The Management Handbook

For UN Field Missions



The Management Handbook

For UN Field Missions

IPI

INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
INSTITUTE

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The International Peace Institute (IPI) is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.

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FOREWORD

Never before has the United Nations been asked to do so much. The demand for a more agile, modern, and efficient global organization has led Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to make management reform one of his top priorities. His goal is to create a performance-driven and results-oriented United Nations that meets the high expectations of the world's people.

As heads of the UN Departments of Field Support, Peacekeeping, and Political Affairs, our focus is on strengthening the way we manage efforts to prevent and resolve conflict. The mandates of peacekeeping operations have become more multidimensional than ever, integrating military, police, and civilian efforts under a common vision. Similarly, UN special political missions have grown considerably in size and complexity since their establishment in the early 1990s.

Those who serve in our field missions and on the frontlines of conflict know better than anyone the challenges and dangers involved in carrying out complex mandates in the face of constant political, operational, and resource constraints. Success in such contexts is hard won. We succeed more often than we fail, but because the stakes are so high, we must always look to improve the way we work, including through greater transparency and accountability.

We must begin by improving how we manage our scarce and precious resources: time, money, and people. This handbook is a valuable resource to help our personnel in the field and throughout the United Nations system do just that. We warmly welcome this IPI initiative. While it does not constitute official United Nations policy, the handbook provides very useful and concise reminders of good management methods and effective working practices, thereby complementing our own internal processes of training and continuous learning.

We hope it reaches a wide audience and helps the brave and talented men and women engaged in UN field operations to carry

out this critically important work. More generally, we also thank the IPI for continuing to be, as the Secretary-General has said, "a source of sound advice and state-of-the-art knowledge" that has "enriched and enabled our mission."

Ameerah Haq

Under-Secretary-General

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PREFACE

I am proud to present *The Management Handbook for UN Field Missions*, a project of the International Peace Institute (IPI) aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of UN peace and security efforts across the globe. Since its founding in 1970, IPI (then named the International Peace Academy, IPA) has worked to improve UN peace operations. In fact, IPA developed the very first handbook for UN peacekeepers, *The Peacekeeper's Handbook*, in 1978.

Responding to the critical need for formal guidance on peacekeeping, and well before the creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it took IPA nearly five years to develop a formal guidebook for peacekeeping troops. In the foreword of *The Peacekeeper's Handbook*, my predecessor, Major General Indar Jit Rikye, reflected his hope that the handbook would "assist the nations of the world in the conduct of whatever international peacekeeping operations are required in the future…as the leaders at the time may decide." As he predicted, peacekeeping operations would come to look much different decades later. Today, UN missions run the gamut from small political missions supporting the good offices of an SRSG, to billion-dollar, multidimensional peacekeeping operations employing thousands of civilians alongside UN troops and police.

With so many personnel executing such a wide spectrum of activities in environments that are indeed challenging and complex, the need for effective and efficient management is evident. It is with this need in mind that IPI, working in close consultation with the UN, developed *The Management Handbook for UN Field Missions*. We are indeed grateful for the support and encouragement offered by the UN during the development of this handbook. Our hope is that this resource will inspire you, the manager in the field, to continually learn, reflect on, and improve your performance and that of your team. In so doing, you will no doubt help create a smarter, more resilient, and, ultimately, more effective United Nations.

Terje Rød-Larsen

President, International Peace Institute

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The *Management Handbook for UN Field Missions* is the outcome of a multiyear project carried out by IPI, but with significant contributions from a number of individuals and organizations. It was made possible by the generous support of the government of Australia, in particular the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Australian Department of Defence. Additional support was provided by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and the government of Canada, through its Permanent Mission to the United Nations. This and many other IPI projects also draw support from the donors to IPI's flagship program, Coping with Crisis, in particular, the governments of Norway and Sweden.

Contributors

We would like to give special thanks to the authors who provided the material that would become the handbook's twelve chapters: Alice Hecht, Julian Junk, Vickesh Kambaran, Till Papenfuss, Dirk Salomons, and Cyrus Samii.

Reviewers

Particular thanks are owed to Phil Cooper, Ian Quick, and Darryl Watters who provided invaluable feedback on the full manuscript and made many substantive improvements to the final product. We are also indebted to all the people who reviewed specific chapters in their area of expertise and/or provided material for or feedback on the case studies. These were: Nelly Ahouilihoua, Suzanna Campbell, Gillian Cull, Elisabeth Diaz, Fabrizio Hochschild, Braima Jamanca, Toby Lanzer, Carole Magnaschi, Youssef Mahmoud, Joanna Harvey, Barbara Nieuwenhuys, Jolyon Naegele, Huria Ogbamichael, Naresh Perinpanayagam, and Jascha Scheele.

IPI is very grateful to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and Department of Political Affairs for their support of the project. A "brown-bag" meeting in 2009 with the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training and an expert roundtable discussion in 2010 both helped inform the planning and design of the project. Commentary on several chapters from the participants of the meeting of heads of

political affairs components, senior political advisers, and civilian chiefs of staff, held at IPI in October 2011, was particularly helpful. Useful feedback was also provided by participants of the UN Senior Mission Leader Course held in Madrid in October/November of 2011.

Design and Illustration

Much work was devoted to enhancing the usability and accessibility of this book. We are, therefore, very grateful to our designer Michael Moon of The Moon Agency for his creativity, patience, and expert design work. With his always insightful cartoons, Emmanuel Letouzé (www.manucartoons.com) ably introduced some levity to brighten a rather serious subject matter.

IPI Team

This project was conceived and designed by Francesco Mancini and Adam C. Smith following research trips to UN field missions in 2007–2008. Adam C. Smith oversaw the implementation as project manager and co-editor. Arthur Boutellis guided and finalized the development of content as co-editor and lead researcher starting in January 2011. Till Papenfuss contributed multifarious support throughout the project: drafting, editorial, and administrative. Further editing, production support, and expert guidance was given by the IPI Publications team, in particular, Adam Lupel, assisted by Marie O'Reilly.

All content, including any errors or omissions contained herein, is the sole responsibility of the International Peace Institute.

ACRONYMS

AAR: After Action Review

ACABQ: Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

ASG: Assistant Secretary-General

BINUB: United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

BPO: Best Practice Officer

BVM: Best Value for Money

CAP: Consolidated Appeal for Haiti

CBO: Chief Budget Officer

CDC: Centers for Disease Control

CDR: Community-Directed Reconstruction

CEO: Chief Executive Officer

CHAP: Common Humanitarian Action Plan

CISS: Chief of Integrated Support Services

CIVCAP: Civilian Capacities

CONOP: Concept of Operation

CoP: Community of Practice

CPM: Critical Path Method

CV: Curriculum Vitae

DAP: Directorate of Penitentiary Administration

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DFID: Department for International Development

DFS: Department of Field Support

DIS: Détachement Intégré de Sécurité

DMS: Director of Mission Support

DO: Designated Official

DPA: Department of Political Affairs

DPET: Policy Evaluation and Training Division

DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSRSG: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

DSS: Department of Safety and Security

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

e-PAS: Electronic Performance Appraisal System

ERSG: Executive Representative of the Secretary-General

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions

FPD: Field Personnel Division

FRR: Financial Rules and Regulations

FRY: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYI: For Your Information

GA: United Nations General Assembly

GLU: Guidance and Learning Unit

GoB: Government of Burundi

HC: Humanitarian Coordinator

HCT: Humanitarian Country Team

HQ: Headquarters

I4S: International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDDRS: Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

ILO: International Labour Organization

IMPP: Integrated Mission Planning Process

IMTF: Integrated Mission Task Force

IOT: Integrated Operational Team

IPSAS: International Public Sector Accounting Standards

ISF: Integrated Strategic Framework

ISG: Integration Steering Group

ITF: Integrated Task Force

JACLM: Joint Advisory Committee on Legislative Matters

JLOC: Joint Logistics Operations Centre

JMAC: Joint Mission Analysis Centre

JMEU: Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Unit

JOTC: Joint Operations and Tasking Centre

KFOR: Kosovo Force

KM: Knowledge Management

M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation

MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MOSS: Minimum Operating Security Standards

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Nongovernmental Organization

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OHRM: Office of Human Resource Management

OIOS: Office of Internal Oversight Services

OLA: Office of Legal Affairs

ONUB: United Nations Operation in Burundi

OROLSI: Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

PBC: Peacebuilding Commission

PBF: Peacebuilding Fund

PBI: Programme Budget Implications

PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office

PCPP: Peace Corps Partnership Program

PDNA: Post-Disaster Needs Assessment

PHP: Personal History Profile

PMCA: Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority

PPT: PowerPoint

QIP: Quick Impact Project

R&R: Rest and Recuperation

RBB: Results-Based Budgeting

RC: Resident Coordinator

SAFAR: Strategic Alliance Formative Assessment Rubric

SCR: Security Council Resolution

SDS: Strategic Deployment Stocks

SLA: Service-Level Agreement

SMART: Specific, Measureable, Assignable, Realistic, and Time-Bound

SMARTER: Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, Time-Bound, Ethical, and Recorded

SMT: Senior Management Team

SOW: Statement of Work

SP-CoP: Stabilization and Peacebuilding Community of Practice

SPM: Special Political Mission

SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

SSR: Security-Sector Reform

SWOT: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats

TAM: Technical Assessment Mission

TOR: Terms of Reference

TVA: Temporary Vacancy Announcement

UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNCT: United Nations Country Team

UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund

UN-HABITAT: United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNIMT: United Nations Integrated Management Team

UNLB: United Nations Logistics Base

UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMISET: United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor

UNPOL: United Nations Police

UNSCOM: United Nations Special Commission

UNV: United Nations Volunteer

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USG: Under-Secretary-General

VTC: Video Teleconference

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organization

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

INTRODUCTION

"The United Nations faces unprecedented demands on leadership capacity as the number, size and complexity of peacekeeping and political missions has expanded dramatically in recent years....mission leaders should ideally possess demonstrated experience in strategic planning and management of large, complex organizations." – Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General[1]

Why Is Management Important?

The UN field mission is a complex beast. From the smallest political mission to the largest peacekeeping operation, it employs a uniquely diverse staff and performs a broad array of tasks in an environment that is sometimes dangerous, often unstable, and always challenging. Resources are scarce and inflexible. Internal regulations and procedures are cumbersome, and, at times, can impede rather than facilitate success. On top of it all, success is often hard to measure or even recognize. Unlike the private sector, success in the field does not come from increased quarterly profits, but rather from a conflict prevented, the perception of a peace dividend, or the renewed optimism of a host population. Unfortunately, UN staff can only contribute to these goals, as so many factors are beyond the mission's control.

In such an unforgiving environment, management might seem a peripheral consideration to some. Yet, the opposite, in fact, should be the case. Precisely because political, bureaucratic, and resource constraints characterize field missions, good management can sometimes mean the difference between success and failure. Sound management is essential to achieving the goals of any organization, regardless of the context, and UN field missions are no exception. Its complexity and uniqueness should not be excuses for bad management or poor results. In fact, if managed well, environmental complexity can increase the resilience of an organization and enhance its ability to adapt, learn, and thrive in changing contexts.

What Is Management?

Management, in its broadest sense, is the act of organizing and directing a set of resources to accomplish clearly-defined goals and objectives. Management includes planning, organizing, di-

1 United Nations Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict," UN Doc. S/2009/304, June 11, 2009.

recting, monitoring, and evaluating the activities of an organization in accordance with certain policies. Of course, all activities of an organization take place in a specific context. When the "best" choices are not possible in a given context, due to political, bureaucratic, or financial constraints, management is very often about improvisation or choosing the "second-best" option.

Management can be seen as a science, because it deals with knowledge, models, and tools, *and* as an art, because it concerns style, practice, and application. It has been said that management is the art of common sense.[2] Yet as straightforward as some of the ideas in this handbook may seem, most managers have a hard time implementing them consistently. At the end of the day, management is about human beings. The purpose of management is "to make people capable of joint performance, to make their strengths effective and their weaknesses irrelevant."[3]

What Isn't Management?

Misconceptions about management abound, and these can often lead to frustration or disillusionment. First, knowing how to manage does not come with the job. Being a good manager is something different from being a good political affairs officer or a good gender adviser. It entails a distinct skill set that must be learned, through experience and training, and practiced repeatedly. Management skills require a greater focus on processes, results, and the people around you. These skills include leadership, team building, financial acumen, accountability, and sharing responsibility for the performance of others.

Second, being a manager does not necessarily mean having more power or freedom to act. Managers often have increased formal authority, access, and status, which may not necessarily equate to power or influence—especially within organizations such as the United Nations. To act, managers must often rely on the cooperation or agreement of others within and outside of the organization. Some can become frustrated when they find they lack control over the actions of others or over outcomes. These limitations, of course, are no surprise to anyone familiar with the workings of a large bureaucracy. But it is precisely within these constraints that good managers make their presence felt.

2 Steven Cohen and William Eimicke, *The Effective Public Manager* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002).

3 Peter F. Drucker, "Management as Social Function and Liberal Art" in *The Essential Drucker* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).

How Can This Handbook Help You Do Your Job Better?

The Management Handbook provides succinct background information on management theory and practice and offers practical tools and insights on key elements of management. These are complemented with real-life examples from UN field missions, and checklists for self-evaluation and diagnosis. It is our hope that the principles, tools, and tips will become useful baseline resources for everyone in the field who struggles with management tasks—be they at the bottom or the top of the organizational hierarchy.

The Management Handbook features twelve chapters. It opens by examining management issues at a strategic level: organization and coordination, leadership, and planning. The next section covers the set of management skills that any successful manager has learned to master: communication, managing people, decision making, and time management. The final chapters—on knowledge management, security, financial management, project management, and evaluation—outline how an organization is run prudently, efficiently, predictably, and with maximum impact.

Please note that this handbook should not be seen as a substitute for training. While it will serve as a practical reference guide, becoming a good manager does not occur from just reading a book. Management is learned by doing—through training and on the job. Learning from doing means that a good manager reflects on his or her experiences once they have occurred: What went right? What went wrong? And what could be improved the next time? A good manager also gathers feedback from those working around him or her: superiors, colleagues, and subordinates. It is important not only to ask *what* was done but also *how* it was done. This will help in understanding managerial style and its effect on people and outcomes. Finally, from these self-reflections and feedback, a good manager learns to anticipate situations in which a difficult action must be taken or decision made. Knowing in advance how one will respond to a potential challenge greatly improves the chances for success and the overall resilience of the organization.

Every effort has been made to ensure that the following pages are filled with insights and tools relevant to those working in UN field missions. We hope that you read it, consult it often, and reflect on your actions and the outcomes they produce. We also hope that you take every opportunity to hone your management skills through training. In so doing, you will become a more effective manager, and as a result the UN will be a stronger, more effective organization for all who work in it and all who depend on it.

Caveat Lector

This handbook is offered as an independent compendium for professional improvement. This is not an official UN document, and is not intended to replace any UN doctrine, guidance, rule, or procedure. It is not intended as a substitute for professional training.

1

ORGANIZATION & COORDINATION

ORGANIZATION & COORDINATION

To organize is to align strategic interests with operational priorities within given structural prerequisites and means. Organization and coordination aim to make the functioning of an entire institution more predictable and its output more effective.

OVERVIEW

Various forms of organization define the daily and professional lives of everyone everywhere. Organization provides structure and order. Internally, however, organizations are full of competing activities and comprise a variety of fluid entities.

UN field missions are no exception, and getting the different pieces of a fragmented UN to work together more effectively is a daily challenge for managers. UN managers have to build large administrative and operational structures when a peace operation is mandated. Subsequently, they have to adapt these structures according to changes in the mandate and the environment, and they have to draw down and liquidate them once a mandate expires or the conditions allow for other options. These acts of starting up, adapting, and transforming structures are no easy tasks, as organizational pathologies such as turf battles, uncontrolled growth, and internal politics are widespread. Moreover, the UN's spectrum of actors in the field acting alongside its field missions—the numerous agencies, funds, and programs—creates the need for elaborate processes of coordination and integration.

This chapter addresses coordination challenges in UN field missions that are political and bureaucratic by nature, and cautions that "integration" is not, either at the strategic or operational level, a panacea. UN field operations are multidimensional, involve a range of diverse and interdependent actors, and their ability to accomplish their multiple political, security, humanitarian, or development objectives simultaneously depends on collaboration within and beyond the mission. Also, different levels of integration and coordination may be best adapted to different realities on the ground.

At the same time, all actors are under constant pressure to show quick results ("to deliver") in implementing the mandate to the benefit of the conflict-affected society, while the time-consuming business of developing appropriate structures to do so is often pushed to the sidelines. In recent years, however, the UN has given a great deal of attention to developing peace operations with

structures and processes that effectively integrate (or at least highly coordinate) the organization's various actors under one strategic vision of building sustainable peace.

This section introduces the concepts of organization and integration, highlights some of the practical challenges and limitations to a UN integrated approach, and provides some tools to overcome some of these challenges.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- Become familiar with key concepts of coordination and organizational development.
- Understand the particular organizational needs of a UN field mission.
- Acquire tools that can help you improve the way you work in a network-like organization.
- Comprehend the rationale of the move toward integrated UN missions, and understand some of the practical challenges to working together toward a common objective in practice.

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

UN operations are unique and complex in that they are both political and bureaucratic. They are political at the top due to member states making decisions that are often suboptimal, as they are always the product of a negotiation within an intergovernmental setting (e.g., the Security Council mandating peace operations). They are bureaucratic at the bottom because the UN Secretariat (i.e., the UN bureaucracy—from headquarters down to the field mission) has to implement these political decisions.

In 2000, the seminal "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (the Brahimi Report) advocated for mandates and resolutions that are unambiguous and based on realistic assessments of mission requirements. In practice, however, managers in UN field missions will continue to have to implement complex, contradictory, or sometimes ambiguous mandates while working across strategic, operational, and tactical levels (fig. 1).

Figure 1.1. Organizational chart for UN field missions



(Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *Mission Start-Up Field Guide for Senior Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, New York: United Nations, February 2008.)

Organizational Forms and Processes

What does that mean in organizational terms? In theory, three fundamental organizational forms can be distinguished: hierarchies, networks, and markets. In hierarchies, coordination takes place horizontally, between functional tasks, and vertically, through command and control frameworks. Networks, on the other hand, consist of multiple organizations that are loosely tied together, with coordination resulting from repeated interactions rather than formal arrangements. In markets the main coordination mechanism is supply and demand. UN field missions are a mixture of hierarchical and network forms of organization.

The hierarchy of a peace operation extends vertically from the headquarters (HQ) down to the field level. The HQ level is characterized by intergovernmental elements, the Security Council,

the Committees of the General Assembly, bureaucratic elements, parts of the Secretary-General's Executive Office, DPKO, DPA, DFS, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the UN regional hubs such as the Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. At the field level, this hierarchy is extended from the top to the bottom of a peace operation or political mission. It is important for managers to be aware of this hierarchical line of authority—it is impossible to carry out tasks unaffected by the opportunities and constraints imposed by interlinkages of the international, regional, and local level of the UN bureaucracy. Indeed, managing in peace operations is never an apolitical task. Frequent exchanges of information and coordination with headquarters, as well as an awareness of the political processes involving member states there (in the Security Council, the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, etc.), are essential.

In addition to the formal hierarchy within the UN mission bureaucracy, there is a coexisting network-like structure of political, humanitarian, and development actors that all have their own bureaucratic structures and lines of authority. Under these circumstances, aligning everyone's activities toward a similar purpose and delivering coherently requires different managerial attention and skills than in a hierarchical setting.

Organizing can be divided into two basic processes, specialization and coordination. Both are dependent on the organizational form within which organizing is supposed to take place. An organizational form constrains the set of available managerial responses. For example, in hierarchical settings, coordination is formal and deliberate, linking policymaking at the top of the organization with operations at the bottom. Organizational charts, explicit assignment of authority and responsibility, and specification of procedures and sanction mechanisms are essential. By contrast, network-like structures involve rather ad hoc, emergent, and collaboration-based modes of coordination, such as creating and nurturing social networks and dialogue, as well as leaving ample room for deliberation, trial and error, and ad hoc responses.

Specialization

Specialization refers to the breaking down of a process into subprocesses and the assignment of staff and resources accordingly. The need for specialization within the UN has led to the creation of many specialized UN agencies (funds and programs such as UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP, etc.) that operate alongside UN missions in the field. As mentioned above, these other organizations adhere to their own principles and priorities, and each have their own hierarchical management structures and intergovernmental oversight bodies.

New entities have also recently been created within the UN Secretariat in New York: in 2005, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and in 2007, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), and the Department of Field Support (DFS). While these institutional reforms responded to many real organizational needs, they have also led to the compartmentalization and sometimes fragmentation of UN responses that become overly supply-driven (i.e., more focused on what the UN can provide than what is actually needed).

Coordination

Coordination is understood as the re-connection of the various subprocess outcomes. While the above-mentioned UN agencies and departments are specialized, they are also linked together by the bond of the United Nations Charter and increasingly by a web of integrative interinstitutional links, interagency bodies, working groups, and other loose coordination structures such as ad hoc task forces, etc. Also, a number of joint planning documents are used (see Planning chapter), such as "joint programs" between the UN mission and country team, Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISFs), UNDAFs, and Integrated Peacebuilding Frameworks. Some of these are internal to the UN system and others, involving national authorities, can also facilitate coordination.

Coordination with non-UN, outside actors is also essential for the overall success of the mission (and the term "coordination" is generally used in that sense rather than for internal UN coordination), and is often part of the UN mission's mandate, sometimes but not always in support of national authorities. It is, however, often the case that in spite of most people recognizing the need for some level of coordination of international actors operating in a given country (bilateral donors, international financial institutions, NGOs, etc.), organizations are generally reluctant to be co-

ordinated from the outside. This becomes particularly challenging when dealing with non-UN organizations and actors with very different mandates and approaches. With these actors it is hardly possible to govern by decree. Organizing is a social and a personal process, in which communication—listening and convincing—plays an essential role. Yet, this is often easier said than done.

Managers in field missions always face the need to balance two main structural challenges: integrating vertically and horizontally (both elements are part of the integrated mission design, though vertical integration has received more attention). The general pattern for vertical integration is to establish strong central lines of authority with significant operating responsibilities and make the relations of social rank and social control explicit. Horizontal integration, on the other hand, aims for fluid and transitory interaction: mutual links between more or less autonomous entities on the operational level that depend on reciprocal relations of trust and respect at the strategic level.

Organizational Development

Organizational development refers to managing change in organizations to make transformation a more deliberate process, with the aim of increasing an organization's viability and effectiveness. As a distinct subfield of organization studies, it highlights behavioral aspects, emotions, and the importance of relationships in organizational life. This is because any change in an organization requires changes of individual behavior, "unfreezing" of old habits and routines, and overcoming fear of the new or unknown.

Understanding the importance of organizational development is key, in part because organizing is never a purely rational process. Planning weeks, months, or even years ahead is both possible and necessary, but interruptions, surprises, diverging interests, and obstructions make organizing all too often a messy process. Managers should not be discouraged when not every piece is falling into place and plans need to be adapted. Flexibility, vigilance, and creativity are necessary at the operational level to reach basic strategic goals. Hence, even though organizing is far from being an orderly process, as the very act of organizing cannot avoid compromise, conflict, and improvisation, steering it is the essential task of any manager in peace operations (see Leadership and Planning chapters).

From a structural point of view, managerial authority is of critical importance. However, as important as *formal* managerial authority (i.e., the right to decide) is, *actual* managerial authority,

(i.e., the effective control over decisions) is also crucial. It is not enough to keep an eye on the legal texts, which outline a manager's lines of control and responsibility. It is even more important to be aware of patterns of, for instance, rivalry between multiple superiors, lenient enforcement of rules or routines, or information overload. The reputation of subordinates and principals also affects actual managerial authority.

There are many tools that can help when working across organizations or within a network-like organization. Some are highlighted in other chapters of this handbook, including tools for managing effective meetings (see case study in Time Management chapter) and for establishing functioning internal and external communication (see Communication chapter). Also, secondments or staff swaps between different parts of the organization (e.g., DPKO and UNDP), as well as joint trainings and simulations, can all contribute to the better functioning of an organization by improving the interaction among its components.

A number of approaches have also been suggested to bring the different parts of an organization closer together. Collaboration can be a strategy to achieve a goal that would be impossible if independent entities only worked by themselves. Bringing about successful collaboration and synergy, however, often requires a certain type of leadership by managers who can foster collaboration and partnerships (see Leadership and Managing People chapters). The assessment tool in table 1.1, the Strategic Alliance Formative Assessment Rubric (SAFAR), can help one identify and gauge the relative strength of a collaborative endeavor.

The whole-of-government approach—formerly known as the "joined-up-government" approach—has also been presented as an alternative to "departmentalism," tunnel vision, and "vertical silos," as a way to address fragmentation in public administrations. It seeks to align the policies of the traditionally independent spheres of diplomacy, development, and defense toward a common policy goal.

Table 1.1. Assessing strategic alliances

Level of integration	Purpose	Strategies and tasks	Leadership and decision making	Interpersonal and communication
Networking	Create a web of communication Identify and create a base of support Explore interests	Loose or no structure Flexible, roles not defined Few if any defined tasks	Non-hierachical Flexible Minimal or no group decision making	Very little interpersonal conflict Communication among all members infrequent or absent
Cooperating	Work together to ensure tasks are done Leverage or raise money Identify mutual needs, but maintain separate identities	Member links are advisory Minimal structure Some strategies and tasks identified	Non-hierarchical, decisions tend to be low stakes Facilitative leaders, usually voluntary Several people form "go-to" hub	Some degree of personal commitment and investment Minimal interpersonal conflict Communication among members clear, but may be informal
Partnering	Share resources to address common issues Organizations remain autonomous but support something new To reach mutual goals together	Strategies and tasks are developed and maintained Central body of people Central body of people have specific tasks	Autonomous leadership Alliance members share equally in the decision making Decision-making mechanisms are in place	Some interpersonal conflict Communication system and formal information channels developed Evidence of problem solving and productivity
Merging	Merge resources to create or support something new Extract money from existing systems or members Commitment for a long period of time to achieve short- and long-term outcomes	Formal structure to support strategies and tasks is apparent Specific and complex strategies and tasks identified Committees and subcommittees formed	Strong, visible leadership Sharing and delegation of roles and responsibilities Leadership capitalizes upon diversity and organizational strengths	High degree of commitment and investment Possibility of interpersonal conflict high Communication is clear, frequent, and prioritized High degree of problem solving and productivity
Unifying	Unification or acquisition to form a single structure Relinquishment of autonomy to support surviving organization	Highly formal, legally complex Permanent reorganization of strategies and tasks	Central, typically hierarchical leadership Leadership capitalizes upon diversity and organizational strengths	Possibility of interpersonal conflict very high Communication is clear, frequent, prioritized, formal, and informal

(From Rebecca Gajda, "Utilizing Collaboration Theory to Evaluate Strategic Alliances," *American Journal of Evaluation* 25, No. 1 [2004]: 65-77.)

Integrated UN Missions

Organizing and coordinating the work of the United Nations is a challenge at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. As such, a number of institutional reforms have been undertaken over the years to introduce a greater level of coherence within the organization, importantly through the concept of the "integrated mission." However, the concept of integration was first embraced by the UN without much understanding of what it meant in practice, leading initially to a degree of improvisation in the field, until the concept was progressively formalized into policy and guidelines.

In June 2008, following wide-ranging consultations with the main parts of the UN, the Secretary-General's policy committee reaffirmed integration as the guiding principle for engagement in conflict and postconflict situations. It clearly stated that the principle should be applied wherever the UN has a "country team" (consisting of the UN agencies, funds, and programs operating in that country) and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission or office. This means, on the other hand, that the principle is not applied in countries with traditional peacekeeping missions, whose mandates are limited to ceasefire monitoring, or in conflict or postconflict countries without a political UN presence.

The 2008 policy decisions also clarified that integration applies not only to missions that are "structurally integrated"—that is, missions with a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) who is also the resident and humanitarian coordinator (RC/HC). In addition, country-level arrangements can take different structural forms reflecting their differing needs and circumstances, as the principle of modern architecture states: "form follows function." These forms translate an effective strategic partnership and shared vision between the UN mission or office and the country team, under the leadership of the SRSG. There is, therefore, now a greater focus on integration at the strategic and planning levels rather than just the structural level.

Early Timeline of UN Integration (1997–2007)

1997: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissions "Renewing the United Nations—A Programme for Reform" (A/51/950), which notes that "separate UN entities...pursue their activities separately, without regard to or benefiting from each other's presence." It rules that "all UN entities....at **country level** will operate in common premises under a **single UN flag**."

2000: The Brahimi Report points out the lack of integration at the headquarters level and recommends the creation of **Integrated Mission Taskforces (IMTFs)**—joint working groups that facilitate mission planning and coordination among different UN entities at headquarters for peacekeeping operations.

Similar Integrated Task Forces (ITFs) now exist for special political missions (SPMs) led by the Department of Political Affairs. The ITF is a coordination and information-sharing mechanism for both headquarters and the field that brings together all relevant departments, agencies, programs, and funds. As for DPKO-led missions, the UN Department of Field Support provides administrative and logistical support to DPA-led missions as provided for by the Service-Level Agreement (SLA).

2000: Guidance notes issued by the Secretary-General specify further integrated leadership structures in the field. This notably includes the creation of a "double-hatted" or "triple-hatted" Deputy SRSG, in which the authority of both the resident coordinator (RC) and humanitarian coordinator (HC) would reside, "where feasible." The DSRSG/RC/HC is tasked with ensuring that mission activities of the peace operation align with long-term development as well as humanitarian initiatives carried out by the UN country team (UNCT). The first "triple-hatted" position of DSRSG/RC/HC was established in Sierra Leone in 2001. Other similar appointments followed.

2006: A further guidance note establishes that the DSRSG reports primarily to the SRSG and through him or her to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, although with a secondary reporting line to the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Also in 2006, the first **Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)** Guidelines are issued for both headquarters and the field, which are revised respectively in 2010 and 2011 (see Planning chapter). This new approach is to be the "authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integration mission plans for all UN departments, agencies, funds and programs." This framework includes the earlier innovation introduced with the IMTFs and replaces the otherwise largely ad hoc planning structures and procedures that were in place prior to the IMPP.

In 2007, as part of DPKO's "Peace Operations 2010" initiative, the concept of "**Integrated Operational Teams**" (IOTs) was introduced. IOTs were then established for each integrated peace operation to address continued concerns about the lack of integrated support from headquarters. The IOTs combine military and police functions (both under DPKO/OROLSI) and political and field support (DFS) functions together to serve as information and liaison hubs in New York for each peacekeeping mission. In the case of special political missions, there are no IOTs, and the DPA regional division and desk officers coordinate directly with the different headquarters departments including DFS and DPKO/OROLSI.

The Limitations of UN Integration

In general, integration reforms have been aimed at improving both the efficiency and effectiveness of UN peace operations. Efficiency gains are supposed to result from the elimination of duplicative administrative structures and the improved use of resources, while effectiveness is to be gained from the more coherent implementation of activities under one vision. However, despite the considerable evolution of the integration concept within the UN, the intended benefits of integration have not yet been fully realized due to the structural and political realities of the UN's work.

First, coherence among UN actors has been undermined by differing administrative and financial systems among the UN's funds, agencies, and programs. Many aspects of integration policy have moved forward faster than the "nuts and bolts" dimensions: administrative, personnel, financial, and support (including administrative fees, air services, communication/IT, safety and security, joint premises, etc.). The Integration Steering Group (ISG), a USG/ASG-level standing body that meets quarterly to verse UN system-wide work on integration, has been discussing these complex issues, some of which are being addressed by the Department of Field Support (DFS) in coordination with UN funds, agencies, and programs.

The ability of the SRSG and his deputy to integrate effectively is also limited by the lack of incentives for UN actors outside of DPKO's authority to actually integrate (see Case 1 on Burundi below). Although in theory a UN country team reports to the SRSG, in reality, they all still have their own boards and bosses in New York or Geneva. More importantly, these actors often have their own goals and visions that are not exactly aligned with the Security Council mandate an SRSG has been handed. In this context, effective integration in the field often comes down to leadership and personalities within the UN mission and UN programs and funds represented, and to effective network-like communication.

In this regard, one of the most debated issues resulting from integrated missions is the tension between the political work of a peace operation and the ostensibly apolitical work of delivering humanitarian aid. The commonly expressed grievance among humanitarians is that integration jeopardizes humanitarian aid workers' neutrality and that their specific and immediate mission of saving lives could be subordinated to broader or longer-term political goals. A recent independent study on "UN Integration and Humanitarian Space" found that despite reforms to the policy of integration over the last decade the debate remains

polarized, and stakeholders—including UN departments, funds, agencies, and programs—should redouble their efforts to promote greater awareness and consistent implementation of policy provisions that seek to ensure that UN integration arrangements protect humanitarian space. They should also do much more to build confidence across the political, peacekeeping, and humanitarian communities to help ensure that the potential benefits of UN integration for humanitarian operations are maximized, and the risks minimized.[1]

Of course, improving coherence among UN actors only addresses one part of the problem. In many conflict-affected states, the money and activities of bilateral actors overshadow much of the UN's work. Such actors are not able to be coordinated under an SRSG, and their goals might not be fully aligned with that of the

1 See Victoria Metcalfe, Alison Giffen, and Samir Elhawary, "UN Integration and Humanitarian Space," Independent Study Commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2011.

UN mission. In this case, activities of all parties can be duplicative at best, or, in the worst case scenario, they work at cross-purposes.

Finally, the coordination that is arguably most important in a conflict-affected country is with the host government and its population. It doesn't matter if the UN itself is fully integrated if it is not on the same page as the people it is serving. Recognizing this, in 2011 at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, a "New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States" was endorsed by a large group of bilateral donors and the United Nations. This agreement proposes a new partnership with host countries that makes integration comprehensive by uniting all international as well as national actors behind a common vision, thereby, ideally, overcoming some of the coherence challenges that have often retarded progress in fragile states. Processes to better work together with host governments and civil society, established through agreements such as the *New Deal*, could have major consequences for how the UN's work in the field is ordered and "integrated" in the coming years.

Addressing the Humanitarian Dilemma in UN Integration

"Strategic Integration"—working together toward shared goals—does not always have to entail "structural integration," namely actual changes in the organizational structure of the mission, where a single UN official will wear the three hats as DSRSG, RC, and HC (i.e., deputy head of the peacekeeping or political mission, chief development official [resident coordinator], and the UN's highest-ranking humanitarian representative [humanitarian coordinator]). Having decided that "form must follow function," the UN has developed three models for integrated missions:

- "Both Feet In": The humanitarian/resident coordinator (HC/RC) serves as DSRSG and OCHA is located inside the integrated mission. This model is recommended for stable postconflict settings where the presence of the UN's political/military mission is well accepted. This was used in Timor Leste.
- "One Foot In, One Foot Out": The HC/RC serves as DSRSG, but OCHA retains an independent presence, outside the main mission. Recommended for situations where the political/military mission is more controversial. This model has been used in the DRC and Afghanistan.
- "Both Feet Out": The humanitarian coordinator and the OCHA office are not integrated with the political or military aspects of the mission. Recommended for what OCHA calls "situations of persistent widespread conflict or lacking a credible peace process." This has been adopted in Somalia.

CASE 1

UN Integration and Coordination in Burundi, 2007–2010

In November 2005, the democratically-elected government of Burundi (GoB) requested that the United Nations draw down the military component of its seventeen-month-old peacekeeping operation (ONUB). After a period of sounding out the views of ONUB and the GoB, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of an integrated office, BINUB, as the follow-on presence to cohere and coordinate the response of the UN to the peace consolidation priorities for 2007–2008 identified with the GoB. This interim arrangement would allow for a smooth transition from peacekeeping to a more development-focused engagement by the UN, and lasted until December 2010 (at which time BINUB was replaced by a small political office, BNUB). At the time, it constituted one of the most advanced examples of integration of the UN system to date.

