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Georgia Again in Putin's Shadow

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Introduction

As the government of Georgia continues its quest for economic modernization and admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU), it must first normalize relations with the Russian Federation to facilitate achievement of these long-term goals. The nation must weigh the benefits of a patient short- and medium-term policy of non-alignment versus an aggressive policy of immediate Western integration. This will be the most effective path for Georgia to improve its citizens' living conditions while ensuring physical security along its borders, which are currently areas of heightened tension. The animosity between the Russian and Georgian governments is counter-productive for both nations, though much more so for the Georgian populace. Georgia has the most to gain from rapprochement, and therefore should initiate the dialogue, ensuring that Russian withdrawal from South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not preconditions for negotiations.

The recommendations put forth in this essay will likely be anathema to many citizens of Georgia, and especially to those in the Georgian political sphere. The events that have transpired and sacrifices that have been made in Abkhazia and South Ossetia can only truly be appreciated by the citizens directly involved. Distaste for Russia among the Georgian people is understandable. Most sovereign nations have no appetite for foreign advice involving their internal affairs, but Georgia must recognize and consider the factors identified below related to their security situation, even if they choose not to act.

Perhaps the most notable facts to consider are the following:

- Vladimir Putin has been elected to the Russian presidency
- Iran is becoming more unstable
- No nation has provided Georgia with security guarantees
- The EU and Turkey are too energy dependent on Russia, and are economically and politically unwilling to significantly pressure their trade partner.

With respect to Georgian hopes for assistance from the United States, the U.S. has no desire to aggressively antagonize Russia over Georgian matters. Notably, the most

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significant outcome of the meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at the White House on 31 January 2012 was a commitment to studying a free trade agreement between the two nations. This identical commitment had been made three years earlier in the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, announced on 9 January 2009. There were no U.S. security guarantees resulting from the visit. The United States is also reluctant to antagonize Russia for other reasons. The U.S. needs Russia to ferry astronauts and supplies to the International Space Station. Washington is pursuing economic interests in Russia resulting from Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, including repealing the Jackson-Vanik Act. In addition to the effort to "resent" U.S.–Russia relations, the U.S. is also facing its own financial challenges, and the military is shifting some of its focus from Europe to the Pacific. The United States has great respect for Georgia and its leadership, but has broader strategic interests that must be considered. Noting these factors (and others that are not discussed here), Georgia must recognize the need to take steps to reduce tensions with Russia if they hope to achieve an atmosphere of security and improved economic vitality.

What Can Georgia Do?

There are several immediate, simple, and inexpensive options available to Georgia to encourage détente with Russia. These efforts will not compromise Georgian sovereignty and may actually improve Georgia's relationships with Western governments, since any endeavor that seeks to lessen friction in the Caucasus would be viewed favorably by EU and U.S. politicians. Options that could be considered include:

- Deemphasize the role played by the North Caucasus in Georgian politics
- Positively promote the 2014 Sochi Olympics
- Assuage Russian anxieties about the possibility of NATO expansion
- Reduce the level of overt anti-Russian rhetoric in public statements, official documents, and parliamentary actions
- Lower the priority of resolving Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence in national politics.

Georgia does not need to become a "cheerleader" for Russia, but they do require a functional relationship with their northern neighbor if they are to achieve their full potential.

The North Caucasus Strategy

The U.S. administration highlighted Georgia's strategy toward the North Caucasus as an area of concern both in 2011 and 2012, when LTG (Ret.) James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, briefed the U.S. Congress that Georgia's approach to the region was increasing tensions in the Caucasus and increasing Russian suspicions regarding Georgia's intentions. Georgia assuredly recognizes Russian sensitivities concerning the region. As recently as 2010, some estimates claim that there were as many as 1700 Russian national casualties in the North Caucasus. Any Georgian outreach efforts that serve

to isolate citizens of Chechnya, Dagestan, Balkaria, and other regions from the remainder of Russia—such as Georgia's policy of allowing visa-free travel *only* for North Caucasians—could be perceived as intended to increase instability in Russia. The short-term economic benefit associated with increased travel will not likely outweigh the strategic costs of collapsed diplomacy.

Promotion of the 2014 Sochi Olympics

It is widely accepted that Vladimir Putin considers the effective execution of Russian-hosted international events a key part of his strategy to improve the Russian Federation's standing in global opinion. He stated this in a lengthy, personally-penned article on foreign policy published in *RIA Novosti* on 4 March 2012, shortly before the Russian presidential election. There are several high visibility events scheduled over the next six years of Putin's presidency, but because of its close proximity to Abkhazia, Sochi has attracted the most interest in Georgia. After initially supporting Russia's bid for the 2014 Winter Olympics, Georgia has subsequently consistently and publicly alleged that Russia is pillaging the resources of Abkhazia to prepare Sochi for the games. Though Georgia's sudden defense of Abkhazian environmental interests is admirable, politicizing the Olympics will most likely backfire. Georgian opposition will not cause any nation to abandon the games, and it will provide Russia with ammunition to launch accusations at Georgia if there are any security challenges at the games.

Ease Russian Concerns about NATO Expansion

Putin addressed the issues of NATO expansion and the United States' missile defense plan in his previously mentioned foreign policy article, written at the end of his presidential campaign. He indicated that NATO expansion undermines Russian security and global stability. Georgia should not push its accession agenda at near-term NATO summits. Instead, Georgia should consider one of two steps in relation to NATO accession. It should either announce that it is reviewing its NATO membership plans, or it should simply quietly let the issue rest for a few years. In either case, Georgia will not renounce their intent to eventually join NATO, but merely reduce the pace of overt steps on the path toward full membership, steps that stoke Russian anxiety. Since most analysts agree that NATO membership is much further away than Georgia desires, there is no risk of slowing down its pursuit of accession to NATO. It will potentially come someday. But the facts on the ground bear out the reality that Georgia's process has already been slowed, and this is not a bad thing, either for NATO or for Georgia. There is a benefit to reduced animosity between Georgia and Russia, yet slowing the pace poses no risk to Georgia's eventual accession to NATO membership.

Reduce Anti-Russian Rhetoric

The recommendation to reduce the level of overt anti-Russian rhetoric in Georgian media and government statements does not require Georgia to openly promote Russia. Rather, Georgia should choose its forums appropriately to air grievances against its

much larger neighbor. It is virtually impossible to read public statements from Georgian officials without finding some derogatory comment or indirect taunt directed at Moscow. The National Security Concept of Georgia, passed by the Georgian Parliament in December 2011, is peppered with negative references to the Russian Federation. The parliament even went so far as to pass a resolution in May 2011 recognizing a Russian genocide against Circassians in the 1800s. Clearly there was nothing to gain from this official recognition but increased Russian anger. Repeated Georgian attempts to humiliate Russia internationally will be no more effective now than they have been in the past, so they must be reduced.

Reduce Focus on South Ossetia and Abkhazia

The final recommendation offered here is that Georgia must place less emphasis on resolving the question of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This will clearly be the most difficult aspect of reengagement, as the emotional scars related to these conflicts are fresh. These territorial disputes are an impediment not only to Russian relations, but also to EU and NATO accession. If Georgia were to pause its accession strategy, or cede full independence altogether to these regions, it would eliminate the border dispute, and perhaps pave a more expeditious path to eventual admission into either NATO or the EU. Ceding these territories does not mean they will never return to Georgia. But, for the immediate future, the territories do not wish to be part of Georgia, and neither force nor diplomacy will resolve this. Between 1801 and today, with the possible exception of the 1918–21 period, Georgia never had effective control of these regions. Few (if any) ethnic Georgians currently reside in the territories, and it is questionable whether they would choose to return if given the opportunity. Georgia should prioritize Russian engagement above Russian de-occupation.

Conclusion

Russia has committed significant atrocities against the Georgian nation. Hundreds of thousands of citizens have been displaced since the 1990s, and thousands have been killed or wounded on all sides since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Despite these offenses, Georgia has to look forward rather than back, and recognize that they remain in the shadow of Putin and the Russian Federation. Their geographic location requires diplomatic nuance and skill that many others may never have to achieve. Georgia has no international security guarantees, and is signatory to no mutual defense agreements. Though the election of Ivanishvilli to the post of Prime Minister may be a step in the right direction, there is much work to be done. Putin's reign as president for another six to twelve years likely ensures that the undesirable status quo of insecurity in Tbilisi will continue, unless positive overtures from Georgia are implemented. Georgia should act immediately. Georgia's progress and achievements have been remarkable since independence, and they will become nothing short of impressive if they can walk the fine line between Russian engagement and Western aspiration. Given what they have achieved to date, we should not discount their chances.

The Challenges and Role of Structures in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

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Abstract: An intervention in Afghanistan that has lasted longer than a decade has not brought about what was most hoped for: security for the Afghan people and stabilization of the entire region. These processes are challenged every day by the complexity of Afghanistan's social structures: its culture, values, way of life, tribal networks, politics, insurgent networks, and its history. A closer examination of examples of cultural and political structures can provide us with a perspective on this complexity, and on the deeply intertwined relationships among various actors engaged in the Afghan conflict. In this light, we can demonstrate the repeated shortcomings of liberal peace building in the case of Afghanistan.

These examples also manifest the differences in values, attitudes toward gender, and cultural and political perceptions between Afghan and Western societies. The possibilities of conflict resolution, and its foundation in traditional structures—such as local communities, tribal or religious structures, or traditional value sets—offer scenarios for feasible strategies to be explored and possibly implemented.

Acknowledgement of the Afghan reality on the ground and preparation for peace building missions can effectively improve the goals of efforts pursued and carried out by the international community, with a corresponding improvement in results. In a country that has managed to repel foreign invasions in the past, and tends not to accept dictates from the outside, our chances of success in our mission can be increased if we can admit that liberal values might not apply universally. By listening to Afghan voices directly and ensuring their involvement in the process of reconstruction, our respect for the realities of Afghan life, in the context of their values, creates the possibility to set up a successful strategy for Afghanistan's recovery.

Introduction

Afghanistan has been experiencing military and humanitarian intervention for more than ten years. "The right war"—as U.S. President Barack Obama has described this effort—carries several distinctive characteristics. It is also considered by some researchers to be a "war on Islam."[1] This statement has been strongly denied by the Obama Administration, which took a decisive step in December 2009 to end this conflict by declaring a significant "detour" and changing its official language, bringing few new wrinkles to the process: the beginning of negotiations with the Taliban and the announced intention to withdraw all U.S. combat troops by 2014. Some others invoke this conflict's similarity

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[1] Steven Simon, "Can the Right War Be Won?," *Foreign Affairs* 88:4 (July/August 2009): 130–37.

to the Vietnam War. Both critics and supporters of this war agree that, under current conditions, Afghanistan will not be able to sustain itself.

Despite the lessons of history, the international community became involved in a conflict from which an exit would be hard to envisage and in which success would be difficult to define, let alone to achieve. One of the key elements contributing to this status is the problematic nature of the goal of building a Western-style state structure in the context of a tribal society wracked by ongoing conflict. Strong calls for the prioritization of liberal values—peace, democracy, equality, and economic modernization—are omnipresent in reports and political speeches related to Western missions in Afghanistan. The shortcomings of these missions mostly relate to civilian casualties and missteps that deeply affect the cultural and religious sensitivities of the Afghan people.

Afghanistan's social structure is dominated by multiple layers made up of ethnic, tribal, clan, family, or *qawm* entities.[2] My primary intention—to analyze these multiple structures (political, cultural, tribal, economic, regional, military, religious, etc.)—would have been too complex to tackle, and indeed would be the work of a lifetime. Therefore, the main focus of this article will be on representative examples of cultural and political structures and their role. However, references to other existing structures and factors will remain a cohesive part of the research.

The importance of these structures inherent to Afghan society is not sufficiently acknowledged and reflected in the strategies, objectives, or current policies of ongoing missions. If they are acknowledged, approaches that take them into account are poorly implemented. Ignorance, negligence, or misinterpretation of these structures in the reconstruction and development process and their vital role in this endeavor are resulting in a relatively unsatisfactory level of positive achievements in comparison to the amount of financial, military, and human resources and efforts dedicated to Afghanistan in the last decade. Shortcomings and (dys)functionality, mostly seen in the current political structures supported by the international community, demonstrate that liberal Western values are not a workable goal on every occasion and under every circumstance. Afghanistan's social structure was buffered from outside influence over the last three decades, first by the years of Soviet occupation and then by a long period of Taliban rule. It is now being challenged in what constitutes a building up of structures and systems that are not fully suitable or compatible with Afghan values and its traditional way of living. Afghanistan is a nation in a situation that would require any state, with any set of values, time for recovery; further, it is currently facing multiple new challenges. New structures and ideas are being introduced, and the capacity of Afghan society to fully absorb them and incorporate them into society is proving limited. This change would be a lengthy process under the best of circumstances, but Afghanistan is being asked to undergo a major transformation within a relatively short period of time.

The first section of this essay will examine two cultural aspects, pointing out the importance of the structures that characterize Afghan society—the moral code of conduct,

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2   *Qawm* is a social structure based on ties of solidarity that may cross ethnic or tribal boundaries.

Pashtunwali, and the significance of the veil and the *burqa*—as two complex elements originating from deep within the region's traditional culture. We will demonstrate what kind of challenges to Western values these two examples represent and how they influence the way of living and how deeply they shape Afghan values. More importantly, the focus will be placed on the interpretation and general approach towards these structures when they are observed from inside as well as from outside Afghan society. The second section will focus on two examples representing political organization and the current political structure. Anchored in the Afghan Constitution, the legal position of the president is very strong. The reasons for and shortcomings of this current political architecture will be demonstrated in a series of examples showing how weak this position is in reality. In the case of the Taliban, the essay will address the question of whether their ability to effectively utilize popular support based on their traditional moral code and delivery of services that the central government fails to provide can be attributes of their "resurrection" and possible future success. The third section will link these examples together and, based on specific situations in the Afghan context, will attempt to depict the complexity of how these issues arise in everyday life, as well as examine their links to examples discussed in previous sections.

On the basis of these examples of deeply rooted patterns and relationships, I will demonstrate their role and also try to determine how compatible they are (or are not) with the core values and practices that are central to the international intervention in Afghanistan. A series of questions will arise in this research: Do we lack knowledge of these structures and local values, or do our own values prevent us from implementing them? Would better understanding of Afghan culture and political structures—that is, better preparation followed by implementation of this knowledge during the mission and the reconstruction process—be a key to a successful and long-term strategy to achieve durable peace? Do these structures actually offer a solution for a feasible and sustainable political model in Afghanistan that is suitable to Afghans? What may prevent us from acknowledging or implementing them? Is it our own political agenda that the international community needs to defend and promote in order to achieve public support and availability of funding in their countries for this mission? Or do we simply ignore them for deeper philosophical reasons, possibly simply due to solipsism? What are the factors preventing Afghans from insisting on having a stronger voice on their own country's architecture?

To understand the depth of the complex issues that bear on the subject of this analysis would require perceiving them in the regional dimension and context. However, the topic of this article will not focus on the development of the situation in Pakistan or Iran, and those connections will not be referred to in detail here. Other questions arise in the process of this critical and comparative analysis that bring the research to more fundamental questions to be asked about quality of the human resources deployed in Afghanistan at all levels and their preparedness and physical and psychological capacity for such a mission. However, full answers to these questions are subject to further research. As recent developments show, months of intensive negotiation, thousands of lives lost in conflict, or billions spent on the reconstruction process might be easily jeopardized in a

day by improper conduct, disrespect, or breach of highly prized local values, and might well result in growing local hostility. It is becoming increasingly clear that the thorough knowledge of the terrain, not only in its geographical terms, is an indispensable pre-condition of any military or humanitarian operation of such a scale as currently exists in Afghanistan. Finally, this article will conclude by addressing some future implications of these ideas and provide recommendations from the perspective of the practitioner.

Cultural Structures

Afghanistan: Basic and Complex

For the purpose of this article, it is essential to define the terms—*structure* and *culture*—upon which this work builds in the first section in order to offer greater clarity on the subject itself. Equally, the arguments drawn and the examples used in this research or conclusions drawn should be interpreted in the context of these definitions. The structuralist approach is used more widely in anthropology. It was popularized by Claude Lévi-Strauss, who considered "not [the] uniqueness of the societies but the differences between them as a subject [of] structural anthropology."[3] This concept has been applied in studies of language, media, religion, and culture. Clifford Geertz, in contrast to Lévi-Strauss, saw anthropology as "not [an] experimental science and search for laws but an interpretive one in search for webs of meaning."[4] Both agreed that the natural order of human behavior and the "web of meanings" that constitutes culture cannot be separated from the human actor and his intentions in the process of social interactions. According to Durkheim's writings, "patterns of human behavior form established structures; they are social facts, which have established reality, beyond the lives and perception of particular individuals."[5]

Lévi-Strauss and Giddens' theory contains the notion that "individual and society form [an] interdependent duality. This functionalist approach views structures as constraining and enabling: while it establishes limitations on action, it is also the medium through which one is able to affect his surroundings."[6] Giddens defines structures as "rules and resources drawn on by individuals in the production and reproduction of social actions."[7] The concept of structure is now often a substantial foundation of nearly every mode of inquiry and discovery in science, philosophy, or art. The description of structure implicitly offers an account of what a system is made of – a collection of interrelated components. Therefore, a structure will be observed in a hierarchy or a historical experience, and will be present as a network of actions within tribes or families, configu-

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[3]   Tom Ingold, ed., *Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology* (London: Routledge, 1994), 370.

[4]   Ibid., 37.

[5]   John J. Macionis and Ken Plummer, *Sociology: A Global Introduction* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2010), 125.

[6]   Scott A. Appelrouth and Laura Desfor Edles, *Classical and Contemporary Theory*, 2nd Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2012), 719.

[7]   Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 19.

rations or connections between sub-tribes, political actors, between two genders, or among foreigners – all of these components that are currently correlating within the Afghan context.

As was discussed above, people and their social constructs are the main subjects and actors in creating structures. Simultaneously, people's actions in the process of creation of structural networks are influenced not only by their behavior but also by existing structures. The significance of these structures can be observed, for example, in the possibility of making free choices and acting independently, but also as factors shaping action, such as social class, religion, gender, customs, ethnicity, etc. Structures should be seen as a *neuron system,* inside of a society or a country, rather than as a skeleton. The reason for that is that the structures possess not only a certain organic quality and flexibility, but they are also subject to constant metamorphosis. They also have the capacity—as does any organic matter—to reflect and respond to significant external and internal factors (e.g., invasions or emigration, technology or regime changes). This process of change and evolution is not particularly notable for its speed; however, once a new structure is established, its impact progressively deepens.

It is not hard to explain why the study of cultural concepts in political science, security analysis, or comparative political studies is relatively rare. First, culture is not a concept that is typically studied by political scientists or security analysts. The reason for that might be that a cultural approach complicates issues of hard evidence; simply put, culture is problematic to account for, and it is not an exact science. Second, an attempt to present intangible factors like behavior, social aspirations, and cultural patterns as evidence might fail to convey the impression of a sufficiently scientific approach. Third, cultural analysis also raises many issues and questions that cannot be answered through political science or security studies (although other branches of the social sciences might answer them more adequately).

But what is to be understood by our use of the term *culture*? Culture, more frequently tackled in sociology or anthropology as a central concept, has been defined in a wide variety of ways that emphasize "culture as social organization, core values, specific beliefs, social action, or a way of life," with few variations.[8] More contemporary analyses, however, begin with Geertz's definition of culture as "a historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life."[9] This view emphasizes culture as public, shared meanings; "behavior, institutions, and social structure are understood not as culture itself but as culturally constituted phenomena."[10]

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[8] Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckholm, "Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions," *Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology* 47:1 (1952).

[9] Clifford Geertz, "Religion," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89.

[10] Melford E. Spiro, "Some Reflections on Cultural Determinism and Relativism with Special Reference to Emotion and Reason," in *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion*,

Especially in the Afghan context, many cultural and political aspects of the current situation cannot be understood without reference to history, geography, or religion in terms of how people live their lives. The area that we presently call Afghanistan occupied a central position in the space where four great civilizations met. In spite of this heterogeneity and diversity, along with the effects of recent decades of conflict and displacement, Afghans continue to hold to their traditional values and customs that distinguish them from their neighbors, and they continue to place significant emphasis on ethnic diversity and regional differences. Despite that, the essence and roots of their culture remain strong in their consciousness and traditions. They may have changed and altered in some ways over time, but they remain identifiable. Several scientists who have carried out their research in Afghanistan in the last few decades have agreed that this great diversity, evident all around Afghanistan, adds value and richness to their culture and the complexity of their society. Multiple groups represent different spiritual beliefs in Afghanistan today: Sunni, Shia, Ismaili, Sikh, Hindu, and Jew. The large number of various ethnicities also leads to ethnic rivalries, most notably between the dominant Pashtuns and Tajiks, although conflicts between Pashtuns and Hazaras and factionalism among Pashtuns themselves are ongoing aspects of Afghanistan's reality, a reality that is only complicated by the presence of many other ethnic groups: Uzbeks, Turkmen, Aimaqs, Baluchs, Brahuis, Pashais, Nuristanis, etc. In spite of the high level of ethnic diversity within the Afghan population, there is a strong unifying factor among Afghans. "A glance at Afghan history affirms an often repeated pattern of alternating periods of fission and fusion. Afghans may quarrel happily among themselves, but they stand together and assert their pride in being Afghan when outsiders threaten. A sense of national identity does exist, elements of divisiveness notwithstanding."[11] But how are we to understand the meaning of being cultured in a society where above 70 percent of the population is illiterate? How can we measure the level of culture, if in the Afghan reality it is certainly not the same as being well educated or well read? Wisdom unrelated to formal education is highly regarded and reflected in the practice of local legal customs. In this case, those individuals "who observe the rules of accepted behavior and follow the prescriptions of etiquette are highly respected. Moreover, because of vibrant oral tradition, many non-literates are well aware of their cultural heritage."[12]

Close observation and understanding of structures in the cultural or political system present in Afghanistan can help paint a complex picture about the *modus operandi* of its population and Afghan society. To a greater extent, such observation can indicate how to approach the mission that Western nations came to Afghanistan to accomplish. History shows that implanting modern, Western values into Afghan society has not been successful, despite the fact that in some cases the initiative came from their own legitimate political leadership (as will be demonstrated below by the example of the *burqa*).

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ed. Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. LeVine (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 323–46.

[11] Nancy Hatch Dupree, "Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly* 23:5 (2002): 977.

[12] *Ibid.*, 978.

How great a chance do we, as foreigners, have in any similar attempt? We need to work hard to respect and recognize differences between our values and those of the Afghan people – as products of different histories, reactions to different circumstances, and expressions of differently structured aspirations.

Pashtunwali: A Code from Far, Far Away

Winston Churchill was certainly not enamored of the Pashtun moral code, which he famously described thus: "Their system of ethics, which regards treachery and violence as virtues rather than vices … is incomprehensible to a logical mind." This opinion remains fairly widely held, and demonstrates one of the biggest challenges we face in both the current mission in Afghanistan and in our minds. "Regardless of whether culture does or does not make sense, we live in a world which forces us to make decisions."[13] Another challenge for a researcher, strategist, politician, simple soldier, or humanitarian worker is a choice between multiple cultural realities – between whether to follow the familiar set of values with which we were brought up, or to apply those values that currently surround us.

This Afghan moral code, known as *Pashtunwali*, may be, in the eyes of a Westerner, old-fashioned, bizarre, or simply wrong. But for Afghans, protecting one's honor (*izzat*) is placed above all other considerations, including acquisition of money or property. It is a pedestal upon which social status stands. Family is considered to be the most important institution of Afghan society, unlike in the West, where the individual is the primary unit of interest and rights. As one scholar has written, "Individual honor, a positive pride in independence that comes from self-reliance, fulfillment of family obligations, respect for the elderly, respect for women, loyalty to colleagues and friends, tolerance for others, forthrightness, an abhorrence of fanaticism, and dislike for ostentation – is a cultural quality most Afghans share."[14] *Pashtunwali*—literally meaning "way of the Pashtuns"— is far more than a system of customary law. It is an all-encompassing code of conduct and way of living. Most Afghans live in accordance to some variant of this code, although non-Pashtuns do not necessarily identify their moral code by this name. However, Afghan society remains an honor–based system in which possession of honor guarantees membership in the society and drives any social interactions. "Pashtun without honor can no longer claim to be Pashtun, and he does not have the rights, protection, and support of the community."[15] Although certain aspects of *Pashtunwali* do not apply to other ethnic groups, many of the principles are the same. At the same time, this code "stresses autonomy and equality of political rights in the world of equals. This is impossible to fulfill in a class-structured society or where governments prohibit such an insti-

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[13] Richard M. Merelman, *Partial Vision: Culture and Politics in Britain, Canada and the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 232.

[14] Dupree, "Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan," 978.

[15] Kakar Palwasha, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority" (Harvard Islamic Legal Studies Program, 2005), 3.

tution as blood feuds or demand tax payments."[16] *Pashtunwali* is not anarchy, but rather "an alternative form of a social organization with an advanced conflict resolution mechanism."[17] It accomplishes this without courthouses, lawyers, police, prisons, or executioners by using *jirga*, a quasi-legal process that resolves a majority of their issues.

Islamic religious practices and law seem to be layered over a much older tribal social code. The two systems are different, and although they coexist in relative harmony, *Pashtunwali* has deeper roots. The main pillars of this honor-based society are the concepts of chivalry, bravery, or courage (*qalang* or *nang*); hospitality (*melmastia*); clear boundaries between the sexes (*purdah* or *namus*); and council (*jirga*).[18]

"Chivalry is defined by two sets of normative practices: honorable actions in battle and defense of one's honor. Honorable conduct in battle includes rules about skills in battle, bravery, and it explains who may be attacked, e.g., not civilians, and how to distribute the war spoils."[19] Defense of honor requires a response against an insult or some other shame caused by another. This defense is called *badal* (justice or revenge), and it is handled between the affected parties, as long as the retribution is not excessive, in which case a council intervenes. *Badal* has no limitation in space or time—it is valid until an adequate solution is reached—and can be passed on from one generation to another. "In the case of adultery or murder, the honor of the victim and that of his family and kinsmen are only restored by the ultimate act of killing the offender."[20] This concept is unknown in the legal systems of Western societies, and in practice we often disregard its existence in Afghan society, as will be demonstrated later on in the example of gender protection programs.

Melmastia (hospitality) to strangers and friends alike increases honor; these acts increase the individual's social network, which adds to their authority. "Hospitability

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[16] Thomas J. Barfield, "Weapons of the Not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace," paper for the for Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series, "Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: Transactions and Identities," held at Yale University (23 February 2007), 11.

[17] Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign Until the Burst of Fire," *International Security* 32:4 (2008): 61.

[18] Many scholars have written about the importance of these elements of Afghan society. See Nancy Louis Dupree, "Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan"; Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Barfield, "Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power Before the U.S: Withdrawal," *Foreign Affairs* 90:5 (2011); Peter Tomsen, *Wars on Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failure of Great Powers* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Frederik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); and Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont, "Afghan Women in the Turmoil of Modernity," in *Afghanistan on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Three Essays on Culture and Society* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010).

[19] Palwasha, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali."

[20] Nabi Mistdaq, "Historic Perspective on Afghanistan, its People and Culture," panel presentation in Rayburn House Office Building, Washington D.C., 25 March 2009.

also includes *nanawati*—protection of one's guest—literally to enter into the security of a house," which also extends to anyone who claims protection under the code of hospitality, including enemies.[21] Obviously, it creates complications for combatants when enemy forces request shelter from a local population. This practice has been extensively used by Taliban or Al Qaeda members and is often incorrectly understood by the international community as a sign of local support for the Taliban movement.

Boundaries between the sexes (*namus* and *purdah*) are marked between men and women's physical space. They vary between social classes within each group in question. Each group has its private space, which is to be respected by persons of the opposite sex, even if they are visitors or strangers. Kakar Palwasha observes, "The level of separation differs among most strict *qalang* societies, to the middle grade as seen in [the] *nang* population, to the most liberal, which can be observed amongst the Kuchi community."[22] It is an open question to what extent we relate to and deal with this segregation when working with Afghans in an international working environment, and what kind of challenge it represents for Westerners who have very few nuances of gender segregation in their societies—not in their family, nor in their education system, nor in their work environments. How do we deal with practical situations related to *purdah* in Afghanistan, if gender equality is a highly regarded value that is promoted at the societal, political, and legal levels in Western societies?

