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INDEX

Page

FOREWORD BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT 9

PREFACE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE 13

INTRODUCTION 23

CHAPTER I. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 27

— Globalisation of the strategic environment 29
— The European security environment 30
— Risks on the horizon 34
— The new profile of conflicts 36

CHAPTER II. THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT .. 41

— The allied strategy 43

- The 1999 Strategic Concept 44
- The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO 46
- The challenge of enlargement 47

— Europe and defence 48

- Towards a Common Defence Policy 49
- Institutional Interaction between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance . 52

CHAPTER III. SPANISH DEFENCE POLICY 55

— The Spanish strategic conception 56

- The universalistic perception of Spain's world presence 57
- Protecting Spanish interests 57
- Shared security and collective defence 58

Page

- The Armed Forces, a guarantee of security and the cornerstone of defence 60
- The defensive nature of military strategy 60
- The Armed Forces, in support of external action 61

— Significant geopolitical areas 62

- European vocation 63
- Mediterranean vocation 65
- Atlantic vocation 66

— National security interests 68

- Vital interests 68
- Strategic interests 69
- Other national interests 71

— Objectives and basic courses of action of Defence Policy 71

- Objectives 72
- Basic courses of action 73
  * Regarding the consolidation of Spanish presence in international security and defence organisations 73
  * Regarding the upgrading of the Armed Forces 74
  * Regarding Spanish society 75

— Present and future of Defence Policy 75

CHAPTER IV. ARMED FORCES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 79

— Military strategy 80
— Missions and scenarios 82
— Military capabilities 85
— Characteristics of the Armed Forces 89
— Guidelines for the Armed Forces 91

- Joint action 91
- The ground forces 93
- The naval forces 95
- The air forces 96

CHAPTER V. PROFESSIONALISATION 99

— A requirement and a challenge 100
— Main characteristics of the model 103

- Personnel 104
- Profile of the professional soldier 106
- Principle of equality 107
- Supplementary contribution of human resources 108

— Personnel management 108

- Incentives to joining and remaining in the Armed Forces 110
- Support for reintegration into the labour force 112

Page

- Military education system ... 113
- Adaptation of civilian personnel ... 114

CHAPTER VI. MODERNISATION ... 117

— Armaments and materiel ... 118

- Plans for the procurement of armaments and equipment ... 120
- Joint programmes of the Defence Staff ... 123
- Programmes for the Army ... 126
- Navy programmes ... 130
- Air Force programmes ... 133
- European armaments policy ... 136

— Infrastructure ... 139
— Environment ... 141

CHAPTER VII. RATIONALISING AND ADAPTING THE DEFENCE STRUCTURES 145

— Adapting basic defence criteria to the new strategic environment ... 146

- Need to adapt organisation ... 147

— Organisation of the Ministry of Defence ... 149

- The basic administrative structure of the Ministry of Defence ... 151
- Operational Command Structure of the Armed Forces ... 152
- Force Structure ... 156

— Rationalisation of management ... 161

- Human resources ... 161
- Armaments and materiel ... 162
- Health ... 162
- Information technology and communications ... 164

CHAPTER VIII. ECONOMIC SUPPORT OF DEFENCE ... 165

— A supportive and effective Defence effort ... 166
— Current situation ... 167
— The financial outlook ... 169

APPENDIX A. ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ... 173

— Measures related to conventional forces and arms ... 176

- The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ... 176
- The Vienna Document ... 178
- Register of Conventional Arms ... 179
- Treaty on Open Skies ... 179
- Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines ... 180
- Regional stability and the Dayton Accords ... 180
- Future control of Short Arms/Light Arms ... 181

Page

— Measures related to weapons of mass destruction 182

• Reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons 182
• Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 183
• Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty 183
• Biological Weapons Convention 183
• Chemical Weapons Convention 183

APPENDIX B. THE ARMY 185

APPENDIX C. THE NAVY 193

APPENDIX D. THE AIR FORCE 199

APPENDIX E. THE SPANISH ARMED FORCES IN THE MULTINATIONAL SPHERE 205

— European Corps (EUROCORPS) 207
— European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) and European Rapid Deployment Force (EUROFOR) 208
— European Air Group 209
— Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (FAHI/SIAF) 209

APPENDIX F. PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS 211

— Peace Operations 211

• United Nations 212
• Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 214
• Spain's contribution 214

– Humanitarian assistance operations 216

APPENDIX G. SECURITY AND DEFENCE DOCUMENTS 217

— Modified Brussels Treaty 219
— The North Atlantic Treaty 223
— Barcelona Declaration (only the chapter on Political and Security partnership is included) 227
— Consolidated version of the treaty on European Union. Amsterdam Treaty (articles related to security and defence issues) 229
— Report of the Joint, non-Permanent Congress-Senate Commission establishing the formula and timescale for the full professionalisation of the armed forces 231
— The Alliance's Strategic Concept 241
— Defence Capabilities Initiative 253
— Cologne European Council Declaration on strengthening the common European Policy on Security and Defence 255
— Charter for European Security 259
— Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council on the Common European Policy on Security and Defence 269

FOREWORD BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

FOREWORD



José María Aznar López
President of the Government

Over the course of the last quarter of the 20th century—during the reign of HM Don Juan Carlos—Spain has found itself again. It has also realised that its interests cannot be defended in isolation, but rather collectively, with all the nations that share its commitment to peace, freedom, the defence of democracy, and respect for human rights and the rules of international law.

We Spaniards form an open society and want Spain to attain its rightful place in the world in accordance with its history and political, economic and cultural weight. Throughout the past decade, the regular participation of our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen beyond our borders has been a valuable Spanish contribution to international peace and stability.

Spanish society can feel proud and thankful for the effort that the Armed Forces have been making to defend our values and interests overseas. In the new world order, the armed services have become a privileged agent of external action, supporting our efforts to guarantee a more stable and secure international environment.

Therefore, the government I head began the 6th parliamentary term determined to strengthen Defence by adapting it to the requirements of the new strategic landscape. Overhauling the Armed Forces, which are the specific instrument of defence, is a major task that requires the participation of society as a whole, since it affects everyone and the resources needed to undertake it belong to all. The efforts required to achieve a secure and stable geostrategic environment are always useful and beneficial to the wellbeing of society.

With this idea in mind, the Government obtained from Parliament the backing it considered necessary for this purpose. This backing was granted through the report of the Joint Congress-Senate Commission establishing the formula and timetable for attaining the full professionalisation of the Armed Forces.

The Government's objective was thus threefold: to secure Spain a position as a member of the western community fully integrated into the Atlantic Alliance; its firm commitment to European security; and the adoption of a new model of Armed Forces based on the total professionalisation of its members.

Today, Spain's full participation in the structures of the Atlantic Alliance and its attitude in promoting the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, in accordance with the report drawn up by the Cortes Generales (Parliament), are facts that evidence our efforts in collective defence with our partners and allies.

The publication of a Defence White Paper should not be an extraordinary event but rather a completely normal fact. However, this is not possible on this occasion as it is the first time that a document of these characteristics has been published in Spain. By doing so, the Government is exposing itself to healthy criticism and opening a debate on our defence and security that can shed the light needed to guide us on our path over the next few years.

Spain is currently in a position to set itself new goals and to assume supportively the responsibilities deriving from its role in the international community. The conclusions inferred from this collective thinking will provide the basis for proceeding, when the time comes, to a strategic defence review, in order to equip the Armed Forces with the essential military capabilities they need to act in the strategic landscape of the century that is dawning.

PREFACE
BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

PREFACE

Eduardo Serra Rexach
Minister of Defence

It is a pleasure for me, as Minister of Defence, to write the preface to this Defence White Paper. This is a special occasion, as it is the first time that a work of this kind has been published in Spain. The idea of bringing out such a publication is not new, of course, but it can be done now that Spanish society has overcome many of its prejudices and is able to discuss the meaning and importance of Defence and the Armed Forces with interest, objectivity and equanimity.

Defence is necessarily a matter of State and, while this cannot give us reason to think that the specific choices made in defence policy are free from controversy, we should recall the considerable degree of political and social consensus reached in recent years. Our country's full membership of the new NATO and the professionalisation of the Armed Forces have secured majority parliamentary support and the general approval of society. The clichés about obsolete, politicised Armed Forces with no international presence have gradually lost meaning in recent years, thanks to the parallel development of the Armed Forces and society. Nowadays there is no denying that our soldiers are more professional and, at the same time, more highly valued—aspects that are mutually reinforcing.

The gradual normalisation of Defence as just another state function that is beneficial to citizens not only requires greater transparency, but also a deeper awareness of the basic aspects. As I understand it, there are issues of Defence Policy, which, owing to their nature, must be kept in strictest secrecy (such as, for example, detailed analysis of risks and threats); but apart from that, treating it with maximum transparency and according it the significance that it merits as a public institution will only afford strength and social backing to the decisions that are adopted. Defence must cease to be a mystery for citizens and become a familiar instrument, which, as such, enjoys the greatest possible social support.

This White Paper reflects the maturity attained by a project of significant change, which aims to provide Spain with Armed Forces that are modern in a broad sense of the word—from personnel to materiel, including doctrine and training. Information and transparency have always been an objective of this Government, and the reason for not publishing the Defence White Paper until now, at the end of the parliamentary term as opposed to earlier on, is the preference that its content should stem from the assimilation of the changes that took place in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union in 1999, and from intense consultations and collaboration within the Armed Forces.

But there is another reason, one that transcends the national framework, for waiting until now as the opportune moment for bringing out this White Paper: the world is undergoing transformation at a hitherto unseen pace, and Spain with it. And the strategic and military aspects of the international situation are not unaffected by this development, as the content of the paper evidences.

We are probably at the threshold of a change that affects the very foundations of defence. Indeed, for centuries the purpose of wars was to conquer or defend a territory, as land was the mainstay of the economy in agrarian societies. Following the birth of the modern state, which exercises its sovereignty and administration over the nation, defence became centred almost exclusively on safeguarding the nation's land and overseas dependencies. Defence, at the outset, thus entailed defending one's territory from possible enemies.

However, an element that has been developed over the past fifty years is pointing to a change in the classical conception of defence as defence of the nation: nuclear weapons, which, in the context of rivalry between East and West, conjure up the spectre of an atomic holocaust, a widespread conflict in which, for the first time in history, the whole of Mankind is under threat. In such a strategic environment, a conflict of this kind could be suicidal, since nobody stands to win from a nuclear exchange. In other words, defence has begun to play a role of deterrent from possible attacks.

Moreover, the Cold War and the huge potential threat of the then USSR led to another significant change in national policies: no European country alone could muster a credible

defence, despite the proximity of this threat. A collective effort was needed to safeguard nations' interests, even their very survival. It is no coincidence that during this period a collective defence organisation like the Atlantic Alliance attained such a degree of development and institutionalisation. The allies will understand that the best deterrent to which they can aspire will be the result of their combined efforts and that their best defence does not always lie inside their borders.

National defence, in the exclusive sense of the immediate defence of a country's borders, is thus rendered meaningless when threats are global and total.

We know, however, that this deterrent-based conception was only valid in East-West relations, and that in certain parts of the world, where the tension between the blocs erupted, destruction and violence were the order of the day.

Nonetheless, following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the world ceased to be organised around the East-West and North-South cardinal points and adopted a new structure of successive concentric circles. Stability and security are at their greatest in the centre, and gradually diminish the further outwards we move. Outside the circle of advanced democratic nations, some still regard force as an integral part of their way of doing politics.

The prospect of a globalised world which constitutes the framework of economic relations that generate wealth and progress for all peoples is incompatible with the serious disruptions to international stability that such behaviour can cause. Modern industrial and post-industrial societies, in particular, have interests that stretch much further than defending their territories—interests that they necessarily agree must be safeguarded, as they are interdependent. This political will to maintain and expand stability is today one of the chief aims of collective security and arouses the efforts of collective defence organisations, particularly the Atlantic Alliance.

In less than fifty years, we have thus witnessed a shift from the traditional concept of defence as defending a territory to a concept of collective deterrence, finally arriving at the current stage which entails conceiving defence also as the projection of stability.

Precisely that co-existence, under the umbrella of globalisation, of a post-modern and stable world and another pre-modern, violent one, commits those of us who enjoy peace and security towards those who lack the stability needed to cater to their most basic necessities of subsistence, co-existence and wellbeing. Indeed, financial and commercial affairs in today's world know no frontiers of time or distances. The time has perhaps come for morality and politics not to know such frontiers either. Governments are aware of the need to guarantee world stability, since the peace and prosperity of their nations are ultimately at stake; but they are also under moral pressure to do something in response to

their societies' displeasure at barbaric acts. In this world of concentric circles, it is we, the advanced democracies, who enjoy the central, most secure position.

Therefore, defence can no longer be a question that stems from a narrow conception of interests concerning a particular territory or assets; rather, it must become a privileged tool for exporting security and peace to a world in which violence is, unfortunately, a frequent temptation.

NATO has had to adapt to this new situation, which no longer requires it to serve merely as an instrument for defending its members' territory vis-à-vis armed aggression, but rather to intervene on a wider scale to try to remedy situations triggered by aggression and the indiscriminate use of violence. In short, to spread the stability and peace that its members enjoy.

And not just the Atlantic Alliance. The European Union itself, broadening the scope of its responsibility, has been endeavouring since 1999 to formulate a genuine security and defence policy to equip it with significant military capabilities.

This marks a considerable shift away from traditional ideas about what defending a country and military and defence alliances should entail. From now on, missions, command structures, procedure for collective action, in short, the way that the forces and their use are conceived, will be understood differently. The scope of action is changing and missions are of a different nature. Hence the importance of having a White Paper to guide and steer our Defence and Armed Forces through this sea of changes.

For many years the world order was based mainly on the strategic balance between two superpowers, on which the medium-sized and small powers scarcely had any influence. Nuclear deterrence was everything. Today things have changed: nowadays, all nations count in missions that support peace in the broadest sense of the word, though more so those which are not only willing to collaborate in this collective effort of the international community, but also have the technical, human and material resources to do so.

Finally, a new phenomenon that has emerged over the past few years, and one that has strategic implications, is the inrush of the media, and most particularly television, as a vehicle for raising society's awareness of disasters and wars. On the one hand, the possibility of obtaining information in real time of what goes on all round the world confronts television viewers' consciences with the human misery of conflicts. On the other, however, insofar as television language is very simple, intense and sporadic, the images of one war are followed by those of another, with no explanations or solutions—in many cases just the horror. This brief but intense attention arouses feelings that are equally intense but not long lasting. Even so, the dedication of the media is largely behind this spectacular development of today's international solidarity.

Spain has understood very well the rules of the new strategic chessboard and is firmly committed not only to its own defence, but to world stability. This commitment was evidenced on different occasions during the nineties, from the Gulf war to Kosovo, and will continue to be seen wherever it is needed. The domestic efforts are centred on the thorough and overall modernisation that our Armed Forces are undergoing to make them among the most advanced in Europe, as reflected clearly in the following pages.

Ortega[1] wrote in his *España invertebrada* that "the degree of perfection of an army measures with amazing accuracy the carats of national morality and vitality". Indeed, the development of our Defence and Armed Forces has been accompanied by a substantial change in society. During the Cold War decades, the chief purpose of arms—to deter aggressors—caused a major sector of western society to fail to see the point of having Armed Forces, which, after all, were an instrument that did not seem to be put to any use.

In the case of Spain, which remained on the margin of the major international structures for years, its role was seen through the particular prism of our recent political history, which largely distorted everything relating to the defence of national interests. Nonetheless, the participation of Spanish soldiers in humanitarian tasks and the progressive assumption of greater responsibility in peace missions in the broad sense of the word have changed the way in which Spaniards regard and value their own Armed Forces. Today, people not only are aware of their meaning, but appreciate their inestimable devotion and good work in areas very distant from Spanish soil.

The changes in society's perception of the Armed Forces are, to an extent, the result of a broader social change, the change that Spain has been undergoing in recent decades. In less than fifty years, Spain has gone from being a poor, agricultural, rural country, under the sway of a dictator and closed to the outside world, to a rich, industrial and post-industrial, urban country with an advanced democracy and open to the world in all aspects. In other words, Spain has fully come to be a part of modernity.

In economic terms, it is not merely a case of generating levels of wealth and income that are gradually closer to the European Union average; rather, the structure of the nation is undergoing highly revealing changes. Basically, Spain has ceased to be a closed economy and is now an open and internationalised economy. To cite an example, in 1960 foreign trade and imports accounted for 16% of GDP. In comparison, the latest data show that in 1997 the foreign sector amounted to over 55% of the national economy. What is more, in 1999, for the second consecutive year, Spain's capital balance was positive, since, despite the substantial inflows of foreign capital, Spain was a net investor abroad.

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[1] Translator's note: José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher and humanist, who wrote *Invertebrate Spain* in 1922.

This economic and social dynamism undoubtedly has clear repercussions on Spain's international action and presence. This branching out into the international sphere also has a positive impact on social awareness, which today is more open and linked to the world. Spaniards travel more and are much more proficient in languages than in the past. Spain is no longer "different", idiosyncrasies are dying out and Spaniards are becoming aware of their horizons as a group.

As mentioned earlier, proof of Spanish society's maturity is its attitude towards military interventions to support peace and in humanitarian assistance missions. For the first time in recent history, Spanish public opinion behaved like our European neighbours towards such a thorny issue as NATO's intervention in Kosovo.

A few years ago, much of the population might have thought that defence was generated spontaneously, not realising the careful planning it requires. This is no longer the case. Society has become aware that it has at its service a genuine instrument of peace, whose action affords Spain credibility and international importance, not to mention other benefits linked to industrial and technological development. Society must therefore be coherent and allow its Defence resources to be in keeping with the greater international role of its Armed Forces, of Spain, after all. It is not Spain's military, or Defence, but our country that needs this. The White Paper aims to bring Defence closer to society, increasing the latter's awareness of defence.

We are a fortunate country in that our position makes us a genuine crossroads between different worlds. Europe and North Africa, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the Old and New continents. We have an ambitious and exciting project in the European Union, for which the time has now come to consider defence. We have a collective organisation—NATO—that safeguards our own Defence and, together with the growing European capabilities, will enable us to contribute to stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

I believe that all these factors clearly explain the reasons behind the White Paper: reasons of social development, international and strategic changes, and the importance of the transformation our Armed Forces are undergoing have made it advisable to bring out this publication. We are now embarking on a new stage that will give a meaning to its purpose.

As I said at the beginning of this preface, Defence is, in itself, a potentially controversial issue that requires debate, provided that it is honest and calm. Discussing the possible successes and weaknesses of the different options will lead to a better, more consistent result that is more fully understood and supported. The Government is committed to an ambitious plan to transform and modernise Spain's Defence, and the knowledge obtained through discussion and debate can only serve to prepare Spanish society better to assume,

as a whole, the responsibilities that lie ahead of our country and its Armed Forces in this 21st century.

This White Paper gives an outline of our Defence, of what it is and what we want it to be. It has been drawn up bearing in mind the need for information that is reliable, up-to-date and as thorough as possible. I trust that it will serve to make Spanish society aware of the challenge we face and be generous with its Armed Forces, realising that in doing so we are being generous with ourselves.

INTRODUCTION

Spain has emerged from a long period of historical isolation and is once again an important member of the international community. Today it belongs to the European Union and is fully integrated into the western defence system, the most prominent element of which is the Atlantic Alliance.

This approach to defence is backed by the report of the Joint Congress-Senate Commission establishing the formula and timetable for achieving the full professionalisation of the Spanish Armed Forces, which was approved by the Congress of Deputies in full session on 28 May 1998. The Senate in full session subsequently approved it on 9 June that same year, stating that, "it is a fact that one of the most important consequences of the strategic changes witnessed in the past ten years is the strengthening of the collective defence and security organisations. The autarkic approaches to defence based on national self-sufficiency have been superseded and, although the conceptions of security and defence based on nations' own military capabilities continue to be valid, political and military co-operation is sought between nations as a means of obtaining greater security at a lower cost".

Now that the threat posed to the western nations by the Soviet bloc has vanished, the medium-term outlook for the world in fifteen or so years' time—the period that this Defence White Paper addresses—points to greater security than in the past, though also greater instability, owing to risk factors that stem for a much more complex and dynamic international situation than the bipolar world.

The Atlantic Alliance, a shared security organisation on which the guarantees of Europe's defence—and therefore Spain's—depends, has had to adapt its strategy and structures,

conceived for the Cold War, to a new strategic environment in which hitherto latent tensions, risks and regional instability are emerging.

Europe too has felt the need to boost its defence and security instruments. The process of bringing European countries' national stances closer together in defence matters—a logical consequence of political and economic convergence—was first glimpsed even before the Kosovo crisis. This process is aimed at starting to develop a European military capability for carrying out humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking and crisis-management tasks, using combat forces if necessary, as envisaged in the Treaty on European Union.

In order to ensure an adequate response to the requirements and challenges of the strategic environment at the beginning of the 21st century, Spain also faces the unavoidable need to upgrade its defence mechanism with modern criteria, in consonance with our active participation in major international issues, our firm commitment to European defence and our full integration into the Atlantic Alliance.

For the above reasons, Spain now has an extraordinary and perhaps historic chance to undertake boldly and firmly the design of a more effective defence system and to give definitive impetus to the process of restructuring the Armed Forces that was begun in 1977 when the Ministry of Defence was established at the start of the transition to democracy.

This White Paper aims to give a realistic and transparent outline of Defence Policy, which is firmly established and based on the consensus of political and social forces and on the boost given by the Government, together with the necessary parliamentary backing, of specific plans to achieve a defence mechanism in keeping with the general principles enshrined in the 1998 parliamentary agreement.

In the following chapters the reader will find, first of all, a synthesis of the salient features of the current strategic environment, including a review of current risks and the new physiognomy of conflicts. This is followed by a summary of how the allies and Europe respond to this new environment, with special emphasis on the adaptation of their strategic concept and structures. The Paper then deals with Spain's strategic conception and the ends, means, objectives and guidelines for action of Spanish Defence Policy.

The White Paper continues with an explanation of the criteria governing the design of the new model of Armed Forces and the plans hatched to develop the three processes currently under way: professionalisation, modernisation and rationalisation of the organisation, all with the intention of adapting the forces to the strategic requirements of the 21st century. It therefore analyses the missions and military capabilities needed to meet these requirements, the necessary human resources and the plans for modernising armaments, equipment and infrastructure, paying particular attention to the environment, since this obviously affects society.

PRESENCE OF SPANISH ARMED FORCES IN THE WORLD OVER THE PAST DECADE

Finally, guidelines are given for rationalising and adapting Defence to the new strategic environment as a necessary condition for the effective use of military potential, and the economic support of the aforementioned policies is considered. The human and material resources needed to achieve and maintain an appropriate military capability and to sustain increasing operational activity entail a financial Defence effort, provided this is within realistic and reasonable limits. This effort must be understood as the price to pay for our peace and security, the demonstration of our solidarity with our partners and allies and the certain possibility of our freedom of action as a sovereign nation.

All in all, on the threshold of the new century, the Government has outlined its view of Defence and the way in which it is fulfilling its commitments to Spanish parliament and Spanish society to overhaul the military instrument that Spain needs to guarantee its security and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability.

CHAPTER 1

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the western community has shown signs of a flexibility and dynamism that were unknown during the Cold War, when all efforts were concentrated on containing a specific threat. The decade that is now coming to a close has seen the emergence of a constant majority will to open up channels for dialogue, step up co-operation, strengthen shared security organisations and even establish new ties of partnership—all with the aim of consolidating the long-awaited international situation of a true peace between nations, without confrontation or tension, in which freedom and the progress of all citizens are possible.

Confidence and security building and disarmament treaties have transformed the European strategic landscape following the fall of the Berlin wall

Without a doubt, the nineties will go down in history as the decade that marked the end of East-West confrontation. Humanity was freed from the feeling of imprisonment caused by the threat of nuclear holocaust, which gave way to the conviction that the concept of security surpasses that of defence. Amid an unexpected climate of understanding between the countries that belonged to the formerly antagonistic blocs, treaties were signed and agreements reached on arms control, disarmament, conflict prevention and crisis management.

Confidence—and security—building measures were also adopted through the talks and negotiations that have taken place within the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Appendix A addresses at greater length the more important aspects of the initiatives that brought about this change in the strategic environment.

HM The King with Spanish soldiers posted to Bosnia.

The international situation is not truly stable. The emergence of new tensions and conflicts points to new risks on the horizon

Even so, the international situation cannot be described as truly stable. At the dawn of the 21st century, the hope of a world in peace is clouded by the emergence of fresh tension and conflicts, mostly triggered by instability factors stemming from ethnic, religious and cultural differences, historic territorial claims and irredentist or exclusionist nationalism, long forgotten under the weight of the former geopolitical order. On top of this are the social problems arising from the transition to political and economic freedom, which are giving rise to a new set of risks, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to launch them. This could come to pose a major threat to security.

Genocide and outbreaks of violence in certain African countries, the long drawn out Middle East conflict and the frequent clashes and crises in Asia are obvious signs that world peace is still a distant goal. And in this respect, Europe is no exception, as evidenced by the successive Balkan crises that unleash armed conflict—something that we only thought possible in other parts of the world—on European soil.

In short, although the nineties were marked, at the outset, by the Persian Gulf War and later by the long, cruel conflict in the Balkans, it can be said that, in general, this decade has been characterised by the pursuit of international security and stability in a new spirit of co-operation.

Despite the conflicts, the nineties are characterised by the pursuit of international security and stability in a new spirit of co-operation

Globalisation of the strategic environment

The globalisation of human activity is one of the essential characteristics of the strategic environment at the beginning of the new century. We live in an interdependent world in which walls tend to tumble and borders to become increasingly permeable. Nobody can regard themselves as unaffected by what goes on in any other part of the world, as isolation is an option that is as illogical as it is inadvisable. The prodigious advances in the fields of communications and information systems, the flows of capital and investments and trade relations on a world scale have been conducive to the integration of the financial markets and have stimulated the transmission of ideas and the movement of people and goods. The world has become smaller and the globalisation process seems irreversible.

There is reason to believe that the acceleration of development and the advancement of new technologies are unstoppable trends that are linked to progress. Their potential for change is enormous, and it seems undeniable that the countries which dominate the field of innovation and apply new technologies will be the only ones capable of successfully coping with the future. Those that are left behind will depend on what assistance others are willing to afford them and, in many cases, will have to pay a high price for this in terms of freedom of action.

The globalisation of human activity is one of the essential characteristics of the strategic environment at the beginning of the new century

Globalisation is, in principle, a stability factor, since free trade and competition generate development. As economies become interlinked and the interdependence of some countries on others becomes consolidated, relationships and ties are strengthened, giving way to the idea that instability is damaging to everyone.

However, we cannot be assured that this development will always be balanced or that globalisation will be risk-free.

Globalisation is, in principle, a progress factor, but it can also trigger potentially dangerous situations

It is worrying that the gap between developing countries and the industrialised countries that produce high-tech capital assets is tending to widen. And this effect, which has emerged as an indirect consequence of globalisation, is more difficult to correct insofar as certain private multinational entities become the focus of decision-making. Indeed, they sometimes have considerable political impact and are capable of escaping the control of national authorities, or even conditioning them.

This means to say that globalisation as a progress factor also sows the seeds of instability which, unless appropriate corrective measures are taken, can deepen inequality and create potentially dangerous situations from the security point of view. In order to prevent this happening, it is necessary to find solutions to political, economic and demographic imbalances, whether internal or regional, and this only seems to be possible through dialogue and co-operation.

Any political measure centred on closing the gap between the technologically more advanced developed countries, which have more encouraging future prospects, and the developing nations makes a valuable contribution to stability. The world will undoubtedly be safer and more inhabitable the smaller the differences between the economic, social and cultural levels of the human communities which constitute it.

The European security environment

The past few years have witnessed the birth of twenty-two states, new players on the Central and Eastern European stage and surrounding area

The past few years have witnessed the birth of twenty-two states in Central and Eastern Europe and the surrounding area as part of this environment of economic interdependence and pursuit of political convergence in security matters. These countries until not long ago were part of the Soviet bloc or were non-aligned states, and some of them are currently fully immersed in the process of joining the western model, though they are weighed down by a variety of internal difficulties.

The opening up of Western Europe to these nations entails a natural process of acceptance of, and support for, their nascent democracies, and facilitates their access to a world based on free



competition and to the institutions of the western community. This no doubt poses an additional challenge to the process of building Europe and to the renovation of the Atlantic Alliance. It is necessary to strike a balance between solidarity and realism, since we cannot ignore Russia's misgivings about its former allies acceding to organisations that it continues to regard with caution.

Europe's political and strategic situation has ushered in an age of greater security and confidence which has brought about changes in the international environment.

Europe's political and strategic situation has ushered in an age of greater security, at least for most of the continent. Decisions and initiatives such as the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; the adoption of transparency and confidence- and security-building measures; the recent advances in the field of arms control, particularly the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction; the monitoring of the fulfilment of the Dayton accords; the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and the new reductions of nuclear arsenals to be carried out following the ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federation and the negotiations for START III have brought about deep changes in the international environment. These changes have been conducive

to the establishment of new relations based on dialogue, co-operation and partnership between former adversaries and have banished the threat of a massive and potentially immediate attack.

A new Europe is thus emerging, characterised by a complex security architecture and built on international organisations, which, despite being founded at very different moments in history, have proved to some extent their validity and ability to adapt to present-day requirements. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Atlantic Alliance (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU) itself mutually enhance their action in a continent where security requires a variety of instruments capable of addressing the complex geopolitical structure.

A new Europe is emerging, characterised by a complex security architecture and built on international organisations that have proved their ability to adapt to present-day requirements

Founded to defend its members in Europe and North America, NATO not only expresses the Atlantic links of European security, but the will to face up to the risks posed by instability in regions adjacent to the area defined in its founding treaty. The Partnership for Peace initiative, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the special relationship with Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue give specific form to the collaboration efforts to extend security to the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area.





European security unavoidably encompasses the Mediterranean dimension of the continent

Europe's security unavoidably encompasses the Mediterranean dimension of the continent, whose importance not only affects the southern regions but also Central Europe, whose Balkan region extends to the Adriatic Sea. The Mediterranean is an area of contrasts and disequilibrium in the political, economic and social spheres and, as a result, is prone to instability. It should nonetheless be pointed out that the countries around the Mediterranean basin make up an area with its own characteristics and development potential, and all look set to work together and co-operate with each other.

Finding a solution to the security problems in the Mediterranean and creating an area of peace and stability require communication and confidence between the two shores. This is the aim of several forums for dialogue, such as those that take place within the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union's Barcelona Process, which complement each other and are backed and promoted by Spain.

Initiatives to boost the European economic and political integration processes arouse expectations of a future that is promising though perhaps uncertain.

In this international environment, economic and social factors have become more important than ideological ones, and the pragmatic approach strengthens the need to adapt to the new situation. In Europe, where the changes are more visible, initiatives to boost the economic and political integration processes—among which monetary union could be a paradigm—and the development of co-operation between former adversaries in all fields, but particularly in military aspects, arouse expectations of a future that is promising, though perhaps uncertain.

Risks on the horizon

During the Cold War, world stability was based on bipolarity. Now that we are no longer troubled by the fear of the consequences of widespread conflict and the threat of certain mutual destruction, different sources of instability point to the prospect of multidirectional and multifaceted risks and uncertainties and make for an international situation that is indeed complicated. The world faces risks arising mainly from the social tension sparked by economic imbalance, the demographic explosion, democratic deficit, environmental aggression and cultural clashes.

In global terms, now that the blocs have disappeared, international relations have become much more dynamic and we are more likely to witness the emergence of crises which are no longer focused on the attachment of the states in question to certain spheres of influence of the superpowers. Situations are thus more complex than in the past, as evidenced by the large number of conflicts that continue to trouble the world.

Now that the fear of widespread conflict has disappeared, different sources of instability point to the prospect of multidirectional and multifaceted risks and uncertainties

During the previous historical period, much of Eurasia revolved around the Soviet Union. Now that the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, the possibility of a large-scale aggression in the Euro-Atlantic region has faded, but a situation of genuine stability has

Paratroopers during operation Alfa-Kilo in the Middle East (1991).

not yet been achieved in Central and Eastern Europe following the vacuum left by the former Soviet Union.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and biological—is a serious instability factor

Nonetheless, the states that have regained their external freedom of action are in the process of joining the international community. Their path is strewn with difficulties arising from the reconstruction of their civil societies and from their finding their place with respect to their neighbours and the rest of the world. This delicate transition to freedom, democracy and a market economy is giving rise to tensions to which Europe was not accustomed, and which can potentially sow the seeds of instability.

Instability is therefore a phenomenon of our time and a risk that must be borne very much in mind, all the more so because its consequences in a globalised world like today's can affect us all. It also triggers uncertainty regarding the possibility—undoubtedly real—that the climate of confidence, security and co-operation created in the world at the end of the 20th century may disappear.

First, although there are currently no threats of this kind, we cannot rule out the possibility that a deterioration in the situation in the long term could again give rise to the possibility of a large-scale aggression, as we must be highly conscious that there are still vast nuclear arsenals. This risk, owing to its far-reaching consequences, must be averted by prevention and co-operation and by maintaining military capabilities that enable us to react in the event of a change of scenario.

Second, the possibility of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and biological—and the means to launch them is a matter of particular concern, as these are a serious instability factor since they alter the strategic balance and have enormously harmful effects. Measures to control and combat the proliferation of weapons come up against the added difficulty that much of the technology used is also civilian—known as "dual use" technology—and is available on the commercial networks that are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Therefore, the monitoring of this kind of traffic requires close international co-ordination, which is considerably difficult to achieve in practice.

The economic imbalance is a factor that needs to be taken very much into account in the new strategic environment

In addition, the economic imbalance between developed and developing countries is a tension factor that needs to be taken very

Co-operation and development aid must be combined with arms control measures, the fight against the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction and the maintenance of a decisive military capability as a deterrent

much into account in the new strategic environment. To prevent this becoming a risk, a pragmatic stance by the West no doubt requires solutions in the field of co-operation and development aid, supplemented by measures to control arms, combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, of course, maintain a decisive military capability as a deterrent.

In the economic field, owing to the size of markets of all kinds, even energy resources and commodities, a seemingly distant crisis can have far-reaching repercussions on the performance of the overall economic system, so much so that a major change in the flow of primary resources can pose a real threat to stability.

Demographic disequilibrium encourages population movements that should be controlled in order to adapt them to changes in the labour factor, preventing, in any event, the illicit traffic entailed by clandestine immigration. A more serious factor is the possibility of mass human displacements as a result of situations of violence or an extreme shortage of vital resources.

The social and technological dynamism of today's world is so great that the fight against organised crime can hardly be addressed from a strictly internal perspective, since it has reached international dimensions. Thus, the huge international development in means of transport and communications makes it very difficult to crack down effectively on transnational organised crime, another great scourge of our time that mainly takes the form of drug trafficking and terrorism. Security is thus a complex affair that calls for a broader concept to enable the different elements available to be co-ordinated to protect society.

The new profile of conflicts

It is highly unlikely that total war could break out in the near future or in the medium term

In view of the current and foreseeable risks on the horizon, it seems highly unlikely that total war, of the kind that characterised the first half of the 20th century, could break out in the near future or in the medium term, and the likelihood of a widespread nuclear exchange is even slimmer. By contrast, some of the features witnessed in the conflicts that are erupting currently will become accentuated.

The Air Force is an effective deterrent in peacekeeping.

Future conflicts will foreseeably be limited in scope

It is therefore reasonable to believe that future conflicts will be limited with respect to the political ends and objectives pursued and to the means used. The limitation of conflicts signifies, in a sense, a return to the past and a shift away from the 20th century model of all-out confrontation, which, in the nuclear age, could lead to situations in which all the sides in the conflict would be losers and none could achieve its political objectives.

In these circumstances, in practical terms, the Cold War endorsed the abstention from the widespread use of force as a means of settling conflicts, in the same way that the Charter of the United Nations, back in 1945, condemned war as an illicit means of resolving international disputes, unless in self-defence. In this framework, which is now history, what really mattered was the need to avoid large-scale war, even if the tensions between the major blocs erupted into minor or limited conflicts.

Having left this period behind, the international community now aspires to true peace, a situation in which the risks that threaten international stability are averted to the advantage of the security and progress of peoples. In order for this to occur, it is necessary, above all, to anticipate the causes of any possible conflict—which is what prevention entails. Any potential aggressor must furthermore be discouraged, and this is the purpose of

deterrence. As a last resort, if peace is disrupted, it will be necessary to manage the crisis.

The importance of diplomatic action should be stressed in this connection. Diplomatic efforts, even while operations are being conducted, are an indispensable means of negotiating the interests at stake and preventing the causes of a possible conflict from becoming critical. They can furthermore offer an alternative to escalation, should this occur, and, if armed conflict erupts while they are being conducted, they can at least limit its intensity and duration and control the results.

Quite often conflicts arise in states that tolerate repeated and very serious violations of human rights, the suffering or death of a large number of people and even, at times, true genocide. The international community should not remain impassive in the face of such situations.

It is to be hoped that the action of the western nations becomes oriented towards upholding common values and interests, such as maintaining international peace and stability rather than territorial defence

The infringement of human rights and the need to prevent the civilian population from suffering are increasingly becoming a priority concern of security, as factors that can trigger conflicts. It is therefore to be hoped that the action of the western nations becomes oriented towards upholding common values and interests, such as maintaining international peace and stability rather than territorial defence.

The Santa María *frigate sailing towards the theatre of operations in the Gulf War.*

Peace is emerging as a universal value and the stability which makes it possible is an interest that is widely shared by all nations. Therefore, the existence of a system that ensures prevention, deterrence and, if the need should arise, an effective response to a possible rupture of the peace in a crisis situation concerns the international community as a whole.

In these circumstances, legitimisation of the use of force falls to the international community, through the international organisations and the United Nations in particular, though if this is blocked by the Security Council, the international community could respond on the principle of humanitarian intervention in cases of blatant violation of human rights. In the area of operations, the population may not only be victim, but even become the target of violence and fall hostage to those causing it, and these circumstances should be borne in mind when deciding on possible courses of action.

Multinationality will probably be another of the characteristics of future conflicts. The shared interest of the international community in preventing their development and expansion goes beyond purely territorial factors and will lead states to use their forces, even far from their borders, with the firm intention of preserving international stability as best they can.

CHAPTER II

THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Today's strategic environment is largely the result of successive historical challenges, the latest of which was manifested throughout the second half of the 20th century. The Atlantic Alliance was the West's response to an alternative model that was established in Eastern Europe and showed clear signs of spreading necessarily to the rest of the continent. An area of freedom and progress was thus created in which not only was post-war Europe rebuilt, but the seeds of economic integration were sown.

An area of freedom and progress in which post-war Europe was rebuilt was created under the aegis of NATO

The collapse of the Soviet system in the early nineties dragged down the old order in Central Europe and the purposes for which the Alliance had been founded appeared to be achieved. It was soon realised, however, that an organisation which had been capable of channelling the defence efforts of a large number of sovereign nations could also organise a common response to the risks threatening the plan to build a new division- and threat-free Europe in peace.

NATO has fresh ideas for maintaining stability and has adapted its missions, military structure and strategic concept to the new age



The process of adapting NATO to the new strategic environment was developed throughout the nineties. During this time, without modifying the defence commitments adopted in the Washington Treaty, a series of new ideas were formulated to maintain stability in a threat-free area, including new missions for its forces, a new military structure capable of implementing these ideas and, to round this off, in 1999 a new strategic concept that embodied the foregoing.

For the European Union member states, the end of the division of Europe entails the historical duty of assuming responsibilities to broaden the area of freedom and progress

For the European Union member states, the end of the division of Europe marks an invitation for greater political integration, a stimulus for fresh possibilities for economic growth and an opportunity to open up new markets. But it also entails the historical duty of assuming responsibilities to broaden the area of freedom and progress, so that it can eventually take in all the peoples of Europe. It furthermore highlighted the need to strengthen Europe's defence and the security of its own geopolitical environment, which was severely threatened by the Bosnian and Kosovo crises.

1999 witnessed major events with respect to what can be considered the conception of a western strategy as a response to the

uncertainties and risks at the beginning of the new century. Against the backdrop of the Kosovo crisis, the NATO Summit held in Washington in April renewed the allied strategy. For its part, the Council of the European Union, which met in Cologne in June, announced its decision to promote a Common European Policy on Security and Defence to back the Union's foreign policy. Later on, at Helsinki, the Council defined the civilian and military structures for developing this policy.

The Atlantic Alliance and the European Union complement each other and represent a new security and defence policy for the 21st century

Both initiatives, allied and European, are complementary and based on Atlantic solidarity, which was put to the test with encouraging results during the thorny Kosovo crisis and mark, as a whole, the culmination of a process of co-operation that will give way to a new security and defence policy for the 21st century.

