Fissile Material Treaty (FMT): Implications for Pakistan

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>BoP</td>
<td>Balance of Power</td>
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<td>BM</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Fissile Materials</td>
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<td>FMCT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty</td>
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<td>FMT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Treaty</td>
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<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter Continental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>IPFM</td>
<td>International Panel on Fissile Materials</td>
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<td>IBGs</td>
<td>Integrated Battle Groups</td>
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<td>CSD</td>
<td>Cold Start Doctrine</td>
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<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defence</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Negative Security Assurance</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NPRTR</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Regime</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Supplier Group</td>
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<td>PAD</td>
<td>Prithvi Air Defence</td>
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<td>PAROS</td>
<td>Prevention on Arms Race in Outer Space</td>
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<td>PNE</td>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosions</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Organization

This paper is aimed at exploring the idea of Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) and its implications for Pakistan. The first part will deal with the definition of Fissile Materials, a brief background of FMT discussions at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (UNCD). The second part would highlight the implications of proposed FM(C)T for Pakistan. Pakistan’s position will be discussed in the third part. Concluding remarks and recommendations will be given at the end.

Introduction

The proposed Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) is under active considerations in the sixty five-nations (65 Countries) Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The projected treaty is aimed at halting quantitative nuclear proliferation. The treaty is designed to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament mentioned in Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) under Article VI.

Under the prevailing geo-political environment of the international system, the need is felt to control the production of further fissile material that can be used for manufacturing more nuclear arsenals. Barak Obama, the US President announced his intentions for ‘a nuclear weapon free world’ in his famous Prague speech in April 2009. He amplified that the proposed FM(C)T (Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty) would be one of the major developments in that regard.

The proposed Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) faces two main challenges for its entry into force. One is the Pre-existing stockpiles and the other is its Verification mechanism. FM(C)T proposes to stop the further production of fissile material. Now, if this treaty comes into forth, it will limit only the further production of fissile material but what to do with the previous stockpiles of fissile materials that can also be used for making new nuclear arsenals? Another issue is of its verification. The US in its statements, professed that there was no need of verification. The treaty should serve the basis of a norm. On the other side, Pakistan and many other states urge on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that is accepted in Shannon Mandate.

While analyzing its impacts, it would put a great set-back on security considerations of Pakistan. Firstly, it will keep the hegemony of P-5 states (the US, UK, Russia, France and China) over the existing stocks of fissile material which can be diverted for military use. Secondly, if talking about the three outside NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) nuclear states (Israel, India and Pakistan), the first one has enjoyed special status and privilege in nuclear dealings with the support of a major power and through

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1. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a United Nations negotiating body which deals with arms control & disarmament and non-proliferation issues. This organization works on the rule of consensus i.e. every state has veto power for accepting or defying a proposal. There are 65 members of the CD.

2. There is a difference between FMT and FMCT. FMT (Fissile Material Treaty) is a proposal by Pakistan to halt the future production of fissile materials on one hand and include the existing stockpiles of fissile materials under the ambit of the proposed treaty on the other hand. Whereas, FM(C)T Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty is a proposal by the United States and the West to stop the further production of fissile materials. They ask not to include pre-existing stocks of fissile material under the scope of proposed treaty.

3. As above stated
its policy of nuclear ambiguity. The second one (the perpetrator of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia) is recently been rewarded with nuclear cooperation deal and NSG (Nuclear Supplier Group) waiver by so-called non-proliferationists. Therefore, the only target of this proposed treaty would be Pakistan.

On 24th September, 2010, the UN Secretary General, Ban ki Moon has urged to break the ice in Conference on Disarmament by making this treaty into force. Now, when FMT discussions are getting focus for the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, it is pertinent to analyse options for Pakistan. Should Pakistan become the part of it or it should negate this discriminatory and unverifiable treaty?

Pakistan’s response on FM(C)T talks is crystal clear that it will not sign any treaty that is of discriminatory, unverifiable and ineffective in its nature. It refuted the proposed FM(C)T as only a non-proliferation measure. However, Pakistan emphasizes on a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) that would be a disarmament measure. It stipulates a treaty that will not only prohibit the future production of fissile materials, but also include previous stockpiles of fissile material in its ambit.

Pakistan also condemns the discrimination of some profit-makers who insist for non-proliferation on one hand and extend nuclear deal and provide immunity of NSG to the perpetrator of nuclear proliferation in South Asia on the other hand. The world should stop this discrimination and give access of nuclear trade and high-tech industry to Pakistan as well.

**Defining Fissile Materials**

Fissile Materials are the fissionable materials which are the essential elements for developing a nuclear weapon. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium (Pu), in simple form are called fissile materials.4

**FMT Discussions**

Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) discussions are one of the off-shoots of the efforts made by arms controllers to curb the menace of further nuclear proliferation and arms race among the states.

Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) is under active consideration in 65 members Conference on Disarmament (CD) to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament mentioned in Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) under Article VI.5 However, the proposed FMT negotiations face two contentious issues that are; verification and pre-existing stocks.6 Divergent opinions about the scope of FMT cause the hindrance for the work of the CD. Some delegations see FMCT to halt the further production of fissile material as a non-proliferation measure whereas, others like Pakistan seek this treaty as a disarmament step and include the pre-existing stockpiles of fissile material in its scope.

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Under the prevailing geo-political environment of the international system, the need is felt to control the production of further fissile material that can be used for manufacturing more nuclear arsenals. Barak Obama, the US President announced his intentions for ‘a nuclear weapon free world’ in his famous ‘Prague speech’ in April 2009 as:

“I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons...” (Obama 2009)

Although, the US is so enthusiastic about negotiating a FM(C)T yet it is not ready to talk about Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and Nuclear Disarmament (ND), the core issues of the CD platform.

