

## Editor's introduction

By Tomas Jermalavičius

Since 1999, the Baltic Defence College has been publishing a bi-annual academic journal, the *Baltic Defence Review*. With time, this publication has evolved and provided a vehicle for a discussion on broader security issues, not only defence. In the end, this shift of content warranted an adjustment of the title of the publication itself, to the *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, which highlights both change and continuity in its approach.

The journal will be published once a year and will become more academic in the future, endorsing studies of non-military aspects of security, but at the same doing its best to encourage deeper research in military affairs – the field which remains largely underdeveloped in the Baltic States. In particular, the editorial team of the *Baltic Security and Defence Review* will vigorously pursue contributions related to various trends in war and warfare, strategic culture, defence reforms as well as armed forces and society.

Acknowledging the realities of how information is distributed and obtained in the time of the Internet, the journal will also be mostly Internet-based, with a very limited number of printed copies produced. The website of the Baltic Defence College ([www.bdcol.ee](http://www.bdcol.ee)) will continue serving as a primary platform for its online publication, with various databases (e.g. International Security Network – ISN) further enhancing its visibility and accessibility.

This volume - Volume 8, counting from the first publication of the *Baltic Defence Review* in 1999 – features articles covering a rather broad range of topics. Holger Mölder combines the concepts of security community and cooperative security to elaborate on the role of NATO in the contemporary European security architecture. He demonstrates that security communities, such as NATO, can be very successful in establishing regional peace and security through using cooperative security strategies to deal with their immediate neighbourhood.

In the next article, Toomas Riim employs social constructivism as a theoretical framework to analyse Estonia's integration in NATO and its adaptation to the shifting focus of the Alliance, expressed in its transformation initiatives. From this perspective, Estonia's policy is seen as increasingly being driven and shaped by the imperative of becoming part of a common identity, embodied by NATO, rather

than by self-interest and threat perception which no longer explain continued existence of the Alliance.

Tine Verner Karlsen analyses how NATO engages civil society of Azerbaijan, using two main youth NGOs as the main examples to illuminate the policy of the Alliance. Her article shows how the dilemma of choosing between democratisation and stability, values and security, leads to an overly cautious stand and support to the pro-governmental NGOs rather than more independent pro-democratic movements. This approach of NATO is contrasted with a more vocal position taken by the EU and the OSCE in support of democratic values and with the very principles underpinning the Alliance and its main projects, such as enlargement and the Partnership for Peace programme.

Liina Muring and Daniel Schaer produced a very prescient article by casting light on Russia's energy sector and its possible impact on the security of the Baltic States. It is worthwhile pointing out that since the time the article was actually written, Russia has abruptly cut off its gas supplies to Ukraine, with reverberating effects on the rest of Europe. This makes the findings and conclusions of the article on security implications of energy dependency on Russia not only a matter of academic interest and discussion.

Arūnas Molis, in his article on small states and the ESDP, attempts to determine the extent to which 'smallness' can explain national position towards the ESDP. His analysis shows that 'smallness' acts only as a factor which prompts to make clear choices between NATO and the ESDP as priorities, but the actual choice is a function of a number of other factors such as a geopolitical position, national experience or public opinion.

The article by Lauri Lugna deals with the question of how the EU institutional framework should be constructed in order to better support its counter-terrorism strategies. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the existing arrangements and their suitability in dealing with the terrorist threat at the EU level. The article demonstrates convincingly that, given the emerging nature and scope of the EU role in combating terrorism, the institutional framework has to cut across the existing EU pillars, if the EU is to become an effective tool for its member states in combating terrorism.

Holger Schabio, a graduate of the Joint Command and General Staff Course of the Baltic Defence College, has contributed with an article on the UN role in

future military conflicts, which is based on his academic research paper produced during his studies at the College. Based on the analysis of evolving military methods, applied by the UN in various conflicts, the author concludes that the UN managed to learn the right lessons from its past military involvements, but the ability to employ adequate military tools and strategies in the future will mostly depend upon the political will of its member states.

The volume also presents a number of smaller policy articles. Renatas Norkus, Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania, is focusing on the political and military challenges for small NATO allies when contributing to international operations. In discussing those challenges, the strongest emphasis has been placed on using NATO more effectively as a principal framework for future operations.

Gediminas Kirkilas, Minister of National Defence of Lithuania, having hosted NATO-Ukraine high level defence consultations, shares his vision and insights regarding Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations. This contribution is very well supplemented by Ambassador Gintė Damušis of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who details lessons learned from the previous enlargements and extends them to Ukraine's integration into NATO. Finally, Kristian Nielsen summarises and critically comments upon the seminar of the Baltic Defence College which addressed Ukrainian integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Our journal will be occasionally offering to its readers book reviews. This volume features a book by Marcel de Haas 'Russian Security and Air Power, 1992-2002', reviewed by Ole Kværnø and Malthe Mulvad. Hopefully, this will help our readers to navigate among a vast amount of academic literature on security and military affairs.

However, quite uniquely among academic publications but very much in line with our aspiration to familiarise readers with the developments in the Baltic States, the *Baltic Security and Defence Review* is publishing annual defence policy surveys of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They highlight major Baltic trends and events in the field of defence and can serve as a valuable source of information for further research and discussion in the academic community.

## NATO's Role in the Post-Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region

By *Holger Mölder\**

### Introduction

In 1991-1992, the European security environment experienced an institutional change. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization abandoned a direct conventional threat against the Western society. As the Cold War ended, there was no need for traditional military alliance anymore. NATO, with the new Strategic Concept approved in the Rome Summit, entered into the new era often called the post-modern society. The creation of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO's first cooperative security arrangement, was the beginning of NATO's new cooperation-oriented security strategy, known as partnership. NATO as a pluralistic security community is presumably one of the most effective ways to produce security, stability and democracy in the new post-modern security environment. The Maastricht Treaty started the process of the European Union, another potential security community. This paper analyses the structure of post-modern European security environment and the perspectives of the Baltic Sea region for the adaptation in this environment.

Karl Deutsch introduced the idea of Western security communities in the 1950s, in the middle of the Cold War. Particularly today, there exist two parallel communities (two different institutions) – the European Union and NATO – that base on similar liberal democratic values but different security cultures. This work focuses on NATO as a specific form of security community and its cooperative security initiatives. NATO has played an outstanding role, achieving institutional control over the political situation that emerged in Europe after the end of the Cold War. The active involvement of Central and Eastern European countries in cooperative security arrangements with NATO has played an important role in the stabilisation of political climate and the promotion of democracy in state building in partner countries. Partnership initiatives deal not only with purely military issues but, for

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instance, are actively involved in security and defence reforms in Partner countries.

The Baltic Sea region hardly pretends to be a separate security community, but it has significantly contributed to both existing Western security communities. As a security complex, the Baltic Sea region has its advantages and challenges, but in sum, it might be a perfect example how security cooperation between countries with different institutional affiliation can develop peace and stability.

## 1. Security communities

Universal peace seems to be the most desirable international regime<sup>1</sup>, and for that reason states at least try to organize systems that could build up zones of peace and stability (e.g., security communities and cooperative security arrangements) in order to establish such international regimes. In general, liberal democratic security communities follow the idea of Immanuel Kant – “if a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic ... this would serve as a centre of federal union for other states in accordance with the idea of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation would extend further and further”.<sup>2</sup>

A unified global community seems to be unachievable, at least in the current stage of human development. However, the concept of security communities may perfectly fit into the post-modern security environment. “A world of mature, overlapping security communities may also provide perpetual peace between states.”<sup>3</sup>

A security community where the use of war against other community members is avoided is one tiny step towards universal peace. The post-modern international system evoked two security communities in Europe, based on liberal democratic values – NATO and the European Union. “The first could be due to the peculiarities of the case, where in Europe the pre-eminent security organization has been NATO, which was there from the beginning, already before the security community and probably part of the reasons for its formation. The second important organization, the EU, has been the main format for the continued non-war community and probably its cultivation of the real security community features in terms of identity and the non-imaginability of war.”<sup>4</sup> These arrangements may be accompanied by collective security arrangements like United Nations Organization (UNO) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Karl Deutsch, following Immanuel Kant's ideas on peaceful change towards unions where disputes are resolved peacefully, has "distinguished between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities: while both have dependable expectations of peaceful change, the former exists when states formally unify, the latter when states retain their sovereignty."<sup>5</sup> Pluralistic security communities came into existence in Western-European liberal security communities such as the EU or NATO. Even there may be discussions that the European Union gradually moves towards the amalgamated security community. NATO contrariwise clearly corresponds to the definition of the pluralistic security.

Present-day security communities are theoretically and empirically pluralistic security communities. Institution building does not necessarily mean unification and losing of national identity. Even amalgamated security community may exist without federative institutional arrangement. Deutsch noted ten characteristics for describing what he called an amalgamated security community: 1) similar values (political ideologies but also economic and religious values); 2) the formation of a common sense of us; 3) similar lifestyles; 4) group of leading actors (so to avoid that the logic of the balance of power prevail); 5) high economic growth; 6) positive expectations with respect to the advantages of integration; 7) intensive transactions and communication; 8) widening of the leading elites; 9) stable links among the elites of different states; 10) high geographical mobility of the population.<sup>6</sup>

At the institutional level, Deutsch's characteristics of amalgamated security communities, however, apply to the post-modern security order, which does not identify security communities solely in military terms. The European Union basically follows all the ten principles of the idea of Deutsch's amalgamated security community. Moreover, under the circumstances of post-modern institution building, the difference between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities hardly exists. "Strangely, Deutsch is still caught in a dichotomy such as domestic/international, inside/outside and hierarchy/anarchy – here called amalgamated/pluralistic security communities. However, the rhetoric of union builders is often an intentional ambiguity between amalgamation and plurality."<sup>7</sup>

Similar values shared by nations are the most important elements in order to establish successful security communities. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett defined communities through three characteristics:

1. Members of community have shared identities, values and meanings;
2. Those in a community have many-sided and direct relations; interaction occurs not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains, but rather in some form of face-to-face encounter.
3. Communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism.<sup>8</sup>

Although the existence of security communities has often been connected with the required settlement of liberal democratic values, there may exist other security communities relying on values other than liberal democracy. The existence of security communities created by totalitarian regimes and based on non-democratic values and identities is also possible. For example, The Warsaw Pact Organization was undoubtedly a security community, though based on Marxist values and dominated by hegemonic Soviet Union. I would call such security communities hegemonic security communities. Hegemonic security communities can also produce stability, and a conflict situation may arise when one member of the community tries to change its identity in a way that is not acceptable for the hegemon (like Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, etc.). War within any kind of security community is impossible. Hegemonic security communities are built up on the forces used by the hegemon in order to hold the community together.

### **1.1 What characterises pluralistic security communities?**

Security communities are institutionalised formations of countries, which share common values, unified norms and similar identity and exclude the use of force in conflict resolution within the community.

Pluralistic security communities have been established on the basis of

- 1) shared liberal democratic values and common identity;
- 2) complex interdependence between community members;
- 3) principles of democratic peace;
- 4) partnership strategy and cooperative security arrangements;
- 5) collective defence and collective security mechanisms for a crisis situation.

The main principle of pluralistic security communities that follow democratic peace<sup>9</sup> constitutes a voluntary engagement where there is no intention to go to war against each other between community members. "Pluralistic security community corresponds to the Kantian model of peace union and is built up on

the principles of democratic peace. Pluralistic security communities are in a situation where a group of independent states have become so interdependent that there is no longer the expectation of the use of force or the threat of the use of force in their mutual relations.”<sup>10</sup> Democratic peace has been established as an international regime within pluralistic security communities. “Following Deutsch, member states also typically share common norms, values, political institutions, and a high degree of economic and other forms of interdependence. Succinctly, a zone of peace has a foundation in the relations of states; a pluralistic security community rests on the social foundations of community between individuals and societies.”<sup>11</sup>

The existence of shared beliefs, norms and identities is presumed in order to guarantee interdependence between community members. Common identity seems to be impossible without interdependence within the community. “Interdependence leads to a common identity – especially economic interdependence.”<sup>12</sup> Therefore, there is a complexity of norms and rules a pluralistic security community should follow - complex interdependence, common identity and shared liberal democratic values among them. The European Union corresponds to these conditions and NATO, although a political-military organization, at the same time is not purely military institution and promotes civil-military cooperation and integration of the military into the civil society.

Complex interdependence is another significant feature characteristic of post-modern security communities. As Keohane and Nye mentioned, complex interdependence can be described by multiple channels connecting societies, absence of hierarchy among issues and absence of use of military force against each other (Keohane, Nye 1977).<sup>13</sup> Value sharing is an important element in the creation of security communities and maintained through appropriate international regimes. There is also an identity question. Alex Bellamy stated that “if an identity can be generically understood as “the understanding of oneself in relationship to others it follows that a community’s identity is predicated on relationship on others.”<sup>14</sup>

These countries follow the principles of collective defence even if these are not fixed in their basic documents, because these countries have become so independent of each other that any attack against one member of the community seriously influences the security of any other member of the community. The attack against any member of the European Union seems



unthinkable without any reaction from co-members, although the principle of collective defence is not fixed in EU's basic documents.

NATO also complements Deutsch's idea, though not directly corresponding to the full characteristics. "The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension."<sup>15</sup> The Membership Action Plan, which prepares countries for future NATO membership, has established norms and values for applicant countries that closely resemble Deutsch's characteristics for amalgamated security community, though sovereignty of states will be maintained. NATO acquired capacity for developing a security community in the mid-1980s, after democratic governments came into power in Greece and Portugal and liberal democratic Spain joined NATO. Since 1978, with the only exception of Turkey from 1980 to 1983, liberal democratic regimes have prevailed in NATO countries.<sup>16</sup>

## 1.2. The future – community or rivalry?

Europe has been just a little bit more than a military alliance. Human security has become a more important factor within the NATO context, which strengthens its new identity being not just a military alliance, but also a political-military institution. "Post-modern security communities recognize security in terms of human security. During the Cold War, for example, there was a widespread – though by no means universal – consensus among international relations scholars that security meant national security, i.e. the interest and survival of the state."<sup>17</sup> Among numerous other variations, the concept of human security may be defined in terms of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.<sup>18</sup> The three different conceptions of human security – rights/rule-of-law, safety of people, and sustainable development – are marked by different understandings about what constitutes the main threat to human security.<sup>19</sup>

The Global War on Terrorism, started on September 11, 2001, has in certain ways influenced the further development of post-modern security communities in Europe. It is notable that the principle of collective defence and NATO's Article Five have for the first time been used not in their traditional meaning, against a clearly identified enemy, but as a means of collective security. At the same time, September 11, 2001 symbolizes the unity of international liberal society, when the defensive actions against international terrorism, including military operations in Afghanistan, have been widely approved. September 11,

2001 stimulated cooperation between countries sharing liberal democratic values. It also stimulated the need for cooperative security, as the threat of terrorism is one of the greatest present-day problems. Moreover, the strengthening of liberal democratic values and cooperative security cooperation has been held in even higher esteem, a fact indicated by the NATO and EU enlargements of 2004.

The Iraqi operation of 2003, on the contrary, indicates a new security situation. The long peace characteristic of the post-Cold War stability is gradually moving towards an instability, where institutionalisation and mutual interdependence continue, but national interests are achieving a much more influential position. In addition to the non-existent consensus in the Iraqi operation, the negative attitude expressed by the United States towards international institutions or agreements (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol or International Criminal Court) has been a clear sign that institutionalisation is not faring very well currently. "All this means that under the Bush doctrine the United States is not a status quo power. Its motives may not be selfish, but the combination of power, fear, and perceived opportunity leads it to seek to reshape world politics and the societies of many of its members."<sup>20</sup> The unilateral actions of the United States may lead to the situation where they acquire an essential military predominance, but simultaneously this may weaken their Allies as security institutions as well. Thus, in the long run, it may bring about the failure of liberal democratic security communities and the emergence of hegemonic security communities, leading up to the restoration of bipolar rivalry or even a pre-war situation as in 1914 or 1939.

## **2. Post-modern security options**

There are four security models existing in the post-modern security environment of Europe: security communities, cooperative security arrangements, collective security arrangements, and security complexes.

**Table 1. Post-modern security architecture in Europe**

Security communities	NATO; EU
Cooperative security arrangements	PfP; MD; ICI; NUC; NRC; Barcelona Process; EU Neighbourhood Policy, etc.
Collective security arrangements	UNO; OSCE
Security complexes	Baltic Sea; Black Sea; Balkans, etc.

Cooperative security arrangements are institutionalised or non-institutionalised formations of countries, which have been formed around the security communities. These countries are interdependent on each other through security and defence cooperation promoted within the framework of cooperative security arrangements and therefore military conflicts between cooperation partners are rare. Partners in cooperative security arrangements do not possess similar guarantees for their defence as members of security communities. Value sharing is not a primary concern for cooperation partners but, wishing peace and stability in the area, they use collective security measures by participation in international peace operations and cooperating both with the security community and with other cooperation partners as well.

Collective security, however, is a very pretentious regime. The collective security tradition is rooted in an aspiration to think of interests beyond those of the nation and its allies and to consider those of international society as a whole – on a regional, if not a global basis. The hallmarks of the collective security tradition include a desire to avoid grouping powers into opposing camps, and a refusal to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out.<sup>21</sup> As Cohen puts it, collective security “looks inward to attempt to ensure security within a group of sovereign states.”<sup>22</sup> Collective security arrangements accept different values in their membership. The effect of collective security requires a larger security environment and is therefore more appropriate for the post-modern system. “Organizations devoted to collective security bring all members of the international community together in response to aggression from any quarter. Thus the potential threat is unnamed, but, should it materialize, all members of the organization should be prepared to take collective action against the aggressor, regardless of any alliance links they may have with the aggressor.”<sup>23</sup>

Contemporary collective security arrangements like OSCE and the United Nations were created during the modern system of states. These organizations aim at peace and stability and promote common actions for that reason. The disadvantage of collective security arrangements is that they allow for different values, beliefs and identities that make it difficult to achieve common goals.

There is one more cooperative security approach focusing on regional or sub-regional cooperation for countries with different institutional affiliation. I would use the term introduced by Barry Buzan – the security complexes. Most states conduct their security relations in a regional rather than global context. Buzan defines a security complex as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely, so that their national securities cannot be realistically considered apart from one another.<sup>24</sup>

**Table 2. Security models**

	<b>Security community</b>	<b>Cooperative security arrangement</b>	<b>Collective security arrangement</b>	<b>Security complex</b>
<b>Method of communication</b>	Complex Interdependence	Cooperation	Institutionalised Cooperation	Regionalisation
<b>Value sharing</b>	Yes	No	No	No
<b>Existence of security dilemma</b>	No	Cooperative	Traditional and/or cooperative	Traditional and/or cooperative
<b>Security regimes</b>	Collective defence and/or collective security	Collective security	Collective security	Promoting stability

Robert Jervis defines a security dilemma as a situation in which “an increase of one state’s security decreases security of others.”<sup>25</sup> This may be called as a traditional meaning of a security dilemma. In a post-modern security system, we are facing the post Cold War’s cooperative security dilemma - as some states tend to cooperate in decreasing their security fears, it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained outside of the cooperative security arrangements.<sup>26</sup>

**2.1 Why cooperative security arrangements?**

Every security community has to be aware of developing stability not only within the community but also having an effective neighbourhood policy. The establishment of cooperative security arrangements may compensate for the need for value sharing in order to join communities. Both NATO and the

European Union have been active developers of cooperative security relationship in their neighbourhood and thus avoiding the emergence of security dilemmas. The appropriate partnership strategy is an important element in security communities for intercommunicating with its neighbourhood and creating stability zones beyond its borders. The partnership strategy of the Western security communities – NATO and the European Union basically follows six criteria.

1. Principle of democratic peace;
2. Introduction of liberal democratic values;
3. Security and defence cooperation;
4. Enhanced communication;
5. Assistance programs;
6. Joint participation in peace operations.

For pluralistic security communities, cooperative security arrangements seem to be proper means of developing peace zones within their borders. “Cooperation should not be viewed as absence of conflict, but rather reaction to conflict or potential conflict.”<sup>27</sup> Cooperative security arrangements that promote interdependence and cooperation have proved themselves as effective measures in order to establish zones of peace, mitigate the possibility for conflicts and avoid the emergence of adversaries. “In zones of peace, militarized conflicts may break out from time to time but capabilities are not targeted toward fellow members of the zone and operational war plans do not include conflict hypotheses against the same members. War has literally become unthinkable in mutual relations.”<sup>28</sup>

Though value sharing is the most important element of security communities, it has less importance in cooperative security arrangements. The principles of cooperative security arrangements apply more for the principles of traditional meaning of military alliance. Clive Archer stated that “cooperative security is a security arrangement where security is maintained by consensus. Here the emphasis is less on identifying an aggressor and more on identifying problems that can lead to conflict and then attempting to resolve them collectively.”<sup>29</sup> According to Cohen, “cooperative security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political, and defence cooperation.”<sup>30</sup> Michalka states that “cooperative security is activity among states to lessen the likelihood of war or its consequences, should it occur, that is not directed at any

specific state or group of states.”<sup>31</sup> These definitions refer to the three main characteristics of cooperative security arrangements:

- 1) these arrangements are oriented to resolve problems, not to defend against an identified aggressor;
- 2) in developing cooperative security relationship, common beliefs are more important than common norms and common norms are more important than common identity;
- 3) cooperative security arrangements emerge around security communities.

Cooperative security arrangements may consolidate countries with different identities, norms, and beliefs to the establishment of zones of peace and stability. Of course, liberal democratic nucleus has its moral influence to the development of its cooperative security arrangements. “Today, many states, especially in Western Europe, are less concerned about deterring or defending against aggression than about preserving the overall stability of their region. Such countries have much to gain by working together to decrease the likelihood of conflict. Their goal has often been called „cooperative security”.<sup>32</sup> Cooperative security arrangements may be institutionalised, but also be carried out through initiatives within the framework of other institutions. Typically, security communities establish peace and stability zones in their neighbourhood in order to avoid conflicts near their borders. NATO’s initiatives EAPC/PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative are cooperative security arrangements, as well as EU’s Barcelona Process or EU’s Neighbourhood Policy.

### **3. NATO’s advancing role in establishing cooperative security systems and NATO’s instruments in developing democratisation through cooperative security**

As mentioned before, NATO has confronted cooperative security dilemma itself, beyond the option for enlargement. NATO as a security community has to identify itself in relationship with others. Therefore, since 1991, NATO has established different cooperative security systems in its neighbourhood (i.e. NACC; PfP; MD; EAPC; NRC; NUC; SEEI; ICI).<sup>33</sup> As mentioned by David Yost, “collective security, particularly in its traditional sense, was conceived as an alternative to the formation of alliances for collective defence. And distinctions between concepts of collective security and collective defence can be helpful and illuminating in understanding NATO’s problems and prospects and the general challenge of organizing a peaceful international order in Europe.”<sup>34</sup> Therefore,

the development of cooperative security initiatives just offered a tailored solution between quick enlargement and maintaining stability. NATO's intentions to develop its cooperative security arrangements according to the needs of post-modern security organisation have been promoted through:

1. Establishing cooperative security links with neighbouring territories;
2. Involvement in international crisis resolution.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was the first step towards partnership between NATO allies and countries that had remained for decades outside democracy and western civilization. At the beginning of 1994, a new qualitative step was made with the launching of Partnership for Peace Invitation and Framework documents. In 1995, NATO introduced a cooperative security arrangement for the Mediterranean area – the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Alliance's Strategic Concept indicates the need for cooperative security arrangements.<sup>35</sup>

Today, NATO's cooperative security arrangements include the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council together with the Partnership for Peace Program with its twenty partner nations, the Mediterranean Dialogue with seven cooperation partners, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and some special cooperative security initiatives like the NATO-Ukraine Council, the NATO-Russia Council and the South Eastern European Initiative. The Partnership for Peace program is NATO's best-known and most developed cooperative security initiative. "The most important institutional arrangement that crosses the boundary between members and non-members is NATO's Partnership for Peace program."<sup>36</sup> PFP has its own tasks to complete. "The PFP program is not simply a waiting room for those countries wishing to join NATO. Many of the former so-called neutrals have used the PFP to promote their own security cooperatively."<sup>37</sup> Partnership promotes communication. "PFP provides a communicative framework in which the construction of a common interpretation of the same norm is developed through a process of communication."<sup>38</sup> This means that certain beliefs are required in order to establish a norm that may lead up to a common identity.

Alex Bellamy counts the benefits of PFP – PFP is a process that would facilitate NATO enlargement; PFP would allow NATO's neighbours to establish their own relationship with the Alliance within an institutional framework that permitted different degrees of integration and cooperation; PFP is a vehicle to export Alliance's common values through programmes encouraging democratic and transparent defence management; PFP aimed at promoting cooperation between Central and Eastern European states by encouraging such states to lead

PfP projects and exercises; and PfP gives non-NATO members access to NATO's military and political bodies, offering a degree of consultation that goes far beyond the dialogue offered by the NACC.<sup>39</sup>

Within the PfP framework, NATO stimulated initiatives in developing democratization through cooperative security (i.e. PARP; PMF; MAP; OCC; TEEP; PAP mechanisms – incl. IPAP; PAP-T; PAP-DIB).<sup>40</sup> These initiatives are not only intended to raise the military capabilities of partner countries but also stimulate democratisation. The main characteristics of NATO's cooperative security initiatives include:

- 1) partnership (i.e. IPAP);
- 2) cooperation and participation in international peace operations (i.e. PMF, PAP-T);
- 3) military interoperability (i.e. PARP, OCC);
- 4) training initiatives (i.e. TEEP);
- 5) defence reform initiatives (i.e. PAP-DIB).

Partnership initiatives are oriented towards the enhancement of cooperation and interdependence between allies and partners. Joint participation in international peace operation emphasizes values that characterize pluralistic security communities against other values. Military interoperability also enhances mutual understanding and cooperation. Training initiatives are maybe the most important contribution from allies to partners, offering besides enhancement of professional capabilities understanding about liberal society. Defence reform initiatives are connected with the democratization of the partner's societies.

### **3.1. NATO and its partners**

According to Jeffrey Simon, there are several groupings within the Partnership for Peace program, involving:

1. Five advanced partners (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland)
2. Three MAP partners (Albania, Croatia, FYROM Macedonia)
3. The Ukraine
4. Three Caucasus partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)
5. Five Central Asian partners (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)
6. Russia
7. Two relatively inactive partners (Belarus, Moldova)



8. Two PfP aspirants, joining with PfP program in the near future (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro).<sup>41</sup>

NATO has determined Central Asia and South Caucasus as priority cooperation areas within the Partnership for Peace initiative. In fact, while Georgia, the Ukraine and, to some extent Moldova have made progress in establishing democratic regimes, the former Soviet republics generally experience a lack of democratic norms. Today, the development of defence reforms in partner countries is one of NATO's cooperation priorities. "By presenting itself as a Western institution embodying a set of values opposite to those represented by the Soviet block, NATO was able to use the communicative frameworks to change the partners' conception of civil-military relations."<sup>42</sup>

NATO has established distinctive partnership with two most powerful partners – Russia and the Ukraine. In 1997, simultaneously with the launching of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) were also instituted. Through the creation of separate bilateral institutions, NATO emphasises cooperative partnership with these countries. At the same time, Russia tends to apply for equal position in partnership with NATO, while the Ukraine has applied for a Membership Action Plan and started to think about future membership.

The Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated simultaneously with the Partnership for Peace Process. Since the issue of prospective membership was excluded in the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the development of the program has taken place more slowly. As a cooperative security arrangement, the MD involves Israel and the moderate Arabian regimes in the area – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania. Over the last couple of years, the trend has been to develop cooperation between the PfP and the MD partners through common participation in partnership activities.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched in 2005 at the NATO Summit in Istanbul, was developed because of the need to establish stability in the wider Middle-East area, full of existing and potential conflicts. The first three countries joining the ICI were Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, contributors to the US-led Iraq operation. From June 2005, the United Arab Emirates also participate in the Initiative. Consultations have also been held with Saudi Arabia and Oman. It is predictable that Afghanistan and Iraq will join the initiative after the stabilisation of their societies.

In fact, NATO stimulates cooperative security not only institutionally, but also exercises bilateral relationship with countries from other regions and has established framework for so-called contact countries (triple-nons)<sup>43</sup>. As NATO's high level official Jamie Shea has said, " ... in addition to our standard partnerships, we're now also talking about triple-nons, which is NATO jargon for those countries who are not NATO members and not EU members and not yet, at least, in the Partnership for Peace. And those triple-nons, in addition to China, now include Japan, with which NATO conducts an annual high-level security dialogue, and Australia, which is coming here next week for its annual strategic session with the Alliance. We've had a NATO seminar also in Argentina."<sup>44</sup>

NATO has pioneered in launching cooperative security arrangements and there is mutual interest between Allies and partners to enhance cooperation. The "Study on NATO Enlargement", launched in September 1995, has set seven criteria for NATO enlargement.

These criteria include;

- 1) encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control;
- 2) fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation, and consensus building, which characterize relations among current Allies;
- 3) promoting good-neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;
- 4) emphasizing common defence and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defence policies;
- 5) reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
- 6) strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
- 7) strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.<sup>45</sup>

### 3.2 NATO's partnership strategy

The development of NATO cooperative security arrangements is based more on creating similar norms than identities. NATO partners are countries with very different identity claims, like Switzerland, Finland, Algeria, Israel, Belarus, Georgia, Tajikistan or Russia among others. NATO's partnership offers different types of cooperation, offering different ways for self-determination in order to enhance peace, stability, and cooperation in the area. Countries aiming to join NATO's security community must also apply for common identity. There are currently only three countries establishing common identity with NATO through Membership Action Plan – Albania, Croatia and FYROM. There are some countries interested in joining NATO henceforth – the Ukraine, Georgia, but possibly also Moldova and Azerbaijan. There are countries applying for membership in the PfP, but they, too, may one day become NATO Allies – Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden are politically and militarily capable of joining NATO, but there is lack of political will for membership and they arrange their security through EU membership and NATO's cooperative security arrangement. Switzerland stays outside both institutions, NATO and EU, but is an active cooperation partner to NATO. In Europe, there is only a minimal number of countries which are not connected with NATO framework neither by membership nor cooperative security arrangements.<sup>46</sup> Among the EU members, only Malta<sup>47</sup> and Cyprus did not join PfP, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro, though cooperating with NATO, are also not PfP partners yet.

There is a three-dimensional range of choices for security partners:

1. To apply for membership in a security community
2. To remain cooperative partners
3. To stay outside of cooperative institutions and arrangements.

The gradual development of NATO's cooperative security initiatives continues, thus strengthening both NATO as a security community and its cooperation partners. Initially, NATO's cooperative security initiatives intend to promote dominantly military capabilities of the partner countries, in order to ensure their interoperability for participation in international peace operations together with NATO forces. At present, there is no significant difference in the involvement of Allies and Partners into NATO's strategic plans. Partners' involvements in initially purely NATO's initiatives like NATO's Response Force (NRF) are widely discussed.

NATO's partnership strategy embraces a wide range of initiatives assisting partner countries to promote not only their military capabilities but also liberal democratic principles in their societies. Planning and Review Process (PARP) was initiated in 1995 and aimed to establish military interoperability through reforming the partners' planning systems and review process according to NATO's appropriate procedures. Individual Partnership Program is the principal training and education program, provided by NATO for Partner countries. Intensified Dialogue was created in order to tighten consultations between Allies and Partners before the Membership Action Plan was instituted in 1999. Political-Military Framework (PMF) develops procedures for partners' participation in NATO-led peace operations. Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) was created in 1999 as an analogue to the NATO's initiative Defence Capabilities Initiative, in order to promote the military capabilities of Partners. Training and Education Enhancement Program (TEEP) concentrates on the promotion of partners' training and educational capabilities. One of the specific outcomes is the establishment of PFP Training Centres. Partnership Action Plan is a model elaborated for the NATO/EAPC Prague Summit. The main purpose of this initiative is to develop cooperation between NATO and Partner country according to individual needs. NATO has recognized that its every partner is an individual entity and therefore has initiated a complex of bilateral activities. When Individual Partnership Program (IPP) facilitates multilateral cooperation, then relationship within Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is built up on individual basis. PAP on Terrorism characterises the mutual interest of NATO and its partners to take countermeasures and enhance cooperation in fighting against one of the most dangerous threats in the post-modern society. PAP on Defence Institution Building was a French initiative from 2003, in order to build up national defence systems in partner countries according to the principles of liberal democracy.

Though partnership does not mean the waiting room for membership, it does not exclude that opportunity, either. In order to accept any membership in NATO, there must be full commitment to the liberal democratic values. NATO's Membership Action Plan has been an effective mechanism for achieving liberal democratic values. Unlike the other partnership initiatives, MAP is a membership-oriented program for such partner countries that express political will to join NATO. "The door to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains open. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), building on the Intensified, Individual Dialogue on membership questions, is designed to reinforce that firm commitment to further enlargement

by putting into place a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership”.<sup>48</sup>

Principles presented in the political chapter of Membership Action Plan are in accordance with the NATO’s requirements for member states. Aspirants would also be expected:

- 1) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means;
- 2) to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights;
- 3) to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations;
- 4) to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces;
- 5) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN;
- 6) to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions and by promoting stability and well-being;
- 7) to continue fully to support and be engaged in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
- 8) to show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, assuming that MAP establishes norms and values for prospective NATO membership, NATO identifies itself as a pluralistic security community.

#### **4. The experience of the Baltic Sea region – how do cooperative security models work?**

Institutionalisation itself does not end the need for regional security. By Buzan and Waever, regional security is “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one and another.”<sup>50</sup> Regional security,<sup>51</sup> together with cooperative security, is a prospective security option for post-modern security environment, establishing communicative ties between security communities and their neighbours and mitigating the emergence of security dilemma.

Karl Deutsch has used the example of Nordic countries in order to describe a pluralistic security community, because the possible disputes by Deutsch will not be resolved by war. “Deutsch further pointed out that pluralistic security communities are dependant on two qualities:

1) existence of like-minded political values within the community and 2) the ability of community states to uphold a dialogue with other governments and to anticipate other states' future political, economic and social actions."<sup>52</sup>

However, neither Nordic countries nor even Baltic countries with the same institutional affiliation themselves hardly form a security community. The reason for starting an intensive Nordic cooperation was not just similar security interests but something more. "Another way of putting this is to say that security has, in the first place, not been a joint Nordic concern. Norden has actually been "a community of a security."<sup>53</sup>

The Baltic Sea region<sup>54</sup> might be a perfect example of the establishment of a successful security complex, introduced by Barry Buzan. This concept stresses security interaction among the neighbour-states and importance of geographical proximity in the security relations. Their main purpose is to promote stability in the given geopolitical environment (i.e. the Balkans, Baltic Sea, Nordic area, Black Sea, Adriatic Sea, etc.). Security complexes are basically (sub) regional security arrangements, which can include countries with different institutional affiliations. If the sub-region includes countries with different institutional affiliations, it might be a precondition for security dilemma. Regional security cooperation may be one option to mitigate this dilemma. Anders Bjurner has stated that "in the absence of developed institutional and administrative framework, sub regional cooperation will depend on political support ... institutional frameworks might be strengthened in order to improve the implementation of decisions, coordination (at all levels), the provision of information and the preparation of joint meetings."<sup>55</sup>

The key elements for the success of the Baltic Sea security complex may be overwhelmingly shared liberal democratic values and the international regime of democratic peace generally followed around the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea region actually includes several different security complexes in the region. For example, the Nordic security complex – Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland – and the Baltic security complex – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – together constitute the Nordic-Baltic security complex. The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is the only institution that involves all Baltic Sea states. The CBSS, however, is neither a security community nor a cooperative security arrangement, though it has to some extent promoted regional security, especially the so-called soft security. Therefore, a specific arrangement may be needed for strengthening security around the Baltic Sea.

The Baltic Sea region experiences also several security cultures - Nordic, Baltic, German, Polish and Russian among others. The Baltic Sea region has a complexity of institutional arrangements:

1. Sweden and Finland are EU members and NATO partners within the EAPC/PfP framework;
2. Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are EU and NATO members;
3. Denmark is also an EU and NATO member, but does not participate in the ESDP;
4. Norway and Iceland are NATO members and have cooperative relationship with EU;
5. Russia is the only country in the region that stays outside the EU and NATO, but has a cooperative relationship with both the aforementioned institutions.

The attempt of establishing a cooperative security relationship in the Baltic Sea security complex has been successful because of the fact that the countries of the region overwhelmingly share liberal democratic values. Although countries belong or have belonged to different institutions, the Baltic Sea region has experienced extensive security cooperation. The lessons learned through participation in the cooperative security arrangements would benefit to security in other regions (Black Sea Region; Balkans; South Caucasus; Central Asia; Middle East, etc.). The success of these arrangements is connected with the success of the principles of democratic peace within cooperation partners. And on the contrary, exclusion from such arrangements would destabilize the security situation in the region.

#### **4.1 Baltic Sea - balanced and cooperative**

The advantage of the Baltic Sea region is that the region has traditionally been peaceful. Wars between Baltic Sea states have been rare during the last centuries and, if they occurred, were mainly caused by the global interests of the two major players in the region, Russia (the Soviet Union) and Germany. At the same time, the region includes a remarkable number of small states with their specific security concerns.<sup>56</sup> Today, there are only some potential conflict areas, but lesser predictability for the emergence of violence. The possible threats for the region include mostly asymmetrical threats like environmental issues, economic issues, migration, etc. The most serious interstate dispute that still exists between Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Russia concerns the existence of numerous Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia;

the future of the Kaliningrad enclave; and an imaginary border dispute between Estonia and Russia and Latvia and Russia.

There are different pillars of regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea security complex. The security cooperation between Nordic countries has a long tradition despite the fact their security preferences have often been different. During the Cold War, a special meaning – the Nordic Balance – was used, describing Denmark, Iceland, and Norway as pro-Western countries, Finland as tightly related with the Soviet Union, and a neutral Sweden somewhere between the two poles. Currently, Sweden and Finland are the members of the European Union and Norway and Iceland belong to NATO's security community. Denmark has posed a cooperative security dilemma itself, being a member of the EU and NATO, but excluding participation in the ESDP. Therefore, the Nordic balance still exists, but now between the EU and NATO, embracing Sweden and Finland on one side and Iceland and Norway on the other, and Denmark somewhere between them.

The Nordic cooperation and the Baltic cooperation have in many cases developed into the Nordic-Baltic cooperation. The Baltic defence projects (BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET, BALTDFCOL, BALTSEA)<sup>57</sup> have also stimulated cooperation in the region. What is typical to the Baltic projects is the involvement of outside players, countries from other regions that promote defence in these countries. NATO's Air policing initiative follows the example of previous projects that have joined different NATO countries for the task of air defence in the given region. The model of the BALTSEA<sup>58</sup> was later transferred into other regions – South Caucasus, and the Balkans.

Before the NATO enlargement of 1998, a defence cooperation link was established between Denmark, Germany, and Poland, while the Baltic countries joined this initiative at the next stage. The purpose of the initiative was initially to assist Poland in accepting NATO's beliefs, norms and identities so as to be able to adopt NATO's requirements. Later, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the process. Countries with a similar cultural heritage made a remarkable contribution - from Poland to Lithuania and from Finland to Estonia, in order to build up reliable armed forces in those countries.

NATO remains the capable security guarantee in the region, although the position of the EU is strengthening. "The EU does not have the capability – or the intention – to defend the Baltic States if they face a serious military threat to



their security...Hence, NATO will continue to play an important role in ensuring the Baltic security for time to time.”<sup>59</sup> However, in terms of human security, the role of the European Union cannot be underestimated. The promotion of EU’s Northern Dimension has established alternative links for the further stabilization of the Baltic Sea area. Since the region includes NATO members (Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland) and EU members/NATO partners (Finland, Sweden), there may be good preconditions for practising NATO-EU cooperation. The EU Battle Group consisting of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Estonia could be one positive example of the coordinative efforts between NATO and EU members.

## 4.2 Russian dilemma

When discussing the Baltic Sea security complex, the Russian factor is unavoidable. Many difficulties have been connected with the fact that Russia’s security culture is more different from others in the region. Of course, Russia is the major military power and thus naturally an important security player here. Russia indicates the presence of a cooperative security dilemma in the region in its both forms – as an institutional dilemma and an identity dilemma. There are some historical paradoxes that make Russia’s political behaviour more difficult to be predicted. Russia is the only country on the Baltic Sea not belonging to any liberal democratic community in Europe. Moreover, Russia is a leading nation in a separate cooperative security arrangement of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTO).

The success of the security complex depends on how Russia will be included to the regional security mechanisms. The cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program and the European Neighbourhood policy offer some opportunities to overcome the problem. The holding stability in the region seems anyhow impossible without interactive relationship and communication procedures with Russia. Currently, there is lack of appropriate regional security instruments for solving problems between the Baltic Sea countries. The confrontation between Russia and Baltic countries seems to be continuing. “However, the policies of the Baltic states, most notably of Estonia and Latvia, towards Russia seem to have somewhat changed after the EU-membership has been attained. Instead of continuing to normalize relations with Russia, a more confrontational policy line can arguably be identified ... The irony of the argument is that the more confrontational political stance is fuelled and mirrored by the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s still more confrontational rhetoric in his political stance towards the Baltic states and their membership of NATO in

particular.”<sup>60</sup> The avoidance of communication often leads to confrontation. The good old Nordic Balance may be awakened if the Nordic countries have to balance confrontation-oriented policies between the Baltic countries and Russia again.