The allied strategy

NATO has evolved from being exclusively a defence organisation to a broader conception of security

In order to face up to these new strategic realities, the Atlantic Alliance, to which Spain has belonged since 1982, has evolved from being exclusively a defence organisation to a broader conception of security and defence in which initiatives for co-operation and rapprochement towards former adversaries are compatible with a suitable military capability.

This adaptation of the Atlantic Alliance, carried out on the principle that security is indivisible, has entailed accepting new missions without losing sight of the essential task of collective defence. As a result, new instruments and structures have been created to implement military capabilities as flexibly as possible. This broader conception of security has also made it necessary to develop ideas of dialogue and co-operation, which have progressively become consolidated over the past decade. Spain has upheld, upholds, and will continue to uphold the idea of their evolving into more advanced forms such as partnership or accession.

Spain has upheld the idea that dialogue and co-operation can evolve into more advanced forms such as partnership or accession.

This new Alliance, the communiqué goes on to state, must be larger, more flexible and able to undertake new missions such as conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management, including crisis-response operations.

One of the most noteworthy decisions adopted is that of devel-

Group photo of the Washington Summit. April 1999.

The April 1999 Washington Summit agreed to give impetus to the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, which will require the European allies to take on more responsibility and participate more in the common effort

oping the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Mention should also be made of the allies' reaffirmation of their promise to take in all European states wishing to join and meet certain conditions, and to intensify relations with the member states of the Partnership for Peace initiatives, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

As regards the Mediterranean, it should be stressed that Spain, as explained in the following chapter on the Spanish strategic conception, has promoted the idea of the need to boost relations with the countries in this area.

The 1999 Strategic Concept

The Alliance's Strategic Concept is undoubtedly the main result of the aforementioned Washington Summit. It defines the Alliance's purposes on the basis of the aims set forth in the Washington Treaty and shapes them into specific missions or tasks.

The main purpose of the Alliance continues to be to safeguard, by political and military means, the freedom and security of all its members, which can be endangered by crises or armed conflict affecting the Euro-Atlantic area. It is therefore necessary to contribute to the expansion of peace and stability in this area.

It is important to stress that the Atlantic Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary and expressly states this. Indeed, half a century after it was founded, the Alliance continues to strive to settle political differences using peaceful means, by promoting friendly international relations and backing democratic institutions as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. It thus acknowledges the primary responsibility of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security and, as such, the crucial role it plays in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The main purpose of the Alliance continues to be to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members

In accordance with these premises, in order to achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance continues to perform its traditional security, consultation, deterrence and defence tasks.

Security is one of the indispensable pillars of a stable Euro-Atlantic environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes—an environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Security is an indispensable pillar for the growth of democratic institutions

Consultation, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, serves as an essential transatlantic forum for addressing any issues that affect allies' vital interests, including possible developments posing risks to members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common interest.

Deterrence and defence tasks are the core of solidarity between NATO members. If necessary, this solidarity would go as far as collective defence against any threat of aggression against any NATO member State, as laid down clearly in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

The truly novel feature of the new strategic concept lies in the fact that it incorporates the idea of promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. This explains why the essential tasks include activities such as dialogue, co-operation and partnership with other countries in the region, in order to increase transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance. They also include crisis management in order to contribute effectively, case by case and by consensus, to conflict pre-

Deterrence and defence tasks are the core of solidarity between NATO members

The new strategic concept includes the novel idea of promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area

vention. Although the Alliance had previously engaged in such tasks, they were not cited expressly as specific missions in the Strategic Concept agreed on at Rome in 1991, as they arose after its approval.

NATO-Partnership for Peace exercise.

The Defence Capabilities Initiative was also approved at the Washington Summit in order to ensure the efficiency of future NATO operations by substantially improving interoperability among Alliance forces, their strategic mobility, possibilities of self-protection and maintenance of prolonged efforts, and their command, control and intelligence capabilities. Modernisation and interoperability are regarded as crucial requirements, particularly in order to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.

The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO

One of the key issues addressed at the Washington Summit was to give impetus to the European Security and Defence Identity. This initiative, which stems from decisions adopted at Berlin in 1996, will continue to be developed within NATO and will require close co-operation between the Alliance, the Western European Union and, when appropriate, the European Union.

NATO's essential tasks include dialogue, co-operation and partnership

NATO's recognition at Washington of the European Union as the Alliance's interlocutor in the future European security scheme

undoubtedly marked an important step. Shortly afterwards, at the European Council meeting held in Cologne, the baton was handed to the European Union and the heads of state and government of the member states agreed to provide the Union with capabilities for undertaking conflict-prevention and crisis-management operations. They also adopted a series of agreements that range from improving decision-making processes to the necessary modernisation of the Armed Forces.

The development of the European Security and Defence Identity will require close co-operation between the Alliance, the Western European Union and, when the need arises, the European Union

NATO has begun internal reflections to enable the decisions adopted at Washington to be implemented. The European Union, for its part, has taken the first steps towards incorporating a defence dimension into its structure. The two processes must keep in step with each other in order to prevent the differences in the nature of the two organisations from giving rise to processes that are parallel but progress at a different pace. The establishment of direct links between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union will no doubt help solve this problem and, at the same time, foster transparency between the two organisations.

The challenge of enlargement

At the Washington Summit, the first in which the three new allies invited to join at the Madrid Summit took part, the Alliance expressed its commitment to continue to take in new members wishing to promote the principles of the treaty and able to contribute to the peace and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. This commitment to enlargement is part of a strategy designed to boost stability and work alongside our partners to build a full and free Europe.

At the Washington Summit, the Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to take in new members wishing to share its principles and contribute to the peace and security of the Euro-Atlantic area

To this end, the Membership Action Plan was approved at Washington. This document is the alliance's blueprint for addressing the enlargement process. Spanish collaboration in this field has been focused on providing assistance in drawing up annual programmes for would-be members who have made the relevant bilateral requests. Spain has thus collaborated with Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia in preparing their respective programmes for 2000.

The Czech and Polish Presidents, Vaclav Havel and Alexander Kwasniewski, and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Horn, celebrate their countries' invitation to join NATO at the Madrid Summit.

The Petersberg missions, incorporated into the Treaty on European Union at Amsterdam, include humanitarian and evacuation tasks, crisis-management operations and missions aimed at peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Europe and defence

The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in October 1997, stated the European Union's wish to secure a presence on the international scene by implementing "a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence".

The treaty likewise defines the Western European Union as an integral part of the development of the Union that provides the Union with access to an operational capability for carrying out humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks as a whole are known as the "Petersberg missions", after the district of Bonn where they were agreed on 19 June 1992.

The Treaty on European Union expressly grants the member States great responsibility in defining and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy—an intergovernmental policy which, as such, must be agreed on unanimously. In order to prevent this fact from hindering Community decisions, the member States agreed at Amsterdam on a mechanism to prevent this: constructive abstention. The Council may adopt actions and common positions by qualified majority, provided they do not have major

repercussions in the military or defence sphere.

The objectives of the European Union with respect to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are many and varied. They encompass, among others, defending the Union's common values, fundamental interests and independence and integrity; strengthening its security and maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and fostering international co-operation and the development and the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The objectives of the CFSP encompass defending the Union's common values, fundamental interests and independence and integrity and maintaining international peace and security

The inclusion of the Petersberg missions in the Treaty on European Union led to the commencement of activities enabling them to be implemented. At Amsterdam it was agreed to set up a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and create the figure of a High Representative for the CFSP.

Towards a Common Defence Policy

The European Union has been endeavouring for some time now to overcome the abnormality of an economically buoyant Europe that nonetheless lacks a security and defence system to underpin its Common Foreign and Security Policy. As has been repeatedly stated on many occasions, an economic power like Europe should have a suitable political presence which should naturally be backed by the military structures and military capabilities needed to decide and act effectively in conflict prevention and crisis management within the framework of the Petersberg missions.

Europe should have the structures and the military capabilities needed to decide and act effectively in conflict prevention and crisis management

The first step in this direction was taken in autumn 1998 in the Franco-British Saint Malo declaration on European defence, which had the virtue of rekindling expectations in this field. For its part, the Vienna European Council held in October 1998 asked the Western European Union to embark on a process of reflection to assess its resources and structures, identify shortcomings and analyse the ways of remedying them. It considered that in order for the European Union to fully perform its role on the international scene, the CFSP must be backed by creditworthy operational resources.

In June 1999 in Cologne, the European Council subsequently announced its decision to begin a new stage in the building of the European Union and expressed its intention to furnish the means and resources needed to assume its responsibilities with respect to a common European security and defence policy.

To this end, at the same Cologne European Council, which, like the Washington Summit, had the Kosovo conflict as its backdrop, the EU pledged its commitment to develop more effective European military resources from the existing ones. It also acknowledged the need for a sustained defence effort and the need to enhance strategic reconnaissance and transport capabilities and the command and control systems.

A more effective role for the European Union in conflict prevention and crisis management will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Alliance

The interdependence of the European Union and NATO was also recognised at Cologne and, in this connection, it was stated that "a more effective role for the European Union in conflict prevention and crisis management will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Alliance". In performing this task, the European Union undertakes to hold consultations with NATO in a framework of co-operation and transparency. The EU also affirmed that the Atlantic Alliance continues to be the mainstay of its members' collective defence.

The task of defending Europe will thus continue to rest with NATO and, as a result, the development of the European Security and Defence Identity will require the European allies to take on greater responsibilities and become more involved in the common allied effort. In other words, it will call for Europe to commit itself more firmly to its own defence.

The task of defending Europe will continue to rest with NATO

On the basis of the guidelines established at Cologne, the heads of state and government of the European Union at their Helsinki

Cologne Summit. June 1999.

meeting in December 1999 agreed to define the necessary consultative, political and military bodies and structures and the size of the force the Union requires to be able to perform the full range of Petersberg missions, and the date by which this force should become operational.

In order to exercise political control and strategic management of the operations, Helsinki provides for the future creation of new bodies, structures and a force consisting of between 50,000 and 60,000 persons

In order to facilitate decision making and to exercise political control and strategic management of the operations, Helsinki provides for the future creation of new bodies and structures: a Brussels-based standing Political and Security Committee; a Military Committee made up of the chiefs of defence represented by their military delegates; and a Military Staff, which will provide the essential military expertise.

Another important decision the EU took at Helsinki involved undertaking to create a force consisting of between 50,000 and 60,000 persons to carry out Petersberg missions. This force must be available by 2003, capable of deploying within sixty days and remaining in the theatre of operations for at least a year.

But above and beyond all forecasts, an effective defence requires developing the relevant military capabilities. This involves greater co-operation between the European defence industries, harmonising national military requirements with respect to arms and stan-

Effective defence entails broader co-operation between the European defence industries

The Leopard tank is one of the most technologically advanced systems of our Armed Forces.

dardising planning and procurement procedures to achieve economically feasible results.

Institutional interaction between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance

The compulsory task of building a united Europe requires the European Union to take in countries with different perceptions of security, including some that have traditionally upheld neutral stances

The integration of the Western European Union into the European Union and the establishment of a common defence are both ambitious goals, which will only be achieved through a lengthy process that is not without its pitfalls. On the one hand, defending Europe is inseparable from defending the West as a whole, and for decades this has rested on Atlantic solidarity in the form of NATO. On the other, the compulsory task of building a united Europe requires the European Union to take in countries with different perceptions of security, including some that have traditionally upheld neutral stances.

The Atlantic Alliance continues to be the cornerstone of its members' collective defence and the commitments deriving from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty must therefore be honoured. The same is true of the commitments arising from Article V of the amended Brussels Treaty, although the Western European Union is to be integrated into the European Union.

For any type of operation other than collective defence, the European Union's role is merely to acknowledge that certain crises which affect Europe directly can be managed under European political leadership. This autonomous decision-making and management capability calls for a permanent organisation, avoiding in any event unnecessary duplication with the Atlantic Alliance structure. The possibility of using the same forces for different operations led by one organisation or the other under the concept of "separable but not separate" continues to be important in this new situation in relations as defined at the Washington, Cologne and Helsinki summits. This does not exclude the possibility that all the members of the Union—irrespective of whether they belong to NATO or the Western European Union—can take part fully in operations should they wish.

The autonomous decision-making and management capability calls for a permanent organisation, avoiding unnecessary duplication with the Atlantic Alliance structure

It will furthermore be necessary to establish satisfactory agreements between NATO and the European Union on the basis of existing mechanisms with the WEU to ensure the greatest possible involvement in these operations of the European allies who are not members of the European Union.

CHAPTER III

SPANISH DEFENCE POLICY

The peace, freedom, prosperity and stability that Spain currently enjoys, its level of political, human, cultural and economic development and the degree of tolerance our society has achieved, the establishment of an advanced democracy and the protection that the Constitution guarantees to all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, their cultures and traditions, languages and institutions are values that have not arisen spontaneously. They have been achieved through the effort of previous generations and it is our duty to preserve them and hand them down to our successors. The task of defence is none other than to help guarantee these values and protect our way of life, goods and interests, wherever they lie.

Spain is today fully committed to achieving a more stable and secure international order based on peaceful co-existence and the defence of democracy and human rights

As stated in the Preamble to the Guidance on National Defence 1/96 signed by the President of the Government on 20 December 1996, Spain, convinced that our security is closely linked to that of the neighbouring countries and others in areas of strategic interest, is today fully committed to achieving a more stable and secure international order based on peaceful co-existence, the upholding

Defence Policy is closely linked to Foreign Policy



of democracy and human rights and respect for the rules of international law.

As part of its concept of security, and in keeping with its role of medium-sized power, Spain has drawn up a Defence Policy conditioned by the need to reconcile what is desirable with what is possible. This policy is aimed at achieving a number of ends—national interests—using a set of means, specifically national resources and the mutual defence commitments to our partners and allies, whose security is inseparable from our own.

Defence Policy is thus closely linked to Foreign Policy. It can be said that these two policy areas account for much of the State's external action aimed at realising our aspirations as a nation and protecting our interests. This overall idea of State action stems from Spain's strategic conception, which is the cornerstone of our Defence Policy.

Spain has drawn up a Defence Policy conditioned by the need to reconcile what is desirable with what is possible

The Spanish strategic conception

The Spanish strategic conception, which is the framework for external action and the defence of national interests, represents our global understanding of our role in the world, how we assert ourselves as a nation in the international arena and define our vocation

on the basis of geographical factors, historical reasons, political reality and projects for the future.

The Spanish strategic conception represents our global understanding of our role in the world

Spain's supportive and active approach to defence and security issues is characterised by the endeavour to establish peaceful relations and effective co-operation between all the peoples on Earth, as laid down in the Preamble to our Constitution. Therefore, Spain, which as a matter of principle does not identify any country as an enemy, expressly renounces the use of force as a means of settling any political differences, gives priority to diplomacy over military solutions in resolving the crises in which it could be involved, and expresses its firm will to defend its legitimate interests wherever they lie.

Although Spain's strategic conception is described in detail throughout the White Paper, it seems appropriate to outline some of the main points to enable the reader to focus on the different aspects of Defence Policy from a global perspective.

The universalistic perception of Spain's world presence

First, our geopolitical position in the current strategic environment characterised by the world-wide phenomenon of globalisation undeniably gives a universalistic slant to the perception—and accordingly the protection—of our interests, to our presence in the world and to our international co-operation efforts in support of peace and stability.

Nonetheless, Spain has, in the past, had a greater presence and influence in three geopolitical areas: Europe, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, which continue to be of particular importance to Spanish external action. Since the 16th century, the European axis projected Spanish power, culture and influence to the very heart of Europe through Flanders. The Mediterranean axis stretched eastwards in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, which were extensions of Spain, while the Atlantic axis linked Spain to the New World as far as the Philippines, at the gateway to the East.

The European, Mediterranean and Atlantic geostrategic environments continue to be of particular importance to Spanish external action

Protecting Spanish interests

Second, although an obvious point, it should be stressed that Spain, like any nation, has its own national interests—intangible

A national security interest is an important national asset and safeguarding it warrants a defence effort

values and assets that comprise its basic aspirations in the international order and are the cornerstone of the wellbeing and prosperity of Spanish people.

Some of these national interests are particularly significant and, should the need arise, safeguarding them warrants a defence effort. These are the national security interests, which are the ends that Defence Policy must achieve. They are always defined broadly and generically, as it is not possible to foresee a priori all the possible scenarios that could arise.

Shared security and collective defence

Third, it should be stressed that national security and defence are based on the combination of two factors. The first of these is the nation's own defence capability, which serves the twofold purpose of a genuinely national deterrent, always necessary in an unstable strategic environment, and a contribution to Spain's importance by providing forces to the European and allied defence organisations. The second factor is shared security and collective defence, which stem from the solidarity and cohesion between Spain and its partners and allies.

This pooling of efforts springs from the conviction that all partners and allies uphold the same principles and values and the same

The overall harmony with our partners with respect to security approaches is based on the fact that we share and uphold the same principles and values

HM The King visits the Air Combat Command HQ during combined exercice Sirio.

political, economic and social model, and from the general harmony with western security approaches, as we consider that our security is closely linked to theirs.



Although the task of safeguarding national security interests falls primarily to each state, it is better addressed from a supranational viewpoint, as today it is difficult to conceive of a risk in our environment that does not affect all the allied nations to some extent or arouse active solidarity, as the experience of recent conflicts has shown.

The multinational option of collective defence that Spain has adopted marks a Copernican revolution in our traditional approach to defence

The multinational option of collective defence that Spain has adopted marks a Copernican revolution in our traditional approach to defence and the end of a chapter of history characterised by isolation and autarky, and confirms our full membership of the western community.

Spain fully shares the main guiding principle of the Atlantic Alliance: "of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members". Therefore, no single Ally is forced to rely "upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges." Thus, without interfering in any way with states' right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in defence matters, the Alliance "enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives".

Spain fully shares the main guiding principle of the Atlantic Alliance: "common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members"

Following the decisions of the Washington and Cologne Summits, Spain, together with other European Union countries, and loyal to its international commitments, firmly promotes the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and the progressive development of a Common Defence

The synergy between our own defence capability and the added security that comes from belonging to the system of alliances thus guarantees our security interests in the best possible way with a reasonable effort

Policy for Europe. Congress in full session on 23 June 1999 pledged its political support to this initiative, urging the Executive to give impetus to the decisions adopted at the aforementioned summits.

The synergy between our own defence capability and the added security that comes from belonging to the system of alliances thus guarantees our security interests in the best possible way with a reasonable effort, as a result of the interaction of our Armed Forces' capability and Spain's active participation in the Atlantic Alliance and the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The means Spain has at its disposal to achieve its security aims through Defence Policy are thus its own national resources, shared security and collective defence.

The Armed Forces, a guarantee of security and the cornerstone of defence

Finally, the Armed Forces must be ready to defend national security interests under the direction of the Government, as provided in the Spanish Constitution. Performance of this task in the framework of collective defence, which is also an instrument of our security, is most likely to entail the participation of the Armed Forces in multinational actions.

The tasks the Armed Forces are required to perform range from habitual presence in areas over which Spain has sovereignty and those in which it has an interest, to the possible use of force as a military instrument to settle a conflict, including all the options that the Government could decide on with regard to managing and steering any crisis situation. In order to carry out such tasks, there is a need, above all, for the Armed Forces to be better equipped. The effectiveness of our forces will be based on the quality of their human and technological resources rather than on size, as operational effectiveness takes priority over size of the force.

Defending national security interests in the framework of collective defence may entail the participation of the Armed Forces in multinational actions

The defensive nature of military strategy

In consonance with the Spanish strategic conception, and within the framework of the allied strategy, our military strategy is purely defensive and based on deterrence, prevention and, should the need arise, a military response. The aim is primarily to prevent conflicts from emerging; second, to deal with them when and where they first arise; or, as a last resort, muster a military response if required.

Troops from the Spanish-Italian amphibious brigade fall in alongside the Príncipe de Asturias *during the ceremony to activate the SIAF.*

A military response to an external aggression is a maximum priority requirement of national policy and a firm commitment to the Atlantic Alliance towards mutual assistance pursuant to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Although it should be pointed out that it is unlikely in the foreseeable medium-term strategic environment that the risks to the stability of the international situation would lead to situations in which such aggressions could occur, we should not forget that this depends, in turn, on the deterrence provided by a suitable defence capability.

In the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces will mainly engage in deterrence and the maintenance and expansion of stability

In the new 21st-century strategic environment described earlier on, an analysis of the risks which threaten the international situation or could affect our security leads us to think that, in the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces will mainly engage in deterrence and the maintenance and expansion of stability, both in our immediate geographical area and in the broader Euro-Atlantic area. It is to be hoped that, if conflicts arise, they will be limited in nature, as it is unlikely that developments in the international situation will require collective defence against a widespread attack.

The Armed Forces, in support of external action

The Armed Forces are also a necessary instrument for the maintenance of international stability. This new field includes different attitudes that represent their contribution to, and support for, for-

The use of the Armed Forces to support the State's external action expresses with facts the commitment to contributing to a more just and secure international order

eign and security policy. Arms control, with the related verification measures, and the fostering of mutual confidence with other countries, including exchanges between military staff and unit visits, is today a meaningful instrument at the service of peace and must be given the proper attention and be suitably valued and systemised.

The use of the Armed Forces to support the State's external action expresses with facts the commitment to contributing to a more just and secure international order and backing respect for international law and human rights throughout the world. By acting in this way they contribute directly and indirectly to protecting Spain's security interests. Directly, because our interests will always be better served in a world situation free from sources of conflict, and indirectly, because a Spain that is committed to maintaining international stability can assert its influence in any other field, economic, cultural or social, in which its interests are focused.

Spain has always maintained—and this was expressed by the Government in Congress on 6 October 1998—that "any international use of force must, in normal circumstances and with the exception of legitimate defence situations, previously be authorised by the United Nations Security Council". Nevertheless, in pressing circumstances, when large-scale human disasters have occurred or are imminent, the blocking of the Security Council, the exhaustion of all diplomatic channels and continued failure to abide by its Resolutions should not hinder the international community's determination to avert human tragedies. On such occasions, Spain could consider the appropriateness of using force, through consensus or a general agreement with the other partners and allies of the international security and defence organisations to which we belong.

The international use of force must, in normal circumstances and with the exception of legitimate defence situations, previously be authorised by the United Nations Security Council

Significant geopolitical areas

As mentioned earlier, throughout the History of Spain, the country's influence has spread along three different axes—Europe, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

These three axes have passed the test of time and survive today, albeit adapted to a reality that has evolved over the centuries. What was, in the past, an axis for projecting Spanish power has today become what can be called "vocation", that is, the political will to be

present in a certain sphere, for its influence to be acknowledged and its opinion appreciated and taken into account in decision making.

In this respect, today's Spain lives and stems from this triple European, Mediterranean and Atlantic vocation that has marked the course of its history and its commitments.

European vocation

Europe is not just a geographical concept, but also a historical, social and cultural identity. Europe has been the cradle of the western civilisation and the transmitter and promoter of the values that underpin western civilisation today. Throughout its History, Spain as a nation has taken an active part in defining and shaping Europe. Just as any identity cannot be divided or any of its parts separated if it is to maintain its ethos intact, so is Europe inconceivable without Spain, and Spain without Europe.

Throughout its history, Spain as a nation has taken an active part in defining and shaping Europe. Therefore, Europe cannot be conceived without Spain, nor Spain without Europe

In the wake of the two world wars, the need to create a Europe that could achieve political unity after economic reconstruction arose from the wish to establish a permanent peace and progress in the continent. Spain joined this project—which is today a reality, the European Union—in 1986, convinced that the member nations share a series of interests based on the defence of democracy, the protection of common values and respect for individuals and for human rights.

Spain signs its Treaty of Accession to the European Union in 1986.

Spain has thus given impetus to the European Union's relations with what are its two other vocations: the Ibero-American world and the Mediterranean area.

The European Union has been the driving force behind change and progress, not only in the economic sphere but also in political and social matters. This has required Spain to rise to the challenges of economic convergence in order to join economic and monetary union. Our income levels have gradually been brought into line with the EU average and the weight our country carries in the international community has increased accordingly.

But while our nation has become progressively more European, it is equally true that the European community has been turning increasing attention to our country, as Spain contributes new perspectives that enrich Europe's viewpoint in its relations with other communities. Spain has thus given impetus to the European Union's relations with what are its two other vocations: the Iber-American* world and the Mediterranean area.

Spain considers that the European Union as a political entity should be built in a balanced way on economic, political and security aspects. Today, the European Union is heading rapidly towards economic and monetary integration and is asserting its presence as a major economic, financial and trading power. However, the Union will not make decisive headway in its historic process of integration unless it develops a common foreign and security policy, together with credible and autonomous security and defence capabilities in keeping with its citizens aspirations, without prejudice to the commitments some of its members have undertaken within the Atlantic Alliance.

The experience of shaping a Common Foreign and Security Policy that includes a collective Defence Policy was hitherto unknown, but the new challenges and Europe's new geostrategic situation require imaginative responses that are not anchored to the past. The Bosnian and Kosovo crises have led us to the conviction that Europe needs a security and defence system capable of facing up to the risks that can affect it. The main thrust of the security and defence system that Spain supports and advocates is the NATO-European Union axis.

The main thrust of the security and defence system that Spain supports and advocates is the NATO-European Union axis

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* Translator's note: The Ministry of Defence opted for this term rather than the more commobly used "Latin American" in order to reflect the Iberian peninsula's special links with those countries.

The success of Europe's defence in the 21st century will depend largely on ensuring transparency, confidence and an appropriate system of consultations between NATO and the European Union, and on shaping a sound initial core, preventing duplication. It is true to say that the European Security and Defence Identity within the Atlantic Alliance is essential to making this relationship a reality.

Mediterranean vocation

Since the Cold War ended, the Mediterranean has come to be perceived by the European institutions and NATO as a region that requires greater attention when addressing security issues. This is true—though for quite different reasons—of both the eastern and the western Mediterranean basins, both of which exercise considerable influence on world and European stability.

The Mediterranean Sea is of great strategic importance to Spain. The political initiatives that materialised in the Barcelona Conference (1995) and later in the Malta meeting (1997) served to make the allies realise that the economic, political and social problems affecting both shores of this sea are a common challenge that requires a general and co-ordinated approach, since Spain considers that the essential aspect of the Mediterranean area is not risk but the unavoidable need for co-operation.

Spain considers that the essential aspect of the Mediterranean area is not risk but the unavoidable need for co-operation

Within the geostrategic unity of the Mediterranean, where problems and tensions spread easily, Spain considers that its western basin requires much attention as a nearby area with specific characteristics. Events occurring in this geographical area do not fail to interest us.

As an area of relations between neighbouring peoples and of historical conflicts, the Mediterranean reflects the economic, demographic and cultural tensions that emerge in the environment.

In order to maintain and bolster stability in this area, shared political solutions are required from the countries on both shores, based on co-operation and a flow of investments capable of mobilising local economic agents and committing them to their own development.

Spain shares and encourages the allies' growing attention towards what was traditionally known as the "southern flank". It likewise offers its possibilities and experience in an area that it knows well and with which it has traditionally been bound by firm ties of friendship, with the exclusive aim of maintaining stability and security to the advantage of all the countries in the area.

Spain's ongoing efforts are centred on ensuring that this security continues to be a common interest shared by all the countries in the Mediterranean area. Indeed, this is the message contained in its prominent role in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance and its participation in the European multinational forces and the initiatives of the Mediterranean Dialogue, as instruments that contribute to stability in an area of common interest.

As a natural bridge between the two sides of the Atlantic, Spain is open to each and every one of the Ibero-American nations on the basis of loyal co-operation and willingness to lend support

Atlantic vocation

Spain's ties with the countries on the other side of the Atlantic are a constant historical feature that the passage of time has corroborated. Relations with the two different geographical areas of this continent, Ibero-America and North America, obviously have specific characteristics, but both are of interest to Spain.

Closely linked to the Ibero-American nations by shared traditions, culture and, especially, a common language, Spain is not unaware of the interest this subcontinent arouses nowadays. Indeed, taking advantage of the closeness that stems from these historical ties, Spain is striving to strengthen the subcontinent's relations with Europe.

HM The King greets the Fleet Units in the Atlantic.

As a natural bridge between the two sides of the Atlantic, our country feels committed to the economic and social challenges Ibero-America faces and makes a great effort in the field of co-operation. This is evidenced by the fact that Spain's presence in this continent, in the form of growing activity in the economic, technological and industrial fields, has become extremely important in recent years, and this has given substance to its relations, which for some time had been characterised chiefly by rhetoric.

Convinced that the model of integration that Europe is attempting to follow is the best formula for generating and maintaining development, Spain is encouraging the Ibero-American countries to continue along the path towards integration on which they have already started out. In the bilateral sphere, Spain is open to each and every one of the Ibero-American nations on the basis of loyal co-operation and willingness to lend support. Complex problems, such as combating natural disasters, drug trafficking, organised crime and environmental deterioration, deserve Spain's sympathies and a co-operative attitude as far as our possibilities allow. A noteworthy effort is being made to step up political and economic collaboration and there are well-grounded hopes of being able to increase this in the future.

Spain's bilateral relations with the United States, a country that is the world benchmark, are accorded the significance they deserve

As regards security, given the importance it attaches to peaceful relations with all peoples, Spain is particularly sensitive to any process of building and maintaining peace in the Ibero-American area. Our experience in incorporating new missions for the Armed Forces, adding stability, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance tasks to the traditional ones of guaranteeing security and national sovereignty, provides valuable lessons that Spain currently shares with the Ibero-American countries.

The bilateral relations established between Spain and the United States in 1953 marked the beginning of Spain's opening up to the outside world. Since then, relations between Spain and the United States in the fields of politics, trade, culture, defence and security have become increasingly consolidated and normalised through different political circumstances. These bilateral relations with the country that is a world benchmark and plays a prominent role in all major international decisions are accorded the significance they deserve.

In addition to the general links within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, Spain today has an Agreement on Defence Co-operation with the United States. Although this agreement, which is renewable annually, was politically highly significant for our country as a support in international relations, it is nowadays focused on co-operation between two sovereign nations in defence matters and is a singularly important instrument in bilateral relations between both countries.

Vital interests are those which Spain is prepared to protect and, if necessary, defend in the face of any risk or threat, as they affect its survival as a nation

National security interests

Protecting national security interests is an important responsibility of the Government. The policy decision to identify a national security interest in a given situation and the assessment of its importance in relation to other interests will gauge the effort that needs to be made to safeguard it, and will form the basis of the courses of action established for this purpose.

As explained in the following paragraphs, national security interests can, roughly speaking, be grouped into two categories: vital and strategic.

The Government's freedom of action to decide on the most appropriate strategic course of action to protect each of our security interests makes it advisable not to classify them in advance into either of the aforementioned categories beyond the obvious, as this would be tantamount to trying to pre-establish the response.

Vital interests

Vital interests are those which Spain is prepared to protect and, if necessary, defend in the face of any risk or threat, as they affect its

The Congress building in Carrera de San Jerónimo, Madrid.

Defending vital interests such as territory and sovereignty is an unavoidable duty and requires any other interest to be subordinated thereto

survival as a nation. Defending them is therefore an unavoidable duty and requires any other interest to be subordinated thereto.

Vital interests are, in fact, the elements that make up the State and, as such, must be preserved from any aggression: the mainland and islands, with their air and sea ports, populations, constitutional order, sovereignty and independence.

Strategic interests

Strategic interests are those which provide security to our environment and whose protection contributes decisively to the defence of vital interests. Those deriving from Spain's geographical location and condition of maritime nation are particularly important and, owing to their significance and permanence, special attention is paid to them in our Foreign Policy.

Since Spain's territory includes extrapeninsular territories, the exercise of sovereignty depends on ensuring the free use of the sea and air links between the different parts of the territory.

Spain gives priority to any measure designed to maintain peace and stability in the Mediterranean

Spain advocates the idea of achieving a more integrated and stable Europe. It shares this interest with its partners and allies and extends it to the Euro-Atlantic sphere. For geographical reasons, Spain has a special interest in nearby Northern Africa, which, with

The Victoria *frigate patrolling the Adriatic.*

A nation like Spain, with an economy heavily dependent on other countries for energy resources and commodities, has a set of interests which largely go beyond defending its territory and sovereignty

its adjacent Atlantic and Mediterranean waters, forms part of our natural geostrategic environment. Spain therefore gives preferential attention to the Mediterranean, particularly the Western Mediterranean area, and to the Strait of Gibraltar and access routes.

Spain considers any measure aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the Mediterranean to be a priority and therefore participates actively in the implementation of co-operation and confidence-building measures, devoting special attention and effort to this aspect, particularly in its relations with the northern African countries.

As well as these geostrategic interests, we should also stress free trade and communications, which are the mainstay of the world economy and, most particularly, of the economy of the countries that make up the broad Euro-Atlantic region of which Spain is part. The strategic interests of the nations belonging to the western community, which depend on trade, and particularly those of Spain, coincide in this point.

In this connection, a nation like Spain, formed as an advanced democracy with an economy heavily dependent on other countries for energy resources and commodities, has a set of interests which largely go beyond defending its territory and sovereignty. Spain needs to ensure its supply of basic resources to maintain the well-being of its people and foster their prosperity. Any act of force that endangers this supply, with the risk of economic collapse, constitutes a threat that would have to be countered.

Army pontooneers in Nicaragua after Hurricane Mitch.

Other national interests

Linked to national security interests, Spain has other different kinds of interests that stem from its position in the international community, its sense of solidarity, its contribution to the cause of peace and freedom, and its relations with the nations of its historical and cultural community.

Spain has other interests stemming from its position in the international community, which may require the action of the Armed Forces to support external action

Although these interests are not a priority aim of the defence effort as they are not closely related to Spain's security, neither are they unconnected, as they are present in the State's external action and can occasionally require the action of Armed Forces units or military personnel. Humanitarian assistance missions and participation in certain peace missions in remote regions can be motivated by these interests.

In particular, as yet another manifestation of its Ibero-American vocation in the spirit of co-operation that characterises relations with these sister countries, Spain also promotes collaboration with the countries of the region in security and defence matters.

Objectives and basic courses of action of Defence Policy

Spain's Defence Policy springs from the definition of objectives and the establishment of basic courses of action to achieve them.



The basic objectives are:
• To consolidate Spain's presence in international organisations
• To improve the effectiveness of the Spanish Armed Forces
• To encourage society to take a greater part in defence tasks

Objectives

Spain faces the challenges of the future with a Defence Policy, which, according to the aforementioned Guidance on National Defence 1/96, is designed to achieve three basic objectives:

- To consolidate Spain's presence in international security and defence organisations, fully assuming the responsibilities and commitments deriving from its membership.

- To improve the effectiveness of the Spanish Armed Forces in order to ensure they are fully capable of performing the missions entrusted to them by the Constitution; in order to contribute, as far as national possibilities allow, to collective security and defence with the allies; and so as to collaborate in the maintenance of international peace and stability, particularly in our geographical and cultural environment.

- To make Spanish society understand, support and take a greater part in the task of maintaining a defence mechanism that is tailored to our needs and responsibilities and to Spain's strategic interests.

A Spanish F-18 aircraft parked next to a US F-16 during the Red Flag exercise.

Basic courses of action

The Guidance on National Defence also contains a set of guidelines for developing Defence Policy by means of the following basic courses of action:

Regarding the consolidation of Spanish presence in international security and defence organisations:

- To contribute to defining a common European Security and Defence Policy within the European Union.
- To contribute to collective defence through full membership of the Atlantic Alliance and, within it, to support the European Security and Defence Identity on the principle of preventing the unnecessary duplication of effort.
- To take part in the European multinational forces which are set up to carry out Petersberg-type operations and are available to NATO.
- To foster dialogue and co-operation as the most appropriate measures for guaranteeing international stability, with particular emphasis on the Mediterranean Dialogue.
- To support and take part in initiatives aimed at maintaining world peace and stability promoted by, and carried out under the aegis of, the United Nations.

One of the basic courses of action is to contribute to collective defence through our full membership of the Atlantic Alliance

A Harrier aircraft takes off from the deck of the Príncipe de Asturias.

The Armed Forces require materiel that is in line with the trends dictated by the strategic environment

- To take an active part in the implementation of the confidence- and security-building measures promoted by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
- To back disarmament initiatives, which are the cornerstones of European security, and to support the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to launch them.
- To achieve harmonisation of our special relationship with the United States, as laid down in the current agreement on Defence co-operation, with our new situation in the Atlantic Alliance.
- To give impetus to bilateral and multilateral relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean region and the Ibero-American and other nations with which we are bound by historic ties.

Regarding the upgrading of the Armed Forces:

- To complete the professionalisation of servicemen by 31 December 2002.
- To continue with the modernisation process, providing the Armed Forces with the materiel they need to be fully efficient, in line with the trends dictated by the strategic environment.

- To carry out a thorough revision of the current structures, applying criteria of agility, flexibility, functionality and optimum use of the resources available.

Regarding Spanish society:

- To convey to Spanish society the need to invest in Defence, as there is no alternative to this public asset.
- To arouse the public's interest in defence issues, raising as far as possible their level of information and always applying criteria of maximum transparency.
- To encourage Spanish society to identify with the effort being made in defence, with the conviction that the work carried out is heading in the right direction.

Present and future of Defence Policy

Over the course of the 6th parliamentary term, during which the aforementioned Guidance on National Defence was enacted, we have witnessed a series of specific decisions and events that are milestones in achieving the objectives set out in the Guidance.

Spain's decision to participate fully in NATO's new military structure has been fulfilled

At the NATO summit held in Madrid in 1997, Spain announced to the allies its decision to join the new military structure, which

The Spanish flag flying next to that of NATO at the Alliance's headquarters.

became effective two years later. The opening of the Headquarters of the Joint Sub-regional Command Southwest in Madrid and Spain's role at the Washington Summit as a member with full rights and duties, show that the first goal of our current Defence Policy has been achieved.

With respect to the professionalisation and modernisation processes designed to boost the potential of our Armed Forces, the related actions were set in motion after the initiatives were given the appropriate parliamentary backing and the decisions adopted announced to our allies. These actions will be described in detail in the respective chapters. In short, professionalisation is progressing at a steady pace and will be completed according to schedule, while the necessary investments in technology to modernise arms and materiel will enable the planned weapons systems to be obtained within the timeframe.

Professionalisation is progressing at a steady pace and investments in technology will enable the planned weapons systems to be obtained within the timeframe

The effort to foster a defence culture within Spanish society has been outstanding. Although it is a goal that will only be achieved in the long term, it should be stressed that significant headway has been made in recent years as a result of the initiatives and work carried out in this field. Among others, mention should be made of the sociological studies and research projects aimed at ascertaining the parameters and motivation that determine society's degree of interest in defence.

Co-operation relations have been fostered and a varied range of activities have been carried out in connection with defence, peace and security issues, and collaboration and activities with Spanish universities and research centres have been stepped up.

While a lot has been achieved, just as much remains to be done. In 1999 the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union began to adapt their defence structures, including military capabilities, to the new strategic environment. For our part, the Government is shaping the Armed Forces of the 21st century with structures, doctrines, human and material resources that provide the essential military capabilities needed to carry out the missions that will foreseeably be required of them in this new period that is now dawning.

In short, our Defence Policy enables Spain to play an increasingly active role in maintaining peace and stability in the Euro-

Atlantic region, in close collaboration with our partners and allies. It guarantees, should the need arise, the safety of our national security interests, maintains a firm commitment of collective defence to the Atlantic Alliance and backs the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to achieve new goals on the road mapped out in the Amsterdam Treaty and the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki Summits.

The effort to foster a defence culture within Spanish society has been outstanding

Spain is furthermore bound by solid bilateral ties of co-operation with the United States, which complement both nations' multilateral relations within the Atlantic Alliance.

Defence Policy, in addition to meeting national security interests, is therefore in keeping with the requirements of our membership of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, with our responsibility in maintaining stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and with our growing presence in the international arena.

CHAPTER IV

ARMED FORCES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The Armed Forces are the specific instrument of defence and the ultimate guarantee of our security. This is their true raison d'être and requires them to adapt continually to the times and upgrade their capabilities in order to be fully effective in preventing and managing crises and, should the need arise, in any future conflicts that could erupt. The determination to overhaul our forces is therefore one of the primary objectives described in the previous pages and constitutes a core element of defence policy. Armed Forces for the 21st century. That is the goal.

Upgrading military capabilities is one of the chief objectives of Defence Policy

When laying the foundations for future effectiveness, we need to consider our Armed Forces within their frame of reference, that is, in a highly developed society, one of the consolidated and prosperous democracies that make up the core of Euro-Atlantic security, as a member of NATO and the European Union.