A brief History of FMT talks

Although the process for initiating such a treaty was slow in the Cold War yet it got momentum in post-Cold War era. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 48/75L which stipulated the “Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, and recommended “the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Moreover, Shannon Mandate of 1995 is also one of the major outcomes of the efforts to initiate FMT negotiations. This mandate establishes that the CD decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a “Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a 65 members independent negotiating body which is entitled as a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. It works on the rule of consensus. The core issues for debate at the CD now a days are:

- Nuclear Disarmament,
- Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS),
- Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), and
- Negative Security Assurance (NSAs)

The CD is also facing the problem of linkage that is called as linkage issue. Some countries including China and Russia urged to start negotiations on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer

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Space (PAROS) and it should be linked to starting work on an FM(C)T in the CD for years. In August 2003, they showed their consent to go forth with FMCT negotiations based on the Shannon Mandate.\textsuperscript{11} Inam ul Haque Khawaja in his paper, “Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,” articulated that “China was of the view that the CD must also address the issue of Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). This proposal received support from several countries including Pakistan and Russia. These countries stipulated simultaneous establishment of Ad Hoc Committee to discuss FMT and PAROS. The United States refused to discuss PAROS and negated to establish an Ad Hoc Committee for this purpose in the CD. This led to the stalemate in the CD which continues to date.”\textsuperscript{12} So, divergent opinions of the CD members on FMT scope and linkage issue are the factors which are causing a long time impasse at the CD.

**Implications of proposed FMCT for Pakistan**

The proposed Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FM(C)T) would affect the P-5 states (the US, Britain, Russia, France, and China) in general and three non-NPT nuclear weapon states (Israel, India and Pakistan) in particular. As P-5 states have enough fissile material stocks at their disposal, FM(C)T is not going to affect their national interests. As far as the three non-NPT nuclear weapon states are concerned, Israel is protected under the US diplomatic umbrella and its policy of nuclear ambiguity.\textsuperscript{13} India can build more stockpiles of fissile materials from its indigenous sources, having the privilege of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal of 2008. Thus, the only country that can be affected by this treaty is Pakistan.

Talking about the South Asian scenario, the animosity between India and Pakistan is a key feature for taking a security calculus of South Asian region. Pakistan regards its nuclear weapon capability to balance the Indian conventional superiority on one hand, and to maintain balance of power in the region on the other hand. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal (2008) would imbalance the strategic stability in the region. It would allow India to build further stocks of fissile materials from its domestic nuclear materials, causing the commencement of a new and greater arms race in South Asia. Pakistan, therefore, would not support any treaty which is prejudiced to its supreme national interests.

Projected FMT can also be used as propaganda tool by the nuclear weapon states against non-NPT nuclear weapon states, and NPT non-nuclear weapon states. As the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 alleging that it had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). This assumption seems to be true as the US claims that Iran is in pursuit of nuclear weapon acquisition yet IAEA for many times has professed that Iran is not involved in nuclear weapon quest. The US can also use this unverifiable and discriminatory treaty to serve its vested interests.


\textsuperscript{13} ‘Nuclear Ambiguity’ is a nuclear policy of Israel which states that Israel neither proclaims nor deny as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS).
In the following paragraphs, the implications of proposed FMT for Pakistan would be analysed in detail.

1. Security Dilemma in South Asia

Theoretically speaking, nuclear proliferation in South Asia implied security dilemma in the region. To better comprehend the nuclear politics in South Asia, understanding the concept of security dilemma is pre-requisite. “The security dilemma exists when many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others.”\(^\text{14}\) Simply speaking, it is a term which establishes a situation that one country tries to enhance its military capabilities to ensure its security by undermining the defensive capabilities of its adversary.

Sharad Joshi and James Martin explained this security dilemma in South Asian region in their paper, “Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends” that “The South Asian nuclear security complex involves several security dilemmas, including Pakistan/India, India/China, and Russia/United States”\(^\text{15}\) which Kenneth N. Waltz referred as ‘Nuclear Pairs’ while saying that “Nuclear States have tended to come in hostile pairs. American capability led the Soviet Union, China became as a nuclear deterrent against the United States in Asia-Pacific region. It can be envisioned that China may conduct further nuclear tests to curb the future development of the US missile defence shield. To strengthen second strike capability, China is aspiring to develop mobile long-range ballistic missiles. China while balancing the United States would compel India to get more reliable nuclear and delivery system capabilities. New Delhi may acquire thermonuclear bomb which needs more stocks of fissile material and second strike capability by manufacturing...”\(^\text{16}\)

Tariq Rauf in his paper, ‘Learning to Live With the Bomb in South Asia: Accommodation not Confrontation’ elaborates the same nuclear security complex at regional and extra-regional level as “the nuclear security dilemma in South Asia remains centered on the fact that nuclear proliferation and nuclear security are interlinked: Pakistan versus India; India versus China; China versus Russia, and Russia versus the United States. Regional security efforts in South Asia, therefore, can be served only by recognizing that both Pakistan and India are at a strategic crossroads.”\(^\text{17}\)

Analyzing this security dilemma by taking India’s threat perception vis-à-vis China is of vital importance. New Delhi is in pursuit of acquiring advanced nuclear and missile technology to counter Beijing. Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China became as a nuclear deterrent against the United States in Asia-Pacific region. It can be envisioned that China may conduct further nuclear tests to curb the future development of the US missile defence shield. To strengthen second strike capability, China is aspiring to develop mobile long-range ballistic missiles. China while balancing the United States would compel India to get more reliable nuclear and delivery system capabilities. New Delhi may acquire thermonuclear bomb which needs more stocks of fissile material and second strike capability by manufacturing..."\(^\text{17}\)


long-range ballistic missiles to cope with China’s strategic superiority.\textsuperscript{18} India’s defence ambitions keeping into account of China’s growing arms production would imply Islamabad to meet the strategic balance in South Asia. As Pakistan’s nuclear policy is Indo-centric, it would also go for having more nuclear weapons and reliable delivery vehicles.\textsuperscript{19} As Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, a Pakistani expert on arms control in his article, ‘Pakistan’s Perspective on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons’, published in April 2009 articulated that “Pakistan fears the consequence of continuing competition between China and India. Pakistan would prefer to see rapprochement among the major powers in Asia, so that an arms competition between India and China does not force Pakistan to make excessive expenditures to keep up its minimal deterrent vis-à-vis India. Any conflict that brings the US, Japan, and India into a strategic alliance against China would (also) force Pakistan to join one side or the other.”\textsuperscript{20}

