THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR
“SECURITY BY BEING”
AND “SECURITY BY DOING”

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Abstract

In the present report, the focus is placed on the European Union (EU) and its security policy. It commences with some context-setting, i.e. with clarifying the EU’s place in the global and European security “architecture” and its relations with the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO, finding the latter to be more controversial than suggested by official declarations. It then proceeds with the analysis of the EU, finding its main contribution to regional security to be related to what the EU is and represents rather than to what it does. An analysis of the latter, i.e. the directly security-related institutions and activities of the EU under the auspices of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) is also provided as well as an account of the “neighbourhood” programmes of the EU.
Executive Summary

Until quite recently, Europe was one of the least secure places in the world, but most of Europe has gradually been transformed from a “conflict formation” into a more benign “security community,” among the members of which war is no longer conceivable. The EU has undoubtedly played a major role in this profound transformation. However, considering that the EU is merely one component of the European “security architecture,” as an introduction the paper provides an analysis of its relationship with the OSCE and NATO, as well as of the relationship of all three with the United Nations.

While the EU seems to build some of its security conceptions and roles on the OSCE experience and to have taken over some of its roles, there seems to be no real competition between the two, as there is in EU-NATO relations, which are much less harmonious than appears from the various declarations by both organisations. At the heart of the dispute lies a US ambivalence about a European security policy. On the one hand, Washington wants its European allies to shoulder a larger part of the burden of collective defence (as defined by the USA) but, on the other hand, it does not want Europe to become truly independent. The paper demonstrates that the EU is far from undermilitarised, unless compared to the United States, and this relative underspending is explained with reference to a different assessment of what can and cannot be accomplished by military means. This also helps explain why the Europeans allocate much more to development aid than does the USA, just as they are much more willing to support the UN, also militarily.

The EU’s main contribution to European security is found to be what the EU is, i.e. an attractive community of nations. Not only has this rendered war within the EU inconceivable, but it also provides the EU with leverage over neighbouring states who would like to join in the future such as Turkey. Even though being is thus more important than doing, an overview is also provided of what the EU does, inter alia within the frameworks of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The conceptual guideline for the latter, i.e. the European Security Strategy of 2003, is subjected to an analysis which finds it to have avoided several potential pitfalls. Whilst acknowledging new security threats such as terrorism and WMD proliferation, the EU has thus not followed the United States in seeking military solutions to these problems.
Wisely, the EU has sought peaceful relations with its expanding ring of neighbours, both in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Greater Middle East, mainly by “speaking softly and carrying big carrots. The only thing that seems to missing before the EU can really become a significant security actor thus seems to be political will.
Preface

Until quite recently, Europe was one of the least secure places in the world. Just remember the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic Wars and the two world wars of the 20th Century – the latter even featuring history’s most massive genocide, the Holocaust. Since then, however, things have improved considerably.

Even though the Cold War period (circa 1947-1989) has been described by some as a “long peace,” it was one built on a non-negligible risk of mutual annihilation through nuclear conflagration, thus, according to others, not really deserving the label of peace. However, not only did the “cold peace” endure in Europe, but there can also be no disputing the fact that most of Europe has gradually been transformed from a “conflict formation” into a more benign “security community,” among the members of which war is no longer seen as conceivable. Even though parts of Europe such as the Balkans have so far remained outside this community, the very fact that it has emerged between historical arch-enemies such as Germany and France, and subsequently seems to have grown to encompass most of Europe, is surely significant. At the very least it seems to have falsified the gloomy predictions of IR Realists and others of perennial strife and war between states.
The EU and the European Security “Architecture”

The above observations raise the question what role the EU has played in this profound transformation. As the EU is “not the only game in town,” it seems appropriate to preface the account of the EU’s security ambitions, tasks and accomplishments with a brief, and inevitably superficial, analysis of its relationship with the two other main organisations in the field of security in Europe, the OSCE and NATO, as well as of the relationship of all three with the United Nations as the global organisation responsible for peace and security.

The UN, Subsidiarity and Self-defence

According to international law, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is vested the paramount responsibility for international peace and security. According to the UN Charter, it alone has the right to either authorise military action by states or regional (or other) organisations, or withhold such authorisation. In the latter case the use of force constitutes a violation of art. 2.4 of the Charter, according to which “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (...).”

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Fig. 1: Global and European Organisations

![Diagram of global and European organisations]

UN Security Council

- Art. 51
- Art. 52/53 (Art. 51)

NATO
EU
OSCE

Use of force, but ...
Non-use of force
The only instances where states or alliances are allowed to use force (or threaten to do so) is thus when the UNSC has authorised this or when exercising their “inherent” right of individual or collective self-defence” (art. 51) in self-defence. Even in the latter case, however, this right of self-defence is conditional on the endorsement of the UNSC, if need be *ex post facto*:

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.\(^5\)

NATO has all along been an organisation of collective defence and the EU may be slowly moving in this direction (*vide infra*), whereas the basis of the OSCE is different, as illustrated in Fig. 1. According to what has sometimes been referred to as the “principle of subsidiarity”\(^6\), the UN Charter defines certain roles for regional organisations, inter alia stipulating in Chapter VIII that

The Members of the United Nations (...) shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.” (art. 52.2)

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council (...) (art. 53.1)

Regional organisations thus represent instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts is concerned, but are not allowed to use force for enforcement actions without UN authorisation. In Europe the regional organisation is the OSCE, to which we shall now turn.\(^7\)

**The OSCE**

The present Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an offspring of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process,
which was launched during the détente phase of the Cold War. Starting in 1972 with the preparatory negotiations leading up to the Helsinki summit of 1975, a process was set motion with a considerable momentum, proceeding from one conference to the next without any “fixtures” such as a permanent secretariat.

One of the CSCE’s strengths was that its membership was all-encompassing. Indeed, as a hedge against Soviet domination “CSCE Europe” included also Turkey, the United States and Canada, i.e. a “Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” Another strength was that there was “something in it” for all participating states, arranged in so-called “baskets” (see Table 1). The total entailed a very broad conception of security, allowing for trade-offs and bargains between the different preferences of the participants. It was not always the case that all parties agreed on the contents of each basket, but the total package was a true compromise between opposing preferences.

The contents of the security basket may be subdivided into “functional” and “structural disarmament,” the former referring to the activities of the armed forces and the latter to their size, composition and deployment. Most functional disarmament measures were intended to further transparency and have been labelled confidence-building measures (CBMs), included an obligation to invite the respective other’s representatives to attend military exercises above a certain size; to announce exercises well in advance; and to provide a calendar of such manoeuvres combined with a ban on non-scheduled exercises or other redeployments of forces. To these were gradually added more substantial confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) including actual constraints on manoeuvres and/or deployment, as well as seminars on military doctrines. By far the most significant structural arms control agreement was the Conventional Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: CSCE “Baskets”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Basket: Security</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Basket: Cooperation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd Basket: Human rights</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, Education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990, intended to “establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe”.

With the end of the Cold War, what had begun as a mere process was transformed into a permanent institution, i.e. the OSCE, which is a “regional organisation” in the sense of the UN Charter’s chapter VIII and duly recognised as such. The institutionalisation has produced a fairly elaborate organisational structure, but it is far from obvious that this institution-building has been accompanied by any real increase in the importance of the organisation, and especially not in the field of security and conflict prevention and management. Because the West refused to grant the OSCE the requisite authority, its role was quickly reduced to the performance of secondary tasks such as oversight of democratisation, the dispatch of election observers, mediation teams, etc. The OSCE also established a Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) in 1992, and in 1994 “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security” was adopted, yet without any underpinning in the form of enforcement means. The OSCE was further placed in charge of the implementation and revision of the CFE Treaty and of those part of the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia that dealt with arms control and CBMs. A Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) has been established and various fact-finding and rapporteur missions dispatched, some of which may have been quite successful in preventing an outbreak of violence. However, such “preventive diplomacy” tends to be ignored by the media, hence also by politicians.

There are no signs that the western attitude to the OSCE will change, implying that its importance is unlikely to increase. However, the EU seems to build some of its security conceptions and roles on the combined CSCE/OSCE experience and to have assumed a number of the OSCE’s functions (vide infra), but neither the EU nor the OSCE seems to regard the respective other as a competitor. The same cannot, alas, be said of EU-NATO relations, to which we shall now turn.