Jirga (council) is a centuries-old institution. There is no common agreement regarding its functioning among members of Pashtun society. It is traditionally a gathering of decision makers in the tribe, village, region, or social group, who arrive at a consensus for actions, rather than following a single individual's direction. It is similar to the Islamic *Shura*. This name is frequently used for "councils made up of respected members of the society, usually elders, belonging to landowning elite in *qalang* societies and being known for their honor, in order to have their decision accepted."[23] Decisions of a *jirga*, this Afghan version of Athenian democracy, "are final and unanimous, as no man may be bound by the decision he does not accept. Fairness and collective justice are the ultimate good, not punishment of the individual wrongdoer in the Western sense, which for the Pashtuns is essentially an alien concept."[24] Traditionally, *jirga* is open to every member of the community, but known leaders are required to attend. In reality, there are very few cases mentioned in the literature about women or young members of the group taking a part in *jirga* proceedings. The *Loya Jirga*, established in 2002 under UN auspices, which resulted in the Bonn Agreement, includes other ethnic groups apart from Pashtuns and has quotas for female representatives. It shows an undeniably democratic process, and represents a crucial modernization of this ancient and traditional decision-making institution. On the other hand, the lack of political party representatives in the

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[21] Frederik Barth, "Pathan Identity and its Maintenance," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, ed. Barth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 120.

[22] Palwasha, "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali," 5.

[23] Akbar Ahmed, *Millennium and Charisma Among Pathans. A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), 83.

[24] Johnson and Mason, "No Sign," 61.

new Parliament compared to the high number of individuals who run for elections and competition between parliamentarians undermines the possibility of introducing checks and balances, and provides the Afghan government with a platform to seek ways to encourage individual parliamentarians to support government dominance over the Parliament, mostly through corruption and bribery (which remain two of the biggest challenges facing Afghan society, right after security).

Veil and burqa [25]

Many scholars, reporters, or commentators frequently make statements about Afghan society being resistant to foreign invasion or rule, using examples of British or Soviet occupations in the past. The example of cultural structure I have chosen to present will go one step further. It will not only serve the example of the historical overview of attitudes towards the *burqa* and the veil in the last century, but will demonstrate that resistance to foreign reign or ideas is not the sole characteristic of Afghan society. In fact, the deeply entrenched resistance to any modern elements that are not synchronized with the rest of the traditional structures of Afghan culture is a repetitive pattern in the society, often carried out in direct rejection of the authority of Afghan rulers or other legitimate leaders who have promoted such ideas or who have tried to introduce modern elements. If these modern elements have not been genuinely considered or adopted by a vast majority of Afghans, they are destined to fail.

Pictures taken in the 1950s and 1960s in Kabul of Afghan women, most of them bareheaded and wearing Western dress—students or young intellectuals posing in various "modern"-day jobs—most likely have an astonishing effect on those who see them now (as was likely the case then as well), given that they are in such opposition to most of the reality of present-day Afghanistan. During my research, I came across a book published in 1960 titled *Afghanistan: Ancient Land With Modern Ways*, which was full of similar images. However, these pictures, despite being true, have little to do with the actual way that the majority of Afghans actually live, whether in the past or today. The logical question following this discovery is where—or where was—the place of women within Afghan society? Are calls for gender equality just another chimera or *pium desiderium* of Westerners, or does it represent a solid ground for a feasible new strategy in this historically patriarchal society? As the former First Lady of the United States, Laura Bush, pointed out, the war on terrorism was "a fight for the rights and dignity of women."[26] According to social anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod, "saving Afghan women" was part of the justification for the U.S. intervention in October 2001.[27] Are

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[25] *Burqa* (Arabic) or the Afghan *chaderi* both refer to a full garment that covers a woman's entire body from head to toe, with slits for the eyes.

[26] James Gerstenzang and Lisa Getter, "Laura Bush Addresses State of Afghan Women," *Los Angeles Times* (18 November, 2001); available at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/nov/18/news/mn-5602.

[27] Nermeen Shaikh, Interview with Lila Abu-Lughod, Asia Source: "Why we can't save Afghan women," access on March 06, 2012, http://asiasociety.org/policy/social-issues/women-and-gender/why-we-cant-save-afghanwomen.

those women hiding underneath *burqas* victims without dignity, voice, and status in their society? Is the *burqa* a symbol of oppression? Or are we mistaken in our perception? In the country reunited for a century under the Pashtun kings in the spirit of *Pashtunwali*, women had a very modest space to occupy, at least from an outside perspective. As stated, life in Afghan society is not only divided between men and women, but also between public and private realms. Women traditionally belong to the latter. Within their legitimate domain, "they are able to exercise influence and even authentic power, sometimes as a means of resistance."[28]

Women can also own property according to Islamic law and practice, even though some tribal rules prevent women's right to inherit in favor of their male relatives. Their possessions, which rarely consist of land but rather shops, vehicles, or tools, are administered for them by a *wakil,* a male representative, often an older brother or uncle. This practice, undeniably discriminatory and archaic according to Western standards of gender equality, could be found in our societies as late as the late 1960s in Europe. Writing of Western media coverage of contemporary Afghan society, Taiba Rahim notes that "mainstream reporting was frequently characterized by an irritating superiority complex, implying that freedom that Western women today enjoy has always been there."[29] It seems that emancipation in our societies was a lengthy process, and that most of the salutary changes came from the bottom up as a result of profound structural shifts, expansions in access to education, simple necessity and the practical demands of everyday life, and other developments within society.

Steps toward equality for women are often seen as a breach of the traditional way of life. The lesson of Afghan history shows us other specifics of this country in the way gender issues have been dealt with. The emancipation process indeed took place, however, in a very different manner. Last century's leaders were preoccupied by the formulation and proclamation of their views on women and their place in society.

In fact, we can say that improvement in the status of women was executed from above – by decrees, and examples set by royal family females. Amir Abdul Rahman (1880–1901), also known as the "Iron Amir," introduced multiple reforms of women's traditional status, "going against tribal customs of forcing a widow to marry her deceased husband's brother and asserted women's right to inherit property."[30] More significant reforms followed with King Amanullah's (1919–29) reign. He tried to reform the seclusion of women in the private sphere and advocated for the acceptance of women in the public sphere, at least marginally. Queens and the king's sisters served as examples in this regard. He introduced social reforms "including a new dress code which allowed women in Kabul to go unveiled."[31] His wife, Queen Soraya, was photo-

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[28] Centlivres and Centlivres–Demont, "Afghan Women in the Turmoil of Modernity," 57.

[29] Taiba Rahim, "An Identity of Strength: Personal Thoughts on Women in Afghanistan," *International Review of the Red Cross* 847 (2002): 638.

[30] Hassan K. Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Abd al-Rahman Khan* (Austin: University of Texas Press), 173.

[31] Ludwig W. Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), 36.

graphed in a sleeveless evening dress during their European tour and without veil, which contributed to the conservative anti-Amanullah campaign. However, ever since the abolition of the veil has been perceived as the sign of woman's liberation and Western modernity.

Already in the 1920s there was a move towards female education and the rights of women. Girls' schooling was initiated in 1921, when the Esmat School was founded, and groups of girls were sent to Turkey for higher education. But the rural areas and some parts of the urban population felt disconnected from the royal reforms, and rejected them. Subsequently, these decrees were considered as violating their liberty and way of life, and were strongly opposed. A rebellion against his rule forced Amanullah to cancel most of his social reforms. As social anthropologists Pierre and Micheline Centlivres, who have both studied Afghan society for decades, concluded, "for many Afghans, these measures were an unbearable transgression of the social and divine order, a conspiracy against the fundamental notions of male honor and divine laws, in which tribal code and religious law are closely connected."[32] The following kings Nader Shah (1929–33) and Zaher Shah (1933–73) continued on the path of providing training and education for women, but while preserving their segregation, and thereby reconciling higher education and *purdah*. Later on, Prime Minister Daud (1953–63) imposed the "voluntary" removal of the veil.

Kabul elites were the only women who did not wear the *burqa* or at least a veil during the 1960s and 1970s, a period during which those stunning pictures were taken. The rest of the Afghan female population did not show the same support for this "modernity," and the provinces responded with even greater reservations, as they do today. When Daud Shah became President of Afghanistan in 1973, he continued in his reforms of women's rights, and their participation increased in the judicial, educational, administrative, and political sectors. But again, this was not a result of any feminist movement within Afghanistan. There were no Afghan-style suffragettes agitating for increased rights; rather, progress for women was the outcome of the political agenda of a man in power. Nancy Dupree formulated it precisely in her brief paper: "they had come out of their homes and taken off their veils, because male leaders, of their own volition, decreed they can do so."[33] The wave of liberation reached Kabul in the 1970s, and certain liberalization of custom went along with the reforms. Girls went to school and universities unveiled, and even miniskirts could be seen, especially in Kabul. This was both a spur to and a by-product of the 1977 Constitution, written during the Republic, which explicitly stated the equality of rights and obligations between men and women. Despite three decades between 1950–80 that improved women's conditions, their acceptance and public involvement, there was still a considerable cultural gap between the capital and main cities and the countryside.

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[32] Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont, "Afghan Women in the Turmoil of Modernity," 66.
[33] Nancy Hatch Dupree, *The Women of Afghanistan* (Islamabad: published by the Office of the U.N. Coordinator for Afghanistan, 1998), 5.

When the Marxist coup in 1978 hardened and reached the intensity of open war, many of the elites, including educated women, emigrated. In general, the implementation of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the reality of mostly rural and Muslim Afghanistan, together with the ideas of equality in male–female relations, was not received positively. The Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was promoting female emancipation, and those female supporters of the regime went out bareheaded or wearing only a little scarf. However, during the same period, "the veil was often worn by educated Afghan women opposed to the regime; it was a symbol of resistance against Soviet presence in Afghanistan."[34] All regimes in their own way proclaimed their commitment to women's rights, including the current government. Communists wanted to free them from patriarchy and subordination, the *Mujahedeens* to save them from "impiety and promiscuity introduced by Communists, and the Taliban claimed to protect them from insecurity and attacks during the *Mujahedeen* regime and moral degradation and Western influence."[35]

The closure of educational institutions for girls and the exclusion of women from public life resulted in a situation where only a small number of medical professionals in the country were permitted to carry out their work. Following the Taliban's decree requiring women to wear the *burqa*, they became an invisible part of society once again. In the decade since the Western intervention began in November 2001, the situation has improved to "normal" or, as many have said, "back to before." The 2004 Afghan Constitution again guarantees equality for women. Schools have reopened, at least in the larger towns, and medical clinics and hospitals are accessible to women, as are most academic institutions. Women participate in political life and hold public positions despite the fact that these achievements are often the result of gender quotas. Employment is available for women, and it is possible for women to go alone to the market, use public transport, etc. Key institutions have been established—such as the Ministry for Women's Affairs, the Human Rights Commission, the National Assemblies—where women play an active role.

However, the *burqa* has not vanished from the streets of Afghan cities and towns. Does abandoning the *burqa* equal gaining rights for women in the Western perspective? Is it still today a symbol of male domination or female oppression? In all the possible color variations that are seen in different regions, the *burqa* remains a symbol of belonging, both to Islam and to Afghanistan. It has also gained some cultural meaning. According to the words of a Kabul woman, "it has become a part of a culture. We will not take it off just because the West wants us to do so."[36] Does the *burqa* need to be redefined? The presumption that only uneducated and downtrodden women wear it might be common among the Western media. In fact, the *burqa* or *chaderi* is considered a town garment. In rural areas, wearing such long clothing would be highly impractical in the performance of daily agricultural labor and housework. When moving to urban areas, or moving to the town from the countryside, a *burqa* is the first item women hurry to pur-

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[34] Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont, "Afghan Women in the Turmoil of Modernity," 89.

[35] Ibid., 92.

[36] Ibid., 91.

chase. It gives them anonymity and freedom to go to public places, the comfort of look-ing at others while remaining unseen. According to Pierre Centlivres, "it symbolizes the role, ambiguous as well as complementary, of weakness and protection: the weakness and protection of women against the insult of a glance, the weakness and protection of men against the dangerous brilliance of a woman's face."[37]

Most of the Afghan female staff I worked with wore a *burqa* after their duties in of-fice. With a few exceptions, they used it during the time they spent on public transporta-tion, or when they traveled to parts of town with which they were unfamiliar. The extent to which they observed other social codes of conduct, personal choice, courage, their families' religious views, as well as familiarity with the environment all played a role in how and when women chose to wear the *burqa*. None of them were uneducated women. All of them were educated, bilingual (at the very least), and in several cases were the primary breadwinner in their family. They were certainly prime examples of young, edu-cated, economically independent Afghan women. What the *burqa* provided for them was a sense of security or protection in a time of growing insecurity in the country. The same purpose for its use has been followed by numerous international female civilian staff serving across Afghanistan who often, depending on their duty station and deployment, purchased this typical Afghan garment as an optional means of security and protection, generally known as an "emergency *burqa*" among expatriates.

Anthropologist Hanna Papanek, who conducted her research in Pakistan, labeled the *burqa* as a form of "portable seclusion," and Lila Abu-Lughod, another Western anthro-pologist working in the Middle East and Afghanistan, calls them "mobile homes." She describes them as "a symbol that frees women to move around in public and among strange men in societies where women's respectability and protection depends on asso-ciation with their families and homes, which are the center of family lives. Many women around the Muslim world who wear these different forms of cover describe this as a choice."[38] She also pointed out that humanitarian operations conducted in Afghanistan have rhetorical elements that are missionary in nature, and ideas of "saving" Afghan women reinforces a sense of superiority of Westerners' model of liberty for women. This fact—that Afghan women may want different things than we would like for them—should be recognized and taken into consideration. Traditions, history, and religion have evolved differently in their country than in the West, but not in total isolation; rather, this evolution is a result of interconnection with other worlds, cultures, and influences. However, the primary ideal that Westerners call "freedom" may not rank high on their scale of values, or at least not in the form that we understand and exercise in the West. The mission *civilisatrice*, one of the core ideas of the liberal order, might not be neces-sary in this case. In the context of growing insecurity, pervasive fundamentalism, and

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[37] Pierre Centlivres, "Bouddha masque, femme voillée," in *Points de vue. Pour Philippe Junoud*, ed. Danielle Chaperon and Philippe Kaenel (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), 339–55.

[38] Nermeen Shaikh, "Why We Can't Save Afghan Women," interview with Lila Abu-Lughod, *Asiasociety.org* (accessed on 3 March 2012); available at http://asiasociety.org/policy/social-issues/women-and-gender/why-we-cant-save-afghan-women?page=0,0.

rejection of values promoted or imposed by foreigners, Afghan women's future often relies on the patterns of resistance from their past.

Political Structures

Strong Weak President

This section will focus, as did the previous one, on two examples of political structures present in Afghanistan and their complex relations in the context of tribal Afghanistan. First, with the example of the role of the president, we can demonstrate how the present basic political structures play a significant role in the state, and how their interactions with other factors influence the political process. Power in Afghanistan is often analyzed by academics through special attention to the relationship between tribes and the state. Both of them are characterized by distinct and strongly defined structures. What is often unclear, however, is how symbiotic (or not) they are, and what links exist between law, tribal background, personal charisma, or patronage. Do these factors in combination result in intended success, or do they cause more shortcomings than has been originally thought? How is this interaction reflected in the reality of governance represented by the highest political office in the nation, and what role does it play in the stabilization of Afghanistan?

The political architecture of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is anchored in the Constitution that evolved out of the Afghan Constitution Commission that was mandated by the Bonn Agreement and was adopted by the Grand Council *Loya Jirga* on 4 January 2004. It created a nation that pledges to be both Islamic and democratic. The 2004 Constitution provided a legal basis for a strong presidency, a national assembly composed of two houses, and a judicial system. It proclaimed equal rights for women. Its Preamble describes Islam as the country's sacred religion, but guarantees protection for other faiths. These significant elements are also the ones that hold potential for legal discord, or show the practical gap between written legislation and tradition and practice within Afghanistan.[39]

Chapter III of the Afghan Constitution establishes a legally strong office of a president possessing large competences over executive and legislative powers, as is indicated in Article 64 and many following ones. Practically, however, a president's ability to execute and implement his powers in the provinces—mainly by nominating thirty-four provincial governors and several hundred district sub-governors—is limited. In this section we will examine what causes this discrepancy, what frictions exist between the president and other elements of the Afghan government, and what undermines this legally powerful office.

In addition to understanding the nation's legal basis, gaining a grasp of the complex composition of the Afghan populace and the relationships between ethnic groups is a fundamental task in studying Afghan social or political structures. The last King, Zahir

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[39] The full text of the 2004 Afghan Constitution is available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/404d8a594.html.

Shah, and the current Afghan President Hamid Karzai are both Pashtuns. Therefore, a closer examination of Pashtun tribal relations is crucial to analyze and unravel the source of the issues affecting the highest political level. With regard to the natural tribal links, it is not clear whether the current president represents the best possible leader for a war-torn country, or if his background exacerbates some traditional enmities disregarding his professional or political capacity. To what extent does the ethnic and tribal relationship influence political development in Afghanistan and the potential for stability if "questions of ethnicity are critical in assessing implications for future Afghan political and social stability"?[40]

Pashtuns represent the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They are predominantly Sunni Muslims, of the Hanafi School of jurisprudence, considered to be the most liberal of the four schools of Sunni Islam. As has been already substantiated in the previous section, they subscribe to *Pashtunwali*, an all-encompassing code of conduct and way of life. Pashtuns have been the subject of more academic study than all the other major Afghan ethnic groups; therefore, there is more information on Pashtun ethnicity and tribal structures compared to the others. The complex structure of their society varies greatly from region to region. Geographical terrain and conditions influence the structures of power in Afghanistan – the flat terrain in the south is more dominated by hierarchical or autocratic structures, while in areas of more difficult terrain and in mountainous or border areas, egalitarian or more democratic social orders are present. Pashtuns living in more isolated mountain regions are less rigid in their social structure, as the condition of isolation causes social groups to identify themselves more with their immediate environment and location rather than with their tribal lineage.

The Afghan President Hamid Karzai is a Pashtun, born in the south, in Kandahar city. He traces his origins to a southern Sarban lineage represented by the Durrani supertribe and *sardars* of the Popalzai tribe of the Sadozai clan (see Appendix).[41] "Since its inception in 1747, Afghanistan was ruled—with few short-lived Tajik-dominated periods—by Pashtun *sardars* of the Sadozai and Mohamadzai clans until the last Afghan King, Zahir Shah, was overthrown in August 1973," as Amin Saikal confirms in his detailed history of modern Afghanistan.[42]

The Bonn Agreement revived this tendency in 2001, when Karzai was appointed to head the new Afghan Interim Government. Despite claiming a link to a long lineage of leaders, the southern Sarban lineage represents only a small percentage of the Afghan population, and is spread into two lineage groups: the Zirok (known as Durrani), and the Panjpai.[43] Both groups further divide into nine tribes, of which the Popalzai is one. (See the Appendix for a diagram of Pashtun sub-groups, along with a map showing their dis-

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[40] Thomas H. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-building after War," *Central Asia Survey* 25:1-2 (March–June 2006): 7.

[41] Sardars are descendants of tribal chiefs and royal descendants of Afghan kings.

[42] Amin Saikal, Ravan Farhadi, and Kirill Nourzhanov, *Modern Afghanistan: History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).

[43] Various sources indicate that between 11–16 percent the Afghan population are southern Sarbans.

tribution.) "Panjpai estrangement from the national government and their political underrepresentation in the past Durrani royal circles might be a reason why they are better represented in the Taliban leadership and their avid participation in the insurgency."[44] The Pashtun Ghilzai supertribe, which represents approximately 20–25 percent of the Afghan population, including many Kuchis (Pashtun nomads), are known as "skilled warriors and are viewed by others as the most violent Pashtuns, and they see themselves as the strongest supertribe and true warriors of the Pashtun ethnicity."[45] The Ghilzai have a long history of internal conflict, and have been constantly at odds with the Durrani rulers. This resentment eventually led to the communist overthrow of the Durrani-led government in 1978. They supplied considerable parts of the Afghan fighting force in every war against a foreign invader. The Hotak tribe is viewed as Ghilzai royalty. In this regard it is important to note that the Taliban's spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, is a Hotak tribesmen.

Within tribal society, leaders are generally selected on the basis of personal charisma, character, respect, and their patronage network. Leaders who do not meet the expectations of their tribe are likely to be removed from their position and replaced by another member of the tribe, usually a rival. When dealing with outsiders, tribal leaders are more inclined to take a utilitarian stance, as their power is largely related to their capability to provide for their members.

Tribal leaders' position toward state bodies and international or state officials is often perceived as growing from their notions of how their tribe will profit from that liaison. Hamid Karzai, who had played an insignificant role in Afghanistan's wars, emerged as the international choice to lead the country. As Alexander Nicoll writes, "Before his assumption, as a compromise choice, of the interim leadership, few people inside and outside Afghanistan had ever heard of him. He cannot claim acceptance among either non-Pashtun Afghans, or among the tribally heterogeneous Pashtuns."[46] President Karzai is known as a compassionate man, hardworking, a devout Muslim and an Afghan patriot, but he does not posses the particular charisma that is generally seen in a leader among Afghans. He cannot claim legitimate succession from a royal ancestor, nor can he serve as a reuniting figure for the Pashtun clans. But he is undeniably a politician – "most significantly he demonstrates his high skill in exercising the Afghan *jirga* tradition and staying on the top of the Afghan tribal summit."[47] Karzai is not a natural when it comes to exercising military power, which distinguishes him from charismatic martyred commanders like Abdul Haq and Ahmed Shah Masood. They would probably have been

[44] "Putting it Together in Southern Afghanistan," *Tribal Analyses Center* (May 2009), 6; available at http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/Research-Completed.html.

[45] Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid* (Bouder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 12.

[46] Alexander Nicoll, "The Road to Lisbon," in *Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond*, ed. Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, Adelphi Series 425–26 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 33.

[47] Peter Tomsen, *Wars on Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failure of Great Powers* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 641.

much more categorical in their dealings with the warlords and in diminishing Afghanistan's dependence on foreigners.

The process of the Bonn Agreements, under the auspices of the UN, brought together representative groups in an attempt to shape an agreement and a new political architecture for Afghanistan. However, Afghan leaders played little part in engineering the nature of the transition from conflict to "peace." In fact, others made the key decisions about the change. Despite U.S. support, Karzai's political position was not secure until the elections in 2004. Peter Tomsen, who served as U.S. President George H.W. Bush's Special Envoy to Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992, gives a detailed record of the event in his *Wars on Afghanistan.* In 2002, the *Loya Jirga* in Kabul was supposed to choose the interim president who would lead the country until the first free presidential elections. On 10 June 2002, 900 of the 1500 delegates banded together near the *Loya Jirga* meeting to support Zahir Shah as transitional president instead of Karzai. Shah's chief adviser, Abdul Wali, was asked by a journalist whether the former king would play a leading role in the country. Wali's response was that "the decision was up to the Afghan people. The king would follow whatever the Afghan people decide."[48] This indication made Karzai's election no longer a certainty. The schedule for the following day's selection was changed, and the change was followed by a demand by Zalmay Khalilzad—appointed by George W. Bush as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan between November 2003 and June 2005—to Wali that "Zahir Shah read a statement to the media, prepared by Karzai's staff, to deny that he is a candidate to lead the transition."[49] The news release reporting the king's statement at the press conference convened that afternoon was broadcast by the media nationally and abroad, and was delivered to delegates in writing. The mood during the conference was understandably dampened by the news. The delegates formally elected Hamid Karzai a few days later. Delegates "complained afterwards that they have not been able to elect the leader they wanted. By bluntly interfering with the Afghan leadership selection process on behalf of Hamid Karzai, the United States fumbled a rare opportunity to let Afghans themselves choose a leader who would not be seen as imposed by outsiders."[50] U.S. support in 2002 in the *Loya Jirga* fortified Karzai's political position to compete in the elections in 2004, which confirmed him as president for the next five years, with 55.4 percent of the votes cast. The renewed presidential mandate in the 2009 elections was, however, highly questionable, and elections with low participation were generally associated with accusations of electoral fraud.

Political survival in Afghanistan requires the formation of a personal patronage network, especially if warlords control a significant part of the country. To gain their support, "Karzai set about co-opting or buying them off with offers of cabinet posts and governorships like *Khaki Shah Madart*—a cunning magician in Afghan history famous for manipulating others by promising them lucrative positions—as the President has

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[48] Ibid., 641.

[49] Ibid., 642.

[50] Ibid., 642.

been jokingly referred to by some Afghans."[51] The loyalty and capability of ministers, chiefs of police, and the presidential staff acquired through these means remains questionable. They assumed their position without deviating from their personal agendas. As a result, the concept of central government remains surrealistic outside of the capital. Power continues to be localized, held by a range of local actors. Because of a lack of regional support, government in the provinces remains weak. Regional leaders are the key to strengthening the government, but they have little motive or obligation to do so.

Certain academic analyses of Afghanistan have argued that "tribes, particularly in rural areas instead of central government, have historically determined the fate of Afghan society, and thus need the support of the international community in order to mitigate insurgent groups and their extremist religious ideology and attempt to subsequently balance Afghan society."[52] Instead of considering substantial support for the regions, the international community focuses on supporting the central government, despite the limited reach of its power and repeated cases of large-scale corruption. The latest scandal of extensive financial corruption in the Kabul Bank prompted the president's decision to set up a special prosecutor's office and court. His decision to pursue this course, instead of referring the case to the attorney general in order to address the fraud of more than USD 900 million and demanding that "all bad loans must be repaid within two months" suggest the presence of political motives behind the decision, especially if we consider Karzai's family ties to this financial institution.[53] The risk of jeopardizing foreign aid funding for Afghanistan would affect ordinary citizens and development projects across the country, yet Karzai does not respond to demands from donor countries to address corruption according to their expectations. As one journalist has noted, "Doubts about his capacity to handle this level of authority became widespread and were fuelled by leaked diplomatic cables from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. A report stated that he [Karzai] is at the center of the governance challenge, and that he struggles to strike a correct balance between institutional and traditional governance. Eikenberry went on to say that Karzai was unable to grasp the most rudimentary principles of state building."[54] In 2008, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan as number 175 in a survey of 180 countries for its Corruption Perception Index. In 2009, Afghanistan fell to third from the bottom, ahead of only Myanmar and Somalia. The bottom three positions remained unchanged in the 2010 survey.[55]

Hamid Karzai has been confronted with a complex situation – an active and violent insurgency, the presence of foreign troops, and limited power and control over Afghan territory. The country's dependency on foreign donors and the frequent occurrence of

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[51] Ibid., 802.

[52] Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition."

[53] Emma Graham-Harrison, "Kabul Bank Scandal," *The Guardian* (U.K.) (4 April 2012); available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/04/kabul-bank-hamid-karzai-special-tribunal.

[54] Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, ed., *Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond*, Adelphi Series 425–26 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 86.

[55] Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2010; available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.

high-level corruption, together with frequent criticism of his office by his supporters abroad, could have a negative impact on the development of the country. His political decisions should be driven by high concern for the prosperity of Afghanistan, but it appears that this may not always be the case. Protectionism and political compromises to smooth over or cover up for the network of patronage or relatives do not earn him sympathy with his Western friends and donors, nor does it make a positive impression among Afghans. The need for change in this highest political position—or a thorough reconsideration of his political priorities—would be both vital and wise under current circumstances.

Taliban: (Un)popular Again!

Using the example of the Taliban in this section, we will point out some crucial facts related to the Taliban movement and their influence and relevance to existing Afghan structures. In order to do so, we need to look back to the social code *Pashtunwali*, the Pashtun tribal system, as well as to Afghan history to get a clear picture of the current situation. Summarizing these facts, we could draw some logical conclusions on how to undermine the Taliban by supporting local structures. To achieve the desirable end state in Afghanistan, coalition forces should defeat the Taliban insurgency. Among the many ethnic groups living in Afghanistan, only Pashtuns are present in the Taliban movement in considerable numbers. The generalization that all (or most) Pashtuns are Taliban is hugely misleading; however, it is true that "most Taliban insurgents are Pashtuns."[56] Therefore, examining the context of Pashtun culture and society is more than relevant in this context.