As the proposed FM(C)T does not cover the existing stocks of fissile material, this security dilemma at regional and extra-regional level can pronounce a greater arms race among the rival states of South Asia. This threat perception is also mentioned in a profound paper written by two faculty members of Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DSS), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad that “It (the Indo-US Nuclear Deal) would tilt the balance of power in India’s favour triggering a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan which would severely undermine deterrence stability in South Asia.”\textsuperscript{21} Pakistan obviously has to seek other options to counter the Indian threat and to avoid security dilemma.

2. Perturbing Strategic Stability in South Asia

India-Pakistan hostility is the core guiding feature of South Asian security calculus. Theoretically speaking, India and Pakistan balance each other in the region. Although, India is conventionally superior to Pakistan yet the latter one has managed to balance the power dynamics in the past years. Pakistan adopted the means of bandwagoning and aligning itself with big powers to maintain Balance of Power (BoP) in the region. But recent political as well as strategic development perturbed the strategic stability in South Asia.

The following arguments will substantiate this analysis.

a. Indo-US Nuclear Deal 2008

Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Deal also known as the 123 Agreement signed between the United States and India\textsuperscript{22} in October 2008. The agreement will assist India to fulfill its energy demands and meet the required nuclear materials and equipment for its civilian nuclear reactors.

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India had to divert its limited domestic supply of uranium to its nuclear-power reactors to meet their demands by cutting its stocks of weapons-grade plutonium. Now, India can import fuel for its civilian reactors by NSG (Nuclear Supplier Group) waiver to India and use its domestic uranium for the production of weapons-grade uranium.\textsuperscript{23}

This view has been clarified by K. Subrahmanyam, the former head of the National Security Advisory Board of India that:

"Given India’s uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India’s advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refueled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons-grade plutonium production."\textsuperscript{24}

The implications of Indo-US 123 Agreement will disturb the strategic stability. The National Command Authority (NCA), the highest political nuclear decision-making body of Pakistan warned, “The deal would have implications on strategic stability as it would enable India to produce fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors.”\textsuperscript{25}

This deal which indirectly helps the Indian nuclear weapon programme, runs contrary to the US Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments and India can commence a greater arms race with Pakistan and China.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, this deal has the gravest repercussions on the strategic stability in the region.

Daryl G Kimball, the Executive Director of Arms Control Association explicates, “if India builds a new plutonium-production reactor (as it is reportedly planning to do) or decides to use one or more of the eight existing heavy-water reactors that would be excluded from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to augment its two existing military plutonium-production reactors (CIRUS and Dhruva), the additional increased consumption of domestic uranium supplies for plutonium production would be compensated for by access to imported uranium for safeguarded power reactors.”\textsuperscript{27} He also established that this deal would allow New Delhi to continue and augment its building-up of stocks of nuclear materials.

The following points will describe the discriminations and fall-outs of this Indo-US 123 Nuclear Cooperation Deal:

i. Widening Asymmetries

It is an open secret that India and Pakistan are striving for competing one

\textsuperscript{26} Daryl G Kimball. op.cit.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid
another in augmenting their stocks of fissile materials since the nuclearization of South Asia. Although, India since its nuclear tests has larger stocks of nuclear materials than Pakistan yet this asymmetry will be widened by Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Munir Akram, the then Pakistan’s ambassador to the CD stated on July 30, 1998 that:

“There is a “wide disparity in fissile material stockpiles of India and Pakistan,” and that the FMT should not freeze this disparity.”

Zamir Akram, Pakistan’s permanent ambassador to the 65-members the CD Geneva, while talking on the exacerbated security situation of the South Asian region stated, “its (Pakistan’s) opposition to the start of negotiations on a treaty to ban production of fissile material used as fuel for nuclear weapons stemmed from the actions of “Some powerful states” that have changed the strategic environment of South Asian region.” He further articulated, “This has accentuated our security concerns as such nuclear cooperation shall further widen the asymmetry in stockpiles in our region.”

ii. Qualitative & Quantitative Improvements in India’s Nuclear Weapons

India has become capable of building prodigious stocks of fissile material qualitatively and quantitatively. It can divert its indigenous stocks for nuclear weapon manufacturing or abrogate its commitments to its importers in future, and convert its imported civilian use nuclear fuel into military reactors.

India has kept its 14 (out of 22) nuclear reactors for civilian use under IAEA safeguards. Now it can buy nuclear fuel and equipment for these fourteen reactors from the US and the 45-members Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). This would free up India’s indigenous production of fissile materials to use for military purposes and it would significantly spur its expansion of nuclear weapon.

India is estimated to have 40-50 nuclear arms in a year and aspire to produce 300-400 weapons within a decade. Obviously, it requires the larger quantities of fissile material. There is no obligation on New Delhi to produce fissile materials for weapon acquisition.

Article 2, Para 4 of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal professes, “The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly,
nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement.”

So, this section of the agreement is clearly giving green signal to New Delhi to enhance its fissile material quantitatively.