There are possibilities for including Russia into the existing security architecture through cooperative security arrangements and/or regional security complexes. Excluding Russia from the cooperative security framework undoubtedly creates a traditional security dilemma<sup>61</sup> and we return to the Cold War security system of antagonistic security communities. During the Cold War, the U.S. President Gerald Ford made his immortal remark that detente must be a two-way street.<sup>62</sup> Russia’s integration into the Western security system cannot either be a one-way street. However, if we identify Russia as a potential security destabilizer, causing problems that decrease security of others, there must be a solution for neutralizing that threat.

Regional security complex can succeed if it does not replace the current security architecture but does contribute to that. The lack of communication between neighbour countries with different institutional affiliation may also create a security dilemma. Regional security forums may be institutions for security complexes in order to overcome misperceptions that may cause security dilemmas. There are still problems creating regional security dilemmas in the Baltic Sea region, from border agreements between Estonia, Latvia and Russia, but also a planned gas-pipeline between Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea, which also has a specific security dimension. The regional security forum with the participation of the Nordic countries, Baltic countries, Russia, Germany and Poland might be an additional possibility for dispute resolution in the Baltic Sea area.

## **Conclusion**

Security communities are appropriate security models for the post-modern security order. In the current post-modern European security environment, there are two emerging Western security communities sharing liberal democratic values – NATO and the European Union. Every security community has to be aware of developing stability not only within the community but also having an effective neighbourhood policy. The establishment of cooperative security arrangements may compensate for the need for value sharing in order to join communities. Both NATO and the European Union have been active

developers of cooperative security relationship in their neighbourhood and thus avoiding the emergence of security dilemmas, including the cooperative security dilemma - as some states tend to cooperate in decreasing their security fears, it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained outside of the cooperative security arrangements.

Present-day security communities include common features characterizing interstate relations between member-countries as shared values; the formation of a common sense of us; similar lifestyles; similar economic life; positive expectations with respect to the advantages of integration; intensive transactions and communication; stable links among the elites of different countries; high geographical mobility of the population; peaceful conflict management within communities, described already by Karl Deutsch in connection with amalgamated security communities. Complex interdependence, common identity and value-sharing factors are together with the commonly followed principle of democratic peace distinctive to the contemporary pluralistic security community in Europe. If pluralistic security fails to use democratic peace as its instrument, there is no security community anymore. This principle also applies to cooperative security arrangements created by pluralistic security communities. Establishing regimes that follow democratic peace, cooperative security arrangements represent a good challenge for any possible conflict arising.

Partnership initiatives deal not only with purely military issues, but they are actively involved in security and defence reforms in Partner countries. Democratic peace can be achieved through extensive security cooperation between states with different institutional affiliations as it has happened in the Baltic Sea security complex. Also, if any county remains outside the security cooperation, a cooperative security dilemma may rise as it can be seen through the case of Russia in the Baltic Sea security complex. The security cooperation has mitigated the possibility to raise armed conflicts in the area. The security architecture based on security communities and their cooperative security arrangements and complemented by collective security arrangements and security complexes seems to be one opportunity to fix an institutionalised system of security cooperation, and thus mitigate the possibilities for emerging armed conflicts. Of course, if the world values the universal peace as an ideal type of security.

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## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> By Stephen Krasner, international regime is a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge (Krasner, Stephen. *International regimes* (1983) Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press).

<sup>2</sup> Kant in Cohen, Richard. Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No. 3, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. 2004. *Security Communities and their Neighbours. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?* Palgrave MacMillan, p. 188.

<sup>4</sup> Waever in Adler, Emmanuel. Barnett, Michael. 1998. *Security Communities*. Cambridge University Press, p. 92.

<sup>5</sup> Adler, Emmanuel. Barnett, Michael. 1998. *Security Communities*. Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Deutsch, Karl et.al. 1957. *Political community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Waever in Adler, Emmanuel. Barnett, Michael. 1998. *Security Communities*. Cambridge University Press, p. 101.

<sup>8</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. 2004. *Security Communities and their Neighbours. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?* Palgrave MacMillan, p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> Democracies are less likely to make war on each other. See also Doyle, Michael W. 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs., *Philosophy&Public Affairs*, Vol. 12 No. 4 (Fall 1983): 57-69.

<sup>10</sup> Archer in Brundtland, Arne Olav. Snider, Don M. (eds.) 1994. *Nordic-Baltic Security. An International Perspective*. Washington: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, p. 119.

<sup>11</sup> Holsti, Kalevi J. 1996. *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge University Press, p. 148.

<sup>12</sup> Cohen, Richard. Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No. 3, p. 62.

<sup>13</sup> Keohane, Robert O. Nye, Joseph S. 1977. *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*. Little, Brown and Company.

<sup>14</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. 2004. *Security Communities and their Neighbours. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?* Palgrave MacMillan, p. 43.

<sup>15</sup> The Alliance's Strategic Concept 1999. ONLINE. Available:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. Last accessed 01.12.2005.

<sup>16</sup> Michael Doyle points liberal regimes in Greece (1975), Portugal (1976), Spain (1978) (Doyle, Michael W. 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs., *Philosophy&Public Affairs*, Vol. 12 No. 4 (Fall 1983): 57-69.). Spain joined NATO in 1982. Political parties are allowed in Turkey again in 1983.

<sup>17</sup> Hampson, Fen Osler; Daudelin, Jean; Hay, John B.; Reid, Holly and Martin, Todd. 2002. *Madness in the Multitude Human Security and World Order* OUP Canada, p. 14.

<sup>18</sup> Hampson, Fen Osler; Daudelin, Jean; Hay, John B.; Reid, Holly and Martin, Todd. 2002. *Madness in the Multitude Human Security and World Order* OUP Canada, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> Hampson, Fen Osler; Daudelin, Jean; Hay, John B.; Reid, Holly and Martin, Todd. 2002. *Madness in the Multitude Human Security and World Order* OUP Canada, p. 32.

<sup>20</sup> Jervis in Caraley, Demetrios James (ed.) 2004. *American Hegemony: Preventive War, Iraq, and Imposing Democracy*. APSA. New York, p. 121.

<sup>21</sup> Yost, David S. 1998. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. Washington: The United States Institute of Peace, p. 10.

- <sup>22</sup> Cohen, Richard. Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No. 3, p. 6.
- <sup>23</sup> Archer in Brundtland, Arne Olav. Snider, Don M. (eds.) 1994. *Nordic-Baltic Security. An International Perspective*. Washington: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, p. 119.
- <sup>24</sup> Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 190.
- <sup>25</sup> Jervis, Robert. Cooperation Under Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, vol. 30, no.2, (January, 1978), p. 169
- <sup>26</sup> Mölder, Holger 1998. The Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region and Its Impact on the Regional Security and Defense Cooperation (Thesis). US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA.
- <sup>27</sup> Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy*. Princeton University Press.
- <sup>28</sup> Holsti, Kalevi J. 1996. *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge University Press, p. 148.
- <sup>29</sup> Archer in Brundtland, Arne Olav. Snider, Don M. (eds.) 1994. *Nordic-Baltic Security. An International Perspective*. Washington: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, p. 119.
- <sup>30</sup> Cohen, Richard. Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No. 3, p. 10.
- <sup>31</sup> Cohen, Richard. Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No. 3, p. 35.
- <sup>32</sup> Michalka Cohen, Richard. Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No. 3, p. 33.
- <sup>33</sup> North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991-97); Partnership for Peace; Mediterranean Dialogue; Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; NATO-Russia Council; NATO-Ukraine Council; South Eastern European Initiative; Istanbul Cooperation Initiative).
- <sup>34</sup> Yost, David S. 1998. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. Washington: The United States Institute of Peace, p. 8.
- <sup>35</sup> The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have generally been positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including Russia, the Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area (Strategic Concept 1999 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>).
- <sup>36</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. 2004. Security Communities and their Neighbours. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? Palgrave MacMillan, p. 82.
- <sup>37</sup> Cohen, Richard. Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. *The Marshall Centre Papers*, No. 3, p. 51.
- <sup>38</sup> Lucarelli, Sonia. Peace and Democracy: Rediscovered Link The EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities. ONLINE. Available: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-02/Lucarelli's.pdf>. Last accessed 12.09.2005, p. 35.
- <sup>39</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. 2004. Security Communities and their Neighbours. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? Palgrave MacMillan, p. 82.

- 40 Planning and Review Process; Political-Military Framework; Membership Action Plan; Operational Capabilities Concept; Training and Education Enhancement Programme; Partnership Action Plan (PAP); Individual PAP; PAP on Terrorism; PAP on Defence Institution Building.
- 41 Simon, Jeffrey 2004. Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era. Strategic Forum, No. 206 March 2004, pp. 4-5.
- 42 Lucarelli, Sonia. Peace and Democracy: Rediscovered Link The EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities. ONLINE. Available: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-02/Lucarelli's.pdf>. Last accessed 12.09.2005, p. 35.
- 43 Triple-nons are not members in either NATO, PfP or Mediterranean Dialogue.
- 44 Shea, Jamie 2004. How Global Can NATO Go. ONLINE. Available: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040309a.htm>. Last Accessed 12.09.2005.
- 45 Balanzino in Yost, David S. 1998. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. Washington: The United States Institute of Peace, pp. 103-104.
- 46 excluding states with pre-modern origin like Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco or San Marino.
- 47 Malta joined PfP in 1994, but left in 1996.
- 48 Membership Action Plan 1999. ONLINE. Available: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm>. Last accessed 09.12.2005.
- 49 Membership Action Plan 1999. ONLINE. Available: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm>. Last accessed 09.12.2005.
- 50 Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole (2003). *Regions and Powers – The Structure of international Relations*, Cambridge University Press, p. 44.
- 51 Within the European security, it seems more appropriate to use the term “regional security”, even within the global context we talk about subregional security.
- 52 Lepik, Lauri (2004). *Nordic-Baltic Defence Cooperation and International Relations Theory*, p. 149.
- 53 Joenniemi, Pertti (1997) “Norden as a Post-Nationalist Construction”, *Neorealism or Regionality: The reconstruction of Political Space Around the Baltic Rim*, Copenhagen, NORD REFO, 1997, p.202.
- 54 Geopolitically, the Baltic Sea region includes the following countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Poland, Russia, and Iceland and Norway, which are geographically outside the region, but tied politically to the region.
- 55 Bjurner in Cottey, Andrew (ed.) (1999). *Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe. Building Security, Prosperity and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea*. Macmillan Press Ltd, p. 17.
- 56 Mölder, Holger (1998). *The Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region and Its Impact on the Regional Security and Defense Cooperation (Thesis)*. US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, p. 64.
- 57 Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, Baltic Squadron, Baltic Air Surveillance Network, Baltic Defence College, Baltic Security Assistance.
- 58 BALTSEA (Baltic Security Assistance) is a coordinating body for assistance to Baltic countries in carrying out their defence reforms.
- 59 Larrabee, F. Stephen. *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era*. Rand Corporation. Available: ONLINE [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2005/MR1744.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1744.pdf). Last accessed 09.12.2005, p. 66.
- 60 Kvarnoe, Ole; Rasmussen Marie (2005). *EU enlargement and the Baltic region*. The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005. The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, p. 90.
- 61 An increase in one state's security decreases security of others.

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<sup>62</sup> Address by President Gerald R. Ford in Minneapolis Before the Annual Convention of the American League. ONLINE Available:  
<http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/750492.htm>.

## Estonia and NATO: A Constructivist View on a National Interest and Alliance Behaviour

By Toomas Riim\*

### Introduction

After regaining its independence in 1991, Estonia has sought NATO membership as a primary goal for its foreign and security policy - formulated as an ultimate means for securing the *national interest* of Estonian State in the foreign and security policy discourse. In October 1991, just two months after Estonia regained its independence, the speaker of the Estonian Parliament Ülo Nugis, returning from the session of the North Atlantic Assembly, stated:

*Our historical experience has proved that neutrality does not guarantee our security (...) we can guarantee our security through an alliance's collective security arrangement. At present, only such an alliance is NATO<sup>1</sup>.*

Initially, the pursuit of this goal was claimed to be a response (solution) to the “historical” security threat posed by the Estonia's unstable neighbour – Russia. As Russia was expected to behave as it had been doing during all of its history, the Estonian foreign policy elite faced a problem: How to avoid repeating past mistakes? An Estonian high-ranking officer has put it straightforwardly:

*The historical source of threat to our independence has been and will remain Russia with its special interest towards the Baltic region and its great-power politics<sup>2</sup>.*

Therefore it seemed logical that Estonia simply had to escape from the vicinity of the “bad” Russia as fast as possible and seek membership in *Western* security structures. For Estonia, “issues of national sovereignty and distinctiveness, of a complete and irreversible breakaway from their Soviet past, and any possibility of being submerged into a new Russia sphere of influence, have ... become the measure and substance of statehood”<sup>3</sup>. At the end of 1993, NATO, from its own part, announced the willingness to enlarge, issuing the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP programme). Already in 1999 the first wave of applicants – Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic - were admitted as full members of NATO. At the NATO's Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999) summits the Baltic States were regarded as potential future member states, who got an

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invitation to NATO in 2002 and a full membership in 2004. While pursuing actively NATO membership, Estonia has done everything to reject or ignore Russia's proposals in the security policy realm (e.g. Russian security guarantees offer in 1997) and has tried to reduce dependence from Russia's economy. On the other hand, Russia has done everything to hinder the Baltic States' entrance to NATO, indicating Russia's geopolitics of spheres of influence which Estonia allegedly feared most.

The Estonian academics from their part tried to conceptualize this situation with the help of the neorealist perspective of the International Relations theory, stipulating that in an anarchical international system especially small states must seek a protection within alliances against a threatening great power. Even if it is not balancing against the strongest actor in the system<sup>4</sup>, it is still in accord with the realist-rationalist ontology of materialism and individualism, where the aim of every state is to enhance its own relative position in an anarchical international system and above all to improve its national security and economic prosperity. But several new approaches – postmodern, cultural and constructivist alike – found it puzzling why after the end of the Cold War, when there was no bipolar confrontation anymore and Soviet threat had gone, many states still wanted to join a military alliance such as NATO. Frank Schimmelfennig studied, for example, why Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries wanted to join NATO and why NATO wanted to expand in the first place. He noted that even if it is understandable rationally why a previously occupied state wants to join a protective alliance, it is much harder to understand the interest or willingness of NATO to admit such states in the face of the disappearance of the former enemy – the Soviet Union<sup>5</sup>.

This suggests that realist approach to IR has some weaknesses in explaining some aspects of the security policies of many Central and Eastern European countries including Estonia. Social constructivism as a new approach in IR theory appeared to address such problems since the beginning of 1990's. Constructivist IR scholars maintain that common identity, rather than shared threat, best explains the post-Cold War alliance policy patterns. According to this, “the pro-Western foreign policy option of the Baltic States can be considered as an institutionalisation of their identification with Western values and norms”<sup>6</sup>. This article suggests that this is not a mere alliance formation between self-interested international actors, but more like a collective *identity* formation between Estonia and NATO, reflected in the foreign and security

discourse. In other words, “participation in the Euro-Atlantic integration process constructs and reconstructs” the identity of Estonia<sup>7</sup>.

Identity (reflected in a discourse) has either a constraining or enabling effect on states’ policies. On the one hand, Estonia has been transforming its nation-state political identity in such a way that it has enabled to build a collective identity (based on the Western values) with the West/NATO, eventually leading to the full membership in 2004. On the other hand, such a transformed identity has clearly constrained cooperation with Russia in the security realm, although, in order to be a part of this collective “self”, Estonia had to accept Russia’s role as a common “other” for the *Western* collective identity building to succeed, eventually enabling some cooperation within NATO’s partnership programmes. However, it cannot be concluded here that Estonia has changed its realist-egoistic security policy rhetoric into a more cooperative security merely because of persuading NATO to accept Estonia as a member<sup>8</sup>. Rather, Estonia’s security policy decisions and actions have been constrained on the basis of Western common ideas and practices about the proper behaviour, which were step by step integrated into the Estonian security policy discourse, especially from 1994 onwards. From the constructivist perspective it could be concluded that in case of such a strong identification with NATO “the collective identity led to the threat perception, not the other way around”<sup>9</sup>.

After Estonia became a full member of NATO in 2004, this kind of perception of Russia as not being a Western/European, i.e. “not us”, even strengthened. Russia, on the other hand, had also revealed that its political identity was something different from the West’s (as formulated in Russia’s security concepts). This kind of identity politics from both sides has hindered a remarkable improvement of Estonian-Russian relations. Here one might conclude that this kind of continuity of perception of Russia as the “other” on the one hand and a continuous enthusiasm to pursue collective identity within NATO on the other hand, shows that identity politics plays equal or even bigger role in Estonian foreign and security policy-making than an instrumental-rational calculation of current threats and mere survival in an anarchical international system. As shown in the empirical part of the article, Estonia’s desire to join NATO has been guided more and more by NATO norms and practices since 1995-1996, having a clear indication that Estonia’s national and security political identity has gone through a complete learning and adaptation process vis-à-vis NATO. This is reflected in the changes in the foreign and security policy discourse, enabling also a membership in NATO. To illustrate this process, several cases (Kosovo crisis 1999, the U.S./NATO campaigns against Taliban

and Iraq) are given as the examples. The article ends with an overview about the prospects of improving the relations between Estonia and Russia as seen from the constructivist perspective.

## 1. Theoretical background

The changes in the international security political environment since the end of the 1980's have led to a more chaotic academic world as well, especially when it comes to the analysis and explaining states' foreign and security policy choices or preferences. The IR field has been "plagued" by an emergence of a myriad of "alternative" or "critical" approaches to the classical understandings of the world politics. States' actions in the international relations have traditionally been explained by so-called rationalist IR theories such as (neo) realism and neoliberalism. According to realism, states follow *national interests* and that the most important thing in every state's national interest is to achieve national security in the sense of protecting state's territorial integrity, political stability, and economic well being within the anarchical international system. Among this classical framework, there are two typical "paradigms": neorealism and neoliberalism. Being rational-materialist in its ontology, neorealism sees a new emerging multi-polar world still as a power balancing<sup>10</sup>. What follows is that states change their foreign and security policies according to their national interest defined in instrumental-rational terms of power projection or survival. Neoliberals, on the other hand, emphasize cooperative institution building to prevent new conflicts emerging in an increasingly interdependent world. Since classical IR theories reveal their weaknesses in addressing new phenomena after the end of the Cold War (e.g. NATO enlargement), social constructivists have done a good job in challenging this materialist and rationalist posture about exogenous national interests.<sup>11</sup> They claim that state interests rather evolve from the intersubjective interaction between states and, consequently, are socially constructed. And states behave according to the identities they inscribe for certain international subjects and that those identities may be the source of states' interests as well<sup>12</sup>. Generally speaking, constructivists "analyse the endogenous determination of interests – how collective actors consider, accept and reject *different* reasonable ways to conceive and pursue security, prosperity and other goals within the *same* international context"<sup>13</sup>. Social constructivists hold the idea that "the past, present, and future are socially constructed according to the meanings actors hold about themselves and their world"<sup>14</sup>. Stephen Walt, while comparing different IR theories, also found that "Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive,

constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes... [and] pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of behaviour”<sup>15</sup>. For example, a constructivist understanding of regimes differs from neoliberal approaches in that it describes regimes as being constituted by shared understandings, rather than a convergence of interests. For constructivism, “interests (and threats to them) are not self-evident derivatives of position, but are shaped (constituted) by identity”<sup>16</sup>. The role of state officials in expressing state’s security discourse is seen indispensable if one employs discourse analysis in order to see how identities are constructed: “The representations created by state officials make clear both to those officials themselves and to others who and what ‘we’ are, who and what ‘our enemies’ are, in what ways ‘we’ are threatened by ‘them’, and how ‘we’ might best deal with those ‘threats’”<sup>17</sup>.

The second theme in the constructivist approach is the impact of international norms on state actors. Constructivist must ask here: “How do domestic and international norms of legitimate statehood condition the identity of states and their realms of rightful internal and external conduct?”<sup>18</sup> Following this, it can be stated that “the dominance of the West and its international institutions rather than the Russian threat may be the primary reason for the course of the foreign policies by the independent Baltic countries in the post-Cold War world”<sup>19</sup>, because “the systemic structure comprises shared international (or regional) norms into which states are socialized and these not only constrain their behaviour but also help constitute the identities that motivate their conduct”<sup>20</sup> and they “are committed in their decisions to values and norms and choose the appropriate instead of the efficient behavioural option”<sup>21</sup>.

This account of the theory is a good point of departure for analysing collective identity formation, which is perhaps, something more than just creating collective security among states or actors together with its rational-material and externally given self-interest behind it.

## 2. NATO's transformation

After the collapse of communism in the Central and Eastern Europe at the end of 1980's many politicians and academics believed that the U.S. would withdraw from Europe as soon as possible, thus making NATO pointless. Many even argued that NATO had actually lost its *raison d'être* and should be disbanded. None of these happened. NATO's New Strategic Concept from 1991 states that

“The new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity” and that “the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess”<sup>22</sup>. Risks “may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and Eastern Europe”. “Study on NATO Enlargement” from 1995 justifies NATO’s “enduring validity” in terms of its “essential role within the developing European Security Architecture”<sup>23</sup>

A new NATO’s Strategic Concept from 1999 is even more confident about NATO’s validity, especially influenced by Serbia’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo:

*The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges*<sup>24</sup>.

Other commentators have suggested rather that NATO’s *raison d’être* had changed radically after the Cold War, for example:

*Its founding objectives of defending Europe and counterbalancing the Soviet bloc largely obsolete with the end of the Cold War, NATO has come to represent an identity as much as a military alliance. For the nations of Eastern Europe, NATO’s role as the ‘yardstick for Westernization’ has been highlighted, and NATO membership has thus become the ultimate goal of nearly every former Warsaw Pact state*<sup>25</sup>.

The fundamental transformation has occurred from a defensive military alliance into some kind of peace-keeping organization and an exporter of western liberal values around the world. According to the NATO’s basic documents (e.g. “New Strategic Concept” of 1991, the “Study on NATO Enlargement” of 1995 and “Alliance’s New Strategic Concept” of 1999), the overall idea of NATO’s continued existence is now a preservation of the Western values and norms (democracy, liberalism, rule of law), with the aim at reducing instability everywhere in Europe. The adherence to the same values will be expected from any potential new member state as well<sup>26</sup>. Estonia declared that it shared these values and, consequently, was entitled to become a new NATO member even if being small and politico-militarily weak. In the next section it will be shown how

these norms have been internalized by Estonian foreign and security policy discourse.

### 3. Estonian foreign and security policy discourse towards NATO

By examining the changes in the Estonia's security policy discourse since 1991, it will be shown how Estonian foreign and security policy elite have perceived NATO since 1991 and what kind of influence might NATO's norms and practices have had on Estonian foreign and security policy, especially vis-à-vis NATO and Russia, eventually leading to collective identity building between Estonia and NATO. Estonia's positive identification with NATO has been present in the Estonian security discourse ever since Estonia restored its independence. Initially, it was hoped that NATO would provide a security umbrella against a highly perceived Russian threat, as voiced out in the next statement:

*But in Estonia, security goes far beyond the abstract, far beyond a future theoretical consideration, for us, it is an acutely tangible concern here and now. It is a fact - foreign occupation troops remain on our soil. It is a fact - the number of fully trained and de-mobilized troops from the former Soviet armed forces in our country – some 10,000 or so - is five times the size of our fledgling and poorly-equipped defence forces, not to mention that Russian fighter planes need but 17 minutes to reach Tallinn from take off in locations within the Leningrad oblast. In short, for us, security is an immediate concern<sup>27</sup>.*

Generally speaking, the aim of Estonian foreign and security policy was - with the help of NATO - to balance against Russian geopolitical domination and its hostile ambitions. Estonian foreign and security policy makers apparently relied on Article 5 commitments in The North Atlantic Treaty, which states the following:

*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area<sup>28</sup>.*

Against any kind of expectations, NATO was not in a hurry to admit Estonia as a full member, issuing instead the Partnership for Peace Programme which did

not contain any security guarantees for the participants. Estonia still considered PfP as a vehicle for the future membership in NATO:

*Estonia's objective is to become a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Western European Union (WEU). Cooperation with both of these defence organisations is the main political and practical vehicle by which Estonia can develop and strengthen its security and national defence. Therefore, Estonia considers it very important to participate in the NATO "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) program and to actively employ opportunities arising from associated partner status in the WEU<sup>29</sup>.*

This heralded the gradual change in the security discourse of Estonia as well. As long as the Russian troops were withdrawn in August 1994, the “immediate Russian threat” seemed to fade away from the discourse, and the policy of “positive engagement” with Russia was announced:

*Right now, both we and Russia enjoy an historic opportunity to improve relations. The potential of goodwill is in the air, and it is our duty, on both sides of Tartu Peace, to seize the moment and make that peace again. We might call this a policy of Positive Engagement. This would involve, among other qualities, mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual respect for national security interests, mutual refrain from verbal and other confrontation, mutual respect for international norms of behaviour, most importantly in the area of human rights<sup>30</sup>.*

Step by step the new role of NATO as “an instrument for protecting the democratic way of life” appeared into the Estonian security discourse already at the end of 1994:

*Still, we are often asked the question, "Why do you still want to join NATO?" The answer is simple. We are convinced that NATO is the international organization which can project stability, a stability necessary to all countries of the continent. Despite some internal differences from time to time, we believe NATO is a relatively stable mechanism in a Europe where uncertainty runs rampant and crises too often break out. Often we hear the phrase that NATO is an outdated instrument of the Cold War. I do not agree. All along, NATO has been rather an instrument for protecting the democratic way of life. For this very reason, eventual accession to NATO is a strategic goal of my Government<sup>31</sup>.*

Even if Estonia was still attracted by NATO's Article 5 security guarantees, which was believed to be the most important reason to join NATO in the formative years of the newly born Estonian state, since 1994-1995 Western

democratic and liberal values gained more prominence over “hard” security guarantees.

Over time, the words like “geopolitics”, “aggressive imperial aspirations”, “Russian threat” etc were dropped from the security discourse at all. The main theme was now NATO’s common values, which Estonia definitely supposed to share:

*First, the backbone of NATO is formed from the common values - peace, freedom, democracy and welfare -which Estonia values above all and which the European Union has made its watchword. NATO was created to jointly defend these common values. Estonia shares these values and therefore sees its future as a full member of NATO, not only as a consumer but also as a producer of security... We believe that all of Europe deserves a lasting and secure peace, and that precisely NATO, in its proven efficiency, relinquishing its cold war role and concentrating on the basic functions mentioned above, can guarantee such a lasting peace. Hence Estonia too must move towards NATO and cooperate with it as closely as possible<sup>32</sup>.*

The former Estonian foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves’ speeches are the best example of the learning process, which Estonia has gone through since regaining its independence in 1991. There has occurred a turn from the threat balancing rhetoric to a more idealistic, moralistic or even naïve perception of NATO’s role in an international and European politics:

*Thus Baltic membership in NATO is the best means to signal to western, eastern and central Europe that the Cold War is truly over. It will signal that we have made a jump into a new age that no-one would have believed in but 10 years ago, into an age where dividing lines, whether old or new, no longer exist. We in Estonia certainly do not believe in these dividing lines and that is one of the major reasons why we have applied for full NATO membership<sup>33</sup>.*

In 2001, the same nice and polished language has been integrated into a new security policy concept, where NATO is not seen anymore as a sort of protector of Estonia’s independence against immediate external threat, but rather as a whole social mechanism for achieving democracy and stability: “Estonia’s goal of joining NATO is founded upon the conviction that full integration is the best way to protect and consolidate the modern democratic state<sup>34</sup>.”

This new security policy concept shows most clearly how the posture of *democratic values* (which is the heart of NATO’s continued existence as well) has already been interpreted in terms of Estonia’s *national interest*, i.e. new value



which must be protected, not so much Estonia's own nation-state physical security:

*It is in Estonia's national interest to participate in international co-operation in order to further reinforce the security environment. This assumes that Estonia will defend and unequivocally support democratic values at home as well as abroad.<sup>35</sup>*

The following conclusions may be drawn from this: Estonia regards NATO as a very important thing despite even a diminished Russian threat. In 1991-1994 NATO was regarded as the only capable organization of protecting states' national security in terms of physical existence. Since 1994 NATO's importance lays in its protection of the values of democracy, market economy and the rule of law, which Estonia said it was willing to share. The breaking point in this process might be the years 1994-1995, when, after the withdrawal of Russian troops, the security political environment was assessed by Estonian security policy discourse more as "all-European".

Thus, a positive identification was in place ever since, although based on the different grounds if we compare the two distinct periods 1991-1994 and 1994-onwards. But collective identity needs, in order to be sustained over time, a sort of common "other", which could in some ways be interpreted as threatening to the collective "self". Estonia's and NATO's security discourses were quite far from each other with respect to Russia during the years immediately after the Estonia's restoration of independence. Initially, while Estonia talked about survival, geopolitics and Russian threat, NATO already talked about European and Western values, the threats or risks which "are difficult to predict and assess", and regarded Russia as a powerful nuclear state together with its essential role to play in "European Security Architecture". There was not so much to share between Estonia and NATO at that time. Nevertheless, there was a clearly visible trend that Estonia had been harmonizing its security political discourse more and more with that of NATO's. This most clearly indicates the constructivists' premise of identity as a basis of state interests, hence foreign and security policy.

Good examples for supporting this thesis are the cases of Kosovo crisis in 1999, the campaign against Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraqi crisis in 2003, which will be elaborated in a more detail in the next section.

#### 4. The cases of Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003

The aim of this section is to give some examples of the cases where NATO's norms and practices influenced most directly foreign policy decision-making in Estonia. In Kosovo 1999, NATO used its military force against a sovereign state for the first time, aiming at protecting human rights of Albanians against Yugoslavian Federal authorities. A fact sheet released by the US State Department in the beginning of bombing in Kosovo described the US objectives in Kosovo as follows:

*The U.S. and NATO objectives in Kosovo are to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace that prevents further repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people. We have three strong interests at stake in the Kosovo conflict: averting a humanitarian catastrophe; preserving stability in a key part of Europe, and maintaining the credibility of NATO... Second, instability in Kosovo directly threatens peace in the Balkan and the stability of Europe. No one should forget that World War I began in this tinderbox. If actions are not taken to stop this conflict now, it will spread and both the cost and risk will be substantially greater<sup>36</sup>.*

Ever since NATO started its air attacks, the Kosovo case figured in almost every speech or statement of the Estonian MFA officials at that time. Those statements showed how well were NATO's security discourse adopted by Estonian officials, helping them to assess any new situation and take the appropriate action. It was not surprising that Estonia supported the bombing campaign, with arguments stretching from the human catastrophe to the need to share responsibility in integrating Europe. Following statements serve as good examples:

*Military action taken by NATO was deemed inevitable in order to stop violence against the civil population in Kosovo and to avoid a military escalation of the conflict. The crisis in Kosovo is turning into a human catastrophe and its continuation may destabilise the situation in the region, thereby endangering the greater European security<sup>37</sup>.*

*As Kosovo demonstrates, no single country or region in Europe can meet post-Cold War security challenges alone. All nineteen NATO members agreed that action was necessary. All aspirant states have lent their political and practical support. Estonia is giving aid, will take refugees and contribute peacekeeping forces when a peace is secured. Sharing the burden of responsibility and risk is the only way to maintain stability<sup>38</sup>.*

Constructivist theory suggests here the importance of NATO norms and socialization with these by international community, especially by those countries who aspired for the NATO membership. The socialization effects are

most clearly expressed in the statements made by then the Estonian minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Ilves, who suggested an almost automatic adoption of NATO norms on subject matter, since this was considered the only appropriate or knowledgeable behaviour for a state that wants to join NATO and the EU, no matter the costs or other rational-material considerations.

The 2001 September events in the USA and the following U.S. attack against Taliban regime in Afghanistan reflect the same kind of normative pressure to act and bandwagoning tendencies among "international society". Estonia, of course, followed the same logic of appropriateness as it did during the Kosovo Crisis. Estonia completely supported the NATO's statements concerning US actions against Afghanistan:

*Estonia supports the statement of North Atlantic Council of September 12, 2001, that condemns the appalling attacks perpetrated against the United States of America and regards this an action covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty...Estonia as a candidate country for NATO membership, associates itself with the message contained in the statement and is prepared to provide the United States with any assistance within the scope of its capabilities. Estonia condemns all forms of terrorism and considers it a serious threat to peace and stability. Estonia stands ready to co-operate in the fight against terrorism in any possible way.<sup>39</sup>*

Kosovo and Afghanistan cases show how far a collective identity formation can proceed. Considering Yugoslavia as an enemy, Estonia showed most clearly that NATO's norms, values had been made a part of Estonia's identity as well. Russian threat was denied and instead new threats were emphasized. The same applies to Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which were considered most important threats to Estonia today. Theoretically, new threats or "enemies" or "others" are desperately needed for a collective identity to sustain over time, and that the threats must be "common" or "shared". Since 1994 Estonian foreign policy-makers had realised that NATO did not emphasize the geopolitical or military threat posed by Russia, but rather threats posed by *non-democratic* elements like tyrannies and terrorists in Europe and anywhere in the world. Estonia just had to adjust its language to the one of NATO, logically expecting that it might facilitate joining NATO as well.

Denying Russian threat, Estonia is now concerned about fighting for democracy everywhere in the world, especially where NATO is involved. Estonia's condemnation of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and, hence, active participation

in the military mission in Iraq indicated the adoption of the norms of the new collective “self”. For these reasons, Estonia also participated in the so-called “Vilnius Group of 10” statement on Iraq in March 2003:

*Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction<sup>40</sup>.*

Many Estonian politicians share the view that participation in these missions most surely will guarantee Estonia's security and survival in the future even if it entails high costs now. The next statement shows what is Estonia up to in Iraq:

*Terrorists should not determine the future of Iraq and make the people of Iraq and the international community to withdraw from the goal of building up a sovereign, democratic and prosperous Iraq<sup>41</sup>.*

All these views are integrated into a new “National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia”, adopted in 2004, where it is stated that “Estonia’s approach to the matter of national security is in full accord with the principles of NATO’s Strategic Concept” and that “Membership in alliances with common democratic principles and goals is the main basis for, and guarantee of Estonia’s national security”.<sup>42</sup> The new security concept is a bit contradictory in terms of where the threat of war comes for Estonia:

*The probability of a military conflict breaking out that would encompass all of Europe or the threat of a conflict in the Baltic Sea region has been reduced to a minimum. Membership in NATO and the EU reduces the threat of war for Estonia even more<sup>43</sup>.*

Even if the threat of war has been reduced in Europe and in the Baltic Sea region, it does not mean that membership in NATO and the EU reduces the threat of war for Estonia generally. Rather contrary: if we consider Estonia to actively participate in the missions to Afghanistan and Iraq, Estonia might now be a target for Islamic terrorists as much as Spain or UK. One might indeed conclude that collective identity led to the threat perception, not the other way around.

## 5. Prospects for the improvement of relations between Estonia and Russia

Even if the Russian threat has been turned down in Estonian foreign and security policy discourse, the improvement of relations with Russia is still in question. Not until the Russian troops were withdrawn from Estonia at the end of 1994, was the immediate military threat from Russia a major concern for Estonian security policy. Since the Positive Engagement policy in 1994, the relations with Russia improved remarkably, but worsened again along with Russia's campaign against Chechnya and with Russia's opposition to the NATO enlargement to the Baltic States. Surprisingly enough, Russia's actions were interpreted not in terms of a threat to Estonia's security but rather regarded non-democratic *per se*, i.e. not appropriate in a given international context. Estonia might also have denied Russian security guarantees offer in 1997 not so much because of the feeling of an immediate threat from Russia, but rather due to the historical reasons and Russia's non-democratic development, which contradicted with the values of the West that Estonia shared. Russia's offer of security guarantees strongly conflicted with these values Estonia was striving for. There was some sort of unique consensus or "common knowledge" about this matter among Estonian foreign policy elite that helped to rule out accepting Russia's – we could say even "friendly"- offer. In its official statement from 03.11.1997 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly rejected these guarantees, stating that:

*Unilateral security guarantees do not correspond to the spirit of the new Europe; these kinds of guarantees and regional security agreements have never been and are not also now on the agenda of Estonian foreign policy<sup>44</sup>.*

With accepting the U.S. security offer – the U.S.-Baltic Charter - in January 1998, Estonia made it clear that it wanted security guarantees from the West, not the East. Signing the U.S.-Baltic Charter was interesting in the sense that it broke down one of the "taboos" in the Estonian foreign policy, namely – no signing of any kind of unilateral security political agreements, aiming at security guarantees. This might suggest that Estonia has gone through a learning process *à la* "we want security but not the one proposed by Russia". Especially, since Estonia became a member of NATO in 2004, dealing with Russia seems to depend not so much on how threatening it might be perceived, but rather on Russia's change of its identity into a more Western one (i.e. more appropriate one), as concerned in the next statement:

*As I also noted at our spring foreign policy guidelines debate, the improvement of Estonia's relations with Russia would be helped along by the international condemnation of the crimes of Communist regimes, by Russia admitting what happened in the past, as well as by the signing of the border treaties<sup>45</sup>.*

At the same time Estonia has echoed implicitly that it does not expect Russia to be a part of “us”, but instead regards Russia as a necessary “other” against who it might be possible to measure Estonia's own degree of adoption of Western values and make appropriate foreign and security policy decisions. For example, Russia is regarded as “a significant obstacle” to stability in the Caucasus region:

*There are obvious obstacles on the road towards liberal democracy and economic stability in South Caucasus. The so-called “frozen conflicts” constitute a particular challenge. The continuing existence of Russian military bases in Georgia is another significant obstacle to achieving stability in this country in particular<sup>46</sup>.*

During the debates on signing Estonian-Russian border agreement in April 2005, such a pressure from Estonia on Russia to change its “thinking” was even more explicitly expressed by then foreign minister Urmas Paet:

*It is very important that Russia readmit illegal immigrants having come from there, no matter, which country's citizens they are. Here we cannot compromise; we cannot alter the meaning of the agreement. The absence of an agreement is better than a bad agreement, because in the case of a bad agreement we cannot foresee the potential consequences.<sup>47</sup>*

In sum, Estonia expects Russia to go through the same learning process which Estonia has done since 1991. This suggests that Estonian-Russian relations will not improve until Russia's foreign and security policy thinking is more in tune with Western values and, accordingly, Russia's behaviour is more appropriate in a given international context.

## **Conclusions**

The current study suggests that Estonian *national identity* (nation-state identity) has been transforming into a *collective identity* with European economic and security organizations - in this case with NATO. This transformation is reflected in the Estonia's foreign and security policy discourse. Estonian foreign and security policy has been strongly influenced by an immediate Russian threat and geopolitical factors in the formative years of the newly born Estonian Republic (1991-1994). Since 1994 or so Estonia has been harmonizing its security policy

discourse with the one of NATO, eventually leading to the full membership in 2004. The constructivist approach to the today's alliance policies suggests that Estonia's ideas about its national interest and foreign policy preferences have been taking into account the changing nature of social practices, identities and role perceptions *contra* to Waltz's systemic or holistic model. Estonia has chosen NATO-membership for the reasons of shared understandings about security, and has consequently disregarded Russia's proposals in the security policy realm, since these did not correspond to the Western understandings of security in a new Europe. By now this has led to the situation where NATO's belief systems, norms, values and practices have become a part of Estonia's identity, functioning independently from external stimuli, e.g. from Russia's foreign policy actions whatsoever<sup>48</sup>. The Estonian security policy rhetoric gradually changed from perceiving Russia as a threat to perceiving Russia as a culturally and politically different society compared to Estonia, while NATO and Western states were perceived more like "us". Consequently, in dealing with Russia Estonia has been trying to harmonize its policies and behaviour toward Russia with that of NATO's stance as well.

The article aimed also at showing the impact of international norms (human rights, democracy, rule of law) on Estonian foreign policy-making, reflected in the discourse of the Estonian MFA during the Kosovo crisis in March 1999, U.S. Campaign against Afghanistan in 2001 and the crisis of Iraq in 2003. The elite socialization seems to be a sufficient account for the impact of international norms on Estonian foreign policy-making. This study shows how an international normative structure (embedded also in NATO) makes national actors to adopt these norms almost automatically, understood as an appropriate behaviour in a given normative environment. Another account for the explanation would also suggest some sort of instrumental rationality on behalf of Estonia to adopt these norms, since Estonia's support of these norms would have facilitated Estonia's joining the EU and NATO.

## NOTES

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<sup>2</sup> Ants Laaneots "Eesti Vabariigi julgeolekukontseptsiooni areng aastail 1991-1994 ja kõrgkoolid", aulaloeng, 8.02.1996.

<sup>3</sup> Boyka Stefanova, "The Baltic States' Accession to NATO and the European Union: An Extension of the European Security Community?", *Journal of International Relations and Development*

5:2, June 2002, p. 158; see also Erik Noreen “Verbal Politics of Estonian Policy-makers: Reframing Security and Identity”, in Johan Eriksson (ed) “Threat Politics: New Perspectives on Security, Risk and Crisis Management”, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001.

<sup>4</sup> Rather contrary: small states tend to bandwagon, not balance.

<sup>5</sup> See Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation”, in Chafetz, G., Spirtas, M., Frankel, B. (eds) “The Origins of National Interests”, London: Frank Cass, 1999

<sup>6</sup> Grazina Miniotaite, “Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A decade of transformation in the Baltic states.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Jul 2003, Vol. 16 Issue 2, pp. 209-223, p. 217.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> see discussion in: Steffen Rasmussen, “Estonian Security Perceptions in the context of EU enlargement: A Critical Discussion”, *Baltic Defence Review* No 11, Volume 1/2004, p. 163.

<sup>9</sup> Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation”, p. 215.