**NATO**

Founded in 1949, NATO is a true child of the Cold War. However, even though the Soviet threat loomed large in the minds of western politicians, this was not the only rationale for the Atlantic alliance. Besides “keeping Russia out,” it was also a matter of “keeping America in and Germany down,” in the formulation of
then Secretary General Lord Ismay. However, the three were interlinked as the importance of the two latter derived from the perceived existential imperative of the former.

“Keeping the Russians out” was seen (by George Kennan and others) as a matter of containment and initially mainly as a political task, but the emphasis soon shifted to the presumed Soviet military threat. Deterrence of, and defence against, an attack was (perhaps erroneously) believed to be beyond the capabilities of the European countries, even if they were to pool their resources for collective defence. Hence the need to “keep the United States in,” in the sense of credibly committing Washington to the defence of its European allies. This was achieved with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, article 5 of which obliged the USA (as well as everybody else) to the following:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them (...) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The credibility of this pledge was ensured by a US stationing of substantial armed forces in Europe and by a forward deployment of its nuclear weapons. Even though the North Atlantic Treaty was formally based on the equality of its members, some members were clearly “more equal than others.” As the “net provider” of security, the United States certainly felt entitled to a greater say on alliance matters than its European allies, all of whom were “net consumers” of security. NATO thus became a vehicle for US hegemony over Western Europe.

That countries such as France were eager to “keep Germany down” was fairly obvious in view of both ancient and recent history, but this desideratum was not easily compatible with keeping the Russians out. A German military contribution was seen as indispensable for the deterrence of the USSR from an attack against Western Europe – and especially so as the faith in the credibility of nuclear deterrence began to dwindle with the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. NATO attempted to “square the circle” by creating a Germany that was strong enough to help deter the USSR, but not strong enough to threaten its smaller neighbours.
The means to this end was to meticulously “embed” the new German *Bundeswehr* in NATO’s integrated military structures – at some expense for the rest of NATO in terms of military efficiency.\(^{28}\)

Even though we may never know to what extent either objective was actually called for,\(^ {29}\) it was certainly no small accomplishment that NATO thus managed to simultaneously keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. When the Cold War finally came to an end around 1989, however, one might have expected NATO to celebrate “a job well done” and dissolve itself as henceforth redundant. This has obviously not happened, but instead NATO has undergone quite a profound transformation, both with regard to an expansion of its membership and a revision of its missions.

NATO had throughout its existence been moderately expansive, by admitting first Greece and Turkey and then West Germany, and in the 1980s also Spain. With the end of the Cold War and German unification, the former East Germany joined NATO “by default,” i.e. by being incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), albeit with some temporary constraints with regard to the deployment of NATO forces on its territory.\(^ {30}\) Then came a flurry of membership applications from former Warsaw Pact members. Concerned about the predictable adverse repercussions for its relationship with Russia of simply admitting them, NATO opted for a strategy of procrastination,\(^ {31}\) creating first the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)\(^ {32}\) and then the (slightly more substantial) Partnership for Peace (PfP), subsequently slightly restructured and renamed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).\(^ {33}\) The actual decision to admit three members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) was only taken in 1997 and implemented in conjunction with the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of the alliance in April 1999, followed in 2004 by the co-optation of the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

NATO’s missions have undergone an equally profound transformation after the Cold War. First of all, the aforementioned CFE Treaty changed the military balance of power so dramatically in the West’s favour that “keeping the Russians out” became so easy as to require no organisation such as NATO, and the near simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself rendered balance-of-power considerations irrelevant. Rather than keeping Russia out of Europe, what mattered now to “keep the Russians in” (i.e. to support “Europeanist” against “Eurasian” Russians), which called for engagement rather than containment.\(^ {34}\)
Secondly, this made it superfluous to “keep the Americans in” as the need for US security guarantees had vanished along with the need for any stationing of US troops or nuclear weapons in Europe. Thirdly, German unification made “keeping the Germans down” both superfluous and impossible. Superfluous because the FRG was itself very eager to prevent any re-nationalisation of its security and defence policy; and impossible because the FRG would obviously be in a position to “go national” (i.e. become a “normal state”) if it should choose to.

This left NATO in urgent need to define new missions, which meant both going “out of area” and venturing beyond the familiar field of collective defence. Having appointed itself guarantor of “stability” in all of Europe, the alliance felt an obligation to help bring about peace in the former Yugoslavia, i.e. in what were effectively (albeit not in legal terms) intrastate conflicts, both in Bosnia and subsequently in the Kosovo conflict, where NATO launched an attack against Serbia on the 24th of March 1999, without UN authorisation and thus in breach of international law. However, NATO’s poor military performance in this war seems to have tempered any interventionist urge (mainly on the part of the United States) considerably by the time of the anniversary summit in Washington, 23-24 April 1999.

In the Washington Declaration, NATO thus pledged allegiance to the UN Charter, and the new Strategic Concept was only moderately innovative, even though it envisaged so-called “non-article 5 operations,” a neologism for military intervention. It was further agreed to proceed with restructuring the military posture for such operations, e.g. by means of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). As a corollary of its two Balkan “victories,” NATO also had to go into the “business” of peacekeeping, mandated by the UN but outsourced to NATO in IFOR and SFOR (in Bosnia) and KFOR in Kosovo – in all three cases with the participation of non-members. It also became involved in “post-conflict peace-building” in Macedonia where its deployment for a month of 3,500 troops achieved the collection of 3,875 light weapons, i.e. about one per NATO soldier – which is hardly an impressive record for history’s strongest military alliance.

The first time NATO’s mutual assistance pledge was ever activated was in response to the 11 September terrorist attack against the United States. The Alliance chose to regard this as one of those attacks which they were all committed to “consider an attack against them all.” As it happened, however, the United States did not really want a military NATO contribution to its “war against terrorism,” not even
to the first chapter thereof, i.e. the war against the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. For this war it preferred a “coalition of the willing,” including NATO member states, but not involving the alliance as such and also comprising non-member states. NATO as such thus played a distinctly minor role in the Afghan war – even though it was entrusted with the post-war International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), entailing the deployment (by December 2004) of 6,500 troops from both NATO member states and others.\textsuperscript{45}

NATO did not play any role at all in the US-led war against Iraq in 2003, even though a number of NATO member states belonged to the “coalition of the willing” launching the attack. The main difference was that most of those who did not were adamantly opposed to the war (which they viewed as an illegal war of aggression), first among which were Germany and France. What NATO as such did was thus merely to provide some defensive equipment to Turkey prior to the invasion and some training for Iraqi security forces after the war in order to replace those which had been dismantled with the stroke of a pen by the United States following its victory.\textsuperscript{46}

This takes us directly to what may be the most important obstacle to the EU’s evolving security political role, namely the troubled transatlantic relations.\textsuperscript{47} A political precondition of proceeding, beyond a certain point, with the “EU track” is that either the United States condones the new initiatives being contemplated, or the EU members agree to disregard US “spoiler” attempts. The latter seems unlikely, considering the emphasis that especially the UK places on its “special relationship.”\textsuperscript{48} Before proceeding with the account of the EU, a brief analysis of transatlantic relations thus seems indispensable.

**Transatlantic Tensions**

There has always been a link between (what is now) the EU and NATO, if only because of the considerable overlap of members of the two organisations – an overlap which has even increased since the end of the Cold War, mainly through the co-optation of former members of the Eastern bloc, i.e. the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, better known as Comecon). Whereas by 1951, only five states were members of both NATO and the EU, by 1990 this had grown to eleven – and both organisations had grown by German unification via the accession of the former GDR to the FRG. By 2004, the number of combined memberships had grown to nineteen, leaving only six EU members that were not members of NATO and seven NATO members which were not
EU members, of which two (USA and Canada) were obviously excluded by sheer geography (See Table 2).

However, contrary to what one might think, this overlap of membership has not translated into a fully harmonious relationship – and one should not accept at face value the several statements in both NATO and EU communiqués to this effect, the vague wording of which may well have been chosen in order to conceal actual disagreement – both between and within the two organisations. ⁴⁹

The main difference between the two organisations is, of course, the NATO membership of the United States, which was throughout the Cold War a superpower in a league of its own. It saw itself as a net provider of security for the rest of the alliance and believed (not without some justification) that this entitled it to more than just a position as *primus inter pares*. Perhaps even more importantly, Washington managed to control the discourse to the extent that all its actions were both presented and accepted as benevolent and unselfish provisions of a “common good” – i.e. it assumed the position of a hegemon. ⁵⁰ However, while there was certainly something “common” about deterrence, it was also in the national interest of the United States, which may be an even better explanation than altruism.