Despite the fact that their regime was defeated in 2001, the Taliban did not vanish from the daily life of many Afghans. On the contrary, they almost instantaneously recovered, began to rearm, and started rebuilding their structures, using safe havens in neighboring Pakistan. In fact, in sizeable parts of east and south Afghanistan, the Taliban is once again playing the role of government, which adds to its legitimacy and power. They have set up "shadow" administrations, and they provide justice to the local population when the central government fails to do so.

As was indicated in the previous section, Pashtuns are proud, free, and independent people who do not hesitate to utilize violence in defense of their way of life. Their laws and strict code of conduct are led by the sense of independence, justice, forgiveness, hospitality, and tolerance, along with four personal core values: honor, revenge, freedom, and chivalry. In general, the Pashtun have high respect for group consensus to resolve a conflict, rather than imposing judgment from a higher authority. Serious matters are referred to the *jirga*, a council whose decisions are given the full weight of law based on an egalitarian form of group consensus. The strong egalitarianism in Pashtun social structures makes their submission to military command or discipline nearly unachievable. For this reason the British would not allow their enlistment into the British forces

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[56] Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 1.

in India. Despite the fact that "they were considered as skilled fighters, they were unreliable and would frequently desert once they passed the boundaries of their ancestral lands."[57] This historical pattern can be observed on a large scale today, since the issue of desertion from the Afghan National Army or the Afghan police forces could very likely be explained in this light. However, Pashtuns are largely underrepresented in the Afghan National Security Forces.

But this pattern has an exception: if Pashtuns perceive an external threat, they will temporarily submit to military authority that would be exercised by a respected religious leader, a *mullah*. The Soviet invasion in 1979 caused the conditions that led to the establishment of the Taliban. "The Taliban, contrary to the *Pashtunwali* traditional system, adopted a much newer and completely different social construct—the strict version of Islam known as Wahabbism."[58] This movement, which has its roots in the late eighteenth century in the Arabian Peninsula, seeks to implement a purer, more conservative type of Islam as practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and his original followers, and compliance with a strict version of *Sharia* law. Prior to the Soviet invasion Wahabbism was nearly unknown in Afghanistan. After December 1979, Muslims from around the world assembled to fight the Soviets, and Saudi fighters imported the Wahabbist form of Islam to Afghanistan. As Ahmed Rashid writes, "Funded by [the] Saudi Arabian government and charities and the United States and controlled by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate," these groups of "holy warriors," or *Mujahedeens*, succeeded in finally pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan.[59]

Facing foreign invasion, not only Pashtuns but Afghans in general obviously had no problem in temporarily modifying their personal autonomy and submitting to religious leaders for the purpose of a holy war. This was a traditional way for Afghans to fight invaders. This time, they did it together with their foreign allies, who were gradually gaining influence over factions of the Pashtun resistance. The spiritual leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, acquired growing authority and legitimacy "in the eyes of his followers as a commander in time of war."[60]

Wahabbist practice grew stronger in parallel with the increase in strength of the Taliban regime. Public beatings of women who left home unescorted were not uncommon, nor was it unusual for women to be stoned to death for accusations of adultery. Girls were forbidden to go to school, men were obliged to grow beards, and entertainment and music were banned. In particular, imposing countless rules resulting in the use of physical punishment against adult males and females was at odds with *Pashtunwali*. On the contrary, this code based on social consensus perceives Pashtuns as independent, and not taking orders from any other man. But the *Sharia* version promoted by the Taliban was enforced by religious leaders through a strict hierarchy, and "frequently im-

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[57] Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition," 50.

[58] Ibid., 53.

[59] Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The United State and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 10.

[60] Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition," 63.

posed the death penalty for homosexuality, adultery, drug use and other offenses."[61] These practices were in stark disagreement with Pashtun social structure, values, or cultural norms. Initially a voluntary and reciprocal system serving a military purpose (ejecting an invading power) was misused to impose itself permanently on all Afghans. The Taliban's attempt was to take over Afghanistan's traditional social structure and replace it with its own construct in order to maintain authority over the tribes in order to gain a support base and recruitment pool for their military forces.

They exploited (and continue to exploit) the traditional concept of protection (*nanawati*) and hospitability (*melmastia*) and used tribal loyalties to fortify their alliance. First, positioning themselves as legitimate defenders against foreign invaders—Soviets in the past, and Americans and their NATO allies today—helps them to win voluntary support. Second, they are capable of filling the power vacuum beyond the reach of the central government, and are able to deliver services that the government cannot. The local population might succumb if they have no alternative or no strength to resist their power. Last but not least, the Taliban have built *madrassas*, which were initially established for the millions of Afghan refugee children living in Pakistan near the Afghan border. Initially they gave one to two years of "indoctrination to thousands of young Afghans, followed by military training. At that point they were sent across the border to confront the invading army."[62] In some locations even today, if parents wish to send their sons to school to learn to read and write, a *madrassa* might be the only available option. Providing ordinary Pashtuns or any Afghans with the possibility to choose an alternative seems like a solution to diminish the Taliban's legitimacy and fight the insurgency with success. Despite the fact that the Taliban enjoys significant popular support, there is an involuntary element to their popularity when the people have no real option to resist. The Taliban's dependence on local support is simultaneously their strength and their weakness.

In one of the poorest countries in the world—a country where the estimated GDP per capita in 2011 was USD 1000, most of which has been gained over the last decade through the vital support of foreign donors—"buying in" local support is close to effortless.[63] Economic disparities between the capital and other urban centers and the rural countryside, where the majority of the population lives, is still very high. The Taliban's legitimacy as defenders against outside invaders will cease if no legitimate grievance or cause for armed struggle is present. Their role in traditional Pashtun society might vanish. General Afghan disapproval of the Taliban's version of *Sharia* law could be exploited. Promotion and the strengthening of the traditional tribal process in Afghanistan by the national government or the international community by investing in education, building up the infrastructure, and funding economic reconstruction projects would

[61] Robert D. Crews and Amid Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2009), 135.

[62] Tomsen, *Wars on Afghanistan*, 198.

[63] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book: Afghanistan*; available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

weaken the Taliban and allow traditional structures themselves to deal with the Wahabbis as they had dealt with intruders for hundreds of years.

Reconstruction or Deconstruction

When we entered Afghanistan in 1979, people gave us a very nice welcome. Exactly a year later, 40 percent of the population began to hate us. Five years later, 60 percent of the population hated us. And by the time we were to pull out, 90 percent hated us. So we understood, finally, that we are fighting the people.[64]

Lt. Gen. Ruslan S. Austhev, USSR

The desire of Afghans to live without external interference is a fundamental principle of *Pashtunwali* and other moral codes that are in place in Afghan culture, and is a result of Afghanistan's historical experience. Internal independence is important. Tribal and cultural alliances are foremost linked to the family and tribe or *qawm* units, and only then to the government, and only if local and tribal interests and needs have been met in the first place. In most societies, security and safety are the primary interests of groups and individuals at any level, and Afghanistan is no exception. In the report provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Afghan government identified "three essential pillars of reconstruction: security, governance and rule of law, and social and economic development."[65] Traditional security providers include the tribal forces *lashkar and arbakai,* both of which depend on the approval and involvement of all members of the social unit. Local populations often regard protection that is provided from outside of traditional social groups with suspicions and doubt. Thorough consideration of the cultural environment and Afghan-specific structures and subtle differences would likely improve military results in fighting the insurgency as well as in implementing civilian programs. In June 2009, upon his appointment as Commander of ISAF and Commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal stated that "we have operated in a manner that distances us—physically and psychologically—from the people we seek to protect." After his evaluation of the situation in Afghanistan and recognition of the need to change the strategic approach, a member of his strategy review team said that "the kind of COIN (counterinsurgency) doctrine that they are talking about requires a level of knowledge that I don't have about my home town."[66] It leads us not only to the acknowledgment of the fact of the complexity of the Afghan reality, but also to the necessity to adjust implementation methods and the preparation of members of the international community who are serving their missions in Afghanistan.

The topic of cultural awareness is part of the pre-deployment training curriculum of different military formations at NATO headquarters or within Afghanistan. Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia is responsible for the principles of the

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[64] Quoted in Megan K. Stack, "The Other Afghan War," *Los Angeles Times* (23 November 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/23/world/fg-aushev23.

[65] International Monetary Fund, "Afghanistan: National Development Strategy: Executive Summary 2008–2013," Report 08/153 (May 2008).

[66] Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 150.

operational training, which is then executed at its subordinate headquarters, primarily at the Stavanger Training Center. However, responsibility for course preparation and its content lies with the individual nations participating in ISAF. In this regard, the transfer of knowledge and best practices between ISAF forces is unreported. The military took the step of providing members on the ground with basic instructions about behavior and conduct in a Muslim environment in the form of a card. Some servicemen are provided with simplified instructions for conduct in Afghanistan, as is the case in the U.S. armed forces and Belgian military forces. Contrary to these, the German Bundeswehr does provide training, including cultural information, but does *not* provide simple card instructions on this matter, only rules of engagement. In order to avoid or diminish the unintentional alienation of the local population, it is highly recommended that all personnel receive pre-deployment training, including information on Afghan culture. Admittedly, there is a wide gap between the preparation and training of officers and enlisted soldiers in terms of length of time and level of knowledge, but a basic effort has been made. On the other hand, there is still space for improvement and further training. Cultural studies and reports similar to the topic of this article could be conducted as part of a pre-deployment training in order to raise sensitivity to the uniquely complex Afghan social structures that diverge across competing ethnic groups, tribes, religions, and geographic boundaries.

The preparation of civilians deployed for humanitarian missions in Afghanistan is less institutionalized and less developed. Similar to the armed forces, such training is a responsibility of each agency. The UN provides compulsory training for every official appointed internationally by any agency that is a part of the UN security umbrella prior to the individual's arrival to the duty station in Afghanistan. This Advanced Security Online Training does not contain any section on the cultural specificity of Afghanistan, and relates exclusively to security measures. Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environment (SSAFE) training, developed by the UN System Staff College, is targeted mostly at security officers of affiliated agencies. This course combines theoretical work with practical exercises and simulations, but it is not routine for international staff serving in high security risk locations (or any other intensely demanding environment), and it provides a minimum of information about security challenges linked with cultural context. Briefing information provided upon arrival to the duty station by security officers of humanitarian international organizations is insufficient and unsatisfactory regarding cultural or political circumstances. Despite the fact that every humanitarian vacancy contains the requirement of the candidate's cultural sensitivity, it is the category that is never scrutinized or verified at any level. During an interview conducted with the senior officer of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affair (OCHA), part of the UN Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors in the field and the main coordination agency of civilian-military coordination, he confirmed the deficiency in the cultural preparedness of international staff. He stated that "previous experience in a similar context [Muslim] country is an asset but it does not make them

automatically sensitive to reality there [in Afghanistan]."[67] He added that "our own security measures and rules are preventing us from having an effective dialogue with local actors who can guarantee our security and access to remote areas, if we want to reach our beneficiaries." Therefore, adjusting security rules and their effectiveness in different areas of the country would be another task and challenge for the humanitarian community.

The confinement and boredom that result from restricted movement caused by high security risks are factors that neither humanitarian workers nor soldiers are trained for. Their individual capacity to manage their behavior and attitudes under these constraints varies greatly. The use of already existing studies and trainings of a high level of professionalism and quality that engage cross-disciplinary approaches in teams of academics, practitioners, civilian and militaries to work together on knowledge transfer and sharing would be highly recommended. During this research I discovered several well-structured, comprehensible materials and already developed hands-on training programs accessible for operational use. One of the best examples, a program that provides the substance of Afghan ethnicities, religions, social norms, etiquette, and culture, has been developed by the University of West Florida.[68]

As the first section of this article pointed out, the sense of honor is paramount value for Afghans – possible disgrace risks exclusion from the community. This is an important factor when conducting operations or working directly with Afghans in a professional environment. If a soldier forces entry into a Pashtun's home, he is dishonored. If they enter the home's female quarters and breach *purdah*, his women are dishonored. If he is corrected, or his errors are pointed out publicly in his work environment, he is dishonored, and the consequences can be dangerous. Knowledge of culturally-specific etiquette, body language, gestures, and awareness of different notions of time pressure and deadlines would not only be a distinct advantage but also a life-saving skill in this environment. Even a high-quality training program does not prepare us for the variety of situations arising in this honor-based society, with codes of conduct that are strange to Western values. Are we prepared to deal with *purdah* and gender separation in a professional working environment? Or with a request by male staff to eliminate females from their work process? Does the deployment of women in this context represent a distinct disadvantage? Professor Pierre Centlivres, an ethnographer with decades of study experience in Afghanistan, suggests an answer to this dilemma of foreign women in terms of perception, but he does not address practical problems that occur in everyday interactions: "Only a foreign woman may enter both the female sphere and the male world. In men's eyes, the foreign woman before being a woman is a person whose female character is neutralized by the quality of being a European guest, and by her independent, manlike status and behavior. Thus, her presence can be accepted in places where their own wives, daughters, and sisters are not allowed."[69] His observations are correct, al-

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[67] Interview with senior OCHA officer conducted on 2 March 2012 at UN OCHA HQ, Geneva.
[68] See http://uwf.edu/atcdev/Afghanistan/index.html.
[69] Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont, "Afghan Women in the Turmoil of Modernity," 54.

though respect for foreign women does not come automatically. Rather, it is a matter of trust and confidence building, and once it is acquired it is mutually well-deserved.

Gender equality is confirmed in the Afghan Constitution, and is largely supported by the international community, but it has a specific context in Afghanistan. The constitution states that "the citizens of Afghanistan—whether man or woman—have equal rights and duties before the law," and includes special provisions to encourage women's access to education and government. But traditional Islamic law treats men and women differently in some cases, and existing law in Afghanistan maintains some of these distinctions. "If a conflict arises between an international [human rights declaration] and the country's law, it doesn't say which has precedence. If we have a conservative judicial system—which we do—it will interpret the laws in a conservative way," said Ahmad Nadery, Commissioner of Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission, in an interview with *The Los Angeles Times*.[70] Various programs of international humanitarian organizations or NGOs that seek to protect female victims of trafficking or domestic violence face issues connected to *badal* (revenge) being sought by the victim's families. If they run away and find shelter with humanitarian organizations, they are considered to have dishonored the family and are condemned to death by the *Pashtunwali* moral code. The father will carry out this penalty, and if he does not succeed, it will pass on to his eldest male descendant. This factor represents a threat to the security of the other victims living in the shelter and to all humanitarian workers, both locals and expatriates. The international community cannot guarantee for how long high security surveillance can be maintained in the future. Their engagement in mediation with communities and families and finding more sustainable solutions would be more constructive and less dangerous.

The population often rejects any change that is rushed or imposed by the government, disregarding the level of its legitimacy, as the example of the *burqa* demonstrated. Emancipation efforts will take time, and projects promoting women's rights and their active participation in society should be implemented with a high level of sensitivity and the perspective of a long-term endeavor. Education is certainly the best and the most natural way to encourage and support women and men in Afghanistan about the process of irreversible change. The challenge remains to consider emancipation in a larger context, and one that is almost never discussed by the international community: that of age. Many young Afghans want to acquire more independence and to participate in the decision-making process, but find few avenues open to them.

A first step to challenge political structures would be to ensure that functional governance be more efficient. The Afghan government should allow local communities, tribes, or local villages to select through their own socio-political processes their own leadership below the district level. All Afghan ethnic groups in the rural areas already have a community-based government *Shura* or *jirga* system at the tribal level making decisions by consensus to resolve important issues. Improving ethnic, social, economic

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[70] Sharon Otterman, "Afghanistan: The New Constitution," Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder (6 January 2004); available at http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistan-new-constitution/p7710.

and political structures and connecting them to the Afghan governmental structures is a difficult long-term task, but it is achievable if it is facilitated as part of an overreaching strategy by the international community. However, such an effort should start at the district level, or preferably below. This move would require a major change in the approach from the Afghan President himself, as he possesses expansive powers to nominate not only his cabinet and part of the *Jirga* but also the governmental officials in the regions. He should act as a wise, mature, and experienced politician, considering the welfare and prosperity of his nation as his highest interest.

Despite complaints about constrained resources, coming mostly from the Afghan side but occasionally from international organizations and NGOs, many activities and projects are planned on a scale far beyond what the Afghan society can in fact effectively assimilate in a given time or in terms of money. Building the training components into every project and including on-site training as a part of our assignment should be the leitmotif of our missions. Robert Lamb writes, "Governance in Afghanistan cannot become 'good' in the way Afghan and international development strategies and official communications often define it, for at least a generation, and efforts to speed that process—through conventional state-building and democratization activities on a massive scale—are fuelling corruption and undermining prospects for stability."[71] Randall Hoffmann concurs: "An unnecessary gamble and, potentially, the insurmountable obstacle to success in the current U.S. strategy is its over-reliance on building a strong central Afghan government in the hopes that its growing military strength will become strong enough to strike the individual 'legs' of [Al Qaeda] or the Taliban."[72]

This essay suggested another possible option for fighting insurgency in a constructive way, respecting the traditional values represented by *Pashtunwali* and natural ties of tribal affiliation. The improvement of local governance through decentralization by supporting tribal or hybrid (formal and informal) systems—enabling changes that would be visible in small but real improvements in the life of Afghan society and the private sector—would most likely be sufficient to keep most Afghan communities from turning to insurgents for services or other assistance if they receive sufficient support from the national government or the international community. Although official high-level political statements proclaim support for the central government, the reality on the ground is driven by more practical needs, common sense, and the work to implement the projects. The military component (represented mostly by Provincial Reconstruction Teams) as well as humanitarians operating in the field are working in closer collaboration with local authorities on the tribal or provincial level than with the central government. Local leaders participate in the reconstruction process, and *jirga* or *Shura* are engaged or consulted if there is a need for hiring a larger number of local workers, or if community projects are being developed and carried out. This approach not only strengthens the

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[71] Robert D. Lamb, "Governance and Militancy in Afghanistan" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2011), 2.

[72] Maj. Randall S Hoffman, "The Way Ahead: Reclaiming the Pashtun Tribes through Joint Tribal Engagement," in *Applications in Operational Culture*, ed. Paula Holmes-Eber, Patrice M. Scanlon, and Andrea L. Hamlen (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 84.

honor of the *Jirga* and the traditional social order; it also facilitates trust building and it makes the local community less vulnerable to Taliban influence.

Afghanistan's constitutional architecture creates dependence of low-level governance on the center in nearly all aspects of life, but the central government, with its limited reach outside of the capital, is not in the position to fully exercise its duties. Many central government officials are not willing or capable of carrying out the full responsibility of their office, but they are also not willing to lose their privileges, prestige, influence, and the right to distribute patronage. Several analysts, including Peter Tomsen, have concluded that "in fact, a major catalyst for Afghanistan's corruption is the sheer amount of international attention and uncontrolled money entering the country in the form of military contracts, expensive aid projects, democratization and electoral reforms, technical capacity building, pressure for formal decentralization, international contractors and advisers, and other common elements of international state-building portfolios. Compared to Afghanistan's needs and problems, these efforts are inadequate; but compared to what Afghanistan can realistically absorb, these efforts are excessive and corrupting."[73]

Conclusion

This article is necessarily limited in its length and scope, and does not attempt to provide an ultimate answer to the complex issues the international community faces in Afghanistan. What it attempted to do was to draw attention to cultural and political structures and their linkages through patterns and history—deeply rooted factors in Afghan tribal society—in order to highlight their importance, presence, and functions. In the ideal situation, these factors should be used as operational tools to achieve the primary goals—stabilization and reconstruction of a war-torn state—and get our projects and strategies to be accepted by the people they are intended to serve.

According to critics, the last decades in peace building have "displayed the tendency to abstract the tasks of peace building goals from their political, cultural, and historical context. This tendency has encouraged a social-engineering approach to the concept of peace building."[74] The liberal, peace-focused approach is considered to be "either fundamentally destructive, illegitimate, or both."[75] Examples of its shortcomings can be seen in many countries around the world: a focus on short-term instead of long-term goals; an emphasis on political rights and agendas, including early elections, instead of resolute economic recovery and social reconciliation; and support for the central government instead of local communities and traditional local leadership. Additionally, this approach often leads to the creation of social and economic inequalities and to the imposition of moral criteria that often oppose the traditional rules of the local population,

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[73] Lamb, "Governance and Militancy," 16.

[74] Mats Berdal, *Building Peace after War* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), 19.

[75] Roland Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding," *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 338.

which are "regarded as 'alien rules' that deny 'human dignity'."[76] These errors have emerged in past peace building missions, and they continue to be repeated, without any lessons being learned.

Historically, Afghan rulers were governed by a political system that could be categorized in present political terms as "federal and consultative." It can be explained by the fact that Sunni Hanafi doctrine is non-hierarchical and decentralized, which has made it difficult for twentieth-century rulers to create strong centralized state systems. The international community undermined the opportunity for Afghans to choose their own leader through its active intervention and favoritism toward Hamid Karzai's presidential ambitions during the early selection of the Afghan leadership. Apart from other negatives, it triggered—most likely unwillingly and unintentionally—a patronage bond that would be difficult to dismantle without consequences. As this research shows, there is great academic knowledge and a vast body of analytical information related to various factors in the context of Afghan society, tribes, politics, culture, etc. Therefore, the claim that we lack sufficient knowledge about Afghanistan is simply unfounded. Better utilization of that knowledge and experience through the interactions with local population could result in a reassessment and more effective implication of strategies and goals, leading to a desirable end state for our missions.

What prevents us from connecting theory, knowledge, and practice? There is no single answer. First, the political agenda of the international community and our values are not compatible with many values that Afghan society shares. Propagating and financing an "Afghan friendly" strategy, based on Afghan values, would not be popular among the European or U.S. public, especially in a time of austerity and economic crisis. Second, the concept of solipsism could offer a possible explanation – a solution to the problem of explaining why human knowledge of the external world must always remain limited or impossible. Simply put, we cannot see beyond ourselves far enough to genuinely know the world beyond us on its own terms. However, this theory has been largely criticized, and the philosophical counter-arguments are numerous. In my view it is the complexity of the situation itself that leads to a certain level of inability or unwillingness to approach Afghanistan on multiple levels and in multiple fields in parallel.

Closer observation of the structures of Afghan society, in fact, could offer feasible options to solve the most urgent matters: confronting the insurgency, strengthening political structures, and providing economic support to local communities. Despite the verbal narrative that stresses the necessity for Afghans to take charge of their own security, the international community and humanitarian organizations present in Afghanistan should design their programs in a way that encourages Afghans to find Afghan solutions to their own problems. Active participation of Afghan nationals in project design, which is usually decided overseas, in the United States or European capitals, should be a coherent part of planning and programming. Long-term engagement to pursue the original goal—stabilization of the country, but also to rethink the way in which this goal is

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[76] William Bain, "In Praise of Folly: International Administration and Corruption of Humanity," *International Affairs* 82:3 (2006): 525–38.

achieved—should be fundamental to any further steps that might be taken. We should offer the tools and training to enable their actions, not detailed recipes of how to do it.

The reduction of NATO troops in Afghanistan has been called "condition-based"; however, the withdrawal is to take place by 2014. More clarity about details and the possibility of any further presence and military participation in Afghanistan might be forthcoming. What the real operational capacity and efficacy of the Afghan security forces will be by 2014 is difficult to estimate. With less than two years left, some of NATO's ambitious transition plan will likely remain unachieved. The humanitarian presence will hopefully continue and extend its assistance for a reasonable length of time after 2014, but ultimately only Afghans themselves should decide what their desires and needs are and how and in which system they want to continue to live.

Appendix: Tribal Map of Afghanistan

THE PASHTUN TRIBES OF KANDAHAR

Source: Institute for the Study of War; Carl Forsberg, *The Taliban's Campaign
for Kandahar* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, November 2009).

Has U.S. Leadership Been Revitalized Through Barack Obama's Innovative Use of Force?

Thomas Labouche [*]

Introduction

The United States developed as a country imbued with the belief that it held a somehow unique and unifying vocation that was best formulated in the key phrase of nineteenth-century westward expansion "Manifest Destiny," which held that the U.S. had a divinely ordained fate to expand across the North American continent, and ultimately to redeem the Old World. While the twentieth century saw this ideology take concrete form in a nation that eventually achieved the status of a unique superpower, the first decade of the twenty-first century has often been suggested to reflect a relative decline in the United States' global standing. Assuming that this decline is unavoidable would be to participate in a form of fatalism, allowing neither the chance for the United States' core strengths to demonstrate the contrary, nor the possibility that geopolitical events may at some point potentially keep other countries from rising.

If, during the last Bush Administration, the United States frequently resorted to the use of hard power as a quick answer to certain issues, under Barack Obama's presidency, some events have suggested a change in the way the U.S. resorts to hard power, eventually "re-casting the way America should approach the world."[1]

Indeed, numerous cases have indicated that the U.S. is currently more moderate than could have been expected, based on the previous eight years. For example, President Obama announced in 2010 the plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2014. Simultaneously, and especially in 2011, the White House exerted unusual pressure on Israel with respect to the latter's potential action against Iran.[2] Parallel to that, events in Libya during the fall of the Gaddafi regime did not reflect an unquestioning willingness to resort to force; indeed, haste seems to be the last word to use to describe the White House's approach to intervention in Syria as well. Concretely, more emphasis has been placed on diplomacy and low-profile actions, such as frequent use of armed drones, targeted elimination, and negotiation (although some of these actions have received significant media attention). Surrounding this unusual stance, a desire to clarify relations with Islam has also emerged. Manifested in President Obama's 2009 speech in Cairo, this

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[1]   "Brzezinski Assesses Obama's Foreign Policy," *National Public Radio* (14 December 2009); audio available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121426655.

[2]   Jeffrey Goldberg, "Obama to Iran and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff'," *The Atlantic Monthly* (2 March 2012); available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/obama-to-iran-and-israel-as-president-of-the-united-states-i-dont-bluff/253875/.

more temperate approach has perhaps helped mitigate some resentment against U.S. military interventionism throughout the Muslim world.

Obama, who was believed—at least from a European perspective—to be a much more peaceful president than his predecessor, has remained above all a Commander-in-Chief, seeing himself as elected and inclined to act to protect U.S. interests.[3] He seems to view the option to use military force—as reflected in the 2010 National Security Strategy—through the lens of attempting to rebalance the use of force, to render the decision somehow surprising, and less predictable than in the past.[4] All in all, the United States has seemed to adopt a new approach to the use of force, one combining reflective moderation and the judicious use of military assets.

Given this framework, the thesis of this article is that a new approach to the decision about whether to resort to force could give the U.S. the opportunity to revitalize its global leadership. This revitalization springs from three advantages that such an approach offers. First, moderation will mitigate the resentment triggered by previous excessive U.S. military interventionism. Second, withdrawal from the open-ended wars that are part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will allow energy to be refocused on the Obama Administration's other core priorities (economy, education). Third, a flexible and adaptive military culture will help deter or address current and upcoming threats. These foundations will assist the revitalization of U.S. leadership around the world. Consequently, this essay will analyze Obama's doctrine by reviewing some main events reflecting his "unspoken" foreign policy doctrine, before advocating for a more flexible military capability that will participate in returning the United States to a position of political and moral leadership, if used wisely.

A Doctrine Best Observed Through a Multiform Rebalancing

Since Barack Obama has not previously clearly articulated a doctrine regarding the use of military force, analyzing some crucial decisions during his presidency may help in detecting his unspoken doctrine. They range from a responsible withdrawal of conventional forces in Iraq, to the massive use of armed drones in Pakistan and Yemen, to negotiations with elements of the Taliban, to verbal deterrence to Israel against resorting to force in Iran. To get a systemic idea of this rebalancing, we could draw an analogy to an operational design and its lines of operations. The overall strategic end-state is to regain some freedom of action, which has been for a long time drastically limited by the si-

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[3] This article will not address the extent to which Obama is the lone decider in cases involving the resort to the use of force. The influence of strong actors—be they institutional, like the Congress, or from the private sector, like business elites—is obvious, but the assumption used here is that, being the president, Barack Obama definitely provides the ultimate impulse and guidance to the United States' foreign policy.

