2005

Conference Proceedings

The Proceedings
of the 8th Annual
Conference
Vienna, Austria
12-14 June 2005



Partnership for Peace
Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes

Eighth Annual Conference

Expanding and Enhancing the Partnerships: Further Steps after Istanbul

Vienna Report

Vienna, September 2005

Publishers:
Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence;
National Defence Academy, Vienna
in co-operation with
PfP-Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes

Editors:
Sean S. Costigan
LtCol Ernst M Felberbauer
Capt Benedikt Hensellek

Rapporteurs:
Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy
Jeff Couch
BG (ret.) Russell Howard
Maj Kyle Jette
Col Michael Meese
Maj Joe Scrocca
Maj Mike Yankovich

Facilitating Editor:
David Mayer-Heinisch

Production:
Akademiedruckerei Landesverteidigungsakademie,
Vienna

Online at:
Austrian Ministry of Defence: http://www.bmlv.gv.at
Columbia International Affairs Online: http://www.ciaonet.org
PfP Consortium: http://www.pfpconsortium.org

Address:
Stiftgasse 2a, 1070 Vienna, AUSTRIA

ISBN: 3-902275-17-0

Dear Annual Conference Participant,

I am delighted that you have chosen to participate in the 8th Annual Conference of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

It is my hope that this conference, focusing on expanding and enhancing partnerships, will broaden your perspectives on the many complex issues associated with this endeavor, help us better understand how to achieve these goals, and stimulate discussion on how the Consortium can contribute to the broader efforts of NATO and other international and national actors in the field of security and defense.

This year, we are privileged to have as speakers and panelists many influential experts in NATO and regional affairs sharing their views on the challenges we will face in making expanded and enhanced partnerships a reality. Their thoughts and the discussions we will have over the next two days will help us to increase our understanding of the issues and the varying perspectives we bring to this forum, and will encourage and inform the work of the Consortium over the coming year.

Again, welcome to Vienna, and on behalf of the Partnership for Peace Consortium, I wish you a most pleasant and productive experience at this year's Annual Conference.

Sincerely,

Bruce P. McLane
Executive Director
Partnership for Peace Consortium

Dear Conference Participant,

Welcome to the Consortium's 8th Annual Conference in Vienna, co-hosted by the Austrian Ministry of Defense.

For the Austrian Armed Forces, this conference is the largest international event related to security policy for 2005, a year of several anniversaries that the Federal Republic of Austria is about to celebrate: sixty years of the Second Republic, fifty years of United Nations membership, ten years of European Union membership and, of course, ten years of Partnership for Peace membership.

The Austrian Armed Forces will be celebrating as well—this year marks their 50th birthday. In the course of these past fifty years, our *Bundesheer* has participated in a large number of international operations, demonstrating the responsibility of Austria within the global security framework.

This conference is an important contribution to academic research in the field of security, helping to improve education and training for military and civilian personnel. It is a great honor to welcome so many distinguished experts from all over the world who have come to share their views in the discussion about strategies of achieving regional stabilization by expanding and enhancing partnerships and building a strategic community through education and research. Let me also express my special thanks to the Bureau for Security Policy and the National Defense Academy for coordinating this event.

As Chief of Defense Staff of the Austrian Armed Forces, I wish you a successful conference.

Sincerely,

General Roland Ertl
Chief of Defense Staff

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure and honor for me to welcome you to the 8th Annual Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes in Vienna.

Austria certainly belongs among the great supporters of the Partnership for Peace program, and takes great interest in the current developments within the PfP as well as in the Partnership's future. Therefore, Austria is very much engaged in PfP activities, and is coordinating three regional stability study groups within the PfP Consortium. Over the past years, Austria has contributed extensively to this unique vehicle of international scientific cooperation. Expanding and enhancing the partnerships is of great importance, especially since NATO's recent Istanbul summit.

Although Austria is not a member of NATO, it plays an important role in enhancing regional stability and security in Europe. This active role of our armed forces, who are celebrating their 50th anniversary this year, is reflected in their numerous military missions abroad, as well as in their academic contributions at international conferences and expert meetings. It is, therefore, a great honor for the Austrian Ministry of Defense as well as the National Defense Academy to host this conference. It is a special platform for international experts, government officials, and scholars to discuss and develop new strategies and ways to further strengthen regional cooperation and stability.

I would like to extend my special thanks to the conference teams, in particular the PfP Consortium operations staff and the members of the Austrian Ministry of Defense who organized this conference.

Sincerely,

General Raimund Schittenhelm
Commandant, Austrian National Defense Academy

Table of Contents

Presenters:
Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, Director of the Polish Strategic Defense Review, Ministry of Defense, Poland

Parallel Panel Meetings

Panel I: "Transforming NATO and its Partnerships" 45

Moderator:
Prof. Dan Hamilton, Director, Center for Trans-Atlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Presenters:
Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director and Theodore Roosevelt Chair,National Defense University, United States: "Transformation of Political-Military Aspects of NATO – What Needs to Be Done"
Col. Ralph Thiele, Director, Bundeswehr Center for Transformation, Germany: "What European NATO Allies Must Be Doing Reference Transformation"

Presenters:
Mr. Andreas Halbach, Regional Representative, International Organization for Migration: “Responses in Migration Governance to Security Issues in the CIS and Central Asia”
Mr. Sabri Ergen, Defense Cooperation, NATO Headquarters: “NATO’s Role in Regional Cooperation: Cultivating Stability and Security”

Panel IV: “Preparing Tomorrow’s Leaders: Promises and Pitfalls of Collaborative Educational Networks” 97

Moderators:
Dr. Sam Grier, Dean of the NATO Defense College
Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Curriculum Development
Ms. Lee Margin-Zingg, Chair of the ADL Working Group

Presenters:
Ms. Victoria Syme-Taylor, Defense Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, United Kingdom: “Interoperability of Skills- Challenges to Training”

Lt Colonel Jean d’Andurain, PfP and Cooperation Programs, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters : “Establashing an International Collaborative Network of Institutions: Education through Reform”

Welcome

Overview

The challenge of the 8th Annual Conference of the PfP Consortium is to further efforts to create an education network and promote interaction among the partners. To this end, Mr. McLane advocated advancing and transforming the NATO alliance, the Partnership for Peace, and the PfP Consortium by expanding and enhancing the minds of future leaders through education. He encouraged partners to create and strengthen networks to leverage what each partner is capable of and possesses in its own individual niche.

Speaker: Mr. Bruce McLane, Executive Director, PfP Consortium

In the early 1990s, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Les Aspin, launched a concept that he called Partnership for Peace. Clearly, that concept did not simply come out of the blue—it was something that had been worked on for quite some time. Those who were involved in developing that concept and nurturing it in those early days had no idea what a powerful force Partnership for Peace and the ideas behind it would become. Partnership for Peace has become one of the most exceptional post-Cold War programs that NATO has ever launched. Now, every country from Vancouver to Vladivostok has become involved with PfP, including nations who are not even members. This week's conference of the PfP Consortium seeks to help NATO expand and enhance those partnerships that have already been so successful. We will share views and explore ideas on how the Consortium can contribute to this marvelous program, as well as promote its further expansion and its contributions to

peace, stability, and prosperity throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

Our vision is to expand and enhance the minds of current and future leaders of the Alliance, of the Partnership for Peace nations, and all the nations who work with us in this noble cause. Education is a relatively new vocation within NATO. Training has been with us as long as the Alliance has existed, and it is well recognized that, in order to create inter-operability among the nations that work together in the cause of peace, getting to know one another, being able to speak the same language, and being able to operate together is absolutely essential. However, to arrive at the next level of our potential contribution to the transformation of the Alliance and the Partnership, the transformation of minds—not just practices—is absolutely essential. That is our business.

How can we achieve this vision? The PfP Consortium is on the cusp of doing just that. Everyone sitting in this room today shares that vision, and everyone here today is totally dedicated to making that vision a reality. We have been working in various avenues to prepare the foundation for this transformation. Some of you work very hard in your various fields and academic endeavors—whatever your subject-matter expertise—within your own networks. Others have been working very diligently on tools to leverage modern technologies to make your knowledge and experience widely available so that it can be used to teach those who will follow you. But what we have not done yet, or achieved to its maximum potential, is to create and strengthen the networks that will bring all of us together to leverage the unique capabilities and perspectives that we all possess in our own individual niches of experience. And that's our challenge—to create this network and interactivity.

In the late 1990s, NATO created the Training and Education Enhancement Program, consisting of PfP training centers, a modeling and simulation network, and the PfP Consortium. It was the vision of the founders and creators of that program that we would work together to enhance education

globally by leveraging our own individual capabilities. Today, we have emerging a NATO education network: we have the NATO PfP education and training network that we are going to be discussing next week in Oberammergau; we have the NATO Defense College; we have PfP training centers, centers of excellence, individual institutions, defense academies, and security studies institutes. It is now our challenge to find the best ways to interact on a regular basis and to work together to maximum effect.

So this conference is a significant step forward, not only for the PfP Consortium but also for NATO, the Partnership for Peace, and the expanded and enhanced partnerships that we will be working together to develop and nurture over the coming years. By the end of the conference, we will all walk away better prepared, with a better understanding of each other, and coming to some kind of consensus on what it is we think we ought to be doing, and how all of our individual contributions can contribute to that vision. This will help us in our work of moving the PfP Consortium forward as a key player of this expanding network of educational institutions and organizations.

Speaker: General Raimund Schittenhelm, Commandant, Austrian National Defense Academy

General Raimund Schittenhelm opened the 8th Annual Conference of the PfP Consortium by welcoming the participants. This year's conference will concentrate on expanding and enhancing the Partnership, and on further steps after NATO's Istanbul Summit. This clearly reflects the vision of NATO as well as the PfP to further develop strategies and options for closer collaboration among the partner states.

General Schittenhelm emphasized the successful work and achievements of the working groups of the Consortium. Everybody involved in these groups has made a substantial contribution, and has helped to make the Partnership a great

success. Our marketplace of ideas has now become a trademark within our community.

He stated that he was taking part in his fourth annual PfP Consortium conference, and noted how much the quality of the consortium work has increased. The large number of distinguished experts and colleagues from defense academies, universities, and other institutions attending this conference highlights the importance of these annual meetings.

Plenary I: "Expanding and Enhancing the Partnerships: Further Steps after Istanbul"

Moderator: Professor, Dr. Otmar Höll, Director, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna

Presenters:
Dr. Werner Fasslabend, former Austrian Minister of Defense
Dr. Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

Overview

In the opening plenary, the theme of the conference itself, "expanding and enhancing the partnerships," was appropriately illustrated with several contemporary examples. Dr. Werner Fasslabend shared his thoughts from a recent conference on international security regarding the challenges that NATO military commanders are facing in the absence of political preparedness or unanimity. He went on to suggest that, despite these challenges, the prospects for traditional cooperative organizations such as NATO and the PfP were good due to the difficulties that some of the newer cooperative structures, such as the EU, are currently experiencing. Dr. Erhard Busek highlighted the critical importance of the region of South Eastern Europe to the security and stability of the entire continent. He outlined some of the critical progress made in the region, pointing to the promising developments in the assumption of responsibility and participation in cooperative frameworks by the nations in the region. He further suggested some of the specific steps that are necessary for these nations to take in the area of security sector reform.

Moderation: Professor, Dr. Otmar Höll, Director, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna

Before introducing the speakers, Dr. Höll highlighted some facts about Austria's membership in PfP.

Austria's commitment to the Partnership for Peace is of long standing, as is illustrated by the following:

- Austria became a member in 1995, and is celebrating their tenth anniversary of participation in Partnership for Peace. This includes joint work in peace-keeping missions, humanitarian and disaster relief, and search and rescue operations. Austria took part in the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR / SFOR) from 1995 until their end last December.
- Austrian troops have participated in the KFOR operation in Kosovo since the autumn of 1999. Austria has reinforced its contingents deployed with both SFOR (up to 150 troops) and KFOR (up to 600 troops). Since 2003, Austrian soldiers have been deployed in Afghanistan, and recently the Austrian government has agreed to deploy Austrian soldiers during the elections in Afghanistan from July until October. Since 1997, Austria has also agreed to cooperate in the framework of "PfP-Plus" for the whole spectrum of peace support operations, including peace enforcement through combat missions (in alignment with the EU-Petersberg spectrum, which includes interoperability and transformation of capacities and strategies).
- Austria is involved in the European Partnership Council (EAPC), PfP's political consultation forum. On a bilateral basis, Austria has intensified also its

talks and cooperation with NATO in all other relevant areas.

It was at last year's Istanbul summit that primary emphasis was given to NATO's transformation to meet the major security threats of today; that is, to fight against international terrorism, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and address the issue of failed states, which can cause widespread regional instability (such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo). These are areas of deep concern that extend significantly beyond NATO's traditional areas of operation in previous periods.

In the view of some NATO representatives, the Balkan region is where NATO and its partners first learned to work together effectively, which partially explains NATO's high level of commitment to that region. In Istanbul it was agreed to conclude SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because of the improved situation there, and the EU took over security operations there in December 2004.

While the EU has become more or less NATO's most important institutional partner, cooperation with individual partner countries—especially within the principal mechanisms of PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council—ranks very high with NATO. Austria is playing an important role, especially in our close neighborhood, the South Eastern European region.

Dr. Werner Fasslabend, former Austrian Minister of Defense

Dr. Werner Fasslabend recently returned from a high-level conference on international security in which the participants addressed the problems and the future of NATO, based upon observations from current participants in NATO operations. His comments were focused on questions posed at the conference.

So what are the problems facing NATO? First, we still have a problem in **intelligence**, because every state produces its own intelligence, which it is reluctant to share. Thus it is very difficult for the commander of combined forces to get the best information he needs.

The second problem is **national caveats**. Cooperation between different nations with different standards generally works out very well. The biggest problem, however, is the caveats that are imposed, because every country has different standards: each nation says, "I can go so far, but I cannot do this, and my soldiers are not allowed to do this," and each nation's tolerance is different. So if you have a mission with fifteen countries, and you have fifteen caveats, then of course this is problematic. We should not only think of problems on the national level, both in our parliamentary and our public discussions, but also of the problems that will face future commander in assembling an efficient mission.

The third problem is **financing**. For example, General Back reported in Afghanistan they have a limited number of helicopters, because everybody tries to send deployments of troops that will not cost too much. In most cases, there is no additional money for the defense ministers to allocate to such missions, and therefore everybody tries to keep his own expenditures to a minimum.

The fourth problem is the **efficiency gap** between the U.S. and Europe. It seems that it becomes wider almost every day. And of course this is not something anybody can resolve in international conferences, because every country has to decide for itself. We need to address this efficiency gap, because otherwise we will not be able to maintain the level of efficiency of international missions the way we did in the past.

The fifth problem is the lack of a **doctrine for missions**. The Americans have a very clear military doctrine. The Europeans do have the Solana paper, which was viewed as a big step forward when it was produced, but of course it is not very specific. This will always be the problem in Europe: papers,

especially political papers, cannot be very specific. If you want to formulate a paper out of the input of twenty-five different states, you will not be very successful in specific terms. And therefore I think it probably should be a necessity within NATO and within PfP to formulate some form of doctrinal goals. Pragmatism is much more important in such a case than is the formal decision on a paper.

A related problem is the difference between the military goals, on the one hand, and the political goals on the other. Our armies should be ready to send troops within five days to any place in the world. But the world of politics reacts far slower. Politicians often expect the military to be prepared for a mission when they themselves are not. There are hardly any political preparations that are made in the field of procedures, issues, goals, or measures. The efficiency of a mission will depend very much on the preparation in the political field, which is much more difficult.

What are the prospects for NATO? What are the prospects for Partnership for Peace in the future? The prospects are quite good. Quite good in the sense that this organization will become more necessary. Why? Because the EU is in crisis. If you look at the political constellation of the most important powers, the Europeans say, well, the Americans obviously know what they want to do—they had their elections not so long ago. They have smoothly functioning administration, and they have their lessons learned from their last missions, such as Iraq.

In Europe, however, they are presented with a scenario in which Germany and France certainly will be occupied with their own problems for at least six months or a year. So there will not be many significant initiatives that come from either Germany or France on the international stage within the next year, because both of them have sizeable internal problems that must be addressed. In particular, their respective domestic job markets will have their absolute highest priority.

From the point of view of politics, most security problems cannot be resolved by just one country. Everybody has

learned that. If we look at "hot spots" all over the world, you will see that there will be a significant need to act together politically in Palestine, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in many other places. If there is a need, but there is no specific national initiative, then the organizations that presently exist and function well will be the frontrunners. This means NATO and Partnership for Peace. The difference between membership and partnership will not be as important as it used to be in the past, because the crucial element is not so much decision-making; rather, readiness and willingness to take part and cooperate have become much more important. The presence of a coalition of the willing within the organizations will become much more salient than in the past.

