feltrinelli's* was no bulwark of the establishment; its heir, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, was literally a paymaster of various international militant groups, including Italian terrorists.<sup>45</sup> Hard-working Italian politicians who labored to build working coalitions of disparate parties failed more often than succeeded, and when Christian Democrat Aldo Moro built a bridge to the legal communist left, in 1978, the Red Brigades immediately murdered him for it.

In hindsight, Italian incident levels make it almost incredible that republican democracy survived. That it did, and without even one month of tyranny, is a lesson for all times. No dazzling new computer software or police science was the key. No one leader from the political parties took the helm and showed the way. Security forces were key— but not the only answer. The country's response was a hesitating and uncollective one, but it did succeed. And the most important victory was on the legal front. Instead of sacrificing the law, as in Argentina and Uruguay, legislators studied and improved the laws on terrorism in several key ways.<sup>46</sup> By measures passed through parliament, police were given greater powers to investigate and to detain suspects. A new group of judges was created to specialize in prosecuting terrorists—as also occurred in France. Terrorism ceased to be considered an anomaly or a quirky expression of libertines and became a named offense in state codes. A new provision, however, pointed the terrorist toward a “golden bridge” even as it threatened longer years in jail and encircled his rear with policemen: this allowed any who confessed, and aided police, to dramatically reduce their own sentences. This last point capitalized on the very size of the underground by giving openings to weaker cadre. The terrorist movement contained not just hardened men and women but softer adherents, or comrades grown weary; some of these were willing to talk when captured; pentiti testimony locked up comrades for decades; and the more they gave away, the more the rigor of the terrorist left generally dissolved. The phenomenon illustrated the vulnerabilities of terror groups that seek to become broad insurgencies; counterintel-

<sup>45</sup> Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1981), Chapter 2.

<sup>46</sup> The impressive and deliberative way Italian democracy brought an end to terrorism has been remarkably understudied, despite bales of publications on that country's violence. A recent exception is the well-done Leonard Weinberg chapter “The Red Brigades.” It does note that the antiterrorist police DIGOS probably used torture in a very few cases during the attempt to find kidnapped NATO General James Dozier and in its aftermath. *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, eds. Robert Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007); 49–56 are relevant.

ligence and discipline problems escalate with growth. It was combinations of legal punches and law enforcement—not an end to Communist bloc aid or the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall, that knocked down so many Italian leftist terrorists during the four years 1979 to 1982. Italy also deployed a specialized police unit, which on 28 January 1982 freed NATO's General James Dozier from a Padua apartment staffed by Brigadists. Incident chronicles then fell nearly silent for the Red Brigades columns; most notations were of arrests of undergrounders, not attacks.<sup>47</sup>

In North America the early 1970s were notable for their violence. This followed the rise in civil rights activism, and included several hideous murders of these activists by right-wingers. Problems were illuminated by arson and rioting in major US cities. The Vietnam War was a second source of domestic violence. It especially affected Americans below the 49th latitude, but the war also inflamed some eyes and ears in Canada.

The Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) is one of those charted by Dr. Crenshaw's groundbreaking 1991 survey "How Terrorism Declines."<sup>48</sup> She lists the group as active from 1963; one may or may not argue whether her end-date of 1972 is too generous to a group another scholar announces as "dormant" after 1970. The early date marks out this nationalist, separatist, and also leftist revolutionary group as among the first to be active in the Northern Hemisphere. They broke away from a larger leftist group and took aim at military establishments and US economic and political influence in their country. Evading police, one young leader returned to his native Belgium, while Raymond Villeneuve made a pilgrimage to Cuba, helping initiate a long relationship between that island state and North American leftists going underground or seeking to land airplanes they hijacked. The organization survived initial police reaction, found support in anti-Ottawa sentiment in the French-speaking region, published the journal *La Cognee* (The Axe), and engaged new members such as part-time journalist Pierre Vallieres, who was to write two solid books of propaganda.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> No Italian leftist killings of the 1980s (after 1981) make the thirty-one-page chronicle of international terror incidents 1920–2007 by Ann E. Robertson, *Terrorism and Global Security* (New York: Facts on File, 2007). Detailed research by Donnatella della Porta is my main source: "Left Wing Terrorism in Italy," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). Certainly there have been leftist terrorist actions in Italy in the last ten years; two murders in 2002 and 2003 were claimed by a group calling itself "Red Brigades," prompting newspaper reports of a revival.

<sup>48</sup> Martha Crenshaw is the scholar who has done far more than anyone to understand "How Terrorism Declines." The most significant way my ideas on the topic vary from hers is in judging that government counteraction is very important – often more so than internal factors.

<sup>49</sup> I have yet to study Pierre Vallieres' introduction to the movement, *Qu'est-ce que le FLQ?* But read with profit his 1967/1968 aggressively titled prison memoir *White N----- of America: The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec "Terrorist"* (New York: Monthly Review, 1968).

Robberies and kidnappings built toward a peak that came between the summers of 1968 and 1969; there were a hundred bombings, including that of the Montreal Stock Exchange. These produced vigorous police action by a government long known as quiescent and liberal. In 1970 the FLQ tried to escalate its efforts but overreached with an elaborate plot to seize a British trade commissioner and swap him for prisoners. As this fell into shambles, the FLQ also seized Vice Premier and Labor Minister Pierre Laporte—soon strangled, and dismissed in a terrorist bulletin as “Minister of Unemployment and Assimilation.”<sup>50</sup> Quebec separatism prompted the Canadian government to its own unique form of radicalism: a World War I-era “War Measures Act” was invoked for the first time during peace. This allowed a range of state actions that must have astonished the terrorists and their intellectually loose allies accustomed to chatter about the rightist “extremism” of Ottawa. Sufficiently provoked, Canadian authorities now introduced, against fellow Canadian citizens, such methods as agents provocateurs, systematic intelligence work, countless arrests, and detention without trial. Hundreds of FLQ cadre or sympathizers were entrapped. Within months the cause had been stalled; the country had become silent. Separatism still watered the soil of Quebecois nationalism, but in legal and fruitful channels, yielding election of the Socialist and former separatist Pierre Trudeau as prime minister in 1968. This victory, by a leader the FLQ’s Vallieres had mocked as a slavish compromiser, could just as well be said to show how the democratic path can be an effective path, that forgiving and indisciplined political culture (such as that of Weimar Germany) need not invite the empowerment of thugs (such as Nazis). Quebec separatists won “half a loaf” and it seems difficult to deny that terrorism was one cause of the change.<sup>51</sup> Now the separatist cause seems satiated; polling gives few indications of support for violence to further set the region apart from Canada. Terrorism ended in a combination of intelligence work, harsh law enforcement, and political accommodation.

Puerto Rico offers a related case, in which serious cultural, linguistic, and political differences may threaten division from a larger multinational country in North America. United States control of the island of the Caribbean dates from the US war with Spain; Puerto Rico was a sort of spoil of war. Advocates of total independence have never been able to capture more than a bare minimum of the island’s votes, but their track record of violent provocations is lengthy, reaching back to 1950, when they nearly assassinated President Harry Truman, and 1954, when the group shot up

<sup>50</sup> Elanor S. Wainstein, “The Cross and Laporte Kidnappings, Montreal, October 1970,” RAND Corporation Report prepared for Department of State and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (R-1986/1-DOS/ARPA), February 1977.

<sup>51</sup> One contribution to this Canadian case is Ted Robert Gurr, “Terrorism in Democracies,” Chapter 6 in *Origins of Terrorism*, a superb book edited by Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

the House of Representatives. Arrests ended these cells. The thoughts and resentments that sparked the cases smoldered as embers, however, and produced new flame in 1974 when the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) appeared. They stunned New York City with a tavern bombing of a type Americans associated with Ulster tragedies. Incendiaries were laid in department stores— in a suggestion of later German RAF arson of 1968, or partisans of Iraq who left dynamite in Paris stores in late 2008. Dozens of other attacks followed. Then the action jumped from the eastern United States to Puerto Rico itself, opening a fresh front. But arrests and convictions, as of ten perpetrators in December 1980, squelched the drive. It has been argued that the group ended in 1982; certainly after 1983 there was little to keep the FALN name in lights. Policing succeeded.

But the FALN case reveals the difference between a campaign and a war. One militant Puerto Rican campaign was finished—but not the war. A very similar group had been founded in 1978 and proved well prepared to succeed the faltering FALN. They called themselves the machete-wielders, or *Los Macheteros*. Displaying that mix of leftism and nationalism so visible in the twentieth-century terrorist world, the new group was an ally of the Marxist-Leninist Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which itself had connections to Cuba. Their greatest triumphs represented guerrilla war and terrorist robbery capabilities. The first was a 1978 simultaneous incendiary attack on nine US combat planes lined up at a military base near Isla Verde International Airport. The second, five years later, was equally impressive. Having placed a member inside the workings of the Brinks armored car service in Hartford, Connecticut, the group awaited the best day, brought other employees under control, and escaped with \$7.2 million. Some of it emerged in Robin Hood-style giveaways in Puerto Rican communities; some of it doubtless bought weapons and supplies; much of it appears to have gone to Cuba in a vehicle driven over the US border with Mexico.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) took apart *Los Macheteros* with the same patience and thoroughness it would show later against rightists and “militiamen” in the US “patriot movement” of the 1990s. With surveillance, wire taps, and other efforts (not to mention the special energy of an organization whose office in San Juan had been rocketed by *Macheteros*), the FBI disassembled this organization, brought its people to trial, and awarded lengthy sentences. Women and men, activists and journalists, social workers, and a Harvard University man were convicted in the late 1980s. The effect on the group was nearly terminal. William Clinton, in a legal but imprudent use of the powers of the presidency, pardoned many of these terrorists as he departed the White House in 2001. Of further concern to counter-terrorists was the continued liberty of Filiberto Ojeda Rios, a long-time *Machetero* leader. Finally,

in 2005, the FBI found him, armed, in a house on the island; he died in the subsequent gunfight.<sup>52</sup>

Los Macheteros may be counted among the “deceased” of late twentieth-century terrorist organs. The proximate cause of their expiry was devoted work by law enforcement and successful trials—the latter can never be taken for granted.<sup>53</sup> It is not irrelevant that the US Navy, after a century of use of Vieques as a bombing and gunnery range, ceased such practices, removing one cause of discontent in Puerto Rico. Perhaps a larger cause of the near-total containment of terrorism by government has been inadequate support for it by other Puerto Ricans. In the same way that a majority of Irish have long rejected IRA methods, the island of four million people,<sup>54</sup> as a whole, neither votes for nor supports bombings and killings for independence. There is no mass support, above or below the political ground level. On the other hand, Los Macheteros were a success for some years, and before them came other waves in this pool of ethnic and nationalist resentments, which may well be stirred by further storms. Such disturbances can sometimes have a cumulative effect. In tsarist Russia, for example, there were three waves of political terrorism; each of the first two subsided, yet all helped produce the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917.

As the twentieth century closed, merging with the twenty-first, another nationalist-separatist fighting force with long tenure and a solid level of performance and skill seemed in profound trouble. Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) in Spain and France is unlike Los Macheteros because it still has fighters in the field and other operational capacities. But the ETA is at an all-time point of weakness. It survives, but barely; it strikes against Spain, but rarely; it makes headlines, but usually with the capture of ETA shooters or financiers by the more clever security forces of Madrid or Paris. ETA is still standing but may be on its last legs. If so, and ETA ends, it would be significant to world terrorism: The group is now a half-century old, has killed nearly nine hundred Spanish in its operations, and has represented a model, and

<sup>52</sup> It is not surprising that Filiberto Ojeda Rios declined to “walk away” from terrorism when discovered in September 2005, or that the FBI had to use their weapons. In a previous arrest, this same terrorist had begun burning documents when agents knocked at his door; he then opened fire with a machine gun, blinding an FBI agent in the eye. Ojeda Rios was disarmed. Later he jumped bail.

<sup>53</sup> When a country’s justice system is corrupted or incompetent the effects on terrorist groups are doubtless exhilarating, or comic. A different problem are justice systems which are more generous to convicts than to the public on which convicts prey; this allows for short jail terms and releases a man onto the streets who may now be better-trained than ever (by others in jail) for future crime or terrorism.

<sup>54</sup> If some four million live on the island of Puerto Rico, more than two million more now live in the rest of the United States – which helps explain the disparate locations of these terrorist attacks.

been an occasional partner, to other terror groups. Among its greatest successes must be counted the attraction of foreign support—guns from Libya, perhaps advice from Soviet agents, certainly training grounds in Soviet-bloc client state South Yemen in the 1970s—without ever being soiled in its image as an indigenous and independent revolutionary force. This is a difficult balance to strike, but ETA has done it well.

Formed at the end of the 1950s, ETA focused on propaganda and political front activities, initiating systematic violence only years later. Principal Spanish political and security force personnel, and Civil Guards (the gendarmerie) were the most usual victims. Shooting was a preferred method; later would come the car bombs, with their far wider swathes of “collateral damage” to other Spaniards. Assigning a “revolutionary tax” to Basques who were, and were not, engaged in revolution was an innovative and successful financing means the group has never abandoned. But weaknesses were also present. Internecine quarreling over ideology was a plague of the early decades, with some leaders favoring pure nationalism while another strong wing wanted to rally behind declarations of Communism and global revolution. Two other problems were larger, also political. Spain emerged as a strong democracy, as the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 led into the benign monarchy of King Juan Carlos, who transferred some powers over to the National Assembly. Second, in a move largely ignored by terrorism analysts and much of the outside world, the central government bestowed on the Basque lands a high degree of autonomy as to matters of culture, local law, and language. This was quite simply a concession to Basque activism of many types. Initially, ETA reacted violently, probably sensing the subtle dangers (to a terrorist movement) in this prudent concession by Madrid. Over time the government work had its effect, helping to divide the ordinary Basque from his confrere in the terrorist underground.

Today the political fronts that were once so helpful to supporting ETA violence are gravely weakened. Several have been banned by Madrid, including Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity), which in the early 1980s was second in strength in Spanish political parties. Herri Batasuna changed its name to Batasuna, only to again be proscribed. In 2007, 2008, and 2009 the most noted spokesman for the front, Arnaldo Otegi, was under intense police pressure. The larger political challenge is that typical Basques no longer respond to ETA battle cries; indeed, the largest parade on the nationalist issue the country has seen in recent years occurred in January 2007 and it was against ETA terrorism.<sup>55</sup> A final problem is almost overwhelming for the dwindling ranks of ETA terrorists: Franco-Spanish cooperation. This began in small ways in the late 1980s, as France at last began making moves on its side of the border to arrest

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<sup>55</sup> See “Timeline: ETA Attacks,” BBC News, last updated 6 August 2009. Accessed 6 September 2009 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/545452.stm>



ETA activists and financiers. For example, a French raid of 1986 on a safe house unveiled much about the group's finances within France, and also captured varieties of international currency. More important was the impetus felt in Madrid to closely collaborate, in 1991 and 1992, to protect impending world tourist events in Spain such as the World Trade Fair, and the Barcelona Olympics of 1992. The late 1990s and early twenty-first century saw continued close cooperation, with arrests on both sides of the Franco-Spanish border. It seemed that new leaders served only months in their roles before capture. The president of France and the prime minister of Spain met in Elysee Palace in January 2008 to advance collaboration on counterterrorism, going so far as to announce creation of a small, combined policing unit.<sup>56</sup> This now continuous and high-level bilateral cooperation is wrecking ETA.<sup>57</sup> There is scarcely another case in recent times of two countries combining so well to snuff out terrorist cells—to the immense advantage of both states.<sup>58</sup>

Two other famous and long-standing terrorist entities of our world might have been comparatively studied, until May 2009. Both were Marxist-Leninist; both had enjoyed protracted periods of leadership continuity; both were wealthy; they have been successful as insurgents and leaders of “shadow governments,” protecting large swaths of territory, and were thus much more than “bite and flee” attackers of civilian and military targets. Mao Tse Tung's “phase two” warfare, combining guerrilla

<sup>56</sup> “Paris and Madrid United Against Terrorism,” *Le Figaro*, 11 Jan. 2008 (trans. CCH).

<sup>57</sup> Notices of arrests of ETA leaders have come almost monthly from Madrid or Paris. Presumed leader Javier Lopez Pena was grabbed in France in mid-2008. Then in November came the arrest of “Cherokee,” spelled “Txeroki” in Basque, the nom de guerre of Mikel de Garikoitz Aspiaz Rubina, alleged military chief. He and a reported lieutenant, Leire Lopez Zurrutuza are charged with conspiracy and arms offenses, although Txeroki is also suspected of murder – killing two undercover Spanish officers in France in Dec. 2007, reports the *Agence France Press*; *Hurriyet* (Istanbul) in English, 22–23 November 2008. See also the story in *The Times* (London), 18 November 2008. Looking back now, one must remember the early observers of prescience who wrote on the declining power and prospects of ETA. E.g., no researcher's “How Terror Ends” subfile on Basque ETA should be without the Foreign Policy Research Institute article of 8 October 2004, “The End of ETA?” Author Michael Radu has been a reliable and forward-looking analyst of international terror groups for decades. Perhaps taking his lead, the *New York Times*' Renwick McLean followed on 20 December 2004 with a good dispatch from Madrid: “Bombings in Spain Are Seen as a Sign of Basque Group's Decline, Not Strength.”