BINUB was built on the foundations laid down by ONUB and the UN country team in 2006. The new leadership of the mission used the newly established principles of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and the lessons learned from the integration experience of the UN in Sierra Leone to achieve the goal of avoiding UN fragmentation in the country. BINUB comprised a small office with, at its head, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG), also wearing the hats of resident coordinator (RC) and humanitarian coordinator (HC) assisted by a Deputy ERSG.

The UN country team was the humanitarian and development component of this peacebuilding office. It included UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNFPA, UNIFEM, UNESCO, UNAIDS, OHCHR, OCHA, ILO, and UN-HABITAT. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also coordinated with the work of BINUB through weekly meetings of the United Nations Integrated Management Team (UNIMT), comprised of heads of UN agencies (UNCT) and heads of BINUB integrated sections. The UNIMT co-chaired by the ERSG served as a structure for joint decision making and for reducing the compartmentalization of the UN's work in Burundi. It also allowed the head of mission to provide strategic guidance on all critical aspects of peace consolidation and define a joint UN position with the GoB and international development partners.

Three BINUB integrated sections (Security Sector Reform and Small Arms, Justice and Human Rights, and Peace and Governance) were responsible for coordination and support to their

areas of work at the national level, and they were responsible for the implementation of Peacebuilding Fund projects and joint programs that reflect peacebuilding priority interventions identified by the government of Burundi. All personnel of integrated sections retained their parent organization's contracts (DPKO/DPA, UNDP, OHCHR, etc.), to maintain appropriate institutional linkages and secondary administrative reporting lines to their respective organizations. To ensure the proper management and integrity of the integrated sections, all non-DPKO employees were accorded the same rights, access, and responsibilities as DPKO staff in BINUB, including supervisory, management, and administrative responsibilities when relevant and feasible. Some of the key planning documents for the mission included the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi (agreed between the UN and the GoB) and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy (or "conflict-sensitive" UNDAF)—with joint programs for each of the key peacebuilding priority areas—later replaced by an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).

Some of the main successes of UN integration in Burundi have been strategic coherence, transparency in planning and programming, and inclusiveness of the GoB and international partners in the processes. Some of the crucial elements of making integration effective, however, relied on the leadership and vision of the ERSG, Youssef Mahmoud (who, importantly, had previously held senior positions in DPA and UNDP), as well as the creation of integrated teams within sections, which in spite of administrative challenges, helped bring overall coherence to the UN's support to the GoB.

In "Partnerships for Peacebuilding in Burundi: Some Lessons Learned," Mahmoud relates that despite notable progress in certain areas, namely the integration of efforts at the strategic, programmatic, and operational levels, integration proved a difficult task. Local UN country team representatives tended to be more beholden to their respective central and regional structures than to the lead official on the ground who was mandated by the Secretary-General to coordinate UN responses. A related impediment was the concern that integration could lead to the loss of the visibility of individual agencies, visibility that is essential for resource mobilization and individual career advancement. In the end, the integration endeavour will remain tenuous and effectively personality driven in the absence of performance incentives that reward integration.

CASE 2

Decentralization, Delegation, and Coordination in a Large, Multidimensional UN Peace Operation: Regional Coordination in Southern Sudan

After its establishment by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (March 24, 2005), the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was set up to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and South. UNMIS was thus forced to be located in both parts of the country. Organizational development and decentralization of the mission were challenges from the outset.

In Southern Sudan, UNMIS tackled the question of decentralization by establishing clear and detailed processes. The mission needed to be visibly present where the people were located in the vast country, in order to generate information as timely as possible and to ensure horizontal communication, coordination, and control among mission functions.

The team in Southern Sudan established clear communication and planning routines on a monthly basis: in the beginning of the first week the head of all military and civil functions in one of three Southern Sudanese sectors met. These meetings lasted nearly two-thirds of a day. Each function had to hand in reports from the previous month and outline very concrete plans for the following month, which were discussed transparently across all functions. Five days of operative planning followed, focused on how many helicopters were needed, how many cars, etc. A staff member responsible for logistics and political affairs reviewed each plan, as did the mission leadership.

Finally, mission security had to clear each plan. On the 15th of each month, the plans for the following month were clear to everyone, with considerable synergistic effects: before those routines were established, civil affairs would, for instance, order helicopters for a field trip to a village that would be visited by police three days later. By engaging in a high degree of monthly coordination, the helicopter hours were reduced by wide margins, a much larger area was observed with fewer staff, and cross-function, highly mobile, visible teams were ensured. All documents and a large summarizing spreadsheet were put on a server accessible for all heads of sections and were sent—signed by the regional coordinator—to the overall mission leadership in Khartoum. Hence, the regional team established both horizontal and vertical control and communication patterns. Transaction costs were reduced as the regional coordinator had to sign the final product only once,

rather than having to sign off on each and every helicopter flight, for instance. In any case, there was a buffer for unforeseen events or maintenance.

This routine was established in one sector first, and the core team traveled to the other sectors to train staff and adapt the mechanisms to their specific needs and resources. In the end, through detailed organization and planning, the UN mission decentralized heavily in Sudan, giving sufficient flexibility to the Juba offices.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. UN integration is not a panacea, and organizational structures do not solve fragmentation issues by themselves.
2. Form should follow function. Different levels of integration and coordination may be best adapted to different realities on the ground.
3. Organizational development is a chief function of a manager and should always be considered. Even seemingly small gestures like well-run meetings, joint trainings, informal communication, and cross-sector secondments, can foster collaborative approaches and help entities better understand each other's realities.
4. Coordinate horizontally and not only vertically. This is particularly true across units, civilian-military-police components, and with UN agencies.
5. Keep a healthy relationship between support and substantive functions by fostering communication between these two camps within a mission.
6. Establish and revise mission priorities as teams, and communicate the limits transparently. Defining goals together across mission functions is key for coordination and reduces coordination costs.
7. Do not fear decentralization and delegation. A manager should try to be present in country field offices, delegate authority to them, and visit suboffices regularly.
8. Engage in dialogue with national staff, across missions, and with New York headquarters whenever possible and relevant.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Organization	Do I hold regular working sessions to define schedules/cycles, task lists, and priorities together with my team? Do I clearly differentiate between daily routine meetings (day-to-day operational/reporting business) and other strategic meetings?		
Coordination	Do my team and I coordinate horizontally (across units, civilian-military-police components, and with UN agencies)? Do I collaborate with both the substantive and support sides of the mission?		
Organizational development	Do I follow knowledge management procedures, including handover notes and shared documents? Do I take into account behavioral aspects, emotions, and the importance of relationships when planning or implementing organizational priorities?		

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2

LEADERSHIP

"A peacetime army can usually survive with good administration...coupled with good leadership concentrated at the very top. A wartime army, however, needs competent leadership at all levels. No one yet has figured out how to manage people effectively into battle; they must be led." [1]

OVERVIEW

We know a leader when we see one. Even if we struggle to define leadership, we recognize when we see a leader in action. The exact combination of skills and traits that results in great leadership—a mix of art and science—is unpredictable, but certainly not unfamiliar. There are many definitions of leadership, but they all refer to common concepts and characteristics: self-confidence, communication and people skills, creativity, integrity, courage, political savvy, compassion, and humility, among others.

Leadership is often confused with management, however. Both require an ability to get people to do things so the organization can achieve its goals, but while management oversees the "here and now," leadership is expected to bring a vision for the future and lead in times of crisis. Being a leader entails acting strategically and consistently in support of a broader vision for the organization. A leader knows how to bring about change when required and how to inspire and motivate staff to work together to implement the organization's strategy and its mission—especially when that mission is being challenged. Leaders see possibilities where others see problems. Regardless of their position in the organizational hierarchy, they are the ones people turn to in times of crisis.

Of course, leadership is a quality that comes more naturally to some than to others. But no one has ever been a perfect leader on day one. Leadership skills are developed through years of experience and training, and must be added to the palette of tools that ultimately make a good manager.

There are also many types of leaders at many different levels in a hierarchy. An operation such as a UN field mission—not unlike the wartime army referenced above—requires competent leadership

1 John P. Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," *Harvard Business Review* 79, No. 11 (December 2001): 86.

at all levels to succeed, as well as cross-institutional leadership in order to foster collaboration in an often fragmented UN presence in a given country (see Organization & Coordination chapter). The lessons for leadership in this section are not, therefore, limited to the head of mission or Special Representative of the Secretary-General, but are relevant to staff at every level of a mission.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- What makes a leader effective
- What the different leadership styles are
- How to develop leadership skills
- How to motivate people around a vision
- How to be both a manager and a leader

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

You can be both a good manager and an inspiring leader: managing and leading are largely complementary with often overlapping activities. While the manager deals with complexity and oversees parts of the organization, the leader deals with change and may challenge the status quo. In the United Nations, as in many organizations, you will likely be asked to be both a manager and a leader at the same time. It is the wise manager who knows how and when to lead and the exceptional leader who also knows how to manage.

There is no one type of effective leader, and different leadership styles need to be adapted to specific organizations and situations, including, importantly, crisis situations. The ability to lead does not come naturally with an appointment to a senior management position. Leaders learn from experience, and see and listen to the world around them—both inside and outside the organization. The table below summarizes different leadership styles, including their characteristics, applicability, and limitations. The more you can develop a range of styles, the more often and more effectively you can exercise leadership.

Table 2.1. Leadership styles

Leadership style	Characteristics	Contexts when useful	Weaknesses & limitations
Coercive/ directive	Leader gives orders and expects to be obeyed	Quick turnaround situations and crises; dealing with difficult employees	Inhibits organization's flexibility; weakens employee morale
Authoritative	Leader establishes overall goal/ strategy and pushes people to follow	Organization is adrift or undisciplined and needs direction and supervision	Goal/strategy not informed by good ideas of staff; goal may have little staff buy-in
Affiliative/ supportive	Leader listens, affirms, and facilitates; "people come first" attitude	Need to build team cohesion; need to raise low morale	Employees may not have a clear sense of direction or purpose
Democratic/ participative	Leader gives employees role in day-to-day decision making	Need to build organizational flexibility, responsiveness, and responsibility	May result in indecision and a sense of confusion, or at worst, poor decision making
Pacesetting/ achievement oriented	Leader sets ambitious goals and high performance standards	With highly motivated employees who work best independently	May feel overwhelming to employees who then feel resentful or give up
Coaching	Leader directs and supports: focuses on personal development	Employees want and have incentive to improve professionally	Not successful when employees are resistant to change; heavy time burden on leader

(Adapted from Harvard Business School Press, *Leading People*, Boston, 2006.)

The personality traits often associated with leadership are generally related to one's ability to influence, motivate, and inspire others. Crafting a vision and motivating others also requires the use of certain skills though. And while you may encounter so-called natural leaders, many of these skills can be learned and developed.

The following elements make up a profile of an effective leader. Together they offer a vision of leadership a manager should work toward regardless of his or her position in the organization. Leadership comes in many forms and must come from all levels of an organization for that organization to achieve great things.

Visionary

The effective leader is able to craft a vision to move beyond the status quo, a vision that is clear, focused, and easily understood, even if the process required for its implementation is lengthy and complicated. Most visions in large bureaucracies are simple but require significant leadership skills to be brought to life, because bureaucracies tend to favor the status quo. People in their comfort zone feel threatened when asked to think differently and to change their behavior. A good vision will provide a shared sense of values and direction to convince the reluctant ones that they will eventually benefit from the changes that the vision will bring into their professional lives.

Articulating a vision helps to define what desired outcomes would look like. The ideal vision describes the desired outcomes in simple terms, appeals to the core values of the organization, and has clear benefits to those involved within the organization and beyond.

In UN peace operations, committing to a joint vision is of crucial importance, yet it is also hard to achieve. The leader has to carefully manage and balance the politics of being at the intersection between the priorities of the UN Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries, other UN entities, international financial institutions, and bilateral donors active in the particular country, as well as of the host government and the local population. This, clearly, goes far beyond the challenge of crafting a vision for a single organization by itself. Thus, it is important to be mindful of the opinions and priorities of other relevant stakeholders when deciding on the strategic direction of the mission and communicating it effectively to these stakeholders both inside and outside the UN family (see Communication chapter). While a UN mission cannot take on every task nor tend to everyone's needs, it can assume an important diagnostic and convening role in a country, thereby coordinating and aligning various actors' strategies and actions, without necessarily carrying out all of the work itself.

Communicator and Listener

Just as important as the ability to craft a vision is the ability to communicate it clearly and succinctly. Even if implementing the vision is a complicated process, explaining it should not be. People won't support what they can't fully understand. It is essential that people be reminded of the vision and kept informed through the implementation phase, of both progress and problems. Keeping people in the know helps create in them a stronger sense of ownership in the process and therefore a greater commitment to its implementation.

Listening is the cornerstone of communication; it allows you to acquire knowledge, understand challenges, and read people's intentions. Good leaders understand that they do not have the solution to every problem. Their strength lies in their openness to outside ideas and their ability to integrate the experience and knowledge of others into their vision. Failure to listen will always result in problems later on.



Informal communication can be just as important as formal communication. A convincing presentation will not result in a successful outcome if one hasn't invested the time to sit down, informally, with the stakeholders who might be opposed to the plan. It is necessary to understand exactly what their concerns are before those concerns turn into obstacles. Personal and informal communication is also preferable in some cultural contexts. In addition, nonverbal communication can be critically important, as leaders' emotional signals are closely observed and interpreted by everyone around them. The ability to show confidence and optimism—especially under trying conditions—is how good leaders manage to inspire and influence others.

Motivator

It has been said that in the UN, "strong leadership and the absence of leadership both have a disproportionate multiplier effect: strong leaders attract the best staff and bring out the best in all staff. Where leadership is absent and morale poor, those staff who can, leave. Others remain but can grow disillusioned, cynical with regard to the organization and unduly preoccupied with their conditions of service and entitlements."[2]

Motivating and inspiring staff is part of what sets a leader and a manager apart. The leader is an enabler of staff performance. Large bureaucracies that necessarily come with rigid sets of rules, policies, procedures, and structures can tend to stifle creativity, flexibility, and individual initiative. Disillusionment and cynicism can follow. The UN is no stranger to this phenomenon. In such work environments, it will often require serious effort from the leadership to motivate, inspire, and develop trust among the staff.

Leaders understand how to develop an *esprit de corps*, unleash the power of teamwork, and bring out the best in a group. This requires interpersonal skills and concerted effort. One must show that one seeks to connect with people and engage them about their job. Remember that people are often stimulated when given assignments outside their routine activities or when challenged to do something above their pay grade. In some cases this can lead to a mentoring of certain staff into developing their own leadership skills. People also want to feel included as a part of the whole process, from planning to implementation.

2 Fabrizio Hochschild, "In and Above Conflict: A Study of Leadership in the United Nations," Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, July 2010.

People, however, have different capabilities, weaknesses, and potential. They therefore need to be engaged in a tailored fashion that addresses their particular needs and interests. Encouragement may need to be given to highly competent people who lack self-confidence, and more responsibilities may need to be delegated to the experienced to keep them motivated. Some desire more guidance and direction than others. Understanding who on staff needs what level of encouragement and independence is likely to be a challenge. Engaging them about both their work and their lives is likely the only way to figure this out. This is best done by visiting other staff on the job informally. One cannot lead by sitting in an office. Instead, leadership requires going out of one's way and one's office to directly engage with staff.

Mediator

UN field missions, as with many multicultural environments, can be the scene of conflict and tensions among employees. While the UN has developed a number of internal conflict resolution mechanisms—for example, the United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services—the manager is often forced to take on an immediate mediation role. Leadership is also held to some level of accountability for conflicts that arise within the team.

Understanding the nature of the conflict and learning simple conflict-resolution skills help you contribute to a hospitable and fair work environment. While the trigger to a conflict may be trivial, the underlying reasons for animosity at work are generally broader, from poor communication to personality clashes or differing work styles. Whatever the reason, early intervention is the key to managing conflicts before they become crises.

- The first step in resolving a conflict is not to shy away from it but rather to meet with the antagonists together, listen to what they have to say, and summarize to them the problem they have described to make sure there is common understanding.
- Next, ask each participant to describe specific actions they'd like to see the other party take that would resolve the differences. Let the antagonists know that you will not choose sides and that you expect the individuals to address the conflict proactively.
- Finally, assure both parties that you have every faith in their ability to resolve their differences. Set a time to review progress.

See the Managing People chapter for managing staff on a day-to-day basis to create a supportive and collegial work environment.

Coalition Builder

Large operations that take on a diverse array of tasks, such as a UN field mission, cannot depend on the leadership of one person but rather need a team of leaders. Managers therefore rightly dedicate much effort to assembling and nurturing a functioning leadership team that brings together complementary skills and attributes.

Leadership is also about building coalitions, both internally and externally, maintaining strategic alliances, and reaching out across hierarchies and across cultures. Such strategic thinking requires being politically wise without becoming politically tainted. This starts within the organization, with building a cohesive and effective leadership team or teams, to deal with specific issues. While a number of formal management teams exist in all UN missions and usually meet on a weekly basis, these may not always be the best fit to respond appropriately to specific challenges the organization faces.

You may therefore consider forming ad hoc teams—boards of advisers, task forces, or coordination groups—to discuss an idea before bringing it into the open, tackle specific challenges, or get the buy-in of key stakeholders not included in formal leadership structures. This can also be the opportunity for mid-level staff to feel empowered and recognized. The importance of informal teams that develop spontaneously outside of the immediate workspace should not be discounted either.

Accountable

Good leaders make good decisions. They do this by identifying and assessing the relative costs, benefits, and risks inherent in every decision. They also have the skills to communicate their decisions well. This is especially important when the decision will have a negative impact on an individual or group of people.

As in other large organizations, in the United Nations accountability for results can be diffused and diminished across its large bureaucracy. In the field context especially, it is often hard for host populations to understand who within the UN is ultimately accountable for the UN's actions in their country. Respected and trusted leaders, however, are those who do not just take responsibility for success, but for failures as well. They show their staff,

their superiors, and the outside community where the buck stops, and often engender respect as a result. It is such leaders who recognize that success should be shared with those who contributed to it, but one should always be prepared to take the blame for failure alone. (See the Decision Making chapter for more on making good decisions).

Coolheaded

Modern life is characterized by continuous and rapid change. The United Nations itself is perpetually changing, and UN peacekeeping is often in constant crisis mode. Staff on the ground must adjust to new political realities, new mandates, new mission configurations and sizes, as well as rapidly evolving operational environments.

Leading an organization or a team through a crisis presents its own set of challenges. A national disaster or violent conflict brings a high level of uncertainty, urgency, and complexity. People will turn to a leader to give them a sense of direction, calm, and the reassurance that things will turn out for the best. In a crisis, leaders need to be constantly visible to provide assurance and show that they have the situation under control.

Formal emergency procedures need to be reviewed, checked, and perhaps even tested, on a regular basis. Yet, in a crisis even the best-laid plans need immediate adaptation to reflect the circumstances. Communication, transport, housing, office space, water, food, etc., are all likely to be disrupted. Large organizations do an excellent job at training their staff in planning but they rarely invest in developing good improvisation skills. Times of crisis demand constant improvisation by leadership.

A crisis brings to the surface the most unlikely leaders. They can be the ones who are quiet, but who have the uncanny ability to find immediate solutions to problems. They can also be the ones who have their own networks and will be able to find the needed resource. Effectiveness in crisis requires recognition of these sudden leaders and empowering them, even if it means breaking the hierarchy.

All crises are a learning opportunity and call for a postmortem analysis to strengthen preparation for possible future crises. Some crises are poorly handled and can also be the consequence of a chain of human errors, poor judgment, and bad decisions. In such an instance one should not be complacent. Rather, take the steps to support a credible investigation to determine responsibility for mistakes made, including your own. More generally

speaking, crises are an opportunity to make use of the UN knowledge management resources, discussed in greater detail in the Knowledge Management chapter. The unique stress conditions during crises put teams, structures, and methodologies to the ultimate test, and important lessons that may be of use to colleagues facing similar circumstances in the future can be drawn out and preserved.

Example Setter

The UN Competency Framework has been developed as a professional development guide for UN staff. Within this framework, integrity is identified as a core value to guide the behavior of all UN staff. To be a leader in the UN means to be fully committed to the highest standards of professionalism, competence, and integrity. Obviously the mission—and the UN as a whole—suffers when UN employees betray these core values. To be a leader in the UN means to be fully committed, in principle and in practice, to these values, and as such, to serve as an example for other UN staff on how to behave while guests in another country. Because of their position in the organization, managers are more closely watched and associated with the UN.

Managers are, arguably, more tempted. For instance, they will have easier access to the resources of the mission. The use of vehicles, telephones, or aircraft are all regulated through various administrative instructions that can be taken advantage of by an unscrupulous manager. It is critical for those in leadership positions to use their influence to set an example of the appropriate use of mission resources and not to take personal advantage of such resources. Managers are also sought after by officials in other organizations, in the host government and member states because of their ability to influence decisions in the mission. While accepting invitations to meals and receptions is part of the strategic development of good relationships, no one in the United Nations, regardless of position or level, is entitled to seek or receive any material compensation from government officials. As a leader, you must be able to assess impartially when a meal is used as a form of enticement, and conversely, when a small gift is a completely innocent gesture that forms part of the local culture, refusal of which could strain relations unnecessarily.

Personal integrity demands consistency between principles and personal behavior. In the field context, a UN employee represents the organization and its values whether that person is in the office at noon on a Tuesday or at a bar on Saturday night. Mistakes made outside the office can have very real consequences inside

the office. As such, managers need to exemplify the highest standards of personal integrity in both the professional and the personal world. They have to scrupulously follow the standards of the organization and be a symbol of integrity and accountability, as the mission of the organization can depend on it.

CASE 1

Profile of a Leader: Rolf Ekéus

Early in May 1991, in the aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait war, a discreet Swedish diplomat, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus arrived in New York. At the request of the Security Council, he had agreed to take on the position of Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). His job was to direct the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and to take the necessary steps to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its arsenal.

Never before had an armed conflict ended with a mandate for a civilian organization to dismantle the weapon infrastructure of a sovereign country. Ambassador Ekéus had no precedent or best practices to follow. He also had no budget to speak of. SCR 687, which established the commission, demanded that Iraq finance the cost of the destruction of its weapons arsenal. Iraq was not a willing partner, neither in disclosing its weapons program, nor in the idea of covering the cost of its destruction. The only asset Ambassador Ekéus had at his disposal was a resolution that gave him the authority to decide where, when, and what he wanted to inspect in Iraq.

Within days of his arrival in New York, to everyone's amazement, inspection teams were zooming in and out of Iraq, crisscrossing the country to implement Ambassador Ekéus's vision of how to insure that Iraq disposed of its WMDs. Member states were knocking at the door of his office ready to provide air assets, equipment, and technical experts. Information agencies were opening their top-secret files on Iraq weapons programs to him. Ambassador Ekéus was a natural-born leader, and this is how some of his former inspectors and staff remember him. "His door was always open and there was no hierarchy to speak of in the commission. Anyone, whatever their position, could attend the daily 9:30am meeting where he got a briefing on the status of inspections in Iraq, and would tell us very openly about his meetings with foreign ministries and ambassadors. This allowed us to understand the political context of what we were doing," explained one of his former staff.

"He could get upset for little things but never, never stressed on the big issues. Some of these inspections brought us to the brink of armed confrontations. If he was nervous, he kept his nerves to himself. I knew that I could call him 24/7, and I did more than once. He never complained."

"He had no problem confronting the Iraqis or taking on any of the members of the Security Council. Some liked him, but some clearly didn't. It didn't matter to him. He never took it personally. But he couldn't manage any conflicts between the inspectors. And there were many, especially in the mid-'90s when there was little progress. To deal with issues like that, he designated one of the staff he trusted as deputy director of operations. It was his way to get away from day-to-day problems."

"He also knew when to change course. By 1997, there was no real progress, and the political climate had shifted. He had given it his best shot and realized it was time to move on. Looking back at the way he projected himself and the commission, people assumed that we had thousands of inspectors in Iraq. In fact, most of our intrusive inspections had at most fifty people."

CASE 2

Profile of a Leader: Sergio Vieira de Mello

Sergio Vieira de Mello had been a career UN civil servant for thirty-four years and one of the UN's most gifted leaders when he died in a terrorist attack on the UN Headquarters in Iraq on August 19, 2003.

In his study on leadership in the UN, "In and Above Conflict," Fabrizio Hochschild indicates that although Vieira de Mello never spent more than three years in the same position, his accomplishments were often far reaching due to his leadership skills and his ability to gain the confidence of many different stakeholders. "From 1997 to 1999 he established the new Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a successor to the largely discredited Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Under his leadership it regained credibility and relevance with its operational and Secretariat partners. From 1999 to 2002, he was the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Transitional Administrator in East Timor. The UN was very poorly equipped to take on the enormous task it was endowed with, but he quickly won the confidence of the Timorese and managed to engineer a relatively short transition for the country to full independence, while laying the groundwork for economic sustainability."

However, Hochschild noted that Vieira de Mello "never prioritized focus on organizational change...[and] his attentiveness to major stakeholder and power interests could predominate over considerations of principle."

In her biography of Vieira de Mello, *Chasing the Flame*, Samantha Power wrote that he "distinguished himself as the consummate humanitarian, able to negotiate with—and often charm—cold war military dictators, Marxist jungle radicals, reckless warlords, and nationalist and sectarian militia leaders...with the moral authority, the political sense, and the military and economic heft to protect human life and bring peace to the unruly new world order."

As the UN's Special Representative in Iraq, Vieira de Mello quickly won the respect of the US administrator, Paul Bremer, despite tension between Washington and the UN over the US-led invasion and the poor image many held of the UN in Washington. Power also wrote that Vieira de Mello was "the only international official who was trusted by all five of the permanent members of the Security Council." Although he played no obvious part in the formation of Iraq's new governing council—chosen by the US-led coalition—Vieira de Mello toured Iraq's neighbors urging them to give their backing to the institution.

Vieira de Mello was said to have recognized the delicate nature of the UN's mission in Iraq, and he had told the UN Security Council in July that "the United Nations presence in Iraq remains vulnerable to any who would seek to target our organization." Some critics suggested that his perceived proximity to the US transitional administration, and particularly a June 2003 joint press conference and photo with Paul Bremer, may have contributed to the association of the UN with the occupying US-led coalition, therefore making the UN a more likely target.

Vieira de Mello's final meeting when the bomb struck the UN compound was with two researchers whom he had kindly agreed to meet, despite the other competing demands on his time.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. There is no one type of effective leadership, and different leadership styles will be more or less suited to certain organizations and situations, including crises.
2. Craft a vision to move your organization beyond the status quo—a vision that is clear, focused, and easily understood.
3. Communicate your vision clearly and succinctly. Listen to people around you and keep them updated on the implementation of the vision and challenges faced.
4. Create a motivating and trustful environment: care for people, motivate them, and coach and mentor as needed.
5. Dedicate effort to establishing a leadership team bringing together complementary knowledge and attributes as well as diverse views.
6. Leadership at the UN is also about external and internal coalition-building and building lateral strategic alliances.
7. Make considered decisions and take responsibility for them.
8. Lead by example and act in accordance with UN's core values of integrity, professionalism, and respect for diversity, in public and in private.
9. Leadership is required at all levels. Whether you are a senior or a middle manager, leadership is your responsibility and not only the prerogative of the senior management team.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Personality traits	When pursuing a goal, do I maintain a positive, focused attitude, despite obstacles?		
	Do I strive to learn about my organization and its stakeholders?		
	Do I listen actively, carefully, and fairly to others?		
	Do I remain calm under pressure?		
	Do I empathize with other people's needs, concerns, and professional goals?		
Crafting a vision	Do I have a clear vision and have I made it clear to my team?		
	Did I gather feedback from my leadership team, colleagues, and stakeholders before finalizing my vision?		
	Does the end result of the vision serve the interests of the organization and its most important stakeholders?		
	Do I have an overall strategy to reach the vision? Is it realistic, and is it achievable?		
Motivating others	Do I keep my team regularly updated on successes achieved to date, how they relate to the bigger picture, and some of the challenges faced by the organization?		
	Do I offer feedback and recognition to individual staff? Do I encourage their professional growth?		
	Can I identify those within my organization who will support me when needed?		
	Do I use humor to relieve tense or uncomfortable situations?		
	Do I have the skills and credibility to mediate and resolve conflicts among my staff?		

RESOURCES

United Nations

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Useful Websites

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3

PLANNING

"Wisdom is the ability to see the long-run consequences of current actions, the willingness to sacrifice short-run gains for larger long-run benefits, and the ability to control what is controllable and not to fret over what is not. Therefore wisdom is concern with the future."[1]

OVERVIEW

Planning is the process of identifying, through the development of strategies, the right combination of resources and activities that are needed to attain an organization's objectives.

Strategies and plans are essential to connecting an organization's general vision of the future to its day-to-day activities. Plans help prioritize objectives, anticipate obstacles, mitigate risk, conserve limited resources, and chart the path toward success. Planning takes place at three levels:

1. **The political**: concerning agreement on overall objectives and resources.
2. **The strategic**: in the development of broad methods and in setting the course of activities to accomplish objectives.
3. **The operational**: in the daily implementation in the field of the strategic plan.

The planning of UN field missions is a complex, but indispensible practice. UN planning aims to design efficient and effective operations toward the realization of the broad political vision contained in a Security Council mandate. The planning process is multilevel, multi-actor, cyclical, and often overlapping. At the strategic level, the UN has developed a set of requirements and minimum standards for how to translate UN Security Council mandates into planning processes that ensure coherence across all parts of the UN system operating in the same country: the United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines for both headquarters and field. At field level, an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is set up to plan and coordinate the work of the mission and the UN country team.

Sophisticated coordination and communication among many actors is required at the start, from initial assessments and mission start-up, through the length of the mission, and during mission

1 Russell Ackoff, *Ackoff's Best: His Classic Writings on Management* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999), p. 99.

reconfigurations, mission drawdown, and the ultimate liquidation of a mission.

This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical underpinnings and basic tools for strategic planning. Even if you are not primarily responsible for planning, this chapter will enable you to better understand why and how UN planning works, make informed contributions to UN mission planning processes, plan your own work, and think critically about, update, and adapt existing plans.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- The importance of effective planning for every organization
- The different types of strategy
- The various components of a model planning process
- How to develop useful objectives
- How to conduct a SWOT analysis
- How these principles apply to the planning of a new UN mission
- How an ISF can be coordinated with other ongoing planning processes

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

"A strategy is a conceptualization, expressed or implied by the organization's leader, of (1) the long-term objectives or purposes of the organization, (2) the broad constraints and policies that currently restrict the scope of the organization's activities, and (3) the current set of plans of near-term goals that have been adopted in the expectation of contributing to the achievement of the organization's objectives."[2] Simply defined, objectives are the ends, and strategies are the means of achieving them.

Strategies are ways to achieve the comprehensive long-range goals of an organization. Strategic planning is the corresponding management function, focused on developing an overall direction for an organization within the context of the challenges and opportunities of the operating environment, as well as the organization's resources.

Strategies can also emerge through processes different from the formal strategy development process. Conceptually, one can differentiate between intended and unintended strategies and

2 Richard Vancil, "Strategy Formulation in Complex Organizations," in *Strategic Planning Systems*, edited by Peter Lorange and Richard Vancil (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 4.

between realized and unrealized strategies (see table 3.1). The various combinations of these categories yield three kinds of strategies: deliberate strategies (intended and realized), unrealized strategies (intended, but not realized), and emergent strategies (unintended, but realized).

Table 3.1. Differentiating between strategies

	Intended	Unintended
Realized	Deliberate strategy	Emergent strategy
Unrealized	Unrealized strategy	—

(Based on Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1994.)

It is important to acknowledge that strategies can emerge in an unpredictable fashion. You should strive to maintain flexibility, continuously review, and, if necessary, update strategy.

Through planning, general strategies are translated into increasingly specific work programs and, ultimately, individual actions. Similar to strategy, plans range from the basic to the more sophisticated. Unlike strategies, which can sometimes emerge in unforeseen ways, plans are always deliberate. In plans, decisions are made in advance about how to conduct your work.

Strategies and plans can be distinguished by the time horizon to which they apply and by hierarchical levels (see table 3.2). In terms of the planning horizon, one can distinguish between long-term plans (five years), medium-term plans (three years), and short-term plans (e.g., one year). When breaking down strategies and the corresponding plans hierarchically, one can differentiate strategic planning for the organization as a whole, management planning concerning different plans and programs within organizational divisions, and functional planning, i.e., support functions such as administration, public affairs, etc.[3]

3 Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1994), p. 62.

Table 3.2. Strategic, programmatic, and functional planning

Time horizon	Hierarchical level
Long-term (5 years)	Strategic/Organizational
Medium-term (3 years)	Management/Programmatic
Short-term (3 months–1 year)	Functional

(Based on Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall*.)

UN field missions are generally mandated by the UN Security Council for six months to one year, renewable, and the UN General Assembly authorizes a budget allocation. The peacekeeping support account budget is annual and runs from July 1st to June 30th of the following year, whereas the UN regular budget that includes the financing of special political missions runs for two consecutive calendar years, starting on January 1st through December of the following year. Mandates and budget planning cycles for UN field missions therefore often do not align.

In addition to the challenges this brings to multiyear planning, different time horizons and hierarchical levels of planning also apply. The time horizons span the life cycle of a mission, and the hierarchical levels range from the political level down to the operational level (table 3.3).

Table 3.3. Planning hierarchy for UN missions

Time horizon	Hierarchical level
Variable time frame depending on mandate (decisions made on objectives and resources)	Political (UNSC resolution, UNGA budget allocation)
Medium-term (development of the strategic plan)	Strategic (UN, Secretariat, and senior mission leadership)
Short-term (implementation of plan through day-to-day operations)	Operational (military, political, and civilian units)

Model Planning Process

Various approaches for strategic management and planning are employed by different organizations, depending on their needs, capacities, and resources. The intention here is to introduce a "model planning process" and to subsequently offer some perspectives on the limitations and merits of such an approach, also taking into account the specific challenges managers face when planning UN field missions.

Strategy development and planning processes typically follow a sequence of steps. While the terms used to distinguish the different phases are often different (note the different terms used in UN field missions), planning processes typically must employ the same mix of phases. We distinguish between five key phases: a "plan for planning" phase, an objectives-setting phase, a diagnostic phase, a design phase, and an implementation phase (fig. 3.1). These five phases of the planning process cover three basic questions for an organization: Where are we now? Where should we go? How do we get there?

Figure 3.1. Five phases of the planning process



(Based on Simon Burtonshaw-Gunn, *The Essential Management Toolbox*, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.)

A sixth phase, evaluation, can be added to this linear process, which evaluates the question of whether we are achieving our goals. Managers should not see planning as a linear and static activity, but as a *cyclical* process that needs to be carried out repeatedly as an ongoing responsibility (fig. 3.2).

Especially in the volatile environment of UN field missions, constant evaluation is necessary, and at times plans may have to be adapted. Plans may need to be revised for changing and unfore-

seen realities on the ground, as well as to capture and codify emergent strategies and bring practices in line with the intended and expressed strategies. Given the importance of maintaining flexible and regularly updated plans, recurring planning cycles are usefully employed to introduce a minimum level of flexibility.