<sup>10</sup> John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, 1994/95, 19 (3): 5-49.

<sup>11</sup> See for example, Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 1999, Vol. 5 (3): 259-289; Nacem Inayatullah & David L. Blaney, “Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory”, in Lapid, Y. & Kratochwil, Fr. (eds) “The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory“, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996; Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, *World Politics*, 1998, 50 (January), 324-48; Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996, Vol. 2 (3): 275-318; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization* 46, 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425; Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review*, 1994, Vol. 88 (2), pp. 384-396; Peter Wennersten, “The Politics of Inclusion: The Case of the Baltic States”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 1999, Vol. 34 (3): 272-296.

<sup>12</sup> Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration”, p. 277.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Inayatullah & Blaney, “Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory”, p. 82.

<sup>15</sup> Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998, pp. 29-44.

<sup>16</sup> Raymond Hinnebusch “Identity in International Relations: Constructivism versus Materialism, and the Case of the Middle East”, *The Review of the International Relations*, Vol.3, No.2, Winter 2003, p. 360.

<sup>17</sup> Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, p. 283.

<sup>18</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, “Imagining society: constructivism and the English School”, *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, Oct 2002, Vol. 4 Issue 3, p. 502.

<sup>19</sup> Raimo Väyrynen, “The Security of the Baltic Countries: Cooperation and Defection”, in Olav F. Knudsen (ed) “Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Russian, Nordic and European Aspects”. Ilford (UK): Frank Cass, 1999, p. 207.

<sup>20</sup> Hinnebusch, “Identity in International Relations: Constructivism versus Materialism, and the Case of the Middle East”, p. 359.

<sup>21</sup> Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation”, p. 210.

<sup>22</sup> The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, 1991, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm> on the 27.11.2005.



- <sup>23</sup> Study on NATO Enlargement 1995, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9501.htm> on the 27.11.2005.
- <sup>24</sup> The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> on 27.11.2005.
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- <sup>34</sup> National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia 2001, <http://web-static.vm.ee/static/failid/335/SecurityConcept.pdf> on 28.11.2005.
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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia Statement, No. 27-I. November 3, 1997, <http://www.vm.ee> on 24.12.1999.

<sup>45</sup> Main Guidelines of Estonia's Foreign Policy. Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia Kristiina Ojuland to the Riigikogu on behalf of the Government of Estonia, 7 December 2004, [http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat\\_140/5088.html?arhiiv\\_kuup=kuup\\_2004](http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_140/5088.html?arhiiv_kuup=kuup_2004) on 27.11.2005.

<sup>46</sup> Address by the Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland at the international conference 04 February 2005, Tbilisi, [http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat\\_140/5182.html](http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_140/5182.html) on 28.11.2005.

<sup>47</sup> Cited in Estonian MFA Press Release “Paet: The success of co-operation between the EU and Russia is directly dependent upon the four “common spaces” package”, 25.04.2005, [http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat\\_138/5408.html?arhiiv\\_kuup=kuup\\_2005](http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_138/5408.html?arhiiv_kuup=kuup_2005) on 05.12.2005.

<sup>48</sup> Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation”, p. 199.

## NATO Facing Civil Society in Azerbaijan

By *Tine Verner Karlsen*\*

### Introduction

NATO has, concurrently with the EU, conducted a wave of enlargement and integration of new partners during the past two decades. The East-West division from the Cold War seemed firmly dissolved when Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with 21 other countries, joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, and when former East European countries became NATO member states during the two enlargement rounds in 1999 and 2004. Along with the successful integration of former members of the past opponent, the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and the EU, have faced new challenges regarding a less homogeneous composition of partner states. Previous common ground on values such as democracy and basic human rights can no longer be taken for granted. NATO's core interest in stability, not least through continuation of a well-preserved partnership with states like Armenia and Azerbaijan, seems to coincide with aspirations of a democratic development. The aim of the present article is to expose what context international organisations are operating in, when it comes to co-operation with less democratic states and their civil societies. The analysis centres on NATO's balancing act in Azerbaijan between stability on one hand and democratic development on the other. Two Azeri youth seminars serve as illustration and starting point for the present analysis. Seminars were arranged by an NGO and a civic association, who, to a varying degree, are both connected to and influenced by NATO's policy towards Azeri civil society.

### 1. Context and motivation

A series of seminars on security issues for international and Azeri university students, called "NATO International School of Azerbaijan" (NISA), has regularly been held since 2003. The latest, named "Energy Security in the Euro-Atlantic area", took place from 31 December 2005 to 6 January 2006, partly in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, and partly in the Quba forest resort in the North Western part of Azerbaijan. NISA is organised by the Azeri NGO, Azerbaijan Youth Euro-Atlantic Organization (AYEAO), in close cooperation with the

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Azeri Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)<sup>1</sup>. On 6 January 2006, some NISA participants attended an alternative afternoon seminar in Baku named “Young people, security and civil society across Euro-Atlantic”, which was organised by the Azeri Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA). This article is inspired by the present writers’ meeting with the two somehow competing Azeri associations through participation in both above mentioned seminars.

## **2. The international YATA network**

The Azeri YATA is part of a larger international network, which has 30 national member chapters within the 46 NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. The network is run by a President, currently Harald Thørud, who also attended both seminars. The purpose of the network is to engage young people in dialogue and mutual understanding. This network is a youth section of a larger network, the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), which has national sections in many NATO and PfP countries. The purpose of the ATA is to engage youth, promote transatlantic cooperation, democracy and values of the North Atlantic Treaty through dialogue. The network is controlled by a representative board placed in Brussels.

The Azeri part of the network is a special case. At the ATA General Assembly in 2005, the AYEAO was formally accepted as a partner of the international YATA network, which means that Azerbaijan is currently represented by both a member and a partner chapter. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) is the network’s main sponsor<sup>2</sup>, and, according to Troels E. Sørensen, president of the network until the end of 2005, it is a normal procedure that NATO co-sponsors activities initiated by local YATA’s<sup>3</sup>. With the admission of the AYEAO into YATA, both Azeri associations should in principal have good possibilities of achieving sponsorship regarding projects. From a financial perspective, the admission of the AYEAO seems mainly to have been a formal procedure, since the organization had already received financial support for its NATO schools two years ahead of the admission<sup>4</sup>. As to the Azeri YATA, the situation is, according to its chairman, Rashad Shirinov, difficult. Shirinov informs that the YATA did send one application in 2005 to the NATO PDD on sponsorship for a conference on the “Wider Black Sea”. Whether the YATA proposal did fulfil NATO criteria for sponsorship is beyond the scope of the present article to analyze, but, according to Shirinov, NATO has never replied to the application.<sup>5</sup> He describes the Azeri interaction with NATO as follows: “There is a not written rule set by Azimov [the Azeri Deputy Minister of

Foreign Affairs] that he is the only guy who has the privilege to deal with NATO. NATO sticks to this rule”<sup>6</sup>

This statement reflects, of course, only how Shirinov perceives the situation, and to investigate a non-written rule is also beyond the scope of this article. A fact is though that NATO does not interact with the Azeri YATA, which, as mentioned above, is opposite of NATO’s normal policy towards the national YATA’s. The Director of NATO’s Policy Planning, Jamie Shea, confirms the situation with a call on the European Union to invest further in developing the Azeri civil society. Contrary to Shea’s perception of the EU, he does not think that NATO has either the capability or the finances to any such project. Shea draws a parallel to NATO’s and the EU’s latest two rounds of enlargement. In both cases, the EU led with certain standards for civil and human rights, which the candidates had to live up to. Invitation to the EU was followed by an offer of NATO membership, and this is how Shea perceives that the working division within the area of developing civil society in the former Soviet states should remain.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Biased Associations

Sørensen underlines that political impartiality is normally a core part of YATA’s brand. Also in this sense the Azeri part of the network seems to represent a special case, because some degree of national political aspirations is connected with both associations. According to the British worldwide information centre, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments (Jane’s), the Azeri government establishes its own state-run or state-influenced NGOs, who mimic the activities of the true non-governmental groups<sup>8</sup>. As mentioned above the AYEAO has taken a seat right next to the Azeri YATA within its international network, and the MFA does co-operate closely with the AYEAO on NISA. During the latest seminar, Azeri MFA staff was present throughout all sessions; they taped all discussions and lectures, and perhaps by coincidence an employee of the MFA, Matin Karimli, was the only translator on various Azeri television interviews with foreign NISA participants<sup>9</sup>. It is difficult to analyze possible motivations behind these conditions. Two conclusions seem though to be that the MFA is present during AYEAO activities, and because of that the AYEAO cannot avoid being controlled by the Azeri government.

The opposite political affiliation seems somehow connected with the Azeri YATA. According to Jane’s report, Azeri opposition parties share a common goal of democratic reforms, but the opposition is weakened by more

competition amongst themselves than with the government<sup>10</sup>. In spite of this alleged weakness, the Azeri government is, according to Shea, terrified of “another orange revolution”, like the ones leading to democratic reforms in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004, to be unleashed in the Azeri streets<sup>11</sup>.

The Azeri YATA chairman, Shirinov, underlines that he is not engaged in national politics<sup>12</sup>. He did wear an orange Ukrainian liberation shirt twice when the author of this paper met him, which was also the campaign colour of the Azeri opposition during the latest parliamentary election in 2005<sup>13</sup>. But Shirinov underlines that he never wear orange in his official role as YATA chairman, and in this sense it is beyond the scope of the present article to define the line between official and personal aspirations. Particularly because Shirinov - unlike the AEYAO - does show official interest in creating international awareness of non-democratic issues in Azerbaijan, as he regularly presents critical articles on the current situation on the network's YATA talk list<sup>14</sup>. Whether absence of financial support from NATO is caused by political aspirations of the YATA leadership, thereby, in Shea's words, creating fright within the Azeri government is difficult to analyze. However, Shea does refer to a contradiction between the YATA and the Azeri state, when he is asked for an explanation for the lacking co-operation between NATO and the Azeri YATA: “Part of the strategy [in Azerbaijan red.] as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union is to support civil society...On the other hand; As soon as you do this the actual regime, western friendly, takes fright.”<sup>15</sup>

That the Azeri state is reluctant to the national YATA is, for instance, illustrated by its organizational status. On the central homepage the network is categorized as an NGO, but the Azeri state has refused to register the national ATA and thereby the YATA as such<sup>16</sup>. Whether this reluctance that influences NATO's policy is related to YATA's political aspirations, or it is, in Shirinov's words, “just an indication that NATO is not interested in the development of civil society”,<sup>17</sup> is beyond the scope of this article to analyze. A conclusion in this perspective is that the Azeri state actively supports an NGO under its control, whereas it seeks to put restrictions on a civic association outside its control. This policy is successfully followed up by NATO support.

### **3. Towards an active civil society in Azerbaijan**

Besides the unanimity on “rule by the people”, the definition of “democracy” constitutes a continual dispute, which scientists seek to solve in varying forms. The term “political equality” is, for instance, widely perceived as one of the core

principles defining democracy, and one of the core terms characterizing “political equality” is equal voting rights.<sup>18</sup> In terms of equal voting rights, the Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, replaced his father by an election that international observers evaluated as marred by fraud<sup>19</sup>. The parliamentary election in 2005 was the first election since the succession. It was widely perceived as a litmus test of democracy, which international observers such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) estimated as failed. Whereas the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Alcee Hastings, devaluated the whole process (“It pains me to report that progress noted in the pre-election period was undermined by significant deficiencies in the count”<sup>20</sup>), Shea emphasizes the relative improvements:

*Last election was not ‘swiftzelet’, but compared to the previous election, the opposition was out and the central election committee cancelled some of the elections which had to be re-run. On one hand, we cannot have NATO playing real politic when the OSCE and the EU are condemning the election; we have to do the same. On the other hand, we should not excommunicate these countries, lock the door.<sup>21</sup>*

Agreeing on a pronounced condemnation or not, NATO, the OSCE and the EU are condemning the 2005 election, and the Azeri so-called equal voting rights seem therefore absent. In this perspective, the current political situation in Azerbaijan may actually seem to have more similarities with the time of totalitarian Soviet rule than with a transition phase towards democracy.

Another solution to the scientific dispute has been to distinguish democracies from other state systems by the existence of basic civil rights such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech.<sup>22</sup> In terms of civil rights, the present writer experienced calm and unproblematic surroundings at the Azeri YATA seminar in January 2006, whereas Sørensen describes a YATA seminar in 2005 as quite the opposite. While the 2006 seminar was held in four star surroundings at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Baku, the 2005 edition took place in a Baku basement, and, regarding the atmosphere, Sørensen explains that the participants were warned at the risk of Azeri police entering and closing down the meeting. The conditions in 2005 indicate that freedom of assembly and freedom of speech are not to be taken for granted in Azerbaijan<sup>23</sup>. As to a possible change of conditions from the 2005 to the 2006 seminar, Shirinov declines it as a momentary state with the following comment: “We [the Azeri YATA] don’t have problems with police right now”<sup>24</sup>. To examine whether the conditions do have changed is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, an interesting

longer term conclusion seems to be the fact that seminars are being held both by the Azeri YATA and the AYEAO. The very existence of these two, along with approximately 1500 other Azeri NGOs<sup>25</sup>, indicates that there is an Azeri interest for an active civil society. As to the previous comparison to Soviet rule, presence of the NGO's marks at any rate a significant difference from the totalitarian system - the difference from a past situation, where people did not discuss political issues with third parties as do the AYEAO with international colleagues, and where regime critical parties such as the YATA were removed. The present interest in civil society appears on different levels within the society.

Among grassroots, the Azeri YATA is one example of unofficial initiatives that seeks to activate the population to take part in political issues. Another example is a participant from the latest NISA seminar, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, who is currently president of a student group called "Say NO to Corruption in Education" (SNOCE, in Azeri: *Rushveteyox.de*), which protests against bribery within the Azeri education system. Hajiyev initiated SNOCE in 2004 as a reaction to a failed demand on payment for his bachelor diploma at Baku State University, and Hajiyev and others were brought to the police station during a peaceful demonstration<sup>26</sup>. A conclusion seems to be that, in spite of election fraud, violations against freedom of speech and assembly and in spite of continuous threat of interference from the police, some Azeri parties stand firm as civic opponents to the Azeri state.

As to the official level, interest in civil society is illustrated by the involvement of the Azeri MFA in the perhaps not state created, but then state controlled AYEAO, and in the MFA's official engagement in NISA. Whether this interest is motivated by a general leaning towards Western organizations or by a true interest in activating civil society to enter a dialogue on political matters is beyond the scope of this article to analyse. What can be concluded is that civil society to some extent is initiated by the Azeri state as well as by state critics, and this can in any case be regarded as a positive feature for a regime, which, according to the present analysis has limited democratic features.

#### **4. A comparison with NATO's priorities**

International organizations like the OSCE and the EU seek to support a democratic development in Azerbaijan. The OSCE has a local office in Baku, which focuses on democratization issues such as elections, gender equality, anti-trafficking and civil society. The latter consists for example in facilitating coming NGOs with the complicated Azeri registration process and supporting



integration of the civil society into the national political scene.<sup>27</sup> As a result of the latest enlargement of ten new member states into the European Union (EU) in 2004, the European Council decided, two months later, to include the new Caucasian neighbours, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, to participate in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In relation to entering the ENP, the Azeri government committed itself to a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, where essential elements are international law, market economy, human rights and democracy. In accordance to the latter, the EU does, similarly to the OSCE, follow and comment on the situation of Azeri NGOs.<sup>28</sup> Both international organizations seem to combine a policy of pressure and co-operation concerning the Azeri government, whereas NATO, referring, for instance, to Shea's statements above, seems to stick more one-sidedly to the co-operation line. Obviously, the primary purpose with NATO's PfP program is military oriented – for instance, to assist Azerbaijan and other partner countries in transforming their armed forces so that they can play a suitable and transparent role in a democratic society. NATO is a security organisation, and the main aim is a stable development within its partner area,<sup>29</sup> whereas democracy is, of course, important, but it seems second to stability. Shea puts it as follows:

*They [the Azeri government red.] want to control it themselves, the pace and the speed of change. I believe we got to play a very sophisticated game; Give enough support for the civil society to keep the regime under pressure, and at the same time encourage the government to avoid the fate by introducing changes now before it is too late.<sup>30</sup>*

As mentioned above, the Azeri YATA is an obvious possibility for NATO to follow the financial line of support that it conducts towards other national branches of the ATA, and thereby indicate a contribution to the work that the EU and the OSCE perform. As to the quotation of Shea, such a step seems to be more than enough support to keep the regime under pressure. A conclusion is therefore that NATO, contrary to the EU and the OSCE, does not play an active role in stimulating civil society. By supporting the semi governmental AYEAO unilaterally, NATO sends a rather controversial signal of contribution to upholding the governmental mimic of the true associations. In this sense, NATO contributes to the maintenance of non-democratic practices. Doubt rises as to whether NATO's active governmental support on this matter stands in some kind of indirect opposition to the goals of the EU and the OSCE, or whether it is to be seen as simple passivity.

## 5. Population and official Azeri policy

According to both Jane's and the Head of Department of International Relations at the private Azeri Caucasus University, Rovshan Ibrahimov<sup>31</sup>, a gap of legitimacy consists among a majority of the Azeri population regarding the powerful ministers and advisors that President Ilham Aliyev inherited from his father, Heydar Aliyev, after succession in 2003<sup>32</sup>. But Jane's and Ibrahimov do not agree as to whether the crisis of legitimacy also includes the current president per se. Jane's argue that, whereas the former governed Azerbaijan by a one-man-rule and was generally perceived as the guarantor of stability, the latter lacks a political power base of his own and is therefore over-reliant on his father's powerful staff, which generates insecurity about his capability to run the country.<sup>33</sup> According to Ibrahimov, one explanation to Aliyev's claimed legitimacy is that the broad support is enhanced by a situation, where, as mentioned above, there is no strong alternative to the president within the opposition. Another explanation is, according to Ibrahimov, that Ilham and his predecessor have managed to stabilize Azerbaijan's economy by attracting and maintaining foreign investment, so that the country's massive oil resources are now obtained and exported to a great extent.<sup>34</sup> This argument is related to Ibrahimov's third explanation of why a majority of the population of which nearly a half is living below the poverty line<sup>35</sup> in an oil rich country should support the leader, despite a noticeably uneven distribution of wealth. The explanation is, according to Ibrahimov, one of fear for the alternative. An apparently widespread fear that centres on both an increased possibility of civil war as a result of a potential struggle for surrender of power by the ruling regime and a fear of the financial outcome of a regime change.<sup>36</sup>

Ibrahimov emphasizes that the country has endured a democratization process during an extended time span. As to the present analysis, it has revealed minimal democratic indications regarding Azerbaijan. From a perspective of this analysis, Azerbaijan is more or less to be seen as an autocracy, because of the violations of speech and assembly, the suppression of NGOs outside the government's control, and because the latest election process was condemned due to fraud. Against the background of these findings, democratic peace theory may actually contribute with a reason as to why it could be a well-founded anxiety within an autocracy to fear a civil war as a result of transition to a democratic order of business. According to the Swedish conflict researchers from Uppsala University, Thomas Ohlson and Mimi Söderberg, mature autocracies and democracies persist with more or less the same stability factor regarding low potential risk of experiencing armed conflicts. Whereas states on in-between

positions, moving from autocracy to democracy, are more likely to experience armed conflicts<sup>37</sup>, which therefore is a risk zone that Azerbaijan could venture into by a change of regime.

Given the autocratic characteristics of Azerbaijan, it seems relevant to underline the logical interrelation between power struggles and instability, which means that a consequence of armed conflicts or less severe types of showdowns in relation to forcing an autocratic regime its power and privileges most likely is instability. As to Ibrahimov's explanation of fear of the financial outcome of a regime change, it would be understandable if the anxiety was notable among the Azeri population. More than 90 % of the Azeri export revenues stem from the oil and natural gas sector<sup>38</sup>, which is dependant upon foreign investments and know-how. Governmental suppression of the opposition parties is a strategy of staying in power, but it is also a strategy of maintaining stability. On the basis of the latest NISA lectures, there seem to be indications that instability will scare foreign investors away and thereby eliminate the country's single source of income. Oliver Broad, risk analyst of the British Petroleum (BP) department in Azerbaijan, outlined during his NISA lecture BP's rigorous policy of excluding investments in high risk zones<sup>39</sup>. During NISA the General Manager, Ali Ak, of the Turkish oil company's, Petoil, department in Azerbaijan, stated that Petoil has been willing to invest in war zones like Iraq, but that the company in 2004 was forced to pull out because of too much destruction and limited mobility<sup>40</sup>. A comparison to the risk in Iraq is hardly proportional to the possible instability created by a change of regime in Azerbaijan, but, according to these statements, the risk of losing foreign investments because of instability seems present.

On the basis of the above analysis, a conclusion seems to be supportive of an argument for NATO to - indirectly - support and thereby contribute to upholding a non-democratic Azeri government. Such an argument could be to avoid instability caused by a possible power struggle in relation to a change of regime, and to avoid a worst case scenario of a country in civil war, brought to the brink of ruin by losing its investors. This conclusion will be questioned in the successive part of the analysis.

## **6. Moscow**

According to Shea, Russian influence does explain NATO's quite one-sided approach towards the Azeri government, leaving the civil society out. Azerbaijan is not a NATO candidate, and therefore NATO does not have the political

leverage of enlargement to change official Azeri behaviour into co-operation on a democratic development. And Russian efforts to build up its own security system challenge NATO's policy within the region. In 2005, Uzbekistan signed a bilateral defence agreement with Russia. More countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia will, according to Shea, be tempted to join in, because Russia will not interfere with internal affairs such as elections and actions used in dealing with "terrorists", critics of the regime. Shea continues:

*The dilemma we face is their [Russian red.] logic of a new division, whereby the Russians are more or less going to take these countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. We may be able to get Ukraine and Moldova, with the Baltic states already, but then that is it, that is going to be the new division line. Of course I think we have to resist that strategy. We have to keep our links with these countries open.<sup>41</sup>*

## 7. Values

Whether Mr Ibrahimov's perception of the dominant public opinion in Azerbaijan reflects his personal opinion more than the real picture is beyond the scope of this article to analyze. But even if a majority does support the ruling regime, a question remains as to whether an international organization with democratic values, NATO, should - indirectly - back non-democratic policies, when other international organisations, the OSCE and the EU, seek to contest them. As to the present case, NATO will, on one hand, counteract the Azeri regime by supporting YATA, and the regime may turn to the Russian security alternative. The Azeri government does, on the other hand, engage in and show interest for co-operation with organizations such as the EU and the OSCE. The civil society in Azerbaijan is to some extent present, and thereby not something NATO has to build up, and, as to the Azeri YATA, it seems spot-on to support this association alongside the PDD standard procedure.

The PDD and the US Mission to NATO are currently the only official sponsors of the network. It has however conducted a new strategy, 'The YATA of Tomorrow, where a core purpose is to find new financial partners in order to be able to reach out to all national branches.<sup>42</sup> In the long run, the Azeri YATA seems therefore able to find sponsors for prolonged international seminars like NISA, and thereby balance the mimic activities. This situation does not erase a fundamental question of NATO's policy of stability and one-sided support to a non-democratic regime. A question of whether it is acceptable that an organization, co-financed by several members of the EU and the OSCE, perhaps not directly, but definitely indirectly contributes to maintaining a non-

democratic social order. Stability is NATO's main self declared goal as to the P4P policy, and the fact that it limits the co-operation in Azerbaijan to pro-governmental NGO's may not be problematic for the organization per se. But, if it is not counterproductive in relation to the efforts of the EU and the OSCE, then it does appear as an indicator of passivity and a remnant of the narrow focus on high politics during the Cold War. The question is, if it is about time not only to follow the democratic demands and footsteps of the EU, as was the case during the latest two rounds of enlargements within the two organizations, but to contribute actively to a democratic development instead.

Another question is if NATO's strategy in Azerbaijan does contribute to stability in the long run. As mentioned above, a gap of legitimacy has followed the replacement of Heydar Aliiev. According to Ohlson and Söderberg, the wider a gap of legitimacy gets, the greater is the risk of intra-state violence, which naturally creates instability. The gap consists of what citizens perceive as their right to expect from the state in terms of security, participation and distribution of power and wealth on one hand, and what the Azeri state is willing and able to do for its citizens on the other.<sup>43</sup> Following this theory, NATO may contribute to widening the gap of legitimacy by the unbalanced support for the pro-governmental NGOs. When all this is said, it seems appropriate take a glance at the alternatives to the current situation. In the light of NATO's fear of losing its Caucasian partners to the Russian logic of a new division line, the only alternative would perhaps be to stop sponsoring any of the two Azeri NGOs and thereby to separate the Azeri society even more for the outside world.

## Conclusion

The present analysis leads to an acknowledgment of the difficulties that an international organisation like NATO faces, when it co-operates with a less democratic state like Azerbaijan, more than it leads to a critique of how NATO handles the dilemma between stability and democratic development within such states. The main conclusion is that where other international organisations - like the EU and the OSCE - combine a policy of cooperation with a policy of pressure towards the Azeri state to develop civil society, NATO sticks to the cooperation line. YATA represents a possibility for NATO to balance its support between civil society and the Azeri state, which it, because of a Russian ambition of a new division line, is reluctant to use. In sum, NATO takes up a passive and uncritical role, waiting for the EU to pave the way for a less suppressed civil society. As to civil society within less democratic states, the

second conclusion is the importance of intervening third parties being attentive to both the outspoken purpose of the national civic associations and the state's perception of them. NATO's policy towards Azeri civil society constitutes an example, where a third party compromises its own standards as it deliberately chooses to focus on a mimic NGO within the influence of the Azeri state instead of supporting its usual civic partner association. The third conclusion is that NATO adopts this strategy to preserve Azerbaijan as a partner state and thereby an open door within the Russian sphere of interest.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> In the NISA invitation the AYEAO writes that the seminar is organized "with the outstanding support of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan" NATO International School of Azerbaijan Invitation for Seminar, contact the international YATA for a transcript [www.atlantic-youth.org] (21/11-2005).

<sup>2</sup> The Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (2005): *About Us*, [http://www.atlantic-youth.org/index.php?mod=1], contact the YATA regarding the talk list.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Sørensen, Troels E (15/01-2006). *Former YATA President*, Copenhagen, confirmed by email DATO.

Sørensen was YATA president from 2002.

<sup>4</sup> NISA invitation 21/11-2005.

<sup>5</sup> Mail correspondence with Shirinov, Rashad, *Azeri YATA Chairman*, Baku (AZ) (11/01-2006, 17/01-2006, 13/02-2006, 19/02-2006).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid 11/01-2006.

<sup>7</sup> Shea, Jamie (02/02-2006): *Director of NATO's Policy Planning*, Question & Answer session, Copenhagen, contact the Danish ATA for a transcript.

<sup>8</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments (10/10-2005:53): *Country Profile - at a Glance, Azerbaijan*, XXX (), online

[http://www.sentinel.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/country\_country\_report\_doc.jsp?Prod\_Name=CIS], cited 02/02-2006.

<sup>9</sup> Karimli was, for instance present during the whole seminar. He and a colleague handled powerpoint presentations by various lecturers as well as the taped microphones placed on all tables during the four days in Quba. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze if the taping was a matter of saving discussions and lectures for later scientific use, as the purpose of it was never mentioned. As to interviews by Azeri television, the present writer did one in Quba on the 03/01-2006, and the current YATA President, Thørud, was also interviewed on the 05/02-2006 in Baku. Karimli has been studying abroad and has excellent language skills, and whether this was the reason why he translated both interviews is beyond the scope of this article to analyze.

<sup>10</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments p. 8.

<sup>11</sup> Shea in Q&A 02/02-2006.

<sup>12</sup> Mail correspondence with Shirinov 19/02-2006.

<sup>13</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation (07/11-2005): *Observers Condemn Azeri Election*, News Department, online [www.bbc.co.uk], cited 06/02-2006.

<sup>14</sup> For instance on Bush' double standards of giving oil rich allied autocracies free pass as to democratic development (New York Times 26/12-05), Human Rights Watch devaluating the opening process of the Azeri parliamentary election (31/10-05), War & Peace Reporting

questioning Aliyev's controversial dismissal of several ministers claimed of conspiracy to overthrow the government (20/10-05). Currently Shirinov himself is collecting signatures for an appeal to the president, because of two student's critical conditions caused by hunger strike, a protest of their expulsion from a state university because of their political belief (YATA talk 18/01-06).

<sup>15</sup> Shea in Q&A 02/02-2006.

<sup>16</sup> Therefore the description as association, mail correspondence with Shirinov 13/02-2006.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. 19/02-2006.

<sup>18</sup> Heywood, Andrew (1997): *Politics*, Palgrave, New York. p. 66-82.

<sup>19</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation (01/11-2005): *Dead Leader Still influences Azeris*, News Department, online [www.bbc.co.uk], cited 06/02-2006.

<sup>20</sup> BBC News 07/11-2005.

<sup>21</sup> Shea in Q&A 02/02-2006.

<sup>22</sup> Hansen, Hansen & Quist (2000): *Samfundslæx*, Gyldendals uddannelse, Copenhagen, p. 45.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Sørensen 15/01-2006.

<sup>24</sup> Mail correspondence with Shirinov 17/01-2006.

<sup>25</sup> Commission for the European Communities (2005): *European Neighbourhood Policy*. section 2.2.

<sup>26</sup> mail correspondence with Hajiyev, Bakhtiyar, *President of Say NO to Corruption in Education*, Baku (AZ) (04&13/02-2006).

<sup>27</sup> The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, (2006): *Democratization*, The OSCE Office in Baku, (AZ), online [http://www.osce.org/baku/13193.html], cited 02/02-2006.

<sup>28</sup> Commission of the European Communities, section 1.1-2.2.

<sup>29</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2004): *NATO Transformed*, Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels.

<sup>30</sup> Shea in Q&A 02/02-2006.

<sup>31</sup> E-mail correspondence with Rovshan Ibrahimov, *Academic Lecturer NISA*, Baku (AZ) (20/02-2006) Rovshan Ibrahimov was the academic moderator of the latest NISA.

<sup>32</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments p. 5, Mail correspondence with Ibrahimov 20/02-2006.

<sup>33</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> Mail correspondence with Ibrahimov 20/02-2006.

<sup>35</sup> Some 49 per cent of the Azeri population lives below the poverty level (Jane's 2005:8).

<sup>36</sup> Mail correspondence with Ibrahimov 20/02-2006.

<sup>37</sup> Ohlson & Söderberg (2002): *From Intrastate War to Democratic Peace in Weak States*, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (S). p. 3.

<sup>38</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments p. 8.

<sup>39</sup> Broad, Oliver (02/01-2006): *Threat and Risk Aspects to Energy Security*, Quba (AZ), contact NISA for notes on lecture.

<sup>40</sup> Ak, Ali (02/01-2006): *Threat and Risk Aspects to Energy Security*, Quba (AZ), contact NISA for notes on lecture.

<sup>41</sup> Shea in Q&A 02/02-2006.

<sup>42</sup> YATA homepage 2005.

<sup>43</sup> Ohlson & Söderberg p. 8.

## The Effects of the Russian Energy Sector on the Security of the Baltic States

By *Liina Mauring and Daniel Schaer\**

### Introduction

What do \$80 oil barrels, single hull tankers and nuclear energy reactors have in common? They all have the potential to affect the security of countries. A region's security can be influenced by the energy sectors of other countries especially in the areas of the environment and economy.

The European Commission forecasts an energy dependence level of 70% in 2030 for the European Union compared with 50% today<sup>1</sup>. It is also generally agreed that the world's energy demand and consumption will continue its growth for decades. Furthermore 40% of EU gas imports originate from Russia and by 2030 over 60% of EU gas imports are expected to come from Russia with overall EU dependence on gas imports expected to reach 80%<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, European dependence on the Russian energy sector does not only weaken the security of the Baltic States, but also that of the European Union (EU) itself. Without a significant domestic energy supply, the EU needs to guarantee the security of its external energy supply sources. This, however, must be done without negatively affecting the security of other EU member states.

The European Commission's "Report on the Green Paper on Energy - Four years of European initiatives" confirms that the EU's dependence on energy imports is growing daily. The report also confirms the worries of the 2000 Green Paper, where security of supply, the spread of nuclear energy, the threat of terrorist attacks, the need to diversify energy sources and environmental safety are considered as threats to European security<sup>3</sup>.

On the basis of these developments, energy has become a key topic in EU-Russia relations. Energy co-operation was at the top of the agenda of the EU-Russia Summit held on October 4. In 2005 in London the first meeting of the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) on Energy was held the day before in the same venue. The PPC reported to the Summit that energy is a crucial part of the relationship between Russia and the EU, and that they had discussed ways of

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deepening their engagement. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue's 6<sup>th</sup> Progress report was released on 7 October 2005. It recognised the need for increasing co-operation and the exchange of information in the energy sector, and underlined the importance of the convergence of regulatory frameworks in the EU and Russia<sup>4</sup>. Several green papers, white papers and reports on the energy sector, have also reflected the importance of this topic on the EU agenda.

This article argues that the EU's dependence on the Russian energy sector not only affects the Baltic States economically, but also has a significant impact on security in the Baltic States. This article concentrates on energy, environmental and economic security and so from the perspective of soft security. The first section introduces the EU's dependence on the Russian energy sector through EU-Russia relations, while looking at how this affects the stability of energy supply in Europe. The second section looks at the Russian energy sector and its environmental security, while presenting clear examples of threats to Baltic security. The third section presents the internal energy security situation in the Baltic States. The fourth section is a case study of the planned German-Russian gas pipeline that is to be built in the Baltic Sea.

## **1. EU-Russia relations and the dependence on the Russian energy**

Since the customary security threats of military nature are not an issue in EU-Russia relations any more, the development of Russia's increasing interest in the EU common market poses new threats of other origin - namely those of a "soft security" nature. There is reason to believe that the EU's dependence on Russian energy has created several threats to soft security, defined as non-military security that has a cross-border effect on its neighbours and presents a threat that is hard to defend independently.

The EU's energy dependence has allowed Russia to create a new policy tool for itself - energy. The new approach of using economic levers as a diplomatic tool is letting the EU know that the relationship is ruled by "interests" (national, economic etc.). There is, however, uncertainty in the relationship as to whether the Russia-Germany natural gas pipeline construction and similar projects should fall under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or whether they should remain bilateral agreements. There is also the question as to what role the Commission should play in this domain as energy falls into the 1<sup>st</sup> pillar - the community pillar. The article treats the energy security question as a CFSP question as it is an aspect EU security in this context. If Europe is seeking the

deepening of European integration then these kinds of issues should at least partly be treated at the EU level.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia serves as a basis for their bilateral relations, which came into force as of 1 December 1997<sup>5</sup>. Formally, Russia is the EU's strategic partner. Current debate shows that the EU and Russia share common interests that are largely related to the energy sector as the EU is the largest importer of Russian energy and therefore the largest market for Russia in that sector (EU's trade deficit with Russia originates from the energy sector, Russia accounts for some 50% of total gas imports or 25% of total EU gas consumption, and for over 30% of total crude oil and oil product imports or over 25% of total EU oil consumption<sup>6</sup>).

### 1.1 Economic security

A fairly new concept in the security debate that has developed considerably since the end of the Cold War is economic security. Barry Buzan defines economic security, "Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power"<sup>7</sup>. This article concentrates on the supply of resources aspect of economic security and the reliance on Russian energy.

After looking at the statistics and reading the reports compiled by European institutions (Commission Energy Green Paper) it can be said that the EU is dependent on Russian energy and that in turn leads to potential threat of energy price discrimination, which in turn is related to the concept of energy supply security. What happens if Russia decides to use its energy exports as foreign policy tools?<sup>8</sup> This problem is listed in the "National Security Concept for Estonia", "A major threat factor is the great dependence of Estonia's gas and electrical systems upon foreign monopolistic energy systems and suppliers"<sup>9</sup>. The Lithuanian security concept has a similar point and the Latvian concept mentions economic security in general. However, this might even be the most dangerous threat to the Baltic States and the European Union in particular because European economies and cities are dependent on energy. The lifestyle of every European would be significantly affected by a decline in energy supply.

The EU must maintain a stable energy supply, but the question remains whether Russia is a reliable partner? It would be rather difficult to change strategic energy suppliers in a short run. Can only one dominant energy supplier guarantee stable supply? The volatility of energy price may also depend on other factors such as

Russia's internal political stability, e.g. in case of a macroeconomic shock the state's budget may have to be increasingly financed by revenues from energy sector exports. Currently, the Russian fiscal dependence on gas and oil revenues amounts to almost 37% of annual budget revenues making the budget significantly dependent on revenues from their energy sector<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, the price of imported energy from Russia is not only dependent on EU-Russia relations, but also on the internal developments in Russia, which the EU has very limited control over.

The growing dependence on Russian energy fortunately has another side as well. The fact that the Russian energy sector is a part of the world's energy sector makes it dependent on the prices of world energy, which reduces its arbitrary possibilities for gas price manipulation. So, it can be said that there is a degree of mutual dependence as the growing European dependence on energy imports from Russia are being balanced by Russia's reliance on oil and gas revenues<sup>11</sup>. In other words the invisible hand does its job.

When looking at potential energy trade partners, we cannot forget the interests of China, Japan and India towards Russian energy. These economies are also dependent on energy imports and could play a role in disrupting the EU-Russia relationship, as Russia will not be able to supply all of the demand. This represents the growing dependence of other consumer regions on imported energy where the competition is predicted to intensify, which will in turn modify international political and economic relations<sup>12</sup>.

The world's demand for energy will also force the EU to make concessions in negotiating with Russia in other policy areas. If Russia is able to freely choose whom it will supply, the choice will be made based on two criteria: the highest price and the least political demands. This gives a significant advantage to China who is prepared to buy energy at all costs to ensure their continued economic growth.

Another problem with supply is the concentration of world gas and oil reserves in a few areas (including Russia). This limits the amount of potential suppliers and gives these countries "monopolistic" control over energy sources and may mean monopolistic prices<sup>13</sup>. The EU will try to balance its supply by looking at other energy import sources such as the Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan oil pipeline supplying energy from the Caspian region<sup>14</sup>. However, a threat to this diversification of energy supply sources is the role played by Russia in the CIS

area. Recently, a Russian state-owned Pipeline Company Transneft has decided to remove its signature from an agreement to provide oil transport solutions to the Kazakhstan energy company Kazmunaigaz to block oil transport from Kazakhstan to Latvia<sup>15</sup>. This is an obvious attempt by Russia to use its energy transport monopoly to control supply in the energy market.

## 1.2 The Russian energy sector and its environmental security

World's demand for energy has helped the energy industry grow significantly. Oil, natural gas, electricity, coal and nuclear energy, the main energy sources can be found in Russia and are all exported by Russia to world markets. Since energy has become a key component of economies around the world, its importance in a security context has grown. The production, export and consumption of energy can threaten security in several ways through environmental damage, attacks against energy networks and supply related effects on economies.

Russia's most important energy source according to exports is crude oil of which 70% is exported. The Oil and Gas Journal lists Russia's proven oil reserves to be at 60 million barrels, ranking it 8<sup>th</sup> in the world. Russia also ranks second in the world to Saudi Arabia in oil production and exports. 60% of Russia's oil exports are transported via pipelines<sup>16</sup>. Another important energy source in Russia is natural gas. Russia's proven natural gas reserves more than double those of its closest rival as it places number one in the world with 1 680 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas reserves. It was also the world's largest producer (22.4 Tcf) and exporter (7.1 Tcf) of natural gas in 2004. Russia has a significant pipeline system to distribute the natural gas domestically and internationally.

One of the most multifaceted Russian energy sources is electricity. Electricity is produced using three different methods: thermal, hydro and nuclear. Russia has 440 thermal and hydro electricity plants of which 77 produce electricity by burning coal. Russia also has 31 nuclear reactors in 10 nuclear plants and plans on building 4 or 5 more nuclear power plants in the next 15 years<sup>17</sup>. Thermal power accounts for 63%, hydro power 21% and nuclear power 16% of total energy production. Russia exported an estimated 55 billion kilowatt hours of energy to former Soviet countries, China, Poland, Turkey and Finland in 2004. Another major source of Russian energy is coal. Russia has the world's second largest recoverable coal reserves (173 billion short tons), second to the United States.

### 1.2.1 Environmental security

Environmental security is an aspect of security that is often forgotten. Several security theories do not even take environmental security into consideration. Environmental security is needed to address threats to the ecological balance of states with an emphasis placed on the safety of the basic requirements of human life: the quality of water and air, the purity of arable land. According to Buzan, “Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend”<sup>18</sup>.

The environment is also a relevant topic in the Baltic soft security especially because of the Soviet heritage. One of the weaknesses of environmental security is that it often needs to be politicised or needs a public outcry before it is dealt with. Many environmental security actions seem to be reactive rather than preventive measures. This is the reason why environmental security breaks down into two categories: scientific, based on hard scientific facts; and political, influenced by the decision makers and public interest<sup>19</sup>.

An environmental catastrophe in Russia would also affect the human security in the Baltic States. The result of the pollution of water or the threat of radiation could lead to a significant movement in refugees towards the EU.

### 1.2.2 Nuclear energy

Nuclear safety is the most talked about potential environmental threat of the Russian energy sector. Environmentalists including Russian environmentalists say that none of Russia’s nuclear reactors meet Western standards. The Leningrad nuclear power plant (LNPP) located in Sosnovy Bor, 80 kilometres west of St. Petersburg produces 50% of the electricity in the St. Petersburg region and 25% of its production is exported to Finland. The 4 reactors are RBMK-1000 model a new generation of the models in Chernobyl “...thought to be the most unsafe in the world...”<sup>20</sup> The LNPP is one of the largest and oldest plants in Russia. Construction on the first reactor began in 1967 and the reactor was fully operational in 1973. This style of reactor has a life span of 30 years. Thus, the two oldest reactors were supposed to have been taken out of operation in 2003 and 2005, but a decision was taken in 1999 to extend their use after reconstruction<sup>21</sup>.