Nasrullah Mirza and M. Sadiq in their paper namely, ‘Indo-US 123 Agreement: Impacts on Deterrence Stability in South Asia’ published in 2008 explicated “The ‘123 Agreement’ does not have any provision according to which India will give up its right to nuclear testing. Similarly, India has not agreed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear testing. Thus it can be comprehended that India would also increase its nuclear weapons qualitatively by conducting nuclear tests in future.

iii. Discriminatory Agreement

b. Indian pursuit of BMD

It is the unfair and discriminatory agreement because it has blessed India to buy all nuclear materials, fuel and technology from the US and NSG members that is prohibited under the Article number one and two (Article I & II of the NPT) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus, India on one hand and the US on the other side are the violators of the NPT. Indo-US Deal has made India to stand in the row of legitimate nuclear weapon states without any constraint and obligation. “It is evident from the Indian nuclear track record that they got nuclear technology under the guise of civilian use and then diverted it for military purposes.”

“The Indo-US ‘123 Agreement’ once implemented, would surely prove to be a “yellow cake” for India. India has acquired and is acquiring nuclear technology from the West, especially by the US under the guise of civilian uses. Although Indo-US strategic agreement is a bilateral affair, it has profound and grave regional and global implications and deterrence stability in South Asia is most likely to be disturbed.”

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36. Article I &II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty stipulates its state parties that:

   “Article I: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”

   Article II: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

37. Ibid
38. Ibid
listic Missile Defence (BMD) which affected the strategic environment of South Asia, is the second major concern for security calculus of Pakistan. India’s assistance of BMD programme from Russia, Israel and the United States and its efforts to develop a PAD (Prithvi Air Defence) capability will further intensify the strategic balance. Pakistan in response has to build more sophisticated missile delivery system and seek to increase its number of nuclear arsenals for which it needs more stocks of fissile material.\textsuperscript{39}

India started its Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in July 1983 with the collaboration of Russian Federation and Israel. India wishes to ensheild entire India under its missile defence capability against Chinese and Pakistani strategic ballistic missiles. By capturing a wholly picture, India’s Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) system scope resembles the US National Missile Defence (NMD) programme.\textsuperscript{40}

Geographical contiguity of Pakistan with India, Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth and India’s ambitions to launch a sophisticated missile defence systems, would harm strategic deterrence of Pakistan, destabilize strategic equilibrium in South Asian region and shift balance of power in favour of India. Pakistan would be under intense pressure if India continues its interest in ballistic missile defence.\textsuperscript{41} In pursuance of India’s BMD programme, Pakistan will seek the option of modernizing its offensive force to guard itself by penetrating defence forces of India.\textsuperscript{42} For this purpose, Pakistan has to enhance the numbers of its nuclear weapon that require more fissile materials.

c. Indian future ambitions

India intends to spend US $50 billion from 2007 to 2012, aiming at developing immediate strike force against Pakistan and long-run deterrence against China. It raised its defence budget by 34\% during 2009-10 from $211 billion in 2008-09 to $283 billion in 2009-10.\textsuperscript{43} The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a renowned think-tank of Great Britain, in its annual report “The Military Balance” stated that India boosted its defence spending by 21 percent in 2009 after the 2008 Mumbai carnage that killed 166 people.\textsuperscript{44} The Indian government has hiked its defence expenditure with an increase of 8.3\% from the previous year by allocating $29.46 billion for the year 2010-11.\textsuperscript{45}

Development of Agni-V Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) which would have the range of 5,000 kilometers, the induction of 124 Arjun main battle tanks (MBTs) to Indian army, the


\textsuperscript{40} Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. “India’s Anti Ballistic Missile Program: Impact on Pakistan’s Security.” IPRI Journal II, no. 1 (Summer 2002).

\textsuperscript{41} Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan. op. cit

\textsuperscript{42} Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. op. cit


purchase of the latest generation Harop loitering weapon system, or missile firing drone, as well as the Heron long-duration unmanned aerial vehicles and allocation of $1.05 billion to India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to fast-track its indigenous weapons development program\(^46\) shows the Indian future ambitions of India to become a great power in the region. The Mumbai crisis of 2008 formulates the offensive inclination of India’s military preparations.

Shri A.K. Antony, the defense minister of India said:

> “India needs to push for modernization of the armed forces. This does not mean only procuring of equipment. Along with that, training of the armed forces is also important.”\(^47\)

Allocation of a huge proportion of budget in India’s defence and its military preparedness depict that India aspires to become a Great Power in the world. India establishes that its huge defence expenditure is being made to attain its national interests yet it will trigger a severe arms race with Pakistan and China. To counter Indian threat, Pakistan also has to divert a large chunk of its budget to defence industry which will put grave political, economic and military implications for Pakistan. It has to produce more fissile materials for manufacturing more nuclear weapons to preserve its supreme national interests and curb Indian contemporary emerging threats.

d. Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)

India proclaims that it has sufficient conventional forces and nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan and plans for waging a limited war under the protection of nuclear umbrella. This plan is called as ‘Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)’ which evolved in the wake of military crisis of 1999 (Kargil Conflict) and 2001-02 (Attacks on Indian parliament).

This doctrine emerged on 28th April, 2004 when the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Padmanabhan initiated the process of formulating a new war doctrine, titled ‘Cold Start’ which revolves around ‘the employment of “Integrated Battle Groups” (IBGs) for offensive operations.’\(^48\) “Cold Start is to give a “punishing” reply to Pakistan in case of any alleged terrorist attack on Indian soil with totally different orientation of the Indian armed forces from defensive to offensive. Under the CSD, the Indian army would carry out swift, quick and offensive joint operations against the Pakistan military within 72-96 hours (3-4 days).”\(^49\) Pakistan’s centric military modernization of India put severe security concerns for Pakistan.\(^50\)

These concerns were also expressed under the National Command Authority (NCA), the highest nuclear policy making political body of Pakistan,

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\(^{46}\) Ibid
\(^{47}\) Ibid
\(^{48}\) Attended “Workshop on Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia” arranged by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) from 20-22nd July, 2010
\(^{50}\) Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, op. cit.
which met on 13th February, 2010 under chairmanship of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani. “NCA took serious note of recent Indian statements about conducting conventional military strikes under a nuclear umbrella and said such irresponsible statements reflected a hegemonic mindset, oblivious of dangerous implications of adventurism in a nuclearised context.”