In order to perform their missions effectively, the Armed Forces must be able to project their military potential far from their home bases and act with maximum effectiveness in a wide range of oper-

Joint action is essential in a scenario dominated by information technology and communications, by long-range and high-precision weapons and the requirements of strategic mobility

ational scenarios, including high-intensity combat, if required at any time.

In such a scenario dominated by information technology and communications, long-range and high-precision weapons and the requirements of strategic mobility, joint action is essential. The Army, the Navy and the Air Force will contribute forces with specific capabilities, irreplaceable as regards their respective operational possibilities, but conceived to contribute jointly to a single effort.

This chapter describes Spanish military strategy, which is designed to channel the action of the armed services, their missions and tasks, and the size, characteristics, operational capabilities, level of training and availability they require.

Military strategy

Our military strategy is characterised by the idea of anticipating conflicts through a combination of deterrence and prevention or, if the conflict erupts, being able to muster a decisive and suitably proportioned response in order to achieve the strategic objectives, keeping undesired effects to a minimum.

The purpose of deterrence is to ward off a possible attack on national interests through the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage on the potential aggressor. The power of deterrence is based on credibility—which stems from the size, preparation and availability of a country's military force—and on the firm will to use it if necessary. As a guarantee of Spain's vital needs in any scenario, military strategy as a matter of principle maintains an appropriate conventional deterrent capability.

The purpose of deterrence is to ward off a possible attack on national interests through the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage on the potential aggressor

In the field of prevention, in the sense of an active contribution to maintaining peace and stability, the Armed Forces are the specific instrument of defence diplomacy. This term covers different co-operation measures designed to foster confidence between nations, dialogue and mutual knowledge, the verification of arms control measures and mutual transparency in military activities.

Crisis management, which is the right combination of prevention and response, enables all measures relating to

Amphibious assault vehicles of the Marine Brigade after landing on a beach.

deployment, presence and demonstration of force to be controlled accurately, thereby ensuring a response that is totally in keeping with the political intention, preventing escalation and leaving the option open of reaching a compromise with the opponent.

The policy decision to make use of force triggers the military response through the application of military capabilities, in support of, or in conjunction with, other political, economic, diplomatic measures or of whatever other kind is appropriate.

The policy decision to make use of force triggers the military response through the application of military capabilities, in support of, or in conjunction with, other political, economic or diplomatic measures

The Armed Forces act according to a broad concept of manoeuvre based on obtaining, maintaining and exploiting initiative. It is therefore necessary to have forces that are permanently available and ready for action, as well as suitable plans and resources to move them to the field of operations, deploy them once there and engage them in combat to the extent required in order to fulfil the mission.

As conflicts are foreseeable, a modern military operation cannot be conceived without integrating the specific military capabilities of the ground, naval and air forces from the early stages of conception and planning. The Armed Forces nowadays are frequently required to act within the framework of multinational operations and in collaboration with other governmental and non-governmental organisations.

F-18 aircraft at Aviano base ready for take off during the air operations in Kosovo.

The Armed Forces will be called upon to perform missions in different scenarios ranging from peace situations to international crises or conflicts of varying intensity

The action of the Armed Forces is likely to be required very far from Spanish territory and for indefinite periods of time. This action will be selective, depending on the situation, to ensure that the decision to act and the manner in which the action is executed are in consonance with our military possibilities and operational capabilities.

Missions and scenarios

In general, the Armed Forces will be called upon to perform missions in any of the following scenarios:

- *Peace situation*. This is the situation of stability in which the country carries on its normal activities. The Armed Forces focus their attention on training and serve as an instrument of the State's external action. The most important missions they perform are deterrence and conflict prevention through defence diplomacy tasks. Other characteristic peacetime activities of the Armed Forces are ensuring an effective presence in the areas over which Spain has sovereignty and regular surveillance.

- *Participation in peace operations.* These operations, which can encompass a broad spectrum of activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacemaking, constitute an

important scenario when it comes to identifying possible missions of the Armed Forces. Spain has played an active role in many of the operations of this kind carried out in the past decade. It is nevertheless important to stress that these missions, which have special characteristics, do not in themselves determine the capabilities of military forces.

Crisis management operations vary considerably in nature and duration and, should the need arise, require force to be applied swiftly and flexibly

- *Crisis management.* A crisis situation emerges when dialogue and co-operation between nations are unable to prevent the rupture of international stability. Crisis management operations are, by nature, varied and unpredictable. Evacuating civilians caught unawares in a conflict zone, deploying forces as a result of a particular policy decision or carrying out an embargo by sea, air or land are just some of the situations that need to be addressed in very different ways. The size and nature of these operations therefore vary considerably and, should the need arise, require force to be applied swiftly and flexibly. This entails keeping in control of the situation, in order both to prevent the crisis from escalating into a conflict and to take the appropriate de-escalation measures when the time comes.

- *Limited armed conflict.* Spain could find itself in the situation of having to defend its security interests by intervening in a limited conflict together with its partners and allies or, possibly, at a purely national level. In view of the foregoing and the fact that such a situation entails a commitment for our defence, limited armed conflict is the scenario that should carry the greatest weight when planning a realistic design of our Armed Forces. NATO and the European Union are the main players in the Euro-Atlantic region that includes the geostrategic environment of utmost interest to Spain, namely Europe, the Western Mediterranean and the East Atlantic. The size and quality of the forces Spain makes available for conflicts of this kind are a permanent indication of its determination to defend national interests and contribute to the allied effort.

Defending NATO members from a widespread attack is the most demanding commitment of allied solidarity

- *Widespread armed conflict.* Defending NATO members from a widespread attack is the most demanding commitment of allied solidarity: to protect peace and guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of the member States. While such a scenario is unlikely to arise, it cannot



The three strictly military missions of the Armed Forces can be summed up as: to prevent aggression of any kind and, if necessary, respond to it; to participate with the allies in collective security and defence; and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability

be ruled out altogether, and the need for our Armed Forces to contribute to the common effort must accordingly be envisaged. Therefore, bearing in mind that a situation of this kind would probably arise with considerable warning and not by surprise, there will be plans for mustering additional forces and procuring extraordinary resources for defence.

The missions of the Armed Forces in the scenarios listed above can thus be summed as follows: one, to prevent aggression of any kind and, if necessary, respond to it; two, to participate fully with the allies in collective security and defence, to the extent that national possibilities allow; and three, to make a military contribution to the maintenance of international peace and stability, particularly within our geographic environment and in the Euro-Atlantic region.

In addition to performing these strictly military missions, the Armed Forces also co-operate with civilian structures. This aspect is highlighted in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. It is only natural that a military organisation capable of performing large-scale missions should be able to take part effectively in emergency or disaster situations. Actions of this kind are performed habitually both domestically and internationally, even in the context of peace operations, to address the problems arising from natural disasters.

In a broad conception of defence and security, the Civil Guard, in keeping with its nature, organisation, training, size and deploy-

Civil Guard motorised patrol in Bosnia Herzegovina.

ment capability, is able to contribute significantly to defence, particularly in conflict-prevention and crisis-management missions where the need to protect the population in the area of operations is increasingly evident. Integrated into military units, it can perform the role of military police, controlling traffic, protecting and ensuring the safety of people and premises and public order, or act as judicial police, among other tasks.

The Civil Guard can contribute significantly to defence, particularly in conflict-prevention and crisis-management missions where it is necessary to protect the population in the area of operations

In the same way, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Armed Forces may be called on to collaborate in the fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime and clandestine immigration by carrying out surveillance or providing technical support in keeping with their specific capabilities. However, it should be borne in mind that such tasks do not fall strictly within the scope of defence. Should the Armed Forces be required to perform them, they will thus do so by supporting the law enforcement bodies, in accordance with the co-ordination criteria established by law and in their regulations.

Military capabilities

The Armed Forces require military capabilities that enable them to perform their missions successfully, by implementing military strategy in an environment such as the current one in which the

The fact that Spain is basically a peninsula with archipelagos and enclaves raises special needs of keeping watch on maritime and air space, as well as requirements relating to the capability of projecting military potential

Exploration vehicle of the Castillejos 2nd Cavalry Brigade boarding an amphibious ship.

nature of conflicts is not easy to predict. Set courses of action in response to a defined threat are no longer valid; flexible structures and procedures are needed to enable the Armed Forces to react appropriately to any risk situation. Finding the appropriate response in each case entails, above all, an important change in mentality in order to develop joint capabilities to project our military potential, so as to ensure the necessary coherence between the means and the effective performance of the sort of operations that are more likely to be required in future.

The compatibility between the military capabilities needed to perform defence missions, on the one hand, and tasks to foster sta-

bility, on the other, is particularly relevant to our country owing to the characteristics of Spain's territory and geostrategic situation. This point needs to be taken into account if we are to make the most of the resources allocated to the Armed Forces over the next new years.

Indeed, the fact that Spain is basically a peninsula with archipelagos in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and enclaves on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar requires a dispersed deployment of forces and raises special needs of keeping watch on maritime and air space, as well as requirements relating to the capability of projecting military potential. Furthermore, its eccentric location with respect to Europe conditions its contribution to the allied effort on the need to provide our forces with the necessary strategic mobility.

Transport capabilities for the projection of forces are measured by the volume of resources that can be transported and by the speed and ease of loading and unloading procedures at logistic terminals. The current means of sea and air transport will need to be increased in order to deploy forces and sustain this effort. This is a priority requirement and the means available will therefore be increased by supplementing this joint service through contracts.

The need to make our Defence capabilities compatible with those of our allies involves a challenge and makes certain requirements as to the size, quality and structure of our Armed Forces

Spain's international role requires us to make our Defence capabilities compatible with those of our allies. This involves a challenge and makes certain requirements on our Armed Forces:

- Their size should be in keeping with the relative influence our country wishes to exercise in the multinational sphere
- Their quality, as regards training of personnel and equipment and level of skill, should be comparable to that of our allies' forces
- Their structure and increased interoperability will enable forces to be grouped into formations which can be integrated into multinational forces as a contribution to the allied effort, should the need arise

The Atlantic Alliance's Defence Capabilities Initiative, approved by the Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit in April 1999, is a frame of reference for member States of the Alliance for developing the military capabilities needed to cover

The military capabilities of the members of the Alliance must allow them to deploy and engage in combat in any environment, particularly on lengthy missions in remote places

the full range of missions laid down in the new Strategic Concept and, in particular, to achieve a common operational approach.

This initiative is aimed at ensuring that the allied nations' forces are capable of deploying and engaging in combat in an armed conflict in any environment, particularly on lengthy missions in remote places. Once they have acquired these capabilities, the forces will also be in a position to act successfully in lower-risk situations such as peace operations.

To this end, five main areas are established in which specific capabilities must be developed: strategic mobility, effective engagement, sustainability, survivability, and command and control and intelligence. There is a focus on the need for interoperability, that is, compatibility between the allied forces with respect to personnel, technology, materiel and procedures.

Sustaining the activity of forces that are endowed with technically complex equipment which needs to be kept highly efficient and reliable, operating far from their home bases in a campaign, requires a huge logistic support effort. Supply, maintenance and healthcare capabilities and other functions are critical and must be procured in accordance with criteria of economy and rationalisation of resources, and be co-ordinated from a multinational point of view in order to meet the needs of the forces as securely and flexibly as possible in any circumstances.

In view of the task the allied nations have set themselves to ensure their forces meet the requirements of effectiveness demanded by international security in this new century, the size of their effort will undeniably require the goals to be rigorously programmed, establishing relative priorities, and will need a financial backing that is as committed as it is realistic.

The military capabilities of the Spanish Armed Forces are being upgraded through full professionalisation, modernisation and rationalisation of the organisation

The military capabilities of the Spanish Armed Forces are being upgraded through two processes that are directly and intrinsically linked and inseparable from each other: full professionalisation and modernisation of equipment and weaponry, both of which will be dealt with in greater detail later on.

As regards organisation, the Armed Forces are currently being streamlined, concurrently with the two aforementioned processes. This aspect is also addressed in a separate chapter.

Characteristics of the Armed Forces

The most important characteristic of our Armed Forces must be the quality of their human resources

The main characteristics that our Armed Forces must acquire, and to which special attention will be devoted, are:

- *Quality of human resources*, regarded as the most important characteristic. Special attention needs to be paid to training personnel, leadership, mentality, motivation and dedication. Having fully professional Armed Forces will allow increasingly complex resources to be managed with maximum effectiveness.

- *Availability,* which consists in ensuring the forces are ready for call-up as a prior requisite for generating deterrence, coping with a crisis or responding to an aggression. Expertise and equipment will determine how available the units are. No unit is more costly than one which is unable to engage effectively in combat when required to do so.

- *Flexibility,* with respect both to procedures and to the organisation of the forces. This is a key factor in responding appropriately to the changing circumstances that characterise today's broad spectrum of conflicts. It requires adapting to events, initiative and a modular type of organisation in the structure of the forces.

105 Light Gun-Howitzer of the Parachute Artillery Battalion

Availability, flexibility, strategic mobility and sustainability are characteristics that our Armed Forces must acquire

- *Strategic mobility*, which provides the ability to transport military means with the necessary combat and support capabilities to the areas of operations.

- *Warfighting capability* or combat power, based on effective manoeuvre and fire support capabilities.

- *Survivability* or ability of the military units to protect themselves so as to operate in the characteristic environments of modern-day conflicts, where speed of operations, precision and firepower, the need to remain for long periods of time and, on occasions, in environments with a nuclear, biological or chemical risk, are key factors.

- *Sustained action capability*, which enables forces to engage effectively in operations for as long as necessary by subsequently relieving the units deployed and providing suitable logistic support.

- *Mobilisation capability*, both of personnel and of material resources, in order to maintain and, if necessary, restore units' combat power in the shortest possible time.

The characteristics of the Armed Forces are enhanced by factors such as joint action, advanced technology, interoperability and superiority of information

These characteristics of the Armed Forces are enhanced by factors like the following, which boost their effectiveness:

- *Superiority of information*, in order to obtain, analyse, process and disseminate the data needed to gain a better knowledge of the situation within a suitable time. It facilitates the use of other capabilities such as mobility, survivability, combat power and sustainability.

- *Joint action,* which, from when the operations are first addressed, must enable efforts of military forces with specific or differentiated characteristics to be combined in a single battle environment.

- *Interoperability,* in order for the ground, naval and air forces to engage in action with the forces of our allies. Establishing standard equipment, doctrine and procedure facilitates the implementation of operations and logistic support.

- *Advanced technology*, which is a determining factor as it provides one of the most important advantages today in any sit-

uation. Adopting such technology is of particular importance, both as a characteristic of the new Armed Forces model and for the necessary interoperability with our allies.

Guidelines for the Armed Forces

Joint action

Military capabilities are developed through systems of forces which are conceived harmoniously and developed through integration, with the necessary proportion of land, naval and air forces, concentrating efforts on the essential tasks, pursuing efficiency and complementarity, avoiding redundancy and idle resources, and fostering mutual co-operation in joint action in the national sphere and interoperability in the allied framework.

In a strictly national context, the different systems of forces will, as a whole, constitute an effective instrument for deterrence, prevention and response

Although the possibility of having to perform operations in a strictly national context is not the most likely prospect, adequate means and procedures are required for this. In this connection, the different systems of forces will, as a whole, constitute an effective instrument for deterrence, prevention and response.

Joint action is an imperative given the nature of today's operations, the range and precision of weaponry and the need to use the

Parachute Brigade troops about to board an Air Force Hercules aircraft.

The land, naval and air forces complement each other, as the joint use of each gives rise to synergy

full potential available with maximum efficiency. It is enhanced by technological progress and the current means of information and control.

The land, naval and air forces complement each other, as the joint use of each gives rise to synergy, and modern technology is capable of closely co-ordinating their respective actions, something that was not possible in the past. This complementarity and synergy will produce the best results when each of the components is assigned a suitable role within the whole, depending on the scenario in which the action is to be carried out.

The idea of the scenario where force action is required goes beyond a geographical definition or the strictly ground, maritime or aerial considerations on which military doctrine was traditionally based. Concepts such as battlefield, maritime area or airspace have evolved in the past years and have now merged into a single battle area, which, in addition to the aforementioned spheres, also encompasses electromagnetic space and the modern notion of cyberspace, and even the broad field of social communications.

The circumstances will determine the predominant use of the force that offers the best solution to the operational problem in question

Consequently, it does not usually make military sense to consider the exclusive use of ground, naval or air forces outside a purely tactical context when referring to certain specific actions. In today's world, in which the use of force refers basically to the projection of military potential to guarantee peace and the maintenance of stability, the emphasis must be on integrating efforts through the concurrent use of ground, naval and air forces, bearing in mind their complementary nature and the comparative advantage to be obtained from making use of one of them predominantly, depending on the situation, chosen from the broad variety of options they offer as a whole.

In keeping with this idea, the Army, Navy and Air Force organise their forces in accordance with their own particular doctrines and areas of action in order to serve as elements—all of which are essential—of a joint strategy, each with its respective possibilities and limitations. The circumstances will determine the predominant use of the force that offers the best solution to the operational problem in question. This does not prevent the other forces from inter-

vening; rather, they will complement and support the one that, in each case, plays the leading role in the operations.

The efficiency of the whole depends on the value of each of the elements that make it up. Regarding the force as a whole does not mean that the ground, naval and air components lose their particular characteristics. Indeed, the opposite is true: these must be preserved if the forces are each to make the particular effort required of them. Therefore, although the operations are performed with the necessary combination of ground, naval and air forces under a single national or allied command, these forces will be formed, trained and maintained at a suitable operational level within the administrative framework of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, to which they respectively belong.

Forming a whole is, above all, a question of mentality. The Army, the Navy and the Air Force are, and should regard themselves as, valuable and irreplaceable components of a whole—the Armed Forces—with the mutual understanding that they constitute a chain whose strength is measured by the weakest of its links.

The intervention of the remaining forces complements the one that plays the leading role in the operations

Legion units fall in before leaving for the Balkans.

The ground forces

The ground forces, which are described in greater detail in Appendix B, are designed specifically to secure and maintain military control of the territory in an area of operations.

This task, which may be performed in defence of national territory or wherever it is required, greatly determines the structure and resources of these forces.

Nonetheless, since a direct attack on any of the NATO members' territory is currently highly unlikely, the ground forces will probably be used more as a basic instrument in crisis management and peacekeeping or peacemaking, if necessary, as they are the only ones capable of effectively gaining and retaining control of territorial objectives for the time required. In view of the remote and unpredictable nature of possible aggressions and the foreseeable use of ground forces in crisis situations outside national territory, the emphasis needs to be placed on the characteristics of strategic mobility, availability and sustainability.

The ground forces will probably be used more as a basic instrument in crisis management and peacekeeping or peacemaking, if necessary, as they are the only ones capable of effectively gaining and retaining control of territorial objectives

The light forces, the main one being the Rapid Action Force, afford capacity to react and have fewer transport requirements and greater strategic mobility. As a result, they are given the appropriate degree of priority when allocating resources, in order to ensure high readiness.

But there is no avoiding the fact that in a conflict, however limited, a decisive effort may be needed, which entails the possibility of coming up against troops with considerable combat power in terms of both number and of high-tech weaponry. In this case, the core of the ground forces must be formed by armoured and mechanised units with substantial firepower, tactical mobility and protection. Their use should, however, be compatible with the real possibilities of rapid deployment and with the requirements of strategic mobility that enable the projection of forces.

In accordance with the aforementioned criteria, the Army Manoeuvre Force will have a balanced composition of four heavy brigades and four light brigades. The former—one armoured, two mechanised infantry and one armoured cavalry unit—are being equipped with Leopard tanks and Pizarro combat vehicles.

At the same time, the airmobile forces will be supplied with new attack helicopters equipped with long-range antitank missiles, and the number and features of their tactical transport heli-

Fleet Carrier Group.

copters will be increased to improve the tactical mobility of the light forces.

The naval forces can provide a prompt and flexible response from the outset of a crisis owing to their strategic mobility and ability to remain off a shore, exercising their influence on it

The naval forces

The naval forces, which are described in Appendix C, are a means that is particularly suited to the rapid and gradual deployment of forces in any theatre of operations, however far from national territory, owing to their essential characteristics of mobility, flexibility, ability to remain at sea and expeditionary capability. At present there are no risks that badly affect sea links, and naval operations are therefore focused on waters nearer the coast and under greater influence of the ground-based aerial resources.

The projection of military potential from the sea has always been a capability that is unique to naval formations on account of their ability to move freely, be present and, if necessary, remain for long periods off a shore, exercising their influence as required, by using weapons or carrier-borne aviation, or by performing amphibious operations of varying size. These characteristics make them a uniquely valuable asset today, as they provide a rapid and flexible response from the outset of crises for carrying out missions from the sea such as evacuation, control of installations that enable

ground units to be landed or immediate participation in peace and humanitarian assistance operations.

The new F-100 frigates, which are equipped with the Aegis high-tech antiaircraft system, will improve the safety of the forces considerably, particularly in areas close to a potentially hostile coast, as well as providing a missile defence capability. The Fleet's naval air capabilities will be enhanced with the modernisation of the Harrier aircraft for fighting and bombing.

As for the amphibious forces, their operational potential has improved significantly thanks to the two new Galicia class landing platform dock ships. Their assets will continue to be upgraded and the weaponry, mobility and logistical support capabilities of the Marine Brigade will likewise be improved.

The air forces

Controlling national airspace and, if necessary, providing air defence of the territory, require a system with specific capabilities to prevent any possibility of an air attack. The efficiency of this system is based mainly on the use of high-tech aerial resources, with the co-operation of ground and, possibly, naval units, equipped with antiaircraft missiles. Nevertheless, although we cannot rule

F-18s flying over Entrepeñas dam.

out the possibility that air defence may have to deal with a high-risk situation at some point in the future, in view of the risk of proliferation of weapons of massive destruction and their vectors, this is not the most likely scenario for the coming years.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the air forces, referred to in greater detail in Appendix D, must be suited to their most likely use as an essential coercive instrument for peacemaking, and to the requirement of ensuring the necessary air superiority to carry out land and maritime operations. An air campaign is a persuasive element to be brought to bear on an adversary in a crisis in order to reach a compromise, and is also a course of action that is likely to reap favourable results with the lowest number of casualties.

The air forces must be suited to their most likely use as an essential coercive instrument for peacemaking and exercising air superiority in order to reap favourable results with the lowest number of casualties

The capabilities of the air forces are closely linked to the efficiency of attack aircraft as a platform for using a varied range of weapons and systems that allow precise and selective effects to be achieved on all kinds of air and surface targets. The fighter squadrons will therefore be equipped with the future EF-2000 aircraft, which incorporate high technology, are fully interoperable with our allies' air forces and will gradually replace the Mirage F-1s. Our squadrons will also continue to operate with the F-18s that are currently in service. This fleet will be completed and modernised.

Air operations not only require the availability of combat units, but also of the necessary means of transport to support an advance deployment, and both capabilities must therefore be developed in parallel. Furthermore, there is no ignoring the fact that air transport is one of the cornerstones of the strategic mobility of the rapid reaction ground forces, and this capability must therefore be upgraded, together with the air transport vectors. Air transport capabilities will be given immediate attention through the progressive delivery of the new CASA-295 aircraft and modernisation of the C-130 Hercules, which will continue to operate until the new heavy transport aircraft are received.

CHAPTER V

PROFESSIONALISATION

Citizens' level of education and vocational training is one of the values that underpin the progress of highly developed societies. On the basis of this human potential, it is possible to find the people who are best suited to any task, provided they are chosen in accordance with their skills and are properly motivated. They will thus perform well when they apply themselves. Such a supply of labour is, however, highly costly in a developed society in terms of social structure and economic organisation. Today's organisations are therefore making a huge effort to hire the staff they really need and, once they are on the payroll, manage them properly to ensure they do the job as efficiently as possible.

People are the Armed Forces' greatest asset. Human resources are therefore the most crucial factor of our Defence Policy

These assumptions should be applied to human resources in the sphere of Defence, including both the military and the civilian personnel who render their services at the Ministry of Defence. These resources must be considered as a rare asset for two reasons: on the one hand, their high cost and, on the other, the gradual fall in the number young people as a percentage of the population, which Spanish society has been witnessing for some years now.

Marine armed with a Cetme LV rifle in firing position.

Deploying forces outside national territory requires suitably trained personnel

Today, as in the past, people are the Armed Forces' greatest asset. The latest technology would be of no use without sufficient, well-trained and highly motivated personnel, and leaders at different levels of the organisation to ensure that the assigned tasks are carried out. Human resources are therefore the most crucial factor of our defence policy.

A requirement and a challenge

One of the main consequences of the strategic changes witnessed in recent years following the disappearance of the threat to national borders is the reduction in numbers of troops. In order to face up to the risks arising in an increasingly secure but less stable environment, it is normally necessary to deploy forces outside national territory, and this requires personnel who are suitably trained for the task. Therefore, most of the nations in our part of the world have shown a tendency to abolish conscription. From this social aspiration stems the decision to discontinue military service, which is very soon to be a reality in Spain.

This situation, in which new missions other than the traditional roles of self-defence have emerged and the convergence of

efforts raises the need to see eye-to-eye with our allies, gives rise to specific requirements for the new professional servicemen, and also for their commanding officers. The Defence Capabilities Initiative, approved by the Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit in April 1999, establishes the criterion—which is generally applied by western Armed Forces in the 21st century—of compensating for smaller numbers with greater effectiveness, which stems largely from the efficiency of professional military personnel. At the same time, the technological revolution has brought major changes in weaponry and military equipment, the proper use and maintenance of which requires highly specialised personnel.

The criterion involves compensating for smaller troop numbers with greater effectiveness, which stems largely from the efficiency of professional military personnel

There is no doubt that these circumstances require much better qualified men and women and this calls for solutions that enable the size of the forces to be combined with quality and training. It is thus necessary to rise to a threefold challenge: to provide the Armed Forces with a sufficient number of personnel who are motivated and highly trained. In order to respond satisfactorily to this challenge, Spain has shifted from the "combined model" of 1991 to the new "fully professional model", according to which all the members of the Armed Forces will be professionals.

Specialised personnel carry out a pre-flight check aboard the Príncipe de Asturias.

The size of the forces must be combined with quality and high level of training

In addition to the aforementioned strategic and technological reasons, Spanish society is calling for the abolishment of compulsory military service. Society found it unacceptable, for example, that this service should be performed by a only small percentage of the population, since women and a considerable number of men—for medical reasons or owing to other exemptions—were not performing a compulsory service. These reasons led the Government to opt for a model of professional Armed Forces instead of the combined model.

As well as a historic landmark, the professionalisation of the Armed Forces is a challenge for Spain, whose security is going to depend on whether the process that has been embarked on is successfully completed. But, first and foremost, professionalisation is a modernising process that affects all areas of the military institution. Indeed, the results of this effort do not depend solely and specifically on successful human resources management, but on shaping the Armed Forces into a structure that is more effective yet smaller, and enabling the requirements of the model adopted to be met with the human resources society can contribute, without generating excessive financial expenses.

Professionalisation is a modernisation process that affects all areas of the military institution

Rising to this challenge is a task that particularly concerns officers and non-commissioned officers, to whom, as leaders of sol-

Airmen parading beneath the flag after taking oath or pledging loyalty.

diers, sailors and marines, the motivation, training and management of the latter is entrusted. Style of command must obviously be adapted to the specific needs of the servicemen who possess greater experience and remain in service for longer than in the past. This circumstance, together with the fact that in future the only link with armed service will be professional, means that the Administration should approach personnel management with criteria that allow the professional and social aspects to be addressed suitably—a very different approach from the previous combined model.

Style of command must be adapted to the specific needs of soldiers, sailors and marines who possess greater experience than in the past

The professionalisation of the Armed Forces therefore goes hand in hand with paying increasing attention to the occupational aspects of the military personnel's relationship with the military institution. This necessary condition must not be fulfilled to the detriment of the ties that bind servicemen to the institution through their personal adherence to its characteristic values, one of the principle ones being to serve Spain within the framework defined by the Constitution and laws.

Finally, it should be stressed that the success of this model largely depends on the relationship between society and the Armed Forces, which will need to seek new avenues after military service is abolished. Today, as in the past, the Armed Forces need citizens' acceptance, backing and willingness to take part personally, either permanently or temporarily, in their tasks, and to support their costs financially through the budget.

Main characteristics of the model

The guiding principles of the new model of professional Armed Forces are formulated in the aforementioned Report of the Joint Congress-Senate Commission. They include the maximum number of troops and the basic characteristics of commitment to the services and the recruitment and training of professional servicemen. The report also establishes an interim period for introducing the new model so that the working of the Armed Forces is not disrupted.

Servicemen's relationship with the military institution should encourage personal adherence to its characteristic values

The criteria laid down by the Joint Commission are being applied to the set of rules that will eventually regulate the military personnel of the Spanish Armed Forces at the beginning of the 21st

The guiding principles of the new model of professional Armed Forces were formulated by the Joint Congress-Senate Committee. The cornerstone of this legal framework is Law 17/1999

century. The cornerstone of this legal framework is Law 17/1999 of 18 May on Armed Forces Personnel. This important law establishes, among other basic aspects of the model, the personnel of the Armed Forces, the tasks entrusted to the members of the different Corps and categories and the rules governing their joining, training and professional career. It also provides for the supplementary engagement of reservists should the need arise.

As regards organisation, which is of crucial importance in ensuring the practicability of the new model, the necessary tasks have been undertaken to streamline and trim the current structures and internal workings of the Ministry of Defence, in order to make more effective use of the limited human resources available and contain the related budgetary costs. On the subject of this overhaul, special mention should be made of the progressive adoption of modern personnel management processes, which are being introduced to address the new professional and social realities within the Armed Forces.

Personnel

The law establishes a total of 48,000 officers and NCOs and between 102,000 and 120,000 professional soldiers, sailors and marines. This gives a maximum total of 168,000, within the ceiling of 150,000 to 170,000 professional military personnel laid down in the Report of the Joint Congress-Senate Commission.

Lowering these numbers requires a major effort, bearing in mind that in 1984 the total personnel amounted to 373,000, of whom 66,505 were commanding officers, and that the Armed Forces 2000 model approved by Congress in 1991 established a total of 180,000 personnel, of whom 49,720 were commanding officers and 130,280 soldiers, sailors and marines, including 50,000 professionals.

The modern personnel management processes are consistent with the new professional and social realities within the Armed Forces

Current military defence planning estimates point to a maximum of 48,000 commanding officers and 110,500 professional soldiers, sailors and marines.

The overall figure of 48,000 commanding officers, officers and NCOs entails a reduction in the number approved by Law 14/1993



of 23 December on Armed Forces Personnel. It is thus necessary to carry out a gradual, progressive reduction in the number of commanding officers over the next few years. For this purpose, the Government is authorised to establish the numbers of officers and NCOs for five-year periods and must inform the Cortes Generales (Parliament) of its decision. The numbers for the next five years were approved by Royal Decree 1460/1999 of 17 September, which was submitted to Congress and won the support of all the political groups attending the session.

The law establishes multiyear ceilings on personnel numbers

The two basic mechanisms for progressively adapting the number of commanding officers are restricting the number of regular officers and NCOs who join the Armed Forces to between 50% and 70% of the average retirements over the next ten years, and increasing the number of reservists until a suitable proportion is reached with career soldiers.

As provided in the law, the Government has drawn up a recruitment plan for professional servicemen for the interim period of adaptation to the new model. This takes into account budgetary factors as well as organisation, recruitment and training, and is aimed at achieving an increase of no less than 17,500 persons/year from 1999. This rate will enable the interim period to be completed on schedule, at the same time guaranteeing the operational capability of the Armed Forces during the transition to a new model.

The rate at which new professional servicemen are recruited guarantees the operational capability of the Armed Forces

Profile of the professional soldier

The adoption of the new Armed Forces model not only entails addressing issues such as recruitment or costs, important as they are. Attention must also be paid to the service of professional soldiers, sailors and marines, and to the officers or NCOs who are to command them.

The training the new members of the Armed Forces receive should be geared to achieving a balanced combination of values and preparing them to use the human and material resources as best they can

The most important features of professional soldiers, to which training should be geared, are as follows:

Cadet of the General Military Academy during a climbing exercise.

- A balanced combination of what are considered by modern standards to be intrinsic human values, such as dignity, liberty, justice and solidarity, and military virtues like loyalty, valour and discipline, in order to render appropriate service to the Armed Forces.

- Integration into the cultural environment and a thorough knowledge of the concerns and aspirations of the society, which, as members of the military, they must serve through the rational use of the singular force means that the State places in their hands.

- Professional capacity to make good use of, and administer, the human and material resources available to them at any time: initiative, discernment, intelligence and sufficient common sense to cope efficiently with any circumstance that arises.

- Physical and psychological abilities that are suited to the aforementioned professional and human requirements.

- The capacity to assimilate any new professional requirements stemming from today's continual progress in science and technology, and from the different circumstances arising from relationships in the currently changing international situation.

Principle of equality

A particularly significant aspect of the new Armed Forces model is the career scheme for women within the military institution.

Previous legislation opened the doors of the Armed Forces to women, though they were excluded from certain posts in the units. Now that compulsory military service—which only affected men—has been abolished, the principle of equality in the Armed Forces is being applied with all its consequences, and any professional difference between the sexes must be eliminated. Specific regulations relating to women in areas such as uniform, accommodation and maternity healthcare will, however, be maintained in order to achieve effective equality. In this connection, differences will be established in

Female soldier from the Spanish Rapid Reaction Division Headquarters, during the Somontano exercise.

Effective equality involves eliminating any professional differences between the sexes, though specific regulations relating to women will be maintained

the physical conditions generally required from men and women wishing to join the forces or remain in service.

Supplementary contribution of human resources

The abolishment of compulsory military service for Spaniards does not affect the right and duty, set forth in the Constitution, to provide this service in the event of a serious risk to national security that may require all citizens to participate in defence. Situations may even arise in which the number of military personnel ordinarily authorised is insufficient, though the circumstances are not serious enough to justify widespread mobilisation. In order to ensure that the Armed Forces may draw from supplementary human resources when necessary, the figure of reservist has been established, with different categories and degrees of commitment: temporary, voluntary and compulsory.

In order to ensure that the Armed Forces may draw from supplementary human resources when necessary, the figure of reservist has been established, with different categories and degrees of commitment: temporary, voluntary and compulsory

Professional soldiers who cease to render their services to the Armed Forces will be regarded as temporary reservists. As such, it is their duty, for a period of between one and five years (depending on their commitment), to return to service if called up. Spaniards who apply and are selected for posts that are announced for this purpose are voluntary reservists. Both the temporary and voluntary reservists will be posted to existing units or make up special augmentation forces. The law provides for the possibility that temporary and voluntary reservists may take part in overseas missions.

Compulsory reservists will be citizens declared as such by the Government, following authorisation from Congress, when defence needs so require. It is established that compulsory reservists who are called up have the right of conscientious objection, for which a simple statement from those in question is sufficient. They would then be assigned to general-interest organisations where the use of arms is not required.

Personnel management

In fully professional Armed Forces, personnel management, a basic element of Defence Policy, must meet the needs of the Forces and Force Support in terms of quantity, quality and motivation.

Human resource management must be personalised in order to achieve the best professional development.

Personnel management must be: conducted jointly, flexible, personalised, and decentralised, and encourage merit and capability

This is achieved through appropriate systems, both for recruiting and teaching and for their professional career as a whole.

In this new framework, personnel management must be: conducted jointly, flexible, personalised, and decentralised, and encourage merit and capability.

- *Conducted jointly,* so that the Armed Forces as a whole and their missions and capabilities take priority over more specific aspects and a new mentality is encouraged in which all the members of the organisation share the task of promoting joint activities.
- *Flexible,* and therefore capable of adapting quickly to the new environment and to the requirements of the new professional Armed Forces.
- *Personalised,* in order to achieve better professional development of all members, boosting the human resources departments.
- *Decentralised,* to enable a closer style of management that is more attentive to immediate needs.
- *Encouraging* merit and capability, defining criteria and furnishing procedures to ensure that the professional military career of the future is a greater reflection of these principles and criteria than simply of length of service.

People are the Armed Forces' greatest asset. Ski unit of the Aragón I *Mountain Brigade.*

Personnel policy must therefore make the military profession a more attractive prospect by providing the necessary career incentives

All these elements will shape a human resources policy which, while respecting the particular characteristics of the military institution, will be comparable with the policies pursued by modern organisations geared to achieving their objectives more effectively and developing their professionals' careers. Of the particularities of the military career, the geographical mobility for professional reasons of the members of the Armed Forces, as a result of their permanent availability, is of particular importance with respect to personnel policy. Therefore, Law 26/1999 of 9 July on measures to support geographical mobility establishes a new policy for supporting the housing needs arising from changes of postings and locality. This policy basically establishes economic compensation. Only in special cases laid down by the law itself will military housing be supplied.

Incentives to joining and remaining in the Armed Forces

In order to maintain the model of professional Armed Forces, sufficient demand from young Spanish people is required in order to cover the needs of professional servicemen as posts become available. Personnel policy must therefore make the military profession a more attractive prospect by providing the necessary career incentives.

Recruitment is going to be a major challenge over the next few years. It requires adopting a full, flexible, progressive and practicable human resources programme and subsequently maintaining the established numbers of professional troops.

The new model of fully professional Armed Forces marks a decisive move to adopt an open system that reconciles the necessary permanence and the compulsory renewal of servicemen. It is not a closed model; rather, it is rotational, and the flow of new personnel and retirements allows a balance to be achieved between personnel who remain in their posts, replacements and new recruits. It is necessary to have a certain number of permanent staff for the military organisation to obtain an optimum performance from its professionals and so that they, in turn, can develop a full professional career in the military, if they wish.

It is necessary to convey to young people a real image of the opportunities offered by the military profession, increase the presence of women and establish a system of continual selection

Overall, the system will offer a wide range of opportunities. Servicemen who join the Armed Forces have open prospects for their professional career: they can progress within their own speciality as professional military men and gear their future towards remaining in the forces as soldiers, sailors or marines and possibly being promoted to NCOs or officers; but they can also capitalise on the training they have received and the professional experience they

Sapper vehicle with backhoe.

At least 50% of Civil Guard posts are held open for veterans, who will also receive support when returning to the labour market

have gained and switch to the labour market, in the public or private sector.

In order to achieve this objective, emphasis needs to be placed on several aspects. It is necessary, first, to convey to the young generation of Spaniards a real image of the opportunities offered by the military profession, and increase the presence of women. And second, to establish a continuous selection system to take in young Spaniards to fill the vacancies that arise throughout the year in the Armed Forces according to the rotation system.

Another important matter is that a large percentage of soldiers, sailors and marines should remain in service by successively increasing their commitments. In order for this to be possible, career models are being designed with definite professional prospects, such as, among other possibilities, specialising in technical functions suited to the age and experience of the most veteran members, access, for a small proportion, to permanent engagement, or promotion to the rank of NCO, reserving all the related posts which arise for this purpose.

Support for reintegration into the labour force

The above options do not necessarily have to be taken up by all members of the forces, nor, indeed, is it generally possible to offer an indefinite period of engagement. The model that has been adopted is based on the assumption that a large proportion of servicemen will drop out voluntarily having fulfilled their first commitments, or will have to do so if their service contracts cannot be renewed. In such cases, however, professional expectations should be duly covered, and at least 50% of Civil Guard posts are therefore held open for servicemen. In any event, they will receive support in returning to the labour market once they no longer render their services to the Armed Forces, in the form of suitable training. For this purpose, the law calls on the Government to draw up an action plan to support professional servicemen who return to the labour market.

The education model must facilitate the reintegration of military-trained personnel into the civil labour market once their commitment to the Armed Forces has ended

As occurred previously, the new Armed Forces model conceives military education as a system that is integrated into the general educational system. The purpose is to enhance the quality of training as a main strength that attracts professional servicemen who

Second lieutenant cadets of the General Military Academy during language practice.

will only be rendering their services temporarily and therefore have other job expectations for the future. With this aim in mind, the educational model must be designed to facilitate their reintegration into the labour force once their commitments in the Armed Forces have ended.

The system of military education is the chief means of imparting skills and is characterised by three essential elements: all-round training, global approach and integration into the General Educational System

Military education system

Military education is an essential task for obtaining the professionals that the Armed Forces need. The system of military education is the chief means of imparting skills to the available human resources and is characterised by three essential elements:

- *All-round training*, because the Armed Forces are the depositories of the force assets that the State provides for its defence. Professionals with the necessary technical training but also solid human skills are required to put these assets to use.

- *Global approach*, because attention is given both to initial training and subsequent development and on-the-job training in order to keep personnel constantly up to date. They will therefore form a unitary whole that guarantees the continuity of the educational process, incorporating into the teaching structure everything related to the education of servicemen.