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**Table 2: NATO and EU (ECSC/EEC/EU) memberships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>“EU”</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>“EU”</th>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Netherl.</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1949</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>-</td>
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### Table 3 - EU-NATO-World Comparisons (2003/04)

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (000)</th>
<th>GDP Bil. US$</th>
<th>MILEX Mil. US$</th>
</tr>
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<td>EU + NATO members</td>
<td>428,667</td>
<td>10,301</td>
<td>153,574</td>
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<td>10,348</td>
<td>299</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>182</td>
<td>2,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>5,424</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40,281</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>7,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60,271</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>37,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU, Non-NATO</td>
<td>27,518</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>8,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8,174</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5,215</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3,970</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8,986</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>4,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>456,185</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,066</strong></td>
<td><strong>161,877</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA</strong></td>
<td>293,028</td>
<td>10,990</td>
<td>417,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Non-EU, NATO</strong></td>
<td>136,145</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>23,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7,518</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>32,508</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>8,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4,575</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>3,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>22,356</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>68,894</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>9,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total NATO</strong></td>
<td><strong>857,840</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>594,336</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>11,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Ocean.</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>151,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORLD</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,379,157</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,480</strong></td>
<td><strong>879,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| EU:USA    | 155.7% | 100.7% | 38.8% |
| EU:NATO   | 53.2%  | 47.9%  | 27.2% |
| EU:World  | 7.2%   | 21.5%  | 18.4% |
| USA:World | 4.6%   | 21.3%  | 47.5% |
| NATO:World| 13.4%  | 44.9%  | 67.6% |
| EU:Africa | na     | na     | 1,420.0% |
With the end of the Cold War and the resultant emergence of a situation (or at least a “moment”) of unipolarity, the USA seems to have shed most of its previous inhibitions against unilateralism and “exceptionalism,” inter alia claiming the “right” to pre-empt emerging threats and of dissuading any “peer competitor” by means of unrivalled military preponderance. According to IR realists this is bound to cause a backlash sooner or later.

One of the reasons that it has not happened sooner and clearer may be that successive US administrations have managed to convince the countries that would otherwise be the most likely challengers, i.e. the members of the EU, that the particular US strength matters more than that in which the Europeans excel – hence that the EU is somehow a “dwarf” in comparison with the United States.

The actual “balance of power” between the two organisations may, of course, be measured in different ways. In Table 3, the population, GDP and military expenditures have been compared – and the global figures as well as those for other regions of the world have been added for comparison. It appears that EU’s military expenditures roughly equal those of all of Asia and amount to no less than 14 times those of the entire African continent, and that the EU with a mere 7 percent of global population stands for 18 percent of its total military spending. The EU is thus far from undermilitarised – not to mention the fact that the EU also includes two nuclear powers.

The only comparison that might make the EU appear as a “military dwarf” is thus that with the United States, which counts for almost half of all the world’s military expenditure. With a population more than 50 percent higher than that of the USA and a GDP of roughly the same size, the EU spends less than half of the United States on its militaries. However, unless one reckons with the possibility that the EU may one day find itself at war with the United States such a comparison makes very little sense.

Moreover, as becomes obvious from the Table 4 and Chart 1, whatever “discrepancy” there may be is not so much due to the EU countries neglecting their militaries, as their military expenditures have been roughly constant for the last decade or so, but primarily reflects a drastic US military build-up. The most surprising about EU military expenditures may, in fact, be the lack of change, considering the dramatic changes on the continent in the period covered by the data series, such as German unification (1990), the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
(1989) and the Soviet Union (1991), amounting to an almost complete disappearance of (traditional) security threats to the members of the EU.

Americans tend to see Europe’s alleged underspending on its militaries as either an instance of “free-riding” on the efforts of the United States or as reflecting a “happy-go-lucky” and naïve pacifism. This has been ridiculed by, among others, Robert Kagan, who claims that the Europeans are from Venus, but the American from Mars. However, a much better explanation may be that Europeans simply have a different assessment of what can and cannot be accomplished by military means. This may also explain why they assign much higher priority to, for instance,
## Chart 2: Net ODA

![Chart showing Net ODA by country from 1960 to 2003](chart.png)

## Table 5: ODA Net (USD mil)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>7,163</td>
<td>4,105</td>
<td>7,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>6,320</td>
<td>5,030</td>
<td>6,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>3,395</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>2,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>2,538</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>3,981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>1,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>2,007</td>
<td>1,799</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>4,501</td>
<td>6,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Old EU”</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>13,151</td>
<td>28,326</td>
<td>25,289</td>
<td>37,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>3,153</td>
<td>7,138</td>
<td>11,394</td>
<td>9,955</td>
<td>16,254</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other DAC</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>5,906</td>
<td>14,544</td>
<td>18,506</td>
<td>15,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Total</td>
<td>4,676</td>
<td>6,713</td>
<td>26,195</td>
<td>54,264</td>
<td>53,749</td>
<td>69,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old EU/DAC</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/DAC</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old EU/USA</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>184%</td>
<td>249%</td>
<td>254%</td>
<td>229%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
development aid, in which field they surpass the United States with about the same margin as the US does Europe in military terms (see Table 5 and Chart 2).\textsuperscript{58}

There may thus be a significant difference between the “strategic culture” of the Americans and the Europeans,\textsuperscript{59} inter alia reflected in the different assessments of the utility of the use of force and the regulations and constraints pertaining to such use. Related to this there are also persistent disagreements

![Chart 3: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping 2000-04](chart3.png)

**Table 6: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping (by 30 November)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>7,408</td>
<td>6,585</td>
<td>5,525</td>
<td>5,503</td>
<td>5,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>8,998</td>
<td>11,679</td>
<td>11,172</td>
<td>13,711</td>
<td>22,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>2,647</td>
<td>2,815</td>
<td>6,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (non-OECD)</td>
<td>15,351</td>
<td>21,297</td>
<td>16,982</td>
<td>17,817</td>
<td>27,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5,023</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>4,925</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>2,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>38,501</td>
<td>47,772</td>
<td>41,926</td>
<td>43,531</td>
<td>63,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/EU</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/World</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on the specific form in which this force is to be applied. The main issue seems to be whether to accept deployments on the ground (where both the fighting and the dying take place) as in peacekeeping missions or more “muscular” interventions.

Even though the European contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are dwarfed by those of the Third World, they still surpass those of the United States, as shown in Table 6 and Chart 3.\textsuperscript{60} The Europeans thus seem more prepared to put their troops “in harms way” than the United States, which insists of waging war in the typical “American way,” i.e. by relying on strikes from the air (at safe altitudes) by means of precision-guided weaponry, allegedly allowing for “surgical strikes,” in conformity with the predominant beliefs about the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA).\textsuperscript{61}
The EU and Security

Having now provided the background for the European quest for a common foreign, security and defence policy, which will, hopefully help explain some of the paradoxes and dilemmas involved, the time has come for an account-cum-analysis of this, to which the following section is devoted. It will place the main emphasis on the “traditional security” elements, whereas the following sections are devoted to some of the new and emergent challenges, mostly related to an expanded or at least modified conception of security.  

Even though the future shape of the EU was, by the time of writing (September 2005, rather unpredictable because of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, I have throughout taken this as the point of departure on the (optimistic) assumption that the gist of the treaty will, at some stage, be implemented in one form or the other.

“Security by Being”: The EU as a Peace Project

The European project has all along been motivated by the desire for peace, as was made explicit in the 1950 “Schumann Declaration” which referred to the incipient European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first building block of the present EU:

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. (...) The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe (...). The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.

The intention was thus to transform Europe from a “conflict formation” into a security community (vide supra), starting with a “core” consisting of those two countries deemed most likely to end up at war with each other unless prevented from this – and to do so by furthering interdependency among them. This was, indeed, a very “indirect approach” to security – and especially so as interdependency
and integration were supposed to proceed almost automatically. Both “func-
tionalists” and “neofunctionalists” thus imagined bureaucrats, technocrats and
economic actors to be the main integrating actors who should be given as much
freedom as possible to forge all sorts of cross-border links. Only in the case of
crisis (e.g. when sovereignty was at stake) should issues be politicised, according
to this school of thought. Others, such as the “neoliberal intergovernmentalists,”
expected the process to be less smooth, but still to produce a gradual “pooling of
sovereignty.”