Resolving problems will be a task in the future for North America (the U.S. and Canada) and for the EU; all the questions posed by conditions in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and also Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Africa, are of substantial importance for the Europeans. In addition, there will be a third pillar: the neighbors. That is, the people in the countries that are involved; if they are not taken into account, you will not be really able to resolve the problems that exist in their state or region, because you need their information, you need their backing, and you need local cooperation very badly. This is especially the case because the big institutions, even those such as NATO, do have difficulties with logistics, and also areas such as civil society, etc. Help and cooperation on the local level will become much more important. With the general strategy being to operate more broadly, widening the membership of NATO and the Partnership for Peace goes absolutely in the right direction. It is not just the question of having specifically defined roles and memberships, but the idea of being bound to work together, trying to develop the same standards within the Partnership for Peace and within NATO. It also makes sense to broaden the possibility of trying to help other countries to achieve similar or the same standards. This is not only a question of cooperating within certain

missions, but it is also the learning process, the process of gaining valuable knowledge from each other in the cooperation and preparation process.

In conclusion, a great deal is being done already in the military arena. But a great deal remains to be done in the political arena. Only if we work together—and much better than we used to—will we be able to resolve the problems we want to resolve. And the problems will not become fewer in number, and they will not become smaller. We have significant problems to resolve, and we should not hesitate to try to do it together. Prospects for the future are good.

Dr. Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

Dr. Busek explained that, in five years, the Stability Pact has successfully moved from staging ad hoc interventions to displaying a consistent regional approach to strengthen stability and foster European and Euro-Atlantic integration in the region of South Eastern Europe. This approach has generated progress and supported regionally coordinated reform efforts in critical areas.

Sometimes, we forget the history of the region, a region where we've had four recent wars and a fundamentally changed geopolitical map. Today, six or seven years after this period of war, we have an outstandingly good situation. Stability in the region is still certainly very much dependent on the presence of military forces in the region. We remember fondly the good work done by SFOR and KFOR, and by foreign forces in Macedonia. The number of troops deployed in the area is coming down, and the force is becoming more European in makeup, which is particularly worthy of note because it is connected with the enlarged role of the European Union.

On the other hand, Dr. Fasslabend rightly mentioned that the EU is currently in a state of crisis. While politicians and the

media may make it seem like we're in constant crisis, I believe that this current situation is one that we need to get through and solve. Although the set of problems that we are facing seems like a substantial one, I believe that in the long term, it may prove to be beneficial.

Regarding South Eastern Europe, the EU has many reasons to remain heavily engaged: call it stabilization, call it enlargement, but whatever you call it, engagement is unavoidable. Perhaps the greatest difficulties associated with our job here are explaining it to the public. I believe that the public is not informed about what we are trying to achieve in the region. Is it stability? Is it peace? Is it enlargement?

What we all have to realize is that the situation in SEE is *our* problem. The border of Croatia is only twenty-seven kilometers from Austria. They are our neighbor, and what is going on there should be important to us. Another example is that the distance from Vienna to the Swiss border is farther than the distance from Vienna to Ukraine. This has to be explained to all of the Europeans, because it is a situation that we all share.

A promising—indeed, an essential—development is the region's growing willingness to assume ownership of regional cooperation. This can be seen in the increasing role of the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), including regular meetings of the respective ministers of defense.

2005 will be a year of important challenges and particular opportunities in South Eastern Europe. Obviously, the question of Kosovo's future status is the most prominent one. But due to the inter-related nature of the problems in the region, close attention will have to be paid to effects on other parts of the region. Political developments in Serbia and Montenegro as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina in the run-up to important referenda and elections—which will take place, at the latest, in early 2006—will have implications for the region as a whole.

The opening of EU accession negotiations with Croatia was delayed since the EU member states judged that Croatia is not cooperating sufficiently with the International Criminal

Tribunal in The Hague. The question of Macedonia's application for EU membership is of importance not just to the country itself, but also to the whole region, since it will give further indications on how the process of integrating South Eastern Europe into the broader European community will proceed.

Although the accession of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) will not be possible if the war criminals that are being sought are not extradited to ICTY, NATO is assisting the countries by including them in selected PfP activities. As was underlined at the NATO Summit at Istanbul last year, "each country will be judged on its own merits on the road to PfP."

The topics that bring us together are of special importance for the Stability Pact. The first sentence of the background paper for the conference says that, "over the past decade, the changing nature of global security challenges and the structures to deal with them have been far-reaching and rapid." This "reality" could be fully applied in the Balkan region.

We have observed that military establishments in South Eastern Europe were and still are in the process of being restructured as a consequence of the changed security environment. Traditional security concepts have become outdated because of changes in regional and international relations. Conflict in Europe is unlikely, although the complex political and strategic situation in South Eastern Europe could still negatively affect stability and security in the region.

But there is no reason to expect that there will be again a war. We should not expect that any of the nations in this region would want to turn back from democracy, but we should acknowledge that there are still some volatile situations, and that the changed security environment is playing an important role.

Moreover, terrorist activities, organized crime, and ethnic intolerance unfortunately continue to hamper the consolidation of peace and security in the region. The countries of South Eastern Europe are developing new strategic security concepts

based on participation in collective security measures, and based on Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation with international organizations and institutions.

These are the "strategic" reasons why South Eastern Europe should not be forgotten. Our job in the region is not yet finished. We have to look to finish it in the sense that we are coming to an end of some activities and, on the other hand, the countries of the region are taking regional leadership in addressing their own questions. That is the crucially important change that must influence our approach to the region.

NATO and the EU share a common vision of the future, in particular in the Western Balkans—i.e., self-sustaining stability based on democratic and effective government structures and a viable free-market economy. Without any doubt, this joint vision and determination helps to bring about further rapprochement with European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which is also the central objective of the Stability Pact.

Without wanting to play one off against the other, the European as well as the trans-Atlantic perspective of South Eastern Europe is clear and important for Europe. Therefore, I am convinced that the stabilization and association process, the Partnership for Peace, and the Membership Action Plan still remain the central and most valuable instruments available to help facilitate these integration processes.

There are different approaches that are being taken by the EU and our trans-Atlantic partner, namely the U.S. For us Europeans, achieving stability in South Eastern Europe is part of the wider development process of Europe. Because nations in the region are our neighbors, there is a lot of migration, organized crime, and trafficking of human beings. Seen from the U.S. perspective, the situation in South Eastern Europe is primarily a question of stability in other regions, like the Middle East, Central Asia, etc., as well as for the foreign troops deployed in the area.

The U.S. is doing a great deal in terms of fighting organized crime, and is trying to establish a network in this

regard in Central Asia and in the Black Sea region, because, for example, the international traffic in drugs starts from Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. Trafficked human beings are now starting to come from Moldova, and extending far to the east. South Eastern Europe is not the only transit region for this trade, but it is significant. We need close cooperation to fight these operations, because the money collected to support terrorism comes out of this criminal activity. Here you have clear connections, and therefore we have a common aim that grows out of our different approaches.

When touching upon the security aspects, I would say that, after the challenging years of the 1990s, the Western Balkans are in a good position to improve security in the region. The most important step to be taken is the comprehensive reform of national security sectors, which requires the fundamental transformation of the inherited armed forces, and the implementation of democratic civil control and public oversight of the entire security sector.

Security sector reform (SSR) is currently being prepared or is being implemented in most countries of South Eastern Europe. You know perhaps better than I do that SSR is a multi-faceted subject area, with many recent steps forward having been taken, but also with many remaining challenges, where regional and other types of international cooperation are necessary. SSR should be understood as an integrated process involving the governments, the militaries (as a part of building defense institutions), and the parliaments. This process is indeed, to a very large extent, an economic and social issue and, accordingly, also needs to be dealt within the context of economic reconstruction and social development policies.

The key questions here are how to restructure and downsize the military forces and the military-related sector, adapting them not only to the new security situation, but also to the current economic realities of the region. Therefore, taking measures to cushion the economic and social consequences of major reductions in the armed forces and military infrastructure

are of the utmost importance. To achieve progress and tangible results in SSR, the political will to introduce the necessary reforms is crucial, and will be needed on a long-term basis.

So far, we've created internal parliamentary cooperation; we are investing a lot of time and money to bring the parliaments together in a kind of a learning process. The work that we are doing with staff of the parliamentarians is also important, because I think that we have to look to the fact that the parliaments are new, and the parliamentarians themselves are even newer, because of ongoing elections, and therefore it is necessary to have thorough training in parliamentary practice. Regional cooperation and initiatives—such as exchanging best practices and lessons learned among the relevant actors, as well as financial support by the international community—should help to strengthen the political momentum to overcome existing internal obstacles to such reforms.

The reintegration of former military personnel, the conversion of former military bases, and the restructuring of military industries by conversion of redundant military facilities to civilian purposes represent one of the key SSR priorities for 2005. In other words, we are constantly stressing the importance of defense conversion, since the issue is very often neglected or underestimated.

There are several reasons why we should remain active here. First of all, it should be emphasized that defense conversion is part of the overall process of security sector reform in South Eastern Europe, which, of course, has to be seen in the context of these nations' integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Second, defense conversion represents a very serious challenge, because of its scope and volume: tens of thousands redundant military personnel have already been released from the service or will be released in the near future. Thousands of military bases/sites have to be closed. The defense industry sector faces very serious challenges. In addition, large quantities of obsolete and often unstable ammunition and explosives

(including chemical munitions in some countries), as well as redundant military weapons, should be destroyed, while taking into account the environmental implications. All these aspects have to be properly addressed.

Third, the assumption that defense conversion is mainly a military issue must be corrected. 90 percent of these issues revolve primarily around economic and social issues and, accordingly, they need to be dealt within the context of economic reconstruction and social development policies. To be frank, this quite often is not properly understood. We are not dealing with military/defense reforms as such, but we are focusing on the economic and social consequences of major reductions in armed forces and military infrastructure. And, of equal importance, we are also focusing on how to use the enormous human and material potential previously dedicated to these military ends for civil purposes.

This should also be a part of a new "security culture" in the countries concerned. Since it's evident that links between security and development exist, an integrated approach is essential, in particular involving cooperation and coordination among the ministries responsible for defense, development, social and employment affairs, finance, etc., as well as between the government and parliament. We cannot move forward without the support of our international partners—chief among them NATO, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions. We are grateful to all our partners for their expertise, their commitment, and their support.

Defense conversion is also directly linked with the redirection of military research and development. This is exactly the role that defense academies and security studies institutes should be playing. Experts from the Czech University of Defense in Brno as well as from the U.K. Defense Academy have already started to participate actively in our defense conversion meetings and other events.

In conclusion, when dealing with security sector reform, one can also talk about issues such as human security, including

combating the excessive and uncontrolled flow of small arms and light weapons, border security and management, fighting against organized crime and corruption, and disaster prevention and preparedness. Through its initiatives and task forces, the Stability Pact works closely with the countries of the region to tackle these issues. We are also open to communication with others who might also be interested in these areas. They should do so, because ensuring stability in South Eastern Europe is a common European responsibility.

Plenary II: "Reforming the Security Sector in the Age of Terrorism"

Moderator:
Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler, Director, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland

Presenters:
Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research,
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies,
Singapore

Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, Director of the Polish Strategic Defense Review, Ministry of
Defense, Poland

Overview

In the second plenary, Professor Rohan Gunaratna helped the conference readdress the definition of terrorism and made an assessment of how flawed some models of dealing with terrorism may be in practice. He went on to address three main points: how the terrorist threat has evolved in the past three years; how the terrorist threat should be addressed; and the specific terrorist threats the United States, Europe, and indeed the world will face in the next decade. Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka furthered the discussion by enumerating some of the primary factors driving security sector reform, only one of which is terrorism. He also suggested that, due to the disparate states of security, economic, and political development of the NATO members and the members of its ancillary organizations, that there was certainly no single model or timetable that can be prescribed to adapt a nation's security structure to meet the challenges of terrorism.

Moderation: Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler, Director, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland

Ambassador Winkler noted that this was a repeat performance for both Professor Gunaratna and Dr. Karkoszka, as they had both presented at a panel moderated by Ambassador Winkler at the 7th Annual Partnership for Peace (PfP) Conference in Bucharest. However, since that time many things have changed (and a book has been published), so one could compare what the speakers said on the topic last year to their comments now.

Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Professor Gunaratna addressed three main points: how the terrorist threat has evolved in the past three years; how the terrorist threat should be addressed; and the specific terrorist threats the United States, Europe, and indeed the world will face in the next decade.

Al Qaeda has evolved from a small group of three or four thousand members to a global jihadist movement made up of thirty to forty separate and loosely connected groups. The common thread is that members of the groups all received training in camps in Afghanistan after the Soviets were defeated and until coalition forces defeated the Taliban in 2002. Today, members of these groups have dispersed from Afghanistan to virtually every corner of the world.

Al Qaeda has suffered since its defeat in Afghanistan, but remains a formidable foe, and the "Global Jihad" movement persists. Prior to the events of 9/11, Al Qaeda was able to launch one major attack a year, but now is unable to do so. Nevertheless, the rate of major attacks has increased, because other like-minded groups have become more active. Not only is

America at risk: the French in Pakistan; Australians in Indonesia; Italians in Iraq; Russians in Chechnya; Spaniards in Spain; the British in the U.K.; and Germans in Tunisia have also been attacked.

Counter-intelligence efforts led by the United States have reduced Al Qaeda's ability to organize and to launch major operations. However, new groups are emerging, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's organization in Iraq, which came to prominence in late 2004. In fact, Zarqawi's group changed its name to "Qaidat al Jihad Bilad al-Rafidayn" (Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers), and set up training camps near the Iranian border. Zarqawi's group has built a state-of-the-art network, and has spread it effectively throughout Europe. These networks are recruiting Muslims living in European countries to participate in the global Islamic jihad.

The main concern is that those Muslims who have been recruited to go to Iraq are learning skills such as how to make and use car bombs and sophisticated improvised explosive devices. Iraq is the new training ground for terrorists, much as Afghanistan was the training ground for the international fighters who helped the Afghans defeat the Soviets. My concern is that American and European Muslims will learn terrorist tradecraft while fighting in Iraq, then return to their homes and use what they learned there.

Europe and the United States face a threat from North African groups whose interests are similar to those of Al Qaeda and are receiving training in Iraq. These groups have moved south to the Pan Saharan region, where they receive logistical support. These groups will be serious threats to the West for a long time to come.

There has been some success in hindering terrorist activity—the immediate threat—particularly because of successful cooperative law enforcement and intelligence operations. Heightened public awareness and the change in strategy to hunt terrorists "preemptively" have also contributed to reducing the threat. The key is to be a hunter, not a fisherman.

Fishermen set the bait and wait for the terrorists to come, whereas hunters go after the terrorists before they can do harm. But the United States and Europe may not be doing enough to stop the intermediate and long-term threats that originate in regional conflict zones and failed states, which are the breeding grounds for terrorists and the source of terrorist regeneration.

The "decapitation" model, currently preferred in the West, will not work. Simply put, you can't kill them all. In addition to focusing on detecting and preempting terrorist operations, the West must develop a more holistic approach. Counterterror centers in the West are too focused on the terminal or operational stage. They need to focus more on the initial stages of terror—i.e., the process of radicalization, which is largely supported through propaganda. The focus should also be on the pre-operational stages (recruitment, training, planning, and rehearsals), and should address other dimensions of terrorism, such as the need for more counterterror specialists, the need for conflict resolution specialists, and the need to understand the non-military aspects of countering terrorism.

The West also needs to stop being so "politically correct." For example, Canadians and Europeans have neglected to stop radical imams because of religious tolerance issues. Unfortunately, these imams have radicalized a large number of Muslim youth, who are now capable—at least intellectually—of carrying out terrorist acts.

The six most prominent terrorist regions are: the frontier areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan; Kashmir; the Philippines and Indonesia; Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; Yemen and Saudi Arabia; and the Horn of Africa. Asian terrorist groups are becoming more active, and will probably account for 50 percent of worldwide terror attacks in the next ten years. Groups in the Persian Gulf region will continue to be active too; 60 percent of the foreign jihadists fighting in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The new generations of terrorists generated in these regions will be more formidable than their predecessors for three reasons: they are better networked, they are more willing to put

aside their internal differences and work together, and are more willing to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In conclusion, I would challenge this audience to develop a multi-pronged, multi-jurisdictional, multi-national effort to combat terrorism. Partnerships such as NATO and the PfP must work together to counter the global, networked terrorist threat.

Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, Director of the Polish Strategic Defense Review, Ministry of Defense, Poland

Dr. Karkoszka's comments placed terrorism in the framework of the post-Cold War security environment. He stressed that we now face significant, multi-dimensional challenges, and that terrorism must be considered in the context of many other security challenges.

There is no one single way of reforming the international security sector. After all, PfP includes a much larger variety of members than ever before. We have old members of NATO, new members of NATO, Membership Action Plan (MAP) states, partner states that aspire to NATO membership, partners who do not have such aspirations, Mediterranean dialogue states, and the initiative covering the Gulf states. We are now covering an enormous variety of security sectors, in completely different stages of development, in terms of economics, law or legal norms, and institutions. These states operate under different conditions, have different security requirements, and are under completely different social and political pressures to change, both internally and externally.

We are observing a comprehensive, multifaceted, complex phenomenon of dynamic change across Europe, in Asian territories, and to some extent in the world as a whole. This is caused by several factors; among them—and recently the most significant among them—is the terrorist threat. Terrorism only adds to all those factors already in existence that are currently acting on our security sectors.

These factors of change are very different in substance, and change over time. In the early 1990s, the first, and still most important factor was the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. We had enormously superfluous military capabilities—in numbers, in material, and in orientation, being too offensive on one side and too defensive on the other. Hence, early on, the main change in the security structures in much of the world was the reduction of capabilities and the push take advantage of the peace dividend. The other finding of this time was that many nations had inadequate postures and doctrines in light of the new security environment. They were too antagonistic, too offensive, and thus they had to change to fit into the cooperative security framework that emerged after the Paris and Rome Conferences and the announcement of the Partnership in 1994. The forces that epitomized that era were too heavy, too static, and too territorial.

The next factor is that we also had a new threat during those times: the threat of internal instability around us—specifically in the post-Soviet and Yugoslav territories—requiring completely new international mechanisms in terms of new international structures and new norms. We had to face the problem of getting entangled in the internal developments of other states, develop new norms for the use of force and for human rights as a primary goal of the international community, and confront the challenges posed by new international borders, movements of national self-determination, and the succession of states.

We became more involved in peace-keeping and peace-making, so that we were able to function in the international framework of institutions such as the UN, OSCE, NATO, and the EU by stepping into these problematic situations, at least in military terms. The necessary adaptations of this post-Cold War era are still not finished, as Poland is still fighting against some of the same liabilities of this period in our military and other structures.

The second factor that appeared in the mid 1990s was the drive toward greater integration, or the urge to join the affluent and secure club of states. The reason for this was the belief that membership in organizations such as NATO, the EU, and OSCE was a way of avoiding the "gray zone" in terms of security. With this came a number of consequences for the countries involved, especially in civil-military relationships, and the imposition of democratic control over the security sector. Joining these formal institutions opened the way for other, more substantive, less formal, and more comprehensive forms of integration with those affluent and secure countries.

The third factor is the need to rationalize security sector reform. Again, this came about in the mid 1990s, still exists with us today, and will be with us for a long while. This need for rationalization centered on a need for efficiency in all aspects of the sector, including financial, military, and administrative areas, as well as the need to make the structure of the security sector more adequate to meet existing security needs. States need new norms and procedures for planning and implementing certain new measures, new democratic institutions, and new relationships between different elements of the security sector. This includes new models of education, new ways of working with the media, and so on.

Fourth, toward the end of the 1990s there was a drive for modernization—not necessarily just in research and development—but rather a push to catch up with modern military technologies. So there was a shift in the overall direction of technological efforts away from firepower, heavy platforms, and dedicated C^3 systems toward more effect-oriented systems that addressed battle awareness, information, and decision-making supremacy on the battlefield. Thus we are moving from threat-based structures to more capability-based structures and systems.

Fifth is the need to respond to new threats, which is the real substance of the matter, and there are many of these new threats beyond just terrorism. These new threats include

organized crime, the fall of weak states, the proliferation of WMD, and the fragility of national critical infrastructures. Each one of these, while connected to the others in certain ways, calls for very specific responses. Thus, our security assessment and response must be concentrated on all of them at the same time.

There are some general observations that can be made on the structural responses to these new threats. First is the decline in the importance of military force, relative to the other elements of the security sector. There is a new paradigm of security, which is not necessarily confined to the defense of the state or the protection of its territory or its boundaries, but instead includes crisis management and response. This is the fastest-growing network of institutions in our security sector.

We are also observing the blurring of the line between local and national responses and external international responses. Security challenges today are often defused or defended far from home, so we are now faced with a worldwide security battlefield. With this comes a growing interaction with the security sectors of our allies. This international cooperation is indispensable, and hence we have seen the transformation of NATO or EU attitudes toward crisis response.

There is also the blurring of the line between *strategic* and *tactical*, which is very important, especially for the military. This includes the integration of national security sectors, which is best epitomized by the notion of homeland security systems that call for the redefinition of legal norms, institutions, and the reallocation of attention, money, and technical measures. To be successful, this integration must take place across the full spectrum of crisis management systems, from border guards, to police, to civil protection response units, to fire brigades, to security services, to local and central civil administration, and finally to international organizations. And in our intelligence agencies we need more cohesive missions, exchanges of information, formatting, tagging, analyzing, and fusion of data.

Specifically with regard to terrorism, our understanding of the threat and its sources is inadequate. As Dr. Gunaratna

stated, there is a problem in our definition of terrorism, because it is too sweeping. There are also the problems of discerning between causes and consequences, the problem of interactions between organized crime and terrorist groups, and other elements of a worldwide network. Among the partner nations, there is also a varied level of awareness of the threat and of the lack of a cohesive approach by the international community. There is difficulty in persuading the public, decision makers, and political elites that it is necessary to abandon old assumptions and stereotypes of threat perception and to adopt new ones that will lead to change. There is also inadequate resolve. We need resources, and there are too many "free riders" on this journey. There is also a lack of clarity regarding the depth of change required. A very delicate balance must be struck in all our countries between the classical threat response—which we still have in many of our security structures, such as the police, border guards and so on—and an investment in new approaches, new procedures, and new capabilities. There are a multitude of demands—from new weapon systems, new platforms, new logistical capabilities, long-range transformation, multiple communication systems, individual soldier gear, international reconnaissance targeting, C^3 systems, and so on—all of which must be balanced against very limited resources, which are getting constantly smaller.

So what is the priority? We cannot aim at a comprehensive solution against the entire front. This would be impossible for our budgets. There is what can be called the "U.S. syndrome"—that is, acting with all available potential toward change in international systems or in other countries in the name of the campaign against terrorism, but being unable to sustain the desired process of nation-building. There are many reasons for this problem, and this is a lesson that we must learn from the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. We can obtain the immediate goal, but the strategic, long-term goals of nation-building are not being fulfilled.

Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler, Director, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland

Ambassador Winkler followed the two presentations with some remarks of his own regarding the nature of the new security environment.

We face a serious asymmetric threat by which we are attacked where we are weakest, but not attacked where we are prepared. Such a threat requires a full-spectrum response, as a response only by military means would be courting failure. We are challenged not only within the armed forces, but also within the entire security sector: border guards, police, intelligence agencies, homeland defense, and drug enforcement agencies. This is a threat discussed not only in forums such as this, but also in the UN, as seen by Kofi Annan's recent report on reform, in which he makes a clear identification of the triangle between democracy, defense/security, and development and post-conflict reconstruction. It is within this triangle that the game will be played. You cannot separate development from security; there is no point in digging wells if someone is poisoning those wells.

The new security challenge requires more than just the armed forces; it requires the interaction of all aspects of the security sector. Fusion of intelligence assets is of course an important part of this, but it still goes further. If we don't have the entire security sector involved, there is no exit strategy, so we will always have troops on the ground. If we want to cope with the problems posed by this new and very dangerous threat, we need to look at the issue in a different way. We need to see conflict prevention, war fighting, and post-conflict situations as part of a continuum. We cannot artificially separate these aspects and assign them to different actors, and just leave it to chance that a solution will arise. We need a holistic approach, which must begin at the planning stage of operations, not once the operation is conducted. We need an approach that fuses all aspects of our security sectors as part of our doctrines.

As it is not possible to continue in the old ways, we must adapt military doctrine and transform it into a security doctrine. This also implies changes in our training, since things that we do not train, we do not master. This must go beyond merely the military academies; this debate must also include the academies of the other institutions that make up our security sector: border guards, police, intelligence, etc. The Consortium could play a major role in this enterprise as one of the few organizations in the world that brings together individuals that otherwise would probably not meet. We should pursue this strategy and bring in an even broader variety of expertise to this gathering.

Panel I: "Transforming NATO and its Partnerships"

Moderator:
Prof. Dan Hamilton, Director, Center for Trans-Atlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Presenters:
Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director and Theodore Roosevelt Chair, National Defense University, United States: "Transformation of Political-Military Aspects of NATO – What Needs to Be Done"

Col. Ralph Thiele, Director, Bundeswehr Center for Transformation, Germany: "What European NATO Allies Must Be Doing Re: Transformation"

Overview

This panel focused on both the general concepts of transformation and on the specific actions taken by NATO, the EU and the U.S. in this area. Dr. Hans Binnendijk discussed the political and diplomatic challenges facing NATO, the U.S., and the EU in the area of transformation, and how the lack of effective dialogue between these entities inhibits any synergy-building cooperation between them. He then suggested how each of these entities should approach the transformation of their own military to capitalize on their strengths despite the political and diplomatic roadblocks previously outlined. Col. Ralph Thiele emphasized the continuous nature of transformation, rather than considering it as a single event with a beginning and an end. He then discussed some of the specific conceptual elements of transformation, and finally outlined how the Bundeswehr was encouraging and executing transformation.

Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director and Theodore Roosevelt Chair, National Defense University, United States
"Transformation of Political-Military Aspects of NATO – What Needs to Be Done"

Dr. Binnendijk began by explaining the variety of forms of military transformation, then spoke about the process of military transformation more generally. He moved on to a discussion of the specific challenges facing NATO as it confronts the need to transform its military.

Over the past 800 years, there have been perhaps ten examples of military transformation. While each case has been different, due to unique historical circumstances, there are common elements as well. Generally there are new missions, there is always a new technology, there are new operational concepts designed to harness and use that technology, and new organizational structures that are created to implement those new organizational concepts. When you look at any of these cases historically, you will find that these elements have been present, and you will see that same thing in the United States today. The key technology involved here, of course, is information technology.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is to contrast very briefly for you Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which took place eleven years later. During Desert Storm, the United States already had stealth technology, information technology, sensors, and precision munitions. There was a separation of the service battles and, for that matter, there was a separation of coalition battles. We did that by arraying people in different positions, but there really was not either a joint or concurrent operation. Now, what happened in Iraqi Freedom was very different. The battle was concurrent. We did not have a long air battle; rather, the air and ground battles were much more joint. The notion behind military transformation is to mass *effects*, not to mass *forces*, and you saw that in Iraqi Freedom. We won that

war with many fewer people on the ground than we did Desert Storm.

Now, there is another element that we saw in Iraqi Freedom and in the conflict in Afghanistan, and that is that there is a new theory of how you win: by taking out key nodes, you essentially collapse the regime rather than win by attrition. It is almost like a coup. If you were going to engineer a coup, you would use effects-based operations. It is not a war of attrition, and this is very important, because what it means is that, even though you collapse the Taliban regime, or Saddam Hussein's regime, you can drive what is left of the opposition underground. As a result, you don't have as clear-cut a victory in terms of defeating the enemy force. You collapse the regime, but you do not completely defeat the force.

What you have as a result of that is ongoing conflict, which is what we see Afghanistan and Iraq today. So, an unintended consequence has been that, while we have gotten very good at this first transformation—winning a high-intensity war—there is a demand now for a new transformation, a new capability, and it has to do with stabilization and reconstruction, which we are not particularly good at. You can go back and look at American military history, and see that we had this capability in the past (witness the Marshall Plan). But after Vietnam, we decided that we were not going to do that anymore. So we went into Iraq without the capability to deal with the results of the first military transformation, which was regime collapse. You win a quick victory, you are there with many fewer people in-theater, and you are not really prepared for the following stage. So what we have in the Unites States today is not just one military transformation, which is the high-tech network-centric form of systems transformation that you are all familiar with, but we are also trying to figure out how to negotiate this second transformation, which deals with how you do stabilization and reconstruction missions better, and how you connect the two together through concurrent planning.



If we expand the discussion to include Europe and NATO, we can see that we need some reforms on the political, diplomatic, and conceptual side. We need to figure out how to create a new strategic approach that will unite partners on both sides of the Atlantic. In short, we need to revitalize the trans-Atlantic dialogue. There are a number of bilateral discussions all the time, but the EU-U.S. dialogue has been stifled. The third dialogue should be between NATO and the EU, and that's not happening. Certainly they talk—there are monthly discussions on about five different levels—but those discussions are paralyzed, except when you have a Berlin-plus operation going on, like in Bosnia, in which case it goes forward. But the broad kind of dialogue on military affairs that these two institutions should be having is not taking place. We have to streamline decision-making. We have a NATO response force that is highly ready, highly deployable, but it does not do any good if you have a force that can move out in a week if it takes you three months to make a political decision about deployment. That is the kind of political-diplomatic transformation that is needed.

We also need to do a number of things in terms of military capabilities, and to try to figure out how to take some of these lessons that the United States is learning and pull that knowledge into NATO and the Partnership. The NATO Response Force and Allied command transformation are actually doing very well in moving the game forward. To be successful, you need to actually create a force or command or something that embodies the transformation, and then use that entity to drive it forward. Percentage goals do not work, lists do not work—the way you accomplish transformation is by creating commands or forces that are required to develop certain capabilities. What we should be doing over the next couple of years is pushing the NATO and EU transformation process and the Partnership transformation process further.

Right now, we have deployed almost everything we can in NATO. There is not much left that we can pull together and deploy quickly. So, we need to enhance that capability across the board. If we are going to be able to deal successfully with finance ministries all across Europe and at least keep defense budgets where they are (or hopefully increase them), we need a clear vision of what we want in terms of NATO's expeditionary capability. This middle triangle is about 250,000 people. If you look at the ground forces, it is certainly more than the 8 percent—it's 14 or 15 percent. It starts with special forces. We do not need a lot of special forces—200 to 300 people as the core capability. We are going to envision a very small core of about 300, and then a network of maybe 1000 or 2000 of other special operation forces.

Behind that you have the NATO Response Force. This is something I began working on in 2001, and its genesis really was the conflict in Afghanistan, where we had an Article V commitment in NATO. Our commander, Tommy Franks, was asked if he could use any NATO capabilities other than a number of very close allies. The answer was no. It was a big mistake, I think, politically, but he could not figure out how to fit NATO capabilities into the U.S. force framework. The NATO Response

Force was created in response to that problem. We have an initial operating capability that will be ready next year, but eventually we are going to have full operating capability for the NATO Response Force. It is a joint force of perhaps 20–25,000 troops, highly deployable, but not sustainable for long engagements; it could only operate for a month or so.

There are a couple of issues with the NATO Response Force. While European nations have been very forthcoming, the concern is that the U.S. is not contributing enough boots on the ground for the response force. Second, there is a concern that if we do not use the NATO Response Force quickly, we will lose it. Third, a number of the European allies are saying that they would like to do more in this respect, but they would like to have common funding for operations and even contributions to the NATO Response Force.

Then we have the stabilization and reconstruction force. The United States has learned the hard way that you need to have a capability in place right away—people there who have been thinking about what we call in the United States the Phase IV mission: the post-conflict mission. We made huge mistakes that we are still paying for today as a result of not having such a capability in place. The lesson we learned in the United States is that we need to build up this capability. The same thing is true for NATO. Actually, NATO and our European allies are very good at these stabilization and reconstruction operations, as has been shown in the Balkans and in Africa. We now have NATO capability in Afghanistan; in fact, NATO is going to take over that mission. So, the capabilities are there, but it is put together on an ad hoc basis.

We also need a NATO security-sector reform capability. This is another lesson both from Afghanistan and Iraq. We have had to go in there and rebuild the entire national security structure—the defense forces, the security forces, the police forces—and we did that pretty much on an ad hoc basis. We did not do a very good job of it to begin with, and we have learned a lot. So, the United States needs to have a standing capability to

do this kind of work. This is something again that our European allies are very good at. This has been inherent in the whole PfP process. So, Europe has some real skills—in fact many of the NATO members and Partnership countries have great experience in this area that the U.S. needs to figure out how to harness and use if we are ever in another situation like this.