<sup>58</sup> UK-US cooperation during the R. Reagan /M. Thatcher administrations was an earlier case of excellent bilateral cooperation – against the IRA Provos.

efforts with semi-conventional and positional warfare,<sup>59</sup> is the best descriptor of the character of these two very important organizations. The FARC of Colombia and the LTTE in Sri Lanka have been feared for their skills in varieties of fighting and terrorism. Now the latter appears finished. About the former, the Colombian government must be especially careful. One of the great yet common sins of counterinsurgency is overestimating successes, of which there were many during 2007 and 2008. But Bogota has more to do, and after FARC there is the smaller entity ELN.

The government and armed forces of Sri Lanka after 2001 were seized with a profound determination that has resonated with their polity and allowed concerted national effort against a powerful in-country enemy. The 1980s and 1990s had seen many ground battles, which together with LTTE terrorism had left over sixty-five thousand dead. A negotiated peace made for a few quiet years, but this was overturned in 2006 and replaced by the most intense fighting. As 2008 finished, regional newspapers were printing accounts of major advances by government ground forces, and the recapture of key towns, as well as the idea that founding leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was living on the run—from jet fighters and ground incursions into his traditional safe havens. In pursuit of him, according to the International Herald Tribune, was Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a former army officer, a relentless opponent of negotiated concessions or halts in the military offensive, and a skilled coordinator of the air, ground, and naval forces now hunting LTTE night and day.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>59</sup> American writers, even in military journals, sometimes misrepresent Mao's concepts. From his writings of the 1920s and 1930s, and the historical work of Samuel Griffith, I see "phase one" warfare as the strategic defensive – characterized by political organization and guerrilla war (as well as terrorism, which Mao usually declines to mention). "Phase two" warfare is a strategic equilibrium in which the insurgency is strong enough to hold its ground, and in which guerrilla war continues, supplemented by positional and even conventional war elements. In "phase three," the insurgency has developed well politically and is battle-tested militarily, and commanders can use all manners of fighting that are appropriate, and especially conventional positional war. Mao's theory is too often treated skeptically, even by scholars; it well accounts for the progress and successful resolution of wars in China (1949) and Vietnam (1975). FARC and LTTE are thus groups that for many years have been locked into "phase two" war with their respective enemies. For an effective use of Mao's theory to illuminate modern Islamist fighting, see Dr. Norman Cigar's introduction to Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin's *A Practical Course for Guerrilla War: Al Qaida's Doctrine for Insurgency* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008).

<sup>60</sup> Apart from Sri Lankan progress on the ground, there were many sinkings of LTTE naval assets – that group being a rarity in having such fighting boats and suicide craft. The Hindu (India) reported that the army had the "LTTE Chief on the Run" on 27 December 2008. Press items point to attrition of the LTTE navy in 2008 and 2009; thanks to Larry Cosgriff for the steady stream of clippings. Somini Sengupta wrote the profile on the Sri Lankan minister for the International Herald Tribune, 22–23 November 2008; the paper is now the global edition of the New York Times and one angle of its interest was in Rajapaksa's status as a naturalized US citizen.

He is the brother of Sri Lanka's president. Now, it may be argued that this leadership duo and fine armed forces have wrecked the guerrillas and terrorists of LTTE. After thirty-five indomitable years, Prabhakaran and many top officers are dead.<sup>61</sup>

### Some Groups of Religious Bent

Terrorism is always political. In the late twentieth century it also became more religious. The 1970s and 1980s offered several extreme versions of Christianity and of Hinduism, which caught up "true believers" in militancy. There were Sikh sects active—and killing—internationally in the mid-1980s.<sup>62</sup> There was long-running violence from the Jewish Defense League (in the eastern United States, sometimes by individuals with links to Israelis), which may now be spent. But by 1988 and 1990 one could begin to discern newer groups of religious bent—or bent religion. One study has determined that a definite numerical majority of the new groups founded since 1990 avow religious objectives—in front of, or parallel to, political ones.<sup>63</sup> Most such groups deserve to be taken at their word. Iran's officials supported (then and now) groups of both Sunni and Shia faiths. Beneficiaries include Hamas, which in its well-crafted charter took an integrated approach to conceptual support for struggle and violence that combined ideas of Sunni Islamism in realms of politics, culture, society, even the arts, and the place of women. There are, newly in evidence, many more religion-inspired political movements in the traditional "arc of crisis" from North Africa through the greater Middle East into Afghanistan and Pakistan.

<sup>61</sup> It remains important to learn the fate of certain second-tier leaders, especially "KP" or Kumaram Padmanathan, the logistics chief behind a global and skillful network of money and supplies. Fall of 2009 indicated he may be in custody at last. He has served the Tigers superbly, and almost as long as their supreme leader, and presumably remains in fighting trim. The leader's son, Charles Anthony Prabhakaran, until his death in May 2009, commanded the Tigers' nascent air force. Good short postmortems, summarizing LTTE's effects on the world of terrorism, have been written by Mia Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al Qaeda," *Washington Post*, 24 May 2009, and by Peter Leitner and Rajika Jayatilake, "Lessons from Sri Lanka," *Washington Times*, 22 June 2009. On the more historical side, the student of LTTE always does well with the detailed books of reporter M. R. Narayan Swamy.

<sup>62</sup> One Sikh group took down a Canadian Air flight, killing 329 passengers, in June 1985. Perhaps a scholar interested in how terror groups end, a regional expert such as K.P.S. Gill, will one day detail how it was that international Sikh terror had so short a lifespan.

<sup>63</sup> Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg, "The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 14 No. 3 (Autumn 2002), 141–147.

The 1990s also saw the crest of Aum Shinrikyo (“Supreme Truth”), strong in Japan but also Russia. It offered an eccentric mix of worship of Shiva (Hindu goddess of destruction), certain precepts of Buddhism, fashionable mysticism and self-help, and the claims-to-deity of its founder, Shoko Asahara, who, among other innovations, expanded the Buddhist precept of *poa* into an excuse for mass killing for the “altruistic” purpose of releasing souls for reincarnation in higher forms and better status.<sup>64</sup>

Such perverse ideas and a cult of personality would lead directly to some of the first uses of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a substate actor. Asahara had not always obsessed over WMD, but his views darkened dramatically after efforts to openly compete in political elections to Japan’s lower Diet in February 1990. The failed exercise brought in fewer than two thousand votes. Humiliation set arrogance and self-interest off together on the road to terrorism, and ultimately mass murder. This devolution is a fair rejoinder to the illogic in the oft-voiced apology for terrorism, that “minorities are driven to violence to be heard.” In such cases as Aum, the terror groups are indeed minorities—because their ideas and platforms are simply unpopular; this hardly gives them rights to murder, maim, and menace the innocent until they receive more attention. Asahara hastened his scientific programs, which came to include beam weapons, and Ebola virus, and efforts to acquire uranium. Aum conducted its first WMD attack in April 1990—with botulism. Another dozen WMD attacks of varying type and considerable originality followed, including use of botulinum toxin (against the Imperial Palace) in 1993, a killing with sarin in Matsumoto in June 1994, and a subway attack the next year with briefcases dispensing toxin (botulism, again) through built-in fans. More failed than succeeded, but all prepared the cult well for 20 March 1995 and its mass-casualty success with sarin on Tokyo subways. The world was amazed; Japan was stunned. Maiming many more than it killed, the gas traumatized the Japanese national psyche.<sup>65</sup>

Aum’s strengths included fanaticism, peculiarly combined with the high education levels and scientific training of many top cadres. There was as well a fruitful collaboration with Russia. Thousands of members joined in that country, but more importantly, highlevel military and government and scientific circles in Russia sold or gave Aum many valued prizes, from commando training by former KGB experts to a military helicopter to a formula for sarin.<sup>66</sup> Finally, there was the remarkable budget

<sup>64</sup> Of the several English-language books on Aum, the best on this subject may be Ian Reader, *Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo* (Richmond, Surrey, England: Curzon, 2000), e.g., 193–195.

<sup>65</sup> Haruki Murakami, *Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), trans. A. Birnbaum and P. Gabriel.

<sup>66</sup> David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 108–112.

of the cult, and its enormous infrastructure, especially in Japan; these were massive, and doubtless helped with political influence and deterred punitive suits. But the most important of Aum's strengths, the one that most prolonged the cult's life before 1995, was Japanese tolerance. A society long known to permit or indulge religious societies and cults, Japan is also a liberal democracy, as hesitant as post war Germany to display a heavy hand in domestic or foreign affairs. This religious, social, and political tolerance was stretched beyond all limits as Aum increasingly preyed upon wider circles of Japanese civilians in the early 1990s. There were kidnappings, druggings, shamelessly inept "medical treatments" in their clinics, disciplinary murders, illegal disposal of corpses, and outright attacks on public figures such as judges who had made anti-Aum rulings in property cases.

The cult's weaknesses, by contrast, were few. For example, Aum required a relative minimum of members, being flamingly elitist in its practices and planning. If public support could not be mustered in elections, it was enough to have the public ignore most of the cult's actions. Even the visions of the apocalypse that darkened Asahara's mind were a source of certain strengths: forcing cohesion; permitting discipline; eliciting tremendously long work hours from members. Only the excess of terrorist killing in the final, successful sarin attack brought the group's end. Once government and police were confronted with the act of 20 March 1995, they snapped to attention and dismantled the decade-old organization. Japan arrested some four hundred members; thousands quit on their own. The guru founder and many top leaders went to prison. Administrative proceedings immediately placed Aum in formal bankruptcy, although their legal charter to exist was not revoked, it seems. One can argue that Aum was decapitated by arrests.

Might Aum be a case of a terrorist group enduring exposure and setbacks by changing its name? This phenomenon, noticed by political scientist Harold W. Rood, accounts for many past actions by sophisticated terror groups—e.g., (1) the way the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) created and disused the entity Black September; (2) Irish militants moving from the "Official" Irish Republican Army, to the "Provisionals" (PIRA) in 1969, to "Real IRA" in 1997; or (3) the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), which changed its name after its founder's capture in 1999 and then changed it again, to Kongra Gel, and perhaps most recently the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation.<sup>67</sup> Aum suffered through its public humiliation, mass arrests, and the loss of most of its facilities. It then reemerged as Aleph—the first word of the Hebrew language. On the surface it is different in character: peaceable, though still devoted

<sup>67</sup> A 16 April 2009 news item claims that jailed PKK leader Ocalan founded this new front; no date is given. When Kongra Gel was founded, much earlier, other names listed by the US State Dept. for the new entity included the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK), and the People's Congress of Kurdistan.

to yoga, rites of self-purification, and other aspects of religion, psychology, and public attention-getting. In a classic exercise of democratic freedom of speech, and an unwitting reminder of how Japan allowed a killer cult such as Aum to develop, an earnest foreign newspaper columnist in Tokyo wrote in apparent anguish over how Aleph's "monks" and "laymen" are piteously "hounded" by police even though "no one can explain what the danger is." Police surveillance is attributed by this newspaperman to the logic that Japan "needs" another threat—that only "a potentially resurgent Aum justifies police budgets and staff levels."<sup>68</sup>

Aum changed its name; now observers ask whether it has changed its nature. Some Japanese security officials think Aum's successor does bear close watching: Two years after the sarin attacks, Aum publicity still advertised its interest in poa, and "official guru" duties once held by Asahara were said by adherents to be maintained by his two young children while he is in jail. If thousands of original members did leave the group in 1995, several hundred did not, or later returned, including several top officials who must be considered complicit in the former violence. These include Fumihiro Joyu, who was jailed for three years only to return, gain control of Aleph, and direct it for a half-decade—until a March 2007 schism. None of the capital sentences for murder have been carried out, and many lesser Aum criminals have long since left jail. The new group is also rebuilding physical infrastructure. The shell company that made computers never disbanded in official bankruptcy proceedings by the state, was soon prospering again, with tens of millions of dollars in sales by the late 1990s. In 2002, Kyodo News reported that such sales, and the way Aleph "places the highest level of importance on developing cyber skills" and "identifies itself as a cyber cult," were reasons for US intelligence concern about a cyber-attack by the group.<sup>69</sup> As of 2005, Aleph owned twenty-six facilities, as well as another 120 residences, according to Japan's national police, and 650 members were living collectively in compounds. Canada, the United States, and the European Union all classify Aleph as a terrorist organization.

Other religious terrorist groups of the late twentieth century have not merely evaded arrest for their crimes; they flourish. This success defies an undercurrent of certain academic writers counseling that "calm observers understand that terrorism always fails." Such a view is nonsense, and both Hezbollah and Hamas offer reproof to the idea. The former was born among Lebanese Shia in 1982; the latter is a Palestinian Sunni counterpart begun some five years later. The trajectory of each helps

<sup>68</sup> Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Poison Cult 'Hounded' by Police," *The Independent* (UK), 28 July 2002. Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japan-poison-cult-houndedby-police-649680.html>, accessed 6 September 2009.

<sup>69</sup> Lt. Col. John Kane (USMC) – author of another chapter here – has been of good help in tracking the cyber-side of Aum and of Aleph.

explain (1) how religion works with politics to produce a successful terrorist organization, and (2) how it is that some terror groups end: in success, for both have now achieved political power by degrees, even if their ultimate objects have not been won. Hezbollah and Hamas have proven they are as sophisticated as they are dangerous.

The so-called Party of God (Hezbollah) began by emphasizing a role as the “Organization of the Oppressed on Earth”—another of Hezbollah’s many names. It prudently never abandoned this arm of activity. Human needs are one of the only abundancies of Beirut’s Shia slums, and Hezbollah’s effective shadow government is at work nourishing, nursing, educating, and propagandizing among those people. Such labors have always helped to make people ignore the rank hubris in calling themselves “The Party of God,” on the one hand, and have helped to justify and excuse their terrorism, on the other. Indeed, the infamy of the 1980s days of kidnapping, torturing, and killing hostages including Germans, Frenchmen, and Americans has all but passed out of today’s parlance; it has been some time since Hezbollah acted in such ways against westerners. Even after the death of intelligence chief Imad Mughniyah (in Syria in 2008), this remains an organization of capable terrorist operatives—but their emphasis is of other kinds: guerrilla war and politics.

Against any opponent, especially the Israeli Defense Force soldiers, the organization offers a sophisticated and developing array of methods and techniques, from well-disguised road bombs to anti-ship missiles to unmanned aerial vehicles (which may one day be armed). Several thousand men and women are armed by Hezbollah; many more thousands are trained or active supporters; its discipline and ability have been recognizable to military analysts for a decade and a half, and to the world after July 2006, when Hezbollah forces fired rockets into Israeli territory. Hezbollah has another arm, the political. Its skills well suit the freedoms of action offered in a relative vacuum of Lebanese life, where central government is weak and past official pronouncements about Hezbollah’s existence and de facto rivalry to the state are permissive or even apologetic.<sup>70</sup> Finally there is the media arm of Hezbollah, outlets led by Al Manar television. When Israeli bombs destroy the antennas or studios, Al Manar swiftly resurrects—another proof of the way political infrastructure, religious motivation, and state sponsorship may enliven terror organizations under even the

<sup>70</sup> While events in 2008 seemed to instruct the national government in the dangers Hezbollah poses inside Lebanon, it has been striking to hear how apologetic have been many previous official statements. Twice I heard radio interviews in which the Lebanese Ambassador to the United States said nothing but good about Hezbollah and blamed the group’s violence on the “Israeli occupation” – with the exception of a couple of farms had ended years before. The government spokesmen were ignoring as well the policy ends of Hezbollah, which are contrary to those of democratic multiconfessional Lebanon, and the meddling roles of Iran, which Hezbollah itself counts as its mentor.

most intense pressure. Like FARC in Colombia, or the New People's Army in the Philippines, the Party of God can seemingly absorb any number of hard hits, year upon year, and carry on, planning for an indefinite future. Conceivably, Hezbollah might one day lead a Lebanese coalition government.

Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, formed amid the clatter of stones and bullets in the first Intifada in late 1987. Like Hezbollah, it enjoys huge subsidies from Iranian coffers<sup>71</sup>—even while declining to walk the Shiite line in religious affairs. Individuals and groups of Palestinian expatriates worldwide supply other money and aid, as from the United States, Europe, and the Latin “Tri-Border Area.” Secular Syria gives fulsome support, and always has, despite profound differences of political ideology. These Palestinian terrorists, politicians, and undergrounders began with the slingshot and the knife—and after all the knife was all that was needed in attacks by “The Assassins” of the twelfth-century Middle East. Swiftly, Hamas graduated to a wide array of weapons, especially the vehicle bomb—yet another “lesson learned” by watching Hezbollah.

While Hamas lacks its Lebanese counterpart's skills in complex guerrilla war, it is possessed of a smooth and practiced political touch. It campaigns and competes well at the polls, and did so well before stunning Fatah (and outside observers) with a January 2006 electoral victory in Gaza. That led in turn to a June 2007 formal political regime in Gaza, which rivaled Fatah's control of the West Bank and also allowed the periodic launching of rockets into Israeli towns.<sup>72</sup> Hamas, “owning” Gaza, had the power to gather rockets, the ability to launch them, and the responsibility for the war they produced with Israel. The organization also continues its many other forms of attacks on foreigners, especially Israelis, and its bloody rivalry with Fatah Palestinians. More than a few observers of history— or cynics—have said that some terrorists become sanctified once they attain state power. Hamas has some of each—power and legitimacy—and is grappling for more. In its charter, which lays down its views on society, religion, politics, the arts, etc., there is an absolute and oft-repeated prescription against compromise or any mediated solutions to “the Palestinian problem”

<sup>71</sup> According to A. N. Pratt, posted to a Middle East diplomatic mission during early 2008, Iran gives Hamas some \$120 million a year. Many others' past estimates of Iranian aid to Hezbollah have been as high.