- *Integration into the general education system*, ensuring progressiveness and, as the case may be, complementarity between the courses studied in different systems and enabling qualifications to be standardised and validated, thereby helping improve CVs and raise the quality of teaching in subjects that are not specifically military through the appropriate agreements with national and foreign universities and educational establishments.

The process of professionalisation and modernisation that the Armed Forces are currently undergoing requires military education to be adapted to these new perspectives with sufficient rapidity and flexibility. A new situation requires responses that are not anchored on past approaches.

The main courses of action of military teaching in the medium term are aimed at: revising the content of the study programmes to adapt them to the new strategic conceptions; taking part in multinational structures; and the characteristics of current operations, which require better technical training, a higher level of language proficiency and greater initiative in performing professional tasks.

The military personnel of the Armed Forces must be assigned to military tasks strictly speaking, for which they are irreplaceable

Studies are being finalised in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Culture to validate the qualifications provided by the military education system and establish equivalents with the official qualifications of the general educational system. This means that, in addition to their technical skills and work experience, professional soldiers, sailors and marines will come away with a recognised qualification that enables them to compete on an equal footing for jobs in an increasingly competitive labour market.

Adaptation of civilian personnel

A complementary though no less important aspect of applying the new professional model is making the most of the services rendered by civilians in the Ministry of Defence. The military personnel of the Armed Forces must be assigned to military tasks strictly speaking, for which they are irreplaceable, though they can also perform other tasks which could be carried out by civilians but need to be performed in places or conditions that require the use of military personnel.

In such cases, civilians are required to play a larger role in the daily life of the Armed Forces. For this reason, the Report of the Joint Congress-Senate Commission of 11 May 1998 points to the need to adapt the civilians at the service of the military administration to the requirements of the model of fully professionalised Armed Forces. This requires reconsidering both their number and type of training and speciality.

These new needs require civil servants and civilian personnel to take on new tasks in addition to those they currently perform. It is therefore necessary to draw up a catalogue of posts for the civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defence, in addition to a reorganisation programme and a training process that boost the availability of these human resources and tailor their training to their new responsibilities.

CHAPTER VI

MODERNISATION

The recent conflicts have shown that military success largely depends on having forces that are technologically superior to those of the adversary. This superiority rests on two essential pillars: professionalisation and modernisation of resources. A significant budgetary effort with respect to human resources would be meaningless unless those professionals were equipped with the instruments needed to perform their tasks. Indeed, these two factors cannot be separated from each other. It is therefore important for improvements in personnel and equipment to be carried out at the same pace, mutually enhancing the performance of the financial resources allocated to each field.

The fast-occurring changes in technology that characterise this age make research and development a necessary ongoing effort in the process of modernising the Armed Forces

The fast-occurring changes in technology that characterise this age make research and development a necessary ongoing effort in the process of modernising the Armed Forces. It is therefore not only a question of obtaining modern equipment and systems for the units, but also forecasting the needs that will arise in the medium and even long term to maintain the technological superiority on which the effectiveness of our forces should be based. The financial costs stemming from this requirement would be difficult to

The co-ordination of national armaments policies also stems, among other criteria, from the need to ensure that the allied forces can operate as a whole

bear in the current budgetary framework. This is a basic consideration which has spurred the European Union to make determined progress towards integrating national armaments policies.

It is furthermore evident that the co-ordination of national armaments policies also stems from the need to ensure that the allied forces can operate as a whole, in keeping with a conception of defence and security that is based on multinationality. This is another major challenge for our Armed Forces at the beginning of the 21st century—to ensure that their combat, combat support and logistic support assets are on a technological par with those of the allies.

In order to ensure the overall efficiency of the budget effort with respect to human and material resources, due attention needs to be paid to streamlining the infrastructure, as this requires investment. Despite the thorough transformation carried out in recent years, the deployment of fixed installations on the ground is a legacy of the past, which survives to this day. In order to free up resources for the benefit of the force and improve support for personnel and materiel, it is necessary to continue with the process of grouping bases and barracks and modernising the facilities of the premises that need to be maintained or built.

The modernisation of the Armed Forces personnel, materiel and infrastructure is, all in all, a further reflection of our society's development and can be expected to provide the added advantage of creating wealth and jobs. Defence policy must adopt this criterion as a general policy and, consequently, consider the impact of its measures on the environment, in keeping with the concept of sustainable development that the Government promotes. Our Armed Forces defend interests, values and principles that are none other than those of the society which they serve. Respect for the environment is part of these values and is therefore given special attention in the department's policy, particularly in connection with infrastructure.

The modernisation process should consider the impact of forces action on the environment

Armaments and materiel

Ensuring efficiency in the field of armaments and materiel requires a significant ongoing effort, owing both to the natural wear and tear of the systems from usage and to the technological

and operational obsolescence that occurs over time. When carrying out modernisation, it is necessary to bear very much in mind that the need to incorporate cutting-edge technology to the new weapons entails embarking on a lengthy process of development and, consequently, investments that will not bear fruit until the systems come into service—years after the initial conceptual stage. Modernisation is thus a medium- and long-term target, which involves committing funds to multiyear programmes.

The investments in materiel are not only aimed at obtaining new systems, but also at research and development and sustaining the existing systems

According to what could be called a strategy of means, an ongoing decision-making process is established to determine the best way to meet the need for costly materiel with financial resources which, as in any economic process, will always turn out to be limited. This requires us to prioritise these needs and ascertain the risks that need to be assumed as a result of the decisions adopted.

The investments in materiel are not only aimed at obtaining new systems, but also at research and development and sustaining the existing systems. Maintenance activities in the three forces and, to a lesser extent, all aspects of technological development at military establishments and laboratories, require more facilities and human resources than are currently available. It is therefore becoming increasingly necessary to resort to external sources outside the Ministry of Defence to cover these needs. This process of allocating the available resources to the activities in which they are most efficient is a widespread practice in the modern economy.

The Army, the Navy and the Air Force each have their own particular characteristics that stem from their specific scope of action, but as a whole, they constitute the same, single defence system. Their respective needs are therefore met by the defence budget after considering them as a whole. They are subject to an order of priorities established by the Ministry of Defence and endorsed by the Government in accordance with a joint approach, so that the programmes that are most necessary from the operational point of view are assigned higher priorities. The use of common procedure in procuring and maintaining materiel that can be of service to any of the forces is a valuable instrument in terms of cost-effectiveness.

The Army, the Navy and the Air Force constitute the same, single defence system

Armaments and materiel trading
(Millions of pesetas)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	TOTAL
Domestic market	389,457	1,080,123	374,741	225,942	2,070,263
Foreign market	76,057	25,038	68,932	31,899	201,926
TOTAL	465,514	1,105,161	443,673	257,841	2,272,189



Plans for the procurement of armaments and equipment

The Force Goal, which specifically states the needs of the Armed Forces, gives rise to an Indicative Plan for Armaments and Materiel. This Plan serves to:

- Normalise and rationalise the planning and programming of armaments and materiel.
- Facilitate the monitoring of, and follow-up to, the implementation of programmes.
- Optimise the procurement and modernisation of armaments and materiel, as well as the acquisition of technology and the maintenance of the systems in service.
- Provide the defence industry with the information it needs to plan its activity.

The Indicative Plan for Armaments and Materiel is implemented through specific programmes for the different systems, which govern the whole life-cycle of the materiel, including the phases of feasibility, definition, development and production, as well as maintenance and modernisation while it remains in operation.

Likewise, bearing in mind the importance of information technology and communications for the force's operational capabilities,

it has been considered necessary to devise an Indicative Plan for Information Systems to facilitate the attainment of defence objectives in the field of operations, logistics, administration and management. This Plan includes the Information Systems of the Central Organs and Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Furthermore, in 1999 work was begun on drawing up the Annual Plan for Centralised Acquisitions, which will include consumables and goods that easily deteriorate through wear and tear and are widely used by the forces or central organs, provided they are not weapons systems, in addition to consultancy and technical assistance services. The idea is that a centralised procedure will mean a larger volume of purchases, leading to economies of scale.

The aim of the armaments and materiel policy is to meet our Armed Forces' needs by helping strengthen the industrial and technological base of defence

The aim of the armaments and materiel policy is to meet our Armed Forces' needs by providing them with the best weapons systems and support equipment the available resources can buy, helping strengthen the industrial and technological base of defence. The Government therefore encourages and promotes the active participation of the Spanish Defence Industry in the different programmes for the Spanish Armed Forces' armaments and materiel.

The defence industry is an important component of any developed country's industrial fabric and has frequently been the dri-

Fitting the keel of the Álvaro de Bazán *F-101 frigate at the Bazán factory in El Ferrol, June 1999.*

The Government encourages and promotes the active participation of the Spanish Defence Industry in the different programmes for the Spanish Armed Forces' armaments and materiel

Budgetary allocation for R&D
(Directorate General for Armaments and Materiel)

	Allocation (pesetas)
1996	27,081,265,000
1997	28,423,658,000
1998	30,242,109,000
1999	28,921,910,000
2000	28,355,738,000



The growing complexity and the increasing costs of developing and producing defence materiel make self-sufficiency prohibitively expensive and explain the current trend of industrial co-operation

ving force behind technological innovation. In the past, this has made it a major source of technological know-how that is disseminated to other sectors of industry. Today, the advances in technology in the civilian sector, particularly information and communications, have taken over from defence, leading to the growing use of commercial elements in defence systems.

A considerable proportion of this technological innovation draws from the results obtained from the research and development activities promoted by the Ministry of Defence. These enable us to aspire to an acceptable level of nationalisation in the systems required by the Armed Forces, in keeping with the nation's economic potential. An Indicative Plan for Research and Development has been drawn up for this purpose.

The armaments and materiel policy attaches great importance to this sector with such great future potential, as reflected in the budget allocated annually to upgrading trial and instrument facilities and to supporting and encouraging the exchange of technology between the defence sector and other areas of industry.

However, the growing complexity and the increasing costs of developing and producing defence materiel make self-sufficiency prohibitively expensive for most countries and have given rise to the current trend, which is becoming increasingly widespread, towards industrial co-operation in the international sphere. This trend explains Spain's participation in international industrial co-

operation projects, either through agreements between governments or between the Spanish Government and a particular foreign company. Industrial and technological returns and compensation required from the suppliers are crucially important factors in this option, which opens up new opportunities for the Spanish defence industry.

Finally, there is the option of acquiring materiel by purchasing systems which have already been developed. In any event, purchasing abroad will always entail negotiating industrial co-operation agreements to boost the technological fields of interest and lead to maximum autonomy in industrial logistic support throughout the life of the system.

Many of the projects involve high technology and are carried out jointly in order to support the working of the Operational Command Structure of the Armed Forces through command, control, communications and intelligence resources

Joint programmes of the Defence Staff

A large proportion of military projects are joint programmes conceived and managed by the Defence Staff. These are high-tech projects designed to support the working of the Operational Command Structure of the Armed Forces through command, control, communications and intelligence resources. Services which are not the exclusive responsibility of any of the forces are unified for this purpose, provided that their joint working improves effectiveness and economises on resources.

The "Defence Operations Centre" programme constitutes the apex of the Command and Control structure that supports the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff in exercising the powers vested in them by current legislation, in situations of peace, crisis or armed conflict. It includes the resources required both by the Military Command and Control System and in the Area of Political Consultation, Crisis Control and Civil Defence.

The "Information System of the Chief of the Defence Staff" programme is the top-level segment of the Armed Forces information resources. It interconnects the Military Command and Control Centres of the Headquarters, helping the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Main Operational Commands take decisions.

The "Joint Military Communications System" programme is designed to establish a joint digital network at national level to

meet the regular or permanent communications needs of the Command, Control and Defence Consultations System.

Hispasat ground signals station.

The "Spanish System of Military Satellite Communications" programme, which is integrated into the Joint Military Communications System, is intended to develop ground equipment and infrastructure for military communications through the HISPASAT communications satellites. The continuity of the space capability of communications is being analysed to decide whether it is appropriate to develop an exclusive system for defence.

The growing need for a national intelligence system has given rise to the "Joint Intelligence System for Defence" programme

In the field of electronic warfare, the "Joint System for the Procurement and Processing of Electronic Information (SANTIAGO)" programme is designed to establish a system of sensors for collecting signals and specific resources for processing and distributing the information they contain. This system will enable a higher level of information to be obtained from electronic signals in areas of interest to defence.

The growing need for a national intelligence system that can be used by all three forces and by other defence agencies has given rise to the programme entitled "Joint Intelligence System for Defence", which is part of the "Military Command and Control System". The aim of this programme is to provide adequate and timely intelligence, both in peacetime and in crisis or war, in order to support strategic and operational leadership. The first stage of the Joint

Intelligence System for Defence—establishment of a network between Command Headquarters—has now been completed.

Since 1988 Spain has been taking part, together with other European states, in the HELIOS I programme that came into service in 1995 and is designed to obtain satellite images of the Earth for chiefly military purposes. By the end of 1999 the second HELIOS II satellite had been launched and this will enable the system to operate until 2005, while the ground-based facilities and resources are permanently adapted. These capabilities are currently being analysed to decide whether we should take part in the HELIOS II programme or establish our own system of small observation satellites for defence.

In 1978, the Atlantic Alliance embarked on an airborne early warning and control programme aimed at achieving greater control and surveillance of air space. For this purpose, it has a fleet of early warning aircraft with specific equipment, crews and infrastructure. Thirteen nations take part in this programme as a Multinational NATO Unit. A programme to modernise the airborne equipment is currently being carried out. Spain, which has been a fully-fledged member of the Alliance since 11 December 1998, takes part in this programme, contributing financially together with the other nations involved. The resources that Spain invests revert wholly to its national industry.

As a NATO member, Spain takes part in the airborne early warning and control programme

NATO early warning aircraft (AWACS).

Programmes for the Army

When dealing with programmes involving materiel, the interdependence of elements in the Army should be taken particularly into account. A unit, however well equipped as regards mobility and firepower, will be not be able to act effectively unless it has suitable communications and means of command and control. And even if it has such means but cannot be sustained with fuel, ammunition and spares, it will only be effective for a limited period while it has the local autonomy provided by its minimum provisions. The same can be said of the balance between the capabilities of the different manoeuvre and support units used to make up a combined weapons system. Well-equipped armoured units will be of little use if they lack the support of field artillery with suitable muzzles and ammunition or engineers units to guarantee tactical mobility vis-à-vis any kinds of obstacles.

The chief priority for the Army is to ensure the three essentials for combat, which are addressed in three major programmes: the Leopard battle tank, the Pizarro combat vehicle and the Attack Helicopter

The chief priority for the Army is to ensure the three essentials for combat—the combination of actions of tanks, combat vehicles capable of accompanying tanks and attack helicopters.

Three major programmes have been designed to meet this need: Leopard, Pizarro and Attack Helicopter. The 219 Leopard tanks and the 16 Búfalo armoured recovery vehicles, expected to be delivered between 2000 and 2005, will provide the heavy Brigades and the Cavalry Regiment of the Mechanised Division with an armoured

Pizarro infantry combat vehicle.

capability endowed with up-to-date technology.

Chinook heavy-lift helicopter.

In order to equip the brigades and the regiment with an infantry and cavalry combat vehicle with modern technology, of the same standard of Leopard tanks, the Pizarro Programme has been undertaken to supply 366 personnel carriers and 97 command and control vehicles. The first phase has been put out to contract and comprises the manufacture of 123 combat vehicles and 32 command and control vehicles between 1996 and 2001 for one of the aforementioned brigades. Subsequent contracts will be signed for the other units.

Several programmes for helicopters and armoured vehicles have been undertaken to upgrade manoeuvrability

The Pizarro family will be completed with a series of vehicles with special configurations: mortar carriers and missile carriers, sapper vehicles and ambulances for the Mechanised Division, which will make maintenance simpler and cheaper, as well as modernising the fleet of specialised vehicles.

The Attack Helicopter programme is pending decision, as the Army has completed its assessment of the different helicopters of this kind, which are to replace the Bolkow BO-105. The various alternatives are being studied from the operational, economic and technological-industrial points of view.

In addition to these three key elements, mention should also be made of important programmes to modernise its manoeuvrability (CENTAURO Armoured Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicle) and helicopter transport capability (Chinook, Cougar and Superpuma helicopters).

Another main priority of the Army is to procure a modern command and control system that is interoperable with those of our allies

The CENTAURO is an armoured cavalry reconnaissance vehicle for the Light Cavalry Regiment of the Spanish Rapid Reaction Division. It is wheeled, airportable and fitted with a 105mm cannon which will provide the light forces that need to be deployed rapidly in overseas operations with the essential reconnaissance capability and firepower.

The Chinook heavy-lift helicopter is currently being modernised. From now until 2003, Cougar tactical transport helicopters will progressively be delivered, which, together with the Superpuma currently available, will provide a light battalion with a helicopter transport capability and sustainability for a limited period.

Another main priority of the Army is to procure a modern command and control system that is interoperable with those of our allies. A major effort is being made in this field, since the communications and information subsystems first need to be modernised. Work is being carried out specifically on the following programmes:

- The Basic Aerial Network, which, through communication centres connected by multichannel radio links, will provide the command at brigade, division and Manoeuvre Force levels with swift and reliable telecommunications and will enable mobile users equipped with advanced technology radiophones to be integrated, offering security in communications.
- The Army Command and Control System, which will provide the brigade and higher commands, in real time, with the information needed to help them make decisions and direct operations.
- Intelligence Programmes related to the Surface Information System and the Tactical Intelligence System.

The aim of the programme to modernise the self-propelled guns of the heavy artillery brigades is to extend their useful life

With respect to fire support, the programme to modernise the 155mm self-propelled guns is due to be completed in 2001. This equipment, which will be supplied to the artillery battalions of the heavy brigades, will be useful until 2010. Thereafter it will have to be replaced by a system that incorporates the latest technology in order to ensure enhanced firepower and ability to respond. Also nearing completion is the modernisation of the field artillery of the light brigades of the Spanish Rapid Reaction Division, for which 105mm light cannon have been acquired.

Self-propelled M-109 howitzer.

In order to modernise the truck-mounted artillery for other units, mainly that of the Area Defence Forces, there are plans to start up a programme for the procurement of 155mm REMA cannon. The rocket-launcher artillery will also have to be modernised, for which it is intended to acquire the MLRS system.

Programmes for antiaircraft artillery have been implemented, such as the recent acquisition of MISTRAL man-portable missiles and the modernisation, currently under way, of the 35/90 cannon, which will also entail acquiring a fire control system with technology enabling the cannon to be steered. The programmes to modernise or replace the ROLAND and ASPIDE low-level air defence missiles will then have to be undertaken. In order to direct the action of the anti-air artillery semi-automatically and in real time, programmes are under way to acquire operations centres for light and medium-weight anti-air artillery.

The following programmes will contribute significantly to enhancing the mobility of the units, particularly the brigades with heavy resources: sapper vehicle and bridge layers, which will shortly be supplied to the sapper units of the heavy brigades, and with fixed supports, which will be delivered up to 2001. When there is a sufficient budgetary allocation, 150m of floating bridge will be replaced.

In addition to these substantial modernisation programmes, there are other minor but no less necessary programmes, which

There are other minor, but no less necessary programmes, such as the replacement of the current assault rifle and improvement in the quality and quantity of night-vision resources

overall amount to a significant sum. These programmes involve: replacing the current CETME assault rifle with a new model; continuing with the acquisitions, already under way, of 40mm Automatic Grenade Launchers; improving the quality and quantity of night-vision devices and acquiring simulators and training devices, particularly for helicopters and missiles, among other features.

Lastly, it should be stressed that although the aforementioned modernisation programmes are important, the main effort that needs to be made involves keeping current materiel operative. Giving impetus to programmes for the maintenance of armaments and materiel is a constant need, to which should be added the requirements stemming from the Cougar helicopters, Pizarro combat vehicles and Leopard main battle tanks, which came into service in 1998 and 2000 respectively. All these systems are very expensive to maintain.

The complexity of ships as platforms that integrate different systems determines the Navy's ability to achieve its force goals

Navy programmes

The complexity of ships as platforms which integrate different systems determines the Navy's ability to achieve its force goals. A lengthy and costly period of concept design, programming and building elapses between the conception and entry into service stages of a vessel. As a result, the Navy's projects are particularly vulnerable to modifications after the conceptual stage, since any revision entails restarting a process which in itself is slow, with the risk that the units to be replaced may have to remain in service until they lose their operational capability.

The Navy is also conditioned by factors that are similar to the characteristics of the Army and Air Force, since it has Marine units, aircraft and helicopters. These afford the Navy's force goals as a whole a physiognomy of their own, as the sustainability of an inventory made up of short series of a broad variety of specific systems needs to be assured.

Surface vessels are the most characteristic element of the Navy, and also its basic means of securing and exercising control over the sea. Therefore, of all the Navy programmes, special mention should be made of the programme to build four F-100 frigates, which are due to be delivered to the Navy between 2002 and 2005. These vessels belong to a new generation developed as part of a

Computer image of the future F-100 frigate.

Of all the Navy programmes, special mention should be made of the F-100 frigates, which belong to a new generation and guarantee the Navy's capacity to operate under threat of an air attack

multinational programme. They will be equipped with a system that will guarantee the Navy's capacity to operate under a close threat of an air attack, such as in the waters of the Mediterranean, where there is not much room for manoeuvre and the proximity of land is a definitive factor.

Amphibious capability has great importance as an essential part of the modern naval concept of operations carried out from the sea, according to which the strategic influence of sea power comes to the fore when managing crises which can affect shared security. The programme to built new amphibious ships is designed to procure two Galicia class landing platform dock ships equipped with a floodable landing dock and a flight deck for helicopters, one of which has already been delivered to the Navy and the second has enhanced command and control characteristics. These vessels are the result of a bilateral Spanish-Dutch project aimed at providing the Marine forces with suitable platforms for amphibious operations.

There are several programmes to boost the effectiveness of the Marine Force. The most noteworthy of these is the Programme for Amphibious Vehicles currently under way, which is designed to renew surface assault capability by means of mechanised forces. Other projects, such as those to improve communications, light

The new amphibious ships are intended to provide the Marine forces with suitable platforms for amphibious operations

AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicle.

artillery or TOW antitank missiles, can be undertaken in conjunction with the Army.

As for air resources, now that the procurement of the carrier-borne Harrier AV-8 B Plus has been completed, the Programme for the Remanufacture of the AV-8B is intended to equip the remaining aircraft with radar and new weapons system to enhance their air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. As for helicopters, a programme is under way to complete the equipment of the Santa María class frigates and the new F-100 frigates currently being built, and to acquire multipurpose tactical transport helicopters to replace those now in service.

The programme for Series 80 submarines is designed to maintain and boost underwater capability

In order to maintain the submarine capability established in the Navy plans, the Programme for Series 80 Submarines, currently at definition stage, is geared towards building an as yet undetermined number of conventional attack submarines equipped with highly potent weapons and capable of operating at considerable depths below the surface.

There are plans to build a second series of minehunters with the same characteristics as the Segura class in order to make the most of the infrastructure created when the first series was built.

Air Force programmes

The Air Force resources should be based on the most modern technology in order to maintain an appropriate level of effectiveness

The Air Force resources should be based on the most modern technology in order to maintain an appropriate level of effectiveness. This requirement chiefly applies to aircraft, including the sensors they incorporate, but also weapons systems and air control systems. The high costs of technological development, combined with the equally high costs of the products manufactured by the aeronautical industry, make it particularly difficult to programme force objectives in this case.

Therefore, the European countries are increasingly opting to participate in consortia for the research, development and production related to the aeronautic and defence industry. It is very advisable to take part in these consortia, since they strengthen our nation's industrial policy, enable us to acquire technology, keep us at the forefront of development, afford our products access to markets and create jobs for highly qualified professionals.

On account of its importance to the effectiveness of the Air Force as a whole, special mention should be given to the Programme for an Integrated Air Command and Control System designed to upgrade and boost the Force's detection capability with a series of domestically-produced radar and equipment, and, at the same time, to improve

EF-2000 combat aircraft.

The EF-2000 or Eurofighter has enabled the European aerospace industry to hold onto its lead in the competitive world market and includes a major participation from Spanish industry

Mirage F-1 fighter of the 14th Wing.

There are three programmes under way with respect to one of the Air Force's star weapons systems, the F-18. There is also a programme to upgrade the Mirage F-1

communications within the system and with other Command and Control systems, both national and allied. This programme is integrated into the NATO Air Command and Control System, a programme that is common to the whole of the organisation.

Another programme that is of paramount importance to the Air Force and to national industry involves the production of EF-2000 combat aircraft, also known as Eurofighter. The aim is to acquire 87 of these aircraft, which have been developed as part of a co-operation programme between Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom. These aircraft are due to be delivered between 2002 and 2014. This multinational programme has enabled the European aerospace industry to hold onto its lead in the competitive world market and includes a major participation from Spanish industry, which entails a significant advantage in the acquisition of technology.

Also of utmost operational importance is the programme to modernise and overhaul the Mirage F-1 aircraft. This will ensure they are operationally effective until after 2010, by improving their electronic self-protection systems, precision systems for weapon launch, interoperability and protection of communications—an impressive performance bearing in mind that these aircraft began to operate in the Air Force in 1975.

With respect to one of the Air Force's star weapons systems, the F-18, there are three programmes under way. One is designed to complete the fleet of available F-18s by acquiring 24 of these aircraft, all of which are due to be delivered by January 2000. A second programme, which will be started up in 2000, is intended to improve the ability to locate long-distance ground targets by means of infrared vision equipment and state-of-the art laser technology, in order to boost these aircraft's combat potency. Finally, the programme to upgrade and extend the average life of the rest of the F-18 fleet will enhance the operational capacity of these aircraft, incorporating more modern systems and altering some others, thereby lengthening their useful life and operational effectiveness to beyond 2015.

The need for air transport has increased in the new strategic situation in which the ability to project forces rapidly and support them tops the list of priorities of any military force. Several European countries have set in motion a co-operation programme to develop an aircraft with a large cargo capacity and radius of action which would meet Europe's current need for this type of operational capability and would secure the military transport aircraft industry a competitive foothold in the world marketplace. This programme for the future transport aircraft initially involves

Several European countries have set in motion a co-operation programme, in which Spain takes part, to develop an aircraft with a large cargo capacity and radius of action

Transport aircraft at the CASA factory.

Spain, France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Turkey.

Until these new aircraft become available, heavy air transport capability will continue to be based on the twelve C-130 Hercules, which are currently being modernised by the national industry in order to upgrade their systems to ensure their performance in the operational environment of the first decade of the 21st century.

Also in the field of air transport, in view of the development of the C-295 medium-weight transport aircraft manufactured by Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. and its considerable market potential across the world, the Spanish Government has decided that the Air Force will participate in launch of this project as a customer, in order to boost the C-295's sales potential, while setting up a C-295 squadron to meet its air transport requirement.

A strong, competitive and efficient defence industry is pivotal to the European security and identity

As for anti-air defence of the Air Force's facilities and stations, the Short-Range Air Defence Programme has been implemented. This programme includes the acquisition of several integrated systems comprising air surveillance radar and illumination of aerial targets, medium-range ASPIDE radar-guided missiles and short-range MISTRAL infrared missiles. The latter system has now been supplied to the Air Deployment Support Detachment, which means that it may be installed at any base from which air forces are deployed, though there are plans to equip other facilities and air bases with similar systems.

European armaments policy

Developing a common European defence requires the backing of a European armaments policy to harmonise military needs and the planning and procurement of weapons systems. Spain considers that a strong, competitive and efficient defence industry is pivotal to the European security and identity, and central to supporting the development of the necessary scientific and technological foundations. Therefore, together with several European nations, it backs the initiative to discuss common interests in the area of defence and the restructuring of the industry that underpins it.

As a result, it is deemed necessary to harmonise the requirements of the armed forces of the European countries, seek solutions

Pizarro assembly line at Santa Bárbara Blindados.

to procurement in co-operation, when possible, and prevent unnecessary duplication in the field of development and production. In this connection, policies relating to logistic support, research and technological development should be harmonised and a single export procedure adopted. The participation of the different countries in European defence's industrial base should be balanced and reflect the principle of interdependence.

In order to achieve this, a separate policy is needed, aimed at bolstering the industrial and technological base of defence by promoting the companies in the sector, seeking to achieve both a business dimension and a technological capability in keeping with our industrial level and our contribution to common defence.

Spain will support the leading companies that can contribute with competitive criteria to the development of a common European defence and will back their integration into transnational industrial consortia

Spain will support the leading companies in this sector so that they contribute with competitive criteria by supplying their products to the development of a common European defence. To this end, it plans to make an effort in three main areas: research and development, free competition and the use of commercial products.

- Research and development funds will be earmarked to the technological innovation effort, so that Spanish companies may compete with the rest of the European and world industry in this sector.

- Free competition will be encouraged and the procedure for acquiring military materiel will be improved.

- Commercial technology and products will be used increasingly, provided they are compatible with requirements, moving towards greater use of civil regulations and standards.

These measures must go hand in hand with a strategy to foster the foreign expansion of companies which, owing to their consolidated size and quality, could place their products on the foreign market and take part in international co-operation problems. These companies will be encouraged to join transnational industrial consortia. Furthermore, in a globalised and increasingly competitive market, military demand will, in many cases, be insufficient to achieve the necessary dimension.

It is industry which should establish the necessary basis for restructuring the European defence sector

In line with the foregoing, Spain is currently taking part in the initiative aimed at restructuring the European defence industry. This led it to sign the Letter of Intent with Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden on 16 July 1998 to establish a co-operative framework to facilitate this restructuring. The purpose of this Letter is to pinpoint the areas in which the participant countries intend to find common solutions to the problems identified in this industry, defining the principles, organisation and responsibilities, in order to then negotiate appropriate agreements and pacts which, if necessary, could entail amending national regulations.

The necessary progress made towards the streamlining of the defence structures, both in the participant countries and at the different European forums, largely depends on the development of a strong, competitive and efficient European industry. However, it is industry which should establish the necessary basis for achieving restructuring, and in this connection the step taken by the European aerospace industries, and specifically that of Spain, is a clear example of the common wish to reach agreements in this field.

In order to establish conditions that are conducive to the achievement of these objectives, it is considered crucial to remove the obstacles that hinder industrial restructuring, particularly in the areas of protection of supplies, export procedure, financing

research and development and the protection of information and intellectual property rights, while preserving defence interests.

Infrastructure

The aim of the Defence Infrastructure Policy is to provide the Armed Forces with suitable fixed installations that meet their deployment needs and the operational technical requirements stemming from the Joint Strategy Plan. It should be pointed out, first and foremost, that the Ministry of Defence does not own immovable property in the strict sense of the word, and this property does not exist as such. These are state-owned assets assigned to Defence and are therefore regarded as public property.

Infrastructure management should aim to adapt to a changing situation, so that it is always in keeping with real needs. It may seem that infrastructure could easily be altered or reduced, but this is not the case. It is relatively simple to set up a modest facility with limited needs, but it will soon start to grow and take root. These roots become deeper and ramified and cling to the ground so that within a short time it is very difficult to prevent the facility from continuing to develop, and in the long run the effort required to move or eliminate it becomes excessive.

The aim of the Defence Infrastructure Policy is to provide the Armed Forces with suitable fixed installations that meet their deployment needs

Since infrastructure is a means at the service of the forces, the principle of cost-effectiveness should be rigorously applied when evaluating new elements, which should only be built when they have a clear future usefulness. Until well into the eighties, the territorial model of the Armed Forces reflected a classical concept of defence linked almost exclusively to the sovereign area, that is, it was markedly territorial in nature. As a result, assets were progressively accumulated over time, irrespective of their real military use.

When the international strategic environment changed after the Cold War ended, the properties assigned to defence were huge in number, widely dispersed and, in many cases, particularly in urban locations, of very little operational utility. The fact is that most of the installations had been originally established on what was the periphery of population centres. After a time they came to be located inside or even at the centre of the urban nuclei, and this posed

Barracks of the Airborne Light Brigade at Siero (Asturias).

The new infrastructure model is predominately functional, sustainable and based on fewer assets in keeping with current needs

problems both for the activity of the military units and for urban development.

The age and dispersion of many of these buildings entailed hefty maintenance and upkeep costs which made less money available for investments. A forward-looking approach to defence called for abandoning the concept of infrastructure assets, replacing it with a new, predominately functional, sustainable model, based on fewer assets in keeping with new needs.

Infrastructure policy gives maximum priority to investments in military facilities that underpin the dual process of professionalisation and modernisation of the Armed Forces. This policy is based on the principles of reducing and redeploying units and abandoning any unnecessary assets. To this end, the following actions are carried out:

- Maximum concentration of units, centres and organisations at facilities with an appropriate location and infrastructure.
- Closure of facilities which, owing to operational or functional needs, do not serve the purpose for which they were originally created.
- Modernisation of available infrastructure in order to adapt it to the requirements of fully professional Armed Forces.

- Declaration of the buildings and properties that are progressively vacated as a result of the organic adaptations required by the redeployment process as "not necessary" for military use.

- Promotion of the necessary co-ordination and effective collaboration between the Army, Navy and Air Force for the joint use of facilities, chiefly those relating to logistic support, personnel support and transport logistics.

- Make use of all the opportunities offered by NATO investment programmes to carry out infrastructure projects on Spanish soil.

The priority goals are now to support professionalisation and modernisation, reduce and redeploy units and alienate assets that are no longer needed

The ostensible reduction in the public assets assigned to defence, now under way, is possible thanks to a very careful alienation policy which safeguards defence interests at all times.

The resources generated by the Defence Infrastructure and Facilities Management, which is the agency responsible for the aforementioned alienation process, have been used to carry out necessary reforms. In this connection, 47.41% of total investments in Defence infrastructure during the 1993-1999 period were charged to the proceeds of alienating public assets assigned to Defence, once they were detached from the department after being declared unnecessary for military use.

The forecast for investments of funds obtained by the agency between 2000 and 2005 amounts to Ptas52.6 billion, 41% of the total investment in infrastructure (Ptas127.268 billion), while estimated investments through the budget account for 59% of the total, or Ptas74.668 billion. These percentages show the importance of the agency's action as an alternative source of funding and an instrument of infrastructure policy.

Environment

The tasks and training of the Armed Forces must be compatible with protecting and safeguarding the environment

Protecting the environment has become a permanent challenge for society. This has given rise to a collective awareness of the problem of environmental degradation and immoderate use of our planet's natural resources stemming from man's direct action on

The Defence Committee for Environmental Protection pursues the conservation, protection and, if necessary, restoration of environmental conditions at military facilities

nature in his quest for progress through economic and technological development. The Ministry of Defence is not oblivious to these concerns and has adopted different initiatives designed to reconcile the tasks and training of the Armed Forces with protecting and safeguarding the environment.

In this field, the Ministry of Defence's action policy is directed at conserving, protecting and, if necessary, restoring the environmental conditions at its facilities, firing ranges and areas assigned to military use. For this purpose, a Defence Committee for Environmental Protection was set up in 1992 to propose and supervise plans and advise on these issues, undertaking to play an active role in this area.

For some time now the Armed Forces have been involved in a variety of environmental actions, particularly reforestation at bases, training camps and firing ranges, as well as fire prevention and support in the extinguishing of fires.

The Department's environmental policy is basically designed to achieve the following objectives:

- Raise the individual and collective awareness of the members of the Armed Forces through training, information and other documentary programmes.

The main courses of action involve raising individual and collective awareness, maintaining ecosystems and preventing and fighting against pollution

View of the Sierra de Retín Training Camp in Barbate (Cádiz).

- Implement projects for the improvement of energy use, use of non-polluting energy and development of highly renewable energy sources.
- Maintain the ecosystems of military zones, reuse and recycle waste and reduce waste generation.
- Prevent and fight against pollution through actions designed to avoid or lessen damage and spillage, limit noise and emanations and monitor all the consequences of military activities on the environment.
- Collaborate with other national and international public authorities responsible for environmental conservation.

The Ministry of Defence has passed specific regulations and established an Environmental Management System for military installations and bases

In order to implement these policies, the Ministry of Defence has passed regulations and established an Environmental Management System to make environmental conservation and improvement compatible with the activities of the Armed Forces. These measures were applied for the first time at the Sierra de Retín training camp in Barbate (Cádiz) and at the El Palancar and Hoyo de Manzanares firing ranges (Madrid) and at Getafe Air Base (Madrid). It is planned to establish them at other facilities and premises in the future, including the headquarters of the central organs.

The importance the Ministry of Defence attaches to conserving the environment can be gauged from the investments made in this field, despite the restrictive budgets. In 1999 environmental spending amounted to over Ptas2 billion. These actions will continue to be implemented in the future, evidencing our Armed Forces' commitment to the conservation, protection and restoration of the environment.

CHAPTER VII

RATIONALISING AND ADAPTING THE DEFENCE STRUCTURES

The aforementioned report of the Joint Congress-Senate Commission stated that the rationalisation and reduction of the current organisational structures and the enhancement of all types of administrative procedures is one of the general principles that should underpin the new Armed Forces model, in order to achieve more effective management and make the most of the available human and financial resources.

The new Armed Forces model is based on rationalising and reducing organisational structures to make the most of human and financial resources

Putting this principle into practice in fact entails a thorough restructuring—which would be required in any case as a result of the changes in the strategic environment and Spain's bigger role in international security and defence organisations. The aim is to achieve an effective defence system on a par with those of our allies, and to take full advantage of the resources available.

Rationalising structures and methods will affect the department as a whole, that is, the Basic Administrative Structure of the central



staff, the Operational Command Structure and the Force Structure, as well as the territorial or peripheral organisation. The decisions stemming from the overhaul of these structures will be implemented progressively and, if necessary, will be preceded by the appropriate legislative reform.

Adapting basic defence criteria to the new strategic environment

The Organic Law on the basic criteria for national defence and the military organisation, enacted in 1980 and subsequently amended in 1984, is the basic legal framework for the current defence structure. Since then, the strategic, political and social circumstances in which the Law was conceived have undergone deep changes and it is therefore necessary to undertake a review process to adapt the aforementioned criteria and military organisation to the new reality. Although the most important factors in this evolution have been addressed in detail in previous chapters, it is interesting to cite them, albeit briefly:

Hummer Tow of the 3rd Marine Battalion in Bosnia Herzegovina.

It is necessary to undertake a review process to adapt the basic national defence and military organisation criteria to the new circumstances

- Emergence of a new European strategic landscape after the end of the Cold War.
- Consolidation of a broader concept of security which is closely related to foreign policy and goes beyond the traditional scope of defence.
- Spain's integration into the new military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, and active participation in European defence.
- Professionalisation of the Spanish Armed Forces and abolishment of compulsory military service.
- Gradually diminishing likelihood of having to adopt measures conceived for widespread war, particularly with respect to a general mobilisation of resources.

Need to adapt organisation

The commitments undertaken at the Washington, Cologne and Helsinki summits held in 1999 call for the adaptation of basic defence criteria, since the Organic Law currently in force defines a structure conceived for peacetime and, if necessary, for wartime, without explicitly considering the possible use of force in crisis management. As future potential armed conflicts will tend to emerge as crisis situations, in which the political and diplomatic

The administrative defence structures need to be adapted to the new strategic situation, facilitating the ongoing co-ordination between the senior Defence authorities

mechanisms of international relations must continue to function, co-ordination between foreign and defence policies is an essential requirement for achieving, in such an event, the twofold aim of safeguarding the interests at stake and preventing armed conflict. Taking this idea even further, today we are not only concerned with avoiding such conflict, by controlling the crises which could trigger it, but also by countering its immediate effects. This will ensure the maintenance of international stability, which has become a task that on occasions requires the intervention of Armed Forces.

As a result, the administrative Defence structures need to be adapted to the new strategic situation, facilitating the ongoing co-ordination between the senior Defence staff and that of the different government departments responsible for taking appropriate action.

In the particular case of the Ministry of Defence, it is necessary to specify in greater detail the powers and responsibilities of the senior authorities, Chief of the Defence Staff, Secretary of State and Under-Secretary for Defence, Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, and the relations between them and with the Ministry of Defence, in order to consolidate the Department's organisational structure in line with modern criteria of administration, management and use of force.

It also seems necessary to distinguish, within the general concept of crises, situations in which the chief role is one of protecting civilians vis-à-vis natural disasters and similar emergencies from others that require military means in order to be contained and settled. The functions of the Armed Forces in collaborating with the civil authorities in cases of emergency will thus be separated from other actions that relate to their essential tasks of defence or external action.

In order to adapt to the present circumstances, current legislation on extraordinary allocation of resources to defence must be revised

The current Organic Law on basic criteria mainly provides for a wartime economy and the related needs of widespread mobilisation of resources. But this approach does not take into account current circumstances, in which there is more likely to be a need for gradual use of available resources to prevent, manage or resolve crises. In this regard, the current legislation on the extraordinary allocation of resources to Defence should be revised, particularly in

The Minister of Defence greets Spanish troops posted to Mostar (1997).

relation to the provision of the materiel and supplies the forces need, or the provision of essential services such as transport.