In conclusion, I would like to turn to EU and U.S. military transformation. On the EU side, the European rapid reaction force is essentially troopless—it is not effective. I think the EU has recognized that, and for precisely that reason they have created these battle groups. Battle groups are essentially ground forces; they are not really joint in the first instance—they have got about 1500 troops, so they are small. They are highly deployable, and the vision for the use of such a force is a crisis management operation, probably in Africa. Just as the NATO defense force was an instrument for transformation and deployability in NATO, these battle groups serve the same function for the EU, in my view. The other area where the EU can contribute is constabulary forces, which are very much needed for these extended operations. Five European nations today are training their constabulary forces: the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France (in Vincenza). This is another important contribution that the EU can make.

The United States, as you know, is changing its forward-deployed structure in Europe, moving from about 110,000 troops down to probably 60,000 to 70,000. We are moving a lot of ground forces out of Germany, pushing some forces forward to Bulgaria, Romania, and a few other places. We are going to have at least one striker brigade (hopefully more) as part of this forward-deployed capability, and this striker brigade really does pull together many elements of military transformation. What we ought to be thinking about is taking the elements of the U.S. forward-deployed capability and training together with the NATO Response Force, so we can use those training exercises to transfer things we have learned in the United States in our own process of military transformation to the NATO Response Force.

Col. Ralph Thiele, Director, Bundeswehr Center for Transformation, Germany
"What European NATO Allies Must Be Doing Re: Transformation"

Colonel Thiele explained that the process of transforming the armed forces of the U.S. started as early as 1996, with a focus on modernization and joint operational capability. He then discussed the implications of these developments for the European members of NATO.

Transformation

Modernization, structural change, innovative concepts, and technological developments, as well as close cooperation with coalition partners, are the preconditions of interoperable twenty-first-century forces. Transformation institutionalizes such change. In light of current and future security challenges, governmental instruments—and the armed forces in particular—need to be able to react to unforeseen developments and events in a timely and effective manner. Like the political, economic, social, and technological conditions in our societies that are subject to constant change, the armed forces have to adapt constantly.

The U.S. has never taken a limited approach to the transformation of its forces. Rather, transformation has been from the very beginning an interdepartmental effort. Transformation is the permanent search for new answers to new questions; it is not just one single reform program. It is about finding suitable, promising concepts and training methods through the use of networked information and communication technology. Transformation is about the synergy between concepts and training, technology and materiel, and governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both on the national and international level. It is about a new way of thinking and its translation into constant innovation.

The U.S. has also been striving to be joined in this effort by capable multinational partners in Europe and around the

globe, not only with regard to conceptual and technological aspects, but also with regard to taking a shared responsibility for global security. With the changing of the former ACLANT to "Allied Command Transformation" (ACT), the Alliance has moved forward in the development of transformational concepts and capabilities in accordance and in close partnership with the U.S. Joint Forces Command as promoter of the U.S. transformation.

Information superiority plays a vital role. Concepts and operational planning focus on C^4IISTAR. (Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Information, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance). What is needed is a capability to conduct rapid decisive operations in a joint and multinational way. To be able to involve coalition partners, interoperability is the key to effectiveness and cooperation. Future armed forces will target the vital political, military, and social structures of the adversary through effects-based operations that take advantage of modem information and weapons technology.

While NATO is developing the NATO Response Force, and has placed significant emphasis on transformation, the EU has emerged as a separate deployer of member nations' forces, with a military staff, development of a pool of forces available, and some capacity for operations planning. Given this background, what capabilities does Europe actually need?

European nations are responding to the U.S. transformation process, both individually and through institutions such as NATO and the European Union, by changing perceptions of threats and addressing previously identified capability gaps. Efforts toward the modernization of armed forces have paid off with increasing deployments of European troops for operations. However, there are still widely acknowledged weaknesses; institutional attempts to boost capabilities, through NATO and the EU, have so far largely failed. New efforts are now under way with the inauguration of NATO's Allied Command Transformation and the NATO

Response Force, as well as the formation of the EU battle groups, the establishment of the EU Defense Agency, and the EU's formulation of new 2010 Headline Goals. Moreover, individual countries have structural reforms under way in a drive to use their resources more effectively.

To this end, NATO is the single most important bridge across the Atlantic. Europe is transforming its military capabilities under the Alliance's umbrella. The end-state of this approach is a Europe that is a robust and valuable partner of the U.S. in rapid decisive operations, crisis management, and civil-military stability operations. From an American point of view, the perspective of Europe as a global strategic actor holds several promises: Europe's technological assets contribute to the security of the U.S; a U.S.-supported interoperability strategy that provides for the integration of European assets increases the relevance of transatlantic relations; and there is more flexibility in the transatlantic armaments sector, which is beneficial to the capabilities of all partners.

Transformational Concepts

A key factor in implementing the transformational objectives is the capability to conduct network-centric operations. This is the fundamental basis for the capability of today's joint conduct of operations, and of future warfare as such. Units can be smaller, faster, more agile, modular, and multifunctional. Thus, armed conflicts can be resolved more effectively, faster, and with fewer casualties. Adversary decision processes can be impeded considerably or be made impossible by the speed and precision of friendly assets.

Effects-based operations are the emerging new doctrinal approach to the security challenges of the new millennium, as they explicitly focus on political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational effects. As a new concept of warfare and stability operations, effects-based operations describe how to apply military capabilities in conjunction with the other instruments of coalition power: diplomatic, civilian,

and economic means. Military actions will be focused on the precise application of capabilities, matched to produce effects that reduce an adversary's political and military coherence, break his will to fight, and neutralize his instruments of power. Thus the opponent is viewed from a systems perspective, where key links and nodes are identified to be engaged by the most appropriate means. The core capability of these operations is a superior command-and-control process which—based on a network of governmental and non-governmental experts' knowledge and instruments of power—makes it possible to project national power at an early stage to achieve a maximum effect.

Effects-based operations are directed by a standing joint forces headquarters (SFJHQ) and external partners—both virtual and physical—that have a constant presence of operational planners in an operational-level headquarters versed in effects-based planning and operations, and with the command-and-control capabilities to carry them out. The SFJHQ bases its decisions on the operational net assessment (ONA), which is a knowledge synthesis tool that includes intelligence and many other sources of knowledge that provide a continuous stream of information in support of an operational commander's decisions about desired "effects," and provides a set of discrete tasks and actions to achieve those effects. In a multinational context, the operational net assessment provides a combined picture.

Within this network-centric, information-enabled environment, effects are the outcomes that are to be achieved in an operation. These outcomes can be influenced by targeting a set of nodes that are the materiel- and information-based elements that support the adversary's operations. Nodes can be influenced by a number of actions, which may take place in the diplomatic, information, military, or economic contexts. These actions require the use of resources, which are applied during operations to achieve the desired effects.

Flexibility and adaptability are crucial elements for efficiently and effectively harmonizing interagency operations.

The early engagement of non-military instruments of power is essential. Autonomy needs to be respected, as civilian agencies have a presence in crisis regions prior to military engagement. They provide continuity during transitions, and tend to be more focused on long-term solutions. Much expertise is resident within NGOs. These are particularly valuable resources when it comes to designing actions and effects, methods for assessment, and interpreting results. Consequently, a policy needs to be developed that facilitates the participation of NGOs, but honors their autonomy and neutrality.

First of all, there needs to be strategic political guidance to develop a coherent plan with military and non-military elements of governments and NGOs. A strategic framework provides a clear structure for the effects-based operations conducted by all actors. The elements to be considered include common and updated documentation, multinational training, closing interoperability gaps, awareness of cultural sensitivities, and standard terminology. Civilian and military leadership needs to be harmonized for interagency actions. While a military commander should lead during combat operations, a qualified civilian should lead during stability operations. A civilian authority should be designated and involved from the outset of contingency planning to achieve a seamless transition from combat operations to post-combat stability operations. There is an obvious need to establish policies, technologies, and procedures to enable multinational information sharing. The utility of the common knowledge base depends upon the ability to practically share data in a timely manner. It is especially the case in the field of stability operations that leadership and integration, synergy, and rapid action are crucial factors. Democratic-nation building requires an extraordinary amount of human skills, financial resources, and time. Effects-based operations are going to significantly change the multinational operations of the future. However, only in combination with political crisis management and civilian assets can these operations realize their full potential.

Bundeswehr Transformation

Just as critical to the ability of NATO as to that of the European Union to successfully meet future challenges will be its members' ability to generate transformational capabilities. Any given nation's failure to transform would result in an erosion of the military relevance of the Alliance. Fundamental to a successful transformation process is a strong and sustained commitment on the part of all the member nations. In fact, the member states themselves are setting the new transformational standards and the speed of their translation into effective capabilities.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is the only military power with global interests and global range. Despite its political weight and comprehensive capabilities in military technology, it is aware of the fact that it can meet the asymmetrical challenges of the future only in reliable coalitions with effective international partners. Long-term success in the global fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is only possible through cooperation. Therefore, the transformation of the U.S. armed forces is designed to integrate coalition partners in future common tasks. Within the framework of the Military Interoperability Council (MIC), Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. have already formed a comprehensive and highly qualified community for transformation advancement.

The Bundeswehr embarked on its transformational path only a few years ago, participating with other MIC nations in the U.S. Joint Forces Command's series of multinational experiments. As it is the military element of the German preventive security system, the Bundeswehr needs to be intricately integrated into the inclusive concept of "security," both at the European and the transatlantic level, and within the scope of the United Nations. Consequently, it is important to advance the Bundeswehr not only in accordance with the foreseeable security challenges of the future, but also to organize

the process of transformation in Europe in concurrence with German's trans-Atlantic and other interests.

For the Bundeswehr, this means that it has to continue with its development in all relevant fields in order to be a respected, capable, and interoperable partner in the multinational resolution of future crises and conflicts. To this end, Germany is prepared to keep providing forces, particularly for international peacekeeping and stabilization missions, and is building a new set of force categories: response forces, stabilization forces, and support forces. The capability to conduct network-centric operations will have a key role, in particular for the response forces. The roadmap to realizing the new force structure foresees an overall transformed force by 2010.

Germany's contributions to improving the EU's ability to act with regard to the battle group concept, to give but one example, and its contribution of roughly a quarter of the total forces of the NATO Response Force (NRF), send a clear message. The NRF is simultaneously the nucleus of an emerging European network-centric capability, a state-of-the-art force, and the key component of a common European security policy. As a consequence of the establishment of the NRF, Germany's network-centric capabilities will be reinforced.

Furthermore, Germany has initiated the battle group concept together with the U.K. and France. In order to strengthen the EU's crisis management capacity, rapidly deployable combat units of some 1500 troops each are to be created. This provides the EU with a military instrument similar to NATO's response force. The relevance and the scope of the crisis management capabilities of both NATO and the EU will improve considerably. The German approach to transformation supports the transformation processes of these two institutions, just as the further development of NATO and the EU are closely connected with the German transformation process.

Developing transformational capabilities will be the key not only for the German military, but for any nation that wishes to participate in a multinational environment in meeting twenty-

first-century security challenges. Transformational patterns can be found today anywhere in the world. This process needs to be addressed soon in order to enhance the standing of the European nations and to reinforce their credibility vis-à-vis their trans-Atlantic partners.

Panel II: "Preparing Tomorrow's Leaders: Responding to New Challenges in Education"

Moderators:
Dr. Sam Grier, Dean, NATO Defense College

Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Curriculum Development

Ms. Lee Marvin-Zingg, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Advanced Distributed Learning

Presenters:
Professor Jarmo Toiskallio, Department of Education, National Defense College, Finland: "The Internationalization of Education: The Bologna Process as Trigger"

Dr. Jim Barrett, Director, Directorate of Learning Management, Canadian Defense Academy: "Integration of Civilian and Military Education"

Dr. Robert A. Wisher, Director, Advanced Distributed Learning, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness, United States: "Information Age Reform: Individual and Institutional Utility of Advanced Distributed Learning"

Overview

Highlighting the need to effectively prepare tomorrow's leaders, the members of this panel proposed a broad vision for moving beyond the traditional framework of military education. Professor Toiskallio conjectured that the PfP Consortium could play a leading and active role in developing military- and security-related education and training within the context of a common, international system of higher education. Dr. Barrett

highlighted the need to balance the continual tension between the practical and the theoretical in the field of defense education, particularly during a period that is ripe with potential for better integrating civilian and military education. He also posited that the future development of military education should adhere to three principles: protecting the military ethos, setting requirements based on real needs, and providing good support policies. In closing the panel, Dr. Wisher described Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) systems as providing access to high quality education and training that is tailored to individual needs and delivered cost-effectively. The ADL vision is to provide learning content that is reusable, durable, inter-operable, affordable, and accessible anytime and anywhere.

Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Curriculum Development

Mr. Lehmann explained that the purpose of this panel is to go beyond the traditional framework of military education and look at new methods of teaching for preparing tomorrow's leaders in NATO and PfP nations. The panel will elaborate on collaborative networks and the challenges presented by new forms of education and training.

Professor Jarmo Toiskallio, Department of Education, National Defense College, Finland
"The Internationalization of Education: The Bologna Process as Trigger"

Professor Toiskallio first described the basic aims and ideas of the Bologna Process. Second, he outlined a model of the Bologna Process as a complex system. Finally, he gave some ideas for joint master degree programs, in which the PfP Consortium could play a leading developmental role.

The Bologna Process

The Bologna Process aims to create a coherent European area for higher education by the year 2010. The process grew out of meetings in May 1998 (the Sorbonne Declaration) and June 1999 (the Bologna Declaration) in which European education ministers affirmed the concept of the harmonization of the architecture of the European higher education system. Currently, there are forty-five countries participating in the Bologna Process. It is relevant to the PfP Consortium because the Bologna Process offers a unique opportunity for the Consortium to take an active and leading role in integrating university-level education in defense and security studies.

The five aims of the Bologna Process consist of:

1. Establishing easily readable and comparable degrees
2. Creating uniform degree structures
3. Establishing a system of credits (the European Credit Transfer System)
4. Increasing the mobility of students, teachers, researchers, and administrative staff
5. Promoting cooperation of quality assurance through the development of comparable criteria and methodologies

The idea of the Bologna Process is to create a common framework for higher education. The diversification of content and profile of degree programs calls for a common framework of reference in higher education to increase transparency, and thus to facilitate both national and international student mobility. Increasing student, teacher, and staff mobility adds to cultural understanding and promotes innovation in higher education. The great challenge of the Bologna Process is that conceptions of learning—and even the conceptions of humanity—might differ radically between nations and professions.

European universities are not seeking to unify their degree programs into a prescribed set of curricula. Rather, they are looking for points of common understanding based on diversity and autonomy. It is better to describe the process as a type of "tuning" rather than creating a uniform system of higher education. The "tuning" project in no way seeks to restrict the independence of academic and subject specialists, or damage local and national academic authority. Development of the process must not lead to a mono-linguistic world of higher education—multiculturalism and pluralism are to remain the intrinsic values of European higher education. Competencies should be understood as knowing and understanding (theoretical knowledge), knowing how to act (practical application of knowledge), and knowing how to be (values as an integral element of the way of perceiving and living with others in a social context).

The Challenges of the Bologna Process

The Bologna Process, in its geographical, economic, and political composition, faces tremendous challenges. In addition to creating cooperation among the many governmental and academic organizations involved in university education, there are two main streams of educational culture. One is a knowledge society, with emphasis on information technology and information management (science, knowledge, research). The second is critical thinking, which involves intellectual creativity and ethics (development of action competencies). Both streams of educational culture are involved in the process. With respect to defense education, the ministers responsible for defense are also involved.

Higher education institutions should pursue discussions on learning outcomes and competencies in order to help move recognition procedures away from formal issues such as length of study and names of courses towards procedures based on the results of student learning. The most important priority is the

development of conceptual approaches for describing qualifications.



A Role for the PfP Consortium in the Bologna Process: Joint Degree Programs

One method for moving the process along is the establishment of **joint degree programs**, which are high on the European educational-political agenda. As stated at the 2001 Prague Higher Education Summit, it is important to develop modules, courses, and curricula "offered in partnership by institutions from different countries and leading to a recognized joint degree." The joint degree programs would be developed and approved together by several institutions. Students from each participating institution would study parts of the program at other institutions. The students' stays at the participating institutions would be of comparable length. The periods of study and exams passed at the partner institutions would be fully and automatically recognized. Finally, professors of each participating institution would teach at the other institutions,

work out the curriculum jointly, and form joint commissions for examinations.

One example of a possible joint degree program that the PfP Consortium could help to create or organize would be a Master of Crisis Management degree. The aim of the degree would be to enable students to deeply understand the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis-management tasks through the development of a full range of civilian and military means. Students could study civil-military relations in an academy or university in one country, cultures in the university or academy of a second country, and ethics and politics in the university or academy of a third country. The integrating philosophy of the degree program would be human security.