Bellona, a Norwegian NGO, believes that the LNPP is a safety risk to the environmental security of the Baltic area. It currently poses a threat to the Baltic Sea as one of its larger fuel element storage buildings lies 90 meters from the Gulf of Finland and is in an appalling state with large cracks in the walls and roof<sup>22</sup>. The “Asset Mission” by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the LNPP in May 1993 reviewed 327 operational events that had occurred from January 1982 to April 1993 of which 152 were determined safety relevant. The mission also found 5 safety problems that affect the general safety of the power plant<sup>23</sup>. However, it must be noted that an operational event occurs in a nuclear plant in the world almost everyday.

### 1.2.3 Nuclear pollution

Radioactive contamination, having its beginnings in the Soviet period, is still a major source of nuclear pollution. The Yablokov report, an official Russian report compiled in 1993, stated that from 1964 until 1990 at least 17 000 barrels of solid radioactive waste, thirteen nuclear reactors from submarines, between 11 000 and 17 000 containers of radioactive waste were sunk in the Novaya Zemlya and Kara Sea areas. Some cases were already leaking and others had holes shot into them to speed up the sinking<sup>24</sup>. Another legacy of the nuclear pollution is “Lake Karachay ... one of the most polluted spots on earth”<sup>25</sup>. Experts say that the lake contains seven times more strontium-90 and cesium-137 than was released in the Chernobyl explosion. Other significant problems with nuclear safety include the storage, transportation and processing of nuclear waste, insufficient safety rules, brain drain, employee strikes, lack of financing and terrorism.

### 1.2.4 Crude oil

Being the world’s second largest crude oil exporter and producer also increases the potential for environmental desecration. The total length of Russia’s mainline pipelines is equal to 240 000 km<sup>26</sup>. Transneft, Russia’s largest oil pipeline company says “Special attention is paid by OAO AK Transneft to providing highest environmental safety of the Baltic Pipeline System’s facilities at all stages of the project implementation”<sup>27</sup>. Environmentalists refute this by claiming that environmental legislation was not met; “We did not find any waterproofing on the pipe, nor, which is more important, on the welds. So the pipe corrosion has started even before coming into use”<sup>28</sup>.

The most serious problems with oil pipelines are found in Chechnya. Estimates have been made that 30 million barrels of crude have leaked into the ground from the area's black market oil industry of over 15 000 illegal mini refineries<sup>29</sup>. Of course these mini refineries have no interest whatsoever in the environment and do not follow environmental safety legislation. Greenpeace has estimated that 5% of all crude oil extracted in Russia leaks from its pipelines every year representing over 15 million tonnes per year<sup>30</sup>.

Only 4 million bbl/d of Russia's yearly 7 million bbl/d production of liquids for export are transported in its pipeline system<sup>31</sup>. This means that a significant amount of production has to use alternative transport sources: rail and oil tanker. This has several effects on the environmental security of the Baltic States: the proliferation of single hull oil tankers in the Baltic Sea as Russia is the only member of the Council of the Baltic Sea States that does not support the banning of single hull tankers; the construction of new Russian oil ports on the Baltic Sea; increased travel of oil transport trains and trucks. All of these cases increase the risk of an environmental catastrophe<sup>32</sup>.

### 1.2.5 Environmental terrorism

Terrorism is also a threat to the soft security of the Baltic States. Russia's large and intricate pipeline system and its nuclear energy plants are potential soft targets for terrorist attacks. Islamist terror groups in the former Soviet States including Chechen separatists pose a threat to security<sup>33</sup>. By attacking either a pipeline or a nuclear plant serious damage can be done not only to the energy supply, but also to the environment. Placing a bomb at one or more strategic pipeline locations would result in significant oil spills, which would have the potential of polluting water sources. With the energy pipeline network running right to the Baltic Sea ports of Ventspils, Butinge, Tallinn, Primorsk and Gdansk, the entire Baltic area is at threat. The three ports of Ventspils, Butinge and Primorsk transited 1.1 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2004 with the oil arriving through pipelines.

A more serious threat is an attack on one of the nuclear reactors. The potential environmental and human security repercussions would be immeasurable. An attack could bring a new nuclear disaster worse than Chernobyl. It is estimated that only 3.8 to 20 per cent of the reactor fuel was released in the Chernobyl accident. The accident still seriously contaminated over 125 000 km<sup>2</sup> of the Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, the home of over 7 million people. Radiation

reached most of Scandinavia, Poland and the Baltic States, as well as southern Germany, Switzerland, northern France and England<sup>34</sup>. Belarus estimates the damages of the disaster to be valued at 235 billion USD. Since this is only the beginning of the list of damages, it makes one think what could the damage be if all the reactor fuel of a nuclear power plant is released.<sup>35</sup>

International organisations and other countries such as the United States and the EU carry out significant co-operation projects with Russia including the funding of energy safety projects. The European Commission lists the achievement of a high level of nuclear safety in Russia as one of its co-operation objectives in its "Country strategy paper-Russia 2002-2006". Around 300 million EUR have been earmarked to nuclear safety projects in Russia through the TACIS<sup>36</sup> programme from 1991-2001, showing the EU's great concern for nuclear safety in Russia<sup>37</sup>.

### 1.3 The energy situation in the Baltic States

The Baltic States are not only a consumer of Russian energy, but they also play a significant role in the distribution of Russian energy. The oil exports of the three major Baltic ports of Ventspils, Butinge and Tallinn represented approximately 16% of net Russian crude oil exports<sup>38</sup>. Being an important transit location for the Russian export system has given the Baltic States flexibility in bilateral relations with Russia. To reduce dependence on the use of the Baltic ports as transport solutions, Russia has built a port in Primorsk, which significantly reduced the crude oil exports of Ventspils and Butinge. The transit fees collected by the Baltic States represent a fairly significant part of GDP (4-5% and up to 10% when transport services are included)<sup>39</sup>.

Russia's natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, whose majority stake belongs to the Russian Federation, is the only player in the Baltic natural gas market. Currently, the Baltic States, because of their special transit country status, enjoy a price for natural gas of around \$80-\$85 per thousand cubic meters as opposed to the European prices (around \$120-135 per thousand cubic meters)<sup>40</sup>. Gazprom plans to raise the price of natural gas for the Baltic States by 50% at the beginning of next year and this will be simplified by eliminating the Baltic States as transit locations<sup>41</sup>. Gazprom has also begun to make significant investments in natural gas utilities in the Baltic region (34% stake in Latvia's Latvijas Gaze and a 37% stake in Estonia's Eesti Gaas). These investments have two purposes: the first being the control over essential infrastructure and the second being the



reduction of transit fees and other costs when the Baltic companies are owned by the exporting companies.

The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) in Lithuania is another relic of Soviet occupation, but its importance to Lithuania's energy supply is significant as 85% of Lithuania's electricity production comes from the power plant<sup>42</sup>. The INPP consisted of three RBMK-1500 models; reactor 3 was never operational, reactor 1 was decommissioned on 31 December 2004 and reactor 2 will be decommissioned in 2009. Lithuania and Estonia are both net electricity exporters and Latvia is a net importer from the other Baltic States and Russia. Currently, Estonia, Latvia and Finland are co-operating in joint electricity project, Estlink, which aims to lessen the dependence on Russian energy by linking the Baltic States to the Nordic countries through an underwater cable running between Estonia and Helsinki.

#### 1.4 The German-Russian Natural Gas Pipeline-A Case Study

The German-Russian natural gas pipeline, the Putin-Schröder Pact, according to Lithuanian MEP Vytautas Landsbergis<sup>43</sup>, is planned to run 1 200 kilometres from Vyborg, Russia to Greifswald, Germany as early as 2010<sup>44</sup>. The most publicized concerns regarding the pipeline construction under the most polluted sea in Europe, the Baltic Sea, are of environmental nature. Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas has warned that the project was dangerous as it risked disturbing tonnes of chemical weapons sunk in the Baltic Sea by the Russians following the World War II<sup>45</sup>. The dangers related to the building of the pipeline become more serious as they are largely unpredictable. Estonian environmental specialists Marek Strandberg has said that building this tremendous pipeline in the bottom of the Baltic Sea is a threat to the sea's ecosystem as the construction is planned over a short period of time. That would result in sediment rising up from the bottom of the sea and will cause the rise of nutrients in the seawater thus reducing water transparency, the effects of which are multiplied by the shallowness of the Baltic Sea. Strandberg emphasises that we still do not know the details of the upcoming project, which makes any assessments of the effects on the sea's ecosystem unpredictable - a thorough environmental risk assessment is missing in this project<sup>46</sup>.

Although the environmental aspect of the pipeline project is of great importance, the political aspect is what creates the most controversy. The environmental aspect is important, since it is the only way to prevent the

pipeline from being built, but even with ecologically sound arguments that will be difficult. In many cases, the environmental aspect is a cover up for the EU's internal problems. The pipeline agreement was put together in secrecy, in which the Baltic States and Poland were not able to participate in the negotiations. Germany states that it is their sovereign right to ensure their energy security. This imposes on the concept of unity among the EU member states. It is customary to consult with your partners in matters that might affect them.

Another area of debate involves the costs of the construction of the pipeline and whether it would be cheaper to build it above the ground. Most statistics show that it would be cheaper to build the pipeline above the ground as construction and maintenance costs would be significantly lower. However, the advantage of constructing the pipeline in the Baltic Sea from the Russian point of view is that Russia does not need to negotiate transit fees with nearly half a dozen countries, but at the same time it has an effect on these countries as well<sup>47</sup>. Namely, the Russian new energy distribution policy aims at leaving the former Soviet republics in isolation from direct energy distribution channels. Therefore there is potential to isolate the Baltic States from a very important part of EU - Russia relations.

According to the planned agenda Germany will be the major retailer of Russian gas in Western Europe. It will also increase the dependence of the Baltic States and the EU on Russian gas as the Russian energy giant Gazprom will own 51% of the pipeline. Recently, Russia announced that it is happy to look at having new partners join the project, but it is not willing to give up any part of its majority ownership<sup>48</sup>.

Estonian Member of European Parliament, Vice-President of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Toomas Hendrik Ilves has an interesting interpretation of the actions of the Russian Federation. He shares the belief with other Russia experts that Russia is interested only in control. "[But] why bother occupy them (the Baltic States)? It's so much easier and less troublesome to simply control them. No messy independence fights, occupation troops, etc. You get the same effect if you simply control the government, access and influence important international organizations such as NATO and the EU" states Ilves. Russia is trying to achieve this by buying up components of vital infrastructure, and not only in the energy sector<sup>49</sup>.

## Conclusion

The situation is frightening - dependence on imported energy in the EU will rise from the current level of 50% to 70% in 2030. Even worse, 90% of the EU oil demand will have to be satisfied by imports by 2030. More frightening is the fact that the energy that the EU imports creates serious threats to the security of the Baltic States and ultimately of the EU. Environmental dumping, the ending of environmentally unsafe energy production methods in the home country (e.g. nuclear energy) while buying non-green and environmentally unsafe energy from secondary sources (Russia) is an everyday occurrence in the EU.

The Russian energy sector affects the Baltic States in two ways: first in creating a series of soft security threats resulting from shabby energy safety, an old and tired energy infrastructure, lack of finances and a hunger for growth in imports at any cost; second a blind reliance on Russian energy by the EU.

There appear to be two differing views on what should be done to solve the soft security problems. The first is to use more of a “soft” method by engaging in international co-operation and funding energy security programmes such as the EU is currently doing. The idea is that by treating Russia as an equal partner and only reacting when asked will solve the problem. The second more radical view is that there has been an overemphasis on international mechanisms and the stress should be placed on the changing of internal policies and internal conditions of the threatening states<sup>50</sup>. This solution is also difficult as in the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy it is almost impossible for the EU to have one common policy on relations with Russia as the EU is incapable to define its common interests especially in the field of energy supply. The worry is that, “...when it comes to Russia, individual member states’ interests will triumph over the interests of the Union if a good bilateral deal can be had”<sup>51</sup>.

A prime example of the ineffectiveness of the EU policy is that there is no consensus as to whether the Russian-German Pipeline project should fall in the framework of CFSP or should it be based on bilateral agreements. So far, the only countries that currently worry about the non-coherent policy on energy supply security issues are the Baltic States and Poland who have a long history of relations with Russia and therefore are quite cautious about the relations. These four countries along with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary find that “...the EU hitherto has pursued a needlessly naïve appeasement policy toward

Russia, based on lack of knowledge or the pursuit of narrow national agendas rather than based on the interests of the Union as a whole”<sup>52</sup>.

The second problem is connected to the increasing dependence on Russian energy supplies. If the energy market is able to operate solely on market forces there should be no reason for worry. However, Russia itself is dependent on the revenues from its energy sector, which places stable energy supply from Russia into question.

A solution for the energy dependence as well as the diminishing oil and gas reserves, and rising oil prices lies in using renewable, environmentally friendly sources of energy. It has been predicted that oil will cease to be produced in approximately 80 years, meaning that the problem needs to be solved urgently<sup>53</sup>. Europe is already taking a lead in promoting new energy sources, but it still needs to do more. It needs to find a common position on energy security that encompasses all aspects of the sector not simply concentrating on reducing energy consumption, finding new energy sources and diversifying supply. The EU must take into consideration the security threats of the Russian energy sector and must work together to negate them as soon as possible.

## NOTES

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## The Role and Interests of Small States in Developing European Security and Defence Policy

By *Arūnas Molis*\*

*“Nothing is more terrible than activity without insight.”*

Thomas Carlyle, 1795-1881

### Introduction

The main actors of international politics are competing large states. Smaller states gain significance in the permanent struggle for power only when a certain favourable geopolitical situation develops. However, when the European Communities were founded in the 1950s, a considerable effort was made to allow the small Benelux Member States to feel at ease with the larger members. The small states gained proportionally bigger voice within the decision-making system compared to the larger ones. Each member state has got a right to veto within the Council of Ministers, equal access to European Commission and a proportionally higher number of representatives in the European Parliament. The fact that the new institutions of the Communities were mainly located in small Member States (Belgium and Luxembourg) further strengthened their position.<sup>1</sup> This framework gave the small states the possibility to influence policy at the European level to an extent never seen before.

Today, with the constantly changing strategic security environment and with the increased number of external threats, Europeans are in a hurry to improve their military potential and the image of the EU in the sphere of security and defence. However, the idea of developing autonomous military potential initiated by Germany and France was accepted differently by the EU states. Leaving the disputes and arguments of the large states aside, this article discusses the attitude of small EU states towards the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and circumstances determining policy of small states. The opinion of the small states, once they find a common position, could determine a lot – after all, they make a majority of the EU members. But are they able to unite their efforts in protecting their common interests? Do they have common interests at all? This article gives very general answers to these questions.

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A separate part of this article is designed for Lithuanian attitude towards the development of ESDP. Lithuania in its foreign policy is facing a difficult choice: should it support the strengthening of the global hegemony of the US and the irreversible establishment of the American global power? Or should it support the possible aims of the European core states to create the counter-alliance for balancing the hegemony of the US? The last part of the article is an attempt to answer to these questions.

### **1. Concept of a small state**

Upon analyzing foreign policy of small states it is necessary to define how its smallness is understood and how it could influence the foreign policy of the country. Many theoretical models and different criteria could be used for describing the nature of the state. However, the most important criteria determining the size of the state are its comparative power and geopolitical position. Comparative power of a state includes political, economic, social power. Geopolitical position evaluates this power in a definite geopolitical context. States with limited possibilities to protect their interests and establish geopolitical subjectivity are considered as small. Small states are more vulnerable or, to be precise, weak due to lack of power and independence.

Under this definition of the difference between small and large states one may notice that the power and influence of the EU states mainly depends on the size of the territory and population of the state. This is also reflected by its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and defence budget. Therefore, the distinction of small and large states may be based on B. Thohallsson, who attributes states with a population of 38 million and above to the large states of the EU, and the states with a population below 17 million – to small states. In this way the ratio of the EU small and large states is the following:



**Table 1. Small and large states of the European Union**

	Population (in mln, by 2004)	Surface (thousands of km <sup>2</sup> )	GDP (in bn US\$, 2004)	Defence expenditure (in bn US\$, 2004)
Small states				
Malta	0.4	0.3	5.4	0.0524
Luxemburg	0.5	3	31.7	0.243
Cyprus	0.7	9	15.3	0.274
Estonia	1.4	45	10.9	0.172
Slovenia	2.0	20	31.7	0.511
Latvia	2.3	65	13	0.233
Lithuania	3.4	65	22.1	0.311
Ireland	4.0	70	180	0.907
Finland	5.2	339	184	2.5
Denmark	5.4	43	239	3.55
Slovakia	5.4	49	41	0.717
Austria	8.1	84	290	2.14
Sweden	9.0	450	340	5.3
Hungary	10.1	93	99.5	1.53
Czech Rep.	10.2	79	106	1.97
Belgium	10.4	31	349	4.36
Portugal	10.5	92	166	2.83
Greece	11.0	132	202	5.86
Netherlands	16.3	34	575	9.6
Large States				
Poland	38.2	324	241	4.6
Spain	41.0	507	986	12.5
Italy	57.5	302	1660	30.5
UK	59.9	245	2130	49.6
France	59.9	552	2000	51.6
Germany	82.5	357	2670	37.7

*Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2005-2006, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2005;*

## **2. Significance of the small states in forming EU Battle Groups and participating in EU international operations**

In order to avoid unilateral manipulation of large actors, small states are sometimes inclined to sacrifice some of their autonomy and join cooperation structures of different natures. These structures may partially eliminate the imbalance of political influence, military power and economic potential in the bilateral relations with the large states. The principle of equality observed in the

supranational institutions gives the small states structural power which is used trying to compensate the deficit of comparative power.

Generally speaking, ESDP was started as a project of the powerful core states of the EU. However, the intention to fall into the foreign policy strategies of the global actors and to find the place in international system has pushed small states to join the ESDP. Their contribution is seen from the input into development of the EU Battle Groups (BG) and participation in the EU led international operations. Europe decided to create 13 BG, which would be 1,000-1,500 strong and able to be deployed up to 6,000 kilometres. France, Italy, Spain and the UK will form their own groups and another nine groups are to be formed by:

1. France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain;
2. France and Belgium;
3. Germany the Netherlands and Finland;
4. Germany, Czech Republic and Austria;<sup>5</sup> - Italy, Hungary and Slovenia;
5. Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal;
6. Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania;
7. Sweden, Finland and Norway (not an EU member);
8. The UK and the Netherlands.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, out of all the EU only Cyprus, Malta, Ireland and Denmark did not express a wish to join one of the most ambitious projects of the EU defence cooperation. All nine multinational BG will contain at least one small EU state, and the Scandinavian states – attributed to small states – will form a BG without the assistance of the large ones.

A similar situation is seen when analyzing the participation of EU countries in international operations. The larger part of military and civil personnel in the EU operations is made up of the representatives of the large EU states. However in the biggest EU operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ALTHEA and EUPM<sup>3</sup>) about a third of the military and civil personnel are from the small EU states. That EU led operations are the priority for the small EU states can be seen when comparing participation in the EU operations with participation in operations led by NATO or the US (e.g., ISAF<sup>4</sup> in Afghanistan and “Iraqi Freedom“ in Iraq). Small EU states participate in these operations with such capacity:

Table 2. Number of personnel (military and civilian) in most important EU, NATO and US led operations

State	EUPM <sup>5</sup>	EUFOR (ALTHEA) <sup>6</sup>	ISAF <sup>7</sup>	„Iraqi Freedom“ <sup>8</sup>
Denmark	11	0	122	496
Netherlands	31	430	311	800 (0)
Hungary	5	122	159	300
Czech Rep.	6	89	17	110
Slovakia	6	4	16	105
Lithuania	2	1	9	120
Latvia	4	3	9	122
Estonia	2	2	10	55
Slovenia	3	153	27	0
Portugal	8	231	21	0
Greece	9	181	171	0
Sweden	12	80	85	0
Finland	11	183	61	0
Austria	7	202	3	0
Ireland	9	52	10	0
Malta	2	0	0	0
Belgium	5	58	616	0
Luxemburg	2	1	10	0
Cyprus	6	0	0	0
<i>Total small EU states</i>	141 40 % of all EU participation	1,792 31% of all EU participation	1,657 29 % of all EU participation	~ 2,100 11 % of all EU participation
<i>Total EU</i>	359 87% of all participants	5,798 87% of all participants	5,728 70 % of all participants	~ 19,000 15 % of all participants
<i>Total in operation</i>	413	6,656	8,204	~ 123,000

As can be seen from the data provided, small EU states favour joining the operations led by the EU. In these operations soldiers from the EU member states form the majority. All small states are participating in the EUPM operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their common contribution is rather

significant. At the same time only Denmark, Holland and “new” European states participate in the “Iraqi Freedom” operation led by the US.

However, the conclusion that there is no unanimous policy of the small states or at least a common position towards the ESDP is more than obvious. Only Denmark and the mini-states – Cyprus and Malta – have a categorical position as to in which operations to participate. Three groups of small EU states can be excluded according to their attitude towards ESDP: some give more support to the policy of NATO and the US, others are backing pro-European policy, and the rest, which are based on traditional neutrality, act according to the situation. Arguments of these groups are presented in part three of this article.

### **3. Arguments of small states: blocks’ formation**

The tendencies of foreign policy of the small states often depend on their relations with large neighbouring states and the extent to which the small states would like to transform or preserve these relations. It depends on what threat large states pose for the national interests of the small states or vice versa – how large states can defend those interests. Today there is no possibility for any of the EU states, especially a small one, to contribute equally successfully to international operations led by NATO (or US) and the EU at the same time. This is possible as long as there are no several intensive operations taking place at the same time and there is no need to separate the forces. Thus, small states do not have any other option but to set their priorities because of the limited military capabilities. Upon setting them, small states take all possible measures to be included into the strategies of the chosen large states. This is the only way for them to get an opportunity to develop their own foreign policy.

As it was already mentioned, the priorities of the small EU states determine their division into three groups. This depends on different reasons, but the most important one is different relations with the large states of the EU, the US and Russia. The following parts will review the “coalitions” of small EU states.

#### **3.1 Euroatlantic view towards ESDP**

Among the small states of the EU, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Baltic and Visegrad states are known as the euroatlantists, who are doing their best to keep the US in Europe. They consider Europe and the US as inseparable parts of Western civilization. Above-mentioned euroatlantic states are seeking to disbalance the Russian-French-German axis, which is very often

directed against the interests of the US, and to improve the transatlantic relations. According to their point of view, the EU's foreign and security policy should be oriented towards the implementation of common interests with the US and it must not harm, dub or even subvert this unity<sup>9</sup>.

However, the euroatlantists are used to having benefits from their EU membership and structural power, provided by this membership. Therefore these states do not refuse to take part in taking common decisions. They are not satisfied with the current passive role of the EU member states in the defence policy and, therefore, speak out for better co-ordination of CFSP<sup>10</sup> and for the increasing the potential of ESDP.<sup>11</sup> According to the euroatlantists, federal proatlantic Europe could be very useful in advocating the values of euroatlantic community through the Greater Middle East and CIS<sup>12</sup> countries. Besides that, even symbolic participation in ESDP (including the military and civilian operations) provides for euroatlantists at least a theoretical chance to influence the decisions in this sphere. However, once they have chosen transatlantic relations as a priority, their input in ESDP development is as big as it does not contradict their further mentioned choice. There is no surprise that for all the states belonging to this group NATO is the main security provider. Their priority is NATO (or the US) led operations. During the Iraq invasion all of them without any doubt supported the US policy. However, three subgroups can be excluded in this group of states: first group of states are the traditional euroatlantists, the second – reflexive euroatlantists and the third – conjunctive euroatlantists.<sup>13</sup>

### 3.1.1 Traditional euroatlantism

Denmark is a state with traditional euroatlantic orientation, not participating in the military dimension of the EU cooperation even formally. During the Cold War Denmark was one of the most sceptical towards the European defence dimension amongst all European NATO members. The military aspects of security were considered to belong firmly to NATO, therefore European defence dimension linked to WEU or EC was considered highly problematic. European defence dimension was considered as jeopardizing the functional balance between the NATO, the UN, EC and Nordic countries cooperation. The dominant view of the EC was that it should be concerned with economic cooperation and have no significant political dimension.<sup>14</sup>

Before the ratification of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the Danish government formulated an opt-out in military matters in order to make the treaty acceptable

for voters. Now this opt-out can only be undone by referendum. Therefore, Denmark's participation in ESDP is limited to sending military observers and provision of certain logistic support to the EU led operations. Passing the Parliament's resolution in 1997, Denmark repeated its decision not to participate either in taking or implementing decisions related to ESDP. On the other hand, this resolution states that Denmark believes in successful development of ESDP and will not hinder EU partners to pursue ambitions in the military sphere. Thereby, though the position of Denmark is mainly determined by domestic reasons, it may be evaluated as an example of correctness – Denmark decided not to participate in ESDP but is not going to destroy it from the inside.

The Netherlands is not as categorical as Denmark, but in the beginning it also viewed the creation of ESDP very sceptically. However, later it became moderate and intensified its relationship with Germany (creation of a common EU BG). Despite that, the Netherlands strongly supported the policy of the US and UK in Iraq. Though the Netherlands is withdrawing its soldiers from Iraq, it is related more to relocation of resources as the Netherlands has established a Province reconstruction group (PRT) in one of the provinces in Afghanistan.

### 3.1.2 Reflexive euroatlantism

There is no wonder that the Baltic States, which have a close relationship with Denmark, have also chosen the atlantic view towards NATO and ESDP. However, the support of the Baltic, Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to the US is determined not by independent foreign policy traditions but historical reasons. The said states have been trying to prove that they have been reliable partners to the US for nearly a century. Membership in NATO has always been their most important security guarantee. This is related to the support of the US during the years of the Cold War and the threat of Russia that encouraged them to put more effort into acquiring strong international security guarantees. If ESDP would push the US out from the European security system, this could condition more extensive influence of Russia. Therefore, the Baltic States constantly emphasize that they view ESDP in a wider framework of transatlantic relations, where the actions of the EU should complement the actions of NATO. Such an attitude is consolidated in the Security Strategy of Lithuania of 2004, which states that Lithuania “participates in the development of European civil and military capabilities. This will contribute to the strengthening of transatlantic partnership and more effective participation of the EU when ensuring security and stability, as well as when responding to crises in the world”<sup>45</sup>. An agreement of ten political parties of Lithuania of March 17,

2004, states that “Lithuania will seek for non-duplication of NATO and EU military structures, which should complement each other”<sup>16</sup>. Thus the position of the Baltic States may be defined as a goal not to create new military forces for the EU defence, but to coordinate the military contribution of the state to NATO and the EU.

Though the historical experience of Visegrad countries differ, all of them also consider NATO as their most important security guarantee. A belief that “there should be no contradictions between obligations to NATO and support to strengthening the European military defence capacity”<sup>17</sup> prevails in Hungary. Even though Hungary has recently withdrawn a considerable part of its soldiers from Iraq, the existence of NATO and the US is essential for the security of Hungary. On the other hand, situated near the problematic Balkan region, Hungary is interested in ensuring security additionally through ESDP. Therefore though in the beginning of developing ESDP Hungary was concerned with duplication, later its attitude became more moderate and creation of ESDP was started to be viewed positively.

The support of the Czech Republic to the US and the aim to strengthen NATO and the transatlantic relations are also obvious. It has already become a tradition that CBR (chemical-bacteriological-radiological) specialists from the Czech Republic participate in all operations led by NATO or the US. On the whole, the Czech Republic, in comparison to Hungary, faces serious difficulties of generating forces for operations, thus its active participation in ESDP is practically hardly possible (it took a long time for the Czech Republic to formally decide to participate in creating EU BG).

The position of Slovakia, in comparison to other Visegrad countries, is exceptional in that it was not invited together with the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to join NATO. It is natural that after such a surprise membership in the Alliance became an especially important strategic goal of the state. The attitude of Slovakia towards ESDP is the same as of its neighbours – it is said in the security strategy of Slovakia that “ESDP is considered a process complementing collective defence of NATO”<sup>18</sup>.

Because of a lack of resources and capabilities, all the mentioned countries have contributed only minimally to the development of ESDP until now. Their policies may be assessed as an attempt to strengthen their positions in CFSP, to

influence the decisions strengthening the transatlantic relations and to get an additional measure of influence in the area of the EU foreign policy.

### 3.1.3 Conjunctive euroatlantism

The second group of euroatlantists countries is set by those who officially declare NATO as their priority, but practical support depends largely on domestic political situation. Slovenia, Portugal and Greece treat ESDP as a complement to NATO; therefore they regard its development with care. However, they contribute rather insignificantly to the operations led by NATO and the US. The arguments of the said three countries for such behaviour differ only slightly.

The appearance of Slovenia in this group may be affected by different historical experience of this country in comparison with others CEE countries, members of NATO and the EU. Slovenia is the only former part of Yugoslavia, which has successfully integrated into NATO and the EU during the last 10 years. Slovenia was the only CEE country that did not support the US led operation in Iraq. On the other hand, the attitude of Slovenia towards ESDP reminds of the positions of the other CEE countries. The Government of Slovenia emphasizes that “these two structures complement each other and Slovenia does not support the development of ESDP as an alternative to NATO”<sup>19</sup>. Such a twofold position could be best explained not by lack of military capabilities, but by negative public opinion on the Iraqi conflict and reluctance of politicians to risk their reputation.

Portugal is most often attributed to traditionally euroatlantistic states, for which support to the US is a constant characteristic of foreign policy. However, the present behaviour of Portugal is similar to conjunctive euroatlantism, when everything depends on the position of the majority in the parliament and public opinion. For example, after unconditionally supporting the actions of the US, in February 2005 Portugal decided to withdraw its soldiers from Iraq. This decision was made at the same time when this was done by Spain and several other countries. Spain remained a close ally of the US and established a PRT in Afghanistan, while Portugal remained not understood on the other side of the Atlantic. Besides, Portugal supports many of the EU initiatives in the sphere of security and defence. It participated in the EU operations in FYROM, in Congo and in Bosnia, expressed its wish to join the EU BG. According to the Portugal Government, operation “Arthemis” in Congo was supported by the country in an attempt to contribute to the development of the “global” aims of the EU. Other “euroatlantistic” states are rather inclined not to support the ESDP



because of its claims for a global role. Thus Portugal may be attributed to euroatlantic states due to historical relations with the US, but not due to the current policy.

The euroatlantic tendencies of Greece are weakest in this group of countries. Partially it is related to constant tension between it and a close ally of the US – Turkey. On the other hand, traditionally weak administrative capacity of Greece prevents it from formulating and adhering to a consistent policy. This could be a reason why it looks like euroatlantic Greece is more concerned with the EU military potential and not with the strengthening of NATO and transatlantic relations. This became especially obvious in 2002, when Greece chaired ESDP military dimension for two terms.

### **3.2 Traditional neutrality and its transformation**

The second big group of the small EU countries includes traditionally “neutral” states, demonstrating “flexibility” of the foreign policy and not joining any alliances. Finland, Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Malta<sup>20</sup> chose balancing between the EU and NATO as a means for accumulating its structural power. They strive for achieving an overlapping mechanism of Western security structures, which would satisfy their security needs. It should be noted that the future of the ESDP as such may significantly depend on the positions of these economically strong states in the future.

For Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland neutrality during the years of the Cold War meant independent foreign and security policy. Independence, reliable national defence and even a certain self-isolation were the key features distinguishing the neutral states from the other Western countries. When the large neighbours fought for influence in buffer states, the neutral states tried to minimize the threats in the areas of foreign and security policies, to defend their territories and political independence. But the nature of threats has changed and concepts of sovereignty started to force the small states to look for new ways of cooperation and to reconsider their neutrality doctrines.

The idea of H. Lauterpacht (expressed in 1936) that “the more collective security is in the international system, the less space is left for neutrality”<sup>21</sup> started to be very true for the neutral states by the end of the previous century. In 1992 Finland and Sweden reviewed their security doctrines. “Neutrality” was replaced by “not joining” of military Alliances. The changed security doctrine of

Finland supposed not joining alliances, but the legal basis was ordered so that Finland could participate in all EU crisis management operations. In 1992-1995 Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland became observers in WEU, in 1994-1996 they joined the NATO PfP program. Today all four countries are trying to contribute to international security and are expecting assistance from NATO in case of threat.<sup>22</sup> Only Ireland has kept a part of its “true” neutrality in this group of states. Under the Constitution of the state, a UN Security Council mandate, approval of parliament and government are necessary for any deployment of its military forces. However, certain steps are taken even by the Irish Government: in 2000 a White Book was published, in which a possibility to participate in peacekeeping operations not only within the framework of UN, but also with a UN mandate is discussed.

Therefore none of the traditionally neutral states *de facto* is neutral anymore. Though the participation of the mentioned countries in collective respond to global threats does not mean mutual military assistance principle, changes to the security environment determined that they are included into the system of collective security.<sup>23</sup> “Neutral” states participate in taking decisions related to security, their soldiers go to international operations, but the states have no obligations on the military side and the politicians of the countries gain more popularity in the eyes of the public. However, such a position of the neutral countries creates a possibility to form conditions encouraging competition between atlantistic and eurocentristic countries of the EU.

### 3.3 Pro-European view of small EU states towards the ESDP

The only view of small EU countries favours strategic relations with the EU core states but not with the US. These are traditionally under the influence of France positioned Belgium and Luxemburg and with close US partner Turkey confronting Cyprus. These states belong to the group of eurocontinentalists, for which federalised Europe is the value itself. Their long-term interest is not the preservation of the transatlantic community, but the strategic independence of Europe. According to them, the federal structure of the EU and the formation of the area of the EU’s specific interests are the guarantees of the independent future of Europe<sup>24</sup>.

Eurocontinentalists’ approach toward further EU integration says that the only possibility for the emergence of the EU as the consolidated political subject is through consolidation of European continental “core”, which consists of Germany, France, the Benelux countries. In other words, “political Europe”

could only be formed through the neutralisation of influence of the pro-transatlantic EU member states on the EU integration process or by altering their geopolitical orientation. In their view, Europe through the common and effective foreign policy must structure the space around itself, in order to achieve the status of global power. For achieving this it should dissociate from the US at first.<sup>25</sup>

Supporting France and Germany as their closest partners, the states of this group were the initiators of the process, which could mean “the start of the separation”. These states are supporting the new “competition for power” and joined the states that infringed the domination of the US. As a proof of this may serve their active participation in the EU led operations and refusal to join the operation in Iraq. Besides that, Belgium and Luxemburg, together with France and Germany are the states of so called “chocolate four” group, which April 29, 2003, proclaimed their agreement to develop the ESDP. Seven initiatives were foreseen in this declaration:

1. The development of rapid European reaction capability. The progress made in this field may help to strengthen the European contribution to developing a NATO Reaction Force (NRF) and to guarantee their interoperability;
2. The creation of a European command for strategic air transport, available for European and NATO operations, by June 2004 at the latest. The A400M-program was meant to be crucial for the development of such a European capability for strategic air transport. Creation of a common command for strategic transport (sea, air and ground) was also considered;
3. The creation of a joint European NBC protection capability in charge of the protection of both civilians and troops, which are deployed within the framework of European operations;
4. The creation of a European system for first humanitarian aid during disasters (EU-FAST – European Union First Aid and Support team) which would make possible for the EU to combine civilian and military assets in order to engage first emergency humanitarian aid within 24 hours;
5. The creation of European training centres: a common tactical training unit for A400M-crews; a training centre for helicopters crews; harmonizing sea training curricula for marine CO’s in the prospect of the creation of a European school-fleet; harmonizing training for Air force pilots by enhancing ongoing initiatives, notably in the field of tactics;
6. The strengthening of European capabilities with regard to operational planning and conducting operations. To this end “chocolate four” proposed the creation of a nucleus collective capability for planning and conducting operations for the EU;

7. With a view of improving command and control capabilities available to the European Union as well as to NATO, our four Defence Ministers will take the necessary steps to establish, not later than 2004, a multinational deployable force headquarters for joint operations, building on existing deployable headquarters.<sup>26</sup>

Though Cyprus does not belong to the “chocolate four“, its arguments to support ESDP are also related to the wish to lessen the influence of the US in Europe. The pro-European position of Cyprus is mostly determined by its tense relationship with a US ally Turkey. Being afraid of the invasion of EU forces into the Turkish part of Cyprus Turkey blocked the Berlin Plus agreement in 2001<sup>27</sup>. This incident shows that Cyprus cannot be sure about the support from the US in its sensitive relationship with Turkey. However, the EU format gives for Cyprus more than one instrument to influence and pressure Turkey, especially bearing in mind its goal to become a member of the EU. Thus, there is no surprise that not participating in any operations led by NATO or the US, Cyprus participates in EU operations in the Balkans, declares being ready to allow the EU forces to use its air base, ports, training grounds, plans to join the BG.

#### **4. Lithuanian interests in developing relations with NATO and ESDP**

Defining its relations with NATO and ESDP Lithuania first of all looks for an answer to one crucial question – should it commit to play an equally important role in both NATO and the EU? Though Lithuania strengthens its structural power by integrating into both organisations, the power is gained not from being a member, but from the ability to form the alliances. Lithuanian view concerning the formation of alliances is approached in the last part of this article.

##### **4.1 Lithuanian interest to limit the development of ESDP**

Lithuanian foreign policy has traditionally been oriented towards the strengthening of transatlantic relations and strategic partnership with the US. There is no wonder that such an attitude is greatly influenced by the US: Lithuania considers it as the only power which can neutralize the geopolitical influence of Russia in the Baltic Sea region.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the wish to increase the role of the US in the region, to neutralize sources of threats from the East and to gain more space for an action in foreign policy area are the main factors which determine Lithuanian shift towards euroatlantists. The presumptions of this are laid down in the main security related documents of Lithuania: Security Strategy of Lithuania, Military strategy of Lithuania, An agreement of political

parties of Lithuania on defence policy, Law on the Basics of National security and others. Desire not to get the status of the “exchange object” is one more very important factor which influences Lithuanian euroatlantic choice. To become the “exchange object” would be possible in case of the redistribution of the spheres of influence between Russia and the US or between the EU and Russia. This could more likely happen in case of the domination of the eurocontinentalist security system.<sup>29</sup> If France and Germany fail to transform the EU into a unanimous global centre of power and Russia preserves sovereignty for its domestic policy, Russia may take over the control of the EU internal processes. This would endanger the independence of Lithuania.

As the predominance of the eurocontinental security system may condition drifting to the sphere of Russia’s influence, Vilnius is intended to limit the development of ESDP. Officially this is presented as a wish to preserve transatlantic relations. However, preservation of the solid US role in the region is crucial, but not the only reason to stay cold towards the ESDP development. ESDP is a clear move towards the federal model of the EU, which limits the autonomy of decision making for small countries. That is why the intergovernmental model of the EU reflects more the interests of Lithuania, at least in security and defence matters. Lithuania has no interest to become the province of the federalized Union, which can not provide security guarantees and duplicates the organization which can do this (NATO). Besides, participation in ESDP means new highly costly commitments, which may not be in line with commitments to NATO. It may result not only in hard pressure for an economically weaker state, but also lead to a “problem of double loyalty”<sup>30</sup>. Because of these reasons Lithuanian interest is to strengthen the transatlantic link and to ensure the US attention in Europe. The US participation in the European security system makes it possible for Lithuania to control the political relations with other big states - Germany and Russia. Finally, in case of transcontinental security system, Lithuania may acquire the status of the link between the West and the East and become the geopolitical connection<sup>31</sup>. It means more space for an active foreign policy and a possibility to stimulate the democratisation and the geopolitical orientation towards euroatlantic powers countries of Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova).

## 4.2 Lithuania's relations with NATO and ESDP: search for an optimal model

Vilnius is very much interested in preserving the US as a strategic partner of Europe. However, the US itself may be forced to limit its participation in European security system. A vacuum of its political and economic resources may appear because of "getting stuck" in the Persian Gulf, Middle East or other places in the world. Therefore, Lithuania at some degree is interested in the processes of deepening and widening the EU integration.

After becoming a member of the EU, Lithuania is trying to use this status and take part in making common decisions. Lithuania is interested in participating in the activities of ESDP on the following reasons:

1. ESDP is an additional tool for ensuring security. If an effective EU crisis management system is created, it would be an additional tool for managing conflicts and ensuring security and stability in the EU and by its borders. Besides this, the creation of EU Battle Groups can serve as an additional impulse for Lithuania to fasten its defence reform and to create more capable forces;
2. Involvement provides opportunity to influence decisions. Participation in the process of ESDP development provides at least theoretical possibility to influence the decision making. This possibility would especially increase in case small EU states or CEE states manage to unite their efforts and defend interests together. For Lithuania involvement gives an opportunity to require extension of ESDP activities into the states which are considered as top priorities of Lithuania's foreign policy (Georgia, Moldova, etc.);
3. Successful ESDP is a chance to involve Russia into productive cooperation with the West. ESDP is a progressing area of EU integration, which might promote real cooperation of the West with Russia (common operations, training, consultations). The EU could use the fact that its relations with Russia were always better than NATO-Russia relations and take a lead in Russia's liberalization and democratization processes;
4. Supporting ESDP Lithuania supports the interests of potential partners. Supporting ESDP Lithuania can expect, for example, EU core's support by solving the problems related to Kaliningrad and Belarus.