The goal of the planning cycle is interactive planning: An organization that regularly updates and improves its plans and strategies, involves staff at all levels, and ensures maximum responsiveness to internal and external changes will better align its activities with reality.[4]

Figure 3.2. Planning cycle



Plan for Planning

Before engaging in strategy development and planning, some groundwork (i.e., a plan for planning) is required. This requires the allocation of staff, their responsibilities, and corresponding resources, as well as an overall organizational commitment to engage in a process of thinking about the organization's direction.

Investing time and energy in this phase is of crucial importance as it disproportionally affects the chances of success of subsequent phases. When preparing an exercise in strategic planning there has to be a mutually-shared understanding of what strategic planning entails. This also includes an understanding of what an outcome might look like, what its implications for the organization will be, and how work will be conducted.

4 Ackoff, *Ackoff's Best*, pp. 106-114.

Important questions that need to be dealt with include the following:

- Who should be involved in the planning process?
- Could we benefit from outside input, such as experts and facilitators?
- How can transparency be upheld and outside input used productively without bogging down the planning process?
- How much time should be allocated for the planning process?
- How should involved staff divide their time between planning and other duties?
- What are the cost implications?
- And, finally, who is responsible for leading the planning process and, subsequently, for follow through and implementation?

Objectives-Setting Phase

Having completed the preparation phase, overall goals for the organization have to be defined. There are four key components of the objectives-setting phase: the mission, vision, goals, and objectives of an organization. Together, these prescribe many aspects of an organization's future. As a result, it should be clearly established exactly what the organization wants to achieve.

The mission statement defines an organization's overall *raison d'être*. A mission statement should contain three elements: the organization's purpose, its business, and its values. A vision statement should present a guiding image of what success will look like, formulated in terms of an organization's anticipated contribution to the broader society. Vision statements depict an ideal image of the future, a desired end state, intended to provide the members of an organization with an aspiration to work toward. The broad direction expressed in the mission and vision statements is further elaborated through a detailed set of goals and objectives. A useful standard for setting objectives, also mentioned elsewhere in this handbook, is the "SMARTER" criteria. Objectives should be:

- **S**pecific (target a distinct group or thing)
- **M**easurable (include numbers or outcomes that success can be measured against)
- **A**ssignable (assign responsibility to each person or group)

- **R**ealistic (consider only what can actually be achieved)
- **T**ime-Bound (have a start and end date)
- **E**thical (respect the rights and interests of others)
- **R**ecorded (track results and make available to stakeholders)

Related to the hierarchy of strategies and plans discussed above, objectives can be defined for every level of the organization.

In the context of UN field missions, the vision, the goals, and the objectives may not always be clearly or fully elaborated. Resolutions by the Security Council that establish and mandate a UN mission typically list the tasks that UN planning processes must plan for (through the IMPP and ISF, and to some degree in the Results-Based Budgeting and section or unit work plans); however, a broader strategic vision for the country beyond the UN presence is often not included.

The UN Charter and the mission's Security Council mandate can serve as important guidelines for a mission statement and strategic vision, respectively. Indeed, all activities of the United Nations are based on and intended to further the aims of the UN Charter. When in doubt about the purpose of a specific activity, it can be helpful to review it in light of the aims of the Charter and the mandate. For this reason and others, carrying a pocket copy of the UN Charter around with you is never a bad idea.

Diagnostic Phase

Having defined the overall goals of the organization, during the diagnostic phase, a first step toward strategic synthesis is undertaken. The main goal of this phase is to gather more information about the organization and its environment. This knowledge can be used in the design phase to develop strategies and plans that pave a path for the organization to achieve its objectives and that ensure a maximum fit with the environment.

UN planning is a complex interorganizational and political process that involves a significant number of different actors inside and outside of the UN. It may therefore be helpful to conduct a stakeholder analysis in order to gain a better understanding of who key stakeholders are (i.e., which people will be affected by the outcome of the plans and who can affect the chances of success of these plans). For more information on stakeholder analysis, see the Project Management chapter.

As UN field missions are increasingly tasked with carrying out peacebuilding and peace consolidation activities, having a thorough understanding of the context in which they operate is a key component of making sound strategies. The World Bank, UNDP, DFID, and USAID, to name only a few, have all developed useful frameworks for analyzing conflict. These frameworks are intended to provide the basis for "conflict-sensitive" plans and programs; they make clear which kind of interventions might further complicate a situation and what kind of activities may be required to foster lasting peace. This differs from context to context.

Broadly speaking, conflict analysis is the systematic study of the conflict profile, the causes of conflict, the relevant actors, and the dynamics of a conflict. Studying the conflict profile means understanding the political, economic, and sociocultural context and related issues. The conflict profile also identifies specific geographic areas where conflict may be more intense, as well as the history of conflict. The causes of conflict that can be analyzed

typically fall into three categories: (1) structural causes (i.e., root causes); (2) proximate causes that lead to a climate conducive to conflict; and (3) triggers—acts, events, or their anticipation—that can set off conflict. Conflict analyses assess the interests, goals, positions, capacities, and relationships of the actors involved in or affected by conflict.

A useful tool to start systematically identifying strategic alternatives based on the preliminary research is a SWOT analysis (fig. 3.3), which examines the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and the opportunities and threats in the environment. As such, it is a tool for generating a summary of the strategic situation of an organization.

- **S**trengths are capabilities that enable your organization or unit to perform well—capabilities that need to be leveraged.
- **W**eaknesses are characteristics that prohibit your organization or unit from performing well and need to be addressed.
- **O**pportunities are trends, forces, events, and ideas that your organization or unit can capitalize on.
- **T**hreats are possible events outside of your control that your organization or unit needs to plan for or decide how to mitigate.

The main purpose of SWOT analyses is to provide an analytical basis for strategies that reflect reality by guaranteeing a maximum fit between the external factors of the environment and internal factors of the organization. Strategies based on this analytical model ensure that outside opportunities are exploited by inside strengths, while threats are countered and weaknesses minimized.

Figure 3.3. Analyzing strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats

SWOT ANALYSIS		INTERNAL	
		Strengths List strengths	**Weaknesses** List weaknesses
EXTERNAL	**Opportunities** List opportunities	Use strengths to take advantage of opportunities	Overcome weaknesses by taking advantage of opportunities
	Threats List threats	Use strengths to avoid threats	Minimize weaknesses and avoid threats

(Based on Alan Walter Steiss, *Strategic Management for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, New York: Marcel Dekker, 2003; and Burtonshaw-Gunn, *The Essential Management Toolbox*.)

Identifying threats and opportunities in the environment is a key step in developing strategic alternatives. This requires carrying out research by gathering all the information available about the context in which the organization is operating. Key components will be the results of the stakeholder and conflict analyses, provided they were carried out. Other sources can include academic publications, newspapers, and further internal research. The goal is to have a clear picture of trends in the political, economic, and social environment.

Assessing internal strengths and weaknesses is the second analytical component for the development of strategic alternatives. Members within an organization are bound to have diverging opinions on strengths and weaknesses; it is therefore helpful to involve a team from various parts of the organization in carrying out this task. The goal is to get a better understanding of the organization's core competencies, its financial situation, its structure, and its management culture. Given the limited control peace operations have over their own resources, appropriately factoring in resource constraints is of utmost importance.

As a result, it will emerge more clearly if, how, and when the organization should engage in a specific activity—in a peace operation this decision also depends, to a large extent, on the respective mandate.

Finally, when conducting a SWOT analysis, it is important to keep in mind, that (1) not only the quantity of the factors, but also their quality and severity matters, and (2) a SWOT analysis merely pro-

vides a snapshot, both internal and external factors are dynamic and likely to change over time.

Design Phase

In the design phase, the objectives and analysis need to be combined into strategies and plans. Emergent strategies, by definition, are not part of this process as they evolve in unforeseen ways, but will be discussed again below.

Strategy formulation must take into account strategic alternatives derived from the analysis phase. Not all problems can be solved by a single strategy. Instead, strategies should focus on specific problems and prioritize the activities and allocation of resources of an organization. Alternative strategies can be formulated that reflect these trade-offs, trying to match the mission, vision, and objectives of the organization as closely as possible. Ideally, the resulting strategies will synthesize both opportunities and strengths.

Once overall strategies have been developed, corresponding work plans need to be devised, starting at the top of the hierarchies mentioned above, down to the level of operations and individual actions. As was highlighted above, planning is about deliberately choosing specific actions to achieve the organization's objectives. Numerous techniques exist that can help managers make plans; the "critical path method" for sequencing and prioritizing actions and "scenario planning" for managing uncertainty are explained briefly below, and literature references are included at the end of the chapter for further details.

Critical Path Method

The critical path method (CPM) is a technique to analyze, plan, and schedule large, complex processes. It helps managers determine which jobs or activities within a particular project are critical, and how to schedule jobs to meet a certain target date at minimum costs. Even though in UN field missions few things can be quantified and scheduled with the precision suggested by this approach, critical path analysis can serve as a useful heuristic approach to structure the process of planning the various activities in your mission.



(Source: Ferdinand K. Levy, Gerald L. Thompson, and Jerome D. Wiest, "ABCs of the Critical Path Method," *Harvard Business Review* 41, No. 5, September/October 1963.)

In essence, what the CPM entails is, first of all, listing every activity required for the completion of the project along with a unique corresponding symbol (e.g., a letter), the time required to complete the job, and its immediate prerequisite job. Each job is drawn as a circle; inside the circle the symbol of the respective activity is included as well as the time required to complete it. The graph is drawn in the sequence of which activity needs to be completed in order for the next one to commence. The critical path is the longest path from start to finish and indicates the minimum time required to finish the project. This can, for example, help identify bottlenecks. Speeding up jobs along the critical path is the only way to speed up the time required to implement the plan.

Scenario Planning

Scenario planning is a creative process for thinking about the future of an organization. It was first used for military planning during World War II but subsequently spread to the mainstream in the 1970s. By systematically considering strategic uncertainties, scenario planning aims to prepare an organization to be able deal with whatever scenario may unfold. By virtue of focusing on what is uncertain, rather than on trying to predict the future, scenario planning is particularly appropriate for the planning of UN field missions. Exercises in scenario planning generally involve fifteen to thirty people and can take three to nine months. Information collected through strategic assessments, technical assessment missions, as well as by the mission (JMAC and other sections) can be harnessed for the development of scenarios and inform planning.



(Source: David A. Garvin and Lynne C. Levesque, "Note on Scenario Planning," Harvard Business School Case Study, November 2005.)

As is illustrated in the graph, there are a number of components required to build scenarios. First, a key focal issue or critical choice needs to be identified, which likely has long-range consequences for the organization. As a next step, research has to be carried out, and here you should be able to capitalize on the research carried out during the diagnostic phase. Besides stakeholders, it is about understanding the environment. The goal is to identify driving forces—predetermined and uncertain—and critical uncertainties that are likely to have the greatest impact on an organization. The next step is building a scenario framework in a 2x2 matrix with the critical uncertainties on either axis as either present or not present. This results in four different scenarios for the future. Subsequently, these four different scenarios and the corresponding versions of the future that would ensue are fleshed out in detailed narratives, their implications discussed, and indicators defined that can highlight the onset of a particular scenario. Scenario planning, thus, emphasizes preparedness for many different outcomes, rather than forecasting a particular result and prescribing a single set of actions for an organization.

Implementation Phase

Of course, plans are only useful if they are used and implemented. Well-laid plans are often made irrelevant because of poor or incomplete execution. See the chapters on project management, financial management, and evaluation for guidelines and tools for effective implementation.

Generally speaking, it is crucial that responsibility for overseeing the implementation of plans is clearly assigned. Besides clarifying the supervisory responsibilities, regular reporting duties must also be established. Reports on the progress of the implementation of plans (or lack thereof) are important initial indicators for evaluating the success of a mission.

Evaluation Phase

Evaluation—see chapter twelve—is the element that transforms an otherwise linear planning process into a planning cycle. Besides regular reporting, ongoing evaluation of strategies by staff at all levels of an organization is required in order to be able to adapt and update plans. Indeed, strategy development should not only be driven from the top down but should also travel from the bottom up.

This is where a field-level manager can make important contributions. Ongoing evaluation requires regularly asking yourself: Are we achieving the goals set out in our mandate? Are there discrepancies between our work and the strategies in the mission plan? If yes, why? Do we have to update or improve existing strategies? Are there emergent strategies, or ways of achieving goals, that have not been captured in the mission plan?

Limitations of Strategic Planning

It is essential to understand the limits of the effects of planning. There are a number of factors that, when present, make planning more successful:

- **Stability** of the operating environment
- **Maturity** of the organization, including the existence of standard operating procedures and constant structures
- **Simplicity** of individual steps even if managing and timing them is complex
- **Externality of control** by an outside party with the power and intent to influence and direct the organization

The UN, relatively speaking, does not typically enjoy many of these features, as operating environments are dynamic and volatile, missions are temporary, not fixed operations, and control over the direction of the organization is highly diffused, rather than concentrated.

Yet, there are several factors—all typically present in UN field missions—that increase the *necessity* of planning.

- **Large size**: high number of personnel, machines, locations, etc.
- **Capital intensity**: significant investment in resources
- **Elaborate integrated structure**: complex organizational arrangements
- **Tight coupling**: high interdependence of the organization's activities

A paradoxical image results when comparing these lists to the characteristics of UN field missions, as planning UN missions can at times seem to be both a necessity and an impossibility. Relying on a scenario-based approach to planning, which allows for factoring in some level of uncertainty, is therefore a promising approach, as it can prepare missions for contingencies. Periodic re-assessments also take place at the mission level, often with support from HQ (through technical assessment missions) in order to understand the need for changes in mandate or mission reconfigurations. Sometimes mission shortcomings—for example, a failure to protect civilians—may also trigger an adaptation of operational plans without changing the mandate by modifying military deployments, modifying the Concept of Operations, or issuing specific guidance.

Beyond the inherent challenges of planning UN field missions—including the high degree of volatility in postconflict situations—a number of factors specific to the UN context render this task even more complex. Political pressures, coordination challenges, scarce resources, and competition over turf further limit the space for planning and the certainty with which plans can be made. In some instances, making strategies and plans public too far ahead may reduce flexibility in negotiations with parties to a conflict. A balance is required, however, as the mission will need a planning basis to seek resources.

Overview of the Main UN Planning Tools

A **Strategic Assessment** may be requested by the UN Secretary-General initially—as a conflict begins, worsens, or approaches resolution—to identify all possible options for UN engagement. The UN consults with a broad array of actors to determine the best response by the international community, including all relevant United Nations actors; the potential host government and the parties on the ground; member states, including states that might contribute troops and police to a peacekeeping operation; regional and other intergovernmental organizations; and other relevant external partners.

A **technical assessment mission (TAM)** may be requested by the UN Secretary-General to deploy to the country or territory where the deployment of a UN mission is envisaged as soon as security conditions permit. The assessment mission analyzes and assesses the overall security, political, military, humanitarian, and human rights situation on the ground, and its implications in relation to a possible operation. Based on the findings and recommendations of the assessment mission, the Secretary-General will issue a report to the Security Council. This report will present options for the establishment of a peace operation as appropriate, including its size and resources. The report will also include financial implications and a statement of preliminary estimated costs.

An **Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)** is meant to be a short document (between ten and fifteen pages) at the strategic level that represents a shared vision of the whole UN system in a given country (UN mission and UN country team), with a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace. The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration of June 2008 requires UN field presences operating in conflict and postconflict situations where there is a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission or office and a UN country team to have an ISF. Unlike the planning tools of the mission (e.g., Results-Based Budgeting, RBB) or the country team (CHAP/CAP, UNDAF), an ISF does not reach the level of programmatic interventions or outputs. In addition, the ISF is, first and foremost, an internal UN document.

A **Mission Concept** is elaborated after the Security Council delivers the mission mandate, to provide political and operational direction, timelines for priority tasks and activities to achieve the mission's mandate, and related organizational and deployment structures. The Mission Concept is initially developed by the lead department in consultation with the IMTF. Individual mission components (police, military, support, etc.) also produce their own related Concepts of Operation (CONOPs), which link the mission mandate to the execution of key objectives such as strategic intent, organization and deployment (including timelines), security or force protection, terms of engagement, administration and logistics, and command and control.

Result-Based Budgeting (RBB) is a program-budgeting tool approved by the General Assembly in 2000 based on the premise that a budget needs to show what outcomes may be expected in exchange for public funds. Such measures were intended to provide a management tool to enhance responsibility and accountability in the implementation of programs and budgets. (See the Financial Management chapter for additional information.)

CASE 1

The 2010–2011 Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) in Haiti

The challenges Haiti faced following the January 2010 earthquake were manifold, and the presence of the UN system in the country reflected the complexity and size of the support needed to address both urgent short-term and important longer-term reconstruction needs, as highlighted in a postdisaster needs assessment (PDNA) carried out by the government of Haiti. In this context, it was essential that the whole UN system in Haiti work together in a coordinated manner to support this effort. As dictated by the UN Secretary-General's Decision on Integration of June 2008, the multidimensional peacekeeping operation MINUSTAH and the UN country team developed an ISF. But while it largely followed the IMPP guidelines, the UN in Haiti also had to innovate in order to be relevant in a context that was different from the usual postconflict peacekeeping environment.

The ISF process was launched at a retreat of MINUSTAH and UN country team senior officials in July 2010, which set out the strategic direction of the UN in Haiti. Five ISF joint working groups (institutional rebuilding, territorial rebuilding, economic rebuilding, social rebuilding, and enabling environment) were established to identify the strategic objectives, results, and division of responsibilities—including matrices and budgets for each pillar. This ISF was different from other "typical" ISFs in that it included a recovery and development dimension, and in that its timeline was eighteen months in order to align with the action plan of the government of Haiti.

The Integrated Strategic Planning Group (ISPG), the forum in which MINUSTAH and the country team in Haiti met on an ad hoc basis under the chairmanship of the SRSG, provided guidance to the ISF process. Strong leadership by both the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC was required to convince some of the UN agencies (under pressure from their own headquarters) to fully buy into the process. The consolidated draft ISF proposal was then circulated to the whole UN system in Haiti ahead of the ISPG meeting that would endorse it.

The Haiti ISF was also original in that it superseded and replaced the 2009–2011 UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and included a postearthquake dimension (it could therefore be called an "ISF+"). In other contexts, the UN had generally preferred keeping a "UNDAF+" (the "+" standing for peace consolidation). While the ISF and the 2011 Consolidated Appeal for Haiti

(CAP) had different objectives—the former aimed to support peace consolidation and recovery, while the latter highlighted humanitarian needs, including the cholera response—relevant elements of the CAP were in alignment with the ISF.

Although the ISF is generally an internal UN document, in the case of Haiti the DSRSG/RC/HC informed the prime minister of its development, and during the course of its elaboration, discussions were held with the Ministry of Planning and other ministries at the technical level, as well as with key international donors in Haiti. As a last step, a meeting was organized with the Ministry of Planning to formally present the ISF and seek the government's endorsement.

As part of the follow up process, a small monitoring and evaluation group, led by the ISF planning team, was constituted to monitor progress against agreed objectives and indicators, with M&E focal points for each ISF pillar. The review of the ISF early in 2011 allowed UN managers to identify delays in some results and to discuss the reasons behind these, as well as ways forward. Accountability, however, proved to be a major challenge. As the ISF was extended to 2012, the UN in Haiti tried to address this specific issue by deciding on a lead agency or MINUSTAH section for each of the ISF objectives.

Key lessons from this process are that flexibility in the planning process and buy-in from both the country team and the UN mission are essential and often require leadership from the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC. Although it was sometimes difficult to keep the process at the strategic level, it was ultimately rewarding in terms of building strategic coherence and getting the country team and the mission to recognize that they share many similar objectives and to work together toward achieving these in support of the Haitian people.

CASE 2

Mission Start-Up in Liberia

Security Council Resolution 1509 of September 2003 authorized the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, to stabilize postconflict Liberia. The intention was for the mission to deploy rapidly to replace a smaller peacekeeping operation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Given the short time frame for the deployment of 15,000 troops, 1,115 civilian police, and 607 international staff, the mission was officially established on October 1,

2003, but only became operationally effective in March 2004.

UNMIL's deployment was relatively quick, yet still not within the ninety-day deadline for rapid deployment envisioned by the Brahimi Report. UNMIL's deployment was finally achieved, but not without significant difficulties. A lot of the problems were preventable. Unrealistic political expectations, inadequate planning assumptions, and poor coordination led UNMIL's start-up phase to be disorderly and mired with complications.

In the months after Security Council authorization, as the pace of deployment increased, UNMIL found that it did not have the logistical capacity to support the number of arriving troops. As a contingency, UNMIL had to rely on support from UNAMSIL in neighboring Sierra Leone to provide air and sealift of personnel, equipment, and other materiel, as well as support in training, systems, and administration. UNMIL's subpar transit camp, along with poor infrastructure and security and a lack of key enabling units, such as engineers, transport, aviation, and especially hospital units, resulted in the mission initially being unable to deploy beyond the capital of Monrovia.

A number of new mechanisms intended to aid rapid deployment were used in UNMIL. Pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) provided the Secretary-General with the authority to commit up to $50 million in funding once it was likely that a peace operation would be authorized. $48 million in PMCA was allotted to the start-up of UNMIL, but confusion over how the mechanism worked limited its effectiveness. Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) were intended to further accelerate deployment. The extensive use of SDS in Liberia led to its rapid depletion, creating concerns for other operations that might be mandated.

The problems of military deployment were not isolated or separate from other problems during the start-up phase, of course. Similar problems occurred during the establishment of the civilian, security, and public information components of the mission. In addition, key equipment and staff were also lacking in mission security. Five months into the mission, essential equipment, such as shatter-resistant film for windows and x-ray machines, was missing, and only 33 percent of the security personnel had been deployed.

UNMIL's deployment provided a host of lessons for future attempts at rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions. For instance, prior to deployment, a better assessment of the realities on the ground and the logistics required to mount a peace operation in an environment such as Liberia could have identified the logistical, financial, and human resource bottlenecks in advance

and avoided some of the ensuing difficulties. Second, even when a short deployment timeframe is externally imposed, planning needs to be all the more stringent in setting realistic goals. This also involves better managing international as well as host country expectations. Finally, on the ground, such problems can be aggravated by a lack of coordination and communication, as, for example, when in Liberia the civilian and the military components of UNMIL were separated by a thirty minute drive.

(Adapted from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, "Lessons-Learned Study on the Startup Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia," April 2004.)

CASE 3

Monitoring and Evaluation in Support of Strategic Planning: The Pilot Experience of BINUB

The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) set up a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (JMEU) in 2009 to help achieve the desired performance of UN programs and impact upon peace consolidation. It was the first time that such a unit was established in a UN mission. JMEU was essentially responsible for:

- developing indicators and benchmarks for BINUB's exit strategy;
- monitoring and evaluating BINUB's performance on the basis of its mandate, and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy;
- evaluating the impact of BINUB's activities on peace consolidation;
- recommending measures with the UN Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of BINUB.

JMEU first mapped out all the mission's strategic and planning documents (UNDAF+, Strategic Framework for Peace Consolidation, RBB logical frameworks, PBF projects, and BINUB mandates) to assist sections in elaborating their own individual subworkplans. JMEU then designed various tools to monitor the work of all sections, including a monitoring framework using SMART indicators, for short- and medium-term results. These matrices were filled by each section on a monthly basis. This allowed standard data collection and contributed to better analyses, effective reporting, and better planning at mission level.

The unit also put in place a system to collect data on all eighteen Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) projects in Burundi and developed an information system using a database to manage data collected by all stakeholders involved in the implementation (UNDP, implementing partners and NGOs, private companies, beneficiaries, etc.). JMEU also carried out field visits to Burundi's regions in order to collect first-hand data. Quarterly PBF progress reports were sent to UNHQ.

This pilot experience was successful, and JMEU was asked to share its experience with other UN missions. The systematic data collection and analysis was indeed very useful to mission management and helped decision-making processes on planning and management. The following factors were instrumental in the success of JMEU:

- Mission leadership was familiar with monitoring and evaluation (M&E) concepts and their added value, and highly supportive. They convened meetings with BINUB heads of sections and other stakeholders to sensitize them.
- BINUB sections were actively involved defining indicators, targets, methods of data collection, and roles and responsibilities. This facilitated ownership and system buy-in.
- The M&E team was available and ready to discuss and "sell" the M&E approach to all actors involved, in and outside of the UN.

One of the challenges JMEU encountered when it was established was the absence of a prior data collection system from 2007 to 2009. A strong M&E system is most useful when put in place at the onset of a mission.

For more on the link between planning and M&E, see the chapter on evaluation.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Strategies and plans are indispensable for translating a vision into effective action.
2. Different strategies and plans are needed at different hierarchical levels and over different time frames.
3. Strategic decisions have financial implications. It is important to take into account the relationship between objectives, budgets, strategies, and plans.
4. Planning processes are intended to answer three basic questions: Where are we now? Where should we go? How do we get there?
5. Plan for planning by setting aside staff, resources, and time for a planning process (as well as resources for ongoing planning).
6. When deciding on organizational objectives, apply the SMARTER criteria: specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, time-bound, ethical, and recorded.
7. Formulating strategies should be based on an assessment of strategic options derived from the analysis phase.
8. Be aware of the limits of strategic planning: events do not take place in a vacuum, and plans need to adjust to reality.
9. Aim for interactive planning and adhere to recurring planning cycles: regularly review, adapt, and update plans in line with changing circumstances and to capture emerging strategies.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Strategic planning	Does everyone on my team interpret the mission mandate in the same way? Is the mission mandate translated into a strategic plan (ISF)? Does my individual and section or unit work plan fit into the mission's overall plan? Is the plan realistic given available resources (staff, assets, and budget)? Is the RBB coherent with the ISF?		
Planning process	Does each goal or objective fit the SMARTER criteria? Is the plan based on a SWOT analysis? Did I consider alternate scenarios throughout the planning process?		
Planning cycles & evaluation	Do I keep track of and regularly report on implementation of the plan (SG report, monthly reports, individual status reports, etc.)? Has the mission plan been adjusted based on changes in mandate and conditions on the ground? Are these reflected in section or unit work plans or my individual work plan?		

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4

COMMUNICATION

COMMUNICATION

Communication is a core managerial function that includes not only the exchange of information but also the management of information within and beyond the organization. Effective communication entails attentive listening and the clear delivery of messages to enable a shared understanding. Effective communication within an organization and with outside stakeholders is a key element in the successful fulfillment of a mandate.

OVERVIEW

Communication is that essential tool available to a manager not only to win support, persuade, inspire, get information, stimulate ideas, motivate, but also to deliver constructive criticism or soothe flaring tempers. It is the tool that allows a manager to know their team and its strengths and weaknesses.

Managing well means communicating well. Informal communication can often be as important as formal communication; *how* something is communicated is as important as *what* is communicated.

The overwhelming diversity of UN field staff coupled with the complexity of the environment in which missions operate makes communicating a more challenging, but even more critical, tool. The effectiveness of a peace operation is often contingent on a common understanding of what needs to be done. Communicating and forging that understanding with outside partners and stakeholders is essential in this regard.

This chapter relays the importance of strategic communications, provides tools to sharpen your communication skills (writing, speaking, presenting, and listening), and offers guidelines for communicating effectively across cultures.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- What effective communication looks like
- How internal communication can be managed
- Tips for writing more effectively
- How to speak and give presentations to get a point across
- How to communicate across different cultures

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

Types of Communication

The nature and the flow of communication in an organization typically mirror its structure:

- In a hierarchical environment, communication tends to be more formal, written, and flows from the top down.
- In a flatter, less hierarchical setting, people tend to communicate more face-to-face, through informal e-mails, and up as much as down.

Peace operations are a hybrid of the two. Although missions have a formal, hierarchical organizational structure, UN field missions combine a de facto flatter structure as they are composed of a number of relatively autonomous components (military, civilian, police). Hence communications cannot be purely hierarchical and top-down. Furthermore, when working in a field duty station, staff often operate in a less formal, more flexible manner, where rank may mean less than it does at headquarters. Interpersonal skills as much as performance can sometimes determine how a manager relates to his or her team and allocates work.

For a manager in this hybrid environment, effective communication requires a stakeholder analysis:

- Who is my team? To whom do we relate (inside and outside the organization)?
- What style and medium is most suitable to get my message across?
- What are the sensitivities and constraints?

The answers determine your preferred means of communication: formal memoranda, e-mail (using “cc” or “bcc”), telephone, Skype, planned and scripted meetings, one-on-one meals, or just a friendly chat. The answers should also determine how you collect information: how you listen, what you read between lines, what meetings you decide to attend, what you delegate, and whom you seek out for guidance.

In a complex environment, it is often useful to carry out a quick mapping exercise, listing stakeholders you and your team are in daily contact with on substantive matters, those in your own organization with whom you and your team interact frequently, and other important outside contacts in the national and international community.

For each stakeholder, identify the most common and appropriate means and style of communication (fig. 4.1). For external stakeholders, that choice also depends on the sensitivity of the mandate of the mission. When in doubt, reciprocity is often the best strategy—simply mirror how they communicate with you.

Table 4.1. Communicating with stakeholders

Immediate, Familiar Work Environment	Style: mosty informal Tools: walk-in verbal exchanges; team meetings without formal agenda or minutes; emails; occasionally key issues are formally documented
Inside the Organization	Style: based on hierarchy and functional distance, varies from formal to informal Tools: phone calls; scheduled one-to-one group meetings with notes or minutes circulated; emails; memoranda of understanding; newsletters; internal rules and regulations are documented and disseminated, manuals provided
Professional Contacts Outside the Organization	Style: mainly formal Tools: emails; scheduled one-to-one and group meetings with formal minutes or aide-memoirs; letters; contracts; newsletters
Public at Large, Customers, Clients, Beneficiaries	Style: ranging from journalistic and popular to formal and academic, depending on the organization's "persona" Tools: broadcast emails via listservers; publications; website; social media; media releases; public events

Building Trust

Trust is the building block of effective communication. A manager can establish and build trust with his or her team by providing them with information (e.g., summaries of the meetings he or she attends) and encouraging them to share and discuss information openly. The manager will consequently find that an appropriate two-way communication establishes itself with the benefit of constructive and often vital exchanges with the team. To establish trust, face-to-face contact is often essential, as it builds a personal relationship between people. If not feasible, voice contact through telephone calls provides another type of contact more personalized than, say, e-mail.

If there is some lack of trust between the manager and staff, information will be carefully hoarded, and only the barest minimum will trickle down, often just in the form of policy directives and instructions when coming from the manager. From the team members, mistrust will translate into very little upward communication, as fear and uncertainty trump the desire to share honest and critical thoughts with management. Staff will tell their superiors only what they want to hear, not what they need to hear.

Trust can be built through different methods of communication depending on the situation and the audience. In communicating with individuals, one-on-one conversations and an open door policy are important elements in establishing two-way communication. Proper attention should also be paid to respecting the confidentiality of some conversations, as well as the identity of the messenger when appropriate. Town hall meetings, brown-bag lunches, or web-based methods (broadcasts, intranet, and video-teleconferences) can be more useful when addressing groups than issuing a memorandum. Some of these meetings can also be scheduled on a regular basis (weekly or monthly meeting) to allow staff to prepare adequately. The choice of the language you will use (working language of the mission and/or most-spoken language in your audience), and of using translation or not, can also be a determining factor in building trust and conveying your message accurately.

Verbal Communication

Good verbal communication entails both components of a dialogue, the effective delivery of thoughts and ideas as well as the active listening of counterparts. Communicating can only be meaningful in a two-way exchange, hence the importance of listening actively to others. In any operation, a decision maker needs to make informed decisions by listening to what others have to say, whether these are staff or external stakeholders, including, importantly, the local population.

The ability to listen is not an obvious one. It can, however, be acquired through practice and patience. To become a good listener (and to be seen as a good listener), show visible interest through facial expressions and body language, ask follow-up or clarifying questions, and read between the lines by observing the speaker's nonverbal cues (facial expressions, tone, posture, physical gestures).

Speaking effectively is an obvious and constant, yet underdeveloped, skill. In formal interactions, involving a presentation for

instance, a manager, like anybody else, should prepare, practice, evaluate, and practice again if necessary. In general, when speaking in public, a presenter should aim to:

- **Simplify:** Convey your messages in an easy-to-follow pattern both in terms of logic and diction. Remember that for your audience, listening is always harder than reading, so oral arguments must be simpler than written ones.
- **Prepare:** Think about possible questions from your listeners.
- **Be vivid but natural:** Your audience will not pay attention if you don't seem interested in what you're saying. Speak with enthusiasm, but with a natural and slow pace.
- **Be concise:** Concentrate on what *must* be said, bearing in mind the time constraints. You should be aware of drifting attention in your audience.

Six Tips for Presenting

1. Profile the occasion: audience (who, why, and what do they expect?), time allocation, and location (including technical features).
2. Plan and then write out the presentation: introduction, statement of objective, outline, main points, summary, and conclusion linked to the objective.
3. Use visual aids when they will help explain or clarify a concept or assist the audience in following along. Do not use PowerPoint as a crutch.
4. Pick the right style for your subject and occasion: fully scripted, notes, memorized, or a combination
5. Rehearse: ideally in the same location as your talk. Record and listen to or watch your speech in full. Time your talk.
6. Deliver: introduce yourself, capture the audience's attention, give background, objectives, and an outline of your talk. Keep a reasonable pace and maintain eye contact with your audience. Clearly signal when your presentation ends.

General Tips for Running a Video Teleconference (VTC)

UN field missions rely heavily on video teleconferencing for communications both within the mission and with headquarters. During times of financial constraints, VTC is likely to be used even more. Some basic steps can help ensure that your VTC will be successful:

- Test the phone number and technology at least twenty-four hours in advance.
- Arrive before the start time when the on-site operator is adjusting the camera and volume and calling the other side of the VTC.
- Introduce participants and their titles or roles at both sites.
- Speak normally; avoid tapping on the desk or shuffling papers.
- Be aware of your body language; look at the camera, usually positioned on top of the monitor, rather than the monitor itself. Don't forget to smile.
- If there is a slight time delay, wait a moment before answering questions to ensure that speakers on the other side have finished speaking. Be aware of the time.

Written Communication

The skill to deliver a clear, concise, and informative message through the written word is a surprisingly rare one. Given the daily communication demands in a field mission, good writing skills will always be vital for successful managers. The importance of conveying information accurately and efficiently, internally as well as to headquarters and external partners, cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, writing skills are often neglected in professional development training.

While in-person oral communication is critical to building trust and sealing a deal, e-mails, memos, and reports keep track of the decision-making process and inform others. As such, written communication is an essential tool for institutional memory and knowledge management. Remember that you may be succeeded by another manager and that continuity must be insured or valuable progress (and in the worst case, trust) may be lost.

General Tips for Writing

- Decide on your objective—what you want to say and what effect you want to achieve—before you begin writing.
- Brevity and clarity: Use simple but precise words. Avoid slang or clichés and do not overuse adjectives and adverbs.
- Make your argument easily understood: Describe your points in a logical sequence. Try to get across only one main idea per paragraph.
- Make it readable: Break up lengthy text with subheadings and highlight the important points or recommendations.
- Accuracy: Check names, figures, and technical words.

The UN has defined guidelines for drafting some of its official documents. When such guidelines are not available, the manager should remember that aside from the effectiveness of his or her style, three factors are key to effective writing: strong introduction, well-constructed argument, and tight conclusion.

The introduction should convey to the reader the objective of the document and succinctly summarize its background. It must present the problem or situation and invite the reader to continue through to the argumentation. Note that at times, especially in routine communications, there may not be a resolution or an answer needed. Nevertheless, it is always important to structure your written communication as much as possible and to strive to highlight relevant implications.