Similarly, according to the prevailing organisational criteria of the military doctrine of the allied countries, there is a need to update criteria on military organisation, which up to now has been based on territory. This organisation must become increasingly functional and be structured around the missions that need to be performed by the forces and designed to achieve the objectives as efficiently as possible, without overlap. Such an organisation will be more flexible, readier to perform its missions and more suited to operating with our partners and allies.

Up to now military organisation has been based on territory and needs to become more functional, structured around the missions that need to be performed by the forces

The current territorial organisation of the Armed Forces and the peripheral organisation of the Ministry of Defence will therefore need to be revised to simplify both structures as far as possible

Organisation of the Ministry of Defence

The Ministry of Defence, as a department of the administration through which the Government develops and implements its defence policy, is made up of the senior authorities that support the ministry in exercising its responsibilities, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence.

Organisation should be oriented towards a centralised, smooth-running and co-ordinated management, joint action of the Armed Forces, decentralised implementation of decisions and more efficient use of the available resources

The organisation of the Ministry of Defence is aimed at providing a channel through which to develop the actions that make up our Defence Policy, that is, those designed to support Spain's strategic conception, those which make the command and administration of the Armed Forces possible and those which serve to maintain the necessary relationship between defence and society.

This organisation should be oriented towards a centralised, smooth-running and co-ordinated management, joint action of the Armed Forces, decentralised implementation of decisions and more efficient use of the available resources.

The Ministry of Defence performs the activities aimed at administering, preparing and employing the Armed Forces. Its administrative structure should define accurately the tasks designed to allow the administration of resources and operational function. Its functions thus fall into different yet concurrent areas.

The overall revision the Ministry of Defence is to undertake will be governed by three basic criteria, among others. First, the organisation is to be considered permanently as a whole that stems from a global view of defence. Second, the structures are to be simplified and reduced to make them run more smoothly and eliminate any unnecessary elements. And lastly, the different processes that are set in motion between the senior authorities to administer the



The Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff are each responsible for the level of preparation and degree of operational effectiveness of their respective forces

resources allocated to the forces, in order to train and employ them, are to be speeded up.

The basic administrative structure of the Ministry of Defence

The effectiveness of the Armed Forces is the result of different processes which take place concurrently under the supervision of the senior authorities of the department. These processes include, on the one hand, those designed to obtain, allocate and administer resources, and, on the other, those intended mainly to prepare the units for performing their missions with the human and material resources allocated to them.

The technical and administrative complexity of these processes at the Ministry of Defence requires centralised management and decentralised implementation in order to achieve the best performance from the organisation as a whole and make the most of the resources invested in it.

The Minister of Defence is responsible for the level of skills and operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces and for the overall administration of the resources allocated to them. He also exercises the regulatory and disciplinary powers vested in him by law. In exercising his powers, he has the support of the senior staff of the department. The Chief of the Defence Staff is the main person

A medium-term objective is to group together in a single building the administrative arm of the Ministry of Defence and the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters

responsible for the level of preparation and the degree of joint and combined operational effectiveness of the forces, supervising their level of skills and operational effectiveness by delegation from the Ministry of Defence and prioritising their needs. The Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for budgetary policy, and the policies for armaments and materiel and infrastructure. For his part, the Under-Secretary for Defence is in charge of personnel policy and that of the organisation and general administration of the department. The Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff are each responsible for the level of training and degree of operational effectiveness of their respective forces.

When revising the Department's organisation, it should be borne in mind that the raison d'être of the Ministry of Defence is the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. This effectiveness is, in turn, the best gauge of how successful the organisation is, since the usefulness that society perceives from the public services rendered by the Ministry of Defence is precisely the availability and effectiveness of the Armed Forces in any circumstance in which their action may be required.

In order to facilitate the application of these criteria, the difficulty sometimes posed by the dispersion of the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters and the Administrative Headquarters should be overcome. A medium-term objective to ensure more dynamic relations between them is to group together in a single building the administrative arm of the Ministry and the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters.

The Armed Forces act under the authority of the President of the Government and the Minister of Defence, through the military authorities which make up the Operational Command Structure of the Armed Forces

Operational Command Structure of the Armed Forces

The purpose of the Operational Command of the Armed Forces is Force employment. Although the President of the Government can personally direct the action of the forces, in normal circumstances the Minister of Defence is legally delegated by the President to order, co-ordinate and direct such action. The Armed Forces therefore act under the authority of the President of the Government and the Minister of Defence, through the military authorities which make up the Operational Command Structure of the Armed Forces.

Spain's membership of the Atlantic Alliance entails making provisions for defending national territory, should the need arise, under the leadership of the Southern Allied Command Europe,



which includes the Sub-Regional Command South West, whose headquarters are located in Retamares (Madrid). Spain is also part of the allied air defence system through the Air Operations Centre at Torrejón de Ardoz.

As a result, the Operational Command Structure for force employment must not only allow the Armed Forces to act jointly in dealing with a localised conflict in the purely national sphere; it must also be perfectly compatible with that of NATO, in order to ensure interoperability and, if necessary, a rapid transfer of authority over Spanish military units or formations to the allied commanders.

The President of the Government and the Minister of Defence need suitable centres for the strategic management of operations. They will have the direct support of the Chief of the Defence Staff, through whose authority the guidelines of the aforementioned higher authorities are translated into orders and instructions for the operational commanders of the forces. They will also be advised by the Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff.

The operational command structures should enable the Armed Forces to act jointly in national missions and make them interoperable with NATO forces

The Operational Command Structure needs to be overhauled and trimmed to an indispensable minimum, as nowadays a single operations centre can exercise broad control and management



The Operational Command Structure of the Armed Forces must be based on simplicity, joint use of units and integration into multinational forces

functions and, together with others, constitute a network enabling forces to be deployed and efforts to be focused rapidly to the extent required by the dynamics of the operations. Furthermore, the human, material and financial resources required by a command headquarters necessarily entail the application of criteria that are highly restrictive as to number.

Under the operational dependence of the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Operational Command Structure for the use of the forces must adapt to the following criteria:

- Simplicity, in order to meet operational needs without taking into account territorial conditioning factors.
- Interoperability, to enable our military units to become integrated into multinational forces.
- Joint action, to facilitate the joint, integrated and effective use of the specific Army, Navy and Air Force units.

The adaptation of the Armed Forces Operational Command Structure to the new needs will inevitably affect the current territorial command structures and will entail the gradual elimination of those which are no longer necessary.

But the overhaul of the Operational Command Structure must be more thorough. In view of the new international situation and

Allied flags at the opening ceremony of the Headquarters of the Joint Sub-Regional Command South West Retamares (Madrid).

The establishment of an Armed Forces Intelligence Centre will combine efforts and facilitate relations with allied military intelligence agencies

the many missions that the Spanish Armed Forces perform beyond our borders, knowledge of the military situation is an essential factor for taking strategic decisions and leading military operations appropriately. Therefore, information is an essential element in the operational field and, accordingly, the Armed Forces' intelligence resources need to be combined more effectively in a single system that is capable of:

- Supporting the strategic military intelligence needs of the President of the Government and the Minister of Defence, particularly with regard to warning about situations with the potential risk to trigger crises.
- Providing the Armed Forces with intelligence in order to support the planning and execution of military operations.
- Having similar military intelligence structures to those of the allies.

The restructuring of the Armed Forces intelligence arms, which are an essential part of the system, should achieve greater centralisation, enabling more effective management and facilitating relations with allied military intelligence agencies.

The Higher Centre for Defence Intelligence (CESID), whose main task is to cater to the general information needs of the State,

is becoming increasingly important in security and defence owing to globalisation, new risks and the appearance of new non-State players on the strategic scene. These factors require it to collaborate closely with the Ministry of Defence and, in particular, the Armed Forces Intelligence Centre, so that information and intelligence contribute to coping with risks, preventing conflicts and, if possible, avoiding crisis situations.

All this will furnish defence policy with a multidirectional prevention and anticipation capability for detecting problems while they are still at an embryonic stage, preventing their possible mutation and, should the need arise, being in a position to propose and execute the actions the Government deems appropriate.

Force Structure

It is essential for military resources to be ready for use in a graduated manner from the outset of the crisis

A basic consideration, which should be a prevalent feature of the Armed Forces' permanent readiness for the action, is that the Force Structure should be able to provide military resources with the appropriate availability and combat capability so as to graduate their use from the outset of a crisis.

The criteria for the revision of the Force Structure stem from a conception of the Armed Forces that places the emphasis on projecting military capabilities rather than exclusively defending terri-

M-60 tank platoon of the 1st Mechanised Division.



tory or controlling the geographical areas over which the country has sovereignty.

The force structure enables units to be committed to NATO for allied collective defence planning according to their availability

The response to the need to project forces should be realistic and centred on effectiveness, steering away from impracticable costs, and endeavouring at all times to make full and co-ordinated use of the capabilities available, in accordance with their specific possibilities.

The readiness of our forces is generally in line with the current allied structure, which establishes the following categories according to availability: Reaction Forces, Main Defence Forces and Augmentation Units. This classification of the forces into the aforementioned categories mainly stems from allied planning for collective defence missions and other less demanding tasks, such as crisis management and peace operations.

This classification gives an idea of the order in which the forces can be expected to be used in any situation requiring the use of the military. Nonetheless, all the Armed Forces units, particularly those which make up the main combat forces, must be sufficiently endowed with personnel and materiel and properly trained. Another matter is the degree of readiness, which indicates their capability to react rapidly to a specific operational situation in a certain theatre, and this depends, among other factors, on the logistic priorities assigned to them when making provision for their possible use.

Marine Brigade troops during exercises with the Italian Navy.

The common characteristics of the reaction forces are high strategic mobility, flexibility and combat power, as well as capacity for sustained action, in accordance with the type of mission they are required to perform

In addition to constituting joint forces in the strictly national sphere, this structure, as mentioned earlier, allows units to be supplied to NATO for allied collective defence planning. It also enables units to be committed to the Alliance's Combined Joint Task Force, missions led by the United Nations or, when the time comes, operations implemented under the leadership of the European Union.

In the current strategic environment, the Reaction Forces, owing to their greater readiness and availability, are the most likely to provide the necessary instruments for peace and crisis control operations, as well as in the early stages of a possible larger-scale conflict. The common characteristics of the reaction forces, apart from those cited above, are high strategic mobility, flexibility and combat power, as well as capacity for sustained action. All these characteristics are suited to the type of mission they are required to perform. Their fast deployment depends on their readiness for action and this, in turn, depends on a high and permanent level of training, maintenance of the effectiveness of the materiel and the continual availability of the necessary levels of supplies.

The Reaction Forces consist of a combination of ground, naval and air units prepared for rapid deployment. Bearing in mind the resources available, a reasonable size for the Reaction Force, with respect to ground units, would be one that enables rapid deploy-

Patrol of Mirage F-1 aircraft taking off at Los Llanos Base (Albacete).

ment in a single theatre of a brigade-sized force with fire, combat and logistic support, or two tactical battle groups in two different theatres. As for naval forces, a naval group with maritime air and amphibious capabilities based respectively on a carrier-based air unit and a Marine amphibious group and, with respect to the air units, the projection of an air group consisting of two combat squadrons, among other airforce resources.

Sustaining this effort requires reaction forces larger than those deployed to permit the units to be relieved from the field of operations

Sustaining this effort requires reaction forces larger than those deployed—approximately three times the size—to permit the units to be relieved from the field of operations by means of an appropriate rotation system.

Should the development of the situation so require, the Armed Forces must be in a position to undertake an additional effort, which would consist of deploying a large force (no larger than division-size), in a single theatre, or two brigades in two different theatres, other naval combat units, including the Marine Brigade and four Air Force combat squadrons. Ability to execute this additional effort will depend on the capability to supply logistic support to the deployed forces. This task will be more demanding the further away the areas of operations. In order to keep up this effort indefinitely, additional resources to those normally allocated to defence are likely to be needed.

The adoption of a structure classifying the forces into categories according to availability is perfectly compatible with the specific administrative structures of the Army, Navy and Air Force

In the event that a major conflict were to erupt, the Main Defence Forces and, if necessary, the Augmentation Forces, would be required.

The adoption of a structure classifying the forces into categories according to availability is perfectly compatible with the specific organisational structures of the Army, Navy and Air Force, whose specific characteristics with respect to grouping into units should meet the Armed Forces' administration and training criteria, and not necessarily those of their operational use.

These and other very similar concepts will prevail in NATO's new force structure that will emerge from the revision undertaken as a result of the criteria laid down in the new Strategic Concept and the Defence Capabilities Initiative. This revision will place special emphasis on determining the essential operational capabilities of the forces and their availability requirements, in order to respond appropriately to missions arising in the foreseeable strategic environment of the next few years.

In peacetime, the base and support structure constitutes a link between units and territory through the appropriate deployment of the forces. This geographical deployment of the units will meet national strategic needs and will be reviewed in accordance with the principles of concentration and economy of resources. The general tendency will be to station units at bases where they have the necessary logistic support and to limit their numbers, making the most of existing infrastructure possibilities.

The units are to be stationed at bases where they have the necessary logistic support and the number of these bases should be limited so as to take advantage of the existing infrastructure

One of the rationalisation measures with furthest-ranging social consequences—as it generally has considerable impact on the areas in question—is adaptation of infrastructure. The reduction in the size of the forces makes it necessary to close down or deactivate facilities that are no longer needed. This is because, bearing in mind the ever-limited budget, it would not be logical to cease to cater to priority operational needs and maintain infrastructures that are not consistent with sound criteria of military effectiveness.

Without this effort to adapt the defence mechanism to the new realities, in a verifiable manner and with specific plans to bring about thorough changes, it would not be possible to face the challenges of the 21st century with guarantees of success.

Parachutists jumping from an Air Force CASA 235 aircraft.

Rationalisation of management

In order for the Armed Forces to act effectively in performing their missions, the working processes and force support means must also be reviewed, as well as the force structure, in order to optimise the management of the resources earmarked for this purpose. The main areas to be analysed, in order to determine and apply concrete rationalisation measures, are human resources, armaments and materiel, health and information technology and communications.

In order for the Armed Forces to act effectively in performing their missions, the working processes must also be reviewed, as well as the force structure, in order to optimise resource management

Human resources

To improve the effectiveness of personnel management, the related management centres within the Ministry need to be organised as homogeneously as possible, without damaging the specific characteristics that should be preserved. An analysis of the training aspect of management personnel at the department has been undertaken, as well as an analysis of issues relating to postings, promotion and personal motivation, in order to standardise and streamline the processes.

The particular field of education needs to be thoroughly adapted to cater to the demand for a profile of professional servicemen

The necessary joint mentality must be acquired and promoted at the different levels of personnel training

that differs greatly in terms of both quantity and quality to the previous combined model. An analysis is specifically being conducted of the current structure of schools and training centres run by the Department to tailor these facilities to new needs.

One of the guiding principles of military training is to apply joint criteria to education in fields that are similar enough to be unified, while pursuing complementarity between different Armed Forces centres.

The necessary joint mentality must be acquired and promoted at the different levels of personnel training. The establishment of the Armed Forces College for Higher Studies, which awards General Staff diplomas to Army, Navy and Air Force officers and imparts other advanced military studies courses, is a milestone in this regard and sets a standard that the Ministry of Defence will continue to apply in its revision of the management, training and educational aspects of the support structure.

Armaments and materiel

The effectiveness of the Armed Forces largely depends on their having an integrated logistic support system that makes the right materiel available in the right place. Current structures, resources and working are therefore being analysed to ascertain how they can be improved to achieve better support with the minimum cost in resources.

The procurement of elements that are common to the three forces must be standardised as far as possible in order to make the most of the market possibilities and to achieve the necessary interoperability with our allies

Although logistic support is an activity which can only be carried out jointly to an extent, owing to the specific characteristics of the ground, naval and air forces and their respective spheres of action, modern management methods should be adopted to achieve effective support with the minimum cost in resources. Efforts will be focused, in principle, on two objectives: to standardise the procurement of common elements as far as possible to make the most of the market possibilities; and to achieve the necessary interoperability with our allies.

Health

Military health activities are carried out in the logistic-operational and medical care fields. The restructuring of this area stems

Surgical operation performed in support of the civilian population in the area of operations.

mainly from the need to adapt it to the new reality arising from operations in a multinational environment and in theatres far from home. It is therefore essential to be able to rely on medical facilities and equipment that can be moved to different scenes of action in a short time and can operate with the forces for the full length of time they are stationed in the area of operations.

Adapting to this new environment requires a rationalisation process leading to a single military health network

This logistic-operational priority is shared by the European countries and, specifically, by our partners and allies. Recent reports on the trends witnessed in the reorganisation of military healthcare in the European countries, chiefly the NATO and WEU members, show a clear tendency to reduce the size of the hospital network to cover the needs of the forces, both in normal and crisis situations.

Adapting to this new environment requires a rationalisation process leading to a single Military Health Network, in line with the global approach to the Armed Forces and geared to providing the necessary health-logistic support—the chief objective that underpins and justifies its existence.

The integration of hospitals into the Military Health Network will allow logistic-operational healthcare support to be co-ordinated. It will likewise ensure that the military health professionals

maintain an appropriate level of medical effectiveness and are thus able to perform their operational tasks when necessary. It will furthermore boost the cost effectiveness of the health services provided to the members of the Armed Forces and their families.

Information technology and communications

The aim of the Indicative Plan for Information is to integrate all the systems, networks and applications of the Defence system, nationally and in the framework of the international defence organisations to which Spain belongs

Management structures and procedures will be reviewed from the perspective of assigning information technology and communications the major role that they deserve in modern organisations.

The modernisation currently under way in the Spanish Armed Forces is closely linked to the use of information technology and communications as indispensable tools for multiplying operational capabilities while optimising resources. It requires an Indicative Plan for Information Systems to be drawn up for the Department.

The guiding principles of the Indicative Plan for Information Systems are: to organise these technologies so as to achieve the necessary integration in all the existing systems, networks and applications used by the defence system itself; and to integrate the Spanish system into the command and force structures of the Atlantic Alliance and other international defence organisations to which Spain belongs. When drawing up this plan, care will be taken to ensure that the management and operational fields, despite their different purposes and treatment of the information they handle, can use common lines, terminals and systems, as well as establishing the relevant security measures for the suitable protection of classified information.

CHAPTER VIII

ECONOMIC SUPPORT OF DEFENCE

During the first half of the nineties, the changes in the strategic landscape led to an overall downward adjustment in the defence budgets of the western countries, in pursuit of what has been called the peace dividend. Spain was no exception to this trend, and Spanish defence budgets have been successively adjusted and trimmed, making it difficult to modernise the Armed Forces and affecting the activity of the defence industry.

Budgetary resources should be based on realistic foundations, in order to allow gradual professionalisation and adapt armaments and equipment

In this regard, it is significant that the Preamble to Guidance on National Defence 1/96 stated that "as part of its contribution to the common task of defence, and aware of the current shortcomings deriving from the insufficient budgetary allocations in recent years, a sufficient amount of funds will be earmarked to bringing the Armed Forces into line with Spain's rightful role". It establishes criteria on the budgetary resources for Defence, stating that they should be based on "realistic foundations, in order to allow the gradual professionalisation of servicemen, and to adapt armaments, materiel, equipment and infrastructure to the needs".

A supportive and effective Defence effort

The European Union countries' defence effort must be proportional to the respective economic capabilities of each nation

Kosovo powerfully revived the aim to enhance the European Union's role in the international arena, confirming the words of Monet, who once said of Europe that it only accepts change in the face of need, and only sees need in the face of crisis. Europe is keen to shed its role of a stage on which things happen and become a player. In order to do so, it must rise to this challenge by means of a collective defence effort from all the countries of the Union who commit themselves to this endeavour, the burden of which must be proportional to the respective economic capabilities. To invest in defence is also to build Europe, and this responsibility cannot be delegated to others. Spain's position must be one of solidarity with its European partners in this sphere.

The effort will largely result in economic growth, owing to the technological innovation it entails and its repercussion on global demand. Aware of the foregoing, Spain doubled its research and development expenditure during the four-year period from 1996 to 1999 and is demonstrating its commitment to maintaining and promoting a modern, efficient and competitive defence industry in the framework of European security policy.

To invest in defence is also to build Europe

What is required now is to raise the budgetary effort to the level demanded by national interest. There is a logical connection

Mechanised patrol of the Legion in Kosovo.

between the prominent role Spain wishes to secure for itself in the international sphere and responsible compliance with the commitments entered into in security and defence matters, if it wants to achieve a significance in keeping with its history and interests.

The budget effort will largely result in economic growth, owing to the technological innovation it entails and its repercussion on global demand

Current situation

Having dealt with the basic criteria that should govern the economic support of Defence, it is appropriate to point out that in 1996 Spain's Armed Forces included 30,000 professional servicemen and some 150,000 conscripts.

The Defence budget underwent a long series of reductions from 1990, when the non-financial part amounted to Ptas869.992 billion, until 1993, by which time it was down to Ptas757.232 billion. Thereafter it began to recover slightly, reaching Ptas865.972 billion in 1996, 4.02 billion less than 6 years earlier.

It should furthermore be stressed that substantial cuts were made in the initial appropriations, as for several years the amounts shown in the following chart were stated as "Not Available". This led to a veiled reduction in the funds allocated to Defence through agreements of the Council of Ministers.

	1991	1992	1993	1996
Millions of pesetas	107,745	18,613	6,921	22,905
Date	5-VII-91	21-VII-92	4-VIII-93	29-XII-95

After 1997, when the decision was taken on international integration and modernisation, larger amounts were allocated to Defence

After 1997, when the decision was taken on professionalisation, international integration and modernisation, larger amounts were allocated to Defence. A 4% increase was consolidated in 2000, in order to meet the objectives set by the Government.

But the budget is not the only procedure used to earmark funds to Defence. Another funding mechanism has been used to boost the

	1997	1998	1999	2000
Non-financial budget	869,607	897,024	927,767	965,000
% of previous year	0.42	3.15	3.43	4.00

modernisation of equipment—the co-operation of the ministry of industry, which is pre-financing the development of the three main armaments programmes: the EF-2000 aircraft, the F-100 frigates and the Leopard tank. This involves contributing funds to industry, in the form of repayable zero-interest loans, which amounted to Ptas123.131 billion and 115.536 billion in 1998 and 1999, respectively. The forecast for 2000 stands at Ptas140.515 billion.

Future budgets should be in keeping with the goal of overall economic stability established by the Government as a basic requisite for Spain's general progress

In addition, the different budget laws have made the appropriations to finance the participation of Spanish units in international peace operations extendible. This has amounted to an average annual increase of an extra Ptas20 billion for paying wages, living and running expenses and investments for the forces deployed overseas.

Neither should we forget the authorisations granted by the Law on Fiscal, Administrative and Social Measures, which allow the Management of Defence Infrastructure and Facilities to cater to the operational needs of the Armed Forces and finance their modernisation indirectly with the proceeds of the alienation of the movable and immovable assets assigned to them by the Ministry.

It should also be borne in mind that the economic surpluses generated by the sales of military dwellings can be used to finance the modernisation and professionalisation of the Armed Forces, after deducting expenses in respect of support for geographic mobility.

It is important to stress that the future Ministry of Defence budgets should be in keeping with the goal of overall economic stability established by the Government as a basic requisite for Spain's general progress, and which basically pursues the following objectives:

Breakdown of the 2000 Defence Budget by Headquarters and Central staff (thousands of pesetas)

	Item 1: PERSONNEL	Items 2-4 MAINTENANCE	Items 6-9 INVESTMENT	TOTAL	%
Central staff	178,474	29,912	61,648	270,034	27.97
Army	219,630	67,350	80,369	367,349	38.05
Navy	82,673	21,539	60,103	164,315	17.02
Air Force	80,589	25,558	57,560	163,707	16.96
TOTAL	561,366	144,359	259,680	965,405	100.00
Percentages	58.15	14.95	26.90	100.00	100.00





Defence spending is an investment in stability, as well as an economic support of social wellbeing

- To consolidate our incorporation into Monetary Union by cutting Spain's public deficit and bringing interest rates into line with those of the rest of the partners in the Euro Area.
- To boost the employment level—the key to real convergence, on which the present and future of policies such as pensions hinge.
- To improve the welfare system and guarantee Spain's future.

The financial outlook

The economic scenario envisaged by the Government involves: continuing to trim public deficit; bringing inflation down to under 2%—a goal and objective that coincides with the ceiling established by the European Central Bank for the Euro Area; and achieving an economic growth of two percentage points higher than forecast by EUROSTAT for the average of the eleven Monetary Union countries, increasing the differential with respect to previous years and accelerating the process of real convergence with the most advanced European countries.

Spanish society shares the desires of the Armed Forces

Within the general economic guidelines of the State, a course of action should be established, specifying a set of medium- and long-term financial commitments

Having dealt with the forecasts for the budget effort, the financial scenario for which Defence should aim over the next few years needs to be defined.

Defence Policy, as a general policy, is not the exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. Defence spending amounts to spending on security and stability, factors which unavoidably underpin any desire for economic and social wellbeing. Therefore, it should be interconnected with the actions of the different government departments.

Law 44/82 of 7 July on Budget Allocations for Investments and Sustenance of the Armed Forces, extended and amended by Laws 6/87 and 9/90, was useful during the eighties for developing the joint programme of investments, replacements of materiel, equipment and weaponry, and sustenance of the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, from 1991, the systematic failure to meet the forecasts established in the Law led to a major setback in the modernisation process, and this law therefore ceased to be the appropriate framework for pursuing the development and modernisation of the forces.

In order to achieve the financial scenario needed to fund and modernise the Armed Forces, a course of action will be established.

The financial expense of the EF 2000 translates into our economic and social wellbeing.

The structure should aid funding through saving, as the result of the improved management and through the streamlining of the organisation

In the medium and long term, this will specify a set of commitments, within the general economic guidelines of the State, that validate and provide appropriate backing for concrete and attainable goals, quantifying the financial requirements of the Ministry of Defence, in order to cover them sufficiently in each year's budget.

This commitment to establish the economic support of Defence must be both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative, because no commitment can be assumed without injecting funds into the Defence system in absolute terms. Qualitative, because the very structure should aid funding through saving, as the result of the improved management and through the streamlining of the organisation.

The qualitative or internal effort, apart from the saving it can generate, will contribute decisively to improving the quality of the forces, as once the objective of full professionalisation is attained, the goal will be set of progressively reducing the percentage of personnel expenses and increasing funds earmarked to materiel.

The idea is that, by the end of the first decade of the century, Spain will have attained convergence with respect to the breakdown of budgetary expenditure with those Alliance members who aspire to achieve excellence for their Armed Forces. The actual

Defence structure is thus firmly committed—albeit not without considerable effort—to supporting professionalisation in the fullest sense of the word, that is, Armed Forces that are professional, but with substantially improved means at their disposal.

The quantitative, or external, commitment to providing economic support for Defence will translate into a progressive improvement in expenditure, so that once the professionalisation process is completed, we converge in real terms with our Alliance partners and the most significant indicators are brought into line with the average for the European NATO countries.

Promoting a stable financial framework in order to prevent budgetary uncertainty is considered an important objective

In this respect, promoting a stable and realistic financial framework in order to prevent budgetary uncertainty and set the standards for providing proper support to the professionalisation and modernisation processes is considered an important objective. This will enable the Armed Forces to become fully professional on a gradual basis, afford stability to the procurement of materiel, increase international co-operation, gradually raise budgetary allocations and boost the Defence industry.

This scenario must be based on quantifying specific objectives, for which suitable provision will be made when allocating appropriations, combining national interests with the requirements of a common policy of containing public spending.

The effort is considerable; so are the challenges that lie before Spain at the dawn of the new millennium. Coherent thinking in a mature society like our own no doubt points to an encouraging future for the goals set.

APPENDIX A

ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

The Helsinki Final Act (1975) gave rise to the existing arms control process in Europe and to confidence- and security-building measures between States. This process is currently based on two main instruments which control conventional weapons: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (known as the CFE Treaty) and the 1999 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Both spring from the "Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament" adopted at Helsinki.

In the Helsinki Final Act, the signatory countries declared their intention to respect the principle of sovereignty in their mutual relations; to refrain from resorting to the threat or use of force; to accept and regard their frontiers as inviolable; to settle disputes using peaceful means; not to interfere in the internal affairs of other States parties; and to respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and peoples' right to self-determination.

The Final Act also established a short list of measures to foster mutual confidence in the military sphere in order to contribute to increase stability and security in Europe. To this end, the States undertook to put into practice a series of measures such as prior notification of major military manoeuvres, invitations to observers to attend the announced manoeuvres, prior notification of significant military activities and other measures such as visits of military delegations.

The process begun at Helsinki continued with the Vienna negotiations and the meeting of the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), held in Madrid in 1983, where it was agreed on a mandate to call a conference on Confidence- and Securi-

ty-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The first stage of the conference materialised in the "Stockholm Document" (1986), which increased the confidence-building measures provided for in the Helsinki Final Act and established the possibility of carrying out on-site verification inspections within a State without the latter refusing, and made it compulsory to inform other States party when carrying out exercises or manoeuvres above a certain level.

Later, in 1989, the closing document of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting held in Vienna agreed to establish two negotiation tracks: the first, between the 35 member States, to develop and enlarge the "Stockholm Document"; and the second, between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, to conduct negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe in order to establish a stable and secure balance, at the lowest levels, of conventional weapons and equipment.

The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a new international order for security, based mainly on the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, established by the CSCE in 1990. Indeed, the Paris Charter was another important milestone on the path to building security in Europe vis-à-vis the new challenges the old continent faced. At this summit, the Heads of State and Government of the participant states declared that confrontation and division in Europe had ended and that relations would thenceforward be based on respect and co-operation, undertaking to banish the use of force and instead settle disputes by peaceful means.

At Paris it was considered that the best way of fostering security was to reduce threats so as to diminish the likelihood of an aggression, and, if the worst came to the worst and the aggression occurred, also reduce the resulting damage. The two avenues established for this purpose were, on the one hand, confidence building, and, on the other, disarmament. These two efforts are closely related as they both contribute to shaping an increasingly stable and secure international environment.

Confidence-building measures constitute an ongoing negotiation process, in which dialogue and the negotiations themselves are almost as important as the results. The aim is to generate channels for communication and commitment that raise the level of military confidence. The Vienna Document, with its successive reviews, is pivotal to these measures.

For its part, disarmament seeks to establish a stable and secure equilibrium with the lowest possible levels of forces and to eliminate the capacity to launch surprise attacks and large-scale initiatives. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which is applied to the area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals, is the cornerstone of European security.

In keeping with today's global approach, only the international forums are capable of channelling and co-ordinating efforts to establish effective arms control and foster security and mutual confidence-building measures. Spain collaborates at these international forums, determined to make a contribution that is in consonance with its possibilities.

As for the United Nations, our country collaborates closely in all the Organisation's initiatives aimed at disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. In particular, Spain takes part in the Disarmament Confer-

ence, of which it has been a member since 1996, and lends firm support to initiatives designed to control Weapons of Mass Destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical). It is also a party to the Inhumane Weapons Convention, and attaches particular importance to the second Protocol on Anti-personnel Mines and De-mining Activities. It furthermore collaborates by sending the annual information requested by the UN relating to the Register of Arms Transfers and defence budgets and expenditures.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as the CSCE came to be called from 1 January 1995 onwards, has not only promoted generally applied international agreements like the CFE Treaty, but also plays an important role in the regional stabilisation of the Balkans, as established in the Dayton Accords. Spain has joined the framework of negotiations on disarmament and arms control in the area, as it considers these are essential elements to the stability of the region in the medium term.

Many of the disarmament and confidence-building initiatives and measures are designed to shape a more secure and stable Europe. However, this aim would be considerably less substantial were the security of the Mediterranean not regarded as being closely linked to that of the old continent. In order to contribute to the stability and security of the Mediterranean basin, Spain is firmly committed to fostering the Mediterranean Dialogue within the multilateral organisations to which it belongs.

The Barcelona Process, which was set in motion at the Summit in November 1995 under the aegis of the European Union, is an essential tool for achieving the much-desired shared peace and prosperity in the area.

Disabling a tank in compliance with arms reduction measures.

Spain is actively engaged in furthering this process, the results of which are the commitment made by the Alliance at the Washington Summit to give impetus to the Mediterranean Dialogue and the fact that one of the EU's first Common Foreign and Security Policy strategies precisely addresses the Mediterranean.

The international community has directed its efforts towards developing different arms control and security- and confidence-building measures for conventional forces and arms and for weapons of mass destruction. This distinction is used in the following paragraphs to analyse in greater detail the mechanisms commonly accepted as valid instruments for keeping threats in check.

A multinational team under Spanish command inspects former Warsaw Pact equipment.

Measures related to conventional forces and arms

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which was signed in 1990, is a key reference in the arms control and reduction process. In the Treaty, the signatory countries—members of the Atlantic Alliance and the then Warsaw Pact—pledged to undertake a huge reduction in the capabilities of their armed forces deployed between the Atlantic and the Urals. They also promised to eliminate the asymmetries between the two blocs with respect to arms and the capacity to launch large-scale and surprise offensives, by agreeing to adopt weapons ceilings and establishing a control and verification system.

As a result, by the end of the "reduction period" (16 November 1995), over 58,000 conventional weapons and pieces of equipment had been destroyed, the transparency between the different States party to the Treaty had improved and a major boost had been given to co-operation between the allied armed forces and those of the other countries. Spain completed its reductions in May 1995; 481 battle tanks and 88 pieces of artillery were destroyed.

When the CFE Treaty entered into force in 1992, it was supplemented by CFE 1A, which also called for a reduction in the number of troops of the armed forces of the NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries (except for the Baltic Republics and the Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union). This new agreement, which is an inseparable part of the CFE Treaty, established a global ceiling of three million armed forces personnel per group of States, except for naval personnel. Spain was assigned a maximum of 300,000 personnel.

The success of this Treaty lies in the maximum limits established for each category of weapons, the on-site verification system and the transparency in declarations and mutual relations. In addition to destroying surplus weapons, the parties have carried out many inspections and verifications, achieving a level of relationship and mutual knowledge between members of the armed forces of the different countries that was unthinkable until only a few years ago. This factor is a valuable complement to the security- and confidence-building measures enshrined in the Vienna Document, which will be dealt with later on.



In 1996 it was decided to adapt the CFE Treaty to the new situation in Europe, owing chiefly to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and to the future incorporation of some of its former members into the Atlantic Alliance. At the meeting of the Joint Consultative Group on 30 March 1999, the States party reached a substantial agreement on matters regarded as pivotal to the subsequent signature of the Treaty at the Istanbul Summit in November that year.

At the meeting, the OSCE's role as European security organisation was strengthened, and its operational capabilities were likewise enhanced. As a further step towards the design of a more stable and secure Europe, it was agreed to modify the Treaty, reducing arms levels and setting a new structure of ceilings.

As a result of this process, a set of national ceilings (or upper limits) has been established for each member State's forces, together with territorial ceilings establishing the maximum armaments holdings permitted in its territory, including those of the State itself. It should be pointed out that the ceilings established for Spain cover our current security needs.

Furthermore, the amendment of the CFE Treaty includes a clause enabling other States which did not sign the original CFE Treaty as they were not members of any of the alliances or groups of States party to



Istanbul Summit.

accede to the Treaty. All the measures arising from this amendment are pending ratification.

The Vienna Document

The successful implementation of the CFE Treaty provisions has been complemented by the confidence- and security-building measures established in the 1986 Stockholm Document. These measures stem from Helsinki and from the concluding document of the 1983 follow-up meeting in Madrid in 1983, in which the so-called CDE process was begun. The aim of this process was "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations".

Measures to foster mutual confidence between States are designed to promote a climate of relations that, rather than merely limiting the effects of the possible use of weapons in a conflict, actually avert such conflict by preventing it from occurring.

These measures, which were subsequently developed in the successive versions of the 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1999 Vienna Documents, have made considerable headway in this process as they are politically binding and have military significance within the so-called ATTU Zone (from the Atlantic to the Urals) accompanied by verification measures.

The Vienna Document is the best reflection of the OSCE's negotiating efforts in the field of confidence- and security-building measures. It envisages an additional set of measures to support and complement the verification system of the CFE Treaty as well as measures relating to the reduction of risks through consultation and co-operation mechanisms in matters of non-regular military activities, dangerous military incidents and visits to military activities in progress.

The Document requires the prior notification of certain military activities when they surpass the set limits for personnel or equipment and makes some activities compulsory, lowering the thresholds established in the Stockholm Document and consequently increasing transparency between member States.

It also envisages the exchange of annual global information. This exchange includes information on military forces and their organisation, systems of essential weapons and equipment and planned deployments, as well as defence planning, military budgets

and volume of personnel.

The Document enables random verification of this information to be made through "study visits" to the units in question, inspections of military activities of which notification is compulsory and visits of observers, whose role is to provide guarantees that the aforementioned measures are fulfilled. Lastly, provisions are established for arms transfers and standards are set by means of a Code of Conduct on the political and military aspects of security, stability and conflict prevention.

Verification activities.

Impetus was recently given to this confidence- and security-building process by the 1999 Vienna Document agreed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November. In it the States party approved a series of markedly technical modifications, including proposals to lower the number of troops. These proposals relate to notification and to the setting up of information exchange mechanisms and place greater emphasis on the regional approach to security.

Register of Conventional Arms

The importance of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms should also be stressed, as it is proving to be a decisive instrument for promoting confidence and transparency between States. Every year, the States send the United Nations data and information on their imports and exports of seven types of conventional weapons. They also include data on domestic production and stocks, as well as establishing a national contact point for dealing with issues related to the Register. The data are made available to the Secretariat and delivered to the other States, on request. The information which is distributed is published in a leaflet in English, French and Spanish.

Treaty on Open Skies

The OSCE Conference, held in Helsinki on 24 March 1992, served as a forum for the signature of the Treaty on Open Skies, according to which the signatory countries would voluntarily open their airspace to allow overflight by observation craft. The aim of this Treaty was basically to achieve a better guarantee of transparency between countries in their military activities and, accordingly, to facilitate the monitoring of the arms-control agreements and strengthen the OSCE's conflict-prevention and crisis-management capa-

bility over a vast area of land and sea, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The Treaty, which has a system of verification measures that complement those of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document, will come into force once a minimum of 20 States—including the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine—have deposited the relevant instruments of ratification. So far only twenty-four countries have ratified the Treaty. Spain is among them.

Our country firmly backs this Treaty by contributing equipment (cameras for aerial photography), facilities and aerial resources in order to standardise the equipment and procedure to be followed when the Treaty enters into force.

The signatory countries are currently engaging in activities ranging from data-gathering and training flights to the holding of seminars and workshops to analyse the data obtained.

Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction

With respect to anti-personnel mines, which, used irresponsibly in large areas of the planet, are a threat to the population sectors who have the least to do with conflicts, mention should be made of the 1997 Ottawa Convention, which totally bans the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of weapons of this kind and only allows possession of a limited number of them for the training and teaching of the forces responsible for de-mining.

Spain signed the Convention on 3 December 1997 and deposited the relevant instrument of ratification at the United Nations headquarters on 19 January 1999. During that time Law 33/1998 of 5 October Totally Banning Mines and Weapons with Similar Effects was enacted. This Law set even stricter deadlines for destroying stocks than the related international agreements, as it established a three-year period from its entry into force for the destruction of all stocks.

The estimated cost of the mass destruction of existing antipersonnel mines amounts to over Ptas500 million, since the process uses safe measures which respect the environment. Spain plans to eliminate a total of 827,361 mines, of which more than 60% have now been destroyed.

Our country has furthermore taken part in all the UN initiatives to set up a world de-mining fund, making contributions both unilaterally and as a member of the European Union. It has also taken part in activities to aid de-mining in South America, providing technical experts, training courses, technical equipment and funds in co-operation with the Organisation of American States. It has offered this aid at other forums, both bilaterally and in the framework of the EU and WEU.

Regional stability and the Dayton Accords

Appendix 1-B of the Dayton Accords is in fact an agreement on regional stability. It is concerned with arms control in an area that is not covered by the CFE Treaty and between the states or entities which have emerged following the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia. Article II specifically refers to confidence- and security-building measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina (similar to those established in the Vienna Document) and

Article IV refers to subregional arms control in Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (more similar to the CFE Treaty, as it even establishes arms-control measures).

Articles II and IV are currently at implementation stage. OSCE is co-operating in the organisation of verification inspections with the participation or assistance of the OSCE member States. Spain provides continual assistance in this area through its Verification Unit.