As it can be seen from the arguments presented above, ensuring national security Lithuania is interested in consolidating as much resources as possible. The best way to do this is not to choose a security organization, but to develop an integral security policy. As both organizations can help to implement national interests, participation in the activities of NATO and/or ESDP should not

depend on preferences to a certain organization. Participation should comply with the political, economic and military interests of Lithuania. This would be a way to reduce the dependence on conjunctive processes on the global level and the probability to become an “exchange object” in the hands of large states. Besides that, upon the EU crisis management and democracy development mechanisms, Lithuania could claim for a role of “coordinator” of EU Eastern policy.

However, this would be possible if European states coordinate their ambitions, actively implement decisions and do not compete with the US on crucial transatlantic security issues. While this is not the case, Lithuania chooses participation in the activities of NATO as its priority. It means that NATO in Lithuania is perceived as the only instrument for collective defence. As a consequence, according to NATO force planning procedures Lithuania negotiates and fulfils its security related commitments to NATO, but is not so much worried about the implementation of the EU Headlines Goals. At the same time Lithuania takes part in all the most prominent NATO and the US led operations and plays only tight role in the EU led operations. Extensive participation in “Iraqi freedom” and challenging creation of PRT under the framework of NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan are the best evidences of Lithuanian choice.

On the other hand, this does not mean that ESDP is ignored. In May 2005 Lithuania together with Poland (as a leading nation), Germany, Slovakia and Latvia signed a political declaration about the creation of the EU BG. It will be ready to contribute the EU Rapid reaction forces in 2010. Company size unit with all the supporting personnel is considered as possible Lithuanian input. This is different from what Lithuania offers for NRF in 2006, however, supporting the single set of force principle Vilnius asks for the harmonization of EU BG and NATO NRF rotation cycles and hopes to provide the same troops for the next NRF rotation.<sup>32</sup> This endorses the statements that Lithuania prefers to participate in ESDP to the extent these activities contribute to the strengthening of transatlantic relations and coincide with national foreign policy goals. Though Lithuanian voice is not very loud, Vilnius always speaks for coordinated ambitions and political aims of NATO and the EU, single capabilities planning process and not duplicative structures.

According to the Lithuanian view, the EU and NATO should cooperate more closely in capabilities development process: to adopt the same standards,

harmonize the certification requirements and to develop more interoperable capabilities. Lithuania supports the proposal to separate (functionally and regionally) duties between NATO and the EU. While NATO could remain as a central collective security organization, the EU should concentrate exclusively upon small crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The special interest of Vilnius is to seek more active crises management role of the EU in the post-soviet areas, especially if NATO is not interested in participating there.<sup>33</sup>

**Instead of conclusions:  
potentially powerful, practically polarized**

Taking into account the changing nature of threats, small states as well as the large ones started to think and act globally. With the strengthening of the ESDP all of them expressed their wish to contribute to the development of ESDP in one way or another. Belgium and Luxemburg even managed to break into the EU “club of leaders” and become the participants of the new struggle for power between Europe and the US. This determined specifics of ESDP – from the closed “elite club” planned in the beginning ESDP became a more legitimate policy of the EU.

On the other hand, 19 states in a block of 25 members using the current voting rules could achieve much more than they do now. However, the resources of small EU states dedicated to ESDP development in most cases are very tight. CEE countries do not plan to allocate significant additional expenses on ESDP development at all. Therefore, first of all, the initiative to develop ESDP is given over to the main driving forces of this integration – the large EU states. Besides that, the smallness of the country did not become an influential factor determining the formation of coalitions implementing ESDP. Geopolitical orientation, national identity, issues of domestic policy and public opinion are much more important than the size of the state. All this determines the division of small EU states into those who really support closer EU cooperation in security and defence matters and those who simulate the support, but actually attempt to “stay on board” when decisions are made.

The position of Lithuania in the context of behaviour of the small EU states is not exceptional. In order to acquire allies for neutralizing the arising threats, Lithuania is trying to join the dialogue of the US and the large Western Europe states concerning NATO and ESDP. Lithuania speaks for the existence of two euroatlantic security structures (NATO and the EU), which complement each



other and coordinate their actions. However, weak comparative power of Lithuania (limited economic and military potential) prevents it from effective participation in both security formats at the same time. Therefore, by strengthening its security and structural power, Lithuania chooses an organization which ensures security today - NATO. Lithuania participates in the activities of ESDP only to the extent such activities contribute to the strengthening of transatlantic relations.

## NOTES

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- <sup>3</sup> EUPM - European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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- <sup>10</sup> CFSP - Common Foreign & Security Policy.
- <sup>11</sup> T.G. Ash, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time*, Allen Lane, London, 2004, p. 45.
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<sup>18</sup> Slovakian Parliament, *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, 2004, retrieved 10 November 2005, <[http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/eng/security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/eng/security_strategy.pdf)>.

<sup>19</sup> S. Kajnc, *National Report Slovenia. CFSP WATCH 2003*, Centre of International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2003, retrieved 21 October 2005, <<http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports/SLOVENIA%202003.pdf>>.

<sup>20</sup> The smallest EU state under all parameters - Malta – is also traditionally neutral. But its position has little influence on both ESDP and transatlantic relations; therefore Malta's view will not be discussed in greater detail. It can just be emphasized that Malta's priority is the EU initiatives. Sometimes Malta even contributes to the EU international operations.

<sup>21</sup> E. Reiter & J. Frank, 'The European Security Strategy from the Austrian Perspective. A Valuable Contribution to the Further Europeanization of Austria's Security Policy', in M. Overhaus, H.W. Maull, S. Harnish (eds), *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, Trier, 2004, p.10.

<sup>22</sup> In 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland became EU members; today they participate in creating the EU BG.

<sup>23</sup> Ireland (after rejecting the Nice agreement) and Malta (accessing EU) demanded that the EU acknowledge their specific status with respect to EU CSFP, i.e. that participation in CSFP would not mean rejecting their traditional neutrality. At the initiative of all four countries the article of the Constitutional Treaty of EU on collective defence was softened considerably and does not mean automatic help.

<sup>24</sup> M. Emerson, 'The Wider Europe as the European union's Friendly Monroe Doctrine', *CEPS Policy Brief*, vol. 27 no. 10, 2003, retrieved 25 October 2004, <<http://www.ceps.be>>.

<sup>25</sup> F. Guessgen, 'It fires back! The Impact of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the Evolution of a European identity', in European Political-economy Infrastructure Consortium (EPIC), *Ionian Conference 2000 - Challenges of the New Millennium, Corfu, 20-22 May, 2000*, EPIC, Corfu, 2000, retrieved 5 November 2004, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00000642/01/ICGuessgen.pdf>>.

<sup>26</sup> Foreignpolicy.org. *Conclusions of European Defence Meeting*, 2003, retrieved 5 May 2003, <[http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/eng/eu/egmontpalace\\_290403.htm](http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/eng/eu/egmontpalace_290403.htm)>.

<sup>27</sup> According to it, the EU when carrying out independent military operations, may use NATO planning assets.

<sup>28</sup> Russian factor in this context becomes so important because of its historical-cultural ambitions towards its western neighbours.

<sup>29</sup> Č. Laurinavičius, E. Motieka, N. Statkus, *Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai XX amžius*, Lietuvos Istorijos institutas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 167.

<sup>30</sup> "Double loyalty problem" means that those states, which can not afford to maintain double military capabilities (one for NATO, one for EU) must choose in which operations (NATO or the EU) they are going to take part in case several serious crises arise at the same time.

<sup>31</sup> Č. Laurinavičius, E. Motieka, N. Statkus, *Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai XX amžius*, Lietuvos Istorijos institutas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 184.

<sup>32</sup> Considering the different nature and size of EU BG and NRF forces this would be complicated but still possible if some adjustments are made.

<sup>33</sup> Especially in "frozen" conflicts in post-soviet areas – Transdnestria, South Osetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh.

## Institutional Framework of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy Setting

By *Lauri Lugna*\*

### Introduction

One of the objectives of the European Union (EU) as is laid down in the Treaty on European Union Article 29, is to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by preventing and combating crime in particular among others also terrorism, through closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities in the Member States<sup>1</sup>. In December 2003 the European Council adopted a comprehensive document titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World – A European Security Strategy”, outlining the threats facing the Member States. Terrorism heads the list and the document states: “terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe”<sup>2</sup>. The last point in this statement is probably the most significant as the attacks in Madrid and London in March 2004 and July 2005 respectively did have implications on most EU Member States. So in order to minimize this threat, the security strategy proclaims that “Concerted European action is indispensable”<sup>3</sup>.

One has to bear in mind that safeguarding national security and protecting the state and its citizens from terrorists falls in the competence of the Member States. As the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) Mr. Gijs de Vries has stated: “the role of the union [EU] is not to supplant Member States but to support them in working internationally and the main thrust of Europe's defence against terrorism remains firmly at the level of national governments”<sup>4</sup>.

The EU's difficulties are compounded because ‘counter-terrorism’ is not in itself a defined area and in its broadest and fullest sense ‘counter-terrorism’ spans across a number of policy areas<sup>5</sup>. It is a cross-pillar activity engaging many EU actors and instruments and because of that, coordination problems have been encountered on several levels<sup>6</sup>. Counter-terrorism requires action from every

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government department, not only from those charged with law enforcement, border control and foreign and defence policy. Finance ministries need to track terrorist funding, health ministries should have stockpiles of vaccines and education ministries should fund academic research into Islamic groups<sup>7</sup>. National governments find it hard to coordinate their own ministries and agencies involved in counter-terrorism, trying to coordinate the collective efforts of 25 governments at the EU level are exponentially more difficult<sup>8</sup>.

After the Madrid attacks in March 2004, the European Council emphasized in its declaration on combating terrorism that it instructs the Council to put in place new committee structures capable of ensuring greater operational cooperation on security and terrorism within the EU<sup>9</sup>. This article discusses the current EU institutional framework in which the EU counter-terrorism policy is set. It seeks to find an answer to what kind of an EU institutional framework is needed for “concentrated European action” and for “ensuring greater operational cooperation”. The specific research question focuses on how the European Union counter-terrorism policy is being set at the EU level.

In order to answer the abovementioned research questions this article first describes the threat that terrorism poses to the EU Member States. This is followed by a description of the theoretical basis of the EU level counter-terrorism policy setting. Then the actors involved in the EU counter-terrorism policy setting are portrayed and their roles explained. On the basis of the above, an analysis of the current EU level institutional framework and its problems is presented. In the conclusions recommendations are made on how to shape the institutional framework of the EU counter-terrorism policy setting into a more effective one.

As the core action in the fight against terrorism is in the competencies of the Member States, this article mainly looks at the institutional set up of the Council in the II and III pillar policy setting and concentrates less on the set up in the I pillar. Moreover, due to the limits on the length of this article, it does not encompass an analysis of the institutional set up at the Member States level, where national positions for the EU counter-terrorism policy setting are prepared, as that differs considerably between Member States and would require longer research.

## 1. Terrorism as a security threat to the European Union Member States

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe, as the citizens of Spain, United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Greece and Italy know all too well<sup>10</sup>. In Britain, Ireland and Spain alone, more than 5000 lives have been lost to terrorism over the last 30 years<sup>11</sup>.

The European Security Strategy states that Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked<sup>12</sup>. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium<sup>13</sup>. The strategy makes particular pointed reference to the danger of terrorist groups using biological, chemical or even nuclear bombs on European soil<sup>14</sup>. In November 2004 Gijs de Vries the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator said that there remains a substantial and sustained threat of further terrorist attacks in Europe and the threat emanates mainly from Islamist networks, groups or individuals, though non-Islamist groups as well continue to pose risks to security<sup>15</sup>.

Unfortunately 7 July 2005 bombings in London proved de Vries's assessment to be correct. As of 11 July 2005, "New York Times" reported a European participant saying at the meeting of high-level intelligence and counter-terrorism officials from two dozen European countries and the United States in London: "We're all under the threat of attack, and we all must work together to stop the next one. The next attack could happen outside my window."<sup>16</sup>

The continent served as a logistical base for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attackers and has itself been the target of a number of foiled plots<sup>17</sup>. In February 2002, the Italian authorities apparently thwarted a plot by al-Qaeda to poison Rome's water supply with cyanide-based chemicals<sup>18</sup>. In January 2004, the French anti-terrorist police detained five people in Lyon – two of them admitted to plans to attack specific targets in France using ricin and botulinum bacteria<sup>19</sup>. In April 2004, British anti-terrorist agents foiled a plot involving the use of corrosive substance osmium tetroxide<sup>20</sup>. While the impact of these attacks might have been limited – with the exception of the possible attempt to poison Rome's water supply – one can only imagine the psychological effects arising from such an attack<sup>21</sup>. The United States of America embassy in Paris, the Christmas market in Strasbourg, a United States of America base in Belgium and the United States of America military facilities in Great Britain were also among the planned targets of

terrorist groups located in London, Rotterdam and Frankfurt<sup>22</sup>. There is no doubt that cells sympathizing with Al-Qaeda are active in Europe<sup>23</sup>.

As the Madrid attacks demonstrated, terrorism – in particular radical Islamic terrorist groups – remains a serious threat in Europe and beyond<sup>24</sup>. The same was reiterated in the United State of America Department of State “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004”, where it was stated that “terrorist activity and the presence of terrorist support networks in Europe remain a source of concern”<sup>25</sup>.

According to the latest Europol’s report which outlines the terrorism situation in the EU over the last twelve months, the terrorist threat to the EU is posed by a wide number of groups and organisations ranging from international Jihadist networks and large scale nationalist groups to violent political extremist activists, generally involved in acts of sabotage and criminal damage<sup>26</sup>. While the EU as an entity might not be subject to a specific threat from Al-Qaeda and/or its affiliates, these groups are targeting a number of Member States that are perceived as enemies of Islam and designated as “legitimate” targets due to their involvement in Iraq or in Afghanistan or to specific factors such as the law banning the Islamic veil in French schools<sup>27</sup>. As such, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom (as well as other countries, including the United States and Israel) have been specifically designated by al-Qaeda leadership<sup>28</sup>. Moreover, the bomb attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and the disruption of a number of terrorist cells in other Member States demonstrate the continuous will of al-Qaeda and/or its affiliates to strike within the European Union boundaries and influence governments’ policies and the day to day life of its inhabitants<sup>29</sup>.

Terrorist do not limit their attacks to institutions associated with the State, but seek to attract maximum publicity from high profile attacks, deliberately causing large numbers of civilian deaths<sup>30</sup>. Together with their disregard for their own lives, this makes it much more difficult to put in place effective physical counter-measures<sup>31</sup>. The will of some of these terrorists to use chemical devices appears to be consistent; however, the most favoured method still relies on suicide bombers as demonstrated in a string of attacks in Russia in August [2004], which culminated with the Beslan hostage taking<sup>32</sup>. But we have to take into account that intelligence shows a growing interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials by Islamic terrorist groups<sup>33</sup>. Hard-copy poison recipe books were found in training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Georgia<sup>34</sup>. More specifically, recent arrests made in France, Spain and the United Kingdom, where traces of ricin, training manuals and chemical substances were

discovered, are indications that attempts are being made to acquire CBRN materials<sup>35</sup>. That points to the assumption that the threat of a small-scale chemical or biological attack is substantially higher than in the past<sup>36</sup>.

The sheer number of arrests of Islamic terrorists or supporters in the European Union is also an indicator that Europe is not only a target for al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups but it is also to be considered as a place of recruitment and logistical support for the Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya<sup>37</sup>. Furthermore, fully trained fighters returning from these fighting grounds are a potential threat due to their level of training<sup>38</sup>.

The vulnerability of individual European countries makes them so interdependent that none of them can effectively protect their citizens on their own<sup>39</sup>. A chemical or radiological attack on a European capital might have consequences for several countries in the region and conventional attacks are also likely to cause ripple effects far from their target in today's increasingly complex and interdependent societies<sup>40</sup>. Moreover, as the creation of a free internal European market proceeds, competitive pressure on providers of, for example, energy or transportation services would, in the absence of common security standards, result in the lowest common denominator being applied<sup>41</sup>. This all suggests that there is a need for common efforts and cooperation in order to protect the Member States and their citizens. In order for this cooperation to be fruitful, effective institutional set up is needed, where there is no confusion of tasks and competence.

## **2. Theoretical basis of the European Union counter-terrorism policy setting**

In the wake of the hostage-taking and murders at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 and in response to terrorist threats with sources both within and outside Europe, as well as the problem of drug trafficking, the European Community Member States created the so-called Trevi (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and Violence International) Group of interior and justice ministers, which began to meet regularly in 1976<sup>42</sup>. This was largely an intergovernmental forum for collaboration outside of the formal treaty structure and it lacked a permanent secretariat, but provided the law enforcement authorities in the European Community with a limited, yet useful way to communicate and exchange information on various transnational crimes, as well as to share best practices to combat them<sup>43</sup>.

Nowadays the role of the EU in the fight against terrorism is still relatively limited as most of the instruments and competence in this area remain in the hands of the Member States. However, through its legislative work and policy initiatives the EU can do a lot to help national authorities work together internationally<sup>44</sup>.

Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union states that the “Union shall set itself the objective to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”<sup>45</sup>. This is the basis of EU level action in the sphere of internal security, including combating terrorism. Article 29 of the same treaty specifically refers to terrorism as one of the serious forms of crime to be prevented and combated by developing common action in three different ways: closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities, including Europol; closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States; and approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters<sup>46</sup>. For the Treaty on European Union terrorism is part of the problem of (organized) crime, although there are differences between the aims of each form of crime<sup>47</sup>. Organized crime is generally associated with financial gain, while terrorism is considered to have political motives, but what applies to the problem of organized crime certainly applies to that of terrorism<sup>48</sup>.

The Treaty of Amsterdam split up the Justice and Home Affairs policy between a group of newly communitarized areas under Title IV of the Treaty on European Communities (asylum, immigration, external border controls, and judicial cooperation in civil matters) and another group which remains within the intergovernmental context of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters)<sup>49</sup>. From an operational point of view, this legal borderline between the European Community and intergovernmental areas causes many problems because the different strings of decision-making, procedures, and legal instruments which are applicable make any more comprehensive ‘cross-pillar’ action more difficult and cumbersome<sup>50</sup>.

The European Union counter-terrorism policy is not in itself a very clearly defined policy area, as it encompasses aspects of almost all traditional policy areas, for example the EU non-proliferation policy or the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Several EU policies help to address the causes of



radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism<sup>51</sup>. The EU development strategy and its contribution to the Middle East Peace Process play a significant role in this respect, as does the process of comparing and analysing the Member States policies with respect to the integration of minorities and countering discrimination<sup>52</sup>.

There is a paradox in the EU's role in counter-terrorism. On the one hand, the governments agree in principle that cooperation at the EU level is good because of the cross-border nature of the terrorist threat, but on the other, they are slow to give the Union the powers (such as investigation and prosecution) and resources (such as spies and money) it would need to be truly effective<sup>53</sup>. This is because security policy – especially when it concerns protecting citizens – goes to the core of national sovereignty, and governments are reluctant to give the EU powers that could interfere with their existing laws and national security practices<sup>54</sup>. The EU is working hard to coordinate national anti-terrorism policies, but it is only just starting to pursue its own counter-terrorism policies<sup>55</sup>.

### **3. Institutional framework of the European Union counter-terrorism policy setting – actors and their roles**

Institutional framework of the European Union counter-terrorism policy setting could, in broad terms, be divided between four different institutions or groupings: the Council of the European Union with all its bodies, working groups and the secretariat; the Commission of the European Communities; independent agencies of the EU; Member States cooperation outside the formal Council structure, but with links to it.

#### **3.1 The Council of the European Union**

##### **3.1.1 The European Council**

The European Council brings together heads of state or government and the President of the Commission. It discusses numerous contributions that have been prepared by various Council compositions. With counter-terrorism issues that is mainly by the Justice and Home Affairs Council and/or the General Affairs and Foreign Relations Council.

In June 2005 the European Council adopted a Plan of Action containing well over 100 initiatives to be taken during the Dutch, Luxembourg and British

Presidencies<sup>56</sup>. It also identified four priority areas: information sharing, combating terrorist financing, mainstreaming counter-terrorism in the EU's external relations, and improving civil protection and the protection of critical infrastructure<sup>57</sup>. The European Council is turning a lot of attention to counter-terrorism issues as it discusses them at least once a year. But its decisions remain mere declarations as most of the issues are already decided on the ministerial level.

### 3.1.2 The Committee of Permanent Representatives

All the work in the Council is prepared or coordinated by the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), made up of the permanent representatives of the Member States working in Brussels and of their assistants<sup>58</sup>. All texts coming up for a formal ministerial [Council] decision have to pass through COREPER<sup>59</sup>.

Unfortunately, COREPER deals with counter-terrorism related matters in its two formations. COREPER II is composed of ambassadors and deals with counter-terrorism issues that are part of the Justice and Home Affairs, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy, and Financial Policy. COREPER I is made up of ambassadors' deputies and deals with transports, telecommunication, environment, research, etc<sup>60</sup>. As such it does not have the time to devote itself only to counter-terrorism<sup>61</sup>.

*Contact Group (network of focal points) of persons from the Member States' Brussels Permanent Representations dealing with all aspects of terrorism*

The Contact Group (network of focal points) of persons from the Member States' Brussels Permanent Representations dealing with all aspects of terrorism was created in the autumn of 2004 and has so far convened three times<sup>62</sup>. The task of the focal points is to act as central contact points for all counter-terrorism related information in the Member States' Brussels Permanent Representations and guarantee that all relevant documents relating to counter-terrorism reach the competent authorities in the Member States<sup>63</sup>. As such it is not a new Council working group but just a contact group of focal points for preparing the meetings of the Council preparatory bodies and sharing information.

### 3.1.3 The Justice and Home Affairs Council

The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council brings together Justice and Interior ministers on average once a month to discuss the development and implementation of cooperation and common policies in this sector. Since 2001 the Council - notably the Justice and Home Affairs Council - has adopted important legislative measures and policies to facilitate cross-border cooperation by national law-enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies<sup>64</sup>.

The Hague programme adopted in November 2004 by the European Council highlights that “the JHA Ministers within the Council should have the leading role in the fight against terrorism, taking into account the task of the General Affairs and External Relations Council”<sup>65</sup>.

#### *The Article 36 Committee*

The Article 36 Committee (CATS) was set up under Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union to fulfil a coordinating role in criminal matters of police and judicial cooperation and to give opinions for the attention of the Council, either at the Council’s request or on its own initiative. It is also to contribute, without prejudice to the COREPER responsibilities, to the preparation of the Council discussions in the areas covered by Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union<sup>66</sup>.

CATS is, by its nature, a coordinating committee consisting of senior officials from the Member States’ Ministries of the Interior and/or Justice. It coordinates the work of the various third pillar working groups dealing with police cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, Schengen Information System as well as the work of the EU agencies and the various bodies working with police and judicial cooperation (Europol, Eurojust, Cepol etc.)<sup>67</sup>. As a general rule, CATS meets once a month.

#### *The Terrorism Working Group*

One of the two Council working groups fully devoted to the fight against terrorism is the Terrorism Working Group (TWG) composed of representatives of the Member States’ Ministries of the Interior and/or law enforcement agencies (and in some Member States of security services)<sup>68</sup>. This group meets three to five times per Presidency and deals with internal threat assessments, practical cooperation and coordination among EU bodies<sup>69</sup>. For the last three years, the TWG has held, once per presidency, joint meetings with the second

pillar working party on terrorism (COTER) dealing with international aspects, to issue a consolidated assessment ("compendium"), integrating the internal and external dimension of the threat<sup>70</sup>.

The TWG itself covers only the law enforcement cooperation aspects - other JHA elements which might have an impact on the fight against terrorism such as visa policy, document security and judicial cooperation are dealt with elsewhere, while other aspects such as transport security or data protection have yet another different chain of reporting/decision making.

#### *The Working Party on Civil Protection*

The Working Party on Civil Protection is working on an early warning mechanism and consequence management as a whole<sup>71</sup>. It has also been dealing increasingly with counter-terrorism issues as the terrorism threat has been growing in the EU Member States.

#### *The Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum*

The Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum coordinates the work of the various working groups in the field of migration, visa, borders and asylum<sup>72</sup>. This working committee and its subordinate preparatory working groups process regulations that support the fight against terrorism.

### **3.1.4 The General Affairs and External Relations Council**

The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) consists of the Member States ministers of foreign affairs. It touches upon counter-terrorism issues mainly when it prepares the European Council meetings and updates the EU list of terrorist organizations and persons linked to terrorist activities. This list was first adopted in December 2001 in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>.

#### *The Political and Security Committee*

The Political and Security Committee coordinates the second pillar working groups in the field of the CFSP and the ESDP<sup>73</sup>. It has similar functions as CATS, but in the II pillar.

#### *The Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors*

The Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors engages itself particularly in the EU mechanism to freeze assets of terrorists and terrorist organizations<sup>74</sup>.

It discusses the Member States' proposals in the format called the Clearing House.

*The Working Party on Terrorism (International Aspects)*

Second Council working group fully devoted to the fight against terrorism is the Working Party on Terrorism (International Aspects) (COTER), which is mainly composed of representatives of the Member States' ministries of foreign affairs<sup>75</sup>. This group meets once a month and deals with issues related to external matters, threat assessments and policy recommendations as regards third countries and regions, implementation of the United Nations conventions and the coordination of work, in particular in the United Nations as well as handling seminars on the financing of terrorism<sup>76</sup>.

### **3.1.5 The Council secretariat**

In the JHA sector, the Council secretariat has played a markedly different role from that of its other spheres of activity. Apart from the usual role of note-taking and reporting, advising on procedures and being the 'honest broker' and 'institutional memory', the Council secretariat has in this particular field played the role of a motor, legal drafter and initiative taker<sup>77</sup>.

*The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator*

In March 2004 the European Council adopted the "Declaration on Combating Terrorism" in which the Council emphasised "that a comprehensive and strongly coordinated approach is required in response to the threat posed by terrorism"<sup>78</sup>. With the same declaration the European Council agreed to the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC). Consequently the Council also welcomed the decision of the Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana to appoint Mr. Gijs de Vries to the position<sup>79</sup>. According to the Council declaration the Coordinator works within the Council Secretariat, coordinates the work of the Council in combating terrorism and, with due regard to the responsibilities of the Commission, maintains an overview of all the instruments at the Union's disposal with a view to regular reporting to the Council and effective follow-up of Council decisions<sup>80</sup>. According to de Vries he does not have a more specific job description<sup>81</sup>.

In Keohane's<sup>82</sup> opinion, de Vries has virtually no powers, apart from persuasion as he cannot force governments to act, in addition he has no budget and cannot propose legislation nor can he chair meetings of national justice or foreign

ministers to set the anti-terrorism agenda. De Vries has stated himself that he is not responsible for coordinating individual Member States' national counter-terrorism structures or operations as that is a matter for the countries themselves<sup>83</sup>.

### *The Situation Centre*

In June 2005 the Council decided to stimulate cooperation among Europe's security and intelligence services by reinforcing the Situation Centre (SitCen) in the Council Secretariat<sup>84</sup>. SitCen brings together national experts to analyse intelligence assessments from the Member States (rather than raw intelligence)<sup>85</sup>. The national officials decide what information they want to send to SitCen<sup>86</sup>. Previously, SitCen analysts only assessed threats emanating from outside the EU territory<sup>87</sup>. From 2005 onwards SitCen provides the Council with strategic analysis of the terrorist threat based on intelligence from the Member States' security [internal security services] and intelligence services [external services] and, where appropriate, on information provided by Europol<sup>88</sup>.

## **3.2 The Commission of the European Communities**

The role of the Commission of the European Communities is to make proposals for European Union legislation<sup>89</sup>. It also monitors how that legislation is implemented once it has been adopted by the EU Council of Ministers<sup>90</sup>. However, in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security the European Commission shares its right to make legislative proposals with the Member States<sup>91</sup>.

Generally, the Commission, which until 1997 had virtually no role in the area of law enforcement and security, is now fully associated with the work and indeed has generated, in response to requests from the Council and the European Council, most of the proposals in the field of counter-terrorism<sup>92</sup>. One of the examples of the Commission's work is, for instance, its intention to propose in 2005 a European programme for the protection of critical infrastructure with a trans-boundary dimension<sup>93</sup>. Based on the information provided by the Member States, the Commission is drawing up an assessment of the national assets and capabilities that can be made available through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in the event of a major terrorist attack<sup>94</sup>.

According to Mr. Jonathan Faull, the Commission Director-General for Justice, Freedom and Security there is an internal working group of the Commission which he chairs together with his colleague from the External Relations Directorate-General. The working group brings together everybody within the

Commission dealing with the internal and the external aspects of terrorism. Below that level there is an internal group, chaired by Mr Faull's director responsible for counter-terrorism, and an external group, chaired by the external relations staff on the directorate level<sup>95</sup>.

#### *The Monitoring and Information Centre*

Set up at the Commission in the framework of the Civil Protection Mechanism, the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) is the central instrument of cooperation between the national emergency systems and the EU level<sup>96</sup>. Following an attack, Member States may choose to appeal to the solidarity of the other Member States, either bilaterally or through MIC, which has a permanent and direct contact with the various civil protection capabilities in the Member States, as well as a database of the civil protection capacities that may be provided by the Member States on a case by case basis and which may include national military resources<sup>97</sup>. MIC can provide assessment/ coordination teams capable of assessing needs and facilitating coordination, as well as intervention teams made available by the Member States<sup>98</sup>.

### **3.3 The independent agencies**

The institutions listed below have been established by the Member States and remain under the intergovernmental control of their various management boards<sup>99</sup>. However, given their pan-European approach to law enforcement and, in some cases, daily operations independent of oversight by the Member States, these bodies represent a subtle but noteworthy shift in the direction of a more supranational approach to fighting transnational organized crime in the EU<sup>100</sup>.

#### **3.3.1 Europol**

“Europol is the European Union law enforcement organisation that handles criminal intelligence. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness and co-operation between the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing and combating serious international organised crime and terrorism.”<sup>101</sup> Europol is charged with building and maintaining a database of information supplied by the Member States, and using this data to analyse crimes, conduct specific investigations at the request of national law enforcement authorities, and request that the latter launch such investigations<sup>102</sup>.

Europol's main role is to assist national police forces through the exchange and analysis of information, its operational role is limited to supporting joint investigative teams at the request of a Member State<sup>103</sup>. It has been given a central role in the fight against terrorism, following 11 September 2001, particularly through the establishment of its Counter-Terrorism Task Force which brought together experts from various law enforcement and intelligence services<sup>104</sup>.

In Gijs de Vries opinion only Europol has the capacity to comprehensively map European trends in crime and the relationship between the smuggling of people, weapons, drugs and the financing of terrorism<sup>105</sup>. The Counter Terrorism Task Force of Europol has identified the financing of terrorism as a priority issue and is working, *inter alia*, on the identification of new sources and methods of terrorist financing, as well as of fund raising using local Islamic charities and cash couriers<sup>106</sup>.

### **3.3.2 Eurojust**

Eurojust is an independent body composed of magistrates from the EU Member States and it aims to improve coordination and cooperation between investigators and prosecutors dealing with serious international crime including terrorism and has convened meetings on how to improve judicial cooperation to fight terrorism<sup>107</sup>.

The Member States have designated a Eurojust national correspondent for terrorist matters in order to enhance its counter-terrorist work<sup>108</sup>. Eurojust has set up a team that is specifically tasked with looking into questions of terrorism<sup>109</sup>. The main aims of the Terrorism Team are to ensure that the terrorism co-ordination meetings are well prepared and organised, to enhance the exchange of information related to terrorism via regular contacts with nominated correspondents on terrorism and to establish a general database of legal documents related to terrorism<sup>110</sup>.

### **3.3.3 The European Border Agency**

The European Border Agency was created in October 2004 by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004. The Agency coordinates operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders; assists Member States in training national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; carries out risk analyses; follows



up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; assists Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; provides Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations<sup>111</sup>.

### **3.4 Member States cooperation outside the Council**

#### **3.4.1 The Counter Terrorism Group**

The intelligence and security services of the Member States have cooperated in the fight against terrorism for a considerable time within the informal framework of the so-called 'Club of Bern', where some other European countries participate as well<sup>112</sup>. After the attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 2001 and following the conclusions of the European Council of 21 September 2001, the heads of the European Union Member States security services set up a specific counter-terrorism focused cooperation group called the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG)<sup>113</sup>. Their first meeting was held in Hague in November 2001, chaired by the Belgian service and organised by the BVD [Netherlands' National Security Service]<sup>114</sup>.

The Group consists of the EU Member States' security services counter-terrorist experts plus their counterparts in Norway and Switzerland<sup>115</sup>. It is important to note that police services do not participate in this group<sup>116</sup>. The Police services cooperate in the Police Chiefs Task Force and Police Working Group on Terrorism setups. The CTG meets after every three months under the chairmanship of the service of the country holding the European Union presidency, but it is outside the Council structures<sup>117</sup>. The CTG reports to the national representatives in the regular European Union groups via the national capitals<sup>118</sup>.

The objective of CTG is to improve operational cooperation<sup>119</sup>. Its work focuses on Islamic terrorism and, among other things, includes the preparation of common threat assessments and discussions of initiatives to optimise the operational cooperation on combating terrorism<sup>120</sup>. In addition, the group has initiated discussions on a number of organisational and structural issues; as well as preparations for the admission of the services of the new EU Member States<sup>121</sup>. Also the heads of the security forces of the Member States meet regularly in the CTG format<sup>122</sup>. According to Ireland's National Police Service Commissioner Noel Conroy, this co-operation is demonstrated by the fact that

during the Irish Presidency of the European Union, when the outrage happened in Madrid on 9 March 2004, the CTG convened for an emergency meeting in Dublin attended by all countries' heads of counter-terrorism<sup>123</sup>. Its purpose was to identify best practice for a co-ordinated response to that outrage<sup>124</sup>.

Taking into account the abovementioned, the CTG provides the security services with a useful operational level format for changing terrorism related information in a multilateral way. This is a good achievement as traditionally security services have been collaborating bilaterally. The existence of the Group helps in streamlining the implementation side of the counter-terrorism policy and as such is a vital part of the European Union counter-terrorism institutional framework.

### **3.4.2 The Police Chiefs Task Force**

The Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) is an international forum to help high-level national police officials share best practices and information on current trends in cross-border crime, and contribute to the planning of joint operations<sup>125</sup>. Launched during the Portuguese Presidency in 2000, it meets every six months, outlining various common priority areas, such as community policing and drug trafficking<sup>126</sup>. The PCTF is headed by the Presiding Member State of the EU. The Council decided on 19 November 2004 that the PCTF should meet within the Council structures on strategic issues but also that they should have an operational meeting.

### **3.4.3 The Police Working Group on Terrorism**

The Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) was formally established in 1979 in response to terrorist threats from, among others, the Provisional IRA, the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader Meinhof gang in Germany. It provides operational communication between the EU Member States police forces at about the level of the heads of the national counter-terrorism bodies<sup>127</sup>. The leaders of all the PWGT counter-terrorist units meet twice a year in the member countries on a rotating basis<sup>128</sup>. It tends to operate at a level which is below that of the European Police Chiefs Task Force<sup>129</sup>.

## **4. Analysis of the current institutional framework and its problems**

Monica de Boer<sup>130</sup> has outlined the problem with the EU counter-terrorism policy setting very well by saying that, “a crowded policy area, which harbours a

multiplication of actors who may not all be seeking to achieve the same policy objectives leads to obstructions along the decision-making process, or – seen from a slightly more optimistic perspective - to duplications and inefficiency regarding the achievement of policy objectives.”

*Reforming the institutional framework and progress made so far*

In March 2004, only three days before the Madrid bombings, the EU's foreign and security policy chief, Javier Solana, finished an internal report on the EU's counter-terrorism efforts<sup>131</sup>. The report identified three major shortfalls: some Member States were not implementing the EU agreements, such as the common arrest warrant; the EU lacked sufficient resources to play a meaningful role in counter-terrorism; and coordination between the EU officials working on law enforcement, foreign and defence policies was poor<sup>132</sup>.

After the Madrid attacks the European Council emphasized in its declaration on combating terrorism, issued on 25 March 2004, that it instructs the Council to put in place new committee structures capable of ensuring greater operational cooperation on security and terrorism within the Union<sup>133</sup>. From this only one conclusion could be made - institutional framework that was present at the time did not satisfy the Member States.

On 3 June 2004, COREPER discussed the working structures of the Council in terrorism matters on the basis of options submitted by the CTC Gijs de Vries and agreed to maintain the current working group structures but to reinforce coordination in capitals and in Brussels<sup>134</sup>. COREPER also came to the conclusion that it should engage itself in a more systematic and regular follow-up of implementation of the Action Plan, by discussing terrorism once a month at COREPER where Presidency and/or the CTC would make a report on the latest developments, and by giving stronger direction to the work being undertaken in various committees and working parties, and by reporting to the Justice and Home Affairs Council as well as to the General Affairs Council which has overall responsibility for coordinating and organising the work of the Council<sup>135</sup>. COREPER also stated that the working structures of the Council should be reviewed by COREPER before the June 2005 European Council<sup>136</sup>.

In a sense it was a decision to continue with the present status quo situation as reinforcing coordination in capitals is dependent on 25 different capitals with different national systems. The decision to discuss terrorism once a month in COREPER adds extra burden on the COREPER agenda and the ambassadors

might not have enough time to go through all the issues in detail. Furthermore, there has been no review of the Council working structures so far. In a way it shows lack of continuity already at the COREPER level.

*The issue with the EU 'pillars' system and the need for cross-pillar coordination*

The European Union Committee at the United Kingdom House of Lords<sup>137</sup> made a thorough inquiry about the EU's response to terrorism and came to the conclusion that: "In an area where clarity of roles and responsibilities is vital, we found the structures within the EU for combating terrorism complex and confusing". Keohane<sup>138</sup> adds his opinion that "the EU has been slow to build an effective institutional infrastructure for counter-terrorism".

In Gijs de Vries opinion current working structures of the Council are directed towards the artificial division of pillars, something that does not facilitate coordination either in Brussels or in capitals<sup>139</sup>. There is no dedicated body in Brussels that deals with all the aspects of terrorism on a full time basis<sup>140</sup>. COREPER does not have the time to devote itself only to this issue and also deals with terrorist related matters in its two formations (COREPER II deals with the JHA, the CFSP, the ESDP, the financing of terrorism; COREPER I deals with transports, telecommunication, the environment)<sup>141</sup>. The two main Council Working Groups on terrorism (COTER and TWG) act in separate pillars, are capitals-based and do not feed sufficiently into the Brussels-based discussion and decision-making processes<sup>142</sup>. Coordination problems have emerged between the first and second pillars, for example in relation to programming<sup>143</sup>. That is the case especially when it comes to planning technical assistance programmes<sup>144</sup>.

Currently, the Council and the Commission are responsible for coordinating instruments and initiatives within their respective areas of competence<sup>145</sup>. But arguably, the sheer complexity of the field and the variety of actors, institutions and organizations involved means that effective coordination will require some bureaucratic consolidation, as well as the full-time attention of an organization dedicated to the purpose<sup>146</sup>. One of the solutions could be that the CTC could encourage greater cooperation between the Commission and the Council<sup>147</sup>. But according to Keohane some Commission officials are suspicious of de Vries as he works for the national governments in the Council. They fear that, as an 'agent' of the governments, de Vries will try to limit the Commission's role in the EU counter-terrorism efforts<sup>148</sup>.

This all means that within the institutions, there are considerable coordination challenges given the range of actors involved and even more points to the need to have a High-Level Cross-Pillar Counter-Terrorism Committee that would report to COREPER as that is the only cross-pillar decision-making structure preparing the Council meetings. A High-Level Cross-Pillar Counter-Terrorism Committee, chaired by the CTC and Presidency could provide an adequate structure for raising problems and making proposals to COREPER to task other Council working groups to draft concrete solutions in the policy areas that are related to counter-terrorism. That would also take away the extra burden put on COREPER. Also it would help to limit the European policy-makers 'stovepipe' effect<sup>149</sup>, where one actor is unaware of or unable to affect the actions of the other key players. For the EU, this means limiting the barriers raised by the three pillars<sup>150</sup>.

However, it is likely that the best thing to be done in order to overcome the difficulties in the EU counter-terrorism policy setting is to abolish the current pillar structure and to create an appropriate institutional framework that would support efficient policy setting. The provisions in "The Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe" could make it a reality, but for the time being its ratification process has been put on hold following the disapproval by the French and Dutch citizens. But once ratified, the abolition of our famous "pillars" should make it easier to properly design integrated EU policies in this, as in other, areas<sup>151</sup>. And it should significantly improve the decision-making process in the EU, making it easier to adopt legislation on terrorism and other forms of international crime<sup>152</sup>. The Council of Ministers would be able to adopt legislation in the field of counter-terrorism (including public health aspects of emergency response management) on the basis of qualified majority voting instead of unanimity, as is the case today<sup>153</sup>. The European Parliament would gain key legislative powers and national parliaments would obtain additional powers to scrutinise the EU draft legislation<sup>154</sup>. Moreover, The Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe would bring additional power to Eurojust to initiate investigations and to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction, when a European law has been adopted<sup>155</sup>. But as long as the "Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe" is on hold, other ways need to be found in order to achieve concentrated European action.

#### *EU's role in counter-terrorism*

The EU does not, and probably never will, run its own counter-terrorist operations<sup>156</sup>. It is the Member States alone that carry out anti-terrorist

operations<sup>157</sup>. The role of the EU in fighting terrorism, as defined by the Council, is to assist the Member States, not to supplant them<sup>158</sup>. Police forces, judicial authorities, security and intelligence agencies, border authorities all remain under national control, which means also that most operational work in the field of counter-terrorism will therefore remain in the preserve of national authorities<sup>159</sup>. Therefore, one has to be clear about what the EU can and cannot do, so as not to create expectations the EU could not meet.