When constructing an argument, implementing the "pyramid principle" can be helpful (fig. 4.2). Before starting to write, draw a diagram of your arguments and supporting information, starting with your main point or recommendation at the top. Thinking often works bottom-up, but writing is most effective if presented with the thoughts progressing from the top down. For example, your main argument (Z) should be supported by evidence or arguments (X and Y), which may need further support (xxx) and (yyy). For more detailed resources on effective writing, see the references at the end of this chapter, especially the guidebook, *The Elements of Style*, by Strunk and White.

Figure 4.1. Organizing ideas in a pyramid



External Communication

Field missions have public information officers (PIO) formally in charge of external relations. However, within the scope of their respective mandates, field mission personnel interact with a number of distinct external stakeholders on a daily basis, ranging from national and local authorities, political parties, and civil society organizations to international humanitarian organizations and the donor community. The types of interactions also vary greatly, from conversations with villagers to formal meetings with international and national government officials, oral presentations, or formal written materials to headquarters (e.g., code cables, reports of the Secretary-General, and ad hoc reports) or to donors (including reporting requirements for trust funds, the Peacebuilding Fund, etc.).

While many of the tips for public speaking and for written communications mentioned above are relevant regardless of the context, when representing a UN field mission in an external setting, the stakes are considerably higher. A lack of communication or poor communication can lead to misunderstandings, mistrust, and affect the ability of the UN mission to carry out its mandate. If reporting to donors, it is of crucial importance that reporting guidelines are strictly adhered to; this requires close coordination with administrative components of the mission. When discussing policies of the mission in public, it is extremely important to tread carefully and avoid sending mixed or, worse, contradictory messages. It is better to promise an answer at a later stage than to have to retract a false or misleading statement.



Cross-Cultural Communication

"Culture" is in part the learned values and norms that shape the behavior of an individual or a community. In the "hypermulticultural" environment that characterizes UN field missions, communicating well across cultures is a constant necessity. Adding to the challenge are the differing institutional cultures that can exist between components of a peace operation (e.g., military vs. civilian or substantive vs. support).

Successful cross-cultural communication requires active listening, keen observation, and acceptance of differences. In order to manage and get the most out of a team, it is essential to understand basic cultural divides and how to put this insight to practical use.

Culture influences how one thinks, feels, acts, and communicates. This certainly holds true for the people you are working with in a peace operation: no matter how different they are, they all con-

sider their thoughts, feelings, and activities to be "normal." Their culture gives them a frame of reference and identity that to them is self-evident. In practice, cultural differences can lead to misunderstandings and distort communications with colleagues, as well as with the many stakeholders of a peace operation. Understanding important differences between cultures can help you adapt a communications strategy to different situations. The below examples highlight some basic cultural differences that can exist between people. However, as with any generalization, no one person or group will fit entirely into any category.

Individualistic vs. Collectivist Cultures

Individualistic cultures tend to value high achievers as role models and reward them as such—think of the salaries paid to CEOs and athletes. Such cultures attach less importance to group achievements benefiting society; teachers, aid workers, and nurses, for example, are paid more modestly. They are also more likely to prize efficiency and achievement over harmony and unity. Thus, in individualistic cultures:

- Instructions are often concise and authoritative.
- Decisions can be made with less consultation or consensus.
- Rewards go to those with a record of individual achievement.
- Communications tend to flow top-down.
- Criticism is expressed directly and sometimes publicly.

Collectivist cultures are at the other end of the continuum. They tend to prize relationships, group unity, harmony, and honor. Such cultures enforce family and clan rules, rather than focusing on individual "rights," as group welfare is the top priority. In business, one's duty might be to find jobs for other family members, and merit and efficiency come second to loyalty. In politics, this is commonly seen, as jobs and contracts are awarded to the party faithful. Thus, in collectivist cultures:

- Talking business comes after a social relationship has been established (e.g., talking about respective families and network of relations, showing pictures, etc.).
- Rewards are often given to relatives—that merit should always go above patronage is a value judgment, not a truism.
- Communications are group-based (e.g., presenting arguments in terms of their impact on the group rather than on an individual).

- Criticism is often not expressed directly, and certainly not in a group setting so as not to humiliate or shame; rather, it is more important to maintain harmony.

Secular vs. Religious Cultures

Religious cultures maintain that a higher power has revealed clear and inviolable rules and values to live by, often written in holy texts, such as the Koran, the Bible, the Torah, the Vedas, or other scriptures. Often the laws and institutions of these cultures are highly informed by religious doctrine. Likewise, people from a religious cultural background might bring their respective religious values and beliefs to bear on their professional duties and relationships.

Secular societies are marked by the enforcement of a strict separation of religious beliefs and the affairs of the state. These societies and many of their citizens value science over faith and emphasize their openness to a wide variety of beliefs and views.

Military vs. Civilian Culture

Staff without previous exposure to the military may find it difficult to understand or relate to those in uniform. Indeed, civilian-military cooperation in the field is an ongoing source of frustration for both sides of the equation. Cooperation across these two institutional cultures, though, is part of what makes peacekeeping such a unique enterprise. Such cooperation is also a must in order to implement peacekeeping's most critical tasks, such as civilian protection.

The military component of a mission tends to adhere to a strict hierarchy, more than other parts of the mission. They also tend to bring greater planning experience. This ingrained military culture affects how peacekeeping soldiers communicate, coordinate, and make decisions both inside their ranks and with civilian colleagues. Obviously this can create tension with those civilians who prioritize free thinking, consensual decision making, and egalitarianism. Just as civilian managers need to understand the rationale for and the benefits of a task based, loyal, and hierarchical culture, soldiers must recognize the rationale for and the benefits of a "flatter" civilian management structure and consent-based decision making.

Other Miscellaneous Cultural Divides

- Perception of time: Time as money, timeliness as a virtue, living as dictated by schedules and timetables on the one hand. On the other, time as a flexible commodity, taking time for others as respect, results accepted as objectives but not time bound, the future as hard to define or impossible to plan for.
- Perception of space: How far away do you stand or sit when talking to someone, when in an elevator, or on a bus? Do you perceive an office with a window view or corner room as a symbol of hierarchical position?
- Use of language: Indirect language, circumspect, deferential, oral, flowery, formal (e.g., Buddhist or Islamic cultures) vs. direct language, precise or even blunt, written where possible, businesslike, informal (Western business culture, especially languages that have only one word for "you" that does not differentiate between level of intimacy, rank, or age).
- Nonverbal communication and body language: Show emotions or not? Make direct gestures or not? Maintain eye contact or not? Firm handshake or not? Bow? How deep? Point at things, or do not point? How to gesture to "come here," with palm of hand showing or not? Touching people, not touching? Men holding hands or not?

Colors as symbols:

- Color for mourning: black in Europe and North America, white in Islamic countries and Japan.
- Red: love and danger in Western countries, death in some African countries, evil in Indonesia and Thailand (don't use red ink).
- Green: safety in the West, holiness in the Islamic world (do not use green in publications).

When people with such different values have to work together, they need to understand that these differences are real, fundamental, and need to be respected. In general, it is wise to take note of the values of the host country in this respect, and to realize that people will always act on the basis of their convictions. This does not make them "good" or "bad." Many customs are rooted in faith. When communicating across a religious divide, make sure to respect religious holidays, dress codes, dietary rules, and the way gender relations are acted out.

Finally, it is important to remember that in the international setting of a peace operation, it is particularly difficult to make assumptions about people, as their backgrounds often reflect different, overlapping cultures. They may have been born in one country, gone to school in another, made friends all over, lived in different parts of the world, found partners with different backgrounds. In doing so, they have taken on the ability to transition easily from one culture to another. Such people may treat their parents or family in a traditional way, and use language appropriate to that setting—but in the office, or with friends, they act and

speak differently. Similarly, men and women may interact professionally at work, but revert to more distanced, traditional ways in a private setting.

CASE 1

Communicating the Mandate and Managing Expectations

Achieving a common vision and understanding of what needs to be done by the different components of a UN field mission based on the mandate given by the United Nations Security Council (UN resolution) can be challenging in a fast moving environment. This is all the more challenging in times of mission start-up, reconfiguration, or withdrawal. It is therefore the responsibility of the managers in the mission, from the SRSG down to senior and mid-level managers to make sure that this mandate benefits from a common understanding, is disseminated in a timely manner, well understood by all staff, and translated into regularly revised and updated mission strategic planning documents and section work plans. It is also essential that the mandate be clearly communicated to other stakeholders, starting with the host government authorities at all levels.

The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) faced this very challenge in May 2010 when, following a request by the government of Chad, the Security Council passed Resolution 1923 mandating the withdrawal of MINURCAT by December 31, 2010. The SRSG thus organized a series of town hall meetings with other mission leadership in the mission headquarters and country suboffices to explain the content and implications of the resolution to the mission staff. The SRSG also briefed the diplomatic corps in Chad, the UN country team and other key stakeholders in the country, humanitarian actors, and bilateral donors, among others. The next challenge was to reach a common understanding with the Chadian authorities—at the national and at the local level—on the content of the new mandate, the differences from the previous one, and the respective responsibilities of both the UN mission and the government of Chad during this phase of withdrawal. This was essential in order to ensure a smooth exit of the mission and avoid difficulties with the host authorities, as had previously been the case for UNMEE in Eritrea.

The final report to the Secretary-General on MINURCAT (December 2010) highlighted how MINURCAT—prior to the decision on the withdrawal—had suffered from the lack of a communication strategy and was therefore unable to properly manage the expectations of the Chadian government and to some extent hu-

manitarian actors. An effective communication strategy would have been central to enhancing confidence and reducing misunderstandings as to the mission's role and purpose in Chad and the northeastern area of the Central African Republic. Instead, this lack of communication gave space for an alternate interpretation of the mandate by the host country, which raised expectations for economic recovery and development that were beyond the scope of the security-focused mandate. The report concluded that the absence of a communication strategy impaired the mission's ability to narrow the gap between expectations and reality. Such a strategy must be developed at the initial stage of a mission's deployment.

As an attempt to avoid similar misunderstandings and mistrust with the government of Chad during the withdrawal phase, a number of initiatives were undertaken, including the establishment of a forum to foster dialogue and collaboration between the Chadian authorities and their national and international partners to reach a common understanding of roles and responsibilities on issues relating to protection of civilians, humanitarian access, and safety and security arrangements. The SRSG also went on a tour of the country, together with representatives of the government of Chad (including security forces) and humanitarian actors, to explain to stakeholders at the local level what the new mandate entailed, how the mission would withdraw, and what the government of Chad had committed to do for its part. Finally, a joint government of Chad–UN high-level working group was set up to assess the situation on the ground on a monthly basis and track Chad's progress toward meeting benchmarks set out in the Security Council resolution.

CASE 2

Two-Way Communication with Staff

Communicating well with staff is an essential task for a manager to get the best out of a team. Lack of communication, especially on issues that affect the work and the personal lives of staff, can poison a work environment and cause irreparable damage to staff morale, affecting staff productivity and the mission's overall effectiveness.

In one mission, a new director of a civil-affairs section had arrived earlier that year, bringing hope among many of the staff that the section would be re-energized ahead of important national elections in the country. Although few official communications had gone from the new director to his staff in the various field offices

across the country, a staff retreat in the capital was the occasion for all to meet the new director in person and to hear first hand his vision for the section. Although the director ended up listening more than he spoke at the retreat, most of the staff walked away with a positive impression. Sophie, an international civil-affairs officer, who had travelled from one of the mission's regional suboffices for the retreat in the capital, was one of them.

Later that year Sophie applied to a temporary vacancy announcement (TVA) in UN headquarters, and was selected for the post after a competitive process. Sophie felt it was the right move for her at the time, as she had served in hardship duty stations for the past three years, including one year in this specific duty station, and the post would constitute a promotion for her. Before UN headquarters sent the fax to the mission asking for her release on assignment, Sophie felt she had to first inform her hiring manager, the director. According to the UN rules and regulations, it is the decision of the hiring manager whether or not to release staff on assignment. Sophie therefore phoned the director and explained her reasons. The director told her that although his section was short on staff, he understood her motivations and told her that, in the interest of her career development, he would authorize her release for the eleven-month TVA.

A week later, to Sophie's surprise, she was copied on an email from the director to human resources, informing that he no longer authorized Sophie's release. Sophie was taken aback given the earlier phone conversation she had had with the director, and decided to call him again to find out what had happened. The director missed Sophie's call, and in the rush of daily activity, failed to get back to Sophie that day. In the week that followed, the director felt that because the decision had been made, there was very little to discuss at that point. "Why open old wounds unnecessarily?"

As a result, Sophie never received an explanation from the director as to what motivated the change in his initial decision. Although Sophie forced herself to continue to work hard, her motivation was lacking. She was no longer willing to go the extra mile because she no longer respected her manager. What the director did not know was that Sophie could have understood and accepted his reasons for reversing his first decision, if he had only discussed it with her. In this case, other mutually beneficial solutions could have even been found. For instance, the requesting office at UNHQ could have agreed on delaying her arrival to allow the mission to find solutions to the staffing needs. Instead, through a simple lack of communication, the director squandered

the trust and respect of one of his best staff members, hampering the mission's overall productivity in the end.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Understand your context, your stakeholders, and adapt your communication to the audience.
2. Trust is integral to healthy, two-way communication. Look to build and maintain trust at all times.
3. Good writing is an essential management skill. Write with a purpose, for your audience, and keep it simple.
4. Take time to prepare presentations and make sure to rehearse—and if possible record and review—your delivery.
5. Be an active listener.
6. In intercultural settings, don't rush to judgment. Observe, listen, look, ask.
7. Develop the skills and aptitudes that allow you to interact with people from another culture more easily: patience, humor, humility, restraint, acceptance of contradictions.
8. Cooperation between civilian, police, and military components of a mission is essential, as it is between substantive and support sides of the mission. Make sure to continuously build these relationships.
9. Convey important messages and instructions both verbally—face-to-face—and in writing (a memo or e-mail).
10. Keep an open-door policy to address individual concerns and complaints.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Understanding your context	Have I done a proper stakeholder analysis and drawn a communication map? Who are my contacts inside and outside the organization? What style and medium is most suitable to get my message across? What are the sensitivities and constraints?		
Effective writing	What is the objective? What do I want to say, and what effect I want to achieve? Am I brief and clear? Does my argument flow logically, and is it easily understood?		
Effective speaking & presenting	Do I know my audience? Have I prepared and rehearsed my presentation accordingly? Can I stay within the time limits I've been given?		
Supervising staff	Do I share information with my team? By e-mail, in regular staff meetings, in informal settings? Do I listen to my staff enough, and do I know their concerns? Do I speak to them individually on a regular basis?		
Communicating across cultures	Do I develop and maintain contact with people from another culture easily? Do I actively attempt to build relationships across civilian, police, and military components of the mission? Across the support and substantive sections divide?		

RESOURCES

United Nations

- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. "Guidelines on Drafting Correspondence for DPKO Political Affairs Officers." May 1, 2008.

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5

MANAGING PEOPLE

MANAGING PEOPLE

"There is no substitute for getting the right people into the right jobs, at the right time, and only for the time that is necessary."[1]

OVERVIEW

Managing people is about empowering and motivating staff to perform at their highest level, individually and collectively. It requires exceptional communication skills and constant diligence to ensure that the work of each staff member—and the unit as a whole—is both satisfactory and sustainable.

With more than 7,200 international and 25,000 national civilians deployed in thirty peacekeeping and special political missions worldwide, alongside approximately 100,000 uniformed personnel, the majority of the United Nations' peacekeeping budget in 2011 was devoted to personnel costs. While member states expect those resources to be managed efficiently and effectively in support of complex mandates, UN personnel—many of whom toil in dangerous and isolated contexts six or seven days per week—expect to be treated fairly and supported well by member states and UN management. International civilian staff in peace missions, who today represent 45 percent of the UN Secretariat, reasonably expect opportunities for career development and mobility, training, and appropriate contracts and conditions of service that reflect their service in hardship locations and their status as international civil servants.

Managing people is always a challenge, but even more so at the United Nations. National and international civilian personnel work side by side with military and police. The workforce is in constant flux as personnel join and stay in a mission for different periods of time. The quality of personnel also varies in skill, experience, and motivation. A mission's mandate can change every six months. Conflicts between field staff arise easily in a culturally and linguistically diverse work environment, where staff are under additional stress and often separated from family. To top it off, conditions of service are based on grade and status, and the promotion system is often centralized, extremely slow, and bureaucratic—thus allowing managers little scope to influence the advancement or compensation of the staff they supervise. The UN manager thus typically has great responsibility coupled with little authority.

1 United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* [Brahimi Report], UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.

Managers are called on to understand the capabilities, talents, strengths, and weakness of each employee to make them work as a team in support of the goals of the mission. The success of managers depends on their ability to organize, supervise, mentor, and inspire staff toward common projects in spite of the diversity of the work force and the inherent complexity of the operational context.

This chapter follows up on some of the key concepts discussed in the previous chapter on communication. It provides suggestions on how to become a manager that others want to emulate: the manager who acts with integrity, delegates appropriately, respects staff, improves staff performance, mentors, and fosters a collegial atmosphere in the office.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- How to communicate with your team
- How to use available management tools
- How to reward good performance and improve underperformance
- How to prevent or resolve staff conflict

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

To be a successful manager of people, one has to create a supportive work environment and motivate staff to perform their best. Managers that know how to do this are said to have "people skills." They create a work culture and atmosphere that will help their staff excel and get along well with others in the organization. They are not overly friendly but know how to relate appropriately to the various groups in their environment.

Important facets of successful people management covered in this chapter include the following:

- **Open dialogue with staff:** Make a conscious effort to be accessible to your staff, to treat them as individuals whose opinions are valued and respected. Involve them in decisions and delegate when appropriate. Take the time to speak to them individually.
- **Know how to use management tools made available by the organization**: Understand and convey the usefulness of job descriptions, terms of reference, vacancy announcements, unit work plans, individual work plans, and performance appraisal systems (e.g., e-PAS). The latter is especially impor-

tant when trying to address poor performance.

- **Know how to link performance with positive incentives and negative consequences:** Look for ways to reward good performers. Write email congratulations or publicly recognize staff for a job well done. Document poor performance in formal tools such as e-PAS and Performance Improvement Plans.
- **Respect the private life of your staff:** Today, approximately 70 percent of international staff in peace missions have either a dependent spouse or child in their household. Understand that your national and international staff have a life outside the office and duty station, and that time off enhances performance at work. Encourage staff to take their leave and rest and recuperation (R&R) entitlements.

Empowerment Through Information

As discussed in the previous chapter, staff are empowered and their performance enhanced when they feel that their manager keeps them apprised of changes within the broader organization and their teams. Access to information is of prime importance and managers are a key conduit for the transmission and circulation of information.

Managers gain information through a range of means. They attend meetings with senior leadership and other managers of the mission, as well as meals and receptions outside the mission. They also interact with people from other parts of the organization and have access to e-mails and reports on various issues that are routinely circulated to managers.

Yet, managers often tend to keep information to themselves, if only because sharing information takes time. This is often counterproductive. Hoarding information creates an atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty that inhibits good performance. For staff to stay motivated, they need to understand the "larger picture." It is the duty of managers to transmit all information that is broadly relevant to the goals and tasks of their team, understanding, of course, the need for confidentiality of certain sensitive information—particularly with regard to the risk of leaking of documents and forwarding of e-mails by both international and national staff.

Thanks to the Internet and e-mails, organizations now overwhelm their staff with information. They therefore assume that the information is disseminated, available, and understood by all. This works for most routine matters, but information regarding chang-

es in the mandate, policies, procedures, etc., are not always clear and can be the source of misunderstanding between managers and staff, especially in the UN setting where English or French are not native languages for many employees.

A staff meeting and an open discussion is the most effective tool to share important information. These meetings should invite differing perspectives and create an opportunity for debate. Open exchange of communication lets everyone feel heard, and helps managers better understand the concerns of their staff.

Times of mission reconfiguration and drawdown can be particularly challenging in terms of communication about future employment in the organization. Uncertainty about the future can exacerbate tensions within the mission or lead to the premature departure of staff during critical times. Staff management issues need to be addressed with a maximum degree of transparency and predictability and include regular communication with staff.

Occasionally it is helpful to meet outside of the office atmosphere for a day or two, given how consumed managers and staff typically are with day-to-day work. Retreats are good brainstorming opportunities when defining common working goals or solving problems.

People Management Tools

Job description

All employees of an organization are recruited on the basis of a job description that describes the tasks and responsibilities of their position and the minimum required experience and qualifications. The employee may, however, be asked to perform tasks outside of that job description. This can happen because the manager loses sight of an employee's responsibilities, but it can also result from many other factors: operational exigencies, revised policies and guidelines, the availability of new technologies, etc.

When this happens, it is the responsibility of the manager to discuss with the staff member the changes in the job and what the employee might need to be able to meet the new requirements of the position. If additional skills are required, training courses could be considered. It cannot be assumed that staff will implicitly understand and adjust to new requirements, or will acquire the new skills and competences on their own.

Performance appraisal system

Every successful organization has a system to evaluate the performance of its staff. It is incumbent on the manager to understand the importance of the performance management system in place in their organization and to diligently implement it.

The purpose of performance management tools is to recognize good performers, to retain them in the organization, and to facilitate their promotion. Performance management is also a valuable (but underused) tool to correct poor performance, and in the worst-case scenario, to penalize or dismiss staff who are chronic underperformers. The system is also expected to foster ongoing communication about individual objectives and methods.

The Electronic Performance Appraisal System e-PAS:

The UN's main tool for performance appraisals is the e-PAS. According to the e-PAS guidelines, the e-PAS enshrines performance management principles of work planning, ongoing feedback, a midpoint review, and an end-of-cycle appraisal against agreed-upon objectives. E-PAS was designed to improve overall organization performance by encouraging a high level of involvement and motivation, increasing staff participation in the planning and delivery of work.

The e-PAS system faces a number of limitations to its effective use, however. The weaknesses of the UN's administrative justice system make it difficult for managers to address clear cases of gross underperformance through the e-PAS tool. For good performers, there is a lack of correlation between e-PAS outcomes and career advancement. Given the often centralized UN recruitment system and anonymous testing procedures, the actual implications of e-PAS reviews are limited. As a consequence, e-PAS evaluations tend to be carried out as a formality, with evaluations generally positive and uncritical.

Performance appraisal systems typically include three basic components: (1) unit work plan, (2) individual work plan, and (3) end-of-cycle appraisal.

1. Unit work plan

When preparing a unit work plan, it is the responsibility of the manager to share drafts with members of the unit. A team discussion should be facilitated to ensure that everyone in the team has provided input to the plan, and that there is shared understanding of what the unit is expected to achieve and how this will contribute to the overall mission of the organization.

Changes in the mandate of a mission can affect the work plan of a unit and it is the responsibility of the manager to sit with staff and review possible changes in the work plan of the unit. Regardless of any changes in the work plan of the unit, it is important for the manager to review the unit work plan with staff on a regular

basis.

2. Individual work plan

Each employee must understand how their task contributes to the success of their unit. The individual work plan is like a contract that captures the goals to be achieved by the staff member during the reporting period. Such clarity decreases the likelihood of a misunderstanding and opens the door for a continuous dialogue between managers and staff on how to achieve individual and team objectives.

Every employee should have a work plan, including Under-Secretaries-General. Their compacts are important enough to be published so that every staff member is aware of what the leadership of their department has committed to deliver.

The best work plans outline so-called SMART goals—specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, and time-bound. SMART goals avoid confusion and make clear what the benchmarks used to assess performance will be. (See the chapters on planning and on evaluation for a more in-depth treatment of SMART and SMART-ER goals).

3. End-of-cycle appraisal

Finally, it is important to take overall stock of what has been achieved during a work cycle. What progress has been achieved by the group? Has the unit work plan been implemented? How has each individual contributed to the achievements of the group (i.e., have individual work plans been fulfilled)?

This should be a holistic exercise and also take into account previous feedback given during the implementation stage, for example during a midpoint review. As such, there should be a comprehensive conversation between a manager of a unit and staff about the accomplishments of the previous period.

As a result, every member of the organization should have a clear idea of their individual and collective performance during the prior period. Gaps in performance will have been identified, and measures can be taken to improve performance during the next cycle.

How to Manage Performance?

Being an effective manager requires finding a balance between the use of positive and negative reinforcement in managing staff performance. The basic challenges for a manager in the UN are to identify rewards for good performers, to find ways to help under

performers improve, and to find a place for chronic underperformers. The following are some helpful tips to manage performance.

Give clear guidance and measurable performance criteria
With few exceptions, employees want to excel in their job, expect their contribution to a project to be acknowledged, and want their supervisor to recognize their performance.

As such, managers need to explain clearly their expectations for their staff. When employees are not clear about what they are supposed to be doing, it can create a spiral of underachievement and miscommunication. This can be avoided if time is dedicated to explain clearly to the staff what they are expected to achieve.

Keep written notes on the performance of your staff
Solely relying on one's memory to monitor the performance of staff is not advisable. Positive and negative events, compliments and complaints should all be documented when they occur. Written records of performance greatly facilitate the completion of the performance appraisal at the end of the recording period. In case of disagreement between a manager and a staffmember, the notes will be invaluable as the basis for a discussion.

Rewarding good performance
Although the tools available to address staff performance are limited in the United Nations (i.e., managers cannot raise the salary of or promote good performers), the reality is that there are other ways for a manager to recognize achievement.

In the UN, higher performers need exposure and more responsibilities to get promoted. A good manager will look for special assignments for the best performing staff and give them the opportunity to participate in projects that will open doors for them.

Managers should look for and make available special training opportunities for their best staff. Although everyone requires and deserves training, high achievers are often uniquely keen to learn new skills, and a range of training opportunities, inside and outside the UN, are available to staff. Such trainings increase one's marketability for future positions. Trainings are also an opportunity to meet colleagues from other duty stations and create a network to help find the next post.

Building someone's reputation is another way to reward performance. Expressing praise to other managers outside the work unit may never make it back to the staff member, but can be very important. Essentially, this is how reputations are built and careers are made.

Addressing underperformance

Working with highly motivated and high-achieving staff makes the life of a manager easy. It is when employees fail to perform that the manager's skills are truly tested. Such a situation requires skillful intervention that has to take the form of one or possibly several conversations. The goal of this intervention is for both the supervisor and employee to understand exactly why the performance has been deemed poor (see the above section on giving measurable performance criteria), and what the underlying reasons for the poor performance could be. The interaction should be an open dialogue, not a written communication, and it should not take a threatening or overly critical tone.

Very few employees are ineffective in every respect. It is critical to recognize all positive aspects of the performance before looking into the problems. Upon reviewing performance, it is essential to reference the job description of the position and the goals of the work plan in order to clearly establish which aspects of per-

formance have been lacking.

Remember that sometimes outside circumstances will affect performance. Managers need to consider any difficult family circumstances experienced by staff. Problems at home easily bleed into the work place. If an employee has a sick spouse, for example, or a child care problem, the manager and staff can work together.

Finally, a written record of what was discussed and agreed upon should be kept. You should agree upon and write down the steps to be taken to bring the performance up to the level of expectations, as well as decide on a schedule for future meetings to review the performance again.

Addressing persistent underperformance
If at the end of a reporting period, after corrective actions have been attempted, performance has still not improved, the manager should inform the staff member that the poor performance will be officially recorded. The manager should also contact the Chief Civilian Personnel Officer (or equivalent) in their mission, the Field Personnel Division (FPD), or the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) in New York to determine what the best course of action would be.

In most cases, consistent poor performance is the result of a mismatch between the ability of an employee and the demands of the position. It does not necessarily mean that the staff member cannot find another position in the organization better suited to his or her qualifications.

Employees' Private Lives

Diversity is one of the principles of the United Nations. Respecting diversity is thus quite important. This requires making an effort to understand the background of staff and how that background can affect their approach to their work, manager, or fellow colleagues. Know staff members' backgrounds and personal circumstances within appropriate boundaries. People feel insulted when their name is mispronounced. This can be especially the case for national staff. Asking about the health of a sick spouse or how children are doing builds trust and shows an interest in the employee as a whole person, not just as someone who can do work for you.

Of course, the reality of life in the field is that many people work together and socialize together, regardless of their grades or ranks. The isolation of many duty stations can foster an intimacy and friendship between supervisors and staff. Everyone attends

the same party, shares lodging, plays sports together, and develops relationships. This comes with risks. One's reputation can be damaged by only the smallest incident. Managers are always in the public eye or in the eye of their staff, so they must always behave appropriately. Managers should also avoid creating the perception that they always socialize with a few select staff. Sharing lodging with your staff is also not advisable.

Finally, managers should foster an environment that balances work and personal lives. Dedication to any job has limits, and "leave" is a basic entitlement of the job. Respecting the staff's private lives is important and doing so will inspire trust and loyalty. It can also improve productivity and overall quality of output. It is a management failure to request staff to stay late in the office every day, unless exceptional circumstances absolutely demand it.

The UN provides additional time off to most of its international personnel in nonfamily duty stations in peace missions in recognition of the difficulties and stress that derive from prolonged family separation and isolated living conditions. Managers have to organize and plan their work and the work of their team accordingly. Showing no empathy for family concerns or only reluctantly accepting requests for leave will result in low motivation or staff resorting to using sick leave instead.

The UN's Recruitment System

As indicated above, there are institutional challenges which make the UN a particularly difficult organization in which to manage people.

The revised global UN staff selection system is intended to speed up individual recruitment processes through standardized job descriptions and vacancy announcements, coupled with the development of rosters of pre-assessed candidates for various job profiles. The concept behind rosters for field missions was to meet strict UN recruitment standards requiring global competitive processes, while also filling vacancies quickly through pre-assessed candidates that could immediately be brought on board. As of December 2011, there were about 10,000 candidates on the field rosters managed by the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) across all occupational groups, functional titles, and grades.

While managers in field missions sometimes participate in substantive assessment of candidates to be placed on rosters, in practice, a manager in the field often has limited authority in re-

cruitment decisions. It is, however, incumbent on the manager to understand the rules and procedures of recruitment, which can help reduce frustration and facilitate filling a vacant post.

- Seek a detailed, in-person briefing from your local UN human resources office. Even if you served in UN peace missions before, there are new changes and, in some cases, improvements to the UN recruitment system.
- If you are seeking to fill a vacancy, ask human resources for the list of pre-vetted candidates on both the field and HQ rosters, and for the CVs, or Personal History Profiles, of those that meet the requirements of your vacancy. Informal reference checks are strongly recommended, and then a selection should be able to be made without any further formal assessment.
- If you are participating in an assessment process, take a training course in the interview process to be familiar with the competency-based system used. Understand the UN requirements for evaluating candidates.

In addition to "recruitment," a number of other mechanisms exist that are used to staff field missions, including temporary assignment, mission assignment, secondment, or loan. For further guidance on recruitment, refer to the UN's administrative instruction staff selection system and to the online UN Human Resources Handbook listed in the resources section below.

Addressing Workplace Conflict

The stress and the isolation of field missions create conditions where conflicts can easily arise between staff. Your success as a manager will be measured in great part by your ability to manage relationships and conflicts.

Managers at the UN are expected to be familiar with the basic UN guidelines against discrimination, harassment, and abuse of authority, as well as know how to handle internal disputes and disciplinary matters. An understanding of the functional immunities that are applicable to United Nations employees is also essential. Take the lead in attending seminars on awareness of unacceptable conduct.

There is zero tolerance in the United Nations on any aspect of sexual exploitation and abuse. As a manager, you have an obligation to address any complaint regarding prohibited conduct. Failure to do so is considered a breach of duty. It can lead to administrative or disciplinary action against you. Some problems can

be solved informally in a noncontentious manner. Others, such as a complaint of sexual harassment, demand a formal investigation of the facts. The procedure is not simple and has to be followed rigorously.

In general, make sure that your behavior is beyond reproach, that it is never abusive or the source of conflict. Losing one's temper is the clearest sign of poor people management skills.

CASE 1

Addressing Staff Dissatisfaction: The Experience of a New Head of Civil Affairs

The position of chief of the civil affairs section was Mark's first field assignment. He was in charge of supervising a team of five international civil affairs officers, deployed in ministries and government agencies, and seven national staff who supported the work of the section. The civil affairs officers had been working in the field for a number of years and brought considerable hands-on experience in their specific area of expertise.

Determined to be successful in all aspects of the job, Mark had taken the time prior to his deployment to take a training course on performance evaluation. His first step, he knew, was to update the work plan of the section. The SRSG had explained to him they had made some progress toward stabilizing the security situation, and it was time to refocus the work of the civil affairs section toward governance and economic development.

He asked the most senior staff of the section to prepare a draft work plan that would be circulated and discussed during a meeting with all staff in the section. However, the first two meetings did not result in much progress. The revisions of the work plan proposed by the staff were purely cosmetic. Everyone was defending tooth and nail the need for their presence in their individual ministry. Each of Mark's ideas was immediately opposed, while the national staff remained silent.

At the third meeting, the discussion steered away from substantive matters to the topic of performance appraisals. It soon came out that no one in the section believed that the system was fair or could help their career. On the contrary, they saw the system as a potential threat. Positive ratings did not matter; however, negative ratings could be used to support non-extension of contracts. The national staff, who until then had remained silent, mentioned a rumor that the mission was downsizing and that the appraisals would be used as a tool to decide "who stays and who goes." One

national staff member added that according to a reliable source, Mark had been brought from headquarters to cut staff.

All this turmoil came as a shock to Mark. At headquarters, few perceived the appraisal system as a threat. The General Service staff he had supervised never gave him the feeling that their livelihoods depended on him. But he now understood the reluctance of the international staff to alter the work plan. The five civil affairs officers had experience in specific areas and changing the work plan could be interpreted as a way to render their work redundant.

Mark's first priority was to work on developing an atmosphere of confidence and trust. There was no way he could develop new projects if the team saw it as a potential threat to their professional and, in a way, personal lives.

He explained to his staff that he was not sent to the mission with a secret agenda. In reality, they had a complete misperception of the way headquarters functioned. Headquarters had the ability to develop complex administrative processes but lacked the ability for personnel planning. There was no plan to cut the number of posts and no plan to downsize the staff of civil affairs. Among his staff there seemed to be an aura of mystery about the budget of the mission and the approved staffing. It occurred to him that no one in the section had ever seen them. He explained that the budget of the mission was a public document, available on the Internet, and recommended that everyone took the time to read it.

"Clearing that hurdle was the key stepping stone for establishing a working relationship with my staff," explains Mark. "It was obvious that they doubted what I was telling them, but the fact that I could substantiate what I said with the budget was a major help. I couldn't make them change their mind on their perception of headquarters, but, at the same time, they couldn't ignore the reality of the publicly available budget."

The last two meetings proved to be more productive. "The civil affairs officers had known that the section needed to refocus itself in new areas, and had excellent suggestions once they didn't feel that suggesting a new project would mean the end of their contract. The reality of this work is that the skills are transferable, especially as the staff was mostly involved in the management part of the projects," Mark said.

On another subject, Mark couldn't help but agree with the team's assessment that UN performance appraisals do little to help their careers. At the same time, however, it was the only tool available, and it was to their advantage to invest time and effort in their

preparation. Says Mark, "I believe it was important for me to validate their belief with regard to the usefulness of the performance appraisals. There was no point for me to sell them a bill of goods and tell them that a performance appraisal that made them look extraordinary, unique, brilliant, etc. was the way for a promotion. Actually, I explained that managers tended to be skeptical of rave reviews. A more realistic and honest assessment is probably more appreciated when applying to other positions."

Finally, new ideas came up and were incorporated in the work plan of the section. The revised work plan of the section then led to the drafting of the individual work plans.