[4] This strategy differs clearly from the one released in 2002, which referred to military pre-eminence. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, qualified the new strategy as a "dramatic departure" from that of his predecessors. David E. Sanger and Peter Baker, "New U.S. Security Strategy Focuses on Managing Threats," *New York Times* (27 May 2010); available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/world/28strategy.html?ref=world&_r=1&.

multaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, wars that have tied up resources that can be used to better concentrate on projects that will improve the United States' standing in the world, along with its security.

A Withdrawal from Hollow Commitments ...

This could be the name of the first line of operation. The particular issue at question here is the commitment of troops and resources in Afghanistan. The decision made in 2010 to definitively disengage U.S. personnel from Afghanistan[5] was made in total discordance with a counter-insurgency strategy that demands, among other conditions for success, a long-lasting presence, and certainly not a public announcement that offers hope to adversaries for whom time becomes increasingly an ally.[6] Nevertheless, this decision makes sense from the president's point of view: he cannot afford a war which to a certain extent militarily, and certainly from the perspective of state-building, is nothing more than a stalemate.[7] While the democratic evolution of the country (and thus the future of the Afghan people) seems to matter less in Washington than it did a decade ago,[8] Obama still approves the regular use of armed drones to further disrupt Al Qaeda operations.[9] It may sound cynical, but it is a realistic (or realist) stance. In any event, the withdrawal of U.S. troops will be imbued with mutual bitterness, but the United States will have to make the draw-down look honorable by highlighting some progress achieved, the financial assistance provided, and the blood spilt.[10] Ultimately, more than providing "justice to Osama Bin Laden," Operation Geronimo's unilateral conduct

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[5] David Jackson, "Obama: Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal Process to Start Next Year*," USA Today* (20 November 2010); available at http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2010/11/obama-holds-nato-news-conference/1#.UGUJLhjlWL0.

[6] According to a study of ninety insurgencies, on average fourteen years are required to achieve success. Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).

[7] In late 2007 the war in Afghanistan was estimated to be costing USD 300 million per day. See *Current News Early Bird* (17 October 2011).

[8] It is worth wondering what will happen to those who have worked closely with the coalition once NATO forces withdraw. It might well be reminiscent of the tragic destiny of the locals faithful to colonial empires when the latter left their colonies: in Algeria, around 70,000 *harkis* were killed after the 1962 Evian Agreement marking the end of the hostilities, and about 200,000 "boat people" knew another tragedy was on the way in 1976 when they set off from the Vietnamese coast.

[9] Unmanned drone attacks have been the cause of five times more casualties within terrorist cells than were achieved during all of President George W. Bush's mandate. See Victor Davis Hanson, "The President's Chosen Weapon," *Philadelphia Inquirer* (13 October 2011); http://articles.philly.com/2011-10-13/news/30275742_1_drones-pilotless-aircraft-terrorists.

[10] Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, "Truth, Lies and Afghanistan – How military leaders have let us down," *Armed Forces Journal* (February 2012); available at www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/02/8904030.

showed the limits of Obama's consideration for the touchiness of the Pakistanis.[11] This all shows a willingness to stop wasting energy where results seem uncertain, and simultaneously, to go on rooting out terrorism, which was the initial driver for the intervention in Afghanistan in the first place.[12]

… Accompanied by an Uncertain Balance in Risky Areas …

This could describe the second line of operation, where a rebalancing is observable. In maintaining its focus on the Middle East, Saudi Arabia remains a privileged partner for the United States, and it is likely to remain so in the future.[13] Saudi Arabia remains of vital interest for the U.S., receiving protection in exchange for ensuring a consistent supply of oil.[14] It guarantees easy profits as well.[15] Nevertheless, the region remains unstable. The fact that Saudi troops were active in Bahrain in suppressing Shiite rioters during the unrest of March 2011 illustrates the risks of a regional divide. While the rioters alluded to a Saudi declaration of war,[16] Teheran again seized on the event as an opportunity to condemn those who "behave as Saddam and who are backed by the U.S."[17] Regional conflict was once again prevented, thanks to the mediation of the U.S. State Department.[18] The United States' relations with Israel are also potentially dangerous.

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[11] Tom Cohen, "Obama Tells Families of 9/11 Victims that 'Justice has been done'," *CNN Politics* (2 May 2011); available at http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-02/politics/bin.laden.white. house_1_bin-operation-with-extraordinary-courage-defeat-al?_s=PM:POLITICS.

[12] Danny Schechter, "Special Ops now Defines the Pentagon's Expanding Wars," *Global Research* (14 February 2012); available at www.globalresearch.ca/special-ops-now-defines-the-pentagon-s-expanding-wars/.

[13] This relationship was born on board the USS Quincy on 14 February 1945, between the King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud and President Franklin Roosevelt, who was coming back from Yalta. This meeting inaugurated the close cooperation between the U.S. and the Wahhabi Kingdom. See http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdelaziz_ben_Abderrahmane_Al_Saoud.

[14] Lisa Romeo, "Etats-Unis et Arabie saoudite: les liens du pétrole de 1945 à nos jours" [U.S. and Saudi Arabia: The Relationship of Oil from 1945 to Today], *Les clés du Moyen-Orient* (n.d.); available at www.les clesdumoyenorient.com/Etats-Unis-et-Arabie-saoudite.

[15] It is measurable in terms of immaterial advantage—Saudi Arabia enjoys status as a strategic outpost in a sensitive region—as well as in financial profits. Such close relations may be crucial to understanding the indulgence shown by the U.S. towards the country that produced fifteen of the 9/11 terrorists.

[16] Ethan Bronner and Michael Slackman, "Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put down Unrest," *New York Times* (14 March 2011); available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html?pagewanted=all, and "Des troupes saoudiennes à Bahrein, les chiites parlent de guerre," *L'Express* (14 March 2011); available at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/2/monde/des-troupes-saoudiennes-a-bahrein-les-chiites-parlent-de-guerre_9719 43.html.

[17] Robin Wigglesworth and Simeon Kerr, "Ahmadinejad Condemns Foreign Troops in Bahrain," *Financial Times* (16 March 2011); available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5754805a-4e44-11e0-a9fa-00144feab49a.html#axzz27jGsVb3i.

[18] Manama in Bahrain is the harbor currently hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Nevertheless, this does not impede Saudi Arabia from speculating on potential Iranian interference. Indeed, any insta-

Underpinned by regional common interests, and potentially amplified by the influential Jewish lobby in the U.S., they have become even more complex and sensitive, as the latest tensions between Tel-Aviv and Washington reveal perhaps a certain distancing.[19] It makes it interesting to explore how and why the "siege mentality" that currently shapes Israeli foreign policy may lead to a more or less rational decision that may trap the United States in an undesired and uncertain new military engagement under circumstances that would not be appropriate, or based on premises that could not be documented.[20] On Israel's side, the emphasis placed on the potential threat of a nuclear Iran may be designed to draw away international media attention while continuing with settlement construction despite multiple condemnations.[21] The United States' refusal to pay USD 60 million to UNESCO as a protest against the admission of Palestine cannot mask the increasing freedom in the remarks from President Obama regarding Israel. Simultaneously, one could wonder whether the so-called "Arab Spring" revolts will not have a domino effect on the relationships that the U.S. is maintaining with countries in the Middle East.

Already complex, the foreign policy game in the region has become still more confused. Facing such an intricate situation, the U.S. reaction is characterized by reflection and moderation. It reinforces the perception of an appropriate Obama doctrine.

…Extended to Impact the Oldest Alliance

Finally, a reduced NATO footprint sounds like a good strategy to pursue in order to increase the Alliance's freedom of action. While this prospect has yet to be confirmed in terms of future decisions undertaken within the framework of a review of financial burden sharing,[22] former Defense Secretary Robert Gates clearly underlined the disproportionate share of the costs of NATO operations borne by the United States, and stigma-

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bility in the Eastern oil-producing provinces, mainly populated by Shiites, would profit Teheran. See Nouriel Roubini, "Middle East Turmoil and Contagion: A Geoeconomic Tsunami for the Global Economy?," *Roubini Global Economics* (23 February 2011); available at http://relooney.fatcow.com/0_New_9603.pdf.

[19] Covert actions performed by the Mossad, along with the creation of a new command structure in charge of "deep" operations, tend to irritate Washington. See "False Flag," *Foreign Policy* (13 January 2012).

[20] "Israel's siege mentality," *The Economist* (3 June 2010).

[21] "Hillary Clinton: Israeli Settlements 'Illegitimate'," *ABC News* (18 February 2011); available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-israeli-settlements-illegitimate/story?id=1295 2834#.UGpR8hjlWL0. "Israeli Settlements Condemned by Western Powers," *BBC News* (2 November 2011); available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15556801. Adrien Jaulmes, "L'UE appelle à enrayer la colonisation en Cisjordanie," *Le Figaro* (13 January 2012); available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2012/01/13/01003-20120113ART FIG00665-l-ue-appelle-a-enrayer-la-colonisation-en-cisjordanie.php.

[22] The budget cuts impacting the military spending could be a logical cause. Simultaneously, Europe has been criticized for its decreasing military budgets. David Morgan, "Gates Criticizes NATO: How Much Does U.S. Pay?," *CBS News* (10 June 2011); available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20070541.html.

tized European allies who are "willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets."[23] The following U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, delivered the same message in a more oblique way, warning that "we are at a critical moment for our defense partnership."[24] It is obvious that NATO has reached a crossroads: The United States will not continue to consistently shoulder the heaviest financial burden while the European members of the Alliance decrease their defense budgets.[25] This is simply common sense, and the buzzwords "Smart Defense" and "Pooling and Sharing," which are geared more towards savings than efficiency, may simply arouse U.S. skepticism of Europe's willingness to contribute its fair share.

Parallel to these statements, the United States is currently withdrawing one-tenth of their forces garrisoned in Europe, which may not be much but still reveals a reduced U.S. military focus on the region, and potentially points toward future reductions to come. More importantly, the unusually limited U.S. commitment of resources in the latest NATO operation (in Libya) sent out strong signals. Of all the reasons that could have been used to justify the fairly modest U.S. military role in the operation against the Gaddafi regime, Obama pointed to a "moral adventure" placed under the banner of the recent concept of "Responsibility To Protect."[26] A strong early claim about the legitimacy of Western intervention, bolstered by regional support, could have allowed a larger U.S. commitment. However, U.S. interest was not sufficient to provide a contribution larger than the one it eventually did. Despite the media visibility of the effort and the mission-critical assets provided by the U.S., the level of support from Washington in this campaign does not bear comparison with the usual U.S. contribution in NATO operations.[27] Finally, this Libyan adventure again points to a favorable pragmatism on the part of the U.S. It can go on directing NATO through a comfortable "leadership from behind" role while calling for greater participation from the European NATO members.[28] Such a role may help curb resentment against the U.S., as well as aid in avoiding a fiasco like Mogadishu or Bagdad.[29] Again, this moderation stems from Obama's strategic view.

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[23] Ibid.

[24] "Panetta: U.S. Military Can't Make up NATO Shortfalls," *msnbc.com* (5 October 2011); available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44782470/ns/us_news-security/t/panetta-us-military-cant-make-nato-shortfalls/#.UGpQThjlWL0.

[25] Andrew A. Michta, "NATO's Last Chance," *The American Interest* 6:5 (May/June 2011): 56–60; available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=959.

[26] James Traub, "A Moral Adventure – Is Barack Obama as much of a foreign-policy realist as he thinks he is?," *Foreign Policy* (31 March 2011); available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/31/a_moral_adventure.

[27] Command of the operation was given to the U.S. Admiral James G. Stavridis.

[28] Michael Boyle, "Obama: 'Leading from Behind' on Libya," *The Guardian* (27 August 2011); available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/aug/27/obama-libya-leadership-nato.

[29] Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin, 2006).

Finally, it appears that the way Washington behaves in the field of international security has genuinely evolved. First, not all opportunities are used or instrumentalized to justify a massive use of force. Second, the U.S. no longer feels responsible to intervene where others may expect them to intervene simply because of their traditional interventionism or military supremacy. Third, if the decision is made to consider an issue as a security matter, the manner of addressing it does not translate inevitably into a quick resort to a massive use of force. Rather, it takes shape in a much more reflective way that may lead eventually to an unusual mix of soft and hard power, applied in proportions that may be counterintuitive when considering past U.S. security decisions.

It is obvious that President Obama does not want to let political capital, U.S. troops, and financial resources become swallowed up in ill-considered large, long, and costly interventions. On the contrary, standing back from some of the main foreign policy flash points, or using traditional ways of addressing them, results in an increased freedom of action for Washington. In order to foster its global leadership, the U.S. may at times be required to forgo the use of a remarkably effective military tool.

Doctrine and the Improvement of a Military Tool Through Effective Capitalization on Unseen Experience

A doctrine that seeks to take as much advantage as possible of its hard power raises some questions. The first one is whether lessons have been learned from past applications of hard power. The next step is to be sure that learning from the past does not spring only from current pressures; otherwise, in periods in the future that generate less pressure, the tendency would be to simply return to the former outdated doctrine. It is worth considering as a *sine qua non* how the military culturally assimilates this doctrine.[30]

Genuinely Learn from Past Experiences ...

One of the key elements of any military doctrine is that received experience—the lessons of the past—should be better exploited.[31] Throughout U.S. military history, numerous lessons have been identified and a myriad of books written to analyze what has been done in past military encounters. The problem may be that, ranging from the American Revolution to the U.S. Civil War and through the Indian wars, the First and Second World Wars, the interventions in the Philippines and Korea, the rebuilding of Germany and Japan, as well as the Somali and Kosovo experiences and the rebuilding of Iraq, lessons have often been drawn from a perspective that did not effectively question the intellectually established military culture and its resulting mindset. Indeed, the assumption

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[30] For the sake of this article, it is assumed that the cultural field is key to any other changes in the military. Therefore, other elements, such as equipment, recruitment, etc., will not be addressed here.

[31] "With two thousand years of examples behind us we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well...." T.E Lawrence, letter to Basil H. Liddell-Hart; see Liddell-Hart, *Lawrence of Arabia* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1989).

that one always learns more from defeats than victories seems to be ignored. Therefore, simply going back to the U.S. experience in Vietnam is instructive. The use of the term "Vietnam syndrome" highlights the impact this war had and still has upon the United States' military culture.

Vietnam was a complex case because it combined a conventional war fought in the north with a simultaneous counter-guerrilla war being fought within South Vietnam.[32] The war was conducted by a cadre of generals drawn from to the generation of colonels that had defeated the German *Wehrmacht* and the Japanese Imperial military two decades before. Their experiences and culture led them to resort to a massive use of force, which proved unsuccessful[33] – a decision that was made despite numerous opposite views ranging from the advice of British officers to bottom-up proposals.[34] However, awareness at even the highest political level did not manage to influence the predominant military mindset.[35] Moreover, the simultaneity of the Cold War, with its conventional culture, and the failure in Vietnam—which was considered as an accidental, time-limited case—naturally fostered an enduring wariness toward unconventional warfare.[36] Eventually, the *Blitzkrieg*-type war that defeated Iraq's armies in 1990 and 2003 gave additional credence to this trend. However, the second phase of the second Iraq war, involving a conflict with a growing insurgency, as well as the war conducted in Afghani-

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[32] When speaking about Vietnam, one has to overturn some popular beliefs. It has to be made clear that the war in Vietnam was partly lost because of two simultaneous fights: one against North Vietnam's conventional forces, and the other against the Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam. It has been said about the increase in the scale of conventional warfare during the war that the Communists chose that route because the insurgency was about to fail. It actually led to the spring and summer offensive of 1972, aimed at "offsetting the pacification progress met in South Vietnam." In *Military Review* (October 2006): 90.

[33] 50% of the bombs the US dropped on Vietnam fell on South Vietnam. See A.J. Coates, *The Ethics of War* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 230.

[34] Appropriately using the experience gained by British officers in the Malayan Emergency would have helped remove the temptation for U.S. generals to rely almost exclusively on bombings and mass infusions of additional troops. These bottom-up approaches include CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, a pacification program) and the "strategic hamlets" approach, among others.

[35] For evidence of this awareness, see President John F. Kennedy's speech at West Point on 6 June 1962, warning about a new type of war "new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, …war by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him…," a war that would demand "new strategy and new kind of training." Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WSHVh-ZtMs.

"The history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam can be seen as the history of individuals attempting to implement changes in counterinsurgency doctrine but failing to overcome a very strong organizational culture predisposed to a conventional attrition-based doctrine." John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

[36] See the deep analysis of the U.S. doctrine conducted by Walter E. Kretchik in *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011).

stan, confronted and challenged this conventional culture with asymmetric threats representing the new paradigm,[37] for counterinsurgency efforts do not adhere to any fixed standards as conventional warfare does.[38] It is more about adapting to the changes in a given insurgency, which is itself a type of counter-warfare. Therefore it is much less intellectually comfortable than conventional warfare, since it may often lead to questions about what has been taken for granted so far. The field of definite knowledge and unchallenged operational art which used to dominate military thinking yields the floor to an absence of always-applicable rules, where success relies on acknowledging the importance of counter-intuition, and where global understanding and innovation are the main efficiency multipliers. The experience acquired by the U.S. military during the last decade has permitted the emergence of this new school of thought, which has resulted in better approaches about how to resort to force. Its most prominent pioneer may be General David Petraeus who, having studied the Vietnam War in detail, has been able to ensure that the essence of this traumatizing experience is not forgotten.[39] At the same time, he managed not to abandon his judgment of current conditions to his knowledge of history. It has resulted in him always placing the emphasis on gaining a comprehensive understanding before taking any action, and privileging the spirit behind a doctrine rather than the doctrine itself. Cultural independence has paid dividends.

…Should Be Fostered by Current Constraints …

Today's many resource constraints should help this new culture to endure. However, a danger exists if the doctrinal and intellectual shift outlined above is merely a reaction to a situation that turns out to be only temporary. There remains the possibility that, should current pressures only be momentary, and decrease in the near future, the main trends of the former culture might come back.

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[37] Symmetry characterizes a confrontation where opposing forces have about the same standards in terms of doctrine, size, and equipment. Dissymmetry could define the type of war where an unbalance exists in one or more of the previously mentioned domains. Finally, asymmetric warfare reflects a confrontation where the forces, strategies, and tactics of both parties differ significantly. The intent is then to bypass the other's superiority in given domains. "The communist strategy of protracted war succeeded in part because it correctly identified the American centre of gravity as public opinion." In Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill, *Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities and Insights* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2004). Underlying these distinctions are the challenged definitions of words such as *force*, *victory*, *defeat*, *success*, *legitimate*, and *combatant*, within legal, cultural, and international frames.

[38] See Christopher Sims, Fernando Luján, and Bing West, "Both Sides of the COIN: Defining War After Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2012); available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136960/christopher-sims-fernando-lujan-and-bing-west/both-sides-of-the-coin.

[39] Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, for instance, in "Building Critical Thinkers: Leader Development Must Be the Army's Top Priority," *Armed Forces Journal* 148:7 (February 2011): 12–15.

On one hand, we may assume that the decade-long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shaped the military mindset with an emphasis dedicated to counterinsurgency, which as a result may become the dominant feature of military culture. Indeed, the lieutenants and captains who have fought in Fallujah and struggled to stabilize Helmand Province will be the colonels and generals of 2025. On the other hand, assuming that the main emerging threats of the future might best be addressed through conventional means points to a possible resurgence of the culture that emphasized conventional warfare (and conventional thinking). Simultaneously, cuts to the U.S. defense budget will take place in parallel with the development of still existing threats, whether they be global terrorism, conventional militaries, cyber attack, space militarization, etc. All will call for changes. So far, the priority in U.S. defense spending seems to be to reduce the quantity of troops and assets while not diminishing capabilities.[40]

Where all this will lead is unclear, although it may result in the predominance of either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare in the U.S. defense mindset. Nevertheless, enjoying an efficient military force indicates that the fundamental element of true strength lies in not picking one of them and neglecting the other, but in keeping both capabilities alive, reactive, and flexible.[41] Doing so is more challenging than choosing one or the other, since it will require leaders to maintain an open mind, developing a greater sophistication of thought than is required by the recent turn to an almost exclusive emphasis on counterinsurgency.[42] If he intends to maintain the United States' standing as having finest military in the world, President Obama may want to bear that in mind.[43]

…And Eventually Mitigate the Military's Inertia

Changing or adapting one's mentality is not easy; changing an institution's mentality is even harder. And changing that of the military could be more challenging still, which is, sadly, what history repeatedly tells us.[44] What does this lesson imply? A new strategic political doctrine may be adopted, but the path of military implementation will take time to seep out into the institution and change individual mindsets.

A generation of military personnel has served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile, General Petraeus has designed a new doctrine intended to disrupt Al Qaeda and its af-

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[40] Thomas Donnelly, Phillip Dur, and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "The Future of U.S. Military Power: Debating How to Address China, Iran, and Others," *Foreign Affairs* (November/ December 2009); available at www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/65507/thomas-donnelly-philip-dur-and-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/the-future-of-us-military-power.

[41] As stated by former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates: "The principal challenge, therefore, is how to ensure that the capabilities gained and counterinsurgency lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the lessons we learned from other places where we have engaged in irregular warfare over the last two decades, are institutionalized within the defense establishment." Quoted in "2008 National Defense Strategy," *Small Wars Journal* (31 July 2008).

[42] See Dempsey, "Building Critical Thinkers."

[43] As stated in the 2008 National Defense Strategy and reflected in the 2012 State of the Union's speech.

[44] This is the thesis of John Nagl's book, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*.

filiates while mitigating the alienation of the local population.[45] It is certainly difficult to recover confidence in this human field and to "win hearts and minds," particularly in light of initial mistakes made by Western forces in the region. Nevertheless, it has been possible to meet with some success. These positive outcomes should not be totally eclipsed by the local cultural features that remind us how difficult it is to install centralized and respected authorities where civil societies are not mature enough to accept and foster such governance.[46]

Provided that flexibility becomes a cultural norm within the U.S. military, it must not be limited to the current counterinsurgency campaigns. Indeed, the required flexibility lies not only in mastering counterinsurgency strategies, being innovative in implementing them, or designing new ones. It also resides in the ability to carry out counterinsurgency operations—and to adjust the approach when required—without losing the ability to plan, conduct, and adapt strategies to deal with conventional threats at the same time. This is without question highly challenging, since it is much easier to restrict one's expertise to one or the other field. But current security challenges, just as those that might occur in the future, demand from military leaders broader knowledge and unrelenting mental flexibility.

The U.S. military has acquired huge wealth. The combination of the strength of their armed forces, the knowledge gained from the experiences of the last decade, and their dominance of the full spectrum of assets represents a potential for a still enduring and unchallengeable military power. Nevertheless, keeping a flexible and skillful mindset will allow them to wage the type of wars they will face and not those they wish to face. By working to not become intellectually constrained, the U.S. military can continue to distinguish itself as the world's finest, and can serve United States' foreign policy in the utmost manner.

Even if the military institution is better attuned culturally, and thus has an improved potential for increased efficiency, it could still be rendered useless if the political leadership misuses its capability. Indeed, political leaders should not succumb to the temptation to resort more frequently to hard power simply because it has reached a higher level of efficiency. On the contrary, greater success in foreign policy will result ultimately from combining the sensible use of a more efficient force with a more subtle political sense. This could deter adversaries through the respect or fear that armed wisdom inspires.

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[45] In its approach to counterinsurgency, the revised *U.S. Army Field Manual* gives significant space for reflection, adaptability, cultural awareness, and proportionality – numerous issues that were before not so common in doctrine. *Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Army Field Manual*, No. 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 2006).

[46] "It must be remembered that Afghanistan has for centuries been rather a geographical expression than a country." George Alfred Henty, *For Name and Fame; or, Through Afghan Passes* (London: Blackie & Son, 1886); full text available at http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/1/9/7/21979/21979-h/21979-h.htm.

A Doctrine Whose Efficiency Ultimately Depends on the Wise Political Use of an Efficient Military

Adapting Culture to Meet Required Wisdom ...

Wisdom in using the military in an appropriate manner is paramount. Up to the end of the military phase of the second Iraq war and the defeat of Saddam Hussein's forces in 2003, a massive commitment of conventional forces had been the main feature of the use of force. The drawbacks of common, brutal, and hasty approaches to the application of military power have opened the room for reflection. The latter should precede all military commitment for, once forces are engaged, it is too late to reverse the decision. For instance, in the case of Afghanistan in 2001, one might ask whether an initial lighter and sharper footprint wouldn't have been enough to disrupt the Taliban and Al Qaeda. And if it had failed, pouring more troops in later would still have been a possible option. In contrast, an initial large footprint does not leave many alternatives in the case of failure: any downsizing or withdrawal before tangible progress is achieved will be perceived as weakness, and the result of the intervention will be interpreted as failure.

Culture becomes a particularly important topic for discussion when decisions made go against the traditional philosophy of impatience, aggressiveness, and hubris.[47] Obama has been repeatedly criticized for the mode of the United States' participation in Operation Unified Protector over Libya. This expressed frustration stemmed from impatience that was rooted in two facts: not having targeted Muammar Gaddafi immediately, and having performed a proportionate and graduated response to Libyan shelling.[48] Indeed, many had expected a greater use of air power to defeat Libya's leadership and organized military as quickly as possible. In the view of Obama's detractors, the U.S. military involvement should have been entirely about removing Gaddafi and destroying his assets. What took place instead went against the United States' traditional model of waging war. President Obama's approval of European-type proportionate and measured action was therefore seen as a manifestation of weakness or indecision.[49] However, the end of the regime-sponsored killings and the gratitude expressed by the free Libyans once Gaddafi's dictatorship collapsed showed that limited action was the wisest course to follow. Whether time confirms that is another issue. Regardless, "leading from behind" or ac-

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[47] See Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003) – a book (and the article on which it was based) that gave rise to the famous formulation "Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus."

[48] Some strikes against land-based objectives were delayed and even cancelled because of neighboring civilians or the simple vicinity of arable fields, with the intent of not alienating the Libyan people against NATO. Such a degree of nuance has hardly been seen in previous operations involving American forces. Interviews with NATO pilots, conducted by the author, November 2011.

[49] "Non-leader of the Free World," *New York Post* (18 March 2011).

knowledging the United States' imperfections does not flatter the general U.S. ego, but it does help reassure its allies.[50]

... *While Appropriately Repositioning the* Ultima Ratio Regum ...

Considering the consequences any use of force has, and especially the dramatic consequences that can result from its misuse, some questions should be addressed: Why, when, and how should force be deployed? "Why" suggests that force is a logical component required to implement a strategy (provided that one exists), one that makes sense to use either when previous actions have failed or when hard power is viewed as complementary to the full spectrum of possibilities.[51]

"When" implies a conceptual shift. Indeed, President Obama clearly views the use of force through a more Clausewitzian lens, where force is an extension of politics, and not a policy in itself. He intends to place military action at the end of a continuum, where diplomacy supported by multilateralism occupies the broadest range. According to this approach, force is the last option, instead of an option that can be resorted to earlier simply in order to shape the context of any negotiation to the United States' advantage.

"How" raises the question of the type of engagement to be designed and conducted. It requires the political leader to know the nature of the war he is about to engage in. The failure to demand this understanding as prerequisite for deciding on the use of force could be dramatic.[52] It subsequently requires that the U.S. president gain personal insight into the military domain. The institutional outsourcing to the military of the monopoly over the use of force is no excuse not to understand how it is to be done. Effectively shouldering his title of Commander in Chief, Barack Obama does not publicly trumpet decisions about the use of force, but instead aims wisely at efficiency,[53] notably by allowing massive use of drones and targeted elimination of individuals while increasing intelligence assets despite using a less aggressive vocabulary.[54]

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[50] President Barack Obama, Speech in Strasbourg, France, 3 April 2009; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-at-Strasbourg-Town-Hall.

[51] The United States' National Security Strategy 2010 underlines the repositioning of the military as a tool, in contrast to the 2002 version; 2010 version available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/.../national_security_strategy.pdf.

[52] "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive." Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 88–89.

[53] Michael C. Dorf, "The 'Obama Doctrine': The Wisdom and Lawfulness of the President's Take-No-Prisoners Approach," *Justia.com* (24 October 2011); available at http://verdict.justia.com/2011/10/24/the-obama-doctrine. See also Roger Cohen, "Doctrine of Silence," *The New York Times* (28 November 2011).