<sup>72</sup> See Country Reports on Terrorism: 2007 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2008), and past versions of this State Department annual – which has appeared for three decades. In certain recent years the report suffered from flaws in its statistics, which required correction in some cases. But I do not accept the implications suggested by resultant newspaper articles; I find the report in general an admirable compilation and a sound record of most events, highly useful to scholars, and less flawed than the terrorism coverage of many books and periodicals. ’



that surrender any authority over any part of the land.<sup>73</sup> Negotiations, not to mention pathways out of violence, are never easy; it is most challenging to make inroads with a religiously motivated terrorist clan. But that is Hamas; its desirability as a partner—to Fatah or foreign parties—in any peace process is only slightly above nil. The end of Hamas is not near. The group is in fact a success.

### **Graphing Results, in Nine Parts**

The sweep of the twentieth century proffers innumerable examples for the study of how terror groups end. There are hundreds of terrorist groups—too many to master, or even mention, in one essay. And there are different good ways to approach this considerable analytical challenge. We have excluded several notable false starts, such as the odd notion that terror groups have a natural life span. Arguing for the latter ignores the varied and important factors that limit or enable terrorism, ranging all the way from the governmental responses the present author often emphasizes, to the internal and strategic choices the leaders make, and that Martha Crenshaw's scholarship has illuminated.

My distinctive direction, in publications and public lectures of 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, was to classify the leading ways that most groups come to their demise: that is, defeat by security forces; defeat by decapitating the leadership; defeat by government's good grand strategy; folding into pacific political life; and terrorist success. The present, more chronologically oriented approach throws different kinds of light. It comes to conclusions about a given group under a pair of analytical rubrics: duration of the group's life, with emphasis on significant actions or years of "main violence"; and extent of successful results. Studied under the first rubric (I) are terror groups whose campaigns are of short duration (five years or less). Groups that ran for a medium length (eight to fifteen years) are rubric II. Rubric III shows protracted terrorist campaigners whose efforts last for two, three, four, and even five decades. With cross-cutting analysis, we identify, first, organizations that expire defeated; second, others that achieved or are achieving limited success and third, groups that have largely succeeded, or appear to enjoy strategic successes now.

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<sup>73</sup> "The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement," offered up to the "Name of the Most Merciful Allah," is dated 18 August 1988 and may be found on the website of The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject\\_menus/mideast.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/mideast.asp)

A chart at the chapter's end graphs these nine sections of results, and a footnote follows here on methodology.<sup>74</sup>

### Short-Lived Organizations

I A: Scores of twentieth-century terrorist groups have had very brief life spans, as little as three to five years. This fact, and the swiftness with which the public forgets them, ought not mean neglect of how they were defeated or brought into decline. Analysts and strategists have often declared that it is best if government can interrupt terrorism or insurgency in its incipient stages. This is usually a regretful post facto complaint about a government's lapse. It can instead be an optimist's observation about how quickly a dangerous terror group has disappeared or been defeated.

Among the first of these, in post-World War II history, was the Secret Army Organization, founded to save European settlers' status and French power in Algeria, but that totally failed within a year and a half—by mid-1962. Certain other European rightist groups were to have life spans of similar brevity, or do only marginally better. In 1980, for example, there was the aforementioned neo-Nazi scare, a natural result of massive bombings in quick succession in Bologna, Munich, and Paris. But the Paris assault was by Palestinians using an invented French cover name, the Federation of National Action. In Germany the "Military Sports Group" of Karl Heinz Hoffman did exist. But it had barely begun to operate when one of its bombs killed thirteen visitors at the Oktoberfest in the Therese Meadow in central Munich; by a year later, the little clan was on the ropes. Peter Janke's admirable dictionary of guerrilla and terrorist organizations devotes a mere eight lines to the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman. Members went to the Near East for Palestinian training and "were arrested on their return to the Federal Republic . . . Hoffman was jailed in 1981, after which the group ceased to exist."<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> In this chapter, when speaking of a group's lifespan, I treat its participation in violence of consequence to the state – so some periods of preparation and planning, of several years or even a decade (e.g., Sendero in the 1970s) may be excluded. So too might one exclude years of quiet, after violence (as when members of the Symbionese Liberation Army, having failed, hid underground, 1976–1999). So my chart shows dates for the group's existence, but others for the years of "main violence." Consistent with the PTSS approach, I include discussion of appropriate insurgent groups that systematically employ terror; neither this chapter nor this book is merely focused on small terrorist cells.

<sup>75</sup> Janke, 23. The Hoffman group is so lost to history that even the US National Counterterrorism Center's annual desk diaries say nothing of the bombing on 26 September 1980. Yet its significance recurred in 2009 when the famous fall festival in Munich was again directly threatened by terrorists – of al Qaeda.

American examples of total failure and precipitous decline are too numerous to chart. Illustrative are four groups of the 1970s and 1980s, at different ends of the ideological spectrum: the Symbionese Liberation Army, the United Freedom Front, the Order, and the Army of Aryan Resistance. The first two of these gun gangs were black-dominated leftists who held up banks and shot patrolmen while dreaming of status as a revolutionary vanguard. The other two were white-power groups on the political far right. None of these enjoyed even three good years of real power in their respective undergrounds. A common theme of such cases, in Europe and America, is good and aggressive police work, and resultant attrition through both arrests and gun battles, sapping the vigor of these secular, racist and militant organizations.

Myriad fragments of militant life have burned briefly and expired shortly. Consider Latin America. In Bolivia, the endlessly romanticized Cuba-veteran Che Guevara started a “National Liberation Army” that never exceeded fifty-one troops. It formed in 1966 only to see Che and another leader killed the next year. That drama inspired a successor in Brazil, named the October 8 Revolutionary Movement, which a wave of arrests swiftly reduced to virtual invisibility in 1969. Later, as remnants folded back into Brazil’s official communist party,<sup>76</sup> a further Brazilian spore failed to flower, let alone take root: “National Liberating Action” existed from 1968 until 1971.<sup>77</sup> To consider Europe is to rediscover many such flickers and flights. In Holland alone, now-long-gone entities include the Free South Moluccan Youth Organization (1975–1979), and Red Youth and Red Help groups of the early 1970s. Italy’s rightist Revolutionary Action Movement ran for half a decade only, in the mid-1970s. There was the New Force, which lasted six years in Spain, passing from the scene in 1981, and there was Portugal’s yet-shorter-lived New Order. Belgium’s Communist Combatant Cells surely hold some form of European record for brevity. They operated only from October 1984 to December 1985, whereupon arrest of all four members terminated their tactically effective campaign of two-dozen nonlethal bombings of German, Belgian, and other NATO targets.<sup>78</sup> Belgium went quiet, as before, and remained so, for many years.

Thus, a range of twentieth-century groups have been stalled or stopped cold in a few years. These include many secular ones, most of those communist. There are also several good right-wing terrorist examples.

<sup>76</sup> Radu and Tismaneanu, *op. cit.*, 115–123.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 115–123; Peter Janke, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 431–440.

<sup>78</sup> Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, *Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 148–150. Marine Corps University was honored to have both these scholars in our colloquium on “Terrorist Group Vulnerabilities” in Quantico, VA, 30 April 2007.

I B: The known terror groups of short duration were not all total failures, however; some can claim limited achievements, if only when judged by their own lights, or the praise of their own community or prestigious mainstream partisans. It is reasonable to study the US Black Panthers in this way.<sup>79</sup> Colombia offers its own case of a militant organization that began with claims of virtue, degenerated into crime and terrorism, and came to an end after a few short years. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were an umbrella organization of peasant and middle-class militias that took shape to protect their communities from leftist insurgents. No government help was involved; indeed, AUC existed because of the absence of appropriate governmental effort. ELN and FARC, the Castroite insurgents, flourished for decades in rural Colombia before this challenger arose on the right. AUC leader Carlos Castaño saw explosive growth of his 1997 organization, which protected small farmers, defended some villages and towns, and actively sought out and attacked drug dealers and leftist terrorists. AUC would doubtless claim to have helped check the leftist insurgencies and contributed to their current marked decline. Their success is questionable, and of limited kinds. AUC methods too much mirrored the left's, including its drift into massive narco-trafficking. Before the year 2005, the group's leader had

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<sup>79</sup> Are the Black Panthers a case of limited success? They emerged in 1966 and 1967 with aspirations to be a sort of armed wing of the civil rights movement. They expected status as a virtuous self defense force, and carried weapons openly amidst claims to protect their communities and their race from the diffidence of a white majority and the aggressions of its white government. Their quotidian work included "survival activities" such as providing food and medical aid and schools in impoverished areas. Their other side was to be found in brutalizing critics, open calls to "Kill the Pigs" (police), and physical attacks on the establishment. The Panthers found themselves very much out-gunned by police; many died at police hands; their supporters often claimed assassination. More (including "Defense Minister" Huey Newton) died committing crimes, or in battles with other black militants. Dozens were arrested and jailed for rape, drug-dealing, assault, etc., illustrating the criminality often typical of a political terror group. A few Panther notables fled abroad, to return years later, usually disillusioned by life in Cuba, or Algeria. Their organized political violence lasted but a half-decade, ending in 1971/1972. Some Panthers spent the next years folding peaceably into American political and social life, winning community and city elections, or devoting themselves to education. Some wrote memoirs. They had not fallen into indiscriminate killing of normal citizens; this set them apart, and helped make them a limited success in America. Panthers would doubtless claim to have helped the civil rights movement by using publicity, psychological shock, and the spectacle of openly bearing arms; they would say they advanced with force while other Black activists advanced related causes in more pacific, less controversial ways. There are many published memoirs on these times – some by Panthers themselves – as well as Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts about the '60s* (New York: Summit Books, 1990), 149 ff; Crenshaw, *op. cit.*, 81.

disappeared, mysteriously and permanently. And the group was swiftly demobilizing after successful negotiations on amnesty with the government. These talks, generous government terms, and the reassertion of proper powers from the national government of Alvaro Uribe in Bogota and its now-improved security forces add to the reasons AUC has vanished.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, our examination of terror groups yields few that are both short-lived and successful in limited ways. One is a leftist revolutionary and single-race organization in the United States, while the other is a broad “preservationist” terrorist organization that flourished in Colombia.

I C: There are still fewer clear examples of terrorist movements of short duration that came to enjoy total success. Communism did win a violent triumph in Cuba, with remarkable swiftness; but most judge that success came far more from guerrilla war and political work than from terrorism.<sup>81</sup> If one leaves aside the Cuban case, there may be no short-lived classic terror organizations that succeeded so completely, in so brief a time. So we pass along to our second major rubric.

## Midterm Life Spans

II A: The twentieth century’s offerings under rubric two—medium-length terrorist campaigns—are numerous and varied. Some perish in exhaustion, be it physical, psychological, or organizational, and an early post–World War II example was the fatigue of Luis Taruc’s Hukbalahaps (or Huks) in the Philippines. Their insurgency and also their flagrant terrorism<sup>82</sup> ran hard into many obstacles, especially Defense Secretary and later President Ramon Magsaysay. This government wore out its en-

<sup>80</sup> US Dept. of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism: 2005* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 141–142. The START database offers recent information but does not mention the disappearance of the AUC leader; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, accessed on 12 April 2009 at: [www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist\\_organization](http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization)

<sup>81</sup> Dr. David Tucker is one of the very few American authors in recent years to document and discuss Castroite terrorism during the rise to power that ended in 1959 – something older reports and US congressional hearings used to cover. Tucker details several incidents of hostage taking, etc., in a book drawing well on both his Defense Department and academic work: *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997). My point that guerrilla war was far more important than terrorism is also why this essay does not attempt to include so massive a movement as the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to state power in 1949.

<sup>82</sup> One notable Huk attack devastated a military hospital and featured widespread murder of patients. That is a tactic even the most nihilistic terrorist groups avoid – although certain Chechens savaged a hospital.

emy with sophisticated grand strategy. Good political leadership enspirited the new democracy. Fine intelligence work captured a full politburo in Manila. A clever “free land” program seduced away some Huk cadres and demoralized others by answering their calls for “Land for the Landless.” Well-trained, disciplined armed forces protected the Filipino people while hunting down terror cells. Eventually the rural leadership, under the labor activist-turned-communist Taruc, capitulated. The campaign ran from 1946 into 1955, a decade. Good leadership and good grand strategy defeated the Huks.<sup>83</sup>

In the Latin world of the 1960s through the 1980s were other forms of terrorism lasting eight to fifteen years until being totally defeated. Many important and compelling revolutionary terrorist organizations were crushed by governmental force. These included the Tupamaros<sup>84</sup> of Uruguay, who prompted a military coup, and the Montoneros of Argentina, whose cells were ground to pieces by government networks of intelligence, police, and soldiers. El Salvador offers a different kind of case study. FMLN, a front group of some five guerrilla groups, deeply engaged in nationwide terrorism and semi-conventional battles against the military, was finally brought to an end in El Salvador. This did not occur because their demands were satisfied, as one strangely errant new study claims.<sup>85</sup> It was due to a combination of Salvadoran government and military resistance, enormous financial and intelligence help and military aid from the United States, the decline of Soviet bloc aid, and the close and skillful diplomatic engagement of neighboring and international states in a regional

<sup>83</sup> By contrast, Malaysian Communists were pushed out without surrendering. Chin Peng and some remnants held out for decades in Thai border areas, quitting only with a treaty signed 2 December 1989.

<sup>84</sup> The Tupamaros became fashionable; their kidnapping and political theater tactics excited widespread admiration on the militant left. One testament to this is Russell Little’s words in a documentary film about his group the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA, of California). He discusses their fascination with the group, the film “State of Siege,” and says his own SLA literally took form from a discussion group on political films running in Berkeley; Robert Stone’s *Guerrilla: The Taking of Patty Hearst* (Magnolia Pictures, 2005).

<sup>85</sup> “Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador,” Chapter 4 in *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida* by Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). The notion that this Cuban-organized group of communists and self-proclaimed armed forces was mainly pushing for “reforms” and “for the transition to a democratic political regime” is comically naïve (p. 64). But after its defeats at phase two-style fighting, and then disarmament under various national and international pressures, FMLN did morph into, a political party and compete in elections, often with a measure of success. A similar error occurs in Table A.1 in which the “goal” of the 2nd of June Movement in Germany is declared to be “policy change.” They were anarchists, and later some joined the communist RAF.

peace process. The latter included the United Nations and states such as the United States, but the most important actors were Mexico and Contadora countries.<sup>86</sup> This last factor was very important. Like the negotiated conclusion of IRA “Provo” violence in Northern Ireland, it suggests that at the right moment, negotiation may offer its opportunities, even with terrorist enemies.

Western Europeans also grappled with terrorism from the 1960s through the 1980s, of course. Another dozen campaigns of medium length by self-avowed “urban guerrillas” unfolded in cities and towns, but were doomed to defeat. The far left’s fascinating failures included the Turkish People’s Liberation Army (1969–1980); Portuguese of Popular Forces 25 April (1980–1986); German anarchists of the 2nd of June Movement (1971–1980); the Baader-Meinhofs in Germany, whose main violence ran from about 1968 to 1977; Front Line, in Italy (1976–1981<sup>87</sup>); and Action Direct in France (1979–1987). The Italian left was torn apart by dissidents and penitenti (“repentants”), who, under prudent new laws, offered testaments against their former colleagues in exchange for light sentences for themselves.<sup>88</sup> But, in most cases, the European Marxist-Leninist organizations were slowly ground down by civilian law enforcement. TPLA was different; it was among the Turkish clandestine political forces to be forcibly suppressed after a 1980 military coup. The Army took power, defeated many terrorist groups, and gave it back to civilian authorities.

A few of these “rubric II” groups (eight to fifteen years of major violence) have a longer and less-crisp profile: they rose, fell, and yet still defy eradication. Peru’s Sendero Luminoso has existed since the earliest 1970s and determined upon armed resistance in 1977, but did not openly attack until 1980. Thirteen years later, the gravest of blows reversed its rise toward national power. In September 1992, a tiny police intelligence unit located leader Abimael Guzman and made an arrest; he has since been locked up on an island under navy control. In practical terms, the Sendero Luminoso campaign ended there. But the insurgency had sunk deep roots, and a scattering of militants never left the field. As a hardened Maoist, Guzman would know the stories of the twentieth-century “comebacks” after jail or hardship: Adolf Hitler, “Long March” leader Mao Tse-Tung, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelsen Mandela, etc. So, while the

<sup>86</sup> Interview with Mr. Phil Peters of The Lexington Institute, Arlington, VA, 2006. Peters worked on Central American issues for many years in the office of James A Courter, a New Jersey congressman on the Armed Services Committee, and I also had the honor of employment there.

<sup>87</sup> Donatella della Porta, “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy,” Chapter 4 in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 121.