Article V is the stability agreement strictly speaking and, unlike the previous ones, is still being negotiated. The Mandate for negotiations was approved in November 1998 in order to facilitate the implementation of the Dayton Accords and create a dialogue on security in and around the Former Yugoslavia. Spain has joined this agreement as one of the States which adopted the Mandate and is therefore party to the negotiations. It therefore makes a particularly significant contribution to peace and stability in the area and also collaborates in placing the stability of the Former Yugoslavia in a framework of global European security.

Army explosives expert in Bosnia.

VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

TREATY	Led by Spain	Led by others	Received in Spain
CFE			
• Inspections	54	104	48
• Reduction inspections	35	67	21
* Led by other states with Spanish participation			
VIENNA DOCUMENT			
• Inspections	4		2
• Visits to air facilities		24	
• Observation of manoeuvres		5	
• Evaluations	19		6
• Other activities		15	
DAYTON ACCORDS			
• Article II	1	4	
• Article IV		5	
OPEN SKIES	2 flights in Spain and 1 test flight		

Future control of Short Arms/Light Arms

Attention is now focused on controlling short and light arms in order to prevent problems arising from the destabilising build-up and proliferation of small arms. In this connection, the EU adopted a Joint Action in December 1998, which complements the programme to prevent and combat the Illicit Traffic in Conventional Arms and the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted in June 1998.

Spain has not only joined these EU initiatives, but also those currently being applied by other international organisations (such as NATO, OSCE and the United Nations) to

study the different political, technical, legal and commercial aspects arising from lack of control of these weapons in certain parts of the world.

An International Conference on Short Arms/Light Arms is planned to take place in 2001 to deal with all related aspects. Its main purpose is to establish controls to prevent illicit traffic in these weapons and stop them falling into the hands of terrorist groups and from increasing instability in certain geographical areas.

Measures related to weapons of mass destruction

Reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons

As a complement to the SALT treaties of the seventies, the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) was signed in 1991 by the United States and the then Soviet Union, marking the start of a sizeable reduction in strategic weapons.

That same year, 1991, as a result of the application of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the last of these weapons, whose deployment had triggered the so-called Euro-missile crisis in the eighties, were eliminated from Europe. The Treaty aimed to eliminate—and, indeed, had completely achieved this by 1991—all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 3,500km. It is still in force, thus preventing new arsenals of such weapons from being built up. The Atlantic Alliance, in turn, took the decision to withdraw the nuclear warheads of short-range arms from Europe at its meetings at Taormina, Rome and Brussels.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transfer to Russia of Ukraine's and Belarus's nuclear arsenals, the START II Treaty was signed in 1993 and has been ratified by the Russian Federation, which cites economic reasons and shows certain political misgivings about the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to take in former members of the Warsaw Pact. It is hoped that Russia can soon ratify the Treaty, thereby enabling negotiations to start immediately for a possible START III Treaty, in order to achieve more ambitious goals in the process of nuclear disarmament.

The ABM Treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missiles, signed and ratified by the then Soviet Union and the United States in 1972, is today an essential and complementary element of the START Treaties, as it maintains nuclear deterrence through the concept of "mutual assured destruction".

The idea of "mutual assured destruction" is in fact a guarantee of stability between the two powers, based on a balance of nuclear capabilities. Each party is aware that the use of nuclear weapons by either of them would lead unavoidably to mutual destruction. This balance would be upset if either of the parties, through a higher level of technology, could make use of antiballistic missiles to substantially cancel out the effects of the use of the other's nuclear weapons.

It is important to bear in mind the significance of the validity of the ABM Treaty for Russia, now that the significance of its conventional forces has diminished and, accordingly, its deterrent capability. The Treaty is currently at an initial review stage, with a view to mitigating the effects of the possible limited use of nuclear weapons by third powers.

Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

This Treaty, to which Spain has been party since 1987, entered into force in 1970 with 25 years duration. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference it was extended indefinitely. By the end of December 1998, 187 States were party to the Treaty.

By means of this Treaty, the non-nuclear States undertake not to manufacture atomic weapons or other nuclear devices, and the nuclear States undertake not to transfer weapons or other devices of this kind to any other State. The Treaty marks the tendency to negotiate the end of the arms race and achieve full disarmament.

The possibility of amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to incorporate the problem of illicit traffic is currently being debated. There is also speculation about a treaty banning the production of fissionable material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices.

Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty

This Treaty, signed by Spain in 1996 and ratified in 1998, has not yet entered into force. In order to take effect, the Treaty establishes that it must be ratified by 44 States with the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons (such as Spain) and, of course, the nuclear powers (of the latter, France and the United Kingdom also ratified the Treaty in 1998).

The basic obligations stem from each signatory State's promise not to conduct any nuclear explosions and to ban and prevent all such explosions on the territory under its jurisdiction or control. The States party furthermore undertake not to cause or encourage the explosion of nuclear weapons or to take part in them in any way.

The procedures for action are based on: a verification system of surveillance and inspection between States; confidence-building measures to be taken voluntarily in respect of notification of any explosion in which energy of 330 tonnes of TNT or more is released; and sanctions ranging from deprival of the rights and privileges conferred by the Treaty to the adoption of collective measures in accordance with international law.

Biological Weapons Convention

World awareness of the hazards triggered by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is evidenced by the inspection and verification mechanisms laid down in the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. In this connection, the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of 29 June 1999, signed during the European Union-Ibero-American Summit, agreed to strengthen the disarmament process, placing special emphasis on the nuclear, chemical and biological fields.

The European Union gives maximum priority to concluding negotiations on the Protocol on the Verification of Biological Weapons, which will lend credibility and reliability to the related 1972 Convention.

Chemical Weapons Convention

Spain attaches great importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which has

been in force since April 1997 and is based in The Hague. This Convention not only provides for the destruction of chemical weapons, but also the monitoring of any product which may contribute, whether directly or indirectly, to the manufacture of chemical weapons, such as products with a dual use.

This Convention sprang from the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention aimed at establishing a special treatment for chemical weapons, substances, components and precursors and their production and storage facilities. A preparatory committee set up the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is based in The Hague, and its working structure: the Conference of States Party, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. The Convention establishes a system of annual statements on the production and storage of chemical substances and precursors and the related facilities, according to their classification and production volume. Inspections are carried out as a result of denouncement of another State party or declarations of the States party. Very strict rules are laid down on the protection of confidential information. So far some 600 inspections have been carried out, 60% in the US.

The improvements noted so far in the fields of conventional weapons/forces and weapons of mass destruction would not be complete without systems to monitor the exports of products that may contribute directly or indirectly to manufacturing these weapons and their launch vectors. Spain is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zängger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The countries which belong to these groups are making a major effort to promote transparency, in order to spread the message that their aim is not to hinder the exchange of products and technology between States, but rather to guarantee that products cannot be diverted to unlawful uses within a system of free trade relations.

APPENDIX B

THE ARMY

The Army is the component of the Armed Forces which is specifically designed to secure and maintain military control of the territory in an area of operations. The physical occupation of the land consolidates the objectives achieved in conjunction with other forces, whether national or multinational, enabling a stable situation to be established on the basis of the results obtained during operations.

The structure of the Army comprises a varied set of resources, organised and trained to perform a broad range of military operations. In an effort to adapt to the requirements of the strategic environment, a reform has been undertaken over the past decade. This reform not only affects the Army's structure and deployment, but also its very strategic foundations. Indeed, there has been a shift from a conception oriented almost exclusively to defence of national territory to another which, without neglecting this essential task, envisages a broader scope of action that includes other possible scenarios relating to missions performed within the framework of the international security organisations to which Spain belongs.

Peace and humanitarian assistance operations, as well as crisis control, call for additional requirements to those needed for conventional military operations. This adaptation to current needs is shaping the multifunctional nature of the Army, which should not diminish its essential combat capability, but rather, if anything, complement and even enhance it.

The modernisation and lightening of the units envisaged in the so-called "Plan Norte" stem from criteria shared with our allies, which are tending to make their forces more flexible, interoperable and highly mobile. The

Spanish and allied officers at an operations centre.

plans drawn up to organise a rapid response to crisis situation involve core groups of rapid reaction troops that can be transported to areas of operations, far from national territory if necessary, with sufficient protection, firepower and logistic support.

The Army is basically organised in brigades, which form its core structure. However, flexibility as to type of response, which will be required by the multidirectional conflicts that characterise the new century, calls for a structure capable of meeting the broadest variety of international commitment. This structure allows modules to be separated from the organic force units and assigned to the operational structures conceived to settle a particular conflict. The decentralised use of forces must therefore constitute one of the principles on which training is based.

The Army is structured into a Standing Force, established in peacetime, and a Reconstitution Force. The Standing Force is made up of the Manoeuvre Force, the Area Defence Forces and the Specific Forces for Joint Action. The Reconstitution Force consists of the Reconstitution Defence Forces.

This structure has been designed to make the necessary forces available to the particu-



lar Operational Command structure under which they are to perform their missions. The ground, naval or air forces needed to carry out operations may occasionally be transferred to a NATO Operational Command, as explained in Chapter VII.

M-60 tank platoon of the 12th Armoured Brigade.

The Manoeuvre Force is the Army's main and permanent core element. Its personnel and equipment are readily available and enable it to act rapidly in response to crisis situations. Its units reinforce the Area Defence Forces vis-à-vis any risk to territorial integrity or the exercise of sovereignty and implement Spain's international commitments overseas. They are also in a position to collaborate with the civil authorities in the event of natural disasters or similar events.

In order to perform these missions both nationally and in the framework of Spain's international commitments, the Manoeuvre Force comprises a Mechanised Division, a Spanish Rapid Reaction Division, a Mountain Brigade, a Cavalry Brigade and a Support Nucleus with the necessary fire support, combat support and logistic means.

The Area Defence Forces are responsible for the immediate defence of the insular regions or enclaves where they are stationed, within national territory, in accordance with the relevant Operations Plans. They also collaborate in civilian protection actions within their area of responsibility.

The Canary Islands Command and the Command Headquarters of the Balearic Islands and Ceuta and Melilla are part of these Forces.

The Specific Forces for Joint Action are those which, together with other elements of the Armed Services, contribute to developing joint capabilities such as military communications, and, as required, to the Air Defence Plans and Plans for the Control of the Strait of Gibraltar.

These forces are composed of: the Transmissions Command, which has a Strategic Transmissions Regiment, an Electronic Warfare Regiment and a Special Services Battalion; the Antiaircraft Artillery Command, with five regiment-sized units; and the Coastal Artillery Command, which has two regiments.

The Reconstitution Defence Forces help defend Spain's interests in conflicts requiring larger numbers of troops than the Standing Force has. Plans are drawn up for this pur-



pose in order to boost the operational capability of these units, including reception, posting and training of reservists, to keep their equipment operational and to provide support, as far as possible, to civil defence actions.

In order to ensure they are fit to perform their missions, these Forces are required to maintain three Infantry brigades, one Cavalry brigade, one Field Artillery regiment and one Specialist Engineers regiment organised, equipped and staffed at minimum level during peace time.

As the backbone of the Army, the Manoeuvre Force requires a design, resources and tasks that make it fit to perform its missions in the best possible way. Its structure must strike a balance between light and heavy components so as to provide a suitable combination of rapid reaction capability and combat power. Both types of units must be transportable to the area of operations, in or outside our sovereign territory. The existence of core groups of light and heavy forces enables task forces to be built up flexibly and gradually in response to the development of any crisis or conflict, increasing the potency of the force during escalation and progressively decreasing it during de-escalation.

The heavy forces of the Manoeuvre Force are the 1st Mechanised Division and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. The Division is the most potent element of the Manoeuvre Force. It basi-



cally comprises an Armoured brigade and two Mechanised brigades made up of Battle Tank and Mechanised Infantry battalions, though the proportions are different. It also has a divisional nucleus of troops which includes Self-propelled Artillery, Light Armoured Cavalry, Engineers, Signals, Antiaircraft Artillery and Logistic Support units.



These units are equipped with leading-edge technology, such as the Leopard tank and Pizarro combat vehicle, which provide their potent fighting force and manoeuvrability.

The Light Forces comprise the Spanish Rapid Reaction Division and the Mountain Brigade. The Spanish Rapid Reaction Division is equipped with the most readily available manoeuvre elements. It is made up of a Parachute Brigade, an Airborne Brigade and a Legion Brigade. These four brigades are equipped with light resources in order to facilitate their strategic mobility, particularly by air.

The brigades of the Spanish Rapid Reaction Division will be equipped with the latest in fire support and light weapons. The new 105mm light canon, the replacement of assault guns and the improvement in night vision equipment will boost their operational effectiveness considerably.

In order to perform their tasks, the Force's units—irrespective of the structure in which they are integrated—unavoidably require the presence of both combat and logistic support. On the one hand, the combat support units increase or complement the units' combat capability with their fire or specific tasks; on the other, the logistic support units ensure that resources are supplied at the right time and the right



Infantry troops boarding a FAMET (Army Airmobile Forces) Superpuma helicopter.

place, thereby helping fulfil the mission. The maximum centralisation of the support arms and their homogeneity with those of our allies make for a combination of economy of resources and the effective support which every operational organisation requires.

The Manoeuvre Force Support Nucleus comprises a set of combat, combat support and logistic support resources which can be used to reinforce the major units. It includes helicopter, special operations, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, engineers, transmissions, electronic warfare, intelligence, NBC defence and logistic support units.

The modernisation of the rocket-launch artillery, which is to equipped with a new multiple launch system (MLRS) in the future, and the modernisation of the command and control system to improve interoperability with the allies' system, will constitute a considerable advance.

In view of the growing importance of helicopters as suitable instruments for maintaining initiative in operations, mention should be made of the role of the Army Airmobile Forces, which include utility, cargo and attack helicopters, in this Support Nucleus. The first two kinds provide mobility and logistic support to the units. The third are platforms equipped with a broad range of weapons, such as antitank missiles.

The Manoeuvre Force is therefore a balanced formation with 4 light and 4 heavy

Formation of Chinook heavy-lift helicopters.

brigades, able to meet, in a joint framework, the operational needs required in both national and international scenarios.



In peace and crisis management operations where it may be necessary to intervene with extreme urgency, it can mobilise forces which are immediately available and have a limited though sufficient capability for any type of crisis. The size deemed appropriate to provide this type of immediate response is, at most, one of the four existing light brigades. Provision should be made in advance for relieving the brigade used, which means that the others should be permanently trained and equipped.

203mm M-110 self-propelled howitzer.

In limited armed conflict and widespread conflict scenarios, the heavy forces should be fit to engage in high-intensity combat and to withstand the effects of weapons of mass destruction. They will base their response capability on the high level of training of their units and on their technologically advanced equipment, which will enable them to act with precision from long distances, achieve the maximum result from surveillance and alert actions and engage in combat at any time. Their rapid response reaction will enable a major maximum division-size force to make a timely intervention after the outbreak of the crisis. The performance of operations in the international framework will highlight the importance of the interoperability of the different technological and human systems.

APPENDIX C

THE NAVY

The basic characteristics of the naval forces are determined by the maritime environment and its ways of action. The sea is an open space which can be freely crossed, without affecting the sovereignty of any other State, near the place where our interests lie. Ships can remain at sea for long periods with full autonomy, and this enables the forces deployed in an area of operations to act when ordered to, applying different capabilities flexibly: surface, air, amphibious, submarine, minesweeping and maritime surveillance.

The chief mission of the Navy is to ensure the free use of the maritime routes, which are a particularly significant interest in the case of Spain, as it is a country with a vast coastline, archipelagos and enclaves, heavily dependent on trade and on the exploitation of marine resources. However, the strategic environment does not pose great risks for navigation. Therefore, the navies of the allied countries—particularly that of Spain—currently gear their capabilities to exerting influence from the sea over coastal areas of operations far from national territory in what is also a characteristic mission of the Navy.

These capabilities constitute a type of action that is particularly suited to crisis scenarios, even when the latter occur in very remote theatres where our interests are affected, or where co-operation with the allies should take place. When this situation is not clearly defined and developments are difficult to predict, the strategic mobility and freedom of action of the naval forces make a unique contribution to the joint effort. Depending on how the crisis develops, they provide time for the intervention of most of the ground and air forces, co-operating in their deployment and strengthening or supporting their action in the area of operations.

The characteristic mobility of ships, their logistical self-sufficiency and the possibility of furnishing them with supplies at sea are factors which facilitate the incorporation of naval units to the multinational formations established in crisis situations. These factors make them a valuable instrument for providing a prompt international response in scenarios of this type and enable Spain to make a timely and effective contribution to controlling such crises.

The Fleet is the Navy's backbone. Its Headquarters are based in Rota (Cádiz). It is made up of ships, aircraft and Marine troops which, once organised into task forces to carry out specific missions nationally or in an allied environment, provide the suitable capabilities for acting in a particular area of operations.

In addition to those belonging to the Fleet, the Navy assigns other forces to the Cantabrian, Strait of Gibraltar,







Canary Islands and Mediterranean Maritime Zone Commands. These area forces are responsible for exercising sovereignty in Spanish waters, protecting shipping and providing operational and logistical aid to the Fleet in the maritime area linked to Spain's permanent strategic interests.

Numancia *and* Reina Sofía *frigates.*

The Fleet forces are organised into groups, depending on the type of missions they are to perform, and into flotillas or squadrons, according to their basic characteristics. This structure makes it easier to train and prepare them in general.

The Alpha Group is a combat group consisting of the *Príncipe de Asturias* aircraft carrier, with carrier-based air resources and six *Santa María* class frigates of the 41st Squadron which act as an escort and provide the support needed for operations. Depending on the mission, other units can temporarily be assigned to the Group.

The surface air capability of the Combat Group is geared to maintaining sufficient naval superiority in a campaign in order to act in crisis situations, protect shipping routes and exert influence over the land through amphibious operations, air incursions and other actions.

Diana *corvette launching Sea Sparrow missiles.*

Spain pioneered the use of Short Take Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) craft from naval platforms and is currently one of the most experienced

countries in the world in this launch option. This makes it economically feasible for a nation with medium-level resources to have carrier-borne aircraft. The Navy is therefore able to deploy with great flexibility in remote scenarios, without depending totally on support from ground-based aviation.

In addition to the *Santa María* class frigates, the Fleet has five *Baleares* class frigates that make up the 31st Squadron, which is based in Ferrol. As the leading escort ships, both classes possess considerable anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air capabilities thanks to their carrier-borne sensors, weapons and helicopters. These vessels are essential in any operational formation and for controlling the sea.

When the new F-100 frigates, currently under construction, come into service, they will boost the Navy's anti-surface and anti-air possibilities considerably and provide new capabilities for joint air defence against theatre missiles.

The six *Descubierta* class corvettes of the 21st Squadron, based in Cartagena, complete the Fleet's escort ships. The corvettes are light vessels, which, though limited by their small size and weapons systems, are well suited to monitoring missions in restricted waters and to protecting shipping.

The Navy's amphibious capability is centred on the Delta Group and on the Marine Brigade. In the current strategic framework, the use of amphibious forces offers a unique possibility of acting flexibly in a crisis situation by maintaining troops at sea in the area of operations. These troops have the capacity to carry out limited-goal actions, evacuate non-combatants, control logistic terminals for





the subsequent landing of other forces and support ground operations. Owing to their expeditionary capability, the Marine units are also ideally suited to performing peace missions.

The Delta Group is an amphibious group consisting of the naval assault resources designed to project the Marine landing forces on the ground. It will basically consist of two large *Galicia* class landing platform dock ships, the second of which will be incorporated into the Fleet in July 2001. Each of these vessels has a wide flight deck and dock for operating helicopters, craft and amphibious vehicles. Also part of the Delta Group are two *Hernán Cortés* class tank landing ships. During operations, escort ships and other units are assigned to the Group to protect and support it.

The Marine Brigade, organically integrated into the Tercio de Armada, provides the troops needed to make up the landing forces. It comprises two Infantry Battalions, a Mechanised Group with M-60 and Scorpion tanks and amphibious vehicles, in addition to TOW vehicle-mounted antitank missiles, an Artillery Battalion made up of two 105mm batteries and a 155mm ATP battery, one MISTRAL anti-air missile battery, a Combat Service Support Group, an Air Support Group and a Special Operations Unit.

A LAMPS helicopter lands on the deck of a FFG frigate.

The units of the Fleet Air Arm are grouped organically into the Naval Aircraft Flotilla. These comprise over sixty aircraft, including seventeen Harriers, six SH-60B LAMPS III helicopters, three electronic warfare (SH-3D) helicopters, nine

A Marine commando is transferred to a Delfín *class submarine.*

anti-submarine warfare (SH-3D) helicopters, ten AB-212 helicopters for tactical transport of landing forces, ten Hughes-500 reconnaissance and training helicopters and three Cessna Citation aircraft for logistic use.

The Navy's submarine capability is underpinned by the Submarine Flotilla, which consists of four *Galerna* class and four *Delfín* class submarines. The former are able to operate autonomously for 45 days. The latter, owing to their smaller size, lower noise level and manoeuvrability, are very difficult to detect and neutralise.

The Fleet has two logistic support ships, Combat Supply Ship *Patiño* and Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment Ship *Marqués de la Ensenada*. The purpose of the first is chiefly to provide logistic support (fuel, water, ammunition and provisions) to the operational groups to enable them to remain for long periods at sea. The second ensures fuel supplies.

The Maritime Area Forces, which provide support to naval operations, include mine countermeasures ships, training ships, hydrographic and oceanographic ships and maritime surveillance units. The Marine units in charge of base defence and security are also assigned to the Maritime Areas.

The Navy's mine countermeasures capability is based on a Flotilla consisting of four minehunters and eight minesweepers. This Flotilla is currently being upgraded with four new *Segura* class minehunters, the first of which was delivered to the Navy in 1999.

The hydrographic and oceanographic ships conduct intense scientific activities. Special mention should be made of the scientific campaigns of the *Hespérides* in the Antarctic, where it operates with the Council for Scientific Research and the Juan Carlos I Antarctic Base.

Hespérides *oceanographic research ship sailing through ice floes on its first Antarctic campaign.*

APPENDIX D

THE AIR FORCE

The main characteristics of the Air Force derive precisely from the environment in which its operations are conducted, which is not bound by geographical barriers and extends uninterruptedly over land and sea. Air superiority is a prior consideration in planning and developing any military operation nowadays.

The Spanish Air Force comprises a set of human and material resources whose purpose is to project military potential at any time with an extremely rapid response and great precision, even to a long range. It can thus exert a decisive influence on a particular situation from the air and space, at the time and place required to defend national interests. It is a cost-effective and suitable instrument for managing and controlling crises, and for supporting Spain's external action. It is also a necessary element for achieving the superiority required prior to the action of ground and naval forces.

The Air Force possesses a permanent rapid reaction and projection capability. It maintains a high degree of availability at all times—there are always aircraft ready to take off immediately on air defence missions. For other operations, or in crisis situations, to have aircraft ready and on the alert with a substantial combat or transport capability is a small supplementary effort to be made on top of daily training operations, and enables strategic decisions to be implemented shortly after being taken.

This capability is based on the three characteristic tenets of air power. The first of these is flexibility, which stems from its special advantage in handling time and space, high availability and ability to concentrate and disperse substantial firepower with few resources.

The second key factor is precision, as the close relationship between technology and air power makes it possible to switch almost immediately from delivering heavy attacks to pinpointing targets exactly, depending on the most appropriate course of action. Guided weapons and modern integrated navigation and firing systems enable effects to be concentrated, targets to be pinpointed exactly and collateral damage to be avoided.

F-18 fighters from the 15th Group, Zaragoza Base.

The third tenet is effectiveness, which was evidenced both in the recent Gulf War, the air operations over Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Kosovo conflict. It is a determining factor in the different related peace processes as it allows strikes against core or peripheral areas and strategic, operational or tactical objectives to be achieved directly, indistinctly and in any order.

Another air force capability that has proved to be an ideal tool for controlling crises and conflicts of the sort which erupt nowadays is capacity for gradual action, which enables the damage to be inflicted on the target to be controlled at will, thereby achieving the appropriate proportionality.

The air forces have the equally valuable possibility of acting with a minimum risk from either inside or outside the area of operations, minimising both their own casualties and even those of the enemy.

A rapid concentration capability is another of the noteworthy characteristics of the air forces, which enables them to operate in coalition. Concentration can be carried out in proportion to the threat and objective, in order to achieve a firepower ranging from massive to much more selective and accurate. The opposite action, dispersion, can also be carried out very easily and quickly.

In order to fulfil the missions to which it is assigned, the Air Force currently performs many tasks. The principal task is the permanent surveillance and control, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, of the air space over which Spain has sovereignty and the equally permanent availability of fighter aircraft, which are maintained on alert. The resources allocated to this mission are basically a Command and Control System made up of a network of Air Surveillance squadrons and a Mobile Air Control group, command and control centres, fighter squadrons and air defence resources.

Another important task is surface raids, namely operations directed against ground

Two F-18s refuel from a B-707 tanker.

and maritime targets to destroy, neutralise or degrade the adversary's military power and support the surface forces.

Surveillance, aerial reconnaissance and intelligence enable the necessary information to be obtained to exercise control over air space and plan and carry out operations. The Air Force has three squadrons for electronic reconnaissance, aerial photography and photographic reconnaissance. It also operates with optical reconnaissance equipment through the Helios satellite and belongs to the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force.

Air transport is a crucial capability nowadays in order to achieve self-deployment, the projection of surface forces and their sustained activity in the areas of operations.

Air-to-air refuelling is indispensable, as it multiplies an air force's capabilities by allowing aircraft to be maintained in flight in areas of operations that are particularly far away from their bases.

The Air Force can perform a variety of special aerial missions. These are specifically carried out by the Aerial Deployment Support Detachment (EADA) and the Parachute Sapper Detachment (EZAPAC).

In addition to its military tasks, the Air Force performs other non-military missions for the benefit of society, such as surveillance, reconnaissance, identification, intervention and support to general air traffic, and trans-

Canadair hydroplane during a mission to extinguish a forest fire.



sary, use the Air Force in a resolved, permanent and effective manner in peace, crisis and war situations, ensuring the rapid reaction capability and projection of forces:

- Headquarters in Torrejón de Ardoz (Madrid), consisting of an Operational Staff, administrative branches and services.

port in connection with humanitarian support, customs surveillance operations, counter-narcotics, monitoring of species, and support to the meteorological service and to the National Security Forces.

The Air Force's co-operation activities cover many other missions, such as providing the Search and Rescue Service, supporting the civil aviation and maritime rescue authorities, defending the environment by extinguishing fires, collaborating with the health service and universities, and supporting and promoting the national aeronautical industry and space activities, among others.

In order to perform the missions to which it is assigned, the Air Combat Command (MACOM) has the duty to control and defend the airspace for which it is responsible. It is required to reject any aggression and ensure a gradual and proportioned reaction, plan and lead peacekeeping and other operations and co-operate in the planning and execution of joint and joint/combined operations.

For this purpose, it has a structure which enables it to exercise deterrence and, if neces-

- An Air Operations Centre, under the commander-in-chief of the Air Operations Command, which is operationally responsible for several air surveillance squadrons equipped with radars and communications that exercise the surveillance and guidance of aerial resources and the command and control centres in Zaragoza and Gando (Gran Canaria). The Air Defence System has the necessary links to ensure permanent communications with the airbases and aircraft in flight.
- Airforce units, with air resources for performing their missions. These units are structured as follows:

Combat units, consisting of:

– 6 F-18 aircraft squadrons deployed in Torrejón de Ardoz, Zaragoza, Morón and Gando;

– 3 F-1 aircraft squadrons at the Los Llanos airbase (Albacete);

– 1 maritime patrol squadron, with P-3 Orión aircraft;

– A command and control system.

– Short-range air-defence equipment for the self-defence of bases and facilities.

Combat support units:

– 1 tactical aerial reconnaissance squadron with Phantom (RF-4C) aircraft.

– 1 transport and air-to-air refuelling squadron with Boeing-707 aircraft, based in Torrejón de Ardoz.



– 7 transport squadrons with Hércules C-130 transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft deployed in Zaragoza, C-235 aircraft in Getafe (Madrid) and C-212 aircraft based in Villanubla (Valladolid) and Gando (Gran Canaria).

C-130 Hercules aircraft of the 31st Wing.

– 3 search and rescue squadrons with Fokker F-27 aircraft and Puma and Super Puma helicopters, based in Gando (Canary Islands), Son San Juan (Palma de Mallorca) and Cuatro Vientos (Madrid).

– 1 electronic warfare squadron with Boeing 707, Falcon 20 and C-212 aircraft.

– The Mobile Air Control Group (GRUMOCA), which has radar and communications equipment and is highly flexible, enabling it to support the air forces in different scenes of action.

– 2 units of special forces: the Air Deployment Support Detachment (EADA) and the Parachute Sapper Detachment (EZAPAC); the former supports air deployment and the second is used in special operations strictly speaking.

Auxiliary air units which, though not directly involved in combat or combat sup-

F-18 armed with HARPOON missiles.

The Air Force that Spain will have at the beginning of the 21st century has been planned well in advance and is currently taking shape through different programmes to acquire and modernise weapons, materiel and infrastructure and through the training and preparation of its personnel.

The Air Force of the new millennium is being shaped to provide an appropriate response, in the new geostrategic environment, to the different risks and challenges which Spain must face in the field of security and defence. It is increasingly important in future for the air forces to be able to act as integrated elements of the different European and Euro-Atlantic multinational structures. The Spanish Air Force will therefore have the capacity to operate in an integrated fashion both in NATO and within the European defence organisations.

It will furthermore have a greater capacity to project forces within a multinational environment to areas where our presence is required to help avert and manage crises, and to back peace operations and government decisions.

port, complement and aid the action of the other units. They have several squadrons for training air force pilots. There is also one squadron which supports the military parachuting school, 2 squadrons for transporting personnel (aircraft and helicopters), 1 squadron to combat forest fires and 1 squadron of specialised services (retraining of pilots, towing targets, etc.).

All these units are deployed in airbases and military aerodromes across Spain, which are classified, according to their capability, into principal operational, deployment and reserve bases. The aeronautical facilities of some of these bases are open to civilian air traffic or are shared with other national aeronautical entities.

APPENDIX E

THE SPANISH ARMED FORCES IN THE MULTINATIONAL SPHERE

Spain's defence and security commitments extend particularly to the areas of the Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the Western European Union, and are basically regulated by the mutual defence clause of the Washington and amended Brussels treaties. Like the rest of the allied countries, Spain contributes most of its defence resources to shared security and has made the whole of its Army Manoeuvre Force and Fleet available to NATO, as well as all its air force combat, combat support and transport squadrons. All these forces are also at the disposal of the Western European Union.

The aforementioned commitments include, among others, pledging forces to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Allied Mobile Force (AMF). Spain has also assigned a frigate to the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and another to the NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), participates in the Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean (CAFMED) and has recently committed a minesweeper to the Mine Countermeasures Force Mediterranean (MCMFORMED), which became active in May 1999. It is also part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEW).

The new crisis management missions arising from the new strategic environment, which are geared mainly to peacekeeping and projecting stability, led to agreements between some NATO and WEU members over the 90s to establish multinational forces which can be used more effectively in operations of this kind.

Spain, in response to this need, has committed itself politically and militarily to several of the most important initiatives. The

most noteworthy of these are its contributions of forces to the European Corps (EUROCORPS), the European Rapid Deployment Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR). Finally, in mid-1999, Spain agreed to take part in the European Air Group (EUROAIRGROUP), thereby consolidating its participation in the European multinational land, air and naval forces. On the bilateral plane, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (FAHI/SIAF) was activated in 1998. The initiative was coordinated with the two nations' participation in CAFMED and EUROMARFOR.

STANAVFORMED breaks up a formation after being relieved in the Mediterranean.

Like other countries, Spain has supplied units for setting up UN Stand-By Forces and the Minister of Defence has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN Secretary-General on the number, type and arrangement of Spanish forces for this formation. Among other capabilities, Spain has offered an infantry brigade-sized unit, a squadron of transport aircraft, naval assets that vary according to the mission in question, personnel for the international headquarters and military observers.

Army observer at Mount Hum (Bosnia Herzegovina).

EUROCORPS, like EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR and EUROAIRGROUP, are truly European initiatives that stem from the determination to shape a European security and defence identity and strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They therefore welcome the participation of any WEU member States who wish to collaborate.



European Corps (EUROCORPS)

On 14 October 1991, the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany, countries which set up a combined brigade in 1987, informed the President of the Council of Europe of their intention to establish a corps which could be joined by other WEU members. The official decision to establish EUROCORPS was finally taken on 22 May 1992 at the Franco-German summit of La Rochelle.

Later, in June 1992, a provisional military arm was established at Strasbourg with the aim of setting up the General Staff of the Eurocorps, which became fully operational on 1 July 1994. On 22 June 1993, the Belgian Council of Ministers submitted a request for its country to be allowed to join. Spain joined the project on 1 July 1994 followed by Luxembourg a few months later.

EUROCORPS is a major unit consisting of ground force divisions from Germany, Belgium, Spain and France, and smaller units from Luxembourg. It has a permanent headquarters in Strasbourg. Spain's Brunete I Mechanised Division currently takes part in the Corps.

EUROCORPS is a common instrument managed by the governments of the nations which make it up, and the decision to use its units therefore falls to the respective member nations. Its missions can be carried out in the framework of the WEU, as expressed at the latter's Council of Ministers held in Rome on 19 May 1993, or as part of NATO operations.

In accordance with the foregoing, this unit may be used for the following missions:

- Common defence of the allies, pursuant to Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington or Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.
- Peacekeeping or peacemaking.
- Humanitarian operations.

At the Cologne and Helsinki summits held in 1999, support was given to the possibility that EUROCORPS could become a European Rapid Action Force by 2003. It was therefore considered appropriate to trans-

EUROCORPS flags.

form its composition and structure and enhance its role in European defence.

European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) and European Rapid Deployment Force (EUROFOR)

The idea of promoting the creation of an on-call (as opposed to non-permanently constituted) European naval air force emerged at the meeting of the Spanish, French and Italian defence ministers which took place in Rome in September 1992.

After this idea was presented to the Group of Defence Representatives of the WEU on October 1 that same year, the May 1993 Council of Ministers in Rome set the Planning Cell the task of developing it, thus giving rise to Plan Combined Endeavour.

In October 1993, during the tripartite exercise known as "Ardente", the defence ministers of the three countries agreed at Grosseto to resume the initial project to develop the force in a trilateral framework, adding a ground force to provide a greater fire projection capability. The initial studies were begun in 1994 and followed by the drawing up of the instruments constituting two interdependent forces: a naval force, called the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) and a ground force, known as the European Rapid Deployment Force (EUROFOR).

The purpose of establishing these two forces was none other than to provide a European response capability in line with the new missions defined by the WEU in the Petersberg Declaration, such as humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peacemaking, and crisis management.

The performance of these missions should not prevent its units taking part in common defence operations as provided in the amended Brussels Treaty and the Washington Treaty.

The founding documents were signed by the representatives of the three nations on 15 May 1995 in Lisbon, moments before the WEU Council of Ministers began. Portugal joined both forces on this same occasion.

EUROFOR has a maximum size of a light, and easily deployable division. Its permanent multinational headquarters are in Florence. Spain contributes a brigade-sized military capability to this force.

Since it became active in June 1998, EUROFOR has carried out all kinds of exercises as

training for the missions which could be entrusted to it. Members of its headquarters likewise take part in the missions under way in the former Yugoslavia to keep its working procedures up to date.

One of the EUROCORPS Operations Centres during the Cobra *exercise.*

EUROMARFOR is a pre-structured, non-permanent maritime force with a naval air and amphibious capability, and its forces are drawn from the aforementioned countries. Its Command rotates among the naval commands of the participant nations. Spain contributes units from its Alpha and Delta Combat Groups and an armoured infantry battalion, in addition to the headquarters of the Marine Brigade when its turn comes to command a landing force of this size.

European Air Group

Spain joined the European Air Group in July 1999. This Group was set up to enhance the European Security and Defence Identity with respect to use of the air forces. It stems from the 1995 London Declaration signed by the United Kingdom and France to step up the co-ordination of their air forces, particularly in air defence, air-to-air refuelling and military air transport. Italy, Germany, Belgium and Holland subsequently joined.

This joint effort will enable the participant countries to improve their air transport capability in Petersberg-type missions and in joint combined air operations when the European (EF-2000) combat aircraft comes into service from 2002.

This Group does not have any permanently assigned forces. It has a permanently established General Staff made up of personnel from the member states, who are based in High Wycombe (United Kingdom).

Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (FAHI/SIAF)

At the Spanish-Italian Summit of Heads of Government, which took place in Bologna on 10 September 1997, the Defence Ministers of these two nations signed a Joint Declaration providing for the establishment of a Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force. In order to put this initiative into practice, the Italian and Spanish Chiefs of the Defence Staff developed a detailed concept, which was signed during the Bonn meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff on 27 October that same year.

This pre-structured force springs from the convergence of existing national forces, and is similar in terms of troops to the Anglo-

Flags of the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Brigade.

Dutch Landing Force. It is designed to provide a major nucleus of amphibious capability in the Southern Region. It does not require the establishment of a new headquarters—it merely involves the permanent exchange of a nucleus of officers between general staffs. The national components will maintain their organic and operational chains of command.

The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force is another bilateral contribution to the European Security and Defence Identity. Its missions will be collective defence and peace support and humanitarian assistance operations. It will be available to NATO and the WEU, and could be integrated into EUROMARFOR and used to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions or those of the OSCE or other international security organisations.

The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force is made up of naval components and landing forces. The Spanish naval component comprises units of the Fleet Delta Group. The Spanish landing force component is drawn from the Marine Brigade. Command rotates between the two nations. Two commanders are appointed, one for the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force and the other for the Spanish-Italian Landing Force, and are normally of the same nationality.

The FAHI/SIAF will be used following a common decision made by Italy and Spain, chiefly in a multinational context and within the multinational structures to which they belong—particularly the Combined Allied Force Mediterranean (CAFMED), which operates under the NATO Southern Command, and in the framework of the WEU, as part of EUROMARFOR.

APPENDIX F

PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

Peace Operations

Peace operations may range from simple humanitarian assistance to the complex task of making peace between two adversaries. They are based on the principles of legitimacy, multinationality and limited use of force. They also require certain negotiating and mediation skills, though their real effectiveness undoubtedly depends on the legitimate effective power that backs their actions as a whole. This legitimacy stems from the consensus of the international community, through shared security organisations and, in some cases, from the application of the principle of intervention for humanitarian reasons when there is serious human rights violation.

Since 1945, over a hundred conflicts have taken place in the world. The United Nations intervened for the first time in Palestine in 1948, before Spain joined the UN, to supervise the truce that followed the first Arab-Israeli clash. Between then and 1988, thirteen such operations were recorded.

Since the Cold War ended there has been an increase in this type of activity. Thirty eight peace support operations have been organised, nineteen of which are led directly by the United Nations, and the others have been carried out by different regional organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union and NATO, in accordance with a Security Council resolution. Most of them were conducted in the nineties. As a reference, the UN has organised forty eight operations, of which sixteen are still active. Seventy five countries take part in these operations with over fourteen thousand men, not to mention the almost eighty thousand serving in the former Yugoslavia.

Legion checkpoint in Kosovo.

A major difference between early and current peace operations lies in the type of conflicts. Whereas the first operations were undertaken to mediate in conflicts between states such as Palestine or Kashmir, nowadays they are usually a response to internal disputes, as in the cases of Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan.

Another distinctive characteristic of the new peace operations is the intervention of large military contingents to enable the international organisations to perform their tasks and also allow the activity of non-governmental organisations, which in many cases provide the initial urgent response to humanitarian problems while multinational intervention is decided on.

The possibility of having to resort to use of force to achieve peace in some cases makes the military one of the most suitable instruments for carrying out operations to support peace and humanitarian assistance. Although they are obviously not designed for such missions, there is no doubt that they are the only organisations truly capable of performing them.

It should be borne in mind that operations of this kind have certain special qualities. On the one hand, they require military units previously to have undergone specific training to familiarise them with tasks which are not habitually required of them and appear strange to them. But on the other, it is necessary to avoid the risk of specialising some units almost exclusively in peace operations, as this would distort the primary purpose for which they were conceived, as military units.

We should therefore realise that military units are suitable for peace operations precisely because they are prepared for combat, and that is the key to their deterrent power and effectiveness.

United Nations

Article 24 of the United Nations Charter vests the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and Chapter VII empowers the organisation to adopt coercive measures when peace is endangered.

The United Nations is the international organisation with the most experience in planning, deploying and directing peacekeeping operations. Not in vain have fifty years elapsed since it deployed its first mission of military observers to the Middle East in June 1948, and over forty since the first



blue-helmet operation was implemented in the Suez area in 1956.