e. NSG Waiver to India

Another important factor which has adverse effects on the strategic and deterrence stability of the region, is the NSG waiver to India which was granted on September 2008 with the consent of all its members. The 45-nations Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), is a nuclear supplier’s cartel, although established ironically in reaction to India’s 1974 (so-called peaceful) nuclear explosions, outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) yet designed to ensure compliance of the treaty. By giving exemption to India, the group has made one thing clear that it prefers its profit-making interests to a legally binding treaty (NPT). It has not only violated NPT but also breached its own rules and regulations by providing this waiver. Nuclear trade has been legalized by NSG exemption to a country which hampered the NPT regime firstly in 1974 and secondly in 1998. The deal shows clearly that political and economic expediencies can triumph non-proliferation concerns. Daryl Kimball, the Director of the US Arms Control Association (ACA) commented, “The decision is a non-proliferation disaster of historic proportions that will produce harm for decades to come.”

Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s leading diplomat efficiently expressed her views about NSG waiver that “two developments have changed Pakistan’s threat perception and have bearing on its position on the FMCT. The first is the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement, and the consequent NSG waiver that has allowed India to conclude agreements with countries, including Russia and France, to supply it with nuclear fuel. Given its ambition to acquire hundreds of nuclear warheads (400 is one estimated figure), India faced the dilemma of how to build this arsenal while meeting its civilian nuclear needs. This problem was resolved by its deal with the US.”

a. Inclusion of India into NSG

It is ironic to say that the US administration not only ensured an NSG waiver for India, but also recently supported India’s inclusion into NSG and other technology control regimes. When Barak Obama, the US President paid a visit to India in November, 2010, he stated in Joint statement on 8th November, 2010:

“The United States intends to support India’s full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile....

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52. Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan. op. cit.
53. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi. op. cit.
Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangements) in a phased manner.  

3 Undermining Deterrence Stability

Glenn Snyder proficiently defined deterrence as “the power to dissuade.” Thomas Schelling articulated deterrence as “a threat…intended to keep an adversary from doing something.” By simple putting, I would call deterrence as an obsession of keeping one’s enemy of doing something wrong against oneself. Ward Wilson amplifies deterrence as “Nuclear deterrence is using the threat of nuclear attack to dissuade.”

Many intellectuals think that deterrence works as it has kept us safe for fifty years during the Cold War era. Even on the wake of Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when both the United States and the Soviet Union were on the verge of nuclear war yet because of presence of the fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), it provided unique stability in a crisis. I do agree with this notion, if the phenomenon of deterrence is applied in South Asian case, we come across that nuclear deterrence has kept the two nuclear adversaries of the region to escalate any war. It was the obsession of the use of nuclear weapons which prohibited both India and Pakistan to go for war in Operation Brass-tacks in 1986, Kargil Conflict in 1999, Attacks on Indian parliament in 2001-02 and the recent Mumbai attacks in 2008.

According to Ward Wilson, nuclear deterrence provides three specific benefits:

1) Protection against attacks with nuclear weapons,
2) Protection against attacks with conventional forces, and
3) Indefinable additional diplomatic clout.

For maintaining a strategic balance, three C’s of deterrence are mandatory. These three C’s are Capability, Credibility and Communication. Pakistan has all these 3 C’s and fulfills the criterion of maintaining strategic stability but controversy arises when India aspires to become a Great Power in the world and pursues its adventurous policies like Cold Start. Pakistan has sophisticated nuclear weapons which were demonstrated in Chaghi (Baluchistan) in 1998. It has a variety of range of ballistic as well as cruise missile that includes Hataf, Ghori and Shaheen series of missiles. Yet, India’s growing military preparedness conventionally and strategically along with its installation of Anti-Ballistic Missile would jeopardize deterrence capability of Pakistan.

4 Pakistan Specific Treaty

Many scholars concede that the proposed FMCT is virtually a Pakistan-specific treaty for many reasons. Firstly, P-5 states have capped the production...
of fissile material. P-4 (the US, Russia, the UK, and France) formally declared the cessation of their fissile material production while China unofficially ceased production. Israel has already adequate stocks of fissile material and has no nuclear competitor in the region. India is rewarded with Indo-US nuclear deal and NSG waiver to increase its stockpiles of fissile materials from its indigenous sources. Therefore, proposed FMCT is only meant to target Pakistan.

Zamir Akram, Pakistan’s ambassador to the CD articulated his views about the target states of the intended FMT by stating that:

“FMCT is relevant only for countries outside the NPT. Out of those, two have special dispensations and arrangements and thus will have no impact on their nuclear weapons programme.”

5 World’s discriminative Behaviour

I would call Indo-US Nuclear deal as a ‘nuclear segregation’ by the global community. By this deal, India has been regarded as de-jure nuclear weapon state without any NPT constraint as stated in a paper, “Such ‘exceptionalism’ not only accords India, the status of a de-jure nuclear weapon state, but (also) offers unprecedented concessions that may not be even available for the NWS (Nuclear Weapon State) that are signatories to the NPT”. India is enjoying carte blanche (complete freedom) authority to manufacture nuclear weapons by its domestic indigenous sources. The discrimination of the world can be envision by accepting such a state which defied the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The international community, especially the United States which for its profit-making ends exposed its failure to fulfill the commitments of the NPT and the NSG.