"I explained to my staff that I will keep notes of each person's performance throughout the year, so that if I get compliments from their ministry about them, I will remember what was said. Of course, if I get complaints, I will also keep notes, but I explained that I would show them the notes—positive and negative—before finalizing the report. We'll see how that works."

CASE 2

Organizing a Job Fair for National Staff During Mission Drawdown

After the government of Chad requested the withdrawal of the UN Mission, MINURCAT, and the UN Security Council set a timeline for the end of the mission's mandate, mission leadership understood that the premature closure of the mission could cause economic hardship for more than 500 national staff that would lose their jobs. As such, MINURCAT sponsored and organized a four-day job fair to help the UN national staff connect with local employers and ultimately find employment after the mission's closure. Seventeen international and Chadian companies and organizations registered for the fair.

In parallel to the job fair, the mission also hired a consultant to train the national staff on how to create or set up a small-scale enterprise, and the mission's integrated training section staff organized trainings on information technology, building a resume, and competency-based interviews ahead of the job fair. The National Staff Union was involved at every stage of the process, and a general meeting with national staff was held early during the planning phase to address staff concerns and clarify expectations.

Some of the key lessons from this experience included:

- Organizers of a job fair should plan for time ahead of the

event to orient staff and employers, and for employers to prepare listings of vacant positions and required qualifications.

- Two shorter job fairs in separate locations—one in the capital and one in the eastern part of the country—could have better responded to staff needs than one centralized job fair.
- Evaluation forms should have been prepared for better follow-up on interviews conducted and offers made during and after the fair.

While only eight staff members received job offers as a result of the event and another fifty had follow-up interviews in the month following the job fair, the initiative was very well received, and the mission continued to follow up with employers past its liquidation period until the end of April 2011.

The combination of capacity-building programs for national staff and the organization of a job fair, accompanied by regular communication to staff and active involvement of national staff representatives, contributed to a smooth transition process and mitigated some frustrations. This MINURCAT experience also informed the subsequent organizing of a job fair in Burundi during the downsizing of BINUB.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Every staff member needs an individual job description.
2. Develop your unit work plan. Discuss it regularly with your staff.
3. Take time to review each staff member's work plan with them individually.
4. Keep written notes on staff performance for the end-of-cycle appraisal.
5. Share information with your staff and listen to their concerns.
6. Make time for one-on-one coaching and mentoring.
7. Provide training opportunities to recognize staff for high achievement.
8. Respect the private time and the diversity of your staff.
9. Understand the HR administrative rules and regulations.
10. Know in detail the UN policy on harassment and discrimination.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Communicating	Do I share information with my team? By e-mail? In regular staff meetings? In informal settings? Do I listen to my staff enough, and do I know their concerns? Do I speak to them individually on a regular basis and not always about work?		
Managing performance	Do I have every staff member's job description or TOR? Have I discussed the unit and individual work plans with staff? Do I follow deadlines for the performance appraisal systems? Do I provide regular feedback to staff on my team? Do I reward good performers on my team? By e-mail? Publicly?		
Respecting work-life balance	Do I respect the private life of my staff and follow working hours? Do I encourage staff to take their leave or R&R according to a pre-established schedule for the unit?		

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6

DECISION MAKING

DECISION MAKING

Effective decision making is a defined process that helps identify and select the best action among several alternative options, based on a goal and an evaluation of possible consequences.

OVERVIEW

Some decisions are relatively simple and inconsequential. Others are important and can involve several complex and interrelated factors, such as:

- uncertainty or lack of information;
- high risks;
- multiple stakeholders; or
- unexpected consequences.

Pressure to make decisions comes from within the organization to move projects forward and to advance careers, and it comes from the external environment to respond to events and to stay relevant. Sometimes large bureaucracies limit a manager's ability or will to make decisions. Some organizational cultures are highly risk averse; they discourage the taking of initiative and they provide no reward for making good decisions. However, the reality of the work environment is that managers cannot escape responsibility.

Every decision involves risk. Uncertainty can never be completely eliminated. Decisions are always taken with incomplete information and a degree of unpredictability about future reactions. However, a good decision is not an accident. Learning about decision-making processes can help you to reduce uncertainty, optimize the level of information about available options, and increase the probability of success.

With these difficulties in mind, the best way to make a complex decision is to use a defined process. Sometimes making a decision is a lengthy process. Sometimes, decisions have to be taken fast. But even quick decisions require the assessment of alternatives, as every situation offers options to be considered. Part of the decision-making process should also be sound record keeping of how and why decisions were taken. As a manager, you are accountable for decisions you take. Keeping notes is essential in order to be able to revisit decisions at a later stage.

This section presents tools that will help improve your decision-

making process and, hopefully, the quality of your decisions.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- How to define a problem
- How to decide on the best process to make a decision
- How to generate alternatives
- How to communicate a decision

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

Decisions usually impact various parts of an organization, if not the organization as a whole, and can affect a large number of people, within and outside the organization. For this reason, decision making requires "systems thinking"—understanding how things influence one another.

Few decisions can be taken alone. This is not only because in large organizations many are formally involved in the decision-making process, but also because decisions need to be implemented, and implementation almost always entails the combined efforts of various people. Consulting stakeholders in the decision-making process typically facilitates implementation.

A systematic decision-making process helps you proceed through the critical steps that should lead to a sound decision. With an organized approach, you are less likely to miss important factors, and more likely to make a good decision.

In the UN, most managerial decisions unfold over time. However, when crises do occur, speed of action might be a determinant of success. For example, political unrest that creates a security threat for a mission might need to be handled quickly. Humanitarian crises rarely happen overnight, but an unpredictable catastrophic event, such as an earthquake, demands the ability to gather information and evaluate options in a short period of time. Having in place a decision-making process can be of tremendous help in such circumstances.

A sound approach to decision making should include the following steps:

1. Define the problem and the goal.
2. Select a decision-making process.
3. Generate alternative options.
4. Communicate and implement the decision.

Define the Problem and Your Goal

The first step is to define clearly the issue that needs to be addressed and what you want to achieve with your decision. There are several tools that can help to specify the problem. The simplest one is the "five whys": ask "why" at least five times to try to find the source of the problem.[1] The answer to the first "why" will prompt you to ask another "why," and the answer to the second "why" will prompt another, and so on. This is a simple and quick tool to help you get closer to the root cause of a problem.

For more complex problems, a good tool is the cause and effect diagram, also called a fishbone diagram.[2] If you are in a group, this is a useful tool to capture the results of brainstorming.

There are four steps to drawing a fishbone diagram (fig. 6.1):

1. Identify the problem: Write the problem in a box on the right hand side of a large sheet of paper. Draw a line across the paper horizontally from the box. It will look like the head and spine of a fish.
2. Identify the major factors involved, including those that may contribute to the problem. Draw lines off the spine—the bones of the fish—for each factor, and label them (e.g., people, processes, lack of equipment, external factors, etc.).
3. Identify possible causes: For each of the factors you considered, add possible causes of the problem that may be related to the factor. Show these as smaller lines coming off the bones of the fish. Each cause may be further broken down into secondary causes.
4. Analyze your diagram: By this stage you should have a diagram showing all the possible causes of your problem, and you can use it to investigate the problem at hand. However, factors rarely have equal weight, and although the fishbone diagram may help you identify factors, the analysis should differentiate and prioritize factors by order of importance.

1 The "five whys" technique was originally developed in the 1920s by Sakichi Toyoda, the founder of Toyota, considered the father of the Japanese industrial revolution.

2 This is also known as the Ishikawa diagram, after Professor Kaoru Ishikawa, who pioneered quality management in the Kawasaki shipyards in the 1960s.

Figure 6.1. The fishbone diagram



Select a Process

There are at least three factors that influence the choice of how to make the decision:

1. The importance of the decision: the higher the importance, the more you are likely to involve other people in the decision-making process.
2. The level of commitment: the more people need to agree with the decision, the more you should involve these people in the decision-making process.
3. The amount of time: the more time you have, the more opportunity you have to involve others.

Making a decision without consulting anyone is more efficient but rarely the best course of action. It may be good practice to make a decision alone, but only when:

1. You have more expertise on the subject than others.
2. It is a familiar situation that you successfully addressed in the past.
3. Your colleagues will accept your decision.
4. There is little time available.

The above factors should inform which decision-making process to use. The Vroom-Yetton-Jago decision model (fig. 6.2) is a decision-making tree that can help the manager to identify the appropriate process. The options could be summarized as follows:

- Autocratic: You make the decision and inform the others (A1),

or you make the decision once someone provides the needed information (A2). In this case, nobody else is involved in the decision making.

- Consultative: You make the decision, but you may individually ask for opinions (C1), or you make the decision after gathering a small group to solicit other perspectives (C2).
- Collaborative: A group makes the decision together and your role is to facilitate a consensus (G2).

Figure 6.2. The Vroom-Yetton-Jago decision model



(Source: "The Vroom-Yetton-Jago Decision Model," available at www.mindtools.com . Based on Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton, *Leadership and Decision Making*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973; and Victor H. Vroom and Arthur G. Jago, *The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988.)

If you think a group process is appropriate, the decision-making group should have a good representation of stakeholders. You should think of the following questions: Who has information that might impact my decision? Who needs to be involved in this decision in light of its implementation?

A few points need to be considered when forming a decision-making group:

- Choose no more than five to seven people—a large group slows down the process. You can still consult with others without involving them in the decision making.
- Participants should be selected on the basis of their ability to contribute, not their rank alone.
- Don't exclude those who might disagree with you—group dynamics can help work through disagreements.

Remember that the setting of meetings can influence the participants. The venue can affect the relationship between the manager and the team, and the dynamics of the discussion.

- Manager's office: Reminds everyone who is in charge and who will have the final word in the decision. Best used when the situation requires a quick decision and few people need to be consulted.
- Conference room: Conveys the message of an open and equal discussion.
- Rotating venues: Can create inclusiveness when decisions impact on a diverse group of stakeholders that need to be part of the decision-making process.
- "Off-site" location: There is a natural tendency for people to be more open and relaxed when they are out of their regular environment. Off-site venues can facilitate honesty when the participants are at different levels of the organizational hierarchy.

When it comes to organizing the meetings, the decision maker's skills of holding a series of efficient meetings are put to task.

Using a facilitator can make meetings more productive, particularly when the problem requires the input of a large number of participants and a succession of meetings. The facilitator does not take part in the decision and can keep the discussions on track, manage the time, the logistics, and manage emotions and tempers. Provided there is one in the mission, the best practices officer could be a good choice for a facilitator, especially since

he or she is immersed in the wider UN knowledge-management framework.

Basic Rules for Decision-Making Meetings

- Provide background: Participants should have a background paper or note concerning the problem, objectives, and different courses of action as articulated by the manager.
- Introduce the problem: The manager's role is to launch the discussion with a summary of the problem, the various options, and the benefits and risks of each in a neutral tone.
- Set out a timeline: The manager has to provide the deadline for getting to a decision.
- Manage the agenda: Meetings should stay on topic and not turn into an opportunity for participants to advance their own agenda.
- Keep records: Notetakers should be designated at each meeting to prepare a summary of the discussions, record decisions, and follow up action.

Generate Alternatives

Every situation has alternative options and effective managing entails spending time generating and considering alternatives. This is the step when you should gather all necessary information: ask questions; gather documents; explore past lessons from similar cases (i.e., lessons learned); seek advice from those who addressed a similar problem in the past, such as your predecessor or someone in another mission; or commission analysis if time allows.

If you are using a consultative or collaborative process, brainstorming is a common method to generate alternatives. In a brainstorming session participants informally discuss creative ideas and solutions to the problem to open up new possibilities. Given the different experiences and knowledge around the table, it can be useful to ask the participants to come up with alternative solutions from their own perspective. Everyone should be encouraged to contribute, regardless of their rank or position in the organization. Different perspectives can bring new facets of the problem to light. There should be no criticism of ideas during a brainstorm, as criticism stunts creativity and openness—the very purpose of brainstorming. Alternatives should be evaluated only at the very end of the session.

The review of the available alternatives is a tricky process. Emotions and preconceived ideas can hinder rational thinking. Humans have the tendency to filter information in a way that sup-

ports their established point of view. There is also an inclination to favor the option that is the least disruptive and most familiar. As mentioned above, this is common in large bureaucracies, which can make managers risk averse or discourage them from taking new or innovative approaches to problems.

It is important to approach the decision systematically through a dispassionate assessment of each alternative with regard to the overall objective. For this process, it can be useful to keep in mind the following factors:

- Cost: Most alternatives have some difference in costs or potential savings.
- Resources: Some alternatives might require additional staff and equipment. An alternative that relies on the recruitment of more people is always more difficult to implement, requiring additional funding and time.

- Time: Getting results faster is often necessary.
- Risks: All else equal, the less risky the alternative is, the better. Risks can be political or financial, as well as related to security and the overall reputation of the mission.
- Acceptance: All else equal, an alternative is more desirable when it is acceptable for the largest number of stakeholders, especially if their support is needed for successful implementation.
- Political considerations: Often the mission must consider local political factors, as well as the dynamics of the region, including the interests and views of other international organizations, or among members of the Security Council.
- Ethics: Decisions always need to abide by the code of ethics of the organization and relate to the mission's overall mandate.

It can be helpful to use a grid to organize your thinking. You can list your alternatives as rows on a table, and the factors to consider as columns; for example, costs, resources, time, risks, etc. You then score each alternative/factor combination, weight this score by the relative importance of the factor, and add these scores up to give an overall score for each option.

Sometimes, it can be useful to draft a brief that summarizes the alternatives and the arguments for the final decision. When decisions have important implications, the manager should always make sure that there is a record of how and why the decision was made. When time does not allow the record to be made at the time of the decision, it is best to write a note as soon as possible after the event.

Implement the Decision

Once the decision is made, the manager needs to communicate the decision and the next steps for the implementation. Duties and tasks should be assigned accordingly.

The communication, whether through an interoffice memorandum, a code cable, an administrative instruction, a policy directive, etc., should include the following:

- the objective of the decision;
- an explanation of the alternatives considered and the benefits, and risks if present, of the one chosen;
- the participants in the decision-making process;

- the list of tasks and the assignment of roles to implement the decision; and
- the time frame for implementation.

Decisions made at higher levels in the organization will often require a hierarchy of subordinate decision making until tasks at the operational level can be implemented. The chapter on project management provides tools for the implementation phase.

CASE 1

Changing a Decision Is Always Possible

On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 authorizing an international civilian and military presence in Kosovo and reaffirming the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It also placed Kosovo under an interim UN administration (UNMIK). Suddenly, the United Nations was de facto responsible for the gamut of governmental services in Kosovo, including the maintenance of law and order.

Making a Decision Unilaterally

The UN Office of Legal Affairs made a decision on its own that the legal system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would remain applicable in Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK. However, the decision soon proved unacceptable to the local population.

Tony Miller was sent by headquarters to become the legal adviser of the mission and to implement OLA's decision. "As far as I was concerned," he explains, "the United Nations had no choice but to follow the Hague Regulations of 1907. They require the 'occupying power,' in this case the United Nations, to respect the laws in force prior to the occupation. Now, how could the United Nations possibly not follow international legal standards?"

Two days after his arrival, Tony had his first meeting with the Joint Advisory Committee on Legislative Matters (JACLM), which was constituted by local lawyers and UNMIK representatives. The local lawyers threatened to stop all cooperation with UNMIK over the issue of applicable laws.

"The decision had not only upset the local judiciary but had put me at odds with the SRSG who was furious at New York for not understanding what the idea of keeping the FYR judicial system meant to the local population. A number of these laws had been discriminatory vis-à-vis the Albanian Kosovars," Tony says.

Looking for Alternatives

"It took me a few weeks to realize that this wasn't going to work and that I needed to find a solution that was acceptable to the major stakeholders—the local population. But, the idea of going against international law standards was anathema. I also had in mind the larger consequences for the United Nations," he says.

"What made me change my mind was spending time with the local lawyers and listening to their experience of living under discriminatory laws. I realized that the law couldn't be an abstract concept. It had to take the reality of people's lives into consideration. This time, I knew that I had to consult with the local judiciary to propose a solution acceptable to both the SRSG and the Office of Legal Affairs in New York."

However, any alternative solution had to take into consideration the Hague Convention of 1907. A deviation from international law carried the risk of the United Nations creating a precedent that could impact other operations.

After a few weeks of considerable negotiations, the JACLM accepted a compromise. The laws in force prior to March 22, 1989, when Kosovo had lost its autonomy would be applicable together with the regulations promulgated by the SRSG. This meant that The Hague Convention was respected. Laws promulgated by the FYR after March 22, 1989, when Kosovo lost its autonomy, could only be applied, if necessary, as long as they were consistent with eight specific international human rights conventions. This enabled UNMIK to say that no objectionable law since March 22, 1989, would remain on the books.

Tony concludes by saying, "I learned from that experience that the local legal system has to be consulted in any reform. If the proposals are too 'alien' to the local conditions and political reality, they won't be accepted and their adoption will cause more problems than they solve."

Communicating and Implementing the Decision

The Office of Legal Affairs in New York accepted the recommendation of UNMIK to endorse the consensus reached between the mission and the local judiciary. The decision was then implemented through the promulgation of various regulations at the local level.

CASE 2

Rationalizing Decision Making During the Haiti Earthquake Response

On January 12, 2010, Haiti was hit by a devastating earthquake that killed more than 200,000 people in Haiti and left 1.5 million homeless. The UN suffered the largest loss of life in its history that day with the collapse of the headquarters of its Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in Port-au-Prince. Despite the death of more than 100 UN employees, including the mission chief, Hédi Annabi, and his deputy, Luiz Carlos da Costa, the mission was able to make a significant contribution to the postearthquake rescue and relief efforts.

With the government of Haiti crippled by the earthquake, and massive amounts of assistance made available by the international community, effective coordination, prioritization, and decision making were essential to the disaster response. In part, because no process had been developed to deal with decision making during such a scenario, precious hours were lost figuring it out ad hoc. It took nearly two weeks for a mechanism to be created to respond to this critical need. In the end, MINUSTAH, in coordination with OCHA and other key partners, established a Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC).

Utilizing resources and information provided by the key partners, including the government of Haiti, the JOTC provided a common situational awareness of the prevailing security and humanitarian situation. The JOTC also became the single point of contact for requests for military or police assistance in support of humanitarian relief operations (e.g., transport and logistics support; escort and area security support; infrastructure and technical support). Rationalizing the decision-making process of the mission thus enabled country-wide coordination and avoided duplication of support efforts. Priorities were set by the humanitarian coordination mechanism—i.e., the clusters, humanitarian country team (HCT), and humanitarian coordinator (HC)—while the military and police received, validated, and prioritized requests from a single source: the JOTC. It was partly through the creation of this decision-making process that the mission, despite the depletion of its own capacity, made its greatest impact on the critical recovery efforts of the difficult weeks and months that followed.

Figure 6.3. The Joint Operations and Tasking Centre in Haiti



(Adapted from: MINUSTAH, "Joint Operations & Tasking Center: JOTC," presentation by Teresa Encarnação.)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Having a method to make a decision usually leads to a better decision.
2. Clearly define the problem and what you want to achieve, before making an important decision.
3. Select a process to make a decision based on the specifics of the problem.
4. Don't forget to take advantage of a brainstorming meeting to generate creative ideas.
5. Evaluate ideas at the very end of a brainstorm.
6. Keep in mind costs, resources, risks, acceptance, and political and ethical factors when you make a decision.
7. Keep a written record of the deliberation when possible.
8. Communicate the decision to all who might be affected by it.
9. Assign responsibilities and deadlines for implementation.
10. Remember to follow up on the implementation, as you, the manager, remain ultimately responsible for the outcomes.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Define the problem and the goal	Did I identify the problem at hand? Did I define what my solution is intended to accomplish? Did I ask "why" at least five times to try to find the source of the problem?		
Decide on a process	Is my decision of high importance? Do many people need to agree with my decision? Do I have a lot of time to make the decision? Given the answers above, did I opt for an autocratic, consultative, or collaborative decision-making process? If a group process is appropriate, did I think of whom I need to talk to? Did I identify who can provide useful information for my decision?		
Generate alternatives	Did I gather all necessary information? Did I explore lessons learned from similar cases? Did I seek advice from experts, headquarters, other missions, etc.? Did I commission analysis? Did I conduct a brainstorm for creative ideas?		
Make the decision	In reviewing the alternatives, did I consider and weigh the importance of costs, resources available, time, risks, level of acceptance among stakeholders, political factors, and ethics? Did I draft a note to summarize the alternatives and the final decision?		
Implement the decision	Did I communicate the decision? Did I clarify the tasks and responsibilities? Did I establish deadlines for implementation?		

RESOURCES

United Nations

- UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service and Gretchen Sidhu. *Intergovernmental Negotiations and Decision Making at the United Nations: A Guide*, 2nd ed. New York, 2003.

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7

TIME MANAGEMENT

TIME MANAGEMENT

Time management is about planning and exercising conscious control over the allocation of time across all activities so as to improve individual and organizational efficiency.

OVERVIEW

A common complaint among managers everywhere is that they do not have enough time in the day. In particular, a number of uncontrollable factors often frustrate the ability of managers in UN field missions to properly allocate their time. Unanticipated crises that require immediate attention are a day-to-day staple. Different time zones between headquarters and the field further complicate the matter. Priorities can shift quickly depending on needs in the field or demands from headquarters.

The introduction of continuous and instant means of communication tools like smartphones—designed to save time—sometimes do the opposite. Instead of providing more time for creative thinking and planning, instant communication and time-saving devices have created a situation where unplanned and fragmented activities, all labeled as "rush," clash with the need for managers to spend time developing plans and thinking creatively.

Effectively and efficiently organizing time is the essence of good management practice. It is an indispensible skill to achieve professional and personal goals and to increase personal productivity. Time is a finite resource distributed equally to all human beings. The whole world functions on the same twenty-four hours per day, but the way time is used and perceived is not universal. Time management can reflect personal, educational, and cultural habits.

Like most things, time management may be improved by certain skills, tools, and techniques that can be developed. But it requires self-awareness and self-discipline to develop and stick to a system that allows for the appropriate allocation of time among long-term projects, planned, and unexpected activities.

In this chapter you will learn about ways to analyze and monitor how you spend your time, work more efficiently, and improve your overall performance.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- How to set up a calendar of goals and priorities
- How and when to delegate
- How to run effective meetings
- How to avoid procrastination
- How to deal with distractions and interruptions
- How to manage your files and your paper, e-mail, and phone communications
- How to prioritize tasks and work with a to-do list

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

Goal-Based Time Planning

Any plan to allocate resources strategically must begin with an understanding of what one hopes to accomplish. Describing and defining goals and objectives can be empowering and will help you prioritize your time better. Once your goals and tasks have been specified, it makes sense to enter them into a calendar (see simplified version below) that can be reviewed and updated on a regular basis.

Figure 7.1. Defining goals and scheduling time to achieve them

Goal A: Preparation of budgets by Sept. 30, 2011

Task	Activity	Deadline	Tasking
1	Send memorandum to each section chief to request input	Feb. 1, 2010	Chief of budget to prepare draft
2	Follow up on submissions of inputs	Jan. 28, 2010	Personal assistant to follow up
3	Review of submissions	Feb. 10, 2010	Myself

Goal B: Attend high school class reunion on June 1, 2011

Task	Activity	Deadline	Tasking
1	Request leave	April 1, 2011	Myself
2	Purchase plane ticket	April 1, 2011	Myself
3	Designate and brief officer-in-charge	May 20, 2011	Myself

Goals become a guide to set up priorities and tasks to be accomplished on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. SMARTER goals[1] help managers decide whether a project should be delegated and allow them to devote more time to long-term projects or focus on the achievement of more important goals.

Four common categories of goals are organizational, work unit, career, and personal. Organizational goals are outside of the control of an individual manager. In the United Nations, these goals are mandated and need to be achieved within a fixed schedule, leaving little scope for flexibility. Examples of organizational goals in UN field missions that impact on all managers and that require careful time management include:

- preparation of the mission budget;
- preparation of reports of the Secretary-General;
- preparation of performance appraisals; and
- participation in mandatory training courses.

When preparing reports to the Security Council, the drafting can often only be carried out in a certain sequence, making efficient time management critical.

Work unit goals are the responsibility of individual managers. Managers need to continuously review work processes in light of goals to identify strengths and weakness in the way business is conducted within their unit. The time trap created by a proliferation of nonessential tasks must be tackled. A first step is for a manager to define SMARTER goals to provide direction, vision, and a sense of common purpose, and to give everyone in the work unit a clear understanding of what is expected from each staff member.

Unlike most work unit goals, career goals are specific to each individual. They are essential in an environment where mobility is encouraged, yet is often a challenge. A goal-oriented approach will translate into time set aside to acquire new skills, refresh old ones, keep a network of professional contacts, and keep looking for new opportunities. An ad hoc or unplanned approach can easily lead to career stagnation.

Planning one's career requires assessing one's career progress, potential obstacles to advancement, skills needed to advance, and an occasional reassessment of whether to stay in one's cur-

1 SMARTER stands for specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, time-bound, ethical, and recorded. For a full description of SMARTER goals see the chapters on planning and project management.

rent line of work. Spending time to answer these questions and clarify your career goals will guide you in developing a path to meet your aspirations.

The Curious Case of Kofi Annan

Perhaps one of the most famous examples of scaling great heights through steady career advancement is the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In 1962, a 24-year old Annan started his career as an associate administrative and budget officer with the World Health Organization in Geneva. Thirty-five years later, the quiet man who began his UN career as a P1 was elected by the Security Council to be the Secretary-General of the UN. Maybe as a child he had the dream of becoming Secretary-General, maybe not; but from a young age he had a vision of his professional life, and how he wanted to contribute to public service.

His time was as limited as any manager's. It is unlikely however, that he filled his days with unimportant or mindless work. He knew how to concentrate on the important tasks that related to his goals and thus used his time judiciously. We can safely assume that he did not procrastinate or spend hours answering e-mails that could have been dealt with by someone else. Nor did he ever lose sight of the long-term goals he had set out for himself.

In field operations, where separation from family and friends is part of the work environment, and the separation between personal and professional may not be as clear-cut, personal goals and personal time need to be factored into the equation as well. Personal goals should be identified and prioritized, and time should be set aside to reach them.

Transforming Goals into Activities

Breaking down goals into activities that are manageable is the first step toward achieving them. Each goal identified by category needs to be considered, and the list of tasks required to reach the goals must be articulated. Each task can be classified by its estimated time frame (urgent or not) and its order of importance (important or not). This creates four categories of tasks:

- tasks that are important and urgent
- tasks that are important but not urgent
- tasks that are not important but urgent
- tasks that are neither important nor urgent

These categories of tasks are presented visually in table 7.1 below. Managers have no choice but to take care of activities in quad-

rant A (important and urgent). In a field mission these would include a variety of mandated tasks. The key determinant of long-term success, however, is the amount of time spent on activities that fall into quadrant B. These are activities in support of important goals, but it remains up to each individual to develop a time system to spend time on them. These are often the goals that are neglected. The amount of time spent on activities related to quadrants C and D should be minimized or eliminated.

Table 7.1. Prioritizing goals and activities

	URGENT	NOT URGENT
IMPORTANT	**A: (Do it now)** Crises Pressing problems Deadline-driven projects	**B: (Schedule time for this)** Prevention Planning Building relationships Empowerment True leisure activities
NOT IMPORTANT	**C: (Quick fix)** Some mails Some meetings Some phone calls Some trivia activities	**D: (Ignore)** Busy work Some mails and phone calls Some meetings Some pleasure activities

(Table adapted from Steven Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.)

This table can help you assess the priority of your goals. It can also assist you in determining which tasks to delegate in order to have more time for activities in quadrant B. Performance evaluations cannot be delegated, but parts of report writing often can be delegated and provide you with space to pursue other, often neglected, objectives that are also important.

Using an Activity Log

The reality of time allocation is often a far cry from how you would

like to spend your time. Setting up goals and listing the activities required to achieve them is a guide that needs to be compared to the way time is actually being spent on a daily basis, as recorded in an activity log (fig. 7.2).

An activity log should not be confused with a diary. An activity log is a rigorous exercise that requires keeping a detailed track record of how your time is spent throughout the day. The recording needs to be done for a few days, and preferably for a full week. An activity log is most useful if it covers both personal and professional time. The recording should take place as you go, not at the end of the day

The activity log will pinpoint the "time robbers" that do not contribute to any of your important goals. It can help you decide on what activities can be delegated or eliminated all together (e.g., activities in quadrants C and D). The next step is to focus on understanding why so much time is spent on less important activities.

There are five time robbers that turn up on most managers' lists:

- assuming the work of subordinates
- attending meetings with no objective
- travel
- distractions
- paper disorganization

Supervisors sometimes feel that it will take less time for them to accomplish a task than to spend the time to explain what is required to a subordinate and to follow up on implementation. It is easy to fill a working day by doing other people's work. This leads to a prime management failure: lack of delegation and performance management.

Figure 7.2. Example of an activity log

START TIME	ACTIVITY	DURATION (MINS.)	PRIORITY	COMMENTS
7:30	Exercise	30	B	Well-being
8:10	Arrived at office and checked e-mail	20	C	Can be delegated to assistant?
8:30	Daily meetings with chiefs	40	C/D	Is daily meeting required? Would every other day be sufficient?
9:10	Meeting with SRSG	20	A	Mandated
9:30	Call family back home	15	A	Indispensible
9:45	Check e-mails again	15	D	Should be limited to once a day
10:00	Staff member dropped in to provide briefing on a crisis in another division	30	D	There is nothing I can do about the issue; should be limited to 5-minute briefing
10:30	Looked for background paper required for policy meeting	10	D	Need to organize file system so that papers can be found immediately

Delegation

Delegation is the act of assigning authority and responsibility to another person, normally a subordinate, to carry out specific activities. The person who delegates a task remains accountable for the outcome. Delegation empowers subordinates to make decisions and can motivate them into action.

Micromanagement is not effective delegation. It occurs when a manager provides too much input, direction, and review of del-

egated work. This leads to frustration on both sides, and a waste of time for all the involved parties.

Your ability to delegate can partly be identified through your activity log. Your delegation skills need improvement if you see some of these warning signs:

- working overtime on minutia or repetitive tasks;
- a backload of incomplete projects;
- too much time spent checking in on subordinates;
- too many interruptions from staff asking questions about simple tasks; or
- recurrent conflict between staff.

Guidelines for Effective Delegation

- Instructions and guidelines need to be clear. Any ambiguity should be discussed and clarified.
- Measurable standards that are realistic should be used. Staff need to know what will be the measure of success.
- Deadlines for the completion of projects need to be discussed and agreed upon.
- Open communication is a critical factor in delegation. The staff need to know that the manager is available for guidance.
- Delegation has to match the level of competence of the staff, reflect their job description, and their position in the work unit.
- Motivation and commitment will increase and staff will feel a sense of ownership when a project or a task can be delegated entirely, not just a small piece of it.
- Delegation should go hand in hand with giving credit and providing exposure to the staff entrusted with the responsibility of the project.
- Delegation is not abdication. Delegation requires regular monitoring as the manager remains accountable for the success of the project.

Some assignments, however, benefit from not being delegated. Where appropriate, managers need to retain responsibility for the implementation of things like performance evaluations, disciplinary and conduct issues, strategic visioning, or certain politically-sensitive tasks.

Meetings

The need to exchange information, coordinate, and empower means that an entire workday can be spent in a whirlwind of

meetings. Meetings are a necessary evil, but well-run meetings can be not only useful but motivating. The problem is that many meetings are poorly run or held for no pressing reason. In large, risk-averse organizations, meetings are often held as substitutes for making decisions.

When you call for a meeting, you bear the responsibility for ensuring that the meeting is well organized, efficient, and productive.

Six Keys to a Well-Organized Meeting

1. Agenda—circulate in advance to allow for preparation
2. Purpose—have a clear objective
3. Timeframe—should be respected
4. Focus—keep meetings on topic
5. Inclusiveness—invite participants that can contribute something and provide them with an opportunity to speak
6. Note-taking—summarize the main points of the meetings in a short summary note that is distributed to all participants afterward

You can often feel obliged to attend every meeting to which you are invited. With the exception of regular or mandatory meetings, you can save time by staying away from nonessential meetings (i.e., where you have nothing at stake, cannot contribute, or have only been invited as a courtesy). Make sure to communicate your decision and consider sending a replacement, or ask for the meeting summary.

Travel

In the UN, travel is part of the job. Managers lose a lot of time in transit. Jet lag and fatigue add a further strain on productivity. But travel time can often be used productively—background reading can be done, papers can be written, etc. Try to think of time spent travelling as an opportunity for activities to advance one's goals or activities in quadrant B: important but not urgent.

Distractions

E-mail, the Internet, phone calls, and unannounced visitors are all distractions that can diminish productivity or prevent focused work. Distractions shift attention away from the important tasks of the day. A study on the cost of shifting attention concluded

that it reduces a company's efficiency by 20 to 40 percent.[2] Ideally, slots of time should be scheduled to check e-mail and have phone conversations. Visitors should be kindly asked to request an appointment.

Information overload is a major distraction. With the development of electronically available information, this problem has become even more serious. As a manager you should be in control of information rather than the other way around. Here are some tips to avoid distractions:

- Schedule time to read and answer e-mail.
- Clean your inbox by archiving e-mails on a regular basis.
- Do not answer e-mail that you are just cc'd on unless the issue really concerns you.
- Forward e-mail to members of your team with clear instructions (e.g., "FYI," "for your immediate action," "please advise," etc.).

The lack of an adequate file management system is an astonishing time robber. If your activity log shows that you waste time searching for information that was already provided to you, you need to develop a better paper and electronic filing system. Also, remember that computer hard drives can easily crash. It takes little time to have a reliable backup system, while it can take days to reconstitute an important electronic file.

Procrastination

Procrastination is the number one enemy of time management. To procrastinate is to defer or delay an important action by doing other activities of less importance. Procrastination not only reduces your productivity and overall performance, it can be a major source of stress and anxiety.

Common reasons for procrastination include coping with unpleasant or uninteresting tasks, fear of change and failure, or a feeling that the task is overwhelming. Reducing or eliminating procrastination is indispensible to taking control of one's time. Analysis of the activity log will help you identify patterns of procrastination and help you change the underlying behavior.

To move beyond procrastination:

- Make a detailed list that breaks down an assignment into a

2 Melissa Raffoni, "Are You Spending Your Time the Right Way?," *Harvard Management Update* 11, No. 7 (July 2006).

number of clear steps or subactivities.

- Schedule time for the task when there is little chance for interruption, usually first thing in the day.
- Schedule a set amount of time for the task and schedule a task that you enjoy right after it.
- Request help when you feel that you lack the knowledge required to accomplish the task.
- Impose artificial deadlines on your work that must be respected (e.g., schedule a meeting with a superior to discuss a report you're drafting, so you are forced to complete it prior to the meeting).

Scheduling

To master time management requires dedication and discipline. Once the important tasks, professional and personal, have been identified and prioritized, it is necessary to commit to a schedule and to support the schedule with detailed to-do lists.

Bearing in mind the four categories, tasks in quadrant A (urgent and important) and quadrant B (not urgent but still important) should dominate the schedule, while some time should also be kept for quadrant C tasks (urgent but not important). By now, quadrant D—neither urgent nor important—should be eliminated.