The UN's pre-eminence has been acknowledge by other international organisations which, as set forth in Chapter VIII of the Charter, are taking on tasks delegated by the Organisation in the field of conflict prevention and management. In this chapter, the States party reaffirm their intention to strengthen regional peace by participating in regional arrangements.

The Programme for Peace, launched in 1992 by the then United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Boutros Ghali, rationalised and consolidated the specific instruments established in the framework of the United Nations to prevent, control and put an end to conflicts. These crisis-management instruments, the overall term for which is Peace Support Operations, could be defined as multinational operations, directed by an international organisation lawfully empowered to do so and normally under the aegis of the United Nations, which are designed to eliminate threats to international peace and security by peaceful means or by making use of force, keeping this to an essential minimum.

These operations consist of a series of interrelated measures, such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building and peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance. These measures can be carried out in accordance with the related resolution established by the United Nations or by the OSCE, which, following the 1992 Helsinki Conference, became the UN's regional organisation, adopting the latter's same principles.

In order to meet the United Nations' requirements for organising peace support operations in a timely and effective manner,

the need arose to ascertain previously what forces each country could supply for missions of this kind, capable of deploying at very short notice. The consolidation of this idea is the so-called system of Stand-by Forces.

Refugees at the camp set up by the 1st Mountain Brigade at Hamallaj (Albania).

In 1999 Spain signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Secretariat with a view to formalising our participation in this system as another means of strengthening our commitment to peace support operations. Our contribution to this system is dealt with in Appendix E.

In this connection, on 10 June 1998, Spain also became an observer at the meetings of Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), an organisation which currently has nine members and a further two in the process of joining. Spain's contribution will be decided on in 2000.

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Spain's participation in peace operations is not limited exclusively to the UN; it also contributes to initiatives launched by the OSCE, which, as stated earlier, was proclaimed a regional arrangement itself, as provided in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. At the 1992 Ministerial Council of Rome, the OSCE established the principles governing the peacekeeping operations it was to organise and lead.

These principles could be summed up as respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the member States, consent of parties, impartiality and transparency, multinationality, adherence to the political process for settling conflicts, the existence of a clear mandate and a plan for ordered withdrawal.

OSCE has been most active in the fields of preventive diplomacy or preventive action and peacemaking. Particular mention should be made of the participation of members of the Spanish Armed Forces in OSCE operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Moldova, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo and Albania.

Spain's contribution

The Guidance on National Defence 1/96 states that Spain, convinced that its security is indissolubly linked to that of its neighbouring countries, is fully committed to achieving a more stable and secure international order based on peaceful co-existence, the defence of democracy and human rights

and respect for the rules of international law, and that this commitment is evidenced by our presence and determined participation in peace operations.

Spain joined the peace missions in December 1988, when the Government decided to respond affirmatively to the request by the United Nations Secretary-General for a group of Spanish military observers to take part in the verification mission in Angola (UNAVEM).

Since then, Spain has promoted or taken part in many humanitarian and peace-support initiatives arising from the international community, particularly in the allied environment. Spain's generous contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the world has entailed a major effort for our country and a high price in terms of lives of Spanish troops (19 have died in action) and materiel (over Ptas177bn since we began to participate in such operations in 1988).

The current presence of over 3,000 Spanish military personnel in peace operations in different parts of the world has logically led the international community to acknowledge Spain as a country that is responsible, capable, reliable and committed to defending the United Nations principles.

In this connection, in order to convey the experience gained over these past years, the first courses on peace operations and international humanitarian law have been organised and taught in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Spanish Red Cross. These

Spain's military effort in the Balkans

	Kosovo	Bosnia-Herz.
Personnel	1,200	1,560
BMRs	83	67
Missiles		
• MILAN	10	22
• TOW	2	0
Helicopters	0	2
Radar		
• *Mesta*	0	2
• *Arine*	1	0
Mortars		
• Heavy mortars	0	8
• Medium-weight m.	12	4
Engineering mach*	7	44

* Snow ploughs, backhoes, cranes, cement-mixers, bulldozers...

Medical officer seeing to refugees at a field health facility in Albania.

courses have been attended by officers from Ibero-America, Eastern Europe and Africa, as well as from Spain.

Humanitarian assistance operations

When human disasters occur—whether owing to natural causes or as a result of war—the international community, pressured by public opinion, faces the need to come to the urgent aid to the victims and, more often than not, in hostile conditions. Armed Forces' availability and deterrent capability once again make them the most appropriate instruments for performing such tasks.

Humanitarian crises are characterised by their unforeseeable nature and substantial repercussions, not only where they occur but also in the surrounding area.

Saturation of public services, infrastructure damage and price imbalances mean that it is not enough for foreign aid merely to save lives. It is necessary to transport and distribute aid, and provide basic services and medical care. These tasks can be carried out by non-governmental organisations. However, the lack of security in the environment calls for military presence to provide protection.

The experience in peace missions can be applied to humanitarian assistance operations, an example of which is the action of our forces in the Kurdish region or Central America.

APPENDIX G

SECURITY AND DEFENCE DOCUMENTS

MODIFIED BRUSSELS TREATY

Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as amended by the "Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty" (Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954)

[The High Contracting Parties]

Resolved:

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty of collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organise and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented, but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialised agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialised agencies.

They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article IV

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Article V

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article VI

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article VII

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

Article VIII

1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organisations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

2. This Council shall be known as the "Council of Western European Union"; it shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.

3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Article IX

The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Article X

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions;

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that Party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

Article XI

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.

Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

Article XII

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: •on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; •on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

BARCELONA DECLARATION

Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 28 Nov 1995 by the EU. Memberstates, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Palestinian Authority

(Only the chapter on Political and Security partnership is included)

The participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona:

- stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history;
- aware that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response;
- resolved to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants;
- regarding this multilateral framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of bilateral relations which it is important to safeguard, while laying stress on their specific nature;
- stressing that this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success. The participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, with all that this implies;
- convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership,
- hereby agree to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants - the Euro-Mediterranean partnership - through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability

The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal. To this end they agree to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability.

In this spirit they undertake in the following declaration of principles to:

- act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party;
- develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system;

- respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex;
- give favourable consideration, through dialogue between the parties, to exchanges of information on matters relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia;
- respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. The participants stress the importance of proper education in the matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- respect their sovereign equality and all rights inherent in their sovereignty, and fulfil in good faith the obligations they have assumed under international law;
- respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States, as reflected in agreements between relevant parties;
- refrain, in accordance with the rules of international law, from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another partner; respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;
- settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force, and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law;
- strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, in particular by ratifying and applying the international instruments they have signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure;
- fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and combat the drugs problem in all its aspects;
- promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.
- The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.
- Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.
- Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CWC.
- Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation.
- consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Signed on 2 October 1997. Entered into force on 1 May 1999

TITLE V

PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Article 11

1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

Article 17

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article 13 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU.

When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision taking in the WEU.

Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48.

REPORT OF THE JOINT, NON-PERMANENT CONGRESS-SENATE COMMISSION ESTABLISHING THE FORMULA AND TIMESCALE FOR THE FULL PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

Approved by the Congress of Deputies in full session on 28 May 1998 and by the Senate in full session on 9 June the same year

1. General framework: Defence and security in the world

1.1. The change in the international strategic environment

Throughout the last decade of the 20th century, Europe has experienced a period of deep changes in international relations as a result of the demise of the former Soviet Union and the fact that the countries which had fallen under its influence after the Second World War regained their sovereignty and independence. This has resulted in a totally different European security environment from the one which gave rise to the creation of the former antagonistic blocs.

The decline in the Soviet military threat, which had widespread and immediate effects on the security of the western allies, marked the end of the bipolar world and, generally speaking, enabled the European political and strategic situation to change towards an age of greater stability which is gradually becoming consolidated thanks to the transparency and confidence- and security-building measures implemented in recent years. These measures have been conducive to the establishment of new relations based on dialogue and co-operation between the former adversaries, have succeeded in averting the threat of a massive and immediate attack and, consequently, have transformed the international strategic environment.

However, the disappearance of bipolarity, a characteristic of the Cold War, has led to an absence of conflicts, as envisaged in the 1990 Charter of Paris. On the contrary, it has been unable to prevent the emergence, in the centre and periphery of Europe, of a series of conflicts, which, though of limited size, have had significant international repercussions.

Paradoxically, the disappearance of a major enemy has not resulted in the desired stability, because the appearance of small conflicts has given rise to a more complex situation of uncertainty than the previous single, monolithic threat. Now we must face what have come to be called multidirectional and multifaceted risks and challenges, which require new solutions.

This new strategic environment has caused the western concepts of security and defence to evolve. The traditional concept of security was basically focused on military aspects with the changes that occurred; the new concept is based on a more global view of security, which takes into account the concepts of stability and co-operation, including social, economic, ecological and other factors.

In the domestic sphere, stability has been achieved in the social structures, in addition to a level of social wellbeing and maturity which, in itself, inspires security and protection. Externally, nations have built a sufficient degree of confidence with neighbouring countries through bilateral agreements or membership of the supranational organisations in which dialogue takes priority over any other manner of settling differences.

As a result, national defence, though primarily the responsibility of each State, is tending not be approached individually but from a supranational perspective, with the conviction that security concerns everyone and that its problems are settled between everyone. A new concept of shared security is thus emerging.

Therefore, without neglecting self-defence capability, nations are required to make an effort to respond to the most likely risks and challenges and are called on to undertake new missions, which are generally settled in the international sphere in response to mandates of supranational organisations.

In pursuit of the so-called "peace dividend", all nations are showing a tendency to reduce the size of their forces and increase their dependence on multinational organisations in defence and security aspects, as they consider them to be better equipped to respond more effectively to the conditioning factors of the new strategic situation.

1.2. The European and transatlantic framework of security and defence

It is thus a fact that one of the most important consequences of the strategic changes witnessed in the past ten years is the strengthening of collective security and defence organisations. Autarkic approaches to defence based on national self-sufficiency have been superseded and, while the conceptions of security and defence based on nations' own military capabilities are still valid, political and military co-operation is sought between nations as a means of obtaining greater security at a lower cost.

This international co-operation in defence and security issues is generally promoted under the aegis of institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This affords legitimacy, international backing and moral force to the military operations that are carried out to enforce or maintain peace in the world. It is always the best way of meeting common security and defence interests, through multinational action, which is the raison d'être of organisations such as the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). Third, it fosters mutual knowledge between countries which share and respect the same principles and, finally, on an internal domestic plane, it promotes a size and structure of Armed Forces that are compatible, interoperable and coherent with the external environment in which they could be called upon to act, though they should in any event retain their ability to respond to national defence needs.

Although it enshrines and legitimises global initiatives in security and disarmament matters, the United Nations Organisation lacks a military capability. This seriously constrains its possibility of intervening, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has the same limitations as regards military, budgetary and decision-making resources. Therefore, their action is always conditioned to the will of the member nations to respond individually or collectively to these organisations' requests to achieve the maintenance of peace and security in the world.

This does not mean we should not recognise the role that both organisations have been playing in the sphere of peacekeeping or peace imposition and conflict prevention, in which Spain, over the past decade, has taken an active part in many international actions, in accordance with Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations, which points out that forces under UN mandate can only be used with the consent of the conflicting parties to maintain peace, help end hostilities and prevent them being resumed.

The Atlantic Alliance is the principal security organisation in Europe and the world. NATO furthermore contributes a transatlantic dimension to the framework of European security.

At the same time, the Alliance has successfully renewed itself by opening its doors to new countries and shaping a military structure to adapt it to the new circumstances.

Although it is an organisation of sovereign nations and is based on the fundamental principle of consensus, NATO is characterised by a high degree of integration and responsibility in the commitments it has undertaken. Although participation in military operations is not automatic—not even in the event of collective defence—the co-ordination of military planning and the sharing of burdens and responsibilities ensure a collective surveillance, a sort of external audit, of the degree of fulfilment of the force goals and collaboration previously established by mutual agreement. To the Alliance's traditional concern of preventing an uneven distribution of collective burdens is thus added the determination that no member should become a net recipient of security.

The Western European Union is a truly European security organisation whose links with the European Union (EU) are becoming ever closer. The Amsterdam Treaty, like that of Maastricht before it, promotes the possibility of convergence between the EU and WEU in security and defence issues. The Western European Union also attaches great importance to the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link.

NATO's flexibility has enabled the members States of the Western European Union (WEU) to develop the so-called European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance to address the humanitarian and rescue missions and peacekeeping operations, which are performed individually or in conjunction with other members or third States, in which all the allies do not wish to take part.

The definition of the new concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) has been essential to the foregoing, as it also enables other countries to take part in missions.

Both organisations, NATO and the WEU, are committed to maintaining complementarity and transparency between them. Complementarity means not duplicating efforts, and the two organisations have therefore established procedures to enable the WEU to perform operations using NATO assets.

However, we must aspire to strengthening the Western European Union's operational capability. This

aim must give impetus to the organisation of the European armies from the logical complementarily between them, making an effort to avoid duplication, co-ordinating the policy for the procurement of new materiel, developing common R&D policies and establishing joint training programmes for officers and non-commissioned officers.

In the specific case of stability and security in the Mediterranean, we must continue along the line established at the November 1995 Barcelona conference. The objective of boosting the creation of a conference for security and co-operation in the Mediterranean continues to be appropriate from this perspective.

1.3. The impact of new technologies on defence organisations and armies

A different strategic landscape characterised by a seemingly more complex environment, the emergence of new missions in addition to the traditional self-defence tasks and the convergence of efforts that makes it necessary to see eye-to-eye with the Allies is, undoubtedly, all the more demanding as regards the human factor. But seeking the solution to this requirement by increasing numbers of troops would amount to trying to resolve the future using an approach of the past. The solution does not only lie in number but in combining this factor with quality and training.

Crisis situations and use of force still basically stem from the traditional clash of wills. However, although they are substantially the same, the technological revolution has introduced drastic changes in the way of settling them. The possibility of taking decisions in real time and, should the need arise, the ability to use smart weapons and choose targets with precision, avoiding collateral damage, make for a type of operation characterised by quality, in which training is constantly put to the test.

To train armies that are able, at a given time, to handle sensibly and correctly the new resources that technological innovation places at their disposal is a challenge that modern societies are facing with respect to their own security and defence and in their contribution to shared security within international organisations.

Failure to accept this dynamics amounts to being left out of a reality and a modernisation process that the societies in our part of the world are currently undergoing. To accept it marks the first step on the logical path that should lead to the type of Armed Forces that are going to be needed in the 21st century.

The Armed Forces that assimilate this technological revolution will be able to bring their superiority to bear from the outset of a hypothetical conflict. Hence the need for all the member nations of a collective defence organisation to maintain similar modernisation levels to avoid losing touch with technological advances, which would seriously hinder their interoperability.

The European defence industry is very fragmented, unlike that of the United States, where there is a single market. Maintaining a modern, effective and competitive European defence industry should be a priority element of European security policy.

Furthermore, the technological innovation effort should also entail sustaining a suitable degree of training and maintenance of materiel, because its ultimate usefulness does not depend on the physical availability of armaments and equipment, but on its real degree of operational effectiveness.

This does not diminish the importance of the human factor. On the contrary, it points it even more in the direction of quality rather than quantity. It is thus important not only to have the right number of men and women needed to perform the missions of the Armed Forces, but also, and above all, to ensure their training, dedication and professional ability to handle resources whose technical complexity is constantly increasing.

2. Spanish national framework

The aforementioned conditioning factors call for a thorough review of the Armed Forces models, which is now under way in practically all the western nations. Spain has also gone through a period of analysis and reflection in order to decide on a new model of Armed Forces that are capable of performing their missions effectively and constituting a suitable instrument of deterrence and foreign policy in the new international strategic landscape of the 21st century, within the shared security framework that Spain enjoys through its membership of multinational security organisations such as the United Nations, the

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, whose integrated military structure Spain recently joined, and the Western European Union.

We Spaniards are convinced of the need to equip ourselves with an effective defence in order to guarantee the security environment that is indispensable for continuing to build the system of freedoms and the environment of economic wellbeing and social equality which is proclaimed a model from the first article of our Constitution.

At the same time, we are aware that defence has a price—the price of freedom—and entails a commitment to contribute, as far as our possibilities allow, to the maintenance of world peace and to the defence of the system of values and freedoms which our Constitution represents.

When considering the impact of security and defence aspects on public opinion, two key facts must be understood; first, our society is open to the international environment and wants Spain to play its rightful role in consonance with its history and political weight as a nation, but, on the other hand, it does not want conscripts to have to perform missions overseas.

These two facts explain why the majority of Spaniards are in favour of professional Armed Forces and even state themselves to be willing to make the necessary budget effort.

2.1. Need to reform the current combined model of Armed Forces

In this regard, the design of the new Armed Forces model, as well as being based on operational and functional reasons, must have the added value of constituting a valid response to a social demand. It is therefore reasonable to expect that Spanish society will show the necessary understanding and support for this model.

Public opinion thus has a clear perception of the aforementioned strategic environment and of its requirements. It is also convinced that the world of international relations must be based primarily on dialogue and tolerance, and on the progressive correction of the economic imbalances that give rise to the injustice that is the root of many of the conflicts which threaten or devastate mankind.

This conviction of the public opinion, which leads to the conclusion that we need to equip ourselves with professional Armed Forces that are not only capable of defending our territory, independence and sovereignty but also of taking part in peacekeeping and peacemaking or humanitarian assistance operations, is unequivocally reflected in the latest surveys conducted by the Centre for Sociological Research, particularly the January-February 1997 study on national defence and professionalisation of the army, of which this Comission has had knowledge of throughout its work.

Spain is equally aware that we live in a world of fast change in which success is increasingly based on capability to adapt to these changes with the necessary flexibility and speed. This is also the case in the field of defence, since, in this sphere, the future belongs to nations that are capable of thinking quicker, more and better than the rest.

The Armed Forces 2000 model, the combined model currently in force, was approved by the Congress of Deputies in full session on 27 June 1991 by a very wide majority and is at the final implementation stage, which the Government has speeded up for 1998. This model was an important milestone in the huge modernisation and adjustment effort our Armed Forces have made over the past twenty years, under the guidance of the democratic governments .

Despite its youth and the fact it has met the proposed objectives satisfactorily—that is, Spain's defence needs of the last few years—it needs to be revised and superseded by a new model of fully professional Armed Forces that will enable us to adapt to the strategic and political requirements summed up earlier, which have been discussed at length by this Joint Commission.

In short, the reasons for change are as follows:

a The current strategic situation requires more operational, more flexible, more multifaceted Armed Forces oriented towards joint action.

b The technological factor has brought a shift of emphasis from quantity to quality as regards the human factor. That is, the Armed Forces are becoming progressively smaller but require increasingly better trained men and women who are fully dedicated to performing their tasks and fully available to act wherever they are required.

c This quest for a new model is furthermore backed and corroborated by similar decisions taken by

other countries in our environment, which on the whole have expressed their favourable opinion to this Joint Commission of the result obtained from professional Armed Forces.

It is thus considered that the new model will provide a full response to a clear social aspiration of Spanish citizens, reflected in a general state of opinion which, while partly based on the rejection of the concept of compulsory military services, stems essentially from the widespread perception in the western world that the wars, conflicts and crises of the near future will be conducted in a technologically advanced environment, and that highly qualified and professional people are thus needed. In other words, society is calling for a new, up-to-date Armed Forces model that has evolved with society, since it considers that in this age of specialisation, defence should also rest with professional specialists.

The professional model will furthermore be introduced in all the European Union countries. This will facilitate co-operation between the respective armies, can help progress towards a common defence policy and, as a result, will boost the feasibility of Europe's political integration, which will benefit European citizens.

This integration into Europe makes it necessary to disseminate a set of values in the military sphere. Rather than questioning each State's essential patriotic and democratic values, these should be made compatible with an idea of international co-operation in pursuit of peace. In this respect, developing a concept of Armed Forces at the service of the values of peace, solidarity, democracy and constitutional rights and freedoms guarantees the commitment of the whole of society and, particularly, young people, towards these Armed Forces.

2.2. *General principles of the new Armed Forces model*

The new Spanish Armed Forces will need to be mentally prepared, deployed and trained specifically to act in theatres far from national or allied territory in emergency or crisis situations, in addition to guaranteeing the defence of Spain. These actions may be required to guarantee international stability, respect for human rights or the defence of Spain's legitimate interests, whether are not they are shared with the rest of the allies, wherever they are affected by risks or threats. This calls for a capability for external projection which requires, among others, characteristics such as flexibility, high availability, rapid action, a transport capability and sophisticated combat and support resources. They must also have the necessary interoperability in order to carry out action in conjunction with the armies of other nations, particularly the allies.

All this obviously calls for an all-round training that cannot be acquired over the short period of time that military service lasts. Much greater time and dedication are needed than those required only a few years ago, and this corroborates the need for fully professional Armed Forces.

The size, structure, equipment and degree of availability of the forces must be such that they are fit to deter potential adversaries from any aggression against national sovereignty or interests and to contribute, in keeping with our economic and political power, to collective defence within the alliances to which we belong.

This entails reaching a compromise and balance between size of the force, the need to undertake investments in modernisation and the degree of skill and operational capability needed, taking into account the budget foreseeably available for the future. Only in this way will it be possible to achieve fully operational Armed Forces that are willing to guarantee the fulfilment of the missions to which the Government entrusts them, with the parliamentary control established in our Constitution.

The new model professional Armed Forces model, which is able to meet the aforementioned requirements and circumstances, must be underpinned by the following general principles, in order to satisfy fully the reasons from which it stems:

a The fully voluntary and professional nature of its components, without gender discrimination, with respect to commanding officers and servicemen.

b A size, to be determined by the Government within one year, that is consistent with the missions assigned to the new Armed Forces, consisting of between 170,000 and 150,000 professionals.
Depending on how the process of modernising the forces and streamlining their organic structures develops, the Government will make the relevant adjustments over five-year periods, and the Government will send the Personnel Bill to Parliament for approval.

Each time the personnel numbers are established for a five-year period, the Government will inform Parliament on the situation of the Armed Forces personnel and their foreseeable development in the period in question.

c Adaptation of civilian personnel at the service of the military administration to the requirements of the fully professional Armed Forces model. This involves reconsidering both their number and the characteristics of their training and specialities.

d Personnel training in order to satisfy the needs of the military institution and allow for the personal aspirations of those in question, through a suitable system of internal promotion or reintegration into civilian life. At the same time, society itself will benefit from having well-trained and experienced professionals.

e Appropriate materiel. In line with current trends, personnel and materiel expenditure should tend towards a proportion of fifty percent each in the medium term and, subsequently, to forty and sixty percent respectively.

f Stable and sufficient financial-budgetary backing so as to meet the expenses arising from the increase in the number of professional soldiers, their training and permanent acquisition of skills and the programmes to modernise armaments and equipment, in the framework of the general state budgets.

g Criteria that are consistent with the doctrines of joint action and a joint operational structure so as to guarantee the co-ordination and effectiveness of the Armed Forces in performing their tasks.

h Rationalisation and reduction of the current organisational structures and improvement in the administrative procedures of all kind, in order to ensure more effective management and better use of the human and financial resources allocated.

i A reserve and mobilisation system in order to be able to complete the army units either progressively or selectively, or possibly to muster forces to meet security and defence needs. In this regard, the Government will submit the relevant legislative proposals for organising a reserve and mobilisation system that is consistent with the new professionalisation model within one year.

j Development of personnel management and command procedures, adapting them to the fully professional model.

k As uniformed citizens, professional soldiers enjoy the rights and freedoms established in the Constitution, with the essential restrictions or constraints of exercise provided in the Constitution and the regulations developing the latter, in accordance with the requirements stemming from the basic characteristics of the working of the Armed Forces, which are summed up in the necessary discipline. Ways should be sought of facilitating channels for submitting proposals, requests and complaints in the military sphere, while continuing to deepen the objectives of structuring military justice around ordinary justice, thereby applying the constitutional principle of jurisdictional unity, and speeding up the administration of justice and clarifying and simplifying the mechanisms for its application.

It is appropriate to incorporate into our heritage a defence culture, which, like other objectives of peace, justice, freedom, solidarity and prosperity, enables a stimulating project of coexistence to be built—a programme for the future which acts as a stimulus for all citizens.

In this regard, when defining the fully professional model in detail, it is necessary to promote the integration of military personnel into the society of which they are part, which they serve and from which they should also receive the maximum stimulus and support. The system of military education, retributions, support for mobility, healthcare and social action, and the exercise of the military profession as a whole must undoubtedly be adapted to the special characteristics of military activity, at the same time preventing the social isolation of these professionals, who need to find their rightful place in the social and cultural environments in accordance with their professional training and the exercise of their profession.

Another way of improving the integration of the Armed Forces into society is through transparency of their action, by properly informing and communicating with citizens and institutions. The necessary legislative reforms will have to be promoted to enable the Cortes Generales to take a greater part in giving impetus to and controlling security and defence policy, particularly during the planning cycle and in drawing up the armaments programmes and related short-, medium- and long-term investments. In this connection, at the end of each year the Government will submit for a report for debate by the Defence Committee on the degree of accomplishment of the processes to professionalise and modernise the Armed Forces and on the objectives set for the following year.

The personal and professional training of military personnel must expressly incorporate the values and principles of the constitutional rules, bearing in mind the cultural plurality of the State.

3. Basic features of the new model of professional servicemen

3.1. Engagements with respect to duration

Two types of engagements should be established, one for short and one for long duration.

The option of short-duration engagement will be aimed at Spaniards who wish to join the Armed Forces as professional servicemen for a period of approximately 12 to 18 months. It will provide an initial contact with the Armed Forces and is a voluntary option that enables them to exercise their constitutional right to defend Spain, in addition to providing them with a better insight into the military environment and allowing them to take subsequent decisions with respect to continuity.

In addition to benefiting from the incentives described later on, those who assume this commitment should be given preference when opting for the long-duration model of professional servicemen.

Long-duration engagement will initially be no longer than three years, but successive extensions will be possible.

Careers should be designed for these professionals in order to provide them with concrete career prospects and to enable them to progress within their area of professional specialisation and aim for a permanent career as soldiers, sailors and marines, for progression up the career ladder to posts of officers or for placement in the civilian labour market, either public or private.

The career design for servicemen could culminate when they become permanent military personnel, within each category.

3.2. Recruitment and training

The following considerations should be borne in mind with respect to recruitment and training:

a With a view to selecting aspirant professional servicemen who meet the requirements for achieving the necessary quality, a number of places will be made available annually per Force and per speciality. The mechanisms should be studied for progressively establishing a continual selection system.

b Once the aspirants have been selected, they will go through a basic training stage. After completing this stage, they will formalise their initial engagement and be appointed to their related posts. Complementary training will subsequently be provided in areas of specialisation where it is required, in order to furnish the recruits with the more thorough knowledge that is needed to exercise these specialities.

c The selection process must be governed by criteria of competence and effectiveness with a view to recruiting for the Forces servicemen who are motivated and capable of performing their tasks, as in any other professional activity in which parameters of efficiency are required. It is precisely this proper selection and training which should ensure that the Armed Forces are made up of professionals who are fit for the job and also prepared to compete in the labour market. Professionals who are motivated, properly paid and equipped with sufficient means. Appropriate remuneration is a key element, as evidenced in the developments witnessed in the special volunteer scheme and in the combined model; it is therefore essential to determine a system of decent retributions, in keeping with the requirements of military duties.

d All kinds of incentives should be borne in mind, in addition to the purely vocational facet, in order to ensure that the recruitment objectives are met.

e In accordance with the process of reorganising the commanding officers, the number of places available at the Academies will be determined in order to progressively adapt the number of personnel to the staff numbers established by law.

The system should provide professional soldiers with a response to these young people's logical expectations of a permanent job or career opportunity, both in the Armed Forces and outside this sphere, in the public or private sector, after a given term of engagement.

To this end, professional servicemen will have the possibility of continuing to serve in the Armed Forces through internal promotion.

Having completed a term of engagement in the professional Armed Forces, bearing in mind the length of service, abilities or professional skills and qualifications obtained during service, will be considered as a merit in the systems for recruiting civil servants or other employees for the public administration.

Appropriate mechanisms will be established to allow and foster the integration into the private-sector labour market of professional servicemen who have served a term of engagement in the Forces.

4. Financial resources

An economic study of the future professional Armed Forces should, logically, not only include the cost of professionalisation as such, but also, inevitably, the costs of modernising armaments, materiel and equipment.

Professionalisation and modernisation are indissociable concepts. According to data handled by this Joint Commission, the current defence budget breaks down into 57% for personnel expenditure and 43% for materiel expenditure.

Aware that, ideally, a ratio of 40 to 60 would be needed in order to achieve modern Armed Forces, the budget estimates for the period in which the model is to be introduced envisage working towards a ratio of 50 to 50.

All this requires the right funding to ensure the completion of processes of professionalising and modernising the Armed Forces, which must translate into a progressive increase in defence budgets until the objectives of the aforementioned model are achieved in a period of five years. The Government will include these forecasts in the macroeconomic scenario for the next few financial years and will complete the planning of the professionalisation and modernisation processes of the Armed Forces within the aforesaid period, defining realistic multiyear programmes to provide substantial guarantees of their accomplishment.

5. Transition period

The adoption of a new model logically requires a transition period to enable it to be built on solid foundations, ensuring that the Forces' operational level does not diminish during this time.

The Commission considers that the Government must do its utmost to ensure that, in keeping with both budgetary circumstances and those of the organisation, recruitment and training of professional personnel, this transition period is as short as possible. In any event, the process as a whole should be complete by 31 December 2002.

As occurs with any change, the transition from one system to another is a critical moment, because, while the process is under way, the progressive delegitimisation of compulsory military service could take place, which, unless suitable measures are taken, would jeopardise the proposed objective and, consequently, Spain's defence. In order to manage the transition period correctly, the following measures should be adopted:

a Establish mechanisms for balancing the overall numbers of professional soldiers and conscripts so that the progressive increase in one group is offset by a similar decrease in the other. Specifically, the Armed Forces will require a smaller number of conscripts, and formulas will therefore have to be found to exempt increasing percentages of annual conscripts from military service, applying criteria as objective as possible. For this purpose, the cases of exemption for medical or family reasons will be reviewed, and the lot-drawing procedure will likewise be adapted to the development of the situation.

b Spaniards who would ordinarily be due to join from 1 January 2002 will cease to be eligible for compulsory military service, that is, all those born after 1 January 1983 will not be called upon to render compulsory military service.

c Legislation regulating military service or alternative civilian service will continue to be applicable to those born before 1 January 1983.

d Legislation regulating conscientious objection and alternative civilian service will be adapted in accordance with the development of military service.

e Furthermore, the Armed Forces will foreseeably need a smaller number of conscripts as a result of the professionalisation process. Formulas enabling a certain number of young men to be excluded from this legal duty will logically have to be sought.

6. Regulatory reforms needed in order to establish the new model

The establishment of the new Armed Forces model will require legal and regulatory rules to be amended or repealed, and other new ones to be drawn up. The Commission urges the Government to submit to the Houses of Parliament, at the earliest possible date, the relevant bills that will enable the model to become effective.

Palacio del Congreso de los Diputados, 11 May 1998.—The President of the Commission, **Alejandro Muñoz-Alonso y Ledo**.—The Secretary of the Commission, **Jaime Lobo Asenjo**.

This Report was approved by the Congress of Deputies in full session on 28 May 1998 and by the Senate in full session on 9 June the same year.

THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999

Introduction

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.

2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By combining defence with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then.

3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a process to which the Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance's role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.

5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.

Part I - The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

6. NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.

7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment

and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives.

9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.

10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

- Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.
- Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
- Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

11. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.

Part II - Strategic Perspectives

The Evolving Strategic Environment

12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the

full range of the Alliance's missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

14. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organisations have become a central feature of the security environment.

15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.

17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the incorporation of the WEU's Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.

18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance.

19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

Security challenges and risks

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling

over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.

21. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.

22. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO's periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

23. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO's superiority in traditional weaponry.

24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indi-

visible. Thus the Alliance's commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Maintenance Of Alliance Military Capabilities

28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance's ability to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success.

29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special requirements, they will be handled through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures.

The European Security And Defence Identity

30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.

Conflict Prevention And Crisis Management

31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organisations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance's political authorities to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.

Partnership, Cooperation, And Dialogue

33. Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.

34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental affairs.

35. The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO. Through detailed programmes that reflect individual Partners' capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national defence planning and budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies; and the development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. The Alliance is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

38. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO's co-operative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

Enlargement

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

Arms Control, Disarmament, And Non-Proliferation

40. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that - as an important part of its broad approach to security - defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security building measures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Part IV - Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces

Principles Of Alliance Strategy

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO's missions. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. Alliance forces must safeguard NATO's military effectiveness and freedom of action. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the combined military forces of the Alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states. They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's forces have essential roles in fostering cooperation and understanding with NATO's Partners and other states, particularly in helping Partners to prepare for potential participation in NATO-led PfP operations. Thus they contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.

42. The achievement of the Alliance's aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. The North American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military forces available for Alliance missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and through the provision of unique training facilities on the North American continent. The European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defence and to international peace and stability including through multinational formations.

43. The principle of collective effort in Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO's forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies. They are based on procedures for consultation, an integrated military structure, and on co-operation agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common funding; common operational planning; multinational formations, headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air defence system; a balance of roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory when required; arrangements, including planning, for crisis management and reinforcement; common standards

and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exercises when appropriate; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. The inclusion of NATO's Partners in such arrangements or the development of similar arrangements for them, in appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and common efforts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.

44. Multinational funding, including through the Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme, will continue to play an important role in acquiring and maintaining necessary assets and capabilities. The management of resources should be guided by the military requirements of the Alliance as they evolve.

45. The Alliance supports the further development of the ESDI within the Alliance, including by being prepared to make available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.

46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance's Force Posture

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and - in case of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

48. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security.

49. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed. The potential participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations as well as possible operations with Russia would be further valuable elements of NATO's contribution to managing crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.

50. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership for Peace as well as those organised to deepen NATO's relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas

of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

51. To implement the Alliance's fundamental security tasks and the principles of its strategy, the forces of the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions effectively and to respond to future challenges. The posture of Allies' forces, building on the strengths of different national defence structures, will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defence and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory. The characteristics of the Alliance's forces will also reflect the provisions of relevant arms control agreements. Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:

a that the overall size of the Allies' forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions; they will be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;

b that the peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory and waters and forward deployment of forces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular, geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO's periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;

c that NATO's command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance's military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate;

d that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. To develop these capabilities to their full potential for multinational operations, interoperability, including human factors, the use of appropriate advanced technology, the maintenance of information superiority in military operations, and highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills will be important. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers;

e that at any time a limited but militarily significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces will be able to react as rapidly as necessary to a wide range of eventualities, including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers of force elements will be available at appropriate levels of readiness to sustain prolonged operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation of deployed forces. Taken together, these forces must also be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to contribute to deterrence and to defend against limited attacks on the Alliance;

f that the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary. This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to

Alliance security, including potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility of substantial improvements in the readiness and capabilities of military forces on the periphery of the Alliance. Capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within and from Europe and North America will remain of critical importance, with a resulting need for a high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility;

g that appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and selectively, are necessary to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime;

h that the Alliance's defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed;

i that the Alliance's forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

54. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions. This requirement has implications for force structures, force and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up and mobilisation capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high readiness forces capable of beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary, collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; forces at different levels of lower readiness to provide the bulk of those required for collective defence, for rotation of forces to sustain crisis response operations, or for further reinforcement of a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case — but very remote — scenario of large scale operations for collective defence. A substantial proportion of Alliance forces will be capable of performing more than one of these roles.

55. Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication; sea control and protecting the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based deterrent; conducting independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and effective extended air defence; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; strategic lift; and providing effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.

56. The Alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.

57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warfare capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.

58. Given reduced overall force levels and constrained resources, the ability to work closely together will remain vital for achieving the Alliance's missions. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands of NATO's defence planning need to be effectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the preparedness of the forces and supporting structures to carry out the full spectrum of their roles. Exchanges of information among the Allies about their force plans contribute to securing the availability of the capabilities needed for the execution of these roles. Consultations in case of important changes in national defence plans also remain of key importance. Cooperation in the development of new operational concepts will be essential for responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed practical arrange-

ments that have been developed as part of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.

59. To be able to respond flexibly to possible contingencies and to permit the effective conduct of Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufficient logistics capabilities, including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain all types of forces effectively. Standardisation will foster cooperation and cost-effectiveness in providing logistic support to allied forces. Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies' territory, where there may be little or no host-nation support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces of various kinds and at various levels of readiness will be capable of flexible employment in both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. This will require control of lines of communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.

60. The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance's military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.

61. The Alliance's ability to accomplish the full range of its missions will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO for the Allies concerned. Such forces, which are applicable to the full range of Alliance missions, demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; and reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the ESDI within the Alliance. Multinational forces, particularly those capable of deploying rapidly for collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions, an approach which underlies the implementation of the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, effective multinational formations and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit fully the potential offered by multinational formations, improving interoperability, inter alia through sufficient training and exercises, is of the highest importance.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have

to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-roled forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.

Part V - Conclusion

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance's security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.

DEFENCE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE

Launched at the NATO Summit held in Washington on 23 and 24 April 1999

Introduction

1. At Washington, NATO Heads of State and Government launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative. The objective of this initiative is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces.

The Challenge: Adapting Capabilities for a New Security Environment

2. In accordance with the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, NATO must continue to maintain capabilities to deal with large-scale aggression against one or more of the members, although the probability of this occurring in the foreseeable future is low. Warning times for the possible emergence of such a threat are likely to remain long. Potential threats to Alliance security are more likely to result from regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other crises beyond Alliance territory, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

3. Future Alliance military operations, including non-Article 5 crisis response operations, are likely to be smaller in scale than those which were the basis for Alliance planning during the Cold War. They may also be longer in duration, extend multinational cooperation to lower levels and take place concurrently with other Alliance operations. In many cases non-Article 5 operations will include force contributions from Partners and possibly other non-Allied nations. Operations outside Alliance territory may need to be undertaken with no, or only limited, access to existing NATO infrastructure. It may not be possible to invoke existing national emergency legislation to provide civilian transport assets for deployments or to mobilise reserves. These developments will make new demands on the capabilities required of Alliance forces, in particular in the field of interoperability. It is important that all nations are able to make a fair contribution to the full spectrum of Alliance missions regardless of differences in national defence structures.

4. Significant progress has been made in recent years in adapting Alliance forces to the requirements of this new security environment. However, many Allies have only relatively limited capabilities for the rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory, or for extended sustainment of operations and protection of forces far from home bases. Command and control and information systems need to be better matched to the requirements of future Alliance military operations which will entail the exchange of a much greater volume of information and extending to lower levels than in the past. Maintaining the effectiveness of multinational operations will require particular attention to the challenges of interoperability. In this context, increased attention must be paid to human factors (such as common approaches to doctrine, training and operational procedures) and standardisation, as well as to the challenges posed by the accelerating pace of technological change and the different speeds at which Allies introduce advanced capabilities. Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

The Way Ahead

5. Against this background, the Alliance has examined areas where improvements in capabilities would make a significant contribution towards meeting the challenges of the future. The aim has been to develop a common assessment of requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. In identifying the

most important areas for improvement, and with a special focus on interoperability, the work has concentrated on the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and on command and control and information systems. In some cases it has been possible at this early stage to set out the steps to be taken to improve some capabilities. In others, further work is required to examine different options and make firm recommendations about improvements to be made. The initiative emphasises the importance of the resource dimension of this work as well as the requirement for better coordination between defence planning disciplines; takes into consideration the ability of European Allies to undertake WEU-led operations; addresses ways to improve capabilities of multinational formations; and considers issues such as training, doctrine, human factors, concept development and experimentation, and standardisation.

6. As part of this Defence Capabilities Initiative, Heads of State and Government have established a temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG) to oversee the implementation of the DCI and to meet the requirement of coordination and harmonisation among relevant planning disciplines including for Allies concerned force planning, and with NATO standardisation, with the aim of achieving lasting effects on improvements in capabilities and interoperability.

COLOGNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Adopted on 10 June 1999

1. We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. The work undertaken on the initiative of the German Presidency and the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam permit us today to take a decisive step forward.

In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the "Petersberg tasks". To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

2. We are convinced that to fully assume its tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management the European Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments. We therefore commit ourselves to further develop more effective European military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities and to strengthen our own capabilities for that purpose. This requires the maintenance of a sustained defence effort, the implementation of the necessary adaptations and notably the reinforcement of our capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. This also requires efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces.