[54] Greg Miller, "Pentagon Establishes Defense Clandestine Service, New Espionage Unit," *Washington Post* (23 April 2012); available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

… That Needs a Sine Qua Non *Framework to Succeed*

The framework surrounding the decision to use hard power influences the result. It is a mix of consensus within the political leadership and relevant military advice. President Obama has to struggle to make the political community accept the way he resorts to force, as he also fights for reasons other than those that are traditionally accepted.[55] Some members of a military may be concerned about these decisions as well, but their objections are understandably expressed in a more discreet manner.[56] However, the U.S. President has enjoyed special freedom of action in the wake of 9/11 – at least within the U.S. political context. Even though the killing of Osama Bin Laden was carried out with the full consent of those in the U.S. political and military worlds who were involved, and met with great satisfaction, this may not be always the case in the future for similar operations.[57] In such cases, members of Congress will need to be culturally inclined to support Obama's new approach. Time will undoubtedly be required to reach the level of common understanding that is necessary.

Additionally, the military have to provide relevant advice and must be listened to, which has not been always the case.[58] One may wonder whether the appointment of General Petraeus as head of the CIA does not reflect the overlapping of missions between military and civilian intelligence and security agencies, and the deeper coordination it calls for. Above all, it provides a former military leader with a better platform from which to advise the political leadership. Finally, it illustrates Obama's willingness to

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national-security/pentagon-creates-new-espionage-unit/2012/04/23/gIQA9R7DcT_story.html. See also James Bamford, "The NSA Is Building the Country's Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say)," *Wired.com* (15 March 2012); available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/.

According to the right-wing U.S. think tank the Heritage Foundation, "Obama refers to the issue of terrorism 68 percent less often than Bush did. He has slashed references to weapons of mass destruction by 91 percent. But, he speaks of democracy 74 percent less often than Bush did, and freedom 92 percent fewer times." Nicholas Krueger, "The 2010 National Security Strategy, By the Numbers," The Foundry Blog, at *Heritage.org* (19 August 2010).

[55] See President Barack Obama's 2012 State of the Union speech, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2012.

[56] Veronica Roberts, "General McChrystal Fired," *Allvoices.com* (23 June 2010).

[57] Eli Lake, "The 9/14 Presidency," *reason.com* (6 April 2010); available at http://reason.com/archives/2010/04/06/the-914-presidency.

[58] "Any future Defense Secretary who advises the president to again send a big American army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined." Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, before leaving office in July 2011. Quoted by Bing West in "Groundhog War: The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 90:5 (September/October 2011): 163–171; available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68133/bing-west/groundhog-war.

President George W. Bush ignored similar advice before invading Iraq in 2003. Indeed, the U.S. Central Command stated in 1998 that at least 380 000 troops would be necessary to stabilize Iraq. See Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, "A Failure in Generalship," *Armed Forces Journal* 144 (May 2007): 16–23; available at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198.

shape a favorable framework within which to discuss and decide on the appropriate use of force.

Joseph Nye stated, "The required and desirable soft power stems from culture, values, and policies. They suggest respectively that the necessary culture is attractive to others, that the values are both attractive and not undermined by inconsistent practices, and finally that policies are considered as inclusive and legitimate in the eyes of others."[59] This provides a brief summary of the points that President Obama regularly underlines as part of a necessary framework to reinvigorate the United States' standing in the world.[60]

Conclusion

Even if throughout U.S. history most of the nation's security doctrines have been clearly named, eminently foreseeable, and easily characterized *a posteriori*, Obama's doctrine—while still provisional—remains unpredictable, and consequently less comprehensible to adversaries. Whether a doctrine needs necessarily to be officially defined in order to be efficient is questionable. But regardless of this lack of official definition, and in spite of a recurrent chorus of critics, Obama's actions have served to disconcert those who are used to referring to clear-cut strategies. In the process, it has actually helped to increase U.S. dominance.[61]

Obama has regularly been accused of being a weak foreign policy actor, or of continuing the Bush Administration's foreign policy by other means. This essay has attempted to show that his doctrine is rather nonconformist, since he did not continue the Bush Administration's asserted right to unilaterally and preemptively use force against potential threats to the United States. On the contrary, it shows that Obama has sought to reinvigorate the United States' global leadership, at least through wiser decisions about the use of force, often enshrined in more multilateral frameworks.[62] His narrative may be that U.S. leadership still means systematic and ubiquitous military primacy, but his doctrine no longer calls for the systematic use of it. That statement introduces a significant area of nuance. Furthermore, unilateralism and blunt massive military commitments have been proven counterproductive today, more than ever. Obama's sense of responsi-

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[59] Terence Casey, "Europe, Soft Power and Gentle Stagnation," *Comparative European Politics Review* 4 (2006): 402. The term "soft power" was coined by Joseph Nye, Jr. in 1990, and was invoked to criticize the Bush Administration's unilateralism in 2002.

[60] Clearly expressed in Obama's 2012 State of the Union speech.

[61] Clay Risen, "Obama's Non-doctrine Doctrine," *The New York Times* (26 August 2011); available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/obamas-non-doctrine-doctrine.

[62] In Chris Good, "The Obama Doctrine: Multilateralism with Teeth," *theatlantic.com* (10 December 2009); available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/12/the-obama-doctrine-multilateralism-with-teeth/31655. Additionally, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, while suspicious of many other elements of the 2010 National Security Strategy, welcomed this emerging focus on multilateralism. See "Russia Has Objections over U.S. National Security Strategy," *RIA Novosti* (1 September 2010); available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2010/usa-100901-rianovosti01.htm.

bility does not make him risk-averse, but rather risk-conscious, in a country where these different notions may be misleadingly confused. Still, not being able to grasp the difference between the two is a disadvantage when facing the current challenging era, where protean and unpredictable risks have replaced simplistically considered threats. At the same time, a "more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability, nor decline."[63]

Such a framework calls for positioning the military capability, by principle, in a secondary role posture, where the use of hard power is seen as a last resort rather than as a primary tool of foreign policy. It does not reflect or imply any lesser consideration for the military, but it does demand a more subtle use that will increasingly both require and challenge its efficiency. Ultimately, due to the primacy of politics, Obama himself will be judged not only on the way he shapes his military, but also on how he decides to use it. So far, some clever decisions have started to pave the path towards a reinvigoration of U.S. leadership worldwide by avoiding wasting energy when both diplomacy and moderate use of the military as initial tools are sufficient to mitigate crises.[64]

Whether Obama's security doctrine will be combined adequately with advances in other fields like education, economy, and culture to genuinely achieve enduring global U.S. leadership is yet to be determined, and may be a further topic to be explored. Whatever happens, Obama's reelection would definitely provide him the opportunity to engrave a successful doctrine in the annals of U.S. security, one that might allow the U.S. to dominate another century, provided that key decision makers can remain open-minded, and not be tempted by some kind of fatalism.

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[63] Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward," *Foreign Affairs* 90:6 (November/December 2011): 32–47; available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment.

[64] See Graeme P. Herd, *Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2010).

Security in a Communications Society: Opportunities and Challenges

Velichka Milina [*]

> *Information can often provide a key power resource, and more people have access to more information than ever before. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power.*[1]
>
> Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Power always depends on context.[2] The year 2011 has made Joseph Nye's statement starkly visible concerning all actors in the realm of security policy. The Arab Spring up-risings (still ongoing in Syria) and the protests that have erupted in nations around the world of ineffective government policies regarding the global financial and economic crisis have categorically proven that political stability (security) cannot be considered and achieved only in the context of traditional institutions and norms of representative democracy, or through inspiring fear and beliefs in a closed society. These events have demonstrated new forms and scales of political activity, and have called for competent political participation. What unites them, in spite of their widespread geography, is that they were organized and conducted with the help of new communications technologies.

The current context of security policy is the communications society. The phenomena that fall under the rubric of "Web 2.0" have radically changed the characteristics of the objects of security (individuals, society, state), as well as the problems facing security—starting from Twitter revolutions, going through the protests of "the indignant," and culminating in the key role of social media as tools of "soft power." This article is an attempt to assess and analyze the parameters of these changes as challenges and new opportunities for security systems in a communications society.

The Communications Society

Until recently, we used to define the world that we live in as an "information society." But if we carefully analyze the trends of the past decade, we could argue that this state-ment does not reflect well enough the specifics of the present anymore. Although the quantity of accessible information continuously increases, today it is more appropriate to say that we are witnessing a revolution that provides new alternative instruments for *communication*. These communication technologies focus not on increasing the volume of accessible information, but on developing various innovative and effective forms of mass communication from central points to large numbers of people, and also on creat-

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[1] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 116, xvi.
[2] Ibid., xiv–xviii.

ing new modes of information exchange between individual actors. The phenomenon of "communication" is moving toward obtaining the status of the main explanatory principle in many of the social sciences.

The evolution of the Internet at the beginning of the twenty-first century saw the development of a variety of technologies that combined to create what is known as Web 2.0. This stage in the Internet's evolution is characterized by social networks, social media, and user-generated content – by the granting of creative agency to individual users, not just traditional media outlets. A vital feature is the use of the Internet not only as a "communication medium" but also as a "platform."[3] These platforms can be created and improved upon both by designers and users. One of the most significant outcomes of Web 2.0 is the creation of social ("new") media as a new means for online mass information, where every Internet user—even those without any special programming abilities—can take part in the process of creating, storing, and disseminating socially important information, addressed to a wide audience.[4]

The widespread dissemination of these "new media" has turned them simply into "the media" for a large number of people. The following are considered the "traditional" media: printed material (newspapers, magazines, etc.), radio, television, cinema and video programs, and digital editions (so-called Web 1.0) of newspapers, information, and news feeds. Although no official "scientific" definition exists yet, the notion of "new media" characterizes Internet-based (Web 2.0 format) digital, computerized, or networked information and communication technologies, such as blogs, wikis,[5] social networks, file sharing sites, etc.

In the span of only a few years, social media have changed the world we live in. As a result, neologisms like "electronic state 2.0,"[6] "democracy 2.0,"[7] "revolution 2.0,"[8] "public diplomacy 2.0,"[9] "civil society 2.0,"[10] and "policy 2.0"[11] have come into popular use.

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[3] Tim O'Reilly, "What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software" (30 September 2005); available at http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html.

[4] See M. Budolak, "Social Media Concepts," in *Petersburg School of PR: From Theory to Practice*, ed. A.D. Krivonosov (Saint Petersburg: Roza Mira, 2009), 18.

[5] Wiki is a Hawaiian word that means "quick." Wiki-media implies that a given site's content can be quickly modified by users via a simple Web browser.

[6] Soon Ae Chun, Stuart Shulman, Rodrigo Sandoval, and Eduard Hovy, "Government 2.0: Making Connections Between Citizens, Data and Government," *Information Polity* 15:(1&2) (2010): 1–9.

[7] Anand Giridharadas, "Democracy 2.0 Awaits an Upgrade," *New York Times* (11 September 2009); available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/12/world/americas/12iht-currents.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.

[8] Wael Ghonim, *Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater than the People in Power: A Memoir* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012).

[9] Lina Khatib, William H. Dutton, and Michael Thelwall, "Public Diplomacy 2.0: An Exploratory Case Study of the U.S. Digital Outreach Team," *The Middle East Journal* (2012); available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734850.

Communications Technology and Security

How does the communications revolution change the security environment, and what are the new challenges and opportunities for security systems in the context of the political stability of societies? The most fundamental consideration when answering such questions is the fact that Web 2.0 communication technologies have radically changed traditional modes of creating and disseminating information. It is generally held that political communication encompasses a range of processes, including information exchange and the transmission of political information that shapes political activities and attaches new meaning to them. In the information age, digital media are becoming the main—and, for a growing number of young people, the only—channel for political information and communication. They are the primary space for political activities where citizens receive political information, shape their political views and beliefs, and have the opportunity to influence the processes related to functioning of power. According to Lucian Pye, political communication is not made up of unilaterally directed signals from the elite to the masses, but includes the whole spectrum of informal communication processes in society, which have various impacts on policy.[12]

It is an indisputable fact that in the past few years the Internet has become the place where political positions are claimed, disputes and discussions are led, communities are established around specific political occasions or long-term political causes, political information is received, and (last but not least) the society communicates with those in power. The most applicable outlets among the "new media" for the purposes of this discussion are blogs and social networks.

Circulating Information in the New Media Landscape

In what are called "new media," information is created and disseminated in a method completely different from the one that characterized communication for much of the twentieth century. In traditional media, even in the feedback system, the information tool is the source of information and plays the leading role in communication. In other words, the world of traditional mass media is a world of one-way communication that is first filtered and then broadcast. With "new media," the audience creates and spreads information online; only later it can be filtered or blocked. This circumstance radically changes the answers to the question, which is vital to every security system, "Who owns, controls, and spreads information?"

"New media" have radically changed the speed at which political information circulates. There is no question that online information on political events and processes has

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[10] See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/131234.htm.

[11] Orlin Spassov, "Social Networks and Politics 2.0," available at http://www.seminar-bg.eu/spisanie-seminar-bg/broy1/item/198-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B8-%D0%B8-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-20.html.

[12] Lucian Pye, "Political Communication," in *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*, ed. Vernon Bodganor (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1987).

far outstripped that provided by traditional media in terms of its topicality and dynamic nature. In addition, new media also provide users with the opportunity to share different points of view on the same event practically simultaneously with its development. More and more often these are the points of view of eyewitnesses, provided via Twitter or a blog. There are many examples in this context, from the suicide bombing at the Moscow airport in January 2011 to the events of the Arab Spring.

Social media change our perception on how to communicate with the rest of the world. This type of communication has become extremely democratic. It is not necessary to be a skilled IT professional or to be rich in order to communicate with large numbers of people around the world. Anyone with access to a computer connected to the Internet can create a blog or a social network, write on a wiki site, post an audio or a video recording – and can then receive thousands of comments, and potentially become an influential person who can shape opinions and attitudes on different political, social, and cultural events or issues. As political consultants say, in new media information goes "from door to door," or more precisely "from account to account." This is a network that is created from person to person, from group to group, and it cannot be covered vertically in any way. That is the reason why systems based on the vertical distribution of communication signals (in the direction towards citizens and coming from citizens) are not effective today. It is necessary to change the mechanisms of political influence using new means of communication in order to become effective.

New media have aggravated and made visible the crisis in traditional mass political communications. The very notion of the "masses" has gained a different meaning. In the context of a traditional media approach, the "masses" are perceived as an amorphous body, lacking structure and of a vague composition. If, however, we look at the modern Internet community, we will see that in spite of its audience size of hundreds of millions of people, it can not be defined as a "mass." The community of Internet is clearly structured horizontally. The functioning of numerous online communities in the Internet space has formed groups of users who in most cases could be clearly differentiated according to their social, demographic, religious, or other characteristics, but nevertheless are tied together by the virtual connection created by online communities. This turns the Internet community into a specific phenomenon, totally different from an amorphous mass and the models used by classical theories of political communication.

In addition, in the new communications environment it is no longer possible to ignore the presence of minority points of view. The reason is that, due to the communications revolution, according to Marshall McLuhan's words, "too many people know too much about each other…."[13] This entirely new circumstance will change the ideology of how mass communication takes place.

The positive potential of new social media is that they offer governments a powerful instrument for direct communication in a way that is more organic and consistent with local realities. Social networks provide politicians with a very clear and precise profile

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[13] Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, *The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects* (New York: Bantam Books, 1967).

of society in terms of geography, age, occupation, income, and interests. It is already a common practice to compare social networks with a GPS system in the context of social geography. This is a very powerful tool for effective and beneficial political communication.

What is new in political communication is that the average citizen is not just a "mailbox" for political information, passively receiving messages distributed from a central location. Individuals already have the opportunity to immediately express and spread their opinion or attitude on a certain issue as participants in a forum or a social network through voting, "liking" or "disliking," recording and posting video clips, etc. The larger the number of such acts around a particular event, the faster information travels, and the wider the scope of audience. In the Internet's evolutionary phase known as Web 1.0, this circulation could not happen with similar speed and scale, despite the use of chat rooms, e-mail, and instant messaging.

The trend toward using social media to distribute political information will grow with the new generation for whom new media are as natural a place for receiving information as television was for the previous one. Effective leaders of this type of communication will be those who "think of themselves as being in a circle rather than atop a mountain"[14] and who have understood "that two-way communications are more effective than commands."[15]

New Media and the New Social Reality

Social media have made communications inherent in all aspects of the modern world. The main value added by such media for the modern person is the ability to receive, process, create, and transmit information, as a result of which people live today not so much in an environment of people and objects but rather in a world full of images, messages, myths, and stereotypes. Political communication is also characterized by a predominantly symbolic character. It is represented by millions of signs, symbols, and images, shaping a separate type of reality that is being subjectively perceived by participants in the communication network as the only one available.

For the individual, this symbolic environment is no longer a mediator between the self and the real world where events are happening or certain phenomena exist, but rather it functions as a replacement of the real world. The new reality is moving further away from existing real (mainly political), relationships and at the same time exerts an increasing influence upon them.

This paradoxical interrelation is explained with the help of the so-called "Thomas theorem," which states "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." We are witnessing the renaissance of the "Thomas theorem" (first articulated in 1928) thanks to one of the most influential sociologists of the past fifty years, Robert

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[14] Nye, *The Future of Power*, 101.
[15] Ibid.

Merton, who is famous for his works on self-destructive prognosis.[16] In his research, he analyzed the impact of the rule formulated by Thomas: when people believe in something, they act according to their beliefs – whether constructively or destructively.

Today, the new reality of symbolic images and pictures unconditionally dominates political life. Politics in the communications society "may ultimately be about whose story wins."[17] In this sense, the key question is, What is truth in the twenty-first century?[18] Traditionally, the political truth is produced by experts based on real practices, empirical facts, science, and knowledge. Today, when even meritocratic elites have collapsed, power is no longer legitimized through expertise. There is a new understanding about truth, characterized by the notion that there are no traditions and no experts. The truth is moving away from expertise. The opinion of any blogger-amateur could be "liked" more than that of a university professor. Whoever tells a better story gains the most trust.

This new reality raises a number of questions that have as yet received no answers. These questions are connected to the essence of politics as a means of rationalizing conflicts and the responsibility of political leaders to play a role in ensuring political stability in their society.

New Media and the Orchestration of Real-world Events

"Revolutions of social networks" today is the notion that summarizes new radical forms of political activity. Media and experts have defined the events that took place in 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt—the so-called Arab Spring—as "Twitter Revolutions" or "Facebook Revolutions," because it was through these social networks that the mobilization and organization of active participants took place. In these cases, an alternative to official media outlets became widely known, and information was spread about what was happening on the ground, not just in the ether. In other words, social media played informational, organizational, and mobilization roles in the Arab Spring uprisings. As a result of this, can we accept the statement of Hilary Clinton's advisor for innovation, Alec Ross, that social media are "the new Che Guevara of the twenty-first century"?[19]

As a matter of fact, uprisings in Belarus (2006), Moldova (2009), Iran (2009), the Arab Spring (2011), mass protest movements against ineffective fiscal policy in a num-

[16] Robert Merton, "The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect?," *Social Forces* 74:2 (1995): 380; available at http://garfield.library.upenn.edu/merton/thomastheorem.pdf.

[17] John Arquila and David Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), ix–x; available at www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1033.html. Quoted by Nye, The Future of Power, 104.

[18] Peter Faber, "Power and the Westphalian System: Goodbye to All That," International Relations and Security Network Podcast, 2 April 2012; available at www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Podcasts/Detail/?ots591=40db1b50-7439-887d-706e-8ec00590bdb9&lng=en&id=138980.

[19] Alec Ross and Ben Scott, "Social Media: Cause, Effect, and Response," *NATO Review* (2011); available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Social_Medias/21st-century-statecraft/en/index.htm.

ber of Western countries (2011), and Russia (2011) present illustrations of the potential of large-scale, high-intensity political mobilization through social media. "Twitter Revolution" fans believe that the reason for these movements' relative success is the technology itself. Protesters are able to coordinate their operations via social networks; a message on Twitter or Facebook gives people a feeling of belonging, while posting pictures or video clips guarantees the effect of presence. As a result, events become known by millions of people around the world, and they can participate in "naming and shaming" campaigns and shape a global public opinion in support of a cause, insisting on an active response from their governments. Global Internet servers allow for revolutionary spirits to move quickly from one country to another. One might think that, even if the revolution will not be televised, it could be broadcast on Twitter.

The Liberatory Limitations of New Media

This view of the role of social media, however, is strongly exaggerated and one-sided. According to Evgeny Morozov of Stanford University, who was the first scholar to introduce the term "Twitter Revolution" after the events in Moldova in April 2009, revolutions do not happen because certain technologies exist. They are based on political, economic, and social factors. This claim is proved by the fact that, in spite of some expectations that social media would play the same progressive role in China and Russia, this has not happened. One possible explanation, according to Morozov, is that governments are also able to work successfully with new technologies. In China, Russia, Iran, and Sudan the authorities are actively using social media to identify and neutralize the organizations of oppositional activists.[20] Technologies are neutral; they are simply a means and a tool, and the success derived from their implementation is defined by specific factors: awareness of the sociology, the existence of genuine social and political contradictions, and the presence of oppositional feelings in a given society. These processes can be easily manipulated, amplified, or mitigated via social media, but in all cases real political activity should be present. Very often the distance between "liking" a cause on a social network or a blog and genuine involvement is insurmountable, especially in the context of an inactive political culture.

"The new Che Guevara" of Twitter revolutions turned out to be impotent in the period after initial political victory was achieved, when organization and momentum are needed at the next constructive stage. The lack of political ideology, programs or organization—as well as the fear that some leaders will usurp the "victory" or turn a political outcome to personal advantage—could result in chaos and uncertainty.

Today, it is difficult to argue whether all these massive political activities—starting in Tunisia and ending in Russia—would have happened if Web 2.0 had not existed. It is clear, though, that they would not have happened in this way, on this scale, and with this range of participants.

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[20] Evgeny Morozov, "The Price of the Issue," *Kommersant* (9 March 2010); available at http://forum.democrator.ru/index.php?topic=662.0.

Participants in these events were the so-called "smart mobs." This notion was intro-
duced by Howard Rheingold, and it sounds like an oxymoron if we think of the mob in
the context of the pre-communications era where it was a synonym for irrational and in-
stinctive behavior.[21] "Smart mobs" consist of individuals who communicate through
wireless links and for whom the means of mobile communication have turned into a kind
of "electronic prosthesis, the absence of which threatens their personal identity."[22]
Nowadays, this notion "is applied to every fast forming and demonstrating collective
intelligence community in the Internet."[23]

According to a number of analysts, it is likely that "smart mobs" will either become a
key resource for the formation of a civil society or they will become a destructive force.
Today, after the events of 2011, we go back to Rheingold's idea regarding the new way
to engage people in the communications age with group or collective activities – he calls
them "ad-hocracies" (from the Latin phrase *ad hoc*, meaning "for specific purpose").[24]
This is a new type of social community, resulting from the convergence of mobile com-
munications and computers when people have the opportunity to get together temporar-
ily to share information, common interests, and activities. In an "adhocracy" there is no
hierarchy, no legitimate leader, and no clear division of labor.[25] We have noticed these
characteristics in protest movements where participant mobilization and organization
were conducted via social media. As of today, the results of adhocracy are not promis-
ing.

Enhanced Communication and Changes in Modern Democracy

So far, most of the political activity that has been fomented using new communications
media has been oppositional in orientation, and thus has generated insecurity and politi-
cal instability. In 2011, we witnessed mass protest movements against the futile work of
politicians to overcome the economic crisis in a number of liberal democratic states –
starting with Spain, and extending to Belgium and Germany, and to the United States
and Australia. What these movements had in common is that the protests were organized
through social networks and were extremely broad in scale. The culmination was
reached on 15 October 2011, when the global movement of the discontented used social
networks to call for protests in over 700 towns in more than 70 countries with hundreds
of thousands of participants.[26]

This new model of political involvement based on social networks provoked the
journal *Foreign Affairs* to publish a comprehensive analysis on how new social move-
ments are changing the classical political process, written by the political scientists Mi-

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[21] Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
[22] Viktor Buriak, *The Global Civil Society and the Network Revolutions* (Simferopol, 2011), 90;
available at http://www.bazaluk.com/book/files/211.pdf.
[23] Hristo Prodanov, *Digital Politics* (Sofia, 2011), 170.
[24] Rheingold, *Smart Mobs*, 80–82.
[25] See Prodanov, *Digital Politics*, 168–74.
[26] See http://bnt.bg/bg/news/view/62253/protestite_na_nedovolnite.

chael Hardt and Antonio Negri.[27] According to the two researchers, the most surprising finding is that what is happening during the protests has very little in common with the debates going on between politicians. The two seem to exist in parallel realities, which raises the question of whether the political system of modern democracy is still capable of expressing and representing the interests and vital claims of many of the voters.

In fact, the protest movements that shook liberal democracies (Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Washington, Occupy London, the Movement of the Discontented, etc.), as well as the right-wing populist Tea Party movement in the U.S. call into question the effectiveness of today's political model. Until recently, security and political stability in consolidated democracies seemed unconditional. Modern representative democracy has been in place for over two hundred years, with citizens periodically electing their representatives and, if they are displeased with them, replacing them during the next vote a few years later. However, in the age of the Internet, social networks, and Wikileaks, delegating your vote to an elected representative and searching for alternatives at the end of that representative's term seems increasingly clumsy and ineffective. When protesters gather in the streets of Manhattan and shout "This is what democracy looks like!", they insist on people's direct involvement in political processes.[28]

The post-modern age has posed the crisis in political representation as the main factor of public instability in democratic states. In the new atomized social structure of super-symbolic economic societies, people are grouped together in numerous dynamic minorities and often do not see political parties, reflecting the status-quo of the past industrial age, as representative of their interests.[29] On the one hand, this has led to increases in political corruption and political populism, and on the other hand to political mistrust and mass reluctance of citizens to participate in politics.

As early as 1994, Alvin and Heidi Toffler in *Creating a New Civilization* commented on the parameters of democracy in the twenty-first century and spoke about the

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[27] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, "The Fight for 'Real Democracy' at the Heart of Occupy Wall Street: The Encampment in Lower Manhattan Speaks to a Failure of Representation," *Foreign Affairs* (11 October 2011); available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136399/michael-hardt-and-antonio-negri/the-fight-for-real-democracy-at-the-heart-of-occupy-wall-street.

[28] See http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/sviat/2011/10/14/1177444_ulica_protestna/.

[29] This argument is proved by the quick rise in the popularity and success of so-called pirate parties. Starting from the first one, established in Sweden in 2006, pirate parties exist in more than twenty democratic countries, and they participate in the Pirate Parties International (PPI), which will take part in the elections for the European Parliament in 2014, where they already have two Swedish members. Pirate Party Germany has captured 12 percent of the vote in recent elections, and has representatives in the parliaments in Berlin and Saarland. The key issues for the pirate parties are transparency, open state procedures, and better communication with citizens. See "Germany's Pirate Party: The Ayes Have It," *The Economist* (28 April 2012); available at http://www.economist.com/node/21553484. See also Sarah Marsh and Hans-Edzard Busemann, "Pirates Party's Rapid Rise Upsets German Landscape," *Reuters.com* (30 April 2012); available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/30/us-germany-pirates-idUSBRE83T08G20120430.

necessity of changing the relationship between the government and the "unstable and multiplying minorities" that were dynamically emerging after the collapse of the centrally-planned societies of the Communist East.[30] In their opinion, democracy based on the principle of majority rule is ineffective in the information age, and has to be replaced by a "democracy of minorities" via "methods whose aim is to uncover the difficulties and not to obscure them through declaring forced or false majority, achieved by means of excluding some groups from voting, complicated problem formulation, or discredited election procedures." Instead of focusing on the formation of coalitions of groups to achieve a majority, the Tofflers claimed that "the role of various minorities should increase, allowing them to grow into majorities."[31]

Against the backdrop of the mass protests around the globe in 2011, which made explicit the crisis in official democracy, the arguments of the two futurologists sound like a prediction come true. They come to the conclusion that, in order to be effective in the new age, democratic political systems will have to go through a transition from representative to "semi-direct democracy," which means a transition from "dependency on representatives to self-representation."[32] Semi-direct democracy is a formula that does not oppose but rather includes the use of procedures of both direct and representative democracy.