6 Propaganda tool

The US and some other states including India want to impose such a discriminatory, uneffective and unverifiable treaty on Pakistan by using it as a propaganda tool. These states wish to keep their hegemony on others and desire to keep a wide disparity between their stocks of fissile material and that of Pakistan. Daryl Kimball, the Executive Director of Arms Control Association claims that “India’s commitment to support U.S. efforts to negotiate an FMCT is a laudable but hollow promise. India has provided rhetorical support for a global verifiable FMCT in the past, yet it has done nothing to advance the negotiations nor has it joined the original nuclear-weapon states in voluntarily halting production.” It is now an open secret that the US invaded Iraq in 2003 by alleging that it had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) yet even a single

60. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi. op. cit.
WMD could not be found after war. Likewise, the US is now claiming that Iran is aspiring for nuclear weapon acquisition yet International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and even other US intelligence agency’s report say that its nuclear programme is working for peaceful purposes under the Atoms for Peace programme. Therefore, it can be deduced that the US administration may use this treaty as a propaganda tactic against Pakistan. If the US proposed treaty on FMCT of 2006 is imposed, it will produce devastating repercussions on the supreme national interests of Pakistan.

7 Harming the notion of Equal Security for all

Pakistan’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Zamir Akram expressed his reservations on FMCT as:

“It was the lack of political will on the part of some major Powers to pursue disarmament negotiations on the basis of equal security of all States, as accepted in the first special session devoted to disarmament.”

Therefore, FMCT that is not keeping the existing stocks under its obligations and only ban on the further production is mere a non-proliferation, not a disarmament step for which the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was formed. This ‘lack of political will by some major Powers’ that Mr. Zamir has pointed out would also harm the notion of equal security of all states which is the core agenda of the United Nations (UN).

By summing up, I would say that the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would affect the P-5 states (the US, Britain, Russia, France, and China) in general and three non-NPT nuclear weapon states (Israel, India and Pakistan) in particular. However, as P-4 states (US, UK, Russia and France) had already accepted their moratoria on the production of fissile materials. China is assumed to stop its fissile material production. Therefore, this intended treaty would not affect them. If we talk about the three outside non-NPT nuclear weapon states, Israel and India have got special dispensations and privileges by super powers and they also have sufficient stocks of fissile at their disposal. The only target of this proposed treaty is Pakistan. Some major powers plus India wish to implement the US proposed treaty on the cessation of fissile material production for military use as to keep their hegemony on existing stockpiles of fissile material and to have the asymmetries in their stocks vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Assuming South Asian region, this projected FMT would create security dilemma in the region by pronouncing an arms race at regional and extra-regional level. As Pakistan regards its nuclear arms to counter Indian conventional superiority and to maintain balance of power in the region, the recent strategic developments and conventional militarization in the region by Indo-US Nuclear Deal 2008, Indian pursuit of BMD, Indian future military ambitions, NSG Waiver to India and Indian Cold Start would perturb the strategic stability in the region. In a scenario when

this instability is seemed to be intensified, the proposed FM(C)T is disadvantageous for Pakistan and pose a threat to its supreme national interests. India’s growing military preparedness conventionally and strategically along with its installation of Anti-Ballistic Missile would jeopardize deterrence capability of Pakistan.

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal and NSG waiver to India are the instances of nuclear segregation by international community. This shows that their profit-making ends triumph their non-proliferation and disarmament commitments under the NPT. Furthermore, this FM(C)T can also be used as a propaganda tool against Pakistan to achieve certain vested interests of major powers and of India. Moreover, it is the lack of political will of some major Powers to pursue disarmament negotiations on the basis of equal security of all states.

**Comparison of Indian and Pakistan’s stocks of fissile material**

The Comparison of India and Pakistan’s stocks of fissile materials is given below:

**India’s Fissile Material Stocks:**

India’s fissile material production is based on plutonium route. Its weapon grade weapon plutonium is produced in two production reactors namely the 40 megawatt thermal (MWt) CIRUS, started operation in 1960 and the 100 MWt Dhruva, operative in 1985; both located in the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) complex near Mumbai. The later was shut down soon after its operation but from December 1986 to mid-1987 it operated at 25 MW capacity, while from mid-1987 to December 1987 it operated at 80 MW capacity.

A 40 MW (Mega watt) reactor operating at 100 % capacity can produce 14.6 kg of plutonium per year, while the annual production of plutonium by a 100 MW reactor operating at the same capacity can yield 36.5 kg plutonium per year. However, Indian reactor operates at 60-70% capacity normally. Yet, to take a more approximate calculus, a 70% operating capacity is assumed. As for this assumption, CIRUS would produce about 10.2 or 10 kg of weapon-grade plutonium, and Dhruva would produce about 25.6 or 26 kg of weapon-grade plutonium per year. The following chart shows India’s production of plutonium up till now:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Operation duration</th>
<th>Annual production</th>
<th>Total Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIRUS 50 MW</td>
<td>1960-2010</td>
<td>10 kg</td>
<td>10 X 50 = 500 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHURVA 100 MW</td>
<td>1985-88</td>
<td>? kg</td>
<td>13 kg (estimated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988-2010</td>
<td>26 kg</td>
<td>26 X 22 = 572 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total production</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1085 kg (estimated)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68. Ibid
69. Ibid
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... explosive tests of 1974 and 1998 and usage as a fuel for the Fast Breeder Test Reactor and for fuelling the initial core of the PURNIMA Reactor. The estimated consumption so far is as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: “The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective” by Naeem Salik</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consumed for 1974 Tests</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated consumption for 1998 Tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fuel for Fast Breeder Reactor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Core for PURNIMA Reactor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Stock available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pakistan’s Fissile Material Stocks:

Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme until recently was based on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). There is no official quantitative information available on Pakistan’s fissile-material production capacities or histories. It is widely acknowledged, however, that Pakistan has been using gas centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons, at least, since the early 1980s and a plutonium-production reactor has been operating since late 1990s.

Pakistan’s Khushab-I plutonium production reactor is reported to be a heavy-water-moderated, light-water-cooled, natural-uranium-fueled reactor with a capacity of about 40 – 50 MWt. A second production reactor (Khushab-II) has been completed at Khushab and may have started operation in late 2009 or early 2010. A third production reactor (Khushab) is under construction—work on it started in 2005 or 2006. Construction of Khushab-III may be completed possibly sometime in 2011.