Dr. Sam Grier, Dean, NATO Defense College

Dr. Grier explained that an aim of this panel is to inspire discussion and action that would help to leverage the work done by the PfP Consortium and to increase participation by NATO, especially in the area of education.

We have an education network through the Conference of Commandants, but most of the work is based on annual meetings, while little is done between meetings. We would like to create an enterprise network underneath this level that supports the Conference of Commandants. One important related topic is embedding professional military education into civilian universities, so that military service members could earn master's degrees like those earned at universities in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.

Dr. Jim Barrett, Director, Directorate of Learning Management, Canadian Defense Academy
"Integration of Civilian and Military Education"

Professor Barrett explained that professional armies fought Europe's wars until the end of the eighteenth century. After some 200 years, we are returning to smaller professional armed forces. In the process, military education is coming to have more in common with civilian education.

Tremendous technological change and the revolution in military affairs have dramatically changed the tactical soldier's world, even if the old laws of fire and maneuver still apply. Politically, strategically, and socially, the impact has been far more profound. While Clausewitz taught us that war is, or at least once was, a useful instrument of the state, we have learned from Al Qaeda that something similar to war is useful as an instrument of agencies less well-defined than states. Today, the professional soldier, the defense professional, and the defense and security actor all operate in a complex, globalized enterprise that touches every individual in one way or another. In this new

world of defense and security, we might very well ask, "What does it mean to be a modern military professional?"

Very frequently, the answers to that question have meant a broader and deeper education for officers. Never before have academics played so great a role in the formation of military officers, and never before have academic subjects formed so great a part of the military curriculum. We talk seriously about networks of academies and universities to provide the defense education that we seek. This talk will address the emerging military-academic world of defense education, the threats this increased academic influence is seen to pose to the traditional military ethos, and will pose suggestions for academic-military relations.

The Emerging Military-Academic System

The post Cold-War world has seen at least three major impacts on the professional formation of officers. The first and perhaps the most evident of these is an increase in academic content and academic influence. Many senior officers of the Cold War period would be appalled at the current models of Britain's Joint Service Command and Staff College, the Canadian Forces College, or the Baltic Defense College. But in these confusing times, the real utility of the academy is in imparting to officers an enhanced capacity to act strategically in unfamiliar circumstances.

The second major impact arises from both internally perceived needs but also from powerful external currents that militaries cannot escape: demands for career-long learning and recognizable degrees; the rapid growth of distance learning; the introduction of performance measurements; and a constant pressure to reduce costs. These have produced an agenda to develop all officers at a given rank to the same standard and at the same time to reduce the huge cost of military training and education. This agenda is heavily dependent on the successful use of distance learning. While distance learning does not offer the fantastic savings some once hoped for, active research,

practice, and experience have made distance learning more affordable, more effective, and more powerful. There are, nonetheless, continuing fears that the residential schoolhouse might be lost to the distance-learning onslaught. What may indeed be threatened is the old-style staff college, which generates little new insight but is a very congenial means of sharing knowledge. A modern staff, war, or defense college is very different. It is a source of new knowledge, and is therefore of fundamental importance for defense education. Distance learning is merely one vehicle for the distribution of that knowledge.

The new staff college offers the most visible sign of the cultural impact of increasing academic influence. In Newport, Carlisle, Quantico, Watchfield/Shrivenham, Toronto, Tartu, and other places, we see an established or growing quasi-academic environment, which brings together officers with field experience and professors of distinction. The academic tradition of exposing ideas to the rigorous criticism of peers finds fertile ground in these colleges. The commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps University said, "My officers need the stimulus of dissent."

A scholar develops knowledge and expertise over a lifetime. The best become world-class experts in their fields of study. Professional soldiers, who acquire a broad suite of experiences over the course of a career, can, by devoting some fraction of their working life to education, come to understand deeply the profession in which they serve. Military education thus becomes a long-term enterprise, providing long-term collective memory and stability against the hasty introduction of random ideas. As a result, we can expect to find in our armed forces officers who are better equipped to deal with tactical uncertainty, who in the midst of an operation have a better sense of where the optimal points of leverage—military, political, social—might be found, and who better grasp the slower strategic modes.

Defense education is an emerging multi-disciplinary field that is quite unlike any purely academic discipline. It is neither purely theoretical nor purely practical, but depends heavily on both approaches. Within this inter-disciplinary world, there must be a tolerance of and a respect for the important ideas of those who lack scholarly credentials on the one hand, or field experience on the other. This respect must translate into the transparent analysis and criticism of ideas, at least within the boundaries of military education.

A Model of Officer Professional Development

It may be instructive to consider the following simple model of officer professional development, based on the observation of recent developments. It is a hybrid model, in which only some of the required professional development is offered in residence. Some is to be completed by self-study or at a distance. We have extended the model even further, recognizing that some of what interests the officer can be found in civilian universities. There are three components:

1. Residential courses, largely consisting of war-fighting and operations planning, which make up the essential military core of the curriculum
2. Military distance learning, including courses in military history, military science, technology, and shorter courses of immediate relevance
3. Courses offered by other institutions, largely reflecting a broad liberal education

There are great strengths in this model. Properly implemented, it guarantees that officers learn essential military skills and core military values in the right setting, but it also ensures they are not educated in isolation from the society they serve. It offers opportunities for lifelong study of the profession of arms, and for critical input to, and assessment of, current military thinking. It offers a richer, more rigorous formation than most citizens could even hope for, and, over time, will

produce a cadre of knowledgeable and respected senior voices for defense and security in our national councils.

If there are strengths to this model, there are problems and risks as well. The past decade has seen an extraordinary window of opportunity open, within which military education has flourished. That window may not remain open forever. Inevitably, there has been a negative reaction to the intrusion of so much non-traditional material, and there are a few signs of strain. Educational accomplishments are no longer taken into account when U.S. Air Force officers are considered for promotion. Again in the U.S., officers have been denied educational opportunities because of the operational tempo. In Canada and elsewhere, more than a few senior officers have lamented the significant burden that additional education places on an already heavily loaded officer.

Many of the problems can be resolved readily enough, but there are issues that are cultural in origin, and these are less tractable. Soldiers and scholars value different things, and have different rhythms. Soldiers are required to respond rapidly to changing circumstances, while scholars are expected to analyze and debate them. The scholar must explore the complexity of ideas, while soldiers must simplify in order to act. Defense scholars must adapt to both rhythms, adopting what Patrick Lehmann calls a *géométrie variable*, based on mutual tolerance and respect.

Three Principles for the Design of Defense Education

Properly designed and managed, defense education offers great hope, not just for better armed forces, but also for a more stable and peaceful world. It should be seen as a serious enterprise, not one to be left to those who do not understand the business or to those unwilling to confront the issues. I suggest three principles for defense education:

1. **Protect the military ethos**. This means that the schoolhouse (the war college or defense college) must be protected and nurtured, and that, within the war college, special attention must be paid to the socialization of defense scholars. Military professionalism is about far more than curriculum. The values, ideals, and ethos—those deep-in-the-gut bonds—are all best shared in a close, residential setting, in the company of students. While it is neither appropriate nor necessary that all professional development be done in the schoolhouse, it is critical that some be presented there. There is no better investment in defense education than bringing soldiers and scholars together to understand and respect the other's culture, modes, and rhythms, without compromising one's own culture, modes, and rhythms.
2. **Define requirements based on real needs**. Militaries have always set training requirements, but this is a more subtle process when there are desired educational components. These must not be determined by civilian academic credentials, but rather by real needs, as determined by a thorough military-academic analysis. If there is a need for graduate-level study of international relations, then set that only as the requirement, and then ensure that systems are in place to make it possible. Educational requirements can be stated in much more flexible terms than traditional military requirements, and they can often be acquired from external sources, thus permitting useful economies. Finally, when setting requirements, pay attention to the total training burden of the individual, and keep it within reasonable bounds.
3. **Establish good supporting policies**. Good policy will address the requirements of the individual, and will also result in an officer population that exhibits a broad spectrum of educational experience. Good policy will apply useful steering forces to that population, without imposing unnecessary burdens on individual officers.

> Good policy will see that time and financial resources are made available for professional self-development. Good policy will ensure that appropriate credit is given—both military credit for civilian achievement and academic accreditation for military courses. For example, policy need not require or reward a master's degree, but should make a master's degree readily achievable. If a professional military education is to be accepted as a legitimate and welcome part of an officer's professional development, then the utility of a broader foundation must be evident, and the acquisition of that broader learning must be attractive.

To conclude, if we really believe in security through transparency and interoperability, we could do far worse than to start with the education of soldiers. Defense education for collective security provides a visible and equitable platform for all nations, large and small, based on the ancient academic traditions of transparency and debate. No nation can, in such a forum, claim a monopoly on the truth. There is great potential here, and perhaps the time has come to see defense and security education as a calling, something more than a secondary activity for scholars or soldiers with other real priorities.

Ms. Lee Marvin-Zingg, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Advanced Distributed Learning

Ms. Marvin-Zingg explained that, as the age of information matures, e-knowledge should ripen. Educational institutions, militaries, and governments are prompting initiatives to benefit from information-age advances and promote efficiency as well. Information-age changes impact learning, teaching, methods, and the tools with which they are developed.

Dr. Robert A. Wisher, Director, Advanced Distributed Learning, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness, United States
"Information Age Reform: Individual and Institutional Utility of Advanced Distributed Learning"

Dr. Wisher explained that there has been an increased interest in both professional education and in the use of electronic learning. Advanced distributed learning (ADL) strives to provide access to the highest quality education and training that is tailored to individual needs and delivered cost-effectively, anywhere and anytime. In assessing the institutional utility of ADL, the emphasis so far has been on infrastructure, costs, return on investment, and web hits rather than on the knowledge and education of individuals.

An example of ADL is the OpenCourseWare Program operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which is a web-based publication of virtually all MIT course content. MIT OpenCourseWare can be accessed at http://ocw.mit.edu. Site highlights include syllabi, course calendars, lecture notes, exams, problem sets and solutions, labs and projects, and video lectures from over 1000 courses. OpenCourseWare is available on the World Wide Web to anybody at zero cost. However, OpenCourseWare is not an MIT education, it does not represent the interactive classroom environment, and it is not degree-granting. This web program has received millions of hits from every continent on the globe. The single largest user of OpenCourseWare, outside of MIT students, is the U.S. military (especially the U.S. Navy). This is a great example of the maxim, "If you will build it, they will come."

In general, people are accessing MIT's OpenCourseWare because they want to gain knowledge about a certain topic, not usually to supplement a course. The individual utility of ADL, which is under the control of the learner, is a function of

cognitive factors, meta-cognitive factors, motivational factors, social factors, and individual differences. Increasingly, individuals are taking responsibility for their own education, and the individual's motivation drives what he or she learns.



Individual Utility to the Learner

1. **Cognitive factors**. The nature of the learning process is such that complex matter is best learned as an intentional process of constructing meaning from information and experience. Successful learners are active, goal-directed, and self-regulated. The goal of the learning process is to create meaningful, coherent representations of knowledge. Successful learners acquire thinking and learning strategies and pursue personally relevant goals. As part of the process of construction of knowledge, learners link new information with their existing knowledge and experience.

2. **Meta-cognitive factors**. These factors are related to how the learner thinks about thinking. Learners use strategies for selecting and monitoring mental operations. They reflect on how they think and learn. They use a repertoire of thinking and

reasoning strategies to achieve complex learning goals. The context of learning matters as well, due to the influence of environmental factors, culture, technology, and pedagogical practice.

3. **Motivational factors**. How much is learned is influenced by the learner's motivation. Beliefs, goals, and expectations can enhance or interfere with the learner's quality of thinking. Also, creativity and curiosity contribute to the



intrinsic motivation to learn. Successful learners perceive learning as interesting and personally relevant. Motivation has an effect on effort. Learning complex knowledge and skills requires extended learner effort and guided practice. Learning demands the investment of considerable energy and strategic effort, along with a long-term perspective.

4. **Social factors**. Learning is most effective when differential development across physical, intellectual, emotional, and social domains is taken into account. Learning is influenced by social interactions, interpersonal relations, and communication with others.

5. **Individual differences**. Learners have different strategies, approaches, and capabilities for learning that are a function of prior learning and heredity. They have acquired their own preferences for how they like to learn and the rate at which they learn. Learning is most effective when differences in linguistic, cultural, and social background are taken into account.



When all of these factors are taken into account, then ADL can be adapted and tailored to the characteristics of each individual. This can include the degree of assistance available, the degree of interaction among students, the speed and format of delivery, the type of requirements, and other factors of learning across the five dimensions as listed above. An example of ADL in the U.S. Navy indicated that most students could complete a course in an average of about half the time required for the legacy method of providing the same training. Completion time varied significantly based upon the type of learner and individual background.

The U.S. Navy is trying to incorporate several of this panel's themes via the five-vector model. Each person in the Navy maintains an individual scorecard along five dimensions:



professional development; personal development; leadership; certifications and qualifications; and performance. In the spirit of the Bologna Process, it might be of great interest for other organizations to consider a similar model for tracking and assessing individual development.

The vision behind ADL is to provide sharable content objects from across the World Wide Web through projects like CORDA (Content Object Repository Discovery and Registration Architecture). The content should be accessible, reusable, and durable. The content should also be interoperable, such as through projects like SCORM (Sharable Content Object Reference Model), which assemble content in real-time and on-demand. Lastly, the content should be affordable, so as to provide learning and assistance anytime, anywhere. This way, learners can participate in mobile learning (via laptops, PDAs, or other wireless systems), immersive learning environments

(combined Web-based courses with traditional classroom types of events), and the global information grid (currently being developed by the U.S. for the high-speed delivery of Web-based educational content).



Panel III: "Regional Co-operation as a Partnership Goal: Current Challenges to Security Sector Governance"

Moderator and Presenter:
Brigadier-General Karl A. Wohlgemuth, Senior Military Advisor, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Presenters:
Mr. Andreas Halbach, Regional Representative, International Organization for Migration: "Responses in Migration Governance to Security Issues in the CIS and Central Asia"

Mr. Sabri Ergen, Defense Cooperation, NATO Headquarters: "NATO's Role in Regional Cooperation: Cultivating Stability and Security"

Overview

Regional cooperation is both a significant challenge and a significant opportunity for governments as they work together as partners to address issues that do not neatly follow national borders. Moreover, many issues can be much more effectively addressed when states cooperate within a region to share information, capabilities, and lessons about how to confront pressing security challenges. Brigadier-General Wohlgemuth provided a candid assessment of the difficulties facing the international community as they assist in the development of capacity in the nascent government of Afghanistan. While some progress has been made in the creation of the government and the conduct of elections, significant problems still exist, especially with respect to coordination and command among security forces and adjusting the power bases away from warlords and those in charge of the nation's significant narcotics trade. Mr. Halbach explained the essential role that regional

cooperation plays in addressing the problem of migration, which is increasingly an issue with security, political, economic, trade, and diplomatic ramification. Regional cooperation, such as the CIS Conference and its Program of Action, is an example of the type of approach that can enhance success in addressing such difficult issues. Mr. Ergen concluded the panel by explaining that NATO has and will continue to use its tools to facilitate regional cooperation, the best example of which is the southeast region cooperative group.

Brigadier-General Karl A. Wohlgemuth, Senior Military Advisor, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
Introduction and Moderation, "Update from Afghanistan"

Following one year serving as the Senior Military Advisor to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Brigadier-General Wohlgemuth offered a personal update of the current situation in Afghanistan from his perspective. By his account, the international community may be repeating many of the same mistakes in Afghanistan made by the British and Soviets in the past. It was clear that, while he was critical at times, Brigadier-General Wohlgemuth's comments were sincere and aimed at promoting change in the actions of the international community towards Afghanistan.

The modern history of Afghanistan demonstrates that foreign efforts to create governments in Afghanistan can be doomed to failure. Currently, the international community appears to be repeating the same mistake of forcing families out of their tribal traditions into a government before the country is ready, without the social and economic preparation required for such dramatic changes.

Afghanistan faces significant challenges brought on by the global war on terror. While the situation may be improving, the country is still attempting to cope with ethnic and religious issues, tribal loyalties that extend across national boundaries,

communications systems that provide platforms for opposition groups, nongovernmental and multinational organizations and companies establishing competing power bases, and an increasing disparity between rich and poor. The international community must realize these challenges and, instead of forcing on the country a government for which it is not yet ready, it should only define the political criteria that would lead to international acceptance and a major redeployment effort. Then the global community should allow the Afghans themselves to work out political solutions that suit their current situation and challenges. Nevertheless, assistance, advice, and money are still needed.