Until now, two main obstacles have impeded the realization of the idea of the extended use of direct democracy mechanisms in political governance: the technical challenges of participation and the problem of competency. The communications age based on Web 2.0 technologies offers solutions to both problems. Social media constitute a technological solution to the challenge of mass political involvement, presenting a platform for the articulation of opinions and for generating communities around a declared position. New media enable citizens not only to say "yes" or "no" on a certain governance problem but also to argue about an issue, to offer solutions and policies, to formulate problems, and to arrange the agenda and priorities of political governance.

The second and more serious issue, regarding the competency of political involvement, has new dimensions in the communications society as well. New technologies have made knowledge a specific power resource, with several important characteristics. First, knowledge is a democratic resource, because to own it one only needs access to new sources of information. Second, knowledge is a universal resource, because it can be used to multiply other sources of power: wealth, reputation, organization. Third, knowledge is an inexhaustible resource, because when you give knowledge (or someone takes it), it does not diminish. The outcome is potentially revolutionary: educated people who for the first time in history can start making their own decisions.

Actually, there are still no clear models for how semi-direct democracy can function, for what procedures and technologies will best combine the mechanisms of representa-

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[30] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave* (Sofia, 1995), 108–09.

[31] Ibid., 109.

[32] Ibid., 111.

tive and direct democracy. But the resolution of this challenge is clearly necessary, due to the unambiguous impotence of traditional representative democracy to generate security and to effectively solve the problems of social development in a new era.

From the perspective of political stability, the great potential of new social media—which are most often referred to in the context of negative, or oppositional, campaigns—actually lies in the technological capabilities that could enable direct constructive, creative, and mass political involvement. One of the most promising prospects is the use of wiki sites. Wikis are a medium based on software that allows regular users to "freely create and edit Web page content using any Web browser."[33] Wikis have an advantage for group communication in that they allow many people to participate in content creation and development and spread it across wide circles of readers.

There are examples that have shown the useful capabilities of Wiki sites for public participation in the design of and debate on draft programs of political parties, policies, and laws. These practices were initially used by non-government organizations; however, state institutions (in Russia and New Zealand) have implemented them as well.[34] This type of political activity has given birth to additional neologisms, like "Legislation 2.0" and "Expertise 2.0." The positive effect of such methods of political participation with respect to political stability is mainly in the increased sense of partnership that they help create, and hence of people's loyalty to and respect for the legitimacy of policies and laws. And this is not all. Of no less importance are effects like expanding the circle of experts, increasing social capital, and reporting and balancing significant social interests, which can mean yet more stability and security for the public.

Another positive effect on the political stability of democracies generating Web 2.0-based new media is that these media are a tool for mitigating the modern social conflicts summed up in the shorthand "Us vs. Them," or "the 1% vs. the 99%." This happens from both ends. On the one hand, the public can use new media to easily communicate with politicians, to ask them questions, to express their opinions or attitudes towards their work. On the other hand, politics is becoming more "human" with the help of social media. Today, every modern politician has an account in social networks and/or in the blogosphere, and can use those platforms to reach out to their constituents and communicate more directly about decisions and issues. Undoubtedly, the political model of representative democracy, as we know it, will soon undergo significant changes, and these changes will be related to the capabilities of Web 2.0-based "new media."

Whoever Controls Web 2.0 Controls Reality

When we talk about security in the context of Web 2.0 technologies, information security only represents a small portion of the issues that are under discussion. We are talking about a radically new phenomenon: the transformation of social media into the most

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[33] "What Is Wiki," available at http://www.wiki.org/wiki.cgi?WhatIsWiki.

[34] "NZ Police Let Public Write Laws," *BBC News* (26 September 2007); available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7015024.sm. For the Russian case, see www.brainity.ru/society/trends/11051/.

powerful instrument of soft power. Just eight years have passed since the foundation of the world's largest social network – Facebook.[35] In that short time, we have witnessed how new social media have become the most effective tool for influencing the minds of huge communities, even whole nations. This explains the fact that all aspects of the colossal cybersphere—from issue-specific blogs to huge social networks including hundreds of millions of people—are now the focus of focused attention from governments and corporations, security services and terrorist groups, political parties and think-tanks.

Web 2.0 technology itself is neutral. Social media are a tool that gives power to the people who want to push their governments to support a particular cause,[36] want to correct the way their government functions, or to change the political regime entirely. But new media also allow for the creation of platforms that can be deployed against public interests.[37] They can be used to disseminate information where it is needed, but also to spread misinformation. Networks offer new opportunities for criminals and terrorists. They can be used by governments to conduct operations disguised as civilians.

In the communications society, "legitimacy is a power reality."[38] Narratives become the currency of soft power. Governments compete with each other and with other organizations to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents.[39] Therefore, public diplomacy is becoming an important instrument for foreign policy to generate soft power. "Public diplomacy 2.0" is based on a bilateral dialogue, leaving unilateral communications in the past.

The United States has the most active and the most successful strategy for using new media in public diplomacy. Since 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been promoting the policies of "digital diplomacy" and "Internet freedom."[40] The U.S. State Department has spent some USD 28 million to enhance its own digital outreach and innovation and support Internet freedom elsewhere in the world. U.S. Ambassadors and senior diplomats are now authorized to use Twitter and Facebook in order to explain and advocate U.S. policies abroad. Altogether, the State Department hosts 288 Facebook pages, 125 YouTube channels, and tweets in nine different languages, including Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Chinese. U.S. military personnel, including those deployed in opera-

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[35] As of April 2012, Facebook had more than 900 million active users; see www.facebook.com/pages/Facebooking/114721225206500.

[36] The thirty-minute amateur film "KONY 2012" by Jason Russell had received nearly 90 million views on YouTube as of late April 2012. The filmmaker's goal was that the world should know about the Ugandan guerilla leader Joseph Kony—the head of the Lord's Resistance Army, who has been accused of numerous crimes against humanity—and that he should be arrested by the end of this year. The "weapon" of this mission is the Internet and social networks. "Kony 2012" is the fastest growing community in social networks. At the end of last year, the U.S. sent 100 military advisers to Uganda to help arrest Kony.

[37] The street riots in England in 2011; the creation of an anti-immigrant wiki site in the Netherlands.

[38] Nye, *The Future of Power*, 81.

[39] Ibid., 104.

[40] See Hillary Clinton's initiative "Civil Society 2.0," available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/131234.htm.

tions abroad, have also received "Social Media Guidelines" that allow them (within certain limits) to participate in social networks as well. All this makes the U.S. government's social media efforts very robust.[41]

According to the U.S. State Department's definition, "Digital Diplomacy" focuses on applying modern technological tools, approaches, systems, and information products to the missions and tasks of diplomacy and development. This goal will build on "current efforts to use Facebook, Diplopedia, Twitter, LinkedIn, Communities@State, and other social media, collaboration, [and] information sharing platforms…." [42]

All this makes the issue of supervising networks particularly significant. Taking into consideration the fact that over 90 percent of the Internet's physical infrastructure is privately owned and the lack of functional legislation in this sphere, national security systems are facing a serious challenge.[43] According to the Open Net Initiative, at least forty countries use highly restrictive filters and firewalls to prevent the discussion of controversial materials. Eighteen countries engage in political censorship, which the initiative describes as "pervasive" in China, Vietnam, and Iran, and "substantial" in Libya, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. More than thirty states filter for social reasons, blocking content related to topics such as sex, gambling, and drugs. Even the United States and many European states do this "selectively."[44]

Political practices regarding control over network access in times of crisis over the past several years have taught us several lessons. First, private Internet firms, such as Google, can play a political role, creating alternative opportunities for overcoming blocked access, as happened in Egypt. The practical implication is that big companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter could find themselves in times of crisis in the position of "gate-keepers" to information in a given society. Second, blocking of access is quickly resorted to as a tool to contain unrest by non-democratic governments (Belarus) and is at times seriously considered as a possibility by democratic governments (England). Third, national security crises can be both aggravated and resolved with the cooperation of the world community through social media (as was the case in Tunisia, with the hacker group "Anonymous").

It is clear that cybersecurity is becoming a key issue of strategy and security policy in the communications society. The new age of the Internet revolution has led to unprecedented scale, speed, and access to information and communication, and has redefined

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[41] See Stefanie Babst, "Security Policies 2.0: Can Facebook, Twitter and Co. Make an Impact?," *Atlantic-Community.org* (6 September 2011); available at http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Security_Policies_2.0%3A_Can_Facebook%2C_Twitter_and_Co_Make_an_Impact%3F.

[42] U.S. Department of State, "IT Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2011–2013 – Digital Diplomacy," 1 September 2010; available at http://www.state.gov/m/irm/rls/148572.htm.

[43] Tobias Franke, "Social Media: The Frontline of Cyberdefence?," *NATO Review* (2011); available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Social_Medias/cyber-defense-social-media/EN/index.htm.

[44] As documented by the Open Net Initiative. Richard Waters and Joseph Menn, "Closing the Frontier," *Financial Times* (29 March 2010); quoted in Nye, *The Future of Power*, 130.

the primary risks and threats to security. When we talk about security today, we understand cybersecurity in all of its aspects – from defense in cyberwar through guarding critical infrastructure from cyberattacks to the protection of personal data to the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals in cyberspace.

Due to the diffusion and atomization of power, cybersecurity can be achieved only if policies involve non-state actors, if "public-private sharing of information regarding cyber threats and incidents in both government and Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR)"[45] is in place, and if effective partnership between public and private sectors is established. It is interesting to mention the Estonian experience with the Cyber Defense League, which unites volunteer IT professionals interested in contributing their skills to the national defense effort.[46] The United States, Germany, and Estonia are leading countries in the establishment of cybersecurity policies. In the coming security environment, where the impact of new information technologies will become only more apparent, it is necessary that NATO and the EU elaborate effective common cybersecurity strategies.

Conclusion

The communications revolution has posed profound new challenges to established security systems. As Joseph Nye, Jr., who we have quoted already, wrote, "Power always depends on context." Effective and strong security policy must be contextual, and must make use of the new capabilities and instruments of communications technologies. These technologies are neither "good" nor "bad," and they do not automatically contribute on their own to creating more security or more insecurity. Innovative and smart policies can turn them into instruments for enhancing the political stability of democracies and the level of security within societies. Successful security strategies are those that meet the challenges of the communications society. Challenges can always be regarded as opportunities. Whether they will be realized is a question whose answer we are about to learn.

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[45] The White House, National Security Council, "The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative," available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative.

[46] "Ilves in Washington: All NATO Allies Must Contribute to Cyber Security," *ERR News* (13 April 2012); available at http://news.err.ee/politics/6c3ff429-93d2-4979-81d2-3de29e42d763.

The Russian Military in 2020: Russia's Way Back to Power Projection? Implications for NATO

Thomas Braun [*]

Introduction

"Russia Has Lost its Army." This headline of an editorial published on the global defense and military portal *DefenceTalk* in October 2003 gives proof of the perception of the Russian military leadership at the beginning of the twenty-first century.[1] The developments after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to multiple efforts to reform the Russian armed forces. In the early 1990s, former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev initiated a number of military reforms, but met heavy resistance within the Russian officer corps (still strongly influenced by the Soviet era) who were trying to preserve their system and positions.[2] Most of the additional reform efforts of the last twenty years—which were mostly limited to downsizing manpower and equipment, without addressing the larger military system and organizational structure—failed to achieve the goal of a restructured modern Russian military. This led the Russian military journalist Alexander Goltz to publish a book in 2004 titled *The Army of Russia: 11 Lost Years*, in which he concludes that between 1993 and 2004 the military reforms that were carried out in Russia had no meaningful results.[3] In response to the lack of progress in armed forces reform, the newly appointed civilian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov introduced the so-called "New Look" on 23 February 2008. Will the "New Look" reforms lead to the "reappearance of the Red Star," the symbol of the former Soviet Army? What are the possible implications of such a resurgence for NATO? To understand the imperatives behind Serdyukov's "New Look," it is necessary to understand Russia's national interests, as every government will calculate their military reforms based on their perceived national interests, as well as on identified threats and risks.

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[1] "Russia Has Lost its Army," *DefenceTalk* (21 October 2003); available at http://www.defencetalk.com/russia-has-lost-itsarmy-1384.

[2] Timothy L. Thomas, *Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology through Toughness* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), 11.

[3] Ibid.

Key Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's national interests have remained basically unchanged, with one exception. The importance of economic prosperity with respect to oil, natural gas, and other extractive resources has risen considerably, as this wealth is perceived as the foundation of any Russian attempt to tackle existing and future domestic challenges, as well as a way back to gaining dominance in Russia's so-called "near abroad."[4] Russia's traditional national interests, which are stated in the July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept and the 2009 National Security Strategy, include bolstering demographic health and security as well as maintaining security on its borders and within the near abroad. Additionally, Russia wants to ensure that it remains the primary actor in the region, especially in Central Asia.[5] The more recently published "New Military Doctrine" of February 2010 refers to the importance of the "near abroad" and underlines Russian concerns about NATO encroachment in this region. To ensure its regional dominance and to protect Russian interests, the Russian armed forces "might be used operationally outside Russia" unilaterally, according to this doctrine.[6] Russia seems also to be more willing to deploy their forces within the arrangements of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.[7] Russia's national interests and their translation into the New Military Doctrine as well as the ongoing focus on the "near abroad" have to be considered when analyzing any efforts to reform Russia's military.

After the "Collapse of the Red Army": Russian Forces at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century

"Not since 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now," stated Dr. Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee in the Duma in 1998.[8] At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Russian armed forces—which inherited the larger part of the Soviet Red Army in terms of soldiers and equipment—still struggled with a heritage that relied heavily on the mentality of the Soviet era and with the legacy of outdated equipment. The first review of Russia's military doctrine, carried out in 1993, was largely unsuccessful in organizing the Russian forces and in changing the old Soviet military mentality; Russian forces were spread out all over the expansive area of the former Soviet Union, with a lack of general strategy and

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[4] The "near abroad" includes Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. See David Capezza, "Translating Russia's Military Reform," in *Small Wars Journal* (2009): 3; available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/translating-russias-military-reform.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Marcel de Haas, "Russia's Military Doctrine Development," in *Russian Military Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine*, ed. Steven Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 42.

[7] Ibid., 45.

[8] Alexei G. Arbatov, "Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects," *International Security* 22:4 (Spring 1998): 83.

organization.[9] Although the lost campaign in Chechnya during the first Chechen War 1994–96 (as well as the disastrous storming of Grozny in 2004) helped highlight the lack of training and preparation in the Russian Army, which led to multiple efforts to introduce reforms, but none were successful. The Russian government succeeded in reducing the size of the armed forces, but the overall structure of the Russian military remained top-heavy, insufficiently trained, and poorly motivated. Under the guiding objectives of limiting expenditures while retaining sufficient forces to deter aggressors, Russia reduced the size of its armed forces from nearly 3 million soldiers in 1991 to 1.1 million in 2008, although the latest round of major reductions took place in 1999.[10] Since then, calls for further reductions have been ignored. Moreover, the internal workings of the Russian armed forces were massively affected by corruption, and a system known as *dedovshchina*, an informal system of suppression of junior conscripts by senior enlisted soldiers (essentially, formalized hazing) that is still in place today.[11] Growing corruption led Prime Minster Putin in 2003 to address the issue of corruption as one of the main priorities to focus on in the Russian armed forces.[12] The problems that were mentioned were characteristic of the internal state of the military apparatus, although in 2012 a public webpage for official complaints within the Russian Military was introduced. In addition to these internal challenges, Russian equipment was completely outdated, and training became more difficult. Although Putin ordered that strategic bomber patrols be resumed, more than half of all air assets in the Russian Air Force were not combat ready and not maintained. In 2000, the average annual training time for Russian pilots was twelve hours, which was increased to forty hours in 2007, but is still an absolute minimal level to ensure combat readiness.[13] The Russian Navy was facing similar challenges, as they ceased nearly all maritime operations except for coastal patrols in 2008 in order to save fuel. The Russian–Georgian War in August 2008 highlighted numerous problems concerning personnel, equipment, organizational structure, and even training regulations that dated back as far as 1980.[14] Despite the Russian victory in its war with Georgia, the campaign was viewed as a disaster for a Russian military that lacked unified command, sufficient situational awareness, and even suffered heavy friendly-fire losses in the air force.[15] A Russian officer characterized the Russian-Geor-

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[9] Capezza, "Translating Russia's Military Reform," 6.

[10] Ibid., 9.

[11] *Dedovshchina* is literally translated as the "grandfather rule." Kris D. Beasly, "Russian Military Reform from Perestroika to Putin: Implications for U.S. Policy," research paper prepared at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama (April 2004), 79; available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA427322.

[12] Ibid., 54–55.

[13] Capezza, "Translating Russia's Military Reform," 11.

[14] Dale R. Herspring, "Is Military Reform in Russia for 'Real'? Yes, but…," in *The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald*, ed. Steven Blank and Richard Weitz (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2010), 153.

[15] Ibid., 152–54.

gian War thus: "It turns out that a twenty-first century [Russian] army did not go to battle – it was a Soviet army with models from the 1960s and 1980s in the past century."[16]

"The New Look": Russian Military Reforms of 2008

The lack of a new military doctrine in 2008 in the wake of the Russian–Georgian War, the lack of a public debate on national security issues, and the scope of responsibilities of the Russian military led to discussions about whether or not true defense reform was necessary. The Vice President of the Association of Russian Diplomats, Andrei Baklanov, made his doubts about the need for reform clear when he said in 2009, "I see no major grounds for carrying out these reforms."[17] In case his feelings were misunderstood, he added, "Most reasons for the unsatisfactory condition of the armed forces … have nothing to do with the lack of reform."[18] The editor of the magazine *Russian Politics and Law*, Dimitri Gorenburg, recognized the significance of the prospect of the first genuine occurrence of defense sector reform since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and acknowledged the seriousness of such a project. In February 2007, President Vladimir Putin appointed the civilian Anatoly Serdyukov as Russia's new Minster of Defense. This marked the first time that a civilian would serve as Minister of Defense in the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Serdyukov was from St. Petersburg, like Putin, and had the backing of both Prime Minister Medvedev and President Putin, who charged Serdyukov with the objectives of fighting corruption and inefficiency in the armed forces.[19] Without any prior notice he introduced a set of transformations called the "New Look"—studiously avoiding the biased term "reform"—in October of 2008, although the term "the Military Reform of 2008" is widely used. The Russian–Georgian War in the summer of 2008 certainly acted as catalyst for the introduction of the "New Look," which is regarded as the most radical systemic change in the Russian military since "the reforms initiated by Dmitry Milyutin in the second half of the nineteenth century."[20]

A wide range of changes were announced in Serdyukov's "New Look" plan, which included four key dimensions of transformation:[21]

1. *Restructuring the officer corps*. With an officer/enlisted ratio of 3:1 in the Russian military, it was necessary to reduce the number of officers from 355,000 to 150,000.[22] Most of the surplus officers were serving in so-called "skeleton

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[16] Ibid., 155.

[17] Nezavisimoe voennoe obozreni (translated transcript of round table), "Urgent Problems and the Logic of Military Reform," *Russian Politics and Law* 48:3 (May–June 2010): 59.

[18] Ibid., 59.

[19] Thomas, *Recasting the Red Star*, 11–12.

[20] Ilya Kramnik, "Military Reform: Basic Guidelines," *RIA Novosti* (24 February 2010); available at http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100224/157995299.html.

[21] Pavel K. Baev, "Military Reform Against Heavy Odds," in *Russia After the Global Economic Crisis*, ed. Anders Aslund, Sergei Guriev, and Andrew Kuchins (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for Internal Economics, May 2010), 170–72.

[22] Herspring, "Is Military Reform in Russia for 'Real'?," 160.

units," which were non-operational, and would only be manned in case of mo-
bilization. While reducing the number of officers at all ranks save young lieu-
tenants, the reform also proposed establishing a non-commissioned officer
corps that did not exist at the time in the Russian armed forces. With the crea-
tion of a new non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, the system of *dedovsh-
china* could be countered, and the level of professionalism in the military
would rise, as experience at the squad and platoon levels would be retained in
the Russian military longer than in the past.

2. *Reorganizing the command and control structure*. The Russian–Georgian War
   showed the lack of flexibility and unity of command in the Russian armed
   forces. Therefore, the "New Look" reforms included the reorganization of a
   four-level command structure (military district–army–division–regiment) to a
   more flexible and sustainable three-level model (military district–operational
   command–brigade), where district commanders now have command of all for-
   mations in their area of responsibility except for Strategic Missile Forces. As an
   independent tactical formation, the brigade offers more flexibility and requires
   less external support in operations.[23]

3. *Elimination of "skeleton units."* The abolishing of reduced-strength cadre
   units—the so-called "skeleton units"—implies the end of mass mobilization.
   Although some aspects of the mobilization plans will be preserved, such as
   weapons storage facilities and equipment, the numbers of units will be reduced
   from 1890 units to only 172, all of which will then be fully manned with pro-
   fessional soldiers, and known as "permanent readiness units."[24] Of the 22,000
   tanks previously deployed with Russian land forces, only 2,000 tanks will re-
   main for operations according to Serdyukov's "New Look."

4. *Reshaping the system of military education.* The decrease in military personnel
   and a high level of duplication within the Russian armed forces led to the deci-
   sion to combine Russia's military educational institutions. Serdyukov decided
   to reduce the number of military educational centers from sixty-five institutions
   of various kinds to only ten: three joint centers, six academies, and one military
   university by 2013.[25]

In addition to these four key directions, Serdyukov also decided that the overall
strength of the Russian forces would be cut to one million soldiers by 2013, instead of
by the initially projected target date of 2016.[26] Parallel with the "New Look," a program
of modernization of military equipment has been emphasized, as no new weapon sys-
tems have been introduced in the Russian armed forces in the fifteen years since the be-

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[23] Ibid., 165.

[24] Baev, "Military Reform Against Heavy Odds," 170.

[25] Herspring, "Is Military Reform in Russia for 'Real'?," 161.

[26] Steven Blank, ed., *Russian Military Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine* (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 166.

ginning of the reform process.[27] In 2008, only 10 percent of the Russian military's armaments was considered "modern"; the goal is to increase this share to 30 percent by 2015.[28] For this reason, the State Armaments Program (SAP) promised USD 704.9 Billion from 2011 to 2020 in order to modernize the equipment available to the Russian forces.[29] A large portion of these funds will be used for the modernization of the nation's nuclear weapons capability, which is regarded as a guarantee for safeguarding Russia, followed by investments in space weapons and air defense. Additional emphasis will be devoted to the fields of communications, command and control, and strategic mobility.

Challenges and Achievements of the Military Reform in 2011

The reaction among the senior ranking officers to Serdyukov's "New Look" set of reforms was resolutely negative. As one researcher stated, "all officers at the three- or four-star level in key bureaucratic positions either submitted their retirement papers or were fired."[30] The resistance to the radical changes initiated by Minister Serdyukov was quite strong, but despite the opposition from senior military leaders and within the administration, all projects made sufficient progress so that a "point of no return" had been reached by 2010. Diverging comments have been made in public concerning the status and achievements of these reforms. In particular, senior military leaders and the top political leadership seem to have different understandings of progress. The latest appointments of the Chiefs of Services (Army, Air Force and Navy) were clearly a sign pro reform as all new Chiefs supported Serdyukovs line of communication. In October 2011 Defense Minister Serdyukov signaled that the first stage of the reforms—which primarily concerned the organizational changes and the decommissioning of the cadre units—was "nearing completion." He continued to announce the shift from reorganization to rearmament.[31] But his assessment is not in line with the various challenges concerning the effort in the key reform fields mentioned above:

1. *Restructuring the officer corps and creating an NCO corps.* The "New Look" is facing enormous problems, as the recruitment of cadets to military schools has been suspended for two years.[32] But it is not only the recruitment of cadets

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[27] Ilya Kramnik, "Russian Military Reform in Times of Crisis," *RIA Novosti* (15 March 2010); available at http://www.defencetalk.com/russian-military-reform-in-times-of-crisis-24920.

[28] Pavel K. Baev, "Russian Military Perestroika," in *U.S. Europe Analysis*, no. 45 (Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe, 29 April 2010), 3.

[29] Forecast International, "Three Key Factors at Play for Russian Modernization," *DefenceTalk* (14 April 2011); available at http://www.defencetalk.com/three-key-factors-at-play-for-russian-modernization-33469.

[30] Herspring, "Is Military Reform in Russia for 'Real'?," 168.

[31] Roger McDermott, "Serdyukov Signals 'First Stage' in 'Military Reform' Nearing Completion," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 8:191 (18 October 2011); available at www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38541&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=512.

[32] Roger McDermott, "Russian Military 'New Look' Hovers in Limbo," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 8:206 (8 November 2011); available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38639&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=512.

that is at stake. Igor Barinov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, confirmed that the new combat brigades were manned in 2011 at only 75 percent. He states that the shortfall is due to the lack of attractiveness of the Russian armed forces as a career, which he holds responsible for the failure to recruit enough soldiers on contract terms.[33] Part of this lack of appeal of a military career is a result of not being able to completely get rid of the *dedovshchina* system,[34] and the failure to create a professional NCO corps, which showed considerably in the VOSTOK 2010 exercises, where a shortage of trained sergeants was evident.[35] The program is being delayed, as the estimated number of contracted NCO candidates could not be met due to many candidates' low education and poor health. The target for the NCO corps is 250,000 candidates, and it seems to be facing serious problems in attracting enough qualified and interested applicants.[36] Another challenge rises from the mass dismissals of officers who were professionals available for quick deployments. This development led to an accelerated decline in combat readiness, and a lack of motivation that is sufficiently severe so that Major-General (ret.) Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the Institute of the United States and Canada at the Russian Academy of Sciences, stated that the Russian military is genuinely unprepared for large-scale combat at the moment.[37] Finally, it presents a challenge to the military mentality, which is based on tradition and is perceived as being destroyed by the "New Look," to the point that "the Russian officer corps is in a state of chaos."[38]

2. *Reorganizing the command and control structure.* One of the main shortcomings the Russian military experienced during the 2008 Russian–Georgian War was the lack of efficient command and control. The "New Look" led to a unification of command and control systems, since the different branches scrapped their individual systems in favor of a time-saving and efficient system of conformity of command and control, allowing for more streamlined decision making.[39] In addition to the new three-level brigade-focused structure, an automated command and control system has been introduced, although it is not yet fully operational. This part of the reform has been successful, as Serdyukov reported

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[33] Ibid.

[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense reported 1,700 incidents of hazing from January to September 2010. While this record is abysmal, it at least reflects that the Russian MoD is finally focused on the problem. In 2003, when asked about such issues as denial of food to younger soldiers and poor nutrition, Deputy Minister of Defense V. Isakov flatly denied the existence of such problems.

[35] Thomas, *Recasting the Red Star*, 20.

[36] Herspring, "Is Military Reform in Russia for 'Real'?," 171.

[37] Nezavisimoe voennoe obozreni, "Urgent Problems and the Logic of Military Reform," 90.

[38] Herspring, "Is Military Reform in Russia for 'Real'?," 168, 173.

[39] Thomas, *Recasting the Red Star*, 14.

on 1 December 2009 that eighty-five combat brigades could deploy out of the newly organized four military districts.[40]

3. *Elimination of "skeleton units."* The number of units in the Russian Army has been reduced by nearly 90 percent, in the Air Force by 48 percent, in the Navy by 49 percent, and in the Strategic Missile Forces by 33 percent.[41] With the reduction in the size of the standing military, a modernization program is in place in order to achieve at least a 70 percent rate of modern equipment by 2020, although the existing constraints concerning the budgetary situation, especially consequences of a declining oil price, will have to be considered in the future. These radical cuts in the number of units were completed by 2010, and marked an end to the Soviet-era plans for mass mobilization.[42]

4. *Reshaping the system of military education.* The reshaped educational landscape of the Russian military will have considerably fewer joint academies and schools, but by 2013 will feature better coordination between institutions as well as an optimized curriculum. The general staff academy lost eighteen faculty positions, and admitted only sixteen officers in 2009, down from one hundred in 2008. It also changed the focus of its curriculum to involve more practical training, and also began requiring officers to learn a foreign language.[43] The system of military education will need further focus, as the complex nature of modern crisis situations will demand an even broader educational background of officers.