The EU has already proceeded way beyond the “Westphalian model” of a state
system (see Table 7), and today constitutes far more than a “pluralistic security
community” in the traditional sense of a group of sovereign states among which
war has become inconceivable (*vide supra*). Institutionalisation has played a central
role in this development, and has taken place in different ways:

- By simple expansion of the organisation, i.e. by creating new offices, director-
ates, etc., and expanding their staffs.  
- By transferring (in a piecemeal fashion) what were previously sovereign powers
of the states to the community as such, e.g. through the direct application of
EU law without the transmission of national legislation. 
- By an expansion of the competencies of the Commission and the European
Parliament (representing the Communities) at the expense of the Council,
representing the states. 
- By a gradual move from consensual modes of decision-making (protecting state
sovereignty by the implicit unit veto system) to more majoritarian modes such as
qualified majority. The new Constitution for Europe will (if it ever enters into

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Treaty/Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>European Economic Community (EEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>European Union (Maastricht Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Nice Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Constitution for Europe (future uncertain)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
force) facilitate this development, e.g. by means of the so-called “passarelle” clauses, allowing for an easier switch from one decision-making mode to another.  

How far this institutionalisation will proceed is, according to the Constitution, to be determined by an application of the three principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. Whether the progressive amalgamation resulting from this institutionalisation will eventually produce a new “superstate” or, more likely, a polity sui generis, based on some form of “multi-level governance,” remains to be seen, but it seems unlikely that the progressive “deepening” of the EU has reached its final stage.

This deepening has all along been accompanied by a progressive expansion of membership (see Table 3 above). In 2004 the so far most comprehensive expansion was completed with no fewer than ten new members. Moreover, negotiations are well advanced for the accession of Romania, Bulgaria to the communities (presumably by 2007), with Croatia is scheduled to follow, and a decision has been taken (but remains controversial) to commence accession negotiations with Turkey. Contrary to NATO expansion, which has always been opposed by some, there have never been any serious objections (e.g. by Russia) to EU enlargement, perhaps by virtue of its almost exclusively civilian nature.

The case for enlargement has occasionally been couched in security terms, e.g. through an application of the “liberal peace” theorem to the EU’s neighbours. The underlying assumptions are that war among liberal states is unlikely or even inconceivable, and that the EU is able to transform states into liberal ones, either in the sense of “trading states” with market economies or of democracies, or both. If the dyadic version of the democratic peace theory holds true, according to which democratic states do not go to war against each other, then it will surely be a major contribution to the security of the EU to democratise its neighbours.

It is also inherently plausible that the EU can promote such democratisation, not so much by doing something as by being an immensely attractive market and community of nations. In order to join states have to meet various EU standards, not only in terms of their economies, but also with regard to democracy and human rights, including minority rights. The very prospects thereof may induce what has aptly been called “anticipatory adaptation” in the sense that would-be candidates strive to meet these standards by modifying
their behaviour, even before actual membership negotiations commence – as Turkey did with a recent reform package that, among other things, abolished the death penalty.\footnote{\textsuperscript{81}}

The EU has also promoted various more comprehensive “stability pacts” and “partnerships,” mostly with countries on its periphery, as in the Stability Pact for Europe and the more recent Stability Pact for Southern Europe, intended for post-conflict peace-building in the Balkans or in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements under the auspices of the “Barcelona Process,” to which we shall return in due course. All of these initiatives are intended for the same purposes as (half-)promises of and negotiations about accession to the EU.

It is further very likely that benign synergies may develop between those goods that the EU holds out the promise of promoting, i.e. peace, democracy human rights and prosperity, as illustrated in Figure 2. Peace tends to further democracy and human rights, at least in the sense that it removes one of the most common justifications for limiting or even abolishing democracy or curtailing such human rights as civil liberties, namely the danger of war; and it is, conversely, plausible that a free debate and democratic decision-making will militate against decisions for war. It is, finally, likely that peace will promote prosperity, if only by allowing for lower defence expenditures, and that prosperity will secure peace, especially when resting on the aforementioned economic interdependency.

---

**Fig. 2: Benign Synergies**

![Diagram showing the interactions between Peace, Democracy, Prosperity, and Human Rights]

---
“Security by Doing”: The CFSP and the ESDI/ESDP

The EU has gradually, and not without “teething problems”, developed a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, as a corollary thereof, for instance, achieved a unified stance on the recognition on new states such as those in the Balkans. The EU countries are, furthermore, consulting with each other as a caucus within other organisations such as the UN with a view to (but not always succeeding in) reaching a common position on most issues. Moreover, the ministerial and summit meetings of the EU, as a matter of routine, pass resolutions on foreign policy issues which have over time become increasingly comprehensive and elaborate, probably reflecting a growing agreement on most issues. Finally, the EU has established an office of the High Representative for CFSP, which is fused with the post as Council Secretary General and presently filled by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.

Until recently, however, the EU deliberately avoided military matters, even exempting arms production from its general industrial integration schemes, and thus leaving the military aspects of security to NATO and/or the now defunct Western European Union (WEU). The latter, for most of its existence, played virtually no role, as all of its members placed their faith in NATO. It was, however, resurrected from almost complete oblivion in 1984, mainly in order to serve as a convenient framework for an intensified Franco-German collaboration. In connection with the EU’s Maastricht Treaty of February 1992, the WEU was proclaimed to constitute “an integral part of” the EU – even though not all EU members were, or even wanted to become, members of the WEU. In June the same year the WEU formulated its future tasks, henceforth known as “Petersberg tasks,” named after the venue of the meeting and comprising a catalogue featuring such tasks as peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and crisis management.

One of the impediments to faster progress in European defence collaboration has all along been (and remains) the ambivalent US attitude. On the one hand, the United States wants its European allies to shoulder a larger part of the total “burden” of collective defence (as the US defines it). On the other hand, it would lose most of its hegemonic role if the Europeans were to become too independent. As so often in alliance matters, the outcome has been compromise formulations which are only acceptable to all because they lend themselves to different interpretations and which therefore often make very little sense if taken at face value.
In the Washington Summit Communiqué (24th April 1999) on *An Alliance for the 21st Century*, NATO thus took a stand on the relationship between the EU/WEU and NATO (including the United States) with the following formulations, representing a compromise between the EU and the USA.

We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard: (a) We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged; (b) As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU; (c) We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication; (d) We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.

These formulations seemed tantamount to a NATO (i.e. American) approval of further European collaboration, paving the way for a gradual “Europeanisation” of European security. Other obstacles to such a development had by then also been removed.

- France had gradually abandoned most of her reservations concerning NATO’s military structures to become almost a normal member of the alliance, thereby making its European allies more confident in their ability to combine NATO and EU/WEU cooperation.
- The UK had, under the Labour government, become increasingly European in its orientation, even though its “special relationship” with the United States continues to play a role.
- The fact that the very meaning of “neutrality” had undergone transformation after the Cold War allowed the neutral members of the EU more ample scope for collaboration in security and defence matters.
- Paradoxically, the most likely “spoiler” may now be Denmark which upholds principled objections (based on a referendum) to participating in EU military
collaboration, its long-standing NATO membership notwithstanding. So far, however, the other EU members have acquiesced in this Danish “opt-out,” even though it has rather absurd consequences, such as preventing the participation of Danish forces under EU auspices in such military operations as would be regarded by everybody as totally uncontroversial if taking place within the frameworks of NATO or the UN.92

EU countries, spearheaded by Germany, France and the UK, have recently taken significant steps in the direction of creating a genuine European security and defence capacity, the interim goal being the ability to field 60,000 troops on short notice for the aforementioned “Petersberg operations.”93 One of the most significant breakthroughs was the St. Malo meeting between the UK and France in December 1998, where both sides committed themselves to the development of a “common defence policy in the framework of CFSP,” including a “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so” – wrapped, as always, in solemn references to NATO, to the “vitality” of which this initiative would presumably contribute.94

In the Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, presented to the European Council’s meeting in Nice, 7-9 December 2000, the following assessment and predictions were included:

In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This does not involve the establishment of a European army. The commitment of national resources by Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions. (...) The development of the European Security and Defence Policy strengthens the Union’s contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining peace and international security.95
Discussions were by then underway on the “implementation of the specific goal regarding police capabilities, whereby Member States should be able to provide 5,000 officers by 2003 for international missions, 1,000 of whom could be deployed within less than 30 days,” which would indeed be a valuable contribution if dispatched to countries in, or just coming out of, violent conflict. The following details were provided in the *Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration*:

In the field of military capabilities, which will complement the other instruments available to the Union, at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 the Member States set themselves the headline goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. (...) In quantitative terms, the voluntary contributions announced by Member States make it possible to achieve in full the headline goal established in Helsinki (60 000 persons available for deployment within 60 days for a mission of at least a year). These contributions, set out in the “Force Catalogue,” constitute a pool of more than 100 000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels, making it possible fully to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis management missions within the headline goal.