<sup>88</sup> Sources of interest on this include Richard Drake, *The Aldo Moro Murder Case* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 259, ff.

self-described “Fourth Sword of Marxism” kept to his cell during the 1990s, a few remnants stumbled along the shining path of continuous revolution, enlivened by the obvious limitations of Peru’s central government, and unchallenged by rivals on the left. In 2007 and then 2008, a few reporters stretched to insist that Sendero is reviving.<sup>89</sup> More conservatively, we argue that its ideological convictions have allowed it to fail without disappearing. Meanwhile, Shining Path’s former leftist nemesis, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), has totally disappeared. It was weakened in the mid-1990s and decisively crushed by government security forces in 1997.

There are many “studies in defeat” for groups of midterm duration. All imaginable ideological categories are included: leftist, odd combinations of left and right, a religious cult, etc. Some of these groups are mostly urban in their focus, but the range includes many insurgencies as well.

II B: There are also examples of terrorist groups that arose, practiced violence for eight to fifteen years, and ceased operations with a feeling of considerable (but not total) success. Some of these may be found in the Eastern Mediterranean world of anti-British Empire organizations in Cyprus and the Jewish underground.

The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) was an unusual case of a post-World War II nationalist and ethnic Greek group that used terrorism and repudiated Marxism-Leninism. Remarkably independent, it lacked the kind of heavy external support and sanctuary to which some always ascribe insurgent success. The Cypriot Fighters were founded in 1951 by George Grivas; he arrived on the island three years later; April 1955 saw the opening of guerrilla war; the violence when combined with negotiations forced British troops to abandon Cyprus; independence came in 1960. This was, however, but a partial success. Grivas and his sophisticated organization were of the 80 percent on the island whose blood was Greek, not Turkish, and the revolutionaries dreamed of full unity with Greece, not a separate state. And so, a decade later, phase two of the struggle opened under the command of EOKA-B. Now the underground cells attacked indigenous Cypriots, took hostages, and raided armories in a renewed campaign to seize the whole island for unification

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<sup>89</sup> See, for example, Frank Hyland, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: From Maoism to Narco Terrorism,” *amestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor* Vol. 6, No. 23 (December 8, 2008). Available online at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=34237&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=167&no\\_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34237&tx_ttnews[backPid]=167&no_cache=1), accessed 6 September 2009. The article states that “. . . SL’s apparent resurgence may be viewed fairly as an integral part of a burgeoning wave of leftist ideology in Latin America” and “Concern over an SL comeback is well founded.” But I think these reports overblown. As a November 2009 briefing at the Marshall Center by a Peruvian Lt.Col. indicates, the actual area of operations of Sendero today is miniscule and very isolated.



with the mainland. George Grivas died of heart failure in 1974; attrition and jailing took further tolls on his organization. A December 1977 kidnapping of the Cypriot president's son in a plot to free colleagues from prison failed. The group announced dissolution in the next year.<sup>90</sup> Their legacy is thus mixed: a two-part campaign, separated by a decade of peace, left partial success—the expulsion of the British army and government, but not a new unification with Athens and Greece.

Several of the Jewish organizations fighting inside the British Mandate may also lay claim to a degree of success after mid-length campaigns. The achievement of an entirely new and free democratic state of Israel in 1948 appears in hindsight to some people to justify the actions of Irgun, Lehi, and others. In fact, their terrorism is no more redeemable than that of African National Congress/Spear of the Nation bombers, burners, and assassins whose efforts contributed to destroying apartheid in South Africa. The model for Jewish liberation fighters is no terrorist organization, but instead the Haganah, the mass organization that consistently and successfully resisted Arab, British, and Nazi rulers and deployed guerrilla attacks against their military assets. They were the militant Jews who most succeeded with war. But two further groups—both terrorist—helped destroy British authority over Palestine. Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL, or Etzel) was founded by David Raziel in 1937, and was led after his death in 1941 by Menachem Begin. Irgun used terror against the Arab population as well as British targets. The latter included the King David Hotel (1946), which had both civil and military administrative functions; that attack killed ninety-one people and was later detailed in Begin's autobiography *The Revolt*.<sup>91</sup> A fanatical group broke away from Irgun in 1940, damning its truce with the British during years of war with the German Reich; Abraham Stern's gang was formally known as Lohame Herut Israel (LHI, or Lehi, or Lechi).<sup>92</sup> Their attacks on Jewish rivals mirror the inter-ethnic slaughters of a hundred of the twentieth-century's terror groups. The Stern Gang leadership moved to David Yassin in 1942 and the group continued killing: Jews, the British including Lord Moyne,<sup>93</sup> and, most revealingly, Sweden's Count Bernadotte

<sup>90</sup> Janke, 7–10.

<sup>91</sup> Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Ergun*, 5th ed. by I.M. Greenburg, trans. Samuel Katz (Jerusalem: Steimatzy Agency Ltd., 1972). Doris Katz, *The Lady was a Terrorist: During Israel's War of Liberation* (New York: Shiloni Publishers, 1953).

<sup>92</sup> Janke, 245–247, and the Jewish Virtual Library, accessed on the web on 20 December 2008.

<sup>93</sup> Lord Moyne was a friend of Winston Churchill. After the 1944 murder, the prime minister made a scorching speech in the House of Commons, describing Jewish "terrorism" as evil and risking comparison to acts by Nazi terrorists. This was a principled political posture, the right one – however difficult it must have been for Churchill, well known to be a friend to the Jews since his earliest years in parliament.

whose very purpose was to negotiate peace in Palestine. Here, too, was a revealing terrorist pattern: the explicit war upon peacemakers.<sup>94</sup>

Several other terrorist groups might claim “limited success” after a campaign of eight to fifteen years’ length. A most marginal case is the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which killed two dozen Turkish officials abroad and left many more bloody spots around Western Europe, hitting hard as late as 1986. Its leader perished two years later. Soon thereafter the “Republic of Armenia” came into being. While this had mostly to do with the disappearance of Soviet power, it dramatically undercut perceived need for terrorism and brought relief to militant nationalists who had earlier waved the flag and the gun. Indeed, at times, violent sub-state groups are undermined by “political gifts.” The sober and considered granting of semiautonomy to Bretons in France,<sup>95</sup> and Basques in France and Spain, turned many normal supporters against the use of violence against the innocent for larger political ends.

In slightly different light appears the Quebec Liberation Front. Founded in 1963, active by the next year, and soon wholly engaged in violence, they attracted French-speaking nationalists, anarchists, nihilists, and perhaps a few communists; these included several gifted propagandists. The group was never large but it was only shut down with great difficulty by Canadian authorities, as indicated above. Especially due to arrests, FLQ lost all its abilities by 1972. But its terrorists might argue that it had strengthened movement toward provincial self-determination at the expense of rule by Ottawa. Its general political effects reached far wider than its violent acts.

II C: The final parties to tier II are the more successful terrorists, whose eight-to fifteen-year campaigns brought them to power. The century’s first success was doubtless the Bolsheviks, who achieved the near-impossible between 1905 and 1917, taking total power and immediately using it to terrorize and destroy their innumerable enemies on the left and the right. History’s next example might be the more moderate National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria. Fatigued with years of squabbling between militants and reformers, the FLN sprang to life in late 1954, published a short powerful declaration to which they adhered closely, and took power in Algiers in 1962. These politicians, diplomats, guerrillas, and terrorists set the revolutionary

<sup>94</sup> There have been innumerable terrorist attacks upon those who would ameliorate social and economic problems, and often this is a strategy by the violent. Some of these are a pattern of anti-United Nations terrorism – e.g., today’s visible al Qaeda hatreds of the United Nations. I’ve written on other such attacks in *Security Insights*, the first of a new series of policy papers from the Marshall Center: “The Assault on Aid Workers: A New Pattern in Terrorism,” (January 2008).

<sup>95</sup> For example, a Breton Liberation Front fought for independence in northern France from 1966 through 1978.

standard for the post–World War II era. For example, their clever and violent methods of crushing Algerians opposed to them as “the sole legitimate voice” of nationalism would be aped by Palestinian militants under Yassir Arafat’s leadership. They also exported the revolution to the Algerians in France, extracting funding, killing opponents, and undermining French desires to hold the Central Maghreb. The FLN is a brilliant example of how terrorism may end ... in success.

Central America offers the case the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). While many neighboring revolutionaries failed, or slipped into dormancy, as in Guatemala, Honduras, or Mexico, the Sandinistas won and won completely. Founded by 1961,<sup>96</sup> at a time when the Cuban and Algerian FLN examples were heated inspirations, the Sandinistas were revolutionary but enjoyed broad popularity among frustrated farmers and other reformers. Soviet bloc provisioning and Cuban direction were of great help in shaping the group. For example, Carlos Fonseca Amador clarified his own allegiances authoring a book, *A Nicaraguan in Moscow*, that praised Soviet religious and press freedoms. His small organization was at the core of the Sandinistas. Other factions contributed the Ortega brothers, Tomas Borge Martinez, and Lenin Cerna—leaders and security experts who became famous during the war. Arguably their main period of violence is of midterm duration: 1963 to 1979. They slowly discredited the Somoza dictatorship and rattled the regime with terror attacks and strikes on the National Guard. Not long after the United States nervously withdrew support to the sitting government, the Sandinistas marched into Managua (July 1979). Powers of governance lasted eleven years, until they were given away in 1990. The Sandinistas dared to risk elections, and lost. But the turning screw of history kept on, and after years in the wilderness, somewhat less radical Sandinistas returned to power, winning elections in November 2006. Daniel Ortega is president, again.

Asian insurgencies on the Maoist model also demand attention—even when they do not get it from academics in terrorism studies. Let any observer skeptical about “whether terrorism ever works” study the cases of the Khmer Rouge and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) insurgencies. The former hacked its way into the capital in 1975 and ruled until expelled in late 1978 by a larger and stronger army—that of communist Vietnam. Comrade Prachanda’s Nepalese Maoists also began slowly and with protracted war, by taking over swaths of countryside in the Great Helmsman’s way: combining overt politics, clandestine organization, terrorism, and guerrilla war. Then, as Nepal’s monarchy tilted in impotence, and reformists began calling out in Katmandu, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), cut a remarkable political deal that put Prachanda into the prime minister’s chair in 2006. His promi-

<sup>96</sup> Authorities date the origin of FMLN differently; one sees 1958, 1960, 1961, etc.

ses to demobilize his thugs have only been partially kept, which means that if overt politicking ceases to meet the Party's needs, other options remain. No one need hurry in a protracted war.

Thus, a midterm lifespan does not signal defeat, necessarily. Religio-nationalist groups in this category have flourished and survived for many years and eked out gains of demonstrable kinds. Several secular leftist and revolutionary organizations using terrorism have similarly enjoyed limited success. Their will to survive, and their gains over time, indicate the truth in an old maxim about guerrilla war: that in some ways, merely to carry on fighting is to succeed.

### Groups with Longevity

III A: The third and final tier is of organizations with great longevity—protracted campaigns by terrorist groups. Some were ultimately and thoroughly beaten. The international anarchists, dramatic actors of the last two decades of the nineteenth century, after 1920 all but ceased affecting the political world. Later came an ideological opposite but similar fate: the unbelievably long and entirely useless effort of Chin Peng and others of the Malayan Races Liberation Army to create a communist state ended formally with his surrender in 1989.

One might reasonably take the long view of a “war”—rather than study a given group's shorter “campaign”—when examining nationalist militants in Ireland, or in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican nationalist attacks in the early 1950s, the latter 1970s, and the early 1980s all melted away as tactical successes had no real strategic results. Successively, the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), and then Los Macheteros have won no important political change. The Commonwealth remains a commonwealth; polling data still show revolution or total independence to be a far-fetched idea; new recruiting is minuscule; no foreign powers have stepped in to aid the militants other than Cuba—now largely inactive in this respect.

The Tamil Tigers of LTTE lack roots so long, but they did begin as early as 1972.<sup>97</sup> They survived innumerable government campaigns and were only smashed in their “liberated zones” in early 2009. Anther communist group of very different and urban character enjoyed almost as long a lifespan, but was decidedly less lethal. Revolutionary Organization 17 November was made up of a handful of Greek Marxist-Leninists who operated in Athens for a quarter century. They attacked Greeks, Americans, and

<sup>97</sup> A more common date of origin for the Tigers is 1976. This author chooses to begin when Velupillai Prabhakaran founded the Tamil New Tigers, 1972. An active terrorist and guerrilla in the next years, he refounded the Tigers as LTTE in 1976.

NATO personnel, sometimes using the same Colt pistol, and also targeted multinational corporations. They managed to do so year after year, never even suffering a single arrest. But the small size that made this evasion possible<sup>98</sup> also flagged N17's unpopularity and failure to recruit. Lack of numbers likewise determined that if all operations might be secure from police, there would only be very few operations. As the 2004 Athens Olympics approached, Greeks in government took a new attitude toward terrorists. A break for security forces came when a 17 November man failed in a bombing, wounded himself, and then talked. Immediately most of the small organization was arrested, and trials led to long sentences. The new group "Revolutionary Struggle" now seeks to revive leftist terrorism in Greece, but 17 November has come and gone.<sup>99</sup>

Thus, there are certain examples of fighting groups that devoted decades to their will to power and yet entirely failed. Those studied here are mostly "internationalists" of one sort or another, including anarchists and leftists. Two communist insurgent groups also manifest strong quotients of nationalism in their work. And, if one examined state terrorism sponsors, Libya's three-decade record would fit here—as a failure.<sup>100</sup> However, it is more common for a well-organized fighting group to achieve more over time, to create "liberated zones" or otherwise make permanent effects, which brings us to the next rubric.

<sup>98</sup> So long did N17 prosper that some began to whisper that the socialist governments of Greece did not care to arrest the terrorists, given the targets they were choosing. Mr. Keith Weston, once part of an official British contingent in Greece, disagrees. He believes the extremely small size of the group, and the blood connections many had as well, ensured secrecy.

<sup>99</sup> The Kurdish PKK, the most beguiling of cases, may or may not deserve a place here in section. III A. Once easily classified, this protracted insurgency has become an analytical challenge. Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in the mid-1970s, and ruled continuously by this charismatic leader, it was decapitated in February 1999 with his arrest and rendition. Kurdish violence all but disappeared for some four years. Ocalan's announcements from jail appeared to dissuade loyalists from terrorism, and no clear successor has appeared. The PKK appeared defeated. Then a shadow came over Turkey's accomplishment: violence by Kurdish militants of unclear loyalty slowly reappeared. The leader's son is an active militant, and new organizations that may or may not be well linked to the old have appeared and are fighting – in Turkey and from Iraq. There is, for example, the "Kurdish Freedom Falcons," which the US State Department initially reported on neutrally, and years later began referring to as a militant wing of the PKK. Today one must speak of a phoenix of Kurdish militancy. The US State Department, and the government of Turkey, see a new chapter in a long PKK life. Either of these different views may be defensible; a historian might well prefer the latter.

<sup>100</sup> Ken Duncan, the PTSS program's expert on Middle Eastern states that sponsor terrorism, adds that Syria has been successful in its use – a contrast with Libya.

III B: Terrorist groups of protracted duration that did or have achieved limited gains are many and richly varied.

If we chose to study the Provisional Irish Republic Army as a discrete entity, a guerrilla and terrorist organization with an intimate party affiliate, it began in a 1969 split with other Nationalists and ended its violence against unsuspecting civilians with the 1998 Good Friday Accord. That Irish Republican Army, so delimited, is a clear case of limited success. Militancy had of course cropped up often before the twentieth century, as when Napoleonic France aided Wolf Tone, and a few decades later when American citizens began contributing weapons and money to other insurrectionists in Ireland.<sup>101</sup> A periodically successful Irish fight began in 1916 and ran right through the twentieth century, manifesting guerrilla and/or terrorist variants. The IRA had some sleepy years in the twentieth century but came to life as the “Provos” in 1969 and 1970, fired with passion over civil rights, as well as nationalism, and a dash of Marxist-Leninism. A few British overreactions, and indeed the 1972 “Bloody Sunday” event, encouraged the hard men and drew in recruits. By the 1990s, many felt a kind of stasis; the Provos could neither win nor be beaten. Their leaders bent more to politics and sought to do less with terrorism. They negotiated with London, won limited concessions, and joined governance circles in the Stormont-based parliament in Ulster. There is no unification of Northern Ireland with the Eire republic, and the IRA Provos submitted to disarmament—or partially so. But on the other hand the Provos have seen comrades released from jails by the score; they operate openly, peaceably, and respectably; they have not surrendered their many foreign friends. And they can return to terrorism if they so decide. This could occur as a group effort, in theory, or, more likely, scattered individuals may choose to join extant splinter groups such as the Real IRA.

The irony in this is that Orangemen, too, can claim partial success from terrorist campaigns. And perhaps they should. Ulster Volunteer Force (which declared war on IRA in 1966) and Ulster Freedom Fighters (begun 1973) are as able as the PIRA/Provos’ Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness to see a “partial victory” in the status quo of the last decade. They fought below and above ground for decades, hurting as many Irish as English, but always securing prestige and precious political space in that tormented island. Unlike smaller killing squads (e.g., Red Hand Defenders), the UVF and UFF also work with political fronts, making them more significant as well as more morally credible. Now these major Loyalist groups have put down guns and taken up balloting; all their supporters, in English and Irish politics, may see the old terrorists sharing banal administrative duties and profound political responsibilities

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<sup>101</sup> Jack Holland, *The American Connection: US Guns, Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland* (New York: Viking, 1987).

in a new parliamentary structure in the Stormont parliamentary building just outside Belfast. The Orangemen of illegal bands are “preservationist”<sup>102</sup> terrorists who have arguably helped keep the six counties under the British Crown; at least, few would dare tell them otherwise.