Given the above-mentioned achievements, the level of combat readiness was expected to increase, due to the anticipated professionalism of the contracted soldiers who (it is hoped) will now remain in the military longer, as well as to the changes in personnel and organizational structure. By mid-2011 there were 180,000 contracted soldiers in the Russian military, a number that is supposed to rise to 425,000 by 2017.[44] To enhance recruitment, a pay raise became effective on 1 January 2012 in order to make the forces more attractive. result is still to be seen. In addition, the level of basic social and living conditions for soldiers in the Russian military will be improved. But Russia is facing additional non-military challenges concerning future demographic developments and health problems. The demographic imbalance in Russia, which has a rapidly aging

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[40] Ibid., 14–15.

[41] Blank, *Russian Military Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine*, 171.

[42] Pavel Felgenhauer, "Rearmament Declared the Main Issue in Russian Military Reform," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7:122 (24 June 2010); available at www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36521.

[43] Thomas, *Recasting the Red Star*, 16.

[44] "Senior Russian Army Officers Resign over Military Reforms – Paper," *RIA Novosti* (5 July 2011); available at http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110705/165026894.html.

population, will lead to an insufficiently large pool of potential recruits.[45] In 2011, only 135,850 enlisted men were recruited, instead of the necessary 250–300,000 recruits, which led the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, to declare: "We have no one anymore who we can recruit."[46] This will definitely impact the size of the forces, and will probably initiate a redesign of the military's overall size, with a limit of 600,000 to 700,000 soldiers. Concerning the level and quality of armaments available to the Russian military, the military-industrial complex in Russia is unable to cope with the needs of the Russian forces, which leads Russia to buy foreign military equipment such as night vision goggles or the Mistral Helicopter Landing Ships from France, or possible additional armor for combat vehicles from Germany.[47] Another fact that bears on the field of armaments is Russia's fast-growing cooperation with India, which is becoming a special relationship with a strategic partner.[48]

As the Russian military-industrial complex needs more time to transition, there will be and must be more foreign military sales to modernize the Russian armed forces. More progress has been made than was initially anticipated, but the challenges facing the effort of military reform in Russia are numerous, and the risk of fragmentation facing the reforms is obvious. Russia's level combat readiness has declined since the "New Look" reforms were initiated. While this decline may have originated in the transitional phase of the reforms, and thus cannot be laid at the doorstep of the "New Look" program, it is certain that it will not be resolved anytime soon.

Implications for NATO

The New Military Doctrine of 2010 gives evidence that the Russian strategic community (or at least the authors of the doctrine) is not willing to give up the idea of a large-scale conflict with NATO. But when they confront reality, it becomes starkly apparent that by abolishing the "skeleton units," the mechanism for the mass mobilization of the Russian military will be lost, which implies abandoning the idea of waging a long-lasting conventional war.[49] Indirectly it means that the idea of a conventional confrontation with NATO is no longer a probable option. And all efforts and achievements—as well as the challenges—in the area of defense reform thus far underline the fact that Russia is also relinquishing the possibility of a mobilization of the scope that would be needed to counter an attack launched by NATO. The current Russian armed forces pose no direct threat to NATO, but they still have a large stockpile of sub-strategic nuclear weapons that have to be considered. The planned expeditionary character of the new Russian

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[45] According to *RIA Novosti*, only 11.7 percent of young men aged 18–27 were eligible for the army. See "Russian Military Has 'No one left to draft'," *RIA Novosti* (17 November 2011); available at http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20111117/168776056.html.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Felgenhauer, "Rearmament Declared the Main Issue in Russian Military Reform."

[48] "Medwedew lobt Beziehungen mit Indien als privilegierte Partnerschaft" [Medvedev Praises Relationship with India as a Privileged Partnership], *RIA Novosti* (16 December 2011); available at http://de.rian.ru/politics/20111216/262019506.html.

[49] Baev, "Russian Military Perestroika," 2.

military opens possibilities for joint missions, like peacekeeping or continued anti-piracy operations. In the remits of the NATO-Russia Concil (NRC), which was established in 2002, for example, these aspects are found within the key areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia. The Military-to-Military cooperation is focusing on preparation for possible future joint military operations. Initial participation of Russian naval assets in NATO operation Active Endeavour in 2006/2007 showed already the beneficial cooperation with Russia. Taking into consideration Russian foreign policy's focus on the "near abroad," it will continue to be essential to respect Russia as valuable partner for securing Central Asia, especially considering the rapid-deployment combat brigades that Russia will soon be able to put into the field. The reforms initiated by Defense Minister Serdyukov open the opportunity to strengthen defense relations between NATO and Russia, as Russia might be seeking additional advice on carrying out its reforms, although in the past year a more polemic tone has returned to the NATO-Russian dialogue, which might have been a product of the run-up to Russia's last presidential election in May 2012.[50] But military reform is a concept that applies more broadly than to just the armed forces, so NATO may have the chance to offer their experience concerning procurement processes which partly takes place in the NRC and could be a stronger part of the annual Work Plan that structures the NATO-Russia cooperation. As First Deputy Defense Minister Popovkin admitted in 2008, "Modern military equipment is so complex, we will need foreign know-how, while continuing our own military research."[51] Clearly, this statement could be taken to widen the potential fields of cooperation after the completion of the 2007 "Study on NATO-Russia Defence Industrial and Research and Technological Cooperation."[52] This is also an opportunity to upgrade the level of interoperability through programs of bilateral military cooperation, such as those the British agreed to in July 2012,[53] or by joint exercises like "Vigilant Skies 2011," where NATO and Russian fighters trained in intercepting hijacked airliners within the NRC-Comprehensive Airspace Initiative. To profit from Russia's desire to modernize its arsenal, NATO should welcome Russian procurement of Western technology and act as a multiplier by offering assistance, while at the same time remembering not to neglect concerns related to technology transfer. Finally, the pressing topic of missile defense could be an area of greater cooperation on possible joint systems, which would ensure the implementation of the U.S./NATO-dominated approach while enabling Russia to modernize her defense systems, as a nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO seems unlikely.

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[50] "Medvedev's Missile Shield Remarks May Be Election Rhetoric – NATO Chief," *RIA Novosti* (8 December 2011); available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20111208/169468939.html.

[51] Felgenhauer, "Rearmament Declared the Main Issue in Russian Military Reform," 3.

[52] "Nato's relations with Russia" (June 2012); available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm.

[53] "Russia, Britain plan to improve military ties," *RIA Novosti* (19 July 2011); available at http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110719/165282948.html, http://www.defencetalk.com/russia britain-plan-to-improve-military-ties-35777 (5 December 2011).

On 7 December 2011, in the final statement at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Brussels, the NATO Foreign Ministers "reaffirmed that NATO–Russia cooperation remains of strategic importance. … We are also engaged in improving trust and transparency in defense transformation, strategy, doctrines, military posture, and military exercises. We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia."[54] This clearly indicates that NATO is willing to use the NRC as the appropriate vehicle for NATO-Russia cooperation and offers assistance via cooperation and trust building that might be well used if the Russian Defense Ministry overcomes its antiquated attitudes towards NATO and would accept support in advancing the "New Look" military reforms. From the Russian perspective, it would be important that any assistance offered be presented as an option, and not as indoctrination. If interoperability is reaching the level of NATO standards, and if political obstacles can be left behind, NATO might be well served to rethink their position and evaluate the option for Russia becoming more than a special affiliate, with possible future contributions to NATO operations.

The Russian Military in 2020: Re-Rising of the "Red Star," or a "New NATO Member"?

"Russia today lacks a clear hierarchy for strategic decision making and control," declared a participant in a 2010 round table discussion on military reform in Russia.[55] However, Defense Minister Serdyukov has taken some of the steps demanded by the new complex global security environment. During the run-up to the Russian presidential elections in 2012, the tone of the debates became harsher, and the contradictions between the New Russian Military Doctrine, signed by President Medvedev, and the process of Russian military reform became more obvious. The current achievements and outcomes of the "New Look" reforms predict a more flexible and expeditionary military – a force that has less to do with the goals of the Russian Military Doctrine than with the material and demographic realities of life in today's Russia. In order to understand Russia's approach to military reform, it is essential to keep Russia's national interests in mind. With the focus on the "near abroad," the effects of Russian military reform create unique opportunities for NATO in terms of pursuing more practical cooperation, and offer a real chance for deepened bilateral and multilateral military partnership, especially in Central Asia (although the special interests of all parties have to be considered). Undergoing what is probably the most important reform in the past 150 years, every aspect of Russia's military has been changed. The process of Russian military reform started slowly, but has now gained speed, and can point to some successes, despite the remaining challenges. As one observer noted, "In comparison with other military reforms introduced since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), this one

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[54] NATO, "Final statement of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers," held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 7 December 2011; available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_81943.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[55] Nezavisimoe voennoe obozreni, "Urgent Problems and the Logic of Military Reform," 71.

is for real."[56] The extension of General Makarov as Chief of Defence underlines the will by Minister Serdyukov to proceed with the "New Look." Although Timothy Thomas predicted in 2010 that the "recasting of the Red Star is well underway," the current course of events appears to be different, not only because the structure and the conceptual guidelines have been changing, but also because the mentality within the Russian military is about to change drastically.[57] In answering the question posed at the beginning of this concluding section, it is obvious that the Russian military reforms currently under way will not lead to the "Re-Rising of the Red Star," but rather to a new Russian military that in the near future will be able to ensure Russia's national interests, whether they are threatened from the outside or internally. But the new Russian armed forces will have more than just a "New Look," since these reforms will enhance Russia's options to cooperate and enhance regional security, whether working with or without partners. Concerning the possible threat posed by Russia's armed forces, the Estonian Defense Minster Mart Laar noted in September 2011 that "Russia poses much more danger through its internal weaknesses," and the current manifestations by the Russian opposition throughout the country underline this assessment.[58]

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[56] Herspring, "Is Military Reform in Russia for 'Real'?," 151.

[57] Thomas, *Recasting the Red Star*, 363.

[58] Agence France-Presse*,* "Russian Military Might Worries Region: Estonian General," *DefenceTalk* (26 September 2011); available at http://www.defencetalk.com/russian-military-might-worries-region-estonian-general-37234 (15 November 2011).

The Nexus Between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy

Göran Swistek [*]

Introduction

The idea of "public diplomacy" was implemented approximately a century ago as the purely civilian aspect of diplomacy, which aimed to inform foreign populations and citizens about the goals of a given country's foreign policy through the use of information and cultural programs.[1] Within the framework of the Clausewitzian philosophy, which held that war "is the continuation of politics by other means," the military was always linked to the diplomatic realm, but was never part of it.[2] On the other hand, for a long time "military diplomacy" meant simply the business of military attachés; their mission was to be "the Nation's eye and ears abroad in the days before satellite photography and sophisticated electronic collection techniques."[3]

Along with the changes that the past several decades have seen in the makeup of the international arena, particularly regarding the new constellation of alliances, revised goals of foreign policies, and altered threat assumptions, the content of public diplomacy has changed, and its targeted programs have expanded.[4] At the same time, the understanding and definition of the concept of security has changed since the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, security is defined above all by the notion of a "comprehensive approach." Security is now viewed as a set of interconnections between civilian and military means and approaches, while the use of military force remains a last resort. Therefore, programs and means from the areas of military and public diplomacy have received increased attention and have gained a more prominent status.

For this reason, this essay will attempt to trace the close relations of modern defense strategies, policies, and diplomacies. The guiding research question for this essay shall be, Is there in modern foreign affairs and defense policy a relation between military diplomacy and public diplomacy? If so, what characterizes this relation? Along that line,

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[1] Walter R. Roberts, "What is Public Diplomacy? Past Practices, Present Conduct, Possible Future," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18:4 (2007): 37.

[2] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Chapter 1, Para. 24 (Project Gutenberg E-Book No. 1946, 25 February 2006); available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm.

[3] Timothy C. Shea, "Transforming Military Diplomacy," *Joint Force Quarterly* 38 (2005): 50.

[4] Roberts, "What is Public Diplomacy?"

this essay will examine the nexus between public diplomacy and military diplomacy, with the assumption that international relations and defense policies are aimed at overlapping areas, especially when it comes to diplomacy. The hypothesis therefore can be encapsulated thus: without naming it in official policy documents, and without a focused strategy, an area has recently developed where public diplomacy and military diplomacy are proceeding in concert, with a common toolset. I will use the German armed forces as a special case study in order to demonstrate that they have actually been practicing public diplomacy within their military posture for decades.

As a first step, the essay will offer a general overview about the idea, definitions, and different concepts of public diplomacy, which will provide the basic background for further observations. In contrast, a brief examination of the idea and concept of military diplomacy will show the approach from a different perspective. In a third step, the essay will highlight common strategies and tools in order to display areas of overlap and similarity. Following these sections, the essay will present two case studies of the German Armed Forces, which will demonstrate the hypothesis on the foundation of the observation drawn from the first two steps. Finally, the essay's conclusion will draw some general findings on the relationship between public and military diplomacy in our times.

The Concept of Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is to some extent part of a traditional branch of diplomacy, one that refers to government sponsored-programs and initiatives that aim to influence and inform foreign audiences. These programs are also sometimes called "international information" or "cultural" programs. Usually these programs are used to transmit a certain message regarding a nation's foreign policy, political aims, economic cooperation efforts, or even touristic developments.

It is inherent in the concept of public diplomacy that the addressees of the activities carried out under its banner are mainly non-governmental actors. However, public diplomacy does seek to encourage international understanding and engage in dialogue between the involved nations and decision makers. Therefore, traditional public diplomacy efforts aimed to create this understanding with information, language, and cultural programs. Public diplomacy programs were built around two pillars: the first pillar, that of informing, can be compared to a traditional public relations element; the second pillar consists of creating understanding of policies and ideologies. The second part in particular constituted a two-way process, where a nation tried to make populations abroad understand its particular policies while also trying to gain understanding of the policies of foreign countries. Detailed individual actions within this two-pillar approach ranged for example from common academic programs and exchanges, cultural cooperation, outreach programs, and tourism promotion, to the establishment of language institutes and the organization of cooperative scientific and artistic projects.

In recent years, along with the development of a comprehensive approach to a new range of security threats and to changes within the perception of security, public diplomacy again moved more toward a focus on foreign relations as a strategy, a tool for

cross-national interaction, and a mechanism to promote the development of interdependences and therefore to support efforts to maintain and expand peace.

Therefore a new pillar was added to the edifice of public diplomacy: influence on foreign policy. This element aims to have an impact on decisions and decision makers in foreign governments.[5] Even when the actions of public diplomacy largely originate from governments and governmental bodies, however, it does not seek to have a direct impact on foreign governments and decision makers. By creating a positive climate among foreign populations, the countries that are generating public diplomacy campaigns try to facilitate the goals and objectives of their foreign policy.[6]

The ambassador was once the main player within the field of public diplomacy, but nowadays the actors involved in such campaigns are diverse in nature and large in number. The ambassador, as the senior diplomat in a given foreign country, still remains the primary vehicle for diplomatic messages and efforts, but actions on the ground (and particularly away from the embassy) are usually the responsibility of other government-funded bodies, multinational organizations, cooperative networks, or non-governmental organizations.[7] Along these lines, the military has also recently gained more responsibility within the area of public diplomacy in some nations.

What is Military Diplomacy?

Parallel to the definition of public diplomacy, the term *military diplomacy* (or, as it is often also called, *defense diplomacy*) was and is still very closely linked to the role of the military attaché.[8] The attaché, as the counterpart of the ambassador, is a diplomat in uniform with full diplomatic status whose duty was once to observe and assess military developments in a foreign country, as well as to maintain a close relationship with the foreign military elite. This practice emerged as part of nineteenth-century European diplomacy, and continued nearly unchanged until the mid-1980s.[9] An important shift in the nature and purpose of international military relations took place along with the fall of the Iron Curtain. With the change in the perception of security in favor of the comprehensive approach and enhanced security, the role of the military attaché and his duties expanded as well. In addition, he is no longer the only military actor with a role to play in the area of military diplomacy. The term and modern perception of military diplomacy could be defined as follows: "To provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defense to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and as-

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[5] Roberts, "What is Public Diplomacy?," 45.
[6] Ibid., 46.
[7] Ibid., 50.
[8] Shea, "Transforming Military Diplomacy," 50.
[9] Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, "Introduction to Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance," in *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance* (London: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 2004).

sist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution."[10]

The traditional role of the armed forces was defined by their capability and preparedness to use force and pose a threat for the purpose of defense, deterrence, compulsion, or intervention.[11] Military diplomacy nowadays is primarily a peacetime activity, and has become a major task for armed forces and their responsible ministries. It is framed by cooperation among allies and other foreign countries, especially those undergoing a process of transition towards post-conflict and democratic societies, where it can be used as a tool to promote modern foreign and security policy.[12] Under the framework of a comprehensive approach towards security, military diplomacy is today one of the supporting pillars.

Individual activities summed up under the concept of military diplomacy from the perspective of the United States are:

- Creating bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defense officials
- Appointment of defense attachés
- Bilateral defense cooperation agreements
- Training activities for foreign military and civilian defense personnel
- Providing expertise and advice on the issues of democratic control of armed forces, defense management, and military technical areas
- Exchanges between military personnel
- Providing military support and aid with material and equipment.[13]

This extract compares very much to the major tasks and individual missions identified by the U.K. Ministry of Defense in their policy paper on defense diplomacy published in December 2000. With this paper, the United Kingdom government took the lead by emphasizing the increased role of military diplomacy as a primary duty for the armed forces. The named major tasks in this paper are:

- Arms control, non-proliferation, and confidence- and security-building measures
- Outreach activities
- Other activities covering military assistance not covered under outreach.[14]

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[10] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "Defence Diplomacy," *MoD Policy Paper* 1 (December 2000), 2; available at www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/ PolicyStrategyandPlanning/PolicyPapers/PolicyPaperNo1DefenceDiplomacy.htm

[11] Cottey and Forster, "Introduction to Reshaping Defence Diplomacy."

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., Table 1.

[14] U.K. Ministry of Defence, "Defence Diplomacy," 5–14.

Under these broad tasks, the U.K. MoD identified the following detailed missions for its military to pursue as part of its diplomatic efforts:

- Training courses and education programs
- Providing personnel for training, via loan services as well as civilian and military advisers
- Visits by ships, aircraft and other military units
- Visits by ministers and by military and civilian personnel at all levels
- Staff talks, conferences, and seminars to improve mutual understanding
- Exchanges of personnel
- Joint exercises.[15]

Overall it can be observed that military diplomacy has undergone a shift toward becoming a tool in crisis prevention, early warning, and post-conflict rebuilding in the huge area of foreign and security policy. It is used in efforts to create stability and security by changing the attitudes and perception of parties to a conflict; therefore it "is this 'disarmament of the mind' that characterizes" military diplomacy.[16] Thus the central aim for the further development of security can simply be described as building partnerships and partnership capacity.

Common Strategy and Tools

After having reviewed the initial concept and the development of public diplomacy, as well as the perhaps less familiar field of military diplomacy, it is clear that these two efforts have developed overlapping areas of responsibilities and activities in modern foreign and security policies. Together, they aim to inform and influence foreign audiences by the use of cooperation-, information-, and trust-building programs. While military diplomacy initially pretended to focus only on the very sensitive area of security and the use of force, it has over time developed a broad set of tools targeted on such issues as creating understanding, building mutual trust, and influencing other officials, not just senior representatives from the military but also civil servants working in the wider field of security and diplomacy. Public diplomacy, by contrast, is primarily focused only on the civilian population in foreign countries, usually in order to avoid giving any impression of being linked to the military, and therefore generally takes advantage of the reputation of non-governmental organizations. As a result, both concepts seem to have their own areas of responsibility, and work simultaneously on parallel tracks, even if they do also have individual overlapping tasks. In an era where a comprehensive approach to security is the goal—where security is a common task across all fields of politics and for all government ministries—such a duplication of effort cannot be avoided, and even seems to be necessary in order to approach security issues on different levels and in dif-

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[15] Ibid., 4–5.
[16] Ibid., 4.

ferent settings. There are parts of a society who will reject cooperation with military bodies, and at the same time there are parts of a society that are easier to approach from the military point of view. The same observation also applies in the case of public diplomacy. The traditional distance between both areas, and the reservations each has had regarding the other, have become blurred and obsolete. The only remaining objection against this removal of a strict separation between military and public diplomacy is the often used allegation that public diplomacy (and with it, the civil society) might become instrumentalized by the military. With a phased and synchronized approach towards security issues and problems in foreign countries, this anxiety can be alleviated.

Selective Case Study of the German Armed Forces

The central principle in German Foreign and Security Policy was and still is "never again, never alone, politics before force."[17] For that reason, over the past sixty years Germany has objected and continues to object to any unilateral power and military aligned foreign policy. Committed to the values of Western democracies, Germany embedded its Foreign and Security Policy in its practices of cooperation with its allies, the transnational institutions in which it participates, and in the European system of collective security.[18] Considered only on its own, Germany's Foreign and Security Policy represents a specific vision of civil society. Diplomacy, cooperation, development aid, and cultural education programs are major elements of Germany's international relations. This has been a tradition of Germany's approach to international relations since the end of the Second World War, and is reflected in Germany's concept for the creation and deployment of its armed forces. For that reason, the German Foreign and Security Policy was until the end of the Cold War ironically referred to as "checkbook diplomacy," describing Germany's extreme reluctance to use force, and its emphasis instead on well-funded language, cultural, and development programs in international relations. This attitude—and, with it, the general image of Germany's foreign policy—changed with the first deployments of German forces in NATO and UN operations after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the reunification of Germany. However, the basic character of Germany's "checkbook diplomacy" still provides the foundation of today's Foreign and Security Policy.

Along that line, the German Navy developed a field of activities that were often grouped together under the rubric "Ambassador in Blue." This approach never achieved the status of a complete conception, but with several individual and internal naval taskings, it represented a combination of activities carried out from the 1970s until today. A

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[17] Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, "Conclusion: Learned its Lesson Well? Germany as a Civilian Power Ten Years after Unification," in *Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, ed. Harnisch and Maull (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 128–56.

[18] Christine Streichert, "Deutschland als Zivilmacht," *Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik* 11 (Trier: Universität Trier, 2005), 4–5; available at www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/tazip/tazip11.pdf.

major pillar in this field of activity was and is related to visits by German naval ships to foreign countries. The duty for the ships engaged in these visits is to represent Germany through hosting foreign officials, representing developments in German ship building and naval warfare technology, provide support for training efforts for foreign naval personnel, provide a platform for German senior government and military officials, and deliver donations from governmental as well as non-governmental organizations to foreign development projects. These activities supported the work of the German Defense or Naval Attaché in this foreign country, and were focused on creating improved relations, supporting a range of development programs, providing a better understanding of German politics, as well as establishing business relations between these countries and Germany.

Another area where the German armed forces developed unique skills as well as special programs in the overlapping sector between military diplomacy and public diplomacy—and, in the process, took a leading role among its allies—is the critical field of civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC). Today the sector of civilian-military cooperation is an independent organizational part of the German military (called ZMZ).[19] It develops, deploys, and coordinates activities and programs focused on security, development, and threat identification and protection within Germany as well as in foreign countries, and does so by coordinating efforts between governmental and non-governmental organizations together with the armed forces. Under the theme of "no development without security," the German government announced in 2004 the creation of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) and their deployment to Afghanistan.[20] These teams are made up of a combination of workers, engineers, and representatives of development agencies and non-governmental organizations as well as soldiers from the armed forces. Together they are tasked with pushing forward the reconstruction of civilian sites in Afghanistan, redeploying development programs, ensuring the security of foreign non-combatants, and bolstering the reputation of German aid workers and soldiers within Afghanistan. Along with the task of reconstruction and creating the basis for a future secure environment, these teams are also focused on establishing connections to local Afghan authorities as well as senior Afghan leaders. From the point of view of civilian and non-governmental organizations, this project was approached with significant hesitation, as they worried about losing their reputation as independent and charitable actors among the Afghan population. The statistical data is still very sparse, and the timeframe is too short in order to draw any conclusions about the success and achievements of these teams at this point, but governmental officials are already emphasizing the importance of such projects for the overall conflict transformation effort and future integration of German

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[19] More details on German CIMIC activities and structures are available at: www.auswaertiges-amt.de; www.bmvg.de; www.bundesregierung.de; www.bundeswehr.de; www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de. The current concept can be reviewed at: http://www.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/streitkraeftebasis/uleist/zmzi.

[20] Peter Runge, "Helfer in Uniform? Militäreinsätze in der humanitären Hilfe," in *Wissenschaft & Frieden*, no. 4 (2006), special issue on "Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit"; available at http://www.wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/seite.php?artikelID=0463.

personnel into partnership programs. Criticism of the teams was levied on the point that Germany should never engage in operations that would create a blurred mandate between armed forces and non-governmental or charitable organizations, as both would ultimately lose their basic legitimacy.[21]

Conclusion

In summary, public diplomacy and military diplomacy have developed over the past century based on different assumptions about international relations, and have therefore been focused on separate areas and activities. With the more complex and interdependent approach towards security issues in a newly interconnected world, both areas have developed overlapping responsibilities and activities, where both are aimed at common achievements like creating an understanding of a given country's politics, building cooperation and partnership, and supporting processes of stabilization with respect to regional and international security. At the same time, both areas still remain distinct, with unique goals and activities, as they are mainly used in different settings.

Military cooperation—and therefore also military diplomacy—have primarily been part of the toolkit of international *realpolitik* in the preservation of a balance of power by supporting allies and counterbalancing enemies. Today, military diplomacy is used to build and maintain partnership capacities with former opponents and newly engaged partners. It has become one of the first programs deployed in post-conflict societies in order to consolidate the absence of fundamental violence. But military diplomacy has also a legitimate role to play in peaceful and allied societies, where cooperation and partnership (especially in the sensitive area of security) requires continued common efforts. Creating enduring and lasting security and stability remains the overarching goal.

Similar assumptions can be made about the sector of public diplomacy. Once merely a tool used in the attempt to inform and communicate a common understanding of a given country's policies to foreign communities, it has become today an integral part of a wider approach to international security, where a major task is the attempt to influence foreign societies through the pathways of civil society. But it is less an attempt to persuade foreign societies, rather than to provide support in the process of self-determination for a free, equal, and independent society.

Both examined areas have developed, as was suggested, in line with today's general conditions in international relations to become very closely linked areas in the field of foreign and security policy. Both can and should be used as tools in both peacetime and in conflict scenarios to support efforts for stability and security.

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[21] Ibid.

Understanding Gender Mainstreaming in Modern Law Enforcement

Tibor Kozma <superscript>*</superscript>

Introduction

The way we distinguish between men and women is generally based on biological sex differences. An approach to the issue based on gender (rather than sex) examines how societies relate to biological diversity. Societies around the world have developed a variety of models based on different understandings and expectations for male and female roles within society. Worldwide, the roles of women and men—that is, gender—are defined by historical, cultural, and religious factors.

Gender inequality is still prevalent in today's world. According to the United Nations report *World's Women 2010*, statistical research has shown that "progress in ensuring the equal status of women and men has been made in many areas, including school enrollment, health, and economic participation. At the same time, it makes clear that much more needs to be done, in particular to close the gender gap."[1] Societies continue to place limitations on individuals' access to work as well as the ability to enjoy certain rights based on their gender. In the twenty-first century, this is a subject of utmost importance that cannot be ignored.

The "gender mainstreaming" model has proven to be an effective tool in reversing the negative trajectory of gender inequality. Unfortunately, the gender mainstreaming concept is often misunderstood or misinterpreted, met with skepticism, or flatly rejected. Despite numerous publications and much academic research, there remains a pervasive need to talk about gender mainstreaming and to examine this issue in greater detail as it pertains to specific fields.

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[1] UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, *The World's Women 2010: Trends and Statistics* (Geneva: United Nations, 2010); available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW2010pub.htm.