Since Nice, the ESDP has evolved further, inter alia through the “Berlin Plus” agreement with NATO on EU access to NATO assets, the commitment of forces by member states to meet the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goals and Catalogue and its 2004 successor, the Headline Goal 2010, in which the ambition was proclaimed to be the following:

The ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases, is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. These minimum force packages must be military effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the Battlegroups concept. (...) On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Coun-
cil. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. (...) The development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battlegroups, will strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests.  

Other innovations have included the actual creation of an ephemeral EU military staff and the launching of a European Armaments Agency.

In the proposed new Constitutional Treaty (with an uncertain future) the set-up of the CFSP and ESDP were further regulated. First of all, it is envisaged to appoint (by qualified majority voting in the European Council) a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (art. I.28) with the “rank” of Vice-President of the Commission as well as a Foreign Affairs Council, over which s/he shall preside. It is further stipulated that member states must consult with each other on all matters of general interest and do so before “undertaking any action on the international scene or any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests” (art. I.40). The common security and defence policy (CSDP, synonymous with the ESDP) is defined as an integral part of the CFSP (art. I.41), and a “progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” is mentioned which “will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides,” but it is also underlined that this shall respect NATO commitments. It is further envisaged for member states progressively to improve their military capabilities. An Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) shall be established to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector (Art. I.41.3).

Most controversial may be the collective defence clause contained in the treaty, which is modelled after NATO’s article 5, but thereby also competing with it in the sense of providing an alternative. The wording of art. I.41.7 is

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and
assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

The treaty allows for some “variable geometry” in the sense that it envisages groups of member states to enter into “permanent structured cooperation” under the auspices of the CSDP (art. I.41.6 and III.312). Generally, the treaty does not contain much news, but it rather codifies and formalises a number of informal and ad hoc decisions, as was to be expected of a constitutional treaty.¹⁰¹

**ESDP Deployments**

While all of the above has “merely” to do with planning and intentions, in the course of 2003-04 the EU also ventured into the hitherto uncharted waters of actual deployments on six occasions in three different countries, both within Europe and in Africa (see Table 8).¹⁰² In all cases this took place with a clear UN mandate and in most, but not all cases, with NATO support under the aforementioned “Berlin plus” framework. Besides those listed the EU also (16 July 2004) launched Operation **EUJUST-Themis** in Georgia – a so-called “Rule of Law mission” involving a mere ten or so international civilian experts to support the national justice system, but nevertheless labelled an ESDP mission.¹⁰³

The two operations in Macedonia (or “FYROM” in NATO and UN phraseology) have been fairly uncomplicated, as they have primarily aimed at conflict prevention, *in casu* avoiding an escalation of the ethnic tension between Macedonians and Albanians into a fully fledged civil war. The first was **Concordia**, taken over from NATO (codenamed “Operation Harmony”) and involving military units, a total of 308 provided by 13 EU members and 49 by 14 non-member states.¹⁰⁴ It was followed up with a police mission, Operation **Proxima**, which was initially supposed to have ended by 15 December 2004, but was then extended in September 2004. It has a total international staff of 184, of which 22 EU members provide the 163 and 4 non-member countries the rest.¹⁰⁵

The two operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been more complicated, as they have been launched in the wake of a protracted and very destructive civil war-
Western intervention, followed by the rather fragile Dayton Agreement, initially monitored by NATO’s SFOR and IFOR missions. The EU first deployed a police mission (EUPM, i.e. European Union Police Mission), involving merely police, of which a total of 396 plus 53 civilians were deployed by the EU alongside a total of 80 personnel from non-EU member states. This was followed in late 2004 by operation Althea, intended to simply replace the NATO deployment of around 7,000 troops and to borrow NATO equipment.

Perhaps the most importantly, the EU showed a willingness to go really “out-of-area” when it launched Operation Artémis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in response to the intense internecine war between the two main ethnic groups in the Ituri province, the Henda and the Lemu. France served as “frame-

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**Table 8 - ESDP Deployments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police and other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Concordia</em></td>
<td>EUPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31.03-15.12.03)</td>
<td>(01.01.03-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Artemis</em></td>
<td>Proxima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12.07-01-09.03)</td>
<td>(15.12.03-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Althea</em></td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(02.12-04-present)</td>
<td>(30.04.05-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>EU Support to AMIS II</em></td>
<td>Eujjust Themis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Eujjust Lex</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>(01.07.2005-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>EUSEC</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>(08.06.2005-present)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
work nation” (almost synonymous with what is usually called “lead nation” in such operations) in a deployment of around 2,000 troops, most of them French, but with troops from 16 other EU member states as well as small contingents from non-members. This was a logistically very demanding operation, but the EU nevertheless managed without any use of NATO equipment. This was followed in 2004 by the decision to launch a police mission in the same country, EUPOL Kinshasa, as well as a security sector reform project (EUSEC) in 2005. In the same vein, the EU has also provided support for the African Union’s mission in the troubled Darfur region of the Sudan (AMIS II).

Even though the EU’s priorities may still be its immediate vicinity, these missions demonstrate that there is still some sense of international and global obligation left, even towards an Africa which is becoming increasingly marginalised.
**New Security Challenges (?)**

What has complicated the development of a common security policy has, besides transatlantic tensions and their reflection in intra-EU disagreements, been the uncertainty about the dangers and threats against which the EU will have to defend itself.

**The European Security Strategy**

After considerable vacillation and controversy, this matter was finally settled on the 12th of December 2003, when the European Council approved what Javier Solana had drafted, i.e. a European Security Strategy labelled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*.

The text acknowledged that “Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.” Among new threats or challenges it mentioned terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organised crime as well as regional conflicts and state failure – the last two, however, mainly because they could exacerbate the three first. The document further argued that “Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic,” hence that “we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.”

Contrary to the United States, however, the EU did not use this as an argument in favour of military pre-emption, but rather as an argument that “Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early,” duly acknowledging that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means.” Rather than advocating military attack the document thus emphasised the need for “effective multilateralism” as a means to the end of “a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order.” It thus made it a priority to strengthen the UN, “equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively,” but also to lend support to regional organisations around the world.

As far as the armed forces of the EU were concerned, the strategy paper mentioned the ongoing efforts “to transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces,
and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary,” e.g. by means of “systematic use of pooled and shared assets.” Probably discretely referring to the US experience (shared with a couple of EU member states) with the invasion of Iraq, the paper also underlined that “in almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos” (which was a fair description of Iraq after the toppling of the regime), drawing the lesson from this that “We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.”

In conformity with the spirit of this document, the EU’s approach to the most immediate threat, i.e. terrorism and WMDs, has been very moderate as has been the approach to the third major challenge identified, i.e. organised crime, which I shall disregard in this connection.

**Terrorism**

Even though both the number of terrorist attacks in Europe and the casualties resulting from these have in fact been quite low, even in recent years (see Chart 4), both individual European countries and the EU have taken the terrorist threat seriously, at least rhetorically. However, they have largely refrained from US-type forceful reactions and preferred non-military responses to such military responses as would most likely have proven counter-productive.