We also recognise the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. We are determined to foster the restructuring of the European defence industries amongst those States involved. With industry we will therefore work towards closer and more efficient defence industry collaboration. We will seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States consider appropriate.

3. We welcome the results of the NATO Washington summit as regards NATO support for the process launched by the EU and its confirmation that a more effective role for the European Union in conflict prevention and crisis management will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Alliance. In implementing this process launched by the EU, we shall ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the European Union and NATO.

We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations.

We will put in place arrangements that allow non-EU European allies and partners to take part to the fullest possible extent in this endeavour.

4. We therefore approve and adopt the report prepared by the German Presidency, which reflects the consensus among the Member States.

5. We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union. To this end we task the General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks. In this regard, our aim is to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose. The different status of Member States with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member States.

We therefore invite the Finnish Presidency to take the work forward within the General Affairs Council

on the basis of this declaration and the report of the Presidency to the European Council meeting in Cologne. We look forward to a progress report by the Finnish Presidency to the Helsinki European Council meeting.

Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence

1. Introduction

The Treaty of Amsterdam which entered into force on 1 May provides for the enhancement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the progressive framing of a common defence policy as provided in Article 17 of the TEU. The Treaty also provides for the possibility of integrating the WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide.

The European Council in Vienna welcomed the new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy in security and defence. It considered that in order for the EU to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities. Furthermore, it welcomed the Franco-British declaration made on 4 December 1998 in St. Malo. The European Council invited the German Presidency to pursue this debate and agreed to examine the question again at the European Council in Cologne. To this end Foreign Ministers discussed the subject at their informal meeting in Reinhartshausen on 13/14 March and at the General Affairs Council on 17 May.

The NATO Washington Summit welcomed the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy on security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and confirmed that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance for the 21st century. The NATO summit furthermore stressed that the development of a CFSP, as called for in the

Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. This process will lead to more complementarity, cooperation and synergy.

At the WEU Ministerial Council on 10 and 11 May this question was also discussed on the basis of the informal reflection which was initiated at the Rome Ministerial Council. Member States will undertake efforts in line with the conclusions of the ongoing WEU Audit of European defence capabilities.

2. Guiding Principles

The aim is to strengthen the CFSP by the development of a common European policy on security and defence. This requires a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. Decisions to act would be taken within the framework of the CFSP according to appropriate procedures in order to reflect the specific nature of decisions in this field. The Council of the European Union would thus be able to take decisions on the whole range of political, economic and military instruments at its disposal when responding to crisis situations. The European Union is committed to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, as provided for in Article 11 of the TEU.

The Amsterdam Treaty incorporates the Petersberg tasks ("humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making") into the Treaty.

The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that the European Union has at its disposal the necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for effective EU decision making in crisis management within the scope of the Petersberg tasks. This is the area where a European capacity to act is required most urgently. The development of an EU military crisis management capacity is to be seen as an activity within the framework of the CFSP (Title V of the TEU) and as a part of the progressive framing of a common defence policy in accordance with Article 17 of the TEU.

The Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Members. The commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty will in any event be preserved for the Member States party to these Treaties. The policy of the Union shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

3. Decision Making

As regards EU decision making in the field of security and defence policy, necessary arrangements must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations so that the EU can decide and conduct such operations effectively.

Furthermore, the EU will need a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning.

This may require in particular:

- regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers;
- a permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with pol/mil expertise;
- an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee;
- a EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre;
- other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies.

Further institutional questions may need to be addressed.

Decisions relating to crisis management tasks, in particular decisions having military or defence implications will be taken in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union. Member States will retain in all circumstances the right to decide if and when their national forces are deployed.

4. Implementation

As regards military capabilities, Member States need to develop further forces (including headquarters) that are suited also to crisis management operations, without any unnecessary duplication. The main characteristics include: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility.

For the effective implementation of EU-led operations the European Union will have to determine, according to the requirements of the case, whether it will conduct:

- EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities or
- EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

For EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the EU could use national or multinational European means pre-identified by Member States. This will require either the use of national command structures providing multinational representation in headquarters or drawing on existing command structures within multinational forces. Further arrangements to enhance the capacity of European multinational and national forces to respond to crises situations will be needed.

For EU-led operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, including European command arrangements, the main focus should be on the following aspects:

- Implementation of the arrangements based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the Washington NATO summit decisions of April 1999.
- The further arrangements set out by NATO at its summit meeting in Washington should address in particular:
- assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planing for EU-led operations;
- the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations.

5. Modalities of participation and cooperation

The successful creation of a European policy on security and defence will require in particular:

- the possibility of all EU Member States, including non-allied members, to participate fully and on an equal footing in EU operations;
- satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members who are not EU Member States to ensure

their fullest possible involvement in EU-led operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within WEU;

- arrangements to ensure that all participants in an EU-led operation will have equal rights in respect of the conduct of that operation, without prejudice to the principle of the EU's decision-making autonomy, notably the right of the Council to discuss and decide matters of principle and policy;
- the need to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU;
- the consideration of ways to ensure the possibility for WEU Associate Partners to be involved.

CHARTER FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

Signed by the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating states at the Istanbul meeting on 19 November 1999

1. At the dawn of the twenty-first century we, the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States, declare our firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area where participating States are at peace with each other, and individuals and communities live in freedom, prosperity and security. To implement this commitment, we have decided to take a number of new steps. We have agreed to:

- Adopt the Platform for Co-operative Security, in order to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions, thereby making better use of the resources of the international community;
- Develop the OSCE's role in peacekeeping, thereby better reflecting the Organization's comprehensive approach to security;
- Create Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), thereby enabling the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations;
- Expand our ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the primacy of law;
- Establish an Operation Centre, in order to plan and deploy OSCE field operations;
- Strengthen the consultation process within the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council.

We are committed to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible. The steps we have agreed to take in this Charter will strengthen the OSCE's ability in this respect as well as its capacity to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction. The Charter will contribute to the formation of a common and indivisible security space. It will advance the creation of an OSCE area free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security.

I. Our common challenges

2. The last decade of the twentieth century has brought great achievements in the OSCE area, co-operation has replaced previous confrontation, but the danger of conflicts between States has not been eliminated. We have put Europe's old divisions behind us, but new risks and challenges have emerged. Since we signed the Charter of Paris it has become more obvious that threats to our security can stem from conflicts within States as well as from conflicts between States. We have experienced conflicts which have often resulted from flagrant violations of OSCE norms and principles. We have witnessed atrocities of a kind we had thought were relegated to the past. In this decade it has become clear that all such conflicts can represent a threat to the security of all OSCE participating States.

3. We are determined to learn from the dangers of confrontation and division between States as well as from tragedies of the last decade. Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach which combines two basic elements, we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen co-operation between States. Therefore, we will strengthen existing instruments and develop new ones to provide assistance and advice. We will reinforce our efforts to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In parallel, we will strengthen our capacity to enhance confidence and security between States. We are determined to develop the means at our disposal to settle peacefully disputes between them.

4. International terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking represent growing challenges to security. Whatever its motives, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is unacceptable. We will enhance our efforts to prevent the preparation and financing of any act of terrorism on our terri-

tories and deny terrorists safe havens. The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons represent a threat to peace and security. We are committed to strengthening our protection against these new risks and challenges; strong democratic institutions and the rule of law are the foundation for this protection. We are also determined to co-operate more actively and closely with each other to meet these challenges.

5. Acute economic problems and environmental degradation may have serious implications for our security. Co-operation in the fields of economy, science and technology and the environment will be of critical importance. We will strengthen our responses to such threats through continued economic and environmental reforms, by stable and transparent frameworks for economic activity and by promoting market economies, while paying due attention to economic and social rights. We applaud the unprecedented process of economic transformation taking place in many participating States. We encourage them to continue this reform process, which will contribute to security and prosperity in the entire OSCE area. We will step up our efforts across all dimensions of the OSCE to combat corruption and to promote the rule of law.

6. We confirm that security in areas nearby, in particular in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in direct proximity to participating States, such as those of Central Asia, is of increasing importance to the OSCE. We recognize that instability in these areas creates challenges that directly affect the security and prosperity of OSCE States.

II. Our common foundations

7. We reaffirm our full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and all other OSCE documents to which we have agreed. These documents represent our common commitments and are the foundation for our work. They have helped us to bring about an end to the old confrontation in Europe and to foster a new era of democracy, peace and solidarity throughout the OSCE area. They established clear standards for participating States' treatment of each other and of all individuals within their territories. All OSCE commitments, without exception, apply equally to each participating State. Their implementation in good faith is essential for relations between States, between governments and their peoples, as well as between the organizations of which they are members. Participating States are accountable to their citizens and responsible to each other for their implementation of their OSCE commitments. We regard these commitments as our common achievement and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.

We reaffirm the OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE is the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and co-operation in its region.

8. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.

9. We will build our relations in conformity with the concept of common and comprehensive security, guided by equal partnership, solidarity and transparency. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military dimensions of security as an integral whole.

10. We will continue to uphold consensus as the basis for OSCE decision-making. The OSCE's flexibility and ability to respond quickly to a changing political environment should remain at the heart of the OSCE's co-operative and inclusive approach to common and indivisible security.

11. We recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and stability in our region. We reaffirm our rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, including our commitment on the issue of the non-use of force or the threat of force. In this connection, we also reaffirm our

commitment to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.

Based on these foundations we will strengthen our common response and improve our common instruments in order to meet the challenges confronting us more efficiently.

III. Our common response

Co-operation with other organizations: the platform for co-operative security

12. The risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organization. Over the last decade, we have taken important steps to forge new co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations. In order to make full use of the resources of the international community, we are committed to even closer co-operation among international organizations.

We pledge ourselves, through the Platform for Co-operative Security, which is hereby adopted as an essential element of this Charter, to further strengthen and develop co-operation with competent organizations on the basis of equality and in a spirit of partnership. The principles of the Platform for Co-operative Security, as set out in the operational document attached to this Charter, apply to any organization or institution whose members individually and collectively decide to adhere to them. They apply across all dimensions of security; politico-military, human and economic. Through this Platform we seek to develop and maintain political and operational coherence, on the basis of shared values, among all the various bodies dealing with security, both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges. Recognizing the key integrating role that the OSCE can play, we offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them.

We are ready in principle to deploy the resources of international organizations and institutions of which we are members in support of the OSCE's work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise.

13. Subregional co-operation has become an important element in enhancing security across the OSCE area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the auspices of the OSCE, help to promote our common values. They contribute to improved security not just in the subregion in question but throughout the OSCE area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, as a forum for subregional co-operation. In this respect, and in accordance with the modalities in the operational document, the OSCE will facilitate the exchange of information and experience between subregional groups and may, if so requested, receive and keep their mutual accords and agreements.

Solidarity and partnership

14. Peace and security in our region is best guaranteed by the willingness and ability of each participating State to uphold democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. We individually confirm our willingness to comply fully with our commitments. We also have a joint responsibility to uphold OSCE principles. We are therefore determined to co-operate within the OSCE and with its institutions and representatives and stand ready to use OSCE instruments, tools and mechanisms. We will co-operate in a spirit of solidarity and partnership in a continuing review of implementation. Today we commit ourselves to joint measures based on co-operation, both in the OSCE and through those organizations of which we are members, in order to offer assistance to participating States to enhance their compliance with OSCE principles and commitments. We will strengthen existing co-operative instruments and develop new ones in order to respond efficiently to requests for assistance from participating States. We will explore ways to further increase the effectiveness of the Organization to deal with cases of clear, gross and continuing violations of those principles and commitments.

15. We are determined to consider ways of helping participating States requesting assistance in cases of internal breakdown of law and order. We will jointly examine the nature of the situation and possible ways and means of providing support to the State in question.

16. We reaffirm the validity of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. We will

consult promptly, in conformity with our OSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its right to individual or collective self-defence in the event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence are threatened. We will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of our common values.

Our institutions

17. The Parliamentary Assembly has developed into one of the most important OSCE institutions continuously providing new ideas and proposals. We welcome this increasing role, particularly in the field of democratic development and election monitoring. We call on the Parliamentary Assembly to develop its activities further as a key component in our efforts to promote democracy, prosperity and increased confidence within and between participating States.

18. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media are essential instruments in ensuring respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The OSCE Secretariat provides vital assistance to the Chairman-in-Office and to the activities of our Organization, especially in the field. We will also strengthen further the operational capacities of the OSCE Secretariat to enable it to face the expansion of our activities and to ensure that field operations function effectively and in accordance with the mandates and guidance given to them.

We commit ourselves to giving the OSCE institutions our full support. We emphasize the importance of close co-ordination among the OSCE institutions, as well as our field operations, in order to make optimal use of our common resources. We will take into account the need for geographic diversity and gender balance when recruiting personnel to OSCE institutions and field operations.

We acknowledge the tremendous developments and diversification of OSCE activities. We recognize that a large number of OSCE participating States have not been able to implement the 1993 decision of the Rome Ministerial Council, and that difficulties can arise from the absence of a legal capacity of the Organization. We will seek to improve the situation.

The human dimension

19. We reaffirm that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is at the core of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. We commit ourselves to counter such threats to security as violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief and manifestations of intolerance, aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism.

The protection and promotion of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities are essential factors for democracy, peace, justice and stability within, and between, participating States. In this respect we reaffirm our commitments, in particular under the relevant provisions of the Copenhagen 1990 Human Dimension Document, and recall the Report of the Geneva 1991 Meeting of Experts on National Minorities. Full respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, besides being an end in itself, may not undermine, but strengthen territorial integrity and sovereignty. Various concepts of autonomy as well as other approaches outlined in the above-mentioned documents, which are in line with OSCE principles, constitute ways to preserve and promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities within an existing State. We condemn violence against any minority. We pledge to take measures to promote tolerance and to build pluralistic societies where all, regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy full equality of opportunity. We emphasize that questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law.

We reaffirm our recognition that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should be deprived of his or her nationality arbitrarily. We commit ourselves to continue our efforts to ensure that everyone can exercise this right. We also commit ourselves to further the international protection of stateless persons.

20. We recognize the particular difficulties faced by Roma and Sinti and the need to undertake effective measures in order to achieve full equality of opportunity, consistent with OSCE commitments, for per-

sons belonging to Roma and Sinti. We will reinforce our efforts to ensure that Roma and Sinti are able to play a full and equal part in our societies, and to eradicate discrimination against them.

21. We are committed to eradicating torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area. To this end, we will promote legislation to provide procedural and substantive safeguards and remedies to combat these practices. We will assist victims and co-operate with relevant international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as appropriate.

22. We reject any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion. We reaffirm our commitment to respect the right to seek asylum and to ensure the international protection of refugees as set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons in dignity and safety. We will pursue without discrimination the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons in their places of origin.

In order to enhance the protection of civilians in times of conflict, we will seek ways of reinforcing the application of international humanitarian law.

23. The full and equal exercise by women of their human rights is essential to achieve a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic OSCE area. We are committed to making equality between men and women an integral part of our policies, both at the level of our States and within the Organization.

24. We will undertake measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, and to end violence against women and children as well as sexual exploitation and all forms of trafficking in human beings. In order to prevent such crimes we will, among other means, promote the adoption or strengthening of legislation to hold accountable persons responsible for these acts and strengthen the protection of victims. We will also develop and implement measures to promote the rights and interests of children in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including refugees and internally displaced children. We will look at ways of preventing forced or compulsory recruitment for use in armed conflict of persons under 18 years of age.

25. We reaffirm our obligation to conduct free and fair elections in accordance with OSCE commitments, in particular the Copenhagen Document 1990. We recognize the assistance the ODIHR can provide to participating States in developing and implementing electoral legislation. In line with these commitments, we will invite observers to our elections from other participating States, the ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and appropriate institutions and organizations that wish to observe our election proceedings. We agree to follow up promptly the ODIHR's election assessment and recommendations.

26. We reaffirm the importance of independent media and the free flow of information as well as the public's access to information. We commit ourselves to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent media and unimpeded transborder and intra-State flow of information, which we consider to be an essential component of any democratic, free and open society.

27. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can perform a vital role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They are an integral component of a strong civil society. We pledge ourselves to enhance the ability of NGOs to make their full contribution to the further development of civil society and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The politico-military dimension

28. The politico-military aspects of security remain vital to the interests of participating States. They constitute a core element of the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. Disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) are important parts of the overall effort to enhance security by fostering stability, transparency and predictability in the military field. Full implementation, timely adaptation and, when required, further development of arms control agreements and CSBMs are key contributions to our political and military stability.

29. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) must continue to serve as a cornerstone of European security. It has dramatically reduced equipment levels. It provides a fundamental contribution to a more secure and integrated Europe. The States Parties to this Treaty are taking a critical step forward. The Treaty is being strengthened by adapting its provisions to ensure enhanced stability, predictability and transparency amidst changing circumstances. A number of States Parties will reduce further their equipment levels. The adapted Treaty, upon its entry into force, will be open to voluntary accession

by other OSCE participating States in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains and thereby will provide an important additional contribution to European stability and security.

30. The OSCE Vienna Document 1999, together with other documents adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on politico-military aspects of security, provide valuable tools for all OSCE participating States in building greater mutual confidence and military transparency. We will continue to make regular use of and fully implement all OSCE instruments in this field and seek their timely adaptation in order to ensure adequate response to security needs in the OSCE area. We remain committed to the principles contained in the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. We are determined to make further efforts within the FSC in order to jointly address common security concerns of participating States and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible security so far as the politico-military dimension is concerned. We will continue a substantial security dialogue and task our representatives to conduct this dialogue in the framework of the FSC.

The economic and environmental dimension

31. The link between security, democracy and prosperity has become increasingly evident in the OSCE area, as has the risk to security from environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity. On the basis of these linkages, we will ensure that the economic dimension receives appropriate attention, in particular as an element of our early warning and conflict prevention activities. We will do so, inter alia, with a view to promoting the integration of economies in transition into the world economy and to ensure the rule of law and the development of a transparent and stable legal system in the economic sphere.

32. The OSCE is characterized by its broad membership, its comprehensive approach to security, its large number of field operations and its long history as a norm-setting organization. These qualities enable it to identify threats and to act as a catalyst for co-operation between key international organizations and institutions in the economic and environmental areas. The OSCE stands ready to play this role, where appropriate. We will foster such co-ordination between the OSCE and relevant international organizations in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security. We will enhance the OSCE's ability to address economic and environmental issues in ways that neither duplicate existing work nor replace efforts that can be more efficiently undertaken by other organizations. We will focus on areas in which the OSCE has particular competence. The OSCE's efforts within the human dimension have significant economic effects and vice versa, for example by mobilizing human resources and talents and by helping to build vibrant civil societies. In the spirit of the 1998 Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, we will in particular seek to ensure access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

Rule of law and fight against corruption

33. We reaffirm our commitment to the rule of law. We recognize that corruption poses a great threat to the OSCE's shared values. It generates instability and reaches into many aspects of the security, economic and human dimensions. Participating States pledge to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and the conditions that foster it, and to promote a positive framework for good government practices and public integrity. They will make better use of existing international instruments and assist each other in their fight against corruption. As part of its work to promote the rule of law, the OSCE will work with NGOs that are committed to a strong public and business consensus against corrupt practices.

IV. Our common instruments

Enhancing our dialogue

34. We are determined to broaden and strengthen our dialogue concerning developments related to all aspects of security in the OSCE area. We charge the Permanent Council and the FSC within their respective areas of competence to address in greater depth security concerns of the participating States and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible security.

35. The Permanent Council, being the regular body for political consultations and decision-making, will address the full range of conceptual issues as well as the day-to-day operational work of the Organization. To assist in its deliberations and decision-making and to strengthen the process of political consultations and transparency within the Organization, we will establish a Preparatory Committee under the Permanent Council's direction. This open-ended Committee will normally meet in informal format and will be tasked by the Council, or its Chairman, to deliberate and to report back to the Council.

36. Reflecting our spirit of solidarity and partnership, we will also enhance our political dialogue in order to offer assistance to participating States, thereby ensuring compliance with OSCE commitments. To encourage this dialogue, we have decided, in accordance with established rules and practices, to make increased use of OSCE instruments, including:

- Dispatching delegations from the OSCE institutions, with the participation of other relevant international organizations, when appropriate, to provide advice and expertise for reform of legislation and practices;
- Dispatching Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, after consultations with the State concerned, for fact-finding or advisory missions;
- Bringing together representatives of the OSCE and States concerned in order to address questions regarding compliance with OSCE commitments;
- Organizing training programmes aimed at improving standards and practices, inter alia, within the fields of human rights, democratization and the rule of law;
- Addressing matters regarding compliance with OSCE commitments at OSCE review meetings and conferences as well as in the Economic Forum;
- Submitting such matters for consideration by the Permanent Council, inter alia, on the basis of recommendations by the OSCE institutions within their respective mandates or by Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office;
- Convening meetings of the Permanent Council in a special or reinforced format in order to discuss matters of non-compliance with OSCE commitments and to decide on appropriate courses of action;
- Establishing field operations with the consent of the State concerned.

OSCE field operations

37. The Permanent Council will establish field operations. It will decide on their mandates and budgets. On this basis, the Permanent Council and the Chairman-in-Office will provide guidance to such operations.

38. The development of OSCE field operations represents a major transformation of the Organization that has enabled the OSCE to play a more prominent role in promoting peace, security and compliance with OSCE commitments. Based on the experience we have acquired, we will develop and strengthen this instrument further in order to carry out tasks according to their respective mandates, which may, inter alia, include the following:

- Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the OSCE and the host country;
- Observing compliance with OSCE commitments and providing advice or recommendations for improved compliance;
- Assisting in the organization and monitoring of elections;
- Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
- Helping to create conditions for negotiation or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Verifying and/or assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.

39. Recruitment to field operations must ensure that qualified personnel are made available by participating States. The training of personnel is an important aspect of enhancing the effectiveness of the OSCE and its field operations and will therefore be improved. Existing training facilities in OSCE participating

States and training activities of the OSCE could play an active role in achieving this aim in co-operation, where appropriate, with other organizations and institutions.

40. In accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, co-operation between OSCE and other international organizations in performing field operations will be enhanced. This will be done, inter alia, by carrying out common projects with other partners, in particular the Council of Europe, allowing the OSCE to benefit from their expertise while respecting the identity and decision-making procedures of each organization involved.

41. The host country of an OSCE field operation should, when appropriate, be assisted in building its own capacity and expertise within the area of responsibility. This would facilitate an efficient transfer of the tasks of the operation to the host country, and consequently the closure of the field operation.

Rapid response (REACT)

42. We recognize that the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. We are committed to developing a capability within the participating States and the OSCE to set up Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) that will be at the disposal of the OSCE. This will enable OSCE bodies and institutions, acting in accordance with their respective procedures, to offer experts quickly to OSCE participating States to provide assistance, in compliance with OSCE norms, in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This rapidly deployable capability will cover a wide range of civilian expertise. It will give us the ability to address problems before they become crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation when needed. These Teams could also be used as surge capacity to assist the OSCE with the rapid deployment of large-scale or specialized operations. We expect REACT to develop and evolve, along with other OSCE capabilities, to meet the needs of the Organization.

Operation Centre

43. Rapid deployment is important for the OSCE's effectiveness in contributing to our conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts and depends on effective preparation and planning. To facilitate this, we decide to set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre with a small core staff, having expertise relevant for all kinds of OSCE operations, which can be expanded rapidly when required. Its role will be to plan and deploy field operations, including those involving REACT resources. It will liaise with other international organizations and institutions as appropriate in accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security. The Centre's core staff will, to the extent possible, be drawn from personnel with appropriate expertise seconded by participating States and from existing Secretariat resources. This core will provide the basis for rapid expansion, to deal with new tasks as they arise. The precise arrangements will be decided in accordance with existing procedures.

Police-related activities

44. We will work to enhance the OSCE's role in civilian police-related activities as an integral part of the Organization's efforts in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Such activities may comprise:

- Police monitoring, including with the aim of preventing police from carrying out such activities as discrimination based on religious and ethnic identity;
- Police training, which could, inter alia, include the following tasks:
- Improving the operational and tactical capabilities of local police services and reforming paramilitary forces;
- Providing new and modern policing skills, such as community policing, and anti-drug, anti-corruption and anti-terrorist capacities;
- Creating a police service with a multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious composition that can enjoy the confidence of the entire population;
- Promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in general.

We will encourage the provision of modern equipment appropriate to police services that receive training in such new skills.

In addition, the OSCE will examine options and conditions for a role in law enforcement.

45. We shall also promote the development of independent judicial systems that play a key role in providing remedies for human rights violations as well as providing advice and assistance for prison system reforms. The OSCE will also work with other international organizations in the creation of political and legal frameworks within which the police can perform its tasks in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.

Peacekeeping

46. We remain committed to reinforcing the OSCE's key role in maintaining peace and stability throughout our area. The OSCE's most effective contributions to regional security have been in areas such as field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratization, and human rights and election monitoring. We have decided to explore options for a potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. Reaffirming our rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and on the basis of our existing decisions, we confirm that the OSCE can, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role when participating States judge it to be the most effective and appropriate organization. In this regard, it could also decide to provide the mandate covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of participating States as well as other organizations to provide resources and expertise. In accordance with the Platform for Co-operative Security, it could also provide a co-ordinating framework for such efforts.

The Court Of Conciliation And Arbitration

47. We reiterate that the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes is at the core of OSCE commitments. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, in this respect, remains a tool available to those, a large number of participating States, which have become parties to the 1992 Convention of Stockholm. We encourage them to use this instrument to resolve disputes between them, as well as with other participating States which voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. We also encourage those participating States which have not yet done so to consider joining the Convention.

V. Our partners for co-operation

48. We recognize the interdependence between the security of the OSCE area and that of Partners for Co-operation, as well as our commitment to the relationship and the dialogue with them. We emphasize in particular the long-standing relations with our Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. We recognize the increased involvement in and support for the work of the OSCE by our Partners for Co-operation. Building on this interdependence, we are ready to develop this process further. Implementing and building on the Helsinki Document 1992 and the Budapest Document 1994, we will work more closely with the Partners for Co-operation to promote OSCE norms and principles. We welcome their wish to promote the realization of the Organization's norms and principles, including the fundamental principle of resolving conflicts through peaceful means. To this end, we will invite the Partners for Co-operation on a more regular basis to increased participation in the work of the OSCE as the dialogue develops.

49. The potential of the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars must be fully explored and exploited. Drawing on the Budapest mandate, the Permanent Council will examine the recommendations emerging from the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars. We will encourage the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation to draw on our expertise in setting up structures and mechanisms in the Mediterranean for early warning, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.

50. We welcome the increased participation in our work by Japan and the Republic of Korea. We welcome the contribution by Japan to OSCE field activities. We will seek to strengthen further our co-operation with our Asian partners in meeting challenges of common interest.

VI. Conclusion

51. This Charter will benefit the security of all participating States by enhancing and strengthening the OSCE as we enter the twenty-first century. Today we have decided to develop its existing instruments and to create new tools. We will use them fully to promote a free, democratic and secure OSCE area. The Charter will thus underpin the OSCE's role as the only pan-European security organization entrusted with ensuring peace and stability in its area. We appreciate the completion of the work of the Security Model Committee.

52. The original of the present Charter, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, will be transmitted to the Secretary General of the Organization, who will transmit a certified true copy of this Charter to each of the participating States.

We, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance that we attach to the present Charter and declaring our determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above text, have subscribed our signatures below.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Adopted by the European Council of the EU on 10 and 11 December 1999

II. Common european policy on security and defence

25. The European Council adopts the two Presidency progress reports (see Annex IV) on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence.

26. The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

27. The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.

28. Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency's reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;
- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;
- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.

29. The European Council asks the incoming Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects of the reports as a matter of priority, including conflict prevention and a committee for civilian crisis management. The incoming Presidency is invited to draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary. The General Affairs Council is invited to begin implementing these decisions by establishing as of March 2000 the agreed interim bodies and arrangements within the Council, in accordance with the current Treaty provisions.

Annex IV

Presidency reports to the Helsinki European Council On "Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence" and on "non-military crisis management of the European Union"

The Presidency has responded as a matter of priority to the mandate given by the Cologne European Council to strengthen the common European policy on security and defence by taking the work forward in military and non-military aspects of crisis management. The work has been based on the provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the guiding principles agreed at Cologne, which have been reaffirmed by the Member States.

Work has yielded two separate progress reports to the European Council, which are intended to be complementary. The reports propose concrete measures and provide guidance for further work to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000 towards the objectives set at Cologne. During the Portuguese Presidency, consideration will be given as to whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.

To assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks, the Member States have decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks. In this connection, the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.

Also in order to assume these responsibilities, the Union will improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management in which the Union and the Members States already have considerable experience. Special attention will be given to a rapid reaction capability.

All these measures will be taken in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and they will reinforce and extend the Union's comprehensive external role. With the enhancement and concertation of military and civilian crisis response tools, the Union will be able to resort to the whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations.

NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management.

The development of the common European policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice to the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty, which will be preserved for the Member States party to these Treaties. Nor shall the development of the common European policy on security and defence prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Further steps will be taken to ensure full mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO.

The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Following up the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security, the Union will cooperate with the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international organisations in a mutually reinforcing manner in stability promotion, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.

Annex 1 to Annex IV

Presidency progress report to the Helsinki European Council on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence

Introduction

Recalling the guiding principles agreed at Cologne, the European Union should be able to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks.

The European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The action by the Union will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

For this purpose, the following has been agreed:

A common European headline goal will be adopted for readily deployable military capabilities and collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport will be developed rapidly, to be achieved through voluntary co-ordinated national and multinational efforts, for carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks.

New political and military bodies will be established within the Council to enable the Union to take decisions on EU-led Petersberg operations and to ensure, under the authority of the Council, the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations.

Principles for cooperation with non-EU European NATO members and other European partners in EU-led military crisis management will be agreed, without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy.

Determination to carry out Petersberg tasks will require Member States to improve national and multinational military capabilities, which will at the same time, as appropriate, strengthen the capabilities of NATO and enhance the effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in promoting European security.

In presenting this report, the Presidency has taken note of the fact that Denmark has recalled Protocol nº 5 to the Amsterdam Treaty on the position of Denmark.

Military capabilities for Petersberg tasks

Member States recall their commitment made at Cologne and their determination to give the EU appropriate capabilities, without unnecessary duplication, to be able to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP. Such capabilities will enable them to conduct effective EU-led operations as well as playing, for those involved, their full role in NATO and NATO-led operations. More effective European military capabilities will be developed on the basis of the existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities, which will be assembled for EU-led crisis management operations carried out with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Particular attention will be devoted to the capabilities necessary to ensure effective performance in crisis management: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control, taking account of the results of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities and their implications for EU-led operations.

To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment

for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.

Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, areas also identified by the WEU audit. They welcome in this respect decisions already announced by certain Member States which go in that direction:

- to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means;
- to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States;
- to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces;
- to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command;
- to increase the number of readily deployable troops;
- to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.

The General Affairs Council, with the participation of Defence Ministers, will elaborate the headline and capability goals. It will develop a method of consultation through which these goals can be met and maintained, and through which national contributions reflecting Member States' political will and commitment towards these goals can be defined by each Member State, with a regular review of progress made. In addition, Member States would use existing defence planning procedures, including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the PfP. These objectives and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be mutually reinforcing.

The European NATO members who are not EU Member States, and other countries who are candidates for accession to the European Union will be invited to contribute to this improvement of European military capabilities. This will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations and will, for those countries concerned, contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of the NATO.

Member States welcome the recent progress made towards the restructuring of European defence industries, which constitutes an important step forward. This contributes to strengthening the European industrial and technological defence base. Such developments call for increased efforts to seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States consider appropriate.

Decision-making

The Council decides upon policy relevant to Union involvement in all phases and aspects of crisis management, including decisions to carry out Petersberg tasks in accordance with Article 23 of the EU Treaty. Taken within the single institutional framework, decisions will respect European Community competences and ensure inter-pillar coherence in conformity with Article 3 of the EU Treaty.

All Member States are entitled to participate fully and on an equal footing in all decisions and deliberations of the Council and Council bodies on EU-led operations. The commitment of national assets by Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decision. Member States will participate in the ad hoc committee of contributors in accordance with the conditions provided for by paragraph 24.

Defence Ministers will be involved in the common European security and defence policy (CESDP); when the General Affairs Council discusses matters related to the CESDP, Defence Ministers as appropriate will participate to provide guidance on defence matters.

The following new permanent political and military bodies will be established within the Council:

a A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the EU Treaty and without prejudice to Community competence. In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For that purpose, appropriate procedures will be adopted in order to allow effective and urgent decision taking. The PSC will also forward guidelines to the Military Committee.

b The Military Committee (MC) will be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The MC will meet at the level of the Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the MC will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.

c The Military Staff (MS)within the Council structures will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

As an interim measure, the following bodies will be set up within the Council as of March 2000:

a Fully respecting the Treaty provisions, the Council will establish a standing interim political and security committee at senior/ambassadorial level tasked to take forward under the guidance of the Political Committee the follow up of the Helsinki European Council by preparing recommendations on the future functioning of the CESDP and to deal with CFSP affairs on a day-to-day basis in close contacts with the SG/HR.

b An interim body of military representatives of Member States' Chiefs of Defence is established to give military advice as required to the interim political and security committee.

c The Council Secretariat will be strengthened by military experts seconded from Member States in order to assist in the work on the CESDP and to form the nucleus of the future Military Staff.

The Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR), in assisting the Council, has a key contribution to make to the efficiency and consistency of the CFSP and the development of the common security and defence policy. In conformity with the EU Treaty, the SG/HR will contribute to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions.

In the interim period, the SG/HR, Secretary General of the WEU, should make full use of WEU assets for the purpose of advising the Council under Article 17 of the EU Treaty.

Consultation and cooperation with non-EU countries and with NATO

The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.

With European NATO members who are not members of the EU and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU, appropriate structures will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management. In the event of a crisis, these structures will serve for consultation in the period leading up to a decision of the Council.

Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.

Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation.

Russia, Ukraine and other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States may be invited to take part in the EU-led operations.

All the States that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day-to-day conduct of such an operation.

In the case of an EU-led operation, an ad-hoc committee of contributors will be set up for the day-to-day conduct of the operation. All EU Member States are entitled to attend the ad-hoc committee, whether or not they are participating in the operation, while only contributing States will take part in the day-to-day conduct of the operation.

The decision to end an operation will be taken by the Council after consultation between the participating states within the committee of contributors.

Modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO will be developed. Initially, relations will be developed on an informal basis, through contacts between the SG/HR for CFSP and the Secretary General of NATO.

Follow-up for the Portuguese Presidency

The Portuguese Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry forward the work within the General Affairs Council on strengthening the common European security and defence policy. The Portuguese Presidency is also invited to report to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including:

a recommendations on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies related to the CESDP within the EU, taking into account the paper on "Military bodies in the European Union and the planning and conduct of EU-led operations" and other contributions made;
b proposals on appropriate arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management;
c proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit co-operation on the appropriate military response to a crisis, as set out in Washington and at Cologne;
d an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.

Annex 2 to Annex IV

Presidency report on non-military crisis management of the European Union

The Presidency was mandated by the European Council in Cologne to continue the work on all aspects of security including the enhancement and better coordination of the Union's and the Member States' non-military crisis response tools. Developments inter alia in Kosovo have for their part underlined the importance of this task. To this end, a thorough discussion has been carried out within the Council instances.

Work listing all available resources of the Member States and the Union has been initiated and has led to inventories of the tools available to the Union and to Member States, which are contained respectively in doc. 11044/99 REV 1 for the Union and in doc. 12323/99 for the Member States.

The inventories which have been drawn up clearly show that Member States, the Union, or both have accumulated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a number of areas such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, etc. This inventory should be pursued further. Regular updating will be necessary to better identify lacunae as well as strongpoints.

In order to be able to respond more rapidly and more effectively to emerging crisis situations, the Union needs to strengthen the responsiveness and efficiency of its resources and tools, as well as their synergy.

It is therefore appropriate to draw up an Action Plan which would show the way ahead and indicate the steps the Union has to undertake to develop a rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management using non-military instruments.

Action Plan

a The Union should aim at:

- strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, collective and NGO resources in order to avoid duplication and improve performance, while maintaining the flexibility of each contributor to decide on the deployment of assets and capabilities in a particular crisis, or via a particular channel;
- enhancing and facilitating the EU's contributions to, and activities within, other organisations,

such as the UN and the OSCE whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as EU autonomous actions;
- ensuring inter-pillar coherence.

b To that end:

- Member States and the Union should develop a rapid reaction capability by defining a framework and modalities, as well as by pre-identifying personnel, material and financial resources that could be used in response to a request of a lead agency like the UN or the OSCE, or, where appropriate, in autonomous EU actions.
- An inventory of national and collective resources should be pursued to give an overview of resources that could be marshalled within such a rapid reaction framework. In this process Member States and the EU institutions could, if they wish, highlight sectors in which they find that they have acknowledged expertise.
- A database should be set up to maintain and share information on the pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-military crisis management. The availability and quality of these assets would need to be clearly defined.
- A study should be carried out, taking into account lessons learned, to define concrete targets for EU Member States' collective non-military response to international crises (e.g. the ability to deploy at short notice and sustain for a defined period a set number of civilian police as a contribution to civpol missions; to deploy a combined search and rescue capability of up to 200 people within twenty-four hours). This work should be taken forward by the Portuguese Presidency together with the SG/HR.
- The inventory, the database project and the study should help identify areas of relative strength and weakness and could promote improved training standards, sharing of experience and best practice, as well as bilateral or multilateral projects between Member States (e.g. 'pairing' one Member State's helicopter lift with a specialist medical team from another).
- A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, should be set up at the Council Secretariat. It would run the database project and the different capabilities initiatives. In particular crises, depending on the EU's role, it may set up an ad hoc centre to coordinate the effectiveness of EU Member States' contributions. This should be a lean, efficient, non-bureaucratic structure permitting close interaction with the Commission (ECHO in particular).
- In establishing a rapid reaction capability urgent consideration will be given to developing civil police capabilities.
- Rapid financing mechanisms such as the creation by the Commission of a Rapid Reaction Fund should be set up to allow the acceleration of the provision of finance to support EU activities, to contribute to operations run by other international organisations and to fund NGO activities, as appropriate.

Decision-making and implementation

The Union should develop a comprehensive approach with a view to marshalling national and collective non-military instruments within the time limits called for by the situation on the ground.

For the coordination of civilian crisis management tools, the co-ordinating mechanism for a civilian crisis management will be established. This mechanism, which will be of inter-pillar nature, will provide expert advice in support of the management of crises. Decision-making and implementation of non-military crisis management tools under the first pillar will remain subject to institutions and procedures of the EC Treaty.

As an interim practice, this work to develop the co-ordinating mechanism for civilian crisis management may draw on experts from the Member States.

If appropriate, the Union will lay down general guidelines ensuring inter-pillar coherence and setting out the means which should be made available. Arrangements for rapid financing mechanisms for a prompt response to crisis situations could be devised in this context.

COMPUTER GRAPHICS

José Antonio Peñas Artero.

COVER

Gráfica Futura

PHOTOGRAPHS

Claudio Álvarez: Page 170.

CASA: Pages 133 - 135.

Pepe Díaz: Pages 28 - 34 - 38 - 48 - 52 - 58 - 66 - 69 - 75 - 93 - 102 - 109 - 113 - 137 - 149 - 150 - 155 - 156 - 163 - 166 - 179 - 181 - 190 (bottom) - 200 - 206 (bottom) - 209 - 215.

Agencia Efe: Pages 44 - 51 - 63 - 178.

Edu Fernández: Pages 28 - 46 - 71 - 73 - 82 - 85 - 124 - 208 - 212.

A. Florensa: Page 121.

Helene Gicquel: Page 89.

C. G. de la Armada: Pages 61 - 70 - 74 - 81 - 86 - 95 - 101 - 131 - 132 - 158 - 195 - 197 - 198 - 210.

C. G. del Ejército del Aire: Pages 125 - 201 (bottom).

C. G. del Ejército de Tierra: Pages 100 - 110 - 111 - 147 - 176 - 186.

Francisco Núñez Arcos: Pages 91 - 203.

M. Povedano: Page 5.

Revista Aeronáutica: Pages 37 - 91 - 96 - 134 - 159 - 171 - 201 (top) - 203.

A. Manrique: Pages 106 - 126 - 127 - 129 - 187 - 191.

Jorge Mata: Pages 107 - 175 - 206 (top).

Luis Rico: Pages 140 - 161 - 190 (top) - 214.

Jesús Tornero: Page 142.