Afghanistan is a very large country, bigger than France and nearly double the size of Germany, a country in which a severe mistake is continuously made. All news, political information, reports from CNN, and pictures come from Kabul. But Kabul is not Afghanistan. In fact, President Karzai actually only has the power of the Mayor of Kabul. Afghanistan is a country with a population of approximately 25 million people, with an average life expectancy of forty-two years, an average income of US$700 per capita per year, and 75 percent illiteracy. It is a country where one out of five children dies by the age of five. The society has been torn apart by twenty-five years of invasion, occupation, and civil war, but the people long for peace.

The international community reacted to these issues by arranging the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 to establish an Afghan interim authority and an interim legal framework based on the 1964 Constitution. The agreement also called for elections within six months to establish an Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), a constitution within eighteen months, and national elections within two years. Presidential elections were successfully carried out on 9 October 2004, and parliamentary elections will be held on 18 September 2005. District elections, however, had to be cancelled due to disputes over district borders. The agreement also requested the deployment of a

multinational security force (ISAF, deployed in December 2001) and UN assistance with voter registration. Furthermore, and very importantly, the agreement empowered the UN to investigate human rights abuses.

The principal challenge for Afghanistan today remains the opium economy and heroin production. The drug problem is not limited to Afghanistan, however. The trafficking routes run through all of Europe and Russia. Afghanistan produces 4000 tons of heroin a year. 60 percent of the gross national product is derived from the drug trade (US$2.8 billion in farming and trafficking), and the remaining 40 percent comes from international aid. Thus the concept of preventing Afghanistan from *becoming* a narcotic state seems rather cynical. While the international community embarked on a poppy eradication program, it did not offer rural Afghanis any alternative way to make a living. In fact, farmers were throwing their children in front of the eradication machinery because they could not feed them any longer, while drug lords are still profiting from the narcotics industry because they were able to store their harvest from last year while the prices continued to rise.

There are thousands of uniformed personnel present throughout Afghanistan. The police forces total 72,000 individuals, including the Afghan National Police, Border Police, and Provincial Police. Germany trained approximately 30,000 of these forces; 5000 are deployed to Kabul, and 800 are assigned to the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) security staff. Although this seems like a large number, the police are corrupt and largely ineffective. Then there is the U.S.-led coalition force of 19,000 soldiers, which acts without a UN mandate as part of the global war on terror, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), consisting of about 8,000 soldiers, which is accomplishing almost nothing other than securing themselves. The 26,000-strong Afghan National Army (ANA) has been well trained by the coalition forces, and is well received by the population. However, the largest problem facing these

forces is not necessarily the opposition; it is the lack of any unity of command between the U.S.-led coalition, ISAF and the UN.

The opposition consists of approximately 130,000 unofficial militia soldiers led by warlords who have become increasingly wealthy over the last decade. These individuals fought for twenty-five years against the Soviets and against each other. They did the dirty work for the coalition forces against the Taliban, and lost thousands of friends and family in the process. And now President Karzai has called back the individuals who left when the Soviets invaded, earned educations overseas, and has placed *them* in positions to run the country, while those who defended the country are put out of power. This is not going to work out.

There are also many security threats that must be faced in Afghanistan: the Taliban, Al Qaeda, warlords, political factions, and a very high level of criminal activity. The targets of opposition violence (of one form or another) now include political candidates, the voting process, the central government, the security forces (CFC-A/ISAF/ANA/Police), coalition forces, and the international community (UN/NGOs/GOs). In actuality, anyone wearing a uniform in the country is a potential target.

The daily methods of attack are car bombs, hand grenades, kidnappings, and explosive devices, with the worst-case scenarios being the use of hand-held Stinger missiles (which are found weekly) on international aircraft, or the assassination of President Karzai. But again, the most serious threat to the local populace is the U.S.-led coalition, with their search-and-kill operations, and the large amount of attendant collateral damage. Every person killed is simply summarized under "Taliban." Thus, a paradigm shift is needed if the coalition wants to win the hearts and minds of the people.

UNAMA's mission is to promote national reconciliation, to fulfill the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the UN under the Bonn Agreement (including those related to human rights, the rule of law, and gender issues), and finally—working in coordination with the ATA—to manage all UN humanitarian

projects in Afghanistan. There are sixteen major UN agencies currently operating inside Afghanistan, and all UN programs lend support to the Afghan transition process and recognize the lead role played by the Afghan administration. The current activities ensure the effective and efficient operation of UN assistance programs, ensure that these programs address cross-cutting issues and apply sound principles grounded in gender equity and human rights, promote the development of self-sufficient and accountable Afghan government institutions, increase the ATA's ability to lead, and coordinate and manage the ongoing humanitarian crisis and the national reconstruction process.

However, the actions currently being taken by the international community are counterproductive. The international community employs the few educated individuals the government urgently needs, as well as inflating the salaries of uneducated workers. For example, a professor earns US$90 per month, but a UN driver earns US$500 a month. So if the professor can drive, he would rather work for the UN accomplishing menial tasks than work as a valuable asset to his government.

While there are clearly problems with the unity of command in Afghanistan, steps are already being taken to improve the current situation. Since ISAF took over the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the north and in the west, the next step will be to take over in the south in Kandahar and in the east. At present, the Turkish Army is in charge, although they are soon to be replaced by Italian troops. Next year, when the Allied Ready Reaction Corps under British leadership takes over, they will further enhance command and control.

Mr. Andreas Halbach, Regional Representative, International Organization for Migration
"Responses in Migration Governance to Security Issues in the CIS and Central Asia"

Mr. Halbach first prefaced his contribution by placing the connections between migration and security in a larger context. Mr. Halbach focused less on emergency and post-conflict situations, however, and instead presented a brief overview of what has been achieved in the framework of regional cooperation in the migration sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. He referred here, in particular, to the CIS Conference and its Program of Action, which in turn spawned other sub-regional initiatives. He then went on to recall some of the background and referred to the achievements, trends, cooperation, and government commitments.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and failed states are the topics of NATO transformation; they are not the leading topics on any migration menu, even if the global migration agenda, and with it International Organization for Migration (IOM) itself, have undergone a tremendous transformation of their own over the last decade. Nevertheless, there are significant links between terrorism or failed states on the one hand, and migration management on the other—e.g., organized crime income from human trafficking, estimated to be second only to that from drugs or arms, can flow towards terrorism. Furthermore, the intrinsic instability of failed states enhances push factors for population movements. NATO and IOM are increasingly cooperating in a number of thematic and geographical areas. They also have a history of cooperation in training, in pre-deployment exercises, and in formal operational staff officer courses. In fact, SHAPE and IOM have drafted a Memorandum of Agreement aimed at further strengthening cooperation.

When serving an organization that carries the label "migration," one acquires a lot of detailed knowledge, but

struggles sometimes with the most simple and basic questions: What is migration all about? Is it about push and pull factors? Wanted versus unwanted migrants? Brain drain and brain gain? Threats to personal or state security or the security of living standards? What happens to the human right called "freedom of movement"? Such basic questions can be addressed within the framework of a couple of basic concepts:

- Migration is part of the modern human condition; it is a fact of daily life; it is simply inevitable.
- Globalization has freed the movement of goods, of capital, and of services—why then should it not affect the movement of people?

The essence of migration policy is *not* prevention; it is about devising a framework for the movement of people in times when developmental and demographic push and pull factors become stronger, and when the means of communication and mobility have expanded.

The magnitude of today's migration flows is important to consider. 1965 saw an estimated 75 million migrants worldwide; today, we estimate 180 million migrants per year, which is some three percent of the world's population, most of them economic or environmental migrants. Ten years from now, there may be 80 million more.

There is often a temptation to view migration merely as a subsidiary issue of economic policy, or of security policy, trade policy, demographic and population policy, and so on. But migration is a thoroughly crosscutting theme, a book of its own, with many chapters. Each chapter reveals complex challenges, which call for comprehensive consideration, dispassionate discourse, sober articulation, and a vision that is not encumbered by short-term political agendas. To migrate or not to migrate, that is *not* so much the question! How to *manage* migration, that is the real question.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, what were the main migration and population issues in the former Soviet

territories? They included forced displacement in the wake of armed conflict; sizeable population segments in several countries who had become residents of nations that were not their titular nations; the return of formerly deported peoples such as the Crimean Tartars or the Meskhetians; and also populations displaced by man-made disasters (e.g., around the Aral Sea or Chernobyl). Considering the mainly involuntary nature of these displacements, the UN General Assembly mandated the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to organize a conference in 1996, together with IOM and OSCE, and to create a framework for promoting stability and basic human rights. The CIS Conference process has been an innovative and comprehensive response, and its Program of Action contained a set of demanding principles, with institutional and operational parameters that placed an eye on prevention, and included a framework for international cooperation. The Program of Action was implemented against the backdrop of a political, economic, and social transition that has been more complex than expected. It brought together all the countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as neighboring countries and a large number of donor countries.

Following the mid-point review by the steering group in July 2000, the aim set for the next five years was to assist the countries of the region to put in place effective, rational, and humane migration management systems that are compatible with each other and with internationally acknowledged standards and best practices—systems that focus on the major migration challenges and their relation to economic development and the stability of states, but also on the human rights of migrants. IOM proposed a set of goals
in the following areas:

- An integrated legislative, procedural, and institutional framework for migration management
- The management of irregular migration and of borders, with due regard to protection concerns

- The fight against trafficking in persons
- NGO development and institutional participation
- Enhanced regional cooperation and networking on migration issues
- The collection, analysis, and exchange of migration-related information in the interest of *better-informed* decision- and policy-making.

What Are the Current Trends?

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Western Europe braced for an onslaught of irregular migrants from the East. The so-called Budapest Group was created as an inclusive platform for inter-state dialogue and policy recommendations to contain uncontrolled migration. However, contrary to what was anticipated in the Budapest Process, migration flows out of the CIS region did *not* overwhelm Western Europe, and soon began to stabilize. Today, the EC foresees a scenario in which, by the year 2030, the EU will face a gap of 20 million in its workforce, mainly for demographic reasons. Other factors also contributed to forestall any massive uncontrolled migration flows, such as new visa regimes, the effects of EU enlargement, the new security agenda that emerged after September 11, and improved economic growth and job opportunities in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.

The mix of intersecting or overlapping pull and push factors of earlier years is increasingly overshadowed by one major migration concern, namely the search for economic opportunity. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan saw migration outflows ranging from 14 to 24 percent of their populations, and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan saw similar, albeit smaller, outflows. Russia and Kazakhstan remain the primary destination countries within the region. However, significant net migration gains in Russia are offset by other demographic factors, with the result of a net population decline. Similar to Western Europe, demographic

decline in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine is a long-term issue. Russia has recognized it, and is developing an immigration policy to stabilize population levels and enhance economic development.

Much has been achieved in the framework of the CIS Conference. Countries of the region understood and acknowledged that migration is not only a national concern, but one that also depends on bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in international institutions, including the CIS itself or bodies such as the Eurasian Economic Community. Cooperation also follows sub-regional dynamics and agendas in Central Asia, the Southern Caucasus, and the Western CIS, always bearing in mind Russia's significance in any sub-regional context. EU enlargement presents a new challenge to its new neighbors, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus—countries faced with high levels of irregular transit migrants stranded against the new external borders of the EU. In response, they have come together in the Soderkoping Process (so named after a little town in Sweden) to clarify their common interests and entertain with their neighbors to the West a dialogue that aims to avoid the transformation of the old Iron Curtain into an "EU curtain."

Regarding institutional and administrative reform, great progress was made in "institutionalizing" training for migration officials, in developing comprehensive training manuals, setting up independent training centers, and spearheading curricula for the training of trainers. Countries such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan are moving from military towards civilian border guard services.

Border management assessments have been conducted by the IOM in almost all countries of the region, most recently in Moldova. Follow-up efforts have included material improvements, equipment upgrades, better security checks, better-trained staff, and computerized exchange of passenger data between the border services and the relevant ministries. Pilot projects at selected border crossings aim to both curtail

illegal migration and ensure easy and humane passage for legitimate travelers and migrants. The new international security agenda has led governments to request assistance in modernizing travel documents and document issuing systems, and to adapt their visa policies to be consistent with international standards.
The role of civil society in the region has also evolved further in the past decade. Capacity building in the South Caucasus has resulted in a network of NGOs that assist migrants through migrant information service points. Community-based disaster preparedness in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has been strengthened. In Central Asian countries, NGO capacity has been built to provide legal assistance for migrants. The Ferghana Valley Networking Initiative is a good example of cross-border cooperation. Under the slogan "Better Borders," a regional NGO network aims to engage authorities in favor of easing legal border-crossings and granting permits for short-term seasonal labor arrangements in a region that is still largely characterized by unresolved border tensions.

Combating the traffic in persons and organized crime is an area where major progress has been made in several countries. Since 2000, most countries of the region have signed (and many have ratified) the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Most countries in the region have pursued legislative amendments to their criminal codes, and a good number of countries have set up national working groups and task forces and have developed official action plans. Regional cooperation is strengthening in particular in the Western CIS, as illustrated by the three International Law Enforcement Conferences in Minsk, Kiev, and the last one just recently in Chisinau. Nonetheless, the demand for cheap labor and sexual services and the adaptive capacity of organized criminal networks remain a daunting challenge to progress in prevention and law enforcement. The importance of reinforcing cross-border, regional, and international cooperation in combating trafficking in persons cannot be overestimated.

Regional Cooperation

Today, the countries of the former Soviet Union face many traditional migration challenges, such as irregular immigration, trafficking, international transit migration, or disrupted small-border traffic. But they face also increasing migratory flows for reasons of employment or economic distress. Where these flows had been governed by central planning in the former Soviet Union, they are now disrupted by new international borders. The CIS interior ministers and sub-regional groupings such as the Eurasian Economic Community have put migration issues on their agenda. The EU Neighborhood Strategy in the field of justice, freedom, and security, as well as EU technical assistance for third countries, increasingly shape policy development in the region, particularly in the area of border management and counter-trafficking efforts. The states now bordering the expanded EU—namely Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus—have stepped up their level of cooperation with new EU member states (the Soderkoping Process was mentioned earlier as an example of such cooperation). Central Asian states, along with neighboring countries Russia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, participate in a multifaceted regional dialogue and technical capacity-building program. The OSCE is thematizing migration in its human dimension, as well as in its economic and environmental dimension. Migration figures prominently on the agenda of the CBSS, as well as on that of the BSECO. Migration governance and terrorism are included in joint meetings of the CTC with regional organizations, such as the OSCE or the CIS. Last but not least, the majority of the countries in the region are now member states of IOM and participate in its international dialogue on migration.

Indicators of Government Commitment

The past four years have indicated that most states are taking ownership of the issue and support modernization of the migration sector. Obviously, commitment tends to be strongest where national interests are in play, such as in border management or labor migration. The conversion of border guard units from military structures into civilian services, along with increased contributions to training facilities, are clear indicators of this commitment. So are national action plans and task forces to combat trafficking in persons. Migration issues are increasingly reflected in national development and poverty reduction strategies. Similarly, several countries have set up entirely new migration departments or reorganized existing structures in line with national priorities within the migration sector, be it under aspects of forced displacement, labor migration, or immigration of nationals. Resources are being allocated to improve document security. Increasing preparedness to acknowledge the human rights of migrants illustrates an emerging readiness to balance national security with human security interests. New national networks for the exchange of information and statistical data were instituted. Also noteworthy are the initiatives and reforms that aim to protect labor migrants abroad and to allocate funding for improved information services for potential migrants.

To sum up, the very nature of migration is dynamic, reinforced in turn by accelerating mobility and ease of communication. Much of it occurs across international borders in search of economic opportunities. Therefore, international—and, in particular, regional—dialogue and cooperation are essential to clarify the common interests of countries of origin, transit, and destination. Informed by international standards and good practice, regional dialogue and cooperation remain not only a major challenge, but a major opportunity: they are the main mantra of migration management.

Mr. Sabri Ergen, Defense Cooperation, NATO Headquarters
"NATO's Role in Regional Cooperation: Cultivating Stability and Security"

Mr. Ergen has been involved in regional stabilization operations for five years now and began his remarks by commenting on a recent workshop on the border security process that was organized and hosted by Macedonia and backed by Switzerland and Hungary.

During this workshop, it was remarkable to see the European Union, OSCE, and NATO cooperating on a concrete issue such as the border process with nations from Southeast Europe. Cross-border trafficking is an issue that has always endangered NATO operations, but landmark cooperation between countries is making a difference. NATO has assisted because there is a need to assist each other in terms of border control. The issue is also particularly alive now *vis-à-vis* the asymmetric threats of terrorism.