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**Chart 4 - International Terrorism in Europe**
Of course, as long-standing allies and friends of the United States, both the individual European states and the EU were quick to express their sympathy with the United States in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks. The European Council thus on the 12th of September held a special session where it, among other things, declared the attack to be “not only on the United States but against humanity itself and the values and freedoms we all share,” proclaiming the 14th of September a “day of mourning” and asking all European to observe three minutes of silence in commemoration of the victims. At a joint meeting two days later of the heads of state and government of EU member states, the presidents of the EU Commission and Parliament and the High Representative for the CFSP, the EU reiterated these condemnations and expressions of sympathy, accompanied by declarations of intent to proceed with the ESDP and the ongoing efforts to create “a genuine European judicial area.” Since then, a number of concrete initiatives have been launched, including the following:

- A common definition of terrorism, proceeding from a definition of “terrorist acts” (in the form of a list of concrete offences committed for a set of specified reasons) to one of terrorists, terrorist grouping and “entities.”
- A list of terrorist organisations and persons based on these definitions, in the most recent version of which organisations such as Hamas are included—which may well confront the EU with serious dilemmas, considering its commitment to assist democracy among the Palestinians combined with the fact that Hamas won a number of constituencies in the December 2004 local elections in Palestine.
- A commitment to solidarity among members in case one of them should be the victim of terrorist attacks, undoubtedly inspired by the attack against Spain on 11 March 2004 and codified in an “EU Solidarity Programme.”
- Appointment of an EU counter-terrorism coordinator.
- A “Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism,” in which the focus is placed on “deepening the international consensus and enhancing international efforts to combat terrorism” as well as on reducing the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources, improving the detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorists; enhancing security of international transport and border controls and capacities for dealing with the consequences of a terrorist attack, alongside preventive measures such as “addressing the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism.”
What is perhaps equally significant, however, is what the EU has not done or decided to do. For instance, in the conceptual framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism (18 November 2004), there is no mention of military interventions or pre-emptive strikes, but the focus is placed on support for other states and protection of EU troops against terrorist attacks.¹²⁴

**WMDs and Proliferation**

Having long been engaged in the endeavours to stem the proliferation of WMDs,¹²⁵ the EU in December 2003 adopted a “Strategy against Weapons of Mass Destruction.”¹²⁶ It duly mentions the threat so often highlighted by the United States that terrorists may acquire WMD and even means of delivery, but it parts company with the USA when it comes to countermeasures. The document thus underlines “our conviction that a multilateralist approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international order.” Whilst referring to the need for coercive measures as a last resort, it also maintains the pre-eminent role of the UN Security Council in these matters.

Rather than focusing exclusively on the prospective proliferator, the EU also addresses the central question of the motivation for acquiring WMDs.

The EU is determined to play a part in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum. The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems, which lead them to seek WMD. The more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race. To this end, the EU will foster regional security arrangements and regional arms control and disarmament processes. The EU’s dialogue with the countries concerned should take account of the fact that in many cases they have real and legitimate security concerns, with the clear understanding that there can never be any justification for the proliferation of WMD. The EU will encourage these countries to renounce the use of technology and facilities that might cause a
particular risk of proliferation. The EU will expand co-operative threat reduction activities and assistance programmes.

The EU further acknowledges the importance of “positive and negative security assurances,” yet without mentioning that the main obstacle in this respect will surely be the United States, which has so far refused to provide so-called “negative security guarantees,” i.e. assurances that it will not attack a country foregoing the acquisition of WMDs.127

In the spirit of the above document, an agreement was reached with Iran in November 2004 on Iranian guarantees not to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for EU trade concessions and support for the opening of negotiations for an Iranian accession to the WTO. By September 2005, however, talks were discontinued because of an EU belief that Iran was not inclined to submit to complete inspections.128 By the time of writing (September 2005) it was impossible to predict whether the talks would ever resume and, if so, what the prospects would be for achieving any agreement.
The EU and Its Neighbourhood

Europe and the EU have all along been aware of the importance of a stable environment – much more so, in fact, that the United States with its de facto insular position and only two neighbours (Mexico and Canada) who are both friendly and clearly inferior to the USA. Not only have virtually all European countries for centuries had to reckon with the possibility of wars with their respective neighbours, but they have also grown accustomed to other and more peaceful forms of state-to-state relations as well as, increasingly, relations between people across borders. In any case, neighbours matter to European states and therefore also to the European Union (see Map 1).

Neighbours, “Others” and Borders

A neighbour, however, may be socially and discursively constructed in different ways, either as a potentially hostile and dangerous “Other,” or more neutrally as merely a “different Other,” or even as what might be called a

Map 1: The EU and Its Neighbours
“transient Other,” i.e. as somebody who will, in due course, be welcomed into the “family.”

Moreover different strategies are appropriate to the various “Others,” as set out in Table 9. A hostile Other represents a potential threat which should preferably be eliminated (e.g. through war) or at least contained. A different Other, however, is one which one has to (and can) live with for the indefinite future, wherefore it makes sense to establish normal international relations. It also makes sense to abandon ambitions of changing the nature of this Other, which may, however, be better understood, e.g. through dialogue. A transient Other, in its turn, has to be made ready for the “merger” with one-self, which requires engagement and rapprochement— as in the German Ostpolitik with its ambitions of “Wandel durch Annäherung.”¹³¹ Hence, whereas the relationships between the Self and the hostile as well as different Others are based on equality, that with the transient Other is unequal, as the Self is regarded as superior, both by itself and the inferior Other. Such a relationship thus bears some resemblance to the former colonial ideology with its notions of “the white man’s burden” and Europe’s (and, not least, France’s) mission civilisatrice, which explains the resentments sometimes caused by even well-intended instances of such “cultural imperialism.”¹³²

The distinction between the different others, and hence the choice of the suitable strategy also depends on the borders of “Europe,” which are discursively contested, inter alia as a reflection of different conceptions of the identity of Europe. Rather than a clearly demarcated geographical region, Europe may be more appropriately understood as one defined by a European identity. This may, for instance, be defined in civilisational terms (à la Samuel Huntington)¹³³ or even as a religious community as some (e.g. Poland)¹³⁴ argued in connection with negotiations on

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Table 9: Strategies and “Others”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Other</th>
<th>Hostile</th>
<th>Different</th>
<th>Transient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship Strategies</td>
<td>Containment Elimination</td>
<td>State-to-State relations Dialogue</td>
<td>Engagement Rapprochement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Strategies | Hostility | Equality | Inferiority |}

¹³¹ [Note: Source reference]
¹³² [Note: Source reference]
¹³³ [Note: Source reference]
¹³⁴ [Note: Source reference]
the Constitutional Treaty – or it might even be defined in relation to an “Other,” in which role Russia was cast during the Cold War and Turkey (and thus Islam) for centuries.\textsuperscript{135} The social construction of Self and Other may thus be seen as two sides of the same coin, which means, for instance, that the EU as the “personification” of Europe will change its identity (i.e. self-identification) by the likely accession of Turkey to the EU at some point in the future.

To its credit, the EU has opted for an inclusive self-identification and avoided labelling the various “others” as hostile, preferring to treat them as different (as, e.g., Iran) or transient Others, as has been the case of the countries of the former Eastern Europe and the Balkans as well as (after some vacillation) Turkey. In the Constitutional Treaty this orientation is maintained. In Article I.57 on “The Union and its neighbours,” it is thus stated that “The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.” It is further maintained that “The Union shall be open to all European States” (art. I.58).

In a communication from the Commission, dated 11 March 2003, on “Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,” these ambitions were elaborated upon. The documents thus recalled

\begin{quote}
The Union’s determination to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union. (…) Enlargement will serve to strengthen relations with Russia, and [calls] for enhanced relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Southern Mediterranean countries to be based on a long term approach promoting reform, sustainable development and trade. (…) Enhanced interdependence – both political and economic – can itself be a means to promote stability, security and sustainable development both within and without the EU. (…) The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a “ring of friends” – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations.\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

In May 2004, the Commission followed this up with a “strategy paper” on the European Neighbourhood Policy, which included a vision of creating
a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond cooperation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well being.¹³⁷

**Neighbourhood Assistance: Carrying Big Carrots**

What is making such neighbourhood policies all the more important is the fact that the very expansion of the EU has continually brought a growing number of countries into its orbit as neighbours, even though it has also transformed countries from neighbours to members, as set out in Table 10. Obviously, not all these new neighbours have been problematic, and relations

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**Table 10 - EU Enlargement and New Neighbours**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>New Neighbours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Size</strong>&lt;br&gt;(1951)</td>
<td>Belgium, France, W. Germany, Italy, Luxembour, the Netherlands</td>
<td>Austria, Denmark, East Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Yugoslavia (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Enlargement</strong>&lt;br&gt;(1973)</td>
<td>Denmark, Ireland, UK</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Enlargement</strong>&lt;br&gt;(1981)</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Albania, Turkey, Yugoslavia (Macedonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd Enlargement</strong>&lt;br&gt;(1986)</td>
<td>Portugal, Spain</td>
<td>Andorra, Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal enlargement</strong>&lt;br&gt;(1990)</td>
<td>E. Germany (unification with W. Germany)</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4th Enlargement</strong>&lt;br&gt;(1995)</td>
<td>Austria, Finland, Sweden</td>
<td>Hungary, Liechtenstein, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5th Enlargement</strong>&lt;br&gt;(2004)</td>
<td>Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
<td>Belarus, Croatia, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In line for accession</strong></td>
<td>Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Turkey</td>
<td>Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Moldova, Serbia/ Montenegro, Syria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with countries such as Norway or Liechtenstein have not really represented much of a challenge.