Khushab-I is operative since late 1990s, capable of 50 MW plutonium production. It is assumed that the Khushab-reactor operates to produce weapons plutonium at a rate of 0.78 g of plutonium per megawatt (thermal) day. A reactor of 40 – 50 MW operating at 50 % capacity will produce about 5.7 – 7.1 kg of weapon-grade plutonium per year, and at 80 % capacity would produce about 9 – 11.5 kg.

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70. Ibid
72. Ibid
of plutonium per year.\textsuperscript{73}

According to the International Panel on Fissile Material annual Report 2010, “As of 2010, it is estimated here that, Pakistan had produced about 1.6 – 3.8 tons (3800 kg) of weapon-grade (90 % -enriched) uranium, giving a mid-range value of 2.7 ± 1 tons (approximately 2700 kg). About 100 kg of this HEU would have been consumed in the six nuclear weapon tests in 1998, leaving Pakistan with an HEU stockpile currently on the order of 2.6 ± 1 tons (2600 kg). Pakistan also may have produced 60 – 130 kg of weapons plutonium in its Khushab-I reactor, with a mid-range value of about 100 kg. As the recently completed Khushab-II reactor and the new Khushab-III reactor come on-line, the size of Pakistan’s plutonium stockpile will grow.”\textsuperscript{74}

The amount of plutonium required for each weapon is in range of 5-6 kg while 15-25 kg of HEU is needed for weapons, depending on the sophistication level of the bomb design. IPFM 2010 Report professed that Pakistan has about 70-90 nuclear weapons at its disposal.\textsuperscript{75}

**Pakistan’s Position on Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)**

Pakistan is a great proponent of arms control and disarmament. The initiative of nuclear proliferation in 1974 and 1998 by its neighbor compelled it to acquire nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan’s nuclear programme is aimed at countering the conventional military superiority of its neighbor and secondly, to maintain strategic balance in the region. As far as Pakistan’s stance on proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is concerned, it made its position clear for several times that it would not support a treaty that would prohibit only the further production of fissile material. Whereas, Pakistan proposes a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) which not only bans on future production but also include existing stocks of fissile material, in its scope. Only a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) would be a disarmament step for which the CD was established.

While making Pakistan’s position over FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Zamir Akram stated on 18th February, 2010:

> “During the late 1990s, Pakistan made its position at that time crystal clear. We could not accept a treaty that would freeze existing asymmetries or imbalance in fissile material stockpiles between Pakistan and its neighbor which obviously had a head start... our strategic doctrine is based on minimum credible deterrence, we must ensure the asymmetry does not erode the credibility of our deterrence.”\textsuperscript{76}

This position was highlighted in the statement of Pakistan’s then Ambassador to the CD, Munir Akram on 30th July, 1998:

> “There is a ‘wide disparity in fissile stockpiles of India and Pakistan,’ and that the FMCT should not freeze this disparity.”\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{73} “Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Balancing the Books: Production and Stocks.”. op.cit.

\textsuperscript{74} Naeem Salik. Op. cit.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid

\textsuperscript{76} “Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Balancing the Books: Production and Stocks.”. op.cit. p. 10

Dr. Shireen Mazari, a senior nuclear and security analyst of Pakistan has written in an article that, “[A] compromise on the FMCT, in terms of the issue of stockpiles would damage Pakistan permanently.” Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, a nuclear analyst proclaimed in his paper, “In real terms, it (FMCT) does not change the status quo nor does it in any way reduce the gap between the haves and the have-nots. There is a big gap between India’s and Pakistan’s fissile material stockpiles.”

Zamir Akram, Pakistan’s ambassador to the CD explicated the relevance of proposed FMT in his statement of 3rd June, 2010:

“FMCT is relevant only for countries outside the NPT. Out of those, two have special dispensations and arrangements and thus will have no impact on their nuclear weapon programme. So, the FMCT is only meant to target one country – Pakistan. This is unacceptable to us.”

Zamir Akram in the ongoing CD session of 2011 elaborated Pakistan’s position on FMT on 25th January, 2011 as:

“Over the last two years, Pakistan cannot agree to negotiations on a FMCT in the CD owing to the discriminatory waiver provided by the NSG to our neighbour for nuclear cooperation by several major powers, as this arrangement will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan’s security interests.

It is, indeed, unfortunate that instead of reversing this destabilizing course of action, one of the major powers has gone a step further by announcing its intention in November 2010 to support our neighbour’s full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes - the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement - and to “consult with regime members to encourage the evolution of regime membership criteria.” Once again, selectivity, exceptionalism, discrimination and double standards are being employed at the cost of international principles as well as commitments.”

Zamir Akram in the CD platform reiterated his country’s point of view on Fissile Material Treaty (FMT):

“Each state shapes its position on the CD Agenda in the light of its perceptions of the security environment and certainly not by any artificial timeline or attempts to catapult one issue to the forefront while neglecting other equally pressing if not more pressing issues.”

82. Ibid
Many countries criticize Pakistan as the only country for blocking the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FM(C)T). They allege that only Pakistan is proposing a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT). They claim that Pakistan is not ready to negotiate a US proposed treaty on FMCT that is endorsed by the American allies. It is to be clarified by those states that many countries especially states from the G-21 (Group of 21) and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) support a Pakistan’s proposed Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) as a nuclear disarmament step instead of a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT) as a non-proliferation measure. This conviction is stated by Zamir Akram on 28th February, 2011:

“There are a number of countries especially from the Group of 21 (G-21) that would agree with us. The statements during the high-level meeting – especially on behalf of 118 countries of the NAM – made it abundantly clear, that the overwhelming desire of the majority of UN Members was to see progress on the issue of nuclear disarmament. How is the proposed FMCT to contribute to nuclear disarmament when the FMCT has become cost-free for the major nuclear powers?”83

These points were summarized by Zamir Akram as:

“These major powers are ready to conclude a treaty that will only ban future production of fissile material. This approach is “cost free” for them as this will not undermine or compromise their security. For this reason a FMCT would be cost free for the major powers - just as in the case of the BWC, CWC & CTBT.”85

Exclusion of Neptunium, Americium, non reactor grade plutonium for naval and space propulsion from the scope of FMT talks, are not a full scope non-proliferation measure.