How to Build an Effective Schedule

- Tasks in quadrant A need to be scheduled first, both professional and personal activities. These tasks should be given time slots in the coming days, weeks, and months.
- Tasks in quadrant B need to be scheduled as far in advance as possible.
- Tasks in quadrant C: Devote only a part of your day for these tasks to allow time for unexpected crises and events.
- Repetitive tasks: Paperwork, e-mails, and phone calls are best dealt with when clear slot times are dedicated to them, instead of handling these tasks as they come up throughout the day.
- To-do list: Supplement the calendar with a to-do list that should be reviewed on a daily basis, preferably at the start and at the end of each day. Today, most managers rely on electronic appointment calendars that have to-do list applications.
- Timeframe: Each project should have an estimated total number of weeks, days, and hours required to accomplish it.
- Uncompleted priority tasks: Should be rescheduled as a priority.

CASE 1

The Unprepared Meeting

For a week in September, Nicolas had to fill in as head of the section while his boss attended a conference out of the country. As the acting head of section, he was now responsible for conducting the weekly coordination meeting among the staff in his section. Given the large load of new tasks he was now responsible for, in addition to his usual responsibilities, he did not give much thought to preparing for the weekly meeting.

When the time came to hold the meeting, a disappointing number of colleagues failed to show up on time. Nicolas, however, pressed on and began to run through the key issues facing the team that week. Conscious of his boss's tendency to be the only one to speak in meetings, he opened up the conversation so everyone could report on the key issues for the week.

A few important issues came out, of which Nicolas took note. However, the staff also took the opportunity to vent some of their frustrations about the lack of support they receive, and the conversation quickly turned away from those issues Nicolas had intended the meeting to cover. He patiently waited until the conversation ended and went through the other issue he remembered to discuss with the group. As a result of the digression, though, the meeting finished thirty minutes later than intended, and he was now going to skip lunch or be late to his next meeting.

The next week, Nicolas's boss returned from her conference and asked for a run-down of the weekly section meeting. Nicolas had taken a few notes during the meeting, but did not have a comprehensive account of the discussion, since he was actively participating, and had not designated a notetaker. He also realized that he had forgotten to brief the staff on the state of the latest report of the Secretary-General, the inputs that were required, and the deadlines, something his boss had specifically asked him to do.

The section head reminded Nicolas that she always prepares a written agenda prior to any meeting. This helps her remember each point she wants to cover and keep the conversation focused. A focused conversation is more likely to end on schedule than one without an agenda. The section head also has her assistant send out a reminder e-mail a day before each section meeting to remind all staff of the meeting time, location, and agenda topics. Finally, she has someone in the group take on the role of secretary to record the meeting minutes and e-mail them to the participants for comment directly after the meeting. In this way, no important points of the conversation are lost, and everyone understands the next steps and actions that had been agreed on.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Enter goals and objectives into a calendar once they have been identified.
2. Prioritize your time by defining SMARTER goals.
3. Focus on important tasks and weed out time killers.
4. Avoid micromanagement and learn to delegate to have more time for important tasks.
5. When organizing a meeting, always make sure to have an objective, an agenda, define a timeframe, keep the focus, be inclusive and careful about the format and size, and assign a notetaker.
6. Use periods of travel to catch up on important reading and other productive activities.
7. Manage your communications to minimize disruption, for example by allocating time slots to answer correspondence and make phone calls.
8. Set up a filing system, both hard copy and electronically (with backup), to ensure you have quick access to information, whenever needed.
9. Be aware of the time wasted through procrastination, and take active steps to reduce or eliminate it.
10. Build a schedule around your goals and objectives with detailed to-do lists for the various tasks, depending on their importance and urgency.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Organizing	Do I prioritize those activities and tasks (urgent and important) that are required to achieve my goals?		
	Do I keep a calendar of tasks, a daily or weekly activity log and to-do lists?		
	Do I run effective meetings with an objective, agenda, timeframe, and notetaker?		
	Do I have an effective filing system, both hard copy and electronically?		
Delegating	Do I know which tasks to delegate—and then empower and give credit to my staff? Do I know which tasks it is better not to delegate?		
	Am I perceived by my staff as a micromanager?		
Avoiding distraction	Am I able to say "no" to invitations to certain meetings or unannounced visits when my time is better used elsewhere?		
	Do I allocate slots of time to check e-mail and make phone calls?		
	Do I know what the causes of my procrastination are?		

RESOURCES

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8

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

Knowledge management is the process or group of processes by which organizations capture, analyze, and share the experience and knowledge of its staff. Properly executed, it ensures that the right people have the right information at the right time. It facilitates problem solving, saves time, assists planning, and influences policy and guidance development. It fosters learning and improvement in your team and in those that come after you.

OVERVIEW

United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions have evolved into global, complex undertakings. The range of different activities performed and the need to employ resources efficiently require a systematic approach to the way in which operations are carried out. Thousands of similar tasks happen simultaneously in missions throughout the world, and although context varies from mission to mission, lessons emerge on a daily basis that are broadly applicable. Field missions have much to gain from sharing what works best (commonly referred to as "best practices" or "good practices"), applying lessons learned elsewhere, connecting specialized staff across the UN system, and being able to reference a consistent body of tested methods for carrying out tasks. Knowledge management (KM) helps to develop a disciplined approach to capturing, analyzing, sharing, and using practical information. KM fits into a broader learning cycle within the UN: relevant information gathered from the field informs policy and guidance, while subsequent knowledge transfer (training) and the application of policy and guidance on the ground feed back into the development of revised guidance as demonstrated in figure 8.1.

Knowledge sharing within and between UN field missions has the added advantage of allowing missions to fill guidance gaps due to limited capacity at headquarters. Field mission staff come from varied cultural and professional backgrounds, and knowledge sharing across staff and components of a mission can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of certain activities. It promotes continuity where there is high staff turnover, and disseminates expertise through information sharing and training. Sharing knowledge is an opportunity for all managers to contribute to the development of future guidance and policy.

Figure 8.1. Knowledge management and the UN learning cycle

knowledge management tools:

- facilitate learning and sharing of good practices and lessons learned;
- help you avoid repeating past mistakes;
- save time by making knowledge and resources easily accessible;
- facilitate networking with people who can support your goals;
- help solve problems by utilizing the correct knowledge.

This chapter highlights the importance of KM in the achievement of individual and organizational goals. It describes practical tools and techniques that support the day-to-day activities of field staff in the creation, identification, collection, and organization of knowledge. While this chapter is focused on practical approaches for the individual, it is important to recognize that KM requires a supporting culture (often organization-wide), enabled by clear expectations, processes, leadership, and accountability, as well as appropriate systems and adequate technology.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- Why KM is important and relevant to your job
- How to capture and share experience
- How to access and use existing UN KM tools
- How to select the most adequate KM tool

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

Turning tacit knowledge (experiential) into explicit knowledge (often written but also including lessons-learned workshops, etc.) is a fundamental KM process. Organizations, for lack of a better system, often rely on word of mouth or "learning on the job" approaches to share knowledge; however, these require face-to-face communication and significant time, limiting efficiency, impact, and increasing dependency on specific individuals. In UN field missions in particular, high turnover and vacancy rates make it impossible to rely solely on word of mouth to retain important information. Documenting experiences, processes, and "the way we do things" can help:

- retain information and develop institutional memory, reducing organizational reliance on specific individuals;
- communicate and share information more clearly;
- store an idea or specific details about how a task was completed.

The term "knowledge" is broadly applied, but should be differentiated from that which is just information. Reports often merely contain information (e.g., a shortage of equipment, the occurrence of an incident, etc.) rather than knowledge (e.g., how the incident was addressed and what was learned from this approach). It is always more challenging to capture knowledge than information. The below diagram differentiates knowledge from data and information.

Figure 8.2. Differentiating data, information, and knowledge



Knowledge can be seen as *tacit* or *explicit*. When knowledge is considered tacit it is intangible and impermanent (e.g., knowledge relayed in a telephone conversation). On the other hand, explicit knowledge can be physically stored, distributed, seen, and touched. Table 8.1 below provides examples of tacit and explicit knowledge:

Table 8.1. Differentiating between tacit and explicit knowledge

Tacit	Explicit
Conversations Experiences Language Relationships Ideas	Structured briefings, moderated conversations at workshops Printed documents & CD-ROMs Manuals Websites Process diagrams

Knowledge Management Techniques and Tools

The greatest challenge to effective knowledge sharing is not inadequate technology, but rather human nature. KM requires a change in organizational culture (of sharing, rather than retain-

ing, information), and it is therefore essential that subject matter experts, process experts, as well as technology experts work together toward devising effective KM strategies. Although technology can be a critical enabler of KM—providing the means to create, store, organize, and share information—it should not be the primary driver of a KM strategy. Table 8.2 below identifies various KM tools and techniques and aligns them with four knowledge processes.

Table 8.2. Knowledge management processes and tools

Knowledge Process	Examples of knowledge tools and techniques
Capture/store	Documents, databases, picture albums, videos, diagrams, recordings, websites, blogs
Share	Conversations, meetings, documents, e-mails, text messages, tweets, websites
Identify	File names and structures, databases, stakeholder analyses, networking, websites, all communication, indexes, search engines
Create	Documentation, websites, analyses, experiences, conversations, understanding

Organizations rely on specialization—creating teams and structures that develop specific skills and procedures to complete activities effectively and efficiently. As a result, specialization creates interdependencies between groups or teams of people, increasing the need for effective communication and collaboration.

As shown in table 8.3, a number of tools and techniques are used at different times during knowledge management processes—documents, stakeholder maps, debriefs, communities of practice, e-mails, and knowledge bases, etc. Sometimes variations of these or organization-specific tools and techniques are used.

Table 8.3. When to use what tools

Tool/ technique	Description	Process	Before	During	After
Critical knowledge documents	Agendas, minutes, handover notes, end-of-assign-ment reports, after-action reviews, surveys of practice and lessons learned	Capture, store, share	X	X	X
Stakeholder mapping	Where is the knowledge, who are my knowledge partners?	Identify, share	X	X	
Debriefing	Capturing experience and learning	Create, capture			X
Communities of practice	Leveraging expertise and fostering new ideas	Identify, create, share		X	
Knowledge bases	Building and accessing knowledge bases	Identify, share, store	X	X	X

Stakeholder Mapping

A stakeholder is anyone who affects or can be affected by your organization's activities or projects. As demonstrated in figure 2 overleaf, stakeholder mapping can help you understand who is around you and, importantly, what knowledge they have and are responsible for managing.

Figure 8.3. Example of a stakeholder map



Debriefing

A debriefing is a tool to capture the experience of an individual or group after completing an exercise. It allows the person or group to reflect on the process, outcomes achieved, and identify improvements and good practices. For particularly stressful situations or experiences, the debrief process can reduce tension and stress by providing a constructive mechanism to talk or write about how the person or group feels and about the impact the experience had on their work. Debriefs can vary from a one-on-one verbal debrief to a written or published report and are typically facilitated by a manager or team leader. Best practice officers can also facilitate debriefs, for example through after-action reviews (AAR). Common elements across these types of debriefs include a review of the process or steps completed, of who did what, and of outputs and outcomes. Project debriefs also comprise an identification of positive elements and strengths, as well as of areas for improvement.

Sample Debriefing Questions

- What did we want to achieve?
- What was achieved?
- What worked well? Why?
- What could be improved or completed differently? What impact do you think this will have?
- What circumstances were not anticipated?
- Were the mandated/program/project goals attained? If not, what changes need to be made to meet goals in the future?

Community of Practice

A community of practice (CoP) is a group of people who share an interest, skill, or profession, and who are active practitioners. Communities of practice can be informal or formal ways of working together, identifying common solutions, and sharing good practice and ideas. In the context of the UN, CoPs take the form of online platforms that bring together practitioners across missions. They are often moderated by a facilitator who can encourage conversations, follow up on queries, and upload interesting articles and links. CoPs often become dormant without a good facilitator.

There are many communities of practice relevant to the work of UN field missions. The UN has already developed a number of CoPs for various types of specialties (security-sector reform, DDR, etc.), but other CoPs also bring together multiple organizations on a similar topic of interest, such as the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL) or the Stabilization and Peacebuilding Community of Practice (SP-CoP). CoPs work when members actively use them, and there are benefits for field managers in making use of this tool:

- A CoP provides an environment (virtual or face-to-face) that connects people and encourages the development and sharing of new ideas and strategies (i.e., knowledge creation).
- CoPs reduce time by supporting faster problem solving, reducing the duplication of effort, and providing easy access to expertise.

Knowledge Bases

Knowledge bases allow data, information, and knowledge to be organized, stored, and easily accessed. Examples of knowledge bases are databases, FAQs (a list of frequently asked questions), intranets, and wikis—i.e., informal, group-edited websites that make it easy to collect large amounts of information on a range of related subjects. Knowledge bases can be public or private, paper-based or electronic. Private knowledge bases could be an organization's collection of hard-copy documents, or an electronic database, such as an intranet.

Getting the Basics of KM

There are a few guiding principles that will ensure you are making the most of your knowledge management efforts. Whether creating a template, contributing to a community of practice, organizing a presentation, or participating in a workshop, ask yourself whether the knowledge that you are planning to collect and share is relevant, practical, replicable, personal, and followed up on.[1]

- **Relevant**: It should be up to date and current. Focus ideally on new initiatives or involvement in new processes that others may wish to replicate, or on mistakes that others should avoid repeating.
- **Practical**: Remember that the UN is a practice-based organization. The knowledge that you share will potentially be translated into future projects and processes. The emphasis should therefore be on sharing practical experience and lessons. Wherever possible, try to back up recommendations and advice with concrete experience and an impartial and unbiased view of what worked and what did not.
- **Replicable**: Examples of good practice are often heavily context dependent, and so are mistakes. Explaining the context (political, security, socioeconomic, etc.) and the various actors involved helps others judge whether replicating the project, activity, or process in another setting is likely to yield similar results, or whether certain conditions could be created before attempting replication.
- **Personal**: Ideally the knowledge you share should be based on something you have directly experienced or witnessed, not something you have heard about second- or thirdhand.

1 Adapted from the United Nations Development Programme, "Knowledge Management Toolkit for the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Practice Area," March 2007.

If you are not writing about your own experiences, then consider whether you are the best person to carry out the work. It may be better to provide support to others to record their own experiences directly.

- **Followed up**: Contributing to a knowledge management process or drafting and disseminating a knowledge product is only the beginning of a process. It is important to follow up to ensure that lessons learned and recommendations have been received, understood, and acted on by your target audience. Good practice changes quickly in crisis prevention and recovery and it is essential to ensure that KM fits into a broader learning cycle consisting of information collected and analyzed that will go back into the system as knowledge to inform future policy and guidance.

Resources Available for Knowledge Management in the UN System[2]

For the purpose of knowledge sharing, the resources and tools shown in table 8.4 below have been developed and deployed across UN field missions and headquarters. These templates and tools form a "best practices toolbox" maintained by DPKO/DFS. Although the DPA Guidance and Learning Unit (GLU) is separate from the DPKO Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS), the KM tools used by both in field missions are similar.

Templates and communities of practice can be accessed through DPKO and DPA's intranets, as well as the Policy and Practice Database (www.unprh.unlb.org). The use of the templates ensures consistency in the capture of good practices and lessons learned and appropriate management of confidential information. The use of standard formats also facilitates the analysis of issues for follow up at mission and headquarters level.

2 The tools and roles outlined in this section have been adapted from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "Policy: Knowledge Sharing," May 2009.

Table 8.4. UN resources for knowledge management

Tool	Description	Support
End-of-assignment reports	Personal accounts of lessons learned in the implementation of mandates and on the department or team's institutional capacity to carry out mandated tasks.	Created by field staff—templates available on intranets and from DPKO best practice officer.
Handover note	Created by staff members before leaving their post (temporarily or permanently) to assist a successor. Unlike end-of-assignment reports, handover notes are strictly factual and do not contain analysis, assessment, or evaluation.	Created by field staff—templates available via intranet and from DPKO best practice officer.
After-action review (AAR)	An analysis of an action, activity, or project to allow a team to reflect on what happened, why it happened, what was learned, what follow-up action should be taken, and how it can be done better in the future. An AAR can be a routine part of any action, activity, or project with a view toward improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization in the future.	Created by field staff—templates available via intranet and from DPKO best practice officer.
Survey of practice	A snapshot of how peacekeeping practitioners carry out a certain function or activity. Used to provide options, lessons, and good practices to missions on issues that other missions have dealt with before, but for which there is no official guidance.	Created by HQ staff—accessed via intranet and from DPKO best practice officer.
Community of practice	Online networks where members can ask each other questions, exchange information, build up a shared library of useful resources contribute to policy development and find counterparts in other field missions.	Accessed via intranet and from DPKO best practice officer.
Lessons-learned study	An in-depth study on a specific activity, theme, or functional area, undertaken either by DPKO personnel or external experts.	Accessed via intranet and from DPKO best practice officer.

Confidentiality requirements may govern the dissemination and handling of some information shared through the above-mentioned UN tools. Unless specific instructions with regards to the status of a document are received from missions or the authors, sensitivity status should be determined by headquarters before documents are made available to a wider UN audience.

Table 8.5. Knowledge management roles and responsibilities in peacekeeping missions

Roles	Responsibilities
All staff	Share specialized knowledge through participation in communities of practice and draft reports using the best practices toolbox Complete handover notes Complete end-of-assignment reports Consult best practices resources and integrate into daily work
Best practice officer (BPO)	Trains staff on the use of available knowledge management tools Promotes and facilitates the creation and sharing of reports Encourages and provides access to communities of practice and the intranet
DPKO HQ	Promotes knowledge sharing across DPKO peacekeeping missions Coordinates the activities of best practice officers Develops and maintains knowledge-sharing systems, including tools and templates, communities of practice, and the best practices and guidance database on the intranet
Field mission management	Promotes knowledge sharing within all areas of the mission through the creation of a conducive environment and the establishment of supportive policies Ensures follow up on mission-specific recommendations contained in best practices toolbox reports

More generally, different staff members have different roles to play when it comes to managing and sharing knowledge in UN field missions. Table 8.5 below outlines who is responsible for what.

CASE 1

Arriving in a Mission as DDR Program Officer

You just arrived in the mission, quickly met with the DDR section and its chief/director in mission headquarters during your "check-in." You were then immediately deployed to a regional office, where the person you are replacing—previously heading the DDR program there—left a month prior without having completed a handover note. There is also no "start-up kit" waiting for you, and the induction training you received in mission headquarters upon arrival did not go into much detail about the DDR program in this region.

The first step is to meet with your team in the regional office and find any existing documentation (hard copies and electronic files) left by your predecessor, starting with the organizational chart for your office, key mission documents (RBB, ISF, mission work plans), but also documents that will help you better understand your job—e.g., section work plan and budget, project proposals, the country's constitution, essential decrees, ceasefire agreements, peace accords, recent reports, minutes from key meetings, evaluations of projects, talking points, PPT presentations, etc.

Make sure you know what is already there by talking to both your international and national colleagues in your office, as well as other offices within your regional headquarters starting with representatives of the political, civil affairs, and human rights sections, as well as the force, UNPOLs, and the different components of mission support, etc. Ask many questions and listen to as many people as possible. In the absence of a detailed handover note, this might help you avoid reinventing the wheel. Often, national colleagues have been there the longest and have great institutional knowledge, in addition to essential local knowledge. Once you know what you have, you can deduce what is missing, and a simple cordial e-mail or phone call to colleagues from the DDR section in mission headquarters, particularly if you met them in person during your check-in, could get you the information or document you are looking for.

A second step, once you have familiarized yourself with your new office and the program, is to search for existing knowledge and guidance that may be useful for your day-to-day work. You of course know of the IDDRS website (www.unddr.org), which includes DDR templates from past programs, but what you are looking for may not be there. A good place to look will be the mission intranet, from where you will be able to sign up for a

community of practice (CoP) on DDR (where you can ask questions by e-mail to other practitioners across UN missions), but also access after-action reviews, end-of-assignment reports, and best-practice reports from other missions. In some exceptional cases, you may need to contact your desk officer (normally done through your DDR section chief in mission headquarters, who may delegate) in UN headquarters DPKO/OROSLI for support. Do not limit yourself to the UN, the Internet is now an incredible source of information, just make sure to know what you are reading and where it came from.

Now that you have gotten started, make sure you and your office keep well-organized paper and electronic archives so that the next person does not have to go through what you just did. Also, when what your program is doing or has done is worth sharing with others, talk to your supervisor and/or the best practice officer in the mission about capturing this knowledge in an appropriate format for sharing with others beyond the mission, in other missions, and in headquarters. Not only will this help disseminating a useful innovation or good practice, but you may also get invited somewhere to present on it.

CASE 2

How the First QIPs Policy Was Developed and Subsequently Revised

The idea for quick impact projects (QIPs) was first put forward in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (i.e., the Brahimi Report), which recommended that a small percentage of a mission's first-year budget should be made available to the SRSG to fund QIPs. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations subsequently supported this recommendation. By 2006, QIPs had become a well-known part of UN peacekeeping missions and anecdotal evidence showed it to be—at the very least—a useful entry point for missions to build confidence with their local counterparts in fulfillment of the mission mandate. In June 2006, the General Assembly emphasized the need for a comprehensive DPKO Policy Directive on QIPs, including on resource allocations (A/RES/60/266).

Based on this, the DPKO Best Practice Section designed a survey of practice to collect the experiences of peacekeeping practitioners with QIPs across different UN field missions. Although there had only been limited guidance at the time on how to design and manage a QIP, a number of lessons were already available from practice that subsequently informed the first version of the

DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on QIPs, approved in February 2007. The policy clearly defined for the first time the purpose of QIPs: "small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population...used by UN peacekeeping operations to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation." The policy also laid out the minimum financial procedures that must be followed for QIPs. Guidelines on the implementation of QIPs followed the next year, with more detail and codified good practice on the QIPs' management structures and cycle. Finally, a QIPs-specific program management training was piloted in 2011, and will now be held on an annual basis.

Despite the 2007 policy, many challenges in the implementation phase of QIPs remained. This prompted DPKO Best Practices, together with Civil Affairs and DFS, to launch a larger lessons-learned study with a view to identifying those challenges, proposing solutions for addressing them and codifying best practices. The study was based on an analysis of survey responses from QIP managers of approximately 442 projects completed in the past year across nine missions, ranging from the installation of solar-powered public lighting in Haiti to the rehabilitation of policing border posts in Liberia. In addition, qualitative inputs were collected from discussions with heads of Civil Affairs at their annual workshop in June 2010, as well as with QIPs program managers brought to New York in October 2010 for a pilot training program, "Quick Impact Project Management for Peacekeepers." The report also reflected a synthesis of evaluations conducted by missions, a comprehensive review of mission end-of-assignment reports, a review of all QIPs-related discussion in the Civil Affairs Network, and significant inputs from the working level (via Civil Affairs and Mission Support).

Continuing the knowledge management cycle, the DPKO/DFS Best Practices lessons-learned study was published in January 2011 and became the basis for implementing the formal review of the QIPs Policy Directive and Guidelines, as requested by member states, and subsequently for a revised version of the QIPs Policy Directive.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Every member of a peacekeeping operation has a role to play in managing knowledge.
2. Useful knowledge is out there, but you have to know where to look for it.
3. Data and information becomes knowledge when it useful (succinct, analytical, and actionable).
4. Choose the KM tool you think is most likely to be used by others (i.e., e-mail or CoP may sometimes be more timely and widely read than a more formal report).
5. Follow up on reports and reviews to make sure the lessons have been understood correctly and utilized.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Utilizing KM resources	Do I make regular use of UNDPKO intranet resources? Do I have sufficient interaction with the mission's best practice officer? Do I look to other sections or missions to find solutions to problems? Do I utilize expert knowledge networks or communities of practice?		
Capture	Do I have processes in place to document good team practices and lessons learned? Does my team submit after-action reviews, end-of-assignment reports, and handover notes?		
Share	Do I routinely document and share how problems have been solved in my team? Do I make an effort to share knowledge across components of the mission?		

RESOURCES

United Nations

- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Lessons Learned Studies. Peacekeeping Resource Hub. Available at: www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/library.aspx?ot=2&scat=305&menukey=_4_2_4 .
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Further Reading

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9

MANAGING SECURITY

MANAGING SECURITY

Security management is about taking responsibility for, and actions toward, ensuring the safety of yourself and your colleagues.

OVERVIEW

The responsibilities of a manager in field operations are many, and no one is perfect. Wrong hiring decisions, sloppy program management, incomplete planning—all such flaws may become the stuff of legend many years later and looked back on with some indulgence. But where the responsibility for the safety of one's colleagues is concerned, there is no margin for error, and negligence, poor judgment, or reckless decisions will never be forgotten.

One of the readings recommended in this chapter is the report by an independent panel of experts, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, that in part examines how the United Nations lost seventeen staff members in a terrorist attack on its office in Algiers in December, 2007. It describes a culture of bureaucratic "passivity," recalling how a similar attack in Baghdad led to twenty-two dead (with lessons only partially learned), and it singles out numerous individuals, at headquarters and in Algiers, who failed to live up to their responsibilities. Disciplinary action followed, but this did not bring closure—and the many loved ones left behind, as well as the people who were wounded or traumatized in these attacks, still suffer. Clearly, staff security and safety is a manager's primary responsibility, trumping any programmatic or political tasks.

Because a security system is only as robust as its weakest link, the chain of responsibility affects all field staff and managers at every level. Internalizing the security procedures, being familiar with the equipment, taking no disproportionate risks, and communicating effectively are every manager's responsibility. This chapter speaks to the protection of staff, as well as ways to reduce risks to your own security while in the field.

This chapter should in no way be seen as a substitute for the UN's own guidance, standards, or training on safety and security.

Have you ever...

- gone on a field mission without having made a will?
- skipped a security briefing, thinking it would be boring and cumbersome?
- pretended that you understood how something like a handheld radio worked, in order not to look stupid?
- faced a sudden power failure in your hotel, and realized that you did not pack a flashlight?
- left your medicine in your checked-in luggage?
- skipped a security radio roll call, because you did not want to sit and wait for it?
- wondered what you would do if you were kidnapped?

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

Keeping Others Safe

Security management has little to do with brawn—it is mostly about brains. Over the years, and often at high cost, governmental and nongovernmental international organizations have learned quite a bit about the overall concepts, as well as the operational techniques, required to maintain a secure environment. Three core components stand out: the need to understand the context of one's work; the need to adopt a strategy that meets one's particular mission or mandate; and the need to develop and implement both preventive and reactive security plans.

Situational analysis and threat assessment

When working in a field context, it is important to understand that you may have a completely different image of your organization than the people around you. That you have a well-meaning, internationally lawful mandate from the Security Council can mean little to a local audience; your good intentions, your commitment to impartiality, humanitarian principles, or the millennium development goals are also not obvious to all. You may be working in an environment where any external actor is viewed with suspicion, possibly representing a threat to local values, beliefs, and cultures. As such, it is essential that you make an effort to understand how you are perceived, while you reach out to influence that image positively. Your actions during and outside of work, the national staff you recruit (competitive recruitment may not result in a diverse and representative national staff), the projects and programs you run (projects to empower local women may not be well received in certain communities), your support to the host government and its security forces in particular can all either

improve or aggravate the way you are perceived by certain local groups. Always keep this in mind.

You also need to understand the context of your work. There is easily accessible information that can shed light on your security situation. What is the background of the conflict that provides the setting, or even the rationale, for your presence in the area? What is the political economy, and who is profiting from the instability? Who are the major players, what factions are involved, and what are their grievances?

Understanding the regional cultures and their value systems is equally important, especially if they might feel threatened by foreign and alien influences, or the work of your organization. What are the beliefs, norms, and values of the people around you? What groups or divisions are there? How do men and women interact? How do they dress? What are the key symbols of the local religions, or of the local ideology? What are the flags, colors, sacred places, or sacred days?

In addition to the potential violence and insecurity that may be caused by political, religious, or cultural clashes, there is also the threat of random, apolitical crime. What is the local crime rate; are small arms readily available; and what are the sources of instability driven by poverty, food scarcity, or unemployment? Does your organization have a mapping capacity, using geographical information systems, for example, to identify particularly risky areas or situations?

Your component may have a unit dedicated to risk analysis, but it always helps to do one's own fact finding: often, your national colleagues and the local press are well informed, and worth pursuing. International and local NGOs with a permanent presence in areas where you travel occasionally are also good sources.

Based on this kind of information, most organizations carry out some type of risk assessment (e.g., threat x vulnerability = risk). Indeed, the new United Nations Security Level System, as part of the broad UN Security Risk Management model, requires a threat assessment to describe the general security environment in a given geographical area. In this model, the descriptive threat assessment has been separated from the overarching and prescriptive risk management and mitigation strategies.

Ultimately, organization-wide assessments, as well as your personal judgment, should clarify some basic security-relevant questions for every activity and program you carry out: Should we be here at all—do the benefits outweigh the risks? If we stay, can we discern some patterns that make an increase or decrease in

instability likely? What new threats could emerge? How would they affect us? Given our profile, how vulnerable are we to acts of terrorism, political violence, crime, or even the actions of disgruntled beneficiaries or staff? Do not just rely on your headquarters or your principals to carry out such risk analysis—contribute actively! The protective strategies and the security plan adopted by your colleagues will only be as reliable as their understanding of the context in which you work.

Determining a security strategy

Traditionally, three broad strategies are commonly accepted by most security experts as the options available to organizations working in violent environments: acceptance, protection, and deterrence.[1] An acceptance approach aims at reducing risk by increasing the political and social consent of communities to an organization's presence and to its work. A protective approach uses devices and procedures to "harden the target." A deterrence approach, finally, aims to deter a threat by creating a counter-threat—anything from the use of force to withholding aid. In practice, most operations use a mix of these three strategies, influenced by their role and mandate.

For most humanitarian and development agencies, acceptance is the preferred strategy—to reach out to stakeholder communities, even those that may be driven by mistrust, and persevere until consent has been gained. It requires a detailed analysis of who those stakeholders are, what their concerns may be, and how they can be won over. Keeping an open communication channel with local partners is nearly always essential to bridge gaps and build trust.

A protection strategy is easier to implement, but also less likely to gain community support. Perimeter walls around the office, barbed wire, armed guards, metal gates, controlled visitor access, armored vehicles, convoys, blast films, and secure rooms do indeed create a "hardened target," and sometimes are unavoidable, but at the same time, they do not exactly promote a perception of humanitarian or human-rights intentions—these are difficult trade-offs.

A deterrence approach is particularly difficult to translate into practical action. Threatening suspension of programs or withdrawal is often an option, and so is forging an alliance with local strongmen, but this can turn into blackmail. Armed protection can be sought, but that is an acknowledgement of a very high risk threshold, which raises the questions: Should one stay at all?

1 For a thorough discussion of the options, see Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Practice Network, *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments*, Good Practice Review No. 8 (London, 2010), chap. 3.

Should one risk a confrontation where one's armed protection unit goes into battle? And how does the procurement of armed protection from one group affect one's efforts to appear impartial? Again, security managers must consult with top-level decision makers in the organization, who can assess the broader political and programmatic impact of any actions.

Having a security plan

Once risks and threats are fully understood, and once a strategic approach has been crafted that reflects both one's mandate and its operational context, the need arises to transform all this into a concrete security plan. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to reduce the likelihood of a risk event cover a wide swath of topics. The following are elements common to many organizations' plans:

- Obligations and responsibilities of staff and management
- Chain-of command and accountability structures, security management teams, and field arrangements
- Specific country security plans, including emergency communications and evacuation plans
- Security phases and corresponding required actions
- Cash handling, incident reporting, information security, medical procedures
- Personnel issues, insurance, travel, site selection and management, visitor security, training, and briefing
- Firearms, kidnapping, and hostage situations

Keeping Yourself Safe

While your task as a manager is to look out for the safety of staff by taking organizational measures, there are also numerous steps you can take at an individual level—and you should ensure that your staff does the same. Normally, United Nations system staff and consultants joining you in the field will have completed the mandatory online security training required to get a travel authorization. Other visitors, however, such as staff from bilateral programs or consultants working independently, may not be as well prepared. It might be good to remind them of things to consider before traveling.

Tips for Personal Safety

- Copy all essential documents (tickets, passport, credit cards, visa pages, driver's license, prescriptions), send a scan to yourself in cyberspace, forward a copy to a trusted friend, and pack a copy in your suitcase, separate from the documents themselves.
- Draw up a "power of attorney" and prepare a will. This may seem exaggerated, but it is the most thoughtful gesture you can make to those who would survive you, should the worst case scenario occur.
- Make sure you have insurance for emergency medical care, including evacuation by air, as well as life insurance.
- Have a medical check-up; consult the website of the Centers for Disease Control (www.cdc.gov) or a similar authority to see what precautions you have to take, and what inoculations may be needed. Do so well in advance. Take supplies of essential medications, and bring the written prescriptions in order to satisfy a customs agent. Ask your doctor to prescribe a wide-spectrum antibiotic.
- Check with embassies or consulates regarding visa requirements. Plan at least a month ahead as requirements vary by nationality of the traveler and the process can be long and arduous.
- On arrival in mission area, attend a UN security briefing. Whether it is a protracted stay or a short visit, there are again a number of precautions that you should consider in order to stay safe. A consistently good source of advice is the national staff of your organization, since they know both the context and the practicalities—where to find things, where to go, where not to go, what to do, what not to do.
- Respect for local culture becomes more than a professional standard of conduct—it becomes a security strategy.
- Some ways to reflect situational awareness:
  - Learn basic words of greeting and basic transactions: you are a guest and people appreciate it when you make an effort to acknowledge their culture.
  - Dress unobtrusively and try to understand local norms and standards.
  - Avoid situations that might become tricky—political rallies, religious holidays, large observances or demonstrations; let your hosts or the national staff of your organization be your mentors.
  - Keep your cash secure—get local currency (use official channels), and use discretion. Display only small amounts, keep the number of transactions limited, use the office safe or the hotel safe if possible, otherwise choose different places for safekeeping, and avoid routine transactions that are visible and predictable.
  - Develop a mental map of the area, town, and neighborhood—where one can go safely, where the police can be found, where to go when in need (e.g., hotels, stores, offices).

Managers need to be continually on the look out to ensure staff do not become complacent with regard to the implementation of security measures. An up-to-date understanding of the security situation and good common sense are essential when tasking

staff to work outside the confines of UN fortified bases. Additional risk assessments may be necessary before they are sent into the field. Managers should also ensure that vehicles assigned to the unit are driven conservatively and with deference to the local population, as vehicle accidents, particularly those that result in injury to host country nationals, can have grave consequences.

Should you or your staff venture out of the core area where your office is located, find out whether one needs any landmine awareness training, or if there are guidelines in case of checkpoints, car hijackings, or being taken hostage.

Landmines and other unexploded ordnance, such as cluster bombs, come in different guises. Antipersonnel mines can be quite small and unobtrusive, activated via slight pressure or a tripwire. Guidance can be had from the national or UN mine action team. When in doubt, don't move, and call for help. In particular, it is wise to avoid military equipment, boxes, and vehicles. The hunt for souvenirs can kill. Should your duties require you to visit such sites, make sure you are accompanied by appropriately qualified military or mine action staff.

UN Guidance on Security

Guidance on the management of security challenges is available for UN system staff at three levels: through a set of online interactive training programs (leading to two levels of certification), through a detailed Field Security Handbook, and finally, through a formal set of operational standards.

Completion of the interactive security training is mandatory for all staff and consultants heading out for field duty stations even for short visits, and the focus of these courses is to advise staff how to stay safe. The Field Security Handbook and the operational standards are of particular interest to managers who are responsible for the safety of others. The principles and best practices described in the previous section have been incorporated into these UN tools, and they have been translated into structures based on the overall integrated nature of the UN system's field establishments, where, increasingly, premises and equipment, as well as communications systems, are shared among various agencies and programs.