Perhaps surprisingly, relations with Russia have proceeded fairly smoothly, even though this not only became a new neighbour, but also saw part of its national territory (the Kaliningrad exclave) completely surrounded by new EU members. Its unprecedented scope not withstanding, the most recent enlargement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table II - EU Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount 2000-2003 (M€)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Tacis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Meda</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Amount 2002-2004 (M€)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Annual</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia/Montenegro</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total W. Balkans</strong></td>
<td>1,639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
only produced three new formal neighbours, neither of which is particularly problematic for Europe. Much more challenging was the accession to the Union of a Cyprus which remains divided between a South claiming to represent the whole island and a de facto independent North which is only recognised by Turkey.\textsuperscript{139} The next predictable round(s) of enlargement will, however, bring rather challenging new neighbours such as Iraq, Iran and Syria as well as the countries of Central Asia.\textsuperscript{140}

As for now, however, the EU’s most pressing neighbourhood challenges are those with the remaining states of the Balkans and with the Greater Middle East, including the countries on the opposite side of the Mediterranean as well as the Levant.\textsuperscript{141} This neighbourhood policy has aptly been labelled a “friendly Monroe Doctrine” by Michael Emerson,\textsuperscript{142} and it could, indeed, be described as “speaking softly and carrying a big carrot,” as opposed to the “stick” recommended by Theodore Roosevelt and so often wielded by the United States.

As is evident from Table 11,\textsuperscript{143} the EU has shown a considerable willingness to “put its money where its mouth is,” by allocating substantial resources to the various neighbourhoods. While assistance to the Balkans has taken place under the auspices of the “Stabilisation and Association Process” and the “Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation” (CARDS) programmes (\textit{vide infra}), the TACIT and the MEDA programmes have provided the auspices for that to Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, respectively (\textit{vide infra}). The main difference between the two categories is that the Balkan states are officially expected to join the EU at some stage in the future, whereas neither Eastern Europe nor the Middle East are, even though they may, of course be “promoted” to prospective members in the indeterminate future.

\textbf{The Balkans}

In the Balkans, the EU in 1999 launched a “Stability Pact for Southern Europe,” intended for post-conflict peace-building in the Balkans following the Kosovo War. Even though this was an EU initiative, it is not an EU programme as such as it also involves other countries.\textsuperscript{144} It has subsequently been followed up with a number of activities and programmes, including the following:

- The aforementioned CARDS programme, providing assistance to, inter alia, strengthening civil society, facilitating the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDP), training the police forces, etc.\textsuperscript{145}

- The accession to the communities in 2004 by Slovenia, i.e. the ethnically most homogenous (hence most stable) of the constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia

- Special relations with Croatia, related to the fact that accession negotiations are expected to commence in 2005.\textsuperscript{146}

- Stabilisation and Association agreements with the rest, all of which have realistic prospects of joining when the time is ripe, as promised by the European Council in 2000 and confirmed in 2003.\textsuperscript{147}

All of the above have taken into account, and sought to promote, both the general values of the EU such as democracy, human (and, not least, minority) rights and regional collaboration, and more specific demands such as collaboration with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). All of these demands and desiderata were spelled out in the “Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans,” adopted at a joint summit meeting in June 2003 with the telling subtitle “Moving towards European Integration,” in which it was stated that

Providing justice for war crimes is a legal, political and moral imperative to which we are all committed. Sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons is critical for ethnic reconciliation and an index of democratic maturity; it remains high on our priority agenda. We stress the role of education, culture and youth in promoting tolerance, ensuring ethnic and religious coexistence and shaping modern democratic societies. Fragmentation and divisions along ethnic lines are incompatible with the European perspective, which should act as a catalyst for addressing problems in the region.\textsuperscript{148}

In addition to these programmes, the EU has also been involved with ESDP missions in both Bosnia and Macedonia as mentioned above, but its main contribution to stability and security in this “near abroad” has undoubtedly been non-military and more related to being than doing.

**EU and the “Greater Middle East”**

The EU policy towards the “Greater Middle East” may be subdivided into relations with the Maghreb, involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict and relations with the Persian Gulf region, in that order as far as the importance to the EU is
concerned. Whereas developments in the Maghreb as well as the Mashreq (the EU’s preferred term for the Levant) impact fairly directly on the EU, those in the Gulf only do so indirectly and to a much lesser extent, making involvement here a matter of free choice.

Nevertheless, the EU has gone out of its way to forge friendly relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, just as it has long been involved in a “comprehensive dialogue” with Iran over issues such as the Middle East conflict, WMDs, human rights and terrorism, as well as in the aforementioned negotiations on Teheran’s possible nuclear ambitions. Even though profound disagreements persist, both between EU members and with the United States about the legitimacy and legality of the war against Iraq, the EU is further committed to contributing substantially to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, e.g. in the form of support for the elections in January 2005 and for police, rule of law, and civilian administration activities, as was agreed at the Sharm el Sheikh summit in November 2004.

Relations with the Maghreb are very much framed by the fact that this “borders on” the EU in the sense that the two are merely separated by a Mediterranean Sea, which also serves as a conduit for illegal immigrants into the EU area. One of the vehicles for an EU policy in the Middle East in general, and the Israel-Palestine conflict in particular, is the so-called “Barcelona process,” encompassing the EU and countries of the Maghreb as well as the Levant, including both Israel and Palestine. It was initiated with the Barcelona Declaration (27-28 November 1995) which formulated the common objective of “turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity.”

An integral part of the Barcelona process is the MEDA programme, under the auspices of which the EU disburses grant and loans to the partner countries, both bilaterally and for regional collaboration. MEDA and the entire Barcelona process are now in their second phase, yet seemingly without any major changes in orientation. One of the objectives has been the strengthening of regional and sub-regional collaboration, but these attempts have come to nought because of the paralysis of the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union), in its turn due to the long-standing conflict between Algeria and Morocco. Accomplishments in terms of an improvement of human rights or progress towards democracy are also hard to identify.
Relations with the Levant have focused on the Israel-Palestine conflict as well as the more comprehensive Middle East peace process which was launched after the 1991 Gulf War. EU is firmly committed to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, as envisaged in the so-called “Roadmap,” and it is a member of the “Quartet” alongside the UN, Russia and the United States. Should it decide to use it, the EU would have considerable leverage over both sides to the conflict, as it might instrumentalise its development aid to the Palestinians and its trade relations with Israel to exert influence on the parties.

There is no doubt that the substantial support granted to the PA, both by the EU as such and by individual member, countries provides Europe with considerable leverage over the Palestinian authorities. The EU is the main provider of aid, committing from 1994 to 2001 a total of €731.1 million (see Table 12). The EU has further provided special assistance to the PA institutions, including training for the security forces. In response to the Israeli attacks on the PA institutions (including facilities financed by the EU), the EU further pledged supplementary assistance for their reconstruction. While it came under pressure from Israel and the United States to withdraw this support – because of allegations that some of it has been diverted to terrorist activities – the EU remained steadfast in wanting to maintain its assistance and even provided emergency humanitarian assistance to the beleaguered Palestinians. To this assistance should be added the bilateral

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**Table 12 - EU Assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1994-2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Assistance</th>
<th>Mill. €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- EU Member States</td>
<td>1,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- European Commission</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- European Investment Bank (loans)</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Via UNRWA</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- EU Member States</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- European Commission</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Aid</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,564</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
aid granted by individual EU member states and the multilateral aid which most of them are providing via the UN’s various affiliates such as UNRWA. Even though most of the Palestinian trade with the EU still goes via Israel, a free-trade agreement (signed in 1997) has been in force since 2001. Once Israel removes the present trade impediments and the Palestinian economy is reconstructed, the free trade agreement holds considerable promise for the Palestinians, over whom the EU thus has considerable leverage.