This reservation was pointed out by Zamir Akram as:

“Since a FMCT would not cover fissile materials such as Neptunium


84. Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention which were discussed in the CD.

237 and Americium 241, 242 & 243 (which are potential nuclear weapon useable materials) nor reactor grade Plutonium or Fissile material for naval and space propulsion, it would not amount to a real nonproliferation arrangement.”

Zamir Akram recommended:

- The CD is the only forum for the discussion of FMT negotiations,

- Urge on the CD members for a disarmament effort through a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) that does not only ban future production, but also reduction of stocks and takes a broader approach to the issues of definition, scope and verification of fissile materials.86

Pakistan repudiates intense pressure, put by some major powers to agree with discriminative FMCT negotiations. However, it calls for the commencement of formal debate on other agendas of the CD that are Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). These issues also have as much importance as a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), therefore, Ambassador Akram explicity stated:

“Pakistan’s opposition to negotiations on a FMCT has further strengthened as a result of these (recent strategic) developments.87 Nevertheless, we along with a number of other delegations do not want to see a stalemate in the CD. We, therefore, believe that substantive progress can and should be made on the other core issues on our agenda Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.”88

Pakistan criticizes the mute spectator of the NSG members that it is not Pakistan but those states which are responsible for breaching the NPT regime. Ambassador Akram stated on 1st June, 2011 that:

“The international non-proliferation regime has been sacrificed at the altar of power and profit. That members of the NSG surrendered their right to oppose this move only makes a mockery of the NPT, the IAEA and the NSG itself. So please not pretend and be sanctimonious about protecting the CD and promoting disarmament.”89

That is asymmetry which compels Pakistan to block the negotiation process.

86. Ibid
87. These developments are Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) waiver to India in 2008, Indo-US Nuclear Deal in 2008, aggressive Indian Cold Start Doctrine, Indian pursuance of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Exclusion of Indian Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Institute of Space Research Organization (ISRO) from entity list of the US and its conventional weapons modernization put adverse implications for Pakistan’s security calculus. Furthermore, the US assurance for supporting India for a UN Security Council membership and full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group (AG), and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)) deteriorate strategic stability in the region and tilt the Balance of Power (BoP) to Indian side.
89. Ambassador Zamir Akram. “Statement of the permanent Ambassador of Pakistan to the UN at the Conference on Disarmament (CD)” on 1st June, 2011.
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on FMT. Pakistan time and again has been proposing and still calls for a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT):

“Only when the issue of asymmetry in stockpiles is addressed through reductions, can there be a level playing field. We are, therefore, in favour of a Fissile Material Treaty rather than a FMCT, which will be a genuine disarmament instrument and not just a quasi-non-proliferation measure.”

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Conclusion

A proposed FMCT has very bright hopes and prospects for nuclear weapon states and for two non-NPT weapon states as it suits to them. The P-5 states have sufficient quantities of fissile material and the rest two non-NPT weapon states have special dispensations and privileges; yet, Pakistan is a single target county of this proposed treaty.

This treaty, if finalized in its proposed form, would put drastic repercussions on the security consideration of Pakistan. It would imbalance the strategic stability on one hand and would keep the asymmetries of fissile material stocks of Pakistan in comparison of its traditional adversary.

It should be analyzed whether this treaty would produce fruitful outcomes for Pakistan or would be found as a poison tree. If a cold calculus is taken, we come to know that a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon and other nuclear explosive device has somewhat positive aspects as it will put a sign board of ‘stop’ on further fissile material production, resulting in curbing the arms race among states. There are also assumptions that if such treaty is entered into force, it would recognize the three non-NPT member as nuclear weapon states explicitly.

Looking on the other side, proposed Fissile Material Treaty has two main issues regarding its scope. One is its verification measures and the other is existing stocks of fissile materials. The United States in its draft treaty to the CD in 2006 omitted any verification measure and clearly established that the proposed treaty would not include pre-existing fissile materials. Such a proposed treaty cannot be accepted on two bases. First, non-conformity of the Shannon Mandate of 1995 which urge on a non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universal treaty and the second is ambiguous scope of the treaty. A treaty which is aimed at halting the future production of fissile material, it has prospects of the conversion of existing materials into nuclear weapon manufacturing.

Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, a senior analyst on nuclear issues states in his paper, “Philosophically speaking, arms control arrangements preserve the persisting status quo. The status quo is always in the interest of the advantageous nations in the global politics. In the South Asian context, India is in an advantageous position due to its cementing strategic partnership with the United States.”

In the wake of such dynamic change in the international system, Pakistan should not be oblivious of its surrounding developments of so-

90. Ibid
phisticated militarization, nuclear coop-
eration deal, pursuit of Ballistic Missile
Defence (BMD), chalking out of advent-
urous policies and strategies like Cold
Start and add-up of 300-400 nuclear arms
in a decade.

Pakistan should not compromise
on its supreme national interests, keeping
in view of pros and cons of proposed trea-
ty. This treaty in its present form is not
advantageous for Pakistan. Yet, as many
official statements from time to time are
claiming for a Fissile Material Treaty
(FMT) as a disarmament measure should
be proposed and international community
should seek disarmament instead of non-
proliferation to provide equal security for
all. Last of all, the world must stop dis-
 crimination and give up its hypocritical
behaviors regarding NPT regime. Paki-
stan has the experience of more than thir-
ty years of nuclear industry and a skilled
manpower in this field. Its expertise and
human capital should be exploited in the
emergence of coming Oil Peak Crisis,
and therefore, it should be given access
to nuclear trade and high-tech industry.