At the core of this management framework is the United Nations' "Minimum Operating Security Standards" (MOSS), a fundamental policy document that establishes field-based criteria for minimum security arrangements in UN field operations. By setting clear norms, it also establishes an accountability framework for

senior managers, both at headquarters and in the field. The MOSS cover the types of communications gear and equipment required in regional and country offices, suboffices, vehicles, residences, and staff "security packs" (ranging from VHF and HF radio transmitters and body armor to blast-resistant film for windows and back-up power supply systems). The requirements for the implementation of the security plans are equally detailed, describing procedures, drills, meeting patterns, warden systems, as well as monitoring, training, and briefing requirements. The importance of accountability and the chain of command are emphasized.

The concept of a "security chain" is a command-and-control structure that ensures clear communication and decision making up and down the line. At the UN, it starts with the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security. This official, through the Department for Safety and Security (DSS), is responsible for risk assessments, security planning, ensuring compliance with standards at the country level, appointing and training "designated officials" (DOs), chief security advisers, and security management teams (including professional advisers and wardens) for service at the country level, keeping the MOSS up to date, handling hostage crises, and providing overall leadership to keep the UN secure. In a country where there is a peacekeeping presence, the DO will likely be the head of mission or SRSG, with alternates designated in case the SRSG is out of the mission area.

This security framework also covers the funds, programs, and agencies of the UN system, which all maintain parallel security systems that take their guidance from and coordinate with DSS. Staff members have a legal obligation to comply with all regulations, take the necessary training, and know who their local warden—their closest link in the security chain—is at all times.

Efforts have recently been made in the UN system to update security procedures, including threat assessments and overall risk management. In 2009, the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination stated that security management plays a crucial role in enabling the UN to deliver services and that there "should be no program without security." The emphasis of the new system is to actively manage risks by clarifying "how to stay," rather than merely defining "when to leave." The key innovation has been to separate the assessment of threat in a certain area from mitigation strategies (i.e., the risk in a certain area is not fixed, but also depends on management interventions).

DSS also determines what the appropriate security level is for each country, and for various locations within each country. The Security Level System introduced under the new framework clari-

fies the degree of caution required in a particular area. The security levels, in practical terms, are derived from structured threat assessments and grade the presence of threats and hazards in an area. The security levels have been delinked from automatic measures such as relocations or evacuations of staff that were attached to the now-defunct security phases system. Many NGOs follow the DSS guidance, since it is often based on intelligence gathered from the entire international community, in addition to local sources.

Since the attacks on UN compounds in Iraq and Algeria, the UN tends to err on the side of caution. At times, restrictions imposed as a result of the measures by the security risk management system are questioned by the operational UN agencies, especially those working on humanitarian relief in crisis zones, who feel hampered in comparison to their NGO partners. Out of these restrictions, new techniques have arisen, such as "remote control" operations, whereby risk is transferred solely to local actors.

CASE 1

The Attack on UN Headquarters in Baghdad, 2003

On August 19, 2003, a flatbed truck carrying some 1,000 kilograms of explosives was detonated in front of the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, where the United Nations had its headquarters. Twenty-two persons were killed, including the SRSG, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and 150 staff and visitors were wounded. The UN daily security updates for August 18th and 19th indicated a growing concern for the threat posed by improvised explosive devices by means of car or truck bombs. In the weeks before, there had been attacks on several embassies, as well as on NGO and ICRC personnel. Despite the increased threat, additional measures to protect UN staff and premises were not taken. Requests for blast tape to cover the windows and protect staff from flying glass shards were caught in bureaucratic wrangling. There was no contingency plan. A US platoon that had earlier protected the premises had been asked to leave, and US roadblocks had been removed, as a symbolic gesture to emphasize the UN's independence from the Coalition Provisional Authority.

A high-level panel, chaired by the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (also former USG for Administration and Management in the Secretariat, and former head of the UN peace operation in Namibia), issued a report in November 2003 that was highly critical of the UN's security management system, which it characterized as "dysfunctional" and lacking in both profession-

alism and expertise. A major deficiency identified by the panel was the lack of accountability for the decisions and positions taken by UN managers.

The report culminated in a series of recommendations that, once implemented, changed the UN's approach to security management, led to the creation of the current Department for Safety and Security, and to the adoption of a comprehensive set of policy guidelines, norms, and standards. Some of the key recommendations of the panel that shaped this reorganization were the following:

- Conduct an in-depth review of the UN security system by independent professionals.
- Create professional assessment tools to identify and analyze potential threats and risks for UN operations worldwide.
- Introduce a robust security management system with adequate disciplinary measures to counter noncompliance.
- Ensure accountability at all managerial levels for the implementation of security regulations.
- Guarantee adequate and sustained insurance coverage for staff in high-risk missions.

The principles of accountability and professionalism at the heart of these recommendations are of immediate relevance to all staff involved in field operations.

CASE 2

Bomb Attack on UN Headquarters in Algiers, 2007

In the morning of December 11, 2007, a vehicle bomb detonated at the UN offices in Algiers, destroying the building, killing seventeen UN personnel and two visitors, and severely wounding forty other people.

As was done in the case of the 2003 Baghdad bombing, a high-level panel was appointed to investigate this disastrous event, but with a mandate that allowed it to address the security of UN personnel and premises worldwide. It found that much had been achieved to improve the UN security framework in the aftermath of the Baghdad bombing, but much more was still found to be inadequate. The Algiers bombing was in fact only the tip of the iceberg.

While the risk in Algiers had been assessed as low, giving the UN

office a level-one ranking, terrorist groups had been carrying out a number of high-profile attacks in 2006, and security incidents increased in early 2007, prominently featuring several vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Staff had long considered the location of the UN offices as unsafe, and at a meeting of the local Security Management Team in April 2007, it was agreed to seek better premises. However, several alternatives proposed to the Department for Safety and Security (DSS) were rejected, citing standards that were hard to meet in the Algiers real estate market. While new risk assessments characterized the situation in Algiers as "critical," with vehicle-borne suicide attacks "very likely," the security classification for Algiers was not changed. A high-level visit of a DSS official brought no guidance, and no report was prepared. All this, in the eyes of the panel, indicated that there were systemic weaknesses in the UN's security management.

The panel did not just focus on Algiers. It visited twenty countries, and interviewed numerous staff, government officials, and security experts. Some of its key findings and recommendations returned to points made earlier by its predecessor, some were new. Especially relevant for field security were the following:

- The establishment of DSS had substantively improved UN security management, but accountability, leadership, internal management, and oversight all needed improvement. As decentralization of day-to-day decision making to the country level was now a guiding principle, more responsibility and resources needed to be given to the designated official, the most senior UN system official on site.[2]
- The perception needed to be addressed that national staff, who comprise up to 75 percent of all UN field personnel, are not treated in an equal manner (e.g., regarding insurance coverage, working conditions, etc.). In addition, transferring risk to contractors creates another moral dilemma for the UN, as they are not covered by UN insurance or indemnities.[3]
- A significant and growing part of the public no longer perceives the UN as impartial and neutral. Instead, there is a sense that the United Nations "has become an instrument of powerful Member States to advance agendas that serve their own interests, rather than those of the global community of

2 United Nations, "Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability: The Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide," New York, June 9, 2008, paras. 8-12.

3 Ibid., para. 14.

> nations."[4] This perception has a negative impact on the security of UN personnel. "What the decision-making bodies mandate UN entities to do, and how the UN organizes itself to deliver its services in so many different countries and areas of activity, are two strategic matters that impact on the perception people around the world have of the United Nations and thus on staff security."[5]

The panel's recommendations thus went beyond the technical realm of management to tackle core issues of the United Nations' image and mandate, illustrating how staff security is also deeply political.

4 Ibid., para. 20.

5 Ibid., para. 22.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. In the field, security is a manager's key responsibility, dwarfing all others.
2. Security management is a matter of brains, not brawn. Good common sense is as important as up-to-date knowledge of the security situation. The better you understand the political, social, economic, cultural, and religious context of your work environment—and their implications—the safer you are.
3. Acceptance, protection, and deterrence are the three pillars of security planning, all coming with their own positives and negatives.
4. Beware of complacency in your staff regarding safety procedures. You are an essential link in the security chain—failure on your part to identify and mitigate security risks can endanger all.
5. Conduct an additional security risk assessment if necessary before sending staff on assignment outside the confines of UN secure facilities.
6. Always have a flashlight and a radio with you.

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10

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Financial management is the planning, allocation, and monitoring of financial resources in an organization. It is a crucial component in the realization of strategies and plans. Finally, financial management, in particular a budget, provides a basis for performance evaluation.

OVERVIEW

Although most mid- to senior-level managers in UN field operations will have a dedicated capacity for finance and budget within their office, understanding and taking responsibility for financial resources is as important as managing one's human resources—the quality of financial management, ultimately, is an indicator of an operation's overall quality. How have resources been raised, how has their use been planned, how have the goals of the operation been translated into specific activities with a clear price tag, how have expenditures been prioritized, how have they been documented and justified? The answers to these questions are all visible and verifiable.

Member states and other donors increasingly focus on accountability, and in the United Nations, an audit and oversight culture has evolved that is unforgiving—and rightly so. At the same time, multidimensional integrated missions, delegation of authority, austere staffing patterns, and decentralization leave managers more exposed than ever. Staff members who were brought in for their specific substantive knowledge or technical skills sometimes find themselves in charge of projects and budgets, becoming financial managers by default.

Financial management does not exist in isolation: the budgeting process is key to any management role, as the proper allocation of resources is tightly linked to overall program planning. The monitoring and evaluation of program activities, moreover, is impossible without an understanding of financial indicators. The next chapter on project management will provide you with tools for resource mobilization, but it is equally important for you and your staff to keep in mind financial management principles and resources for which you are accountable.

In this chapter you will learn the basic principles of financial management and budget processes specific to the UN. You will also gain basic skills in drawing up budgets, projecting cash flows, and, subsequently, keeping track of your expenses. Finally, this

chapter will introduce you to a number of internal safeguards to minimize mistakes and prevent misconduct.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- How to apply fundamental principles of financial management, especially in a UN context
- How to draw up a budget
- How to project cash flows
- How to monitor expenses
- How to use internal financial management safeguards

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

Preparing a Budget

Preparing and monitoring budgets are among the most important financial management skills. Budgets translate strategies and plans into financial terms and include a forecast of income and expenditures for a specific period in the future. Furthermore, they provide an important basis for measuring performance by comparing the projected to the actual financial performance of your projects.

There are two types of budgets:

- **Revenue budgets** show the ongoing income and expenditures over a fixed period of time, usually one year (fig. 10.1). Excluded are items that may last for longer than one year, such as vehicles, equipment, and computers.
- **Capital budgets** estimate the cost of longer-term items, showing where the money will come from, and spacing it out over several years.

You can often combine the two by including both types of expenditures into one budget.

A budget is a summary of detailed negotiations and calculations. Before you add a figure for, say, salaries, you will have a discussion about the number of people you plan to employ, for how long, at what pay level, with which benefits, and so on—your worksheet then adds up to the number you put into the budget. As such, a budget should not be a series of guesses—it should reflect careful, calculated estimates. This becomes much easier if you have past data to rely on for reference.

Figure 10.1. Example of a basic budget

RURITANIA HEALTH CARE CENTER
Revenue Budget: January 1–December 31, 2012

INCOME	Amount
Columbia University grant	$50,000
Ruritania government grant	$50,000
UNDP grant	$20,000
TOTAL INCOME	**$120,000**
EXPENDITURES	
Salaries (4 people at $10,000 each per year)	$40,000
Rent of premises ($2,000 per month)	$24,000
Purchase of medicine	$16,000
Medical supplies	$20,000
Electricity and water ($200 per month)	$2,400
Travelling expenses (car lease, maintenance, gasoline)	$7,600
Training program (four sessions per year for ten trainees)	$3,000
Office expenses (lease of computers, printing, cleaning)	$7,000
TOTAL	**$ 120,000**

Cash Flow Forecasts

You may have received a grant upfront, in one payment, and all the money is now in the organization's bank account. Often, however, donors make payments linked to certain achievements (one third when a clinic is built, one third after two training courses are held, and so on). In that case, you will have fixed monthly expenses, but your income will arrive in bits and pieces over time.

How do you ensure that you have sufficient cash on hand to pay the bills at the end of every month or quarter?

To avoid falling short, you must make a projection of your cash flow. The chart in figure 10.2 below is an example of a simplified, quarterly cash flow projection. You might need to make a more detailed chart that lays out receipts and expenditures on a weekly basis.

Figure 10.2. Example of a cash flow forecast

PERIOD	JAN - MARCH	APR - JUNE	JULY - SEPT	OCT - DEC
Receipts				
Grant Columbia		25,000		25,000
Grant Ruritania	20,000	20,000	10,000	
Grant UNDP	10,000			10,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	30,000	45,000	10,000	35,000
Expenditures				
Salaries	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
Rent	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
Medicine	8,000		8,000	
Medical supplies	20,000			
Electricity, etc.	600	600	600	600
Travel	4,000	1,200	1,200	1,200
Training	750	750	750	750
Office expenses	4,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURES	53,350	19,550	27,550	19,550
Balance at the end of the quarter (total receipts minus total expenditures)	-23,350	25,450	-17,550	15,450

The example above illustrates how you can run into trouble throughout the course of a project even if you have raised the total funds to match your total project expenses. In the first quarter, you would run a deficit of $23,350 because your receipts for that quarter did not fully cover your expenses. Such planning gives one the opportunity to communicate the situation to funders or vendors ahead of time and possibly change the timing of any grants or bills due.

Bank Accounts, Petty Cash, and Cash Books

One of the first steps in mission start-up will be for UN Treasury/ Department of Management at headquarters to open a local bank account and a mission bank account in New York. A head of office may open an account with assistance from the chief finance officer. Cashier services will then be established, and safes and money security procedures put in place, in order for the mission to be able to pay due salaries and local portions of salaries, including for personnel in field offices. A staff member may be designated by management to look after "petty cash," in which case a separate cash logbook or Excel spreadsheet will help to track it, and a signed receipt should be kept for every payment made.

Establishing Internal Controls

It is important that financial systems are designed to make sure that as few mistakes are made as possible, and that the opportunities for misappropriation (in fact, theft) are minimized. A qualified accountant may have to inspect your systems once they are in place, but on an everyday basis the program or project manager remains accountable.

Some rules and management principles can reduce the risk of misappropriation:

- There should be written policies, procedures, and rules available to deal with financial management, and all staff should be made aware of them.
- Management should monitor its cash flow and compliance with the budget on a regular basis to ensure that problems do not turn into crises. NB: UN field missions only spend (and therefore monitor) cash once installments have arrived.
- Precise records should be kept and every transaction should be recorded as it happens. Receipts should back up every expenditure. Annual financial statements should be accessible for all stakeholders, as well as staff. It may make sense

to have a local oversight board, even if that is an informal arrangement.

- Designate the managers that will be certifying officers (i.e., to whom authority to approve disbursal of agency funds has been delegated), and put in place an (electronic or paper) approbation system for expenditures, unless it is a recurring cost, such as salary or rent.
- Larger purchases should be made in line with internal procurement standards. Some donors may impose their own—UNDP, for example, gives specific procurement guidelines to its implementing partners, who are often locally established NGOs.
- Bank accounts should always be in the name of an organization, not an individual. All requests for bank withdrawals, such as checks, should be signed by two people or by "two out of three," whose names and signatures have been deposited at the bank by the senior program manager (the only one also allowed to make changes). Keep all money in the bank and never keep more than "petty cash" in the office. Checkbooks should be locked up.
- If you use cash, keep it secure, in a safe. Only one person, the "cashier," should have access to the cash. Receipts should be kept for each cash transaction.
- Segregation of duties: separate tasks, for example, by making sure that no person is solely responsible for an entire transaction (e.g., one person to order equipment and another to sign the check to pay for it).

If there is suspicion of fraud, a professional auditor can be called upon through the manager's reporting line. The director of mission support (DMS), who is the person accountable for finance and budget in a field mission, should be involved in such decisions.

The UN conducts its own audits, not only of financial probity, but also of the effectiveness of internal financial control systems. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) has oversight responsibilities regarding the resources and staff of the UN through independent internal audit, monitoring, inspection, evaluation, and investigation services. Some of the larger field operations now have resident auditors, rotated regularly who are meant to provide guidance. The UN Board of Auditors is the "external" audit body of the United Nations and its funds and programs. It reports its findings and recommendations to the General Assembly

through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).



Financial Rules and Regulations of the United Nations

Virtually all international public sector organizations, whether they are intergovernmental or nongovernmental, have a common set of ground rules that regulate the way they handle their money. And those rules are equally important at the global and at the country level.

The United Nations Financial Rules and Regulations (FRR) are an excellent example and can be considered a good summary of general principles of solid financial management. Their most prominent features and principles affecting operations in the field are the following:

- Delegation of authority: The Secretary-General delegates to the Under-Secretary-General for Management, and so it

goes, all the way down to a finance assistant in a field office. The chain of command has to be clear and uninterrupted from top to bottom. Staff members are held personally accountable for their actions.

- Accountability for program budgets: Managers are responsible for the preparation of program budgets, defined in terms of outputs, objectives, and accomplishments expected during the period under review.
- Only the Secretary-General may open bank accounts for the organization: In other words, at the field level, proper authorization has to be obtained to do so, under the "delegation of authority" principle.
- Two signatures required on all checks or other payment instructions: This is the first of a series of measures aimed at minimizing fraud. All checkbooks have to be properly safeguarded.
- Field offices may maintain a small amount of "petty cash": The local administrative staff has clear rules how this should be managed, and how they should account for its use.
- All payments have to be made on the basis of supporting vouchers or invoices: In addition, documents must be kept showing that goods or services were received in good order. This is where the auditors are extremely precise, even when it comes to small sums.
- What has not been spent must be returned: If there are leftover funds twelve months after a project or program has ended, they must be returned. This ensures reasonably prompt closure of accounts and activities.
- There must be a firewall between certifying officers and approving officers: The certifying officer gets a request from a manager to buy or do something, and then has to certify that there is money in the budget, and that the proposed purchase or activity matches the provisions of the budget. The approving officer, who should not be in a reporting relationship to the certifying officer, then reserves the money in the budget (appropriation) and approves payment once services or goods have been delivered and found suitable.

Procurement

The procurement process is a key component of financial management and in the UN system is governed by four core principles:

a. Best value for money (BVM): the optimization of whole-life costs and quality needed to meet the user's requirements, while taking into consideration potential risk factors and resources available.

b. Fairness, integrity, and transparency: staff members must adhere to the ethical standards and responsibilities that apply to procurement activities.

c. Effective international competition: procurement staff should make every effort to achieve as wide a geographical distribution in procurement as possible and practicable.

d. The interest of the United Nations.

The responsibility for ensuring an effective procurement process is not limited to procurement staff and the staff developing budgets. Requisitioners, contract managers, finance officers, and program managers also have key roles and joint responsibilities during the process of acquisition planning, establishing requirements, and contract management.

For field operations, there is a local procurement committee that reviews and approves limited expenditures, whereas large commitments have to be approved at headquarters. Staff planning to request major purchases should take the time to study the procurement rules and procedures, and understand the timelines involved. Ensuring that there are sufficient safeguards against corruption requires a formal and rigorous approach.

The UN procurement process involves a wide range of activities, including: acquisition planning; drafting; reviewing or approving specifications, statements of work (SOWs) and terms of reference (TORs); identifying, registering, and evaluating vendors; preparing and developing solicitations; evaluating bids or proposals; source selection; negotiating price or terms and conditions of contracts; reviewing and approving awards of contracts; providing legal services, including drafting contracts; signing contracts and purchase orders; receiving and inspecting goods or services; performing oversight services; managing contracts; reviewing vendor performance; certifying, approving, and making payments pursuant to large and complex contracts; and handling vendor protests or disputes regarding the procurement process.

Acquisition

Acquisition is the action of purchasing or leasing property, including products, real estate, and services. Planning acquisition is a cooperative process by which the requisitioner (or program

manager) and UN procurement division devise a comprehensive acquisition plan for fulfilling the requisitioner's need in a timely manner and at competitive pricing. Planning includes the development of the overall strategy for managing the procurement and includes a detailed list of anticipated purchases over a period of time, usually one year.

The acquisition process consists of the following phases:

a. planning, funding, and definition of requirements;

b. identification of vendors;

c. development of source selection plan, including evaluation criteria and weighting (if applicable);

d. evaluation and source selection;

e. risk assessment and management;

f. contract management (including vendor performance assessment and ensuring that the vendor complies with the terms and conditions of the contract).[1]

1 Adapted from United Nations, Department of Management, "United Nations Procurement Manual," Revision 6, March 2010.

UN Financial Terminology

The Fifth Committee (administrative and budgetary) is the main committee of the UN General Assembly (GA) entrusted with responsibilities for administration and budgetary matters. This body considers and approves the budget of the organization, as well as financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) is a subsidiary organ of the GA, consisting of sixteen members appointed by the GA who (a) examine and report on the budget submitted by the Secretary-General to the GA; (b) advise the GA concerning any administrative and budgetary matters referred to it; (c) examine on behalf of the GA the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies and proposals for financial arrangements with such agencies; and (d) consider and report to the GA on the auditors' reports on the accounts of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.

Appropriation is the act of setting aside funding for a specific purpose to be used over a specific period of time. In the case of the UN, funds are appropriated by the General Assembly. Unspent appropriations are surrendered back to member states.

Assessment is an amount of money each member state must contribute to finance the approved appropriation, in accordance with a "scale of assessment" based largely on a member state's per capita gross national income.

Commitment authority is given by the GA to the Secretary-General to incur expenditures without an appropriation. The authority is usually given for emergency situations, pending detailed review of budgetary proposals.

Contingency funding, set at 0.75 percent of the overall level of the outline, can be added to the budget to accommodate additional expenditures arising from program budget implications of mandates or revised estimates of activities not foreseen in the proposed program budget.

The regular budget finances the GA, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, as well as the UN's special political missions.

The peacekeeping budget finances the peacekeeping missions and is based on assessments from member states similar to those made for the regular budget but with greater discounts for poorer nations.

Trust funds and special accounts have to be approved by the Secretary-General or by the executive heads of the UN funds and programs to whom this authority has been delegated. They can be "closed" (one or more donors, and no other donor can join) or "open" (all comers are invited to contribute). Donors can also specify that funding is supposed to be used for a specific program or project in line with the mandate.

Voluntary contributions are entirely up to the individual member states to decide whether or not, and how much, to contribute. Voluntary contributions finance most of the UN's humanitarian and development funds and agencies.

The financial period is two consecutive calendar years (biennium) for the UN regular budget, starting on January 1 through December of the following year (this includes the current financing of special political missions), while the peacekeeping support account budget is annual and runs from July 1 to June 30 of the following year.

UN Financial Terminology Continued

The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund was established in 1992, at a level of $150 million, as a cash flow mechanism to ensure the rapid response of the UN to the dynamic needs of peacekeeping operations.

Program budget implications statements (PBIs) detail the administrative, financial, and programmatic changes that the adoption of a draft resolution would entail.

Revised estimates for additional resources required, are submitted by the Secretary-General relating to (a) items not included in the proposed program budget owing to the unavailability of information at the time of preparation of the proposed program budget; (b) items that were included in the proposed program budget on which the GA did not act but did request further information; and (c) developments that took place after the preparation of the proposed program budget.

The Working Capital Fund was established in 1946 to provide advances necessary to finance budgetary appropriations, pending the receipt of contributions, and to finance unforeseen and extraordinary expenses pending appropriation action by the GA. In 1982 the level of the fund was set at $100 million.

CASE 1

Preparing for a New Budget Cycle

At an August meeting of the senior management team (SMT) in a UN mission, the director of mission support (DMS) advised that the mission was about to enter another budget cycle and senior management needed to start thinking about the mission's plans for the next financial period. The SRSG was a little shocked, as the mission's budget for the current year was just approved by the General Assembly in New York. She asked the DMS to brief the next weekly meeting on the process and the timetable for submission of the mission's next budget proposal.

The DMS instructed the chief budget officer (CBO) to put together a short briefing package he could use to brief the SRSG and the SMT. He also noted to the CBO that there were a lot of new faces in the SMT from the same time last year, including a new force commander and a new police commissioner, so the learning curve might be steep.

The following week the DMS delivered the briefing package prepared by the CBO to the SMT. He told them that this was just an outline of the process and that very detailed instructions on how to prepare their budget input in the required RBB format would follow in mid-September. The mission could expect to receive some strategic guidance from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping in the next few weeks. He stressed that it was very important that the SRSG's office then update the mission plan

if necessary. The substantive staff and heads of the uniformed components were told they may need to revise their concept of operations; in particular, they should identify any changes in numbers, dispositions, or activity levels. The DMS advised them that the mission support staff would then work with their teams to determine the broader resource implications, including any changes in staffing levels.

There was much discussion around the table on how all this would be done. The DMS reinforced the message that it was a mission budget, not a mission support budget, and involved serious input from all components. He recommended to the SRSG that, although much of the detailed work would be done by the CBO and his staff, he should appoint a steering committee chaired by the DSRSG to coordinate and review all budget proposals, as he would eventually have to sign off on them. The SRSG tasked the DSRSG to form a steering committee consisting of the chief of staff, the three component heads, and the CBO as secretary. The DMS left the meeting thinking they were off to good start, but much work was yet to come.

CASE 2

Rationalizing Budgets in UNMIT

As Timor-Leste prepared for national elections in 2012, the role of the UN there was changing, and the government and the UN integrated mission began joint planning for the mission's withdrawal foreseen for the end of 2012. A key development in early 2011 was the handover of responsibilities for the conduct and command of all police operations to the national police of Timor-Leste.

In preparation for the planned withdrawal, and in a context of financial austerity, UNMIT proceeded to rationalize its budgeting processes in order to do more with less. UNMIT Chief of Staff Toby Lanzer commented that "in the past, when formulating budgets, managers were asked to focus on proposing activities that would help achieve a mission's mandate. That's the way it should be. However, consolidated information on costs was not available to enable managers to see the full implications of their proposals. For example, budget tables showed staff numbers but not staff costs; costs for travel and training, for instance, were linked to 'travel' or 'training' and not easily apparent to the manager of a particular team. Furthermore, costing mission activities was the responsibility of a separate budget unit and was often done only after implementing teams had agreed on activities."

Lanzer explained the steps taken by the mission to address some of these challenges: "As a first step in improving the budget process, we made the full current cost per team transparent to managers by grouping costs for staff, travel, training, goods, and services for each team. Knowing the full cost of teams strengthened the knowledge base and accountability of managers. It also transformed the budget process into a collaboration between implementing teams and the budget unit. Finally, the mission used several generic cost-saving techniques. For example, we eliminated posts vacant for extended periods, adjusted the percentage of posts expected to become vacant due to historical averages, budgeted certain positions for less than twelve months where appropriate, and reduced the use of UN aircraft and official vehicles."

As a result of all these measures, most of which hinged on improved information and stronger accountability, UNMIT was able to reduce overall costs by 18 percent while minimizing layoffs.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Financial management deals with the planning, allocation, and monitoring of scarce financial resources in an organization.
2. Sound financial practices are a key component for ensuring accountability and are taken extremely seriously at the United Nations.
3. When drawing up budgets, carefully calculate (or estimate) every item; do not make uninformed guesses.
4. Make sure to project cash flows to prevent running out of funds at a particular point in time.
5. Open a bank account as soon as possible in order to have a written and reliable record of your financial transactions.
6. Continuously monitor all expenses via a cashbook or spreadsheet software and keep a logbook for petty cash expenses.
7. Introduce internal financial controls to minimize mistakes and ensure maximum accountability.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Preparing a budget	Do you always understand every aspect of the financial documents you are asked to sign by your staff? Are you fully involved in the preparation of the budgets for your field operations? Do you see clear links between your budget and your operational objectives?		
Monitoring expenses	Do you have a clear idea at all times how your actual expenditures match, or deviate from, your budget? Do you keep track of cash flow? Do you use cash flow monitoring as a tool in your overall progress evaluation efforts?		
Internal control systems	Have you ever dreaded an impending audit? Do your procurement procedures make kick-backs difficult, if not impossible? Are the proper internal financial controls in place?		

RESOURCES

UN Resources

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11

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Project Management is a discipline used to help plan, implement, monitor, and, ultimately, evaluate a project. It offers important tools to manage a nonroutine or ad hoc project—an increasingly common feature of UN peace operations.

OVERVIEW

In any organization, it is important not only to achieve, but also to show, results. This is simplest in the business world, where results—in the form of sales figures or profit margins—are tangible and unambiguous. In peacekeeping and peacebuilding contexts, results are often intangible: a political problem solved, an institutional arrangement reinforced, a security challenge de-fanged to prevent violence. These are essential achievements. At the same time, being able to show immediate and concrete benefits for the people and the institutions of the host country is also necessary.

For this reason, many peacekeeping operations and special political missions are undertaking projects on their own or jointly, intended to create a "peace dividend" for the host population. Often, mission budgets include an allocation for financing "quick impact projects" (QIPs). In addition, integrated peace operations are increasingly expected to manage complex programs and projects, funded via trust funds, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and joint programs with UN agencies and funds. Although the procedures and guidelines for these arrangements may differ (see the Resources section at the end of this chapter), the skills and tools necessary for managing these projects successfully are similar.

As a result of this emphasis on projects, mission staff are sometimes forced to operate outside of their traditional job functions and implement projects that require specific managerial skills and financial accountability. Such projects also have to be managed in challenging environments with relatively little backstopping from headquarters, often in coordination with other components of the mission—military, police, civilian engineering, and finance—as well as other UN agencies and funds, or NGOs on the ground. For all these reasons, all mission staff should be well acquainted with the principles and tools of project management.

Establishing the infrastructure necessary for a field mission to function and implement its mandate is another area where project management skills are essential. The start-up of a new field

mission normally involves multiple projects and mission components (for instance, mission support and the military) that require coordination at the highest level to ensure that facilities, communications, and support systems for administration and logistics are brought online as quickly as possible, often in an inhospitable environment and with shortages in staff and resources.

This chapter presents the basic method to enable a project team—not just the project manager—to organize its work in a logical way to achieve the desired objective efficiently and effectively. Project management helps you, the project manager, to map out where and why you want to intervene, assess the impact that can be expected from your contribution, and work out what has to be done, in specific terms, to achieve results in a way that can be measured.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- How to conduct a situation analysis
- How to develop and design a good project document
- How to prepare a logical framework
- How to implement and manage a project
- How to anticipate risks and manage stakeholders

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

Policies, programs, and projects are all connected, and together they make up the architecture of an organization's activities. A *policy* is a public commitment to a broad goal, like eliminating child labor. A *program* is a comprehensive and coherent set of projects or actions based on a policy, and it usually involves a wide range of actors working together. A *project* is a building block in such a program. It is more limited in scope and time, and has clear deadlines. It often works with one target group (e.g., children) in a particular sector (e.g., health), in a defined geographical area.

The **project cycle** consists of four distinct phases:

1. analysis of the situation, including identification of the problem(s) to be addressed;
2. strategy and project design;
3. project implementation and progress monitoring; and

4. impact evaluation and closing.

The phases should be thought of as a cycle: a good project evaluation should highlight lessons that can improve ongoing projects and lead to the more effective design of future projects.

Situation Analysis

A well-designed project starts with a situation analysis. This includes identifying the problem and assessing the needs. A helpful way to visualize the major problems and their causal relationships is to draw a "problem tree." The output of a situation analysis should be a graphical arrangement of problems differentiated according to causes and effects, joined by a core, or focal, problem. This technique helps one understand the context and interrelationship of problems, and the potential impacts of targeting projects at specific problems.

Figure 11.1. The problem tree

Strategy and Project Design

The second phase in the project cycle is to develop a strategy and write the project document. This includes the reason the project is being done, and a description of what will be done, how it will be executed, who will do it, where, and over what time period. It describes the situation as it was before the project started, so you can evaluate its achievements and impact at the end.

To develop your strategy, start with a stakeholder's analysis (fig. 2), the mapping of a project's key stakeholders, who they are, what interests they have in the project (positive or negative), and how these interests can affect a project. The "stakeholders" in a project are all the people or entities that will be affected by the project, or who could make or break the project's success. They may be winners or losers, included or excluded from decision making, users of results, or participants in the process. Mapping these actors will help you decide what role they should play at which stage of the project and then help you to build and nurture relationships with them.

Figure 11.2. Stakeholder's analysis

	High influence	Low influence
High importance	Stakeholders who can gain or lose a lot from the project, *and* whose actions can affect the project's ability to meet its objectives. These actors are powerful—you need to develop strong relationships.	Stakeholders who stand to gain or lose a lot from the project *but* whose actions cannot affect the project's ability to meet its objective. These actors lack power, but you must make sure their interests are represented.
Low importance	Stakeholders whose actions can affect the project's ability to meet its goals, *but* who have little to gain or lose from the project. They may be a source of risk, and unpredictable, so keep an eye on them.	Stakeholders who have little to gain or lose from the project, *and* whose actions have little influence on the project. Just try to keep this group informed.

The stakeholder analysis will help determine both the beneficiaries and the partners—local and national—of the project. You will need to develop a strategy to engage them. How will you communicate with them? Is a steering committee needed to bring everyone to the table?

Developing a **logical framework** or "**logframe**" is the next step in the project design phase. The logframe is the central tool you will use to plan your activities. Logframes can be very simple or quite elaborate, but always include at least four main elements: (a) objectives, (b) outputs, (c) activities, and (d) inputs. The logframe ensures a logical relationship between these elements.

a. An objective (or outcome) is a simple expression of a desired end-state that relates to your initial problem. For example, if the problem is that 200 children between the ages of seven and twelve can't read in a certain village, the objective could be that 200 children in our village between the ages of seven and twelve will be taught to read. Objectives can be either long term or short term. They can be broad or more specific and time-bound. Some managers use the terms "goals" (long term, broad) and "purpose" (short term, concrete) to distinguish between types of objectives.

   Some donors and aid agencies require that the objectives set out in a project document meet the "SMARTER" criteria, referenced earlier in this book (see the chapter on plan-

ning). Objectives should be: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-bound, ethical, and recorded.

b. Outputs are the actual products that will lead to the stated objectives. Outputs result from the project activities. Examples of outputs might be curricula, reports, policies, training modules, wells, buildings, etc.

c. Activities are the actions undertaken to produce the desired outputs; they are the things that will be done, not the results themselves. The key term is "to do"—organize, develop, design, build, commission, and so on. A good way to set out your activities is through a work plan (also called a Gantt chart). The first draft is part of your project document, and once implementation starts, you continue to update and adjust the work plan, as things never work out exactly as planned.

   Carefully consider which activities can be undertaken at the same time, and which have to be done sequentially (you can't paint a room until the walls are up). Estimate carefully how long each activity will take. Things typically take longer than expected, so adjust accordingly.

d. Inputs are the resources, staff, funds, equipment, expertise, etc., necessary for carrying out the activities. The inputs shape your budget, as each element needs to be costed.



Henry Laurence Gantt (1861–1919) was a mechanical engineer, management consultant, and industry advisor. He developed Gantt charts in the second decade of the twentieth century as a visual tool to show scheduled and actual progress of projects. Accepted as a commonplace project management tool today, particularly since the spread of personal computers in the 1980s, it was a radical concept and an innovation of worldwide importance in the 1920s. Gantt charts were first used on large construction projects like the Hoover Dam, started in 1931, and the interstate highway network, which started in 1956.