Consequently, also in terms of operational cooperation, the CTG should be the main body where these matters are discussed and intelligence shared. If necessary, due to the formal reasons of reporting and accountability, the CTG could be made an official Council working group that would report to CATS or even better - to the High-Level Cross-Pillar Counter-Terrorism Committee.

#### *The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator's role*

The CTC has a vital role in overseeing the work of the various EU groups and committees within the Second and Third Pillars in order to prevent overlapping, avoid duplication and to ensure that their aims and objectives are delivered and in monitoring the implementation of agreed measures<sup>160</sup>. But in the House of Lords opinion, the CTC should have a clear job description which identifies his primary role as an internal coordinator rather than an external representative<sup>161</sup>. It should also provide less scope for ambiguity than at present.

#### *Strengthening analysis*

With the strengthening of the SitCen, one central body which collects information from Member States competent authorities and puts it together into analysis has been established. This can certainly be called a significant step forward, as previously COTER and TWG were preparing threat analysis and other kinds of analysis. With that change, the Council working groups will be able to task the SitCen to draw up analysis and focus their work on drafting policy recommendations and regulations.

Overall, the issue of the counter-terrorism policy setting institutional framework has been on the agenda for at least a year and a half. Only limited progress has been achieved so far. The appointment of a CTC with an ambiguous job description and the strengthening of the SitCen is virtually all that has been done so far. As Keohane<sup>162</sup> notes the EU's countless counter-terrorism committees and its extensive action plan will not have much long-term impact unless they are all working towards the same basic aim. Given the range of interests involved, effective coordination – and the work of the CTC – is crucial<sup>163</sup>. The

present proliferation of the EU groups and agencies needs to be reduced and streamlined<sup>164</sup>.

## Conclusions

Terrorism is a threat to EU Member States security. The European Security Strategy states that Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism<sup>165</sup>. Several plots have been foiled by Member States security and police services. But as the Madrid attacks in March 2004 and the London attacks in July 2005 demonstrated particularly radical Islamic terrorist groups remain a serious threat to all Member States. European countries are so interdependent of each other, which mean that none of them can effectively protect their citizens on their own.

Safeguarding national security and protecting state and its citizens from terrorists falls in the competence of the Member States. The EU has a role to play but it must remain a coordinating one in support of the Member States, which have the primary responsibility for combating terrorism<sup>166</sup>. The hard work of tracking down potential terrorists, preventing attacks and bringing suspects to justice remains the preserve of national services<sup>167</sup>. The EU does not have the powers, such as investigation and prosecution, to tackle terrorism like a national government<sup>168</sup>. It can help governments to identify, extradite and prosecute terrorists, but it is only slowly developing its own anti-terrorism policies<sup>169</sup>.

One has to take into account that counter-terrorism policy is a horizontal policy. It does not only involve internal security policy shaping the legal environment of the security services and the police, but involves also foreign policy, for example agreements with third parties, financial policy setting the rules for financial sector institutions, health policy setting rules as to what kind of vaccines to store, cultural policy regulating the work of religious institutions, telecommunication and transport policy regulations, immigration policy, etc. On the EU level it all comes together as a cross-pillar policy as a result of the current pillar system. It is evident from the description of the present institutional framework and its analysis presented earlier that the present pillar system and its institutional framework complicate counter-terrorism policy setting on the EU level. Member States have understood that as well, by highlighting in the declaration on combating terrorism the need for putting in place new committee structures capable of ensuring greater operational cooperation on security and terrorism within the EU<sup>170</sup>. But as long as the pillar system is in place, only

minor changes to the institutional framework can be achieved. Creation of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator post within the Council secretariat is a step in positive direction, but its job description should be more specific with less ambiguity in it than at present.

Based on the analysis presented earlier one solution could be the creation of a High-Level Cross-Pillar Counter-Terrorism Committee, chaired by the CTC and the Presidency for raising problems and making proposals to COREPER to task other Council working groups to draft concrete solutions in the policy areas related to counter-terrorism. As a cross-pillar preparatory body this would limit the barriers raised by the three pillars. In addition strengthening of SitCen could be carried further by tasking it with analytical activities in all policy areas. That means that other working groups should not prepare their own analytical documents anymore, but concentrate on making policy recommendations and drafting necessary regulations.

As the role of the EU in fighting terrorism is to assist the Member States, not to supplant them, the operational cooperation and intelligence sharing should mainly be left to the CTG, PCTF and PWGT. If necessary, due to formal reporting and accountability reasons, the CTG, PCTF and PWGT could also be made official Council working groups that would report to CATS.

Overall, the issue of institutional framework of the EU level counter-terrorism policy setting has been on the agenda for at least a year and a half. Only limited progress has been achieved so far. The appointment of a CTC with an ambiguous job description and the strengthening of the SitCen is virtually all that has been done so far. As Keohane<sup>171</sup> notes the EU's countless counter-terrorism committees and its extensive action plan will not have much long-term impact unless they are all working towards the same basic aim. Clear understanding of what can be done at EU level in the fight against terrorism and putting in place effective institutional framework for that is crucial for minimizing the threat of terrorism to EU Member States security.

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- <sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>127</sup> The House of Lords, p. 24.
- <sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>130</sup> De Boer, M. (2003). 9/11 and the europeanisation of anti-terrorism policy: a critical assessment. *Policy Papers N°6, Notre Europe*, September 2003, p. 22.
- <sup>131</sup> Keohane, p. 18.
- <sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

- <sup>133</sup> The Council of the European Union, 03.2004, p. 6.
- <sup>134</sup> The Council of the European Union (06.2004). Outcome of proceedings of COREPER on 3 June 2004 on item 27 of the agenda - Working structures of the Council in terrorism matters. Doc. 10147/04, 4.06.2004, p. 2.
- <sup>135</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>136</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>137</sup> The House of Lords, 2005.
- <sup>138</sup> Keohane, p. 23.
- <sup>139</sup> The Council of the European Union, 05.2004, p. 2.
- <sup>140</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>141</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>142</sup> Ibid., p. 1.
- <sup>143</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>144</sup> Põllu, loc.cit.
- <sup>145</sup> Dalgaard-Nielsen, p. 174.
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>147</sup> Keohane, p. 19.
- <sup>148</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>149</sup> Lindstrom, 2004.
- <sup>150</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>151</sup> De Vries, 09.2004a, p. 7.
- <sup>152</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>153</sup> De Vries, 11.2004, p. 7.
- <sup>154</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>155</sup> De Vries, 06.2004, p. 8.
- <sup>156</sup> Keohane, p. 21.
- <sup>157</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>158</sup> De Vries, 11.2004, p. 7.
- <sup>159</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>160</sup> The House of Lords, p. 26.
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>162</sup> Keohane, p. 38.
- <sup>163</sup> The House of Lords, p. 6.
- <sup>164</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>165</sup> The Council of the European Union, 12.2003, p. 3.
- <sup>166</sup> The House of Lords, p.6.
- <sup>167</sup> De Vries, 09.2004a, p. 8.
- <sup>168</sup> Keohane, p. 37.
- <sup>169</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>170</sup> The Council of the European Union, 03.2004, p. 6.
- <sup>171</sup> Keohane, p. 38.

## The UN Role in Future Military Conflicts

By *Holger Schabio* \*

### Introduction

#### The UN in a changing security environment 1945 - 1990

In the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), signed on 26 June 1945, the people determine amongst others, 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war', 'to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours' and 'to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest'.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, this high aim has never totally been achieved. However, the UN established a system, in which the member states find a framework for peaceful settlement of conflicts.

Having overcome World War II, the UN was intended to 'maintain international peace and security' and 'to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace'.<sup>2</sup> As a main instrument the Security Council (SC) was established, which reflected the multi-polar relations of power after WW II. Although the United States were dominant in economical terms, England and France as main colonial powers and the Soviet Union and China had to be considered.<sup>3</sup>

Esref Aksu sees the following cornerstones in the history of the UN:

#### 1. The East – West conflict

In the late 40's and early 50's, the world faced the transition from a multi-polar to a bipolar world, in which a 'step-by-step escalation of the worldwide ideological and strategic confrontation between two superpowers occurred. This phase reached its climax with the Cuban missile crisis and the build-up of the Berlin Wall. This bipolarity between the US and the Soviet Union made it almost impossible for the UN to find the political consensus required to engage in conflicts, in which the interests of one superpower was tangled. <sup>4</sup> In 42 years,

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between 1948 and 1990, only 18 operations were conducted.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, major military operations, such as the US intervention at Guatemala in 1954, the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 or the Vietnam War (just to name a few) were subject of discussion, but not of decision within the UN.

## 2. The North – South conflict

This conflict is mainly characterized by the politics of decolonization after WW II. The colonial powers, mainly France and Great Britain realized that the process had its own dynamics and tried to establish influence – based colonialism instead of the traditional, military – based colonialism.<sup>6</sup> The process of decolonization caused several severe wars and conflicts, which are partially still not solved (e.g. Kashmir – conflict). To a certain extent, the recent ethnic conflicts in the southern hemisphere are the result of failures during the decolonization process.

## The Post Cold War Era

Most of the UN peacekeeping operations until 1990 had a traditional approach, meaning that the mandate was mainly related to cease-fire monitoring and were conducted after the end of hostilities to give a certain backing to political negotiations. Consequently, those missions took up to 50 years or longer.<sup>7</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping became more complex in nature, often embedded in a state building process in originally intra-state scenario and significant cross-border effects. Furthermore, UN operations deployed to theatres, where the conflict is unfinished, the UN forces first need to create the peace, they later keep.<sup>8</sup> The number of UN engagements increased significantly. From 1990 to 2004, 41 missions were ongoing.

This changing environment of the UN Peace Operations implies the necessity to examine which options, strategies, and possibilities the UN have, to meet the future challenges of armed conflicts.

This paper's purpose is to analyse options for UN engagement in different types and intensity of military conflicts in the Post Cold-War Era. Mechanisms and capabilities of the United Nations in terms of conflict – resolution will be analysed. Its suitability to modern conflict scenarios will be studied based on the examples of previous scenarios, which are likely to appear in future conflicts. The question is, whether the military methods of the United Nations as we know them today are suitable for the settlement of conflicts in present and future scenarios?

## Elements of analysis

In order to analyse the problem, it needs to be subdivided into three parts.

1. The “constitution” of the United Nations is the Charter. It provides the framework for all UN activities and is agreed by all member states. The Security Council as an executive element in terms of peace and security, providing resolutions which can mandate military engagement if required. The basis for its resolutions is again the Charter. The question of the legitimacy of UN military operations comes up very frequently, mainly because the principle of state – sovereignty as laid down in Article 2 of the Charter is interpreted in various ways. On the other hand, the nature of many conflicts lies within the internal structure. It is therefore required to investigate the legitimacy and legality of UN military operations in this context.

It also needs to be noted, that the UN is embedded in a system of international organizations. This is important in two aspects. UN can use them by authorizing them to carry out mandated missions. On the other hand, those organizations and countries have the power to act independently. This of course would be negative for the credibility of the UN.

2. The ‘Military methods’, which can be applied by the UN are extremely different in their type and intensity. Since its existence, they were under a permanent process of evolution. Especially since the end of the Cold War, UN missions were not always to be considered successful. The impression of the UN being a ‘toothless tiger’ was widespread. However, as already stated, the number of military missions has increased significantly since 1990. So there is obviously an increasing demand for UN military engagement. On the other hand the question is, whether its instruments are adequate for the given situation. In order to clarify that, it is required to analyse them and to highlight their strengths and weaknesses.

3. The conflict scenarios of present and future are the third element, which needs to be considered. Conflict scenarios have developed significantly. Inter – state war, which has characterized conflict scenarios throughout the history, is not that common anymore. Recent history shows a significant number of intra – state conflicts, which are characterized by extreme brutality against the civilian population. The ethnical or political tension that was the reason for their outbreak was often covered by the Cold War and became visible after the war.

Considering the elements of the problem as stated above, the following factors are crucial for the topic:



*a. The position of the UN in the international security system*

There are other organisations besides the UN, which are related to security. NATO is the most important but others, such as OSCE or OAU also play a role in a conflict resolution. Another globally acting power is the United States, whose policy towards the UN was often subject of discussion. It is important to consider those players as well. Their cooperation or non-cooperation might significantly influence UN's ability to act.

*b. Legal background for UN Military Operations*

The Charter of the UN, which was signed in 1948, is the baseline for all UN military operations. However, during the last years it has become obvious, that not all possible and necessary engagements are *expressis verbis* covered by the Charter. It is of utmost importance for every soldier in the mission to have clarity concerning the legitimacy of his actions making this issue thereby worthwhile to consider.

A second aspect is the problem of UN engagement in intra – state conflicts. During the Kosovo crisis the question about the legitimacy of intervening in, what some countries saw as an internal affair of the state of Former Yugoslavia was raised. Different perceptions of whether a conflict is an internal affair or a threat to the international peace and security might prevent UN from deploying troops.

*c. Selection of the appropriate military operation: Types and characteristics*

The UN toolbox offers a widespread variety of forms of military operations, which are suitable for different scenarios. The choice mainly depends on the stage of conflict. Depending on that, the method and intensity of an engagement will be determined. The analysis of the given situation within the Security Council will then lead to the mandate and subsequently to the composition of the force and the Rules of Engagement. This is probably the most important aspect for the success or failure of an operation.

*d. The mandate*

The mandate as specified in the Resolutions of the Security Council is the key element for the mission, as it determines the nature of the operation. As past operations have proved, the mission is either likely to fail or become impossible to accomplish with the forces available if the mandate does not reflect the situation.

*e. Capabilities and Force Generation*

One of the most important prerequisites for a successful accomplishment of the mission is to have the appropriate capabilities for the given mandate. A force, that is unable to fulfil its task due to the lack of power, will considerably damage the reputation and credibility of the UN. The generation of forces, which means bringing qualified and motivated personnel to theatre, must also be considered as decisive.

Those factors will be investigated on two scenarios of UN operations considered relevant for the future in the second step of the paper with the help of case a study. It is important to mention, that only the aspects of a military engagement will be elaborated.

## **1. Key factors of the UN engagement**

### **1.1 The position of the UN in the international security system**

This section focuses on the political process within the UN which is required to come to the establishment of a military mission. Although it does not specifically address military questions, it is of utmost importance for the generation and setup of a mission. As will be shown later in this study, the political and diplomatic decisions have direct impact on the success or failure of a mission.

As the only global organization, the UN plays the central role in world politics when it comes to the question, whether a military intervention should be conducted or not. The legal framework is provided by the charter of the UN, which commits all member-states to pacific settlement of disputes and establishes mechanisms against those members, which do not follow that principle.<sup>9</sup> The Security Council as the decision making organ in matters of peace and security is the only legitimate authority, which can authorize any action of force by establishing a resolution and giving a mandate for a military force in order to be engaged.<sup>10</sup> Any military action without the approval of the Security Council will have the bad taste of illegitimacy. However, as the conflict in Kosovo has shown, there might be situations, when the Security Council is unable to act because it is blocked by national interests of one permanent member. In those cases, UN credibility is at risk as it is unable to meet its responsibility. NATO and US have stated and demonstrated their will to take military action without UN mandate. For the UN, this implies a very challenging situation, as those actions are suitable to undermine the Security Councils authority.

Other Security or Defence organizations, especially NATO were built around that UN framework and referred in its foundation documents to the Charter.<sup>11</sup> However, the composition of the UN Security Council with its 5 permanent members - USA, UK, France, Russia and China plus 10 additional countries being elected for 2 years reflects the structure of power of the post WW II era. The possibility of the “Permanent 5” to block resolutions with their veto often prevented UN engagement. Consequently, UN’s “inability to act” was often criticized.<sup>12</sup> However, it needs to be noted, that the number of vetoes declined dramatically after the end of the Cold War. Out of 213 “No” votes of the Permanent 5, only 17 were given between 1990 and April 2004.<sup>13</sup>

Whereas the UN is an organization of collective security (acting within the organization), NATO is a system of collective defence (against attacks from outside the organization). Although NATO refers to the principles of the UN charter in the North Atlantic Treaty, the Kosovo Air Campaign in 1999 was carried out without a mandate of the Security Council. The case never came to vote, because it was clear, that Russia would veto any resolution, which would allow the use of force against Serbia. The Alliances Strategic Concept of 1999, which was released during the Air Strikes, highlighted the “primary responsibility” of the Security Council, but the option of military engagement without UN’s approval is not ruled out.<sup>14</sup> This however should be exceptional. The ongoing NATO Non – Article 5 operations, e.g. ISAF or KFOR, are covered by resolutions.

Chapter VIII of the UN charter allows the existence of “regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional actions...” Those regional organizations, such as OSCE or OAU, can establish own missions; however enforcement action shall only be taken when authorized by the Security Council.<sup>15</sup>

It also needs to be noted, that UN can also give the responsibility for military action to an ad-hoc coalition under the command of one state. This was done during the wars in Korea and the Persian Gulf.<sup>16</sup>

Beside international frameworks, the role of the USA in international relations needs to be specifically considered. As the only remaining superpower, US have the capability to act unilaterally. After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the government has declared the war on terror. With the war against Iraq, the US administration has shown that it sees it as its fundamental right to act militarily

where it deems necessary including preventive or pre-emptive strikes. US President George W. Bush stated on 18 March 2004:

*America must confront threats, before they fully materialize. In Iraq, my administration looked at the intelligence information, and we saw a threat. (...) I had a choice to make; either take the word of a madman, or take such threats seriously and defend America. Faced with that choice, I will defend America every time.<sup>17</sup>*

However, it needs to be stated, that the resources of the US military are not unlimited. The military actions, especially the operation in Iraq already require units of the reserves. Active membership in organizations like the UN therefore should be in US interest, although the present government relies more on coalitions of the willing.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have determined a new challenge for international security politics and the UN in particular. If UN wants to keep its role as a primary authority in question of war and peace in international relations, it needs to specify its politics concerning preventive and pre-emptive military action against terrorist structure and terrorist harbouring states. The relationship between the UN and US is of utmost importance for both. Being one of the Permanent 5 in the Security Council and the strongest military power, the US have significant influence over the decision making process. In order to stay credible, UN organs need to include US interests and positions. On the other hand, the UN is not a US installation. Despite being able to act unilaterally when required it is clearly in the interest of the US to find itself a place inside the international community.

## **1.2 Legal background of UN military operations**

This section analyses the UN Charter in its function as a legal framework for UN military operations. Apart from national interests, the question of legality of an intervention is the main reason for disagreement and consequently a possible delay or denial of a UN military mission. Of special concern in this respect is the argument of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign state.

### **1.2.1 The Charter as legal basis for UN operations**

Chapter VI and VII provide the legal background for UN Peace-support operations. Chapter VI emphasises the diplomatic ways for conflict resolution or the decision by the International Court of Justice on legal disputes. Those non –

military operations will not be elaborated. Chapter VII opens the door for restrictive measures in order to enforce resolutions of the Security Council, which are mandatory for any military engagement. Chapter VII operations could be blockades or military actions ‘as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’<sup>18</sup>. This terminology allows forceful engagement, including a full scale war. However, the most commonly known UN operations, the traditional Peacekeeping Operation and the Observation mission, are not explicitly covered by the Charter. This becomes visible when reading the resolution texts, which usually do not refer to any article of the Charter. Apparently, the fathers of the Charter did not see the possibility to engage military forces without having an enforcement mission. Dag Hammarskjöld stated, that those missions would be under “Chapter VI ½”, which of course does not exist. Scholars have different opinions about the importance of this gap and how to overcome it. Christian Tomuschat argues that the right of the Security Council to conduct enforcement actions implies ‘a maiore ad minus’, that less intensive military operations are covered as well. Furthermore he sees common law applicable, as there is no state, which would generally reject the existence of Peacekeeping or Observation missions.<sup>19</sup> Michael O’Connor stresses the fact that ‘peacekeeping operations depend upon the existence of a genuine (...) political agreement between two states in conflict or between parties to a conflict within a state’. They are part ‘of an overall package of assistance to a peace process facilitated by the United Nations’.<sup>20</sup> As a conclusion it can be noted that despite being subject for discussion frequently, the legitimacy of UN Peacekeeping operations are not questioned by the member – states. It therefore seems to be academic in nature. However it should not be forgotten, that clarity in this respect is of importance for discussion in those member-states, who are traditionally reluctant in contributing troops to international missions.

### **1.3 The dilemma on intra – state conflict and humanitarian intervention**

This section focuses on a legal aspect, which is subject to political interpretation. The argument of non – intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state was frequently used by states in the Security Council, which finally prevented the UN to intervene in a conflict. UN officials however pointed out that the lack of political will should not be hidden behind that argument.

The intention behind the foundation of the UN was, as Esref Aksu states, ‘to regulate inter-national behaviour following World War II’. However, nations were

very reluctant in giving away their right to handle what they considered to be internal affairs:

*The Charter embodies states' scepticism as to potential UN intrusion into governance, within their internal sphere. Perhaps the best indicator of such scepticism is the principle of non-intervention, which finds its expression in Article 2.7.<sup>21</sup>*

However, this article specifically excludes 'the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.'<sup>22</sup>

The tradition of the UN to intervene in intra-state conflicts is interpreted in various ways. Aksu sees UN operations with intra – state dimensions since the late 1940s. Between 1960 and 1965 he identified 19 intra-state conflicts, in 5 of which the UN introduced Peacekeeping forces. For other authors, such as Philip Wilkinson, traditional Peacekeeping was conducted 'in the aftermath of an inter-state conflict to monitor and facilitate a peace agreement.'<sup>23</sup> Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst both observe 'changes in the types of conflicts that demand the organization's attention, specifically to the shift from interstate to more intrastate or internal conflicts...'<sup>24</sup>

Secretary – General Kofi Annan describes the dilemma by the example of the Kosovo crisis:

*State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice versa.(...) These parallel developments (...) demand of us a willingness to think anew – about how the United Nations responds to the political, human rights and humanitarian crisis affecting so much of the world...<sup>25</sup>*

*...the Security Council was precluded from intervening in the Kosovo crisis by profound disagreement between Council members over whether such an intervention was legitimate. Differences within the Council reflected the lack of consensus in the wider international community. Defenders of traditional interpretations of international law stressed the inviolability of State sovereignty; others stressed the moral imperative to act forcefully in the face of gross violations of human rights.<sup>26</sup>*

This interpretation of the role of states, that emphasizes the higher status of the individual, compared to the governing authority, stands in contrast to the traditional perception of statehood, as it is known since 1648. However, nations in most cases are only willing to intervene when two factors are fulfilled: the quality and quantity of violations against human security have increased to the extent that

keeping inactive would be immoral and when the public attention lies on that event. In those cases, a third factor, the national interest of the intervening state, might become less relevant.<sup>27</sup>

The dilemma of intra-state conflicts and humanitarian intervention turned out to be a major problem for UN conflict engagement. The traditional understanding of state sovereignty and its invulnerability stands in many cases of conflicts in contradiction with each other. For the UN in its self – determination, this is a challenge. UN leadership has stated that the individual human rights are considered to be a reason for intervention. The decisive authority for any military intervention remains with the Security Council. And this is where the idealistic UN approach meets the states interests and their perception of humanity and sovereignty. As in the past, there are different opinions on whether an intervention is an appropriate reaction to the violation of human rights. However, it needs to be noted, that when facing severe atrocities, state – sovereignty as the only argument for non – intervention, is not considered to be convincing anymore. This, and the fact that in the Post – Cold War era, the disagreement – by – principle policy of the superpowers is overcome and the more and more open-minded policy of China (being now a troop contributor to UN Peace operations) opens the door for an increasingly active UN.

#### **1.4. Selection of the appropriate military operation: Types and characteristics**

Having elaborated political and legal prerequisites for the establishment of a UN military operation, the following chapter highlights the options of UN engagement.

The UN describe their key concepts to respond to conflicts as follows<sup>28</sup>:

- Preventive Diplomacy
- Peacemaking
- Peacekeeping
- Peace enforcement
- Peace-building

The UN summarizes Observer missions under Peacekeeping. However, from a military point of view, there needs to be a distinction between the unarmed Military Observers, not at all capable of using force and the armed or even light

armoured peacekeepers. Furthermore, it does not reflect the transformation of Traditional Peacekeeping to Second Generation Peacekeeping.

John Hillen determines the spectrum of UN military operations as follows:<sup>29</sup>

- Observation Missions
- Traditional Peacekeeping
- Second Generation Peacekeeping
- Peace Enforcement

He also describes the connection between the operational environment and the level of military force in those operations.

Other authors, such as Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel define peacekeeping in a broader sense by including peace restoration and UN state creation in the context of Peacekeeping and so come to a total of six generations of peacekeeping.<sup>30</sup>

It can be stated, that the classic distinction between the military role and the diplomatic component of a mission is not that clear anymore. As the Brahimi – Report states, traditional style peacekeeping missions had ‘no built-in exit strategy’ and treated ‘the symptoms rather than sources of conflict.’ As a result, those missions ‘have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years.’<sup>31</sup> It is realised, that the combination between military function and peace-building, meeting most complex environments, such as refugee-problems, arms vendor or involved regional powers, enhance the risk and costs of those operations. However, those operations are ‘the rule rather than the exception.’<sup>32</sup> Consequently, the Brahimi Report sees peace-building as an integral strategy for each peacekeeping operation.<sup>33</sup> In Kosovo, there are two mandated operations ongoing (KFOR and UNMIK), which in itself comprise several tasks (UNMIK Police and UNMIK Administration). UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment Force) carries the mixture of Preventive Diplomacy and military engagement already in its name. In order to reflect this development but at the same time keep the focus on the military participation, the following concepts of UN military operations will be elaborated:

- Observation Mission
- Traditional Peacekeeping
- Second Generation Peacekeeping
- Peace Enforcement.



### 1.4.1 Observation Mission

Starting in 1948 (UNTSO), the majority of UN operations so far were Observation missions. They normally consist of a relatively small number (usually less than 600) of military officers, who do not carry weapons. Their function is to monitor and supervise achieved agreements between the belligerents. Those could be the establishment of demilitarized zones, such as the Prevlaka peninsula (UNMOP 1996 – 2002) or monitor borders, cease-fires and troop-withdrawal, e.g. after the war between Iraq and Iran (UNIIMOG 1988 – 1991).

Although mainly carried out by military personnel, the character of Observations missions is more of a political nature. As John Hillen writes, they are 'limited enough to form, fund and deploy without undue controversy, but certainly not powerful enough to force belligerents to come to terms.' Consequently, some missions, like e.g. UNMOGIP in Kashmir, can last for generations.<sup>34</sup> However, this does not necessarily question the mission. In this cases it must be asked, why other diplomatic means, which could take away the source of the conflict, were unsuccessful.

There are five main principles in Observation Missions, which are:<sup>35</sup>

***Legitimacy:*** derived from international support, adherence to law and credibility

***Consent:*** of the parties of the conflict to establish the mission

***Impartiality:*** the force must not become a part of the conflict by taking sides

***Credibility:*** achieved through high professionalism and effectiveness

***Negotiation and Mediation:*** being tools to achieve de-escalation and develop a solution to the conflict.

Observation Missions are mainly composed by individual military officers or NCO's, not by entire military units. As impartiality and neutrality are the driving factors of a mission, this is also reflected through the observer's nationalities. Especially during the Cold War, observers came mostly from neutral countries. However, geographical proportionality was always given. Prerequisite for Observation mission is the support of the parties of the conflict. In some cases this is still theoretical. Between 1948 and 1996, more than 50 observers were killed in action.<sup>36</sup> Usually, the observation work is, as already mentioned, carried out by military personnel. However, there is a strong civilian component as well, especially in the administrative and logistical field. There is an ongoing discussion whether, considering the broader context of missions as described earlier, civilians

should become more involved in the actual observation. Christian Harleman highlights the professionalism and competence of military officers in observation missions, however he asks the question, whether “in the future their military appearance (uniform) is more required than their general competence and if this is the case, is it possible that some of their traditional functions can be the responsibility of civilians with the necessary experience.<sup>37</sup> Hillen lists several arguments against this thesis. He sees the officers’ specific experience in military operations, such as the troop withdrawal. Furthermore, he sees a special relationship between military personnel, which makes it easier for a military observer to build up trust and cooperation with the local commanders and the parties of the conflict.<sup>38</sup>

The establishment of an Observation Mission is suitable for an environment, in which all parties of the conflict are seriously willing to overcome the state of war and are therefore interested in cooperation with the UN. Given that for granted, negotiations and mediations arranged by the UN can lead to a pacific settlement of the dispute. By observing the military activities of all parties, mutual mistrust and fear will be reduced. This however can only be achieved if the UN observers enjoy credibility which depends heavily on their impartiality. Those two elements, the more diplomatic process of talks mainly carried out by the political leadership, and the observation part focussing on military compliance of agreements are of utmost importance. It is therefore reasonable that both civilian and military specialists are part of the mission.

The composition of the latest UN observer missions, like for example the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) shows another step ahead. The distinction between unarmed observers and other UN units is not handled that restrictively any longer. The observers are embedded into a protection element. Both work side-by-side, and the observer is even considered to be the leader of the protection element accompanying him. Thereby he is able to generate security in a flexible way and to the extent it is most suitable for the mission.<sup>39</sup>

Although being partly carried out by military personnel, the number and equipment of the UN forces is held so small that it does not impose any physical threat to either party of the conflict. This might be a decisive argument for gaining consent on the establishment of the mission as such. On the other hand, this fact again highlights the vulnerability of the observers and their dependence on cooperation. In case the consent is lost or observers are subject of systematic attack, the mission would have to be withdrawn or replaced by a force or more robust mandate.

As history has shown, Observation missions might last for decades, if they are not accompanied by a political effort to resolve the cause of the problem. This must be considered from the beginning, in order to make UN engagement obsolete in a long term.

### 1.4.2 Traditional Peacekeeping

Although the main characteristics of Traditional Peacekeeping are the same as for Observation missions, some additional aspects need to be considered. Apart from the five principles mentioned above, there is another one, which highlights the difference between Observation Missions and Traditional Peacekeeping:

***Minimum use of Force:*** This does not exclude self defence, but force will not be used to carry out the mandate.<sup>40</sup>

Forces in Traditional Peacekeeping missions are usually equipped with light infantry weapons and APC's. Except of Observation missions, they are not composed of individuals but of entire units or sub-units. The number of forces varies strongly, but can easily be several thousand troops.

Still being political in nature, the capabilities of a military component enables the Traditional Peacekeeping to act in a less stable environment and to be more active, if the mandate allows doing so. The equipment and military power needs to be carefully balanced. The force needs to be strong enough to defend itself. Furthermore, the pure presence of the force can calm down tense situations, especially among non-military actors, such as demonstrating civilians. On the other hand, there should be no signal of aggression against the parties of the conflict. The principles of Peacekeeping operations must not be questioned. Traditional peacekeeping is therefore the most appropriate mission in those cases, where the consent of the parties and their will to end the conflict are there. However, there is the possibility of minor violations against existing agreements. Those could be carried out e.g. by civilians conducting riots.

### 1.4.3 Second Generation Peacekeeping

The term Second Generation Peacekeeping was established in order to reflect the increasing complexity of conflicts and at the same time the more ambiguous aims of the UN to settle those. In 1992, the Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali saw an evolving role of the UN in conflict resolution. At the same time, he

highlighted the increasing demands of those missions.<sup>41</sup> However, the events of the following years showed, that traditional peacekeeping was in some cases not able to cope with scenarios of increasing violence, simply because the principles of Traditional Peacekeeping as mentioned above were not suitable for the scenario. The panel on United Nations Peace operations expressed that development in his report on the example of the principle of impartiality:

*Impartiality (...) must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate (...). Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time (...). In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals, but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.*<sup>42</sup>

Lessons learned from that experience were the development of the more robust and complex (Second Generation) Peacekeeping, mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Comparing Traditional and Second Generation Peacekeeping, the most important differences in the interpretation of the principles are:

**Impartiality:** distinction between impartiality and neutrality, meaning that there are cases, in which UN forces are obliged to use force in order to help victims against aggression carried out by a party of a conflict.

**Minimum Use of Force:** the use of force is legitimate not only in self-defence but to enforce the mandate. Depending on the Rules of Engagement, this can also include the use of heavy weaponry or Air Force.

Subject to the approved Force composition, Second Generation Peacekeeping forces are capable to achieve more complex military tasks. Those could be active protection of Humanitarian Aid or Safe Areas, denying hostile activities of the parties of the conflict or participating in disarming. Air Force units could be used to control No-fly zones.<sup>43</sup>

All Second Generation Peacekeeping Missions were so far carried out in the context of an intrastate conflict. The largest mission was UNPROFOR in Former Yugoslavia with up to 38.000 troops.<sup>44</sup> It is self-explanatory, that forces are deployed as units or sub-units.

The composition of Second Generation Peacekeeping forces allows activities in more belligerent environment, e.g. when cease-fire agreements are frequently

disrespected, provocations of one or both sides occur and lead to hostilities or when uncontrolled, irregular forces are operating in the area. Even more than in other missions, a clear and achievable mandate in combination with appropriate Rules of Engagement are of utmost importance. Being forced to operate in potentially hostile environment, traditional military factors, such as clear Command and Control structures are very important. This can be an area of concern, especially when a part of the forces (e.g. Air Force) is not subordinated to the UN Force Commander but remain under tactical control of the providing nations. It also needs to be noted, that the logistical and financial effort to establish and sustain a Second Generation Peacekeeping mission is significantly higher than Traditional Peacekeeping or Observation Missions. This and the higher probability to suffer casualties could make nations extremely reluctant to contribute troops.

## Peace Enforcement

Peace Enforcement is the most active and restrictive form of UN military operations. It means the enforcement of Security Councils' decision against resistance of that state, which broke the principles of the charter. There were two cases, in which Peace Enforcement was executed against states, namely the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War of 1990 / 1991. Both cases were the result of inter – state conflicts with one aggressor attacking a neighbour state. Although, there was formally no state involved, the INTERFET operation in East Timor can also be characterized as Peace Enforcement, as the mandate went far beyond Peacekeeping.<sup>45</sup>

Due to the size and type of conflict, the military role of the UN was mainly of supportive nature, whereas the operation had to be carried out by ad-hoc formed coalitions under a unified command, which is usually carried out by a militarily highly capable nation.<sup>46</sup> In case of Korea and the Persian Gulf, that was the US, for INTERFET, it was Australia.

The UN operational role in a full scale war operation (what Peace Enforcement finally means) is basically nonexistent. The importance lies in the outspoken legitimacy of the operation, which for many countries is the decisive argument when it comes to the question of troop – contribution.

### 1.4.5 The mandate

As stated earlier, the UN Security Council can release resolutions, in which it mandates the establishment of a military force in a given conflict. This mandate determines the kind of mission, the tasks of the force and its Rules of Engagement (ROE) and forms the baseline for the creation of the mission, which is done by the DPKO. It is essential, that it clearly determines the specifications of the mission and gives an achievable task. The manning and the equipment are determined according to the mandate. Those factors make the mandate a highly political issue. The political will of the member-states concerning the extent of the action that will be taken, which effort shall be dedicated in resources and what degree of force the UN troops will be allowed to use is of utmost importance for the mission.

As the situation in theatre can change, many times to the worse, the UN Security Council can adjust the mandate to meet the new requirements. It is essential, that a change in the mandate, especially if it is going along with additional tasks, is reflected in the composition and the ROE of the force. However it needs to be noted, that the hardware of the force cannot be changed from one day to the next. This process requires significant time and logistical effort. As will be shown later, the success or failure of a mission can depend on that.

The importance of having a clear and achievable mandate has been highlighted in several statements of UN officials. Boutros Boutros Ghali wrote in 1995 that ‘...nothing is more dangerous for a peace-keeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so’.<sup>47</sup>

### 1.4.6 Force Generation and Command: Options and Capabilities

In order to create a military mission, the Charter of the UN gives the Security Council freedom of decision. In Art 48, it is laid down, that it can determine which member states are to carry out its decision. This means, that the UN can either organize a mission by their own mechanisms and possibilities, or authorize another organization, such as NATO or AU to do so. However, the UN depends on the willingness of the nations to contribute troops to a mission. For several nations, the allowances, which are paid by the UN per soldier/military equipment, are a strong argument for participation. For other nations, this financial aspect is not relevant.<sup>48</sup>

Chapter VIII specifies the independent role of regional organizations, as far as there is no enforcement action executed. It needs to be highlighted, that it is up to the member states, if and to which extent they should contribute to the missions. The political will, expressed in the mandate and the will to contribute to the execution of the mandate might be different.

### **Operations led by the UN**

One option to create a force is to task the DPKO to do so. Member states contribute either individuals or units and subordinate those under a Force Commander of the UN.

In order to ease this process, UNSAS (United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System) has been created. Within this framework, UN member states contribute a pre-defined military force at a certain reaction time to the UN that has received appropriate equipment and training in order 'to prepare them to fulfil specified tasks or functions in accordance with the UN guidelines.'<sup>49</sup> The UNSAS was improved in accordance with the recommendations of the "Brahimi Report", which highlights very openly the deficiencies of some nations in training and equipping their soldiers and the necessity to achieve a common standard.<sup>50</sup> At the same time, the report describes the shortcomings in the headquarters structure of the DPKO, which leads to ineffective command and, because of lack of manpower and expertise, does not have the ability to lead a mission in a professional, military way.<sup>51</sup> The recommendations of the report, which the UN mainly implemented, will bring significant improvement to UN lead missions. However, it seems questionable whether some troop contributing countries can achieve the quality in the standard of forces, which would be desirable to get to the results the "Brahimi Report" is seeking for. Although the operational command of the mission lies with the UN, troop contributing nations can still decide to withdraw their forces, if they deem necessary. Therefore, there are experts, such as the LtGen Nambiar, arguing in favour of standing UN forces, which would be immediately deployable.<sup>52</sup>

### **Missions led by other organizations**

Furthermore, the Security Council can, in conjunction with Art. 42 authorize other organizations, such as NATO, but as well single states or ad-hoc coalitions, to enforce a resolution.<sup>53</sup> This option was widely used in previous conflicts, such as SFOR or KFOR in Former Yugoslavia. The major advantage is the possibility

to react quickly, due to the availability of standing forces and structures. The existing command structure ensures that the operation is handled in a professional way. On the other hand, the engagement of an organization such as NATO can easily cause political friction, which might lead to a blockade of the Security Council, as happened in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis.

Article 52 encourages regional organizations to take ‘regional action’ in the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the ‘Principles and Purposes of the United Nations’. However, enforcement action shall only be taken after authorization of the Security Council (Art. 53).

## **2. Application of key factors on different conflict scenarios**

### **2.1 The development of conflict scenarios after the Cold War**

In developing scenarios of future military conflicts the morphological method is one option to use. Iver Johansen developed the model of a morphological box, in which he defines three levels of analysis, which in itself comprise of several dimensions.<sup>54</sup> These dimensions in turn are composed of characteristics. By combining those characteristics, planning assumptions can be derived, which at a later stage form the baseline for the description of a scenario. As a result, J.P. Mac Intosh describes the types of future conflict in stages of intensity, namely the High, Mid, Low and No Intensity conflict, which he brings up in a relation with UN Charter and the estimated frequency of occurrence in the next decade.<sup>55</sup> The US National Intelligence Council identifies in its ‘Global Trends 2015’ internal conflicts as the ‘most frequent threat to stability around the world. They will be characterized by ‘internal displacements, refugee flows, humanitarian emergencies and other regionally destabilizing dislocations.’ Furthermore, they will ‘trigger spill-over into interstate conflicts as neighbouring states move to exploit opportunities or to limit the possibilities of damage to their national interests.’ It sees the risk, that ‘weak states will spawn recurrent internal conflicts, threatening the stability of a globalizing international system. Interstate conflicts or wars, although less likely to occur will ‘grow in lethality due to the availability of more destructive technologies’. Whereas state-sponsored terrorism will decline due to ‘regime changes, rapprochement with neighbours or because terrorism has become counterproductive and terrorism in a ‘diverged, free-wheeling, transnational networks’ with increasingly sophisticated tactics will achieve mass casualties.’<sup>56</sup> Col Ralph Thiele, Commander of the Centre of Analysis and Studies of the German Armed Forces adds that future conflicts will have a high dynamic of escalation and are characterized by asymmetric methods of warfare and the



'involvement of actors below the level of state authority', leading to disregard of international law.<sup>57</sup>

Summarizing and combining those elements mentioned above, one can say, that the most likely conflict scenarios are characterized as follows:

- Internal conflicts of different intensity and potentially escalating;
- Involving civilians as combatants;
- Asymmetric tactics.

As they represent the most important factors and characteristics of future scenarios, the following conflicts, in which UN forces were/are involved, were identified as being suitable for analysis:

- Rwanda
- East Timor

The conflict in Rwanda was an intra-state conflict, in which one ethnic group conducted genocide against another, leading to internal displacements and huge refugee camps and the associated problems in neighbouring countries. Civilians were involved, both as victims and perpetrators. There was no traditional, symmetric warfare, but asymmetric tactics.

The conflict in East Timor was also an intra-state conflict. Due to the geographical location on an island, the possibility of spill over was not given. However, asymmetric warfare was conducted and a huge number of internal displacements took place. Furthermore, civilians were involved in the fighting.

Both conflicts represent the UN approach to military conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the given years. As will be shown, this approach changed radically.