This article will focus on one particular dimension of this issue, gender mainstreaming in the field of law enforcement. As a senior law enforcement practitioner, I firmly believe that no modern state administration system can be effective without a gender mainstreaming strategy and action plan.

The Significance of Gender Mainstreaming

The objective of this article is to highlight the impact and positive changes that gender mainstreaming has made in the process of modernizing law enforcement institutions and to present a toolkit for those administrations who are ready to employ a gender mainstreaming program or for those who are in the nascent stages of implementation. Numerous studies have shown that gender equality in the realms of law enforcement and security directly contributes to comprehensive security. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted on 31 October 2000, "reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressed the importance of their equal participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, particularly in decision-making."[2]

As for the direct relationship between law enforcement reform and gender, the authors of the *Toolkit on Police Reform and Gender* summarize the situation thus:

Security threats and crimes are committed against all sections of society; however, police organizations throughout the world continue to be predominantly male with poor representation from certain groups. Policing has traditionally been regarded as 'men's work' because it is associated with crime, danger, and coercion. Recruitment processes … sometimes eliminate female candidates or men that do not have 'correct' masculine attitudes. However, by having a more representative police service—one that reflects the ethnic, religious, geographic, sex, tribal, and language makeup of the community—the credibility, trust and therefore the legitimacy of the service, will grow in the eyes of the public. Increasing the number of female personnel can have concrete operational benefits.[3]

The most remarkable benefits of gender mainstreaming are:

- An improved security situation
- Increased public support of law enforcement activities
- Increased transparency
- The possibility to develop specific capabilities
- Decreased discrimination and increased acceptance of social diversity
- The strengthening of societal acceptance of female role models.

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[2]   See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps. Report of the UN Secretary-General, "Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Activities," 13 February 2003; available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/693589.001893997.html.

[3]   Angela Mackay, Tara Denham, and Christina Yeung, *The Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit* (Geneva: DCAF, 2008).

Definitions

Before any in-depth discussion of gender mainstreaming, it is important to understand the terminology used in the field. In 1997, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) elaborated its definition of "gender mainstreaming." It stated that

> mainstreaming the gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men in any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.[4]

It is imperative to see the difference between some terms commonly used in these discussions. Gender mainstreaming should be incorporated into different aspects of society, such as legislation, general administration, education, and the workplace. Gender mainstreaming includes a strategy and an action plan with a toolkit of various practices to achieve the final goal of gender equality. It clearly recognizes the biological differences between women and men, but does not accept any gender-based differences regarding equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities available to women and men. This is a core element of human rights.

Gender balance, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which men and women hold certain positions. Examining gender balance in certain key areas can reflect how societies or organizations have applied the principles of gender mainstreaming. We can use it as a statistical indicator for the current moment, or take samples backwards in time to describe the dynamic changes in gender balance.

Implementing Gender Mainstreaming at the National and International Levels

A gender mainstreaming strategy and action plan can be observed at two levels. First, we can examine this issue at the level of individual sovereign states through their administration systems. Second, one can examine the implementation of gender mainstreaming within law enforcement, peacekeeping, and crisis management engagements by global or regional organizations. For this article, I will use as examples the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

In December 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women" (CEDAW).[5] Considered to be the "International Bill of Rights" for women, it paved the way for actions on both the international and state levels to battle discrimination. More recently,

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4   United Nations ECOSOC, "Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997," A/52/3, September 1997; available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-3.htm.
5   Full text available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.

the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on "Women and Peace and Security" on 31 October 2000.[6] Resolution 1325 is a fundamental document for all three international organizations listed above. It urges member states to ensure the increased presence of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional, and international institutions, and states that the perspective of gender should be incorporated into peacekeeping operations, recognizing the special needs of women and girls during repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, and post-conflict reconstruction. Further, the resolution encourages member states to implement gender mainstreaming studies into military and police training. Since military and police forces are closely integrated into the system of state administration, gender mainstreaming should be applied to the whole state administration structure.

In 2005, the European Council welcomed a document prepared by the General Secretariat on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Consequently, in 2006, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council adopted a new policy on "Gender Equality and Gender Mainstreaming in Crisis Management."[7]

Regarding the OSCE, it is important to highlight the 2004 OSCE "Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality."[8] The Action Plan contains the priorities concerning gender equality within the OSCE administrative body and for its participating states. It covers the issue of gender equality within the organization, gender mainstreaming in all sectors, and the priority areas of gender equality.

The Need for a Gender Mainstreaming Strategy and Action Plan

There are two important observations to make regarding the current need for a strategy and action plan for gender mainstreaming. The first relates to timing. Gender mainstreaming does not date back only to 2000, but has much deeper roots. The documents mentioned above can be seen as the cumulative result of several developments resulting in the milestone of UNSCR 1325. For the most part, these organizations are now in the advanced implementation phase of gender mainstreaming as a means to achieve gender equality.

The second observation is that the organizations examined here are in direct relationship with their member states, especially regarding the role of the military and law enforcement organizations in peacekeeping operations. These regional and global organizations can adopt the concept of gender mainstreaming for their staff—as they indeed have done—but those organizations can hardly implement gender mainstreaming effi-

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[6] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, S/RES/1325(2000), 31 October 2000; available at www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf.

[7] Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusion on Promoting Gender Equality and Gender Mainstreaming in Crisis Management," 2760th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006; available at www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/?id=5&material=20.

[8] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Ministerial Council, "OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality," MC/DEC/14/04, Sofia, 7 December 2004; available at www.osce.org/odihr/19333.

ciently without direct involvement of and support from their member states. Since these organizations are staffed for the most part by seconded or contracted officers from the member states, it is crucial that the countries that contribute police and/or military contributing assets themselves have embraced the concept of gender mainstreaming. It is clear that those organizations cannot achieve concrete achievements in gender mainstreaming without the active participation of their member states. Even more effort is needed from the member states, most notably in the implementation of a strategy and action plan.

As I have argued, the implementation of a gender mainstreaming strategy should be conducted at the state level. In examining some examples, we will see that the overall picture is mixed. In my research I have found that some states have made no progress in gender mainstreaming; indeed, in some cases, the issue is simply ignored. In reviewing these states' law enforcement strategies or development programs (if such programs exist), there is no mention of a gender mainstreaming strategy or any related issues.

On the opposite end of the spectrum are states such as Spain and Sweden, where gender mainstreaming was long ago recognized as a priority and incorporated into the development programs of their law enforcement institutions. In 1979, the first women entered the Spanish National Police as police officers. After the fall of the Franco regime, the Spanish government wished to change the image of the police as a repressive force to that of a modern police service. As a result, women represented 8.7 percent of Spain's National Police force in 2007.[9] Also in 2007, a high-level panel called the "Observatory on Women" was established. The panel is co-chaired by the Director of Police and Civil Guard, and its aim is to analyze how women can get equal access to services during the admissions process and, further, to facilitate the integration of a woman into these law enforcement agencies.

Also in 1979, Sweden approved its Gender Equality Law, which fostered a policy of non-discrimination in the police force. They established an independent gender ombudsperson position to promote gender mainstreaming nationwide. The Swedish example presents a rich variety of different programs, such as the "National Plan on Diversity" and regular training programs for police management on equality, discrimination, and gender promotion, to name a few. Due to the gender mainstreaming program in the Swedish police, women currently represent more than 25 percent of the police force, including management.[10]

At the state level, the first gender mainstreaming activities in Western Europe date back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. Several remarkable developments have demonstrated some critical different aspects of gender mainstreaming efforts. One of the key elements is equal access afforded to men and women to join law enforcement services as well as equal opportunities for promotion. By using statistical data, we can measure and analyze gender balance at different organizational levels such as executive, low, middle,

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[9] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Strategic Police Matters Unit, Conference on Gender Balance in Police Management Positions, Spain, June 2007.

[10] Ibid.

and upper management. This is only one crucial indicator. The next section will introduce several other indicators that can be used to measure the success of gender mainstreaming programs.

Basic and Special (Advanced) Indicators

The indicators presented in this section are tools that can be used to compare and control our actions against defined goals in the area of gender mainstreaming. I would argue that there is a need to distinguish between basic and special indicators. The basic indicators should be used prior to the implementation of a gender mainstreaming strategy and action plan, while the special indicators are more helpful during the implementation phases. The following basic indicators should be considered to assess the crucial points of the strategy and action plans.

- *Strategy and action plan*. Is there any Gender Mainstreaming strategy or action plan? If there is, at which level does it exist? What are the lessons that have been learned from development and/or implementation? If there is no gender-specific strategy and action plan, what other binding (or non-binding) legal documents exist related to gender issues? Is there any position assigned to this issue, such as a gender mainstreaming expert?

- *Access to law enforcement service*. Is there any gender-based regulation that may limit access (application) to employment with law enforcement agencies? If there are any gender-based criteria addressed during the application process, what are the primary aims and effects? Is it a discriminatory or supporting action? For example, a gender supportive approach might be noted in a vacancy announcement such as, "Preference will be given to equally qualified women candidates."

- *Numbers of men and women within the service*. The most important number to calculate is the general ratio of men to women within a particular agency. However, there are additional areas that should receive study. The ratio can be examined at different working levels, such as executive, lower, middle, and upper management. Another approach would calculate the ratio at Station, Headquarters, and Main Headquarters levels. Or we can view the gender ratio by age group categories, or within different departments. All approaches would present different views, and when combined would give a complete picture of the effectiveness of previous gender mainstreaming efforts. Generally, statistics will show a relatively low number of female officers, that most female officers are concentrated at the executive level, and that only a very few have been promoted up to the top management level.

The following indicators are more specific and less generic, and can be used to measure and analyze the implementation of the strategy and action plan.

- *Education and training*. The whole staff should attend training programs about gender mainstreaming in order to inculcate shared perception of the issue's im-

portance. There are two fundamental points. The subject should be incorporated into the basic training provided to new police employees; in addition, future officers should be thoroughly trained in the subject during their academic program. These officer candidates should understand, accept, and further support gender mainstreaming, since they will be responsible for shaping the culture of the law enforcement agency in the future. It is also vital to achieve a change of attitude at the highest commanding levels; therefore, specially designed training should be given to flag officers.

- *Internal and external gender-sensitive approach*. An internal approach refers to the development of gender-sensitive policies within the service. Examples of this are a paternity/maternity leave policy and the application of non-discriminatory mechanisms for recruitment, promotion, and mentoring. The external approach focuses on the role of the law enforcement service in the broader community context. Security and safety needs vary by community, and also differ for each member of the community depending on factors such as age, gender, and location. Law enforcement service members should understand these differences and be able to apply different approaches. When this is accomplished, the community will come to expect gender-sensitive behavior from their law enforcement services. Additionally, gender-sensitive operational protocols should be implemented when dealing with gender-specific cases such as domestic violence or rape. Additionally, there is a need to implement gender-sensitive outreach capabilities.

- *Gender-specific regulations, codes of conduct, and policies*. All regulatory measures that may block gender mainstreaming should be removed, and regulations promoting gender mainstreaming should be implemented. All internal regulations, including codes of conduct, policies, guidelines, etc. should be reviewed to ensure that they are in alignment with the gender mainstreaming strategy and action plan.

Conclusion

Modern law enforcement models cannot address the current security environment without implementing gender mainstreaming. The motto should be: Think Gender. Due to historical, cultural, and religious factors, law enforcement agencies—as integral parts of their societies—long ignored the importance of gender mainstreaming, and created a working environment characterized by high degrees of gender inequality. Significant changes started during the 1980s and 1990s—changes that are still under way. But progress has been uneven, and some agencies remain essentially unchanged. The global picture is extremely mixed, which is why we should use all means available to promote gender mainstreaming. The first step is to understand that gender-based discrimination is a violation of fundamental human rights. Discrimination due to stereotypes and ignorance is no longer acceptable.

Meaningful change with respect to gender inequality starts by changing the views of leadership, and continues with the creation of a gender mainstreaming strategy and action plan. It requires the commitment of extensive effort and time, as our earlier examples show that even forty years has not been long enough to achieve proper gender balance within law enforcement services. There remains much to do.

This article is meant to highlight the importance of gender mainstreaming for law enforcement agencies and security forces around the world. The aim is not only to present one perspective on gender mainstreaming, but also to highlight some useful indicators for those who wish to promote the subject and for those who are practitioners of it.

China, Russia, and the Foreign Policy of the SCO

Flemming Splidsboel Hansen [*]

Having celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2011, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can be said to have risen rapidly to a position of prominence in the world of regional organizations. Part of the reason for this is found in the successful political marketing of the organization, a process which has seen the member states openly promote their ambition to develop a strong Asian bloc based on both wider and deeper cooperation. As was made clear by the 2001 Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, this ambition includes the development within the organization of a culture of "close cooperation on the most important international and regional problems." [1]

A high level of agreement on aims and modalities among the members of the group—a precondition for close foreign policy cooperation—will indicate that they may more readily form a united policy front and thus find it easier to have an impact on their surrounding environment. Conversely, a low level of agreement will indicate that they will find it relatively difficult to stand together shoulder-to-shoulder and to achieve the ambitions outlined in the Declaration.

Assessing SCO Cohesion

What follows is an assessment of the actual level of foreign policy cohesion within the membership circle. This includes most importantly the six current full members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (the founders in 1996 of the Shanghai Five, the predecessor of the SCO), and Uzbekistan, which joined the SCO at the founding meeting in 2001. [2] To this group I add the original four observer states—Mongolia (which joined in 2004) as well as India, Iran, and Pakistan (all of which joined in 2005)—as these are the most likely candidates for future full membership. [3]

I measure the level of foreign policy cohesion within the SCO by analyzing the voting records of the ten member and observer states in the United Nations General Assembly. The voting record of each state is seen as a proxy for its foreign policy behavior. These types of studies date back to the 1950s, making this a well-tried and oft-used methodology which can help provide us with quantifiable information as we speculate

[1] Shanghai Coooperation Organization, "Deklaratsiya o sozdanii shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestvo," 15 June 2001; available at http://www.sectsco.org/RU/show.asp?id=83.

[2] For an introduction to the Shanghai Five and the SCO, see Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, "The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation," *Asian Affairs* 39:2 (2008): 217–32.

[3] Afghanistan was granted observer status at the June 2012 SCO summit in Beijing; this decision was made after the completion of the present article and the voting record of Afghanistan was therefore not included in the data set.

about the possible changes in the foreign policy of a single state or in the relationship between two or more states.[4]

The Toolbox

The data set used in this analysis is the voting records of the SCO member and observer states, all of which are freely available on the United Nations website.[5] In order to present a fuller picture of the development of foreign policy in these respective states I expand the temporal basis by using data from General Assembly Sessions 47 through 65, beginning in September 1992 and ending in July 2011. This means that I include data reaching back before the establishment of the SCO and even the Shanghai Five. Within this time span, I extracted data from every second session, giving me data from a total of ten different sessions.

The data collection methodology was based on three basic principles.[6] First, I only used votes on resolutions *passed* (thereby excluding resolutions that were rejected as well as parts of resolutions). Second, from this data set I included only roll call (recorded) votes. These two principles combined result in a pool of more than 700 recorded votes. These votes form the basis for the following analysis. The third and final principle is to treat absenteeism as abstention. On each of the more than 700 votes, the SCO member or observer states had the choice of voting "Yes" or "No," or abstaining. A fourth option, however, is to simply choose to be absent—that is, not take part in the voting altogether.

Faced with the challenge of absenteeism, some researchers simply throw out all cases with less than full participation by all the objects of analysis.[7] However, as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all had high levels of absenteeism in several sessions, this clearly would not work in this study. Such an approach would leave a much-reduced pool of votes, and these remaining votes would, moreover, be unevenly scattered across various sessions, making the final result a highly skewed set of findings without much validity.

What I do instead is to treat absenteeism as abstention, thus assigning a "middle" position to the state. The basic assumption behind this principle is that the country is regarded as not knowing how to vote – "it is 'in-between' a pro and a contra vote."[8] However, if a member state was absent for more than one-third of all recorded votes during a

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4   Steven Holloway, "Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 23:2 (1990): 279–96; and Erik Voeten, "Clashes in the Assembly," *International Organization* 54:2 (2000): 185–215.

5   At http://unbisnet.un.org.

6   See Paul Luif, "EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly," Institute for Strategic Studies Occasional Papers 49 (2003): 22–23; and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "The Voting Practice of the Fifteen in the UN General Assembly: Convergence and Divergence," Observatori de Politica Exterior Europea Working Paper 54 (2004).

7   Johansson-Nogués, "The Voting Practice."

8   Luif, "EU Cohesion."

Figure 1: The Overall Pattern of Cohesion.

single session, data for this particular state were not included in the data set for the year in question.

This rule applies to three different member states and to five different sessions. Tajikistan has shown remarkably poor voting discipline in the General Assembly; voting data for the country are excluded from Sessions 47 and 51–57. Data for Uzbekistan are excluded from Sessions 47 and 55–57, and for Kyrgyzstan from Sessions 47 and 57.

The Overall Pattern

I began by looking at the overall voting pattern of the SCO as a whole. This was done by classifying the data into three categories according to the distance between the states on the spectrum "Yes–Abstention–No." The first category is that of unanimous votes on which there was full agreement. The second category contains votes that featured a two-way split (or partial disagreement) where at least one state abstained while the others voted either "Yes" or "No" (but not both). The third group consists of votes that were split three ways (or full disagreement), where at least one state voted "Yes" while at least one other state voted "No."[9] Figure 1 shows the result (X axis = session; Y axis = percentage of total number of recorded votes).

The chart reflects, first, that the share of unanimous votes saw dramatic variations in the years from 1992 to 2011, and that the picture is indeed a rather complex one. This is partly as a result of absenteeism, which unfortunately colors the findings. When viewed as a whole, this time period witnessed a 13 percentage point increase in the share of unanimous votes (from 28 percent in Session 47 to 41 percent in the Session 65). There is little doubt that this figure would have been higher had Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan not all been excluded from the data set for Session 47 as a result of extreme absenteeism. All moderate outliers at the time, their votes undoubtedly would have re-

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[9]   Johansson-Nogués, "The Voting Practice," 4.

duced the level of unanimity during this first session, and thus provided a bigger overall increase in the share of unanimous votes across the ten sessions.

When examining only Sessions 57–65 more closely—that is, the years 2002–2011—we find that the share of unanimous votes actually decreased by 8 percentage points. As will be demonstrated below, Uzbekistan developed a foreign policy that made it a very strong outlier in the group in the late 1990s. If Uzbekistan's votes had been included in the data set for Session 57, this one country's actions alone would have caused the share of unanimous votes to fall to 14 percent (from 49 percent) and the share of two-way splits to increase to 78 percent (instead of 42 percent). The figures for Session 55 would have been 12 and 75 percent, respectively, instead of 43 percent and 43 percent. It should, however, be made clear that these figures are surrounded by a very high degree of uncertainty, as a large percentage of the Uzbek votes currently included were absentee votes (which are treated here as abstentions).

However, given the earlier record of Uzbek voting, there is good reason to speculate that the country would in fact have continued (although possibly with some moderation) the strong independence that so characterized its foreign policy in the years preceding its decision to enter the SCO in 2001 (see Table 1). Not only would this have delayed the increase in the share of unanimous votes, it would also have "flattened" it, thereby giving the SCO more credit as a homogenizing agent. Thus, we should expect that if the Uzbek votes were included in the data set for Session 57, the overall picture would show that the SCO member and observer states had actually *increased*—not decreased—their number of unanimous votes in the years 2002–2011.

These speculations aside, Sessions 59–65, which include data from all ten states, show an average share of unanimous votes of 44 percent (within a range of 34 to 58 percent). By comparison, the EU has consistently recorded a share of unanimous votes of well over 75 percent – and this with a much larger group of member states.[10] Little in the post–2001 pattern seems to suggest that the SCO will be able to reach a similar level of unanimity in its second decade, whether through socialization or instrumental vote-casting, where typically the less powerful states follow the lead of the more powerful ones in order to gain benefits or avoid punishments.

What these data also indicate are different levels of disagreement. The share of two-way splits has varied almost inversely with the share of unanimous votes, and has been affected by the problem of absenteeism in a similar way. This type of disagreement (as opposed to full disagreement) indicates that a given state has a policy preference that is only slightly at odds with that of the majority on a given issue. The voting record also suggests, however, that less powerful states may be reluctant to oppose more powerful ones directly in three-way splits. It is interesting to note how Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia—all relatively weak in terms of their capabilities—have a pattern in their ration of votes in two-way and three-way splits that seems disproportionately tilted towards the former. Highly dependent on their partners in the SCO, these states may have drawn the conclusion that their dissent was best expressed in moderation.

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[10] Ibid., 6; and Luif, "EU Cohesion," 28.

Table 1: The Distance of Member and Observer States from the SCO Mean.

	47	49	51	53	55	57	59	61	63	65
CHI	5	5	3	7	3	3	3	2	5	3
IND	4	11	11	13	6	8	8	8	9	8
IRN	3	11	9	9	3	5	5	5	7	6
KAZ	17	7	13	7	11	12	3	5	4	3
KYR	n/a	11	15	10	7	n/a	5	4	2	11
MON	6	2	6	7	5	11	6	9	8	4
PAK	3	2	3	7	4	4	4	5	5	5
RUS	26	20	20	13	8	12	8	6	9	10
TAJ	n/a	15	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	8	7	3	7
UZB	n/a	9	26	28	n/a	n/a	16	9	3	5

The level of full disagreement among the member and observer states has been relatively low. While reaching highs of 18 and 24 percent in Sessions 49 and 51, respectively, in general it has remained relatively close to the 10 percent mark. This general pattern means that the member and observer states have held directly opposing views on approximately only every tenth vote. These three-way splits have mainly been produced by India and Russia, both of which held minority positions in three-way splits far more often than the other states. While India did so quite consistently across the period in question, Russia mainly voted in the minority in three-way splits during the 1990s. Following a policy change dictated by Russian President Vladimir Putin early in the 2000s, it moved closer to the mean, and since then has caused fewer three-way splits. The full disagreements have primarily been provoked by votes on security issues (especially nuclear proliferation and disarmament) and, earlier, on human rights, where Russia often voted in complete isolation from the other states in the group to condemn alleged human rights violators, including even Iran.

The SCO Mean

The voting patterns presented in Figure 1 only inform us about the SCO as a whole; they do not tell us anything about the behavior of individual states. We may find information on this instead by looking at the SCO mean or "average" voting record and calculating each state's distance from this figure. I arrived at this value by identifying all *absolute* majorities among the SCO member and observer states included in the data set for the various sessions and then assigning values to each state based on their distance from this majority. The standard absolute majority will be 50 percent *plus* one—that is, six states. However, since a number of states have been excluded from a number of sessions be-

cause of absenteeism, the absolute majority will vary; in Sessions 47 and 57 it is only four, while in Sessions 51–55 it is five.

If a state forms part of an absolute majority, it receives a score of 0; if it votes against the absolute majority in a two-way split (partial disagreement), it receives a score of 1/2; and if it votes against the absolute majority in a three-way split (full disagreement), it receives a score of 1. The combined total is then presented as a share (in percentage terms) of the total number of recorded votes in a given session. The results are presented in Table 1 (0 = minimum distance; 100 = maximum distance).

The figures show an overall convergence on the mean, regardless of whether this is measured as the maximum outlier position (from 26 percent in Session 47 to 11 percent in Session 65) or as an average distance (from 9.1 percent in Session 47 to 6.2 per cent in Session 65). When viewed in isolation, Sessions 59–65 point in the same direction, although the development is less clear. There was a slight divergence in the years 2009–2011, but no firm conclusions can be drawn on this weak temporal basis.

We see that China clearly is closer to the mean voting behavior than any other SCO member or observer state. In seven of the ten sessions the country had the shortest distance to the mean, and with an average distance score of only 3.9, its positions epitomize the "SCO foreign policy line." It is followed by Pakistan and Iran (with average distance scores of 4.2 and 6.3, respectively).

A leading member of what Eric Voeten has called "the counterhegemonic group" in world politics, China has led the overall coalescence of opinion within the SCO in this same anti-Western direction.[11] This policy rejects the alleged universality of the democratic and human rights agenda of the West and instead insists that traditional state sovereignty be respected and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations be observed.[12] Featuring a maximum distance score of 7 during the period examined here (and in the twenty-first century scoring no higher than 5), a picture emerges of a country that has largely stayed where it decided to stand, observing from this position how the other member and observer states in general have moved still closer toward it.

This analysis also reveals that Russia has been a strong outlier. In four of the ten sessions the country had the greatest distance from the mean voting position. With an average distance score in the ten sessions of a full 13.2, Russia trails only the quite unpredictable Uzbekistan. As seen in Table 1, the voting record of the latter has been very dramatic—going from high levels of dissent to high levels of conformity—giving it an average distance score of 13.7 over seven sessions. A relatively distant third, India has an average distance score of 8.6. When looking at Sessions 59–65 in isolation, we find that with average distance scores of 8.3 these three same states tie each other for the position as the leading outlier from the mean SCO position.

As seen in Table 1, Russia has only gradually gravitated toward a more consensual position. It is important to add that this move toward the mean was caused by the change

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[11]   Voeten, "Clashes in the Assembly," 213.

[12]   Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?," *International Security* 27:4 (2003): 5–56.

in Russian policy mentioned above, rather than by a process through which the other states gradually and increasingly voted *with* Russia.[13] Following this re-definition by Putin of Russia's view on what is right and wrong in the world, the country has kept the frequency of its dissent from the SCO mean in the range of 8–12 percent.

The changes in policy in Russia and Uzbekistan, the two early outliers, may of course be rolled back at some future point, but it does seem that both countries have defined more stable policy preferences in more recent years. In Russia they reflect the ideas of so-called sovereign democracy, which is the ideological basis of both the domestic and international outlook introduced by Putin.[14] In Uzbekistan they are tied to an even more fundamental question – that of the survival of the regime led by president Islam Karimov.[15] As long as the Uzbek regime feels threatened by pressure from the West to expand democratic freedoms and improve its record on human rights, we should expect it to follow quite loyally the lead of its more powerful allies in the SCO.

Perspectives

The foreign policy record of the SCO is mixed. On the one hand, it is clear that overall the member and observer states have been voting in increasingly similar ways since 1992, when the post-Soviet member states were all admitted to the UN. This development may also be observed in Sessions 59–65, for which data for all ten states exist, although it is clearly slower and less unidirectional here. The data do not tell us whether the convergence has been caused mainly by socialization or by instrumentality, or when and how this has happened. More detailed studies of the individual states are required before we may say anything conclusively about this shift.

As voting patterns become increasingly similar, the risk for an individual state of committing itself to closer cooperation is reduced; it is simply less likely to find itself in a vulnerable outlier position or to be forced to compromise on important policy preferences. Continued convergence in this way suggests, all things being equal, that the SCO will find it still easier to widen and deepen its foreign policy cooperation and even to allow observer states to join the group of full members.

On the other hand, the slowing down of the process of convergence indicates that the member and observer states have reached a line that at least some of them will be reluctant to cross. What remains is likely to be a mixed pool of core preferences—for instance, on human rights, nuclear development, or weapons technology—which various constellations of states will continue to observe. The stability of the number of three-way splits in the 2000s points toward this same conclusion.

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[13] Aleksandr Chubaryan, "Osnovnye etapy vneshnei politiki Rossii," in *Desyat let vneshnei politiki Rossii*, ed. Anatoly Torkunov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 26–32.

[14] Various contributions in Leonid Polyakov, ed., *Pro suverennuyu demokratiyu* (Moscow: Evropa, 2007).

[15] Matteo Fumagalli, "Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan's Rapprochement with Russia," *International Political Science Review* 28:3 (2007): 256–57.

To this should be added the important fact that Russia remains a leading outlier. The policy convergence is a Chinese-led process, and it seems safe to assume that Beijing is more satisfied with this development than is Moscow. The lively public debate in Russia reveals growing concerns that the country is losing power relative to China – and that it is losing influence in post-Soviet Central Asia.[16] The convergence discussed above, which sees the latter area tilting slowly towards China, may cause Russian policy makers to hesitate before committing to closer cooperation or to future SCO enlargement. What is good for China—and perhaps even for the rest of the SCO—is of course not necessarily good for Russia.

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[16] For a discussion, see Aleksandr Lukin, "Tsena vopros," *Kommersant* (17 June 2011); available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1660857.