Twentieth-century history is crowded with candidates for this rubric of “protracted campaigns leading to limited success.” American labor militants—a few of whom were terrorists—gradually won major concessions, first in wages and then organizational rights and later in benefits, and came to struggle pacifically and successfully in recent decades. The traditionalist and racist American Ku Klux Klans have atrophied drastically; once a mass movement, now but numerous cells, they have never disappeared in a hundred and fifty years of influence. In Colombia, FARC and ELN are examples of rural insurgencies, widely using terror, that seem uneradicable and have endured for half a century. That mark may one day be met by India’s Naxalites—Maoists who are in effect a shadow government in certain areas. Western Europe’s ETA Basques have lasted exactly a half-century. France remains bedeviled by the Corsican National Liberation Front, which still lights up strings of bombs to keep alive hopes of withdrawal from metropolitan France and its system of district governance—as Algeria succeeded in doing in the insurgency ending in 1962. France is also troubled by being the Euro-home to the secular and ideologically vague People’s Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI), also known as the People’s Mujahideen al Khalq (MEK), which is still under veteran leaders’ wings. Contained and disarmed on Iraqi territory and subject to US and Iraqi controls up through 2008, MEK still flourishes politically abroad. While this is especially true in France, MEK also enjoys friends in the halls of US and European national parliaments.

Certain Middle Eastern groups are marginal but unrepressed; these include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, a Syrian-supported terror outfit that has operated for decades with no one to control it but Israeli forces. Hezbollah has turned covert and overt organization and violence<sup>103</sup> into de facto political control over large swaths of Lebanon. Their success in national politics in Lebanon has been immense, as indicated by presence in political bodies and the na-

<sup>102</sup> This unique term “preservationist” is from Bard O’Neill. The term “pro-state” terrorist is inferior because it is less exact; some right-wing groups want to preserve the cultural or political status quo, not necessarily the sitting government, with whose police they often quarrel.

<sup>103</sup> Stephen Morris, an Australian scholar and former colleague at the Naval War College, propounded a very useful scheme for beginning study of an insurgent group – analyzing its performance in the overt political, the covert political, and the military realms. If we group terrorist violence in with the third category, the approach has much value for study of organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and to lesser degrees al Qaeda.

tional political life. The “mainstreaming” of such terrorists is a reproof to thinking that terrorism “has always failed and . . . will fail again,” as one post-9/11 argument proclaimed. Much more narrowly, a think-tank report of 2008 about the fate of terrorists concludes that “Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives.”<sup>104</sup> But even that more careful view is misleading—given the impressive if incomplete successes of such religious groups as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Thus, analysts may find innumerable cases in the range of moderately successful groups engaged in protracted struggle and terrorism. From the radical rightist and “preservationist terror groups one may look to the left, and nationalist-leftist, and onward to religiously motivated politicians. The most successful have strategies that far exceed terrorist methods—combining these in a prudent and broad approach to power. Some may ultimately fail, but others appear likely to move to greater plateaus of success.

III C: Earlier pages and rubrics explored terrorist successes—e.g., Bolsheviks, the Algerian FLN, Greek-Cypriot EOKA, some Jewish groups, and Sandinistas—that achieved some or all of their strategic objectives after violent campaigns of medium duration. But there are as well a few groups of longer life that did come to triumph and take state power.

In South Africa, 1961 saw the creation of “The Spear of the Nation,” forged to do bloody work for the African National Congress (ANC, founded 1912); this mid-century strategic choice followed years of indifferent political success; now ANC militants bombed energy companies, shopping centers, and other civilian targets. Later they commenced “necklacings”: victims were bound, seated, and then burned, by means of placing an automobile tire around the torso, filling it with gasoline, and torching it off. This was apparently done to murder black rivals or dissidents more often than to white South Africans, an example of an old pattern—terrorism for discipline and control of “one’s own.” In retrospect, ANC terrorism led toward stunning electoral triumphs—not unlike the ways Palestinian terrorism has done so.

Yassir Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964. Like most revolutionaries, it aspired to match the fresh triumph of the FLN in Algeria. Fatah was the armed force the PLO created and shaped. After it came innumerable subgroups and splinters, which achieved a certain advantage in deniability and decep-

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<sup>104</sup> The second source, described as more careful, is the aforementioned Jones/Libicki study dated 2008, which declares on p. xiv: “No religious group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.” That student of history inclined to think terrorism fails will be most content with the views of, and best instructed, in studying the works of Walter Laqueur. His decades of fine work, based on many primary sources and varied languages, has set high standards for writing the history of terrorism.



tion. But, except for Abu Nidal's gang,<sup>105</sup> which left the PLO only to hunt its former colleagues, the PLO splinter groups were generally helpful and useful to Arafat. He might support an Abu Abbas (of the Palestine Liberation Front) in one season, then hold him at arm's length later, and welcome him back in a new springtime. Skillful as an organizer, adequate as an orator, immovable as the controller of PLO businesses and income streams, Arafat won. It took three decades of his own blend of protracted war, yet he created a Palestine homeland. It may today be divided in civil war. But it is a statelet; Israel has departed and hopes to avoid unpleasant returns; foreign governments jostle one another to lead in supplying humanitarian aid to Palestinians under the control of the Palestine Authority; Hamas terrorist acts all rebound in favor of PA legitimacy and give the older more secular guard airs of empathy. Our Marshall Center is among the many mainstream locales where Palestine authority security officials are now schooled in countering terrorism.

Thus, PLO and Fatah and the ANC's Spear of the Nation are among the few cases in which long-term efforts including systematic terrorism have led eventually to strategic success.

### **An Afterword: Whither al Qaeda?**

Al Qaeda falls within our rubric of real longevity and limited success (III B). This innovative, international, and powerful organization has taken body-blows without going down. It lost in Afghanistan and still found cover. It absorbed members of Egypt's battered al Jihad group at the end of the 1990s; in early 2007 it absorbed North Africans of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat; European converts and others have joined to offset losses. Many senior and mid level leaders have been killed or captured, yet several of the newest leaders are from the ranks stupidly released from Guantanamo and other prisons.<sup>106</sup>

Certainly al Qaeda and its allies will never achieve their New Caliphate. But what matters is that they are fighting for it. No one should claim they have "failed" when top leaders with long experience and obvious charisma remain in the field (Osama

<sup>105</sup> The Abu Nidal Organization flourished for a quarter-century and killed some nine hundred people before expiring from combined causes. These culminated in the shooting of the leader in Iraq but included internecine violence in ANO, repudiation by other Palestinians, and a clever US effort in counterterrorism thus far described by almost no one in print; see the chapter on "History" in David Tucker, *op. cit.*

<sup>106</sup> ABC Radio News, 24 January 2009 named a released terrorist who rejoined al Qaeda. These incidents have occurred perhaps once a year, during the very same years of popular European and American agitation for closure of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay (on US-controlled land in Cuba).

bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, and Taliban partner Mullah Omar). Al Qaeda's terrorism has made impressions on the politics, public opinion, or defense policies of a hundred countries worldwide, as in influencing the US troop withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden's birthplace. It accomplishes such things; holds up its intellectual, moral, political, and religious banners of attack; and protects many of its human and financial assets in the face of the largest manhunt in global history. To call al Qaeda a "failure" would be the most desperate form of false hopes. It is apparent that states, and the international community, have much to do before al Qaeda ends.

*Dr. Christopher C. Harmon Dr. Harmon has long-held interests in the two subjects of this text: strategy and terrorism. His first book, coedited with low intensity conflict expert David Tucker, was *Statecraft and Power* (University Press of America, 1994), a work in honor of a teacher of strategy, Harold W. Rood. Harmon taught on the Strategy & Policy faculty of the Naval War College, Newport, RI, and then wrote and directed a strategy syllabus for 200 Marine majors, foreign allies, and US civilians at Command & Staff College, Quantico Virginia, where he later held Marine Corps University's Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism (2005–2007). He is the author of two editions of the graduate-level textbook *Terrorism Today*—published by Frank Cass (2000) and Routledge (2007), as well as chapters on terrorism and counterterrorism for *Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age* (2005) and *The American Military Tradition* (2007). Two of Dr. Harmon's articles have appeared in the journal *Vital Speeches*. The US State Department gave him a Distinguished Public Service Award. From March 2008 through September 2009, Dr. Harmon was executive director as well as curricula chief of the Marshall Center's Program on Terrorism & Security Studies; he is now Director of Studies.*

## Recommended Readings

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Harmon, Christopher C. "How Terror Groups End," web-cast lecture from The Woodrow Wilson Center, 20 March 2006. Hosts: Dr. Robert Litwak & Dr. Bruce Hoffman. Summary and event film: [www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event\\_summary&event\\_id=1770...](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=1770...)

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## Following the Terrorist Money Trail

By *Celina B. Realuyo*

Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations. Today, we're asking the world to stop payment.

*President George W. Bush, 24 September 2001<sup>1</sup>*

In combating terrorism, the international community must employ all the instruments of national power to disrupt, dismantle, and deter terrorist groups. These instruments include diplomatic, military, intelligence, information, law enforcement, economic, and financial capabilities that can be applied singularly, or in combination, to counter international security threats, including terrorism. These countermeasures have been successfully leveraged at the local, national, and international levels to combat terrorist networks around the globe. This chapter will focus on the financial front of the war on terrorism and demonstrate how “following the money trail” enhances governments’ efforts to identify, root out, and defeat terrorists and their financiers. We will begin with an overview of how terrorist groups raise and move their money. Subsequently, strategies to combat terrorist financing through law enforcement and intelligence operations, public designations, international cooperation, and capacity building programs will be examined. A case study of Indonesia’s response to the tragic October 2002 Bali bombings will demonstrate how counterterrorism measures, including those to address terrorist financing, have been developed and applied successfully to combat terrorism. We will conclude with a review of the progress made to combat terrorist financing and underscore the challenges that remain in this arena.

### Methods of Terrorist Financing

Financing is essential for any organization and its activities, and terrorist networks are no different. Terrorist activities can be categorized into operational and support activities. Operational activities include surveillance and reconnaissance, rehearsal, final preparations, and the actual attack. Support activities entail propaganda, recruitment, fund-raising, procurement, transportation and travel, safe havens, multiple identities, communications, and training. All of these activities require financing. While the actual cost of a terrorist attack can be merely in the thousands of dollars, developing and

<sup>1</sup> President George W. Bush, “President Freezes Terrorist Assets,” White House Press Briefing, 24 September 2001, available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html>, accessed 9 September 2009.

sustaining a terrorist network require millions of dollars. So how do terrorist groups raise and move their money? Over the years, terrorist groups have relied on a broad spectrum of methods to fund their networks and operations. While money laundering involves disguising funds obtained through illicit activities, terrorist financing does not always involve “dirty money,” receiving funding from state and individual sponsors; and this presents more challenges for the counterterrorism community. The tragic attacks of September 2001 brought to light how al Qaeda exploited the international financial system to fund its preparations for and execution of the attacks. In response to 9/11, the international public and private sectors instituted more stringent controls over the traditional banking sector to combat terrorist financing and money laundering. However, over the years, we have observed that terrorist groups have turned to various funding sources and methods to circumvent this increased oversight of the banking sector. Let us examine some of the mechanisms beyond traditional banking abused by terrorist networks.

**NGOs/Charities.** Terrorists may be attracted to charities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to raise and move their assets because of the industry’s non-transparent nature. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering’s Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003, some charities have served as a cover for moving funds to support terrorist activities, usually on an international basis, in addition to serving as a direct source of income.<sup>2</sup> For example, according to the US Department of Justice, the Global Relief Foundation, an Illinois-based charity, sent more than 90 percent of its donations abroad and had connections to and provided support and assistance to individuals associated with Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda network, and other known terrorist groups.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the Department of Justice asserts that the Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation moved charitable contributions fraudulently solicited from donors in the United States to locations abroad to support terrorist activities, as the foundation had offices worldwide through which it could facilitate the global movements of its funds.<sup>4</sup> While legitimate charities promote noble social and economic causes, the lack of regulation and oversight of the sector, as well as the international nature of charitable work, make this sector vulnerable to abuse by terrorist networks.

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<sup>2</sup> Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on Money Laundering Typologies, 2002–2003, 14 February 2003, available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/29/33/34037958.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>3</sup> *Global Relief Foundation vs. Paul O’Neill, et al.*, 207 F. Sup. 2d 779, US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 11 June 2002.

<sup>4</sup> *United States of America vs. Enaam M. Arnaut*, Case No. 02CR892, US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, April 2002.

**Cash Couriers.** Moving large amounts of currency, through bulk cash smuggling or cash couriers, is an attractive terrorist financing mechanism since US dollars are accepted as an international currency and are readily convertible. There is no traceable paper trail, no third party involved, and the terrorist has total control of the movement of that money by using cash couriers. However, this is a more risky method of moving funds for terrorists. There is the risk of a courier stealing the money, of informants within the network, and of border searches or government inquiries that could compromise the network or mission. In the United States, bulk cash smuggling is a money laundering and terrorist financing technique designed to bypass financial transparency reporting requirements. The currency is often smuggled into or out of the United States concealed in personal effects or shipping containers, or it is transported in bulk across the border via vehicle, vessel, or aircraft. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “some of the September 11 hijackers allegedly used bulk cash smuggling as another method to transfer funds.”<sup>5</sup> In response to the 9/11 events, US Customs initiated an outbound-currency operation, Operation Oasis, to refocus its efforts to target twenty-three identified nations involved in money laundering. Between October 2001 and August 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement seized more than \$28 million in bulk cash.<sup>6</sup> While some of the cases were linked to terrorism, DHS officials were unable to determine the precise number and the extent to which these cases were involved in terrorist financing. In the war in Iraq, bulk cash smuggling has been used by al Qaeda in Iraq to fund their operations and foreign fighters, facilitated by the lack of border control.<sup>7</sup>

**Alternative Remittance Systems.** Terrorist organizations use a type of alternative remittance system or informal banking system, sometimes known as hawala, to move their assets, due to the system’s nontransparent and liquid nature. A remittance is a transfer of money by a foreign worker to his/her home country. An informal banking system is one in which money is received for the purpose of making that sum, or an equivalent value, payable to a third party in another geographic location. Such transfers generally take place outside of the conventional banking system through non-bank money services, businesses, or other, unregulated and undocumented, business

<sup>5</sup> US Government Accountability Office, *Terrorist Financing: US Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2003, available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, “The Evolution of Al Qaeda,” in *Countering the Financing of Terrorism*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert (New York: Routledge, 2008), 58–59.

entities. Traditionally, expatriates—traders and immigrant laborers—use informal banking systems to send money home from or to countries lacking formal and secure banking systems. These informal systems are still used by immigrant ethnic populations in the United States and Europe due to their high efficiency and low costs. Such systems are based on trust and the extensive use of connections, such as family relationships or regional affiliations. In Afghanistan and Somalia, the al Barakaat informal banking system reportedly moved funds for al Qaeda.<sup>8</sup> In the more recent case of the November 2008 siege of Mumbai, the perpetrators of Pakistani origin are believed to have relied on hawala transactions to fund this operation.<sup>9</sup> Informal banking systems remain challenging to safeguard against money laundering and terrorist financing.<sup>10</sup>

### Strategies to Combat Terrorist Financing

Terrorist networks use an array of means and methods to raise and move their money. In order to combat terrorist financing, counterterrorism officials have had to devise comprehensive strategies to identify, interdict, and isolate terrorists and their financiers. According to the 9/11 Commission, “after the September attacks, the highest-level US government officials publicly declared that the fight against al Qaeda financing was as critical as the fight against al Qaeda itself. It has been presented as one of the keys to success in the fight against terrorism: if we choke off the terrorists’ money, we limit their ability to conduct mass casualty attacks.”<sup>11</sup> To this end, counterterror-

<sup>8</sup> According to the US Department of Justice, al Barakaat operated a hybrid hawala in which its informal system interconnected with the formal banking system. Since al Barakaat used financial institutions, law enforcement was able to discover the transactions to Somalia by analyzing Suspicious Activity Reports generated by the banks pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.

<sup>9</sup> Doug Farah, “A Bit More on Dawood Ibrahim and Why He Matters,” DouglasFarah.com, 11 December 2008, available at <http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/429/a-bit-more-on-dawood-ibrahim-and-why-he-matters.com>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>10</sup> According to US Department of Justice, al Barakaat operated a hybrid hawala in which its informal system interconnected with the formal banking system. Because al Barakaat also used financial institutions, law enforcement was able to discover the transactions to Somalia by analyzing Suspicious Activity Reports generated by the banks pursuant to their obligations under the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act [Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951–1959 (2000); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5330 (2000)].