## **2.2 The conflict in Rwanda**

### **2.2.1 Background**

The population of Rwanda mainly consists of two ethnic<sup>58</sup> groups, the Hutu (85 %) and the Tutsi (14 %). Despite sharing the same language and culture, ethnic violence broke out shortly after the country became independent in 1962 and continued in the 70's and 80's. This already caused refugee movement into Uganda. Out of these refugees, a resistance movement was established, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). This group launched an attack, starting the

outbreak of fighting until 1993 when a ceasefire agreement was achieved between the RPF and the Rwandese government. A UN mission (UNOMUR) was established to monitor the border between Rwanda and Uganda and to verify the compliance of the parties.<sup>59</sup> The peace talks between the parties continued and came to final agreement on 4 August 1993 in Arusha / Tanzania. Both parties called for another UN mission, which was established with resolution 872 (UNAMIR). Although a fact finding team, lead by the designated Force Commander BrigGen Romeo Dallaire requested a force of 4260, which he saw as a minimum requirement, the UN Secretariat found that number too high from a political standpoint and finally recommended 2548.<sup>60</sup>

The mandate of UNAMIR consisted of the following elements:<sup>61</sup>

- Contribute to the security of Kigali
- Observation of the ceasefire agreement
- Monitor the security situation
- Assist in mine clearance
- Investigate alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement
- Monitor the process of repatriation of refugees
- Assist in humanitarian relief
- Investigate the incidents regarding the gendarmerie and police

The situation in Rwanda was assessed in two completely different ways. The UN noticed, that 'the parties showed good will and cooperation with each other and the United Nations and the Secretary General were 'encouraged that the parties had maintained the process of dialogue'<sup>62</sup> At the same time, UNAMIR received information that the Rwandese government prepares violent activities. The Force Commander recommended to conduct a search for weapons caches, but was denied to do so by UN HQ officials.<sup>63</sup>

Triggered by the death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in an aircraft crash, a series of atrocities were carried out, claiming up to one million victims, mainly members of the Tutsi minority. Amongst the killed, were the Prime Minister of Rwanda and 10 UNAMIR peacekeepers from Belgium, who were assigned to protect her. As a result, Belgium withdrew its forces, reducing the strength of UNAMIR from 2165 to 1515. Michael Barnett characterizes the credibility and capability of UNAMIR as very low and mainly blames the UN HQ officials:

*And months of impartiality, and of capitulation to assassinations, civilian killings, and known violations of the weapons ban, meant that UNAMIR had little credibility as a deterrent force. (...) The entire mission was in jeopardy, because it was running dangerously low on fuel, water and food, a direct consequence of the fact that their constant pleading for essentials had gone unanswered by officials at UN headquarters.*<sup>64</sup>

UNAMIR was not able to carry out its mandate by this time. Facing severe atrocities, the political level at the UN debated for approximately two weeks on how to react appropriately. As reinforcement of UNAMIR and a Chapter VII mandate in order to carry out significant military operations could not be expected, on 17 April the FC offered two options for further engagement. Option A was to reduce UNAMIR to the strength required to protect Kigali airport as an airport of debarkation for humanitarian relief and supply (1300 troops). Option B was to reduce UNAMIR to approximately 250 troops, 'just to keep the files going in a secure situation'.<sup>65</sup> With resolution 912 released on 21 April, UNAMIR was reduced to 270 troops and tasked to 'act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire', 'to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible and to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda (...)'.<sup>66</sup> This resolution was executed immediately so that by early May, UNAMIR had a total strength of 444, out of which 179 observers were located in Nigeria waiting for further orders.<sup>67</sup>

Being confronted with the continuing massacres, the Security Council passed a Resolution 918 on 17 May. UNAMIR strength was increased to 5500 troops, which were supposed to contribute to the security of refugees and for humanitarian relief operations. However, the execution of this decision was significantly delayed. The total number of troops was in theatre not earlier than October, long after the massacres had ended.<sup>68</sup> In the meantime, France conducted an operation (Operation Turquoise), mandated under Chapter VII, in order to fulfil the tasks of UNAMIR until it would arrive.<sup>69</sup>

After the end of the massacre, it is estimated that 1 million people were killed and 2 million people displaced (out of 7.9 million of the total population). Within the refugee camps, violations were ongoing. Fighting continued also in Rwanda. In addition, diseases claimed many lives. In November, the UNAMIR mandate was extended until June 1995. The government of Rwanda insisted on a significant reduction in the aftermath, as the war had come to an end and the situation stabilized. UNAMIR was reduced in several steps until 8 March 1996, when the mandate ended and the last troops were withdrawn.<sup>70</sup>

## 2.2.2 The role of the UN and the international security in case of Rwanda

*The overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized by a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide.<sup>71</sup>*

The UN engagement in Rwanda has damaged the reputation of the organization significantly. Under the eyes of two UN missions (UNOMUR and UNAMIR), one of the most grave genocides in history took place. In this context, two aspects need to be mentioned. One is the role of the UN organisation and its officials. From the very beginning, the recommendation of the Force Commander concerning the number of troops was ignored, and the finally presented and accepted number was approximately 40 % lower. Also, UN officials underestimated the situation, although UNAMIR informed the UN HQ about the activities. ‘The overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized by a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide.’

The member states of the Security Council did not show the political will to intervene in Rwanda with a strong military force. This becomes obvious in the Resolution 912, ‘adjusting’ the tasks and reducing the manpower. But even earlier, when the mission was about to be established, there were clear indications of disinterest. The key players United States, which obviously was still under the impression of the events in Somalia, did not veto resolutions, but was not prepared to contribute to a mission. ‘The United States delegation had suggested to the United Nations that a symbolic presence of 100 should be sent to Rwanda.’<sup>72</sup> It is also worth noting, that for the French led Operation Turquoise, thousands of troops were made available in a short notice, whereas the attempts of the United Nations to enforce UNAMIR were not successful. Furthermore it needs to be highlighted, that some nations, such as US, Belgium, France and Italy clearly understood the situation and evacuated their nationals from Rwanda, thereby hampering UNAMIR activities.<sup>73</sup>

The unilateral withdrawal of the Belgium UNAMIR contingent left behind 2000 civilians unprotected, which were seeking refuge in their compound. After the Belgians left, many of them were massacred by the waiting militia.<sup>74</sup>

Considering the mechanisms within the UN, it needs to be noted, that Rwanda was a member of the Security Council at this time. One party of the conflict

therefore was involved in the decision making process and had the possibility to influence the discussion. The presence of Rwandese officials hampered the work of the Council.<sup>75</sup>

### **2.2.3 The legal background of the UN operations in Rwanda**

The legal backgrounds for the separate UN missions in Rwanda were different. The resolutions for UNOMUR and UNAMIR were covered by the consensus of the parties. As a traditional peacekeeping mission, the ‘Chapter 6 ½ construct’ applied. Operation Turquoise was a Chapter VII operation, mandated by UN Security Council resolution 929 dated to 22 June 1994. The establishment of the missions was therefore undisputed. However it needs to be noted, that the UN needed to react on the Rwandese demand to significantly reduce and finally end UNAMIR mandate in 1996.

#### **Type of mission**

UNAMIR, being a traditional Peacekeeping mission was set up in accordance with the principles as described in Chapter 2.3.2. This means, that the use of force was allowed only in self-defence. This determination was debated from the beginning. The use of force only in self defence appeared to be insufficient for the Force Commander, who predicted in November 1993 the probability of a genocide and therefore the necessity to use force in case of ‘ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts’.<sup>76</sup> As there was no formal reply from the UN HQ regarding his proposals he considered them to be valid. However, the force did not apply those rules even when the situation developed that way or in cases, where the use of force was explicitly allowed, e.g. when persons under UNAMIR protection were threatened.<sup>77</sup> At no point was UNAMIR holding a Chapter VII mandate, with which enforcement action could have been taken or as a minimum a “second-generation” – Peacekeeping mandate allowing the use of force in order to enforce the mandate. Although this was discussed within the UN, again the lack of political will prevented more active engagement.<sup>78</sup>

#### **The mandate of UNAMIR**

The UN assessment of the situation in Rwanda by the UN was done, as Michael Barnett writes, ‘through Rose coloured glasses’.<sup>79</sup> Various UN documents highlight the assessment, that ‘the parties showed good will and cooperation with each other and with the United Nations’.<sup>80</sup> Despite of the deterioration of the

security situation in January and February 1994, when civilians and political leaders were killed and an UNAMIR escorted convoy ambushed,<sup>81</sup> there was no change in mandate or RoE's. The optimistic assumptions ignoring information and events which indicated different development consequently lead to a weak UNAMIR mandate resulting in a weak UNAMIR force. The weakness of UNAMIR was easy to observe for the aggressive party of the conflict and therefore UNAMIR was not taken seriously any longer. This opinion is shared by the Independent Inquiry Board which calls the mandate 'inadequate': 'If the mandate (...) was more limited than the Secretary-General's proposal, than it was even more distant from the original broad concept agreed on by the parties on the Arusha Accords.'<sup>82</sup> The 'adjustment' of the mandate with Resolution 912, was de facto a deactivation without withdrawal of UNAMIR. Resolution 918, activating UNAMIR again and determining its strength to 5500, basically reversed 912. However its implementation was significantly delayed and it still did not improve the authority to use force.

## 2.2.4 Force Generation and Command

As mentioned earlier, the UNAMIR was established with approximately 40 % less manpower, than the Force Commander requested. The UN HQ needed to plead for troops from the member-states, as there was (and is) no standing UN force in place. This procedure is extremely time-consuming.

Furthermore, the composition of the force was debateable. The major participation of Belgium as the former colonial power of Rwanda appears to be sub-optimal, although both parties agreed on it. However, the withdrawal of the Belgium battalion not only reduced the overall manpower. Being the most professional, trained and equipped unit in UNAMIR, the most capable part was taken away.<sup>83</sup>

The reluctance of the member-states to contribute forces to UNAMIR at all stages hampered the mission significantly. The evacuation of expatriates and the contribution to Operation Turquoise proves that it was not a lack of resources but of political will, that prevented UNAMIR from having the required manpower.

Concerning the chain of command of the operation, the Independent Inquiry Board identified severe deficiencies in coordination within the UN HQ in especially DPKO. Some of the FC requests remained even unanswered.<sup>84</sup>

Within UNAMIR, in reality the FC did not have the full control, as the Belgium contingent was placed under the national command of the evacuation troops and the Bangladeshi contingent did respond to orders from the UNAMIR HQ.<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, in some cases, the professional performance of UNAMIR troops was poor. E.g. UNAMIR frequently failed to protect moderate political leaders, which then were murdered by extremists.<sup>86</sup>

The actions of the UN in Rwanda are very well documented; the UN itself initiated an Inquiry Board, which highlights the failures and responsibilities. The failure to prevent the genocide despite having a Peacekeeping Force in theatre has several reasons:

1) The political will of the member-states to contribute troops to the UN mission was not sufficient to provide the manpower and the mandate required to respond to the atrocities.

2) The UN HQ made poor analysis of the situation when relying too much on the will of the parties of the conflict to come to a peaceful solution, ignoring indications of tensions and hostilities. This led to a weak mandate, which prevented UNAMIR to take firm action. The administrative work was not as effective as it would be required.

3) The UNAMIR forces were weakened by a lack of supply. Furthermore they proved to be not in all cases qualified to perform their assigned tasks, especially after the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent.

It needs to be stated, that operational errors can be observed on all levels of the operation. In their combination, they led to the final result.

## **2.3 The conflict in East Timor**

### **2.3.1 Background**

The former Portuguese overseas province East Timor came under Indonesian rule in 1974, following the annexation of the territory in 1976. The UN did not acknowledge the annexation considering Portugal as the administrative power and demanded the withdrawal of all Indonesian forces in Resolution 384 (22 December 1975). The East Timorese Independence Movement FRETILIN and its military arm FALINTIL resisted the occupation. It is estimated, that between 1975 and 1979, one fourth of the population died in massacres or by starvation<sup>87</sup>.

Whereas Indonesian military operations continued, talks between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN began in 1982 and finally in May 1999 led to an agreement, which proposed a ‘popular consultation’, in which the East Timorese could vote for status of autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia or disapprove that plan.

In order to organize and supervise the referendum, UNAMET, which did not incorporate a military component and did not have security related tasks. On 30 August 1999 more than 78% voted against the autonomy and thereby for the national sovereignty of East Timor. After that result was published on 4 September 1999, pro-Indonesian militias, allegedly supported by Indonesian military conducted severe atrocities against the population. It is estimated, that a total of 1000 people were killed, 250 000 displaced and approximately 80% of the living quarters damaged or destroyed by arson or looting.<sup>88</sup>

On 15 September, the Security Council mandated a multinational force under the unified command of Australia (INTERFET) with Resolution 1264. This was agreed upon by the Indonesian government.<sup>89</sup> First troops arrived at Dili on 20 September, tasked to restore peace and security. Indonesian forces began to withdraw and on 19 October the Indonesian parliament recognized the result of the referendum. On 25 October, the Security Council established UNTAET, a Chapter VII operation, consisting, among others, of more than 1600 policemen, almost 9000 troops and 200 military observers. Its mandate was to provide peace and security as well as administrate and state building measures and humanitarian assistance. INTERFET was put under UNTAET command in February 2000. After a parliament was elected, East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002. On the same day, the Security Council established UNMISSET, the successor mission of UNTAET. Again under Chapter VII, the strength of the military component was initially 5000 troops and 1250 police officers. As situation proved to be more and more stable, the number is reduced to currently 615 uniformed personnel.<sup>90</sup> UNMISSET is mandated to contribute to the security and border control, law enforcement and administrative assistance. The mandate ends on 20 May 2005.<sup>91</sup>

### **2.3.2 The role of the UN and the international security in case of East Timor**

The struggle of the East Timorese for independence including the atrocities committed by Indonesian forces lasting more than 25 years was tolerated by the member states. However, the UN provided ongoing talks about the status of East Timor.<sup>92</sup> In a long run, that set the preconditions for the referendum that finally



led to the countries' independence. With the establishment UNAMET, the UN contributed significantly to the realization of the referendum. After violence deteriorated, UN reacted promptly mandating INTERFET. Mainly Australia, but also other countries of the region intervened only four days after the Security Council gave the mandate and re-established law and order. The member states also contributed to the following peacekeeping missions UNTAET and UNMISSET significantly, enabling them to fulfil their mandate.

### **2.3.3 The legal background of the UN operations in East Timor**

All missions with military involvement were mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter, enabling the forces to react of escalation in a flexible way, including the use of force to execute the mandate.

#### **Type of mission**

There were two kinds of ongoing missions in East Timor:

1) INTERFET was a Peace Enforcement operation. Although Indonesia formally cooperated with the multinational force, the adversary, pro-Indonesian militias, were not under control of the Indonesian government. The mandate of INTERFET did not include any kind of peacekeeping tasks or principles, but solely focussed on the restoration of peace and security by all necessary means. Therefore, the operation went far beyond peacekeeping. It set the pre-conditions for the establishment of the following missions.

2) UNTAET and UNMISSET were both second generation peacekeeping missions. They incorporated political and administrative assistance. At the same time, they have a strong military component, mandated to maintain peace and security and a police force, contributing to law and order. Mandated under Chapter VII, the forces are able to react flexibly and firmly to a change in the security situation.

#### **The mandate of the UN operations in East Timor**

The mandates of all military missions were set in a clear way and determined achievable tasks. The number of troops was sufficient to fulfil the mission. The

Security Council reacted promptly to changing situations, being careful in analysis of the situation and considering possible developments to the worse. This can be seen in the fact, that despite the end of the actual fighting, the mandate is still covered by Chapter VII.

### **2.3.4 Force Generation and Command**

The prompt response on the events in East Timor leads to the conclusion, that the generation of forces for INTERFET and the following operations were not very complicated, although the number of forces was high. Concerning the Command, INTERFET operated under Australian command. Being under unified command is one characteristic of Peace Enforcement operation. After the Transfer of Authority in February 2000, INTERFET became a part of UNTAET, which, being a peacekeeping operation was commanded by the UN HQ.

After the traumatic experience of the UN in Rwanda and later on in Bosnia – Herzegovina, the UN engagement in East Timor is able to restore the reputation of the UN to a certain extent. It proves that the UN has the organizational capabilities to intervene in military conflicts, if the organization receives the support of the member states.

### **Conclusion**

The unknown factor in international security is the political will of the member states to spend money and resources on conflict resolution and by that enabling the UN to apply the methods it has. Although there are commitments of the member states in terms of troop contribution in UNSAS, the UN is far away from having an ad-hoc deployable force and still relies on the final decision of the member states. This is only one example of the UN's dependence. The increasing number of UN operations after the Cold War indicate that there is a growing need for engagement.

The cases of Rwanda and East Timor are representative of the attitude and policy of the UN concerning military operations of their time. The focus of traditional UN peacekeeping until mid 90's was the extreme reluctance towards the use of force and the focus on impartiality (interpreted in the traditional way, see Chapter 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). That was overcome by what is now called "Second Generation Peacekeeping". After failure of the UN in Rwanda and Bosnia, a process of analysis was initiated. By carefully analysing the events through an Independent Inquiry, personal mistakes and organizational failures were identified. The Report

of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) additionally identified areas of improvement and made recommendations, which to a large extent were followed. The DPKO was especially strengthened in the field of military operational and analytical capabilities. The system of Force Generation was improved by developing UNSAS.

It can be stated, that UNAMIR and UNPROFOR were the last operations of its kind. They proved not to be suitable for the challenges of modern conflict resolution. The UN adapted their strategy to the new environment. Following missions were conducted under a robust Chapter VII mandate, enabling UN forces to carry out their mandate in more belligerent situations. A mixture of the tools given in charter was used, including the option of mandating other organizations to conduct military operations, such as SFOR and KFOR.

The operation in East Timor demonstrated that the UN with its organizational tools is capable to handle conflict situations of those scenarios, which are most likely to appear in the future. The traditional military methods of the UN were supplemented by the “Second Generation Peacekeeping”. This acknowledged the importance of a tool mix in conflict resolution and the necessity to use military capabilities firmly if required. By using the possibility to mandate coalitions under the unified command of one nation, as seen in East Timor, the UN used all the flexibility given by the Charter.

With the release of the “Brahimi Report” the UN made a significant step towards capability improvement in the organization and command of military operations. The improvement of the military expertise in the DPKO especially contributes to this development. However, there are areas, in which the implementation of the report’s recommendations is too slow. This is of a particular concern in the area of Force Generation. Although the improvement of UNSAS is on its way, some potentially troop contributing nations are very reluctant in committing units. For the proposal, of Gen Nambiar, a standing UN force, one cannot see any chance of implementation.

Considering the obvious changes in strategy and organizational structure, it can be stated, that the UN understood the challenges of modern conflicts. The factor of uncertainty remains with the member states and their political will to support a UN military mission. Most likely, this factor will lead to heavy criticism of the UN as such in the future, as it happened in the past.

Although there are some deficiencies remaining, the improvements made within the UN lead to the overall conclusion that the new military methods of the UN have proven to be suitable for the resolution of conflict scenarios of present and future, if the member-states find the political will to implement them in a way as done in East Timor.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> UN Charter, Preamble.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*, Article 1.

<sup>3</sup> Aksu, Esref (2003): *The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press): p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid* p. 44 – 67.

<sup>5</sup> Operations Timeline (see Annex 1).

<sup>6</sup> Aksu (2003): p. 46 – 49.

<sup>7</sup> Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations („Brahimi Report”): para. 17

<sup>8</sup> *ibid*, para 18 – 20.

<sup>9</sup> UN Charter: Chapter VI and VII, accessed 03 October 2004.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid*, Chapter V.

<sup>11</sup> North Atlantic Treaty, Preamble, Art. 1 and 5.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. “Do you back Bush’s war deadline” at

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking\\_point/2853335.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/2853335.stm), accessed 08 October 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Report of the open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase of the Security Council and other matters of the Security Council, File No: A/58/47, Annex 3.

<sup>14</sup> “The Alliances Strategic Concept”, para 15.

<sup>15</sup> UN Charter, Article 52 and 53.

<sup>16</sup> Hillen, John (1998): *Blue Helmets: The strategy of UN military operations* (Washington: Brassey’s), p. 227.

<sup>17</sup> Speech of George W. Bush at Fort Lampell, Kentucky on 18 Mar 2004.

<sup>18</sup> UN Charter, Article 42.

<sup>19</sup> Tomuschat, Christian (1991): *Die Rechtslage für Peacekeeping-Einsätze nach der UNO-Charta (Legal situation concerning Peacekeeping missions according to the UN Charter)* in Koch, Ernst, ed, *Die Blauhelme (The Bluehelmets)*, Frankfurt 1991, Report Verlag: p. 49.

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<sup>21</sup> Aksu, Esref (2003): p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> UN Charter: Article 2.7.

<sup>23</sup> Wilkinson, Philip (2000): *Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies* in Woodhouse, Tom and Ramsbotham, Oliver eds: *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, London: Franc Cass and Co Ltd: p. 63.

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<sup>25</sup> Karns, Margaret and Mingst, Karen (2001): p. 215.

<sup>26</sup> Report of the Secretary General on the work of the Organization 1999: para 66.

<sup>27</sup> Smith, Dan and Stohl, Rachel (2000): *The Evolving Role of Military Forces in Human Security*; at <http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/april2000.html> accessed on 14 October 2004: p. 2.

- <sup>28</sup> UN Guidelines for Peacekeeping operations: p. 5 – 6.
- <sup>29</sup> Hillen John (1998): p. 16 – 31.
- <sup>30</sup> Thakur, Ramesh and Schnabel, Albrecht, eds: (2001): *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc missions, permanent engagement*: p. 9 – 14.
- <sup>31</sup> Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations („Brahimi Report”): para. 17.
- <sup>32</sup> *ibid*, para 18 – 19.
- <sup>33</sup> *ibid*, para 35.
- <sup>34</sup> Hillen, John (1998): p. 37.
- <sup>35</sup> United Nations Military Observers Handbook: p. 6 – 7.
- <sup>36</sup> Hillen, John: p. 41 – 43.
- <sup>37</sup> Harleman, Christian (2000): *Civilian Peacekeeper – a Future Challenge*, at <http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2000/peacekeepers.html> accessed 29 October 2004: p. 5.
- <sup>38</sup> Hillen, John : p. 39 – 40.
- <sup>39</sup> Lecture of LtCol (GS) Manfred Ertl, DPKO, given at Führungsakademie Hamburg 28 Nov 2005.
- <sup>40</sup> United Nations Military Observers Handbook: p. 7.
- <sup>41</sup> Boutros Boutros Ghali (1995): *Supplement to An agenda for Peace*, UN New York 1995 at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupphtml>, accessed on 11 November 2004: para 14 – 15 and 47 to 49.
- <sup>42</sup> Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations („Brahimi Report”): para. 50.
- <sup>43</sup> Hillen, John (1998): p. 165 – 179.
- <sup>44</sup> Hillen, John (1998): p. 27.
- <sup>45</sup> elaborated in detail in Chapter 3.3; the pro – Indonesian militias were not controlled by the government. Officially, Indonesia agreed to the resolution, mandating INTERFET.
- <sup>46</sup> Hillen John (1998): p. 225.
- <sup>47</sup> Boutros Boutros Ghali (1995): para 35.
- <sup>48</sup> Lecture of LtCol (GS) Manfred Ertl, DPKO, given at Führungsakademie Hamburg 28 Nov 2005.
- <sup>49</sup> Homepage of the DPKO. [http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas\\_files/sba.htm](http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/sba.htm), accessed on 05 December 2004.
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- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid* para 170 – 233.
- <sup>52</sup> Nambiar Satish (1999): *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Problems and Prospects* at [http://www.indiagov.org/policy/Peace\\_Keeping/UN\\_Seminar/ UN\\_SeminarNambiar.htm](http://www.indiagov.org/policy/Peace_Keeping/UN_Seminar/UN_SeminarNambiar.htm) accessed 29 October 2004: p. 6.
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- <sup>58</sup> The ethnic distinction was determined by the European colonialists (Germany until 1916, then Belgium until 1962) is the 20<sup>th</sup> century and is therefore artificial. Hutus and Tutsis are not separate tribes. Details on that can be reviewed at Barnett, Michael (2002): p. 49 – 51.
- <sup>59</sup> Background of UNAMIR at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamirft.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirft.htm) p. 1 - 3, accessed 28 December 2004.
- <sup>60</sup> Barnett, Michael (2002): p. 66.
- <sup>61</sup> Resolution 872 at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 29 December 2004.
- <sup>62</sup> Background of UNAMIR at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamirft.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirft.htm) p. 7 - 8, accessed 28 December 2004.
- <sup>63</sup> Barnett, Micheal (2002): p. 78 – 79.
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- <sup>66</sup> Resolution 912 at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/190/85/PDF/N9419085.pdf?OpenElement> accessed at 29 December 2004.
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- <sup>69</sup> Ibid p. 15 – 16.
- <sup>70</sup> Background of UNAMIR at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamirft.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirft.htm) p. 29 - 44, accessed 28 December 2004.
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- <sup>81</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>82</sup> UN S 1999 /1254: p. 32.
- <sup>83</sup> UN S 1999/1254: p. 34.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid p. 9.
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- <sup>86</sup> Ibid p. 44 – 45.
- <sup>87</sup> Fleschenberg, Andrea: p. 11.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>89</sup> Resolution 1264.
- <sup>90</sup> by 30 November 2004; East Timor – UNMISSET Facts and Figures at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/missions/unmisset/facts.html> accessed at 02 January 2005.

<sup>91</sup> East Timor UNMISET background at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html>, accessed on 01 January 2005.

<sup>92</sup> Fleschenberg, Andrea (2002): Der Aufarbeitungsprozess in Osttimor (The process of reconciliation in East Timor), at <http://www.osttimor.de/Laenderbericht/aufarbeitung.html> accessed on 02 January 2005: p. 10.

## Ukraine's Integration in the Euro-Atlantic Community – Way Ahead

By *Gintė Damušis*\*

Since joining NATO and the EU, Lithuania has initiated a new foreign policy agenda for advancing and supporting democracy and reform in the region. Euro-Atlantic integration as an engine for reform is the driving force behind our own diplomatic, defense and development cooperation initiatives in the area east of the new NATO and EU borders.

Lithuania recently shared its experience and strategy for increasing public support for Euro-Atlantic integration efforts in Ukraine with officials and opinion formers from Kiev invited to Vilnius. Our main message to our Ukrainian counterparts was simple and straightforward: We maintain that Ukraine should be given a strong message of support for its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and even though no one disputes the strategic importance of Ukraine, membership in NATO is neither agreed, nor guaranteed. It is a tangible goal, but its realization will largely depend on Ukraine itself, on its commitment to reform.

Membership of Ukraine in NATO would be different from other enlargements in recent years, because it would alter the geopolitical map of Europe. Ukraine and other countries on the Black Sea are in an unsettled region, which has not enjoyed the same degree of commitment that “core Europe” and the United States demonstrated toward Central Europe.

This dynamic region faces a West that is sometimes distracted, divided and complacent over why it should engage as an active partner for change. Many Western leaders have issued rhetorical support for a wider Europe that is more democratic, more secure, and more of a partner for the West. But the concept remains relatively undefined, its mechanisms underdeveloped, and support for it uncertain. Some have yet to decide whether Western engagement should be foremost about keeping Ukraine happy as a constructive non-member or advancing a truly transformative approach to Ukraine and the region. That

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approach would align – and eventually integrate – Ukraine and other nations, like Georgia and Moldova, into the European and Euro-Atlantic community.

Lithuania supports and appreciates the transformative power of the transatlantic partnership. For half a century, the transatlantic link protected the western half of the continent from threats from its eastern half, while transforming relations among western countries themselves and working to overcome divisions of the continent. Then the West joined in solidarity with those in the East during their singing revolutions and seized the opportunity to build a Europe whole, free and at peace with itself. It began by anchoring the Visegrad countries in the Euro-Atlantic community. After some hesitation, and great human tragedy in the Balkans, it extended that vision to Southeast Europe. This vision was broadened to include other new democracies from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The result has been the successive advance of democracy, security, human rights and free markets through most of the Euro-Atlantic region.

Today the challenge is to extend this vision to fully include Ukraine. Lithuania believes that we must provide Ukraine with a clear perspective. In sharp contrast to the past ten years, when Leonid Kuchma led Ukraine, today we have a partner that shares our values. President Viktor Yushchenko appears very serious about embracing democracy and broader reforms. Successful reforms in Ukraine would reverberate throughout the societies of the former Soviet space, offering compelling evidence that freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law is not some faraway unreachable dream.

Ukraine actually helped to overcome some lingering strains in trans-Atlantic relations caused by the war in Iraq. The display of coordinated US-EU support for free elections in Ukraine was perhaps the most recent dramatic example of what can be achieved by transatlantic entente. Lithuania was pleased to be an active player in the process of active EU engagement during the political crisis. The West is perhaps at the same point in its relations with Ukraine as it was with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe more than a decade ago, when the notion of Euro-Atlantic integration was considered excessively ambitious, potentially threatening, or simply unrealistic. These were arguments that the Baltic States came to know only too well. That experience, while ultimately successful, tells us that anchoring Ukraine to the West will be neither quick nor easy. It cautions us about trying to predict the exact course or nature of the process, which cannot be artificially accelerated. The process of Euro-Atlantic

integration must be genuine. But it also offers some useful lessons along the way.

Firstly, closer association with the West begins at home. Western countries will deepen their links with Ukraine to the extent they see that the leadership and the people are making tough choices for democratic, free market reforms – not as a favor to them, but as a benefit to themselves. Lithuania’s breaking point in the Euro-Atlantic integration process came after this realization. Closer integration into western structures is likely to be accelerated to the extent Ukraine “acts like a member” even before it becomes a member. Seeking closer association with the West, Ukraine needs to articulate clearly and consistently to Western partners how its closer association would benefit the entire Euro-Atlantic community – and then it needs to act accordingly. Ukraine has been demonstrating its commitment by participating in NATO-led operations and acting like a *de facto* member.

Secondly, we need to keep the door open. Even though the burden of change rests primarily with Ukraine as it seeks reform, it is critically important that Western leaders be clear that the door to Western institutions remains open. Such a vision should be underpinned with concrete manifestations of support and outreach. Ukraine has been offered instruments for strengthening its ties with NATO, such as Intensified Dialogue. Lithuania supports extending a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine, which would officially recognize Ukraine’s aspirations and lay down further steps toward membership. Success will depend primarily on Ukraine’s concrete, measurable progress in implementing key reforms and policies, as well as the conduct of free and fair elections to the Verkhovna Rada in March 2006.

Thirdly, we must engage on a broad front. Western openness to Ukraine should go beyond monetary assistance alone. In earlier phases of enlargement, both the EU and the U.S. offered aspiring members a range of inducements credible enough to secure strategic leverage over the course of reform and practical enough to guide those reforms in ways conducive to Euro-Atlantic integration. Such leverage is likely to be limited without the prospect of admission to Euro-Atlantic institutions, even if that prospect appears to be on the distant horizon. The credibility of an “open door” policy depends on the willingness and ability of the West to provide intermediate mechanisms and transitional vehicles – as was done with the U.S.-Baltic Charter and the Northern European Initiative, the EU’s Stabilization and Association Agreements, the Northern Dimension – to

guide and support reformist Ukraine along what could be a long and winding road. The NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan, the EU's "10 points for closer cooperation", the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, the fact that Ukraine will be invited to align itself with EU CFSP common positions are all steps in that direction.

Then, we should also keep the impact on Russia in mind. Efforts to establish a closer Euro-Atlantic association must be advanced with an awareness of their impact on Russia and neighbouring countries. This is by no means in terms of political sensitivities or within the context of assigning spheres of influence. Success in Ukraine would be powerful evidence that democracy, free markets, respect for human rights and the rule of law can take root on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine's successful transition toward a full-fledged democracy and rule of law would resonate profoundly throughout Russian society – a particularly important message now, given Moscow's rapid retreat from freedom and democracy. Strong Western support for Ukrainian reforms is necessary not only for the sake of Ukrainian success, but also for the future of democracy and the rule of law in Russia.

Current member states can work with Ukraine in specific areas, especially in areas of comparative advantage, where Ukraine has identified the expertise it lacks. Already, in cooperation with the National Democratic Institute, Lithuanian institutions (our anti-corruption watchdog – the Special Investigations Service, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Chancellery of the Government) are actively engaged in a training program for Ukrainian civil servants. We encourage Ukraine to support the aspirations of others, for example – Georgia and Moldova, rather than holding them back in a zero-sum competition for Western favors. Here again, one can point to earlier successes, including mutual support among the Visegrad nations and the cooperation network created by the aspirant countries of the Vilnius Group. The looming danger now is that those who oppose Turkey's membership in the EU will use Ukraine's aspirations to block those of Turkey, arguing that Ukraine is clearly "European" and should jump the queue. Turkish and Ukrainian leaders would be well advised to join forces, rather than allow to be pitted against one another in some sort of "beauty contest."

Finally, regional conflicts must be resolved. Efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration must be accompanied by active attempts by the parties themselves, as well as by third nations, to resolve regional tensions and conflicts. So-called "frozen conflicts" – in Moldova (Transdnestria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia),

and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan are not really “frozen”. They are festering wounds that absorb energy and drain resources from countries that are already weak and poor. They inhibit the process of state building as well as the development of democratic societies. They generate corruption and organized crime. They foster the proliferation of arms and a climate of intimidation. They are a major source of instability within these countries and in the broader region. They severely undermine the prospects of the involved countries for Euro-Atlantic integration, while giving Moscow a major incentive to keep these conflicts frozen. Ukraine has a constructive role to play in this region and should be encouraged to do so, especially with regard to ensuring effective control and management of its eastern borders and intensifying its cooperation with the EU on regional issues, such as Moldova and Belarus.

These lessons offer both orientation and elements of a roadmap for change in the West’s relations with Ukraine on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration. These lessons also offer one overarching reassurance – the transatlantic partnership can be truly transformative, if we choose to make it so. The solution depends not only on Ukraine, but on the democracies of North America and Europe as well. They must begin by recognizing their moral and political stake in the outcome. They must demonstrate their political will and clear preference for an independent and democratic Ukraine, firmly rooted in Europe and trans-Atlantic relations.

## Lithuania's Contribution to International Operations: Challenges for a Small Ally

By *Renatas Norkus*\*

In this essay, I will attempt to raise a few observations that stem from the experiences of a small ally. Indeed, ever since the invitation of 2002 to join NATO, my country has regarded missions abroad as one of the main tasks for the armed forces. It is quite a remarkable departure from the focus on national defence. Such buzzwords as “usability”, “deployment” and “sustainability” have replaced the notions of total defence and territorial forces and now dominate our thinking and guide our military reforms.

Why such a shift? The process of our accession to NATO coincided with dramatic changes in the security situation and ensuing global campaign against terrorism. Having invested so heavily in achieving NATO membership, we had no wish to see the Alliance becoming irrelevant in the post-9/11 environment and took the phrase “out of area, or out of business” with full seriousness. We endorsed NATO’s transformation agenda and, yet again, had to reshape our military to fit the notion of NATO “going global”. The level of our commitment and ambition is well reflected in our decision to lead a PRT in Afghanistan – a very demanding, mobilising but also enriching enterprise for our Armed Forces.

There is quite a number of “lessons learnt” stemming from our decade-long participation in international operations. Although the title of this essay alludes to a small state perspective, the same challenges are almost universally applicable to NATO Allies, EU member states and the PfP countries, big or small. Let me make it clear - for me personally, it does not matter, which organization – UN, NATO or the EU – will put up the flag for any given operation – the most important thing is to get the job done. It is not a matter of which flag to use, but a matter of getting the right capabilities to the right place at the right time. All NATO and EU members as well as PfP countries need rapid reaction forces capable of full-spectrum operations, regardless of which organization will take

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action. It is therefore absolutely crucial that UN, NATO, EU and OSCE cooperate and coordinate their military and civil efforts in the ongoing and planned international operations.

All these organisations and their members face two types of challenges when conducting international operations: political and military. Starting with political challenges, the first of them is choosing between standing alliances and ad hoc coalitions to pursue national interests. True, Lithuania is involved in NATO-led, EU-led and U.S.-led campaigns. Yet our interest is to ensure that NATO is not reduced to a mere toolbox, a peacetime training and standardisation organisation that never plans and conducts actual operations. Ad hoc coalitions might offer the advantage of greater flexibility for a leading nation, but their stability and longevity often presents a challenge.

Each state in a coalition is driven by its own national interests and domestic political dynamics even under most severe of threats. These interests have to be constantly monitored by a lead nation, striving to sustain a coalition. Sometimes such an effort is not rewarded, and some nations inevitably leave coalitions. This can be painful politically and disturbing militarily, as a pullout of even the smallest contribution can upset a well-planned campaign. The lead nation has to plan how to plug the resulting gaps, mostly with its own forces, which prompts to maintain certain reserves and diminishes the advantage of burden-sharing so intrinsic to coalitions.

It seems that it would be much more difficult for nations to abruptly leave from UN, NATO or EU-led operation. Maintaining the effectiveness and cohesion of the organisation in charge of the operation is in the best interest of all its members, I wish to believe. Is it not the case that an international organisation – be it the UN, NATO or the EU – are by default better placed than any ad hoc coalition to create, stimulate and maintain the unity of purpose, which is an essential ingredient of effective multinational operation. In addition, organisation's staff can carry the burden of co-ordinating various national positions of contributing nations – a luxury absent in the case of ad hoc coalitions.

Another important political consideration is that of generating and sustaining political will of domestic political establishments to commit troops for international operations. Small states rarely have vital national interests at stake in conflicts distant from their territories. On the contrary, there is a common sense public perception that by taking direct part in the fight against terrorism, we expose ourselves more to the threat of international terrorism. Our

participation, therefore, is not a function of acute perception of an immediate threat. It is rather an expression of solidarity within the Euro-Atlantic community and defence of common values. Naturally, we hope that if we faced a serious danger ourselves, our allies would respond and come to our assistance, even when their national interests were not directly challenged either.

Admittedly, the question of “staying power” remains. When the survival of a state is not at stake, it takes substantial political will and resolve to sustain commitments in expeditionary campaigns out of solidarity considerations. This points to a broader issue of shaping strategic culture so that international operations are seen as the main mission of the armed forces by increasing number of civilians, while society and decision-makers accept the risks of deploying them to adverse environment that may involve high-intensity combat.

Small states also cherish and are very sensitive about their sovereignty. This political sensitivity may infringe upon the possibility to make timely decisions and take timely actions. However, Lithuania’s example demonstrates that the issue can be cast aside: our Parliament has pre-authorized deployment of the Lithuanian element of the NATO Response Force, thereby granting full decision authority to the North Atlantic Council. It seems that all NATO and EU countries will have to have similar arrangements, otherwise any deployment of the NRF or the Battle Groups will be anything but rapid. Militarily, a usual complaint is that small states bring too few meaningful capabilities to the table, while the burden of integrating them is substantial. Given various national caveats on the use of those assets and capabilities, planning coalition operations often resembles building the Tower of Babel. Differences in procedures, doctrines, levels of training, standards of equipment, weapons and communication systems further complicate the task. It is quite understandable that some countries would often prefer to do the job by themselves.

The counter-argument is that in the times of shrinking defence budgets and overstretched forces even small contributions do matter. Contribution of our special operations unit to the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan is a good example. Large strategic effects of small contributions are also a function of the prevalent type of warfare. They may be of lesser relevance in large-scale manoeuvre warfare. However, what we face in Iraq and, to some degree, Afghanistan are insurgencies that are normally countered by smaller units supported by air power. The times of divisions and corps are in the past. Companies and battalions, operating as semi-autonomous mobile units in a

Collaborative Information Environment are becoming the main combat muscles.

In this context, for instance, Lithuania's plans to be able to deploy and sustain a battalion task force for operations abroad would allow for a significant contribution to allied expeditionary operations in counter-insurgencies, stabilisation or peace support operations. In addition, setting up a PRT in the province of Ghowr, which is militarily small, but strategically a significant contribution, is another example of trying to "think globally and act locally". Thinking small is natural to us, but, paradoxically, it may be somewhat of a challenge for the countries that are used to planning for major decisive wars. The Chagcharan PRT is an excellent example of a truly multinational project, which unites small countries like Lithuania, Denmark, Iceland and soon Croatia, is supported by the US and the UK, and is a part of the NATO-led ISAF operation, taking place under the UN mandate.

Then there is the issue of role specialisation, or so-called "niche capabilities". As an Ally, we are looking into some areas where small contribution could bring about significant effects. However, we should avoid the trap of what could be called overspecialisation. Politically, it is not palatable for the small guys to "serve water and do laundry" while the big guys will do the fighting. For example, Lithuania could develop a Water Purification Brigade to fill in this niche in the Alliance and scrap all its combat units. Although such a move would seem economically sensible, it would be a political suicide for any defence minister of any country. Small states need to share the same risks and challenges with the big countries in order to demonstrate their equal military stature within the Alliance and acquire necessary combat expertise. Multinational projects are a better way to fill various gaps, instead of relegating small nations to the militarily secondary role of service support.

Interoperability is certainly one of the crucial factors of success of international operations. Lithuania and other new NATO members made a considerable progress in this area well before the accession to the Alliance. Partnership for Peace was instrumental in this process. The longstanding practice of standardisation within the Alliance is clearly paying off.

However, interoperability of armament and equipment is just one side of the coin. Achieving interoperability of minds is a far more difficult goal. Understanding each other on a battlefield comes only through constant and intensive common training and education. Without it, our militaries would be



forced to build familiarity with each other's mindset, practices and capabilities during actual operations, which do not help in terms of effectiveness. Certainly, it is not always possible to be equally well familiar with the military of all the Allies and partners. In a way, cultivating closer relation with some of them might be necessary. For example, Lithuania is very keen to deepen the format of Nordic-Baltic Eight for these purposes, building upon our solid record of co-operation.