Its leverage over Israel has little to do with aid (for which Israel does not qualify) and more with trade relations. To the extent that it is able and willing to collaborate with other MEDA countries, however, Israel is also eligible for its share of the funds that are set aside for regional collaboration. More importantly, however, Israel has an association agreement with the EU, signed in 1995 (replacing a precursor from 1975) and in force since 2000. Partly as a result of this, the EU is Israel’s main trading partner, standing for about 27 percent of Israel’s exports and 35 percent of its imports (see Table 13). This trade dependency of Israel on the EU might be instrumentalised by being made conditional on satisfactory Israeli performance vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Suggestions have also been made for a modification of the Association Agreement enjoyed by Israel to ensure that the privileges do not apply to commodities produced on occupied land, thereby barring access for the produce of Israeli settlements from the West Bank, Gaza and Golan.

### Table 13: Israel’s Trade (Mil. ECU/ EURO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>6,956</td>
<td>12,044</td>
<td>39,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>5,456</td>
<td>13,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Share (%)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports to:</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>3,984</td>
<td>9,427</td>
<td>34,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>3,626</td>
<td>9,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Share (%)</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The EU also has other, less concrete, instruments at its disposal for exerting influence on Israel. The Jewish state has an obvious interest in posing as a semi-European “island of modernity” in a sea of (what it portrays as) pre-modern orientalism. Even though this interest may not be equally strong will all segments of the Israeli population, all share the desire to be acknowledged as the bastion of western values. This might be instrumentalised by the EU, e.g. by making the acknowledgement of Israel’s “European credentials” conditional on conformity with the standards of “civilised behaviour” in its treatment of the Palestinians. Holding up the prospects of an EU membership at some indeterminate point in the future might be an even stronger instrument which might induce “anticipatory adaptation” to European standards.

The EU thus has the potential for exerting considerable influence on both parties to the conflict, albeit mainly by “soft” means. Unfortunately, however, the impact thereof is likely to be less significant, the more both sides are in “a security mode,” i.e. the more all other considerations are set aside for the sake of national or societal security. To the extent that they see their very survival as states and/or nations to be endangered, both Israel and the Palestinians are quite prepared to endure hardships. Needless to say, it also takes more than just leverage and instruments to make a difference in a conflict as complicated as that between Israel and the Palestinians. Most important of all is to have a policy that may work.

The European states have, at least collectively, a more impartial attitude to the conflict than does the United States, albeit one resulting from different (and to some extent perhaps even incompatible) attitudes to the conflict. France thus tends to lean towards the Arab side of the conflict, whereas Germany is almost certain to be on the side of Israel, at least as far as “existential” issues are concerned, lest it be accused of a resurgent anti-semitism. The UK has tended to be more pro-Israeli than the French, if only because of its “special relationship” with Washington; whereas the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) have a long history of equidistance, having all supported Israel in existential matters while at the same time taking the legitimate demands of the Palestinians seriously. That the “sum” of European policies is thus more impartial and even-handed because of the divergence of policies, however, does not easily translate into a unified impartiality, and the European Union has, indeed, found it difficult to agree on a concrete Middle Eastern policy apart from the general support for a two-state solution (*vide supra*).
**Conclusion**

The EU also has relations with, e.g., the Third World, but as these neither impact on the EU’s security nor are primarily driven by security considerations I have chosen to disregard them in the present paper.

What emerges from the above account of EU security policy seems to be, first and foremost, an EU which has managed to transform its entire space from a conflict formation to a security community – and one which is so attractive (also for other reasons) to other countries that it is almost bound to expand considerably in the coming years. In addition to its “security by being” approach, however, the EU is also increasingly involved in “security by doing,” inter alia through its CFSP and ESDP programmes, whereas the various neighbourhood programmes fall somewhere between the two categories. Both hold considerable promise, and the EU seems to possess all that is required to become a major actor that might even challenge the US global supremacy – not in order to substitute its own or to move the world towards old-fashioned multipolarity, but rather to help transform it into a global space government by order.

The only thing that seems to missing before the EU can really become a significant security actor thus seems to be political will. Whether this missing ingredient will ever materialise will depend, among other things, on the mood of the European electorates.
Notes


6 The first formulation of this principle seems to have been in the papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (Leo XIII, 1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno*, issued by Pius XI in 1931, according to which the principle entails that “a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.” See the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops: *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (chapter 2: The Human Community), para 1885, at www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect1chpt2.htm#7. See also Carozza, Paolo G.: “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,” *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 97, no. 38 (2003), pp. 38-79; Wilke, Marc & Helen Wallace: “Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-sharing in the European Community,” *RIIA Discussion Papers*, no. 27 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990); Schilling, Theodor: “Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle, or: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously,” *Working Paper*, no. 10/95 (New York University School of Law, Jean Monnet Center, 1995); Kersbergen, Kees van & Bertjan Verbeek: “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the European Union,” *Comparative European Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2004), pp. 142-162.


18 See *OSCE Handbook* (op. cit., note 10), pp. 44-84 and, for a continuous update, www.osce.org/field_activities/field_activities.htm


35 Haglund & Mager (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 30).


40 www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.


42 IFOR and SFOR are described by NATO at www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm and www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm, and KFOR at www.kforonline.com/.


54 Figures for population and GDP (in purchasing power parity terms) are from CIA: World Factbook 2004, and those for military expenditures have been taken from the SIPRI online database, for individual countries at http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php, and for regions and the world at www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_wnr_table.html. They are in US $m., at constant 2000 prices and exchange rates and are for calendar years. Africa excludes Angola, Benin, the two Congos, Liberia and Somalia, and Asia excludes Afghanistan. World totals exclude all of these plus Iraq.

Calculated on the basis of figures from http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php.


72 The French overview of the Constitution (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/final_passerelle.htm) thus identifies “passerelle” clauses in articles IV-444 (general) and I-40, III-210, III-234, III-269 and III-300, respectively. As with so many other EU terms, the French version seems to be the most commonly used.


75 See the entry on “Enlargement” on the EU website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/candidate.htm


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From *ibid.*, pp. 168-211.


105 Lindström: \textit{loc. cit.} (note 102), pp.121-122. See also the mission’s website at www.eupolproxima.org/.


041129%20Althea%20update%203.pdf. See also ICG: “EUFOR: Changing Bosnia’s Security Arrangements,” Europe Briefing (Brussels: ICG, 2004).


118 “Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the EU, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the CFSP, Brussels, 14 September 2001,” ibid., pp. 147-148.


120 See “Updated List of Terrorist Organisations and Persons Linked to Terrorist Activities,” at http://ue.eu.int/ uedocs/cmsUpload/GA17.05.04.pdf.


126 http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf,


129 On IR constructivism see George, Jim: Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction
to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Pettman, Ralph: Commonense Constructivism or the Making of World Affairs (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000); Wendt Alexander: Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

130 This terminology is inspired by, but differs from, the following: Hansen, Lene: Western Villains or Balkan Barbarism? Representations and Responsibility in the Debate over Bosnia (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1998); and Malmvig, Helle: “Cooperation or Democratisation? The EU’s Conflicting Mediterranean Security Discourses,” DIIS Working Paper, no. 8 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004). See also Neumann, Iver B.: “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2, no. 2 (1996), pp. 139-175.


143 Figures for TACIT and MEDA are from Commission: “Strategy Paper” (*loc.cit.*, note 137), p. 30; and those for the Balkans are from “Report on Activities of the European Commission/World Bank Office for South East Europe 2003,” at www.seerecon.org/joreport2003/pdf/joreport2003.pdf, p.23. Please note that the figures are not directly comparable, as the author was unable to locate comparable data covering the same periods.


149 On EU-Gulf relations see Lucuiani. Giacomo & Tobias Schumacher: *Relations between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council States. Past Record and Promises for the Future*


“Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association on Trade and Cooperation between the European Community, on the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaze Strip, of the other part,” Official Journal L187 (16 July 1997), pp. 3-135.


The Danish policy towards the Palestinians is described in Gaza/Vestbredden, Tillæg til strategi for det dansk-palestinsiske udviklingsamarbejde 2000-2003 (Copenhagen: MFA, Danida, 2000), at www.um.dk/ danida/landestrategier/gaza-Vestbredden/.
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