Regional cooperation builds confidence and security, helps transparency, and assists with interoperability. One important issue now is how to use this system of regional collaboration. The key requirements for the effective use of this new system of cooperation are political will and feedback from the local and theater levels to the political level, so that the cooperation is effective and inputs are acted on within the decision-making process. Sending permanent representatives to operational areas is one way for the NATO leadership to further ensure the value of regional cooperation.

Within NATO, there is a Southeast region cooperative group. This includes Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, and can be as flexible as necessary to accomplish its objectives. This is only one example how NATO can adapt to changing situations. As part of the Stability Pact, we are assisting with South Eastern Europe's defense and, while we are concentrating our efforts on South Eastern Europe because here there is sufficient political will, there will be

difficulties in replicating this approach in Central Asia. Thus, perhaps the way to go is to look not just at regions, but also at functional areas and to a certain extent at border security, which is not a primary NATO role. However, this is an issue connected with terrorism and other operational issues that threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Therefore, any system of international security reform must include border control and security as a key issue. For instance, we can have true partnership in the planning and review process in terms of defense planning. This would assist the reform process in moving forward, and would also help further regional cooperation.

With respect to Afghanistan, meetings are being held concerning the narcotics trade Afghanistan, and the ministers of the Euro-Atlantic Council did discuss this issue, but a solution is not easy to find. Nevertheless, regional cooperation—along with other efforts, such as effective border control and security—is an essential approach to solving many of these problems. However, it is not NATO's job to go out and tell nations to cooperate regionally. If they do wish to cooperate, though, NATO has various venues in which they may be able to assist, but this effort must come from the bottom up.

Panel IV: Preparing Tomorrow's Leaders: Promises and Pitfalls of Collaborative Educational Networks

Moderators:
Dr. Sam Grier, Dean of the NATO Defense College

Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Curriculum Development

Ms. Lee Margin-Zingg, Chair of the ADL Working Group

Presenters:
Ms. Victoria Syme-Taylor, Defense Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, United Kingdom

Lt. Colonel Jean d'Andurain, PfP and Cooperation Programs, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters

Captain Thomas Ernst, Branch Head, Cooperation Dialogue and Partner Training, Headquarters SACT

Ms. Tanja Geiss, ADL Scientific Assistant, Policy Department, NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany

Overview

The panel opened with Ms. Victoria Syme-Taylor from the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom, who discussed her country's recognition of the need for joint military education that is concurrent with collaborative military education with governmental agencies, NGOs, and other institutions. This approach seeks to ensure that the military

remains close to the society it serves. The final three speakers discussed how NATO and PfP are developing and using collaborative education networks. Lt. Colonel Jean d'Andurain spoke about the Partnership Real-Time Information Management and Exchange System (PRIME) and the vision of NATO Headquarters for using it as the backbone for the NATO/PfP Education and Training Network. Captain Ernst gave a conceptual overview of ACT's view of the NATO/PfP Education and Training Network. Finally, Tanja Geiss provided insight into when such collaboration will be possible using this network, which has been developed by ACT.

Ms. Victoria Syme-Taylor, Defense Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, United Kingdom

Ms. Syme-Taylor provided examples of the changes in military education in the United Kingdom, particularly at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. She then described the philosophy behind the program's course design and development.

The first consideration to keep in mind regarding modern military education is that integration is crucial, because the military is operating in a much wider sphere than was historically the case. What defense requires and what a military officer needs is something much greater than it was before. There is a far more robust requirement for professionalization in combat.

In post-conflict situations, military officers have to understand that they must work with other governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, civilian authorities, and so on. There are also political agendas out there that have to be understood, and there are particular cultural and identity issues that need to be recognized. The image of the military officer, as well as that of the soldier, sailor, or airman, has

changed; society views these roles in a very different way. Through education, it can no longer be said that the military stands outside of the norms of the society in which they work.

The military professional has to be a reflection of wider society. One way in which that can be seen is the way we deal with the media. At the Command and Staff College, we've recently launched a course for journalists that actually runs alongside the training for staff officers, so that journalists can see and understand how the military works, and so that the military can see how journalists work. We also have to be aware that these ideas on the education that officers receive are disseminated throughout their career. It is not something that they experience for only the nine months of the course, and when they finish is effectively deleted. It is an *update*; continuing professional development is a key element of military education.

There's a much greater awareness within NATO, for example, that the education of an NCO / Warrant Officer is just as important as the education of an officer, and that at all levels we have to disseminate this knowledge. And there is also an awareness that this kind of knowledge perhaps should be standardized within our coalitions—that we should all be talking in the same language.

General Sir John Kiszley underscored the importance of military education when he said that it was particularly crucial so that officers "are able to cope with uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity; and to embrace change." *Change* is a word that we are constantly talking about at the JSCSC. Our mission is to provide the British armed services with command and staff training—at the junior, advanced, and higher level—to a world-class standard, in order to support the operational effectiveness of all three services.

The Staff College in the United Kingdom is a highly regarded military establishment. It is run on a joint basis, and it produces an elite educational approach. It is also forward looking; it has a concept of intellectual freedom and a wider contribution beyond the military sphere. It's a military

establishment that addresses the social dimensions of learning. It prepares students for warfare and operations, and its intellectual ethos is the key to these efforts. The whole premise is that the concept of the military ethos not be lost amid the observational burdens that may be placed on the education or training. This education is formative for all generations of officers. It must not be seen as a static educational approach; rather, it stresses that continuing professional education and development throughout the career is of vital importance. It strives to be unique, it has a world-class reputation, and it is a center of excellence.

Looking at the joint dimension of the approach, it's not just about everybody getting along well; it's not just about reaching the lowest common denominator of agreement; and it's not just about the espousal and teaching of joint doctrine. It is about shaping people who have the ability to deal with complexity, and about sharpening the skills and awareness of people who have a single-service understanding of a high order and are prepared to stand up and be counted in a joint debate. We've moved from a single-service Staff College training environment, where we had Navy, Army, and Air Force colleges, to a joint educational environment, to one that combines with external states and other agencies, to a model of interagency educational operation which looks into other organizations and which stands outside the purely military sphere.

What Is the Educational Approach?

The educational objective is for director staff and DSD and students to all be educated to prepare for the future, to have open minds, to take intellectual risks, to debate and analyze, and above all be comfortable with uncertainty. But the balance is the enduring themes of military education that operate in this environment. These themes of course include history, doctrine, the strategic context, and academic studies. These exist alongside the contemporary experience of operations, technology, developing ideas, and experimentation. The actual experience that the students bring to the college has increased.

How to interpret that experience leads to a very different form of debate. That is the inductive foundation that links into the idea that they are prepared for the future.

The Joint Services Command and Staff College also makes a wider contribution. It doesn't just educate students; it also produces information that goes out to joint establishments within the U.K. and ministry institutional hierarchy, joint headquarters, the Joint Doctrinal Concepts Center, and other centers where this information is vital and training developments are discussed. This dissemination is done via seminar events and discussion groups. What the JSCSC also hopes to do is to contribute to the development of doctrine and intellectual capital within the field of defense. We recently set up an R-CAP stream, which has recently had its own website launched which is accessible to all people interested in military education and all staff colleges throughout the world, who can now look at the new information that is being produced at the college.

The college is also interagency in nature. The JSCSC deals with the Front Office in the Department of Foreign International Development, the GCHQ, intelligence gathering, and of course the Home Office. It also extends into information that goes to the Front Office but then is externalized beyond that. It is also a part of the Defense Academy, as well as of the broad umbrella organization that contributes information to the Royal College of Military Science, which addresses some of the wider issues dealing with national development, defense conversion, defense economics, and so on.

In the Joint Services Warrant Officers Course (Non-Commissioned Officers Training), we teach the functions of command, leadership, and management in the joint, combined and interagency environments. Personnel need to understand the capabilities, organization, and interdependence of the U.K.'s armed services in peace and across the full spectrum of conflict. They also need to develop the communication and judgmental abilities of a Warrant Officer in the joint and combined environments.

The aim of the Advanced Command and Staff Course is to prepare selected officers for high-grade appointments, to develop their analytical skills, and teach wider aspects of defense as a whole. The international aspect of the Advanced Command and Staff Course is becoming of greater significance, which we hope may be spread to other nations as appropriate. We also support lecture programs and seminars and host international visitors. In the training and education of international students, we feel that we need to use their cultural resources more effectively.

Our professional links are of vital importance. We have links with service war colleges, single-service staff colleges, and the National Defense University in the U.S., and other organizations throughout Europe, which are of vital importance, as well as institutions in other regions. An important aspect of this is that it produces interfaces that we seek to maintain between these organizations, so that we are conscious of the changes that are occurring outside the JSCSC with regard to military education.

What Challenges Do We Face in the Future?

One key challenge is the concept of transformation with identity. To what extent does the transformation of military education change it into a collaborative network between states and the other governmental and non-governmental organizations? How can we do this while maintaining the identity of the particular military education that we offer?

One answer is that we believe that collaborative research allows us to have a greater understanding of the key issues that concern others outside our particular institution. It is very important that our collaborative research material is available to students and researchers, so that information that we have produced is disseminated effectively. This should produce open military minds, because that is what our military education system should be about. We are constantly talking in the U.K. and at the JSCSC about the danger of what we describe as

"stove-piping" within military education, which is he tendency to think in discrete, self-contained groups, without appropriate collaboration between those groups both internally and externally.

We also need to be aware that the concept of what the military represents is now much wider. We have to recognize the "civilianization," as some have called it, of military education of the military mind. And we are very conscious of the requirement to try to train more people outside the military alongside our military officers. We offer short courses for members of non-governmental organizations, for the police force, for the judiciary—we have even had a short course for bishops.

In the U.K., we are still in a very early stage of understanding of how distributed learning (DL) platforms will operate. We are aware of the requirement to transform military education in that direction, and of course we welcome other developments in that field. But while the mission of the JSCSC remains the same, we need to adapt to those kinds of information educational challenges that we see happening in the world outside.

Lt. Colonel Jean d'Andurain, PfP and Cooperation Programs, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters

Lt. Col. d'Andurain explained that NATO has wrought a revolution in the way it is addressing the Partnership, and that there are collaborative ways in which the Partnership for Peace consortium members can work collaboratively with NATO headquarters.

Security depends on the structural reform of states, in addition to the states' military capabilities. So we are giving a new substantive focus to the Partnership, addressing primarily the Caucasus and Central Asia. We are refocusing on

developing new reform capabilities and new defense institutions—this approach has been endorsed by all forty-six heads of the member states.

To reinforce the decisions that were made at Istanbul, we want to work on education for reform, which goes far beyond interoperability. We are talking about values; we are talking about building institutions in support of democratic reform.

We need the help of the PfP Consortium, and of the individual members of the PfP Consortium, as to how you can contribute to this new approach by NATO toward the Partnership. We are developing national capabilities to support the reform of defense education institutions. We are currently holding discussions in NATO Headquarters on how curricula might be adapted to support the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building (PAP DIB), which is a tremendous result of the Istanbul summit.

What can NATO Headquarters offer? In our discussion here—if you are ready to accept it—what we can offer is an established, sophisticated, and operations-oriented framework for cooperation with Partners. We have been doing this for ten years, and we have a lot of experience; at this conference we are represented by many members with ample and diverse experiences. We also have access to heads of state, and to the highest levels of where the policy is made. We have a common conceptual and political platform, which is a definition of defense-institution building that has been agreed to by all the heads of state of the Partnership member nations. It is crucial to realize the importance of this step—they have all agreed on objectives on defense-institution building. This is what we call the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building. Along with up-to-date information, we can offer reliable insider knowledge on NATO relations with each of the Partner countries.

What we want to do is to work together—with a good framework, a sound conceptual basis, and access to information—in order to do a better job for the Partnership. To

do it, we at NATO Headquarters and the PfP Consortium Institutions need to establish close collaboration. Our proposal is that, in order to contribute to bringing people and institutions together, we would like to extend an invitation to the steering committee of the PfP Consortium to come to Brussels as a first step toward establishing this collaboration, to see how we can best work together on the collaborative approach.

Captain (N) Thomas Ernst, Branch Head, Cooperation Dialogue and Partner Training, Headquarters SACT

I was invited here to speak as a representative of SACT, to discuss the wealth of information in education and training and defense reform, and the collaborative network that we are working to establish.

Let me start with some remarks about the Strategic Commander, Allied Command–Transformation (SACT) mission and assets in this field. SACT is the strategic commander responsible for individual education and training for NATO, as well as for those programs that Partner nations choose to include in their military training offerings. SACT strives to use education and training to create military assets and forces that are interoperable with NATO forces, but also possess improved capabilities to participate in various NATO-led operations. Initially, through the PfP, SACT hopes to promote transparency among Partner nations' defense forces, and ultimately transform their defenses into democratically controlled, efficiently operated, and economically feasible armed forces for their respective nations

The SACT is responsible not only for NATO nations but also for those nations who choose to operate with NATO. It pursues transformation both in the manner in which forces are organized and in how nations view their defense establishments, as well as in how they view the role of the military in their nation and how they see their defense forces interacting within and

among the community of nations. It is a transformation from the Cold War mindset into that of an international and active community, in which allies and partners bring to the table forces with capabilities that complement each other. The final product of all the various forces being brought together, united and working toward a common goal, is what we hope to achieve

So what are the means to contributing to that force from the collection of Allied and Partner military forces, services, and cultures? How can SACT accomplish its mission regarding the education and training of the troops making up this coherent force? As NATO forces work toward the end state of military transformation, the education of the officers and NCOs of that coherent force becomes critical.

To achieve the goal of many nations working together as one coherent force, it is necessary to have common frames of reference and a common knowledge base. The education of the personnel in the armed forces can be achieved in many ways. The first is through classroom instruction, which affords the students the opportunity to explore ideas and interact with their colleagues from other nations. Education can also be advanced through seminars and conferences or exchanges among the various NATO forces. These opportunities provide the members of the military a chance to understand other cultures, and it also provides a forum to introduce, instruct, and integrate a common NATO foundation or culture in which we can work toward common goals.

Extending the same experiences to the Partner nations provides their military personnel with the opportunity to experience and understand the NATO culture. Education is the means through which defense reform can first be introduced and discussed while exploring new ideas. The ultimate goal for Partner forces is to integrate them into NATO-led operations. As the educational foundations are established, Partner nations' forces can then train to NATO standards so as to become interoperable with NATO forces.

Naturally there are challenges and obstacles to the goal of working toward interoperability—items such as common equipment (or at least compatible equipment), as well as the ability to communicate with one another. But education forms the foundation for common experiences, which then aid in the communication of ideas, ultimately synchronizing actions while working from common frames of reference and a common knowledge base.

SACT's main methods of intervening in defense reform issues through education reform are classes, seminars, conferences, and expert team visits which are focused on specific functional areas of cooperation. The ACT part of the Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP) contains the various activities open for Partner nation participation. The opportunities are designed to promote effective and transparent cooperation among the participating nations.

So where does SACT hope to achieve this education of the member nations' military personnel, market the ideas of the Alliance, and transform nations' defenses? ACT's Joint Education and Training Subdivision focuses on a wide variety of forums in order to shape transformation throughout PfP nations. Some are all within a single command, some are part of the wider NATO command structure, and a large number of entities providing activities for the Alliance's Partnership Work Plan are internationally planned and operated. Let's take a closer look at how ACT connects to those vehicles for implementation.

The organizations shown in italics are the ones ACT owns, and the rest are the ones we have a connection with. SACT is joint-hatted with the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and its relationship is a powerful linkage, which is outward oriented and forms the foundation for common understanding and synchronization of transformation efforts across the Alliance. A fully functional and transparent relationship is the cornerstone of this vital engagement with the U.S.—as well as with other Alliance nations and Partners—for NATO's transformation, and

for for the imperative of international interoperability in the near future.

There are a number of entities throughout Europe that help give us a strong footprint there. We have a so-called STLE, which is a SACT staff element and representative at NATO Headquarters. The SEE (SACT Element in Europe) offers a footprint in Mans. These groups are in place in order to ensure that the closest possible relationships are maintained with Allied Command Operations and the NATO Headquarters committees, who—along with Allied nations—we regard as our customers.

Transformation Structure (MC-324)



The main center for implementation is the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, which already conducts collective training for the NATO Space Force and ICEF commanders and staffs. Drawing on lessons learned from units based in Kabul, Kosovo, and Iraq, the JCWV's training efforts have been very well received from the operational customers. Of course, there is also the Joint Forces Training Center. They provide assistance in tactical training for Allied forces, helping to spread ideas on doctrine and operations to promote interoperability as a result.

Plus we have the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Portugal, where we capture lessons from operations. We also have a significant degree of partnering and networking with existing agencies, national institutes, and centers of excellence, along with the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center in Weiss, which will be associated with ACT once it is operational in 2007. We will be associated in a similar way with NATO education facilities that are used to train leaders and specialists.