<sup>11</sup> John Roth et al., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing, (Washington, DC, 2004), available at [http://www.911commission.gov/staff\\_statements/index.htm](http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/index.htm), accessed 19 September 2009.



ism finance (CTF) strategies intended to detect, disrupt, and deter the funding of terrorist networks are based on the following four lines of operation:

1. Law enforcement and intelligence operations
2. Public designations and asset freezes
3. International standards set to counter terrorist financing
4. Capacity building programs<sup>12</sup>

### **CTF Law Enforcement and Intelligence Operations**

“Following the money trail” has greatly enhanced law enforcement and intelligence operations against terror networks. How, when, where, and from/to whom money has been transferred are reliable data points that counterterrorism officials use to map out and identify terrorist groups, their facilitators, and their activities. In many cases, financial intelligence and forensics are determining factors in developing and prosecuting cases of terrorism and material support of terrorism. Unlike confidential informants and witnesses for the prosecution, the money trail presents clear evidence of a financial connection or link between two or more parties.

**The Financing of the September 11 Attacks.** The financial blueprint of the multiple-aircraft effort by al Qaeda is instrumental for understanding how the nineteen hijackers lived among us, prepared their plot, and took advantage of the vulnerabilities of our security systems to execute the most spectacular of terrorist attacks. According to the 9/11 Commission, that plot cost al Qaeda approximately \$400,000–\$500,000, of which \$300,000 was deposited into the US bank accounts of the nineteen hijackers. Al Qaeda funded the hijackers in the United States by three primary and unexceptional means: (1) wire transfers from overseas, (2) the physical transport of cash or travelers’ checks into the United States, and (3) accessing the funds held in foreign financial institutions by debit or credit cards. Once in the United States, the hijackers used the US banking system to store their funds and facilitate their transactions.<sup>13</sup>

The hijackers and their financial facilitators used the anonymity provided by the vast international and domestic financial system to move and store their money. The existing mechanisms to prevent the abuse of the financial system did not fail; they

<sup>12</sup> US Government Accountability Office, *Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate US Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0619.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>13</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Outline of the 9/11 Plot: Staff Statement No. 16,” June 2004, 11–12, available at [http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff\\_statements/staff\\_statement\\_16.pdf](http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_16.pdf), accessed 19 September 2009.

were just never designed to detect or disrupt transactions of the type that financed 9/11. Virtually all of the plot funding was provided by al Qaeda. There is no evidence that any person in the United States, or in any foreign government, provided any substantial funding to the hijackers.<sup>14</sup>

In response to the investigation of the financing of 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted on 26 October 2001 to expand the US government's tool kit in anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing.

This legislative package:

- Enhances transparency in financial transactions
- Protects international gateways to the US financial system
- Increases the vigilance of all our financial institutions (including money services and businesses) subjecting them to the more rigorous anti-money laundering and terrorist financing compliance programs
- Facilitates critical information sharing among US law enforcement agencies that investigate financial crimes
- Amends existing legislation to enhance the ability to freeze terrorist assets
- Amends the Immigration and Naturalization Act with the creation of the Terrorist Exclusion List that denies or revokes visas for terrorists and their supporters<sup>15</sup>

These new measures expanded law enforcement and intelligence agencies' abilities and authorities to "follow the money trail" to pursue terrorism cases. The successful prosecution of US citizen Jose Padilla, better known as the "Dirty Bomber," and his codefendants relied heavily on evidence of terrorist financing and the provision of material support. In August 2007, the jury found the defendants guilty of being part of a North American support cell designed to send money, physical assets, and mujahedin recruits to overseas jihad conflicts.<sup>16</sup>

### **Public Designations and Asset Freezes**

The US government has sought to stem the flow of financial resources to terror groups for decades through various designation programs. The first of these efforts aimed at state sponsors of terrorism. To target these actors, a provision of the Export Admin-

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<sup>14</sup> Roth, *op. cit.*, 1–16.

<sup>15</sup> For an overview of the USA PATRIOT Act, see Charles Doyle, "The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch," CRS Report for Congress RS21203, 18 April 2002, available at <http://fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Abby Goodnough, "Jose Padilla Convicted on All Counts in Terror Trial," *The New York Times*, 16 August 2007, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/us/16cnd-padilla.html>, accessed 19 September 2009.

istration Act of 1979 (Section 6j) authorized the Secretary of State to designate states who provide funding to terrorists or terrorist organizations as state sponsors of terrorism.<sup>17</sup> Past designations of this kind have triggered a variety of sanctions, including restrictions on US foreign assistance, a ban of defense exports and sales, control over exports for dual-use items, and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including a denial of foreign tax credits for income earned in designated terrorist-sponsoring states.<sup>18</sup>

By the mid-1990s, intelligence reports had indicated that terror groups were seeking financial independence by using front companies and charities to obtain funding. The William J. Clinton administration drafted legislation to make it illegal to provide material support for specific acts of terrorism or for foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). Enacted as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, this legislation specifically criminalized not only financial contributions, but also the provision of financial services to groups designated as FTOs by the Secretary of State.<sup>19</sup> In January 1995, at about the same time the legislation was introduced in Congress, the Clinton administration issued Executive Order (E.O.) 12947 to freeze the assets of twelve terrorist groups (ten Palestinian and two Jewish) that threatened the use of violence to thwart the Middle East Peace process. This was pursuant to the authorities of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.<sup>20</sup>

One of President George W. Bush's first initiatives after 11 September 2001 aimed directly at the financial front of the war on terrorism. On 24 September 2001 he declared, "We will starve the terrorists of funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places, and bring them to justice."<sup>21</sup> A day prior to this statement, the president issued E.O. 13224 to designate and block the assets of orga-

<sup>17</sup> 50 USC. App. 2401 ET. seq.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of State, "State Sponsors of Terrorism," available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm>, accessed 19 September 2009. Also see "Testimony of Juan Carlos Zarate, Assistant Secretary, Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes," US Department of Treasury, Before the House Financial Services Subcommittees on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology and Oversight and Investigations, 30 September 2004, available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1971.htm>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>19</sup> Charles Doyle, "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary," Congressional Research Service American Law Division, 3 June 1996, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>20</sup> (50 USC. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 USC. 1601 et seq.), and section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 USC. 287c) (UNPA), and sec. 301 of Title 3, US Code.

<sup>21</sup> President George W. Bush, "President Freezes Terrorist Assets," White House Press Briefing, 24 September 2001, op. cit.

nizations and individuals linked to terrorism. By this order, President Bush declared a national emergency to deal with the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States,” posed by grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on US nationals or the United States.<sup>22</sup>

The new Executive Order broadened the Treasury, Justice, and State Departments’ mandates to designate individuals and entities (not only foreign terrorist organizations) as material supporters of terrorism. Since 2001, designations of terrorist financiers by the Treasury, State, and Justice Departments have been used to disrupt terrorist networks by blocking their assets and deterring would-be terrorist supporters from providing financial resources to terrorist groups, pursuant to E.O. 13224. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “the US has taken an active role in developing and implementing international standards to combat terrorist financing through the United Nations conventions and resolutions and Financial Action Task Force recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing,” and in promoting international cooperation.<sup>23</sup>

### **International Cooperation**

Since terrorism presents a transnational threat, governments cannot solely rely on national responses to effectively combat this security concern. International cooperation on all fronts, including the financial front, is essential to defeat terrorism. For decades, under the auspices of the United Nations, international standards have been devised and adopted in response to various acts and methods of terrorism (airline and maritime hijackings, piracy, use of explosives, etc.). There are thirteen UN conventions and protocols against terrorism, yet no single universally adopted definition of terrorism. Since 11 September 2001, international cooperation and coordination on counterterrorism financing have progressed dramatically at the national, regional, and multilateral levels. In addition to the United Nations, the FATF responded to the 9/11 attacks by expanding its mission beyond anti-money laundering and devoting its energy and expertise to combat terrorist financing. The FATF issued Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (For Detailed Information Please See

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<sup>22</sup> President George W. Bush, “Executive Order on Terrorist Financing,” White House Press Office, 24 September 2001, available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-1.html>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>23</sup> US Government Accountability Office, *Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate US Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Abroad*, 2–3.

Original Version of this Article.) and called on all countries to adopt and implement these measures.

The FATF and member nations attempt to identify emerging methods and trends in money laundering and terrorist financing and to devise regulations and best practices to counter these new methods. International cooperation has contributed to successful cases against terror networks operating in multiple jurisdictions thanks to CTF measures put into place. The international standards set and adopted by the public and private sectors around the world have safeguarded international financial systems and created formidable barriers and challenges for terrorists and their financiers.

### **Building Capacity to Combat Terrorist Financing**

Counterterrorism finance assistance programs are aimed at “build[ing] sustainable, dynamic anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance regimes that adhere to international standards and implement effective programs in the legal, financial regulatory, financial intelligence, law enforcement, prosecutorial, and international cooperation fields,” according to Gerald Feierstein, former State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Programs and Plans. He told the US House of Representatives in 2006 that “improving the capability of our partner nations to combat terrorist financing significantly enhances our own ability to detect and isolate terrorist financiers and to ‘follow the money’ to where it links global terrorists and their support networks.”<sup>24</sup>

To successfully combat terrorist financing, governments must develop an effective counterterrorist finance regime based on five basic elements described below.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> US House of Representatives, Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Counter-Terrorism Financing Foreign Training and Assistance: Progress Since 9/11,” 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 April 2006, available at <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/109-84.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>25</sup> Celina Realuyo, “Building a Counterterrorist Finance Regime,” US Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs, E-Journal USA: Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2004): 10–13, available at <http://guangzhou.usembassy-china.org.cn/uploads/images/tlZ5ybS8T9PYsu730CyKsA/ijee0904.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2009.

### **I. Legal Framework to Criminalize Terrorist Financing**

Each country should dispose of a legal framework that criminalizes terrorist financing and money laundering. This allows countries to comply with international standards pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1373<sup>26</sup> and the Financial Action Task Force Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.

### **II. Financial Regulatory Supervision to Protect the Integrity of the Banking System**

Each country should develop a financial regulatory framework that vigilantly supervises the financial services sector. Additionally, the financial services sector must develop and employ strict anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance compliance measures that ensure that their employees “know their customer” and file suspicious transaction reports that may indicate money laundering and terrorist financing activities.

### **III. Financial Intelligence Unit as the Link Between the Private and Public Sectors**

Each country should set up a financial intelligence unit charged with collecting, analyzing, and disseminating suspicious transaction reports submitted by the private sector associated with financial transactions. An effective financial intelligence unit leverages well-trained analysts, equipment, information technology platforms, and specialized analytical software to meet its mission to develop and refer relevant evidence of financial crime cases (including terrorist financing cases) to law enforcement authorities.

### **IV. Law Enforcement Investigations to Track Down Terrorist Financiers**

Each country should develop specialized financial crime units within their law enforcement agencies. These units may reside in different law enforcement agencies but must possess the deep technical skills necessary to follow financial forensics and develop financial crimes cases that include terrorist financing. Oftentimes, these financial crime units follow the money trail of terrorist groups and greatly complement counterterrorism investigations.

### **V. Judicial/Prosecutorial Process to Bring Terrorist Financiers to Justice**

Finally, each country should possess a well-developed judicial system capable of bringing terrorist financiers to justice. An effective regime would employ well-trai-

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<sup>26</sup> Adopted in late September 2001, the resolution calls on UN members to share intelligence relating to terrorist activities and attempts to restrict terrorist financing activities. UNSCR 1373 is binding on all member states.

ned prosecutors who are able to “follow the money trail” and make their case to the judges and magistrates.

### **Impact of CTF Programs**

Despite some interagency growing pains, these counterterrorism finance programs have made a remarkable difference in partner nations’ abilities to combat terrorist financing.<sup>27</sup> Relative to the inherent challenges of the fight against international terrorist financing, US CTF strategy, based on law enforcement and intelligence investigations, public designations, and foreign assistance programs has been very effective over the past seven years. In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission gave an “A2” grade to the US government’s vigorous effort against terrorist financing for winning the support of key countries in tackling the issue.<sup>28</sup> In particular, CTF capacity building programs have enhanced countries’ ability to “follow the money,” from drafting legislation to criminalize terrorist financing, to creating financial intelligence units, to organizing specialized law enforcement task forces and cash courier training. Law enforcement and intelligence officials believe that these CTF measures have significantly reduced al Qaeda and its affiliates’ funding. Several experts, including those associated with the 9/11 Commission, are convinced that al Qaeda is having a difficult time raising funds and that the terror group has had to cut back significantly on its expenditures.<sup>29</sup> Such funding is instrumental for recruiting, training, planning, and executing terrorist operations.

### **Case Study: Counterterrorism Capacity Building in Indonesia<sup>30</sup>**

**Background.** On 12 October 2002, Indonesia experienced the largest and most deadly terrorist attack since 9/11 anywhere in the world: a bombing at a popular night spot for foreign tourists on the island of Bali. Since the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) perpetrated these murders, and subsequent attacks in the capital, Indonesia has endeavored with its international partners to strengthen its defenses. The United Sta-

<sup>27</sup> From author’s interviews with Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism program managers on 22 February 2008.

<sup>28</sup> 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, 5 December 2005, p. 5, available at [http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05\\_report.pdf](http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf), accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>29</sup> Roth et al., *op cit.*, 10.

<sup>30</sup> Much of this case study is drawn from a previous work by the author. See Celina Realuyo and Scott Stapleton, “Response to Bali: An International Success Story,” US Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs E-Journal USA: Economic Perspectives, 14–17.

tes and other allies employed several instruments of national power to deliver foreign assistance programs to Indonesia to counter the terrorist threat from JI in Southeast Asia. From direct law enforcement training to broader judicial assistance, the international community came together to help Indonesia rapidly develop its capacity to fight terrorist activity.

At the time, Washington considered the Bali attacks another manifestation of the global threat of terrorism. The US government emphasized the importance of assisting Indonesia with the Bali investigations and coordinated interagency efforts to deliver such assistance in a timely and effective fashion. Washington developed and executed a comprehensive strategy in support of Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts. In this case, US antiterrorism assistance and counterterrorism finance programs directly empowered Indonesian counterterrorism professionals to confront the threat from JI.

### **Immediate Response: Arresting Those Responsible**

The Bali bombings began at 11:05 p.m. on 12 October 2002, when an explosive device was electronically detonated inside a crowded bar in the heart of the island resort's entertainment district. Seconds later, as victims ran from the site of the first explosion, a minivan packed with explosives detonated nearby. Terrorists had strategically targeted young tourists at popular nightspots, leaving 202 people dead, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, and seven Americans. The devastating attack on innocent civilians was compounded by dramatic economic consequences for Indonesia. The terrorist operation, which cost about \$35,000 to execute, shattered Bali's tourist industry, leading to losses estimated in the millions of dollars. In the aftermath, Indonesia, unprepared to counter the growing dangers posed by terrorist groups alone, eagerly met a coalition of countries willing and able to provide extensive guidance and assistance in counterterrorism.<sup>31</sup>

With the aid of the United States and other international allies, Indonesia quickly launched a credible and professional law enforcement campaign to investigate and capture the terrorists responsible for the attack. Australian and US law enforcement experts rapidly deployed to Indonesia to assist with the various aspects of the Bali bombing investigation. Ultimately, from identifying the victims to "following the money trail" using ATM receipts, the Indonesian authorities investigated the attack and arrested most of the Jemaah Islamiyah members involved in the Bali operation. As a result of coordinated law enforcement assistance, in areas such as forensics, and preparing sound evidentiary packages, Indonesian judicial authorities have successfully prosecuted the Bali bombing perpetrators.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 14–15.



## Longer-Term Counterterrorism Capacity Building in Indonesia

Following the 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government sought to strengthen its overall capacity to prevent future terrorist attacks. A specialized counterterrorism unit within the Indonesian National Police, known as Special Detachment 88 (SD-88), was established in Jakarta and was trained and mentored by US law enforcement and Australian National Police counterparts.<sup>33</sup> Indonesia also developed and improved the Indonesian National Police's (INP) capacity to investigate and prevent terrorist crimes that included Crisis Response Team (CRT) and Explosive Incident Countermeasure (EIC) training.<sup>34</sup> As "following the money trail" was considered an important aspect of countering JI, officers with financial forensic and counterterrorism finance expertise have been incorporated in these specialized CT units. With such instruction and interdisciplinary skills, Indonesian counterterrorism forces have become more effective in disrupting plots and rooting out terror cells linked to JI. In November 2005, SD-88 located Indonesia's most wanted terrorist, Azahari bin Husin, who was linked to the Bali and Jakarta bombings. SD-88 planned and executed a successful assault on Azahari's stronghold, killing him and securing valuable intelligence to help prevent other attacks.<sup>35</sup> Since its inception, according to State Department testimony, "Detachment 88 has been instrumental in the apprehension or elimination of more than 425 terrorists. In 2007, they and other police units arrested more than 30 terrorists and killed several others, including top JI leaders Abu Dujana and Zarkasih."<sup>36</sup>

On the judicial front, Indonesia's attorney general staffed the long-awaited Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force in July 2006, which had been designed by US and Indonesian judicial experts to oversee counterterrorism trials nationwide and develop a cadre of special terrorism prosecutors. Task Force members immediately began to take on over a dozen counterterrorism cases. The Task Force won several high-profile convictions and is prosecuting a dozen members of JI's military unit

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>34</sup> US Department of State, "The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2005," available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75780.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>35</sup> US Department of State Bureau of Resource Management, "Strategic Goal 2: Counterterrorism," FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Highlights, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2006hlts/html/79818.htm>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>36</sup> Gina K. Abercrombie-Winstanley, Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2008, available at <http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080604115139.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2009.

who were arrested in March and June 2007 raids in central Java, including two key figures—Zarkasih, the JI military leader, and his deputy, Dujana.<sup>37</sup>

On the financial front, the Indonesian government, with foreign assistance, also dedicated significant resources to protecting its financial system from abuses by terrorists. Indonesia has made substantial progress in reinforcing its ability to combat terrorist financing and money laundering in the five key areas for an effective counterterrorist financing regime as outlined below.