At the end of the day, we should not forget that the vital ingredient of multinational operations is trust. Trust in that the allies will not abandon you. That politicians will seek to maintain unity. That commanders will exercise sound judgement. That units will do their job properly. It takes time, effort and patience to build trust. However, without it, any coalition will be a burden, and the integration of any ally and partner, small or large, will not succeed. Within the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies, we must work on strengthening the bonds of trust, hoping that the Alliance, instead of just enabling "coalitions of the willing", will remain THE Coalition.

## **Advancing NATO - Ukraine Relations: the 'Vilnius Process' Continues**

*By Gediminas Kirkilas\**

It has become a nice tradition to hold significant NATO-related events in Vilnius. In 2000, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 10 NATO hopefuls gathered in Vilnius and declared membership in the Alliance their common goal. Seven of those countries have already succeeded in this goal. In Vilnius, April 2005, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NATO member states and Ukraine launched an Intensified Dialogue. In October 2005, Vilnius again became the host of yet another high-profile event – the informal NATO-Ukraine high level defence consultations. Somewhat symbolically, 10 countries, including the United States and Ukraine itself, were represented by their Ministers of Defence at the event.

Due to the informal nature of the meeting, no formal far-reaching decisions were made. However, the spirit of the meeting itself definitely gave a positive boost to NATO-Ukraine Intensified Dialogue. Even more importantly, Ukraine received a very clear message from a number of Allies, including Lithuania, that the membership perspective in the form of Membership Action Plan is on the horizon. But the Alliance now wants to see Ukraine's political leadership showing their determination in implementing the necessary reforms and delivering tangible results rather than beautiful but vague promises.

The NATO-Ukraine consultations made it clear that both sides are finally on the same page. The quality of dialogue between Ukraine and NATO Allies has improved dramatically, not least because of the substantial progress achieved by Ukraine over the past few months. The leadership of the Ukrainian defence establishment is able to soberly assess the current security sector situation in Ukraine and understands which immediate steps need to be taken. Notably, Ukraine appears to have a clear list of priorities which require instant attention: strengthening democratic oversight with the security and defence sectors, carrying out defence policy review, downsizing the Armed Forces and fighting corruption.

NATO has clearly taken note of the substantial progress Ukraine has made so far. In Vilnius, many member states agreed that Ukraine is on the right track of Euroatlantic integration. However, it is also well understood that the ball is now

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in Ukraine's hands and that the further success of the country is directly linked to the commitment and hard work of Ukraine's leadership

The Allies in their own right have showcased a strong solidarity with Ukraine's efforts and identified a number of areas in which they are already supporting or going to support Ukraine's government during this complicated transition period. During the Consultations, fifteen nations signed A Letter of Intent for Nations Expressing Support for the JWGDR Programme for Professional Development. In addition, both sides seem to agree that Ukraine has a good tool at hand – the NATO Liaison Office in Kiev. The possibilities provided by this Office should be exploited to the fullest extent.

The Vilnius Consultations was an excellent evaluation point for the Intensified Dialogue. For the time being, it seems to be a good tool for enhancing NATO-Ukraine partnership further. In Vilnius, several Allies have remarked that NATO could consider extending its Membership Action Plan to Ukraine in 2006. Some nations would still like to wait until after the 2006 parliamentary elections in Ukraine before taking a decision on MAP. I believe it would be a natural and logical next step in NATO-Ukraine relations. On the one hand, the Membership Action Plan will bring an unambiguous membership perspective to the Ukrainian government and society. On the other hand, it will also be an ultimate test of Ukraine's readiness for membership. NATO's candid and sometimes even severe scrutiny, which is inherent in the MAP process, is an irreplaceable tool to oversee and assess the actual progress of a candidate country. In this regard, Minister Grytsenko's idea of inviting "MAP experts" to Ukraine for providing first hand advice for Ukrainian experts and helping to prepare them for the eventual MAP process, should be given due consideration.

A revitalised Vilnius process could and should once again play an instrumental role. After all, the governments of the seven newest NATO members themselves underwent the difficult path of often painful defence reform. Just as Ukraine today, they had to downsize or restructure their Armed Forces, close some military bases, dismiss some officers and at the same time modernise their equipment and armaments. Undoubtedly, these seven Allies - ex-MAP countries - are best placed to support the efforts of another future Ally – Ukraine. Vilnius stands ready to provide its share of expertise and coordinate the contributions of all other NATO countries willing and able to offer their support.

To sum up, the momentum of the Orange Revolution is still in the air – NATO and Ukraine cannot afford wasting it. I hope that in 2008 we will be able to hold another historic NATO summit, which will feature the invitation of new NATO members.

## Ukraine on the Way to NATO Membership?

*Observations on the seminar "Integrating Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic Security Structures: Regional and Strategic Challenges Ahead"*

By Kristian L. Nielsen \*

Part of the Baltic Defence College's ambition is to be an innovative institution, which can respond to the ever-changing challenges facing a higher education institution in the field of military education. The commitment to this aim shows in the attempt to stimulate debate of the security policy-related issues of the day.

To further this aim The Baltic Defence College was the organiser and host of a seminar entitled "Integrating Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic Security Structures: Regional Strategic Challenges Ahead". The aims of the seminar were two-fold: To contribute positively to the public debate on the strategic environment, and to deepen the knowledge, among students and staff as well as all others interested, of this important issue.

The Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Brigadier General Algis Vaičeliūnas stressed these points in his welcome speech at the seminar: The ambition of the college is to make a strong contribution to the ongoing debates on the important security political issues of the day. General Vaičeliūnas also pointed out, that the defence college itself is already doing its small part to facilitate the kind of developments addressed by this seminar, by opening its courses to students from Ukraine and other PfP-countries.

The main thrust of the discussion was on Ukraine's possible accession to NATO. However, the seminar also aimed to explore the opportunities for Ukraine to integrate into the European Union. I will deal briefly with this part before turning to NATO.

Some progress has been made in Ukraine's adaptation towards EU standards. Market economy status is close to be achieved, which will make the negotiation of free trade agreements with the EU possible.

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Ukraine is not yet a candidate or applicant country, but through the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy a process has started, which may eventually end up with membership. Action plans have been agreed on for further reform, and a number of agreements have been signed, regulating among other things the energy sectors. At the same time Ukraine is already supporting several of the aims of the union's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

On the so-called Copenhagen Criteria Ukraine has also made progress. As already mentioned, Ukraine will soon have achieved a functioning market economy, thus satisfying one of the main criteria. On the political front much progress has been made, and the panel seemed quite in agreement, that the upcoming general election, if it is conducted cleanly, will be crucial for cementing this progress. Ukraine is most lacking in the administrative sphere. At present it is not realistic to expect the capacity to implement the EU's acquis. Many more reforms need to be carried out before that is realistic. Likewise parliament needs to step up its efforts to pass the necessary legislation. It is hoped that once the electioneering is over (March 2006) there will be renewed impetus for reform.

The EU is currently in a cautious wait-and-see mode. The main burden is thus on Ukraine to make a decisive move in favour of membership. "The door is not open, but also not closed". Ukraine has to show its sincerity in wanting to reform and adopt the democratic values underpinning the EU. Luckily it seems that a political consensus is emerging in Ukraine regarding the ambition to accede to the EU.

At the same time, some panellists were also suggesting that Ukraine should not try to engage in a competition with Turkey over membership. These two countries should treat each others like allies, and cooperate to achieve a stronger position. But for the moment, the key for Ukraine is reform.

A group of like-minded people, gathering to confirm themselves in their good intentions - that description could quite fairly be used for certain parts at the seminar. Such was the one-sidedness of the opinions brought to bear on what is in fact a major, and still unresolved, issue for Ukraine. Among the speakers nobody was questioning the basic view that Ukraine must belong to NATO, or that it is very much in Ukraine's interest to move in that direction.

This was perhaps predictable, given the composition of the panels. Of the Ukrainian opposition we heard only in the third person. Other sceptics towards Ukrainian accession to NATO did not attend the event either. Hearing their views and opinions explained would probably have made for a more balanced discussion.

Clearly, it was repeated a number of times, NATO countries have strategic interests at stake, and the securing of Ukraine into the alliance is crucial. Yet, that Russia should consider similar interests to be at stake was not taken as seriously. Some were talking of it being time “to take the gloves off” with Russia, others of never again allowing Russia to gain any influence over its neighbour. Others again acknowledged that a balancing act would be required, and the best way of re-assuring Russia would be through transparency, even if it was unclear what the result would be, if such efforts failed to have the desired effect.

It was easy to get the feeling, listening to this part of the debate, that following the change of government a year ago, all was now set for Ukraine to achieve a long-held ambition for NATO membership.

And yet it did come out that public opinion in Ukraine is not at all favourable to NATO membership (possible membership of the EU seems to be much less controversial). Such issues were predictably brushed aside as being a sign of people’s general ignorance. That NATO should be an alliance against Russia - a perception which it seems contributes to the coolness among many Ukrainians towards membership - was strenuously denied. Nobody was asking whether Ukrainians are not in fact quite satisfied with their present equidistance between Russia and Western Europe. The common consensus was that people need information, and that public opinion is sure to come around once more factual information is available.

Equally interesting was the language used when talking about those who oppose NATO membership for Ukraine. These were said to be suffering from misconceptions and delusions, if they were not in fact doing the business of outside powers. Their activities amounted, in the opinions of some panellists, to manipulating the people and trying to abuse the democratic process. An (entirely legal, as far as I could understand) initiative by opposition groups to stage a referendum on NATO accession this coming spring (2006) was denounced as “dangerous populism”; mostly, it would seem, because such a vote will almost surely be lost the way things currently stand.

None of this is really in order to take issue with the conclusions that each speaker had arrived at. Nor should it be seen as criticising the speakers for putting forward their opinions forcefully. Ukraine may indeed, I agree, be better served by joining NATO. Rather, my point is that this question was too fundamental to be exempted from thorough debate, and that the panel's composition ensured that such a debate would not occur.

New knowledge and new insights are only gained when opposing ideas are allowed to meet and be discussed openly. On this particular point, arguably the most controversial relating to the seminar's topic, that did not happen.

Even if the question the seminar was set up to answer was indeed loaded with respect to one fundamental issue, then the seminar produced some fine debates on other fronts.

It was clearly highlighted that Ukraine has in terms of military capabilities shown itself very able to transform. Civilian control of the military has been clearly established, and the armed forces have gradually approached the NATO standards and the defence development plans are consistent with the alliance's aims. Indeed, were the military issues the only ones at stake Ukraine would have received the invitation to full membership by now. From several sides it was thus pointed out, that Ukraine has long since established itself as a major 'security provider', and that the progress achieved through the NATO-Ukraine Partnership framework has been very substantial.

The Ukrainian armed forces have moved through a substantial re-structuring away from the Cold War-era territorial-defence military towards a more professional force geared for international missions. This process has been accompanied by a significant downsizing of the armed forces. The progress is ongoing, and driven by targets set for Ukraine's capabilities. A number of wordplays were made between the speakers, stressing what needs to be done. However, the agreement was that Ukraine needs to focus strongly on prioritising its aims, developing the capabilities, and above all: Implementation! The continuous transformation is strengthened by the dialogue with other countries. Lessons can clearly be learned, and experiences exchanged between the armed forces of states that have had to either develop or reform armed forces over the past 15 years.

As part of the transformation of the armed forces, and Ukraine's emergence as a 'security provider' Ukraine has taken an active part in many international



missions, both inside and outside the UN framework. The size and quality of the armed forces have both been useful, as Ukraine is one a country that has shown itself capable of deploying all three branches of the military abroad. This capacity to deploy the full range of military capabilities should and will be maintained, and it will not be an issue to talk of Ukraine developing a niche capability.

Another aspect of Ukraine's ongoing transformation on which some interesting perspectives were brought out, was the process that Ukraine will have to go through in order to achieve integration with Western Europe and ultimately NATO membership. In fact the word transformation is the key.

This transformation has to be applied not just to the military or to some political structures. It is the whole of society that has to be transformed. It is therefore important in itself that the reform process continues. And again information was deemed to be essential. As has been witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe, a transition process does not happen by itself; enormous amounts of political will is required. In this sense Ukraine is probably in a weaker position than most, as the danger of a relapse towards more authoritarian ways is still a distinct possibility. For that reason it is all the more important that the West is committed to offering the assistance Ukraine needs. Not necessarily in the shape of monetary subsidies, but much more importantly in the shape of an end goal.

Several stressed that what the west needs to do, is to hold Ukraine steady in a process. And be ready to accept Ukraine if reforms succeed. Too many political leaders in the west are merely rhetoric in their support for Ukraine, but have far too little action to show for their words.

At the same time, the Ukrainian government has to be more open, both externally, and even more important, internally, about the reform processes being carried out. The momentum for both democratic and economic reform achieved by the Orange Revolution will almost certainly fizzle at some point. By acting in time to keep people informed of what happens, much can be avoided in terms of reverses. In this respect the importance of people understanding that the reform process is not happening because of outside diktat, but because it is necessary in its own right, because it is right for Ukraine (whether in NATO or not), can not be underestimated. If these challenges can be met, there is plenty of reason to hope that the reform process achieves a "critical mass", i.e. reaches a point at which it can no longer be stopped or rolled back.

The real question is not whether the Ukrainians are ready to embark on this transformation process – they are! But are the Western European institutions and countries ready to engage them, “to make the partnerships truly transformative?” Again, they have to be, as the price of failure will be high. A democratic Ukraine will be an example to others in the former USSR, and will in time be able to act as a regional leader. An unstable Ukraine is in nobody’s interest.

Ukraine is today where the Baltic countries were 10 years ago when they set course for NATO and EU membership. The experience of the Baltic countries can thus serve as a good guidance for Ukrainian decision-makers. Also in the Baltic experience, scepticism in the West had to be overcome. This was done through determined diplomacy, and a clear resolve to transform society. Equally important, a consensus was achieved domestically regarding the foreign policy objectives to be pursued. At the same time the Baltic States did not let themselves be burdened by outstanding issues with Russia. Likewise Ukraine must not let issues such as the Sevastopol base stand in the way.

There can be no concrete timelines for Ukrainian accession to either organisation, but there has to be a chance of it happening. Creating this opportunity and firmly signalling that it is available is the task of the Euro-Atlantic organisations. But the decisive move to take it is for Ukraine to make. As one speaker quoted the American ambassador to NATO: “The way to NATO is open, but the road is yours to travel”.

## Book Review

*De Haas, Marcel (2004),  
Russian Security and Air Power 1992-2002 (Frank Cass, London)*

*By Ole Kværnø and Maltbe Mulvad\**

### Introduction

Marcel De Haas' book, which is an abridged version of his PhD thesis, poses restates one of the central questions of political science, being the relationship between structural factors, such as economic development and international political dynamics, and the qualities of leaders and interest groups in explaining the courses of history and behaviour of states. Especially in the study of great power politics, researchers have often been puzzled with the interaction and importance of structure and agency in explaining sometimes seemingly illogical courses of action. A large body of theoretical literature addresses the problem of structure and agency in predicting Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy<sup>1</sup>. De Haas' research is conducted in the same tradition. In his contribution, a comprehensive study of the application of air power during 1992-2002 and an investigation on Russian security policy. Thus, the aim of the investigation is to understand the way in which policy is formed by identifying the significant indicators on different levels of explanation for the directions of Russian policy.

### *The Structure of the Book*

With the goal of gaining an overall understanding of Russian security policy in the addressed period and a specific perspective on air power, the book is divided in four substantial chapters that address the structure and implementation of security policy and air power respectively. Four research questions are used as points of reference and they largely correspond with the four sections of the book. The first question regards the thought process of the Russian political-military leadership in formulation a security policy and the armed forces. The second question addresses the relations between structural developments and what De Haas calls "opportunistic" decisions. These questions are answered in the first half of the book and are on the levels of grand- and military strategy. The two final questions are focused on the operations and tactics of air power

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and are treated in the second part. Thus, the third question forms a direct link between the two parts by looking at the consequences of security policy for the build-up, tasks and status of the air forces. The fourth question relates directly to the case study and concerns the interaction between doctrinal thought and the experiences of the use of air power in and around Chechnya.

In addressing the formulations of security policy, De Haas identifies the key actors and institutions of Russian security policy, the levels they operate on and the relations they have to documents of foreign and security policy. A combination of structural developments and individual characteristics of decision makers shapes the security policy, concluding that president Putin has had a stronger personal impact on and control of policy formulations than his predecessor Yeltsin, but internal and external structural factors and developments shape the setting. Concerning air power, external and internal political events and economic circumstances play a great role in explaining the build-up, tasks and status of the service. But disputes about command and control between different actors and the dualistic Russian security policy between great power thinking and the realities of the post-cold war environment have played a role as well. There has been a clear interaction between doctrine and use of air power and experiences on the ground are increasingly reflected in security documents. Reflecting the recent experiences and contrasting the soviet doctrinal thinking, internal conflicts are now accepted as a possibility and a security threat and hence described in the newer doctrines.

### *Assessment*

One of the great strengths of De Haas' book is the immense and very well structured empirical research conducted on official Russian documents. This is reflected in the various graphic and schematic representations of the results and the research process. The tables in chapter two demand special attention: Table 2.2 presents a schematic diachronic comparison of Soviet, CIS and Russian military doctrines, where change and continuity can be traced in the period of 1990-2000. Table 2.3 supplements this by giving a schematic synchronous comparison of the 2000 editions of the Russian Military Doctrine, National Security Concept and Foreign Policy Concept. This presents the reader with an overview on threat perceptions over time and on different levels in the political and military hierarchy. Not only does this give an insight in the developments of Russian security policy, it also enables researchers to use this body of empirical material for further research. The mapping of institutional relations and biography of key persons in the development of Russian security policy also

makes this work a good starting point for an understanding and overview of this policy domain.

The overall conclusion, that Russian security policy during the period of investigation fluctuates between imperial great power thinking and acceptance of the changed post cold war power configuration, is not particularly new or surprising<sup>2</sup>, but the fact that De Haas supports this through detailed investigation on Russian sources and demonstrates the effects of this schism on all levels of policy implementation, makes his contribution to the analysis of Russian security policy unique. Furthermore it enables the structured use of changes of behaviour sub-strategic levels of decision-making as indicators for future changes in the strategic policy, and vice versa. This addressing of causality could provide valuable insight in the workings of Russian strategic behaviour. The detailed empirical investigations on the structure of Russian security policy enable De Haas to predict that the consistency of internal security policy will be lower that of external security. The reason for this is that the primary policy-making actors agree to a higher degree on the assessment of external than on internal threats. Whereas the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopt a broad security concept, the Ministry of Defence understands security in strict military-diplomatic terms. If president Putin manages to balance the interdepartmental differences, it will ensure him greater control and consistency in security policy.

One of the weaknesses in the study is the reliance on written sources and especially on official documents. De Haas acknowledges this shortcoming and concludes that the official documents are indicative of Russian security policy although the domestic political meaning of the documents is marginal, at least on all other levels than the political and military elites. The case study in the second part of the book does give some indications on the relationship between doctrine and practice, but the linking is weak and few references are made to the assessments in the first part when describing the course of the Russian air strategy in Chechnya and Dagestan. Because of the reliance on doctrine, De Haas concludes that Soviet security policy was ideologically based rather than rational as opposed to the Russian policy, which displays a growing level of pragmatism. Although this might be true concerning the official statements, one could argue that the security political practice of the Soviet Union displayed a lot of rationalism that is not found in the programmatic statements.

## Conclusions

De Haas has written a book of great interest for anyone concerned with Russian security- and defence policy. Especially the first part gives a detailed insight in Russian security policy and provides an understanding of the actors, institutions and documents in the policy-shaping-process. The second part of the book sheds light on important tactical aspects of Russian air operations during the last decade and the institutional evolvement of Russian air power. In sum, *Russian Security and Air Power 1992-2002* presents a nuanced study of Russian security policy and practice that manages to combine structural explanations, which often lack the understanding of the internal conditions under which security policy is shaped, and “culturalist” explanations, which tends to ascribe disproportionate value to the domestic factors. De Haas contextualizes Russian domestic and foreign policy and international events in their influence on security policy. The result is a piece of research that is worthy in itself and very usable as a platform for further empirical studies.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance Ward, Chris (1999), *Stalins Russia*, 2<sup>nd</sup>. ed., (Arnold Publishers, London), for an example of this debate in the studies of the Soviet Union.

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. Adomeit, Hannes (2001), ‘Sicherheitskonzepte und Militärpolitik’, in: Höhmann, H. & Schröder, H., *Russland unter neuer Führung* (Agenda Verlag, Münster), for similar conclusions.

*Defence Policies in Brief: 2005***Estonia: Participation in international operations - Estonian Defence Forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans\***

Principles guiding Estonian participation in international operations

Estonia has participated in international operations for ten years with more than 1300 troops. Why does a state with population less than 1,5 million want to risk its citizens lives thousands of kilometres away from home? Our commitment to contribute to the enhancement of global security is based on the understanding that today's security is indivisible.

In the globalizing and interdependent world, defending our own independence, nation and democratic values starts by securing peace and stability in geographically far away places. According to the fundamental security and defence policy regulations Estonian security and defence policy is based on the principle of indivisibility of security.<sup>1</sup> In other words, Estonia regards its security as indivisible from wider security environment: changes in security environment outside Estonia affect security environment inside, and vice versa. Our policy makers realize that participation in international peace operations contributes to the preservation of global security, which in turn enhances our own security.

By implication, Estonian national military strategy stipulates that a key task of the Estonian defence forces (EDF) is participation in international crisis management and peace operations. The objective of such operations is to support international peace, stability and security by military means.

In addition to the principle of defending democratic values and fulfilling commitments to our allies, international missions benefit our defence forces by very tangible means. Involvement in international operations is indivisible part of the every day activity of EDF. As one of the catalysts for the transformation

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\* Prepared by Piret Pernik, Advisor of Analysis Section, Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Defence of Estonia.

<sup>1</sup> Such as national security concept which was adopted by the national parliament *Riigikogu* on 16 June 2004 and national military strategy which was confirmed by the Government on 18 January 2005.

process that our defence forces are currently undertaking, it is high priority for Estonia.

### **Contribution to international operations**

Estonia participates in the most important NATO's mission in Afghanistan, in the largest NATO's mission in Kosovo, in the European Union's largest operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the most important global operation in Iraq. Estonian troops participating in international missions comprise of professional soldiers.

At the moment our contribution to international missions equals 5% of peacetime strength of the land forces (133 troops). According to the "Force Structure and Development Plan of the Estonian Defence Forces 2010", the EDF will be able to deploy and sustain a contingent of up to 350 personnel by 2010. This goal corresponds to the NATO's Istanbul commitments according to which 8% of the nation's land forces should be deployed and 40% deployable. By 2010 Estonia plans to deploy and sustain 9% of its land forces.

By 2007 Estonia will be capable of simultaneously participating in a one-off international operation, for up to six months with rotation, with a tactical group of the battalion, smaller specialist units and a mine countermeasures vessel. By 2008 Estonia will be capable of participating in a long-term international operation by simultaneously providing a contingent up to 250 personnel and a mine countermeasures vessel. By 2010 our goal is to sustain up to 350 personnel in international peace support operations. Annually we spend 3-4% of our defence expenditures on international operations - this is average amount compared to the other allies.

Estonia is able to provide capabilities for crisis management operations such as: light infantry, military police and intelligence, staff officers, medics, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, air movement control, military observation, transient maintenance and cargo handling.

Due to the limited resources it makes for us more sense to contribute bigger units to fewer operations rather than participate with a small number of troops in multiple missions. For this reason we are going to increase the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan and Balkans.



## International Security Assistance Force

NATO took over command and coordination of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003. At the Istanbul summit in June 2004 NATO allies declared the situation in Afghanistan and ISAF a high priority for the Alliance. Estonian government believes that participation in Iraqi and Afghanistan operations derives directly from Estonian security interests.

The EDF have been taking part in the NATO peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan since March 2003. In 2005 Estonia doubled its contribution to ISAF from 12 to 23 troops. At the present Estonian contribution to ISAF includes as a part of UK led Mazari-e-Sharifi provincial reconstruction team (PRT) a ten-member Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, Military Observation team (MOT) of six persons and two staff officers. In addition Estonia provides Cross Service Team of three persons and two staff officers in Kabul. On December 7, 2005 Estonian parliament Riigikogu extended unanimously mandate for deployment of Estonian troops in Afghanistan by two years until 2008.

The previous parliamentary mandate allowed us to deploy up to 25 troops to Afghanistan. Now Afghanistan will become the biggest mission for Estonia with up to 150 personnel deployed in that country. According to the plans the size of the mission unit will be up to 120 personnel by the end of next year. Estonian troops will be serving in the reconstruction of the Helmand province under British command.

About 19.2 million kroons (EUR 1.2 mln) has been earmarked for the Afghanistan mission in this year's budget and about 82.3 million kroons for the next year. Our increased participation during 2006 is planned to include two infantry platoons, a company staff, a logistics element, a Human Intelligence team (HUMINT), a MOT team, an EOD team, staff officers in MNB (S) HQ and in ISAF HQ, and Air Force personnel.

## Operation Iraqi Freedom

Estonian soldiers have been in Iraq since June 2003. At the moment Estonian troops in Iraq consist of a 34-strong infantry platoon ESTPLA-11 stationed in Al Taji camp (20 km northwest of Baghdad) under command of the United States Third Infantry Division. In addition there are three staff officers serving at the coalition forces headquarters and one officer in the composition of the NATO Iraqi training mission.

In terms of civilian assets, in the framework of NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) we donated to the Iraqi Ministry of Internal Affairs 2400 automatic rifles with ammunition and a computer lab with 11 workstations to assist the training process. Also a staff officer is assigned to the NTM-I as Deputy Chief of Staff Support. In December 2005 we plan to rotate ESTPLA-11 by a new infantry platoon ESTPLA-12 and continue the service of staff officers.

The budget for Iraq mission in 2006 is 24 million kroons (EUR 1,53 mln), most of it for personnel costs. We have also contributed 50 thousand EUR to the NATO assistance foundation for Iraq. In total Estonian assistance projects to Iraq amount to more than seven mln kroons (EUR 447 284).

On December 7, 2005 the national parliament Riigikogu extended the EDF mission in Iraq by one year starting from 1 January 2006 by 68 votes in favour and three votes against from Social Democratic faction. The mandate allows deployment up to 40 troops.

## Kosovo Force

Our current contribution to Kosovo Force (KFOR) comprises a staff officer in KROR HQ, a staff officer in the Danish Battalion HQ (DANBN HQ) and a military police platoon ESTPATROL-12 (21 persons) in Italian led KFOR Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU). Total number of Estonian troops in Kosovo is 23. ESTPATROL-13 will leave for Kosovo in December 2005.

In addition, we intend to participate with a company minus sized unit Baltsquadron-13 within Danish battalion starting from March 2006. The total contribution to DANBAT will amount to two platoons and staff officers (68 persons). The parliamentary mandate for using Estonian troops in KFOR was extended on December 7, 2005 by two years as of January 1 when the current mandate expires.

For next year the expenditure for participation in KFOR (the costs of military police and reconnaissance company) is more than 37 million kroons (EUR 2,36 mln).

### **European Union Force Operation Althea**

Up to the present there have been a staff officer in NATO Sarajevo HQ, two officers in EUFOR HQ and an officer in EUFOR MNTF(N). In December 2005 we increased our contribution by infantry platoon ESTGUARD-1, the unit of volunteer National Guard Kaitseliit (Defence League). This is the first fully Kaitseliit-based mission unit.

The 28-strong Kaitseliit guard platoon will be guarding and defending the Tuzla air base 120 kilometres north of Tuzla. ESTGUARD-1 will act in the European Union-led Althea operation under Australian battalion command in a multinational company together with soldiers from Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

### **Other operations**

In addition to our largest contributions to these operations Estonia provides military observers for United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Lebanon. We have also a staff and support vessel Admiral Pitka in NATO Response Force (NRF) until March 2006. In the European Union Battle Groups (BG) we plan to participate with 45 persons (infantry battalion, medics, staff officer and support elements) under aegis of Nordic BG that will achieve full operational readiness in January 2008.

Since March 2004, Estonia has in its history unprecedented security guarantee – membership in NATO. Obligation to participate in international missions is for Estonians closely related to this security guarantee. Estonian membership in NATO is an important tool for defending our own country.

On the other hand, participation in international missions is important not only for our immediate national security. Stability in the Middle East is not solely concern of the United States, but also of the European Union and NATO. Without stability in Iraq, Afghanistan and Balkans the world as a whole is less safe place. Participation in international missions and enhancing security beyond

the territorial borders of Estonia is thus an important tool and task for our foreign and security policy.

### **Latvia: Security assistance outreach policy towards South Caucasus\***

Having become a fully-fledged member of NATO in 2004, Latvia received unprecedented security guarantees. At the same time, we became a part of the much wider common security environment; therefore it is also our responsibility to undertake new roles to achieve common values and interests in the Euro Atlantic security area. Latvia sees its role as two-fold: one – as security provider in the form of participation in the international support operations and, second – as contributor to the reform process in the countries currently reforming their security and defence sectors. This policy brief will provide closer look in the currently ongoing and planned Latvia's security assistance outreach activities towards South Caucasus. The cooperation has been activated also with the West Balkan countries. Latvia has developed bilateral cooperation program with Croatia and currently drafts cooperation plans with Albania and Macedonia. The joint cooperation initiatives with Ukraine are developed under the Long Term Cooperation plan which defines main areas of cooperation. Our experts also examine potential cooperation plans with Moldova.

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 the Alliance has stepped forward to develop closer relation with the countries of South Caucasus and Central Asia by creating position of Special Representatives for both regions and permanent Liaison Offices in Georgia and Kazakhstan, thereby fostering political, economic and military reforms. To support this initiative, Latvia intensified its security assistance outreach policy towards South Caucasus, especially Georgia. The region has been identified as our priority in the area of security assistance as our countries are similar by size and we share common historical background that makes our security sector reform experience and lessons-learned during the NATO integration process more relevant and applicable. This is a niche of expertise that Latvia as a new NATO member can provide in strengthening NATO's partnership with those countries. Latvia also supports the aspirations of South Caucasus countries towards development of closer partnerships with the Euro Atlantic structures and use of currently developed cooperation frameworks such as Planning and Review Process, Individual Partnership Action

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Plan, Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism and Partnership for Peace program that allow to bring partners closer to the Alliance's interoperability standards and values.

Latvia's security assistance outreach activities towards the partner countries include expert level consultations on security sector reform and NATO integration issues, so called on-the-job-trainings to the partner country experts, funding of studies at the Baltic Defence College and development of joint projects in cooperation with our traditional cooperation partners.

This year Latvia launched active defence cooperation with Georgia, which is undergoing a complex process of reforming its defence system. The first bilateral cooperation agreement was signed in December 2004 and it envisages regular political-military expert consultations, 'on the job trainings' in the areas of international relations, defence planning, personnel management, procurement, public relations, administrative and legal issues. The training of Georgian specialists at the EOD School has been scheduled for 2006. The bilateral agreement on the Protection of Classified Information that was signed in July 2005 allows expand much closer cooperation and exchange of information. Similar bilateral cooperation plans are currently being developed for other two South Caucasus countries - with Armenia and Azerbaijan and will be signed by the end of 2005. Upon the request of the Georgian Prime Minister, Latvia has designated two special advisors - Mr. Jānis Sārts and Mr. Aivars Puriņš - to provide expert assistance on implementation of the Individual Partnership Action Plan. They will serve as advisors to the IPAP Implementation Commission that works under the auspices of Georgian Prime Minister. We hope that Latvia's acquired experience will foster Georgia's defence reform progress. This fall Latvia welcomed the first Georgian defence experts on-the-job-trainings. Along with the bilateral activities, at the beginning of 2005 Latvia made its first Voluntary National Contribution for the assignment of NATO Liaison Officer for the Caucasus. The former Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and Advisor to the Ministry of Defence Mr. Romualds Ražuks started his assignment in January this year.

Another important aspect is well-coordinated delivery of the international assistance aimed to foster security sector reforms in the partner nations. Transferring from the status of assistance recipient to the donor allows us to know how essential it is to have a permanent and constructive dialogue between both sides. Latvia actively engaged in the South Caucasus Clearinghouse – a

forum that brings together donor and recipient countries to discuss the ongoing or planned assistance project. The last Clearinghouse meeting was held in Riga, Latvia, from 2 - 4 November 2005 and we were particularly pleased to see an increased number of the donor countries being represented. The approach of using IPAP International Assistance List that have been so far developed for Georgia and Azerbaijan and currently is drafted also for Armenia is very instrumental for the delivery of such well-coordinated assistance. We hope that the International Assistance Lists will serve as the key documents for this purpose.

It is also known that many of the countries that have expressed interest to develop closer relations with NATO or EU and follow the course of democracy are facing issues of internal instability created by outside factors or history. The countries in the South Caucasus are no exception. Therefore, Latvia was pleased to learn about the signed Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Russian Federation and Georgia on the closure of Russian bases and other military facilities in the territory of Georgia in May this year. It creates a hope that also the Agreement on the timeframe and details of the withdrawal operations will be reached. We anticipate that Armenia and Azerbaijan will continue joint efforts on finding a peaceful solution over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which would be based in the principles and recommendations given by international organizations.

## Lithuania: Policy of active membership\*

Since becoming a member of NATO in 2004 Lithuania managed to establish itself as an active member and a net contributor to the collective defence of the Alliance and international security.

The aim of this paper is to overview the main political-military activities that Lithuania has been pursuing during the last year and will pursue in the future.

Three defence policy areas were of particular importance for Lithuania in 2005: build of capabilities, international operations and partnerships. In 2005, Lithuania continued to reform and modernise its armed forces, in order to fully meet all NATO capability requirements; made a considerable qualitative leap in terms of participation in international operations; and advocated for faster Ukraine's integration into NATO.

### Fulfilling commitments to NATO

Developing its capabilities to effectively contribute to a full range of NATO's operations and to strengthen the Alliance's collective defence, by the end of 2005 Lithuania prepared its first infantry battalion group assigned to conduct wide range of NATO missions far beyond the borders of Lithuania.

Lithuania will now concentrate its efforts on preparation of the second infantry battalion group by the end of 2009. By the end of 2014 Lithuania seeks to have a brigade-size unit that assures the whole rotation cycle of one infantry battalion group with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets participating in international operations.

Alongside a deployable battalion-size task group Lithuania has also committed to develop and make available for NATO operations other specialized units. Following these commitments, in 2005 a water purification unit was on six month stand-by within NRF-4 (NATO Response Force) and a special operations unit carried out a six-month duty within NRF-5. National capabilities assigned to the NRF are kept in a stand-by position within their respective countries ready to be deployed within a few days to the location of operation in case NATO decides to use its Reaction Force. As of January 2006, a Squadron

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of the Lithuanian Special Operations Force has been on its duty within the NRF-6.

### **Participation in international operations**

Successfully continuing defence reforms in Lithuania allowed enhancing the countries' participation in international operations.

The year 2005 was exceptional in terms of Lithuanian troops' participation in international operations. For the first time in its history Lithuania undertook a leading role by establishing a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) as a part of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. In February 2005, after extensive consultations with NATO authorities and allies, Lithuania agreed to undertake responsibility over reconstruction efforts in the province of Ghor, a remote and poorly developed area in the Western part of Afghanistan. This decision signalled a qualitatively new Lithuanian contribution to international operations. For the first time Lithuanian military were entrusted with the responsibility to lead the mission independently and ensure its successful performance. In all previous missions, Lithuanian troops were subordinated to foreign military commands. In the case of the Ghor PRT, Lithuania is responsible for planning, execution, and command and control of the whole endeavour.

The primary task of the Lithuanian-led PRT in the Ghor province of Afghanistan is to reinforce influence of the central government in promoting good relations with political, military and religious leaders of the region as well as representatives of international nongovernmental organizations, to assist local security structures in establishing stability and secure environment, and create proper conditions for reconstruction of the province and the State.

The first Lithuanian-led PRT-1 made up of military and civil personnel headed by Colonel Gintautas Zenkevičius started operating in June 2005. During the first six-month rotation term, Lithuanian-led PRT set up a base in the province's capital Chaghcharan, thus securing full independence from Afghanistan's infrastructure support, established necessary contacts with the local authorities and pertinent institutions of the province, and started carrying out regular patrols in the area. As a special challenge for the Lithuanian-led PRT was to provide security conditions for carrying elections to the Parliament and provincial municipalities in Autumn 2005.



The second 150-manned PRT group headed by Colonel Gintaras Ažubalis took over the mission from the first PRT at the end of November. Military units and civilian specialists from Denmark, Iceland and US contribute to Lithuanian-led PRT. The United States also provided strategic airlift connecting Lithuania with Afghanistan during the initial stage of the mission, meanwhile the United Kingdom provided a pre-mission training of PRT-1 Lithuanian personnel

Having assumed a responsible role in NATO-led operations, Lithuania proved the readiness and ability of its armed forces to defend NATO allies' common security interests and values, and thus increased its visibility within the NATO context.

By leading PRT in Afghanistan, Lithuania is gradually attaining its aim to improve its participation in international operations by making more substantial contributions to a smaller number of operations. By concentrating its military capabilities on fewer missions, Lithuania seeks greater influence on ongoing operations, ensuring more feasible operational control, more cost-effective use of financial resources and more effective logistics.

Seeking to improve efficiency of participation in international operations, Lithuania also plans to increase its contribution to NATO Force in Kosovo (KFOR). In June 2005, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine signed a Letter of Intent authorising establishment of a common trilateral battalion for peace operations in Kosovo. At present, Lithuanian peacekeepers participate in a KFOR operation as part of the Polish-Ukrainian battalion POLUKRBAT. POLUKRBAT will be transformed into a trilateral battalion. After the existing POLUKRBAT is restructured into POLUKRLITBAT, the number of Lithuanian personnel will increase from a platoon to a company size unit. Lithuania will also contribute more staff officer to the battalion HQ.

After a severe earthquake in Pakistan in the autumn of 2005, the NATO authorities activated its Response Force for first time to participate in a humanitarian mission. Accordingly, Lithuania contributed to this operation by allocating a water purification unit (water purification equipment along with service personnel). The Lithuanian water purification unit assigned to the Combat Engineers Company within a Spanish battalion was stationed in the city of Bagh, North-East region of Pakistan, in November.

In Iraq, another hot spot of the world, Lithuania has continued its participation in the Multinational Forces under the U.S. leadership by contributing platoons

to the Danish and Polish contingents. Lithuania has also supported establishment of the NATO Training Mission. Two Lithuanian instructors are currently participating in this mission. Lithuania, like other countries of the Alliance, has allocated financial support to the Travel and Subsistence NATO Trust Fund.

### **Partnerships**

One of the major aspects of Lithuania's post-accession strategy is to help other post-Soviet nations – especially South Caucasus and the Ukraine – to proceed with the democratic and security sector reform and to promote NATO's co-operation with these Eastern European countries.

Lithuania's co-operation with the Ukraine may serve as an example of this new direction in the country's policy. Making use of its own experience of integration to NATO and the EU as well as the related transformation processes, Lithuania seeks to promote Ukraine's co-operation and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Lithuania's eagerness to support the Ukraine steams not only from its aspirations to be NATO's expert for the Eastern countries and to give more prominence to its membership, but also by natural desire to contribute to regional and European stability. The Ukraine is one of the largest countries in Europe whose democratic development should directly and positively impact democratisation processes in Russia and Belarus.

Lithuania actively supports the Ukraine's likely future integration to NATO and Vilnius has become an important point on the Ukraine's way to NATO. In April 2005, Vilnius hosted the NATO-Ukraine Commission Meeting of Foreign Ministers during which an Intensified Dialogue between NATO and the Ukraine was launched. In its efforts to facilitate the Ukraine's integration to NATO, in October 2005, Vilnius again became the host of High-Level NATO-Ukraine Consultations of Defence Ministers. The aim of the Consultations was to review the NATO-Ukrainian co-operation and the progress made by Ukraine in the area of defence and security reforms while implementing tasks set forth in the Intensified Dialogue and to streamline NATO's support towards achieving integration.

Lithuania demonstrates not only political support to the Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations but also shares her own experience when preparing for membership in NATO and her own implementation of reforms in the security and defence sectors. Lithuania identifies the following areas of assistance to the Ukraine:

public relations, administrative capabilities and resource planning. Lithuania sponsors long-term English language training and International Captain's Course for Ukrainian representatives at the Lithuanian Military Academy. Ukrainian officials also take part in international seminars held at the Military Academy on security policy, military strategy, crisis management, force readiness planning and international law. In 2006, Lithuania plans to appoint a military liaison officer to the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kiev.

The other focus of Lithuania's assistance policy is South Caucasus. Lithuania takes efforts to share its experience gained from the Baltic co-operation and integration to NATO and the EU with the countries of this region – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Lithuania seeks to contribute to stability building in this region and facilitate its co-operation with NATO.

Lithuania offers advice to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on the development of civil control of the military, defence planning and financing, public relations, crisis management, military reform, legal and a number of other issues. Lithuania focuses its support to Caucasus countries in the field of military training and education. For several years we offer International Captains Course, English language and other training courses and specialised seminars at the Lithuanian Military Academy. Lithuania also sponsors studies of militaries from the countries of South Caucasus in the Baltic Defence College in Tartu.

### **In conclusion**

In 2005, the top priorities of Lithuanian defence policy were development of modern, well-trained and deployable forces, increasing qualitative and quantitative contribution to international operations and sharing the experiences of NATO integration and defence reforms with partner countries. This strategy has been primarily aimed at winning NATO's confidence and convincing other Allies of Lithuania's ability to contribute substantially to NATO's collective defence and other missions.