ACT is the single point of coordination across all these institutions. When gaps in education and training are discovered in NATO, or new conceptual or operational procedures are introduced, or perhaps when the need for a new course is perceived, ACT works to find the solution. By coordinating our work with that of other institutions within the Partnership framework, we will avoid duplication. Centers of excellence and PfP training centers are important facilities for delivering transformation to the Alliance as well.

Some nations offer centers of excellence in various areas. The idea behind centers of excellence is that they are and will be nationally funded, supported, and manned. HQ-SACT is responsible for concept development, education, and training in NATO; we develop the standards for the NATO centers of excellence, working with the nations involved. ACAE will support ACT in its mission. The centers of excellence, if they can meet the required NATO standard, may hoist a small NATO flag on their flagpole. HQ-SACT can offer specialist education and training for other member nations or partners, and thus the centers of excellence will be a part of the NATO Education and Training Network.

As of today, we have a less fully formed relationship with the PfP Education and Training Centers (PTCs) than we have with the other education facilities or centers of excellence. The commandants of the PTCs meet at a regular conference chaired by the commandant of the NATO School at Oberammergau. Our intention is to establish closer and more formal relationships

to all PTCs, and thus help to support another member of the broader NATO education and training family.

Some of the realignment has already taken place. For example, the NATO Training Group has been restructured and made subordinate to one of the branches within our subdivision. We have also added our centers of excellence to the picture. In our opinion, we needed to streamline the processes and the lines of coordination among the participants in NATO for education and training, in order to establish a single and coherent network.

NATO Educational Network



Last June we conducted a conference in Oberammergau at the NATO School in order to establish what we have labeled the "NATO / PfP Education Network." Sixty-six participants from various educational facilities within NATO attended, as well as PTC commandants, some center of excellence commandants, and representatives from seventeen nations. The basic concept is as follows: to better serve transformation goals, all education facilities (NATO and national military) should, to the greatest extent possible, work as a network in order to facilitate coordination and harmonization, avoid duplication of efforts, and allow the improved flow of information. The

network will consist of all NATO education facilities, centers of excellence, and PfP training centers; national education facilities will be invited to attend as well.

Some issues are listed here which the network should deal with. As you can see, we are envisioning two levels of linkage. Various sub-networks are already in existence, as well as an underlying electronic network, which is made up of all the necessary elements of managing, executing, and communicating content and activities. The network will also strive to establish a maximum level of commonality in our office. The network will not only include educational facilities. At ACT, we see ourselves as the hub in this network of sub-networks, which is continuing to develop.

The diagram below reflects the already established networks of networks that we are seeking to engage.

NATO PfP Education & Training Network



The Commandant's Conference, for instance, chaired by the commandant of the NATO Defense College, is a good example of such a sub-network. The PfP Training Centers will have a conference chaired by the NATO School commandant, as was mentioned above. To sustain the network, and for coordination purposes, an annual educational seminar or conference will be conducted with participants drawn from the network's members.

Why a Network ?

- **To better serve transformational goals**
- **To deepen existing relationship with other education facilities**
- **A venue for educators to meet in order to coordinate and facilitate a better use of resources**
- **Widen sources of expertise**
- **To avoid duplication of educational efforts**
- **Syncronize and harmonize curricula**
- **Revise directives**
- **Enable HQ SACT to spread a uniform transformation message to NATO including partners**
- **Foster a common understanding of the importance of education and training as a major tool for the implementation of transformation**
- **Common course documentation/ evaluation**
- **Sharing of a Knowledge Portal**
- **Common course data integrated in a Master Catalogue**

The primary idea behind this network is to establish a venue for educators to meet at least annually, coordinate their efforts and make better use of resources, widen their sources of expertise, and enable HQ-SACT to spread a uniform transformation message to NATO as a whole (including our partners). The network will be used to avoid duplication of education efforts, synchronize and harmonize curricula, revise directives as necessary, and foster a common understanding of the importance of education as a major tool for the implementation of military transformation.

Ms. Tanja Geiss, ADL Scientific Assistant, Policy Department, NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany

Ms. Geiss discussed how the NATO School networks with international partners, using the ADL program at the NATO School as an example of how the Human Trafficking Module was created. Several courses are already on line.

ADL Networking

Course:	
NATO 101	online
Modules:	
NATO Overview	online
CIMIC Overview	online
NATO's PfP Program	online
Introduction to Satellite Operations	online
NATO's Space Support	online
NATO's Space Applications	online (to be updated in '05)
Introduction to Information Operations	online (to be updated in '05)
NATO's Reserve Forces	online (to be updated in '05)
Introduction to NATO Logistics	TBD
NATO/Partner Operational Staff	online
Combined Joint Task Force	online
Introduction to NATO's Maritime Operations	online
Introduction to Environmental Awareness	online
Peace Support Operations	online
Fundamentals of CBRN Defense	online
Introduction to the Operational Planning Process	online
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings	online (since June 2005)

The NATO School is not able form networks with international partners by itself. It needs the support of Partner nations, and other ADL partners. ADL is priority at the NATO School. As a measure of the depth of the support that USJFCOM provides to the NATO School and this project, all of the courses listed will be completed and available online through their server through the summer.

With regard to networking on current political issues, and particularly the traffic in human beings, at the Istanbul Summit NATO adopted a policy on combating trafficking in human beings. Following this summit, the Curriculum Development Working Group met at the Geneva Center for Security Policy last

September and nominated a core working group for further discussion. This core group held its first meeting at the NATO School in Oberammergau in November 2004. They agreed on the development of three modules, and committed to present these modules at their next meeting in February 2005. Additionally, it was decided to make this an ADL module and make it available online, a module which was launched just yesterday.

ADL Networking

JFCOM ADL Support – NATO School '05

• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Apr. 05**	**1.** ***Joint Medical Planners Course*** **COL Stoffels**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Apr. 05**	**2.** ***Medical Intelligence*** **COL Stoffels**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Apr. 05**	**3.** ***Senior Medical Staff Officer*** **COL Stoffels**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Apr. 05**	**4.** ***Major Incident Medical Management*** **COL Stoffels**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Sep. 05**	**5.** ***Resource Mgmt. In NATO*** **MAJ Calabuig**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Sep. 05**	**6.** ***European Security Defence Policy*** **TBD**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Sep. 05**	**7.** ***Crisis Management in NATO*** **MAJ Uras**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Sep. 05**	**8.** ***Press and Media in NATO*** **LTC Hondrogiannis**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Sep. 05**	***Intro. to Information Operations*** **CDR Herrera (Update)**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**TBD 05**	***NATO Space Applications*** **MAJ Paquette (Update)**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Sep. 05**	***NATO's Reserve Forces*** **LTC Orth (Update)**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Sep. 05**	***Intro. to NATO Logistics*** **TBD**
• ***NATO* / NATO School**	**Completed**	***Fundamentals of NATO*** **LtCol Kabs (Mod 1) / NDC / US**

We also have a module for military commanders. It presents the responsibilities of the commander, and explains why this issue interferes with NATO missions and why it is a security problem. The last module was for military law enforcement entities, especially designed for the military police, which should help the MP's become more aware and provide them training on how they should treat, interview, and assist victims that they work with.

These modules were prepared with the assistance of subject matter experts. Some of the organizations that assisted us included the GCSP, the IOM, the EUPM, the UNDPKO, the GTZ, UNOHCHR, the UNODC, and the Norwegian and U.S. delegations to NATO, among others. Following the development of these three modules, GCSP, ISN, and the NATO School discussed how to develop an ADL module based on this same information. The ADL module has five learning objectives on combating the traffic human beings. They are:

- An explanation of the NATO Policy
- A general overview on the topic
- A discussion on the victims and the perpetrators of this crime
- An explanation of the impact of this crime on NATO-led operations
- The duties of NATO-led forces in preventing trafficking

These modules are available on the PfP P2 LMS (http://pfplms.ethz.ch/p2lms/pfplms.html) and the PfP LMS powered by ILIAS, which was demonstrated yesterday.

So clearly the NATO School is interested in networking. The several needs of the user can only be served by cooperation, for several reasons. First of all, there is a lack of experts on special issues. When there is a great demand for information on a specific issue, it is very difficult for a course director to become a subject matter expert. This can be solved by cooperation with subject matter experts not only within NATO, but also within NGOs and from other institutions. Secondly, ADL courses can be used to give a brief overview of a topic in a very short period of time. Courses can be developed quickly, but can also be kept to a high quality standard by utilizing the subject matter expertise within the network. This certainly cannot be completed by just one person. In the future, an ADL course should be able to be developed much more quickly, in a very

timely manner, which will keep up with demand and the demand for high quality by drawing on the expertise that exists within the NATO network.

So the road ahead for ADL at the NATO School includes our goal to bring all of our courses online with pre-learning packages, so that our students will be able to access them before signing up for classes and will be able to be much more prepared. We will also have post-course studies, which will use a knowledge portal accessible from the website so that former students and other interested persons can brush up on what they previously learned at the school and/or get the latest information on the various NATO issues and topics. We will also have course certifications, as well as further growth in connecting ADL with modeling and simulation exercises, such as the upcoming Viking Exercise in December 2005.

Plenary III: Final Session and Closing of Conference

Overview

The closing plenary session of the conference wrapped up many of the discussions that took place throughout the conference. Dr. Jaroslaw Skonieczka explained that partnership at the systems level means the integration of nations, institutions, policies, and values; at the state level, it means the transformation of structures within states so that they can be integrated; at the individual level, it means the education of persons, which will facilitate both transformation and integration. Dr. Rose expanded on this discussion and challenged the Partnership for Peace Consortium members to create the kind of intellectual interoperability required for the future leaders of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Mr. McLane concluded the conference by highlighting the unique and valuable contribution that the Partnership for Peace Consortium members can make when they are all moving forward with a common vision for the future. Finally, General Sundov provided the next step in that vision by formally inviting the Consortium to hold its meeting next year in Croatia.

Dr. Jaroslaw Skonieczka, Director, Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate, NATO
"Partnership: Learning from the Past, Moving to the Future"

Dr. Jaroslaw Skonieczka explained the importance of partnership between professionals in academia and professionals in military and policy organizations, such as NATO headquarters, where he is currently working.

What is partnership? Partnership at the systemic level is integration—the integration of nations, institutions, policies, and

values. Integration works as the best means of ensuring stability, security, and peace. It worked in Western Europe; it has already worked in Eastern, Central, and parts of South Eastern Europe; and it will work further to the East. There are different levels of integration, but we must give all states the opportunity for some form of integration, because it works.

Why did integration work in Western and Central Europe, and in Poland in particular? It worked because we were integrating democratic states. At the state level, partnership means transforming states so that they can be integrated. States need to *think* about integration, but *work* on transformation. This is what the Istanbul Summit mandated. The refocus-and-reform document from the Istanbul Summit identifies clearly defined objectives, priorities, and mechanisms. The geographic priorities are the nations of the Balkans, the southern Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Within these countries, the priorities are reform—specifically, defense reform—because that is what NATO is best able to influence. For NATO/Partnership for Peace purposes, we have a common Euro-Atlantic definition of defense reform, which consists of ten objectives that forty-six heads of state agreed to pursue or help others to pursue. Reforms must be tailored to specific countries, which is done through partnership action plans, which are detailed bilateral, political frameworks for pursuing agreed reform objectives. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are already in this program. If you are doing work for partnership, it should be done in this context of the partnership action plan framework, or the work will be marginalized.

Beyond working with governments, we must also build the interoperability of minds. This is the individual level of our analysis of partnership. At the individual level, partnership is about education. NATO knows how to work with nations, but members of the Partnership for Peace Consortium can provide critical assistance in assisting with the education of individuals. We need to provide targeted education for reform, within the

political framework and mechanisms established within each nation. In exchange, NATO will provide the most sophisticated political framework, education networks for exchanging views, the definition for defense reform, mechanisms for reform, and best-available information about what NATO is doing with each partner nation. NATO will provide policy-relevant information for the education of individuals in each partner nation. By providing the political framework and the best information, NATO provides the offer of policy relevance to the Partnership for Peace Consortium and its institutions.

This education will be focused on nations that need help in reform. For nations that are already reformed, or do not need help with reform, they can pursue specific higher-order capabilities so as to contribute to NATO in specialized ways. This is attractive for countries such as Sweden, Finland, or Austria. We are not forgetting about developed nations while focusing on those that need the most help. Both tracks of partnership complement each other. We are seeking unity through diversity. Successful defense reform will generate interoperability and greater capabilities.

In conclusion, I would reiterate that partnership is about integration at the system level, transformation at the state-level, and education at the individual level. I encourage you all to read the paper "Refocusing and Renewal" from the Istanbul Summit (available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b040623e.htm). It provides the context for defense reform, and will focus member states and those contributing to partnership on making a difference.

Dr. John P. Rose, Chairman, PfP Consortium Senior Advisory Council
"Vision on the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes"

Dr. Rose explained that the Partnership for Peace Consortium is entering its 8th year, and this conference—the strength of the agenda, the important debates, and the quality of the participants—are testaments to the Consortium's contribution to peace, stability, and security.

The Consortium is stronger, more vibrant, and more productive than at any time in our history, with outstanding working group meetings, excellent publications, and significant advances in distributed learning and curriculum development.

The Partnership for Peace Consortium was established with the goal of enhancing the education of current and future leaders in the fields of defense and security, through the collaborative efforts of educators, researchers, policy makers, and practitioners throughout the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The Consortium has provided a useful and essential service to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council defense and security community by creating a formal network of experts focused on education. This year, that network expanded to Northern Africa and to the NATO/Mediterranean dialogue countries.

As we look to the future and what we can become, we can agree that tomorrow's leaders will be confronted by numerous and increasingly complex challenges. The quality and content of the education provided to future leaders will directly affect their ability to reach common understanding of key issues, to develop successful approaches to problems, and to work together to confront the challenges they will face.

While we have been highly successful in building and nurturing a network of experts, we have yet to optimize our impact on teaching by virtual means, whether it be in the classroom, in our homes, or in our offices. There are many

initiatives and organizations that intersect through the medium of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, but we lack the common vision and habits of cooperation necessary to create synergies among our organizations and institutions, so that the sum of our collective efforts can become greater than the parts.

I want to challenge the Consortium to take the steps forward to create the kind of intellectual interoperability we seek to achieve for the future leaders of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. These steps would first include identifying an Alliance-endorsed compendium of core educational elements that describe what it is that future leaders need to learn and understand. The second step is to organize teams that bring together technical capabilities to share this with other partners throughout the Alliance and with other partners, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue nations, Central Asian nations, and even nations of the Greater Middle East initiative. Third, we would need to establish a process to review the work and ensure its quality. Finally, we would recruit organizations and institutes to take ownership of elements within that compendium of core elements to develop courses or e-learning modules to facilitate effective instruction.

These organizations in institutions under the rubric of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council could form teams of experts to do the work, which would then be made available to the entire community, adapted for particular audiences, and reviewed and maintained by volunteer institutions. The Partnership for Peace Consortium's experts, working groups, resources, and capabilities would be immensely valuable in this regard.

Major-General Mirko Sundov, Commandant, Joint Education and Training Command, Republic of Croatia
"Invitation to Annual Conference 2006"

I would like to call attention to the contribution of this conference in discussing crucial topics, including the stabilization and security of South Eastern Europe. This includes NATO and European Union efforts at strengthening democratic processes in the countries of the region in order to minimize the probability of new conflicts. The Republic of Croatia supports these efforts and wider interests, including the protection and development of democracy, the rule of law, economic prosperity, and social justice. The government's program includes the goal of gaining full membership in NATO and several additional defense reforms, and is fully involved in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process.

In conclusion, I invite the Partnership for Peace consortium to hold its annual conference in the Republic of Croatia in 2006.

Mr. Bruce McLane, Executive Director, Partnership for Peace Consortium

I would like to thank all of the participants of the conference, particularly for the stimulating discussions, honest and open debate, and sharing of powerful ideas about where we are going in the future. The theme of the conference was "Expanding and Enhancing Partnerships: Further Steps after Istanbul." The Partnership for Peace Consortium is most concerned with expanding and enhancing the minds of current and future leaders in the defense and security field in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and beyond. We are about creating intellectual interoperability, so that those who face complex defense and security challenges can do so more effectively. We can accomplish this mission through forms of collaboration and

cooperation that no other organization can bring to bear. We bring together educators, operators, policy makers, and other experts. We have utility to both educators and the policy community. Our impact is large, and it will be larger still. As we leave here, we will continue to work with each other to enhance our success in contributing to our common vision of where we have to go. Thank you again for your participation.