**1. Legal Framework.** Successful prosecution of terrorists relies on a strong legal framework, and the United States and its partners have assisted Indonesia in developing strong Anti-Money Laundering/CTF laws. Since July 2002, the United States has been training Indonesian and other Southeast Asian judicial authorities in drafting and amending legislation that would enable them to adopt the UN conventions related to terrorism and comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 to criminalize terrorist financing and money laundering. In the past, Indonesia had a weak track record in countering financial crimes; in 2001, it was added to the Financial

Action Task Force list of Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories (NCCT) of money laundering concern, which affects investor confidence in listed countries. However, in September 2003, technical assistance from a US interagency team helped Indonesia adequately amend its anti-money laundering legislation to meet international standards and avoid further FATF sanctions.<sup>38</sup> As a result of this legislative progress, FATF removed Indonesia from the NCCT list in February 2005.<sup>39</sup>

**2. Financial/Regulatory.** Central banks are instrumental in monitoring and suspending money flows to terrorist groups. Indonesia has been working with the Asian Development Bank and other international donors to modernize its financial sector. In October 2003, Indonesian central bankers participated in a financial regulatory workshop on how to combat terrorist financing and money laundering

<sup>37</sup> US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Chapter 2 – Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism, 30 April 2008, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103706.htm>, accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>38</sup> Realuyo and Stapleton, *op. cit.*, 15–16.

<sup>39</sup> Berita Sebelumnya, “RI Removed from Money Laundering List,” Jakarta Post, 12 February 2005.

and how to detect suspicious activities in private banks.<sup>40</sup> The training led Bank Indonesia to later devise and build out a compliance audit program for AML/CTF and plan to conduct full on-site supervision and examination of banks.

**3. Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).** Bali's remote location and inadequate preparedness for a large-scale attack meant that national and international law enforcement agents could not rely solely on crime scene evidence to track and apprehend the responsible terrorists. One of the most powerful investigative tools in the Bali bombings was the analysis of communication and financial transactions between JI members. Working closely with Australia's financial intelligence unit, US officials assisted in developing the Indonesian FIU. Washington conducted a one-week training seminar entitled "Basic Analysis and Suspicious Transaction Reporting" for FIU personnel and other government officials responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Through a grant from USAID to procure essential information technology equipment, the United States directly assisted Indonesia's FIU in bringing its electronic reporting system online in October 2003 to collect suspicious transaction reports from the private sector. With this assistance from the United States and Australia, Indonesia's FIU passed a milestone in June 2004 when it officially became a member of the Egmont Group of FIUs<sup>41</sup>—the international body that promotes financial intelligence sharing.<sup>42</sup> Financial intelligence, according to a former Treasury Department official, has played an important role in individual operations, such as the investigation that led to the capture of Hambali, Jemaah Islamiyah's operations chief who masterminded the 2002 Bali bombings.<sup>43</sup>

**4. Law Enforcement.** In January 2004, the FBI Terrorist Financing Operations Section conducted training courses for sixty-nine Indonesian National Police and other officials responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. In an attempt to foster interagency cooperation in terrorist financing cases, participants included personnel from the Indonesian National Police SD-88 counterterrorism unit, financial crimes unit, and financial intelligence unit. As a result of this training,

<sup>40</sup> Realuyo and Stapleton, *op. cit.*, 16.

<sup>41</sup> Realuyo and Stapleton, *op. cit.*, 16–17.

<sup>42</sup> See <http://www.egmontgroup.org/> for more information.

<sup>43</sup> 43. Michael Jacobson, "Extremism's Deep Pockets: The Growing Challenge of Fighting Terrorist Financing," *The Politic* (Yale University), 17 February 2008, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1134>, accessed 19 September 2009.

Indonesian law enforcement authorities have initiated over thirty money laundering investigations, two-thirds of which have been referred to the Attorney General's office.<sup>44</sup>

**5. Prosecutorial/Judicial Process.** The US Department of Justice's Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training division (OPDAT) has assigned a resident legal advisor in Jakarta to work with the host government in applying the new counterterrorism and anti-money laundering legislation. The resident legal advisor assisted with the passage and application of mutual legal assistance legislation.<sup>45</sup>

## Lessons Learned

Through law enforcement operations and public designations, Indonesia responded quickly to the Bali bombings and made significant strides in rooting out the JI cell responsible for the attacks. Training and capacity building provided by the US government and other international donors have significantly augmented Indonesia's ability to prevent and respond to terrorist financing and international terrorism. From law enforcement programs to a comprehensive overhaul of financial and legal structures, Indonesia has benefited extensively from the continuing assistance of its allies, and it serves as a positive example of international capacity building efforts. The case of Indonesia demonstrates how Indonesia and its allies were able to work together to build counterterrorism capacity to confront Jemaah Islamiyah.<sup>46</sup> Washington and other world capitals dedicated and deployed technical expertise drawn from across the disciplines (law enforcement, financial, judicial experts) that enabled Indonesia to work toward defeating terrorist groups such as JI.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Realuyo and Stapleton, *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>45</sup> Realuyo and Stapleton, *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>46</sup> Realuyo and Stapleton, *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>47</sup> More background available from the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Indonesia Country Brief," June 2008, available at <http://www.indo.usaid.gov.au/projects/counterterrorism.html>, accessed 19 September 2009; and AUSAID in Indonesia, "Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Initiative," available at <http://www.indo.usaid.gov.au/projects/counterterrorism.html>, accessed 19 September 2009. Australia has a strong historic interest in Indonesia, which it considers to be part of its "back yard." Bali is a major tourist destination for Australians and New Zealanders, somewhat comparable to the Caribbean for Americans and Canadians. In an informal arrangement discussed with S/CT officials to make joint resources go further, Australia and New Zealand generally have taken the lead in assisting South Pacific nations in law enforcement and counterterrorism issues. Coordination takes place through regular meetings and at the embassy level. Australia and Indonesia have also taken the lead in promoting regional counterterrorism cooperation, including by jointly hosting the Sub-Regional Ministerial Conference on Counter-Terrorism in Jakarta in March 2007. That meeting provided impetus for closer regional counterterrorism cooperation and led to agreement on priorities for future CT action in Southeast Asia.

## Conclusion

For nine years the international security community has newly focused on addressing the threat of terrorism and on disrupting, defeating, and deterring terror networks. Governments at the national, regional, and international levels have devoted considerable resources to these counterterrorism efforts, including to the financial front of the war on terror. So, how successful have these counterterrorism finance measures been in combating terrorism? Very successful, according to former US Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell. In February 2008, he commented that “over the past 12–18 months, the intelligence community notices that al Qaeda and its affiliated groups have had difficulty in raising funds and sustaining themselves.”<sup>48</sup> Post-9/11, we have witnessed governments around the globe establish and reinforce more robust counterterrorism finance regimes. These actions have hampered the ability of terrorist groups to raise and move money to such an extent that they are resorting to more risky methods of terrorist financing such as cash couriers, alternative remittance systems, charities, and front companies. The nexus between terrorism and crime is of growing concern to international security experts as terrorist groups have partnered with criminal organizations or turned to engaging directly in criminal activities to finance and support their networks’ operational and support requirements.

Since financing is the lifeblood of terrorist networks, depriving terrorists of funding constrains their operating environment and ability to plan and execute deadly attacks. This is the objective of counterterrorism finance strategy. The four lines of operation—(1) law enforcement and intelligence operations, (2) public designations and asset freezes, (3) international cooperation, and (4) CTF capacity building—enhance each country’s and the international community’s ability to combat terrorist financing. There has been greater appreciation for the importance of “following the money trail” and financial intelligence to track down terrorist groups and their enablers. Although it is impossible to stem the flow of funds to terror networks completely, counterterrorism finance measures serve as a disruptive tool, intelligence resource, and deterrent by becoming an integral part of broader counterterrorism policies. There has been significant progress made on the financial front of the war on terrorism; however, the international community must remain ever vigilant and responsive as terrorist groups and their financiers devise new means and methods of raising and moving funds for their murderous plots and attacks.

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<sup>48</sup> US House of Representatives, “Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment,” 7 February 2008, 16–18, available at [www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080207\\_transcript.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080207_transcript.pdf), accessed 19 September 2009.

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## **Building a National Counterterrorism Capability: A Primer for Operators and Policymakers Alike**

*By James Q. Roberts*

This chapter describes the diverse considerations governments should take into account as they seek to build or improve a national counterterrorism capability. For the purposes of this discussion, conducting a successful hostage rescue operation will serve as the benchmark for a competent counterterrorism capability. Although terrorists armed with a weapon of mass destruction and seeking to leverage that weapon (or weapons) to blackmail a government present perhaps the most difficult decision for politicians as they consider the employment of their counterterrorism forces, we can be thankful that such a scenario has not yet occurred.

Rather than address such a theoretical challenge, this chapter will focus on counter terror hostage rescue operations. Recent history is replete with many case studies of both successes and failures in these operations, from which lessons learned may be drawn. These also serve to highlight the key challenges for the three elements involved in any hostage rescue decision; the counterterrorism force, the intelligence structures supporting the rescue, and the politicians who must decide whether or not to launch the operation.

Despite a decrease in the appeal of hostage-taking operations in apparent favor of suicide body, car, and truck bombs, terrorists still can get major mileage out of hostage taking. The most recent example is the attacks on luxury hotels by Lashkar e-Tayyiba-trained Muslim extremists in Mumbai during November 2008.

To have decent odds for the conduct of a successful hostage rescue, there are three components of any government that must come together to form an alliance of shared capabilities, risk analysis, and political resolve. First, the government beset with a hostage-taking situation must possess a trained hostage rescue force—the hammer. Second, an intelligence capability must be able to provide adequate details about the hostage crisis to enable a reasonable chance of a successful rescue—the eyes. Third, political leaders must have confidence in both the rescue force and the intelligence underpinning the operation. Politicians, the brain, must muster the political will to close the crisis by launching an operation—and suffer the consequences, good or bad.

I refer to these three components—hammer, eyes, brain—as the “Iron Triangle” of counterterrorism decision making. In most governments, the three components (where they exist) live in separate worlds, that is, separate ministries, different values, divergent concepts of risk and degrees of risk aversion, different skill sets, different understandings of the political environment.

All too frequently, they come together only at the moment of crisis. However, for a successful rescue they must coalesce into a competent political-military whole—like a skilled carpenter, striking a nail with a hammer, on the first swing, without denting the wood below. This chapter argues that such coordination requires practice, practice, practice.

### **The Rescue Force—the Hammer**

The first component of the Iron Triangle is the rescue force itself. History shows us that successful rescues almost always have been executed by a specialized hostage rescue force. Whether the force is a military, police, or gendarmerie organization is not of critical importance. What is absolutely crucial are the skill sets the force possesses, and its readiness. The key skills combine outstanding physical and mental toughness, an unparalleled sense of mission and duty, and a set of lethal and nonlethal capabilities, which is ever evolving and can be brought to bear with speed, force, and surgical precision.

To find the “right cut of cloth” for their operators almost all hostage rescue units begin with an assessment and selection process. In this phase the unit is building its initial cadre or looking for new members to fill losses or make the force more robust. An initial records screening is conducted to establish that the candidate possesses the requisite intellect, performance record, and physical abilities, and can obtain the necessary security clearances. Next, a typical assessment and selection process involves a series of physical, mental, and psychological tests, usually putting the candidates under significant and unexpected stress in an effort to weed out the weak of heart, or mind, or will. This process is usually several days to several weeks in length and is often conducted in an isolated and uncomfortable environment.

The stress period allows the unit to observe behaviors such as individual performance, teamwork, competition among candidates, ethical decision making under stress, and the effects of fatigue, weather extremes, and sleep deprivation on candidates’ physical and mental capabilities. Some units also test for preexisting skills such as photography, martial arts, marksmanship, demonstrated leadership, mountaineering, or experience in urban operations. Almost all conduct basic and advanced physical fitness tests, and swimming examinations in difficult conditions. A few also test for irrational fears such as claustrophobia or acrophobia.

A detailed physical examination and some degree of psychological assessment frequently round out the assessment phase. Finally, many units conduct some type of interview with the candidate during which leaders try to get a final measure of the candidate. If he or she is deemed to possess “what it takes,” an offer to join the unit may be extended on the spot or in a follow-up contact.

The training phase is next. Operators habitually undergo extensive training regimens to further develop their individual and team skills. Honing physical conditioning and exercising mental toughness are standard fare. So are martial arts and other one-on-one, and team-on-team, hand-to-hand combat exercises. Marksmanship forms the cornerstone of most individual and unit skills, with many units firing thousands of rounds per member per month in both range and shooting house environments.

Close quarters combat experts and snipers evolve into their own specialty worlds, yet regularly interact in coordinated training scenarios to ensure both skills can be orchestrated to produce the desired results. Many units conduct street craft training to ensure that members can operate unobtrusively in diverse urban environments. Military hostage rescue units also train in a wide variety of natural terrain environments—mountains, deserts, and jungles are the norm. Both civilian and military units usually have parachute and water/underwater capabilities as well.

Individual training gives way to team training as the new operators develop. Team training leverages the individual skills and brings them to bear in a variety of situations. Most units train for hostage rescue operations in urban static (building) scenarios, land mobile scenarios (cars, busses, trains), water environments (ships and oil platforms), and aircraft scenarios. Each of these requires different skills, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Command and control for each may also require adaptation or special communications equipment.

Counterterrorism units often serve as test beds for developmental equipment or emerging technologies—body armor, scopes and other targeting devices, specialized team communications gear, long-range observation and photography equipment and techniques, explosives and shaped charges, medical advances, robotics, and others.

Finally, readiness, alert status, and emergency transportation arrangements round out the force requirements. Most units maintain some portion of their force in a high readiness state, usually expressed in the number of hours required to assemble an initial force and have it ready for transport. Many ensure they possess or have access to vehicles, boats, or aircraft to ensure quick deployment, either throughout their country or for the more global powers around the world.

The most common practice is to divide the entire force into three subordinate units, each “on watch” for a period of a few weeks. Of the two elements not on standby, one is usually in a team training phase, preparing for its “watch period” while the third has just finished its “watch” and is conducting leaves, training, or developing individual skills. After a year or two of training and development these units begin to exhibit a personality all of their own. The unit’s traits most often include a spirit of independence, a certain degree of secrecy, a sense of invulnerability or invincibility, and an elite mentality that sets them apart from peers. Operators and their commanders tend to be tough, uncompromising, competent, brusque, and edgy.

Long hours of training and standing ready also result in a collective impatience for operational opportunities in “the real world.” These attributes form both the strength and the weakness of counterterrorism units around the globe. As one senior commander of such units was fond of saying, “We must not confuse enthusiasm with capability.”

### **The Intelligence and Investigative Unit—the Eyes**

The second component of the Iron Triangle is the intelligence and investigative capability that a nation can bring to bear on the hostage crisis. These scenarios typically present a multifaceted intelligence and investigative challenge. At what one might call the strategic level, of key concern from the outset are the identity and agenda of the hostage-takers. Are the hostages being held for political reasons? Or is this a kidnapping-for-ransom scenario? Do the hostage-takers represent a domestic or foreign terrorist organization? Does the organization have a track record? Do they rely on internal or external support? Are they state supported, or state sponsored? Are the local media sympathetic to their cause? If this is not their first adventure at hostage taking, what is the previous track record? How lethal have their actions been in the past? And what are their tactical and/or strategic demands in the current crisis?

As a general consideration, if the terrorists are foreigners, national intelligence organizations may have the lead; if they represent a domestic group, then law enforcement and other domestic agencies may be better suited to develop the strategic intelligence picture for both the counterterrorist force and the political leadership. If the terrorists are threatening to kill the hostages in the near term, then the pressure to develop this strategic picture must run in parallel with the development of the tactical intelligence picture. A quick rudimentary tactical picture is always required to enable an emergency assault by the hostage rescue force, should that become the only option to save the remaining hostages.

If the terrorists are foreign, another key intelligence question is whether this represents a state-sponsored attack. If state sponsorship is suspected, or can be proven, then national responses can be structured very differently than if the group is a foreign non-state actor without known or discernible links to any foreign government. In the event of the former, all tools of state power can be used to pressure the sponsor. However, in the latter, the tool box is far more constrained and must more directly address the hostage-takers and their (often shadowy) non-state actor organization.

Nevertheless, for a successful rescue, detailed intelligence and information about the tactical situation are essential. At the top of the list is the number of hostages. Within the hostage group are there women, children, elderly, or others who might be released on humanitarian grounds? What are the nationalities of the hostages? If the terrorists make no initial demands, can some intent be determined based on these bio-

graphical aspects of the pool of hostages? Can negotiators gain the release of some of the hostages based on knowledge of the hostage population?