Figure 11.3. Gantt chart



The final element of your project design is the budget. Make sure that your own contributions are reflected—if they are in-kind (e.g., time spent finding good people for your team), put a price on them. Below is a simplified budget with some of the typical budget lines:

Figure 11.4. Sample budget

Category	Item	Number of items	Unit cost (USD)	Total cost (USD)
Personnel (staff and consultants)	Project manager	1 (for two months)	3,000 month	6,000
Contracts (commercial, grants, services)	Warehouse rental	2 (for two months)	500 month	2,000
Training	For national partner	2 sessions	300 session	600
Transport	Trucks	2 (two weeks)	500 week	2,000
Supplies and commodities	Reintegration kits	1,000	40 kit	40,000
Equipment	Computer & printer	2	1,000 set	2,000
Travel	Plane ticket	1	1,500	1,500
Monitoring & evaluation	Set cost: 5% of budget			2,700
Indirect cost (or overhead cost)	Set cost: 11% of budget			6,200
			TOTAL	63,000

Finally, it is time to create an overview of the entire plan, and introduce some tools to refine the planning process: assumptions, risk assessments, and objectively verifiable indicators.

a. Assumptions are those conditions outside the control of the project but critical for its success (e.g., a supportive government, adequate legislation, continuing peace in the area, etc.).

b. Risk assessment is required to acknowledge that something can go wrong: the government may be replaced by a less favorable one, local staff may fear for their safety in joining your project, the security situation may deteriorate, etc. Risks should be part of your project plan. Generally, the risks are not very likely at the moment—otherwise you would not propose the project.

c. Indicators also need to be identified (following the SMARTER criteria) when you develop your logical framework, which will allow you to determine whether you have achieved the objectives (or outcomes) that you expected, whether you have delivered all the outputs you planned, and whether all the activities on your plan have in fact been completed. You should also develop or identify tools to verify these indicators.

Use these elements to create an overview of the entire plan in the form of a logframe. A logframe in a project document might look similar to figure 5 overleaf.:

Figure 11.5. Logical framework

	Description	Objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs)	Means of verification (MOV)	Assumptions and risks
Goal (general objective)	Wider problem that the project will help to resolve	Changes in the extent or severity of the problem	Statistical data or expert analyses over time; evaluations	Can be linked to security, government policies
Purpose (specific objectives)	Immediate impact envisaged to the project area or target group; i.e., the change or benefit to be achieved by the project	Things that can be measured: test results, survey results showing levels of satisfaction, changes in behavior, etc.	Conduct tests, do surveys, compare baseline data with current data	Stakeholders committed, funding not interrupted, staff selected have the expected competencies
Expected results (outputs)	Specific deliverable results of the activities undertaken—meant to achieve objectives	Number or frequency of services provided, percentage of beneficiaries treated, studies completed	Keep records of all activities, levels of participation, and so on; track reports	Access to beneficiaries assured, sources for records are reliable, studies are meaningful
Activities	Lists the numerous things that need to be done to achieve the results expected	Mainly quantitative data, and data re: timeliness or quality	Detailed management tracking, record keeping	Site selection or selection of target group allowed work to proceed in expected conditions
Inputs	The equipment, staff, vehicles, sites, etc., required	Time of arrival, condition of goods, qualifications of staff	Minutes of meetings, procurement and personnel records, operational logs	Audit systems and oversight tools sufficient to prevent fraud or kickbacks

Project Implementation and Progress Monitoring

The third stage in the project management cycle is the implementation of the project. Implementation will be guided by the strategy and the workplan already developed. Monitoring activities will take place during the implementation. (See the next chapter on monitoring and evaluation for more on both processes). Simply put, monitoring is a continuous internal process, conducted by the project manager, to check on the progress against the predetermined plan—the logframe. You can use the Gantt chart to monitor activities. Regular reports on project implementation are the product of a monitoring process. This kind of careful watching makes it possible to catch problems before they become unmanageable and to take corrective action before it is too late.

Impact Evaluation and Closing

Evaluation and closing comprise the final stage of the project cycle. Evaluation is the act of checking whether you are achieving, or are likely to achieve, your objectives. Evaluations focus on effects and the overall effectiveness of the projects or programs. They can be carried out using audits, inspections, and investigations both internally—by specialized units within your organization—or externally.

Monitoring and evaluation are critical. Your donors, your stakeholders, and most of all you as project manager or member of a project team have an interest in how the implementation of the project is progressing, and whether it achieved the results you had intended.

The closing of a project is often overlooked but requires proper preparation, as it is not only an administrative process of ensuring proper closure of all project-related contractual obligations but also implies recognition of deliverables by all stakeholders and the documenting of lessons learned (see the chapter on knowledge management) and archiving.

Figure 11.6. Summary of the project cycle



CASE 1

Managing UNMIK Start-Up in the Field

Within days of NATO troops occupying Kosovo, the first civilian and UNPOL elements of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) began to deploy across the Kosovo-Macedonia border. The start-up team of a few substantive staff and about forty support personnel immediately established the mission headquarters in a former military headquarters complex in the center of Pristina. Essential services such as power, water, and communications were virtually nonexistent, either as a result of war damage or just a lack of maintenance and staff to run them. Support-staff priorities were the establishment of a secure and functioning mission HQ and four regional headquarters in the same locations as the KFOR sector headquarters. This work took four to six weeks and allowed a skeleton UNMIK staff to deploy and start the planning on the ground for a mission of 10,000 personnel, 7,000 of them international police.

As well as establishing its own infrastructure, the mission had to provide functional facilities for the future provincial government, government departments, and municipalities. Ten 100-person police camps had to be built for formed police units, together with the refurbishment of police stations throughout the province. The task of planning and managing the delivery of fully functional facilities, services, and communications for UNMIK was given to the chief of integrated support services (CISS). Fortunately for the CISS, the section chiefs were of the highest caliber and quickly got their heads around the magnitude of the tasks ahead of them.

With much of the work to be done concurrently and dependent on the delivery of equipment, supplies, and building materials into the province, as well as a build-up in international and national staff, the CISS decided to take a project management approach to manage the planning and oversight of what would be multiple concurrent projects through the development of a Gantt chart for key resources. This allowed choke points to be identified in time to prevent delays. It also gave mission senior management a timescale on which to plan the deployment of substantive staff and UN police. One P4 officer was appointed full-time to the task of keeping the chart up to date through regular coordination meetings with section chiefs and through attendance at CISS management meetings with key staff. At its height, more than thirty projects were being monitored, and more than 300 activities tracked. Key resources and equipment such as prefabricated buildings, generators and cranes were tracked on the Gantt chart. The chief engineer was given the important task of ensuring a

facility was fully functional (power, water, communications, IT, security, etc.) at handover.

Of course, flexibility was required. Priorities changed on numerous occasions, and the plan and allocation of resources had to be adjusted accordingly; however, the discipline of having a plan meant this was not done lightly. The CISS and his management team were constantly visiting worksites to monitor progress and identify coordination issues, especially those that relied on procurement from within the region or delivery of materials and equipment from the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB). Good planning and coordination of projects resulted in the mission being able to rapidly deploy within twelve months and begin the task of fulfilling its mandate.

CASE 2

Reducing Prison Overcrowding in Haiti and Employing QIPs in Support of Mission Objectives

Massive overcrowding in Haitian prisons is a long-standing concern that was severely exacerbated by the earthquake on January 12, 2011. Thousands of detainees escaped or simply walked out of the prisons when the earthquake struck, and many detainees were rearrested on a questionable legal basis and placed back into even more limited prison space. At the national prison (PCPP) in the capital Port-au-Prince, the average space per prisoner fluctuated in 2010 between 0.25 and 0.35 square meters, falling inhumanely below international standards. Only slightly less extreme conditions were encountered at most other prison facilities throughout the country.

The efforts of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN country team to develop a proposal to address issues of prison overcrowding commenced, comprised of two complementary components: judicial measures and rebuilding of the damaged national prison. While judicial measures consisted mostly of capacity-building programs by MINUSTAH's Justice Section experts and other non-UN actors (helping to reconstitute lost files, prioritize cases, and deal with certain types of simple cases via an expedited process), the rebuilding of the prison was more challenging given that the mission did not have donor money to support construction projects.

The mission thus decided to use quick impact projects (QIPs) in support of the construction projects no other international donor was willing to fund. The 2007 DPKO/DFS Policy Directive

on Quick Impact Projects defines QIPs as follows: "Quick Impact Projects are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population. These projects are used by UN peacekeeping operations to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation." QIPs are normally limited to $25,000, but in the case of Haiti after the earthquake, the mission was authorized to submit QIPs for up to $100,000.

As a first step, the construction project at the national prison was developed and endorsed by the Haitian Directorate of Penitentiary Administration (DAP). The next step was to find a reliable organization that could implement the project. While some MINUSTAH military contingents could have been used for implementation, they were already overcommitted. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was chosen instead, based on their past experience in rehabilitating buildings in Haiti. While IOM was implementing the project, regular joint visits by the UN and the DAP ensured that timelines were kept and construction plans respected. Regular coordination meetings were also held together with all other actors involved in the national prison, including the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), but also other UN actors such as UNDP and the Human Rights component of the mission, to ensure coherence in the overall support to the DAP.

Through the use of QIPs, the mission was able to complement other capacity-building projects, and support incremental progress in the Haiti corrections system. This case also highlights the importance of building synergies between different potentially complementary projects and ensuring coordination among the many international actors in support of national authorities.

(See also United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Section et al., "Lessons Learned Study: Management of Quick Impact Projects," January 2011.)

CASE 3

Setting Up, Managing, and Handing Over a Mission Trust Fund in Support of the *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité*

The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was established in 2007 primarily for the purpose of contributing to the protection of civilians in eastern Chad. One of the mandates of Resolution 1778 (2007) was for MINURCAT to select, train, advise, and provide support to elements of the Chadian police force and gendarmerie who would eventually take part in the *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité*

(DIS), tasked with policing refugee and IDP camps, as well as key towns in eastern Chad, in particular those towns and major roads used by humanitarian agencies. Despite some shortcomings, DIS has been a relatively successful experiment of a nationally-owned and internationally-supported security structure for the protection of civilians.[1]

Beyond training the DIS elements, the UN Police had to provide for all the necessary logistics, not least with more than 100 cars purchased and twenty police posts and stations built, as well as special allowances for 850 Chadian police officers and gendarmes assigned to the DIS.

In line with the resolution, the mission set up a trust fund specifically dedicated to supporting the activities of the DIS and received a financial contribution of $34.8 million for the 2008–2010 period from a group of donors. A trust fund unit was set up within the mission to manage the funds, and the mission Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) coordinated the actual logistical support to the DIS.

While the DIS became viable from an operational perspective, its sustainability following the departure of MINURCAT at the end of 2010 warranted considerable attention. In preparation for its withdrawal, the mission prepared a plan for the consolidation of DIS and progressive handover of administrative, financial, and logistical functions to the Chadian government. However, at the request of the government of Chad, and as a transition from the trust fund, UNDP started administering a "basket fund" in support of procurement and operations of the DIS, while UNHCR provides support to DIS for day-to-day operations, such as management and maintenance of vehicle fleet and upkeep of facilities.

A lesson to be drawn from the DIS experience is that sustainability requirements—and resources to support them—should be planned from the first stage of conception and the principle stringently adhered to throughout the project's development.

1 For lessons learned, see United Nations Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad," UN Doc. S/2010/611, December 1, 2010, section X.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Project management starts with understanding the context and analyzing the situation.
2. The project should always contribute to furthering the organization's objectives.
3. Make sure your project will actually achieve the objectives you set out (using a sound logical framework).
4. Make sure your project is properly staffed (team) and financed prior to launching it.
5. Always plan on the conservative side for work plans and timetables.
6. Project management does not stop with the selection of an implementing partner.
7. Managing expectations of all stakeholders through effective communication is essential.
8. Learning—through monitoring and evaluation and teamwork—is a key to project success.
9. The environment and situation on the ground may change, and the project can change too.
10. Do no harm, and always measure the impact of your actions.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Situation analysis	Will this project contribute to furthering the mission's mandate? Will it contribute to peace and stability in the area concerned (a "do no harm" approach)? Have I studied other similar past or existing projects and their lessons learned? Do I add value in taking on this project? Is there anyone else doing this already? Did I draw a problem tree? Did I consider all stakeholders and how the project affects them? Do I have a communication strategy for them? Did I consider the situational review (socio-economic and gender considerations)?		
Project description & implementing arrangements	Does the project tackle the problem as analyzed in the problem tree? Did I create a workplan (or Gantt chart)? Do I have the resources to achieve the objectives (number of staff, skills, funds)? Is the timeline realistic? Have I properly identified the target groups? Will my indicators adequately measure the outcomes? Are my indicators SMARTER? Have I built the right partnerships within the mission and outside?		
Feasibility & sustainability	Did I consider the assumptions and risk assessment? How can I address risks and unintended consequences? Is this project cost-effective? Is the project sustainable? Have national stakeholders taken ownership of the project? Have I made handover arrangements? Did I take into account the interests of vulnerable groups?		

RESOURCES

United Nations

- United Nations. "Guidelines: UN Strategic Assessment." May 2010.
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Further Reading

- Carroll, John. *Project Management in Easy Steps*. Southam, UK: In Easy Steps, 2009.
- European Commission, Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). "Manual: Project Cycle Management." June 2005.
- OECD Public Management Service. "Best Practice Guidelines for Evaluation." PUMA Policy Brief No. 5. May 1998.

12

EVALUATION

EVALUATION

Evaluation is a core process of any organization, supporting effective planning and program management; improving accountability; and helping the organization learn and improve. It is essential at all levels of the organization.

OVERVIEW

Given the vast mandates, resources, and often heavy footprints of UN peace and security interventions, it is essential to understand what the impacts of a peace operation are, as well as whether planned results are being achieved. This supports reflection and learning by the member states, governing bodies, management, and staff, as well as national stakeholders, on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of UN activities.

Many different things can be evaluated: activities, projects, programs, strategies, policies, entire organizations, etc. This chapter will focus on three evaluation tasks: project and activity assessments, impact evaluations, and strategic-level benchmarking. It describes the difficulties managers are likely to face in conducting or commissioning an evaluation, and the challenges inherent in a rigorous evaluation of impact in postconflict contexts.

What should you get out of this chapter?

- An understanding of the importance of proper evaluation
- How to plan project/activity evaluation, impact evaluations, and strategic-level benchmarking
- How to avoid the "before-after fallacy"
- How to demonstrate effectiveness with an impact evaluation
- How to design impact evaluations so that they are most effective for accountability and learning

PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE

The critical functions of evaluation are to (a) support strategic and evidence-based management, (b) improve accountability, and (c) assist organizational learning.

Strategic Management

As emphasized in other chapters: UN field missions work in dynamic environments. The key tasks of management—planning, organization, project management—are thus not "one-offs" but are rather iterative over time. Evaluation provides the evidentiary basis to assess whether changes are needed, ranging from specific programs all the way up to the overall mandate of the mission.

This takes on particular importance in complex operations where there are many UN-system and other actors on the ground. Well-managed evaluation provides a shared diagnostic, which is often an indispensable starting point for a shared strategy.

Accountability

There are often explicit legal and policy requirements for the evaluation of UN activities. These include, for example:

- Results-Based Budgeting requirements;
- mandates from the Security Council to benchmark progress;
- the policy framework of the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP); or
- program evaluations by the Office for Internal Oversight Services, which focus on the performance of individual peacekeeping or political missions.

Underlying these formal requirements, there is a broader accountability to the principals and the host country population.

The group of principals includes the UN Security Council and General Assembly, which both play roles in deciding the parameters of UN field missions. It usually also includes donors contributing specific resources, such as voluntary contributions for program activities or trust funds underwriting mission support requirements.

These stakeholders can and do set specific legal requirements for evaluation, whether through mission mandates or funding / project agreements. But for in-country management, evaluation can also be a "force multiplier" (or even a marketing tool). The time and resources spent to assess whether results are being achieved are essential to ensure that support keeps coming. And when assessment is done well, it can channel that support in the right directions at the right times.

The host country population includes those who are supposed to

be helped by mission activities. The specific group may be very narrow or very broad depending upon the scope of the evaluation, ranging from a specific community targeted by a project to the whole country affected by a peacekeeping operation.

Learning

This function is intended to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of activities. Effectiveness is judged by the extent to which benefits were realized over and above any negative consequences of the program. Efficiency is judged by the net benefits relative to the cost of program inputs.

In both respects, the learning function of evaluation means identifying areas for improvement—getting a sense of what works and what doesn't. These can broadly be called lessons learned, and answer questions such as the following:

1. What kind of management structure provides the right incentives? What structure helps to ensure good problem solving and decision making rather than hinder it?
2. How can we design activities to increase positive impact? For example, should they be sequenced in a particular way? Are certain benefits more significant or visible than others? Are there positive inter-relationships (synergies) between different activities that could be encouraged?
3. How can activities be designed so that beneficial changes are sustainable beyond the direct involvement of the mission?

These lessons can be used to modify ongoing activities or programs or to design new ones in the future.

Organizing for Evaluation

The best evaluations are *prospective*, meaning that they are initiated at the start of an activity, and not retrospective, meaning that they are initiated only after the activity is finished. Prospective evaluations ensure that those doing the evaluation know exactly what is happening in the activity.

Within a planning process it is essential to have a "baseline" as a point of comparison. Policy guidance such as the DPKO/DFS "capstone doctrine" accordingly emphasizes that considerations for transition and drawdown should be factored in from the very start of mission planning. The Integrated Missions Planning Process sets out specific expectations in this regard.

Articulating a Theory of Change

A "theory of change" is an explanation of your expectations about how activities or projects will ultimately translate into meaningful outcomes. This is the basis for sound impact evaluation.

For example, community reconciliation efforts might be centered on interethnic community dialogue meetings. The theory of change is that dialogue will help community members to learn new things about their common interests, and thus help to overcome mistrust across ethnic lines. Evaluation then has three focal points:

(i) Outputs: that meetings occur, and are attended.

(ii) Theory of change: whether learning occurs at these meetings.

(iii) Impact: whether levels of trust actually increase.

Being explicit about your theory of change helps to focus the evaluation and assess whether the program is working as expected.

Stakeholders

Those who need to be involved must also be carefully considered at the design phase. A large-scale evaluation will invariably implicate multiple parts of the mission, usually other parts of the UN system, and very often other actors. Most notably these include the following:

- The host government. For some interventions, it may be important to have an evaluation that is independent of the host government. For others, it may be imperative to secure the buy-in and engagement of the host government, particularly when there are questions of transition and handover of responsibilities from the mission. (And in some cases, both these statements are true.)
- The UN system in-country. Most peacekeeping and political missions are now formally integrated. In practical terms, a shared diagnostic is usually the best starting point for shared programs, or for shared strategy. The Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) sets out specific expectations in this regard.
- Authorizing actors. This includes those headquarters offices that interface directly with the Security Council and member states. Above all, country-level benchmarking must connect effectively with processes at HQ level. (For example, the

technical assessment missions that usually precede the renewal of a peacekeeping mandate.)

Beyond those who are directly involved, also consider who might be interested in the findings. This may include humanitarian actors, advocacy groups like Human Rights Watch or International Crisis Group, or diplomatic partners.

Case study 3 below provides one example of process design for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which built upon integrated missions planning teams comprising the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) and the UN agencies, funds, and programs.

Types of Evaluation

For an evaluation to deliver what you want, you need to be clear about your goals. This section covers three such goals:

1. monitoring whether activities occurred as planned, and if they were relatively cost-effective;
2. assessing the true impact of an activity, and lessons for the future; and
3. tracking the overall strategic picture, either for a specific sector or the country as a whole.

Evaluation of Delivery

There are two main perspectives for assessing the delivery of activities and projects: a beneficiary assessment and a performance evaluation.

A beneficiary assessment measures conditions among those receiving benefits, directly or indirectly, from the activity. It addresses the following questions:

- Are the intended outputs reaching the intended beneficiaries?
- Are the beneficiaries satisfied with what they are receiving?
- Is the activity generating any ill will in the targeted community or elsewhere?
- How are the conditions of beneficiaries changing over time?
- Is the activity providing benefits that are relevant to the target community's needs?
- Will changes brought about by the activity last beyond the

period of direct engagement?

Beneficiary assessments can help managers understand whether the assumptions behind the design of the activity were good ones, whether the goals are valid, and whether immediate needs are being addressed appropriately.

They may use either quantitative (statistical) information or qualitative (narrative) information. Information may be gathered using management information systems or activity logs, questionnaires administered to beneficiaries, focus group discussions, or interviews with key informants.

Performance evaluation is a second perspective on activities and projects, which focuses on the individuals and organizations who are the implementers. It answers the following questions:

- In implementing the activity, did the organization perform as efficiently as possible, and if not, why?
- Did decision-making processes help to reduce mistakes? Did they help to ensure that all stakeholders' interests were taken into account? Or, did they unduly obstruct timely and effective problem-solving?

Performance evaluation is usually undertaken after the activity is finished, but it may be done at points in time during the activity period. The evaluation is usually based on interviews with staff, quantitative data such as budget execution reports, and qualitative information such as internal after-action reports.

Performance evaluations often also include vignettes that describe specific successes or failures that occurred during the program. These vignettes are used to suggest lessons for future management practice. DPKO's Best Practices Section publishes this type of material.

Impact

Evaluating impact is more ambitious and more technically challenging than evaluating project delivery. It tries to answer the following questions:

- For the people targeted by the activity, would their well-being have been worse, better, or pretty much the same had the activity never taken place?
- Were there any indirect or unintended effects, whether good or bad, due to the activity?

- Were the benefits of the activity sufficient to justify the costs?
- What kinds of people benefited most from the activity?
- What strategies are effective for making the activity more beneficial?

According to the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, "high quality impact evaluations measure the net change in outcomes that can be attributed to a specific program. Impact studies help inform policy as to what works, what does not, and why."

(See www.3ieimpact.org)

Methodology

Broadly speaking, impact is the difference between beneficiaries' well-being after the activity is finished, and the estimate of beneficiaries' well-being had there been no activity.

This is a subtle and often misunderstood concept. People sometimes define impact as the "difference between beneficiaries' well-being before and after an activity." This can be called the "before-after fallacy." It is a fallacy because many things affect how beneficiaries' well-being changes over time. We cannot automatically attribute all these changes (whether positive or negative) to the activity.

Figure 1 illustrates this. It shows a case where the "before-after fallacy" would result in an unfair judgment about the activity. The well-being of beneficiaries (the "treatment group") goes down over time. A naïve interpretation would be that the activity caused harm. We avoid this incorrect conclusion by looking at a "control" group. What we see is that both groups experienced a decline in their well-being. However, the decline is less severe for the beneficiaries than for the control group. Therefore, the activity in fact had a positive impact.

Figure 12.1. Illustrating the before-after fallacy



Because of this problem, the gold standard for impact evaluation is a randomized controlled trial. This is the approach preferred for clinical and medical evaluation, and sometimes in education and development settings. It requires the random selection of the group to be targeted by an intervention. The "control group" is then the people who were left out. Because the selection is random, the two groups should statistically be the same except for the intervention. In consequence, we can fairly attribute differences in outcomes to that intervention.

Is this model feasible for development, postconflict peace and security, or humanitarian programs? Sometimes it is, and often it isn't. Randomization can be infeasible in some postconflict and humanitarian contexts, either because it is unethical or politically impossible to limit interventions to specific areas; or because there is simply a need to act quickly.

Designing Programs to Allow for Rigorous Impact Evaluation

The ideal is to identify a comparison group at the start of the activity. There are two types of strategies to do this. The first is to design the program itself in such a way as to allow for a rigorous impact evaluation. The second is to exploit almost-random variation and use controlled comparisons for a "quasi-random" comparison.

Full randomization is always the strongest method. Potential beneficiaries can be narrowed down to a pool of eligible individuals, communities, or organizations. In some cases, the number of potential beneficiaries may be much greater than the number of people that the program can serve. A lottery system is then used to determine who receives benefits and who does not.

The impact evaluation then tracks outcomes among those selected as well as those not selected. It uses differences between these two groups to determine impact, either for the program as a whole or for different approaches within the program. A case study at the end of this chapter provides an example of a randomized impact evaluation, studying the impact of a community-directed reconstruction program in eastern Liberia.

Quasi-Random Strategies

- Matched comparisons: The idea behind this approach is simple: create a pseudo-control group by matching each beneficiary with someone or something that resembles the benefi-

ciary in important ways but is not a beneficiary. In the case of a program that operates at the household or community level, one would match beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries. In the case of a regional or national-level program, one could create a so-called synthetic match by using information from comparable regions or countries. Then, one tracks the outcomes of the beneficiaries and the matched counterparts. Impact is estimated as the difference in outcomes between these matched units. The second case study below shows an example of a matched comparison impact evaluation, studying community-level impacts of security provision by UNMIL peacekeepers in Liberia.

- Natural experiments and fortuitous accidents: Sometimes, we can use variation due to nature or unanticipated occurrences to obtain a situation that resembles an experiment. For example, a recent impact evaluation of ex-combatant reintegration in Burundi took advantage of the fact that a bureaucratic dispute between one of the implementing partners and the government resulted in nearly a third of the program's beneficiaries having their benefits withheld for about a year. The impact evaluation conducted a survey during this period of disruption, using those whose benefits were being withheld as a pseudo-control group to compare with those whose benefits suffered no such disruption.

Impact Evaluation Without a Comparison Group

In some cases, it would seem impossible to identify or construct a comparison group. An obvious example is the measurement of the impact of an activity that is administered at the national level.

There are approaches that can be tried in these situations, although generally they cannot reach the level of rigor of the approaches already discussed. One approach is to try to identify changes that could only plausibly occur as a result of the activity, and then to track outcomes to see if these changes happen. Such a strategy can benefit a great deal from qualitative information from beneficiaries who can provide details about how, exactly, the program has affected their well-being. The weakness relative to using a comparison group is that this approach relies on more assumptions; there is no way to say for sure whether an outcome is exclusively attributable to the program.

Another approach is to use pre-activity information ("baseline" information) and the opinions of experts and informants to project what would have happened with no program, and then to

track outcomes against this benchmark. These strategies are what national governments sometimes do in assessing the impact of, for instance, tax laws, in which case economic models are used to predict what would have happened had there been no policy change. The obvious weakness of this approach is that there is no way to validate these projections.

Benchmarking & Strategic Assessment

UN missions are directed to monitor and report on the in-country situation in a number of ways. This may relate to specific issue areas: human rights, humanitarian access, or democratic space, for instance. For larger peacekeeping and political missions, it is now a common practice for the Security Council to request "drawdown benchmarks" to guide the process of handover and withdrawal. This expectation has also been incorporated into key policy documents, including the DPKO/DFS "capstone doctrine," and the Integrated Mission Planning Process.

Generally, the objective of these "situational" or "strategic" benchmarks is to enable evidence-based policymaking through an international assessment of the situation in-country. This can occur at points when national authorities are unable or unwilling to provide an assessment, or have requested outside assistance to improve the credibility of their findings. This is in contrast to the development sector, where it is more common to rely upon and reinforce national systems and statistics.

At the highest level, benchmarks inform decisions about deployment, configuration, and drawdown of UN missions. They are frequently also a key source of information for other international stakeholders, including international financial institutions and diplomatic actors.

Design Considerations

A good starting point for designing the scope and purpose of an evaluation can be found in the DPKO/DFS "capstone doctrine":

> There is no standard "check-list" of benchmarks applicable to all situations. The specific benchmarks used will differ from situation to situation, depending on the underlying causes of the conflict and the dynamics at play. They must be developed in close collaboration with the rest of the United Nations system, the national authorities, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders, taking into account the United Nations longer-term strategic goals.

> Care must be taken to identify appropriate benchmarks that reflect real progress towards the consolidation of peace in the country. Indicators should not simply be measurements of international community inputs to a peace process, which may present an incomplete picture.[1]

This guidance is equally applicable to other contexts. Uncertainty is expensive. It makes decisions about mission configuration and key activities difficult and risky. A useful benchmarking exercise is one that reduces this uncertainty, and makes these decisions easier. Design of a benchmarking process should accordingly:

(i) Keep key decision processes—at country and headquarters level—firmly in mind. Current policy on integrated missions emphasizes the role of "regular stocktaking by senior managers."[2]

(ii) Provide for revision and updating when there are major changes in the country situation.

It is an unavoidable fact that a UN mission is physically small compared to the population, and this is compounded by language, cultural, and other barriers. As a result, the biggest operational problem for benchmarking tends to be sampling bias: drawing conclusions from data that is not truly representative of the larger population.

For a manager charged with developing or monitoring benchmarks, two specific points bear emphasis.

(i) Evaluation is not resource-neutral.

Information is costly. There is accordingly a substantive bias toward areas which have long-established monitoring and reporting mechanisms and the staff to back them up. This includes, most notably, the areas of human rights and protection of civilians. Data in other areas—local conflict dynamics, rule of law, political participation—may be much scarcer. And it may be difficult to adapt available assets like military observers and contingents to collect relevant information.

There is also a geographic bias. Data is invariably scarcer in areas with a thin international presence. One should not confuse this "absence of evidence" with "evidence of absence," and it may be more honest and useful to mark these areas as "unknowns" or

1 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," January 2008, p. 88.

2 United Nations, "IMPP Guidelines, Role of the Field: Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences," January 2010, para 25.

"uncertains."

(ii) It is rarely safe to rely on a single source of information.

Using multiple sources helps indicate where there may be sampling biases that are skewing results, even if it is not possible to resolve which source is "correct." It will also make the process as a whole more robust if some data sources are not always available.

A related point is that the frequency of assessment should not be too high. Longer periods allow you to put fluctuations in the data in their proper perspective, and also allow for self-correction where there are issues like delayed or miscellaneous reports. In other words, a distinction should be made between "flash" or emergency reporting and benchmarking.

CASE 1

ICRC and DFID Impact Evaluation in Liberia

The International Rescue Committee and the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned a fully randomized evaluation of the impact of a two-year community-directed reconstruction (CDR) program in Lofa County in Eastern Liberia (2006–2008). The program constructed a pool of eighty-three communities that were "equally deserving" to receive assistance through the CDR program. A lottery was used to randomly select forty-two communities to receive the program. The forty-one non-selected communities formed the control group. The recipient and control group communities were assessed at the beginning and the end of the two years of the program. The theory of change was that CDR programs would help to reunite communities divided by war, and that this would allow communities to promote their own welfare more effectively. The impact evaluation examined indicators of "community reunification" and "social cohesion" as well as indicators of material welfare and governance. The findings suggested that "the program reduced social tension, increased the inclusion of marginalized groups, and enhanced individuals' trust in community leadership." However, "evidence is much weaker that the program positively reinforced support for democracy, had an impact on material well-being, or resulted in an increased ability of the community to act collectively, and it provides no evidence that the attitudes of traditional leaders towards decision making were affected in any way."

The evaluation was exceptional in its rigor, owing mostly to the use of full randomization as the method for creating a control

group. In addition, the evaluation used a combination of sample surveys, behavioral games, and interviews with community leaders to measure outcomes of interest. This kind of "triangulation" of measures helps to boost one's confidence in the accuracy of the findings.

(James Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy Weinstein, "Community-Driven Reconstruction in Lofa County: Impact Assessment," submitted to the International Rescue Committee, December 2008.)

CASE 2

UNMIL Impact Evaluation

In 2008, the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) Inspections and Evaluations Division commissioned an evaluation of the impact as of Autumn 2008 of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) deployments on community-level security, economic recovery, and democracy promotion. The evaluation team used a "matched comparisons" strategy to construct a control group. Twelve communities that hosted deployments were matched to twelve communities that were far removed from deployment bases but resembled the deployment communities in the following ways: ethnolinguistic region, agricultural region, proximity to roads, number of households, number of schools per 100 households, number of health posts per 100 households, and the number of conflict events that occurred in or near the community during the war. The theory of change was that deployments created a local security bubble, and that within this bubble, economic reconstruction and democracy promotion would be able to flourish. The evaluation team used sample surveys of people living in these twenty-four communities to measure local security conditions, economic recovery among households, and political perceptions. The key finding from the impact evaluation was that the security contribution of UNMIL was not the provision of local law and order but rather a more general suppression of the likelihood of conflict recurrence nationwide. Deployments stimulated local labor markets, but there seemed to be no impact of the deployments on democracy promotion.

A few remarks are in order on the quality of this impact evaluation. First, since deployments cannot be randomized, we should be concerned about the possibility of hidden factors that tainted the comparison between the two groups of communities. Second, there are always difficulties involved in using surveys to measure things like security conditions or democracy promotion. With these subjects particularly, survey results may suffer from what is called "courtesy bias," when respondents say what they

think the interviewers want to hear.

(Eric Mvukiyehe and Cyrus Samii, "Quantitative Impact Evaluation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia: Final Report," submitted to UNOIOS-IED, February 2010.)

CASE 3

Assessing Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (I4S) was launched in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2008. It aimed to support an eventual drawdown of the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO and had four program pillars: security; political processes; restoration of state authority; and return, recovery, and reintegration.

After two and a half years of implementation, the I4S Situation Assessment was launched in June 2011. The assessment mapped progress in each of eighteen administrative territories in the I4S area of operations, covering a total population of 14–15 million people. The assessment for each program component was scored from one to five according to a set of common criteria.

Assessments were based on all available sources. This included, for example:

- security data gathered by MONUSCO's military contingents and human rights section;
- governance and public administration assessments from Civil Affairs, UNDP, and NGOs working in this area; and
- economic and social indicators gathered by the UN agencies, funds, and programs and humanitarian actors.

The assessments were coordinated by the integrated mission planning teams (IMPTs) for the three provinces covered by the I4S. The IMPTs were convened by the local MONUSCO head of office and comprised UN heads of office and several other international actors. And assisted by a dedicated stabilization coordination unit. The three provincial assessments were then compiled into a regional summary that was handed to the country-level Stabilization Working Group to develop policy recommendations for "phase two" of the I4S, and presented to international partners.

After the first iteration, there remained substantial room for improvement. Data in some substantive areas was quite scarce, and it was clear there was a need to develop better information collection protocols. An additional issue was inconsistent "coding"

of the situation between different areas. This would be improved through better calibration of the provincial teams against assessment criteria, perhaps through common training exercises using historical data.

(Based on United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, "International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy. Situation Assessment: Summary of Findings," August 2011; and Ian D. Quick, "Evaluating Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo," forthcoming.)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Evaluations serve two primary functions: accountability (toward principals *and* beneficiaries) and learning (what works, improving efficiency and effectiveness).
2. Monitoring and evaluation are not the same thing—the first tracks whether deliverables are in fact delivered; the latter measures the changes brought about for the beneficiary population.
3. Make sure to distinguish between and appropriately employ beneficiary assessments, performance evaluations, and impact assessments.
4. When carrying out an impact assessment, creating a control group is the ideal way to avoid the before-after fallacy.
5. If possible, use a form of randomization to maximize confidence in your results.
6. Consider using prospective studies that directly affect program design to further improve your evaluation results.
7. Make your expectations about the results explicit in a theory of change to provide structure for the evaluation.

SUMMARY CHECKLIST

	Did I ask myself the right questions?	YES	NO
Why undertake an evaluation?	Do my evaluation goals imply that I only need monitoring and, perhaps, beneficiary assessment, without an evaluation of impact? Are my evaluation goals and my methods for reaching them written into my planning and (where relevant) program documentation?		
Projects & activities	Will my evaluation method effectively measure conditions and satisfaction among beneficiaries of the activity, whether directly or indirectly? Is the primary purpose of this evaluation to measure the organization's performance and to learn lessons in order to improve its functioning in the future?		
Impact evaluation	Has the activity been functioning long enough to have visible effects? Is the activity of a scale that justifies an impact evaluation? Is an impact evaluation feasible (using a design-based strategy)?		
Benchmarking	Which stakeholders are directly affected and should be included in the exercise? Beyond the immediate participants, who else would be interested in the results? What is the relationship with existing processes for making major decisions?		

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