Next are the details about the terrorists. How many? What ages and sexes? Which ethnic, cultural, religious backgrounds? Armed with what? Is there a suicide bomber's device involved? Are there small arms only? Or do the terrorists have grenades, other explosives, tear gas or other chemicals, rocket-propelled grenades, or other heavy weapons? What other equipment did they bring to the crisis, such as body armor, gas masks, or video or audio monitoring equipment? What is the chain of command, and who is the commander? Does he or she have a track record from former terrorist operations? What languages are they using? Is chain of command respected among the terrorists? What indications are there of military training? Do they have communications with an outside force or support base? Do they have contact with the media?

Next the hostage rescue force needs details about the specific location and whether the terrorists envisage moving with all or a portion of the hostages. To the extent possible all details about the physical site where the hostages are being held must be obtained to enable planning by the hostage rescue force.

These include details about the construction of the building from top to bottom, with particular emphasis on the floor plans where the hostages are being held; numbers and locations of windows and doors; building support systems such as heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and associated duct work; water and sewerage plans; elevators; internal furnishings; food sources (snack bars, restaurants, kitchens, food storage facilities); parking garages; basements; and the like.

As these tactical details are being collected, the intelligence unit must also develop exact locations for the terrorists and the hostages. Knowing how many, and where, the terrorists are at any given moment is one of the most valuable elements of information that can be provided to the hostage rescue force. It is highly desirable to obtain long duration, constant, concealed observation of the crisis site and to employ multiple audio and video means to augment that observation.

This durable observation task is often initiated by or turned over to the tactical hostage rescue unit preparing the assault. Most such units have skilled sniper/observers who can monitor the crisis site and keep the tactical commander fully informed about activities therein. Bringing the entire intelligence and observation picture together into an all-source real-time view of all aspects of the crisis is perhaps the single most important contribution of the intelligence component.

This picture needs to be provided to the tactical commander of the hostage rescue force in a constant stream for situational awareness. Some political leaders may also want such details about the state of play, in order to better assess their options and the viability of any proposed rescue operation. This situational awareness may also determine the necessity of launching an emergency assault, in particular, should the terrorists begin to systematically kill the hostages.

Investigative and intelligence skills needed to accomplish these tasks are beyond the skill levels of many standard domestic police or civilian or military foreign intelligence units. Nations must determine how best to develop and maintain such capabilities. In many instances there are legal or constitutional prohibitions against combining investigative and intelligence skills or organizations. Whatever the challenges, obtaining timely intelligence of this specificity is a sine qua non for successful hostage rescue operations.

The intelligence and investigative units capable of these tasks, if they exist at all, tend to have some quirks of their own. First, they will be secretive in the extreme. Second, they will likely consistently underplay their capabilities, for fear of not being able to produce when needed. Third, like almost all intelligence organizations, they will likely caveat their information with great care. Fourth, they probably will be comfortable with the uncertainty of the unknown. Fifth, they will shun any media, and often even any political, attention.

These qualities can make a poor mix with the psychological profile of the hostage rescue force and its leaders. The first obstacle to overcome is the issue of trust. The intelligence professionals will tend to see the operators as “a bunch of cowboys,” while the operators will see the intelligence types as timid, evasive, shifty, and potentially unreliable. Since the prestige of the hostage rescue unit, and in fact, the success of the operation, will rely heavily on the accuracy and timeliness of the intelligence, it is essential to close this gap in trust. The question is how? There are two well-proven methods.

The first is to develop a habitual relationship between the operators and the collectors. This typically involves conducting frequent exercises that stress the capabilities of both elements. Over time each begins to learn the strengths and weaknesses of the other, and each becomes more tolerant of the personality quirks of the other. The unit commanders develop an appreciation of “the possible” for each element, and trust can be developed with a concerted, long-term effort. It is clear, however, that the first time the two units encounter each other must not be at the moment of crisis. The exigencies of a real crisis will stress even the best of strong relationships—the teams must know each other well, long before they get to the field of strife.

The second model is to build a tactical intelligence capability inside the hostage rescue unit. Such a solution helps to establish the habitual relationship and to build teamwork among the components. The downsides are that this approach is expensive, and there may be significant legal hurdles to overcome, depending on the charter and authorities of the ministry from which the hostage rescue force comes. Additionally, interagency jealousies may doom the effort as the intelligence and investigative bureaus become aware that the operators are building their own capabilities. In some countries there may be budget authority considerations, especially when it comes to the purchase of particularly sensitive intelligence-related audio or video monitoring

gear. Finally, the downside of this approach is that a counterterrorism unit commander is already stretched thin to keep his assault force on razor's edge—ready and trained to go at a moment's notice. Keeping these intelligence and investigative types at the top of their game simultaneously may be too much to ask. Success, however, requires that these two components be fully compatible and well trained together, like the eyes and the hands of our carpenter referred to earlier.

### **The National Political Leadership—the Brains**

The national political leadership is the ultimate authority that must decide whether or not to launch a hostage rescue operation. Those authorities are charged, first and foremost, with the protection of their populations. The taking of hostages is a direct and irrefutable challenge to the security of their citizens. Policymakers cannot avoid coming to grips with their responsibilities when confronted with the stark choices terrorist hostage scenarios present. The lives of the hostages swing in the balance, based on the outcomes of their decisions. Successful rescues reinforce the moral authority of political leaders, while failed ones, particularly in democratic regimes, have caused governments to fall.

I refer to these leaders as the “brain” of the Iron Triangle, not out of deference to any (possible?) superior intellect, but because it is they who are charged with this decision, as is the brain of the carpenter, using the “eyes” to guide the “hammer” to strike the nail with precision and finesse. But this “brain” operates in a very different world from the other two components of the Iron Triangle.

Politicians are products of an entirely different culture than either the hostage rescue force operators, or the intelligence collection and analysis experts we have addressed so far. For politicians, decisions are best delayed for as long as possible, and when one must be made, a compromise or trade-off is usually the preferred course of action. This is why hostage taking creates such political pressure. It places politicians between three bad choices, each of which they would prefer to avoid.

Essentially, political leadership is faced with three options in a hostage situation: (1) acquiesce to the demands of the terrorists in hopes the hostages will be released, their lives spared; (2) refuse to meet the terrorists' demands and perhaps see the hostages killed either one by one, or as a group; or (3) launch a hostage rescue attempt in the hopes of rescuing the hostages while killing or arresting the terrorists. Because for most politicians the decision “not to decide now” is considered a legitimate decision, launching a hostage rescue effort is usually their last choice, often by default. But waiting too long can create risks for the possible success of any rescue operation, and it places the initiative in the hands of the terrorists.

Given their culture of “deal making,” many politicians would prefer to meet, or partially meet, the demands of the terrorists, and hope for the release of the hostages.

There are many cases where this tactic has resulted in short-term gains, particularly in kidnapping for ransom cases, where hostage-takers have been paid off. But true terrorist attacks present additional pressures on the government—first, their political demands are unlikely to be able to be met, and second, the political dimension of capitulating to their threat of violence will undermine the legitimacy of that government in the eyes of its population. Third, the terrorists may go back on their promises, either increasing their demands or killing some or all of the hostages anyway. Capitulating to demands will also likely result in future terrorists trying the same tactic for similar or different causes.

In the long run, giving in to terrorists' demands only serves to strengthen the terrorists' hand, while weakening the government's. This essential equation should be reviewed with policymakers in advance, so that, should a crisis occur, the "brains" will understand the challenge their propensity for "deal making" presents in their role as protectors of their populations. In many nations the tendency for deal making is countered by policy pronouncements such as "we don't negotiate with terrorists" or other such political edicts. These pronouncements notwithstanding, most nations do negotiate with terrorists, especially hostage-takers. There are two legitimate reasons for this, both tactical.

First, skilled negotiators may be able to gain the release of some number of the hostages. Most frequent are agreements to release women and children. There may be other groups in the hostage population (based on race, religion, or other factors) that negotiators may be able to convince the terrorists to release. Every hostage freed by negotiations is one less requiring to be rescued, and one less potential hostage casualty. These freed hostages can also provide key information about conditions inside the crisis site and can answer many of the key questions to which the rescue force requires answers. Negotiators may also be able to develop a sense of rapport with the hostage-takers, which can come in useful later on. Sometimes this sense of rapport coupled with time to wear down the terrorists' resolve can result in the hostage-takers "giving up."

But should a rescue attempt become inevitable, a relationship between negotiators and the terrorists can be played to excellent advantage by the rescue force. This is the second reason why it is important to negotiate during the crisis. Negotiations can be used to modify the terrorists' behavior or their disposition, adjust the fidelity of the crisis intelligence, and optimize the timing of any eventual operation.

Deciding who should be the negotiators, and how to integrate them into the three structures we have discussed, is another key decision governments must make. In some instances, the negotiators are an integral part of the hostage rescue force—sometimes even the force commander takes on this role. In other models, negotiators come from the investigative or intelligence units. Some nations may rely on "profilers" or psychologists to perform these tasks. Finally, some political leaders



may want to control the negotiations and frame the discussions with the terrorists at their level. Whichever model is selected, practicing negotiations as an integral part of the government's hostage rescue capability is another key relationship that must be developed over time and on a basis of trust, by all parties—hammer, eyes, and brain. Negotiators could be considered as the other hand of the carpenter, placing the nail in just the right spot, fully coordinated by the eyes and the brain, and thus optimizing the effectiveness of the strike by the hammer.

### **Building a Governmental Counterterrorism Team**

This next section provides some advice to policymakers on how to assemble and exercise the components of a national counterterrorism hostage rescue capability. A sense of trust and shared values, or at least a cognizance of the key differences between the components, is a basic starting point. Setting out national rules of the road is another. Finally, exercising the components under a variety of scenarios is also necessary.

First, establish a national policy framework. Governments should develop an agreed national policy on combating terrorism. One element of that policy should be on handling hostage crises. The policy should be an interagency consensus document, well known to the rescue force, the intelligence apparatus, and the political leadership. It should be an enduring document that reflects the core values of the society, and it must differentiate between terrorism and other forms of political violence. It should also establish a balance between the responsibility of the government for combating terrorism and its responsibility to ensure the basic freedoms of its citizens. This is particularly important when it comes to subjects such as domestic intelligence and surveillance and the collection and retention of personal data on citizens, immigrants, and visitors.

Second, develop a national strategy for combating terrorism. Such a document would assign roles and missions to agencies involved in the many facets of a full-spectrum campaign, with timelines and coordinating instructions. Key components might include:

Diplomacy	Border control	Health
Intelligence	Finance	Emergency services
Law enforcement	Information	Military
Customs	Agriculture	Others, as appropriate

Third, create a national-level interagency combating terrorism working group. Depending on the structure of the government involved, this group can be chaired either by a representative of the office of the chief executive—president, National Security Council, prime minister—or by a lead agency such as the Ministry of Interior for domestic terrorist events, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for events involving foreign or international terrorists. This working group should assemble all of the ministries involved in the nation’s combating terrorism strategy and meet regularly to address threats and assess vulnerabilities.

The group should develop plans to defend critical infrastructure and other national resources against terrorist attacks, respond to terrorist events with force when appropriate, and manage the consequences of a terrorist attack. Particular attention should be given to events involving attacks at multiple locations, attacks on critical infrastructure nodes or capabilities, and attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. It may be appropriate to create a subgroup devoted to disrupting terrorist financing, another focused on countering the informational or ideological aspects of terrorism, and other subgroups as necessary. Both functional and regional structures should be considered. Another concept might be to organize around key terrorist groups active in the nation or region concerned.

The combating terrorism working group should meet regularly, ideally once a week or once every two weeks. The intent of the group is to ensure that all agencies concerned are kept abreast of threats and capabilities, and to build a sense of teamwork and shared responsibility over time. Furthermore, the group must be ready to provide focused expert advice to the government, in the event of a crisis. The requirement for the national foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement communities to provide a consolidated, complete, and current threat picture to the group, and the agencies involved, is an absolute necessity for the development of coherent responses.

Fourth, exercise the team at multiple levels. The top level is the head of state or head of government, and the ministers represented in the combating terrorism working group. Since the top political authorities will be making the ultimate decisions to launch a counterterrorism operation, it is essential that they become exposed to, and ideally familiar with, both the rules of this game and the capabilities of their players.

Since their time is precious, an optimal way to engage them is to conduct “table-top games.” These typically propose a scenario, with a series of “moves”—by both the terrorists and the government. As the players work through the moves, they are exposed to the tactical, strategic, and political risks and results of their decisions—both good and bad. Such learning can take place over a short period, three to five hours—but can be invaluable in exposing the most senior members of the government to the challenges they would face in a real situation. The key is to develop a scenario that is seen as feasible by the players, which involves “moves” that highlight

the choices to be made, and to have a facilitator who can gain the respect of all. To avoid embarrassment of any players, individuals should be briefed in advance on the design of the game, their general roles, and the roles, capabilities, and limitations of their ministry, so they can be comfortable during the play.

The next level of exercises or games should involve the members of the national interministerial working group. The group's exercises should be similar to the tabletop exercises discussed earlier, but conducted in more detail, with more moves, and over a longer period of time—perhaps twelve to twenty-four hours. These games should be conducted in two formats. First, the game should be played only within the working group. This will familiarize the players with their roles and responsibilities, and with each other. Once the inter-ministerial process has been “debugged,” then the group should move on to the second format.

This format should bring the tactical players—operators, collectors, and negotiators— together with the working group policymakers. They also should participate in two types of exercises. The first would be what the military would call a “command post exercise.” This would exercise roles and missions, inter-ministerial coordination, and decision making, based on a tactical scenario in which the leaders of the intelligence and operational units would play roles, but no troops would be deployed. Such an exercise might last from one to several days. One goal should be to demonstrate the effects fatigue will have on both the government officials and the terrorists, as the crisis drags on.

The second level of exercise would be a “field training exercise” in military parlance. This would be similar to the foregoing “command post exercise” but would involve the deployment and employment of all the forces involved. It will also require the fielding of a group of “terrorists” and a group of “hostages.” The terrorist role players often come from within the operational and/or intelligence units involved. Before the exercise they are pulled aside, sworn to secrecy, and prepared for their roles in the game. For hostage role players it is usually best to choose government personnel with no experience in the counterterrorism business. Not knowing what to expect is an integral part of the hostage experience, and neither the terrorists nor the government forces are sure what the hostages may do next. This unpredictability is a key wild card in each of these games, but it adds a degree of reality and free play that is invaluable.

The full “field training exercise” should unfold over several days to a week, and may involve all aspects of the operation, testing the deployment, intelligence picture development, emergency and deliberate assault capabilities, hostage-handling techniques, and post-operations forensics aspects of a counterterrorism mission. Such an exercise requires a detailed scenario, experienced exercise controllers, an appropriate venue, and a good process to conduct debriefings of all involved in order to capture “lessons learned.”

Although such a series of games and exercises is an expensive and time-consuming endeavor, it will pay big dividends when it comes time to execute an operation “for real.” These exercises and games provide all involved with a sense of purpose. They highlight capabilities and vulnerabilities across all forces involved and can be used to allocate resources for investment in areas needing improvement. They also develop familiarity between the many components—hammer, eyes, brain—and thereby increase trust and confidence among these key players.

The intent of all of these preparations is to bring the elements of the Iron Triangle together at multiple levels, in multiple scenarios, in advance of any actual operation. Bringing them together will forge bonds of friendship and trust. These will be critically important if and when a real rescue operation is needed.

For the senior policymakers such a regimen can serve two purposes. The first is to bring the Iron Triangle together to enhance the chances for a successful rescue operation. On a more political level, the preparations can be used to demonstrate to a skeptical parliament (or public) that the government is taking terrorism seriously, and has taken appropriate steps to ensure all ministries are as prepared as can be, in the event of an actual terrorist hostage crisis. More skeptically, in the event a crisis occurs and an assault fails, these preparations can serve as a form of “political insurance” to counter the inevitable charges of unpreparedness, clumsiness, or intelligence failure from national or international political opponents.

The final ingredient for a successful operation is one over which we have no control. A rescue force that is only marginally capable, but enjoys a large dose of luck, will likely achieve results far superior to one with outstanding skills, but bad luck. It may seem fickle or inappropriate to speak of luck in such a context, but long years of experience demonstrate the crucial role played by this uncontrollable variable. Operators and policymakers alike must recognize that once they cast the dice by launching an operation, skill will only take them so far. Although any operational commander worthy of the title will seek to convince the policymaker he or she can prevail, in all likelihood, Lady Luck will have the last word. Pray that she will be on your side.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has described the ingredients for a competent counterterrorism force and a governmental structure to support the employment of that force. It is intended to serve as a “cookbook” for operators, intelligence personnel, negotiators, and policymakers at several levels of government. Developing such a set of capabilities is an expensive and time-consuming enterprise. It will require a long-term political commitment at many levels of government, development of an inter-ministerial approach, allocation of resources to all components of the team, and constant exercising

and adaptation, particularly in light of the rapidly evolving terrorist threat.

Nevertheless, building such a national capability should be near the top of every government's agenda. Given the breadth and scope of terrorist acts in today's world, to be without such tools when terrorists do attack is to fail to uphold one of the most basic bargains between governments and their citizens—the requirement to provide an environment safe and secure from terrorists—to the extent practicable.

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## Recommended Readings

Alexander, Yonah, ed. *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006.

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